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EDITOR'S NOTE

The current edition represents number 1 of our journal, for the year 2020 (no. 74), and comprises a collection of eight articles, followed by a recently published book review.

The journal is opened by the rubric ***NATO and EU: Policies, Strategies, Actions***, which encompasses two topical articles. The first, entitled *The Role of the Armed Forces and the Police in EU Operations under CSDP*, by Colonel (ret) Radoslav Ivancik concludes that the participation of the armed forces and the police in EU operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy is extremely effective, as it contributed significantly in achieving and maintaining international peace and security. The second article, *Is The NCRS-OPP Dual System the Best Tool for Planning NATO Operations?*, developed by Lieutenant colonel Paul Sanda, analyses the NCRS-OPP dual system, highlighting its weaknesses.

The rubric entitled ***Security and Military Strategy*** contains three articles whose topics represent three priorities on the international strategic agenda. In the article *The European Security in Times of Refugee Crisis*, Lieutenant Viorel Ene, PhD, identifies viable solutions and how to develop an action plan, absolutely necessary to avoid a regional crisis, with international implications, caused by waves of refugees advancing to the border of the European Union. The second article brings to the fore an issue of present days, namely *The challenge of Hypersonic Missiles*. The author, Lieutenant colonel Cătălin Chiriac conducts a research on the development of hypersonic military systems, which can be directed at great height and distances, with great precision, but also efficiently (one not yet demonstrated), and which proves to be much more difficult and challenging, even in terms of providing the necessary resources. Also, the third article, *How to Become a Soldier? A Survey on the Personnel Serving in the Military Health Care*, written by Lieutenant-colonel Martha Pakozdy, in collaboration with Professor Gÿorgy Bárdos, represents a study aimed at formulating proposals regarding the main topics of future quantitative research on career choice in the military.

Next, in the rubric ***Geopolitics and Geostrategies: Trends and Perspectives*****,** we have included the article *Change of Direction in Turkey's Africa Policy. What is Behind the Turkish Intervention in Libya?* written by Mr. Andras Malnassy. The article is an analysis of the key reasons for Turkey's foreign policies and its military intervention in the North African region, due to the strategic, economic and geopolitical importance of the continent.

The ***Intelligence Studies*** rubric is opened by an article co-authored by Cristian Istrate and Maria Magdalena Bulancia, titled *The Role of Mental Maps in Intelligence Analysis*, whose purpose is to highlight the benefits of developing heuristic thinking in the process of information analysis and to explain why intelligence analysts should use this technique frequently. In the second article, entitled *Open Source Intelligence: Opportunities and Challenges*, Mrs. Raluca Codruța Luțai, PhD, proposes a rethinking of the open sources usefulness for intelligence services and communities, by analysing the advantages and disadvantages that OSINT imposes, starting from when defining the intelligence discipline.

In this edition, we set out to bring to our readers' attention, in the ***Book Review*** rubric, a book written by Thomas Hegghammer, titled "The Caravan – Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad", reviewed by Mr. János Besenyö, PhD. Little known in the Western world, Abdallah Azzam is considered one of the founding theorist of the concept of global jihad.

In the context of SARS-CoV 2 pandemic, the scientific events to be carried out within CDSSS were, as the case might be, rescheduled or cancelled. Thus, the Workshop on *Adapting defence planning documents to security challenges*, scheduled for March 26th, 2020, was rescheduled for the following year, and the International Seminar *UN 75 years later and the future of multilateralism*, planned for May 28th, 2020 was cancelled.

However, we are currently preparing the organization of the *Strategy XXI* Conference on *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, between November 5th and 6th, 2020. We would like to invite you to subscribe on the platform at https://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/en/conferences-strategies-xxi/the-centre-for-defence-and-security-strategic-studies-conference.

For those who read for the first time *Strategic Impact*, it is an open-access peer reviewed journal, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies and published with the support of the "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, and, according to the National Council for Titles, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU), the publication is a prestigious scientific journal in the field of military sciences, information and public order.

Strategic Impact is being printed in Romanian language for twenty years and in English for fifteen years and approaches a complex thematic: political-military topicality; security and military strategy; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; geopolitics and geostrategies; information society and intelligence. Readers may find in the pages of the publication analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – the primary objective of the journal – the recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and, in addition, WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, but also its presence in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad, such as NATO and of universities with military profile in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia etc.

Strategic Impact is printed in two distinct editions, both in Romanian and English language. The journal is distributed free of charge in main institutions in the field of security and defence, in the academia and abroad – in Europe, Asia and America.

In the end, we would like to encourage those interested to publish in our journal to prospect and evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of the security environment and, also, we invite the interested students, Master students and Doctoral candidates to submit articles for publication in the monthly supplement of the journal, *Strategic Colloquium*, available on the Internet at http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/cs.htm, indexed in the international database CEEOL, Google scholar and ROAD ISSN.

Editor in Chief, Colonel Florian CÎRCIUMARU, PhD
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE IN EU OPERATIONS UNDER CSDP

Radoslav IVANČÍK, Ph.D.*

Scientific research in the field of security, particularly in the area of security forces and services within the European Union, is rather complicated. The difficulties associated with security research are mainly connected with the fact that the EU is not a state, it does not have its own armed forces, its own police force, a fire and rescue corps, and other security and rescue services. Therefore, scientific research on any security forces activities within the EU must be different from the scientific research carried out by a particular Member State of the Union. Our intention is to contribute to research in this area, particularly regarding the participation of the armed forces and the police in EU operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Keywords: *European Union; armed forces; police; security; operations.*

Introduction

The development of human society in the last decade of the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st century has been very dynamic and turbulent. This has caused that the current security threats, which have been affected by the changes in the global and regional security environment, since the end of the Cold War and the bipolar division of the world, differ significantly from the security threats we were accustomed to less than three decades ago. According to them, at that time, individual states and military-political pacts formed their security policies and the resulting security, defence and military strategies.

While in the past the states have been the only relevant actors in the field of international relations and international security[1], they now must share their place and influence with a wide range of non-state actors at higher or lower levels. Although the risk of classical military conflicts between states has declined

[1] Pavel Nečas, Jaroslav Ušiak, *Nový prístup k bezpečnosti štátu na začiatku 21. storočia*. Armed Forces Academy M.R. Štefánika, Liptovský Mikuláš, 2011, p. 52.

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significantly[2] (but in no case armed conflicts between states are excluded), the non-state actors' activities, in some cases even individuals' activities, can cause damage to such a large extent (e.g. on states' critical infrastructure) as armed forces of other states can. Thus, asymmetric security threats gradually prevail over symmetric security threats.

One of the most significant consequences of deepening globalization and fundamental changes in the security environment is the decline of territoriality importance in the international system. Globalization represents a highly dynamic multidimensional process in which political, economic, social, military-strategic, technological, environmental and other factors are intertwined and influenced.[3]

The globalization development has shown that economic factors have a decisive impact on its course, which, nonetheless, significantly affects others and, on the basis of these, creates a new system of international economic, political, security and social relations.[4] The result of globalization is, on the one hand, closer cooperation between states, but on the other, wider economic interdependence. According to Marek, the impact of globalization increases not only the vulnerability of any state of the world but also of the entire international community.[5]

The above-mentioned decline in territoriality significance is very closely related to another result of globalization, which, according to Ondria and Kollar, is the falling power and influence of the sovereign state.[6] While in the past, the state's territory was clearly defined, and states had a firm control over who and what enters or transits them, today it is not the case anymore, especially due to globalization and rapid technical and technological development. A typical example of this phenomenon is the European Union (EU), in which European integration has significantly reduced the privileged position of the modern state, as a part of its functions and competences have moved to a transnational, European level.[7] The internal space of an EU Member State cannot be clearly separated from the space outside it. Both these dimensions are overlapping across the EU in some domains (e.g. trade regulation or border transit, for some Member States).

Similarly, the boundaries between the state's internal and external security are gradually wiped out. Internal security threats, as terrorism or organized crime, have already gained external, international level in the form of international terrorism or transboundary organized crime. Nowadays, an attack or criminal act can be easily committed using modern technical means from another state's territory, even from the far side of the world. The originator of the external security threats is no longer in a form of the armed forces of another state as it was in the past but, on an ever

[2] Rastislav Kazanský, *The Theory of Conflict*, Belianum, Banská Bystrica, 2015, p. 28.
[3] Milan Šikula, "K metodologickým východiskám ponímania fenoménu globalizácie", in *Ekonomický časopis*, 2005, p. 667.
[4] Radoslav Ivančík, "Fenomén zvaný globalizácia", in *Vojenské reflexie*, 2011, p. 33.
[5] Ján Marek, "Globalizácia ako aktér medzinárodnej bezpečnosti 21. storočia", in *Národná a medzinárodná bezpečnosť*, 2017, p. 298.
[6] Peter Ondria, Dávid Kollár, "Vplyv globalizácie na národnú bezpečnosť", in *Bezpečnostné fórum*, p. 20.
[7] Radoslava Brhlíková, *Bezpečnosť a Európska únia*, Konštantína Filozofa University, Nitra, 2014, p. 126.

greater scale, the threats origins can be linked to illegal migratory flows caused by internal civil conflicts or the failure of states' basic functions in neighbouring or remote regions of the world.

Europe is currently facing threats that are diverse, less visible and very difficult to predict. With their new approach, the external security threats have prompted the deepening and strengthening of security and defence policy, both at national level and at the level of international organizations (unions, alliances, blocs, pacts etc.). The need for capabilities and forces to respond to these security threats, whether in the form of international terrorism, organized crime, mass illegal migration, religious fundamentalism or nationalist radicalism, or even the threat of using weapons of mass destruction, has not circumvented the EU. This has led to the implementation of the European and, later, Common Security and Defence Policy as an integral part of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union has recognized that, in the event of the outbreak of crises and conflicts arising from new security threats, civilian and military (or mixed) operations will be needed in the context of crisis management, should diplomatic instruments fail.

1. The Role of EU missions and operations in maintaining security

EU is not a classical international organization, but it is a *sui generis* organization[8], so scientific research in the security area is not simple because it is not possible to use research-friendly methods suitable for general research of international organizations. Moreover, as the EU is a unique political and economic union of 27 European countries with a unique decision-making process, European integration significantly influences the processes in all areas of society, in all policies and at all levels.

The EU, as mentioned, is a special player in international relations, which, while implementing its own foreign security and defence policies, engages in international crisis management operations but has no security forces of its own. Therefore, in terms of implementing the activities deriving from these policies, the EU uses forces assigned to the Union by individual Member States. These are, primarily, military and police units.

The armed forces and the police are brought to the foreground because they represent (of all security forces) the most important tool through which states apply their monopoly on legitimate use of force. The armed forces and the police are also the primary institutions employed by states in order to ensure their security, freedom, autonomy, territorial integrity, internal and external security and the protection of their populations.

In the past, the vast majority of states actively participated in wars and armed conflicts for many reasons. Mostly, they fought with other states for territory, resources, population or influence. This is the case of the First and Second World Wars or other conflicts like those between India and Pakistan or between Israel and

[8] Ľubica Baričičová, Monika Pajpachová, "Policajná organizácia ako garant vnútornej bezpečnosti", in *Právní a bezpečnostní prostředí Evropské unie v teritoriální optice vybraných zemí středoevropského prostoru*, 2016, p. 18.

the Arab States. Later, in the second half of the 20th century, several international and non-international conflicts erupted, having their origins in civil wars. It was the case of the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1964-1975) or Afghanistan wars (1979-1989, 1989-1992, 2001-present) and several wars on the African continent, among others. Many external actors were involved in each side of the conflict.

Today, the fundamental changes that have happened not only in the political and economic international relations, but mainly in the security environment, have led to the conclusion that the military defeat of the enemy does not mean a final solution to the conflict. The objectives are to restore full state functionality, to achieve national and regional stability, to enable states' capabilities to manage and control their territory, and to prevent other actors from disrespecting or attacking their territorial integrity, occupying parts of their territory or strengthening the influence on them. The impossibility to protect itself along the borders means that the state needs not only to purge of its enemies but it also needs for other states in the region to function properly and to prevent the emergence of threats on their territories.

In a view promoting the idea of democratic peace in the contemporary world, according to which democratic states do not fight each other, the state's internal establishment also matters. Therefore, the international community's effort is to maintain peace and international security, to end fighting and violence and, subsequently, to establish democratic regime that respect the rules of good governance, create a functional democratic government and integrate it into regional and global structures.[9]

New objectives require new approaches and new forms of participation. Probably the biggest change was in the peacekeeping operations. Traditionally, they are based on three principles: on the approval of belligerents with the deployment of peacekeeping forces; on the impartiality of deployed peacekeepers; and on the right to use force only in case of self-defence.[10] The aim of the deployed forces was not to interfere with the ongoing conflict and country's internal affairs, but to maintain the ceasefire, to increase confidence in the peace process and to support a peaceful dialogue between the parties involved in the conflict.

The current forms of peacekeeping operations have changed with the tasks that the deployed forces should perform in the area of operations. In view of the more and more frequent forces deployment in non-international conflicts, between governmental and non-governmental forces, or between such groups only,[11] deployed units are increasingly involved in the ongoing fights. Their primary task is not to maintain peace, but to restore it, or even to enforce it, as the primary fundamental goal is to stop the fighting and the violence. The mandate of such units is, of course, much wider than in the case of standard peacekeeping

[9] Barnett R. Rubin, "Constructing sovereignty for security", in *Survival*, 2005, p. 99.
[10] Vojtech Jurčák, *Organizácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu*, Armed Forces Academy "General M. R. Štefánika", 2009, p. 31.
[11] ICRC, 2008, *How is the term "armed conflict" defined in international humanitarian law*, 2008, URL:https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.htm, accessed on 23.12.2019.

operations.[12]

However, engaging external actors should not end by stopping fighting and violence and by forcing peace. It is necessary, in a state weakened after a civil war, to restore the functionality of its institutions and offices that enable them the ability to manage and control activities on its territory. At the same time, it is necessary to reform the whole security sector, which comprises a set of organizations (institutions, agencies etc.) that have the legitimate right to use violence, to condemn the use of violence or to demonstrate it in order to protect the state and its people.[13] The security sector includes a wide range of institutions, such as, of course, police and armed forces, paramilitary units, intelligence services, as well as border guards. It also includes institutions belonging to the judicial and criminal system, as well as the entire state administration that governs the state and formulates individual policies.[14]

The security system reform is the basic precondition of post-conflict transformation because it affects the process in several areas. The starting point is providing the proper help to democratic governance by the security forces, the armed forces and the police in particular, in order to prevent their misuse. Successful reform is an effective tool for preventing conflicts and crises, but the process is a long and complicated one. Moreover, in many cases, it is not even a reform, but rather a process of building a functional state. For this reason, in such cases, international organizations, such as the EU, must gradually use all available tools, from military forces and police units to civilian experts in the law system, economics, public administration etc., in order to be successful. They are mostly implemented within crisis management operations and missions, which can be military, civil or mixed.

2. The armed forces and the police in EU missions and operations

As already mentioned, the European Union conducts operations and missions. All civilian CSDP interventions are called 'missions'. The military interventions launched in order to implement an executive mandate (e.g. Atalanta or Sophia) are called 'operations', whereas the military interventions launched in order to implement a non-executive mandate (e.g. EUTM Mali or Somalia) are called 'missions'. In the case of military operations, they are aimed at conducting military actions in order to fulfil an executive mandate, by employing military forces composed by military personnel and military equipment. Conducting civil missions is, in fact, carrying out several different kind of actions. These are police, border, or law enforcement operations in which police officers, as well as a wide range of civilian experts and officials (in the field of justice, health, economy, finance, or government and public administration etc.) carry out the tasks assigned to them.

[12] David M. Malone, Karin Wermester, "Boom and Bust? The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping", *Routledge*, London, 2001, p. 44.
[13] Hans Born, "Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector. What Does it Mean?", in *Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series*, 2002, p. 4.
[14] Marina Caparini, Philipp Fluri, "The Relevance of Democratic Control of the Security Sector", in *Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series*, 2002, p. 6.

However, civilian operations can also be subdivided into executive, support or monitoring operations. In the case of executive operations, experts and officials that are sent must also carry out tasks in the context of the operation that would otherwise be conducted by local institutions and authorities, in a normal security situation. In support operations, the participants do not perform such tasks on their own, but assist and help local authorities and institutions. At the same time, they also practice, train and transfer their experience and knowledge to local authorities, or provide them with specific expertise. In monitoring operations, personnel do not engage in the activities of local institutions and offices, but only monitors the performance of tasks or adherence to the agreed rules in the area of the operation.

So far, the EU has led (and continues to lead) more than three dozen civilian or military CSDP operations and missions. These include all types of operations and missions, from military (e.g. EUTM Somalia, EUFOR RD Congo or EUFOR Tchad/RCA) through police (e.g. EUPOL RD Congo or EUPOL Kinshasa) to monitoring (e.g. EUBAM Moldova or EUMM Georgia). The vast majority of operations and missions are either expressly military (e.g. ALTHEA, ATALANTA, CONCORDIA or ARTEMIS) or civilian (e.g. EULEX Kosovo). However, EU conducts operations and missions (such as the above-mentioned EULEX Kosovo Rule of Law Support), in which both executive and non-executive tasks are fulfilled and where not only judicial and administrative participants, but also relatively large police units operate. An exception were also two mixed military-civilian operations aimed at transforming the security sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) and Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) and the African Union support operation in Sudan Darfur (AMIS II).[15]

Tasks for individual operations are determined by the EU Council, and, more exactly, by its decision (formerly joint action) before the beginning of each operation, no matter whether civilian or military. Subsequently, on the basis of a previously agreed mandate, the operational headquarters will work together with the Military Planning and Conduct Capability[16], which is a permanent command and control structure at the military strategic level within the EU Military Staff[17], or the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability[18] to the development of an operational plan. After approving the plan and generating a sufficient number of units and staff, the Council will initiate the operation with

[15] *European Union Military and Civilian Missions and Operations*, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en, accessed on 02.12.2019.

[16] *Military Planning and Conduct Capability*, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf, accessed on 23.12.2019.

[17] *The European Union Military Staff*, URL:https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/5436/The%20European%20Union%20Military%20Staff%20(EUMS), accessed on 03.12.2019.

[18] *The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities*, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en/5438/The%20Civilian%20Planning%20and%20Conduct%20Capability%20(CPCC, accessed on 04.12.2019.

its next decision. Tasks are either directly concluded in a document approved by the Council, or the reference in the document is the relevant United Nations Security Council resolution under which the EU is engaged in the country or region concerned. The roles and responsibilities of the aforementioned responsible bodies, as well as other components involved in planning and conducting EU missions and operations, such as The Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), are more detailed in the Handbook on CSDP.[19]

The mandates for each operation are clear and precise. Police operations, substituting or strengthening, are aimed at cooperating with local authorities, supporting and assisting them or, in some cases, replacing them in the fight against corruption, organized crime or in serious crime investigations. They can also participate in the training of local police units and in the reform of police forces and law enforcement institutions. Military operations are primarily aimed at creating and maintaining a safe environment, protecting vulnerable parts of the population (e.g. refugees, displaced persons) or operating personnel, as well as controlling and protecting important objects (e.g. airports). An exception is represented by the aforementioned mixed military-civilian operations in which military-civilian cooperation is needed and specific military and civilian expertise is required.

Although the definition of individual mandates of military and police operations seems clear, in fact, due to the specifics of operations, some tasks may overlap. Typical examples are police operations of EUPM and military operations of EUFOR ALTHEA, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where military forces had been intensively involved in the fight against organized crime until 2006. Military personnel, in the framework of carrying out "atypical tasks", searched suspicious persons, subsequently secured space and then left the police to arrest suspects. In the vast majority of cases, as it has been stated several times in the text, the boundaries between military and police operations are precisely defined and there are no tasks overlapping.

Currently, under the CSDP, there are 16 EU-led operations, out of which 6 military operations/missions and 10 civilian missions, with 5 000 soldiers, police, civilian experts and officials serving their tasks. Ongoing operations are primarily focused on peacekeeping, conflict prevention, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention of human trafficking and piracy.[20]

Conclusion

Engaging the EU Member States' armed forces and police forces into civilian and military CSDP operations is a very important tool for crisis management

[19] *Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, 3rd edition,* 2017, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/handbook_on_csdp_-_3rd_edition_-_jochen_rehrl_federica_mogherini.pdf, accessed on 13.01.2019.

[20] *European Union Military and Civilian Missions and Operations*, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en, accessed on 23.12.2019.

to deal with and solve crises or conflicts that have already occurred and that could jeopardize the security of EU and its citizens.

Deploying armed forces and the police into EU operations is subject to several constraints resulting from the mandates set for individual operations. The mandates, as already mentioned, are either endorsed at EU level or referred to the relevant United Nations Security Council resolution. In view of different mandates, tasks accomplishment is different, and the duties of military and police units, as well as the use of force, are different. In general, effective coordination and cooperation between military and police forces (e.g. in the form of joint patrols) and civilian experts involved in the respective operations takes place.

Overall, it is possible for a number of reasons to consider the engagement of the armed forces and the police in EU operations very successful as they contribute significantly to creating and maintaining international security and peace worldwide.

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IS THE NCRS-OPP DUAL SYSTEM THE BEST TOOL FOR PLANNING NATO OPERATIONS?

Paul-Alexandru SANDA*

NATO commanders at all levels, operating in different theaters of the Global War on Terror or the Long War, as it was renamed by the Obama administration, are facing a serious problem – the adversary seems to have the strategic initiative. Thus, no matter how detailed an operations plan and irrespective of the level its objectives are achieved, the opponent seems invincible.

Part of the predicament might reside in the way NATO plans and executes operations, process which does not offer sufficient tools for swiftly adapting to an extremely fluid strategic environment.

Keywords: *NATO; USA; COPD; chief of mission; NAC; SACEUR.*

Introduction

In his most important work, which subsequently became a *sine-qua-non* reference for any specialist in the field of military sciences, Carl von Clausewitz advanced the idea of analyzing the actors involved in any war by using an instrument, thereafter called the "Clausewitzian Trinity[1]". This instrument was represented by a system of forces that included *passion*, *play of possibilities and probabilities* and *subordination* of the whole to the political end-state[2].

The first force in the triad is represented by the population who, through passions like hatred, violence or animosity, provides sustainability to the war effort. The second force is represented by the military commander. The third force is represented by the political decision-maker[3]. The resulting force of this system, of a lesser or greater value, will determine the chances of success. Thus, the political decision-maker, whose nation is involved in a war, will have greater chances of achieving the envisaged strategic outcomes the better he intuits and uses popular passions, on the one hand, and the better he communicates

[1] A.N.: see also: Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity", URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235198452_Reclaiming_the_Clausewitzian_Trinity, accessed on 01.04.2020.
[2] Carl von Clausewitz, *On war*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 89.
[3] *Ibidem.*

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with the military commander entrusted with implementing the military part of the strategy, on the other hand.

From this standpoint, in von Clausewitz's view, the incarnation of the *trinity* is represented by Napoleon Bonaparte, whom the Prussian author calls "the God of War[4]". Besides being the "outcome" of the French Revolution, incarnating the desires and commanding the passions of the French nation, Bonaparte was a true "God of War" because he represented the political decision-maker and the military commander, at once. In his case, the least significant change of the situation which necessitated variations in the strategic approach would instantaneously receive a solution, both at the strategic-political level, as well as the strategic-military level, and sometimes even at the operational level. And this offered him the decisive edge against the commanders he was confronting in the operative reality. They were still acting along the lines of the Frederick-the-Great era, according to instructions given by politicians located in capitals far-off from the battle fields, which resulted in drastically reduced chances of promptly adapting to changes[5].

This article aims at analyzing the way this communication, between the political decision-maker and the military commander in a theatre of operations (TO) takes place, according to NATO doctrine, based on a simple assumption. If the communication process is a seamless one, it will allow for an easy adaptation of the strategy which, in turn, will facilitate operational and tactical adaptation and will prevent resource waste. If, in turn, the process is inefficient, NATO's adversaries will receive an unhoped-for advantage, their chances of seizing and maintaining the initiative at all levels, strategic, operational and tactical, thus growing.

1. NATO operations planning

NATO communication between the political decision-maker and the military commander, in a TO, is regulated by the following allied documents[6]:

- C-M(2001)63, NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS): Policy Guidelines;
- NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM), which describes the NATO Crisis Management Process – NCMP;
- MC133/4, NATO's Operations Planning, which outlines the NATO Operations planning process (OPP), which supports the NCMP;
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD);
- AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine;
- AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations.

Due to the fact that the first three documents on the list are NATO-classified documents, they are only mentioned here for reference, but no data from them will be used in the present article. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this document, we consider more than sufficient the information contained in COPD, part of which comes

[4] Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 583.
[5] *Idem.*
[6] A.N.: even though the NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at the 2010 summit in Lisbon, states as NATO essential core tasks, Collective defense, Crisis management and Security through cooperation, we chose to focus on Crisis management because most of the NATO deployments, if not all, are mandated under this essential core task.

from the NATO-classified documents already mentioned. However, based on the information contained in COPD, it is worth stating that this is not intended to be an analysis of the operations planning process at strategic and operational levels, but merely an analysis of the design of the information routes that link the political decision-maker and the commander in a TO.

