STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 1/2[66-67]/2018

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Contact address:

Șoseaua Panduri, nr. 68-72, Sector 5, Bucureşti, România
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Websites: http://cssas.unap.ro/index_en.htm, http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The current edition englobes two numbers, 1 and 2, for the year 2018 (no. 66-67), and comprises a collection of eight articles, to these adding the *Book review* rubric and the traditional *Guide for authors*.

The journal is opened by the rubric **Security and Military Strategy**, where we included two materials regarding hybrid threats, signed by experienced military, whose names are resonant for the national academic community, written in co-authoring with young PhD students and researchers.

Thereby, Colonel Iulian Martin, PhD Professor, and PhD. Student Lisa-Maria Achimescu, following their research work, launch the question whether *forecasting can ameliorate the negative impact of hybrid threats*, which was accomplished within the framework of PYTHIA Project.

Teodor Frunzeti, PhD. Professor and PhD. Student Cristian Bărbulescu bring forward a *framework of analysis regarding national resilience to hybrid threats and the security culture*, the article being published within the Scientific Research Project entitled "Security culture and national resilience to hybrid threats".

Next comes the rubric **Defence and Security Concepts**, where we grouped three materials, of which the first two were presented at the Workshop on Strategy, under the name "Scenarios in Strategic Theory and Practice" organized by the CDSSS on 22nd March, 2018.

In the first article, Commander Ioan Mischie, PhD Student, proves that *the scenario is an important instrument in the process of strategic planning in conditions of incertitude.*

In turn, Captain Commander Cristian Abaianiti, PhD Student, analyzes *the role of the comprehensive approach in the development of military scenarios using the PMESII model.*

The third article in this rubric, written in co-authoring by PhD students George-Dorinel Dumitru and Dragoş-Adrian Bantaş, analyzes *the reflection of the good governance concept in Romania's security strategies after December 1989.*

At the rubric **Geopolitics and Geostrategy - Trends and Perspectives**, we included as well three materials, regarding Eurasia and the Arab World. Thus, PhD student Iulia Moise brings to foreground *the paradox of the Russian power*, launching the question whether we *should (still) fear Russia.*

Next, PhD Student Magdalena Crişan reveals the results of her research regarding *international migration as a result of the geopolitical shock caused by the Arab Spring.*

Last but not least, PhD student Lavinia Moiceanu has made a research on *the China-Pakistan economic corridor in light of the "mobility of power".*

In this edition, we would like to bring to our reader's attention, through the rubric **Book Review**, a recently published work, written by the well-known historian Timothy Snyder, named *The Road to Unfreedom. Russia, Europe, America*, reviewed by Ruxandra Buluc, PhD. Associate Professor.

In the ending of this edition, we always signal the **Guide for Authors**, this being a required reading for the ones who may wish to publish their research results in our journal.

For those who first discover *Strategic Impact* journal, published by Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, with the support of the "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, it is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order,* according to National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and

Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published in Romanian for eighteen years and for thirteen years in English and approaches a complex thematic: the current political-military situation, security strategies, military strategies, politics, NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions, peace and war future matters, information society, elements and aspects regarding intelligence community. Readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – an important objective of the journal –, recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA), Index Copernicus International (Poland), WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, but also by its presence in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad such as NATO and of universities with military profile from Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

Strategic Impact journal is issued in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in main security and defence institutions, as well as in national and international academia in Europe, Asia and America.

In the end, I would like to encourage the ones interested to publish in our journal to prospect and evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of the security environment and, at the same time, we would like to launch the invitation for the interested PhD students and Master students to submit articles in *Strategic Colloquium*, the monthly supplement of this journal, available on internet at http://cssas. unap.ro/ro/cs.htm.

Florian CÎRCIUMARU
Editor in Chief,
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

CAN FORECASTING AMELIORATE THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF HYBRID THREATS?

Iulian MARTIN, Ph.D.*
Lisa-Maria ACHIMESCU**

Introduction

Understanding "hybrid threats" is made exceedingly difficult by both its elusive characteristics and the lack of international consensus. The current international normative milieu is left paralyzed in the face of defining and ameliorating the negative effects of hybrid threats. Given that response options are dictated by foreseeability, there is a stringent necessity to incorporate risk analysis and forecasting methodologies in the very conceptual fabric of our strategic planning process directed at countering and ameliorating the negative impact of hybrid threats. The research has a two-tiered approach: one purely theoretical, which focuses on the current international framework applicable to the concept of "hybrid threats", on a legal, political and military level, and a second one, which aims to analyse and build towards a broadening of our current understanding of countering and ameliorating hybrid threats by focusing beyond the limits of current conceptual frameworks and incorporating forecasting and risk analysis as means to compensate international normative bias.

Keywords: hybrid threats; hybrid war; hybridity; normative bias; forecasting; foresight.

Countering hybrid threats, hybrid warfare, cyber threats and the general concept of *international security* have become policy staples for all international organizations and are in the forefront of all political discourses. While the umbrella concept of *hybrid threats* and/or *warfare* may seem all-encompassing from a strictly linguistically point of view, the vagueness raises serious political, legal, security and military issues. Vagueness places concepts in a no-man's land, voiding them of key conceptual structures that can ensure their enforcement or dissemination.

1. The conceptual design of hybrid threats and war

The postulation expressed by C. Clausewitz, which mentioned that each epoch has its own type of war, its own limitations and its own perceptions, and therefore, for each epoch, conflicts and wars should be analyzed in terms of their particularities[1], is also applicable when

[1] Von C. Clausewitz, *On war*, New Jersey: Ed: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 732.

* Colonel Iulian MARTIN, Ph.D. Professor, is Prorector for Research, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: imartinlfd@yahoo.com
** Lisa-Maria ACHIMESCU, Ph.D. Student in Information and National Security, is Expert within Educational Management Department, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: lisa.achimescu@gmail.com

analyzing the hybrid war.

When discussing the macro-design of world order, constituted in a unipolar-polycentric international system structure, military power has maintained its cardinal value in the evolution process of the national and international security. The end of the Cold War marked a change of paradigm with respect to the emergence, amplification and multiplication of new facets of asymmetric threats, highlighting the hybrid war phenomenon, which can not be hybrid only by its capabilities and means, but also by its consequences, if not approached from a theoretical and conceptual perspective, essential in understanding and countering this challenge.

There are authors that debate about the "unbearable vagueness of hybridity"[2] and many doctrinarians consider that "hybrid threats are incontrovertibly a stretched concept"[3]. The definition of the adjective *hybrid*, according to the Oxford Dictionary, reads as follows "of mixed character, combining two or more different elements, or composed of different parts"[4]. The adjective "hybrid" has been apposed to specific security phenomena, *videlicet* war, warfare, and threats. When referring to *hybrid war* and *warfare* "blending of various means of conflict, both regular and unconventional"[5] is described. In NATO documents, hybrid threats are defined as "those posed by adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives"[6]. The main conclusion one can draw from these definitions is that, ultimately, *hybridity* has a defining property, namely the "simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional means"[7].

Over the last decade, the nature of military conflict has been substantially transformed, beyond the conventional conflicts between the state's military forces, unconventional conflicts and hybrid warfare, causing changes in the organization and structure of the military forces, the manner of action, the technique and the means of combat. This trend manifests itself globally and state-actors adapt, modernize and professionalize their military power, revise their security strategies and military doctrines, develop new techniques, procedures and technologies, which, in all, characterize the importance of increased interest in the security environment of the 21st century.

The very conceptual validity of hybrid warfare and of hybrid threats respectively, their theoretical geminate, are often challenged in the academic discourse. There are trends in the specialized literature that contest their actual existence[8], and trends that challenge the ambiguity of the concepts. The theoretical understanding of hybrid warfare is considered by some doctrinarians to be too unclear and indeterminate to be of any real conclusive value.[9] The fact that terms such as hybrid threats, hybrid war, and hybrid warfare are used interchangeably and without specific clarifications contribute furthermore to the ambiguity of the said concepts.

Following the evolution of military conflicts at the beginning of the 21st century, which tend to change their physiognomy frequently, in regard to the degree of sophistication and character, many military experts are inclined to pay more attention to the *complexity* and *dilution* of the types of war, as well as to the increased frequency and the lethality of military operations. Known

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[2] Eugenio Cusumano, Marian Corbe, *A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats*, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 4.

[3] *Ibidem*.

[4] Oxford Dictionary of English 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 289.

[5] G. Lasconjarias, and J.A. Larsen, "Introduction: A New Way of Warfare", in *NATO's Response to Hybrid Threats*, Rome: NATO Defense College, ed. G. Lasconjarias and J.A. Larsen, 2015, pp. 1-13.

[6] NATO, 2010, *BI-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats*, 2014, *MC 0411/2: NATO Military Policy on Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-military Interaction (CMI)*, URL: http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2010/20100826_bi-sc_cht.pdf, accessed on

May 20, 2018.

[7] Eugenio Cusumano, Marian Corbe, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[8] B. Renz, "Russia and 'Hybrid Warfare'", *Contemporary Politics* 22 (3), 2016, pp. 283-300.

[9] J. Asmussen, S. Hansen, and J. Meiser, "Hybride Kriegsführung – eine neue Herausforderung?", *Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 43, 2015, p. 23.

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at the theoretical level as hybrid war, this new type of warfare involves a unique combination of hybrid threats, that allow the exploitation of the multitude of challenges, resulting from the use of both strategic and tactical operations, most of the time, simultaneously.[10]

If NATO interprets hybrid threats as those "posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means, adaptively in pursuit of their objectives", according to the *European Center for Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats*, inaugurated in 2017, "hybrid threats are methods and activities that target vulnerabilities of the opponents" and "the range of methods and operations is wide." The term "hybrid war" has been popularized in the lexicon of military theory to describe the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.[11]

Hybrid war represents a new approach to non-conventionality against the backdrop of highly developed technology in which state or non-state actors are able to choose from a multitude of tactics and technologies, to combine them into innovative procedures that would satisfy their own cultural aspirations based on their geostrategic position and geopolitical ideology, in confronting the armed forces of the Western world. Combining the ways in which a conflict unfolds no longer shows the major interest of the state-actors, but the devaluation of the levels of war, using tactics and hybrid techniques in order to achieve strategic effects and political objectives. The industrialization of the 20th century brought about the symmetrical and proportional armed conflicts, known as "conventional conflicts".

The current informational revolution period is characterized by the reduction of massive armies and the high technological potential of several super-developed actor-states, major technological disparities between states, coupled with substantial reductions in military budgets and restrictive access to resources and information. This amassment of characteristics has changed the nature of armed conflicts, by attributing an unconventional character to both political and military actions undertaken by international coalitions, alliances and organizations, such as NATO, the UN or the EU, which are forced to counter hostile military, paramilitary and political actions of both state and non-state actors, taken with no regard for the provisions of international law. Countering such actions is made particularly difficult for actors belonging to the North-Atlantic regions, given that the hybridization of war does not equate to the abandonment of the Western values that stand at the center of the international order.

Hybridisation is considered to be a continuous process intrinsic to all social and political phenomena.[12] The conceptualisations of hybrid warfare provide us with a distorted understanding of contemporary warfare, as, customarily, the warfare concept has an inherent propensity to bypass and profit from established practices and norms, regnant in the current international security environment.[13]

It is widely considered that future military conflicts will present three important characteristics, especially depending on the ability and capacity of combatants to cope with the new demands of the contemporary operational space:

- a *super-technical conventional war*, ultra-fast and extremely expensive, which can only be supported by a limited number of economically and militarily over-developed actor-states;

- a *hybrid war*, where a mix of new technologies and old doctrines will be used by combining different types of tactics and techniques, whose frequency and lethality will increase;

- the *generalization of asymmetric conflicts* in which conventional and unconventional forces will be used and atypical means like terrorism

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[10] C. Ioniță, "Is hybrid warfare something new?", in: *Strategic Impact*, no. 4 (52), 2014, p. 64.

[11] Henry Suckow-Ziemer, "Hybrid War: A Definition and Call for Action", *The Yale Review of International Studies*, March 2018, URL: http://yris.yira.org/comments/2323, accessed on May 20, 2018.

[12] *See* R. Rosaldo, Foreword, in *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*, ed. N.G. Canclini, xi–xvii, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

[13] *See* E. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1987.

and organized crime.[14]

Hybrid warfare, although not necessarily a new category of war, constitutes a concept that has the makings to challenge future theoretical conceptualisation of conflicts. This conceptualization, or better said re-conceptualisation, additionally includes a desideratum to reassess the law paradigms applicable to modern conflicts, which do not perfectly fit the categorization outlined in the *jus ad bellum* (right to wage war) and *jus in bello* (the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict).[15]

The ethical and legal lack of balance between *law-abiding and non-law-abiding actors* can certainly have repercussions on the success of military operations in both traditional and hybrid warfare scenarios.[16] Although it is generally considered that lawfare accords well in all types of wars, it seems that hybrid warfare is particularly susceptible to lawfare, as lawfare is best fitted to be used as part of *successful defensive or offensive approaches*[17] to XXIst century conflicts.

The theoretical analysis of conventional and unconventional military action requires the realization of some conceptual delimitation, given the existence of multiple paradigms and of a wide variety of formulations, especially with respect to new types of conflict. The debate on the conventional - unconventional dichotomy of military action must take into account the main categories that concern them: on the one hand, *war* with various forms – the classic conventional war, unconventional war, asymmetric war, nuclear war, guerilla warfare, civil war, network warfare, war on terrorism, information warfare, hybrid war[18]; and on the other hand, military operations, such as peace enforcement operations, peacemaking operations, peacekeeping operations, monitoring, peacebuilding operations, humanitarian or psychological operations, as defined by contemporary military doctrine[19].

Hybrid warfare has become more and more a comprehensive concept used to portray all manners of warfare that do not perfectly conform into a traditional category of warfare, but find themselves in a an interjacent gray area.

"Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors [with or without state sponsorship]. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict."[20]

It is within this context that particular attention must be given to *hybrid threats* and the incorporation of forecasting and analysis methods into strategic planning as viable means of countering and ameliorating the negative consequences of the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) operational security environment.

2. A normative perspective

It is of utmost importance to comprehend that hybrid warfare does not change the international legal paradigms applicable to interstate conflict and its legality.[21] Article 2(1)-(5) of the UN

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[14] C. Ioniță, *op. cit*, pp. 65-66.

[15] Sascha Dov Bachmann and Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, "Hybrid Warfare as Lawfare: Towards a Comprehensive Legal Approach", in Eugenio Cusumano, Marian Corbe, *A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats*, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 61.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 62.

[17] *Ibidem*.

[18] T. Frunzeti, "Asymmetric, Unconventional and Hybrid Actions in 21st Century Warfare", in: *Strategic Impact*, no. 1, 2013, pp. 7-8.

[19] *See also* NATO, AJP-1(E), 2017, pp. 2-20, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/602225/doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf

[20] Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007, p. 8, http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf

[21] Sascha Dov Bachmann and Andres B. Munoz Mosquera,

Charter[22] and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty constitute the legal cornerstone in assessing the legality of any action involving the use of force. In the case of hybrid warfare, one has to take into account two main issues of particular importance: primarily, whether the aggression meets the threshold requirement of an 'armed attack' as a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations in the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state; and secondly, whether the *attack* can be precisely ascribed to its aggressor. [23] As Sascha Dov Bachmann argued in an interview, "whether any form of hybrid attack, alone or cumulatively, amounts to a use of force and, if so, reaches the threshold of an "armed attack" to justify a military response under Article 51 - and what form that response would take - are very difficult questions to answer. They are situation/fact specific. Moreover, attribution may be problematic. In addition, hybrid warfare - with its possible elements of cyber, terrorism, asymmetric warfare etc. - might not reach the threshold of such an attack and hence allow affected states to "deny" the existence of such warfare in order to continue with their diplomatic relations, trade, etc. with the "aggressor" state. Such behavior might undermine existing alliances and weaken international comity"[24].

Hybrid warfare provides a generous dais for the use of different instruments of power. Using the law as a weapon constitutes such an instrument of power, as lawfare is focused on the transformation of current legal paradigms, by means of noxious or beneficial measures.

Lawfare's ultimate goal is not only *jus in bello*, but it is also directed to areas in relation to the interpretation and implementation of international obligations, which are mainly addressed in *jus ad bellum*. Modern hybrid warfare and the use of lawfare does not only constitute a threat to international peace and security, but also thwarts the present national and international legal frameworks by inquiring on the current public international law and by challenging the present *status-quo*. Paradoxically, as the "fog of Lawfare"[25] leaves behind a great number of ambiguities, the importance of the part that it actually performs in the broader framework of hybrid warfare becomes clearer. In such particular situation lawfare cunningly uses any legal ambiguity and tries to challenge the legal thresholds and faulty delimitation lines. When lawfare is applied by an adversary, be it a state or a non-state actor, it can take advantage of the inadequacies of the legal constraints placed upon any compliant actor, *ergo* prompting to the emergence of the "asymmetric warfare by abusing laws".[26]

One could claim that in hybrid warfare, as a result of manipulating international law and judicial processes, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) may become perverted or simply inapplicable. This constitutes the result of the fact that the law applied in a hybrid milieu offers only incomplete answers or misconstrued responses.[27] More importantly, this lack of legal balance can be rooted in the idea that abiding by the law would become irreconcilable with the acknowledge interests of the parties in conflict.[28]

Thus, we can conclude that there is "a proactive, positive 'Zeusian' use of lawfare aimed at neutralising the malicious 'Hadesian'

op. cit., p. 64.

[22] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, URL: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

[23] S. Bachmann and A. Paphiti, "Russia's Hybrid War and its Implication for the Defence and Security in the United Kingdom", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 2/2016 (44), p. 46.

[24] *See* Oxford Research Group, Interview on hybrid warfare with Sascha Dov Bachmann, URL: http://remotecontrolproject.org/interview-sascha-dov-bachmann/, accessed on May 20, 2018.

[25] This expression has been used in *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*, a 2003 American documentary on the former US Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara with his views of the modern warfare characteristics and refers to the above-identified ambiguity.

[26] *See* http://www.theLawfareproject.org/what-is-Lawfare.html, accessed on May 20, 2018.

[27] T. Pfanner, "Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action", *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 87, no. 857, 2005, p. 165.

[28] *Ibidem*.

use of the law"[29].

A successful use or *Zeusian* lawfare implies multilevel support, from both political and military leadership, aimed at countering *Hadesian* uses of international law provisions. "Only an all-encompassing legal approach will guarantee that the military and political leadership of law-abiding countries remains committed to an affirmative use of lawfare and capable of neutralising their opponents' malicious, Hadesian application of the law"[30].

The conflicts in Ukraine, Iraq and Syria have re-focused the attention of the international arena on the 'hybrid warfare', in which combatants use a mix of military and non-military tactics to achieve their goals. Russia is waging lawfare in respect to the conflict in Ukraine by "using law as a weapon to manipulate legal paradigms"[31]. Lawfare is used by Russia both within and outside the scope of traditional armed conflict, because Russia views its use of lawfare as a constancy of its foreign policies - that of using every power instrument at its disposal to attain its political and geo-strategic goals.[32]

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine transferred all nuclear weapons present on its territory to Russia. The *Budapest memorandum* was signed in 1994 by Ukraine, the United States, Russia and The United Kingdom; the signatories agreed to "respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine" and "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine"[33]. The Russian's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Alexander Lukashevich, answers a media question about the situation around the *Budapest Memorandum*:

"In the memorandum, we also undertook to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine's territorial integrity or political independence. And this provision has been fully observed. Not a single shot was fired on its territory during which, or before, the people of Crimea and Sevastopol were making crucial decisions on the status of the peninsula. The overwhelming majority of the population of Crimea and Sevastopol, in a free expression of their will, exercised their right to self-determination, and Crimea returned to Russia. As for the ongoing attempts to accuse us of military interference in the events in southeastern Ukraine, the authors of these claims have not presented a shred of conclusive evidence yet. Furthermore, neither in the Budapest Memorandum, nor in any other document, has Russia pledged to force a section of Ukraine to remain as part of the country against the will of the local population. The loss of Ukraine's territorial integrity has resulted from complicated internal processes, which Russia and its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum have nothing to do with."[34]

The statement is a stellar example of hybrid warfare methods, namely *deniability*, when affirming that "not a single shot was fired on its [Ukraine] territory during which, or before, the people of Crimea and Sevastopol were making crucial decisions on the status of the peninsula"[35] and intentional misrepresentation in regard to the scope of the existing treaty obligations, thus purposely concocting a narrative meant to confuse the public opinion. The Annexation of Crimea was a success for Russia and realized through the use of hybrid warfare and lawfare in

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[29] Sascha Dov Bachmann and Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, *op. cit.*, p. 70; the authors use the dichotomy between the two mythological characters - Zeus and Hades - to describe the two types of lawfare use.

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 71.

[31] C. Dunlap, "Lawfare Today: A Perspective", *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 2008, p. 146.

[32] *Ibidem*.

[33] The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, signed on the 5th of December 1994, in Budapest, Hungary, by Ukraine, The United States of America, Great Britain and Russia.

[34] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich answers a media question about the situation around the Budapest Memorandum, 12 March 2015, URL: archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/CC1C845CAA26D5A043257E07004BF6EB, 12 August 2015.

[35] Sascha Dov Bachmann and Andres B. Munoz Mosquera, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

"an affirmative or malicious way"[36].

The situation in Ukraine constitutes clear proof as to the fact that Russia engaged in hybrid warfare against both Ukraine and NATO and its partners by misinterpreting international law. Voyger said that "while Russia is not in control of the entire international legal system, and thus not fully capable of changing it "de jure", it is definitely trying to erode its fundamental principle "de facto"."[37]

In opposition, state-actors that use affirmative, *Zeusian lawfare*, *per a contrario* to *Hadesian lawfare* follow democratic procedures, subject to courts review and the scrutiny of the court of public opinion.

Proliferation of the *Hadesian use of lawfare* has led both state actors and international organizations to the conclusion that there is a need for greater normative flexibility and the incorporation of strategic forecasting in order to address the "mixture of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare"[38].

As any important national security matter, countering hybrid threats remain mainly the actor-states' responsibility.

Conclusions

The *chapeau* of *hybridity*, both overly generous and ambiguous, dubbed by anachronic character of the contemporary normative system in dealing with the subtleness of hybrid threats creates a theoretical and practical void in strategic planning. The focus must not fall extensively onto hybrid war, which can yield *lessons learned*, but rather on hybrid threats, and the means by which we can analyse the operational environment with a view to generate valid strategic response options. All information has become relevant information,

ranging from food prices to demographic values and technological development, all social, economical and especially political developments affect the behaviour of all comprehendible international actors. Key variables are identified, data banks are created, the data is further cropped, sorted and analysed, only to be crunched into small pieced of the intelligence puzzle. Will State X opt for a regime change, a coup, or will the failing government prevent the pending civil war. All of this information is further layered: prices, overall quality of life, demographics pointing out to a boom or an aging population (younger populations are more likely to engage in violent outburst, rather than older ones), weather conditions, and so on. The ability to look at an international actor, whether a state, an insurgency, a terrorist faction or even an N.G.O., understand the general strategic context it functions in, and then factor in as many *layers* of analysis as possible, will yield not a complete picture, but rather a higher level of foreseeability.

It is essential to underline the fact that there is a conceptual distinction between *foresight* and *forecasting*, namely foresight offers strategists *multiple futures* or *alternative futures*, lending them the opportunity to make use of available means to implement the envisaged strategic ends, while forecasting uses indicators, analysis and different methodologies to determine the probability of specific event taking place, on the basis of available data. At both organizational and state levels, a preliminary stage of strategic foresight is necessary in order to determine *the most favorable future*, in order to correctly and efficiently commit the necessary resources and intelligence according to strategic interests. Taking into account the overwhelming complexity of the contemporary security environment and the dynamics of technological development, it is essential to implement complex, multidimensional analysis models, such as DIME (diplomatic, information, military, economic) or PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information). Efficient strategic planning and countering hybrid threats require a comprehensive approach to security, which must incorporate both forecasting and foresight methods.

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[36] *Ibidem*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[37] M. Voyger, "L-Element of RUS Comprehensive Strategy", *NATO Land Command Izmir Land Power Magazine*, Spring 2015, Volume 1, Issue 2, p. 20.

[38] Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, 2016: para. 2.

Forecasting is the liaison between countering instability and strategic planning, and it is embedded into the very fabric of key concepts such as *early warning*, *strategic planning*, *drawing strategic response options*, and constituting one of the main instruments available to actors bound by the constraints of legality and legitimacy to counteract and ameliorate the negative impact of *hybridity*. NATO and EU member states are bound by rigidity of the international legal order, and fighting *fire with fire* is not a legitimate course of action. Any and all actions must conform to the obligations set forth by international instruments, and that is why prevention is a central conceptual element. While the game appears unequal, it is the unprecedented technological development, access to *lessons learned* and solid strategic foundation that create the premises to incorporate forecasting into strategic planning, making the future not uncertain, but a set of possible variations that one can and must prepare for. Cooperation between military and civilian agencies, as well as understanding that the normative bias characterized by current state of the international legal order makes *power* rather than legal instruments the valid approach, constitute the foundation of countering and ameliorating *hybrid threats*.

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NATIONAL RESILIENCE TO HYBRID THREATS AND THE SECURITY CULTURE. A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD*
Cristian BĂRBULESCU**

The present paper presents the main challenges and drivers of the emerging hybrid threats with security impact. Subsequently, considering these specific elements, we argue the need for a new resilience-based approach for the management of such threats and security risks. Nation-state and its various constituent elements (public institutions, civil society and critical infrastructure) is at the center of the approach we describe, revealing several options that might be useful in designing a security culture-based conceptual framework of national resilience to hybrid threats.

Keywords: hybrid threats; hybrid warfare; national resilience; security culture; vulnerability; fake news.

Preliminary considerations

The recent security developments – like the annexation of Crimea and destabilization in eastern Ukraine and the proliferation of cyber and informational threats for the purpose of influencing social perceptions and political processes in some Western states (e.g. US and France) – are emerging security challenges that need to be addressed both nationally and through an enhanced and extensive external cooperation.

The most recent hybrid threats' patterns reveal, on the one hand, the complexity of these type of threats derived from the multiple combinations of the hybrid aggressor's methods and means implemented to achieve its strategic objective (which represents, in fact, the quintessence of hybrid warfare) and, on the other hand, the need for a whole of society (public institutions, private companies, academia etc.) effort to address these kind of threats. Our approach is related to this latter objective and aims to develop a *conceptual framework for national resilience to hybrid threats based on enhancing security culture*. Such a model might support a better understanding of the concepts we operate with – *hybrid threats, national resilience* and *security culture* – as well as the results from their cross-intersection.

