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SCIENTIFIC EVENT

EDITOR'S NOTE

The fourth edition of Strategic Impact journal, volume 89/2023, comprises four articles where the authors disseminate their research findings in terms of political-military affairs, strategies and actions in the field of NATO and EU, trends and perspectives in geopolitics and geostrategy, as well as the information society, to which is added ***Book Review*** and ***Scientific Event*** rubrics.

Political-Military Topicality. Petru MIHALCEA, PhD Student, in his research *Is the Contemporary Russia-Ukraine Conflict "Conventional"?* attempts to reveal the extent to which the Russian-Ukrainian conflict can be classified as conventional since both sides have been using a long range of elements of unconventional war. The paper also emphasizes that the conflict cannot be classified fully conventional or unconventional as the actors use both elements to reach their military and political objectives.

NATO and EU: Policies, Strategies, Actions. As the UN, NATO and the EU have proven that building resilience is a good solution to increase the security level of organizations, the second article, *Romanian Resilience from the Perspective of Security Sectors in a Globalized World*, written by our colleague, Scientific Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, PhD, presents a few resilience indicators and practices at the level of national security of Romania, with an emphasis on the security sectors through the lenses of the methodological framework of Copenhagen School.

Geopolitics and Geostrategy: Trends and Perspectives. Diana-Cristiana LUPU, PhD, in the 3rd article *Multilateralism – Past, Present and Possible Futures,* examines the current perception of the foundations of global cooperation stability, considering the high level of interconnectedness as well as the complexity of the crises our world is currently facing. There are presented some of the challenges to the multilateral system focusing on the UN, an inclusive multilateral institution, and the EU, a regional one, and mentioning also Romania's position in this context.

Information Society. The following article *Threat Actors Seeking to Exploit AI Capabilities. Types and Their Goals*, signed by Petru KOVACI, PhD Candidate, talks about a world where cybercriminals are interested in making profit, terrorist groups cause ideological violence and nation-states target geopolitical influence, and they are increasingly interested in developing AI-driven cyber warfare capabilities for either attacking their enemies or enhancing their defence measures against such attacks. Thus, it has become crucial for organizations and individuals to understand

how AI affects cybersecurity and adapt their strategies accordingly. Traditional defences must be supplemented with AI-powered tools and techniques to stay ahead of the curve, while security experts must continually update their skills and expertise to cope with the changing threat landscape.

In the **Book Review** rubric, we bring to the public's attention a review essay, signed by Researcher Mihai-Vladimir ZODIAN, PhD, called *Nuclear proliferation, strategies, and Romania's case*, where the author speaks about the book *Seeking the bomb* that stresses the significance of nuclear proliferation and the fact that the issue is still important, and the salience may even grow, since the arms control and disarmament security regime weakened after Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Thus, the author believes that we may face an even greater impact in the future than the one expected at the time the book was written.

The edition also includes the **Scientific Event** section, that presents aspects of interest from the workshop on the Phase II of the Project entitled *The impact of climate change on Romania's national security*, held on 26 October 2023.

Also, this edition includes the **Guide for authors**, a mandatory reading for those who wish to disseminate the research results in our journal.

For those discovering *Strategic Impact* for the first time, the publication is an open-access peer reviewed journal, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies and published with the support of "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, and, also, a prestigious scientific journal in the field of military sciences, information and public order, according to the National Council for Titles, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

Strategic Impact is an academic publication in the field of strategic defence and security studies journal that has been published since 2000 in Romanian, and since 2005 in English, in print and online. Starting with January 2023, the journal is published in English exclusively. The articles are checked for plagiarism and scientifically evaluated (double blind peer review method). The thematic areas include political science, international relations, geopolitics, the political-military sphere, international organizations – with a focus on NATO and the EU information society, cyber security, intelligence studies and military history. Readers will find in the pages of the publication strategic-level analyses, syntheses and evaluations, views that explore the impact of national, regional and global dynamics.

In terms of international visibility −the primary objective of the publication − the recognition of the scientific quality of the journal is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), Index Copernicus (Poland), ProQuest (USA), and WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, as well as its presence in the virtual catalogues of the libraries of prestigious institutions abroad, such as NATO and military universities in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia etc.

The journal is distributed free of charge in main institutions in the field of security and defence, in the academia and abroad – in Europe, Asia and America.

In the end, we encourage those interested in publishing in our journal to rigorously survey and assess the dynamics of the security environment and, at the same time, we invite students, master students and doctoral candidates to submit articles for publication in the monthly supplement of the journal, *Strategic Colloquium*, available on the Internet at http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/cs.htm, indexed in the international database CEEOL, Google scholar and ROAD ISSN.

Editor-in-Chief, Colonel Florian CÎRCIUMARU, PhD
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

IS THE CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT "CONVENTIONAL"?

Petru MIHALCEA

One of the biggest European conflagrations after the World War II constitutes Russian's unprovoked attack on Ukraine which begun in 2014 and evolved in a full scale war in February 2022. Despite the fact that it represents an armed conflict between two actors, it is difficult to classify it as pure conventional or unconventional war. The main goal of the paper is to reveal the extent to which conflict can be classified as conventional since both sides have been using a long range of elements of unconventional war. Using the historical and analytical method, the paper emphasizes that the conflict cannot be classified fully conventional or unconventional as the actors use a mixture of both to reach their military and political objectives. The scope of our paper limits the research to the Russian military interventions unfolding during the last two decades.

Keywords: *Russia; Ukraine; unconventional war; security; military power.*

Introduction

The 21st century started with a controversial event that shook the entire world. The 9/11 attacks on the world hegemon raise a question mark on whether the upcoming wars will be conventional. In his book "On war", Clausewitz emphasized the unstable character of war stating that "War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case" (Howard and Paret 1976). The following aggression of Russia in Georgia, in 2008, and in Ukraine in 2014 ingrained a new typology of war among scholars – the hybrid warfare. Acting aggressively to annex Crimea, Russia changed the Western military mindset. In the quest for its previous

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status as a great power and in combination with its imperialistic aspirations, Russia sought a different confrontation with the West. With a weak economy and a military instrument in reformation, Russia could not afford a direct military confrontation with a more powerful adversary. As a result, its military strategies during the last decades to maintain its control over the ex-Soviet countries resemble a combination of conventional and unconventional activities (Boston and Massicot 2017). Such move was necessary to surpass or prevent overreaction from the international community.

Conversely, Russia's recourse to unconventional activities in the regions where the denial of their presence proved less economic and political risk increased. Intervention in Syria in 2015 highlights its commitment toward an international assertion of the great power. Yet, to limit domestic stress, Russia started using the Wagner Group for some illicit missions as control of oil fields. The 2018 failed operation against US troops and denial of the presence of the Russian military is a clear example of the Russian use of irregular units to achieve its political ends, lowering political risk (Hauer 2019). The presence of the Wagner Group in Eastern Ukraine and the way Crimea annexation occurred strengthen the claim that Russia is willing to resort to unconventional methods. "Blurring" the threshold between legal and illegal, between war and peace, Russia seeks to limit a possible overreaction from the international audience.

The present paper highlights that the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine tends to be more conventional than unconventional. In this respect, we will highlight that Russia resorted more to unconventional methods to initiate the conflict in 2014 and made it successful in Crimea but failed in Eastern Ukraine. Secondly, we will emphasize that in the ongoing operations in Ukraine the means and ways used by Russia and Ukraine to achieve their end states are more conventional.

1. The Trends in the Russia-Ukraine War

The post-Cold War period of a relatively warm relationship between the West and Russia ended when Russia suddenly annexed Crimea. Understanding Russia's way of conducting military operations explained by General Gerasimov as New Type War (NTW) was complicated in the West because of its emphasis on non-military rather than military tools and many scholars tried to identify it as something new (Gerasimov 2013). This might explain what Russia implements nowadays on the battle field adding its commitment toward a strong military standing force.

Chekinov and Bogdanov defined the Russian approach as "New Generation Warfare," suggesting a focus on more conventional war using long-range weapons to strike adversaries in the entire strategic deep. However, they abandoned the idea and switched toward a mixture of conventional and unconventional, emphasizing the use of "mislead or bribe opponents, to conduct sabotage operations, and to utilize

cunning and indirect actions to surprise adversaries," which proved successful in Crimea (Chekinov and Bogdanov 2012). Bērziņš made the same observation in his report that Russia's view of developing military capability will switch from direct destruction of the enemy toward indirect influence. He coined it as new generation warfare, emphasizing "the idea that the successful use of force results in legitimacy" (Bērziņš 2014).

However, NATO found that Russian New Generation Warfare has different techniques and tactics than asymmetric warfare due to the gradation on which it is managed. According to Palmer, "Russia seeks to accomplish politically significant results with, if feasible, no or only a limited use of force, while being prepared to strike militarily, with devastating effect at the operational level, if required" (D. Palmer 2015). On the other hand, Thomas explained it being an arrangement of strategic opportunity and need implemented in an appropriate situation interrelated to societal instability and vulnerabilities (Thomas 2016). Such construct allows them to reach political objectives by using mainly non-military means to avoid implementation of deadly force.

The new approach to conducting military operations took a distinctive form, and many argued that the 2013 Gerasimov article preempted the emergence of such change in Russia's way of conducting wars. Russian military strategists provided a different perspective to comprehend Russia's vision on modern warfare, which they referred to as a "new style of conflict". Instead of the phrase used by Chekinov and Bogdanov, General Gerasimov used NTW to describe how their foe intended to wage future conflicts (Thomas 2016). Additionally, Thomas suggested that Gerasimov and other Russian military officials rejected the use of the term hybrid tactics in military affairs, claiming that this is a Western strategy for waging contemporary conflicts (Thomas 2016). Gerasimov argued for the non-military aspect of the war, indicating a ratio of 4:1 which speaks in favor of unconventional warfare (Gerasimov 2013).

Despite the numerous explanations of the Russian type of warfare, all have a standard feature and are focused on unconventional activities to shape the environment for victory. Russia's seizure of Crimea reflects Sun Tzu's insight that the "highest excellence" in the war was not in winning every battle but in subduing the enemy's force (Tzu 2008). The same idea conveyed Bērziņš who considered that Russian non-military tools as the "psychological warfare, intimidation, bribery, and internet/media propaganda" overcame the resistance of Ukrainian military units in the Crimea peninsula, and allowed Russia to avoid the use of firepower (Bērziņš 2014). Such victory was possible due to several factors that Russia facilitated before the operation and such a perspective can face some countries from the Russian border as they are perceived as Russian zone of strategic interest.

Furthermore, Russia's unconventional approach proved very successful in Crimea as it surprised a conventional, unprepared and less experienced adversary.

Its covert use of military power in support of its proxies in Donbas still highlighted its proneness toward unconventional methods. Using a column to transport the humanitarian aid in order to supply its units and separatist formations in Donbas emphasizes an excellent example of their approach toward war (Buel and Joselow 2014). Moreover, constant shelling across the border and the "loss of orientation and sudden appearance in Donbas" of airborne troops captured by Ukrainian forces sustain its denial of conflict involvement. The downing of the MH flight over Eastern Ukraine proves that Russia played unconventionally during the conflict. However, its results proved less successful in Donbas when converting toward traditional actions even though it achieved a temporary political goal – stopping NATO's advance.

On the other hand, such a scenario applied in Eastern Ukraine before the full scale invasion had little success as the Ukrainian government could organize state resistance, forcing Russia toward a more conventional intervention that balanced the power. However, Russia denied its presence in the region, acting through local separatist movements and paramilitary organizations, trying to maintain the deniability of government intervention. Unconventional warfare, according to Joint Publication 3-05, constitutes the "Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area" (Staff 2014). Thus, despite its military might, Russia preferred to act covertly and smoothly to achieve its political goals rather than use the bulk of the army as it might consider them less developed and capable than their Western counterpart, however, never admitted it openly (Renz 2016). Moreover, its activities in Eastern Ukraine emphasized its tendency to act unconventionally as it proved harder for the Western adversary to react appropriately. Even if the West viewed the Donbas operation as a failure, Russia succeeded in preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and advancing towards the EU integration. The unrecognized secessionist territories from Eastern Ukraine (and others from the former Soviet space: Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia) are a perfect tool for Russian external policy in Eastern Europe, maintaining its influence in its neighborhood. These results, in addition to the complete control over Crimea, highlight that the adapted combination of conventional and unconventional methods of warfare and means may prove successful. However, the use of Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG), which proved very viable on the battlefield, still highlights the necessity of Mao's view on the third stage of the protracted war – the war of position – to seize and retain the territory (Tse-Tung 1967). Although Russia's way of war is prone to Clausewitz approach of massing military power toward an adversary, the initial attack on the Crimea and subsequent aggression on Eastern Ukraine highlight an incline toward Sun Tzu's approach (Tzu 2008).

POLITICAL-MILITARY TOPICALITY

Moreover, we can sustain that Mao's approach could also succeed if Russia maintained its superiority over the information space of Ukraine. By doing so, it could "gain the hearts and minds" of the Russian-speaking population, which overwhelms the Ukrainian-speaking in South - Eastern regions, and realize the "Novorossiya" project as smoothly as they annexed Crimea. Russia encouraged separatists using its intelligence services and provocateurs even before 2014 attack and provided indirect support through third-party Russian organizations in terms of arms and funding to deny its intervention (Kofman, et al. 2017).

However, the switch toward conventional operation through proxies in Donbas and more support from regular units allowed Ukraine to take the initiative in the information space by portraying Russia as an invader. Moreover, Ukraine gained full support from the international community, which was absent during the Crimea annexation and immediately after it. Thus, Russia's unconventional actions lost its primacy as it integrated its proxies from Donbas into regular units that conducted conventional operations alongside Russian troops deployed in the region. Consequently, the 2022 full-scale invasion had no other choice than a conventional one as Putin sought the seizure of the entire Ukraine by rapidly using an overwhelming force as a modern implementation of Clausewitz concept. However, Ukraine's approach toward conventional operations adjusted, giving them an advantage over the operational battle space. Ukraine started to attack Russia's line of supply that could not sustain its massive bulk of forces. Such an example is Russia's 40-mile armored column bogged down on the march toward Kyiv (Ellyatt 2022). Ukraine's strategy sought to strike the weak points in the Russian military structure that enabled small Ukrainian forces to circumvent the power of a direct attack. Ukraine's approach revealed the experience of Napoleon's march on Moscow when Russian generals applied the same method: retreat and harass – attack the enemy strategy. Ukraine proved that an unconventional approach, although used by the conventional military, achieved its goal – stop advance and force the adversary to play on the defenders' condition. Moreover, Ukraine was able to reverse the situation in the battle space through an astute application of drone technology by inflicting many losses in manpower and equipment.

Thus, trying to employ conventional forces in the first phase of the conflict, Ukraine encountered an almost disastrous defeat coalesced with many casualties. Ukraine's army, trained and equipped in an old Soviet-style, could not resist Russia's bulk of experienced forces. Moreover, its limited combat-ready troops led by Russophone leadership could affect their initial effectiveness (Kofman, et al. 2017). Overwhelmed in the information space and having disrupted lines of communication, Ukraine's army needed help in coordinating its response in Crimea. To reveal the true face of Russian action in Donbass and to gain the time for preparation, Ukraine formatted its actions as operation combating terrorism. Highlighting the

internal character of the problem and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the lead, Ukraine could have shadowed Russia and kept its possible use of full military strength that bought it valuable time. While preparing the army and economy for a more conventional approach, Ukraine still used unconventional methods to fight the Russian threats. Partisan attacks behind the enemy lines and targeted killing of specific persons gave to Ukrainian actions an unconventional approach (Peter and Ivshina 2023).