According to the NATO foundational documents, the decision pyramid has at its helm the North Atlantic Council (NAC), based at NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ), in Brussels, Belgium. Although, currently, consisting of the permanent representatives of the member states, the NAC can organize special sessions at Ministers-of-defense and Ministers-of-foreign-affairs levels, even at the Heads-of-State-and-government level, and it is the only NATO decision-making body that derives its authority directly from the North Atlantic Treaty[7].

Under NAC's authority there is the Military Committee (MC), consisting of military representatives of the NATO member countries, which is also located in NATO HQ. The MC is the highest military authority within NATO and it is the sole responsible to NAC for the proper operation of NATO's military element[8]. This way, MC acts as the link between the political decision maker and the military strategic commands – Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which MC coordinates[9].

Under the MC's authority, and at the command of ACO, there is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) representing the military-strategic level. It functions at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), situated in Mons, Belgium.

Under SACEUR's command, in addition to other entities, there are three operational-level Joint Force Commands (JFC): one in Naples, Italy (JFCNP), one in Brunssum, the Netherlands (JFCBS) and one in Norfolk, the United States of America (JFCNF). If one of these JFCs is deployed, it has to conduct one major operation. In cases where the JFCs are not deployed, such a command can coordinate multiple smaller missions[10].

In normal situations, different ongoing missions and operations can be placed under the command of one JFC. Thus, JFC Naples coordinates NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), Kosovo Force (KFOR) and NATO Support to African Union[11], and JCF Brunssum coordinates Resolute Support (RS) in Afghanistan[12].

So, to focus only on the case of the Commander RS, they will be placed at the base of a five-level command chain during the time of their command (Figure 1).

[7] ***, NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 34.
[8] ***, COPD, pp. 3-1.
[9] ***, NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 37.
[10] ***, "Military Command Structure", *Shape/NATO*, URL: https://shape.nato.int/military_command_structure, accessed on 01.04.2020.
[11] ***, "Operations", *Allied Joint Force Command Naples/NATO*, URL: https://jfcnaples.nato.int/operations, accessed on 01.04.2020.
[12] *Ibidem.*



Figure no. 1: The organization for the planning of an operation (according to NATO doctrine)[13]

A short analysis of COPD proves the correctness of this chart. Therefore, at least theoretically, this kind of organization has every chance of slowing down the information flow between the two poles – the political decision-maker (NAC) and the commander in TO – a fact which will negatively impact the making and transmission of decisions during the planning process.

This dual planning process, called NATO Crisis Response Process (NCRP) at the political-military level (NAC and MC) and Operational Planning Process (OPP) at the military-strategic level (SACEUR) and operational-tactical level (JFC and subordinates), is structured on six phases, with slightly different names and constituting activities. Due to space concerns and the fact that COPD presents the correspondence between the phases of the two processes very clearly, we will focus only on presenting the NCRP, thus:

- Phase 1 – Indications and warning of potential/actual crisis;
- Phase 2 – Assessment of the crisis;
- Phase 3 – Development of response options;
- Phase 4 – Planning;
- Phase 5 – Execution;
- Phase 6 – Transition.

In order to further simplify the analysis, we will proceed to split the entire process into two major parts – the Planning, including phases 1-4, and the Execution, including phases 5-6.

As it becomes clear from all references, NAC is the only entity authorized to approve or order the initiation of the planning process and the transition from one phase to the next. Thus, through a NAC decision, embodied in a directive addressed to SACEUR to issue a Strategic military assessment (SMA), NATO enters the Planning stage. During this stage, an exchange of information among all levels involved takes place, with NAC moving the process towards the superior phases, as mentioned.

At the end of Planning, NAC will approve, amongst other documents, the strategic-level operations plan (OPLAN), which will be communicated to the lower echelons and which will cause

[13] A.N.: see also the NCRP graphical representation, reproduced in COPD, p. 3.

the approval and issuance of similar documents. This process ends with the TO commander receiving his approved OPLAN.

Throughout NATO, a process called *mission command* will be used for the conduct of operations. According to it, a commander will specify to his subordinates, first and foremost, a mission and a desired end-state, the subordinated commanders having the liberty of modifying the assigned tasks as long as the new tasks ensure mission accomplishment and the achievement of the end-state. This *mission command* ensures the facile adaptation to changing situations, through the simple modification of the tasks that cause the wanted effects. However, any decision-making level will introduce its own series of limitations, which the subordinates have to take into account.

Thus, the NAC-approved OPLAN, and the annexed documents, will contain constraints that can range from limitations on the capabilities destined to the operation, to legal and geographical limitations, such as confining the operation to a TO strictly delimited, from limitations in the use of force, represented by the rules of engagements (ROE), to targeting constraints that define very strictly the adversary against which force can be employed.

During the transmission of the NAC orders to the inferior echelons, the set of constraints is expected to grow, every echelon having the possibility of adding its own limitations and never lifting any of those established by the superior levels.

After the approval of the OPLAN, NAC will move the process to the Execution phase through the issuance of the NAC Execution Directive (NED).

During the Execution, the TO commander will face realities which, more often than not, require changing the initial plan, sometimes because, for instance, the planning hypotheses, left un-checked, turn out to be invalid. In these situations, the commanders at different levels will be forced to appeal to *mission command* in order to make the necessary adjustments.

Sometimes, however, the situation on the field can change so much that the OPLAN is rendered completely obsolete. And the possibilities to arrive at such a point are numerous: due to the wrong assessment of the enemy's center of gravity, the entire operation will have to be rethought and re-planned; the under-evaluation of the enemy's capabilities can make it necessary to supplement our own capabilities approved for the operation; the TO approved for the operation might need adjustments through the inclusion of adjacent areas that contain key points or capabilities that give the enemy marked advantages; ROEs that can be very restrictive for the achievement of success, giving the enemy a strategic plus.

In all these situations, the commander in TO will have to initiate a Periodic Mission Review (PMR) that will have to be staffed at all superior echelons (JFC, SACEUR/SHAPE, MC) each with its own analysis, before being presented to the NAC. Even though the decision-making process is exactly the same as when initiating the operation, we consider this point the most appropriate to briefly present it. In this scenario, while NATO forces are deployed in a TO, where they are supposed to implement an OPLAN

that is no longer viable, the NAC is called upon to make a *decision by consensus*. Reaching consensus translates into a series of discussions, bilateral and/or multilateral, or in NAC plenary sessions, whereby national positions are stated and a compromise is sought. This process gives member states, sometimes even partner nations, the chance of soliciting adjustments in every document that will be approved by NAC. In order to help the reader fathom the costs of this decision-making process in situations of capital importance, it is worth mentioning the situation where NATO decision of intervening against Serbia, in 1999, was delayed by a few days due to the need for reaching consensus, a period in which Kosovo civilians continued to be killed[14]. And this happened in a period when NATO had only nineteen members. In today's world, with NATO having no less than thirty members, the process cannot be expected to have become simpler, but rather more complex, resulting in this complexity prolonging the intervals necessary for reaching the coveted consensus in matters that do not present a direct and grave threat to the entire Alliance. And the vast majority of threats are countered with measures labelled as 'crisis management' and tend to not reach the threshold that enables this feeling of urgency. Sometimes, NAC itself will approve an OPLAN that requires constant consultation of the highest NATO decision-making body. To continue with the Serbian example, NAC approved a three-phase plan aimed at forcing the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, to stop the ethnic cleansing process. Each phase meant the escalation of the anti-Serbian measures and for its implementation a new approval from NAC was necessary. At that point, NAC was split into two camps – one, led by France, was trying to accelerate the process and move to more drastic measures, and the other, consisting of the US and the UK governments, was using every chicanery available to slow the process[15].

At this point, we can safely catalogue the NATO operations planning process as slow moving from at least two perspectives. From a managerial perspective, a process structured on five levels, apart from the benefit of multiple reviews and consideration of every planning detail, presents the marked disadvantage of requiring a long time for implementation[16]. From the perspective of actually making a decision, another disadvantage becomes apparent – the dependency of the functioning of the ensemble on NAC's capacity to reach a consensus. As was previously mentioned,

[14] Paul Gallis, "NATO's decision-making procedure", *Congressional Research Service – The Library of Congress*, p. 4, URL: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20030505_RS21510_938903f6732d885dcddf7fd385713ad6c62ff63e.pdf, accessed on 01.04.2020.

[15] *Idem.*

[16] A.N.: even though the available references present also a Fast-Track Decision Making (FTGM), we do not deem it brings a sizable improvement, from the standpoint of the variable considered – the number of levels at which the information is analyzed. To invoke only the information available in the public domain, FTDM takes place at the same echelons presented in Figure 1, the process supposes the same number of phases, the only compression being represented by that of the documents exchanged between echelons. For example, according to FTDM, SAUR submits to NAC the SAEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA) along with the Military response options (MRO). See COPD, pp. 3-15.

in addressing crises where the collective defense principle cannot be invoked, it is possible that divergent opinions appear, reflecting member states' different views.

Moreover, even when one of the member states is attacked, NAC is not always very prompt in making a decision. For instance, even though the U.S.A. had suffered a terrorist attack in 1992[17], and again in 1993, when a terrorist attack had taken place targeting the World Trade Center Towers in New York[18], during the 1999 Washington summit, the representatives of Germany and France blocked the assumption by NATO of a counter-terrorist role. Even after the 9/11 attacks, the representatives of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway were difficult to convince on the necessity of a common NATO action, NAC officially invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty only on 2 October, 2001[19].

Adding the NAC's proven lack of rapidity in making decisions to the problematic, 5-level decision-making structure used for operations planning, we can conclude NATO is far from having the same agility and capacity for adaptation, strategic, operational and tactical, as that of the *Grande Armée* under the command of the "God of War", Napoleon Bonaparte.

In searching for ways to improve this state of facts, we shall next analyze the U.S.A.'s way of planning and executing operations on its own.

[17] A.N.: at 29 December 1992, al-Qaida organizes bomb attacks against two hotels in Aden, Yemen, aiming at killing US soldiers.
[18] A.N.: at 26 February 1993, an al-Qaida squad detonates a car bomb in the underground parking of the WTC towers.
[19] Tom Lansford, *All for one: Terrorism, NATO and the United States*, New York, Routledge, 2018, pp. 39-42.

2. US operations planning

Just like in studying NATO's way of transferring information, of making and communicating decisions, in analyzing the American model we will rely entirely on the legislation available in the public realm. Again, the purpose is not to realize a comparative study of doctrinal provisions regulating different decisional levels. More simply, our purpose is to gather the data describing the architecture of the political decider-TO commander system, wherever available. Thus, the American operations planning process is based on the following legislation:

- United States Code (USC), document regulating the activity of the entire US executive branch, to include the armed forces[20];
- Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP-1);
- Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (JP 3-0);
- Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning (5-0).

Whereas the NATO doctrine envisions the operation as a continuum, starting with the receipt of an indication or warning, going through the steps of the Planning, moving thereafter to the Execution, to end with the transfer of all activities to other entities, the US doctrine sees planning as starting with the initiation and ending with the approval and publishing of the operations plan, or order.

The US architecture of the command system during the operations planning is one slightly simplified compared to NATO.

[20] A.N.: title 10 of the USC, regulates the activity of the US Armed Forces.



Figure no. 2: The architecture of the decision-making chain during planning an operation

The President of the United States (POTUS) is the political decision-maker, NAC's equivalent. He subordinates all national instruments of power, including the military. However, unlike NAC, which represents a body of national representatives that make consensus-based decisions, POTUS makes decisions more simpler, by himself, of course, based input from the advisers (e.g. Joint Chiefs of Staff – JCS), and based on his own judgment[21].

Under POTUS' direct command, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) acts as the primary coordinator of the military, the equivalent of the MC[22]. Both POTUS and SECDEF are located in Washington D.C.

Under the coordination of SECDEF and the command of POTUS, there are the Combatant Commands (CCDR)[23]. These entities are responsible for large geographical areas (e.g. USEUCOM is responsible for no less than 51 states and territories[24]), being ready to command US forces, in situations where the US is engaged in conflicts in the respective areas. This level is the equivalent of the NATO military-strategic commands, SACEUR and USEUCOM commander being one and the same person.

Finally, under the CCDR acts a Joint Force Commander (JFC) deployed in a TO[25]. In figure no. 2, we have the architecture of the decision-making chain during the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), according to the US doctrine.

During the planning of a major operation, the decisions are made at the highest level. Thus, POTUS establishes the desired *end state*, SECDEF establishes the *ways* – the modality or modalities – in which the military will be used and JCS establishes the military units participating in the operation − *means*[26]. Normally, and in case it is not established otherwise by POTUS or SECDEF, this is the only instance when JCS makes decisions. Usually, JCS only provides advice to the two political decision-makers[27].

By means of a simple comparison, we realize that the American model already

[21] ***, *USC*, Title 10, section 162. Also, JP 1, pp. II-2.
[22] *Idem*.
[23] *Idem*.
[24] ***, "U.S. European Command", *Globalsecurity*, URL: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/eucom.htm, accessed on 02.04.2020.
[25] ***, *JP-1*, p. xix. (not to be confounded with JFC from NATO doctrine).
[26] ***, *Joint Publication 1 – Doctrine for the armed forces of the United States*, July 2017.
[27] ***, *USC*, Title 10, Subtitle A, sections 151 and 152.

provides an advantage over the NATO one, in that it offers a shorter circuit for the information flow and decisions between the two, top political decision-maker and TO commander (see Figure 3).

the same operations at military-strategic and operational levels, as well as for the Execution phase, the organization changes.

As shown in Figure no. 4, in the



Figure no. 3: Comparison between NATO and US organization during operations planning

Again, POTUS-SECDEF-JCS, supported eventually by CCDR, is the decision-making system provisioned for by the US legislation during the Planning stage, at the strategic level of major operations. For the planning of

planning process it is included the Chief of Mission. As a direct representative of POTUS, the Chief of Mission will have under his/her command or control all capabilities, corresponding to the different national instruments of power, allocated



Figure no. 4: The Chief of Missions place in the C2 architecture during operations planning[28]

[28] ***, *JP 3-0*, pp. I-13.

for mission execution. This person will cooperate with the appropriate CCDR to ensure the objectives established for the deployed military forces support the strategic objectives and, thus, contribute to the achievement of the POTUS-approved end state[29].

Subsequently, the Chief of Mission cooperates with the TO commander to ensure the military planning process and its products support the national strategy, for the success of which the Chief of Mission, is responsible to POTUS[30]. This way, if during the initial planning phase the decision-making architecture looks as depicted in Figure no. 2, during the execution of the operation the hierarchy tends to look more like that presented in Figure no. 5, with the Chief of Mission in charge of the entire effort, reporting directly to POTUS, and the TO commander, in charge of the military part of the effort, reporting to SECDEF, through CCDR.

The Chief of Mission will play a pivotal role during the execution phase. As we have noticed in the introduction chapter, plans never will remain unchanged under the constraints of reality. Many times, the changes can prove facile to make and implement, the operations orders giving military commanders the desired power. However, in many instances, the changes to the plan necessary for achieving the desired end-state and realizing the strategic objectives ordered by the political decision-maker, will have to be approved by the same political decision-maker. In this second scenario, the Chief of Mission's role becomes extremely important.

In case the discrepancies between the plan and the real-life requirements are great, the Chief of Mission, as the direct representative of POTUS within TO, maintains a constant dialog with his superior and has every chance of ensuring a rapid adjustment of the strategic parameters on which the plan is based. Moreover, in certain situations, even POTUS can delegate the Chief of Mission the right of making these capital decisions when the time available does not allow for consultation.



Figure no. 5: The role of the Chief of Mission during the operation execution

Conclusions

Based on the aforementioned, from a managerial standpoint, the NATO operations planning process is affected by an important inconvenience – slowness –, inconvenience that originates from two factors: firstly, the 6-phase planning process is moved from one phase to the next only by NAC decision, a decision which is made by reaching consensus.

29 ***, *JP 1*, pp. II-2.
30 ***, *JP 5-0*, pp. II-3.

Even though in some situations the consensus will be facile to reach, a fact that will give speed to the entire process, as we have seen, in no few cases, national interests will block the NAC decisions, a fact that can be counterproductive for NATO, as a whole. Moreover, if the lack of consensus can have negative effects during the planning *per se,* it can be catastrophic when it intervenes during the execution of the operation and the NAC is called upon to either approve the launching of a new phase (e.g. the NATO intervention against Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia) or to approve substantial modifications of the operations plans (e.g. the modification of the ROE or the TO boundaries): secondly, the lack of speed comes from the architecture of the C2 system, which is structured on no less than five levels. Such system can be useful during the actual planning, ensuring a thorough analysis and review of all planning aspects, due to the multitude of levels. However, the same system has all chances to become counterproductive during the actual execution of the operation, where agility in adaptation to the operational environment, through making and implementing decisions, is of capital importance.

Even though the US model cannot offer an example to NATO with regards to the NAC decision-making process, it can still prove useful to implement during the actual mission execution. In this situation, a person or a small team, with a political mandate, can play the part of the Chief of Mission in the US doctrine and praxis.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY IN TIMES OF REFUGEE CRISIS

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The permanent state of tension in the Middle East countries results in a massive population displacement, with international implications. The approach to this problem generated by the refugee waves is highly sensitive and it requires a thorough analysis of its causes and consequences.

From an European perspective, if we consider the new waves of refugees heading towards Europe, the situation is starting to be quite alarming. In the absence of a common policy and in the context where a huge wave of refugees is heading towards the Union Border, the European Community' security is suffering. In this regard, identifying viable solutions and devising an action plan are an absolute necessity in order to avoid a regional crisis.

Keywords: *refugee; protection; security; cooperation; consensus; integration.*

Introduction

In a context where instability persists in North African countries and in those from the Middle East, and a part of the indigenous population sees itself obliged to flee from their homeland, Europe is facing important security issues.

A joint response from the European Union member states and from those who aspire to this status it is absolutely necessary in order to respond with the appropriate means to the current challenge.

The European reply came too late and unevenly. Through the European Council Declaration of 23 April 2015 and by the Parliament resolution that followed, the consent regarding the necessity of taking rapid actions to save lives and the strengthening of actions at European level was underlined[1]. This consensus was not at the foundation of the member states' actions, rather it has materialized into a common theoretical approach. In practice, responsive actions varied among states. While Germany and Sweden have embraced the idea

[1] A.N.: In this regard, see also „Comunicare a comisiei către Parlamentul European, Consiliu, Comitetul economic și social European și Comitetul Regiunilor", Bruxelles, 13.05.2015, URL:https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_ro.pdf

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of the refugees integration, Hungary considered appropriate to build a wall along the border with Serbia in order to stop refugees' access, without taking into account that this policy is unable to solve this matter.

In order to handle a highly sensitive problem such as the one in question, it is necessary to take the most diverse measures, starting with the adjustment of the legal framework and continuing with ensuring their protection, and identifying medium and long-term solutions which must be applied with the aim of reducing the phenomenon as much as possible.

The 1951 Refugee Convention along with the Protocol concerning the status of refugees, signed in New York in 1967, represent the fundamental legal acts in this particularly sensitive area.

If the Convention's provisions strengthen the pre-existent international instruments in the field of refugees' protection and outlines their rights with European applicability, the 1967 Protocol, taking into account the new international situation, extended its incidence area, it cleared the geographic restrictions and transformed the Convention into a legal act with universal application.

Even so, this normative acts are not able to operate in an isolated environment, but they need to be correlated with the international humanitarian law and with the provisions of the universal 1948 Declaration of human rights. These three legal acts, although adopted in the middle years of the last century, still represent the most important instruments regarding the refugees' protection and the way each refugee must enjoy legal protection.

The state has the responsibility of ensuring the protection of its own citizens and be responsible for the human rights enforcement without discrimination. However, given the fact that there are governments that do not have the capacity to act, or deliberately do not act in such a way as to ensure the citizens' security, thus having to leave their countries and seek protection elsewhere, international society had to act.

Designed to protect the European population forced to flee after the Second World War, the Refugee Agency, set up at the United Nations level, represents one of the most important actors in terms of refugees' protection globally. Today, its activity is doubled by the actions of state actors, in an attempt to achieve the protection of all the refugees.

In a general sense, the refugee's situation does not present any important problems. In this respect, it is enough to mention that the securing the borders of a state which does not have a large number of refugees in its vicinity and which is not on their favourite route, can be carried out under normal conditions, while in the case of a country such as Turkey, which is constantly pressured by the refugees wave, strengthening external borders is not an easy mission at all.

Considering the large number of people who were forced to seek protection outside the borders of their home state, we notice certain security threats, for both neighbouring and European countries, the latter being an attractive destination given the living standards and level of civilisation.

1. Being a refugee

With the significant increase of the refugee's number making their way to the European countries, the phenomenon got everyone's attention and has been permanently in the full glare of the media spotlight. Following the terminological confusions[2], we emphasise the need to clarify the notion of *refugee*. At the same time, these clarifications are necessary because other provisions are incidental to each category, enjoying, as the case may be, international protection or from the government of the state of origin.

The word *refugee* derives from the French *réfugié,* which had a special meaning. It defined the Protestants who left France following the 1685 revocation of the Nantes Edict, a law that supported the religious freedom of this confession for almost a century. The English version, *refugee*, designated those who have been forced to migrate in safe territories because of persecution arising from political or religious reasons[3].

Regarding the legal framework, corroborating the provisions of the Article 1 of the Convention with the provisions of Article 1 of the 1967 Protocol[4], turns out that refugees are those who leave their country because of the fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or because of an armed conflict.

One of the fundamental principles that protects the refugees from the repercussions of the state of origin is the non-refoulement principle, a term that also comes from the French *refouler*. Generally, this principle stipulates that no refugee can be sent to a country where there is the possibility to be submitted to persecution or torture. This principle of law has become an international instrument of protection since 1933 when, under the League of Nations' auspices, the Convention appeared[5].

In contrast to the *refuge* term, which refers to hiding because of an imminent danger, migration, according to the International Organization for Migration, it is defined as temporary or permanent movement of a person, from the place of residence, inside or outside the country of origin, for various reasons[6]. The reasons that motivates migrants to leave their

[2] A.N.: Lecturing some articles that appeared since 2015, we can notice the confusion between the concepts of *refugee* and *migrant.* In this respect, we give some examples in which the authors are using both notions to define the same category of people, URL: https://www.rri.ro/ro_ro/romania_pregatita_pentru_un_posibil_val_de_imigranti-2613147; URL: https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/migrantii-sirieni-acuza-armata-turca-ca-i-a-fortat-sa-treaca-frontiera-cu-grecia-1269678; URL: https://www .dw.com/ro/doar-pu%C8%9Bini-migran%C8%9Bi-sirieni-aleg-s%C4%83-se-%C3%AEnt oarc%C4%83-acas%C4%83 /a-48431067; URL: https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/ue/grecia-si-bulgaria-intaresc-paza-la-fron tiera-cu-turcia-sute-de-refugiati-incearca-sa-treaca-1268119, accessed on 02.03.2020.

[3] Eesha Pathak, dr. Sharmiladevi J.C., "Refugee crisis around the world today", *Pune Annual Research Journal of Symbiosis Centre for Management Studies*, Vol. 6, 2018, p. 19, URL:https://www.scmspune.ac.in/journal/pdf/current/Paper%202%20%20Eesha%20Pathak%20&%20Sharmiladevi.pdf, accessed on 02.03.2020.

[4] ***, *Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees*, UNHCR – Public Information Section, Geneva, 1996, p. 16 and p. 48.

[5] Guy Goodwin-Gill, *The refugee in international law*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 117-120.

[6] A.N.: In this regard, see also URL: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf, accessed on 02.03.2020.

home country are in complete opposition with those of a refugee and are backed up by economic, social, or political aspects or they simply aim for a better living standard in a country considered to be more civilized that the one from which they are migrating.

On the other side, the displaced persons are the ones forced to leave their homes and move to other territories, without crossing the state border, for reasons of armed conflict, internal conflict, systematic violation of human rights, natural or man-made calamities[7].

Therefore, the differences between these notions are essential and each category of people brings with it different challenges.

2. Security issues in the context of the refugees' wave

Defined as the largest humanitarian disaster since The Second World War[8], the Syrian civil war is affecting not only the Middle East states, but also a considerable part of Europe. In this context, when we analyse the situation of the refugees' home countries, it is necessary to identify the source of this crisis, in an attempt to limit its effects and to ensure their return to the country of origin.

Initiated in March 2011 as a civil protest with the main objective of implementing a number of democratic reforms, the situation in Syria has immediately pass through the phase of a strong insurgency and then escalated, starting a bloody civil war. After that, it prepared a fertile ground for the rise of Islamic groups and, in conjunction with all the external factors, reached what we now call the refugee crisis.

Enthusiastically welcomed, the destabilization of the Assad regime produced a boomerang effect and has had the effect of the Islamic State's expansion and the increasing number of refugees on account of the never-ending conflict.

The Syrian conflict continues to produce massive displacement of population, both in the country and abroad. The evolution of this exodus is worrisome and has produced various effects.