We consider that such an action must first start by identifying the specific drivers that determine how *hybrid threats* appear, as well

* Teodor FRUNZETI is PhD. Professor with "Titu Maiorescu" University and President of Military Science Section within the Academy of Romanian Scientists in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: tfrunzeti@gmail.com

** Cristian BĂRBULESCU is PhD. Student in Information and National Security with "Carol I" National Defence University and Research Assistant with the Academy of Romanian Scientists in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: cebarbulescu@gmail.com

as known patterns, derived from the analysis of recent hybrid actions. These elements and aspects resulting from the analysis of the relationship that can be established between *hybrid threats* and *national resilience* can ultimately support the projection of a*n analytical framework for managing the response to hybrid threats*, which might be applicable also for e*nhancing security culture at national level*.

1. Hybrid threats – a new challenge to national security

The fight against hybrid threats was identified as one of the priority areas of NATO and EU cooperation for the first time during 2016 Warsaw NATO summit. The Joint Report of the European Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued in 2017 described the European security environment as significantly affected by hybrid actions: "hybrid activities are becoming a frequent feature of the European security environment. The intensity of these activities is increasing with growing concerns over elections being interfered with, disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities and perpetrators of hybrid acts trying to radicalize vulnerable members of society as their proxy actors. Vulnerabilities to hybrid threats are not limited to national boundaries."[1]. In this way, it was practically recognized not only that the effects of hybrid threats exceeded the Member States' borders (and that these effects were actually felt at European level) but also that "European security has become a negotiated, contested and combatted issue"[2] as a result of new challenges derived from the actions of both state and non-state actors.

If during the Cold War security developments were defined by the confrontation of two dominant military superpowers, nowadays the global security environment is much more difficult to be described in the same terms or by referring to the prevalence of conventional means of deterrence. However, this change does not make the conventional threats less relevant nor it means that the classical military threats are felt less intense at the level of some international actors. These threats continue to manifest, but they overlap on the unconventional and asymmetric threats favoring the emergence of new hybrid threats. These current threats are multidimensional and the connections between the different hostile activities that define them are becoming blurred, unclear and sometimes very difficult, if not impossible to be confirmed and assessed. This kind of threats (of a hybrid nature) manifests at the limit of conflict escalation between two or more actors. If the interests and objectives of the aggressor using such tactics are not met and especially if his actions are not detected in time, the conflict may escalate into a *hybrid war*[3]. Hybrid threats are and might be used to define a new reality in which new military tactics might be tested[4], the most eloquent example in this regard being the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. Therefore, for states prone to hybrid threats, a first effort should be undertaken to understand the instruments used in these hostile activities and the principles according to which these activities are carried out.

Combining different methods and means is ubiquitous in classic military actions. This peculiarity, drawn from the general theory of war, makes unfeasible the hybrid war thesis (because, in essence, *war has always been hybrid!*). Also, this type of strategy (hybrid by its nature), whereby several power instruments are used simultaneously and complementary to achieve a common goal, existed long before the illegal annexation of Crimea and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. A hybrid actor can opt for "vertical escalation", by intensifying

[1] *** *Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats - a European Union Response*, 2017, p. 3, URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=GA, accessed on 12.05.2018.

[2] Matti Saarelainen, *Hybrid threats – what are we talking about?*, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Helsinki, 2017, URL: https://www.hybrid-coe.fi/news/hybrid-threats-what-are-we-talking-about/, accessed on 10.05.2018.

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] *Ibidem.*

actions specific to one or more instruments of power, or for "horizontal escalation", by synchronizing multiple instruments to achieve a greater combined effect[5] against its target.

Unlike *hybrid war*, what is essential to remember about *hybrid threats* relates to the interconnection between different and specific activities and, moreover, to the difficulty in establishing the connections between these activities outside the framework of an armed conflict.

In the *Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats*, drafted by the European Commission in 2016, a first definition of hybrid threats is proposed, which is, in our view, a starting point in the concept operationalization processes at the member states level. Hybrid threats are described as "the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats"[6].

The range of methods and activities associated with hybrid threats is much wider, unlike other types of threats, conventional and/or asymmetric, we are familiar with. Thus, if connected on the same strategic objective, hybrid actions may include activities of influence through propaganda and disinformation, economic pressures by exploiting the vulnerabilities of a particular actor (e.g.: energy dependence), lawfare actions and even military activities (e.g.: demonstrations of force, border security incidents like violations of national airspace and waters etc.) conducted to influence the decision making processes and population of the target.

Therefore, hybrid threats refer to the instruments, methods and means used by a potential aggressor – who might be both a state or a non-state actor – to promote its own interests, strategies and objectives[7] in relation to his opponent(s). As a tendency in the current heavily globalized international system, weaker revisionist state actors are acting according with their own agenda by implementing hybrid strategies in contested *grey zone* areas. Besides state actors, non-state entities (e.g. terrorist organizations) pursue hybrid actions to popularize their operational successes, their own ideological models on targeted audiences and/or to conduct specific rebranding activities. These are new and challenging topics for the Western countries, EU and NATO, which will inevitably have to identify appropriate cooperation options to address them.

In hybrid scenarios, unconventional actions are increasingly present, while the military, classical or conventional, operations are limited and, often, used to enhance the effects of the political, diplomatic, economic, informational and/or cyber activities. New types of threats (hybrid) are multidomain, exhibit a high degree of synchronization and generate non-linear and difficult to (rapidly) assess effects.

A recent study[8], developed in the academic and research field in Sweden and Finland reveals the *factors contributing to the emergence of hybrid threats*[9], namely:

• *The post-Cold War change of international order.* In the new international system "the power to change beliefs, attitudes,

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[5] Patrick J. Cullen, Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, *MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare*, 2017, p. 8, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/647776/dar_mcdc_ hybrid_warfare.pdf, accessed on 01.05.2018.

[6] *** *Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats - a European Union Response*, 2017, p. 3, URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=GA, accessed on 12.05.2018.

[7] Matti Saarelainen, *op.cit.*

[8] Gregory F. Treverton, Andrew Thvedt, Alicia R. Chen, Kathy Lee, Madeline McCue, *Addressing Hybrid Threats,* Swedish Defence University, 2018, URL: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Treverton-AddressingHybridThreats.pdf, accessed on 01.05.2018.

[9] *Ibidem*, pp. 1-2.

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preferences, opinions, expectations, emotions and/ or predispositions to act – is today more important than material power"[10]. Nowadays, that the world is experiencing the "dark side" of globalization[11], the role of the nation-state comes into question, likewise the alliances with their rules and principles that limit the responses to asymmetric and hybrid actions.

- *Globalization, advanced communication technologies and online developments* are instrumental in increasing the operational potential of both state and non-state actors (e.g. multinational corporations, groups of hackers, terrorist groups etc.) in less rule-based operational domains, such as cyberspace.

- *The emergence of new areas of confrontation, such as cyberspace, where the "rules of the game" have not been created yet.* With the exception of cyber means and technologies, most of the means used in hybrid conflicts – such as propaganda and political/ diplomatic or economic actions – are not new. Actions in cyberspace offer both new tools of action (like cyber espionage and fake news), but also new opportunities to maximize the effect of traditional instruments of influence (political/ diplomatic, economic, informational, etc.).

- *Exploiting the potential of new media technologies, as well as new tools for social influences.* The high speed of information flow, the way information is produced and how social communities can connect beyond national borders are the result of the global process of digitization and the advanced development of social media tools. Trust, one of the fundamental pillars in democratic societies, is eroding under the influence of modern manipulation techniques. The internet has become the new "tactical field" of confrontation, and propaganda, disinformation and fake news are the new weapons to be used in (hybrid) warfare.

- *A clear delimitation between peace and war is increasingly difficult to achieve.* The target does not realize the real situation or if it is at war until the military instrument is used even by short scale or dissimulated operations (like the "little green men" in Crimea in 2014).

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[10] *Ibidem*, p. 1.
[11] *Ibidem*.

2. Enhancing national resilience - a strategic option to manage hybrid threats

In the last years, academia and various national and European institutions[12] have been increasingly discussing about "resilience" outside the concept's traditional area of applicability[13]. If previous approaches on resilience in security studies were, in particular, to reduce the exposure of critical infrastructure to external shocks, the question now arises whether or not these models are useful and can also be extended to complex adaptive systems such as social systems (private organizations, public institutions, social communities or even nation states), in a way that may help strengthening national security and its social dimension.

In most cases, the institutional emergency response policies have been instruments used to enhance the resilience of complex systems (both physical and social systems) following their exposure to extreme, random and very difficult (if not impossible) to anticipate events, like calamities and/or natural disasters. States have been and are still concerned, for example, about minimizing the negative, ecological and social effects generated by extreme weather phenomena (earthquakes, tropical storms, eruptions of volcanoes etc.). To achieve this objective, national authorities have developed contingency plans which, through the specific response measures they include, contribute to enhancing the social and critical infrastructure resilience to these types of threats.

The analysis of the literature reveals that *resilience is both a feature and a process of social systems.* Both attributes are observable during or after exposure to external actions with disruptive potential.

Although the social systems have a naturally ability to bounce back when exposed to shocks and to adapt, this is never enough to guarantee their survival. This is why it needs an effort to permanently prepare for the worst as a way to

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[12] A.N.: such explicit references are found in the content of documents adopted at EU and NATO level, but also in the various strategies developed at national level.

[13] A.N.: in engineering sciences, ecology, social sciences (organization theory, psychology) or economics.

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achieve resilience that, however, should not be seen as an absolute attribute of social systems. Therefore, *resilience is a property of social systems* because, in principle, any social system has self-regulating functions that keep them functional, despite the "damage" produced by external shocks, and allow them to adapt to the new conditions of the environment and to reorganize, sooner or later, in the sense of becoming "antifragile". Antifragile systems are those organizations that have the ability to learn from their own experiences and profit from uncertainty and volatility[14].

Christophe Béné et al.[15] define *resilience* as the capacity of the systems:

• *to resist/cope with* the challenges in the external environment; in this case, resilience is defined by resistance/persistence of systems functionality and an increased attention should be paid to critical infrastructure elements;

• *to adapt* to dynamical changes in the security environment;

• *to transform/learn* in the sense of becoming stronger in the face of new security challenges.

Learning capacity is an essential attribute of resilient social systems from private companies, public institutions, non-governmental organizations, up to large-scale social systems, such as state and international organizations. Lessons learned lead to the sedimentation and consolidation of the *security culture* of these systems.

The thesis saying that *resilience is a (pre-defined) characteristic of complex social systems* inevitably arises some questions whose response might facilitate a better understanding of the concept. *If these systems have a certain degree of resilience, then why do they need to become more resilient? Why is it not sufficient to address resilience as a property of social systems? Why is it necessary to generate a process within these systems that leads to increasing their resilience to the threats they face or have to deal with?*

The speed of changes in the integrative environments of the different social systems determine the need to train their resilience capacities on each of the three previously specified dimensions – *robustness/continuity*, *adaptation/flexibility* and *transformation/learning*. Also, addressing resilience as a *process* arises as a necessity amid the diversification of non-conventional security threats (manifested in new and unregulated operational domains, like cyberspace), the resistance to change of the public bureaucratic institutions and the increase in social interconnection, as an effect of digitization in the economic sector and in the media industry.

Resilience development cannot be achieved otherwise than through *processes* established at different systems' levels (in a multilayered approach). In the case of nation states, for example, such a process is an integrative one that include public authorities and civil society actors' participation.

From a *resilience* perspective, risk management is based, also, on an integrated analysis of threats and vulnerabilities (identified in connection to the threats). Such an approach emphasizes the need to identify the weaknesses, exploited in the hybrid register by a potential hybrid opponent. Although this approach is much more anchored in the present, on the system ability to respond the security challenges that impact its future evolution, it also stresses the acute need for the "knowledge of the future". Therefore, from a resilience perspective, it is much easier to determine whether a system is fragile under certain specific environmental conditions (in our case, the manifestation of hybrid actions), rather than being obsessed to accurately anticipate the future uncertain developments. In this approach, we need to accept volatility, understand the stressful factors that affect/can affect the system and identify possibilities to make it stronger and more efficient.

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[14] Nicholas Nassim Taleb, *Antifragile*, Random House New York, 2012, p. 17.

[15] Christophe Béné, Rachel Godfrey Wood, Andrew Newsham, Mark Davies, *Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability Reduction Programmes*, Institute of Development Studies, 2012, p. 21, URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2012.00405.x, accessed on 12.05.2018.

In such a context, a systemic and process-oriented approach becomes extremely relevant because many types of threats affecting societies are now covariant, in the sense that they simultaneously affect several segments or even large communities (and hybrid threats create such effects!). Such an effort must be an interagency and a collaborative one – focused on strengthening the public-private partnership and the state and society bound. This approach is necessary in order to be able to contribute to a satisfactory reduction of the nation states (and different physical and social systems within them) level of exposure to the different types of external actions that endanger their security.

3. Managing hybrid threat response – an analytical framework

In our view, any satisfactory results cannot be achieved if the following key questions are not pursued in the processes devoted to the management of hybrid threats: *What are the national vulnerabilities that need to be addressed in the first place? How could an opponent take advantage of these vulnerabilities? What are the relevant scenarios of the threat? Are all sectors of society engaged in defense and are they prepared to act in situations of exposure to hybrid aggression?*

Both theory and empirical examples (emerging from recent developments in the global and regional security environment), allow us to advance *a possible useful analytical framework* to properly deal with hybrid threats. This framework includes the following steps:

1) Identification of the instruments of power that the opponent could use in hybrid actions

At this stage, it is important to conduct an analysis on the different instruments of power that a potential opponent could use in a hybrid confrontation scenario. We believe that this analysis is necessary in order to be able to make it easier to assess how these instruments can be synchronized in practice and to assess the non-linear effects of the hybrid hostile actions.

The analysis of recent hybrid patterns reveals a number of specific trends of the threats in the information and cyberspace domains that can be found in hybrid strategies and scenarios:

- *The use of propaganda as a prevalent means of action*

We are currently confronting with the "weaponization" of information as a specific warfare function[16]. This process of "weaponization" reveals something that is unrelated to the objectives of the propaganda – which remain the same and associated with the intent to influence the target political decision and population as well as its own population in order to legitimate its future actions (the aggressor delivers to his own audience an image of a victim which is forced to act in self-defenses). The novelty aspect lies in the means used in propaganda actions. *New media* technologies and *social networks* can be vectors of aggression in the informational domain. They are used to maximize the effects of a campaign in a hybrid confrontation. The costs of exploiting these means are low in relation to the proposed strategic objective of destabilizing the opponent[17].

In order to successfully carry out information operations, two essential conditions must be met[18], *the channel through which information can reach targeted audiences* (e.g. traditional media sources and social media platforms) and *detailed information and knowledge of the target* which provides the ability to develop those informational constructs that bring to the aggressor advantages in the hybrid scenario. Such constructions may include, where appropriate, opinions on sensitive topics for the target audience concerned, data leaks or fake news spreading.

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[16] Iulian Chifu, "Pulsul planetei. Militarizarea și transformarea informației în armă de război", *Evenimentul Zilei*, URL: https://evz.ro/pulsul-planetei-militarizarea-si-transformarea-informatiei-in-arma-de-razboi.html, accesed on 01.05.2018.

[17] N.A.: If we only think, by comparison, of the (operational) limitations that states had during Cold War attempt to implant a piece of news or an article in a publication in another state.

[18] Gregory F. Treverton, Andrew Thvedt, Alicia R. Chen, Kathy Lee, Madeline McCue, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

• *Control on local media which benefit of wide audiences, both inside and outside of the aggressor territory*

Subservient media might become very efficient when the articles they publish are taken over by foreign popular media sources[19].

• *Social media offers new possibilities to a potential aggressor intending to gain access to the media and the general public of the targets concerned.*

Disinformation can be particularly effective given the high prevalence among the general public accessing news through social networks.

Social media platforms' business models, as well as media publications – also users of social networks – are based on generating content based on users' preferences captive in their "echo chambers"[20] – limiting their knowledge universe to the content consumed and to the "people" with whom they share the same ideas and values. This is a practice for which social media platforms are much blamed and criticized.

Social media platforms are thus becoming news "aggregators" that can be easily used to promote disinformation and fake news – through state-sponsored accounts, botnet networks, trolls – which, in this way, go directly to the target audience. This appears to have been one of the particularities of the information campaign in the last US presidential elections, when numerous news from Russian media sources were then taken over and rolled into Twitter and Facebook through botnets and trolls, generating algorithms based on misleading or false consumption trends and the risk of takeover and popularity by local media sources[21].

• *Fake news widespread use in order to influence the perception of target audiences*

Fake news are more than just false stories. They include information that deliberately distorts the truth and seeks a specific objective, usually associated with the satisfaction of hostile interests. In contrast to fake news, false stories can be generated by causes that indicate superficiality in media documentation or lack of professionalism, but also of interests derived from editorial policy that can be reflected in the content and the manner in which the information is presented.

Fake news dissemination is frequently performed via social media channels due to the absence of "filters" or instruments for verifying the veracity of the online information. Most of the time, this type of filter is found exclusively at the end-user level. Even if social media platforms develop new instruments to verify published postings, their complete content removal is difficult, if not impossible, because of the algorithmic model after which these platforms function, which allows "rolling" information from one user to another. It is also unlikely that mainstream media distribution through social networks of promoted articles that are suspicious of fake news would stop. As long as they have a high level of popularity among users, this scenario seems unattainable. Beyond the advantages and opportunities offered by the new era of digitization, one of the major challenges we have to face is related to the social ability to process the information, especially if fake news will end up generating trends in social media or be taken over and reported by other media in search of "sensational" news.

• *The existence of platforms that facilitate publication of data leaks* (e.g. WikiLeaks, DCleaks.com), obtained through cyber espionage actions (such actions would have been carried out in recent US and France elections)[22].

It is very difficult and it is incumbent on the specialized security structures to identify the connections between these platforms and the hybrid actor interested in the publication of sensitive and sensational information, with the ultimate consumer only having the precautionary measure and its own critical sense as a defense instrument in the face of manipulation.

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[19] *Ibidem*, p. 47.

[20] *** *Facebook în era post-adevărului*, URL: http://intelligence.sri.ro/facebook-era-post-adevarului/, accessed on 02.05.2018.

[21] Gregory F. Treverton, Andrew Thvedt, Alicia R. Chen, Kathy Lee, Madeline McCue, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

[22] *Ibidem*.

2) Assessment of the vulnerabilities, based on the assumption that, in hybrid actions, the aggressor acts by exploiting social sensibilities

Gregory F. Treverton provides enough useful landmarks[23] on this topic. This analysis includes two steps: identifying critical functions of society and assessing the vulnerability dimensions.

Identification of social critical functions

One direction could target how much the state is dependent on digital services and how vulnerable they are to cyber aggression. The assessment should probably include a relevant set of threat scenarios that can be used to support the processes related to strengthening national resilience on its social and cyber dimension.

Assessing vulnerability dimensions

Geography or proximity to the potential source of threat will amplify certain social fears represented by the impending of a possible hostile action, which could be for instance of conventional/military nature. This is clearly an effect that worries national security decision makers and experts.

The *social* and *political* security dimensions are equally relevant at this stage. The existing social fault lines, generated by conflictual opinions and beliefs between different ethnic communities, generations, social classes, livelihood (rural versus urban), and the way information is consumed by different social classes (online media, radio/television, social media) as long as their preferences and interests are exploitable factors in information campaigns. At the same time, the orientation of the state's foreign policy and the changes of social perception, as well as the relationship between authorities and society (the degree of confidence of the population in public institutions) are themes that can be found in hybrid actions.

3) Identification of the objectives that the opponent might pursue in relation to existing vulnerabilities

This could be done in conjunction with the hybrid actor's instruments of power. Hybrid defense planning must be based on the understanding of the motivations and objectives

indicating the opponent's actions and identifying possible targets for the opponent's hybrid operations. In other words, the planning process should answer to the questions: *what should be defended?* and *for what reason?* For example, information operations carried out through media and social media as well as cyber-attacks are not instruments used in a hybrid action strategy if they cannot be connected to a strategic objective along with other means of action (political, economic, etc.). In other words, the presence of an informational campaign does not guarantee that the opponent has employed or will necessarily use other means of action (political, economic, etc.), but could be an indicator of a *potential* hybrid strategy[24].

4) Calibrating means of response to hybrid threats that are applicable to enhance the national security culture

Based on the premise that *hybrid threats* are manifested, with predilection, in the cognitive field, at the level of civil society, with multiple implications in the national security[25], an enhanced *security culture* approach – as an exponent of national resilience to hybrid threats – is more than necessary.

Security culture is generically defined as "the ideas, customs and social behaviours of a particular people or group that help them be free from threat and danger"[26]. Security culture involves two interconnected dimensions:

• *knowledge* – refers to the degree the population is aware of security issues and its perception of several strategic strands of action deriving from the answers to fundamental questions such as *who is the opponent?, how does he threaten us?* and *how can we effectively*

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[23] *Ibidem.*

[24] *Ibidem*, p. 19.

[25] A N.: for example, affecting social cohesion in crisis situations that the target state can undergo, undermining public confidence in state institutions, changing perceptions in the population in relation to certain sensitive topics of public debate, etc.

[26] Kai Roer, *Build a Security Culture,* IT Governance Publishing, 2015, p. 6, URL: https://news.asis.io/sites/default/files/Build%20a%20Secuirty%20Culture%20%28Fundamentals%20Series%29%20by%20Kai%20Roer.pdf, accessed on 28.05.2018.

manage the threats?[27].

- *behavior* – expresses the use of knowledge in people's way of reporting on a particular security issue with an impact on the community they belong to; refers to the active participation of the society in the management of security issues. We consider that critical thinking abilities are also a measure of a social healthful behavior from the security point of view.

The process initiated towards the development of the *security culture* can be designed on three levels: *individual* – refers to the cultivation of each person's ideas and principles (aimed at the mental and spiritual dimension), *social* – refers to the organizational values development and to an action-related consciousness for the benefit of the social security and *material* – relates to the existential resources at the level of society.

Conclusions

The interconnection between physical, digital and social domains – as an effect of the developments generated by *the fourth industrial revolution* that we are experiencing – makes the hybrid aggressions become much more accessible to state and non-state actors, which uses them to support their own strategic interests. The hybrid nature of the new types of threats is a reflection of the developments in Ukraine and Syria but also in western democracies that claim a high degree of exposure to hostile information operations and cyber-attacks, in order to influence the perception of the population and the internal political processes.

The new era of *hybrid threats* puts into question the nation-state role and, equally, the efficiency of regional cooperation formats and the alliances to which they belong, as well as existing international law rules, which either

limit or fail to provide an appropriate framework for responding to this kind of action.

In the new security context, defined by hybrid manifestations in the conduct of international actors, resilience and security are not incompatible concepts. However, *resilience should not be considered an alternative to national security but, on the contrary, an innovative way of enhancing it*. This possible new security perspective should be much more flexible, so it would allow deterrence and countermeasures and the use of a wide range of instruments, as a result of the cooperative efforts between civil (public and private) sectors and the military sector.

The complexity of *hybrid threats* tests the responsiveness of public institutions and the existing connection between society and central authorities. Therefore, in the pre-manifestation phase of the threat, awareness of the danger and strengthening the partnership between public institutions and civil society are paramount to increasing social resilience. We believe that stepping up the effort to identify smart solutions by enhancing *security culture* can support the development of *social/community resilience* on medium and long term.

The social dimension of security must represent – alongside the initiatives to strengthen the institutional capacity to respond to the strategic decision, defense, public order and national security and the level of critical infrastructure (transport, communications, energy, etc.) - as a complementary function of good governance that can sustain, on long term, a *whole of government* strategic approach - in formulating response measures to *hybrid threats*. One of the useful options that we support in this respect is the need to promote policies that contribute to the development of security culture, as one of these measures.

The relationship between the government and the population in the hybrid context is essential. National resilience to hybrid threats does not only imply specific response measures designed at institutional level (how do authorities prepare to respond in the event of aggression?),

[27] Lucian Dumitrescu, *Lansarea barometrului culturii de securitate. Ce este cultura de securitate?*, București: Fundația Universitară a Mării Negre, 2018, in "Adevărul", URL: https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/lansarea-barometrului-culturii-securitate-cultura-securitate-1_5acf1cf9df52022f75bd7153/index.html, accessed on 28.05.2018.

but it is a process that includes all the elements of a nation, including the participation of the society. The development of the security culture should not only cover the confidence building in the national security institutions, but also concrete measures aimed at increasing the level of social knowledge/awareness about emerging/revolutionary forms of manifestation of security threats, as well as concrete policies to tackle new actions in cyberspace and information operations – such as actions to minimize the large scale effects generated by fake news.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

THE SCENARIO –
AN IMPORTANT INSTRUMENT
IN THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
IN CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY

Ioan MISCHIE*

Given the high costs involved in endowing an army and changing doctrines to employ forces in military actions, it is necessary to clearly define the threats and the requirements to equip forces with military technique for building and developing military capabilities. In this context, it is necessary to use certain tools to substantiate decisions. One of the most important tools that can be used at strategic level, in conditions of uncertainty, to substantiate these decisions is the scenario. This article presents the requirements to be followed for developing a strategic level scenario, the way of choosing the most appropriate scenarios, and a methodology to develop these types of scenarios.

Keywords*: scenario; strategic level; security; operational planning; military capabilities; forecast.*

Introduction

The current situation at global level is unstable, marked by the emergence of new military players, state and non-state actors, eager for power or world order change. The struggle for power "was a constant of human existence"[1] and will probably continue to be so in the future. The principle "train as you fight, fight as you train"[2] is the essence of training of any army that takes seriously the threats to the security of the incumbent state.

For this, it is very important, at strategic level, to make accurate analyses and interpretations of emerging threats to the security of the state, as well as changes in the regional and international security environment. These analyses will support the development of standing defence plans, contingency plans, generic contingency plans and graduated response plans as part of strategic planning at an early stage, called *Advance planning*[3].

However, these documents are elaborated based on the uncertainty about the future evolution of the security environment, as well as future changes that will occur in the areas of interest in all the analyzed areas (political, economic, military, social, etc.). In order to be able to estimate the viability of these plans under conditions of uncertainty, the formation of new capabilities, future concepts and policies, doctrinal changes in the use of armed forces, strategic scenarios should be developed to form the basis of extensive exercises with forces in the field, computer simulated/assisted exercises, mapped or combined exercises.

Scenarios, generally, represent both art and science that requires creativity, imagination and

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* Colonel (AF) Ioan MISCHIE is PhD Candidate in Military Sciences with "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania and Chief of Planing Training Section/ROU AFHQ. E-mail: bar_onu@yahoo.com

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solid military knowledge. They are meant to "guide the thinking behind"[4] the development process of the strategic plans presented above, as well as their renewal.

It is worth mentioning that scenarios should not be confused with forecasts, these being much more complex. The forecast data can be used within scenarios.