2. More Conventional is Effective or Vice Versa?

As discussed previously, the first phase of Russian aggression in Ukraine proved more unconventional than conventional. Such an approach gave Russia a considerable advantage both on the international stage and internally. Moreover, it proved successful on the battlefield as it could achieve its goals with the minimum use of military force. Oppositely, Ukraine's conventional approach proved ineffective as it could not cope with the increasing threat in Donbas, as Russia displayed the tendency to intervene with traditional forces when necessary to prevent the defeat of its proxies (Menkiszak, Sadowski and Żochowski 2014). Its pure conventional intervention encountered many casualties and loss of territory, as seen after the Ilovaisk and Debal'tseve battles (Menkiszak, Sadowski and Żochowski 2014) as it sought "a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. It typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) against each other in all physical domains" (Staff, JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 2017). Their inability to combat Russian BTG's which relied mainly on great fight power resulted in "extensive restructuring, reform, and modernization efforts" in the Ukrainian army (Akimenko 2018). Such improvements reduced separatist efficiency to a buffer and screening force that separated Russian regulars from Ukrainian troops (Holcomb 2017).

After 2015, Ukraine reformed its Armed Forces denying Russia's ability to use unconventional methods on Ukraine's controlled territory. Ukraine increased its irregular activities on lost parts of its territory, allowing it to shape the future environment. Russia's emphasis on conventional forces was ineffective because they underestimated Ukraine's capacity for resistance. Moreover, Ukraine's primacy over the information space gave priority and resolve toward gaining Western support to Russia's detriment. Russia continued to focus on conventional activities, decreasing the unconventional, which resulted in a stalemate after September 2022.

Russia resumed its aggression against Ukraine based on its conventional forces by simply looking to seize the country and force regime change. Bettina Renz explains such behavior from the point that nations perceive powerful traditional forces as an attribute of a strong state that gives them more credibility on the international stage

(Renz 2016). Thus, Russia's resort toward more conventional than unconventional stands for its quest for international recognition as a great power but not from the point of just retaining control over Ukraine (Neumann 2008). Moreover, Russia needed to prove that its military returned to its Cold War period greatness and, as in Georgia, it could conduct full-scale expeditionary operations.

However, as in Syria, in Ukraine, its conventional forces acted alongside mercenaries. Denied in the beginning, it proved necessary as conventional forces encountered defeats on the battlefield. Moreover, "Kadirovtsev" could be perceived as an application of unconventional methods to inflict stress on Ukrainian soldiers. Furthermore, the recent statement of the Ukrainian president that Russia seeks to attack Moldova covertly and overthrow the legitimate government stands for Russia's return toward unconventional methods due to the unsuccessful operation in Ukraine (Reynolds 2022). One of the goals sought to be achieved through the Ukraine campaign was to create a land corridor to Transnistria, where Russia has deployed a contingent as peacekeeping forces and the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF), currently guarding the Cobasna ammunition depot (Solovyov 2022). Conversely, the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies assessment that Russia focuses on "conduct strikes on targets throughout its adversary's operational depth with long-range precision fires" still emphasizes the conventional overmatch of its operations (Zabrodskyi, et al. 2022). Thus, in spite of using mercenaries and subversive actions across Ukraine it still maintains a low level of unconventional activities.

On the other hand, during the 2022 conflict, Russia continuously emphasized the imminent use of nuclear power as a deterrent against Western involvement and support to Ukraine. Although it was a prerequisite of the Russian military standpoint during and after the Cold War, it became more prominent during the Ukraine aggression. Unlike the initial attack in February 2022, Ukraine also focuses on more conventional actions to increase its military capability to resume its counter-offensive operation. Its goal was to regain territorial control over the lost areas, and such success could be acquired through Mao's war of position, while maintaining strikes on enemy supply lines. The continuous military and economic support boosted Ukraine's capabilities, which allowed it to stabilize the front and create preconditions for a counter-offensive, in summer 2023. Therefore, all these activities highlight a more conventional effort of war from both sides to control the territory.

Conclusion

The 21st century started with a new threat for international security emphasized by the 9/11 attack on the US. The afterward wars against Iraq and Afghanistan brought to light an increased emergence of unconventional wars. However, Russia continued to build its conventional forces but focused more on an unconventional approach

toward its Global Power Competition with the West, avoiding an overreaction from US/NATO side. Thus, the 2008 attack on Georgia highlighted its commitment to combining conventional and unconventional methods to achieve its political goals. Its successful implementation against Georgia constituted the premises for 2014 Crimea annexation and aggression against Ukraine in Donbas. Ukraine crises emphasized a more unconventional approach toward war, thus maintaining a clear presence of military power to boost its quest to reassert its status as a great power. Russia's commitment to unconventional more than conventional proved successful as it prevented a coherent response from the Western side.

However, the focus on unconventional methods could not bring the necessary result, as it did not stop Ukraine from progressing to Western integration. Consequently, a more robust response under conventional attack was considered by the Russian leadership. Although Russian military strength overmatched Ukrainian, it could not succeed in achieving its objectives. Russia's unsuccessful results owe to the unconventional approach taken by Ukraine. Ukraine chose to attack Russia's strategy by cutting its overstretched lines of communication and "shaping" international and domestic information space. Moreover, Ukraine's effort to gain the international community's support isolated Russia and burdened its economy.

To sum up, the Russia-Ukraine war cannot be described as purely conventional or unconventional, as both actors implemented extensive methods to reach their objectives. Therefore, it must be seen as a typical confrontation between two regional powers with the application of combinations of conventional and unconventional methods according to operational and strategic needs. It cannot be entirely depicted as conventional or unconventional, as different stages of the conflict highlight more or less such features.

Despite Russian inclination to develop a conventional military force and continuous use of military to threaten its neighbors for the near future it will tend to use more unconventional methods as its capabilities are degraded in the current war in Ukraine. Having a damaged economy and being politically isolated, Russia will not be able to restore its depleted military force and will try to cover the gaps with its nuclear umbrella. Moreover, China's rise as global power tends to conduct dialogue with Russia from a position of strength which was not before a norm. Such situation can raise new risks and challenges for the regional and international security that might conduct to new escalations in Central Asia and Eastern Europe normally seen as Russia's particular zone of strategic interest.

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ROMANIAN RESILIENCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY SECTORS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

Mirela ATANASIU, PhD*

States are constantly in search of security, but the current multiple globalized crises (sanitary, economic, societal, but also political) overlapping in an international context already affected by hybrid threats and military aggressions does not facilitate the pursuit to achieve this goal. UN, NATO and the EU have proven that building resilience is a good solution to increase the security level of organizations. Therefore, also states' security policies have gradually become more focused to provide resilience to its subsequent sectors and dimensions.

In this study, there will be presented a few resilience indicators and practices at the level of national security of Romania, with an emphasis on the security sectors through the lenses of the methodological framework of Copenhagen School.

Keywords: *national resilience; security sectors; globalization; resilience factor; vulnerability.*

Preliminary considerations

The international environment has transformed in terms of dynamics, complexity and interconnectivity in all aspects of security sectors (political, economic, societal, military, and environmental), phenomena reflected in the multiplication of difficult challenges for people, organizations and societies, usually trespassing the borders of the sovereign states.

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These changes in the international security environment were majorly triggered by the characteristics of globalization (free movement of people, merchandises and services on the global market; intention to create an overarching set of values, thinking and behaviour models; reconfiguration of the state's role who must cooperate with non-state actors; dominant tendency of security regionalization reflected in the proficiency of regional security organizations and the pre-eminence of some transnational threats – pandemics, natural disasters, crime, terrorism, overflow migration, etc.), each of them reflecting a security dimension (economic, cultural, political and military) (Duțu 2010, 16). But globalization itself increased dynamic with the rapid development and wide spreading of high technologies and trade global expansion, and therefore interdependencies are growing in all security and insecurity aspects. Thus, "while these developments create real possibilities to achieve economic prosperity, spread political freedom, and promote peace, yet they are also producing powerful forces of social fragmentation, creating critical vulnerabilities, and sowing the seeds of violence and conflict" (Davis 2003, 1). Therefore, the need for security incentives has increased.

Resilience has emerged as a strategy of states and organizations to develop and maintain security, which must demonstrate not only the ability to manage the vulnerabilities and to counter the new types of threats, but also the ability to be aware and prepared to face the risks. In this context, state resilience "is the extent to which a country can prepare, manage, and *recover* from a crisis, relative to the severity of that crisis" (Fund for Peace 2024). This is reflected in different categories of indexes as the State Resilience Index (SRI), "new tool used to identify capacities and capabilities in countries under stress" (Fund for Peace 2024), whose methodology is based on certain pillars of analysis (inclusion, social cohesion, state capacity, individual capabilities, environment and ecology, economy, civic space), each of them containing a set of sub-pillars reflecting national security sectors.

In the first part of this paper, the presented concepts and the relations between them are explained by using as research methods the analysis of resilience documents of UN, NATO, EU, Romania and other European states, but also field's literature. In the second part, we identify and present some resilience indicators and practices, empirically connected to the pillars and sub-pillars considered in SRI and other indexes, at the level of national security of Romania, with an emphasis on the security sectors as seen through the lenses of the methodological framework of Copenhagen School[1]. This second part of the analysis will bring clarity to the key aspects that need focused practices in different security sectors, for the betterment of the Romanian national resilience.

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[1] This framework offers a constructivist reconceptualization of the field of security studies, emphasizing the roles of securitizing actors, but which also broadens the security agenda horizontally (i.e. security sectors) and vertically by accepting society and non-state actors as security referent objects, besides states.

1. Globalization – Security - Resilience Concepts and their Nexus

Globalization is considered to be simultaneously a process and a phenomenon. Sociologists have seen it as "all those *processes* by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society" (Albrow and King 1990, 8), or "a *phenomenon* whereby economic, political, and socio-cultural exchanges take place freely across national boundaries" (Hamadullah 2010, 11). Economists describe it as "the growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information" (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2022).

Globalization is characterized by multidimensionality and dynamics, being a complex phenomenon that includes realities and trends that insinuate themselves into all areas of social life. The most affected areas are those related to some dimensions of international security, namely political, economic, social, informational, cultural, ecological and military, and which constitute as many dimensions of globalization.

In the current context of globalization, many security aspects (interstate conflicts, hybrid wars, financial crisis, poverty, migration, etc.) combine to increase the dangers of a variety of transnational threats such as economic war, weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, ethnic violence, environmental degradation, cross-border crimes activities that incorporates drugs, human and arms smuggling, and the spread of infectious diseases. Therefore, globalization also means security challenges transcending national dimension, reflecting the increased porosity of state's borders and relative decline in the *de facto* sovereign authority of states.

Another characteristic of globalization is internationalization: "Globalization is the process of international integration, whereby more and more issues that were once considered domestic ones are transformed into matters of global concern" (Sankar 2022), and state's role dissipation on the international scene as "the state's position as the prime referent object of security is now rivalled by other societal groupings" (Hughes 2001, 410). Therefore, the needs of national security coincide in many ways with international security, even if this operational concept is not universally shared (Pişleag 2016, 69). Concomitantly, national security is also globalizing in its sectors recognized by the Copenhagen School (social, political, military, economic and environmental), but so does insecurity.

Security is among the oldest problems that exist in the world; one can say with certainty that the definition of this concept depended and it still depends not only on the analysed era but also on the involved actors, and more importantly on the one issuing this definition. Moreover, the process of defining this concept is even more difficult nowadays, considering the many dimensions of security and the diversified dangers and threats to security in the contemporary world. Still, one of its shortest interpretations is "the absence of threats … the absence of fear" (Wolfers 1952, 481).

When it comes to security analysis "the link between threat, aggression, vulnerability, impact and risk is an obvious one, even if sometimes there is confusion regarding their identification or sequence, based on causal criteria" (Petrescu 2022, 276).

States face increasing insecurity, triggered by more frequent and intense "disruptions from a range of acute shocks, such as natural disasters, pandemics, cyberattacks, infrastructure failure, and loss of key industries" (FEMA 2023, 1). Therefore, "a nation's ability to withstand and recover from shocks, whether they are economic, political, or environmental, is a testament to its national resilience. Robust governance, strong infrastructure, social cohesion, and effective disaster preparedness are crucial components of national resilience" (Rawinji 2023).

Hence, considering the above presented ideas, globalization impact on security consists of "both the vertical extension of security in terms of its referent objects and the horizontal extension in terms of security-threat dimensions" (Hughes 2001, 410), and therefore *globalization – security nexus* is mainly seen in terms of apparition of new security actors and challenges, which obviously need appropriate mitigation strategies, as such provided by resilience.

Resilience is a concept adopted in many research fields: politics, engineering, ecology, economics, psychology, etc. Also, "the theorization of cybernetics and general systems theory are also important developments in the formation of resilience theory and thought" (Oxford Bibliographies 2024). Moreover, when talking about resilience in security domain "the lexicon of resilience has grown in international prominence with a focus on resilience practices seen as simultaneously proactive and reactive, with in-built adaptability to the fluid nature of myriad threats and hazards challenging states and their territories" (Coaffee și Fussey 2015, 90).

Resilience has become an umbrella term to cover many different aspects of overcoming adversity and adapting to environment, but we will refer to it as "the ability to prepare for threats and hazards, adapt to changing conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions" (FEMA 2023, 2). Actually, the proactive *ability to recover quickly from shocks* is found in most of resilience definitions of international organizations wherein Romania is part of, and therefore our country also adopted it, namely:

- UN defined resilience to be "the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and *recover* from the effects of a hazard *in a timely and efficient manner*, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions" (United Nations 2009, 24);

- NATO sees resilience as "the individual and collective capacity to prepare for, resist, respond to and *quickly recover* from shocks and disruptions, and to ensure the continuity of the Alliance's activities" (Article 3, The North Atlantic Treaty 1949);

- EU defines resilience "as the ability not only *to withstand* and cope with challenges but also to undergo transitions, in a sustainable, fair, and democratic

manner" (European Commission 2023a). Moreover, for EU resilience means "decreased *vulnerabilities*, increased capacities, and improved well-being" (European Commission 2023b, 3).

When we speak about state's resilience, Romanian researchers consider it "must be seen as a national characteristic, as a multidimensional and multifunctional ability, a skill construct with a configuration in a permanent dynamic, shaped by the challenges of the security environment" (Circiumaru 2021, 71). Therefore, building national resilience means to align mind-sets, capabilities and investments (Smith-Bingham, Wittenberg, and Kaniewski 2020). Moreover, national resilience of a state is the result of dealing with each security sector resilience: political, military (defence), societal, economic and environmental. These concepts are explained below.

Political resilience of a state depends on its internal characteristics that allows it and its institutions to navigate a variety of disruptions" (Brown 2022, 2). Therefore, the political sector of resilience is reflected in all the others, as "the governance for resilience is complex and often multidirectional" and "… a few governance super-factors − such as control of corruption, societal trust, and high quality political leadership−are exceptionally powerful in enabling a country to augment its resilience through multiple pathways" (Brown 2022, 2).

In a security and defence (military) context, "resilience is focused on whole-of-society mitigation of, response to, and recovery from national emergencies, especially those sparked by hostile actions from adversaries or competitors" (Institute for Security Governance 2021, 1). The latter NATO Strategic Concept "emphasizes that ensuring our national and collective resilience is critical to all our core tasks and underpins our efforts to safeguard our nations, societies and shared values" (NATO 2022). Also, for the Romanian national security, resilience (together with other factors as continuity, adaptability, flexibility, and predictability) is part of the base for an effective response to face the risks, threats and vulnerabilities (Administrația Prezidențială 2020, 5).