Analysing the situation in Turkey, we have to mention that the first group of Syrian refugees seeking protection arrived at the border in 2011 and it comprised 252 people.

Today, Turkey is hosting the largest number of refugees, with a total of about 4.1 million, out of which 3.7 million Syrian refugees and 400,000 refugees of other nationalities[9]. The common border and the pre-existing cooperation between these two countries represented important factors in terms of increasing the total refugee number.

Following the signing of the 2004 Free Trade Agreement, which came into force in 2007, the trade between Turkey and Syria doubled in just 3

[7] ***, "Refugees and displaced persons", *UNHCR*, URL: https://www.unhcr.org/excom/bgares/3ae69ef14/refugees-displaced-persons.html, accessed on 02.03.2020.

[8] Martin Chulov, "Half of Syrian population will need aid by end of year", *The Guardian*, URL: https://www.theguardian.com /world/2013/apr/19/half-syrian-population-aid-year, accessed on 02.03.2020.

[9] See also URL: http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2544, accessed on 02.03.2020.

years, with a spectacular increase from $795 million to 1.6 billion, in 2009. In 2000, Turkey was not on the top 10 countries economically linked to Syria. This fact changed in 2010, when Turkey became Syria's most important partner. Before this conflict, the Turkish-Syrian delegations had concluded more than 60 cooperation agreements. In 2009, the non-visa agreement was signed, which aimed at developing the tourism. Next year, 1.35 million Turks visited Syria, while more than 750,000 Syrian crossed the Turkish border.

The mobility agreement has led to the free passage of the borders in the beginning of the crisis. The first wave of Syrian refugees was welcomed with an incredible hospitality. In June 2011, more than 10,000 people were once again seeking a safe place on the Turkish border, which led the Ankara's government to declare open borders policy for those fleeing persecution and extreme poverty[10]. By the end of 2011, Turkey had already allocated $15 million to set up six locations for refugees' accommodation. In December 2012, the number of Syrians surpassed 150,000 and at the end of 2014 exceeded 1.5 million people[11].

On the other hand, Lebanon, with a population of about 4.5 million inhabitants, is currently hosting 1.5 million Syrian refugees, being the country with the largest number of refugees compared to the indigenous population. Furthermore, there are 18,500 refugees from Ethiopia, Iraq, Sudan and 200,000 Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)[12].

As in the case of Turkey, Lebanon signed a bilateral agreement with Syria in 1991, which provided the right to free movement, right of residence and property. This pact was an important economic step for both parties, Syrian citizens being engaged in seasonal agricultural work and in constructions, actively participating in Lebanon's infrastructure projects.

In Jordan, the number of Syrian refugees registered in January 2020 was 655,216 people, of which 302,854 meeting the age criteria necessary to be employed[13]. Before the Syrian conflict, the bilateral policy, available for Turkey and Lebanon, was also embraced by Jordan. This led to the inauguration of the first refugee camp, in Jordan, in mid-2012, which would accommodate 9,000 people in 1,800 tents. Starting with 2013, the government, concerned about the risks that started to emerge, created a Directorate for security policies, whose immediate purpose was to control the access of the refugees.

The peak of the Jordanian management efforts was reached with the ISIS violence in Syrian territory, after September

[10] Kathryn Reid, "Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs, and how to help", *World Vision*, URL: https://www.worldvision.org /refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts, accessed on 02.030.2020.

[11] Alexander Betts, Ali Ali, Fulya Memşoğlu, *Local politics and the Syrian refugee crisis*, Refugee Studies Center, University of Oxford, 2017, p. 19.

[12] See also URL: http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2520, accessed on 02.03.2020.

[13] "Jordan: economic inclusion of Syrian refugees (January 2020), URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-economic-inclusion-syrian-refugees-january-2020, accessed on 02.03.2020.

2014. A number of border restrictions were implemented in October, so that Jordan refused to register new asylum applications. Thousands of refugees were forced to camp in the demilitarized area located within the boundaries of Syria and Jordan. As a result of the London Summit, held in February 2016 and due to the important role that Britain played in determining Jordan to provide support for Syrian refugees, 60,000 jobs have been created to allow their integration[14].

Although it may seem surprising, 247,568 Syrians have taken refuge in Iraq[15], another unstable country in the region.

We notice that countries that neighbour upon Syria have been severely affected. But it is not a surprise if we point out that around 90% of worldwide refugees remain in the countries adjacent to their home country. Therefore, the most important criterion used is the geographical one. Only ten countries are hosting 60% of existing refugees: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo[16].

The most recent global estimations show that there are approximately 13 million children refugee and 17 million children who have been forcibly displaced inside their own countries[17].

These data confirm the magnitude of the phenomenon and issues a strong warning. The highest humanitarian costs fall within the responsibility of the neighbouring countries. If we add that these data include only the refugees that are in the record of the Agency, we can draw a quite worrisome picture[18]. Without the implementation of a set of measures representing the result of an international political consensus, this crisis will only become more acute over time, and its potential to affect more and more European countries must not be neglected.

If Syria's neighbours, although facing real security problems, have adopted a relatively common policy and have set up refugee camps and even began the procedure for their integration into society, from a European perspective things are a little more nuanced.

In the last few years, Europe has witnessed significant waves of refugees seeking international protection as a result of the armed conflicts in their home countries. Although the year 2015 is considered the crucial point of this refugee crisis, their arrival has never been stopped. However, in comparison with the neighbouring countries, Europe has not been faced with a consistent wave of refugees so far[19]. Suffice it to mention

[14] Alexander Betts, Ali Ali şi Fulya Memşoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 10.
[15] ***, "Refugee situations", URL: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/5, accessed on 02.03.2020.
[16] Alexander Betts, Ali Ali, Fulya Memşoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 3.
[17] Marie Mcauliffe, Binod Khadria, "Report overview: Providing perspective on migration and mobility in increasingly uncertain times", URL: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf, p. 6, accessed on 02.03.2020.
[18] A.N.: Some of the Syrian refugees choose not to register in the United Nations evidence. This lack of consent comes from different reasons that range from fearing the consequences of having their names in official records, to lacking either proper information or access to the registration points. In this regard, see Benedetta Berti, "The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications", in *Strategic Assessment*, vol. 17, no. 4, Ed. Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, 2015, p. 41.
[19] March 2020.

that in 2019, just under 101,000 refugees reached the EU's borders, most of them traveling by sea[20].

The refugees brought new challenges to the European states governments and to the Union as a whole. The distinction between refugees and migrants represented one of the elements that raised most questions, both from the perspective of the applicable rights and the fact that their motivation is different. Many of them need immediate humanitarian assistance, but some of them wish to enter Europe for reasons of economic migration. There is the possibility of creating a fertile ground for the radicalized people, in such a way that this action ensures access within Europe, and, also, enables a significantly increased possibility of terrorist attacks.

Most refugees aim to reach the Schengen states in order to benefit from freedom of movement within the Union, but, at the same time, create a state of danger for the very existence of the Schengen Area, given that states such as Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Denmark have temporarily introduced customs checks at the border or have even built barbed wire fences in certain areas transited by refugees[21].

As already stated, Germany and Sweden were preferred by refugees, because the dominant perception is that, in these countries, it is more likely to receive asylum and good treatment. These states have received hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants, in contrast to Central and Eastern European countries, who had a different behaviour. Moreover, Germany is experiencing an accelerated demographic ageing, which had a decisive contribution to the refugee reception policy. As for Sweden, the economic component played the most important role in determining refugees to move towards the northern part of the continent.

At European Union level, there has been an attempt to force Member States to receive a certain number of refugees, but progress has been very slow because of national sovereignty, of the sensitivity of the issues related to the integration of the minorities and the social perception of the phenomenon. These are the main reasons why there is no joint action within the Union. Another reason was that, through the agreement with Turkey and the support given to Lebanon, the European Union considered itself being on the edge of the crisis.

Unlike Europe's slightly relaxed view, a strong voice came from the United States Congress members, who have emphasised that refugees and migrants, coming in waves, represent a key challenge and an extraordinary threat to the region's stability. They have also expressed concerns over the risks

[20] ***, "European Union, Events of 2019", *HRW*, URL: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/european-union, accessed on 02.03.2020.

[21] ***, "Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control", *European Commission*, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-bordercontrol/index_en.htm#top-page; Tom Bachelor, "The New Iron Curtains: Where the fences are going up across Europe to keep migrants out", in *Express*, 06.12.2015, URL: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/624488/Europe-borderfences-migrant-crisis, apud Cătălin Alin Costea, "Uniunea Europeană și criza refugiaților, Policy Study No. 6/2016", *Romanian Diplomatic Institute*, Bucharest, 2016, p. 6, URL: https://www.idr.ro/publicatii/Policy%20Study%206.pdf, accessed on 02.03.2020.

that terrorists could pose Europe as part of the flows[22].

The fragility of the existing policy so far, by financially stimulating the neighbouring states of Syria and by creating a buffer zone to protect Europe against the refugee wave, stands out these days[23], when 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike that took place in north-western part of Syria, in Idlib province. The answer came immediately. 309 Syrian soldiers have been neutralized and Turkey has opened its borders so that the refugees can travel to Europe. In this context, EU representatives say that Turkey must honour the agreement and provide border security and assistance for Syrian refugees, in exchange for six million euros[24].

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan noted that he has opened the gates to Europe and about 30,000 refugees may travel to Europe in just 2 days. During this time, the humanitarian crisis in getting bigger, because the clashes between refugees who want to enter Greece and the police forces have already begun at the Turkish-Greek border[25]. Moreover, in a desperate attempt to reach the Greek shore, a small boat had sank[26]. In this incident, a child had died and another is currently under medical supervision.

Lesbos, the Greek island where refugees began to arrive and which, according to the locals, has been hosting refugees since the 1990s, is currently sheltering over 25,000 refugees, in a crowded and unhygienic camp[27].

After World War II, with the establishment of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the refugee problem has been a constant concern at international level. During this time, the flow of refugee has been fluctuated, eventually becoming a persistent global phenomenon[28]. In light of the above and given the armed conflicts that generates mass displacement of people, we must be aware that the flow of refugees will not stop so easily and the aid given to Greece by the European Union, which consists of €700 million, technology and vehicle for border patrolling[29], will not solve the problem by any means.

This refugee crisis raises the issue of European security, materialized in the fraudulent crossing of borders, in the risks of terrorists entering Europe as part of the flows and planning new attacks,

[22] Kristin Archick, Rhoda Margesson, "Europe's refugee and migration flows", URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ row/IF10259.pdf, accessed on 03.03.2020.

[23] End of February

[24] ***, "Siria war: Alarm after 33 Turkish soldiers killed in attack in Idlib", *BBC*, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717, accessed on 03.03.2020.

[25] ***, "Erdogan vows to keep the doors open for refugees heading to Europe", *Aljazeera*, URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2020/02/erdogan-vows-doors-open-refugees-heading-europe-200229093245893.ht ml, accessed on 03.03.2020.

[26] ***, "Child dies as boat carrying migrants capsizes off Lesbos", *Aljazeera*, URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2020/03/child-dies-boat-carrying-migrants-capsizes-lesbos-200302092321525.html, accessed on 03.03.2020.

[27] ***, "Refugee crisis in Greece: Anger and foreboding grow on Lesbos", *DW*, URL: https://www.dw.com/en/refugee-crisis-in-greece-anger-and-foreboding-grow-on-lesbos/a-52615534, accessed on 03.03.2020.

[28] A.N.: In this regard, see also URL: https://www.unhcr.org/history-of-unhcr.html

[29] ***, "EU chief says Greece is Europe's shield in migrant crisis", *BBC*, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51721356, accessed on 04.03.2020.

with strong economic, social and political implications.

Although the humanitarian crisis must be carefully studied and addressed in order to ensure that the asylum seekers rights are respected, we cannot overlook its other consequences.

With this massive wave of people forced to flee persecution, the probability that radicalized members be among them should not be overlooked. Regardless of how states will check asylum applications, in light of the fact that most refugees do not have identity documents, the risk of terrorist attacks is increasing. Moreover, the instability and the clashes between refugees and law enforcement have the role of enhancing insecurity and creating a very favourable framework for the emergence of a feeling of concern among the local population.

The economic pressure generated by the huge expenses for hosting, feeding, providing the medical care and the integration process of the refugees is causing financially difficulties for the host nation. The overwhelming presence of the crisis is also felt in the field of tourism, an extremely important source of income for a country such as Greece. The beautiful beaches of the Aegean Sea are nowadays more and more assimilated to refugee camps. For example, in 2016, bookings on the Lesbos island decreased by more than 50%, and in 2019 only 8 cruise ships reached the shore, compared to 94 in 2011[30].

Politically, in the countries that have already received refugees, we are seeing a massive increase in the popularity of far-right parties, which have anti-refugee speeches on their agenda. Is commonly known the case of the Alternative for Germany party, which received 12.6% of the votes in the 2017 election, when Europe did not have tens of thousands of refugees on its border. The financial impact that will strike Europe will be another reason for joy for these parties.

The 2015 elections in Austria brought the Freedom Party on the first stage of politics, which doubled its number of votes compared to 2009, reaching the 30% threshold with an anti-refugee campaign, and these are not the only examples[31].

The data listed above shows us the current situation and gives us an overview regarding the threat to Europe security, when the problem is treated superficially or not at all.

In this context, it is necessary to analyse the possibilities of combating this crisis and to identify viable solutions so that asylum seekers can return safely to their countries or, why not, to go through the integration process in the receiving country.

3. Sustainable solutions

Questioned because of the uneven and, sometimes, extreme response of the Union states regarding the refugees issue, the fundamental European principles,

[30] Justin Higginbottom, "It's a powder keg ready to explode: In Greek village, tensions simmer between refugees and locals", *CNBC*, URL: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/01/refugee-crisis-in-greece-tensions-soar-between-migrants-and-locals.html, accessed on 04.03.2020.

[31] Andreas Steinmayr, "Did the refugee crisis contribute to the recent rise of far-right parties in Europe?", URL: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-steinmayr-december.pdf, accessed on 04.03.2020.

such as freedom, equality of treatment and tolerance must be firmly upheld. We are witnessing the collision of two totally different cultures, with different principles and values that can generate social fear about the loss of national identity[32]. A great number of the European countries' citizens are considering that the refugees integration policy of the European Union is dangerous[33], both in terms of the competition on the job market and in terms of the rising crime, this concern being based on xenophobic, powered by mass-media and political environment. This is why it is vital to identify the most appropriate way to act and to give a common response to this humanitarian crisis.

The UN Refugee Agency assumed the role of policy coordinator in this field and tried to implement sustainable solutions in order to ensure respect for human rights and to provide a safe environment for those affected. However, the Agency's actions cannot achieve the expected result without the European states and USA collaboration, because of the variety of factors that have led to this crisis. In order to achieve this goal, it is mandatory that experts in economic, political, demographic, defence, foreign, health fields come up with medium and long-term solutions in response to the current refugee situation.

The simple situation is that when a country can help the refugees in the vicinity of their home state, both from the perspective of the cultural closeness between these states, and the fact that most people who are fleeing want to return.

Although the globalization has brought significant changes and the migration phenomenon has been subjected to a thorough analysis, the present situation has some particularities, because it involves more attention and appropriate policies, both locally and internationally.

The legislative framework must ensure the protection of a set of rights such as the right to work and, thus, freedom of movement, issuance of residence and identity documents, and finally, enabling integration into society.

At the local level, there are various solutions that can be implemented, such as voluntary repatriation, local integration, resettlement, naturalization, each of them with certain particularities.

Thus, voluntary repatriation in safe conditions requires the home state involvement of the in order to eliminate the reasons which led to refugees' departure. These people may face economic, social and even legal issues. In this regard, it is sufficient to mention the lack of jobs or the need of estate' restitution. Voluntary repatriation of refugees was not successful, being a process that involves a rapid metamorphosis of the home state.

Integration into the local communities of the asylum countries is a complex and gradual phenomenon involving the participation and contribution of the

[32] Slavoj Žižek, *Refugiații, teroare și alte probleme cu vecinii – împotriva dublului șantaj*, Ed. Cartier, București, 2016, pp. 92-98.

[33] A.N.: In this regard, see *Raportul privind percepția românilor despre criza refugiaților*, URL: http://www.apd.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Raport-de-cercetare-privind-criza-refugiatilor.pdf and URL: https://www.comillas.edu/en/chair-in-refugees/news/14727-what-do-europeans-think-about-refugees-2-3?jjj=1583394079320, accessed on 04.03.2020.

whole society in order to ensure an equal treatment and access to all facilities that the inhabitants of the community benefit from.

The resettlement involves the refugees' relocation from the country in which they sought help in another state willing to accept them and that offers them the right of residence and the opportunity to be granted citizenship. Romania is among the countries that have implemented these programs, but the number of people who have benefited from this instrument of protection is quite small.

The naturalization is the highlight of the integration process within the society. This is the purpose of the social integration process and certifies that states comply with Article 34 of the Convention, which stipulates that each state must facilitate the naturalization of refugees and make the necessary efforts in order to reduce procedures in this regard as much as possible[34].

In implementing of these strategies, it is necessary to take into consideration certain fundamental aspects of the society concerned, each of them implies a certain degree of risk and effort.

From an economic point of view, the labour market is facing an important issue, if we consider that the asylum seekers do not have, in most cases, a certificate attesting the education level or any specialization. Therefore, employers must respond by adapting to the needs, education level and skills of the persons concerned.

The cultural and social protection and the right to education represents key elements in the context of the refugee integration process. Accepting asylum seekers without discrimination, their involvement in social activities and their participation in different cultural activities are able to ensure a strong link between them and the local community. Access to education is crucial for a rapid integration. The barriers imposed by a different language and a different culture, in the absence of a suitable arrangement, cannot be removed, and the children and young refugees will not be an active part of the society, resulting in youth-crime development. Host language learning opportunities, special classes and a proper teacher training program are essential in this regard[35].

For a fair representation of their rights and needs, their political involvement is more than relevant.

At the European Union level, all the actions shall be unified in order to solve a number of problems. Nowadays, the refugees are receiving humanitarian aid, but this is not enough to help them make some progress. This helping hand does nothing but cover the basic necessities of their lives. For a faster and a more efficient social integration, considering the abilities of every individual and, at the same time, considering the need for manpower of the receiving state, a European common system can be created in order to provide jobs, by connecting all labour markets.

[34] Frances Nicholson, Judith Kumin, "Securing durable solutions", in *A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum system*, Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UNHCR, 2017, pp. 228-246.

[35] ***, "Integrarea refugiaților și utilizarea indicatorilor: dovezi din Europa Centrală", *UNHCR*, URL: https://www.unhcr.org/ro/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2016/12/Refugee_Integration_RO.pdf, accessed on 05.03.2020.

Another aspect is combating the smuggling networks, the cross-border crime and terrorism, the adaptation of the repatriation policy to the current needs, the allocation of funds in order to reduce the poverty, the inequality, the unemployment issue in the home countries, the border security through a joint action plan, the management of IT systems in order to identify the refugees, the support for fingerprinting and eventually the relocation of the refugees, according to the needs of the states involved and the insurance of an equal treatment for non EU nationals shall have a common European approach in order to eliminate the security risks that possess the capability to destabilise the entire European structure.

Adopting a dedicated policy in the field of refugees' integration within Europe and the permanent collaboration with the international specialized structures in each European Member State, shall be backed up by the international community involvement in the refugees' home states, in order to cease the hostilities and to create a secure environment, so that they can return in the country of origin. The perpetuation of this state of conflict will generate new displacement, new waves of refugees, will deepen the present crisis and it will lead the states into a sensitive area, unable to meet the new challenges.

In this respect, the collaboration is essential not necessarily for the sake of the European solidarity, but especially for security purposes, regardless any misunderstanding and contrary view, the security of the European Union will be shaken if there is no consensus, because the crisis management within the boundaries of a particular state will have indirect effect for neighbouring countries[36].

Conclusions

In a constantly changing world, where the impact of the governments' actions manifests itself internationally, and where interdependence is a certainty, states shall cooperate in order to reach a political consensus and, in this way, to strengthen the citizens' security. The notion of insecurity no longer involves an armed presence, it may be generated by the states' failure to solve the problem of the asylum seekers, given the scale of the phenomenon.

Looking at the profound and diverse implications of the situation subjected to analysis, and considering the fact that it is difficult to make a clear distinction between those who left their country to avoid persecution and those who left for economic or social reasons, the security cannot be the attribute of a single state.

Solidarity represents the only way to deal with this issue that can affect the European states. It provides vital protection for the development process of our societies and the harmonious integration of the asylum seekers and it also ensures that the human rights are respected.

In the process of social integration and crisis management, the human life value has to prevail and the political factor and media must play an important role and to

[36] Ana Lavinia Popa, "Criza refugiaților în Estul și Centrul Europei", în *Uniunea Europeană și criza refugiaților*, Policy Study nr. 6/2016, Bucharest, 2016, p. 57, URL: https://www.idr.ro/publicatii/Policy%20Study%206.pdf, accessed on 05.03.2020.

sanction any acts of discrimination.

The European Union represents a key factor in the process of protecting and promoting the rights of the migrants. The EU's policy focuses on integrating migrants and ensuring that their rights are respected. Following this policy, there is a need for the EU to act in order to prevent the isolation of states through anti-refugee walls or fences and militarization of borders. At the same time, it is necessary for the Union to take action in order to end hostilities in the refugees' home countries, to ensure lasting peace, to strengthen political regimes and to develop infrastructure, in order to allow citizens to return home.

In the context of the ever-increasing flow of refugees, the common policy is a key element, both in terms of the need to link the Member States' efforts, the structural cohesion of the Union and the achievement of the European objectives.

Member states must be an active part in ensuring the security of the Union borders. In 2016, the states of the Union agreed to establish a common border and coast guard to ensure that EU protects its external borders and meets these new security challenges.

The European cooperation represents a fundamental element in preventing any security breaches that may arise during this crisis. In a Europe united under the umbrella of common values, the dialogue, the consensus and, above all, the collective actions cannot be neglected.

The phenomenon which we are facing has seen a permanent amplification in recent years and has shown us that no state can succeed on its own, without paying great economic, social, political and security costs.

The emergence of some enclaves within the European borders by raising the border walls does not count as a common assumption of the problem and not even a way in which we can solve this issue. The member states must manage their borders in a way that is compatible with the European legislation, with its own values, with the guarantees and benefits of the Schengen area.

In order to ensure the compliance with the European legislation and its objectives, every member state must adopt a set of measures, as a result of a common European view. At the same time, the rights of the refugees must be respected, their integration must be facilitated and the causes of the crisis must be removed or improved.

Demonstrating solidarity by respecting all the measures and all the decisions taken at the European level has implications both for the security of the Union's external borders and for the necessary steps in order to identify and implement the most appropriate measures to combat the crisis immediately. At the same time, the aid granted to the refugees shall meet their needs and it can be consistent only with the cooperation of the entire European structure, given the scale of the crisis and the actions needed to be implemented in order to keep its consequences under control as much as possible. Therefore, the European security is the responsibility of each Member State and can only be attained through joint actions and common policies.

In pursuing these objectives, it is

essential that the European Union's policy and its action plan be based on its very core principles: promoting peace, well-being, European values, combating social exclusion and discrimination, ensuring freedom, the security and fair justice, so as to ensure sustainable development and, at the same time, respect the cultural and linguistic diversity.

Far from ending, the refugee crisis requires an examination of the reasons that triggered it, the existing situation and the measures that the states involved must take to limit, as far as possible, its consequences.

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THE CHALLENGE OF HYPERSONIC MISSILES

Cătălin CHIRIAC*

The idea of developing a rocket that flies at very high speeds is not new in itself, because such concerns and achievements have existed since the Cold War. The highlighting element is the approach and use of these missiles (overcoming technical flight problems under extreme conditions), in the context of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles' existence. During the Cold War, the development of systems using supersonic speed was particularly expensive and complex, so few nations were able to achieve it. However, the development of hypersonic military systems, that can be guided at high altitudes and long distances, with high precision, but also efficiently (not yet demonstrated), is much more difficult and challenging, in terms of securing the necessary resources.

Keywords: *hypersonic speed; security threat; counter hypersonic missiles; flight regime; hypersonic missile; ballistic missile; cruise missile; anti-missile systems.*

1. Speed and its challenges

Generally, speed is known as a feature of moving objects and it is perceived with both positive connotations (when the result leads to a progress) and negative (when losing control results in a disaster or an anomaly). Identifying the means, by which the speed of a body can be improved, has always been a researchers' concern, both in the civilian field and, especially, in the military. In the latter situation, speed has been an indispensable factor starting with the first known conflict in history.

High-speed movement, occupying combat positions and engaging your opponent at the right time, have always been preferred by military leaders over an expensive war of attrition. Regardless of the nation or military commander, year of operation or technology involved, the used strategy had at least one technique element or category related to the idea of speed or speediness. In these circumstances, the emergence of the first offensive military doctrine, known to the general public as the Lightning War/ Blitzkrieg, tailored by the Germans after

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the World War I and applied in the next war, followed naturally.