1. The development of strategic scenarios

If operational planning is aimed to build a joint task force in accordance with existing threats, strategic scenario planning aims "to explore a wider range of possible challenges several years or even decades into the future".[5]

The *Provision regarding the planning, development and analysis of exercises in the Romanian Armed Forces* also presents a scenario as "a hypothetical conceptual framework that configures a potential crisis situation"[6] that can affect national security and will require army intervention to solve it.

Hence, it results that the scenarios describe a possible future situation, as well as the ways in which it can be reached, generating guidance on what may happen in the future.

Each state has its own way of developing strategic scenarios, but they need to be constantly updated according to the evolution of specific instruments and techniques.

There are three important issues to take into consideration when referring to developing scenarios, according to researchers Hannah Kosow and Robert Gaßnerfrom from the Institute for Advanced Studies and Technology Assessment in Berlin, and these are:

a. The scenario cannot present a complete picture of the future, but it will present some clearly defined parts of reality.

By extrapolating, we can say that the scenario will take into account certain factors, usually present at the time of conception, and will eliminate others, usually those with a high degree of uncertainty.

b. The selection, combination and analysis of relevant factors for the time horizon taken into account is "a construct"[7].

The two authors state that certain factors and events will deliberately be considered relevant or ignored, depending on certain assumptions. In other words, even if this is not desired, the scenario will have a certain amount of subjectivism.

c. Scenarios will be developed based on the interpretation of the future, starting from existing trends. It should be noted that these trends may continue, linearly or exponentially, depending on other variables that may occur in the future timeframe, or may remain constant.

From all of the above, it appears that strategic scenarios cover a future with many uncertainties, being themselves characterized by uncertainty.

The development of scenarios follows several stages, but most of the work in the field is based on identifying future challenges to national security of a state. Based on these, one can formulate a country's national defense strategy. As a result, the political factor will issue guidance for the army, which, in turn, will enable it to develop its military strategy. Next, we will identify the key factors that will influence the future over a certain period of time and how they interact with each other. Depending on this, several possible scenarios will emerge, from which one will be chosen and will be put into practice.

Hence the importance of strategic level scenarios, the outcome of which can lead to a review of policies or doctrines.

As a result of the STRATAL research project of the Center for Security Studies and Military Strategy of the Defense University of Brno (Czech Republic), a methodology for developing scenarios at strategic level for capability planning was issued, as it is presented in Table no. 1.

As it can be seen, this methodology presents all the steps specific to the development of the scenarios previously specified. However, its importance lies in the fact that it tries to eliminate a large part of the redundant factors that could arise during the development of a strategic scenario.

[4] Anne Cann, *Scenario-Based Strategic Planningin the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Program*, IWR White Paper, Institute for Water Resources, 2010, p. 5, URL: https://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70 /docs/ iwrreports/Scenario-BasedStrategicPlanning.pdf, accessed on March 18, 2018.

[5] Michael Fitzsimmons, *Strategic Insights: Challenges in Using Scenario Planning for Defense Strategy*, United State Army War College Press, 2018, p. 2.

[6] *Dispoziţia privind planificarea, desfăşurarea şi analiza exerciţiilor în Armata României (Provision regarding the planning, development and analysis of exercises in the Romanian Armed Forces)*, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 88.

[7] Hannah Kosow, Robert Gaßner, *Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis*, Bonn, Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik, 2008, p. 11.

It basically turns into a planning guide, which will avoid diverting from the proposed final goal. At the same time, it avoids long discussions in the planning process, guiding brainstorming for added value.

I have presented this model precisely because of the most important limitations in the development of scenarios, namely:

- time consumer;
- it depends heavily on the qualification of those working on it;
- they do not always have standards for their development.

In the *Provision regarding the planning, development and analysis of exercises in the Romanian Armed Forces*, there is no methodology for elaborating strategic scenarios. However, the modules which compose the scenario are presented at all levels of the military art, where we can find some of the elements presented in the methodology, as shown in Table no. 1.

Considering the need for answers to hypothetical questions and uncertainty factors,

in order to develop the best scenarios, as well as the presented methodology, it is advisable to use or to develop computer programs (eg. *Massive Scenario Generation/MSG* programme). These will assist decision makers by providing answers and courses of action in developing scenarios that eliminate subjectivism or the desire to impose certain preconceived ideas. They also help to significantly reduce the time required for the various analyses that are important to the process of developing strategic scenarios, such as analyzing the influence and dependence of PMESII specific factors. This analysis can determine the most influential/dependent factors, as well as those who are both influential and dependent at the same time, information that contributes significantly to identifying the optimal solution for scenario development.

2. Choosing the strategic scenario

In choosing a certain strategic scenario from those developed, given their primary purpose

Table no. 1: Methodology for development of scenarios
at strategic level in order to plan capabilities[8]

Strategic analysis	Security environment – security challenges and risks
	Operational environment and application of military power
	Technology
	Politics, economics, demography and environment
Political guidance	Strategic assumptions
	Strategic and security interests (state, international organization)
	Political ambitions
	Multinational obligations
	Resources
Mission type	Collective defense (Article 5 Ops)
	Air defense, cyber defense
	Crisis response operations (multinational effort)
	Operation under national command
	Crisis response operations (national effort)
Generic scenario	Infrastructure
	Enemy
	Political and military end state
	Strategic objectives and effects
	Operational objectives and effects
	Key tasks = capability requirements
Specific Scenario I	Geography
	Specific operational conditions including the enemy
Specific Scenario II	Geography
	Specific operational conditions including the enemy

[8] Libor Frank and Josef Procházka, *Scenarios and Capability Planning: Creation of Scenarios as a Tool for Predicting the Future Operating Environ*ment, Strategos Conference, University of Defence Brno, Czech Republic, 2017, p. 79.

- to verify the validity of certain plans and the development of future military capabilities, military decision-makers have to answer some of the following questions:

1. What basic assumptions on the ability to predict the future and its limitations were taken into consideration?

This is the starting point for choosing the scenario. The important role lies with existing information structures and computer programs that can be used for analyses. For example, if the predicted timeframe in the scenario is too long, changes in the overall security situation may have many variables, the result of the scenario being altered. Also, short periods of time are not recommended. The optimal periods of time provided in the strategic scenarios must be between 4-6 years.[9]

2. To what extent can the developed scenarios become reality?

The answer to this question is essential because, at some point in the future, the outcome of a possible armed confrontation, or even worse, the existence of the state might depend on it. In my opinion, the answer is a subjective one and it mostly depends on the experience and vision of the person who is asked to choose a particular scenario. So, the decision-makers/people responsible for these types of scenarios must have competencies in, at least, the following areas: information, politics and military.

3. Does the scenario cover the most likely course of action or the most dangerous course of action?

An important role in finding the answer to this question, for an uncertain future, is given by political and military analysts, due to changes that can take place in the security environment at a geostrategic level. They have to define the field for which the scenario is developed. This area should cover the courses that are the most likely and the most dangerous to happen from the security point of view. A compromise between the many scenarios that can be drawn up and the choice of the most plausible to happen is desirable, also taking into account the analysis carried out by the intelligence services. These services can provide objective information that provides a basis for understanding future developments in the area of interest.

4. Was the process of developing the scenario a collaborative one between agencies/departments?

If the scenario is elaborated on a single level department, it risks to be subjective and does not take into account all available information. It is very likely in this case that the results of the scenario are erroneous. It is advisable to develop the scenario at interdepartmental level, in which case all areas will be covered. Where there are signs of high uncertainty, in collaborative scenario development, the best answer can be found, because in this case there is the expertise of a wide range of agencies/departments.

Depending on these answers, one will choose a certain scenario, which will avoid subjectivism, as much as possible.

Also, the criteria set for the scenario evaluation should determine whether the scenario is plausible, distinct, coherent, useful, objective, and complete for the problem that needs to be solved. For a scenario to be plausible, it must have a certain degree of realism. If there is a low degree of probability for these events to happen, the scenario is irrelevant to the domain for which it was created, being thus only a time and resources consumer. For relatively simple scenarios, where there are a few factors considered, it is easy to determine the likelihood of the situation presented. In the case of complex scenarios, with many factors, a software must be used to calculate the degree of certainty.

Any scenario should be different from another, not just variations on the same theme. From the elements of a scenario, only the most appropriate one will be selected or a reevaluation will be made and a new scenario will be formulated.

The cohesion of the scenario consists in keeping a logical thread of thought that follows the purpose for which it was created, not to diverge from the subject. Addressing multiple domains related to the problem identified will induce confusion and the result will be vitiated.

Also, the utility consists of the value given in providing answers for the domain/situation for which it was developed. The ultimate goal of the scenario is to validate, as we have already stated, some strategic plans, develop new capabilities, or even operate some doctrinal changes.

Once the scenarios that match the established criteria have been selected and the answers to the questions have been answered, a list with the advantages and disadvantages for each comprising should be drawn up. Depending on this last step, corroborated with the decision-makers experience, competence and degree of intuition, the scenario best suited to the domain will be chosen.

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[9] Marius Titi Potirniche, "Military Scenario Development", in Vojenskérozhledy: Mimořádnéčíslo/2017, Prague, p. 34.

The quality and usefulness of strategic scenarios also depend on the quality of the information provided by the planning team.

Conclusions and proposals

The analyzing and predicting process at strategic level, in a constantly changing environment, with increasing globalization tendencies and, at the same time, polarization of power, must be permanent and of a good quality.

Developing strategic scenarios is not just a theoretical, futuristic exercise, as they represent a fundamental tool, aiming to provide adequate future responses to the challenges that may arise on a state's security issues.

In this respect, it is noticed that scenarios are generally important analytical tools, which are the basis for strategic level planning, in conditions of uncertainty. The outcome of future confrontations depends on choosing the right scenarios, verifying them through exercises and correctly interpreting the results. A scenario can provide multiple solutions to a problem, without being limited to one, thus representing a decision support tool.

Scenarios do not provide answers and solutions, but offer a process platform (usually the operational planning process / OPP) that can provide answers and solutions for a future with a high degree of uncertainty, using information and trends valid at the time of their development. They depend heavily on cognitive limitations or possibilities for the future to be interpreted by those involved in their development.

The scenario also provides a common reference language for all actors who will be involved in putting it into effect through exercise. Scenarios of this level must be brought to the attention of policy makers in order not to create inconvenience or confusion.

The fairness of a strategic scenario and of the choices made as a result of its verification in practice, can only be demonstrated by the outcome of a future confrontation for which it was drawn up. It should be specified that the scenario is a useful tool in strategic planning, but it is not the only one. For best results, the scenario should be combined with other tools (doctrines, handbooks, studies, monitoring systems, etc.).

As a conclusion, in order to standardize strategic scenarios, as well as to facilitate their development, I believe that there should be followed the methodology for the development of strategic scenarios at the level of the Romanian Armed Forces and specific software programs should be implemented.

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THE ROLE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SCENARIOS USING THE PMESII MODEL

Cristian ABAIANIŢI*

PMESII model is a comprehensive instrument for developing viable scenarios in order to validate the missions of all instruments of power used to manage a crisis situation. At the same time, the coherence of such an instrument can affect the understanding of the security environment, whose definition is a distinct field under a comprehensive scenario.

In our approach, we sought to highlight those characteristics of the comprehensive approach by analyzing the emergence of this concept in the vision of the main international actors whose responsibility is to maintain an optimal security climate. These characteristics are essential for adopting a comprehensive analysis model of the security environment, that is constantly changing.

Therefore, PMESII model can be adopted for the development of comprehensive scenarios based on hypothetical situations emerging from systemic security environment analysis and meeting the needs of a strategic vision. In addition, using this model in developing scenarios presents a number of benefits that we will identify during our analysis.

Keywords: *scenario; comprehensive approach; integrated approach; systems approach; instruments of power; security; PMESII model.*

"Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it."
Winston Churchill

Introduction

Developing a scenario is an extrapolation of describing a security environment, which imprints an almost universal tendency to the difficulties encountered in accepting the consensus on the use of a single scenario-development method, which is particularly important for forecasting. At the same time, the steps taken in the definition of security are more relevant to the specialization acquired in a certain field of activity of the one concerned than to the establishment of a generally valid type. However, the multiple definitions of security show a common element represented by the necessity of accepting a definition reflecting a "systemic perspective"[1] largely due to the migration of this concept from the military domain to other specific non-military dimensions, in particular, the International Relations domain. Thus, a systemic approach of a security environment may represent a viable

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[1] For details, see Ion Chiorcea, *Rolul componentei navale în cadrul structurilor de forţe ale UE pentru asigurarea securităţii prin cooperare la Marea Neagră*, Editura Universităţii de Apărare "Carol I", Bucureşti, 2014, p. 19.

* Commander Cristian ABAIANIŢI is PhD Candidate in Military Science with "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: cristache_juria@yahoo.com

way of prefiguring a hypothetical situation, the resolution of which requires the use of all instruments of power.

At the same time, it is beneficial to create an appropriate framework for a systemic perspective of a scenario, and this approach must be comprehensive. Moreover, in the context of the social evolution that permanently marks the volatility of the security environment, it is necessary to approach solutions that go beyond the military domain, tending to be an expression of all the instruments of power. This expression has turned into a permanent challenge for all military ideologists to find a coherent way of predicting the hypothetical development of a current situation by identifying logical events directly proportional to security risks and threats in order to generate possible solutions.

Undoubtedly, a scenario is a basic instrument in formulating and verifying strategies, the importance of which is also reflected in the decision-making process regarding the achievement of strategic objectives that must be proportionate to the available means and to the extent of the risks the strategy permits. If one of the elements of the triad *objectives - means - risks* is disproportionate, then the instrument or instruments used in a scenario development represent the occurrence of errors in the assessment of the security environment. Also, the non-validation of the entire range of missions of a single power instrument will affect, similar to a domino effect, the definition of the missions of the other power instruments.

If the role of a scenario is aimed at validating or invalidating missions of power instruments geared to achieving the objectives set by the strategy, the nature of a scenario seeks to cover the entire range of operations – from combat, stability and support to intermediate operations[2]. Among these types of operations, stability and support operations are real crucibles for expressing a comprehensive approach of all areas of security manifestation and having an impact on scenario development. To that end, a number of concepts

can be regarded as standard units to describe what is meant to be comprehensive in the development of a scenario, namely comprehensive approach – concept used by NATO, effects-based approach to operations, whole-of-government approach and integrated missions concept[3] – concept used by UNO.

1. Coherence – a key hallmark of comprehensive approach

It is obvious that the term *comprehensive* is associated with the operations *approach*, with multiple meanings, all aimed at achieving objectives through activities in which both the military and the civilian instrument are used in the proportions related to the strategic vision. But, until some definitions of the comprehensive approach are highlighted, a brief analysis of the emergence of this concept is required. Thus, the emergence of the "comprehensive approach" concept is closely linked to the purpose pursued in solving emerging crises in the areas of instability which the international community has faced in the last decade, where a single government agency or international organization failed to achieve the target objectives.

The first meaning specific to the term *comprehensive* can be identified in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), an organization known as the OSCE since 1995. This act was the result of the conference on security in Europe, a theme originally proposed by the Soviet Union – at that time – by the Warsaw Treaty, but was put into effect only in 1975, at the initiative of the Government of Finland. In this regard, in May 1969, Finland sent a memorandum to the European states, to the USA and Canada, offering to host such a conference in Helsinki. Starting with november 1972, 35 states representatives have met in the following three

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[2] According to FT-1, *Doctrina operaţiilor Forţelor Terestre*, 2017.

[3] Kristiina Rintakoski & Mikko Autti, *Comprehensive Approach: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management*, Finland Ministry of Defence, 2008, p. 11, URL: https://www.defmin.fi/files/1316/Comprehensive_Approach_-_Trends_Challenges_and_Possibilities_for_ Cooperation_in_Crisis_Prevention_and _Management.pdf, accessed on 14.12.2017.

years to work on a project on the issue of security, economy and humanitarian assistance in Europe, a project that was materialized in the Final Act[4] signed on August 1, 1975 by the leaders of the 35 states. This act, also known as the Helsinki Agreement, represented an understanding of the integrated use of two instruments, both political and military, aimed at implementing measures to improve security and cooperation in the area between Vancouver and Vladivostok. Therefore, since 1975, it has been demonstrated that a comprehensive approach is needed to manage security, that is to say, a collaboration between the two instruments of power in order to achieve strategic objectives of maintaining security through cooperation.

The development of the concept *comprehensive approach* has evolved in a way that is directly proportional to the crises evolution, as well as the difficulties encountered in finding solutions agreed by all parties involved. Thus, a number of regional governmental or non-governmental agencies and international organizations have individually developed structures to find viable solutions to the problems posed by systems that characterized the complexity of crises. One of the main issues with the implementention of this concept until 2003 was the lack of coherence regarding the involvement of various actors who often pursued parallel purposes, demonstrated rivalry and unnecessary competition, doubling the effort and sub-dimensioning of the economic capacity allocated to supporting the effort.

Therefore, a first conclusion is that the coherence was a necessary characteristic to solve all the difficulties encountered in addressing crises, as it is highlighted in the definition of the comprehensive approach concept outlined in Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, 1.0 version, 2010 edition, where this concept is described as "a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors"[5]. Moreover, considering the achievement

of the objectives expressed in terms of effects, a comprehensive approach of a stability operation can be described as *the coherent way of arranging the effects needed to achieve the objectives within a design.*

Although there is no widely accepted definition of the *comprehensive approach*, all these outlines are almost synonymous with the coherence of relations between the different governmental structures involved in achieving a common integrating approach of all the areas that can be embedded in an international mission (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information). The only difference identified in the meaning of this concept is given by the manner and degree of involvement, namely *coherence, cooperation, collaboration & coordination and coexistence*[6].

Thus, when we refer to coherence, we mean a common action as a result of a "shared mandate, strategic vision and objectives"[7]. Unlike coherence, cooperation implies the adoption of a joint action, but aimed at achieving "complementary and/or overlapping mandates and objectives"[8]. Collaboration & coordination are used when multiple actors perform actions "with different mandates, […] but who nonetheless share some similar interests or strategic vision"[9]. Coexistence is the degree with the lowest level of involvement where the actions carried out do not show any similarity in terms of the strategic vision or the targeted objectives, as they are under different mandates.

Referring to coherence, we will briefly analyze the definition of this key term for the comprehensive approach. According to the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, coherence represents "close (and

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[4] For details, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *The Helsinki Process and the OSCE*, URL: https://www.csce.gov/about-csce/helsinki-process-and-osce, accessed on 11.01.2018.

[5] ***Allied Command Operations, *Comprehensive*

Operations Planning Directive COPD Interim V1.0, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe, Belgium, 17.12.2010, p. 2 – 2.

[6] Kristiina Rintakoski & Mikko Autti, *op. cit.*

[7] Karsten Friis, Pia Jarmyr, *Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2008, p. 7.

[8] *Ibidem*.

[9] *Ibidem*.

harmonious) connection between the parts or elements of a whole"[10]. From this definition, we keep the *link* noun as the proximal gender (i.e., the first relevant term of a definition), and *close* and *harmonious* adjectives as the specific difference, thus constituting the key elements that imprints substance to the comprehensive approach.

Another meaning of coherence in the context of crises management is "the effort to direct a wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, rule of law and security dimensions of a comprehensive approach system towards common strategic objectives"[11].

Analysing the two definitions, we can conclude the following: the *elements* are represented by those five domains[12] (political, security, development, rule of law and human rights), the *whole* is represented by the *comprehensive approach* concept, and the *close/harmonious connection* can be associated with the effort. Thus, the germ that gave rise to the concept of comprehensive approach was coherence, having the significance of making the effort, without specifying how it should be done.

In this regard, a number of government and international agencies have attempted to develop new concepts, models or instruments to improve coherence, respectively to define the effort. Although without collaborating with each other, these agencies aimed at improving the effort by harmonizing and synchronizing the activities of all local and international actors during analysis, planning, execution and assessment. Thus, a first step is made in the evolution of coherence, namely

the definition of the effort through harmonization and synchronization, as well as the stages of the process of solving a crisis − analysis, planning, execution and assessment.

Until this point of our analysis, we have the following description of coherence: the effort to harmonize and synchronize the activities specific to the five areas (political, security, development, rule of law and human rights) during analysis, planning, execution and assessment to achieve strategic objectives.

Between 2003-2005, the European Union, NATO and the UN have developed separately-specific approaches to refine coherence and improve the harmonization and synchronization effort. Also, a number of states independently develop ways to implement inter-agency coherence through the whole of government approach concept that is assimilated at EU level with the whole-of-EU approach[13] and within NATO with the comprehensive approach.

For a better understanding of coherence through the evolution of the comprehensive approach, we will continue to present and analyze the emergence and evolution of the concept of comprehensive approach in the vision of the main international actors.

2. Comprehensive Approach in the UN vision

In 2005, through the voice of Secretary General Kofi Annan, the UN defines the *integrated mission* concept as "guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security) into a coherent support strategy"[14]. Later, in 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon considers

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[10] Author's translation from Academia Română, *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române*, ediția a II-a, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1998, p. 193.

[11] Cedric de Coning, *The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach*, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008, p. 8.

[12] A.N.: These domains can be considered precursors of the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information) model that is a SoS (*System of Systems Approach*) model, a model that means an approach from the perspective of the six areas, regarding the evaluation of the operational environment in order to identify the operational problem and how to solve it.

[13] Fernanda Faria, *What EU Comprehensive Approach, Challenges for the EU Action Plan and Beyond*, European Center for Development Policy Management, 2014, p. 4.

[14] Cedric de Coning, Karsten Friis, *Coherence and Coordination, The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach*, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 2011, p. 5.

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the concept of an *integrated approach*[15] more appropriate than that of integrated missions, noting that the difference is not due to the need for structural integration but to the need for procedural integration, that is "strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UN local team that ensures that all the UN system components operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners"[16]. To understand this new approach, we will briefly present the differences between the two concepts, *integrated approach* and *integrated mission.*

The concept of the *integrated approach* arrises in the situation of hostilities cessation, respectively, following a peacemaking operation, whose mission, as a rule, continues to be a peace-building task. In this situation, besides the means used to restore peace (from the UN system), there are also other UN peacebuilding means whose actions are coordinated by the UN local team, in such a manner as to achieve the operation main objectives.

This concept is more based on procedural integration, namely on the objectives integration, without a predefined structure. It is also applicable both during conflicts and during post-conflict situations. The concept of an integrated approach is appropriate in peacemaking operations when, besides the military component, which is a key task in support of the diplomatic instrument, we also have a civilian component whose task, namely humanitarian assistance, is rather a more implicit/ inferred one; during peacebuilding operations, the roles are reversed.

The concept of integrated mission is a concept that has previously defined the processes, mechanisms and organizational structure to facilitate the fulfillment of the main mission. It is a concept describing the coordination of the actions of all UN actors to accomplish the specific missions established by manuals, instructions, etc. and whose achievement leads to the main mission of the operation. It is also generally applicable in situations post-conflict, without

the need for independent UN-coordinated (other non-UN) actors. Also, this concept is appropriate for peacebuilding or peacemaking operations involving only the UN directly, where the civilian component plays the key role, the effort being assigned to it, the military component having implied/inferred tasks.

From the analysis of the two concepts, we can conclude that the integrated approach is more comprehensive than the concept of integrated missions, due to reporting to other non-UN actors with which they collaborate in crisis situations. This comprehensive character is also provided by the requirements of the integrated approach, namely:
- a common vision for achieving strategic objectives;
- an integrated or as much interconnected planning as possible between all the instruments of power used;
- an agreed set of expected results, timing and responsibilities for implementing essential tasks in peacebuilding;
- an agreed monitoring and evaluation mechanism[17].

At the same time, the integrated approach has as its role the achievement of objectives, while the concept of integrated mission aims at fulfilling the main mission by coordinating all other intermediate missions.

3. Comprehensive Approach in the EU vision

In the European Security Strategy[18] adopted in 2003, the European Union defines the security environment as being uncertain, characterized by terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, states decadence and organized crime. Regarding the coherence of security policy, the EU recognizes the need to integrate all its instruments and to cooperate multilaterally with other international actors on both external and internal levels and with all

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[15] *Ibidem.*

[16] *Ibidem.*

[17] Cedric de Coning, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[18] European Security Strategy, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world, accessed on 04.01.2018.

members of the community. This internal and external multilateral cooperation has been the starting point of a comprehensive approach, which has led to permanent disputes between members of the European community, with consensus being difficult to achieve due to various issues such as: different government priorities and objectives, distinct mandates and different ways of fulfillment, different principles and rules used by their own financial instruments and so on. Thus, the period between 2003-2013 represented a time of uniformity of all these differences through political debate and confrontation, and the experience acquired from participating in certain operations and missions[19] both inside and outside the European area.

At the same time, without being explicitly expressed, the beginnings of the comprehensive approach are dated as early as the start of the Berlin Plus Agreement (1999) concluded between NATO and Europe (taking effect from 2003). This agreement refers to: a NATO-EU Security Agreement that covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules; insuring the access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led operations; availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led civilian-military operations; procedures for providing, monitoring, returning and recalling NATO assets and capabilities; terms of reference for using NATO's DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) for commanding EU-led operations; EU-NATO consultation methods regarding the use of NATO means and capabilities during EU-led operations; arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, in particular the conscription within NATO's defence planning of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations[20].

Following the Joint Communication[21] of 2013, the concept of "comprehensive approach" is mentioned and described as referring "not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States. […] By bringing all these together […] the EU can better define and defend its fundamental interests and values, promote its key political objectives and prevent crises or help restore stability"[22].

According to the same document, the requirements of a comprehensive approach are: developing a joint analysis, defining a common strategic vision, focusing on prevention, mobilizing EU capabilities and strengths, long-term commitment, policy alignment with internal and external actions, good use of EU delegations and working in partnership.

By comparing the features of the comprehensive approach in the EU vision with those of the integrated approach in the UN vision, we can identify some differences arising from the vision of how to handle a crisis situation. Thus, a first difference lies in the defining domain of the vision, namely foreign policy, in what EU is concerned, and humanitarian assistance in the case of the UN. As a result of the vision different domain, another difference is given by the possibility of long-term foreign policy engagement in the case of the EU and, in the short run, humanitarian assistance to the UN. The third difference lies in the stages of the crisis resolution process during which the comprehensive approach is applied, namely during planning and assessment, in the case of the UN, and during the analysis and execution in what EU is concerned.

As a follow-up to the Joint Communication, in 2014, the EU Council issues a document

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[19] For details, see EEAS, *Military and civilian missions and operations*, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters /headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20 civilian%20missions%20and%20operations, accessed on 06.01.2018.

[20] For details, see EEAS, *Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy*, subcapitolul The Berlin Plus agreement, trad. noastră, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/

headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en, accessed on 06.01.2018.

[21] ***Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, *The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises*, Bruxelles, 11.12.2013, URL: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/structu-res-instruments-agencies/eu-military-staff/save_the_date/ docs/joint_communication_on_comprehensive_approach. pdf, accessed on 05.01.2018.