Societal resilience refers to "the capacity of communities to flexibly contain major disruptions and to rapidly bounce back and forward following the unavoidable decline of their core functionalities" (Elran 2017, 301).

Economic resilience is typically used in two distinct, but overlapping, understandings: the first, when is seen as a "community's ability to foresee, adapt to, and leverage changing conditions to their advantage" (Georgia Tech 2017) and the latter, as "the ability of an economy as a whole to cope, recover from and reconstruct after a shock" (Hallegatte 2014, 2). In this paper it is considered the second definition that refers to the national economy ability to maintain its balanced status in the occurrence of a threat.

The ecological resilience is defined as "the capacity of a system to undergo disturbance and reorganize so as to still maintain essentially the same functions,

structures, and controls by not moving in a different region of the state space controlled by a diverse set of mutually reinforcing processes" (Zaccarelli, Petrosillo and Zurlini 2008).

In the National Defence Strategy 2020-2024, the concept of Romania's resilience is approached in a double key: "the inherent capacity of entities - individuals, communities, regions, state - to resist and adapt to events in an articulated manner violent, causing stress, shock, disasters, pandemics or conflicts, on the one hand, and the capacity of these entities to quickly return to a functional, normal state, on the other hand" (Administrația Prezidențială 2020, 11).

In terms of national security aspects, the same strategic document operates with the concept of "extended national security" that involves the protection of more dimensions besides the armed defence (national and collective), namely "foreign policy, public order, intelligence activity, counter-intelligence and security, crisis management, education, culture, health, economic, demography, financial, environment, energy or cyber, critical infrastructures and historical and cultural heritage" (Administrația Prezidențială 2020, 7). Thus, resilience presumes implementing mitigation practices in the above-mentioned security dimensions, all these intertwined in the security sectors identified by the Copenhagen School.

2. Resilience Factors for Each National Security Sector of Romania

National resilience is expressed in specialty literature under different perspectives (economic, political, all sectors, etc.) and a series of factors, items or pillars.

FM Global Resilience Index achieved by the FM Global Group's family of business insurance companies and affiliates examines national resilience from the business' insurers perspective considering three **factors**: *economic* – it measures political and macroeconomic influences on resilience and is composed of five drivers: productivity, political risk, urbanization rate, energy intensity and health expenditure; *risk quality* – it measures the relative commercial and industrial property risk across countries and comprises as drivers (seismic risk exposure, climate risk exposure, climate risk quality, fire risk quality and cyber risk); *supply chain* –that comprises five drivers: infrastructure quality, control of corruption, corporate governance, supply chain visibility and supply chain timeliness. In this Index, Romania has an average 68.4 score of 100 (expressing the maximum level of resilience), ranking on the 38th place from the analysed countries (FM Global 2024).

The Lloyd's Register Foundation World Risk Poll expresses national resilience in terms of the Resilience Index composed by four-**item** index of confidence in national institutions (ranging score is between 0 and 1, with a higher score indicating greater resilience), wherein Romania, in 2021, ranked 67th out of 111 countries) (L R Foundation 2021).

The European Resilience Dashboard sets of series of aggregate indicators focused on vulnerabilities and capacities quantified in synthetic indices (*social and economic* − economic and financial stability and sustainability; health, education and work; inequalities and social impact of the transitions; *green* −climate change mitigation and adaptation; ecosystems, biodiversity and sustainable agriculture; sustainable use of resources; *digital* – cybersecurity; digital for industry; digital for public space; *geopolitical* – financial globalization; raw material and energy supply; security and demography (European Commission 2023b, 11). For 2023, Romania registered an overall vulnerabilities index of 0.59 and an overall capacities index of 0.25 (European Commission 2023b, 13), that translate in the third place in the EU in terms of exposure to vulnerabilities (Greece and Bulgaria are more vulnerable) and the last place in EU in terms of capacities for resilience.

For NATO, resilience is strictly linked and envisaged in conformity with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and considered to be the first line of defence focused on societies and critical infrastructure (energy, health, transport, financial, ICT, water, food, public and legal order and safety, chemical and nuclear industry, space and research), action that "involves supporting continuity of government, and the provision of essential services in member states and civil support to the military" (Roepke and Thankey 2019).

For UN, resilience is strongly related to development, therefore, states are quantified in a global framework with 231 unique indicators (Sustainable Development Goals 2024). *Sustainable Development Goals Indicators* are set in conformity to the goals and their subsequent objectives included in *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Thus, for the *Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere,* there is considered the objective to "build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters" (UNGA 2017, 5) for which with 4 indicators[2]. Inhere, are also included political, economic and societal indicators related to poverty, hunger, food security, health, inclusion, rule of law and equality, access to vital resources, sustainable energy, resilience infrastructure, climate change, sustainable use of water, biodiversity, etc.

In 2022 State Resilience Index achieved by the Fund for Peace (an US NGO) with the most complex set of **pillars** – inclusion, social cohesion, state capacity,

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[2] Indicators: 1. Number of deaths, missing persons and directly affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population; 2. Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP); 3. Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030; 4. Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with national disaster risk reduction strategies (UNGA 2017, 5-6).

individual capabilities, environment and ecology, economy, civic space[3], Romania stands the worst in its social cohesion (4.6 score), economic sector with 5.6 score, particularly in dynamism sub-pillar (2.8 score) related to the capacity of innovative economies to generate productivity using new ideas and technologies, but also in the trust placed in national institutions (3.1 score) (Fund for Peace 2024).

In this paper's section analysis, we will consider the overall resilience of state's institutions, infrastructures and population. Therefore, in Table 1, there are presented some resilience indicators identified in the above-mentioned statistics as well as practices identified in UN, NATO, the EU, and Romanian policy documents, but also in field's literature containing resilient states experience. Some indicators and practices are specific to each sector, but some comply with most or even all the mentioned security sectors. Still, this is not an exhaustive iteration, but rather an explanatory one, with the most needs in terms of national resilience for Romania.

As it was already shown in the European Resilience Dashboard, Romania is among EU countries with the weakest resilience performance. This is expressed in "higher vulnerabilities in the areas of inequalities and social impact of the transitions, health, education and work, sustainable use of resources, digitalization and financial globalization" (European Commission 2023b, 43), and the need for capacities particularly in "inequalities and social impact of the transitions, health, education and work, sustainable use of resources, ecosystems, biodiversity and sustainable agriculture, all areas of the digital dimension, as well as security and demography" (European Commission 2023b, 43). Thus, there is room for improving both categories of resilience indexes by limiting vulnerabilities and building capacities. This is mainly achieved through "the development of the security culture of society as a whole to minimize vulnerabilities" and specific practices as "increase of citizens' inclusion on social, political and economic dimensions" (included in Table above).

UN Sustainable Development Goals Indicators show in 2023 Romania encounters major challenges in achieving *gender equality* goal (particularly "Ratio of female-to-male labour force participation rate" indicator) and significant challenges in other 10 out of 17 goals, each with poor performance on at least one indicator (SDG 2023, 2). Thus, inclusive education and equality on the job market are a must to increase gender equality resilience.

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[3] In the State Resilience Index methodology, for each pillar are assigned sub-pillars: *inclusion* – inclusion of youth, political inclusion, access to finance, group based inclusion, access to economic resources, access to employment, protection against precariousness; *social cohesion* – social capital, social relations, confidence in national institutions; state capacity – finances, government effectiveness, disaster risk reduction, public health, education outcomes, rule of law, freedom from corruption; *individual capabilities* – food/nutrition, education system, health, wealth; *environment and ecology* – pollution, ocean and fisheries health, agricultural productivity, ecosystem health, biodiversity, long-term climate stability, clean energy, water availability; *economy* – diversification, business environment, dynamism/innovation, physical infrastructure, capital flows, economic management; civil space – engagement, accountability, democratic structures, human rights and civil liberties, information access. **All scores are between 0 and 10, from the lowest to the maximum level of resilience for a state.**

Table 1: Resilience factors and practices
for Romanian national security sectors

National security sector	Resilience indicators[4]	Resilience practices
Political	- robust governance; - high political leadership; - political stability; - strong civil society; - confidence in national institutions; - control of corruption.	- diminishing threats against state's sovereignty (Circiumaru 2021, 17), through international cooperation and diplomacy; - providing continuity of government and critical government services (Roepke and Thankey, Resilience: the first line of defence 2019); - representation and involvement of civil society in governmental projects; - building public trust in state's institutions; - enhancing government capacity for effective and efficient action (Guvernul Romaniei 2024); - private sector involvement in policing; - tackling corruption and wastefulness and improving transparency (Howell 2013, 7).
Military	- performance of military capabilities[5] and personnel; - membership in collective security organizations; - defence spending.	- enhanced military cooperation within the formats established in the region; - "maintaining and developing individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Article 3, The North Atlantic Treaty 1949); - levelling up more than 2% defence spending in the GDP.
Societal	- **social cohesion;** - proficient educational system; - culture of tolerance and equality; - public health; - access to natural spaces; - rule of law; - cultural heritage; - judiciary system.	- multidimensional social support, particularly for disfavoured categories of people (elders, children, women, migrants, disabled, etc.); - settling legislation to improve tools for fighting hybrid threats (terrorism, disinformation, extremism, hate speech, etc.); - "ensuring quality and inclusive education, adapting human resources to the dynamics of the labour market and technology, combating poverty and promoting social inclusion, ensuring quality health services accessible to all" (Ministry of Investments and European Projects 2023, 13); - "the increase in the quality of life of citizens and to the reduction of economic and social division" (Ministry of Investments and European Projects 2023, 13).
Economic	- GDP/capita; - foreign investments; - strong industry; - sustainable use of resources - balanced currency; - access to resources; - income equality.	- better absorption of EU and national funds for innovation and technologies in the market (Ministry of Investments and European Projects 2023, 6); - "investment in innovation and knowledge-based capital" (OECD 2014, 4); - reducing gaps between the development level in different regions (Ministry of Investments and European Projects 2023, 13); - "increasing economic competitiveness and the level of digitalization to support the innovative and intelligent economic transformation of Romania" (Ministry of Investments and European Projects 2023, 13); - "provision of reliable, secure, and affordable electricity" (Stout, et al. 2019, 2).

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[4] Resilience factors are excerpted from the factors, items or pillars used to quantify in FM Global Resilience Index, The Lloyd's Register Foundation World Risk Poll and State Resilience Index.
[5] For this indicator there are considered: military equipment, readiness, doctrine, interoperability.

Environmental	- stable ecosystems; - water access; - clean energy/ greenhouse gas emissions; - biological diversity; - agricultural output (The World Bank 2024).	- harmonization of forest management practices with those regarding biodiversity conservation and environmental protection (Consiliul Uniunii Europene 12319/21 ADD 1 2021, 31); - optimum management of wastes; - implementation of green budgeting practices (Consiliul Uniunii Europene 12319/21 ADD 1 2021, 171); - need for sustainable use of resources (European Commission 2023b, 43).
All/more sectors	- strong critical national infrastructure; - protected space and cyber capabilities; - effective disaster preparedness; - inclusion of different categories of population; - security culture.	- "robust civil-military capabilities that sustain governance and build and maintain operational readiness in the face of national emergencies, crises or conflicts" (Institute for Security Governance 2021, 1) - increase of citizens' inclusion on social, political and economic dimensions; - the development of the security culture of society as a whole to minimize vulnerabilities; - effective crisis management and contingency plans settlement for challenges and threats against national security predicted on medium term horizon (climate change[6], the destabilization actions of the Russian Federation, etc.) (Administrația Prezidențială 2020, 21); - "development of own mechanisms of quick and efficient reaction and, inherently, of a culture of solidly dimensioned security - including among its citizens" (Administrația Prezidențială 2020, 6); - providing a stock of education, health, income, and food security for each citizen in order to avoid syncope in "vital areas such as economics, health or education" (Administrația Prezidențială 2020, 6); - "more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges to our security" (NATO 2022, 7); - "share and evaluate successful resilience policies and practices from different country contexts" (United Nations 2020, 74).

Fund for Peace State Resilience Index shows the resilience practices related to improvement of social cohesion and dynamism through *inclusive practices in society*, *multidimensional social support, particularly for disfavoured categories of people (elders, children, women, migrants, disabled, etc.)*, *better absorption of EU and national funds for innovation and technologies in the market* and *building public trust in state's institutions* are a must. Also, all the pillars and sub-pillars must be supported with specific factors and practices in order to improve the level of resilience of a state in all the security sectors.

Romania's National Recovery and Resilience Plan is based on six pillars (green transition; smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; social and territorial cohesion; health and economic, social and institutional resilience; digital transformation; and policies for the next generation) that cover national needs in the security sectors (NextGeneration EU 2024). These are integrated in national strategies financed

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[6] "The main threat to national security (of Romania, author's note) lies in the production sudden changes in temperature, particularly dry summers, torrential rain and subsequent flooding" (Circiumaru 2021, 21).

with European investments mainly through the Recovery and Resilience Facility[7], but also by other adjacent multiannual financial frameworks (i.e. Cohesion Policy related to SME support, investments in a low-carbon economy, research, innovation and territorial development (EuregioDataStories 2024) or Common Agricultural Policy used to secure the future of agriculture and forestry, as well as achieving the objectives of the European Green Deal (European Commission 2024a)). Obviously, each EU resilience pillar is reflected in at least one or more sectors of security, but utmost in national security overall. For example: green transition is part of economic and environmental security sectors; smart, sustainable and inclusive growth is addressed in economic, societal and environmental sectors; social and territorial cohesion – political, economic, societal sectors; digital transformation and policies for the next generation are part of all security sectors).

Conclusions

All three concepts, namely "globalization", "security" and "resilience" lack generally accepted definitions, although their topics took a plethora of perspectives in different specialties literature. Still, all of them have in common the overarching characteristic their future development majorly preoccupies societies, states and organizations.

As regards the nexus between the three, while globalization and security are phenomena that need to be tackled in the contemporary ages for the well-being of human organized structures, resilience comes as a solution to those. Also, resilience practices need to be multidimensional in order to support all the security sectors affected by the multi-layered globalization.

In literature, there are a series of statistical indexes that present factors, items or pillars identified to reflect security sectors' national resilience indicators. Some of them are focused on economic resilience (FM Global Resilience Index), societal resilience (State Resilience Index), political resilience (The Lloyd's Register Foundation World Risk Poll), or multi-sector resilience (The European Resilience Dashboard, UN Sustainable Development Goals Indicators). Moreover, as the overall indicators found in statistics and the increased use of resilience strategy to build security show a new connection, further investigations need to be conducted, other than the one between security and development, the one between resilience and development, as resilience, although in the absence of a crisis, triggers development. Thus, a further study could thoroughly investigate security – resilience – development nexus.

Romanian national resilience key aspect means implementing practices in different security sectors related to some specific indicators that need to be addressed: political – to reinforce key governance competencies and citizens'

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[7] EU's plan to emerge stronger and more resilient from the current crisis (European Commission 2024b).

confidence on those to support delivery in the context of multiple crises; societal −to improve citizens and stakeholders participation and representation, concomitantly with stimulation of inclusion and innovation; all sectors − critical infrastructure preservation, development with the use of high technology and effective crisis management and contingency plans settlement for challenges and threats against national security predicted on medium term horizon.

Part of the resilience practices to address key indicators affected at the national level are already implemented in some organizations (NATO, EU), or in more resilient states[8], or are already stipulated in national strategic documents, particularly the National Defence Strategy, but not already properly implemented as it should in order to deliver positive results (for example, the level of absorption of EU and national funds used to develop innovation and technologies to improve the six pillars of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan).