In the military field, the need for speed is more pronounced in the case of aircraft or missiles, the only weapons that have developed this feature beyond any thought or imagined limit, only a few decades ago. Achieving the specific effects of using these systems is dependent on the speed feature, its increase could ensure the desired effectiveness, but with the associated resources and costs.

If aircraft have managed to reach supersonic speeds, which has led to a rethinking of how operations can be planned and, above all, conducted, the transition to another level by missiles reaching the hypersonic speed will certainly generate a new revolution in using them, but especially in refuting them. In these circumstances, *hypersonic missile*, the new concept and system at the same time, emerged in response to the need of enriching military arsenals with weapons that would be both provocative and lethal for opponents, in detecting, tracking and engaging them.

Hypersonic technology is not only applicable for the military, with rockets and space shuttles being just two examples that have been built and used since the middle of the twentieth century[1]. But when a country has a technology considered revolutionary, tested in different ways that certify its value, identifying military applicability is only a matter of time which, incidentally, is happening with the new hypersonic missile programs.

What is hypersonic speed? It is a fact that an object that flies at a speed of 340 m/s actually reaches the speed of sound or Mach 1[2]. The speed regimes known today were established depending on the speed of sound: *subsonic, supersonic* and *hypersonic*. *Subsonic speed* involves a movement close to the speed of sound (Mach 1). Around the speed of Mach 1 (0.8-1.2), a transonic regime is debated in the published literature. *Supersonic* involves a speed of movement greater than that of the sound (usually between Mach 1 and Mach 5), and *hypersonic* is a speed of movement of more than 5 times the speed of sound[3]. According to the *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, hypersonic is defined as *"pertaining to speeds equal to, or in excess of, 5 times the speed of sound"*[4].

What is a hypersonic missile? The current sources present it in the form of a weapon that brings to the foreground the speed and range of ballistic missiles and the manoeuvrability of cruise missiles. If the main feature of ballistic missiles is the re-entry speed into the atmosphere, hypersonic missiles add an increased

[1] A.N.: the X-15 became the first manned vehicle that reached hypersonic speed, in 1959 under the X-Plane Program (URL: https://history.nasa.gov/x1/appendixa1.html); in April 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first man that had traveled at hypersonic speed during the world's first piloted orbital flight. In the same time, there were other manned vehicles that used hypersonic speed (Apollo and Soyuz).

[2] A.N.: the Mach number comes after the Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach, who made important contributions to the study of shock waves.

[3] ***, "Mach number", *NASA*, URL: https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/airplane/mach.html; ***, "Flight Regimes", *Globalsecurity*, URL: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/intro-regimes.htm, accessed on 20.03.2020.

[4] ***, AAP-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NSO, 2019, p. 64, URL: https://nso.nato.int/nso/nsdd/listpromulg.html

manoeuvrability to it, in a way that the warning and countering measures are reduced to zero. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that it represents a new type of weapon, and thus a new threat with increased potential for manoeuvre, and the very high speed provide increased possibilities of striking a variety of targets, in a very short period of time.

The hypersonic missiles are very fast and manoeuvrable, with the possibility of flying about 5,000 to 25,000 kilometres per hour (for comparison, these missiles fly at speeds between 6 and 25 times higher than modern airplanes), and the flight altitude is unusual: between a few tens and 100 kilometres[5]. At this time, these characteristics of speed, manoeuvrability and altitude provide hypersonic missiles certain advantages over existing air defence systems, simply because the latter were not constructed to counter such threats.

The speed and precision of a weapon, plus the absence or the inefficiency of countering measures, are desirable characteristics in any operating environment and, consequently, this type of missile has caught the attention of the world's great powers. At the same time, these new weapons and the interest in their development have triggered a new concern among military analysts regarding the possibility of initiating a new race arms between the great powers, one that can overcome, in ambition and destruction, the same period of the Cold War. Furthermore, these missiles the development and ownership will lead to new challenges to the operating environment and global security, in addition to a much greater threat of the existing ballistic and cruise missiles.

The published literature brings to the foreground the existence and development of two types of hypersonic missiles: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles/ HGVs and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles/ HCMs. While *Hypersonic Glide Vehicles/ HGVs* are launched into space using other missiles where, from altitudes between 50 km and 100 km (or higher), are released for hypersonic flight from the upper layers of the atmosphere to the set targets, *Hypersonic Cruise Missiles/HCMs* have their own advanced jet engines (scramjets) necessary for target-directed flight, which they usually perform at relatively low altitudes[6].

The development of a weapon with the same characteristics of speed and range of ballistic missiles, but with improved performance in accuracy and manoeuvrability, while at the same time causing significant destruction without nuclear warheads, is a goal for most military powers. Thus, it is normal for a weapon with such declared performance – but still in the development and testing phase – to become a "*hot topic*" for most military publications and a topic of debate for political and military analysts. The reality that it is considered a revolutionary weapon, as were, in turn, aircraft carriers, "invisible" aircraft, ballistic missiles etc., can no longer be denied, and the possibility of radically changing the way of future conflicts are

[5] ***, *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons*, RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017, p. xi.

[6] ***, *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons*, RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017, p. 2.

thought and carried out is more and more increasing. US Senator Angus King makes, in this respect, an expressive comparison between the hypersonic missiles and the use of the long bow at the Battle of Agincourt in the 14th century, when the English army manned with such bows succeeded to defeat a four times larger French army[7].

However, the development of such missiles, especially those that are launched into space, cannot be done without overcoming technical problems specific to the propagation medium[8]. First of all, from the *aerodynamics* point of view, it is necessary to ensure a stable flight in an aerodynamic regime that is not very well known, because there are differences between the flight of ballistic missiles which, upon entering the atmosphere, are designed to reach the target as quickly as possible, and that of hypersonic glide vehicles, which must glide towards the target with very high accuracy. Secondly, *the thermal management* must be carried out so that the heat released due to the very high speed and friction with the atmosphere does not affect the aerodynamic properties of the missile. At the same time, it should not be overlooked that the *orientation, navigation and control*, especially in case of the use of kinetic energy, must be achieved in such a way as to ensure that the optimum point of impact is achieved in order to produce the desired effects.

2. Threat of hypersonic missiles

In order to understand the implications arising from the interest in the development of hypersonic missiles, it is necessary to understand the (relative) advantage that these missiles offer, compared to existing missiles. Clearly, their purpose is not to threaten nations that do not have and cannot develop such technology, since they are already vulnerable to existing and already traditional threats (ballistic and/or cruise missiles).

It is possible that these weapons bring that something *extra*, necessary to the great powers, that would guarantee their separation from the others, which inevitably leads to a new race to obtain and possess the weapons, followed inevitably, by the specific crisis. Under these circumstances, several arguments naturally arise, which may form the basis for the non-proliferation of these types of missiles, first by starting from the existence of the treaties regulating this problem.

The emergence of new types of weapons and the threat of their use led to a change at doctrinal level, in the way of managing a crisis and conducting a conflict, in light of identifying solutions to counter them, particularly in the context of reducing the time available. The range of missions that can be assigned to these missiles leads to their establishment between strategic and conventional/ tactical boundaries. According to the

[7] Russ Read, "Nightmare weapon", *Washington Examiner*, URL: https://www.businessinsider.com/king-hypersonic-missiles-nightmare-weapons-and-us-carriers-vulnerable-2019-8, accessed on 23.03.2020.

[8] A.N.: more details are provided in James M. Acton, Silver Bullet: Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Strength, 2013, pp. 59-61, URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf, accessed on 18.02.2020.

aimed effect, their use may be justified when trying to annihilate an insurgent group in a location that is crowded or protected and unjustified and difficult to understand in situations with major, mass destructive consequences.

The swift development of this new type of weapons brings forward any discussion of its characteristic danger, and simply putting them into the equation of a crisis can lead to its escalation. At the moment, there are no international agreements on regulation of the use of these missiles or plans to start such discussions between countries that want this kind of weapons[9].

The development, possessing and use of new types of missiles shall be considered a threat to future international crises, both by the countries that are interested and possibly owners, and by countries which cannot afford the resources for their development. The main three reasons are:

- their existence in the arsenal of a state make them strong in a negotiation or crisis situation;
- incorrect assessment of a crisis situation, to which a possible and, ultimately normal human error can be added, an ordinary example can be a false launch of such a missile[10] that may lead to the maximum shortening the time to make a correct decision and the possibility of triggering a brutal response with catastrophic consequences;
- during a conflict or crisis situation, the use of such a missile can set up the conditions for employment of other types of weapon systems, with disastrous consequences for the entire planet.

By considering the possibility of using this type of weapon systems, *the pros* (considered from the viewpoint of a potential hypersonic missile owner state) can be identified, but also *cons* (from the international community perspective).

Pro-arguments for the use of hypersonic missiles:

- early warning loses its characteristics, as the time available to respond to a possible attack is short, thus surprising on the offensive actions carried out;
- missile features ensure the possibility of changing the target during flight, which leads to a greater number of targets being maintained under threat, thus a dissipation of the air defence effort;
- the execution of simultaneous attacks, under the protection of jamming and combined with the use of other weapons systems, has very high chances of achieving the set objectives, in a short time and with minimal losses;
- the psychological effect has a great impact on the military and political system.

Arguments against the use of hypersonic missiles:

- the perception over the offensive potential of these missiles, as well as the possibility that the owner states will use them in the first phase of a conflict (to

[9] R. Jeffrey Smith, "Speed Kills", URL: https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/future-of-warfare/scary-fast/hypersonic-weapons-race/, accessed on 18.03.2020.

[10] A.N.: a real case concerning the alarm of the population of The State of Hawaii regarding the launch of a ballistic missile (proven to be false): Adam Nagourney, David E. Sanger and Johanna Barr, "Hawaii Panics After Alert About Incoming Missile Is Sent in Error", URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/hawaii-missile.html, accessed on 23.03.2020

paralyze the entire military, economic and social system) may lead to a fierce race for obtaining such weapons or, possibly other types, but with the same destructive effect;

- their presence in a country's arsenal can lead to the exacerbation of a crisis;

the time between the identification of a missile launch and the effective measures to counter it does not allow for an effective defence of military and non-military objectives, especially when the identification of the target needing defence is difficult; in this context, the response of the nation under attack may be 'of the last resort' or even nuclear;

- uncertainty about the nature of the warhead of these missiles can generate a response with far more destructive consequences than the attack itself.

The topicality of hypersonic missiles can lead to a quite difficult situation to imagine two decades ago: their use at the expense of nuclear weapons, with the same paralyzing effect of the adversary, but perhaps without the radioactive consequences and international blame, possible in the case of nuclear weapons[11]. Thus, one can speak of a possible paradox of hypersonic missiles – states are blamed for their development and possession, but possible use may not be criticized as much as in the case of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, even if the effects of their use may fall within the same range of destruction.

3. Global concerns

Currently, there are three actors in the world highly concerned about the research, development and testing of such capabilities: the U.S., Russia and China[12]. Each of them stands out for initiatives, programmes or actions that are defining elements of their efforts in the field of hypersonic missiles.

For the *United States*, the development of hypersonic missiles constitutes a significant part of the *Conventional Prompt Global Strike* program, which would allow the U.S. hit targets located anywhere in the world, in less than an hour[13]. The U.S.'s concerns are directed not only towards developing and possessing such capabilities, but also towards identifying the systems that provide defence against hypersonic missiles. Thus, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has requested 206,832 million dollars in the fiscal year 2021, for the development of hypersonic missile defence systems, as Russia and China have reported considerable progress in the development of this technology[14].

On 1st March 2018, Vladimir Putin, the President of the *Russian Federation*, gave an important speech to the Council of the Russian Federation, the upper house of the Russian Parliament, where he also presented an update on some of the important developments in the country's strategic arsenal. During the speech, President Putin provided technical details (which is quite surprising) about

[11] R. Jeffrey Smith, *op. cit.*

[12] A.N.: the order is random and does not reflect any particular progress in the field

[13] ***, *Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues*, URL: https://crsreports.congress.gov, accessed on 20.03.2020.

[14] ***, "US Missile Defense Agency requests funds to counter hypersonic threats", *Jane's International Defence Review*, April 2020, URL: https://emagazines.janes.com/webviewer/#janesinternationaldefencereviewapril2020, accessed on 20.03.2020.

several ongoing strategic programs, including the hypersonic glide vehicles (called 15Yu71/Avangard), which can be launched using ballistic missiles, such as the RS-28 Sarmat (still in the testing phase), the intercontinental ballistic missile which, according to the president, "practically has no range restrictions"[15]. A year later, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced, according to TASS news agency, that the first regiment of intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with the *Avangard* hypersonic glide vehicles missiles became operational on December 27, 2019[16].

In the case of *China*, the hypersonic glide vehicle program is quite advanced, by 2014 China had conducted seven tests, six of which were successful. The development of hypersonic missiles is considered a potential capability to strike, with use in A2/AD[17] concept implementation or for force projection[18]. The advance of hypersonic missile programs is also likely to be due to the paradigm shift in this country, as in June 2017, the Chinese Academy of Sciences highlighted the shift from the phrase "*copied in China*" to "*created in China*", through a list of seven science and technology premieres, made in China between 2012 and 2017. Among them, relevant to this article, is "the World's largest shockwave hypersonic wind tunnel", thus demonstrating experience in supersonic and hypersonic speed flights, as well as an interest in the development of hypersonic missiles[19].

Apart from the three important actors, other states express their interest in this direction. Thus, according to a study conducted by RAND Corporation in 2017, France and India are among the most interested in developing capabilities in the field, both based on cooperation with Russia, followed, in terms of the effort made, by Australia, Japan and countries in the European Union[20]. The same source states that there are concerns regarding hypersonic research in Brazil, Canada, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, but the actions are only at the academic research level or proposals made by various entrepreneurs, with fairly small allocated budgets. The exception is Brazil, which is involved in both development and testing[21].

In terms of combat load, the hypersonic missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear payloads, which make them even more fearsome in relation to their characteristics. At the same time,

[15] ***, *Strategic effect*, Jane's Defence Weekly, November 28, 2018, URL: https://emagazines.janes.com/ihsj-defence-weekly, accessed on 20.03.2020.
[16] ***, *Russia declares first Avangard regiment operational,* Jane's Defence Weekly, January 08, 2020, URL: https://emagazines.janes.com/webviewer/#janesdefenceweekly8january2020/cover, accessed on 20.03.2020.
[17] A.N.: Anti-Access/Area-Denial.
[18] Tate Nurkin et. al., "China's Advanced Weapons Systems, Jane's by IHS Markit", May 12, 2018, URL: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Jane's%20by%20IHS%20Markit_China's%20Advanced%20Weapons%20Systems.pdf, accessed on 20.03.2020.
[19] ***, "7 'firsts' in China's sci-tech achievements in 2012-17", *China Daily*, URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-06/15/content_29752320.htm, accessed on 12.03.2020.
[20] ***, *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation*, *Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons,* RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017, p. xii.
[21] ***, *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation*, *Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons,* RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017, p. 14.

hypersonic missiles have the potential to use kinetic energy to destroy or damage targets, which is possible due to the very high speed and materials from which they are made. The kinetic energy of such a missile at the time of impact, at a speed of at least 1,900 km/h, is strong enough to penetrate any building material or armour, representing the equivalent of the detonation of three to four tonnes of TNT[22]. Even if, on a declaratory level, the U.S. is pursuing the development of hypersonic missiles with conventionally load, while the counter-candidates Russia and China intend to equip the same missiles with both conventional and nuclear warheads[23], the estimated possibilities of these missiles almost make these differences so irrelevant. The competition for the possession of these weapons is fiercer for the three major players, as a simple calculation demonstrates that launching such a missile from anywhere in these countries can hit any target in the territory of the other two.

However, the materialization of the use of these new weapons is not possible in the near future, as potential developers and users must identify solutions for overcoming the technical barriers related to missile control at high speeds and altitudes or identifying materials that meet the existing conditions during the flight[24]. At the same time, we can add the problems related to their testing in real conditions and, finally, yet very important, those relating to the costs and justification of the construction and possession of these missiles in relation to the expected outcomes. RAND Corporation specialists estimate that both types of missiles could be used for military purposes within a decade or less[25].

4. Countering hypersonic missiles

Identifying the possibilities of building a missile that is as manoeuvrable as a cruise missile, but with a much higher speed and which, at the same time, has the same speed or even greater than a ballistic missile, but a much better manoeuvrability, logically leads to concerns for the development of defence systems against them. Regardless of the choice made (the development of hypersonic missiles or the development of defence systems against them), the necessary investments must be identified, which are often significant. Only in the U.S., testing such a missile at Mach 5 speed cost 160 million dollars, and the Missile Defense Agency suggested a 600-million dollars budget in 2017, for a five-year programme, to identify the technological solutions needed to counter hypersonic threats[26].

With the development of hypersonic missiles currently being in the research and experimentation stage, the technological effort of the highly interested countries is seriously

[22] R. Jeffrey Smith, *op. cit*.

[23] ***, "Hypersonic Weapon Basics", *Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance*, URL: https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-basics/hypersonic-missiles/#_ednref2, accessed on 18.03.2020.

[24] A.N.: given the experience and challenges that have arisen during the development of ballistic missiles, it is somewhat likely to be overcome.

[25] ***, *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons*, RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017, p. xii.

[26] Jason L. Sherman, "The Hypersonic Arms Race Heats Up", URL: https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-hypersonic-arms-race-heats-up, accessed on 22.02.2020.

considered, and, thus, the identification of measures to counter this type of missiles is required. Even though hypersonic missiles are currently presented as invincible, there are certain vulnerabilities that can be exploited to identify means of countering and neutralisation. At the same time, combat solutions can consist not only of the development of missile defence systems that have the possibility of physically destroying a hypersonic missile, but also of systems that can influence its performance (the most well-known technique of "functional destruction" of a system is *GPS denial technology*, with which its guidance system can be affected/disabled[27]).

Countering hypersonic missiles is a problem not only for states that cannot afford a weapon of this kind, because in addition to counter the missile itself (which is extremely difficult to do with the current technology), their level of proliferation must also be taken into account. Even for major powers, the proliferation of hypersonic missiles will create new threats to national and global security, because of the impossibility of protecting all military and civilian objectives and facilities and, above all, urban congestion.

Hypersonic missiles differ from ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in the characteristics of speed, altitude and manoeuvrability, in the sense that, for the former, the point of impact and the trajectory may undergo changes during the flight regime. In a RAND Corporation study on hypersonic missile issues, these differences are presented and exemplified in a graph, presented in Figure No.1. In these circumstances, the



Figure no. 1: The trajectory of a Ballistic Re-entry Vehicle/ RV and a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle/HGV[28]

[27] James M. Acton, *Silver Bullet: Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike*, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, p. 71, URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf

[28] *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons,* RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017, p. 4.

possibilities of warning, identification, tracking and countering are different and even more difficult.

Possible targets for hypersonic missiles can be identified in the same range as those for ballistic missiles, but taking into account specific requirements related to their distance, available time, target value, level of protection and level of collateral damage. Thus, possible targets could be military command and control structures, strategic forces, naval groups, air bases, facilities for the production or possession of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear infrastructure (production, testing, storage and use facilities etc.), leaders of terrorist groups, A2/AD systems etc.

The hypersonic missiles effectiveness is closely related to how increased speed and manoeuvrability characteristics are managed at an appropriate level. Because of that, the two types of hypersonic missiles intended to be developed (hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles) are much more difficult to counter than existing ballistic missiles. The flight altitude and speed they can develop make the warning of their use very difficult to achieve, with implications on the time available for effective combat, while increased manoeuvrability increases the degree of uncertainty about the objective to be defended. All aspects presented represent the main problem of countering these missiles: *the physical possibility of neutralizing* a missile that has a hypersonic speed is discovered too late and has increased possibilities for manoeuvring. Currently, it is quite likely that the most important mean of countering be deterrence, but for this, there must exist the proper means to produce the desired effect. As it is known, the best defence is the attack, so, it is possible that the defence against hypersonic missiles is the credible possession of these weapons itself. The counter of hypersonic missiles is primarily linked to the possibilities of detection, which involves the development or improvement of air, space and ground sensor systems that can detect their launch or flight. Even with these capabilities available in the military arsenal, the time decision-making on how to act and the time of combat itself are quite limited[29].

Countries with only ground sensor systems (radars) in their inventory will have to cope with a harsh reality, during which the decision-making process must be rapidly carried through and the time for countering is extremely limited. In this context, it is a certainty that the rapid rate of hypersonic missiles development must require an alert rate of identification of new missile defence solutions. It is expected that, in the first phase, the solution be the current systems and programmes that can counter ballistic and cruise missile, but brought into a configuration and range of performance commensurate with the threat. However, their effectiveness against hypersonic missiles can only be proven under similar conditions such as the ones of

[29] A.N.: according to the RAND Corporation study, states equipped with performance earth and space sensors have a few minutes to know that the missiles are in their airspace; see: *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons*, RAND Corporation, Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017, p. 14.

a conflict. The current ballistic missile counter technology can also be a solution to underpin future hypersonic missile counter systems, supported by high-performance early warning capabilities. It is certain that, regardless of the proposed and chosen solution, defence systems must also be viable in case of multiple attacks, under the protection of jamming or combinations with other lethal systems.

At the same time with combat actions, it is necessary to carry out actions limiting the consequences of the hypersonic missiles use. These actions may relate to: command and control decentralization, dispersion of forces and, in particular, structures providing their command and control, prioritization of objectives to be defended, existence or establishment of reserve command posts to take over the tasks of the main ones as soon as possible, thinking and applying tactics, techniques and procedures that use the most of the mobility of forces, the defensive measures specific to the technique and the terrain.

Conclusions

History has proven that this is not the first time that the great powers have ignored the risks arising from the desire to have miraculous solutions regarding the military threat. The nuclear weapon is just one of many examples of military programs with which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. threatened each other during the Cold War. However, the existence of such weapons in a country's military arsenal leads to a change in its perception of the resolution of future crises, but also a positioning of the country at another level of military power. The mere presence of these missiles can lead to an escalation of a conflict, and the deployment of hypersonic missile systems, even with a declared conventional load, can put an end to good intentions to peacefully resolve a crisis situation.

Perhaps the main problem with these missiles is not their development (it is quite possible that the tests that are currently being carried out show that all technical and construction problems can be overcome), but the continuous interest that more and more states have in them. As a competition involving at least three superpowers, the results are expected to emerge very soon and increasingly convincing, contrary to the opinion of military analysts who consider this race harmful to the security environment.

The possession of hypersonic missile construction technology may be equivalent to the possession of the nuclear weapon, unless measures are taken to limit access to it. The resources involved for the construction and possession of such weapons are not fully known yet, but it is certain that there are large funds allocated to research of hypersonic missiles programmes.

Research, development and use of hypersonic missiles does not create the prerequisites for a safer planet, but merely provides a state of relative quietness for the holders and a new concern for those who want them, but cannot afford them. At the same time, the possession of these weapons by states that normally do not have other equally large threats in their arsenal, leads to a situation where hypersonic missiles can pose a real threat

to the great powers, further complicating the equation of the poles of power or the peaceful resolution of crises.

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2. ***, "Flight Regimes", *Global Security*, URL: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/intro-regimes.htm
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7. ***, "Strategic effect", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, November 28, 2018, URL: https://emagazines.janes.com/ihsj-defence-weekly
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HOW TO BECOME A SOLDIER? A SURVEY ON THE PERSONNEL SERVING IN THE MILITARY HEALTH CARE

*Márta PÁKOZDI**
*György BÁRDOS, Ph.D.***

In qualitative studies one can have a view about the internal world of the interviewees regarded rather subjectively. However, this offers a chance to look at the basic phenomena, to reframe former ideas and acquire new information. The aim of this study is to formulate proposals regarding main topics of future quantitative research on career choice.

Methods: Half-structured interviews in dyadic situations were conducted following directed sampling. All interviews were based on a general requirement: "Please, let us know how to become a soldier". The qualitative analysis was based on the Grounded Theory narrative analysis method.

Results and Conclusions: Dominant factors affecting career choice for military health care were: personality, family background, adventure seeking. Career choice is also greatly affected by the demand of fitting to the occupational fitness requirements. A surprising result is the weakening of the behavioural norms, an area that requires further research.

Keywords: *becoming a soldier; career choice; Grounded Theory (GT); interviews; military health care.*

Background and aims

Being a soldier is not an easy job and, even though the military service is regarded mostly a male profession, there are also many women in the world of uniforms. To correspond to the military challenges, such as the use of weapons, route marches, military exercises, drilling, including special actions, mission assignments, all of these are really probing activities[1]. This is probably why even some of the tough, persistent, dedicated people find it difficult to meet the requirements of the military service. Nevertheless, military service seems to attract many people, offering a secure

[1] N.E. Betz, L.F. Fitzgerald, *The career psychology of women*, Academic Press, 1987.

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job, a current modest but calculable existence and a well-defined career. It is also a fact that the military provides high services on the health, psychological and physical state of the employees, ensuring free-of-charge screening and medical care services, as well as the provision of recreation facilities. In addition, the soldiers' physical condition is maintained by daily physical exercises. Formerly, many people had been afraid of the infantry, while today many would look at these possibilities due to the changes in legal relations (regular, contractual, volunteer services).