[22] *Ibidem*, p. 3.

where it defines, for the first time, the concept of "comprehensive approach" as beeing "both a general working method and a set of practical measures and processes which improve how the EU collectively can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more effective policies, working practices, actions and results, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its wide array of existing tools and instruments"[23]. The measures referred to in this definition are precisely the requirements of the comprehensive approach listed above.

Furthermore, the EU Council determines when this concept should be implemented, namely starting with the situation analysis that could degenerate into a crisis, an analysis that is the first stage of the crisis resolution process. Thus, this analysis should be coordinated, shared and focused on three directions: to each area/region with potential risk to EU security, to the dynamics of the conflict, and to the elements generating the crisis. Also, to carry out this analysis, it should in particular build on "mechanisms and processes and systematically bring together all relevant domains of EU external action, including diplomacy, security, development and, as appropriate, humanitarian assistance, justice and migration"[24]. We note the introduction of migration, given the security challenges EU has faced since 2014.

Next, in 2015, the *Action Plan for implementing the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises*[25] is issued, where the concept of comprehensive approach is clearly defined as "working better together in order to enhance coherence, effectiveness and impact of the EU's policy and action, in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution […] In fact, the comprehensive approach is not about «what to do», but more about «how to do it» and how to make best use of the EU's collective resources and instruments, with a particular focus on conflict and crisis situations"[26].

In regard to the evolution of the comprehensive approach concept as described in 2013 in the Joint Communication, then defined in 2014 in the European Council Communication and finally redefined to be implemented under the 2015 Action Plan, we can note the following:

–   the comprehensive approach concept described in the 2013 Communication is marked by the lack of a common denominator on multilateral cooperation regarding the coherence of both internal and external policies;

–   the European Council Communication of 2014 includes, within the definition, the characteristic features of the broad approach, namely consistency and efficiency; moreover, this definition is logically expressed as a result of the component elements of a general definition, namely the proximal type being given by the general method, and the specific difference being marked by the expression that improves the collective way of the EU to develop, select and supply a policy, working methods and actions in a more coherent and effective manner;

–   the significance of the comprehensive approach of the 2015 Action Plan is more focused towards "how to do" at the expense of "doing what one must do", respectively working better for better coherence and efficiency on EU policy and actions on conflict prevention and crisis resolution.

In the new strategy of 2016, based on the security environment analysis, namely *The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy - Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*[27], the EU admits that prosperity, democracy and peace are called into question, and if the EU was seen

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[23] *** *Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach*, Bruxelles, 2014, p. 1, URL https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf, accessed on 06.01.2018.

[24] *Ibidem*, p. 2.

[25] ***Joint Staff Working Document, *Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises Action Plan 2015*, Bruxelles, 10.04.2015, URL: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7913-2015-INIT/en/pdf, accessed on 07.01.2018.

[26] *Ibidem*, p. 2.

[27] *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy – Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/, accessed on 10.01.2018.

as a soft-type organization that mainly used the civilian instrument, this must be reconsidered, given the new identified risks and threats. Having experience of the conflicts in Libya and Syria, where peace, democracy and prosperity have not been achieved, but rather new threats of terrorism and migration have emerged, the EU has adopted a new approach to conflict, namely the integrated approach[28], which "outlines how to ensure rapid and effective crisis response, […] to the deployment of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) crisis management or capacity building missions and operations"[29]. Another comprehensive definition of this concept is the following: "being fully engaged in all stages of a conflict, from early action and prevention, wherever possible to staying on the ground long enough for peace to take root"[30].

From the analysis of the two definitions, some defining issues arise: if the 2003 EU strategy was focused on crisis prevention, which could have repercussions on its own security, the 2016 strategy bears the imprint of a new direction, namely the need for external action marked by the EU interests – peace and security, prosperity, democracy, rule-based global order – all expressed globally. This external action can be conflict-oriented, in which case the second definition is appropriate, or it can be focused on a crisis situation, in which case the first definition is valid. The two definitions are similar, the only difference is the long-term commitment at all stages of the conflict or, in the short run, in the event of a crisis.

4. Comprehensive approach from NATO perspective

The prerequisites for developing the concept of a comprehensive approach in NATO have started to take shape starting with 1990, when, at the London Heads of State and Government

reunion, since the establishment of this alliance, emerged the need to reconsider the missions that had been a counterweight of hegemonics trends of some state-owned actors, and, subsequently, of the measures set out in the Warsaw Treaty. Between 1989 and 1991, changes on Europe's geopolitical scene led to the reconfiguration of the Euro-Atlantic area, which required a thorough analysis of future strategic objectives for safeguarding common freedom. Thus, the need to maintain the "peace preservation" and "NATO security preservation"[31] objectives, mentioned in the Strategic Concept 14/3 of 1968, has led to a reassessment of the strategic context characterized by risks and threats on NATO security other than those of the Warsaw Treaty. Thus, the 1991 Strategic Concept in Rome identifies these risks and threats to the security of NATO member states as a result of possible instabilities that can occur both in Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle East and in the South of the Mediterranean Sea, with political, economic, social and ethnic difficulties resulting from recent events. At the same time, within this strategic concept, the concept of comprehensive approach is mentioned and described as "the basis of the Alliance's security policy"[32], covering "objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means"[33].

Between 1992-1995, following the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with implications for Europe and NATO security, the Alliance aims to develop new conceptual approaches to common understanding of how to solve the tasks of a peacekeeping operation led by UN and CSCE. In this respect, for effective cooperation between NATO and the UN/CSCE, several comprehensive

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[28] *Ibidem*, p. 9.

[29] European External Action Service, *The EU Global Strategy–year 1*, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ headquarters-homepage/49750/eu-global-strategy- %E2%80%93-year-1_hi, accessed on 11.01.2018.

[30] Definition available on https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/ en/integrated-approach-conflicts, accessed on 11.01.2018.

[31] ***North Atlantic Military Committee, *Final Decision on MC 14/3 – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area*, 16.01.1968, p. 7, URL: https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng /a680116a. pdf, accessed on 11.01.2018.

[32] ***Heads of State and Government, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, North Atlantic Council, Rome, 1991, paragraph 23, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/ official_texts_23847.htm, accessed on 11.01.2018.

[33] *Ibidem*, paragraph 23.

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definitions are offered to understand the UN and the CSCE's way of conducting peacekeeping operations. Thus, in the 1993 NATO's Report[34] drafted by the Nord Atlantic Cooperation Council, a series of concepts related to this area are defined for a better understanding of the UN vision, as follows: conflicts prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding.

In the Final Communique[35] issued on 13th June 1996, NATO recognizes the key role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, former CSCE) in maintaining security and stability in Europe. Therefore, following the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the OSCE adopts the *Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century* that NATO considers to be an essential tool in addressing comprehensive security in terms of dimensions[36] to be considered in conflict prevention, management and resolution, respectively:

– the human dimension, with reference to human rights and freedoms that could be jeopardized by the risks of electoral fraud, attacks on media independence, aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism;

– the economic, social and environmental dimensions, whose identified risks imply the need to manage the causes they have produced through cooperation with other relevant international institutions in the respective fields.

In the context of the crisis in Kosovo, where NATO conducted Allied Force operation, on the Washington Summit held at 24th April 1999, it is issued Strategic Concept "An Alliance for the 21st Century"[37]. Faced with the surprise of the operation extension (initially, many NATO officials estimated the duration of this operation to take no more than a few days) due to the under-appreciation of Slobodan Milosevic's willingness to resist, NATO reaffirms, within the framework of the strategic concept, the need for a broad approach[38] that does not focus only on the military dimension, but also on the political, economic, social and humanitarian ones. Thus, the international effort "to develop and stabilise the region must be comprehensive, coherent and well co-ordinated"[39] and the broad approach is "the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks efectively, and its increasing effort to develop efective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations"[40]. Regarding the comprehensive approach, this strategic concept assimilates it with the broad approach[41] when referring to relations with international organizations (WEU/EU, OSCE, UN), and when mentioning relations with other partner countries (eg. Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue), the co-operative approach[42] is brought to attention. Also, there was not a clear, scientific and unambiguous definition given for those two types of approaches. What appears in the 1999 strategic concept can be attributed to the specific meaning of the *comprehensive* term, namely multi-dimensionality (political, military,

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[34] *** North Atlantic Co-operation Council, *Report to the Ministers*, 1993, pp. 1-2, URL: https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24152.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 13.01.2018.

[35] For details, see URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25065.htm?selectedLocale=en accessed on 13.01.2018.

[36] *** Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Lisbon Document 1996*, Lisbon, 03.12.1996, p. 6, URL: http://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true, accessed on 13.01.2018.

[37] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 1999, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/official_texts_27433.htm?mode=pressrelease, accessed on 13.01.2018.

[38] Within the *Alliance for the 21st Century* Strategic Concept, NATO refers to the broad approach that, from our point of view, we will assimilate to the comprehensive approach.

[39] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *An Alliance for the 21st Century*, 1999, p. 6, URL: https://www.nato .int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27440.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 13.01.2018.

[40] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 1999, p. 6, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 13.01.2018.

[41] *Ibidem*.

[42] *Ibidem*.

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economic, social and humanitarian), coherence and coordination, which can be considered as defining characteristics of a comprehensive approach.

As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, NATO redefined the area of risk, refocusing on the risk posed by modern terrorism, whose magnitude demonstrated in this attack requires a "multi-faceted and comprehensive"[43] response. NATO is committed to strongly supporting international organizations to combat the multidirectional nature of terrorism using political, diplomatic, economic and military means, while exploring new ways and methodes to improve cooperation in combating this scourge.

Another stage in the implementation of the comprehensive approach concept is represented by the Istanbul Summit on 24 June 2004, where it was acknowledged that, in order to face the new challenges of the strategic environment characterized by increasing risks of aggressiveness and decisive character, there is a need for adequate capabilities made available by states that show willingness and fastness. Also, a political decision-making process characterized by profound and balanced consultations on the common understanding of purpose and way of accomplishment would be dignified to be taken into account in achieving what it means comprehensive. Moreover, a clear and shared definition of visions and objectives prior to the start of an operation would limit the divergences with implications on the sovereignty of the states that provide capabilities.

It is already well known that NATO is a military-political alliance that does not have civilian capabilities designed to support operations with a predominantly civilian character. Therefore, in the Communication[44] of June 8, 2006, in order

to compensate for this deficiency, it was stressed the urgent need for practical cooperation with various partners, international organizations and other non-governmental agencies to work more efficiently both during planning and during the conduct of a civil operation. This admitted aspect is a preamble to what has been stated at the Riga Summit, an event that is considered to be of particular importance in defining and further developing the concept of comprehensive approach.

The Declaration of 29 November 2006 of the Riga Summit begins by defining the risks characterizing the complex security environment of the time, namely terrorism, which is increasingly developing on a global scale and by the diversity of the used means, the phenomenon of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and instability caused by the inability of some states to govern or by dissolving states. As a result, NATO aims to improve the coherent application of its own instruments used in crisis situations, along with practical cooperation at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) with all parties involved in crisis management, both during planning and execution. This proposal aims at adjusting military and political planning procedures, with emphasis on the civilian-military cooperation. At the same time, at this summit, there was approved the Comprehensive Political Guidance, a document which defines the political direction, as well as the requirements imposed on the transformation of the military instrument in the field of planning and operations management. One of the 10 comprehensive requirements imposed on transformation is given by "the ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various actors may be undertaking combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian activities simultaneously"[45].

[43] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Response to Terrorism*, 06.12.2001, URL: https://www.nato .int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_18848.htm?selectedLocale=en accessed on15.01.2018.

[44] Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers session held in Brussels on Thursday, *Final communiqué*, 8 June 2006, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_22441.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 16.01.2018.

[45] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, 29.11.2006, Part 3, 16.h, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_56425.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 16.01.2018.

These guidelines do not include a clear definition of the comprehensive approach concept, but only explanations of what is meant to be comprehensive. These explanations are related to the need to transform the planning and conduct of an operation that responds to the need to integrate the ends, ways and means. Therefore, the presented requirement can be considered as a first definition of the comprehensive approach, whose description, in terms of operational art, is the following: *ability, creativity, experience to integrate (during planning) and to coordinate (during execution) the essential tasks of both the military component and the civilian component involved in an operation in order to achieve the objectives set for accomplishing the desired end state*.

From a military point of view, this approach to an operation is referred to in the Comprehensive Political Guidance[46] as the "effect based approach"[47] being considered the most representative of understanding coherence on how to achieve integration and coordination of effects, the latter being common elements to which all actors involved in an operation report. In conclusion, the concept of "comprehensive approach" is a concept specific to the political, diplomatic, economic and civil domain, and the concept of "effect-based approach" is a concept specific to the military field.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Council of The North Atlantic reiterates the need for a comprehensive approach to security challenges, taking the example of the still unresolved crises in the Balkans and Afghanistan. In addition to the need to adapt planning and conducting operations in such an environment, NATO is focusing on training and education as well as on improving cooperation with other global actors in order to achieve what is called a comprehensive approach.

As a result of the task received by the Secretary General of the Alliance, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, of organizing a group of experts to establish guidelines for a new Strategic Concept, on May 17, 2010 a report is finalized entitled "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement"[48], where the concept of comprehensive approach is clarified because of the misunderstandings in some environments as "a desire on NATO's part to assert a dominant global position or to put civilian organisations under military control"[49]. To this end, in order to remove such errors of meaning of the comprehensive approach concept, another definition is highlighted as it "is not about hierarchy but about recognising that security has military, political, economic and social dimensions. It follows, therefore, that building security will often require working with an effective mix of partners to piece together the various elements of a single shared strategy"[50]. Therefore, comprehensive approach is the coherent commitment of all parties involved in the integration of the various elements into a framework governed by a common strategy. Depending on the circumstances specific to each situation, this commitment falls on NATO, when it has the UN mandate, or on behalf of another organization, in which NATO has a supporting role.

Another brief description of the comprehensive approach concept is mentioned in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, version 1.0 edition of 2010, issued following the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit, entitled "Active Engagement, Modern Defence"[51]. The meaning

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[46] Comprehensive Political Guidance, 2006, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_56425.htm

[47] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, 29.11.2006, p.5, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_56425.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 16.01.2018.

[48] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 17.05.2010, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_63654.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 16.03.2018.

[49] *** Group of Expert, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 17.05.2010, p. 14, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_63654.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 16.01.2018.

[50] *Ibidem*, Chapter 3, para. 2.

[51] ***Active Engagement, Modern Defence – Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19.11.2010, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.

of this comprehensive approach is "a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors"[52]. This is a general a description and can not be scientifically considered a definition because it lacks the distinctive element of the specific difference. However, the explanation is quite eloquent, as the presence of *coherent* and *coordinated* terms give a high predictability on how to make an operation effort in a crisis situations, respectively the essential task in terms of operational art. Also, specifying the term *means* as a proximal gender attributes this explanation to a high degree of quantification, of fulfilling the task set in the crisis management process. This means can be translated through operational art as a framework for visualizing how to coordinate the intermediate tasks (of the political, military and civilian instrument) in order to fulfill the essential task of the operation, being governed by the common strategic vision.

This depiction of comprehensive approach is changed in 2013, through the new Comprehensive Operational Planning Guide, version 2.0. Thus, comprehensive approach is described as "as a means to enhance a complementary, compatible response to crisis by all relevant actors"[53]. It is noted that the inserted purpose is altered by replacing the verb *to ensure* with the verb *to improve* and the characteristics of the comprehensive approach, namely *coherent*, *coordinated* adjectives are replaced by *complementary* and *compatible*. The amendments to the 2013 explanation follow the Political Directive of 23 September 2011 on how to improve NATO's involvement in stability and reconstruction. This directive was developed following the lessons identified in Afghanistan, where the international effort to achieve viable security in the area was not met by the time this document was drawn up. It has been noticed

that managing a crisis also involves a stage of stability and reconstruction, a stage where the involvement of the military instrument alone does not ensure the fulfillment of conditions that characterize the desired end state. In this respect, it is necessary to involve the non-military instrument, which has an essential role, in line with the military one, which has the role of support. As a rule, the main responsibilities in stability and reconstruction operations "normally lie with other actors – ultimately, the relevant national authorities, but also, as appropriate, various local and international organisations and NGOs"[54]. Consequently, the military effort (task) in the Stability and Reconstruction Operations "contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and to complementarity, coherence and coordination of the international community's efforts towards security, development and governance"[55].

5. PMESII model – a comprehensive instrument for developing a scenario

As we have already mentioned, defining a security environment for the purpose of developing a scenario is best expressed through a systemic perspective.

In terms of the evolution of this model, the starting point of this approach is represented by the method of determining the center of gravity proposed by Col. John A. Warden, also called the Warden's Five Ring Model[56]. This method, used by the Air Force Service in the US-led

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htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 17.01.2018.
[52] ***Allied Command Operations, *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD Interim V1.0*, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe, Belgium, 17.12.2010, p. 2 – 2.
[53] ***Allied Command Operations, *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD Interim V2.0*, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe, Belgium, 04.10.2013, p. 3 – 1.

[54] North Atlantic Council, *Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO's involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction*, 23.09.2011, p. 2, II.5, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_78314.htm?SelectedLocale=en, accessed on 17.01.2018.
[55] *Ibidem*, II. 4.
[56] Major Gary M. Jackson, *Warden's Five-Ring System Theory: Legitimate wartime military targeting or an increased potential to violate the law and norms of expected behavior?*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2000, p. 9, apud: Colonel John A. Warden III, "Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century," in *Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, ed. Karl P. Magyar (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994) 311-32 hereinafter Warden at p. 326.

Figure no. 1: Five ring model

coalition in the first Gulf War (1990-1991), implies, according to Figure no. 1[57], the existence of five concentric rings: the core represents the leadership, the following being called "essential organic elements", then "infrastructure", "population" and the outer circle being "military capabilities". Warden perceived the functioning of a nation-state as a biological organism with a brain (assimilated with leadership) that controls the other systems and which, if it is destroyed, produces paralysis, which translated in military terms is "strategic paralysis"[58]. So, leadership is the most important, because its neutralization can be decisive in terms of enemy's course of action, and the other circles arranged outwardly are of decreasing importance, the latter, military capabilities, having the least importance, with the role to protect the inner circles. In order to achieve the collapse of the enemy nation, Warden argues that action should be taken directly on leadership, if possible, and if this is not possible, then an indirect approach will be taken by actions on the other circles that protect it. In this respect, planners will identify the main targets – elements of the strategic center of gravity (assimilated to critical

vulnerabilities) – whose neutralization leads to influencing leadership. Next, at operational level, we will identify the appropriate elements of the center of gravity by analyzing each of the circles (system) using the same method – the five-ring model, but this time the rings are identified according to the operational level.

Subsequently, Warden's method is taken up and smoothen with the purpose to define operational art approach on a crisis situation analysis, and it must highlight the causes, circumstances, context, the main actors' influence and the implications of such a crisis on their own interests. As we can see, all these points pursued in such an approach of operational art are precisely the constituent elements of a possible scenario. Such an approach has been developed with the designation of system approach or system-based approach.

The systems approach[59] analyzes the strategic problem by assimilating it with a system made up of several systems interconnected by nodes and links (relationships). One of the models assimilated to such an approach is the PMESII model, in which the component systems are: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information. As it can be seen in Figure no. 2 – PMESII model[60], the systems based

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[57] Figure taken from Clayton K. S. Chun, *Chapter 19: John Warden's Five Ring Model and the Indirect Approach to War*, p. 5.

[58] Major Jacob Barfoed, *The COG strikes back: Why a 200 Year Old Analogy Still Has a Central Place in the Theory and Practice of Strategy*, Baltic Security and Defence Review, Volume 17, Issue 2, Baltic Defence College, Estonia, 2014, p. 10.

[59] Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, U.S. Naval War College, Second printing, 2009, pp. XIII-58 – 61.

[60] Figure taken from Joint/Interagency Smartbook, *Joint Strategic & Operational Planning, Planning for Planners*, pp. 14-35.


Figure no. 2: PMESII model

approach is a graphical construction relying on the relationships and nodes within the same system, as well as the relationships between the different nodes between two or more such systems. These nodes can be linked to those tangible or intangible factors, whose exploitation leads to effects emergence. In turn, these effects influence relationships within the same system or component systems and involve the desired reconfiguration of the entire group of systems.

In addition to the PMESII model, other types of models[61] are also used, such as: PESTL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal), STEEPLEM (Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political, Legal, Ethical, Military), constituents of a nation (Rule of law, Education, Commercial, Humanitarian, Health, Information, Military, Economic, Diplomacy, Administration, Governance) and ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisations, People, Events). For a better understanding of the factors that influence existing relationships between their systems, these models can be matched in a matrix framework in order to compare two such models. As a rule, the ASCOPE system is compared to any of the other systems, because the domains of each of them can be developed through the ASCOPE domains.

In addition to defining the security environment, PMESII model is also beneficial in determining the desired end state at strategic level. In this situation, the correct setting of the conditions describing this desired end state implies the absence of ambiguities in the understanding of the strategic environment, which in turn must be analyzed through the six PMESII domains, to which, at the operational level, adds the PT domains (physical environment and time[62]). It should be emphasized that the PMESII-PT analysis is mainly done at strategic/ operational level; at tactical level, the analysis of the operational environment is done by examining the six variables that may affect the accomplishment of the mission – METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations)[63].

Conclusions

Given the dynamic nature of the security environment characterized by a variety of more or less identifiable risks and threats, it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive model for defining it, a model contributing to the development of a scenario based on the risks and threats identified.

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[61] *** AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning with UK National Elements*, Ministry of Defence, 2013, pp. 2-36 – 2-38.

[62] *** FM 3-0, *Operations*, Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008, p. 1-5.

[63] *Ibidem*, p. 1-9.

Under these circumstances, the use of the PMESII model for this purpose has multiple advantages. Thus, through this instrument, risks and threats can be analyzed in a flexible manner, making use of questions, we can get answers specific to each of the analyzed PMESII domain, leading us to that presumable situation that meets the requirements of a scenario. One such example to be considered

Table no. 1: Risks/threats analysis

DOMAIN	RISKS/THREATS	GENERATING A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
POLITICAL	Corrupt political class	What political issues lead to the deepening of the level of corruption ?
MILITARY	Poor logistics supply of armed forces	What are the military options which implementation leads to the improvement of the current situation ?
ECONOMIC	Low economic production	Which economic branches must be used for economic recovery ?
SOCIAL	Non-existent health insurance	How should the health system be reorganized so that all citizens benefit from health insurance ?
INFRASTRUCTURE	Ineffective road infrastructure	What are the disadvantages of the lack of a practicable road network ?
INFORMATION	Weak information system	What changes should be done so that the national information system be re-launched?

the determination of those tangible and intangible elements that can be constituted in the nodes. These elements, such as leadership, the morale of the forces, the will to fight, the discipline, the level of cohesion, the motivation to support the combat determines the existence of relationships that uniquely configures the security environment in which the scenario develops. Also, this instrument has applicability to the determination of strategic centers of gravity. Another advantage is given by the conceptual form through which a possible scenario can be visualized by the cursivity and coherence of the determination of the existing nodes and connections. Identifying effects is another advantage of using this model. The necessity of determining the effects leads to the proper planning of those actions required to be executed by all instruments of power in a coherent manner.

Referring to the first advantage, namely the risk and threat analysis in a flexible and structured manner, in addition to tangible and intangible elements that can be constituted in nodes, also it can be a hypothetical situation. So, starting from risks/threats, by asking the proper

is presented in Table no. 1.

In conclusion, in the conditions of social evolution, which results in an interchangeable security environment, the early adoption of a solution that prevents surprise about the occurrence of an unexpected situation is a requirement that PMESII model is capable to address. Moreover, the coherent use of this instrument in the development of a scenario can have the most beneficial results in the decision-making process regarding the achievement of the objectives with the means at its disposal and within the limits of the accepted risks.

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THE REFLECTION OF THE GOOD GOVERNANCE CONCEPT IN ROMANIA'S SECURITY STRATEGIES AFTER DECEMBER 1989

George-Dorinel DUMITRU*
Dragoş-Adrian BANTAŞ**

National security programmatic documents have, among other, the role of highlighting the most relevant risks, threats and vulnerabilities that decision-makers, benefiting from the technical expertise of specialized structures, consider relevant for national security at some point, but also the priorities that the State's external action and its action in the field of security must pursue for the duration covered by each strategy of the respective State. Basically, reading a security strategy can directly place the reader in the time it was issued, and the reading all of these documents, in their temporal succession, provides an overview of the evolution of the political and security situation of the State concerned, for a given time frame. Through the present study we propose to provide such a picture at the center of which the concept of good governance is located.

Keywords: *national security strategy, country defense strategy, good governance, Romania.*

1. Introductory considerations. Programmatic documents in the field of defense

In an adaptation of a famous statement belonging to former French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, according to which war is a task too serious to be left to the generals, about the defense we can say that it is also an activity too serious to be left unplanned at strategic level. For this reason, in Romania and not only, the existing legal framework provides for the development of programmatic defense documents in which we find the main coordinates of risks, threats and vulnerabilities to national security, identified by the authors of that document at the time of its elaboration and valid for a certain period of time.

Thus, currently, according to Law No. 203 of 16 July 2015 on defense planning, with subsequent amendments and additions, it represents "a complex of activities and measures aimed at protecting and promoting national interests, defining and fulfilling the objectives of national security in the field of defense"[1]. Defense planning comprises a whole complex of documents, of which the main ones are, as stated by the Law in question, in this

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[1] Article 1 of *Legea nr. 203 din 16 iulie 2015 privind planificarea apărării (Law no. 203/16.07.2015 on defense planning)*, published in the Official Gazette no. 555, July 27th, 2015, URL: http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/legea_203_ 2015_planificarea_apararii.php, accessed on 15.04.2018.

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*Major (Military Justice) George-Dorinel DUMITRU is PhD Student in Intelligence and National Security with "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: ddoxa2@yahoo.com
**Dragoş-Adrian BANTAŞ is PhD Student in Intelligence and National Security with "Carol I" National Defence University and also PhD Student in European Union Law with "Nicolae Titulescu" University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: adrian.bantas@gmail.com

order: the country's national defense Strategy, the governance Programme, the White Charter of Defense, the Military Strategy, the Defense Planning Directive, the Major Programms and Annual Plans[2].

The first one, *The Country's National Defense Strategy*, is the "basic document that substantiates defense planning at national level" and is presented by the President of the country in the Parliament, within maximum of 6 months after the submission of Oath. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, together in a joint hearing, debate and approve, by decision, the Strategy in question. It must comprise, according to Law No. 203/2015, "the national security values, interests and objectives, the assessment of the international security environment, the potential risks, threats and vulnerabilities identified, the strategic objectives and defense priorities, [as well as] the directions of action and the main ways to ensure Romania's national security in the field of defense"[3]. The country's national defense strategy regards, generally, the duration of a presidential mandate, but it may also include provisions exceeding it.