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MULTILATERALISM – PAST, PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURES

Diana-Cristiana LUPU, PhD*

Starting from the definition of multilateralism, based on its main characteristics – peaceful resolution of conflicts, sovereign states equality under international law, inclusion and active participation of all stakeholders, the present paper examines the current perception of the foundations of global cooperation stability. Thus, considering the high level of interconnectedness as well as the complexity of the crises our world is currently facing, some of the challenges to the multilateral system are presented, focusing on the UN, an inclusive multilateral institution, and the EU, a regional one. Romania's position in this context is also mentioned. In connection to the Western-based democratic values and liberal societies, three possible futures are exhibited. Under the given circumstances, it has been almost unanimously agreed that reforms are necessary. However, there are still few specific details related to the substance and means of the changes, and there are too many variables to be considered in the efforts to align goals, interests and expectations, as well as to accommodate the structural, functional and strategic elements of transformation.

***Keywords**: multilateralism; institutions; challenges; transformation; structural, functional, strategic goals.*

Introduction

It has become increasingly obvious that the beginning of the 21st century is marked by multiple crises. Therefore, today, the challenges are interconnected, as solutions should be found to a lot of problems that, by definition, exceed national boundaries, such as climate change, humanitarian crises, migration, cyber security (AI challenges included), space security. Taking into account the above-mentioned aspects, against the background of the well-known international relations triad –

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unilateralism, bilateralism, multilateralism –, the present article is intended to briefly define the terms, to explore the current state of affairs, and to present some future scenarios related to possible responses to the challenges, focusing on multilateral approaches, diplomacy and institutions.

In this context, considering that the core of multilateral approach is represented by providing mutually agreed solutions, based on shared values, to complex problems, besides the well-known multilateral organisations and institutions (e.g. United Nations – inclusive multilateralism, European Union – regional multilateralism, International Monetary Fund, World Bank – financial multilateralism, NATO – militarised multilateralism, Universal Postal Union – functional multilateralism), as the number of actors engaged in transforming the world is increasing, thus entailing much economic dynamism, other formats for cooperation have emerged (e.g. G7, then G20 – elite multilateralism). Therefore, one of the main challenges of the 21st century is to update existing multilateral institutions to meet the new reality generated by emerging state and even non-state actors as well as organisations (e.g. BRICS/ BRICS+ – challenging multilateralism), which have divergent values. This is the reason why multilateralism-related themes have been so frequently and extensively debated lately.

The main research methods employed in developing the present article are as follows: *framework analysis* – to define the terms, codify concepts as well as themes and map them for interpretation; *content analysis* – to clarify the relationships between the identified concepts, themes and data; *comparative analysis* – to search for similarity and variance among the units of analysis; *scenario analysis* – to provide descriptions of possible, probable and/or preferable futures. Mention should be made that the analysis is focused on the United Nations (UN) as an example of global multilateral approach and the European Union (EU) as one of regional multilateral approach.

1. Terminology – Brief Explanation

Multilateralism is better explained in contrast to *individualism* and *bilateralism*. All three concepts are interrelated in international relations theories. In a *quantity-based* approach, it is obvious that unilateralism involves one actor, bilateralism – two, and multilateralism – three or more actors. In a *quality-based* approach, multilateralism is defined by the following characteristics: indivisibility, meaning that it is based on socially constructed public benefit; generalised organising principles, thus opposing discrimination; diffuse reciprocity, entailing that it is different from preferential bilateralism (Ruggie, 1993, p. 11).

Multilateralism can be also approached from the *theoretical* or *functional* viewpoints. From a *theoretical* perspective, multilateralism entails a common

political project as well as a shared system of norms and values. The decision-making process is based on consultation, solidarity and inclusion, thus guaranteeing that all actors have the same rights and obligations in all situations, not on a case-by-case basis. The overarching characteristic in this regard is an inclusive approach aimed at maintaining the stability of the international system in the long run. From a *functional* perspective, multilateralism is a diplomatic practice based on cooperation between several state and, more recently, even non-state actors, emphasising multilateral diplomacy characteristics. Mention should be made here that the concept of multilateral diplomacy is older than that of multilateralism, being implicit in the papers of great philosophers throughout history, such as Leibniz (1695), Rousseau (1782), Bentham (1789), and Kant (1795), who dedicated part of their studies to developing perpetual peace projects.

Besides the fact that it is a *method*, multilateralism can be also a *form of organisation*, as the actors get involved in both the formulation and implementation of multilateral policies. Thus, its main *roles* can be defined as an essential instrument for coordinating international actions and an essential means of addressing common challenges in order to provide a coordinated response, especially in the situations with which states cannot cope by themselves. Examples in this regard can be the principle of collective security in NATO, which is based on a multilateral approach, conflict prevention and resolution, in the case of a conflict that, directly or indirectly, goes beyond local borders, thus requiring the support of regional actors and/or major powers.

In strict connection to its main roles, multilateralism *institutionalisation* has to be mentioned. It is related to the processes and efforts meant to embed and implement the above-mentioned aspects in the international system, as well as to establish the proper institutions to support the endeavour.

The three mentioned terms (individualism, bilateralism and multilateralism) are more complex than they appear at first glance and they do not totally exclude each other in the theory and, especially, in the practice of international relations. Moreover, considering the current transformation the world is facing as well as the implicit challenges, multilateralism seems to be at heart of contemporary international life. However, it is still difficult to grasp and not thoroughly studied, although it is neither a novel notion, phenomenon, principle, nor a newly emerged institutional basis.

2. Multilateralism Institutionalisation. Historical Overview

The *Concert of Europe* or the Congress System or the Vienna System was established after the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), which can be considered the foundation of what we now know as Modern Europe, following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, which had troubled Europe since the 1790s.

In general terms, as there were some contained crises during the period the System was functional, namely between 1815-1914, when the First World War broke out, the Concert of Europe refers to the geopolitical order established on the continent in which the great powers intended to act in concert to resolve disputes and respond to new challenges so that wars and revolutions could be prevented and political and territorial status quo could be maintained. Therefore, as it provided an institutional consultation mechanism aimed at preserving the stability of the international system, the Concert of Europe can be considered the first modern multilateral institution, although it did not meet the inclusion and consultation conditions, as the small states were rarely consulted. It was based on the idea of balance of power, so that the ambitions of a great power could be contained by the others. Despite of it, the System could not prevent the outbreak of the war. However, some of its mechanisms and principles were preserved or updated when the League of Nations was established.

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 can be considered the first multilateral treaties related to the conduct of warfare, enabling governments to cooperate in order to develop rules in the common interest. They were largely based on the Lieber Code, which, among others, defined the command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, the regulations for behaviour in times of martial law, for the protection of civilians, for the prisoner exchange process, as well as for the status of individuals engaged in civil wars. The 1907 conference focused on naval warfare. Some of the derived provisions and institutions still exist today, even if they have an updated form (e.g. the Permanent Court of Arbitration).

The League of Nations was established on 10 January 1920, following the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where unanimous agreement was reached on the text of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was an organisation for international cooperation, which could be considered the first fully-fledged multilateral institution, meant to provide the member states having the same status and sharing common values with the opportunity to meet periodically and discuss all major international issues in order to respond to challenges in a coordinated manner. The League was considered a unique moment when international affairs were *"institutionalised"*, in contrast to the pre-First World War methods of law and politics (Kennedy, 1997). However, as it has been mentioned, many of the League's attributes were developed from existing institutions, conventions and diplomatic methods. A quite new concept included in the Covenant was that of collective security, alongside those of arbitration, economic and social cooperation, reduction of armaments and open diplomacy. Besides the previous multilateral achievements, the Covenant was largely based on the US President Wilson's Fourteen Points' declaration, which outlined the post-war peace settlement. Nevertheless, the League of Nations failed in preventing the outbreak of the Second World War, but it continued to exist legally and conducted limited operations. The Secretariat remained in Geneva, while some

staff worked in offices established in London, Washington, DC, and in the campus of US Princeton University.

The Allied powers decided, at the 1943 Tehran Conference, to create a new body to replace the League, namely the United Nations (UN), many of the League bodies becoming affiliated with the UN. When the UN Charter came into existence on 24 October 1945, the League of Nations was still active. For a few months, the two organisations coexisted. In April 1946, 35 of the 46 member states met in Geneva to formally approve the dissolution of the League. "It was not the League which failed. It was not its principles which were found wanting. It was the nations which neglected it. It was the Governments which abandoned it" (Paul-Boncour, 1946).

The United Nations was established after the Second World War. More exactly, on 25 April 1945, 50 nations met in San Francisco and started drafting the UN Charter, which was adopted on 25 June and took effect beginning on 24 October 1945, upon ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council, namely the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China. The Charter defined the UN goals as maintaining international peace and security, protecting human rights, providing humanitarian aid, promoting sustainable development, upholding international law, developing friendly relations among countries, harmonising the actions of nations. The UN has six main operational organisations – the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the UN Secretariat, also including specialised agencies, funds and programmes, such as the World Bank Group, the World Health Organisation, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). In addition, non-governmental organisations may be granted consultative status.

Considering the 21st century emerging challenges, in 2000, it was held the Millennium Summit, when all member states adopted the Millennium Development Goals. The 2015 World Summit reaffirmed the importance of promoting development, peacekeeping, human rights and global security, launching the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as part of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. The 17 SDGs are as follows: no poverty; zero hunger; good health and well-being; quality education; gender equality; clean water and sanitation; affordable and clean energy; decent work and economic growth; industry, innovation and infrastructure; reduced inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; responsible consumption and production; climate action; life below water; life on land; peace, justice and strong institutions; partnerships for the goals (SDGs, 2015).

In line with the goals, on 13 June 2019, the UN signed a Strategic Partnership Framework with the World Economic Forum (WEF) to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the world's plan for peace, prosperity and a healthy planet.

The partnership is structured along the following key focus areas: financing the 2030 Agenda, aligning financial systems and accelerating finance flows toward the 2030 SDGs; climate change, reaching carbon neutrality by 2050; health, realising universal health coverage; digital cooperation, meeting the needs of the Fourth Industrial Revolution; gender equality and the empowerment of women; education and skills, delivering inclusive green growth to achieve the SDGs (UN-WEF Strategic Partnership Framework, 2019).

The European Union can be considered, as it has been mentioned, a regional multilateral format, having among its goals, in the context of the present paper, to preserve peace in Europe, based on cooperation. Thus, between 1945 and 1959, the European Coal and Steel Community was established, the Treaties of Rome were signed and the European Parliament became an official institution.

On 1 July 1967, the three European Communities – the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) merged, having a single administrative arm – the Commission, and a single executive – the Council. In the 1970s, the European communities adopted laws to protect the environment, the notion of "polluter pays" being introduced. Thus, many environmental NGOs were established. On 10 December 1974, leaders of the EEC agreed to set up a major new fund under European regional policy. Its purpose was to transfer money from rich to poor regions – to improve infrastructure, attract investment and create jobs. The European Regional Development Fund was created the following year. In 1984, the *Esprit* programme was launched, the first of many research and innovation programmes at European level, so that the organisation could stay at the forefront of innovation, another sustainability-related goals. In February 1986, considering that the main obstacles in trade flowing freely across the borders between member countries were the differences in national regulations, the Single European Act was launched, meant to create a single market. When it entered into force, on 1 July 1987, the European Parliament was provided with more say and the European Commission with more powers in the field of environmental protection. On 7 February 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed. It represented a major milestone, setting clear rules for the future single currency as well as for foreign and security policy and closer cooperation in justice and home affairs. The European Union was officially created by the treaty, which entered into force on 1 November 1993. A year later, the single market was established, focusing on the free movement of people, goods, services and money. In 1998, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, laying down plans to reform the EU institutions so that Europe could have a stronger voice in the world and devote more resources to employment and the rights of citizens. It entered into force on 1 May 1999. In February 2001, the Treaty of Nice was signed, aiming to reform the institutions so the EU can function efficiently after reaching 25 member

countries, while preparing for a group of new members. In April 2021, the EU launched the year-long Conference on the Future of Europe, which was considered an unprecedented exercise in participatory democracy. (Historical Archives of EU Institutions).

More specific arguments for the fact the EU is a key actor in the multilateral system can be found in its important documents. To illustrate, in the Report on the Implementation of the 2003 *European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World*, it is stated that "at a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world" (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 9). The document has an entire section dedicated to "Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism" (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 25). ok

In the same vein, the EU published, in 2016, the strategic document *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe.* The implementation reports (The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2019) describe the Strategy's visions turning into action. Thus, it is stated that "Our demand for reformed global governance was echoed by the ambitious reform agenda of the United Nations' system (…). Our investment in multilateralism and our commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change and to the Sustainable Development Goals have cemented strong global alliances across the globe." (Ib., p. 10). Moreover, in relation to the Integrated Approach to conflicts and crises, it is shown that it "entails a multi-dimensional approach through the use of all available policies and instruments; a multi-phased approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle; a multi-level approach acting at the local, national, regional and global levels of conflicts; and a multilateral approach engaging all key players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution" (Ib., p. 17).

According to the current President of the European Commission, "Multilateralism is in Europe's DNA. It is our guiding principle in the world. My Commission will keep on championing this approach and ensure that we uphold and update the rules-based global order. We are on the right path and have achieved a lot over recent years, but major challenges remain." (von der Leyen, 2019, p. 17).

3. Challenges

Considering the high level of interconnectedness, the multitude, the nature and the complexity of crises our world is currently facing, it has become obvious that a single state alone cannot provide viable and sustainable solutions to these crises, especially in the context of a multipolar system, the new type of world order that has

been increasingly advanced by experts in the field, in relation to present and future developments. This is the reason why multilateral organisations and institutions are in need for update and reform to meet the challenges. Under such circumstances, there have been a lot of expert debates, highlighting the main issues multilateral organisations should address. As it has already been mentioned, this paper is intended to present only the main ideas related to the UN and the EU.

With regard to the UN, in 2023, Carnegie Europe[1] launched a debate focused on the question "Is the UN still fit for the purpose?". The expert answers to the question were presented in the organisation publication (Strategic Europe, 21 September 2023). In what follows, a selection of the main themes and arguments is provided.

"Without a doubt, the UN suffers from geopolitical tensions, and numerous member states with competing interests challenge the international order. (…) the UN can be a successful norm-setter – if member states allow it – with the UN system supporting follow-up and implementation. Take the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals, which now serve as a kind of glue for the international community. (…) The 2024 Summit of the Future will be a litmus test of whether member states can agree to make the UN a place that saves us from future threats and existential polycrisis. As Secretary-General António Guterres put it, <It's reform or rupture>" (Beisheim[2], Strategic Europe, 2023).

"When people ask whether the UN is relevant today, they usually have in mind the UN Security Council. It is definitely one of the most dysfunctional parts of the UN, largely due to the widening ideological gulf between the five veto-wielding permanent members (P5), usually pitting Russia and China on one side and the United States, UK, and France on the other. Time and again, the Security Council has failed to take any action on Ukraine, Israel, Sudan, and countless other crises because one or more P5 members blocks things." (Charbonneau[3], ib.)

"Almost everyone is unhappy with the state of the UN. (…) Europeans would say the organisation's main failing is its inability to constrain Russia. (…) For the countries of the so-called Global South, rich countries' failure to invest in fulfilling the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is the top worry. As the economic shocks associated with COVID-19 and Russia's war on Ukraine have left poorer states floundering, there has been a growing sense that Western and non-Western UN members are drifting inexorably apart." (Gowan[4], ib.).