Despite the challenges, the military career seems to be more-and-more popular among women[1,2,3]. Though women are present in many areas of the military, a special branch within the frame is health care and military medicine. Those working in the military health care system face many extraordinary challenges and significant difficulties thus becoming a medical officer or health-care personnel requires strong determination. Our research, therefore, deals with life stories of the military health care workers and may significantly improve our knowledge on the military profession as a career option. In addition, getting an answer to the "How" question using a qualitative research method, could help us determine the way quantitative data may be obtained regarding these phenomena in a small target group.

The theory of the career choice has been studied by many professionals, locally and in other countries, such as: Parsons[4], Ginzberg[5], Holland[6] or Szilágyi[7]. They can be divided into two main types: static and dynamic theories. According to the static theories, career choice is the result of an actual decision. According to the dynamic theories, career choice is influenced by some personality components – interest, values and norms, needs – as internal factors, or the prestige of the given career as external factors[8].

Previously developed studies, in the United States and in other countries, highlighted significant components of the recruitment process and the factors influencing the success of this process. Most of these surveys, however, had been based on questionnaires, frequently filled up by officials and institutions[9]. Some of the earlier surveys focused on the recruiters' role and performance, others

[2] N.K. Denzin, *Review of Pragmatism and feminism: Reviewing the social fabric*, Symbolic Interaction, 1998.

[3] B.J. Roberts, K.M. Kocher, *Recruiting and retaining Army nurses: An annotated bibliography*, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School. 1988.

[4] A. Broadbridge, E. Parsons, "Gender and career choice. Experiences of UK charity retail managers", *Career Development International*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005, pp. 80-97.

[5] E. Ginzberg, "Toward a Theory of Occupational Choice", Personnel and Guidance Journal, 1952.

[6] J. L. Holland, *Making vocational choices: A theory of vocational personalities and work environments*, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, USA. 1985.

[7] K. Szilágyi, *A fiatalok és felnőttek pályaorientációs és karrierépítési készségeinek szintje, fejlesztésének lehetőségei* [Level of the youngsters' career orientation and building skills and possibilities for a development], Budapest, Nemzeti Felnőttképzési Intézet, 2005.

[8] P.J. Hartung, L.M. Subich, *Developing self in work and career: Concepts, cases, and contexts*, American Psychological Association, 2011.

[9] G. Richter, N. Hanhart, *Factors affecting attraction, recruitment, and retention of NATO military medical professionals*, Science and Technology Organization, NATO, 2012.

described the many factors influencing the application and the young people's propensity towards enlisting into the army.[10,11,12] These studies are usually conducted around different models of the recruitment process, for example the one seen in **Figure no.1**. Although these studies revealed significant factors and circumstances of the military recruitment process, few of them tried to do this by interrogating the soldiers themselves and by analysing their opinions, without preliminary suggesting questions.

Therefore, the aim of this pilot study has been to uncover motivations of the military career choice of personnel serving in the military health care system, from the viewpoint of the soldiers themselves. Since personal interviews were analysed by a yet seldom applied qualitative method (Grounded Theory), new aspects of the propensity towards the army could have been found. As a result, the authors' intent is to make proposals for topics of future quantitative studies.



Figure No. 1: A model of the recruitment process[10]

Methods and sampling

This study has been conducted with soldiers serving in the military health care system, at their workplace. Half-structured interviews had been run in dyadic situations in about 10-15 minutes, with directional sampling (n=4). The interviewees' age ranged between 44 and 50 years old, half of them being women. They were mostly officers, either employed on a fixed-term

[10] L.M. Penney, K.E Horgen, W.C. Borman, *An annotated bibliography of recruiting research conducted by the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences*, Tech. Rep., No.1100, Alexandria, 2000.
[11] L.M. Penney, M.J. Sutton, W.C. Borman, *An annotated bibliography of recruiting research conducted in the U.S. Armed Forces and in Foreign Services*, Tech. Rep., No. 1109, 2001.
[12] B.J., Roberts, K.M. Kocher, *Recruiting and retaining Army nurses: An annotated bibliography*, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988.

contract or for a determined period of time. Criterion of the interview was coherent living spoken language. A generally valid requirement was to answer the question: "How to become a soldier?". They were asked to offer detailed answers, and to report complete stories.

Analysis

Since no adequate quantitative methods had been available for our research, we have opted for a qualitative analysis in which the Grounded Theory narrative processing

Table no. 1: Demonstration of the coding process. Same data as on Figure 2b are shown here to demonstrate how open codes had been grouped during the axial coding, finally resulting in the creation of a selective code





was applied[13,14,15,16].

The interviews were recorded and then, the transcript had made possible the written version of the interviews.

During the analysis, three levels of coding were applied: *open* (*basic*) coding, *axial* coding and *selective* coding. This process resulted in less and less codes representing larger and larger categories, resulting in a final concentrated overview of the interviews.

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Open (basic) coding

After reading the texts several times, firstly, we created open codes by assigning categories to the meaningful segments of the text (i.e. words, expressions or sentences). During further processing, some categories have been kept while others were removed[15,17,18]. The basic idea was to find out what a certain category can tell us about the basic problems, components and aspects of the studied phenomenon. In this phase, we examined the context of the codes, that is, their antecedents, circumstances and consequences, their environment, space and time frame.

Axial coding

During the axial coding, we intended to discover conceptual relationships among the categories (open codes)[15,18,19], by searching for answers to such questions as what could a certain category tell us about the basic topics, parts, different aspects of the study, and for associations between individual codes and different dimensions, as well. By the end of the axial coding, basic and subcategories had been available, ready to look for relationships and correspondences[19,20,21]. The notes recorded in this phase helped the analysis in its following phases.

Selective coding

Finally, during the selective coding, the categories and subcategories obtained in the first two phases had been collected and grouped under new, higher level summarizing codes and were fitted to the text (that is, correspondence among the codes and the text were checked for, validation of the relationships)[22,23,24,25,26]. The categories left out through the axial coding were omitted in this phase.

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[25] A.L. Strauss, Corbin, J., *Basics of qualitative research techniques*, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 1998.
[26] J. Wuest, "Grounded theory: The Method", in *Nursing Research: A Qualitative Perspective*, 5th Edition, Jones and Bartlett Learning, Sudbury, MA, USA, 2012, pp. 225-256.


OPEN CODES
AXIAL CODES
SELECTIVE CODES
subserviency - superordination
burocracy
service
airforce, army
commanders
discipline relaxation
system has changed
System
setting up
legal relationship
regular
új
volunteer
rank
status
rising, advancement
waging, allowances
Career, legal relations
rigour, discipline
suitability
following regulations
Norms
becoming a pilot
entering the army
serving in armed forces
vocation
Serving
PERSONALITY


OPEN CODES
AXIAL CODES
SELECTIVE CODES
input requirements
aptitude tests
health suitability
health status
diseases for exclusion
physicality tests
Requirements
uniform
handling arms
fight types
Norms
less rigour
discipline relaxes
system has changed
Discipline
military training
parades
teamwork
Military training
SUITABILITY FOR WORK



Figure no. 2 a, b, c, d: Overview of the coding process. The first column represents the open (basic) codes, the second column shows the axial codes, whereas the third column contains the final, selective codes

Results

We have analysed and compared the reasons for choosing a military career by applying the Grounded Theory approach. The common characteristic of these factors is that the soldiers have told their life stories by external impulses. Life stories were characterized by singular mode and past tense, whereas social experiences were told in plural. In addition, the reports also have a look at the present as an expression of the satisfaction of choosing the military profession.

As the result of the coding process, four selective codes have been obtained (see Figure 3), as follows:



Figure no. 3: Summary of the results of the coding procedure: overview of the axial and of the selective codes

Personality
(Figure 2/a)

All texts represent selectively, and at the same time, expansively the personality of those opting for the military profession. All of them are able to accept the subservience-superordinate character of the military system and their place in regular or contractual legal relationship. They like the exactly same determined tasks requiring observation of the norms, such as the uniform, rigor, disciplines, formalities, following regulations, respectively. However, even in this overly regulated professional system, there are well performing interviewees for whom aiding and helping the injured in the hospital or at the military fields is still important, and some of them prefer to combine military service with becoming medical officers.

The best-known career choice theory is Holland's, stating that the career is primarily determined by personality. The theory describes six different personality types and, thus, six career types. However, in reality, there are not clear and unequivocally distinguishable personality types[27, 28, 29]. This is also reflected in the reports. The persons saying

[27] G. W. Allport, *Pattern and growth in personality*, Oxford, UK, Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1961.
[28] E. Aronson, *The Social Animal*, New York, H. Freeman, 1995.
[29] C. Peterson, M. E. Seligman, *Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification*,

"I wanted to become a pilot" following the career modification due to the illness experience – "I got a serious illness and was sure I could not fulfil the extreme requirements for becoming a pilot" – after having been healed – "instead of the military school I applied for the medical school". For him, responsibility for others and providing help is important, but he is also able to accommodate to the rule-driven military environment[30] – "we have learnt the rigor, the discipline, formalities you know, arms usage, fighting styles, the commands, the sub- and super-ordination; that is everything a soldier should know". It is obvious that, in addition to the realistic personality, he shows the typical social personality traits as well, and even has the characteristics of the conventional, military rules accepting personality – as he says "since then, I have had several positions and even have been on a mission".

Suitability for work
(Figure 2/b)

Requirements: In all texts, the *strict input* requirements are frequently mentioned as entry conditions for becoming a soldier. The aptitude tests, for each military branch, include the health status, factors that exclude eligibility, the *physical fitness* accomplished within the set time, as well as the *psychological suitability*. One of the texts contains details about the important differences between the aptitude tests (as preconditions for application) in the different military branches, whereas another stresses the physical preconditions. Most of the analysed texts contain also feelings, experiences and attitudes regarding the fulfilment of these requirements. They also indicate the necessity of the knowledge required by the fulfilment of the terms.

Norms: There are mentioned in almost every report the service rules, formalities, rules for using weapons, in addition to common exercises and drills. One report mentions milder rigor and stacked discipline, referring to the earlier military system. Requirements for the given career, as predispositions, can be found in each report, meaning that in order to fulfil the goals, each participant has the information about requirements and has prepared to answer the purpose which also brought about their commitment toward the military career. "I had to consider that due to my weight, I cannot be accepted in the army – but I put myself together and have been able to fulfil even the physical requirements". "I was in the hospital several times, and even then I was sure I cannot correspond to the serious entrance requirements for becoming a pilot. Fortunately, I met the admission conditions by not applying for being a pilot".

These specifications and their differences among military branches have been shown by one of the reports in detail. To meet them, requires enough desperation, vocation and firmness from those who choose the military career [29].

"Well, they have been and still are serious, then and now. First, the health status is checked, there are certain

Vol. 1, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2004.
[30] P.J. Hartung, L.M. Subich, *Developing self in work and career: Concepts, cases, and contexts*, American Psychological Association, 2011.

diseases that exclude becoming a soldier, as you know, such as autoimmune diseases. If you focus just on the air forces, everything, including the health status is more rigid, think of hypertonia or hay fever. Let us go on. There are the physical requirements where there are also differences between the air force and the infantry. You know, the air force is much more difficult to get into. And finally, there are the psychological requisites". In another report, one can find the description of the physical requirements which, in addition to the interest toward the military career, includes the performance motivation, and even has a role in the formation of real self-evaluation.

"Running 3200 meters in a certain time, the push-ups and then the sit-ups were merciless, but I have completed them".

Social support and family

(Figure 2/c)

The factors mentioned in one of the texts are *following the family traditions, the help of a long-time soldier*, which had been decisive for the armed forces as becoming choice of career. The whole text mentions different versions of family support.

Duality includes both worrying about dangers and also supporting the military career. The former appears in the reports in a well formatted way as the family's protection and the fear for the dangers on the battlefield, especially for the air force or the medical officer service chosen after the illness.

Family support as acceptance, as trusting in avoiding the missions was also found in the reports.

Support of the military leaders found characteristically in one of the analysed texts; in the form of inviting the "overeducated" civilian in the military environment, specialized and with adequate qualification to be dedicated for the military career.

Friendly support – is mentioned in one of the texts as being ambivalent, oscillating from recklessness to being born a soldier.

Had come together one of the reports mentions in a special and rich language narrative the friendship being formed as a result of common trainings and drillings of the military students. In addition to friendship, experiences gained in the common trainings and drillings, everything a soldier has to know, strengthened their commitment toward the military profession.

Teamwork appears as an analogue of the hospital team activity in the reports of the interviewees arriving from the civilian health care system, when they refer to tasks given for military groups frequently at the battle fields, especially when preparing for mission assignments.

Effect and motivation

(Figure 2/d)

Adventure search is a primary element of the female reports about trying a mission involvement, for the success which they refer to not only at the beginning but also at the end of the reports. The whole report, expansively visualize, in a way, the *desperation* and *bravery* as well as the *self-conscious*

preparation in the background of the adventure search characterized by such dangers. **Duality** is also characteristic, including the *lack of military experiences* and the *mission*, respectively.

Media-effects are especially presented by the interviewees who joined the military forces because of adventure search. The TV is included, which, in addition to mission reports and calls for health care professionals, presents military movies and war correspondences influencing the decision of the interviewees about joining the military services. Looking for articles regarding the military medicine, military health care equipment and services on the Internet have also significant effects.

Many reports refer to *childhood experiences* associated with the military services, such as war stories told by grandparents and readings about the air force. Among social experiences some worth mentioning are the play games of imitating airstrikes using toy planes, fighter planes and helicopters, which they refer to as "I had played infinitely". Other popular play games for them, as kids, were jungle-fighting with faces decorated by shoeblack using toy guns, and also a "fantastic experience" when visiting a real fighter plane.

Illness experiences: one of the reports presented the call of the military career in a special way. A man's decision of becoming a pilot, when being young, has been cut off by an illness, but the illness experience has led him to decide to become a medical officer during the recruitment activity organized by the armed forces.

Conscription experiences appear in one of the reports. Meeting with the uniforms during working in the military medicine had brought up memories of the conscription services; these two, together have significantly affect the career choice at the adult age.

Experiences: In two of the analysed texts, we found references to a field at which the interviewees had negative or positive work experiences at a military corp. In the description of the negative experiences it also appears the suggestion that this career is not suitable for women.

Recruitment was the topic of a long talk of one of the interviewees. Promises given by the military forces, on one hand, represent the social value of the medical officer career, and, on the other hand, security that means a calculable, secure future for the speaker.

Social appreciation: majority of the reports stress the social judgment of the military career that includes the *respect for the uniform*, *honour for the soldiers* and possibilities of the *material* as well as *vocational respect* and the possibility of *real rising in rank*.

Calculable, secure future: The *calculable, secure future*, the safety and the sure subsistence promised by the army appear in almost all reports. In addition to security, the text also contains numerous comparisons with previous experiences. These refer to the restricted financial conditions of the family, as well as to the social appreciation.

As a basic motivation, most of the texts refer to the calculable, secure future, being associated with the acquisition of material goods, to opting

for a socially accepted job and to the professional and moral appreciation. Security is a basic human need driven by instincts which, in addition, may refer to means of subsistence and to the future. This is placed second in the Maslow-pyramid, but still is a significant force in establishing subsistence[31].

One of the interviewees described this as follows: "The army had organized a recruitment, we were called to join in order to become medical officers, even offered a stipend; you may think this was a good offer since we were poor; in addition to the stipend, they also offered us the prospect of a secure future".

Adventure search and weakening of the behavioural norms were characteristic among the interviewees. Adventure search is a basic motivation for the woman who has been committed to the military career due to a single reason "I wanted to go to on a mission in order to put myself to the test", affected by the media "I had seen on TV mission reports and heard that they are looking for health care workers". Being fond of the army has also been a factor, "the uniform simply has attracted me as well as the challenges, the mission and the military lifestyle – I felt like this is my place, that I have to do this". In addition to the primary goal, for her accepting the gender role has also been stressed "I wanted to show that I can meet the requirements of the military service as a woman". Behind the "once and easy adventure" there is a strong and persistent personality who acts intuitively to reach the goal: "I was not afraid of the drill and of the weapons, had no idea what all this mean. Yes, I trusted myself, my need and bravery".

According to the instinct theory of Sigmund Freud[32], prosperity, human and professional relationships are driven by instincts. Therefore, it seems that the huge amount of energy required for achieving her goal was induced in the adventure search[33,34]. In the case of this adventure seeking interviewee, considering also Holland's theory[35,36], there are several personality types presented simultaneously: the well-functioning social type in the helping-supporting environment since she is a health care professional; the conventional personality being able to accommodate to the rule-accepting environment; and the venturesome type, characterized by motivation for achievement, the urge to correspond to the expectations, the desire to keep and execute the commands[37,38]. This complex personality type-structure fitting to the environment is well

[31] A. Maslow, *Motivation and personality*, New York, Harper, 1954.

[32] J.E. Strachey, (ed.) *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, The Standard Edition, Vol. 1-24, Volume Set, 1st Edition, W.W. Norton & Company, 1976.

[33] A. Broadbridge, E. Parsons, *Gender and career choice. Experiences of UK charity retail managers*, Career Development International, Vol. 10, No. 2, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005, pp. 80-97.

[34] N.K. Denzin, *Review of Pragmatism and feminism: Reviewing the social fabric*, Symbolic Interaction, 1998.

[35] J.L. Holland, *Making vocational choices: A theory of vocational personalities and work environments*, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, USA, 1985.

[36] R.C. Reardon, J.G. Lenz, "Holland's theory and career assessment", *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 1999.

[37] G.W. Allport, *Pattern and growth in personality*, Oxford, UK, Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1961.

[38] C. Peterson, M.E. Seligman, *Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification*, Vol. 1, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2004.

represented by the sentence "the medical attendance on the battle field requires extreme attention"[39].

Discussion

The period of choosing a career is a very specific part of the lifetime, in which, in addition to the individual settings, social factors are also important. This process is full of contradictions and tensions[40],[41],[42]. In addition to the labour market, other important factors are personality, family background, knowledge about the chosen career, the community and the structure of society. Adult life actually begins with the career choice, although the individual has the possibility to change the decision later if actual circumstances require[40,42].

This picture is also reflected in the interviews. One of the interviewees, despite a disease changing his previous made decision about the military career, has still become a soldier as the result of recruitment by the military forces, and was able to satisfy his strong professional calling for the military service as a medical officer. "I remember exactly, I had decided to be a soldier when I was 14, I wanted to join the air force… However, during middle school, I got a serious disease which cut off my intentions…. Fortunately, I have passed the aptitude test since it was not for the aircraft… Finally, I opted for this when the military forces started to recruit for the position of medical officers." Another interviewee admitted the military forces has changed her decision based on her labour experiences. "Then, while already working, I have realized that this career is not suited for women – although it is also a fact that I was coming from a police-formed family". Due to the family model, she has still remained in the armed forces since "it has not been questioned that I should remain in the armed forces".

Nowadays the stereotype[40] that only males should be soldiers has been changed. The stereotypes associated with the military service are not selected according to the gender, as it was well demonstrated by the interviewees. Many of them serve in the armed forces corresponding year-after-year to the tough competence requirements[40,41,43,44].

The adventure seeking as a motivation has not been dominant among the interviewees and was not directed by getting material goods – being, however, general in the case accepting mission services; although its uniqueness is worth being noted. On one hand, it might be one of the key elements of the recruitment process for women acting in the health-care field, and, on the other hand, it might

[39] K. Chamberlain, *Using grounded theory in health psychology. Qualitative Health Psychology: Theories and Methods*, 1999, pp. 183-201.
[40] N.E. Betz, L.F. Fitzgerald, *The career psychology of women*, Academic Press, 1987.
[41] A. Broadbridge, E. Parsons, "Gender and career choice. Experiences of UK charity retail managers", *Career Development International*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005, pp. 80-97.
[42] P.J. Hartung, L.M. Subich, *Developing self in work and career: Concepts, cases, and contexts*, American Psychological Association, 2011.
[43] N.K. Denzin, *Review of Pragmatism and feminism: Reviewing the social fabric*, Symbolic Interaction, 1998.
[44] B.J. Roberts, K.M. Kocher, *Recruiting and retaining Army nurses: An annotated bibliography*, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988.

be the focus of future research aiming at analysing thoroughly the personality of the women joining the armed forces that could significantly help the training of the women soldiers for missions.

The military service is basically labelled as being dangerous. The soldier does not get into a situation where life could be extinguished or harmed only on the battle field. The frequent drillings, exercises, to which the reports regularly refer to – "I like to be a soldier, to fire, to participate in drills" – require the observation of the military norms, and their impairment would raise the level of dangers frequently affecting human life.

Another feature from the reports refer to the easing of the discipline, as described in one of the texts: "Yes, once only regular officers served along with the enlisted men, today there are also contractual and volunteer soldiers. And the rigor is not that stiff either, that is discipline becomes weaker as I see it". It is not clear to what extent all these changes can be attributed to the alteration of legal relations of the military service appearing in the reports. The broadening of categories of the legal relations by appearing the contractual and volunteer staff suggests a kind of stereotypy, namely that it is not compulsory to be a soldier after the expiration date of the contract, and even during this period it is possible to leave the armed forces. What is more, law provides favourable financial conditions for them, that are not available for regular officers[45, 46].

[45] R.K. Fullinwider, *Conscripts and Volunteers: Military Requirements*, Social Justice and the All-Volunteer Force, Totowa, NJ, Rowman & Allanheld, 1983.
[46] G. Harries-Jenkins, *Women in Extended Roles in the Military: Legal Issues*, Current Sociology, 2002.

Our study has allowed to have a look at the soldiers' personal viewpoints regarding the recruitment process, requirements and characteristic features. This probably is a good additional finding to those earlier studies which had addressed this procedure from the institutional point of view, including the role and capacity of the recruiters and the general attitude toward this process[47,48,49,50,51].

Future research and limitations

To what extent these conditions influence the military system and the value system of those who serve in the military? Could these factors be responsible for the above described phenomena? To what extent this phrasing can be generalized to the entire armed forces system? On the other hand, to what extent can they be attributed to the soldiers' personality?

[47] National Research Council, *Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth: Implications for Military Recruitment*, Washington DC, The National Academies Press, 2003.
[48] L.M. Penney, K.E. Horgen, W.C. Borman, *An annotated bibliography of recruiting research conducted by the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences*, Tech. Rep., No.1100, Alexandria, VA, U.S., Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2000.
[49] L.M. Penney, M.J. Sutton, W.C. Borman, *An annotated bibliography of recruiting research conducted in the U.S. Armed Forces and in Foreign Services*, Tech. Rep., No 1109, U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2001.
[50] G. Richter, N. Hanhart, *Factors affecting attraction, recruitment, and retention of NATO military medical professionals*, Science and Technology Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012.
[51] B.J. Roberts, K.M. Kocher, *Recruiting and retaining Army nurses: An annotated bibliography*, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988.

Do the gender differences play a role? If yes, what is the difference between them? Have all these been induced by the military management? Answers to these questions should be given by future research, what we suggest to run on a larger scale, and which may be useful to induce necessary changes and their realization. Although studies have been made on these topics, for example, in the USA[48, 49], the situation of the small East-European countries may be significantly different, thus it is worth studying it. Selecting the interviewees seemed to be an easy task by saying that being a soldier, the simplest way is to call fellow soldiers. However, we must truthfully say it has proven to be difficult for many reasons, such as closeness, fear, mistrust, laconism, widely characteristic for them. Based on earlier experiences on the pilot interview, the interviewer decided not to meet with colleagues in uniforms that may initiate a stressing situation, and also the most effective way to record interviews was the one using a sound-recorder. Still, there were some who were not willing to talk because of the possible identification of their voice. This has been one of the limits of the study despite the fact that everybody had been informed that the records would be handled confidentially, the data will be processed anonymously and they may quit at any time.

Protection against refusal of the participation due to the mistrust of the professionals – being one of the limitations of this study – seems almost impossible; the key to be successful might be the omission of voice/video recording which we may suggest for the future, for those studying this field.

In addition to giving information, eye-contact, evaluation of the non-verbal signals, tone and accentuation were also important largely helping coding of the interviews. Special attention has been paid to the additional language of the interviewees, to the jargon expressions ("civil care, looking for healthies, the system becomes loose, there is no strict subordination as over places") seldom used in everyday life, thus having special meaning for their peers. However, for the interviewer, they have been easy to interpret since all serving in the military health care speak the same language; thus, we had never returned to these phrases, a possible limitation of this study.

The informal style – an equal relationship – has offered a kind of trust through which we have managed to get information, otherwise difficult to access. The good collegial relationship has been supported by empathy as well as by the quietness, pleasant place for the dyadic interviews and by the declaration of the confidential processing.

It was quite pleasant that fellow soldiers have recounted their memories with empathy and extensively. Special attention has been paid to the heterogeneity, thus men and women, junior and senior officers, respectively, regular and contractual soldiers have been included into the sample, thus, being a possible advantage of this study.

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30. STRAUSS, A.; CORBIN, J.M., *Grounded theory in practice*, Sage Publications, 1997.

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34. ***, National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes and Aspirations of American Youth: Implications for Military Recruitment, Washington DC, The National Academies Press, 2003.