In the specialized doctrine, the strategy was also considered the fundamental political document outlining the framework for the existence and survival of a nation, in the international security context, with the objective of achieving and protecting national interests through all the resources available to a community[4].

The next relevant document for the national security is the *Governance Programme*, comprising, inter alia, "the objectives, priorities and directions of action in the field of defense"[5]. It is presented by the Government in the Parliament along with the request of the vote of confidence on its part, and contains, generally

speaking, provisions covering the duration of the government's term of office, even if, in this case, some objectives can be designed for a longer period, given that all the provisions in the Programme have the potential to produce effects that are felt beyond the temporal horizon of a government's mandate.

Further, on the basis of the provisions of the national defense strategy, the governance programme and, in accordance with the provisions of NATO Strategic Concept, the Ministry of National Defense shall, within 6 months since the Parliament grants its trust to the to the Government, the *White Charter of Defense*, which must be appropriated by the Government and endorsed by the Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND)[6].

As a result, on the basis of the three documents already mentioned, and taking into account the similar documents of NATO and the EU, the Ministry of National Defense develops the *Military Strategy*[7], followed, also on the basis of all the hierarchically superior documents, by the *Defense Planning Directive* and by the major programmes.

The aforementioned aspects illustrate the existence of a hierarchical system of security and defense programmatic documents, whereby, starting from the country's national defense strategy and the governance programme, each document listed by the aforementioned legal provisions is built on the basis of the hierarchically superior ones, taking into account their provisions.

In the following, we will try to include, in a case study, the reflection of the main coordinates of the concept of good governance in the successive national security or national defense strategies, drawn up after the restoration of the democratic regime in Romania, in December 1989.

However, before proceeding with this analysis, we will carry out a brief overview of the concept of good governance, in order to present the main indicators of this concept and subsequently pursue their occurrence in the programmatic documents analyzed.

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[2] *Ibidem*, art. 3.

[3] *Ibidem*, art. 4

[4] Neculai Stoina, Alexandru Baboş, Benoni Sfârlog, *Studii privind problematica securităţii contemporane*, Land Forces Academy Publishinghouse, Sibiu, 2006, pp. 113-115, apud Dan Constantin Mâţă, *Securitatea naţională: concept, reglementare, mijloace de ocrotire*, Hamangiu Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2016, p. 52.

[5] *Legea nr. 203 din 16 iulie 2015 privind planificarea apărării (Law no. 203/16.07.2015 on defense planning)*, art. 5.

[6] *Ibidem*, art. 6

[7] *Ibidem*, art. 7

Thus, the definitions offered by the specialized literature and by international governmental or non-governmental organizations with concerns in the field are multiple. Since, for the time being, the doctrinal analysis of this concept is the subject of an extensive part of the doctoral thesis developed by one of the authors of this article, in order not to influence the viability of this endeavor, we will only present, in the following, the definition given to governance by the World Bank and the indicators it uses in the analysis of its quality.

Therefore, according to the World Bank, governance can be regarded as a set of traditions and institutions through which the authority is exercised in a state. These include: processes whereby the power structures in the state are chosen, controlled and replaced, their ability to effectively formulate and implement public policies and the citizens' and State's respect for the institutions that govern economic and social processes[8].

The Indicators used by the World Bank to assess the quality of governance are: freedom of expression, accountability for decisions, political stability and absence of violence, government efficiency (a concept that has a broad meaning, including the efficiency of central and local government), quality of regulation, rule of law and the control of corruption phenomenon[9].

Given the general conjuncture of post-1989 Romania, we believe that these indicators are relevant for our study, even if some of them, for example, political stability and the absence of violence, have really been a problem only in the first decade after the Revolution, and after that period, these concerns disappeared from the public agenda as they no longer represented a real threat.

We will do, in the following lines, something that we consider as an important terminological clarification. Thus, the reader will observe, during this work, the use of alternative document names, like, for example, *National Security Strategy* and *National Defense Strategy*, for the programmatic documents in the analyzed field.

This terminological difference is given by the fact that the first analyzed document (the Conception), which was not finally adopted, was drafted before the adoption of the Government Ordinance No. 52/1998 on the planning of Romania's national defense, so its name was not subject to the rules laid down in that act.

Subsequently, Ordinance No. 52/1998 ruled that "Romania's National Security Strategy is the basic document on which the defense planning at national level is based"[10], so the documents adopted according to this Regulation bear the name given by its provisions.

Afterwards, Law No. 415/2002 on the organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defense entered into force and states, in its article 4 that SCND, inter alia, *"analyses and/or proposes, according to the law, the promotion of the National Security Strategy of Romania"[11]*.

Ordinance No. 52/1998 produced its effects until it was repealed by Law No. 473/2004 on the planning of defense, in force since 15 November 2004. It established that "the main documents on which the defense planning at national level is based are: *the National Defense Strategy* and the Governing Programme"[12]. Therefore, any document adopted during the period in which that law was in force should have been entitled like this. In its turn, Law No. 473/2004 was repealed by Law No. 203/2015, to the provisions of which we referred previously.

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2. Relevant Provisions Contained in Romania's National Security Strategies After December 1989 Revolution

2.1. The Integrated Conception of Romania's National Security of 1994

In the following argumentation, we will retain, in our study, the chronological approach, presenting the main elements of the documents mentioned in the order of their occurrence[13].

Thus, the first analyzed document bears the name "*Integrated Conception on Romania's national security*", and was approved by SCND in April 1994[14].

Of course, it is well known that this document has not been approved by the Parliament, as the legislation in force during that period stipulated, for political reasons. But the drafting, its approval by the SCND and its submission to the pre-approval debates are relevant enough for us to include it in our analysis and to consider it representative for the dominant conception of the policymakers of that time regarding the issues related to national security.

Therefore, the *Conception* starts from the premises of the need to correlate concrete data related to Romania's positioning in Europe and the world, with the advantages and challenges accompanying it, and places a strong emphasis on the need to build a general European system of security, the constant repeating of this idea throughout the Conception standing as a prove.

As far as Romania's essential interests are concerned, the *Conception* lists the preservation of the characteristics of the Romanian State, as mentioned in art. 1 of the *Constitution*; building a competitive, dynamic social market economy that provides the necessary resources to increase the living standards of the population and the necessary development of the security system;

the need to achieve a satisfactory overall level of prosperity of the Romanian society as a whole, with everything that this brings with it; the development of the cultural and spiritual life of the Romanian people, with the capitalization of national traits and the belonging to the European cultural area; ensuring a fair level of environmental protection, avoiding pollution and excessive deterioration, and, last but not least, an almost strange reference to the physical and moral vigor and health of the Romanian people, that demand protection.

In order to promote these interests, the *Conception* identifies as a necessity the consolidation of the institutional and democratic mechanisms of the State at all its levels (both central and local), the maintenance and development of political and social pluralism and the functioning of the Romanian State's politico-institutional system.

In our opinion, all these are references to the components of *good governance* concept, and are not the only references of this type in the *Conception*.

The document proceeds by referring to the need to continue and to complete the reform process (mainly economic, but also social and political) and to build a genuine and functional market economy that meets the roles referred to above. These can also be seen as applications of the constituent elements of *good governance* concept.

In the third part of the *Conception*, there are enlisted a series of elements named "risk factors", of an internal or external nature, and which we prefer to call risks, threats and vulnerabilities to Romania's national security.

External risks and threats are not front-ranked in the analyzed document, as it admits that, after the end of the Cold War, the danger of a foreign aggression has declined significantly. Of course, there is a number of external risks and threats, such as conflicts close to Romania (Transdniester or the former Yugoslavia) approached in the *Conception*, along with their effects, namely a possible mass influx of refugees. It is also mentioned that, although it will never initiate

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[13] For a detailed presentation of the national defense strategies, see Dan Constantin Mâță, *op.cit.*

[14] The aspects that we present in the current section follow the structure and content of *Concepția integrată privind securitatea națională a României (The Integrated Conception of Romania's National Security)*, approved by the SCND in 1994, URL: http://www.zulean.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RO-CONCEPTIA-INTEGRATA-1994.pdf, accessed on 20.04.2018.

any aggression against another state, Romania reserves the right to use all the available means to defend itself, implicitly the military ones. However, this is not the type of threat occupying the main place in the *Conception* approved by SCND in 1994.

A very extensive space is reserved to vulnerabilities or, in the wording of the *Conception*, internal risk factors. They are identified as elements of an economic, social or political nature that can weaken Romania's ability to provide an adequate response to external risks and threats.

Some of the examples of vulnerabilities identified by the *Conception* are mainly effects of the extreme difficulties of the transition period towards the market economy, such as the drastic decline in the production of goods, the decline in trade balance, the inflation and the subsequent devaluation of the LEU (Romanian national currency), the extreme budgetary deficit, the radical disparities in society, the increasingly high unemployment rates due to the closure of non-profitable enterprises and so on.

According to the document under discussion, all of these as well as the social effects they generate are the cause of an acute state of population grievances, leading to social unrest, distrust, apathy and increases the level of crime, as more and more citizens, deprived of a decent living standard and clear perspectives are moving towards outlawed activities, such as banned substances and goods traffic, offences against the patrimony and life of persons or, if they are part of state administration, they could become susceptible to influence, corrupt, etc.

Also, the general impoverishment of the state entails a poor functioning of its basic services, which is clearly seen in the poor functioning of health, education and administrative systems, and undermines the state's ability to respond to an improbable external military aggression or to more subtle hostile acts, carried out by information means, or even disasters or natural phenomena. Moreover, we could add that all of these have long and very long term effects, forming generations of citizens with certain

mindsets and issues that will reflect upon their entire lifetime.

The same factors can also affect the environment through poor control of its protection, which may lead to uncontrolled dumping of toxic waste, accidents or sabotage of important economic objectives, damage to ecological balances as it is happening, we could add, in the case of the irrational exploitation of Romania's wood resources, which is also due to the aforementioned vulnerabilities.

The Conception continues by approaching possible ways of combating these threats and vulnerabilities by strengthening Romania's defense capacity, improving the country's external relations and, more importantly, the perspective of joining the European and Euro-Atlantic political and security structures, seen ever since then as the main objective of Romania's internal and external action.

Internally, it will be pursued the adaptation of compensatory benefits for the people affected by negative effects of the transition to the specific possibilities of the state, the continuation of the reform process and the protection of persons affected by serious social risks, as well as the strengthening of the functioning capacity of the Romanian state and the national cohesion.

Another component to which the document under discussion refers is related to the functioning of intelligence services, considered of particular importance in countering the subtle threats. Similar importance is given to public order services in the context of ethnic and social disorders present throughout the country. As far as the military dimension of security is concerned, *the Conception* provides for the maintenance of the necessary capacity for Romania's own defense while complying with the obligations to reduce conventional armaments and to improve the technological level of equipment.

From another point of view, it is also noteworthy the fact that the Conception insists on the necessity of political and social consensus, under the conditions of frequent turmoil in the early years of democracy, to which we have referred. Nevertheless, we agree with Dan Claudiu

Dănişor who in his work *De-constitutionalized Democracy*, argues that it is not the consensus, but the contradictory debate which is specific to democracy. However, no matter how fierce the debate is, and no matter the degree of opposition of the exposed opinions, democracy, the same author says, implies consensus on the procedure, i.e. compliance with fundamental rules such as the absolute prohibition of the use of violence[15].

In conclusion, we note that, despite some language aspects specific to the previous totalitarian regime and despite certain conceptions that are rather similar to those preceding the year 1989, the *Conception* approved by SCND in 1994 identifies correctly the vulnerabilities of Romania's defense capacity and proposes specific solutions to combat them, even if their practical applicability would be delayed. Moreover, it is also representative for the Romanian society of those years is the fact that the Strategy was never be adopted, due to political dissensions.

2.2. 1999 Romanian National Security Strategy

The next *National Security Strategy of Romania*, approved by SCND in June 1999 and presented, in the same month, by President Emil Constantinescu in the Parliament, kept some of the components of the Conception of the year 1994, but it also included a series of new elements that we will try to identify in the following[16].

Thus, this vision, Romania's essential include the preservation of the Romanian state with all its constitutional characteristics, but, besides this, strengthening the democratic character of the political regime, strengthening the connections between Romania and its overseas nationals or

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[15] Dan Claudiu Dănişor, *Democraţia deconstituţionalizată*, Universul Juridic Publishinghouse/Universitaria Publishinghouse, Bucharest/Craiova, 2013, passim.

[16] The aspects that we present in the current section follow the structure and content of *Romania's National Security Strategy*, approved in the SCND meeting of June 1999, of which important aspects can be identified in: Andrei Bădin and Gabriel Hizo, "Preşedintele Constantinescu susţine, azi, în faţa Parlamentului Strategia de Securitate Naţională a României", in *Ziua*, June 23rd, 1999, online edition, URL: http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?data=1999-06-23&id=26936, accessed on 15.04.2018.

our country's participation in Europe's security architecture are added.

These objectives are to be achieved through the correct and professional use of the capabilities offered by the Intelligence services (including through their cooperation with foreign partners), building a form of institutional cooperation between all state structures with attributions in the field of national security, strengthening the links between public order structures, Intelligence services, the Public Ministry and Justice as a whole, intensifying efforts to fight the organized crime, including through cooperation with third countries and organizations, strengthening border security, etc.

External risks and threats remain broadly in line with those identified in the previous *Conception* and have at the forefront the persistence of regional conflicts in Romania's proximity and their negative effects.

In the vulnerabilities area, alongside with the economic, social, and political vulnerabilities also mentioned in the 1994 *Conception,* there are identified a number of new elements are, such as: restricting state access to some of the most important resources for both the population and the economy, actions of the various forces in society that have as a result the weakening of the Romanian state and its democratic institutions.

The *Strategy* also identifies a number of priority lines of action for the next period at both external and internal levels. In its view, external action must focus on strengthening relations with European and Euro-Atlantic partners and pursuing the objectives of integration in NATO and the European Union, as well as participation in regional security arrangements, such as the OSCE, alongside with the improvement of relations with neighboring states, in particular, the Republic of Moldova.

Internally, it places the main emphasis on measures aimed at stabilizing the economy, completing the transition process by privatizing state societies, harmonizing Romania's legislation with that of the European Communities with a view to strengthen the commercial relations and in perspective, becoming a Member State,

connecting Romania to the major European transport axes, the formation of a human resource capable of performing its activity in the information society etc. All these are elements of novelty, compared to the previous *Conception*. This adds to the objectives of improving the functioning of the aforementioned health and education systems, also mentioned in the 1994 document.

As far as the military component is concerned, the *Strategy* recalls the need to strengthen democratic control on the security system, improve the technical level of the Romanian armed forces' endowments in order to achieve interoperability with partners in NATO and participation in international missions, as well as for the edification of modern and well-prepared armed forces capable of safeguarding national territory. The *Strategy* also refers to the necessity of training the Romanian troops in accordance with NATO standards, in order to form officers and non-commissioned officers trained at highest standards and in accordance with the most recent conceptions of the Alliance.

As a result, the 1999 *Security Strategy* not only stands as an example of a significant review of the vision on Romania's vulnerabilities, but it also provides means of tackling them. Moreover, it establishes certain priorities and lines of action that, if carefully and accurately identified, will be observed, years later, in the institutional developments and in the action of certain institutions of the Romanian state.

2.3. 2001 Romanian National Security Strategy

In the following, we will proceed to the analysis of Romania's National Security Strategy issued in 2001, approved by Parliament and published in the Official Gazette No. 822 on December 21st, 2001. This document, which we consider to have a high technical value, was issued shortly after the terrorist attacks of September, 11th 2001, being consequently adapted to the new international security environment created by these events[17].

However, as far as the internal level is concerned, by sharing a modern vision of the interconnection between the components of the security sector, the *Strategy* states that it is addressed to all of them, the security sector being seen as all the means, regulations and institutions with responsibilities in achieving, protecting and asserting the interests of the Romanian state.

These interests are asserted by the *Strategy* in a manner that is relatively similar to the previous documents to which there are added certain innovations, which we will emphasize below. In this line of thought, 2001 strategic vision refers to the necessity to preserve the constitutional characteristics of the Romanian state, as well as all the democratic rights and freedoms, the welfare, safety and protection of Romanian citizens, and the socio-economic development of the state. Furthermore, there are also references to the completion of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, to the promotion of Romania's identity within these frameworks, as well as to the environment protection.

In close connection with these, the objectives of national security policy include strengthening the rule of law, namely the democratic mechanisms of the Romanian state, re-launching the national economy, strengthening the role of civil society and developing a strong middle class, an optimal functioning of the financial and banking system, optimizing the country's defense capacity, improving the functioning of the health and education systems, reforming the public administration sector, harmonizing the interethnic relations and strengthening the ties with Romanians from abroad, participating in international actions for fighting against the terrorism or enforcing and maintaining peace and combating cross-border crime, development of ecological security, good diplomatic representation of Romania and so on.

The analysis of the international security environment also provides some of the main coordinates of Romania's external action, aiming at developing partnerships with and within NATO, the UN, the OSCE, and the EU.

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[17] The aspects presented in the following section follow the structure and content of 2001*Romania's National Security Strategy*, approved by the Parliament and published in the Official Gazette no. 882/21.12.2001, URL: http://www. monitoruljuridic.ro/act/strategie-din-18-decembrie-2001-de-securitate-nationala-a-romaniei-emitent-parlamentul-publicat-n-monitorul-oficial-nr-59479.html, accessed on 15.04.2018.

In our opinion, it is noteworthy that that 2001 *Strategy* unequivocally states that democracy is an important resource for the internal security environment, recognizing its role and indicating the means for strengthening it.

The *Strategy* also identifies a number of Romania's main problems affecting the security of our country, which are mainly linked to the precarious state of the economy and the totality of its consequences in the field of quality of life, general social status of Romania, the functioning of the State etc. In addition, the *Strategy* also recognizes the excessive level of bureaucracy in the state services, the insufficient development of infrastructures and the difficulties in the industrial, agricultural, health and communications sectors.

External risks and threats are those inherent to the international security environment, with its global and regional dimensions, which are also found in the other documents analyzed. As far as the vulnerabilities are concerned, the *Strategy* identifies, *inter alia*, a number of elements that are closely connected with good governance or with the insufficient achievement of its standards. Among these we will list the phenomenon of corruption, poor administration of state resources, criminality (especially of economic nature), latent social tensions, non-compliance of industrial companies with the environment protection rules, citizens' diminishing confidence in State institutions, development gaps between the various regions of the country, insufficient fulfilment of commitments to the EU and NATO, low quality of information infrastructure, poor protection of classified information or the phenomenon of "brain drain" (emigration of the best qualified specialists in areas of utmost importance for the functioning of the State).

To combat them, certain lines of action are envisaged, such as drafting of legislation in compliance with the European Union's one, the equal application of the law in relation to all categories of citizens, compliance with the principle of stability and predictability in the field of drafting normative acts, simplifying legislation or practicing and ensuring the correctness of administration and justice functioning.

The state of the economy is not neglected either. In this area the recommendations include the adoption of coherent fiscal policies, rethinking the tax system, restructuring and privatization of state societies, diminishing bureaucracy to encourage the business environment, boosting SMEs, developing a genuine international economic cooperation, strengthening the banking and insurance system, as well as the agricultural and forestry sector, infrastructure rehabilitation, the development of capabilities necessary for a genuine information society, development of the tourist industry, attracting foreign investment or improving consumer protection.

The social field is also approached, here the recommendations are aimed, in general, at improving social protection, dialogue with social partners, reforming payroll and pensions systems, developing policies and programs for diminishing unemployment, protecting and supporting children and families, ensuring minimum living conditions for people without income, diminishing generalized poverty and developing civic spirit and social solidarity.

Interestingly, the *Strategy* also contains rich references to action in the field of education, research and culture, aimed at the development of an educational system tailored to the needs of the information society, the rehabilitation of the national research system, development of cultural policies, improving interethnic relations and supporting youth.

Of course, a large part of the *Strategy* is devoted to aspects related to national security and, more specifically, to national defense, which are aimed at the integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, but we will not insist on them, as we detailed the reforms carried out in these areas in the section dedicated to Romania's efforts to meet the conditions related to NATO membership. Also, in the vision designed in 2001 *Strategy*, the country's external action revolts around the same desiderate.

Finally, we emphasize that the Strategy refers to a number of inextricably related aspects of good governance, namely the management based on integrated programs for the institutions

in the national security sector, coordination of institutions with attributions in resource management, exercise of parliamentary scrutiny and better transparency of the use of public funds, together with the accountability of their managers.

2.4. 2006 Romanian National Security Strategy

The next programmatic document analyzed, the *Romanian National Security Strategy* issued in 2006, brings a change of perspective not only in terms of expression, as the wrought wording is preferred to precise exposure, but also in respect to the manner in which Romania's security is approached as NATO member state and EU future member state[18].

In this context, the Strategy lists ever from its firsts paragraphs the values considered characteristic for Romanian social, political and legal space: democracy, equality, rule of law, respect for human dignity, rights and fundamental freedoms, civic responsibility, the pluralistic political system, property (we would emphasize mainly the private one), market economy, solidarity with democratic states, the search for peace and international cooperation, and, last but not least, the desire for dialogue and communication between civilizations.

In addition, the 2006 *Strategy* underlines the existence of a direct link between prosperity and security, and therefore proposes the full integration of Romania in the European Union, together with assuming NATO membership, maintaining the constitutional characteristics of the state, the development of competitiveness, dynamism and performance of the market economy, modernization of the education system, harnessing the human, scientific or technological potential of Romania, increasing the general wellbeing of the citizens of the country, the level of living and the health of the population, the affirmation of national culture and identity,

as well as of spiritual life, all in the context of European integration. Incidentally, we have also observed these issues outlined in the previous Strategies.

With regard to the characteristics of the international security environment, as opposed to previous documents, the Strategy we are referring to adds references to the phenomenon of globalization, and, of course, maintaining the considerations that remain valid in the context of the year of its development.

In relation to this, we emphasize a conclusion that appears particularly important to us, namely that, in the context of globalization, the greatest risk faced by a state is precisely to remain outside the positive processes of globalization, while its negative consequences must be accepted and faced, as the denial of the phenomenon is not possible. Globalization is a phenomenon existing independently of the desire of States, and each of them must find the best ways to adapt to it.

Regarding the risks and threats identified by the analyzed *Strategy*, these are broadly related to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime (Romania being seen as a possible source of arms, narcotic drugs, human beings, counterfeit products, etc. trafficking)

The *2006 Security Strategy* is the document which, for the first time, contains an explicit reference to the need of a more efficient public affairs management, to the responsible and efficient exercise of power, to the compliance with the democratic requirements, and to the observance of human rights, all of which being brought together under the name of *good governance*, area in which the document in question acknowledges the progress made by Romania. Coming after the occurrence of certain large-scale natural events such as floods, the *Strategy* also broadly refers to the possibility of disasters of any kind and to the need for an adequate capacity to manage their effects.

Among the vulnerabilities that could amplify the effect of risks and threats, there are listed the dependence on resources that can become difficult to reach, the population decrease tendency, the emigration phenomenon, social insecurity, increased poverty, substantial social

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[18] The aspects presented in the current section follow the structure and the content of *Romania's National Security Strategy – European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: for a better life in a democratic, safer and more prosperous country*, Bucharest, 2006, URL: http://old.presidency.ro/static/ordine/CSAT/SSNR.pdf, accessed on 20.04.2018.

differences, insufficient force of the middle class, shortcomings of population participation in civic life, insufficient development of infrastructure, problems of health and education systems, and the small role of civil society.

As a consequence, *the Strategy* aims at combating risks, threats and vulnerabilities, and for this it proposes improvements in the exercise of democratic rights and freedoms, improving political stability, encouraging civic spirit, ensuring a climate of good understanding between ethnicities and confessions, improving critical infrastructure, maintaining the stability of financial and banking systems, and the protection of natural resources and the environment. To achieve these goals, maintaining good relations with the external partners is seen as essential.

Not incidentally, in light of the foregoing, the *Strategy* further mentions *good governance* as an essential tool for building the national security, which we in turn consider to be. The reference to this concept was, moreover, criticized by a part of the press and civil society. However, Marian Zulean argues the use of this concept by referring to the same term and the relevant documents of the European Union, as well as the worldwide attention to the connection between security and good governance[19].

In this context, it is also noteworthy that the European Union requires, for states aspiring to membership, to comply with criteria such as *the existence of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for Rights of minorities and their protection*[20], which, in their turn, are related to the implementation of *good governance*.

The same *Strategy* further introduces in the scope of the main national programmatic documents the notion of *democratic security* achieved through cooperation, rapid modernization and integration, which sights out participation in managing global issues and assuming an active role within the Euro-Atlantic community in democracy promotion.

Moreover, at regional level, the *Strategy* insists on the role of southeast European states in the de-escalation of tensions and, consequently, in increasing the region's security. In the same idea, the *Strategy* also mentions Romania's interest in getting together with stable, democratic and well-governed states, for the reasons listed above.

The *Strategy* also insists on the important role of the Black Sea and its wider region, seen as a corridor between democratic and well-governed, resource-consuming and security provider states and the states of the Middle East and Central Asia, seen as resources suppliers and needing security, which we consider to be an interesting vision of the role of Romania, with a high potential to assert an important role, under the condition of the actual implementation. However, the *Strategy* also highlights the problems of the Black Sea region, listing the numerous frozen conflicts in its proximity and the problems accompanying them or the subsequent threats, such as the activity of the cross-border criminality groups. Romania's response to this situation is the organization of the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation, which aims to promote democracy and its values in Black Sea area.

Another element we consider significant is the Strategy's conception on internal security, ensured through the cooperation of all the institutions involved, such as the administration, public order structures, Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence services, border surveillance, fraud prevention, tax evasion or money laundering services, environmental guard, health services, essential industrial operators, etc., but also in extreme situations, by the armed forces.

Furthermore, but not without regard to the aforementioned aspects, the document introduces the idea of establishing an integrated crisis management system whose mission is to ensure the coordination of the work of the central or local, civilian or military crisis management structures, as well as the efficient management of their resources.

In the following, the *Strategy* enshrines an entire section dedicated to good governance, for the first time after 1989, considering it to be a condition of security and prosperity, a bond between the theoretical concept of democracy

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[19] Marian Zulean (editor), *Strategiile de securitate națională*, 2nd edition, Tritonic Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2017, p. 309.
[20] Augustina Dumitrașcu; Roxana-Mariana Popescu, *Dreptul Uniunii Europene – Sinteze și aplicații*, Universul Juridic Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2015, p. 176.

and its practical application for obtaining tangible benefits for both the citizens and the state. The document details the conditions to be fulfilled in order to achieve the state of good governance and here we mention the public administration efficiency, the quality of its action, proper institutional capacities, both centrally and locally, strengthening the independence and efficiency of the judiciary, alongside with increasing the citizens' confidence in the act of justice and the efficiency of the fight against the great corruption. In our opinion and not only, there may be a substantial difference between the perception of phenomena such as the functioning of justice or combating corruption, on the one hand, and, on the other, the reality that characterizes these phenomena, even if the perception can be considered an indicator of the extent of the respective phenomena. However, this indicator must be read in conjunction with others of a more precise nature in order to form a real opinion and avoid misleading.