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[1] A think tank that delivers independent insights and interdisciplinary expertise that bring together national, regional, and global perspectives, a *"trusted source for European foreign and security policy analysis"*, https://carnegieeurope.eu/, retrieved on 11 February 2024.
[2] Marianne Beisheim is Senior Associate in the Global Issues Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
[3] Louis Charbonneau is the United Nations Director at Human Rights Watch.
4 Richard Gowan is the UN Director at the International Crisis Group, New York.

"The UN is in desperate need of a major root and branch overhaul. The system is old and hopelessly out of date. It harks back to a long-gone era when a few countries, led by the United States and some European states, ran the show. It does not reflect the complex realities of today's multipolar world." (Islam[5], ib.)

"That would depend on how one defines <purpose>. From a Chinese perspective, the UN is perfectly fit for the purpose of advancing its agenda to reshape the world order in a way that would suit its interests. (…) China seeks to legitimise its principal global leadership by commanding a majority of UN member states; if you wish, the diplomatic version of the Law of Large Numbers. Chinese diplomats use UN fora to advance Chinese messaging – be it the definition of democracy or <indivisible security>, which Russia used as a pretext to invade Ukraine. Chinese officials and diplomats hold senior positions in the UN and across its specialised agencies." (Steiner[6], ib.).

"The UN reflects the world order that has emerged after 1945. Despite several well-meaning attempts over the years, it has not sufficiently reformed itself to change with the times. And times have changed. Geopolitical shifts have empowered nations that were not even on the political map when the UN was created. Today it is really difficult to champion the legitimacy of a global system where the veto right remains in the hands of the five nations that happened to be on the winning side of a global conflict almost eighty years ago." (Ulgen[7], ib.)

As for the EU, on 8 November 2023, the European Commission adopted a new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. It is based on four pillars: enhancing economic integration with the EU's single market, boosting economic integration within the Western Balkans through the Common Regional Market, accelerating fundamental reforms, increasing financial assistance through a Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans for the period 2024-2027, meaning also that Serbia and Kosovo need to engage in an EU-facilitated dialogue on normalisation of relations, as necessary pre-condition (European Commission, 2023).

Moreover, in December 2023, the European Council decided to open negotiations for EU accession with both Moldova and Ukraine, which applied for EU membership in February 2022 and were granted EU candidate status in June 2022. Georgia, in turn, applied for EU membership in March 2022 and was granted candidate status in December 2023. As it has become obvious, the EU has to meet the "absorption capacity", which, according to many experts in the field, entails extensive reforms. Mention should be made that these efforts should be simultaneous with those meant to meet SDGs, and under the circumstances of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, whose territories are situated in the European continent – totally, in the case of Ukraine and partially, in the case of Russia.

[5] Shada Islam is Managing Director of the New Horizons Project.
[6] Tommy Steiner is Policy Director at the Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL).
[7] Sinan Ülgen is Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe.

Romania's position, in the context of the topic of this paper – multilateralism, was recently expressed by its President and Prime Minister.

In the speech delivered at the 78ᵗʰ session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York (19 September 2023), Summit on Sustainable Development Goals – Leaders' Dialogue, with the theme "Unity and Solidarity: Strengthening the Multilateral System for Consolidated Support, Cooperation, Follow-up, and Review", President Klaus Iohannis stated that, according to the 2023 Voluntary National Review on SDGs, Romania had already achieved 62% of its 2030 national targets, highlighting the significant progress made by the country on the SDGs associated with environmental protection and limiting climate change. Moreover, the head of state showed that the seven years left until 2030 "must be used for decisive action which is not possible without unity, solidarity, and strong multilateral engagement. We need to further strengthen the UN Development System, better monitor the SDGs implementation, and base development policies on science and reliable data" (Ib.).

Furthermore, President Klaus Iohannis (7 February 2024) was invited to address the European Parliament as part of "This is Europe" series of debates. On that occasion, the head of state acknowledged that the European Union "faces unprecedented geostrategic challenges. Our future and the future of the next generations depend on each and every decision we are taking now." (Ib.). After mentioning the great number of crises our world is currently confronted with, President Iohannis showed that "On top of all these challenges, we witness a crisis of values. And, as far as I see it, a crisis of public trust in our institutions. We are indeed facing an erosion of values within the European Union, which fuels the perception of decline of Europe, or at least of Europe's leadership and global role. This is why we need to do more, to promote the feeling and the certainty that we are all part of the same community of values, which must be protected by every single one of us." (Ib.). Regarding the possible solutions, he advanced a transformative rethinking of our actions as a Union, strengthening national resilience as a fundamental condition for a stronger Union, developing sectoral policies such as technology, including artificial intelligence, fighting climate change, stimulating competitiveness, industrial production, and sustainable supply chains, encouraging creativity and large-scale development. Moreover, related to the question "How can we stay attractive as a Union? The answer is clear: enlarging our European family by accepting new members will only strengthen the Union." (Ib.). To the voices invoking a European solidarity fatigue, President Iohannis answered that "Defending democracy, territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as the rules-based international order, cannot be subject to any fatigue. Romania remains engaged in this common effort." (Ib.). As for the means to achieve our goals, the head of state considered that the Union has the legal and institutional instruments to achieve its goals, while it is equally obvious that

"we need to streamline our decision-making capacity. (…) Therefore, (…) it is our shared responsibility to do the best for all our citizens. (…) The future generations are looking towards us with hope and optimism in times of geopolitical volatility and socioeconomic distress. The future of Europe is about the capacity of the Union to give them honest answers and to deliver in education, health, prosperity, climate security and employment opportunities." (Ib.)

In the same vein, during the USA meetings Prime Minister of Romania, Marcel Ciolacu (7 December 2023), had with António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with Dennis Frances, the President of the General Assembly of this forum, he voiced Romania's firm support for the reforming efforts of the UN: "We support your leadership and vision, as reflected in Our Common Agenda regarding the future of global cooperation through an inclusive and efficient multilateralism, which will mean a renewed solidarity between people and the next generations, a new social agreement rooted in human rights, a better management of the essential common goods and the global public goods to the benefit of us all, fairly and sustainably." (Ib.)

Also in relation to Romania's agenda in the field of promoting global partnerships in order for the governments to be more effective in the 2030 timeframe and beyond, three initiatives were advanced by our country's representatives at the World Governments Summit (Abrudean, Borbely, 12 February 2024), namely the Government Accelerator program – the possibility of launching in Romania a government accelerator, as a platform for intersectoral government teams to address challenges and achieve ambitious goals within a 100-day period; the Centre of Excellence for Public Administration in the field of Sustainable Development (CExDD), provided for in the National Recovery and Resilience Plan – a future innovative Romanian public institution of research, education and dialogue for the alignment of public policies and decisions in order to support the objectives of sustainable development; the Integration of AI in the provision of public services – assessment of how Romania can benefit from the expertise of the United Arab Emirates in the digitization of government services and the use of AI to measure user satisfaction. (Abrudean[8], ib.,). It was also stated that "This Summit is an opportunity to show the whole world that Romania is an example worth following in the integrated approach it has developed in recent years at the Government's centre in the field of sustainable development. We are awarded at the UN level for our functional and inclusive governance system and act as a regional hub for sustainable development in the European region." (Borbely[9], ib.)

[8] Mircea Abrudean is the Secretary General of the Government of Romania.
[9] László Borbély, State Counsellor, Department of Sustainable Development, Government of Romania.

4. Possible Futures

As it has become obvious from the above-presented aspects, the world is at a crossroads, almost everyone acknowledging that the post-Second World War, post-Cold War world order and the Bretton Woods arrangements need revision if not drastic changes. Moreover, as the recent Munich Security Report (February 2024) showed "amid growing geopolitical tensions and rising economic uncertainty, many governments are no longer focusing on the absolute benefits of global cooperation, but are increasingly concerned that they are gaining less than others. Prioritising relative payoffs may well spur lose-lose dynamics (…) There is thus a real risk that more and more countries end up in a lose - lose situation, which is no longer about who gains more, but only about who loses less" (Bunde, Eisentrant, Schutte, 2024, pp. 9, 11).

In connection to the Western-based democratic values and liberal societies, three possible scenarios could be as follows:

A. Westlessness. According to the Munich Security Report 2020, "today, <the West> is the subject of a new declinist literature, as a cottage industry of politicians, pundits, and public intellectuals has produced speeches, books, reports, and articles discussing the decay of the Western project" (Bunde et al., 2020, p. 6). In fact, the first such acknowledged discussion was provided by Oswald Spengler (1923), about a century ago. More recently, Robert Keohane (1984) advanced the idea that liberal institutions could have a life on their own and do not necessarily require a hegemon or a leader to provide the global public good. Mention should be made that the concept of public good, in a broader perspective, can have a nuance of moral philosophy, in the sense that in order for a society to be economically, politically, and culturally functional, the regulation of externalities (norms, decisions, and technical aspects) and the free-rider (benefit-related cost) problems arise. Without infrastructure and their protection, goods cannot be exchanged, votes cannot be cast, and it would be harder to enjoy the fruits of cultural production. Therefore, a certain level of education is required in this regard, including conflict prevention, management and resolution skills.

B. Westishness. It is "characterised by ambivalence about the role of American military hegemony, deep interdependence of Eastern and Western actors (e.g. European reliance on Russian oil and gas, American debt and trade dependence on China), and a proliferation of risks without a clear set of structures or rules to manage them" (Day[10], 2022, p. 5), in the context in which geopolitics has come to be less defined in binary, zero-sum terms. In other words, Westishness refers to the fact that some of the aspects of the West's values and power endure, while others get fragmented, following the Concert of Powers model. In the same vein, it has been

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[10] Adam Day is the Head of United Nations University Centre for Policy Research's (UNU-CPR) Geneva Office.

advanced the idea that the market, the state and human social organisation should not be set in predetermined institutional arrangements. On the contrary, they need to be left open to experimentation and revision according to what works for the project of individual and collective empowerment (Unger[11], 2022). In an interview from January 2023, based on the recently-released book, the mentioned philosopher advanced the idea of "soft globalism". "By that, I mean that many people who write about this topic are often antagonistic to national sovereignty and prefer the attenuation of it. (…) Whereas the soft globalists seem to think there exist a huge range of possible alternatives for governing the world worth considering, experience suggests there's only one option that works: voluntary cooperation among sovereign states to help solve problems that they cannot adequately solve alone" (Unger, 2023). However, he also showed that "pluralism comes with dangers, including the danger of environmental destruction. Some of these national experiments will take us backward. But the fact that the future is open means it is inherently open to danger. It cannot be open without being dangerous." (Ib.)

C. Westfulness. Starting from the concept of Westlessness, coined as such by Ian Bremmer[12] (2020), during the 2021 Munich Security Conference what could be "Beyond Westlessness" (Bunde[13], 2021) was discussed, which could be called Westfulness. Thus, many speakers at the conference saw the world's liberal democracies at a crucial juncture. Therefore, "facing tremendous challenges at homeland abroad, Western countries will have to deliver on issues of concerns to their citizens and jointly address the challenge posed by authoritarian powers to prevent the rules-based order from unravelling" (Ib., p. 17). To them, the green transition and the digital transition have added. They might seem like two distinct issues, but they are really twin challenges, as neither can succeed without the other. The mentioned transitions are equally important for both Europe and the Western world. In this context, the European approach will be based on three main pillars to ensure that Europe seizes the opportunity and gives its citizens, businesses and governments control over the digital transformation, as follows: technology that works for the people; a fair and competitive digital economy; an open, democratic and sustainable society (European Commission, 2020). As for the green transition, EU policymakers have recently agreed on new rules to promote local production of equipment for solar and wind power, fuel cells and other clean technologies to compete with China and the USA. The bloc aims to set a 2030 target of producing 40% of the products it needs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Blenkinshop,

[11] Roberto Mangabeira Unger is a Brazilian philosopher, Professor at Harvard Kennedy School.
[12] Ian Arthur Bremmer is an American political scientist, author, and entrepreneur focused on global political risk. He is the founder and president of Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting firm. He is also a founder of GZERO Media, a digital media firm.
[13] Dr. Tobias Bunde is Director of Research & Policy at the Munich Security Conference and Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School in Berlin.

2024). If we agree that there is still heterogeneity, even in relation to the Westfulness scenario, possible ways to overcome fragmentation should be considered, which entails a transition period.

In the context of transition, the main characteristics of what has been coined as *G-Zero world and beyond* (Bremmer[14], 2016) are briefly presented. Appreciating that the world is at the end of a geopolitical cycle as the global order that prevailed since the end of the Second World War has reached its limits, the mentioned author defines the G-Zero world as the result of a breakdown in longstanding domestic, regional, and international political equilibria, which is making policymakers both less able and less willing to collaborate internationally, a world characterised by a growing vacuum in global governance (Ib., p. 3). However, "this breakdown will not continue forever. Sooner or later, the G-Zero will give way to whatever new world order comes after it. The question is whether citizens across the world will remain passive throughout this process, or take on a proactive role in determining what future they want to live in" (Ib.). Moreover, it is shown that "the current fracturing of international governance, along with growing grievances over the values underpinning the Bretton Woods order, has already led emerging powers to begin creating new and alternative institutions of global governance, as their power and influence in global institutions is not keeping pace with their growing international importance and interests" (Ib.). In addition, "an expectations-capabilities gap is boiling in emerging markets" (…) "demand for decentralization is weighing on markets" (…) "failed states are no longer a mere nuisance" (Ib., pp. 6-8), "interdependence has become a perceived vulnerability" (Ib., p. 13), "a trade-off between domestic and international affairs" (Ib., p. 15) are also among the characteristics of such a world.

Having considered all the above-mentioned aspects, it is for us to see if competition or collaboration will be emphasised. Anyway, it seems that partnerships or partnering will get increasingly importance.

Conclusions

Starting from the definition of multilateralism, based on its main characteristics – peaceful resolution of conflicts, sovereign states equality under international law, inclusion and active participation of all stakeholders, the present paper examines the current perception of the foundations of global cooperation stability, considering that the post-Second World War global order was built on multilateral cooperation. Throughout this period, the main stakeholders have been represented by nation-states that have committed to international laws, mediated through international organisations, some of the most important ones being presented in the paper.

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[14] IMF website, mentioning that the views expressed in the paper are those of the author(s) only, and the presence of them, or of links to them, on the IMF website does not imply that the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management endorses or shares the views expressed in the paper.

In financial terms, the rules of Bretton Woods (1973), set forth in the articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, provided for a system of fixed exchange rates. The post-Bretton Woods world has been thus based on a negotiated monetary order intended to govern monetary relations among independent and sovereign states and to encourage an open system by committing members to the convertibility of their respective currencies into other currencies and to free trade.

Over time, the international system has included other actors from different social, political, economic, academic, media and other fields. That is why the concept of multistakeholder governance emerged. It refers to the practice of governance that employs bringing multiple stakeholders together to participate in dialogue, decision-making and implementation of responses to jointly perceived problems or in public-private partnerships. Thus, there have to be accommodated the tensions between inclusion and exclusion as well as to balance the pressures generated by the interests of the emerging powers. In this context, mention should be made that there are experts who draw attention to the possible threat that is currently represented by multilateralism being captured by the corporate world. Therefore, the space for multilateral solutions has narrowed, and the traditional tools of multilateralism have become insufficient to manage the complex emerging issues, which seems to represent a crossroads.