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CHANGE OF DIRECTION IN TURKEY'S AFRICA POLICY. WHAT IS BEHIND THE TURKISH INTERVENTION IN LIBYA?

András MÁLNÁSSY*

Most recently, Africa has started to receive more and more attention due to the continent's strategic, economic and geopolitical importance. Turkey is strongly interested as well in the developments, particularly in the North African region, both in economic and military terms. This article is trying to disclose the key motives of the Turkish foreign policy and military intervention in the region.

Keywords: *geopolitics; foreign policy; national security; Turkey; Libya; Africa.*

Introduction

By its geographic location, the Turkish Republic interconnects regions and continents as well as the East and the West. According to former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey has many points of contact based on which the country is European and Asian at the same time while being tied up with the African continent through the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Due to the focus on Turkey's European and Asian ties, or its role in the Middle East, studying the relevant issues generally suffers some losses in the field of African relation. In the recent years, these relations have been seen more and more appreciated. Also, with regard to the Turkish aid to Libya, it must be considered as a long-term foreign policy trend.

1. History and background of Turkey – Africa relations

Turkish-African relations have a centuries-old history. The Ottoman Empire maintained ties with a large part of the African continent, either as part of the empire or as a vassal thereof. The Northern African region – Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt – belonged to the Ottoman sphere of interest, extending in the south to Sudan, parts of Niger and Chad, and to the east to areas of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia.[1]

[1] Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects", in *SETA Policy Brief* , No. 22/2008.

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Figure no. 1: Expansion of the Ottoman Empire[2]

However, it should be highlighted that Turkey's foreign policy has been, and continues to be, marked by a sharp border between North Africa and the sub-Saharan region. While since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish leadership has kept up only a marginal relationship with the Sub-Saharan region, the North African region has always been of particular interest due to its geographical proximity and closer historical-cultural ties.[3] The so-called "global opening policy" of the Turkish Government was begun in the 1980s under Turgut Özal's leadership, first as Prime Minister and then as President. At that time, however, it was still mainly focused on the economic sector. At that time, moreover, according to secular traditions, Islam, which was later used as a religious-cultural-diplomatic trump card, was not part of Turkish foreign policy.[4]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, major changes took place in Turkish foreign policy. By that time, Western orientation became increasingly narrow for Ankara, and the post-bipolar international system was less stable, but more volatile for Turkey due to conflicts

[2] ***, "Ottoman Empire", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, URL: https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire, accessed on 21.01.2020.
[3] János Besenyő, Péter Oláh, "One of the new competitors in Africa: Turkey", in *AARMS*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2012, URL: http://real.mtak.hu/83768/1/real_OneofthenewcompetitorsinAfricaTurkey_2012_u.pdf, accessed on 21.01.2020.
[4] Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey's 'New' Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications", in *Centre for Strategic Research Papers*, Autumn 2011, Sevilla, Sevilla University.

in its surroundings. The basic concept for Ankara's "new" Africa policy was born in the 1990s.[5]

The Opening to Africa Action Plan, made public in 1998, contains the main objectives that set out Turkish foreign policy. The action plan includes the need to increase the number of high-level visits; relations with African actors in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) need to be stepped up; encourages parliamentary committee visits; underlines the importance of aid and development aid both within the UN and at government level; proposed opening of new embassies; and the goal of joining the African Development Bank. Finally, an essential element of the Action Plan was the need for Turkey to play a greater role in establishing security in Africa.[6]

2. The African Doctrine of the AKP and Ahmet Davutoglu

When the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy was significantly transformed. Members of the intensifying nationalist and religious movements gained leadership in the 1990s, which also influenced Turkish foreign and geopolitics. All this was reflected in Turkey's increasingly open reference to Islam and its common historical past in its foreign policy-making. It should also be kept in mind that for the dynamically growing Turkish economy, the African continent's raw materials as well as its import needs are important. The current state of out-of-date African industry is incapable of supplying more than one billion people on the continent. So while Ankara is trying to maintain and protect its traditional economic interests, it is also trying to exploit new markets in Africa. Turkish interest is also reinforced by the fact that the Middle East remains an unstable region.[7] In contrast, much of Africa can be considered stable and economically promising. In addition, in recent years, Ankara has worsened relations with its former strategic partners such as Egypt, Israel or the United States and the EU.

In addition, the Turkish leadership recognized that there are no historical burdens on relations with African countries, but the Islam, the common historical tradition and Turkish economic potential can be a good basis for developing relations. As a result, the AKP announced 2005 as the Year of Africa. To this end, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the first prime minister to visit the Sub-Saharan region, visiting its two key states, Ethiopia and South Africa.[8]

One of the Turkish first steps was the establishment of the Institute for African Studies, which became an important centre

[5] Mehmet Özkan, Birol Akgün, "Turkey's opening to Africa", in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2010, p. 532.

[6] Numan Hazar, "Turkey in Africa: The Implementation of the Action Plan and an Evaluation after Fifteen Years", in *ORSAM Report* No. 124/2012, Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, URL: https://www.orsam.org.tr//d_hbanaliz/Analiz_124_eng.pdf, accessed on 09.01.2020.

[7] János Besenyő, Security preconditions: Understanding migratory routes, in *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*, (2016, September) Volume 6, Number 1, pp. 5-26, accessed on 09.01.2020.

[8] David Shinn, "Turkey's Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Shifting Alliances and Strategic Diversification", in *Chatham House Research Paper*, No:.10/2015.

of scientific activity on the continent. In 2005, Ankara gained observer status in the African Union (AU), and in 2008 the AU declared Turkey a strategic partner. The first summit between the parties took place in 2008. The most important outcome of the opening ceremony in 2005 was the Summit on Turkish-African Cooperation under the patronage of President Abdullah Gül. Of the 53 states then on the African continent, only Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique were absent from the Istanbul event, which marked the opening of a new phase of cooperation.

The 2008 Summit was also a breakthrough in recognizing the political and economic potential of Turkey as well as its increased interest in the continent. In addition, the Turkish side has a positive perception that they truly consider African actors as equals and focus on developing relations rather than intervening in internal affairs.

Turkish-African relations were heavily influenced by the "strategic depth" doctrine developed by former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. According to the doctrine, Turkey is centrally located, with many regional links. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy must be multidimensional. The basis of Davutoglu's foreign policy can be summarized in five pillars: (1) multidimensional foreign policy in accordance with the interests of global powers; (2) "zero problems with the neighbours" policy; (3) promotion of the most important values and norms through foreign policy in the region, and through the increase of influence; (4) rhythmic diplomacy, a never seen activity to be established towards abroad, with the tools of classical diplomacy and introducing other, new tools as well; (5) Turkish foreign policy must rely on the interdependence in the economies of the region's countries.[9] It also follows that African opening is part of a thoughtful and conscious strategy. At the same time, it is true that Africa is only one direction in terms of "strategic depth", but in the light of current events it is a very important direction in Turkish foreign policy. All of this from the point of view of Davutoglu's geopolitical concept aims to increase Ankara's international room for manoeuvre as a regional power, both politically and economically.

3. Tools for accomplishing geopolitical interests in Africa

One of the most important areas of Turkish advocacy is the improvement of development, aid and cultural relations, which can also be considered as tools of Turkish *soft power*. The use of these tools may in future facilitate political and economic positioning in countries where Ankara wants to assert its interests more strongly. Experience in recent years has shown that policy makers have recognized the need for patient, long-term construction on the African continent to deliver the right results. Summits, bilateral visits and the results of membership in the organization also contribute to this. It meant a new quality of relationship development as Turkish Airlines began to develop its African network. This facilitated the work of

[9] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", in *Insight Turkey 10*, No. 1/2008, pp. 79-84.

the Turkish International Agency for Cooperation and Development (TIKA). Founded in 1992, TIKA operates under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office and plays a key role in shaping Turkish foreign policy. In addition to aid, TIKA also places great emphasis on raising the standard of education in Africa and training the African elite for the future. This means that thousands of students can study with scholarship at Turkish universities. Furthermore, the Turks also regularly build schools and mosques in Africa. The most important Turkish advocacy organizations in Africa are the Hüday Foundation, the Humanitarian Assistance Foundation (IHH), Kimse Yok Mu (KYM), the Turkish Red Crescent and the Turkish branch of Doctors Without Borders.

However, another important tool in the geopolitical resources is the military dimension/hard power. Until the military intervention in Libya, Ankara was rather cautious about the conflicts in Africa and, with a few exceptions,[10] played mostly a mediating role.

4. Turkish foreign policy in the Libyan crisis

Turkey's first reaction to the events in Libya was neutrality. Cautious approach was also justified by the presence of around 60 Turkish companies and 25,000 Turkish guest workers at that time.[11] Even in 2014, at the height of the escalation of the conflict and the turmoil in Turkish-Libyan relations, the total value of bilateral trade between the two countries reached $ 2.3 billion.[12]

As a result, Erdogan, in his first manifestations, was opposed to NATO intervention. However, the international situation led the Turkish President to become aware of the existing real policy actualities. In particular, he could not stand up to the international community urging intervention, and thus the Libyan people. Therefore, in March 2011, Turkey agreed to support the NATO intervention. In the first half of the civil war, Turkey supported the Libyan Transitional National Council, which was formed by opposition forces, but raised the question of the extent of Turkey's military intervention, which would have raised the aspirations of some hegemonic states labeled neo-Osmanism. Ankara eventually opted for neutrality at this stage of the crisis, characterized by the Transitional National Council, financial support for insurgents, financing reconstruction projects, training of Libyan law enforcement forces, and technical assistance. With this policy, Turkey has, as a matter of fact, fled its economic interests from the Gaddafi regime.

As events progressed, recognition of the Transitional National Government was not, however, widespread throughout the country. During the political transition, Turkey seemed a natural ally to the Justice and Construction Party, founded

[10] A.N.: Turkey regularly contribute frigates to the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151).

[11] Csicsmann László, N. Rózsa Erzsébet, "A Török Köztársaság az átalakuló Közel-Keleten" [The Republic of Turkey in the Transitional Middle East], in *Külügyi Szemle* No. 1/2013, pp. 59-78.

[12] Jonathan Schanzer, "Turkey's Secret Proxy War in Libya?", in *The National Interest*, March 17, 2015, URL: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkeys-secret-proxy-war-libya-12430, accessed on 22.01.2020.



Figure no. 2: The Opposing Parties in the Libyan Conflict[13]

in 2012 following the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, in 2013 Libyan opposition forces began to attack Islamists more and more sharply. Former Islamists in the National Congress were steadily losing their mandates in the midterm elections, and an alternative government was established in Tobruk with Western support. In spite of the recognition by the UNSC and several countries of the Tobruk government as a legitimate representative of Libya, Turkey refused to recognize it and terminated its diplomatic representation there.[14]

Turkey viewed the 2014 events in Libya in parallel to the Egyptian military coup a year earlier. After setting up a base in Tobruk, Khalifa Haftar declared war on various Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Against this background, the international legitimacy of the Tobruk Parliament and the extension of its power to the entire territory of Libya would have come to a military coup in the interpretation of the Turkish government. For Ankara, legitimate power continued to be represented by the General National Congress, which was strongly dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups (such as the Misrata Group). The complexity of the situation is evidenced by the fact that, according to many sources, Turkey supported not only moderate Muslim groups but also extremist Islamist groups.[15] Thus, the Libyan civil war in 2015 increasingly portrayed a proxy war in which Turkey and Qatar recognized their Tripoli government, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates and a significant part of the international community recognized

[13] ***, "Libya conflict: Turkish MPs approve bill to send troops", *BBC*, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50975494?ocid=socialflow_twitter, accessed on 21.01.2020.

[14] Zülfikar Doğan, "Political Missteps in Libya Cause Turkey's Economy to Stumble", in *Al-Monitor*, January 6, 2015, URL: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-loosing-libya-due-to-muslim-brotherhood-passion.html, accessed on 15.01.2020.

[15] Fehim Taştekin, "Turkey is part of the problem in Libyan conflict", in *Ahval*, April 8, 2019, URL: https://ahvalnews.com/libya-turkey/fehim-tastekin-turkey-part-problem-libyan-conflict, accessed on 15.01.2020.

the Tobruk government while striving for arming militias to extend their influence to the region.[16] The situation was overshadowed by the adoption in December 2015 of UN Security Council Resolution 2259 (2015), in which it was decided that all governments previously considered legitimate would lose their international legitimacy and that only a UN-backed national unity government would in the future be the only legitimate representative of the Libyan people.[17]

In Libya's civil war currently, Turkey has supported the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, against the Libyan National Army, led by eastern military commander Khalifa Haftar. The support is related to an important deal in which the GNA agreed to delineate boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea. The deal is designed to help Turkey explore for natural gas and oil oppose to its coastal neighbours.

5. Sea Border Agreement between Turkey and Libya (GNA)

Ankara signed an agreement with the GNA on November 27, 2019. In context



Figure no. 3: Turkey-Greece/Cyprus overlapping claim[18]

of the Agreement, there is a sea corridor between the two countries, which would cut through a zone currently claimed by Greece and Cyprus. Here a future gas pipeline is planned to connect the eastern

[16] Jonathan Schanzer, "Turkey's Secret Proxy War in Libya?", in *The National Interest*, March 17, 2015, URL: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkeys-secret-proxy-war-libya-12430, accessed on 16.01.2020.

[17] Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2259 (2015), Security Council Welcomes Signing of Libyan Political Agreement on New Government for Strife-Torn Country, UN Security Council Meetings Coverage, 7598th Meeting, December 23, 2016, URL: https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12185.doc.htm, accessed on 16.01.2020.

[18] ***, "Turkey's dual Libya objectives", in *Petroleum Economist*, URL: https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/middle-east/2020/turkey-s-dual-libya-objectives, accessed on 21.01.2020.

Mediterranean gas fields with European markets. The project would help reduce Europe's dependency on the Russian gas.

The countries involved – Cyprus, Egypt and Greece were irritated by the Turkish action, since they saw it as an attempt for territorial expansion and gaining energy resources in the region. The situation is still more difficult because of the conflict in relation to Cyprus as a result of the Turkish military intervention in 1974, and the economic use of the island's territorial waters between Greece and Turkey.

6. Strategic significance of the Agreement

In the recent years, Israel, Greece and the Greek Cyprus made moves for cooperation forming a bloc and Saudi Arabia, another significant regional power also joined this bloc, while Turkey was left rather isolated at the same time.

The accord of 28 November, 2019 established a virtual sea line between Turkey's southwest coast and Libya's northeast coast allowing for a good position for Turkey against the Egyptian-Greek-Cypriot-Israeli bloc in the face of their pressure on GNA.

The Sea Border Agreement can set out new boundaries of the related economic zones including the continental shelf. Under the current circumstances and with regard to the claims concerned, the 'gunboat diplomacy' will certainly remain alive in the near future and the region is, or may as well become, a potential war centre. The world powers – the United States, Russia and China, in addition to Iran – are also involved in the conflict. Very complicated and casual coalitions have come up with local and global players, thus, creating

Figure no. 4: Turkey-Libya Maritime Border Deal[19]

[19] ***, "Strategic, legal aspects of Turkey-Libya deal", in *Anadolu Agency*, URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-strategic-legal-aspects-of-turkey-libya-deal/1673079, accessed on 21.01.2020.

a reliable overview is quite difficult and the frontlines are still left confused.[20]

7. Security and military cooperation between Turkey and the GNA

Turkey and Libya (GNA) also concluded a military cooperation agreement providing for training, technical assistance, material support, including police actions against smuggling and terrorism, intelligence or relief operations in case of natural disasters. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which was signed on November 27, 2019 in Istanbul allows the Turkish government to send troops to back the GNA against the Libyan National Army.[21]

8. Turkish troops in Libya – Ankara using its *hard power*

On 19 December, 2019, the Libyan Government (GNA) formally requested Turkey's support to prevent rebel forces from taking the Libyan capital. As a response, the Turkish Parliament approved to send troops to Libya and give aid to the Sarraj Government (GNA). The Turkish aid has comprised a wide range of military services in the fields of control, communications, air defence, intelligence and reconnaissance – that is, the key shortcomings of GNA forces in Tripoli.

On 2 January, 2020, the Turkish parliament approved a motion to deploy forces to Libya. The vote established a one-year mandate for Turkish forces to transfer weapons, planes and vehicles in support of the UN-recognized Tripoli government.

Currently some 80 Turkish military personnel are in Tripoli mostly in the advisory capacity.[22] According to some sources around 650 fighters from the Syrian National Army (SNA)[23] left Syria through the Hawar Kilis military border crossing and were flown to Tripoli. On 5 January, 2020 another 1,350 Syrian fighters crossed into Turkey. Some have since been deployed to Lybia, while others still undergoing trainings at camps in southern Turkey.[24]

Conclusion

Over the past decade, Turkey has been an increasingly active player in the North-African region. Libya is a key partner for Turkey while taking crucial geopolitical role for the European countries, too, due to its location and oil reserves. The

[20] Mesut Hakki Casin, "Strategic, legal aspects of Turkey-Libya deal", in *Anadolu Agency*, URL: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-strategic-legal-aspects-of-turkey-libya-deal/1673079, accessed on 21.01.2020.

[21] Abdullah Bozkurt, "Full text of new Turke, Libya sweeping security, military cooperation deal revealed", in *Nordic Monitor*, 14 December 2019, URL: https://www.nordicmonitor.com/2019/12/full-text-of-new-turkey-libya-sweeping-security-military-cooperation-deal-revealed/, accessed on 21.01.2020.

[22] Metin Gurcan, "Could fragile cease-fire lead to peace in Libya?", in *Al-Monitor*, 13 January, 2020, URL: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/01/turkey-russia-libya-can-fragile-ceasefire-bring-peace.html, accessed on 21.01.2020.

[23] A.N.: Umbrella of Syrian rebel groups funded by Turkey.

[24] Bethan McKernan; Hussein Akoush, "2,000 Syrian fighters deployed to Lybia to support government", in *The Guardian*, 15 January, 2020, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/exclusive-2000-syrian-troops-deployed-to-libya-to-support-regime, accessed on 06.02.2020.

European Union is, of course, particularly interested in the regional processes. It is not only about the oil, but Libya makes the entry and access to the inside of Africa where further natural resources are found, in addition to oil. Besides, the country is a huge gateway for African migration into Europe.

Overall, the North-African region has become by now a real buffer zone, where local and global powers battle with one another and the developments may generate migration movements, as well. The Libya issue has so many layers, and it is not expected to be resolved anytime soon.

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THE ROLE OF MIND MAPS IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Cristian ISTRATE*
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The evolution of the international security environment requires that intelligence services be tailored in a way so they respond coherently, efficiently and in time to threats. The changes must not only focus on how intelligence structures act, but also on how intelligence analysts operate. Mind maps are the proper tools designed to shed light on complicated issues and to find creative solutions to extremely complex problems.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the benefits of developing heuristic thinking in the information analysis process and to explain why intelligence analysts should use more frequently this technique.

Although heuristic schemes may initially seem to be a method of little relevance in the field of intelligence, this article aims to prove the exact opposite.

Keywords: *mind maps; intelligence analysis; intelligence; information; crisis; analysis.*

Introduction

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was perceived not only as a breath of fresh air for the Soviet Republics, but also as a source of uncertainty in what was intended to be the post-Cold War international security environment. In terms of holding and exercising power, the bipolar geopolitical system was about to be replaced by a unipolar system. Thus, the United States of America were about to become the first and only global power.

In a sea of uncertainty, one of the few truly certain aspects is related to the fact that the poles of power from the international arena seek to constantly realign themselves in relation to the fluctuations of the geostrategic and geopolitical environment, in the context of states' continuous struggle to obtain resources, informational supremacy, but also of counteracting other current challenges and threats. In view of

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the globalized international security environment, achieving information superiority can prove to be a real challenge, not just a vital goal. Therefore, the transformation of intelligence services and the use of new analysis methods must be the two priorities that any democratic state must take into account.

1. The epistemology of intelligence analysis

In the activity of intelligence structures, information plays a central part. One of the most important challenges for intelligence services is to identify potential crises before they produce irretrievable effects. Therefore, achieving information supremacy cannot be ridiculed as it is a necessity imposed by the international arena turmoil. The 21st century brings to the fore, among other things, a diversification of threats against international security, and it is often possible to establish a connection between threats and information, as in the case of cyber-attacks launched on private or state owned databases.[1] Thus, the intelligence services are in the position of recruiting specialists from as many fields of activity as possible, given the fact that the information collected is, most of the time, within the sphere of multidisciplinary. Basically, "the individual finds himself in a strong information field, subject to an information flow from all directions and in all ways, official and unofficial, intentional or unintentional"[2]. Therefore, critical thinking and analytical ability prove to be the two key conditions that anyone, not just intelligence analysts, must meet. If one thinks of Kantian philosophy, one may conclude that the individual is both purpose and means, in the field of information.

On the one hand, the purpose of information is to convey a certain message to a target audience, as each entity, political or private, takes the necessary actions to direct people's perceptions and opinions in a certain direction. On the other hand, in intelligence, humans are the oldest and most important source of information. Those who do not work in intelligence services have a moral obligation, which derives from pragmatism: checking information from multiple sources, preferably from the primary ones, and reducing the consumption of prefabricated information products.

Beyond the cliché expressions, the power of information is undeniable. Thus, the information came to have two edges, one for the enemy and one for our own forces. When it is not correctly used or it is out of control, things can degenerate, because, like our own forces, the enemy also relies on information."[3] Therefore, tainting information is both a goal and a concern that requires preventive measures. It

[1] Florian Coldea, *Despre serviciile de intelligence. Gânduri, perspective, opinii. Pledoarie pentru încredere*, Rao Publishing House, Bucharest, 2018, pp. 41-42.

[2] Ioan Manci, Dan Mangaliuc, Corneliu Preja, *Managementul informațiilor militare în actul decizional*, "Nicolae Bălcescu" Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 2014, p. 21.

[3] Sînziana-Florina Iancu, *Rolul intelligence-ului în prevenirea și managementul crizelor*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2019, p. 119.

can bring success to operations against the enemy, or it can ensure unfortunate failure if our own information is not protected even when it does not appear to be in imminent danger.

Intelligence is one of the most important components of strategic knowledge and "the main form of decision-making input for risk management, detecting challenges and threats in a state's security policy, as well as for seizing opportunities in order to achieve long-term goals".[4] The whole intelligence process must result in an intelligence product designed for national security. Depending on what it foresees, the political decision-maker will lay the foundations of a relevant strategy to the national security related to a certain period.

Intelligence can also be approached from the perspective of the product resulted from the information processing about certain nations, forces or other hostile elements, as well as about current areas of operations or potential others.[5] This way of defining is specific to the Romanian Army intelligence structures. The intelligence activity is carried out both in times of peace and war. By obtaining information about the specifics of certain nations and their political and military intentions, the policy maker can develop a specific strategy that becomes a guideline for how relations with the respective states will be conducted.

Scientific endeavours to develop a universal intelligence theory have proven to be a partial failure, for multiple reasons. Firstly, there are large differences between the intelligence services in terms of organizational culture, even if only the intelligence structures in democratic states would be considered.[6] Secondly, an area with so many variables is difficult to be conceptualized. There are some elements that should be taken into account: sources of information, developments in information and communication technology, the war on terrorism, the achievement of information supremacy, as well as the contamination of the information that the enemy possesses, without them noticing.

The analysis can be defined as a mechanism underlying the establishment of knowledge, comprising the rational activities that determine gnoseological approaches.[7] Basically, knowledge cannot be conceived in any form without going through the process of analysis first. Its role is to render a cognitive content with a novelty character. The newness of the cognitive approach can be reported at the individual's micro level or at the systemic level. The novelty manifested at systemic level necessarily implies innovation.

The intelligence analysis is composed of a series of steps as follows:

[4] George Cristian Maior (coord.), *Despre intelligence*, Rao Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014, p. 10.

[5] Gheorghe Savu (coord.), *Informații pentru apărare (I). Note de curs*, "Nicolae Balcescu" Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 2012, p. 242.

[6] Consuela Avram, *Intelligence și arta guvernării*, Top Form Publishing House, Bucharest, 2016, p. 22.

[7] Marin Ioniță, *Încadrarea conceptuală a activității de informații. Informația de securitate națională*, în Ionel Nițu (coord.), *Ghidul analistului de intelligence. Compendiu pentru analiștii debutanți*, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intellingence Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 15.

"establishing the necessary information; planning, according to the priorities, the collection of information; obtaining and collecting primary information; analysis of information collected by specific methods and procedures; dissemination (communication) of results according to their own procedures to the targeted group".[8]

The fundamental role of intelligence analysis is to identify a certain meaning from a lot of collected information in various forms, by placing them in a certain context. The issues concerned may be religious, political, geographical or military, or may be based on a little of each, in a complex matrix of time, place and circumstances.[9] Even if the pieces of information that were provided to the intelligence analyst may be good, bad or even contradictory, he must place them in a certain context with relevance to the policy maker.