The *Strategy* also refers to certain objectives of an economic nature, such as improving market access for economic operators, as well as improving the education system, adapting it to the realities of EU integration and the requirements contemporary labor market. It is also emphasized the importance of health services and ensuring the supply of energy resources.

Another aspect of novelty are the references to setting the national Intelligence community, meant to harmonize the activity of various Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence services, in order to avoid the overlapping of their duties and activities and to ensure their coordination and avoidance of gaps in the specific tasks of those structures. Such a community operates successfully in the United States of America and, as 2006 *Strategy* indicates, the compatibility of the security sector with the ones of the Euro-Atlantic Partners is one of Romania's objectives in the context of its integration in the aforementioned structures.

In a later section, the Strategy also refers to the need to develop road, rail and communication infrastructures, together with river basin planning

and their preparation to tackle the effects of potential natural disasters, elements whose connection with the country's prosperity appears as evident.

The Strategy concludes with mentioning its guiding role, presenting SCND attributions to watch over its observance and, in particular, with emphasizing the fact that the fulfilment of the objectives set out there depends mainly on the political will of the decision-makers, a conclusion to which we rally, and which we consider to be comprehensive.

2.5. 2008 National Defense Strategy

On the basis of the guidelines set out in *2006 Strategy*, to which we referred, the Parliament of Romania adopted, on the proposal of the President, on November, the 4th, 2008, Decision No. 30/2008 on the approval of the *Country's National Defense Strategy*.[21]

Some of the values laying at the basis of Romanian state's existence and prosperity mentioned in this document can be also found among the indicators we presented in the first part of the present paper, being thus relevant for the establishment of good governance concept: democracy, freedom, equality and rule of law, respect for human dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms, civic responsibility, political pluralism, property and market economy, solidarity with democratic nations, peace and international cooperation, dialogue and communication between civilizations. Furthermore, in relation to these values, the strategy identifies a number of national interests, among which those connected with good governance are, in our opinion, the development of a competitive, dynamic and performing market economy; radical modernization of the education system and effective exploitation of human, scientific and technological potential, as well as natural resources; increasing the wellbeing

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[21] The aspects presented in the current section follow the structure and the content of the *National Defense Strategy*, adopted through the Decision no. 30/2008 of the Parliament of Romania, URL: https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/geytomr-she/hotararea-nr-30-2008-privind-aprobarea-strategiei-na-tionale-de-aparare-a-tarii, accessed on 20.04.2018.

of citizens, the living standard and health of the population; asserting and protecting culture, national identity and spiritual life, in the context of active participation in the construction of European identity.

Threats to Romania's national security are, according to the *Strategy*, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of destruction, instability due to crises and regional conflicts, the potential activation of "frozen" conflicts, increased availability of new types of conventional weapons, cross-border organized crime, the use of new technologies for destructive purposes, disruption of vital resources flow, illegal migration and natural disasters. In this context, the Strategy expressly mentions that inefficient governance poses a danger to the exercise of fundamental human rights and freedoms and affects the fulfilment of international obligations, hence favoring the production of the consequences of the aforementioned threats. These threats can produce effects due to vulnerabilities preventing the States from responding appropriately to their presence and action.

According to the analyzed document, the main vulnerabilities are: the increased dependence on hard-to-reach vital resources, persistent negative demographic trends, massive migration, high level of social insecurity, chronic poverty, accentuation of social differences, the reduced proportion, fragmentation and still insufficient role of the middle class in organizing the economic and social life, the fragility of civic spirit and civic solidarity, weakly developed and insufficiently protected infrastructure, poor state and reduced efficiency of the public health sector, organizational shortcomings, resource shortages and difficulties in adapting the education system to the companies' requirements, inadequate organization and scarcity of resources allocated to crisis management, insufficient employment of civil society in the debate and resolution of security issues.

Therefore, it is noteworthy that these vulnerabilities exist, in reality, in the context of shortcomings in the quality of governance indicators, presented earlier. In other words, in the absence of good governance or in the context of its insufficiency, vulnerabilities arise, consisting in a fertile ground for the indicated threats to undermine states' security.

Further, the *Strategy* is updated in relation to the document of 2006, and there are certain provisions inserted for adapting to the reality, new at that time, of Romania's joining the European Union, on January, 1st, 2007.

The role of governance quality in security enhancement is indirectly acknowledged in the text of the *Strategy*, as it specifies that national defense capacity results from the coordinated actions in the military field, public order and Intelligence, but also in the economic field, central and local government, education, health, infrastructure and communications or the environment. This happens because the indicators of those areas are directly influenced by the quality of government, in general and in each individual case.

The following provisions only confirm those asserted before. More specifically, the *Strategy* acknowledges that sustainable economic growth and technological progress are key factors in guaranteeing Romania's national security. It also stipulates that ensuring the sustainable economic development of the country contributes both to increasing citizens' individual security of and to ensuring the resources needed to further reform and modernize the sector of security and defense. Another priority action relies in the education area given the fact that, as the *Strategy* mentions, the valorization and development of the cultural, scientific and human potential of Romania is an essential component and resource of modernizing Romanian society. For this purpose, the *Strategy* proposes to improve the research and development process in areas with an impact on security and defense policy, participation in international, European and bilateral programs and projects in the top areas of science and technology, harmonization of military education with national education policies and the provision of high-class specialists, according to the standards of security and defense requirements of the country, as well as those of the other NATO members, preparing

the population for crisis and civil emergencies and promoting security culture in partnership with civil society.

All this depends, either directly or indirectly, on the quality of government.

We also note positively that *the Strategy* enshrines and acknowledges the protection of the environment, seen as an essential coordinate of improving the life of the population and increasing the prosperity of citizens.

As regards government efficiency, the *Strategy* stipulates that supporting national efforts to develop the necessary capabilities in the field of security and defense must be based on the efficient use of the entire range of resources available, in particular human, material and financial. In this respect, it proposes, as directions of action, to improve the coordination between the legislative and executive powers on decision-making in allocating resources for the defense of the country, the control of institutions involved in the management of that sector and the exercise of parliamentary scrutiny over them, the generalization of the implementation of resource management on the basis of multiannual programs and priorities by the institutions with responsibility in the field of security and defense, increasing the transparency of the use of public funds and accountability towards the taxpayer and improving the preparedness of the defense population system.

At least some of the indicators of good governance identified in the first part of our study are visible in the previous statements.

The *Strategy* also emphasizes the need to develop a network of physical, specialized and efficient infrastructures, compatible with the European ones, providing increased facilities and capabilities. To this end, it opts to maintain the operating parameters and harness the existing capacities through the rehabilitation and modernization of civilian and military infrastructures, the rehabilitation, modernization and development of transport, in particular air and sea, the realization of a modern, viable and secure communication infrastructure capable of being integrated into the European communications system, the development of the energy transport system, the promotion of environmentally friendly transport technologies and the promotion of infrastructure projects to be financed from NATO's common funds.

In order to achieve these ambitious objectives, the *Strategy* underlines the importance of multiannual planning, in order to integrate into a unified system the short, medium and long-term objectives across all the constituent elements of the institutions with responsibilities in the field of defense and a realistic sizing of the resources needed to support them, according to the priorities and to identify the constraints, limitations and restrictions of any kind that may affect the fulfilment of the objectives undertaken and timely taking of measures to mitigate any adverse effects. In other words, this comes to the support of government efficiency, one of the indicators of good governance mentioned by us.

2.6. 2010 National Security Strategy

The Security Strategy of 2010 presents numerous similarities to the preciously analyzed document, which is not surprising, given its development in a similar political regime. Although the name of the document is the *National Defense Strategy – For a Romania that guarantees the security and prosperity of future generations*, its content addresses the security issue as a whole[22]. One of the newly presented ideas is the link between security and prosperity, in the sense that the state not only owes to its citizens security, but also the expected state of prosperity and the promotion of its national identity in an increasingly globalized world. It is also innovative the fact that the *Strategy* mentions that one of its vocations is to attract the support of Romanian citizens in promoting the necessary measures to achieve its goals, which occurs precisely at a time when the popular support for a government marked by the constraints of the economic crisis is in a continuous decline.

Hereafter, the *Strategy* broadly resumes the considerations on globalization and good

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[22] The aspects presented in the current section follow the structure and the content of the *National Defense Strategy. For a Romania that guarantees the security and prosperity of future generations*, Bucharest, 2010, URL: http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/Strategia_nationala _de_aparare.pdf, accessed on 20.04.2018.

governance encountered in the previous document, stressing again that globalization must be accepted and states must not remain outside its positive parts and that good governance is a condition of security and prosperity, represents the instrument by which democracy translates in daily real life.

In the following, the *Strategy* lists the national interests, characterizing them as perennial. However, in our view, even though national interests' existence is indeed perennial, they are not necessarily understood in the same way at any time and in any place, the dominant conceptions at certain time influencing the manner in which society perceives its fundamental interests. The *Strategy* mainly points the national interests also mentioned in the previous document, even if the way they are presented differs, as it adds issues such as their perception within the framework created by EU membership and, in the prospect of the evolutions of the war in Georgia, cyber security.

The *2010 Strategy* includes a number of principles and characteristics, including the principle of the priority of national interest, compliance with European and Euro-Atlantic approaches, international correlation, active and anticipative, participatory, pragmatic, and functional character. In the context of the international correlation principle, we note an eloquent listing of the framework in which the external action of the Romanian state is carried out and in which it ensures its security, consisting of NATO, the European Union, the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe.

The analysis of the international security environment comprises, in addition to the constant elements and of natural changes in relation to the evolution of international events, a mention we consider particularly relevant, namely that, at the international level, crises and conflicts are not isolated and, therefore, we consider that they must be responded jointly with the main partners.

As a result, broadly speaking, it is noteworthy that there are some constant aspects of the international security environment, for example, terrorism or frozen conflicts, as well as new

aspects such as the threat posed by the actions of the Russian Federation, the crises brought by its strategy of using resources for political purposes or the financial crisis with its consequences.

In terms of risks and threats, there are specified terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, frozen conflicts, the financial crisis, the espionage and external actors' efforts to influence population and decision-makers. Public health risks such as pandemics, natural environment's degradation or natural disasters are also included.

With regard to the vulnerabilities identified in the *Strategy*, one could note as an adaptation to the new social and political conditions, the reduced administrative capacity, the excessive politicization of institutions, high-level corruption, the lack of planning mechanisms, budgetary imbalances or press campaigns aimed at denigrating state institutions, i.e. press pressures to influence political decisions, an element that appears for the first time in a *National Security Strategy* and will no longer be found in the document following the review.

As for Romania's external and internal action, it maintains the main coordinates of previous documents, in particular its coordination and deployment within the framework created by NATO and EU membership. Moreover, for this purpose, the document mentions that the armed forces of Romania need to be rapidly deployable to the source of the threat, committed internally or externally and in a sustainable manner, in the sense of being able to be maintained for a long time in the theatres of operations.

In addition to the previous strategic vision, the one issued in 2010 refers to the need to participate in the American air defense effort, as Romania does not have the necessary capabilities to build such a system on its own, and NATO or the EU did not develop such a system, so the only solution to cover Romania's territory against the potential effects of a missile attack is to rally to the American one.

Next, the *Strategy* includes the main directions of action concerning the activity of the National Intelligence Community, its objectives, as well

as directions for the development of the national defense industry, aspects of energy security, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, crisis management, aspects regarding the identification and management of resources for achieving national security and its intellectual, educational and cultural dimension.

Concerning the latter, it is significant the emphasis on the importance of scientific research, but also the need to build a security culture, by diversifying the study programs in this field, an aspect in which we see empirically an obvious breakthrough in the years after the drafting of this document.

2.7. 2015 National Defense Strategy

In the following, we will analyze the latest programmatic document in the series of national security strategies, namely the one currently in force, the *National Defense Strategy for the 2015 - 2019*[23].

In this line of thought, the present *Strategy* underlines this issue, proposing its convergence with the *European Security Strategy* (which was still in force when the Romanian strategy was issued) and the *Internal Security Strategy of the European Union*, highlighting the direct relation between security and development.

Furthermore, *2015 Strategy* was issued at a time when it seems that the recent views, according to which the classical, conventional threats nature are a subject of history is not consistent with the reality of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, in which Russia's action marks a strong revival of the use of military force on a large scale. For this reason, the Strategy underlines the need to develop military and civilian capacities in order to be able to prevent and discourage any hostile action against Romania and, if necessary, to defend the country against them.

As far as national security interests are concerned, it is noteworthy that, in addition to these issues newly introduced, such as the

participation in integrative processes within the European Union or ensuring the irreversible membership of the Transatlantic collective defense system, the issue of maintaining of the constitutional characters of the Romanian state, the preservation of which is seen, in each strategy, as an essential interest. Thus, in the present enumeration is not present the unitary character of the state, the others being reproduced exactly.

Additionally to the aspects previously presented, the document also details the national security objectives, mentioning the need to remove the shortcomings of good governance, together with the strengthening of administrative capacity and the protection of the decision-making process against illegitimate or non-transparent influences or actions.

Furthermore, in the section dedicated to external action, the need to strengthen the strategic partnership with the US with reference to economic or trade areas and the deepening of cooperation with the neighboring states and the eastern flank of NATO appears for the first time so clear and explicit.

Moreover, in the section approaching Euro-Atlantic security dimensions, NATO is presented as the main guarantor of Romania's security. In addition, as response to recent international developments, there are also mentioned the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, namely supporting the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea, as well as the conflicts in the Middle East that can end with the return of jihadists of European origin to our continent, but can also generate waves of population migration. As we well know, both phenomena have become reality and have generated real security issues.

When it comes to threats, the document introduces the destabilizing actions in the eastern neighborhood (of political nature, but we would also add the "little green men" type actions), but also the emerging cyber threats. This vision is complemented by the section approaching risks, where it mentions social risks such as emigration, as well as low intensity but protracted military confrontations.

As far as vulnerabilities are concerned,

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[23] The aspects presented in the current section follow the structure and the content of the *National Defense Strategy for the 2015 – 2019 period. A strong Romania, in Europe and in the World*, Presidential Administration, Bucharest, 2015, URL: http://www.presidency.ro /files/userfiles/ Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf, accessed on 20.04.2018.

without being detailed on a very large space, the document makes references to issues related to good governance deficiencies: the poor absorption of European funds, the misuse of public funds, energy issues, critical infrastructure, agriculture, environmental protection, health, education or scientific research. Moreover, it insists on the delayed reaction to threats due to the scarcity of resources and the impact of corruption on the functioning of the state. Also, internally, it is worth noting that Intelligence services are expressly receiving the task of identifying and signaling acts of corruption.

What brings new directions of action to strengthening the national security is the need for properly budgeting the armed forces, by allocating 2% of GDP to defense beginning with 2017 and developing response capabilities to potential asymmetric or hybrid threats.

Conclusion

On the basis of the analysis of succeeding programmatic documents, we observe that good governance with all its internal parts, such as the strengthening of the administrative capacity, the correct use of the public funds, corruption prevention and control, explicitly or implicitly accounted for a constant concern of the political decision-makers in charge with the elaboration of national security programmatic documents. It also shows the efforts Romania made for the purpose of complying to the national organizations' standards in order to achieve the membership, a goal set ever since the beginning of the 1990s. Among these, especially regarding the good governance, it is noteworthy the significance of the European Union whose accession conditions have been a pressure factor as well as an engine of changes, and without them, probably, the progress would have been much slower or less substantial.

Of course, one could not say that the current state is the final one, as reaching standards implied by good governance still requires consistent and constant efforts, but if we look at the starting point after the Revolution from December 1989, substantial progresses are undeniable, progresses that were obviously proven through joining NATO and EU. The manner in which the next strategies will reflect the demands and the evolutions regarding the implementation of good governance, is still to be considered.

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3. DĂNIȘOR, Dan Claudiu, *Democrația deconstituționalizată*, Universul Juridic Publishinghouse/Universitaria Publishinghouse, Bucharest/Craiova, 2013.

4. DUMITRAȘCU, Augustina; POPESCU, Roxana-Mariana, *Dreptul Uniunii Europene – Sinteze și aplicații*, Universul Juridic Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2015.

5. IQBAL, Kazi; SHAH, Anwar, *A critical review of governance indicators*, URL: siteresources.worldbank.org.

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8. *Legea nr. 415/2002 privind organizarea și funcționarea Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării (Law no. 415/2002 on the organizing and functioning of the Supreme Council* of National Defence), URL: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=36672.

9. Legea nr. 473/2004 privind planificarea apărării (Law no. 473/2004 on national defence planning), URL: https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gu3dinby/legea-nr-473-2004-privind-

planificarea-apararii.

10. Legea nr. 203 din 16 iulie 2015 privind planificarea apărării (Law no. 206/16.07.2015 on defence planning), published in the Official Gazette no. 555/27.07.2015, URL: http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/legea_203_ 2015_planificarea_apararii.php.

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12. Strategia de securitate națională a României din 2001 (2001 National Security Strategy of Romania), approved by the Parliament and published in the Official Gazette no. 822/21.12.2001, URL: http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/strategie-din-18-decembrie-2001-de-securitate-nationala-a-romaniei-emitent-parlamentul-publicat-n-monitorul-oficial-nr-59479.html.

13. Strategia de Securitate Națională a României. România Europeană, România Euro-Atlantică: pentru o viață mai bună într-o țară democratică, mai sigură și prosperă (National Security Strategy of Romania. The European Romania, the Euro-Atlantic Romania: For a Better Life in a More Secure and More Prosperous Democratic Country), Bucharest, 2006, http://old.presidency.ro/static/ordine/CSAT/SSNR.pdf

14. Strategia națională de apărare a țării, aprobată prin Hotărârea nr. 30/2008 a Parlamentului României (National Defence Strategy approved by Romanian Parliament in Decision no. 30/2008), URL: https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/geytomrshe/hotararea-nr-30-2008-privind-aprobarea-strategiei-nationale-de-aparare-a-tarii.

15. Strategia Națională de Apărare. Pentru o Românie care garantează securitatea și prosperitatea generațiilor viitoare (National Defence Strategy. For a Romania Guaranteeing Security and Prosperity of Future Generations), Bucharest, 2010, http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/Strategia_nationala _de_aparare.pdf.

16. Strategia Națională de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada 2015 – 2019. O Românie puternică în Europa și în lume (National Defence Strategy for 2015 – 2019. A Strong Romania in Europe and in the World), Presidential Administration, Bucharest, 2015, http://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf.

SHOULD WE (STILL) FEAR RUSSIA? THE PARADOX OF THE RUSSIAN POWER

Iulia MOISE (BĂDĂLUȚĂ)*

The thesis of this article – whose main topic is about power, perception of power and power of perceptions in international relations – stems from the desire to explore to what extent the power of a state depends on the resources that it holds (power as resources) rather on its ability to change the behavior of others (power as manifestation).

This article aims to find an explanation for the so-called paradox of Russian power, translated into the following research question: how does Russia, a regional power in decline (in terms of capabilities) succeed in achieving the desired behavioral results in the current international system?

To explain this paradox, the research calls for two different approaches on the concept of power in international relations: power as resources (potential power) and power as outcomes. Power is not just a sum of resources and the resources that a state actor possesses can lead or not to results, effects.

Keywords: *power, potential power, power as outcomes, "sharp power", Russia, perceptions, information.*

Argument or the paradox of the Russian power

Associating these two topics – *power* and *Russia* – as controversial and as popular they are is at least a risky endeavor. Why? Because *power*
is the foundation of the theory of international relations and *Russia* is a suitable case study to illustrate the concept of power in international relations. However, despite the ubiquity of the concept, as suggestively ascertained by David Baldwin[1], "investigating power seems paradoxical at times, but it is also unavoidable".

In order to explain the international dimension of power, the analysis calls for two different approaches on the concept of power in Joseph Nye Jr.' s vision[2]: the potential of power of a state (the potential power) and the manifestation of power emanating from that certain state (power as outcomes). The main objective of this article is to explore in the mirror *the potential power*, respectively *the power as outcomes*, in order to highlight that, in the international system, the character of a state being powerful consists not only in the resources it possesses, but rather in its ability to change the behavior of others. A series of complementary objectives stem from this main objective:

▪ assessing Russia's potential power in terms of capabilities;

▪ revealing the essential role of perception in estimating the threat posed by a certain state;

▪ revealing the essential role of information resources within strategies staged by certain

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[1] David Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
[2] Joseph Nye Jr., *Viitorul puterii* (The Future of Power), Polirom, Iași, 2012.

* Iulia MOISE (BĂDĂLUȚĂ) is PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations within National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA), in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: iuliamoise82@gmail.com

states in order to maximize their power, in the 21st century. Power has always been a concept analyzed in terms of resources – *the instruments the potential power is based on* – and the geopolitics of resources remains, as George Cristian Maior suggestively noticed, "one of the most important determinants of conflicts and strategic games"[3]. As a method, the evaluation of Russia's potential power in terms of resources is based on secondary analysis, within the limits given by the access to existing data in the public space, and it is guided by the principles of the Realist school of international relations, which best surprises the permanent competition for power among states and the constant preoccupation for maximizing it.

Thus, from a theoretical point of view, this approach will call for:

▪ the classic realistic vision (as expressed by Hans Morgenthau), centered on the quantitative aspects of power (the elements of power), wherein factors such as military or economic capabilities play a dominant role in guiding the behavior of state actors;

▪ the neorealist perspective (grounded by Kenneth Waltz, 1979), which adds an essential assertion in explaining the behavior of state actors in the international system by introducing a systemic variable (the resource distribution) and a cognitive variable (threat perception: if the rest of the states perceive a state as aggressive, then they will tend to align themselves against of that certain state, perceived as a threat to their security).

In explaining the paradox of Russian power, we will also call for several principles of the constructivist theory, which has the incontestable merit of highlighting the importance of ideas in shaping the international politics. For constructivists[4], relations between states are influenced by behaviors, which are based on identity (both their own and their partner's identity), which, in its turn, is determined by ideas. Once we act on these ideas, modifying them, we can change the whole perception on the system itself. In constructivist terms, knowing the identity of a state is a half-won battle because it reveals the intentions of the respective state.

In the light of developments in recent years, Russia has become a priority topic on the world politics agenda, as well as in the Academic community debates, being presented as a revisionist power trying to alter the current international system. The events in recent years have revealed a growing presence of Russia on the global scene, indicating its desire for transition to a multipolar international system.

The end of the year 2017 marked a prominent success for President Vladimir Putin towards accomplishing his most fervent national project assumed when coming to power, namely the re-establishment of Russia in the Great Powers' lodge on the international stage. US recently released security and defense strategic documents – *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* – assign Russia and China the status of competitors in front of the US supremacy; this signal could be interpreted as turning away from the idea of a unipolar world and acknowledging the multipolar character of the international order.

According to the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2017), China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity[5]. On 19 January 2018, the US Secretary of Defense released the new *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, a document that clearly mentions: inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security[6].

[3] George Cristian Maior, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI*, Rao Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.

[4] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

[5] ***, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, December 2017, Washington DC, p. 2, URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, accessed on 13.03.2018.

[6] ***, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*, Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1, URL: https://dod.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, accessed on 13.03.2018.

Russia as a Global Power has been the key-concept of the strategic identity assumed by President Vladimir Putin ever since his coming to power. The strategic identity, a concept specific to the paradigm of social constructivism, represents the vision assumed by the political elites towards the great strategy to follow in order to ensure the state's place and role in the international system; it can be defined as the finite product of the discursive competition for defining "national conscience" and interpreting the internal and international environment[7]. From this perspective, the strategic identity assumed by a state is the result of the interaction between self-perception and the perception of other actors, wherein the other states' recognition of the place and role that an actor plays in the international system represents an indispensable condition for a state to impose itself in relation with the other states.

The reaffirmation of multipolarity and the restoration of the Russia's greatness represent two of the purposes of the narratives underpinning the political discourse of president Putin, the essence of the political project assumed by him being that *for Russia, the only option is a strong and self-confident country.* Depending on the circumstances, Putin's rhetoric depicted Russia as a great nuclear power, a great energy power or a crucial actor in the fight against global terrorism.

1. How powerful is Russia in terms of capabilities?

Russian Military Power

Military power is one of the most important elements of national power. For years, the ambitious foreign policy run by the Russian president has also been reflected in increased defense spending (the comparison of defense spending remains the standard approach to measuring the distribution of military power). In the context of Russia's military-modernization process started in 2008, Russian government

spending on national defense has constantly grown over the last decade, having reached, in 2016, a post-Soviet record. Despite this constant growth in the budget, it is relevant, just for comparison, that NATO member states collectively spent over 12 times more on the military in 2016 than Russia[8].

Moreover, according to *Military Balance 2018 Report*, although Russian defense spending appeared to increase in 2016 statistic data, the recorded increase actually stemmed from an exceptional payment of 11.8 billion US dollars, under the government's scheme of state-guaranteed credits, to offset the debts that had been accumulated by defense industry[9]. Since 2016, budget defense spending has fallen steadily. According to a report released by the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm (SIPRI) in May 2018, *in 2017, Russia's military spending diminished by 20% – a first for the past 20 years: the first annual decrease since 1998 to date*[10].

Although military modernization remains a priority for Kremlin, in March 2018, President Vladimir Putin announced plans to decrease its defense spending[11]. Most likely, this decision comes amid the economic problems faced by the country as a result of the economic sanctions imposed by Western states; military budget expenditure has been a heavy burden on Russia's economy, which can no longer support Kremlin's

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[7] Stanislav Secrieru, *Rusia după imperiu: între putere regională şi custode global*, Editura Institutul European, Iaşi, 2008, pp. 41-42.

[8] ***, "NATO military spending over 12 times more than Russia in 2016, SIPRI data show", in *NATO Watch*, URL: http://natowatch.org/newsbriefs/2017/nato-military-spending-over-12-times-more-russia-2016-sipri-data-shows, accessed on 15.03.2018.

[9] ***, *The Military Balance 2018*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018, URL: https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance, accessed on 15.03.2018.

[10] Nan Tian, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, *Trends in World Military Expenditure 2017*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017, URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pdf, accessed on 15.03.2018.

[11] ***, "«We will not allow any arms race» – Putin says Russia will reduce military spending", in *The Defense Post*, 19.03.2018, URL: https://thedefensepost.com/2018/03/19/putin-russia-cut-military-spending-arms-race/, accessed on 10.05.2018.

geopolitical ambitions anymore. The analysis of the evolution of military indicators over the last 10 years highlights the emergence of another military *challenger*: China, a state whose military budget has experienced a continuous increase over the last two decades, with an accelerated growth trend in the last years. China's spending as a share of world military expenditure has risen from 5.8 per cent in 2008 to 13 per cent in 2017, thus becoming the world's second military power (in terms of the military budget). According to SIPRI data: China made the largest absolute increase in spending (12 billion dollars) in 2017 (in constant 2016 prices), while Russia made the largest decrease (– 13.9 billion dollars) [12].

its status as a great power, an additional pressure factor in any negotiation.