The main challenges the traditional multilateral institutions have had to face, some of them acknowledged even by UN and EU officials, the two multilateral organisations being extensively discussed in the paper, can be summarised as follows: resources – financial, human and legal, legitimacy and the ways to strengthen it; bureaucracy, resulting in delays and deadlocks; competing interests; power imbalances, generating tensions among stakeholders that do not consider themselves properly represented, in accordance with their interests and perceived power.

Under such circumstances, it has been almost unanimously agreed that reforms are necessary. However, there are still few specific details related to the substance and means of the changes. Moreover, there are too many variables to be considered in the efforts to align goals, interests and expectations, as well as to accommodate the structural, functional and strategic elements of transformation.

In this context, three possible futures are presented, coined by experts as *Westlessness, Westishness* and *Westfulness.* In addition, the characteristics of the transition period are briefly mentioned. Having all the above aspects considered, the idealism of perpetual peace seems an increasingly distant possibility, if not a mere utopia.

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THREAT ACTORS SEEKING TO EXPLOIT AI CAPABILITIES. TYPES AND THEIR GOALS

Petru-Dan KOVACI*

Artificial Intelligence's advancement has led to ethical and privacy concerns due to the ability of algorithms to mine personal data and conduct surveillance on a large scale. The influence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in cybersecurity extends beyond private entities and individuals. In this scenario, it is important to highlight the threatening actors and their objectives in order to counter AI-based cyber threats. We are dealing with different entities, each having its own interests: cybercriminals are interested in making profit, terrorist groups cause ideological violence and nation-states target geopolitical influence. Moreover, they are increasingly interested in developing AI-driven cyber warfare capabilities for either attacking their enemies or enhancing their defence measures against such attacks. This trend will most likely aggravate the global cyber arms race as countries compete to surpass each other in the development and deployment of AI-driven cyber capabilities. Consequently, it has become crucial for organizations and individuals to understand how AI affects cybersecurity and, thus, adapt their strategies accordingly. Traditional defences must be supplemented with AI-powered tools and techniques to stay ahead of the curve, while security experts must continually update their skills and expertise to cope with the changing threat landscape.

Keywords: AI; cybercriminal; cyberattack; deepfake; social engineering; threat actor.

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Introduction

Every conceivable aspect of life is gradually incorporating artificial intelligence, including social networks, independent bus companies, retail stores, and cybersecurity firms. Although AI enhances cybersecurity, it also gives hackers an upper hand in executing complex attacks. Chatbot (a computer program that simulates human conversation with an end user) usage is on the rise. One of the biggest risks in cyberattacks is social reengineering; if AI can be used to teach bots to interact amicably with humans, then the same technology could be used to conduct cyberattacks.

Anyone in the world can easily connect to a video or picture they never captured thanks to deepfakes technology. AI is currently the primary technology that generates deep fraud. AI-based deepfake technology expands possibilities but also makes it easier for bad actors to manipulate and interfere. Deepfake's main component involves machine learning, which allows it to create deepfakes more quickly and at a lower cost.

Automating image and audio processing expands a country's state surveillance capabilities by enabling the massive gathering, processing, and use of intelligence data for a variety of objectives, including the stifling of dissent.

Both state and non-state cybercriminals continue the search for ways to inflict disruptive and destructive attacks on targets within the critical infrastructure sector. Tactics employed by these cybercriminals often include the use of ransomware, denial-of-service attacks, and the defacement of websites.

Some actors aim to either refine their existing abilities or acquire new ones to disrupt the industrial control systems that underpin the one state energy, transportation, healthcare, and election sectors. In this article, there will be discussed the capabilities that an attacker may develop with AI technology as well as the types of attackers and their malitious intentions. The article employs a qualitative research method, focusing on descriptive and thematic analysis, literature review, and case studies to explore and understand the complex issues surrounding AI in cybersecurity and cyberattacks.

1. AI Functions That can be Utilized in Cyberattacks

1.1. Deepfakes

To this day, most content created through artificial means is predominantly user-generated, typically demonstrated by technologists exhibiting their AI capabilities through training algorithms to manipulate the appearance or voices of disparate actors or politicians. Consequently, a significant part of the content produced by users is evidently inauthentic.

A deepfake represents an AI-manipulated image, sound, or video that appears authentic. The underlying technology can synthesize speech, replace faces, and control facial emotions. Someone can appear to speak or do something that they actually never said or did in a deepfake. Usually, face swapping and facial expression manipulation are prominent in deepfake videos. Academics and internet firms have tested several techniques to identify deepfakes. These techniques usually employed AI to scan videos/photos for digital flaws or details - like blinking or facial tics - that deepfakes are unable to accurately replicate.

Source: GAO; conceived from DARPA image at https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-09-03a. | GAO-20-379SP

Figure no. 1: Examples of characteristics that may indicate a deepfake[1]

Deepfakes are frequently used for exploitation, despite the fact that they have harmless and legal uses in industries like entertainment and commerce. An article recently published ("An Investigation of the Effectiveness of Deepfake Models and Tools") by several researchers (Md. Saddam H. M. & Co., 2023) claims that a large majority of Deepfake recordings target politicians or celebrity personalities. They are widely disseminated online for misinformation. Deepfakes could be employed as a psychological warfare tool to sway elections, or to stir up civil unrest. They may also cause people to ignore valid proof of misconduct and, in general, erode public confidence in audiovisual content.

1.2. Social engineering
The focus of social engineering attacks is on the attacker's use of trust and persuasion. People are more prone to act in ways that they otherwise would not be appropriate when they come across these strategies (Sowjanya M, 2022). Attackers using social engineering try to obtain confidential information from their victims so that they can sell it on the dark web or use it for their own agenda. While social engineering attacks are unique, they share a general pattern with comparable stages.

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[1] URL: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usgao/49584240932, accesed at 20.01.2024.

The typical process unfolds as follows: 1) gathering victim information; 2) building a connection with the victim; 3) using the information at hand to launch an attack and, 4) making a clean getaway (Salahdine, F., Kaabouch, N, 2019). The attacker chooses a victim in phase one, commonly referred to as information gathering, depending on predetermined criteria. During the hook phase, the attacker uses email or direct communication to start building the victim's confidence. By divulging private information or creating security flaws, the attacker emotionally manipulates the victim during the execution stage. In the exit phase, the attacker disappears.

Large volumes of personal data from emails, social networking sites, and other sources may be analyzed by AI algorithms, which gives hackers the ability to develop phishing attacks that are both highly targeted and convincing. AI is capable of producing extremely persuasive voice calls, texts, and emails, which makes it more difficult for victims to recognize fraudulent activity.

1.3. Automated functions

In the domain of cybersecurity defence, (AI) is already being applied extensively for improving the efficacy and scalability of defence mechanisms such as spam and malware detection. Simultaneously, many villains are naturally motivated to try their hand at using AI to breach other people's usually weak systems (Miles B & Co., 2018). These incentives include a premium on speed, labor expenses, and challenges in luring and keeping competent workers. AI can be used to automate a number of cyberattack-related tasks, including vulnerability assessment, exploiting vulnerabilities, and even launching the attack. As a result, the attack may become more effective and unlikely to be discovered.

For instance, it facilitates the creation of covert channels for information exfiltration, malware agent distribution, and malware agent command and control. These covert channels are designed to evade systems that identify anomalies, malware, and intrusions. AI also facilitates malware obfuscation, which makes it more difficult to identify.

AI features will also improve the identification and exploitation of hostile vulnerabilities. They will encourage malware's concealment and increase its sophistication in both design and operation. Malware with AI capabilities can adapt cleverly to changes in the target's behavior and avoid detection. They will operate as an autonomous and adaptable implant that learns from the host it is running on to stay hidden, find and categorize engaging material for exfiltration, find and infect new targets, and find new lateral movement channels or techniques.

For example, as early as 2018, researchers at IBM created a malware of this kind and called it „DeepLocker." (Melisha 2018). The malware could evade detection by the majority of antivirus and malware scanners until it targeted particular victims

by concealing its dangerous payload in carrier apps, such as video conferencing software. It is almost tough to reverse engineer this straightforward "trigger condition" that opened the assault. Only once the desired target has been reached will the malicious payload become accessible. IBM researchers created and presented a proof of concept in order to illustrate the effectiveness of DeepLocker's capabilities. The WannaCry virus evaded detection by antivirus engines and malware sandboxes by disguising itself as a harmless video conferencing application. A human was chosen as the triggering condition, and AI was trained to initiate the virus when specific parameters, such as the target's facial recognition, were satisfied. IBM created DeepLocker merely as an experiment to demonstrate how simple evasion strategies and open-source AI tools may be coupled to create extremely effective, targeted malware.

AI is used now to enhance target prioritizing and selection, avoid detection, and adapt creatively to behavioral changes in the target (either independently or in conjunction with humans). Autonomous software has long been capable of taking advantage of system flaws, but more advanced AI hacking tools could perform far better than previous examples and, in the end (though maybe not for a while), than human experts.

Cybercriminals use AI approaches to automate several parts of their attack pipeline, such processing payments or communicating with victims of ransomware (Dash B & Co., 2022). To identify targets with greater precision, large datasets are used, for example, to estimate one's assets and willingness for reimbursement according to online behavior.

2. Threat Actors with Different Types of Motivations

2.1. Nation states – geopolitical interest

Government officials and organizations via state sponsorship. AI is being used by nation-states to produce more credible misinformation campaigns in an effort to erode public confidence in democratic processes, social cohesiveness, and government institutions. Also, the terrorist groups sponsored by a state can create more intricate and sophisticated attacks because they have plenty of resources and a great deal of experience. They may target critical infrastructure and industries within a nation, manipulate polls and spread misinformation to undermine its constitutional framework, or steal private data from businesses and government agencies.

According to "Homeland Threat Assessment 2024" the most advanced malicious influence operations on the internet are still being developed by Russia, China, and Iran (Office of Intelligence and Analysis 2024). It is likely that these adversaries will employ many of the same strategies to sway US audiences in the run-up to the 2024 election. AI-generated deepfake technology can be used, for instance, to sway

political opinion by creating phony videos of officials or celebrities speaking or acting indecently.

A key characteristic of gray zone conflicts in China and Russia is the blurring or thin line that separates cybercrime from funded by the state actions. In fact, these governments frequently employ contractors who, when not working for the state, might also commit cybercrime (Dunn C & Wenger A, 2022). For example, APT41, employed by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), engages in cybercrime activities during the late hours and cyberespionage actions during daytime.

Another instance of nation-state sponsored group utilizing artificial intelligence in hacking is APT28 (also known as Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, the Sednit Gang and Sofacy), a cyber-espionage organization connected to the Russian government. This group has a history of automating their hacking operations and increasing their productivity through the use of AI and machine learning techniques.

APT28 is well-known for using the Carbanak virus (Kaspersky 2015), which automates its cyber operations using machine learning algorithms. The goal of the Carbanak malware is to steal information from banks and other financial organizations. It makes it very challenging to detect and prevent by using machine learning to find and exploit vulnerabilities in the target systems. They might want to become well-known or recognized in hacking circles. The big issue of this group, in regard with the hacking activity is that it operates in alignment with Russian military and political objectives.

2.2. Cybercriminals and transnational criminal organizations – profit

The goal of cybercrime organizations is very clear: to make money. They can employ artificial intelligence systems to execute attacks or directly attack these systems in order to profit monetarily from their illicit activities. For instance, breaking into AI chatbots to gain access to private data, such as a customer's bank account information (obtaining financial information by pretending to be account holders) and request access to secure systems.

For instance, back in 2020, fraudsters used AI voice cloning to deceive a bank in the United Arab Emirates and steal $35 million (Alvarez Technology Group). Court records that Forbes has recently discovered reveal that the con artists tricked the manager of the bank into giving them the huge sum by imitating the deep-fake voice of a senior executive in the business. Hackers created a convincing bogus voice of the manager via AI voice cloning technology, stating that his business was going to undertake a purchase and lacked the funding to do so. The bank manager approved the transfer because he knew the executive's voice from prior job activity and considered everything was in proper order. The bank and the business had to handle the fallout after the cybercriminals fled with the stolen funds. This incident emphasizes the risks associated with cybercriminals utilizing AI to launch complex

attacks and the requirement for greater safety precautions to stop similar events from occurring in the future.

A recent report (UN 2023) states that during the previous year, there has been a 35% increase in online child sexual abuse and exploitation. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the global trafficking of illegal drugs enabled by cyberspace, along with guns, ammunition, and parts and components that are sold on the dark web. In certain parts of the world, there has also been a sharp rise in the trafficking of people for forced criminal activity related to casinos and organized crime groups' con games.

Independent groups of people operating on a global scale with the goal of obtaining power, influence, money, and/or commercial advantages through all or some illegal means are known as transnational criminal organizations. In order to hide their illicit activities, these groups may also employ international organizational structures, benefit from global trade and communication channels, or follow a violent or corrupt pattern.

AI-driven apps, systems, and technologies provide transnational organized crime groups with the tools and chance to engage in a wide range of illegal activities that are more intricate, can be carried out over longer distances, and pose less risk to individuals.

According to an analysis from Caldwell, M & Co., 2020, criminal organizations can use artificial intelligence (AI) for "supply chain management, risk assessment and mitigation, personnel vetting, social media data mining, and various types of analysis and problem-solving," just like legitimate businesses can.

Drones are used by organized crime in Africa for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, and surveillance, but they can also be a threat to physical security. AI-controlled autonomous attack drones, already in use by Mexican drug cartels, can provide criminals greater adaptability, dexterity, and coordination when physically attacking infrastructure, people, or supply chains.

Criminals can use satellite imagery to plan and coordinate cross-border smuggling routes with the aid of artificial intelligence (AI) systems like Earth Observations, which offer extremely precise and up-to-date local terrain data. In order to avoid detection (such as biometric screening procedures), get around security measures (at banks, warehouses, airports, ports, and borders), or cause havoc with government and private sector networks and economic infrastructure, organized crime can also target AI systems.

2.3. Terrorist groups – ideological violence

Extremists use AI for radicalization and recruitment, in order to get new followers to join, but also to identify people who share their ideology. These algorithms to look for trends and potential indicators of radicalization analyze massive amounts of internet data. With deliberate targeting, they seek out and entice weak people,

eventually bringing them around to radical viewpoints.

Extremist content can be produced and distributed via AI. Algorithms for natural language processing produce content that looks real. Via messaging apps, websites, and social media platforms, this content can disseminate radical narratives. Chatbots and other automated systems enable the rapid dissemination of this content, reaching a wider audience with less effort.

According to an article from Binder JF & Co, 2022, the term "online radicalization" refers to the process by which people use the Internet, particularly social media and other online communication platforms, to become exposed to, mimic, and internalize extremist ideas and attitudes. The phenomenon of online radicalization has raised significant concerns regarding grievance-based violence as well as terrorism. In fact, a comparative method that builds on the similarities among those who commit acts such as hate crimes, terrorist attacks, and high school shootings has been introduced in recent work.

2.4. Thrill-Seekers – satisfacion

As their name suggests, thrill seekers target information systems and computers primarily for amusement, for the purpose of boasting or try new things. While some use hacking to test their ability to substract large amounts of confidential data, others use it as a means of learning more about how computer networks and systems operate. Script kiddies are a subset of thrill-seekers who, despite lacking sophisticated technical knowledge, target weak systems with pre-existing tools and methods mainly for entertainment or self-gratification. Excitement seekers may interfere with a network's cybersecurity and create a gateway for future cyberattacks, even though they rarely seek to do harm.