Therefore, the intelligence analyst must have, among others, the following skills: a good knowledge of the subject to which the pieces of information subjected to analysis are related; knowledge of data research and evaluation methods; scientific rigor, but also imagination, both necessary in order to generate new hypotheses that will be subjected to further tests; knowledge of the particularities of information collection methods; awareness of cognitive errors; openness to opposing opinions; the honesty needed to admit one's mistakes and the willingness to internalize the lessons learned.[10]

Some of these peculiarities are not specific to intelligence, and they are necessary to any analyst from any field of activity. Therefore, most analysts are experts in culture, politics, history, linguistics and so on. By far, the most important skill that analysts must possess is the lessons learned acquisition, being the only method that allows them to improve their skills, giving consistency and quality to the intelligence product. In intelligence, the error is unfortunate, it can have serious consequences, but it is necessary in order to eliminate the gaps from the intelligence activity and for ensuring the evolution of the relevant institutions.

Although sometimes used as synonyms, there are substantial differences between the information and the intelligence concepts. The information is rough, it is necessary to place it in a certain context and, also, confirm its validity. In the collection stage, it can be placed in the sphere of ambiguity; the intelligence analyst must clarify all these variables. Intelligence is the result of gathering the pieces of information, analysing and evaluating them, as well as disseminating them to the policy maker. Therefore, at least in theory, the dissemination of the intelligence product cannot happen until all the elements that placed them in the uncertainty area have been removed. Even though intelligence services have begun to increasingly use open sources,

[8] Niculai-Tudorel Lehaci, *Componenta intelligence în combaterea amenințărilor de tip hibrid*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2019, pp. 45-46.

[9] J. Ransom Clark, *Intelligence and National Security. A Reference Handbook*, Praeger Security Interntional, London, 2007, p. 47.

[10] Roger Z. George, James B. Bruce (ed.), *Analyzing Intelligence. Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 3.

analysts continue to rely mainly on classified information. The information sources used in intelligence can also be seen in Table no. 1.

Table no. 1: Typology of information sources

Information sources[11] (from the perspective of obtaining the pieces of information)	Meanings
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence - access to these kind of information sources is not unregulated
HUMINT	Human Intelligence - the information comes from both secret and non-secret human sources
PHOTINT	Photographic Intelligence - the information results from surveillance by photo and video means
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence - exploitation of images taken by satellites or aircraft
ACINT	Acoustic Intelligence - acoustic data are used to obtain certain information
MASINT	Measurement and Signal Intelligence - technical sensors are used to obtain the information
COMINT	Communication Intelligence - the information comes from the interception of the foreign communications
COLINT	Cooperation Liaison Intelligence - obtaining information is based on cooperation with other intelligence structures
RADINT	Radar Intelligence - radars are used to extract the desired information
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence - technical information obtained by studying electromagnetic radiation
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence - involves the interception of electronic communications
FISINT	Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence – it is based on the interception of foreign electromagnetic waves, especially those resulting from the testing of aquatic, aerospace or terrestrial systems

[11] Mireille Rădoi, *Serviciile de informații și decizia politică*, Tritonic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 33-34.

2. Mind maps - defining elements and intelligence usability

To increase the effectiveness of intelligence analysis and to enhance its efficiency, military and civilian experts have searched for several methods, some of them coming from other fields, which can be applied here as well. The mind map is also known as the heuristic scheme and refers to "an important visual technique that provides a universal key to unleashing cognitive potential"[12]. The mind maps' role is to facilitate learning and clarify thinking, these two being the essential elements for the performance creation. Basically, they give up linear thinking, opening a realistic horizon: informational chaos. Therefore, thinking acquires new perspectives that give meaning to the myriad of data each person has at a given time. They must have several features: the focus is on a central image; the essential aspects of the subject in question emanate like branches from the central image; the branches are secondary subjects, forming a nodal structure.[13] Mind maps are, in fact, graphic tools that are based on the use of colours, images, lines, and logical connections. Their purpose is to organize information, but also to facilitate ideas' development. The hierarchy and the organization of information becomes a lot easier by using it. Moreover, this allows anyone to see not only the big picture, but also the details that underlie a particular topic.

Mind maps become truly valuable when used as a part of a comprehensive approach to all concepts that constitute a particular analysed subject.[14] They become much more efficient in terms of storing information, given that mental maps are multidimensional, coloured in a multitude of shades, working in perfect harmony with the brain's natural structure.[15] These tools can be used in any field with the same efficiency, especially for the development of organization projects, meetings, lists development, note-taking or personal development. In fact, heuristic schemes lead to the personal and professional development of any person. Performance is a consequence of the continuous improvement of the learning process, as well as of a coherent thinking, aspects to which the mental maps can contribute decisively. At the macro level, mind maps can be the tools that could have a strong contribution to a paradigm shift by creating new conceptual frameworks, as a result of reorganizing old ideas and principles and adding new ones. Ideally, those elements that have made a certain paradigm vulnerable can be identified and removed from the new conceptual framework.

Mind maps are a graphical representation of radiant thinking. It is based on a few steps: collecting information, making observations on the gathered information (this is where the analysis process begins); verification

[12] Tony Buzan, Barry Buzan, *Hărți mentale*, Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 77.
[13] *Ibidem*, pp. 77-78.
[14] P. S. Meier, „Mind-Mapping. A Tool for Eliciting and Representing Knowledge held by Diverse Informants", in *Social Research Update*, No. 52, 2007, p. 4.
[15] Aliye Erdem, „Mind Maps as a Lifelong Learning Tool", in *Universal Journal of Educational Research*, No. 5 (12 A), 2017, p. 2.

of observations from an empirical point of view, detailed description of observations; development of descriptive, prescriptive and normative principles. If the truth value of the conclusions is universal, then they can be an axiom. Drawing mind maps is not as difficult as it is effective, as seen in Figure 1.



Figura 1: Instructions on how to prepare a mind map[16]

This technique presents many benefits, one of them is that using the essential words for a particular analysis can result in saving a substantial amount of time.[17] Mind maps also force the author to focus his/her ideas on the real problems. Another advantage is the increase of the brain's ability to make quick and clear associations between words, concepts, situations etc., the brain having the ability to remember easier those multidimensional and colourful mind maps, unlike traditional and linear notes. Moreover, as the author elaborates a mental map, he can make more and more associations and connections, being much simpler in this organized graphic framework than in what would be called informational cram.

Heuristic schemes must be based on highlights, associations, clarity and on the author's personal style.[18] Although there are certain principles a mind map must be built on, the author is free to enrich it as he/she pleases. Basically, he has to find himself in what is designed and organized. The heuristic scheme can receive meanings known only by the author, the main condition being that of thought unleashing and giving it the freedom to manifest itself in other forms than linearly. Therefore, if two different people would have to make a mental map

[16] The figure was taken from ***Mind Maps. *Learning and Information Service*, URL: https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/nmp/sonet/rlos/placs/critical_reflection/pdf/mind_map_factsheet.pdf, accesed on 14.12.2019.

[17] Tony Buzan, Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 122.

for a certain problem, the results would be different and, therefore, the suggested solutions would not coincide.

The hierarchy and numerical ordering of information contributes to visibility increase and to facilitating the creation of conceptual connections. Also, the author should not avoid the use of images when he wants to make a comprehensive approach of a particular subject or the use of synaesthesia (the use of "words or images that activate sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch and kinaesthesia"[19]). Heuristic schemes oblige the author to associate thinking with his own senses, with his own perceptions about the analysed subject.

Mind maps should be one of the most useful tools in the work of intelligence analysts. They operate with information from both open and secret sources, having a very high responsibility, given the results of the analyses can be decisive elements in the elaboration of the political decision. He must be a very well-organized person, with a well-developed critical thinking, but he must permanently prove creativity in making associations and establishing connections. For this reason, heuristic schemes must not only be known, but also applied by intelligence analysts. Given the volatility of the international security environment, establishing links between apparently distinct and unrelated events may be the missing piece of the puzzle in developing a scenario that can avoid a major crisis.

The development of mind maps can be a real help for intelligence analysts even when they try to memorize as well as possible the concepts that they must use in their activities. Most of the time, if not every time, the analyses impose a strong character of multidisciplinary. In this context, heuristic schemes become one of the most effective methods of establishing the elements that make possible the similarity/complementarity from certain points of view of different areas. The intelligence analyst can also use mind maps to better organize the received information. The data collected does not always reflect what the policy maker asks for. Therefore, analysts need to sort the received data according to their relevance to a particular topic, and then check their validity. The intelligence analysis based on heuristic schemes, where it is possible and when appropriate, is much clearer, and the resulting intelligence product has more chances to fit within the limits set by the policy maker. They also represent a useful tool in terms of time efficiency. In most cases, intelligence services need to act urgently, and analyses need to be developed in a very short period of time, but with clarity, consistency and efficiency, like when the time allotted is much longer. Heuristic schemes have a beneficial effect on stimulating creativity, and analysts need to have it when faced with information dilemmas. In many cases, creative thinking is the only way in which they can interpret certain data and develop solutions to complex problems.

If intelligence analysts frequently appeal to the use of mind maps, then they will be able to make associations much faster than usual, while meeting two requirements: quality and a reduced

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 126.

action time. By far, the most relevant aspect of mind maps is the overall picture that results in the end. For intelligence structures to be able to take the necessary measures in order to avoid a crisis situation, they must have in front of them a detailed and schematic representation of the crisis situation manifestation, as well as a picture of the context that made possible its occurrence.

Once completed, the mind map should be checked regularly. Its adjustments result from the way in which a certain problem evolves, from the post-conception implications, as well as from the consequences of the decision-makers' involvement in solving a problem/crisis.

Conclusions

Any potentially conflictual/crisis situation requires an overview in order to develop a strategy for resolving or avoiding it, and intelligence structures have a role to play not only in the stages of gathering and analysing information, but also in the counteracting stage. Adapting intelligence services to the threats of the 21st century also means streamlining intelligence analysis.

Mind maps cannot be conceived without considering the trio: visual memory - active learning - making connections. When intelligence analysts receive the information, it looks like dozens or hundreds of puzzle mixed pieces. In such a situation, the first step that analysts take into account is the data organization. The next step is to rank the information, as a requirement to fit somewhere in what should become the final picture of the analysis. Heuristic schemes can help them highlight the relevant details of a particular case, details that could be lost in a linear analysis. When there is a surplus of information, mind maps help analysts improve their concentration level, a sine qua non condition for finding hidden meanings in certain pieces of information.

Heuristic schemes shed some light on the problems whose magnitudes are less known. Therefore, an analysis on a subject with many unknowns and variables must use this method. The mind map helps establish the limits of a problem/crisis and the point from which the solution should be conceived. Intelligence analysis would be far less susceptible to error if analysts would rely more on the use of radiant thinking with all its peculiarities.

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Raluca Codruța LUȚAI, Ph.D.*

The information explosion and the technological progress made by humanity in the latest decades have determined the emergence and the development of new forms and methods for collecting the information. In this context, the usefulness of the open sources for services and information communities is being re-thought. Starting with the definition of the intelligence discipline, this article analyses the advantages and disadvantages required by OSINT (Open Source Intelligence).

Keywords: *open sources; information services; advantages; disadvantages; globalization*.

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, events that opened the democratization and liberalization processes of the states throughout the world, the digital revolution that followed due to the explosion of the Internet and the communication technologies, doubled by the growth and the transformation of the risks and of the threats present on the international security agenda, led to rethinking the importance of an existing but marginalized intelligence. Open source intelligence, the intelligence discipline which deals with collecting, analysing and transforming into intelligence data obtained from open sources is today a major part of the reform which is felt by the international communities, in the context of openness to information.

Created by the American and British intelligence communities during the Second World War, OSINT has represented for, for a long time, a marginalized discipline, a complementary "black sheep" of intelligence services[1]. The supremacy of the intelligence obtained from human sources (HUMINT) or by intercepting the signals (SIGINT) was indisputable. The transformations that came with the 21st century make it possible for this discipline to prove its usefulness more than ever before.

After clarifying certain aspects related to the definition and

[1] Robert D. Steele, "Open Source Intelligence", *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, Ed. Loch Johnson, Routledge, 2007.

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conceptualization of this discipline, this work presents an analysis of the challenges and the opportunities to be managed by the information communities that use Open Source Intelligence, toward eliminating the unknown from the equation of the decisional procedure.

1. Open Source Intelligence: definition, typology

The institutionalization of the use of *OSINT* and, therefore, most definitions that best capture this intelligence discipline come from the American intelligence community which, since the Cold War, has been dealing with collecting and analysing open sources, in order to gain a strategic advantage. The United States Department of Defense defines *OSINT* as "intelligence produced from public sources, collected, analysed and disseminated efficiently, addressed to an interested audience, with the purpose of satisfying certain requirements related to intelligence"[2]. The legal document which establishes how the intelligence community works is the Intelligence Community Directive (IDC) 301, which defines *OSINT* as a "intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited and disseminated in a time-efficient manner, to an interested audience with the purpose of addressing a certain request"[3]. On the other side of the ocean, in the British intelligence community, the information from open sources is also defined by many institutions. In 2011, the British Ministry of Defense defined *OSINT* as "intelligence derived from information available to the public and which, then, has a limited distribution and access to the public."[4]

The importance of this new INT is also justified by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for whom open source represent a vital component of its strategic vision. In November 2001, the Alliance launched the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, a complex guidebook that, in its first chapter, offers a comprehensive definition of the new discipline. OSINT is not seen as a substitute for satellites, spies or other forms of civil and military intelligence. OSINT is considered information discovered in public space, analysed and disseminated to a limited public, mainly the commander and the commander's leading team, with the purpose of responding to a specific request related to intelligence[5].

Also known as white intelligence, OSINT is also defined by the Romanian intelligence community. The Romanian Intelligence Service defines the new intelligence discipline as follows: "Open Source Intelligence represents the result of a procedure that requires identifying, validating, collecting, corroborating and analysing with the purpose of elaborating

[2] Hassan Nihad A., Hijaz, Rami, *Open Source Intelligence. Methods and tools – a practical guide to online intelligence,* Apress, 2018, p. 2.
[3] ***, *Intelligence Community Directive (IDC) 301*, National Open Source Enterprise.
[4] Douglas Wells, Helen Gibson, "OSINT from a UK perspective: considerations from the law enforcement and military domains", in *Proceedings Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, 16: From Research to Security Union*, Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, 84-113, p. 87.
[5] *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, November 2001, URL: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nato/osint_hdbk.pdf, pp. 1-3.

products that are relevant to national security, products corresponding to the specific requirements related to intelligence.[6]"

In other words, OSINT applies the procedure that is specific to any type of INT, to the vast diversity of open sources, in order to deliver viable intelligence products. All the definitions stated take into consideration three main criteria for OSINT. The first one is *the open character of the information and the source from which it is collected.* The information published by individuals or organizations can be accessed by simple observation, by requesting free access or by accessing it after a payment (here we refer especially to journals and publications for which access is done based on a subscription). The second major element of the new discipline is that it must be registered *within the legal delimitations* and be compliant with *the principle of legality*. In other words, the analyst who collects data and information from open sources must not be put in the situation of stealing information, compromising IT systems through hacking or operating social engineering mechanisms. OSINT cannot use information that are prejudicial to privacy or harms intellectual property. Any information collected in this way is not considered OSINT and, as a result, its analysis and dissemination is not encouraged[7]. A third element, highlighted by Mark Lowenthau and Robert Clark, that is important for the discipline of INT to be recognized at the level of the other disciplines, is related to the fact that the information collected from open sources must always be validated in order not to cause prejudice to the rest of the stages related to the intelligence procedure.

Regardless of how it is defined, the new intelligence discipline envisages the legal exploitation of open sources, the validation and analysis of discovered data and the information, either through simple observation procedures or through its acquisition.

There are many open source categories. They have evolved alongside technological developments. The first generation of open sources was represented by books and other open sources on paper support (hardcopy). *Books* are a real open source used in intelligence-related activities. They have always been used, not necessarily for their specific content as much as for the references they contain. Another especially important category is represented by *newspapers and magazines*, useful for their more specific content, dedicated to certain subjects. An eloquent example of this is the *Aviation Weekly* magazine, which often provides details related to the former Soviet Union's military capabilities[8]. Newspapers are important in order to understand real-time events.

The first revolution recorded by open sources, the one that represented the starting point for the discussion related to their role in the decision-making

[6] ***, *Ghidul OSINT*, Romanian Intelligence Service, URL: https://www.sri.ro/upload/Ghid_OSINT.pdf, p. 8.

[7] A.N.: In the activity related to collecting and analyzing open sources, the intelligence analyst can identify classified information, or discover them. In the relevant published literature, this situation is defined as NOSINT - classified information which intervenes during the OSINT procedure.

[8] Bean Hamilton, *No more secrets - Open Source Information and the Reshaping of the U.S. Intelligence*, ABC Clio, SUA, 2011, p. 23.

process, is related to the evolution and development of radios. *Radio broadcasts* worldwide represent a wonderful source to fast understand certain events. Even though the popularity of radio stations is lower today, they continue to be a useful and easily accessible source for analysts. After 1980, the world was revolutionized by the spreading and the popularization of *television.* The latter has represented, and still represents for many individuals, a main source of entertainment and information. Through the specific issues they address, through the fact that they cover local events, we are more informed and more connected with what is happening near us or further away from us. The intelligence community has understood the ease with which information can be collected and the television's role in the world of open sources.

If the radio defines the idea of open sources, the emergence and the popularization of the internet redefines how open sources are perceived. The digital world brings radio and television in the same place, it decreases the costs and it greatly increases the variety of information that can be exploited. Digital open sources revolutionize through the large quantity of information they make available and through the availability of these information. The digital open sources that have appeared and developed in recent decades are called *new media* and can take the form of: (A) social media - blogs, sites, virtual worlds (Second Life, a.s.o.) or the already famous (b) social networks, such as: Twitter, Facebook, Instagram or Tik Tok. The evolution of digital resources is taken into consideration in a research by RAND, *Second generation OSINT.* Various types of social media turn the individual from a consumer of information into a generator of information and content, which is vital for OSINT. All the information surrounding us is our product. We can capture everything, record everything on video or audio, write or publish whatever we wish. Anything can become a trend, a media phenomenon even though not necessarily a "hit". The challenges brought by this environment to the collecting and analysis activity are obvious. The phrase "needle in a haystack" is more than relevant. The explosion of information is evident, but so is the difficulty with which they can be analysed.

2. OSINT – opportunities

The use of OSINT within the information communities brings with it, besides a series of obvious advantages, also a number of challenges that specialists must face. OSINT is, thus, a double-edged sword for governments and intelligence communities[9].

In terms of advantages, the literature published records several aspects. Analysing the issue from the perspective of the intelligence cycle, we can state that OSINT *contributes to the planning of operations.* The potential that someone has at their disposal, in any domain, is unlimited, therefore it can, also, approach different issues and targets. Gathering information come with *low costs, without endangering lives* or becoming subject to leaking information. *The speed,*

[9] Bean Hamilton, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

timeliness and novelty of the information obtained are much higher than in the case of exploiting secret sources[10].

The analysis of open sources represents a real support for strategic intelligence. Due to the information "tsunami", *the analysis of the open sources offers an historical, cultural and knowledge-related content*, which are especially important in order to obtain and maintain the strategic advantage. In other words, OSINT largely covers, *without claiming legal issues*, the needs of knowledge, through strategically, but also tactically, useful information.

OSINT can prove its advantage over other forms of intelligence in times of crisis. "The speed with which it offers information is undeniable because, most probably, the first thing you do when a crisis happens is to turn on the TV"[11] or, more recently, due to the developments brought by technology, we can watch live events. The *early warning* function is a very important one. OSINT is, most of the times, the first "soldier" in the INT army who "comes forward", the first who sounds the alarm in relation to the modifications brought to the security environment"[12] and offers *solutions aimed at anticipating surprises*.

The same is true *in case of humanitarian crises*. During conflict situations which require a fast and integrated response, the analysis obtained from classified sources can be completed by analysing the sources mentioned above. The information analysis obtained from open sources seems to be easier, because it *facilitates a multi-source analysis*, and *the time to obtain and to analyse is often much shorter*.

The result of the analysis represents different information products, with a *low level of classification*, which can be very easily disseminated. The use of open sources and the ease with which they can be disseminated contribute to *strengthening the trust in the intelligence services and the democratic system*, which highlights, once again, the theory according to which OSINT is one of the most democratic intelligence disciplines. The intelligence obtained from OSINT (especially OSINT-V) is *easy to disseminate,* not just within an internal intelligence community but, especially, within international cooperation programs. Because the classification level is low, states, selfish in their nature, will be much more available, and more open, toward cooperating with other countries[13]. The need to share theory is, therefore, applied much simpler with open source intelligence. OSINT empowers everyone, no matter their race, nationality or institutional development.

Another element which is especially important for democratic societies is the *security culture*, a term that defines a

[10] Gheorghe Boaru, Cătălin Cîrlănaru, "Informațiile obținute din surse deschise – prezent/perspective", in *Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I"*, no. 2/2011, p. 5.

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[12] Florian Coldea, "HUMINT și OSINT în viitor și în prezent", *Intelligence*, no. 27/2014, p. 10.

[13] Cristopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran, Daniel Salisbury, *Open Source Intelligence in the 21st century-new approaches and opportunities*, 2014, p. 2.

set of values, information, behavioural attitudes promoted by citizens, which support state institutions concerned with the protection of national and security interests. All intelligence services in the democratic world strive to create or maintain a society in which security culture defines its citizens' behaviour. OSINT, through its open character, through the large number of producers it has, contributes, without a doubt, to its development and to the creation of that *smart* nation, theorized by Robert Steel[14]. In this context, cooperation with civil society or academia becomes much more feasible.

In the work *Open Source Intelligence in the 21st century - new approaches and opportunities,* in relation to the benefits of OSINT, the authors manage to synthesize very well OSINT's usefulness and the advantages it brings, not just to the intelligence communities but, also, to society as a whole. According to Sands, OSINT is useful due to its five essential characteristics: credibility, accessibility, the ability to create a framework, the simple methodology it entails and because it offers the final material a low protection[15].

Stevyn Gibson lists six factors contributing to OSINT's efficiency:

- OSINT provides *context.* This INT is considered to be a primary source, a starting point to analyse a situation.
- OSINT is *useful*, synonymous with speed. More productive, much less expensive. Information obtained from open sources can change the equations, can open new analyses tracks.
- OSINT is *reference* for the information communities and an important partner for classified sources and other intelligence disciplines.
- OSINT is *available* – satellite images are available, news can be quickly analysed and the growing number of "journalists citizens" enriches the range of information.
- OSINT is *easy to disseminate.*
- OSINT analysis contributes to acknowledging the situations, to understanding them. OSINT, thus, becomes useful in making forecasts[16].

To further support the theory of utility, which is brought to the intelligence communities by rethinking the open sources, the revolution and the evolution it produces, Robert D. Steel states that: "OSINT is democracy. OSINT is moral capitalism. OSINT will improve our lives and offer hope to generations. E veritas pontes! (Power from the truth)![17]

3. OSINT in the fight against terrorism - an opportunity that must be exploited

The role of open sources in the fight against the terrorist phenomenon is obvious. OSINT manages to "fill in"

[14] A.N.: Theorized in the work Robert D. Steel, *The Smart Nation Act – public intelligence in the public interest*, 2006, a U.S. senior Intelligence official defines the idea of smart nation as the nation in which the decision-making factors make informed decisions, where the intelligence services are, for as much as possible, transparent and liable and where its citizens' ignorance level is low.

[15] Cristopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran, Daniel Salisbury, *Open Source Intelligence in the 21st century – new approaches and opportunities*, 2014, p. 15.

[16] *Ibidem*, pp. 16-17.

[17] Robert D. Steele, "Open Source Intelligence", in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, Ed. Loch Johnson, Routledge, 2007, p. 144.

and complete the information obtained from other sources. OSINT represents a major factor in the analysis and intelligence collection with regard to terrorist groups. Even though terrorist groups will never declare publicly where they intend to place the next bomb or the terror spreading method they intend to use, the information they let out, at random, through open sources, help anti-terrorist fighters in understanding their agenda, thus, facilitating the process aimed at preventing and combating these destructive acts.

Registered in the intelligence from open sources category, the magazines published by the terrorist group Islamic State represent a classic example of the effects brought by the globalization procedure and of the symbiotic relation appearing between mass media and terrorism. Terrorist groups have always been concerned with the loyalty of their members, on one side, and attracting new supporters, on the other side. In this logic, it is not surprising the fact that the great groups have developed real marketing departments. Some of these departments have real editorial offices (in the true meaning of the word). The activity of these editorial offices translates into long lasting publications which are filled with information disseminated online and which, at a click away, can be accessed from anywhere in the world. There are many examples as such: the Al Quaeda group publishes *Inspire* and *Azan*, while the Islamic State terrorist group spreads its ideology and plans through the *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* Magazines.

The Islamic State's publications, the *Dabiq* and the *Rumiyah* magazines, fall into the first category of open sources, the classic sources. The necessary reference is related to the fact that, unlike the traditional, physical, magazines, the magazines promoted by the Islamic State circulate in the online environment, in the digital version. This is justified by the fact that, today, the internet is the contemporary individual's main source of information, and the ease with which they are disseminated to the target public is undeniable.