President Putin's annual state-of-the-nation address (delivered on March 1st, 2018) is evidence for the important role that the nuclear arsenal is playing in the Russian military power [14]. A significant part of this speech was devoted to a presentation of Russia's newly developed military capabilities, the Kremlin leader claiming that Russia owns invincible nuclear weapons that can penetrate any missile defense system.

However, one cannot exclude the possibility that Putin had been showing off about Russian military capabilities in order to raise population support in the view of the presidential elections held on March 18th, 2018.


Figure no. 1: U.S. Defense Spending in 2017 Compared to Other Countries [13]

Russia's nuclear arsenal

Nuclear weapons play a fundamental role in Russia's defense and deterrence policy and they are an indispensable tool for implementing the Russian strategy towards reaffirming/establishing

In any case, with no doubt, Russia can be considered a superpower in this aspects, as it possesses the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, holding – together with the US – more than 90% of the worldwide nuclear weapons stockpile. Experts affiliated to the Federation of American Scientists estimate that Russia is

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[12] Nan Tian, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, *cited works*, 2017.

[13] ***, *U.S. Defense Spending Compared to Other Countries*, Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 07.05.2018, URL: https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison, accessed on 10.05.2018.

[14] ***, *Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly*, Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, 01.03.2018, Moscow, URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957, accessed on 15.03.2018.

in the middle of a broad modernization of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. These modernizations, combined with an increase in the number and size of military exercises and occasional explicit nuclear threats against other countries, contribute to growing concerns regarding the Russian intentions[15].

when looking into the hierarchy of the world's most advanced global economies, Russia is not among the top 10: according to World Bank data, Russia's GDP ranks 11th[17].

Russia (the largest country in the world) ranks first in terms of natural resources; however, because the state has failed to make proper use of


Figure no. 2: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2018[16]

Russia's economic power[16]

In the end, political power is based on economic power and economic power is, in turn, an indispensable condition for military power.

Is Russia a great power in economic terms? There are several factors at play here. Firstly,

it, Russia fails to be the superpower of the world. This is precisely the paradox of power invoked by Joseph Nye Jr.[18], according to which *even the most well-endowed (in terms of resources actors) may not always obtain the outcomes they desire.*


Figure no. 3: The World's Top 10 Largest Economies for the years 2018 and 2019[19]

[15] Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, "*Russian nuclear forces*", in *Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 73, No. 2, 2017, pp. 115-126.

[16] Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, *Status of World Nuclear Forces*, Nov. 2018, Federation of American Scientists, URL: https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/, accsessed on 10.05.2018.

[17] ***, *GDP (current US$)*, The World Bank, 2017, URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=chart&year_high_desc=false, accessed on 10.05.2018.

[18] Joseph Nye Jr., *op.cit.*, 2012.

[19] ***, "The World's Top 10 Largest Economies", in *Focus Economics*, Dec. 2017, URL: https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-largest-economies-in-the-world, accessed on 10.05.2018.

A first explanation for this paradox would be that Russia is essentially a resource-based economy – and not an industrial power – where oil reserves are the key pillar and the main source of budget revenue. Relying overwhelmingly on oil and gas export revenues, Russia's economy is dependent on the international environment and the foreign oil market, which makes it vulnerable.

Despite the fact statistics show stabilization in 2016 and a trend of economic growth in 2017, Russia's position remains modest in terms of economic indicators According to OECD 2017 Report[20], improvement in headline economic indicators in 2016 is apparent: the recovery is partly driven by temporary factors: investment growth was led by a surge of public infrastructure spending in the first half of 2017, consumption has risen by rising credit rather than real income growth and real incomes continue to decline.

Long term and medium term prospects are not very optimistic: growth is expected to be moderate – around 2% in 2018 and 1.5 % in 2019[21], radical economic reform is unlikely, due to a series of remnant structural deficiencies: a weak financial sector, an aging population and a shrinking workforce amid the demographic decline Russia is facing. This landscape is completed by a series of domestic weaknesses that affect the prospects of economic growth and that could raise, in medium and long term, social instability: corruption at all levels, social disparities and the lack of a strong middle class, the cleavage between the population and the elites, the competition among the interest groups around President Putin, low living standards.

In the absence of structural reforms to address persistent economic and social deficiencies (notably the lack of investments and poverty), Russia's stability risks to be affected in the long run. In fact, President Putin himself is aware of the fact that the Russian economy is in need of structural reforms: building a competitive Russia in the economic field represented one of the main narratives of president Putin's annual speeches on the state of the Federation over the last years.

If we look objectively (in terms of capabilities), Russia is not a great power at all. In the light of the aforementioned, the analysis of military capabilities and economic indicators shows that *Russia is facing a near-certain, long-term decline*[22]. Russia's power is highly based on symbols and perceptions and less on capabilities and resources. Russia may be a Great Power in terms of nuclear arsenal and the tradition of occupying a permanent seat in the UN Security Council; however, when it comes to capabilities, Russia is just a regional (and not a global) power, affected by internal vulnerabilities but with very ambitious foreign policy objectives.

The typology proposed by Robert Cooper[23] seems to be edifying at this point. According to Mr. Cooper, in the new, post-Cold War world, states can be classified in three broad categories, namely: 1) "pre-modern" states (Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, etc.) – fragile states that have no foreign policy and do not exercise the monopoly of violence; 2) "modern" states (China, India, Brazil, Pakistan) – which revolve around the concept of nation-state; 3) and "post-modern" states (the Western states) – states have given up force when managing their disputes and whose security is based on transparent foreign policies and economic interdependence. As suggestively Robert Cooper notices, when trying to include Russia in this typology, Russia is a specific case surpassing any of the three categories, as it is a special case exhibiting, in a particular way, pre-modern, modern and post-modern characteristics.

And that is one facet of the Russian power paradox: the major fracture between resources and ambitions, the sharp contrast between

[20] ***, *Russian Federation – Economic forecast summary*, OECD Report, Nov. 2017, URL: http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-forecast-summary-russia-oecd-economic-outlook.pdf, accessed on 10.05.2018.

[21] *** Russia Country Report, *The Economist,* URL: http://country.eiu.com/russia, accessed on 10.05.2018.

[22] Stephen Kotkin, "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics", in *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 2016 Issue, URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics, accessed on 20.03.2018.

[23] Robert Cooper, *Post Modern State and the World Order*, Demos, London, 2000.

its economic capabilities and its great power aspirations in what regards the foreign policy, the preoccupation of political elites towards foreign policy to the detriment of internal reforms. Under these circumstances, the following question naturally arises: *how could Russia emerge, in 2018, as a strategic competitor to the US?*

2. The perception of power and the power of perceptions. The (re)sources of power in the information age

Megyn Kelly: How important do you think it is to project strength as a President?
Vladimir Putin: It is important not to project strength, but to show it[24].

A possible explanation of this paradox resides in the assumption according to which *states interact with each other mostly depending of the perceived threats that are not always the result of a state's power growth.* It is not the increase of the power resources of a state that pose a threat to the security of other states, but the manner in which its power is perceived. In other words: the power of a state is proportional to the perception of the threat it poses to the security of other states, which, in turn, depends substantially on the image it projects in the system. Moreover, "powerful" players do not actually hold power, unless they are perceived as having power, as "the psychological aspect of power is crucial, since a nation's power may depend in a considerable measure on what other nations think it is"[25].

Why are representations so important? Because they create the reality in which we act and function, as, *in a network-type society, the power is run through collaborative processes by the construction of meaning in the human mind*[26].

A second possible explanation of the Russian power paradox calls for the importance of analyzing the concept of power from behavioral or a relational perspective. According to David A. Baldwin[27], there are two core dimensions of the concept of power in the theory of international relations: *power as resources (potential power)* and *relational power*. To begin with, the former approach, which emphasizes the possession of resources is restrictive, because power resources are understood as power in itself. Power is not just a sum of resources, and the resources owned by a state player may or may not lead to outcomes.

Power is the result of several categories of factors – power resources, the internal capacity of a state to turn such resources into actual power, the context in which such power is exercised. For all these reasons, the power of a state consists not only in the resources it has, but mostly in its *ability to alter the behavior of others*. This is the second approach to power, which, according to Baldwin, caused an actual revolution, by introducing the concept of *relational power* in the second half of the 20th century.

Along with the distinction *power as resource – relational power*, several clarifications on the three aspects or faces of relational power (imposing change, agenda setting and preference shaping) are necessary at this point to provide a better understanding of the paradox of Russian power.

The first face of power (imposing change) was defined by Robert Dahl (1957) and implies the ability to make others act contrary to their initial preferences and strategies: *"A" has power over "B" to the extent that he can get "B" to do something that "B" would not otherwise do*[28]. The ability to make others change their behavior in contrast with their original preferences is an important facet of relational power, but not the only one. In the 1960s, political analysts Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz noticed that Dahl's

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[24] *Interview to American TV channel NBC*, Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, 10.03.2018, URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027, accessed on 20.03.2018.

[25] John George Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations. World Politics of Our Time*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1990, p. 13.

[26] Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, Oxford

University Press, 2009, p. 193.

[27] David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies", in *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1979), pp. 161-194.

[28] Robert A Dahl, "The Concept of Power", in *Behavioral Science 2*, no. 3, December 11, 1957.

definition was lacking in what they called the two-dimensional power approach or the "second facet of power": *agenda setting* ("A" is controlling the agenda of "B" actions in a way that limits the strategic options of "B")[29].

With a highlight on the role of ideas and beliefs in shaping the preferences of others, in the 1970s, sociologist Steven Lukes[30] pointed out that power is not always exercised in an open, observable way as the first two faces of power imply. According to Lukes, the most effective way "A" can exercise power over "B" is to influence the latter's beliefs in relation with what is and is not in accordance with his interest. To the extent that "A" can inoculate to "B" misinterpretations about its interests and take advantage of these misinterpretations, power of "A" over "B" will be even greater as it remains practically invisible to those on whom it is exercised. This is the third facet of power (*preference shaping*), that consists in the ability of "A" to affect the preferences of others so that "B" wants what "A" wants: *"A" can exert strength on "B" by determining the need of "A" and thus modelling the fundamental or initial preferences belonging to "B"*.

In world politics, some of the goals pursued by states are more sensitive to the second and third faces of power than to the first one. Moreover, from a cost-benefit analysis, it is desirable for a political decision maker to consider preference shaping and agenda setting as ways in which it can model the environment, prior to resorting to the first facet of power: imposing decisions[31].

Kremlin's strategy to maximize power in the international system can be understood in this line of thought – a strategy relying on a series of power instruments having information as their main source. "The 21st century can be described in many ways – as the century of speed, technology, and globalization –, however none of these definitions captures the essence of the revolution going on under our very noses better

than information"[32].

Research conducted at European level show that Putin's Russia turned information into a weapon of war[33], utilized in order to shape events, strategies, national will or perceptions at international level, all of which have a final purpose: modelling the process of decision-making. In other words, it is about the third facet of power identified by Steven Lukes (*preference shaping*). As George Maior suggestively noticed, "*the current conflicts are often carried out for control and influence and less for the conquest of new territories*"[34].

Power based on information resources is not a new aspects in international relations, but the current context characterized by rapid flow of information and progress of the information technology left a decisive mark on the manner in which states devise their strategies to maximize their power in the international system. Military power remains important in critical areas of global politics, but conventional warfare is less and less regarded as "a continuation of politics by other means" (as described by Carl von Clausewitz), having become too expensive. The access to information and the ability to exploit information have thus become essential conditions for the capacity to project power[35]; anticipating the role of the Internet 30 years before its emergence, Canadian Marshall McLuhan forewarned as a true visionary that "World War III is a guerrilla information war with no division between military and civilian participation"[36].

In fact, the findings of a study released in 2017 – *Sharp Power. Rising Authorian Influence[37]*

[29] Peter Bachrach, Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (1962), pp. 947–952.

[30] Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, Second Ed., Palgrave Macmillian, London, 2005.

[31] Joseph Nye Jr., *op.cit.*, 2012, p. 34.

[32] George Cristian Maior (editor), *Un război al minții. Intelligence, servicii de informații și cunoaștere strategică*, Editura Rao, Bucharest, 2010, p. 8.

[33] Cécile Barbière, "Moscow launches French language propaganda platform", in *Euractiv News*, 30.01.2015, URL: https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/moscow-launches-french-language-propaganda-platform/, accessed on 19.02.2018.

[34] George Cristian Maior, *op.cit.*, 2014, pp. 146-156.

[35] *Ibidem*, pp. 116.

[36] Marshall McLuhan, *Culture is Our Business*, Balantines Books, 1970, p. 66.

[37] Juan Pablo Cardenal, Jacek Kucharczyk, Grigorij Mesežnikov, Gabriela Pleschová, *Sharp Power. Rising*

– show that the Russian government has been carrying out a wide range of propaganda and misinformation activities targeting four specific areas, having a critical role in shaping perceptions and public opinion in democratic societies: (1) media, (2) academia, (3) culture, and (4) the policy communities and think tanks. This time, however, it is a different kind of influence that cannot be defined either by the term *hard power* or by the *soft power* one. The best term to capture the essence of Russia's strategy is the one of *sharp power*: the specific dimension of power aiming at polluting the information environment in order to shape perceptions and public opinion in democratic societies through disinformation actions for hostile purposes; the ultimate goal is to sow doubt and disorder among the rivals[38].

Instead of conclusions: Should we still fear Russia?

Russia has never been as strong as it has wanted to be and never as weak as it is thought to be. Russia is a medium-sized regional power (and not a global one) weakened by internal vulnerabilities, but with very ambitious foreign policy aspirations. Being aware that it has no chance of success in the event of a conventional military conflict against the West, the Kremlin is trying to minimize the actual costs to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

Power sometimes depends on whose armed force or economy wins, but it can also depend on whose story wins; that is why Kremlin's strategy aims at avoiding effective engagement of the military force by calling for a true arsenal of subversive tools centered on information resources.

Looking from this perspective, Russia may impose fear because, in a world of information resources, in the medium to long term, pollution of the information environment aimed at shaping

perception and public opinion in democratic societies is emerging as a major threat.

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AS A RESULT OF THE GEOPOLITICAL SHOCK CAUSED BY THE ARAB SPRING

Magdalena CRIŞAN*

Migration caused by the geopolitical shock in the Middle East and North Africa affects not only Arab society but also the Western one. The article analyzes the factors that led the region to this turning point and the extent to which the wave of migration to Europe, an immediate consequence of the shock, can destabilize European states or even the community bloc.

Keywords: *geopolitical shock; strategic shock; Arab Spring; migration; securitization; perception.*

Introduction

Migration, especially the illegal one, has drawn public attention as a result of the geopolitical shock caused by the turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East. The Arab Spring, an unprecedented protest movement that led to the fall of well-rooted autocrats, turned for Europeans, and not only for them, into an *"Arab nightmare"* because it fostered religious radicalism, led to the outbreak of civil wars, generated proxy wars, and created favorable conditions for terrorist groups. All of this determined a mass displacement of people.

Regime change in the Arab region led to the ascendance of *parties with a strong religious component*, based on Islamic doctrine, underlines Leon Gross Bernardino, European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Region[1], and the riots in Syria and Libya have not been followed by the expected reforms, but turned into civil war, which has generated a wave of migration, first within these two countries and the neighboring ones[2], then to southern and central Europe[3]. The influx of migrants was perceived by European states as a major humanitarian, social, and security crisis. European countries closed their borders, those in the Schengen area reintroduced border controls, *Frontex's* mandate was reshaped, and a cooperation agreement was

[1] Leon Gross Bernardino, *Arab Spring: A European Perspective*, Conference, 9 November 2011, Dickinson College, Carlisle, URL: http://media.dickinson.edu/academic_ life/Clarke_forum/Bernardino_Leon_Gross_11_9_ 2011. mp3, minute: 00.36.39, accessed on 9.07.2017.

[2] Turkey currently hosts the largest number of refugees (3.3 million), followed by Lebanon with 1 million Syrian refugees, and Jordan with 655,000, according to UNHCR statistics. Data available at URL: http://www.unhcr.org/ syria-emergency.html, accessed on 17.12.2017.

[3] More than one million migrants arrived in Europe in 2015, especially in Greece and Italy, according to Jonathan Clayton, Hereward Holland, *Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015*, UNHCR, 30 December 2015, URL: https://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/ latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html, accessed on 17.07.2017.

* Magdalena CRIŞAN is PhD Student in Military Science, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: crisanmagda@yahoo.com

signed between the EU and Turkey to stop the migratory flow. At the political decision level, the influx of migrants divided Europe into two camps: on the one hand, Germany, which opened its doors to the refugees, and, on the other hand, the Visegrad Group countries, also joined by Austria, which rejected the idea of receiving/relocating a certain number of migrants established at EU level. Concerning Germany, without minimizing the humanitarian component of the political decision to receive a large number of migrants, pragmatism played an important role given the need to solve the shortcomings in the labor market with migrants[4]. On the other side, prevailed the concerns about the integration of refugees in a culturally different society, about potential security risks (e.g. radicalized refugees or vulnerable to radicalization), about the financial burden associated with migrants until their integration in the labor market.

But is there a clear causal link between the crisis of migrants in Europe and the Arab Spring? We consider that it is, that the large number of migrants registered in Europe in 2015 is a consequence of the Arab Spring riots[5] and of further developments in each of the states involved in this movement. We have the extreme cases of Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq, where the revolts were followed by bloody civil wars which left a vacuum of power that allowed the terrorist organization Islamic State to flourish[6]. The consequence: millions of people fled terror. According to Frontex, in 2014-2017, the main four countries of origin for illegal immigrants arriving in Europe are: Syria (780,944), Iraq (145,620), Nigeria (88,431), and Pakistan (75,413)[7]. Additionally, there are also hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants from Gambia, Mali, Morocco, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Bangladesh[8].

In 2011, the year of Arab spring revolts took place, the number of asylum seekers from Tunisia increased by 92.5%, those from Libya by 76%, and those from Syria by 50%[9]. A year later, the number of Syrian asylum seekers in the European Union grew by 206%[10]. The Syrians also remained in 2017, along with Iraqis, the main asylum seekers in Europe[11]. We should not overlook that Syria housed more than one million refugees in 2010, most Iraqis[12], part of them charging the number of migrants in Europe.

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[4] In the well-known speech of August 31, 2015, in which Angela Merkel sent the message "We succeed!", she used as arguments Germany's strong economy and the labour deficit on the German market. *Die Zeit* has named the 2015 refugee wave as "the chance of the century" for Germany's economy (Uwe Jean Heuser, "Die Jahrhundertchance", in *Die Zeit*, 26 November 2015, URL: https://www.zeit.de/2015/46/fluechtlingskrise-wirtschaftswunder-zuwanderung, accessed on 10.05.2018.

[5] The Arab Spring riots in 2015 broke out in Algeria (January, 5th), Jordan (January, 7th), Oman (January, 17th), Yemen (January, 27th), Iraq (February, 6th), Bahrain (February, 14th), Libya (February, 14th), Saudi Arabia (February, 17th), Iraqi Kurdistan (February, 17th), Djibouti (February, 18th), Kuwait (February, 19th), Morocco (February, 20th), Mauritania (February, 25th), Lebanon (February, 27th). Palestinian Territories (March, 15th) and Syria (March, 18th). The chronology is provided by Professor Stephan Rosiny of the Leibniz Institute for Global and Regional Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg in "Ein Jahr 'Arabischer Frühling': Auslöser, Dynamiken und Perspektiven", GIGA Focus, no. 12, 2011, URL: http://www.sahara-social.com/Portals/de/Docs2011/NewFolder/Arabischer-Fruehling.pdf, accessed on 01.07.2018.

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[8] *Ibidem.*

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[12] ***, *World Migration Report 2018*, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 2018, p. 33, URL: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf, accessed on 20.06.2018.

Regarding Iraq, which, after Syria, is the country of origin of most illegal migrants (2014-2017), some political scientists such as Professor Kanan Makiya[13], from Brandeis University, and Ed Hussain[14], a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, consider that it is the country in which the Arab Spring originated or was prepared. Ed Hussain reminds that after September 11, 2001, autocratic leaders in the region became the United States' allies against terrorism. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 could have encouraged opponents of the regimes, but the only US administration tool to counter the repression of the opposition in the autocratic Arab states was to fund civil society members and NGOs, as part of the democracy promotion agenda[15]. With this funding, there have also been training programs for democracy activists in the Arab world, including communication skills on social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, tools that contributed to the build-up of movements contesting autocratic regimes and organizing riots[16]. Arab Spring came at a moment when Iraq was crushed by conflicts, war against al-Qaeda and unprepared for the terror of the Islamic State. One study shows that the majority of Iraqis arrived in Europe in 2016 had left conflict zones and that one of three migrants first sought shelter on the territory of his own country, having, in the first instance, the status of internally displaced person[17]. In the context

created by these revolts, the European Union's borders proved to be extremely permeable as *"Mubarak, Ben Ali, Gaddafi were not just the dictators of some nations, they were also the guards of the borders of Europe"*, says Bilgin Ayata, political sociology professor at Basel University[18].

The European Neighborhood Policy, launched in 2003, actually implied EU's desideratum that states in its southern neighbors would not to let illegal African migrants come to Europe and, with this purpose, the EU paid 5 billion dollars to Muammar Gaddafi to keep Maghreb and African migrants in Libya[19]. In 2011, 422,000 Libyans temporarily fled to Tunisia and Egypt, and there were also 706,000 migrant workers who left with them, once attracted by Libya's prosperity, but about which there is not any information available[20]. However, we can see that the Central-Mediterranean route from Libya to Europe is used by migrants originating in Tunisia and in sub-Saharan states[21]. Frontex data show that the Central Mediterranean route was used in January – May 2018 not only by Tunisian migrants, but

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[17] The Iraqis said they left Baghdad and Nineveh. 75% of them knew of the existence of the EU-Turkey agreement (p. 2) and yet they did not give up the trip to Europe that

they planned for an average of 2.5 years (p. 12), according to ***, *Iraqi migration to Europe in 2016: Profiles, Drivers and Return*, June 2017, Reach, p. 10 URL: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/reach_irq_grc_report_iraqi_migration_to_europe_in_2016_june_2017%20%281%29.pdf, accessed on 01.05.2018.

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[19] *Ibidem*.

[20] Philippe Fargues, „Mass Migration and Uprisings in Arab Countries: An Analytical Framework", pp. 170-183, in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), *Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA*, International Development Policy Series, No. 7, 2017, Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications, Boston: Brill-Nijhoff, URL: https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2275#tocto1n1, accessed on 20.05.2018..

[21] In January-March 2011, 23,000 Tunisians, economic migrants, left Libya hoping to find a job in France. They arrived on the island of Lampedusa. In March-August 2011, over 40,000 Sub-Saharan Africans reached the same route on Lampedusa, Sicily and Malta, according to ***, *Migratory Routes*, Frontex, URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/central-mediterranean-route/, accessed on 20.05.2018.

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also by those from Eritrea, Sudan, Nigeria and Ivory Coast[22]. Sub-Saharan African migrants also use the West-Mediterranean route (Morocco-Spain); the push factor were the conflicts in Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Central-African Republic[23]. The route was used in January – May 2018 not only by Moroccan migrants, but also by migrants from Guinea, Mali and Ivory Coast[24]. Pakistani migrants coming to Europe (4th place in Frontex ranking of 2014-2018 illegal migrants) claim that they left their country of origin either because of violence/persecution[25], or because of economic reasons[26]. Most Pakistani people choose Italy as a destination country due to the easier access to asylum[27].

Now, we can ask ourselves the legitimate question if the migration induced by geopolitical shock – as the *Arab Spring* was a shock for the *statu-quo* in the Arab region – accounts for a change of the legal and illegal migration patterns to the EU so far. Before answering this question, we review the objective and subjective factors that led to the outbreak of the *Arab Spring* and generated the wave of migration.

1. The premises of migration

The emotion stirred up in Tunisia by the street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in December 17, 2010 in the public square after the police had humiliated him and confiscated his merchandise, was just the spark that triggered the revolts breaking out fast, as in a domino game, in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. However, for decades, economic, political, and social grounds for rebellion could have been found in the Arab world. Firstly, the economic situation of the population in the region worsened, the differences between the rich and the poor were increasing[28], the dissatisfaction with the living standards[29], as well as the dissatisfaction with corruption[30] grew. Secondly, political reforms were delayed. The West also contributed to this delay tolerating the region's autocracies following a principle that later proved wrong.

"The deceit was that either you have your dictators and relative stability, or else you have al-Qaeda and global jihad, and the ideas were that those dictators were working hand in hand with the Americans to bring about peace, stability, and to fight the so-called war on terror"[31], emphasized in 2011 Nabila Ramdani,

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[22] ***, *Migratory Map*, Frontex, URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/, accessed on 20.05.2018.

[23] ***, *Migratory Routes*, Frontex, URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/, accessed on 01.05.2018.

[24] ***, *Migratory Map*, Frontex, URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/, accessed on 20.05.2018.

[25] 91% of Pakistani migrants choosing the Central Mediterranean route say they decided to leave their country of origin because of violence and persecution, according to ***, *Analysis: Flow Monitoring Surveys Top 5 Nationalities Interviewed on the Eastern and Central Mediterranean Routes*, International Organization for Migration (IOM), February 2018, p. 7, URL: http://migration.iom.int/docs/Flow_Monitoring_Surveys_Top_5_Nationalities_2017_.pdf, accessed on 01.05.2018.

[26] 70% of Pakistanis who chose the East-Mediterranean route say they migrate for economic reasons, according to ***, op. cit., OIM, p. 14.

[27] *Ibidem.*

[28] 4% of the Arab world population lived below the world poverty level – $ 1.25 per day, and 40% of the population in the Arab world lived with less than $ 2.75 per day, according to ***, *Arab States: Sustainable Development Goals*, United Nations Development Program, URL: http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-1-no-poverty.html, accessed on 13.12.2017.

[29] In 2010, population in MENA states was dissatisfied with the small number of good jobs, the education and the education and infrastructure system, according to a World Bank report. The document points out that World Bank economists failed to predict the Arab Spring because they only took into account economic indicators, not the degree of dissatisfaction (obviously subjective) related to the standard of living of the population, cf. ***, *Inequality, Uprising, and Conflict in the Arab World*, MENA Economic Monitor, World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region, October 2015, p. 28, URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22711/9781464807350.pdf, accessed on 12.12.2017.