A set of AI-generated posters for unproduced films that are styled after Pixar and Disney animated features are known as the "Offensive AI Pixar" case (Toolify. ai). The posters frequently deal with sensitive subjects that are deemed improper, exploitative, and unsuitable for a family movie. When an AI-generated poster for an animated film called "Caust", based on the Holocaust and of Adolf Hitler' life, became viral on social media in October 2023, the trend began to take off.

2.5. Insider Threats – discontent

Insider threat actors do not always have bad intentions, in contrast to the majority of other actor types. Some cause harm to their companies by accident, such as installing malware without meaning to or misplacing a company-issued device that a cybercriminal finds and utilizes to access the network. However, there are bad insiders as well. An example would be a disgruntled worker who misuses their access rights to substract data for financial gain or damages data or applications as a form of revenge for not being promoted.

For instance, Office of Public Affairs from US Department of Science mentioned in a press release from 2022 (Office of Public Affairs n.d.), the case of Twitter employee Ahmad Abouammo who exploited AI to accomplish his malicious intentions. In August 2022, Abouammo was found guilty of accepting bribes in return for gaining access to monitoring and sharing with representatives of the Saudi Royal family and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia users' personal information on Twitter. It is plausible to believe that AI may have been used to automate the process of monitoring and collecting Twitter users' private information, even though the precise details of how AI was employed in this case are not given.

Research method

The article extensively reviews existing literature, studies, and case examples. This approach is qualitative, focusing on understanding the nature, characteristics, and implications of AI in cybersecurity and cyberattacks through detailed descriptions and analyses. It categorizes different types of cyber threat actors and discusses their motivations and methods, which is typical of qualitative research that aims to understand phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. The article delves into the ethical and societal implications of AI in cybersecurity, concerned with understanding human experiences and societal impacts.

Conclusions

The integration of AI across various sectors, including cybersecurity, social networks, and retail, has both positive and negative implications. While AI significantly enhances cybersecurity defences, it also provides sophisticated tools for hackers, leading to more complex cyberattacks. This duality presents a critical challenge in the field.

Deepfake technology, a prominent application of AI, poses significant risks. It is primarily used to manipulate images and videos to create seemingly authentic but false representations. Although it has legitimate applications in entertainment and commerce, deepfakes are often exploited for malicious purposes such as spreading misinformation, swaying public opinion, and undermining trust in audiovisual content. This technology highlights the potential of AI to be used in psychological warfare and misinformation campaigns, especially targeting public figures such as politicians and celebrities.

Social engineering attacks, which rely on manipulating human trust, have become more sophisticated with the integration of AI. These attacks follow a pattern of information gathering, building trust, exploiting the acquired information, and then withdrawing without detection. AI's capability to analyze large volumes of

data from various sources, including emails and social media, has enabled the development of highly targeted and convincing phishing attacks, making them more challenging to detect.

The automation of cybersecurity functions through AI significantly improves the efficiency of defence mechanisms such as spam and malware detection. However, this also opens up opportunities for malicious actors to automate their attack processes, including vulnerability assessment and exploitation. For instance, the development of malware like DeepLocker demonstrates the potential of AI in creating sophisticated and targeted cyberattacks that are difficult to detect and counteract.

Different types of threat actors exploit AI for varied purposes. Nation-states use AI for geopolitical interests, including misinformation campaigns to undermine democratic processes and public trust in institutions. Cybercriminals and transnational criminal organizations primarily focus on financial gains, employing AI to execute attacks and penetrate secure systems. In contrast, terrorist groups use AI for ideological violence, leveraging it for radicalization, recruitment, and spreading extremist narratives. Thrill-seekers, often lacking advanced technical skills, exploit AI for amusement or to demonstrate their abilities, occasionally opening gateways for more severe cyberattacks. Lastly, insider threats pose a unique challenge as they may misuse AI either intentionally or unintentionally, leading to significant security breaches within organizations.

In conclusion, the rapid advancement of AI in cybersecurity is a double-edged sword. It offers unprecedented capabilities in data processing and pattern recognition, essential for detecting and neutralizing cyber threats. However, these same capabilities also raise serious ethical and privacy concerns because of their potential for intrusive data mining and surveillance. The complexity of the cyber threat landscape is increasing, with various actors employing AI to enhance their offensive and defensive capabilities. This necessitates a balanced approach, combining AI's computational power with human expertise and judgment for effective cybersecurity.

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
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REVIEW ESSAY: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, STRATEGIES, AND ROMANIA'S CASES

Mihai-Vladimir ZODIAN, PhD

• Vipin Narang,
Seeking the Bomb. Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2022, 400 pages

• Eliza Gheorghe, "Atomic Maverick: Romania`s negotiations for nuclear technology, 1964-1970", *Cold War History*, 13(3), 2013, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2013.776542

• Eliza Gheorghe, "Peace for Atoms. US Non-Proliferation Policy and the Romanian Role in the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1971", *The International History Review*, 40(5), 2018, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2018.1425893.

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Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Realism,
Great Powers, Minor Powers

Nuclear proliferation fell into a corner in the last years. There are still disagreements about the significance of this phenomenon, its causes, and sometimes, even about its effects. The texts reviewed here suggests that the issue is still important, and the salience may even grow, since the arms control and disarmament security regime weakened after Russia`s aggression against Ukraine. There, we may face an even greater impact in the future than the one expected when the they were written.

Seeking the Bomb is one of the best books written about nuclear proliferation published in the last few years. Vipin Narang is a known expert in this domain, with a previously work on nuclear strategies and posture for minor and medium powers. In the new book, the author tries to explain how states plan and act to acquire this weapon of mass destruction and to help us grasp the factors that stimulate or inhibit this behavior. It is based on an article that contains the main argument, but it may be read by anyone interested in the details and nuances of nuclear proliferation and the international politics around it (Narang 2016/2017).

The author has both theoretical and descriptive goals. What I liked about this book is the author`s ability to synthesize different situations and actors in a common theoretical framework and the clarity that his approach brings to the field. He also navigates with ease around methodologies that are contradictory, or at least, in tension, like statistics and case studies. I`m not entirely convinced that the author fully achieved his goals, because some of his variables are not well specified, especially the ones about domestic politics, which seems much like a theoretical dumping ground.

The author advances a neoclassical realist explanation for the strategies that states pursue in search of the bomb. He tries to explain their motivations, taking them for granted because he aims to study strategies, practices and the set of factors that affect the behavior, once the choice of a nuclear capability is made. These are a security threat, alliances, domestic politics, international status (vulnerability), and the protection of a great power (Narang 2016/2017). There is a subtle oscillation here between being empowered by various resources and having agency, and V. Narang argues that even minor actors matter in some contexts, an observation which became more frequent in research after the end of the Cold War (Miroiu 2005).

The author then classifies the states according to these factors, set up in almost an algorithmic order. We have three types of states that get close to nuclear weapons, but they don`t cross the threshold, the hedgers, with three types, arranged in a progression: technical, insurance, and hard (Narang 2022, 296-300).

Romania during the Communist regime shows up in the second category, but more on that below (Narang 2022, 42). There are three active types for the pursuit of nuclear weapons: sprinting (usually, a great power), sheltered (under the protection of one), or hiding (if neither) (Narang 2022, 126-291).

The main message: if not a great power, protected by one or part of an alliance, and you face a security threat, it`s a tough world. V. Narang expects that nuclear proliferation will continue and that hiding will remain the main path followed by states interested in nuclear weapons, mostly because there aren`t many candidates for the other two strategies, especially for sprinting. The rationalist nature of his framework is notable, the only exception being the way the factor of domestic consensus is specified, which may be seen as a departure from the main perspective. It`s also significant that the author is responsible for the proliferation policy, among others at Pentagon (Defense 2024).

Seeking the Bomb is interesting also from a methodological point of view. V. Narang pushes further a research tradition initiated by Scott Sagan, in which internal and external factors are combined to understand nuclear themes like deterrence and proliferation (Sagan 1994). The author uses a mixed methods approach, combining statistics with detailed, process tracing-style case studies. This combination represents the main difference between the book and the article on which it is based.

I would recommend *Seeking the Bomb* to any reader interested in nuclear topics or regional politics. The extended case studies include lesser-known stories, such as the Swedish or Taiwanese interests and projects, and offer consistent information on Israel`s policies in this domain. V. Narang developed two IR explanations to grasp nuclear proliferation and combined statistical methods and historical research. The main drawback is similar to other variants of neoclassical realism, that the domestic factors are not well developed in this theory, while alternative perspectives are underestimated.

Communist Romania'S Nuclear Policies

Now, let`s see what happened with Romania. Eliza Gheorghe is a researcher who gained her PhD at Oxford on this subject and represents the main voice on this subject (Gheorghe 2014). There is a consensus among international experts that the former regime tried to keep its nuclear options open, that it had some interest in the military applications of this technology, and that it took some steps, breached the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), then the system fell and everything stopped (Gheorghe 2014, 1). She argues in her thesis that the details are not very well known, and she relies on declassified documents and interviews to tell an interesting story which inspired a couple of articles, two being reviewed here (Gheorghe 2014, 2).

The first one tells the origin of this policy. In "Atomic Maverick", E. Gheorghe explains how Communist Romania gained from the West a research reactor,

technologies to manufacture plutonium, a heavy water plant, and later, a CANDU reactor, and sensitive nuclear materials (Gheorghe 2013, 374). Alongside natural uranium, these could have allowed the former regime to pursue a nuclear weapons program, the main reason why this strategy is called hedging (Gheorghe 2014). This way, an actor develops elements which, combined may offer a good chance to build nuclear weapons, but it refrains from the last steps, from internal or external factors (Narang 2022, 53-56).

The external or transnational context is the stage for these events. Romania`s Communist regime started to distance itself from its political patrons from the Soviet Union and gradually started to act more autonomously once the Red Army withdrew, in 1958. There were several disputed issues, a significant one being the Valev Plan, Moscow`s ideas about a supranational economic specialization, in which Bucharest's role would have been that of an underdeveloped hinterland for other, more industrialized socialist countries (Miroiu 2005, 164-177). Then, Nicolae Ceauşescu came to power and used his popular opposition against the Warsaw Pact`s intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to boost the nationalistic discourse and his credentials in the West (Miroiu 2005, 164-177).

E. Gheorghe underlines diplomacy and the ability to maneuver, contrasting with V. Narang's approach, which emphasized power or internal consensus. Romania`s nuclear interests were first pursued under the Soviet Union`s guidance, but the Soviets were careful not to slip too much to its clients, especially once they started to be cautious about the reliability of its satellites (Gheorghe 2013, 375-376, Gheorghe 2014). Once the political distance started to grow, the former Communist regime cultivated the image of a maverick, a disturber inside the Socialist camp, an image whose limits were known and accepted by all the parties (Gheorghe 2013). The Romanian authorities started multisided negotiations with Western countries, like the UK, France, and the US, but also with China and the Soviet Union (Gheorghe 2013, Gheorghe 2014).

This approach failed the first time. The reason was that the Soviets had a veto and that Nicolae Ceauşescu was not an entirely autonomous actor, or a dissident but a leader whose opposition could be tolerated by the Soviets because it didn`t threaten them and it provided them with Western knowledge and technology. For example, Bucharest tried to mediate between Washington and Hanoi for an end to the Vietnam War, while providing the second one with supplies, a diplomatic activity encouraged by the Soviet Union (Gheorghe 2013, 382-389). This baffling situation ended when Moscow reinforced the deal it made earlier with the Romanian authorities, promising them the delivery of a nuclear reactor for a plant situated in the Olt country, a reactor never provided (Gheorghe 2013, 390).

Nevertheless, the former Communist regime persevered. This is the story told in „Peace for Atoms", another article by Eliza Gheorghe, also based on her thesis

(Gheorghe 2018). The Republican administration of Richard Nixon in which an important role was played by Henry Kissinger came to power in 1969 and tried to use the Sino-Soviet split to improve the US standing in the world, which was challenged in the context of the Vietnam War and the economic conditions (Kissinger 1998). As with the previous attempts, Bucharest tried to mediate between Washington and Beijing, but this time, acting without with Soviet approval (Gheorghe 2018, 2018).

E. Gheorghe argues that proliferation was less important than great power diplomacy for the Nixon administration. This outlook allowed a minor power to play a bigger role than its capacities would have allowed, but it wasn`t the only factor. Romanian diplomacy and the international setting were also important to understand how Bucharest gained access to sensitive Western technology during the Cold War, even if it was known that the country would not switch camps (Miroiu 2005, Gheorghe 2014, Gheorghe 2018). Also, the goals were obvious since Nicolae Ceauşescu was skeptical towards the NPT in the past and he even explained his policy a couple of times (Gheorghe 2018).

There were several important moments, according to the author, in this process. One occasion was Nixon`s visit to Romania, in 1969, where the two leaders talked about the mediation with China and nuclear cooperation with the US, at a time when the diplomatic relationships between Washington and Beijing were frozen (Gheorghe 2014, 5-7). In another, the invitation addressed to the US president for the soon-to-be historical visit to China came a bit later through Romanian contacts, by comparison with the parallel Pakistani channel (Gheorghe 2018, 13-14). Some messages were even carried by Ceausescu himself (Gheorghe 2018, 15-16).

Romania wasn`t the main channel between the US and China, but sometimes, it was important. According to E. Gheorghe, it offered the US leaders an internal view of the workings of the Communist world, especially of *nomenklatura*`s perspective (Gheorghe 2018, 15-16). It also provided redundancy, which prevented the secret communication from being interrupted (Gheorghe 2018, 11-12). The Romanian Communist regime achieved its short-term goals and gained access to the capacity it needed for the intended hedging strategy (Gheorghe 2018, 16-17).

An example quoted by the author illustrates this point. The secret, mediated, negotiations between US and China were often influenced by events like the extension of the Vietnam War in Laos by the American authorities (Gheorghe 2018, 14-15). The Romanian middlemen plead for a de-linkage of these issues from the general subject of US-China relationship. A similar argument was used for the more protracted Taiwan question (Gheorghe 2018).

Up to a point, is a tale of how close Romania came to resembling North Korea. Disgruntled by the relationships with the dominant power, the Soviet Union, the former regime pursued a nuanced strategy of obtaining access and nuclear facilities from any international actor willing to provide, while remaining in the socialist camp.

The regime became more ideologized, nationalistic, and dynastic, and everyone can notice its fixations simply by looking at *Casa Poporului* or *Casa Radio*(Burakowski 2011). Nevertheless, Eliza Gheorghe tends to see Communist Romania`s policy under a realist lens, as a search for external power, influence, and autonomy, being closer to the perspectives based on state or national interests, than to the approaches reliant on domestic policies.

E. Gheorghe`s research brought new light on a controversial idea: Nicolae Ceauşescu`s nuclear projects. One of the main strong points of her approach is the reliance on an impressive collection of documents, from various sources like official Romanian texts, US archives, or from international organizations. The other is the theoretical framework, which is mostly realist, and allows the reader to connect the conclusions with wider debates on nuclear proliferation and the role of capabilities in world politics. There is an unanswered question, why did the projects remain in the hedging stage and why weren`t they intensified towards the end of the regime, when the external situation worsened?

Nuclear proliferation is close to many other important issues in International Relations. One is the role played by power in world politics since the dissemination of this technology depends on the relationship between great and minor powers. Both authors argue that small powers matter, even if the setting is dependent on the major players, as shown by Romania`s mediation between US and China. The other is the relationship between technology and society, and we see that political actors and structures play an important part in modeling it.