Using the document analysis method, in the following, we will briefly demonstrate the usefulness of the analysis of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines in the fight against terrorism. The issues of the two publications were analysed from the perspective of the issues they promote, through analysis grids, which include three dimensions set as a result of a review of the published literature and of having read the magazines. The three issues followed within the analysis are: the issue of war, promoting the Caliphate and religious aspects. We have considered that these indicators are the most suggestive in the approach we have started, because the issues promoted by the magazines of the Islamic State group represent a major source of information which, placed next to other information, obtained from different types of sources, can generate strategic or tactic intelligence. In the following we will show some relevant aspects related to the first issue, the issue of war, not before describing the two open sources.

The digital debut of *Dabiq* magazine took place a month after the conquest of Mosul, on July 5, 2014. It announced the most important moment of the terrorist

group: the proclamation of the Caliphate, on a day full of symbols, the first day of Ramadan. The symbolism of the day, in which the announcement was made by the network's declared leader, is very important and full of meanings. The first day of Ramadan is a solemn moment for the entire Islamic world, which opens the path to spiritual purification. At this solemn moment, the leaders of ISIS chose to proclaim the establishment of the Caliphate and the Islamic State. *„Raise your head because today, by Allah's will, you have a state and a Caliphate, which will bring back the dignity, the power, the rights and the leaders"*[18]. Since then the Islamic State has published constantly and, today, Dabiq Magazine has reached its fourteen edition.

The magazine' name has also a particular meaning. Dabiq is a city in Syria, 10 kilometres from the border with Turkey, a place full of historical meaning, conquered by the Islamic State's fighters. Being a place of military encounters between Muslims and Roman armies but, also, between Muslims and Crusaders, Dabiq is seen as the place where the final fight between unbelievers and Allah's fighters will take place, a fight which will end with the Caliphate fighters' incontestable victory. "The spark was ignited here in Iraq, and its fire will continue to intensify, by Allah's will, until the armies of the Crusaders in Dabiq burn"[19].

The first issue of the Islamic State group's second editorial project, the *Rumiyah*, appears online, in an interesting geo-political context. Until 2016, the terrorist group experienced a period of extraordinary territorial expansion and prosperity. Fortunately, the international coalitions were successful in recovering many of these territories. One of them was, in October 2016, the town of Dabiq, a town with an important meaning for the terrorist group. Not only the name of the town was, also, the name of the successful editorial project, but this town must be the place where the crusaders and Allah's courageous troops were to meet for a last battle which, in their view, that ended with the triumph of Islam. The loss of control over the city of Dabiq meant, for the Islamic State, a delay in the Islamic Armageddon they were imagining, the end of the Dabiq editorial project, which lost its legitimacy, and the debut of a new terrorist publication, the *Rumiyah* magazine.

As a result, the *Rumiyah* magazine has replaced and continued the *Dabiq* magazine. The publication appears within the Himmah Publication and it has been available online since the end of 2016. It can be read in more languages: English, French, German, Russian or even Indonesian[20].

As in the case of Dabiq magazine, for this publishing project, the editorial commission chose a name just as full of meaning. The name refers to the city of Rome, the place where jihad fighters

[18] ***, "Kalihaf Declared", *Dabiq-Issue* 1, 1435, p. 4. ("Raise your head high for today, by Allah's grace, you have a state and Khilafan, which will return you dignity, might, rights and leadership").

[19] ***, "Kalihaf Declared", *Dabiq- Issue* 1, 1435, p. 5. ("The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heart will continue to intensify –by Allah permission-until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq").

[20] Torsha Ghosh, Pooja Basnett, "Analysis of Rumiyah Magazine", in *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Volume 2, Issue July 7, 2017, p. 16.

will rest after conquering the world. *O, mujahedin, rejoice because, with Allah's permission, at the end of this fight we will rest under the olive trees in Rumiyah (Rome*)[21]. This time, Rome is seen as the place where the encounter between the Islamic fighters and their enemies will take place.

In terms of content, the two magazines address the same general topics. The magazine is a religious one, with a lot of ideological and propaganda content, and its purpose is to attract as many followers as possible but, also, to promote the military and administrative successes recorded by the new "state". In the following, we will focus our attention on the issue of war, in order to demonstrate one of the opportunities offered by this discipline of intelligence.

Similar to the early years of the Westphalian state, Islamic State is in a process of expansion. This process of expansion and conquer is recorded in each issue of the magazines, in a detailed report, which included images with the places where the new state's flag imposes its authority. The issues of the *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines constantly remind of the military victories and territorial expansion recorded by the group. Moreover, the magazines issues do not hesitate to show the training grounds where the recruits train for the future fights.

The Islamic State brings back into discussion the issue of territories and borders, through the impetus of their conquests. Taking advantage of the unstable situation in the territory and the solid financial resources at their disposal, the members of the Islamic State group have come to gain more and more territory in Sinai, Yemen, Libya or Afghanistan. The great challenge that they must face is not related to the conquest itself, but to how they gain legitimacy in these territories. The main vectors, on which the Islamic State relies for this process, are religion and the rightful word of Allah. The network's leaders are convinced that mankind is at a crossroads, in which Allah's soldiers will conquer the world. *Oh soldiers of the Islamic State, oh Muhammad's youth... Today we are on the doorstep of a new era, a turning point for the map of the region, rather the world. Today we are witnessing the end of a lie called western civilization and the rise of the Islam giant*[22].

The magazine's articles portray the Islamic State organization as a force that cannot be contained, in which soldiers are called to fight for material possessions and women's love. Death is, of course, the "passport" to the 72 virgins and the supreme proof of loyalty and martyrdom.

The pages of *Dabiq* magazine, but also those of *Rumiyah* magazine, eloquently capture the fact that the army is a basic pillar of the newly created group. The element of originality brought by the terrorist group proclaimed to be a state

[21] A.N.: An incitement and citation identified on all the cover and in all the issues of the magazine. ("O muwahhidin, rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah - Rome").

[22] ***, "Foreword", *Dabiq Issue 4*, p. 4. *(*"O soldiers of the Islamic State, o youth of Muhammad… Today we are upon the doorstep for a new era, a turning point for the map of the region, rather the world. Today we witness the end of a lie called western civilization and the rise of the Islam giant").

in this context is given by the fact that the army is not homogeneous and national, because this is confusing, but has a multinational component. Soldiers fighting for the Islamic State and against unbelievers come not only from within the Syrian and Iraqi populations, but also from the Western world.

Brutality is one of the most common topics mentioned in the two terrorist publications. Promoted in order to attract followers, in order to cultivate the idea of the triumph of the Caliphate's army, the issue of brutality appears throughout the magazine, under various forms. Whether we are talking about the famous kidnappings and beheadings of European journalists or bloody images, the Caliphate's army, formed by local soldiers or by those who have returned to fight for the Islamic State, is shown as an always victorious army. The soldiers are always fighting and always winning. They are the ones who delegitimize their enemies and who eliminate them.

For the terrorist group the offensive and defensive war is the agent of change and revolution, a real *raison d'etre*[23]. Through it, the Islamic State organization shows its fighting capacities and is successful in clearly transmitting the organization's message.

The magazines' articles incite to violence and to bloodshed against all those who do not join and do not believe in the Islamic State. Anyone can, and must, be targeted by Allah's fighters, even the simplest citizen, who does nothing but sell flowers on the side of the road[24]. The network's spokesman goes further, and describes, in an issue of *Rumiyah* magazine, Allah's ideal fighter: he who has "divorced" the world for the sake of Allah and of his promises to the afterlife. The ideal fighter loves death more than life and is willing to make all sacrifices – *They love death more than they love life. They represent a generation who has divorced from the worldly life and hope for the After Life promised by Allah.*[25]

An important section of the publication, featured in almost every issue of the two magazines, refers to the military operations carried out by the Islamic State – "While the soldiers of the Caliphate continue the war against the armies of the unbelievers, let us look at the most recent operations carried out by the Islamic State's mujahedeen. They were successful in extending the Caliphate's territory, in terrorizing, in carrying out massacres and in humiliating Allah's enemies. These operations are just a series of various operations carried out by the Islamic State on various fronts in more regions, throughout the last weeks"[26]. Therefore, the section shows a

[23] Charlie Winter, *Documenting the virtual caliphate*, Quilliam Foundation, October 2015, p. 24.

[24] ***, "Tha Kafirs blood is Halal for you, so shed it", *Rumiyah*, Issue 1, 1437, p. 36.

[25] *Ibidem.*, p. 37 ("They love death more than you love life. It is a generation that has divorced the worldly life and hopes for what Allah promised in the hereafter").

[26] ***, "Operations", *Rumiyah*, Issue 1, 1437, p. 22 ("As the soldiers of the Khilafah continue waging war on the forces of kufr, we take a glimpse at a number of recent operations conducted by the mujahidin of the Islamic State that have succeeded in expanding the territory of the Khilafah, or terrorizing, massacring, and humiliating the enemies of Allah. These operations are merely a selection of the numerous operations that the Islamic State has conducted on various fronts across many regions over the course of the last few weeks").

radiography of the Islamic State's many successes. Both magazines describe, sometimes graphically, all the successes recorded by the Islamic State around the world. The successes of the Islamic State are accounted for, applauded and accompanied by suggestive pictures. An eloquent example of this is provided by the eighth issue of *Rumiyah* magazine, where the attack on Westminster Bridge in London is presented in detail as a real success of the organization.

Also in terms of *war* or, more exactly, aspects regarding the idea of war, *Rumiyah* magazine comes with an interesting section, which is not found in the pages of *Dabiq*, which is not an innovation when it comes to terrorist publications but it certainly is an element that might be useful for those who analyse the magazine and want to anticipate future activities. This is the *Just terror tactics* section, reminiscent of *Open Source Jihad*, present in *Inspire* magazine (published by the Al-Qaeda group). The section is thought with the purpose of offering inspiration and knowledge to all those who are willing to fight in Allah's name. The editors consider that in order to organize successful attacks, you do not need to be a soldier, an expert or a master in martial arts. With the proper training, offered by this section, and with the proper means, anyone can organize successful operations, that end with the wounding of many unbelievers and with terrorizing an entire nation[27]. Throughout several issues, the readers are instructed on how to carry out knife stabbing attacks (what are the advantages and the best tactics), how to choose the best cars to carry out drive-by shootings or how to plan and execute kidnappings and hostage taking operations. The valuable lessons the readers can learn represent hints that can be used by the information services in the fight against this group.

Placed on an intelligence analyst's table, the terrorist publications *Dabiq* and *Rumiayh* represent a rich source of information that can be complementary to the vision related to the Islamic State terror group through the intelligence collected in the field. A careful analysis of the magazine's issues forms a *general image* related to the evolution of the terror group and to its future strategy. I Open source intelligence is now becoming a major element in *understanding the ideology promoted by the group*. The analysis of this magazine will reveal not just the *religious elements* on which the Islamic State is built, but also *the plans and organizational progress of the organization or the state.* The costs for this analysis are low, and the benefits it can bring seem to be really relevant.

Regarding the analysis of the issue of war, we believe that the information obtained by carefully studying the magazines are useful in generating important ideas about *the organization's strategic plans*, while the "lessons" accumulated through the *Just terror tactics* section indicate *directions related to modus operandi promoted by the group*, offering a possible image of what the group's future terror attacks will look like. The brief analysis of the two publications represents an example of how the open sources provide cultural content, knowledge and, sometimes, even solutions to anticipate the surprises. The

[27] ***, "Just Terror tactics", *Rumiyah*, Issue 2, 1438, p. 12.

presence of these types of publications in the online environment must not be neglected.

4. OSINT – challenges

Beyond these advantages, the use of open source information also brings a series of disadvantages. One of these is related to the fact that OSINT has not yet come to have an analytical discipline,[28] and this can cause problems at any moment of the intelligence cycle. Sometimes, the large amount of information available creates problems. Joseph Nye has called this situation *the paradox of plenty*[29]. The "90% of everything is crap" rule[30] proves to be, within the open source analysis, a truth which is difficult to fight against. In this case, the analyst may face a series of blockages that might render inefficient the process and, no doubt, also some information with no relevance whatsoever. Gathering information can, therefore, change into a perpetual sum of discoveries without a purpose[31], which *increases the human effort*.

Also, due to the large volume of information, overload problems[32] or the tendency to create a priori sources may occur. In terms of result, the information obtained from open sources may be the consequence of a disinformation process, which may jeopardize initial or future activity. New digital media dominated by the idea of user-generated content, the false tracks or the already traditional *fake news* are elements that can cause hinder and raise criticism of open sources.

The explosion of digital information draws on OSINT the criticism according to which information gathering can be done exclusively online, OSINT's traditional sources being neglected, that the analysis of texts is done through translation, mostly from English and less from other languages.

The time in which the collecting of information has been done *can become a long one*, filtering useful information becomes more difficult, and *the tendency to accept an information as valid, without checking it before, is higher*[33]. In the context in which open sources are OSINT's main source of collecting, their veracity becomes an important element. The *fake news* phenomenon complicates the process of collection and analysis, the analyst finding himself in the situation to make additional efforts in order to verify the information used. The lack of this concern can lead to intelligence errors that can negatively affect decision-making processes. The situation can be changed through measures related to a partnership between the media agencies and the public sector[34]. In the context in which the prospects of eradicating this phenomenon seem to be small, security-related education and culture come as a support in increasing credible sources.

The analysis and the results obtained from the intelligence process come,

[28] Gheorghe Boaru, Cătălin Cîrlănaru, *op.cit*., p. 3.
[29] Stevyn Gibson, *Open Source Intelligence a contemporary intelligence lifeline*, PhD Thesis, Cranfield University, Defence College of Management and Technology, 2007, p. 106.
[30] Christopher Hobbes, Matthew Moran, Daniel Salisbury, *op.cit.*, p. 17.
[31] Gheorghe Boaru, Cătălin Cîrlănaru, *op.cit*., p. 4.
[32] Serviciul Român de Informații, *Ghidul OSINT*, p. 9.
[33] ***, *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, February 2002, p. 81.
[34] Olaru Gherghina, Teodoru Ștefan, "Fake News – a challenge for OSINT", in *International Conference RCIC 18-Redifing community in the intercultural context*, 2018, p. 394.

usually, across with the *obsession of the classification* and with the traditional view according to which, only classified sources are capable of producing valuable products. To this we can add the *bureaucratic resistance to change* and the heaviness with which certain intelligence communities embrace the use of open sources.

We conclude our discussion on the challenges and the criticism brought to OSINT by stating the fact that no intelligence discipline is considered to be 100% complete and without minuses. We believe that, with the right planning, by allocating enough resources and a proper expertise, OSINT can produce results on a large scale and can be an important partner of other INTs.

Conclusions

The exploitation of open sources has led to changes in the services of the intelligence communities. The context and directions in which it can be used have determined modifications in the information communities, mostly from internal processes.

Today it is estimated that approximatively 80-95% of all data used by the information communities are supplied through OSINT. Its importance differs from one community to the other, from the structural perspective, in terms of its support and trust given, or in terms of its use. Opinions related to the importance of OSINT for the intelligence communities are divided. All this enthusiasm is, most of the times, dismantled by the information communities for whom OSINT is an inferior discipline, sometimes even excluded from the spectrum of intelligence disciplines. This vision is vitiated by elements specific to the culture of the secret of myths and misperceptions, which highlights the challenges set by this discipline and not the opportunities it offers. In many intelligence communities worldwide, OSINT is seen as *the second violin* of the intelligence processes, its role being often undermined.

The open sources culture has become part of the structure supporting every modern information service. Intelligence services, whether civilian or military, understood its usefulness and have started to use it more and more often. OSINT provides, fast and at low costs, access to a wide range of information that can prove its strategic operational or tactic usefulness, it can be the starting point for another intelligence cycle, it provides a framework which widens the information already obtained, helping to achieve an overall picture. We have seen the usefulness it can have in the short discussion about the two terrorist publications. At the same time, OSINT is used as a framework for validating secret information and as an early warning system for certain risks.

Even though the advantages take precedence, we cannot avoid to mention also the challenges that OSINT can produce for the information communities. The issues can, mostly, be related to network overload, the tendency to manipulate or misinform and, eventually, collect completely validated information, which can cause damage to the whole

intelligence process.

Predictions referring to OSINT's usefulness within the information communities are favourable. Experts and supporters believe that its role will be increasingly relevant to any intelligence communities.

Together with other intelligence disciplines, OSINT can contribute to the development information services included within the post-modern patterns and are able to cope with all the risks and threats the 21st century brings.

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The Caravan – Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad



Thomas Hegghammer's (T. H.) newest book, titled "The Caravan – Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad"[1], has been recently published by the prestigious Publishing house Cambridge University Press. Abdallah Azzam, a religious teacher of Palestinian descent, known by few in the Western world, but to those who are familiar with his work, is, along with Hassan El Bana and Sayyid Qutb, considered a founding theorist of the concept of global jihad. This is the reason why T. H. could rightly consider exploring Azzam's activities, teachings and how they are put into practice, as well as how the activities of radical Muslim organisations impact the present, all in a biographical book.

The author of the book, expert in international jihadism, is Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), and a Lecturer at the University of Oslo. T. H. had conducted his research for more than a decade, the results of which are included in the current volume, from which the reader can get to know not only the major stages of the Palestinian religious leader's adventurous life, but also the jihadist movements of the 1970s and 1980s, their development, major events and characters.

Hegghammer not only examined Azzam's religious work as a teacher, but also the timeframe between his childhood up to his death, for which he conducted field research and interviews and made use of previously unemployed and authoritative English and Arabic sources. We learn that in 1953, at the age of only 12, he had joined the Muslim Brotherhood, later graduated with a teacher's degree, and left his homeland after the six-day war of 1967. The events of that time had an impact on

[1] Thomas Hegghammer, *The Caravan - Abdallah Azzam and the rise of Global Jihad*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2020.

his later life that made the restoration of Jerusalem under the Islamic flag one of his main goals. However, at that time, the Palestinian liberation organisations were mainly left-wing, while the Islamists formed only a minority group. The two groups were in constant conflict with each other, and so, Azzam hated the leftists, whom he considered apostates (*kufir*) and an enemy of Islam. His second main objective was to preserve and teach the Islamic religion and culture purely "free from foreign influences". However, unlike several religious teachers, Azzam did not reject the achievements of the modern age, which he considered usable for the spread of Islam. In the book, we can trace Azzam's life and activities in Jordan, where he joined the *Fedayeen* group, who planned a coup against the ruler for being expelled from the country by the Jordanian authorities. Therefore, in 1971, Azzam fled to Egypt, where he enrolled in the world's most famous Muslim university, Al-Azhar, which he graduated from with a 600-page doctoral thesis. After his doctoral studies, he returned to Jordan and became an internationally recognised religious authority, a teacher who knew all the major jihadist leaders and whose main goal was to teach pure Islam. An Islamic revival took place in the 1970s, during which he held various lectures and seminars, not only in the United States, but also in most Western European countries. He had also met Osama Bin Laden at one of these seminars in Indianapolis, in the United States, who later became the leader of the Muslim volunteers fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, then the leader of Al-Qaeda. In 1980, he was again forced to leave Jordan, so he soon moved to Saudi Arabia, together with his family. In addition to his educational activities, he soon recruited fighters for the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets and collected aid for refugees displaced from Afghanistan. As part of this activity, he travelled the world, teaching and seeking support, in several countries, for a group fighting the Soviets, called the mujahideen, whom he later joined. By this time, he was already operating in Pakistan.

He soon became one of the leading theorists of Muslim groups fighting in Afghanistan, playing a significant role in internationalising jihad and teaching that jihad is the personal duty of every Muslim. This teaching has been used by many to validate terrorist attacks against civilian targets and to take an active part in "jihad without borders", freeing themselves from the traditional constraints imposed on them by nation-states or religious, tribal, or family authorities. Referring to Azzam' teachings, a large number of second and third-generation Muslims joined the Islamic State and carried out acts contrary to the teachings of the Qur'an, despite prohibitions from their government, their parents or even local religious leaders. Nevertheless, several members of the Muslim community not only did not condemn them, but considered them a kind of heroes. Therefore, one of the author's important claims is that, because of Azzam's teachings, Islam lost effective control over the Islamist international community and, thus, opened Pandora's box. Azzam's authority was still somewhat accepted by these groups, but after his death in 1989, the previously seemingly united community split into smaller groups. The rejection of authoritarianism

("Authority problem") would not only not have created an international unity within Islam, but it would have produced further fragmentation and, then, conflicts between the pragmatist and militant Muslim groups. Of these, those who forced the armed struggle came out victorious, and this led to the formation of Al-Qaeda, which has gained a global role, and later, formed other terrorist groups. Nevertheless, Azzam himself together with his teachings were highly valued by all of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other Muslim militant organisations, and his teachings were used, in several cases, to validate and legitimise their actions. However, not only them, but many Muslim believers were/are influenced by Azzam's books – especially the 1985 "Defence of Muslim Lands" – and other writings. As a result, in 2013 and 2014, several young people joined the Islamic State to fight a holy war for the victory of Islam.

Another important teaching of Azzam was the total rejection of the nation-states – including the Muslim states, which he believed were created by the Western powers and the Zionists, against whom he had very hostile feelings –, as he saw them as one, if not the biggest, obstacle to Pan-Islamism. Therefore, he regarded himself as a member of the *ummah*, the international Islamic community, and not a citizen of a particular country, and encouraged his followers to do the same. Perhaps this is why he became one of the role models for Muslim fighters who have fought for Islam on many battlefields, within the framework of Islamic globalisation. Such were the Muslims who fought in Bosnia, in the 1990s and then, after the formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were granted Bosnian citizenship and settled there. However, as foreign fighters, they have continued to fight in Afghanistan, Iraq, or other wars against Western states (unbelievers). Another important viewpoint of the author is that jihad could not become international because political Islam and Islamism could not be integrated by the otherwise Muslim nation-states, radical Muslim groups were suppressed, their activities were successfully restricted, and those who became dangerous to them were forced to exile. Most of them fled to Saudi Arabia and Europe, where the majority were employed by various Muslim NGOs. This created an active, international community, whose members did not belong to any state or participate in any of its political life, but as members of international Islamic organisations with a strong financial background, they were free to continue their activities on the international stage. Because they felt that Islam was under attack, much more emphasis was placed on the unity of the Muslim community, which was planned to be achieved by leaving out the nation-states. As a result of the perceived or real threat, Islam was militarised, part in which Azzam played a significant role – he encouraged Muslims not only towards humanitarian but also "military solidarity", he expected them not only to send money to Afghan refugees, but to participate in armed jihad against infidels attacking Afghans. The author also points out that jihad has now stepped out of the "personal" and, also, the local and regional frameworks and has become global, the impact of which on everyday life is not negligible. He also indicates that sectarian differences were not a problem in the early jihadist period as they are today.

This is because the unity of the Muslim community has also accepted and included cooperation with the Shiites, as the Al-Ma'sada camp was established with the help of the Afghan Shiites, which became the centre of Al-Qaeda and where Bin Laden had lived in peace with the Shiites. In contrast, one of the main goals of the Islamic State' leaders was to eradicate the Shiite community in Iraq, which hit them back in several ways.

The author has examined several common myths in his book that proved to be untrue. One of them is the claim that Al-Qaeda was armed and trained by the CIA and they, then, turned against their former allies after they had won against the Soviets. In contrast, the truth is that the Arabs fighting in Afghanistan avoided representatives of the CIA and various Western countries, and they received support not primarily from them, but from Muslim countries and organisations. Also, Al-Qaeda was not particularly important to the CIA at the time, as it played only a marginal role among anti-Soviet groups, and the intelligence agency had only limited activities in the region. Of course, the Americans supported the mujahedeen, and even allowed Azzam and his comrades to raise money and recruit volunteers in the US undisturbed, which was a bad decision in retrospect. This is also confirmed by Azzam's son-in-law, Abdullah Anas, in his book "To the Mountains – My Life in Jihad, from Algeria to Afghanistan", published jointly with Tam Hussein in 2019, in which he claimed that only a few hundred Arabs were fighting in Afghanistan, and they did not really have a role in defeating the Soviets and never received any serious support from the United States. Hegghammer specifically wrote about the bombing carried out against Azzam, on the 20th of November 1989, in front of the Arab Mosque in Peshawar, in which both he and his two sons lost their lives. After more than ten years of research, the author could not figure out whether the assassination was perpetrated by the Soviets, the Western states, Muslim countries, opponents within the jihadist community, or the Afghan (MAK) or the Pakistani Secret Service (ISI). Nevertheless, one thing is certain: the attack was a kind of message to the Arab community in Afghanistan, and the way the attack was carried out showed it must have been an important organisation behind it.

The 695-page book, written in great detail, is not an easy read, it also makes the reader think hard and constantly take sides. Nevertheless, once the reader gets immersed, the book can no longer be put aside. Photos and maps in the book help the reader understand it better, together with the detailed bibliography the author has used. I recommend this book to anyone studying security policy or history, and to anyone interested in the Middle East, the Afghan-Soviet war and its background, the ideological background of modern or, otherwise, global jihad, and the activities of the people who created and influenced it – including Azzam.

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