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WORKSHOP

"The impact of climate change on national security"
(Phase II)

- 26th October, 2023 -

Climate change is a set of impacts caused both by natural causes and, directly or indirectly, by human activity. These effects are felt in the form of long-term changes in weather patterns, in short, climate changes that can threaten people's security, the environment and development conditions in all sectors and areas. In other terms, climate change is a deeply chronic phenomenon, in the sense that it occurs over a long period of time, with effects that are not yet felt very often, acutely. The real issue is that, as with any chronic dysfunction, the closer we get to what is called 'the point of no return' and the longer it takes to prevent it, the more the diversity, complexity, and scale of measures to deal with the effects of climate change increase, and the more serious the impact.

The unavoidable effects of climate change are increasingly visible, at national, regional, and even global level. We are witnessing periods of extreme temperatures (intense heat waves or cold waves), periods of drought, which destroy agricultural production, threaten to affect biodiversity caused by floods, vegetation fires, landslides or other such phenomena that affect people, deepen, or multiply vulnerabilities, thus causing risks to national security.

Climate change is not a new phenomenon, it is already a constitutive part of life on our planet and acts, if not directly, often as an conflict amplifier in society with potentially destructive effects on human systems. We are witnessing an increase in the frequency and scale of extreme weather and climate phenomena. The current rapid and widespread pace at which they are occurring, the transition to a development model that protects the environment, in which economic and social considerations are balanced with concern for combating climate change and the sustainable use of natural resources, represent the main challenges of the 21st century

for the international community. People and societies will need to identify, mitigate (through increased use of renewable energy, promotion of behavioural change, etc.), prevent and continuously adapt to the disruptive and unavoidable consequences of these phenomena (through conservation of water resources, crop rotation, public planning and awareness raising, increasing the height of dams, etc.).

As a result of climate change and global warming, along with the disruption of natural ecosystems come the political, social, and economic systems that underpin every society and guarantee the security of citizens, communities, and states. The overall consequence is that climate disruption can lead to political, economic, and social instability on all levels of national and international security.

Climate change has prompted states and international organisations to develop policies, strategies and plans to combat the disruptive and destructive effects of climate, global warming, the greenhouse effect, and environmental degradation.

The European Union has been at the forefront of global efforts to combat climate change and has been actively involved in making climate change a central element of its external policy. In this respect, discussions on climate change on the agenda of EU leaders have led to the setting of a rather bold target in the current security context of moving to green energy and reducing greenhouse emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (European Commission 2023).

Within NATO, there has been a growing recognition of the links between climate change, security, and geopolitical stability, increasingly integrating climate considerations into its security planning and operations. NATO's Strategic Concept 2022 defines climate change as a "crisis and threat multiplier".

NATO and the EU are demonstrating a shared commitment to addressing climate change challenges by actively promoting the adoption of green energy solutions and advancing the transition to a more sustainable future by actively promoting the adoption of green energy technologies at the civilian level.

The World Economic Forum held on January 11, 2023, in its *Global Risk Report 2023*, highlights the importance of climate change and ranks extreme weather as the top ten risk in terms of likelihood of occurrence and climate action failure as the top risk in terms of impact − before weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks and infectious diseases (World Economic Forum).

These are just a few introductory aspects that refer to the need to focus efforts on taking the most serious steps possible to analyse the situation, draw up realistic forecasts, identify solutions to address the issue of climate change, and develop a coherent and integrated strategy and its implementation at sectoral, national, regional, and global level through plans that include objectives and deadlines, measures, and actions, as well as allocated means and resources.

With more than 20 years of activity, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) organises and conducts a wide range of scientific events, each with the common objective of developing security culture while increasing visibility

in academia and scientific research. This year's *Workshop edition was held on October 26, 2023, in hybrid format, marking the second phase of the project entitled "The impact of climate change on Romania's national security"*, requested by the Armament General Directorate (AGD) and included in the Ministry of National Defence sectoral research and development plan for the period 2022-2025.

PROJECT PRESENTATION

• **PURPOSE** − to identify Romania's vulnerabilities, as well as threats and risks to national security, caused by ongoing climate change, and to forecast them over the next two decades, with the aim of providing a model for analysis and a coherent basis for the development of future strategies and policies in the field.

• **OUTPUTS** − the research outputs approach three workshops, one organized each year of the allocated period. Each workshop will generate the following deliverables:
- summary material on how it was carried out and the results obtained − sent to AGD;
- presentation of the scientific event in Strategic Impact journal, edited by CDSSS;
- portfolio with recordings, photos, presentations;
- media coverage of the scientific event through official media channels (social networks), in compliance with the rules in force.
• at the end of the project, a model for analysing the effects of climate change on national security will be developed to enable beneficiaries to develop/adapt future strategies and policies in this field.

• **PROJECT TEAM**
• the project team comprises project directors and CDSSS staff members (researchers and administrative staff).

• **EXECUTION**
The project period was divided into three phases as follows:
- Phase I: March-December 2022;
- Phase II: January-December 2023;
- Phase III: January-December 2024.
A workshop is held at the end of every phase to effectively accomplish both general and specific objectives.
The general objectives address the whole research approach and aim to: *identifying the main national threats posed by climate change; analysing the major consequences of climate change impacts on national and regional stability and*

security; identifying possible solutions to the climate change challenges we face - green economy opportunities and climate action; discussing measures to adapt to the inevitable impacts of climate change; identifying solutions for improving adaptive capacity and increasing the resilience of socio-economic and natural systems to the climate change effects; identifying responsible institutions and the role and place of national instruments of power in managing the climate change effects; presenting national policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; identifying economic sectors where specific measures to reduce GHG emissions are needed; identifying specific elements of a low-carbon economy.

The objectives for each workshop/phase follow the standard ADDIE (Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, Evaluation) sequence. This is the process that will be undertaken to develop the Climate Change Impact Analysis Model for National Security, which will be the final deliverable.

WORKSHOP I (December 14, 2022)

The first workshop was held online on the ILIAS-DIDAD platform. More than 30 specialists, academia and researchers from the country and abroad participated in the activity.

The following specific objectives were achieved:

O1. *initiation of scientific research approach − presentation of the general coordinates of the whole project: purpose, theme, framing in the research effort of MoND, NDU, CDSSS, allocated period, beneficiaries, participants, results expected by the beneficiary (deliverables, activities,), necessary steps, etc.*

O2. *definition of study problem − presentation by invited experts of the climate change situation in cause-effect format. The project team understood the topic under study, which created the prerequisites for a more realistic design of the whole approach as well as of each phase of the project, determination by the project team of the necessary data (sources, format, documentation activities, etc.), of the needs and possibilities for cooperation, as well as of the methods and tools used for the analyses they will undertake in the approach, each member per chosen section/field.*

O3. *definition of research objectives, outline of the organisational framework (participants tasks, contributions to activities and deliverables, possibilities for cooperation, etc.). The research objectives, phases and milestones for the whole approach have been defined, according to the purpose and expected results of the beneficiary. The organisational framework has also been set up to carry out the necessary activities for the development of the climate change impact analysis model on national security, based on the threats and risks generated by climate change, correlated with system vulnerabilities, as well as elements of forecasting on the subject, in line with the project scientific objectives. It was agreed that the entire project team's approach would focus on the security sectors as understood by the Copenhagen School (political, defence, societal, economic, environmental), to which the public communication component was added.*

The scientific event was publicised through official information channels and the conclusions were submitted in summary to the main beneficiary, namely the AGD.

WORKSHOP II (October 26, 2023)

The second workshop was held in a hybrid format, physical − at NDU, and online – on ILIAS platform. In response to numerous invitations, the workshop was attended by specialists with concerns in climate change, security and defence and related fields. The audience included representatives of structures such as the Department for Defence Policy, Planning and International Relations, Control and Inspection Corps, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Air Component Command, Joint Forces Command, "Henri Coandă" Air Force Academy, General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.

Valuable contributions were made by specialists from structures such as SNAOPSN, governmental, non-governmental and academic institutions respectively:

• Director General of the National Meteorological Administration, Elena MATEESCU, together with Roxana BOJARIU, Romania's Focal Point to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

• Manager of "Marius Nasta" Institute of Pneumophysiology, Doctor Beatrice MAHLER;

• representative of Special Telecommunications Service, Colonel Iuliana GUIȚĂ-ALEXANDRU;

• representatives of Control and Inspection Corps within the Ministry of National Defence, Colonel Adrian ANTIP, and Major Valentin MĂRĂCINEANU;

• representative of Department for Defence Policy, Planning, and International Relations, Civil Servant Ștefan NIȚULESCU;

• representative of the Defence Staff, Colonel Iliuță VLAD, representative of Air Force Staff, Captain Cristian CIULEAN and representative of Joint Forces Command, Major Alexandru CRISTIAN;

• representative of Romanian Reserve Officers Association, Colonel (ret.) Stan ANTON, former director of CDSSS, and representative of Ministry of Internal Affairs, Second Lieutenant Adrian NISTORESCU;

• professor emeritus Sabina ȘTEFAN, Romanian Academy of Scientists and Bogdan ANTONESCU, PhD, Faculty of Physics, University of Bucharest;

• professor Adrian PITICAR, PhD, Vice-Rector for Scientific Research together with Captain Alexandru TUDOR from "Henri Coandă" Air Force Academy;

• PhD candidates from National University of Political Studies and Public Administration and "Carol I" National Defence University;

• researchers from CDSSS, members of the project team scientific component.

Specific objectives:
- identifying and analysing national vulnerabilities, as well as threats and risks that may be generated by the effects of climate change, to configure the set of threats-risks-vulnerabilities associated with the impact of climate change − inputs of high importance in the equation that will be solved by the previous analysis model;
- identify forecast inputs, oriented to the PMESII domains, to support those produced by the implementation of the analysis model; this objective will also be maintained in Workshop III.

Workshop conduct
The event was moderated by the head of Strategic Analysis and Evaluations Office, Colonel Dan-Lucian PETRESCU, PhD, together with Scientific Researcher Mihai ZODIAN, PhD, from CDSSS. The Workshop organising committee, under the

coordination of the Head of BAES, included research staff from the Centre as well as members of the Scientific Secretariat, Events and Collaborations Department.

The event was attended by more than 30 people. The set objectives were achieved through presentations and debates. The proposed themes provided the scientific framework for 22 presentations (including two with the same title), as follows:

• *Global Warming and International Relations Theory: Issues, Concepts and Approaches;*

• *Climate Change in the Context of National Security;*

• *Climate Change in Romania - Trends and Challenges;*

• *Identifying the Effects of Climate Change and its Impact at National Level;*

• *Climate Change Initiatives;*

• *Strategy for Romanian Armed Forces Preparation to Address Climate Change and Energy Transition;*

• *The Interdependence between Critical Infrastructure and Climate Change;*

• *The Impact of Climate Change on National Security;*

• *Climate Change and its Direct Effect on Romania;*

• *Implications of Climate Change in the Military;*

• *Pollution as a Risk Factor in Chronic Lung Diseases;*

• *Changes in Heat Wave Indices in Romania;*

• *Ecological Dimension of Security - The Importance of Water;*

• *Ro-Risk Project;*

• *Vulnerabilities Translated by Climate Change Effects into Environmental Risks and Threats to National Security;*

• *Vulnerabilities of the Economic Sector in the Context of Climate Change;*

• *Climate Change Impacts on National Security. Vulnerabilities in the Societal Sector;*

• *How to Be Resilient. Emotions, from Survival Lessons to Lessons Learned;*

• *Reflecting Climate Change in Public Discourse and Romanian Media;*

• *The Effects of Climate Change on Military Security;*

• *NATO Action Plan on Climate Change and Security.*

A brief assessment of the activity was made at the end of the workshop, during which the conclusions on the results obtained from the scientific approach were presented.

The activity was publicized online, before and after its conclusions, during which the participants expressed their appreciation on how the activity was organised and their intention to participate in the next CDSSS scientific activities.

Event photo: Workshop with the theme
"THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON NATIONAL SECURITY (II)"

The Workshop represented a success both for CDSSS and for "Carol I" National Defence University, in terms of the topics addressed, the scientific level of the presentations, the institutional affiliation of participants origin and the results obtained. The activity made a real contribution to the development of the knowledge-sharing in the security and defence field, providing a high-quality academic framework for debate and real support for the strategic and security culture development.

WORKSHOP III (fourth semester, 2024)

The third workshop is scheduled to take place at the conclusive phase III of the associated research approach of the project, towards the end of 2024.

Specific planned objectives:

- to present the model analysis on the impact of climate change on national security;

- to present the results of the model implementation in the form of conclusions on how climate change may affect national security in the next 20 years;

- to determine ways to optimise the model.

Raluca STAN, PhD*
Otilia LEHACI**

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- ✓ **Compliance with the thematic area of the journal – security and strategic studies** and the following topics: political-military topical aspects, trends and perspectives in security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence, information society, peace and war, conflict management, military strategy, cyber-security;
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BOOK
Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)
Grazer, Brian, and Charles Fishman. 2015. A Curious Mind: The Secret to a Bigger Life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Smith, Zadie. 2016. Swing Time. New York: Penguin Press.

In-text citation
(Grazer and Fishman 2015, 12)
(Smith 2016, 315–16)

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[1] URL: https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html

CHAPTER OF AN EDITED BOOK
In the reference list, include the page range for the chapter. In the text, cite specific pages.
Reference list entry
Thoreau, Henry David. 2016. "Walking." *In The Making of the American Essay*, edited by John D'Agata, 167–95. Minneapolis: Graywolf Press.
In-text citation
(Thoreau 2016, 177–78)

ARTICLE
In the reference list, include page range for the whole article. In the text, cite specific page numbers. For article consulted online, include a URL or the name of the database in the reference list entry. Many journal articles list a DOI (Digital Object Identifier). A DOI forms a permanent URL that begins https://doi.org/. This URL is preferable to the URL that appears in your browser's address bar.
Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)
Keng, Shao-Hsun, Chun-Hung Lin, and Peter F. Orazem. 2017. "Expanding College Access in Taiwan, 1978–2014: Effects on Graduate Quality and Income Inequality." *Journal of Human Capital* 11, no. 1 (Spring): 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1086/690235.
LaSalle, Peter. 2017. "Conundrum: A Story about Reading." *New England Review* 38 (1): 95–109. Project MUSE.
In-text citation
(Keng, Lin, and Orazem 2017, 9–10)
(LaSalle 2017, 95)

WEBSITE CONTENT
Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)
Bouman, Katie. 2016. "How to Take a Picture of a Black Hole." Filmed November 2016 at TEDxBeaconStreet, Brookline, MA. Video, 12:51. https://www.ted.com/talks/katie_bouman_what_does_a_black_hole_look_like
Google. 2017. "Privacy Policy." Privacy & Terms. Last modified April 17, 2017. https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/
Yale University. n.d. "About Yale: Yale Facts." Accessed May 1, 2017. https://www.yale.edu/about-yale/yale-facts
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(Bouman 2016)
(Google 2017)
(Yale University, n.d.)

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Articles from newspapers or news sites, magazines, blogs, and like are cited similarly. In the reference list, it can be helpful to repeat the year with sources that are cited also by month and day. If you consulted the article online, include a URL or the name of the databases.

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)

Manjoo, Farhad. 2017. "Snap Makes a Bet on the Cultural Supremacy of the Camera." *New York Times*, March 8, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/technology/snap-makes-a-bet-on-the-cultural-supremacy-of-the-camera.html

Mead, Rebecca. 2017. "The Prophet of Dystopia." *New Yorker*, April 17, 2017.

Pai, Tanya. 2017. "The Squishy, Sugary History of Peeps." *Vox*, April 11, 2017. http://www.vox.com/culture/2017/4/11/15209084/peeps-easter

In-text citation

(Manjoo 2017)

(Mead 2017, 43)

(Pai 2017)

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