[30] Corruption is the main cause of Arab revolt in 2011 (64.26% of respondents), followed by the need to improve the economic situation (63.55% of the respondents), and social justice (57.21% of the respondents), according to the study *The Arab Barometer Wave III (2012-2014)*, apud ***, op. cit., MENA Economic Monitor, October 2015, p. 27.

[31] Frank Gardner, "Is the Arab Spring Good or Bad for Terrorism?", in *BBC,* 2 June 2011, URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13878774, accessed on 12.12.2017.

from the London School of Economics. Volker Perthes, Chairman of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and former UN Assistant Secretary General, Senior Advisor to the UN Special Envoy for Syria, argues that, taking into account the economic situation in the region, the socio-demographic evolution is the most important factor that led to the *Arab Spring*[32]. The population of the Arab world tripled from 1960 to 2010[33], and the authoritarian regimes did not respect their "social contract"[34] with the population, meaning guaranteeing subsidies, a state of welfare, in exchange for loyalty to the regime and for giving up a series of freedoms. Specifically, since 1980, when oil prices dropped dramatically, the Arab states have been unable to offer young people free education, a safe job or a home. And young people make up the bulk of the population in the region. In 2010, in most Arab states, the majority of the population was under 35 years old. On the eve of the revolts, in 2010, 65-75% of Arab states' population was under 35 years old, while youth unemployment rate reached 23%[35]. It was this large multitude of young people who was the actor wakening up the Arab world revolts.

Another cause of economic degradation that fueled revolts, too little documented in the literature, is climate change. One of the slogans of Egypt's protests in Tahrir Square was "*aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya*", meaning "bread, freedom, human dignity". Why bread? It is not a metaphor, but one of the protesters' demands. They wanted cheaper bread. The rise in bread prices was one of the factors that fueled the Egyptian revolt. The year 2010 brought a rare drought in China, the largest wheat producer and consumer in the world, and the first consequence was the drastic reduction of wheat production. World's largest importer of wheat is Egypt. Bread represents one third of the Egyptian caloric intake; Egyptians spend about 38% of revenue on food[36].

Syria's economic situation has also deteriorated due to climate change. The country passed through a long drought (2006-2011) that affected 60% of agricultural land[37]. According to UN and the International Federation of the Red Cross, 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihood in 2009 due to drought[38]. In 2011, the number of Syrians who didn't have enough food due to the drought reached 1 million people[39]. Another study published by the National Academy of Sciences in the United States showed that the drought in 2006-2011 led to the migration of 1.5 million Syrians from rural areas to cities, resulting in social friction which, ultimately, fueled the rebellion against the Assad regime[40].

[32] Volker Perthes, *Der Aufstand: Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, Pantheon, München, 2011, p. 24.

[33] In 1970, the population of the Arab world was 122 million people, and, in 2010, on the eve of the Arab Spring, the population in the region reached 357 million, according to ***, *Arab World: Population, total*, The World Bank, URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=1A&view=chart, accessed on 14.12.2017.

[34] Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgard, Tarik Yousef, "Is the Arab Authoritarian Bargain Collapsing?", Brookings Institution, 9 February 2011, URL: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-the-arab-authoritarian-bargain-collapsing/, accessed on 12.05.2018.

[35] Volker Perthes, *op. cit.*, 2011, p. 30.

[36] Wheat price rose from $ 157/ton in June 2010 to $ 326/ton in February 2011, according to Troy Sternberg, "Chinese Drought, Wheat, and the Egyptian Uprising: How a Localized Hazard Became Globalized", p. 7, in: Caitlin E. Werrell, Francesco Femia (eds.),*The Arab spring and Climate Change*, A Climate and Security Correlations Series, Center for American Progress, the Center for Climate and Security and the Stimson Center, February 2013, URL: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/climatechangearabspring-ccs-cap-stimson.pdf, accessed on 14.12.2017.

[37] Francesco Femia, Caitlin Werrell, "Climate Change Before and After the Arab Awakening: The Cases of Syria and Libya", p. 25, in: Caitlin E. Werrell, Francesco Femia (eds.), *op. cit.*, February 2013.

[38] ***, "Drought Driving Farmers to the Cities", IRIN, 2 September 2009, URL: http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2009/09/02/drought-driving-farmers-cities, accessed on 12.12.2017.

[39] Francesco Femia, Caitlin Werrell, *op. cit*, p. 25 in: Caitlin E. Werrell, Francesco Femia (eds.), *op. cit.*, February 2013.

[40] Colin P. Kelley, Shahrzad Mohtadi, Mark A. Cane, Richard Seager, Yochanan Kushnir, "Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought", in *PNAS*, vol. 112, No. 11, 17 March 2015, URL: http://www.pnas.org/content/112/11/3241, accessed

All these political, economic, and social grievances quickly spread through social media, via *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *YouTube*. Internet has become the cheapest[41] and safest place because it keeps the anonymity of users, the place where the civil society critical of the autocratic regimes in the Arab world built up. Protesters used the internet to discuss with those with the same type of dissatisfaction and to organize protests[42].

We share the opinion of Volker Perthes, according to which the revolt of the people in the Arab world must be understood as a historical event of large size, comparable to the turning point of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. But the deep change will be process of higher difficulty than the one in the former Eastern Bloc states, more bloody and it will take longer[43]. Perhaps, this happens also because Arab societies' process of opening up has also been delayed with the help of the West, which in the global war on terror, chose to cooperate with autocrat leaders in the Arab world: "while two decades ago, Eastern Europe managed its own spring, most Arab regimes have remained unaffected by the winds of change. The global war on terror (GWOT) helped entrench the idea that the West's culturally-bound upper classes represented strong and reliable assets for the future"[44].

In order to argue why the Arab Spring is a geopolitical shock that generated migration, which, in its turn, has the potential to trigger shockwaves in the Western world, we shall briefly explain the shock theory.

2. Shock events and the importance of the manner in which they are perceived

One of the earliest definitions of shock dates from the '70s, and was given by Alvin Toffler: the psychological state reached when introducing a major change in a very short time[45]. The idea of a major event that brings a major change, at least in perspective, is used by Nathan Freier in the military field. The shock of the future becomes a strategic shock, which "suddenly and irrevocably change the rules of the game, as well as the contours and composition of playing surface itself"[46]. It entails rapid adaptation of defense policy and structures. Hence the opinion that the military environment should study even the unknown, the so-called Known Unknowns, the term used by Nathan Freier. He argues that "strategic shocks will arrive via one of two distinct paths. The first is rapid, unanticipated arrival at the natural end of a well-recognized and perilous trend line; or, as a corollary, earlier than expected arrival at a dangerous waypoint along that same trend line"[47].

Debate about surprise or shock events have existed in military circles for several years. In 2007, the US defense ministry introduced the notion of strategic shock in a project called "Strategic Trends and Shocks". Here is how the shock was defined: "an event that punctuates the evolution of a trend, a discontinuity that either rapidly accelerates its pace or significantly changes its trajectory, and, in so doing, undermines the assumption on which current policies are based… Shocks are disruptive by their very nature, and can change how we think about security and the role of the military"[48].

12.12.2017.

[41] In 2010, one hour in an internet café would cost an Egyptian a quarter of his average daily income, and in 2010 only 5% of its average daily income, according to Philip N. Howard, Muzzamil M. Hussain, *Democracy's Forth Wave. Digital Media and the Arab Spring*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 5.

[42] Philip N. Howard, Muzzamil M. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[43] Volker Perthes, *op. cit*, p. 7.

[44] El Hassane Aissa, *The Arab Spring. Causes, Consequences and Implications*, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 2012, p. 5, URL: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560779.pdf, accessed on 09.07.2017.

[45] Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, Random House, New York, 1970.

[46] Nathan Freier, *Known Unknowns: Unconventional Strategic Shocks in Defence Strategy Development,* US Army War College, November 2008, p. 5, URL: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB890.pdf., accessed on 09.07.2019.

[47] *Ibidem,* p. 9.

[48] Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Transformation Chair, Forces Transformation Chairs Meeting: Visions of Transformation 2025 - Shocks and Trends, February

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Strategic shock is not just an event that is unlikely to happen but, as Professor Colin S. Gray points out, it can be an expected event, but whose "terrible consequences" have not been taken into account[49]. Professor Constantin Hlihor emphasizes that events on the international stage that are "linked to sphere of influence or hegemony can be classified as geopolitical shocks"[50]. Events that change the evolution of international politics, which lead to the replacement of social, political or economic structures with others, such as the emergence of a new ideology, revolutionary technologies, the outbreak of a war, a banking crisis, can generate *a geopolitical shock*; it is important that "the way actors react to this type of events, processes and phenomena that cause the geopolitical shock divides the actors involved in the defeated – winner equation"[51]. Therefore, the perceptions at the moment of shock and the magnitude of the impact on society and the international scene are important. The Great Depression of 1929, the fall of the Iron Curtain, the reunification of Germany, all these events that changed the physiognomy of the international scene fall into the category of geopolitical shock.

Geopolitical shock concept was already adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which uses it in connection with the phenomenon of migration, seen as a consequence of environmental and geopolitical shocks. *Geopolitical shock* is defined in the annual OECD migration report 2016 as "sudden, often unpredictable, changes with sweeping social and economic consequences – (are) often associated with large-scale migration

flows"[52], which put pressure on the legal migration and the protection system. The concept is used by Martin Ruhs and Nicholas Van Hear as *shock-migration*[53], meaning that the geopolitical shock that cause sudden and rapid alteration of human security from political, economic or social causes often generate a wave of migration, which, in its turn, can generate another shock wave. Without proper responses at the right time, migration can have a major impact on political, social, and cultural balance in host countries, as well as in the countries of origin.

In this context, the influx of refugees in 2015 has all the terms of reference of a geopolitical shock wave caused by another geopolitical shock. Arab Spring, which encompassed many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, surprised the international scene, led to the collapse of deep-rooted authoritarian regimes[54], whetted Arab societies' appetite for a kind of democratic transformation after the model of a potential new hegemony in the region, led to internal conflicts and proxy wars that opened the way for reshaping borders in the region[55]. Last but not least, it also brought a wave of migration to neighboring countries and to European countries.

Why the migration wave can be considered a potential geopolitical shock? First, it has the surprise component, European countries were surprised by the scale of the phenomenon, a magnitude caused by the policy of the European

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21, 2007 apud Helene Lavoix, "Looking Out for Future Shocks", p. 40 in ***, *Resilience and National Security in an Uncertain World*, Centre of Excellence for National Security, 2011, URL: http://www.academia. edu/506028/Looking_Out_for_Future_Shocks, accessed on 12.06.2017.

[49] S. Colin Gray, *Strategy and Defence Planning, Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty,* Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 200.

[50] Constantin Hlihor, *România şi şocurile geopolitice ale Războiului Rece (1980-1991)*, IRRD Publishing house, Bucharest, 2016, p. 48.

[51] *Ibidem,* p. 51.

[52] ***, *International Migration Outlook 2016*, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016, p. 147, URL: http://dx.doi. org/10.1787/migr_outlook_en, accessed on 12.07.2017.

[53] Martin Ruhs, Nicholas Van Hear, *Irregular Migration as a Response to Geopolitical Shocks: The Long-Term Effects of Short-term Policies*, European University Institute, November 2014, URL: http://www.eui.eu/Documents/ RSCAS/PapersLampedusa/FORUM-RuhsVanHearFinal. pdf, accessed on 12.07.2017.

[54] Ben Ali headed Tunisia for 20 years, Hosni Mubarak for 30 years, Muammar Gaddafi held the power in Libya for 40 years.

[55] Steven Blockmans, "Vanishing Lines in the Sand. Why a New Map of the Middle East is Necessary", CEPS Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies, 1 October 2013, URL: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ Blockmans% 20CEPS%20Commentary%20Middle%20 East%20-%20Lines%20in%20the%20sand.pdf, accessed on 12.12.2017.

Union that, after the outbreak of conflict in Syria, oscillated between doing nothing and keeping them outside the EU. Let's remember that, in 2013, over 95% of the 3 million refugees in Syria at that time found shelter in Syria's neighboring countries[56]. European states have been internally, politically, and socially shaken by the flow of refugees and illegal migrants. They had to rethink their migration policies, reassess the environment and security policies, and adapt their political discourse to the wave of populism and nationalism that fed itself on fears about new migrants. European countries were determined to strengthen their national and community defense structures (they decided to remilitarize borders by suspending the Schengen agreement), to cooperate more in the area of defense (extension and strengthening of Frontex mandate in order to fight illegal migration, cooperation with NATO for the defense of external borders), to be actively involved, under the umbrella of the European Union, alongside NATO, in solving the causes of migration.

We have to deal with another paradigm shift: with the increasing phenomenon of migration, the natural outcome of globalization, we can now speak about a process of "de-globalization of borders"[57], as Roderick Parkes, researcher at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, names it. Migration is no longer considered as two decades ago "the triumph of global economic drive over territorial order", but "an object of geopolitical competition"[58]. "Across the world, countries are not only trying to reassert control of their borders but also to use people flows and differences of population size for geostrategic gain"[59], just as Turkey did recently, for example, by conditioning the accommodation of refugees on its territory with certain European Union decisions. Another example are MENA states,

which tried to use mobility to impose autocracy or theocracy in the region[60].

However, is the migrant wave of 2015, caused by a geopolitical shock, a proof for a pattern change in migration? The answer is no. The trend of rapid growth of south-north migration already existed: 22.5 million refugees in 2016 compared to 17.2 million in 1990[61]. Following the conflict in Bosnia (1992-1995), 700,000 people fled to Western Europe[62], most of them in Germany[63]. In 2015-2016, more than one million migrants reached in a rather short time on Germany's territory (442,000 asylum applications in 2015 and 722,000 in 2016[64]), namely three time more than the ones in the '90s. Information (about possible host villages, welfare states) that travels fast through social media and televisions, cheaper means of transport, already known routes like the Balkan Route are factors that also contributed to the large number of refugees. The way in which the wave of migration to Europe has been perceived in recent years makes it different from the other waves, due to images and information on the arrival of refugees transmitted by television and online in real time, but also because of *fake news*[65], distorted information, in a fake context or with titles which have nothing to do with the content. A study by the German Ebert Foundation, in 2017, puts the explosion of false news about migrants on pro-Russian propaganda's account,

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[56] Martin Ruhs, Nicholas Van Hear, *op. cit.*, November 2014, p. 5.

[57] Roderick Parkes, "European Union and the Geopolitics of Migration", UIpaper, no. 1, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2015, p. 6, URL: https://www.ui.se/globalassets/butiken/ui-paper/2015/european-union-and-the-geopolitics-of-migration---rp.pdf, accessed on 21.07.2017.

[58] *Ibidem,* p. 1.

[59] *Ibidem.*

[60] *Ibidem,* p. 11.

[61] ***, Global Report UNHCR 2016, UNCHR, 2016, URL: http://reporting.unhcr.org/publications#tab-global_report, accessed on 21.07.2017.

[62] ***, *The State of the World's Refugees, Fifty Year of Humanitarian Action*, UNHCR, Oxford University Press, 1 January 2009, p. 219, URL: URL: https://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bb50.html, accessed on 14.07.2017.

[63] ***, *Statistiken zur Migration und Integration von Migranten*, Europäisches Forum für Migrationsstudien, Universität Bamberg, 15 December 1997, URL: http://www.efms.uni-bamberg.de/ds27_2_e.htm, accessed on 12.11.2017.

[64] ***, *International Migration Outlook 2017*, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2017, p. 190, URL: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2017/germany_migr_outlook-2017-18-en#page1, accessed on 14.07.2017.

[65] Fake news consisting in distorted information, presented in a misleading context or with titles which have no connection with the content.

who uses the refugee theme to divide, weaken the European Union, a strategic gain for Moscow. "Just as anti-immigration propaganda in general, the pro-Russian propaganda outlets also tend to connect the European migration crisis with terrorism, criminality and the decline of the Western world. First, they securitize the issue with this tool and, second, they create a stark contrast between Russia, depicted as well-organized, peaceful and strong, and the weak, chaotic West declining into a state of civil war"[66]. The most prominent target of pro-Russian propaganda on migration has lately been Germany. We have the well-known case of Lisa, a 13 year old girl in Berlin, half-Russian, reported missing by parents, who, when found, claimed to have been raped and beaten by three men from the Middle East. The extremely emotional case was taken over by the Russian press that blamed the refugees[67], triggered protests from Russian minorities in Germany and almost caused a diplomatic crisis between Berlin and Moscow[68]. The investigation has shown that Lisa was not raped or beaten, and the story become a case study in articles on Russian propaganda in Europe[69].

Conclusions

Undoubtedly, the Arab Spring is a turning point for the Middle East and North Africa.

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[66] Attila Juhász, Patrik Szicherle, *The Political Effects of Migration-related Fake News, Disinformation and Conspiracy Theories in Europe*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Political Capital, Budapest, 2017, p. 7, URL: https://goo.gl/wDCKqs, accessed on 21.07.2017.

[67] "Russia-1", Russian television channel feature on Lisa case, 16 January 2016, URL: https://www.1tv.ru/news/2016-01-16/3330-avstriya_vremenno_priostanavlivaet_deystvie_shengenskogo_soglasheniya_iz_za_sluchaev_nasiliya_v_germanii, accessed on 12.02.2017.

[68] Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergey Lavrov, accused the German authorities of trying to "politically correct whitewash reality for internal political reasons" (Daniel Bax, "Kreml wittert Vertuschung", in *TAZ*, 26 January 2016, URL: http://www.taz.de/!5269840/, accessed on 12.09.2017.

[69] Stefan Meister, "The 'Lisa Case': Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation", in *NATO Review*, 2016, URL: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm, accessed on 12.12.2017.

Although the conditions for the outbreak of riots in the region because of the socio-economic and political situation existed, the magnitude of these revolts surprised the analysts and the West. The upheavals grew and became more range through the contribution of social media and television. The fall of traditional autocratic regimes in the region led, in some countries, to small reforms, and, in others, to the rise of governments with a strong Islamic component and, in the worst cases, to bloody internal conflicts, to proxy wars in which the great global (United States, Russia)/regional (Iran, Saudi Arabia) players are trying to expand or re-gain their influence. Conflicts, political, economic, and social instability, left behind by the geopolitical shock in the Middle East and North Africa, have led to sudden, unexpected changes in human security in some states. The immediate consequence which surprised European countries was the wave of refugees from 2015 onwards. The influx of migrants respects the trend of south-north migration over the last few decades and has reactivated already existing migration routes. We notice that the pattern of managing this migration has changed. The magnitude of the phenomenon was given not only by the number of migrants, but also by the way it was perceived by the states – which already securitized migration – by the population who witnessed the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees in real-time via television and live stream on the Internet. The phenomenon has been augmented by using migration as an internal political tool by nationalist and populist parties and foreign political tool, with the help of misinformation, in order to divide the European Union. It is certain that, with this migration crisis, the European Union is at a turning point. It has to re-evaluate its values and rules.

The European Union needs to look at how viable the Schengen Area is, how well the Dublin Agreement works in such situations, whether solidarity in the redistribution of migrants is the right solution or whether each European state decides for itself. In order to be prepared for such situations states need resilience, not understood as shock resistance, but as the capacity of states to transform shocks with potential negative impact into advantages.

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THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR IN THE LIGHT OF THE 'MOBILITY OF POWER'

Lavinia MOICEANU*

The article presents a parallel between Halford Mackinder's view on the 'mobility of power' during the XVIth century and the projects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in the attempt to analyse the impact of power exertion over geographical and economic mobility within the projects that compose the BRI, which are the belt (Silk Road Economic Belt- SREB), and the road (Maritime Silk Road Initiative - MSRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as their component. This analysis emphasizes the term 'mobility of power' by linking it to the infrastructure projects such as the CPEC in particular and the BRI in general, to the geographical aspects of building infrastructures in South Asia and mostly with the economic rationales which could lie behind the CPEC projects. This article also presents a parallel between the role of the CPEC under BRI and the role of the discovery of the route of transport through the Cape Route.

Keywords: *mobility of power; geography; economic relations; defence; infrastructure; Belt and Road Initiative.*

Introduction

In his article called *'The Geographical Pivot of History'*, published in 1904, the geographer Halford Mackinder was writing on the geographical and geopolitical significance of the discoveries of Christopher Columbus and the discovery of the transport route that passed by the Cape of Good Hope to Europe. In the view of the author, the discovery improved 'mobility of power', which in the end changed 'the relations of Europe and Asia, for whereas in the Middle Ages Europe was caged between an impassable dessert to south, an unknown ocean to west, and icy or forested wastes to north and north-east, and in the east and south-east was constantly threatened by the superior mobility of the horsemen and camelmen, she now emerged upon the world, multiplying more than thirty-fold the sea surface and coastal lands to which she had access, and wrapping her influence round the Euro-Asiatic land-power which had hitherto threatened her very existence.'[1] The alternative route around the Cape offered Europe the shortest known way to the domination of the newly-discovered lands. In the view of the author, the European power became more mobile due to its improved defence, it created itself more transport and trade routes and improved its access to the newly-discovered shores and to its domination on them.

A brief history of the attempts to connect the Asian continent to the interests of the Great

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[1] Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, April 1904, p. 433.

*Lavinia MOICEANU is PhD Student of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Switzerland, former Visiting Fellow of the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels, and former intern of the Centre for International Strategic Studies from Islamabad, Pakistan. E-mail: lavi.moiceanu7@gmail.com

Powers and of the actors involved in the Great Game[2] emphasizes infrastructure projects which were meant to link India with Germany, Great Britain, Russia or France. As Mahnaz Ispahani outlines too (*Roads and Rivals*, 1989), all these powers competed at different times for the economic facilities that the Indian subcontinent offered due to its access to remote areas of the British India.[3]

In 1877 the city of Quetta was occupied by the British in order to prevent the access of the Russians to British India and to secure the trade from the region. Bolan Pass then became very important to the British after the Second Afghan War because it facilitated military logistics. Russia built a road from Qasvin to the Gulf of Anzali (important Iranian port at the Caspian Sea) in October 1899, but the best access route that they were considering was the route that linked Tehran and Caucasus. The possession over Sistan Province was one of the Russian targets because it would have brought them nearer to Baluchistan, but it was also the shortest route to linking the Trans-Caspian railway to the Indian Ocean and a safer route than any other crossing Afghanistan. The implementation of the Berlin-Baghdad railway had a difficult diplomacy during the Second World War. It was meant to reopen 'the central route' of the Medieval trade and be modernised in order to bring the economic benefits that the Germans were hoping for. But this railway was going against the Russian interests. After the Second Afghan War the British started to build a railway from Sind to Pishin, which linked Bostan in today's Turkey to Quetta in today's Pakistan and which was finalized in 1892. Thirteen years later, in 1905, this railway route was also covering the distance between Quetta and Nushki and was later extended to the border with Iran. Once these routes were built, the movements of troops were facilitated in emergency cases, and political subordination was improved. Moreover, the lands crossed by the British infrastructures were territorially integrated in the British Empire and ruled by it.

1. Significance of 'mobility of power'

'Mobility of power' is rather a term used by Mackinder in 1904 in order to define the international context of Europe in the XVIth century, considering that its advantages, territorial expression and significance had been discovered long before. Therefore, we will analyse the projects that compose the BRI and their significance as a result that combines 'mobility of power' with the current geopolitical realities that take place on the Asian continent.

From the implementation of the infrastructures that compose the CPEC and the BRI, mobility in the south of Asia increased from the point of view of transport, energy, and China's access to markets from the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Africa. The CPEC, as part of the BRI, also includes the dynamic dimension of connectivity. The corridor is the piece that connects the MSRI and the SREB, created and financed by the Chinese government. And the projects do not stop here, as some of the components of the corridor are not fully implemented, and news articles have revealed that a potential extension of the corridor on the Afghan territory is planned by the Chinese initiators. 'China played a critical role in Afghanistan's change of attitude toward Pakistan and the Talibans. On 26 December 2017, the first China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Dialogue of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs took place in Beijing. The two most important observations resulted from this trilateral dialogue were related to Beijing's availability to play a constructive role for the improvement of the ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the decision to extend the CPEC to Afghanistan.'[4] All these observations mark the dialogue about the beginning of a potential extension of CPEC and of a mobility of the Chinese power to Afghanistan.

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[2] The Great Game is the name of the asiduous competition that began in the XIXth century and ended a century later among the British empire and the Tsarist Russia for the strategic advantages entailed by Central Asia.

[3] Mahnaz Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: The Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*, I.B. Tauris, London, 1989, p. 37.

[4] Muhammad Munir, 'Extending CPEC to Afghanistan', in *Pakistan Observer*, 7 March 2018, URL: https://pakobserver.net/extending-cpec-afghanistan, accessed on 05.05.2018.

Figure no. 1: Projects of the BRI[5]

The infrastructure network of the CPEC represents the climax of the Sino-Pakistani relations and links the two components, the terrestrial and the maritime, of the BRI. One of its objectives is that power receives more mobility for Pakistan, but especially for the Chinese initiators of the BRI. The corridor gives more 'fluidity' to the Chinese power, linking it to pre-existent infrastructure networks from Europe, the Middle East and Africa, in addition to the infrastructure built and or planned by China. And the increased geographical connectivity of the corridor determined other manifestations of power. For example, the Chinese financial power in the region cannot be overlooked, as the over 46 billion American dollars Chinese investments have not reached their final on the Pakistani territory. Military power is another dimension of the corridor, as both parties have engaged to offer their security to the labour force that finalizes the infrastructures of the corridor. Moreover, the strong military ties between the two neighbour countries are well known. The corridor improves the mobility of the army in case it has to intervene in order to prevent dangers and threats. Thus, the workers can be more easily evacuated in case of danger, and unrests can be better kept under control once the military moves more easily to the affected areas.

2. Geography and mobility – space and power

We will now focus on the aspects that Mackinder considers when he approaches geography and mobility. First of all, he mentions the relationships between Asia and Europe that reversed as an effect of the discoveries made during Columbus′ times, which offered Europe the opportunity to influence other territories and to get out of its isolation. Thus, Europe reached new lands that increased its economic relations and its control over its own borders and over the other discoveries. The new extended terrestrial and maritime power allowed Europe to extend its commercial ties to Asia and to dominate the trade sector. Now, after more than six hundred years from those events, SREB offers the reversed

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[5] ***, *Mapping the Belt and Road initiative: this is where we stand*, Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Berlin, URL: https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker/mapping-the-belt-and-road-initiative, accessed on 07.05.2018.

image of those times. The BRI extends from the eastern coast of China to the western border of Europe, in Spain, connecting the Chinese power to major railways, roads and maritime routes that generate an economic transborder system which overcomes the magnitude of the European model described by Mackinder. The significance of the CPEC within this system results from the strategic geographical advantages that its components assure. And it is not only about the energy or technology transfer projects and the new markets that the geographical location of Pakistan opens within the BRI. It is also about the maritime connections that China has built to the Persian Gulf, which connect it to Africa and the Middle

of power exertion and of 'mobility of power' in the case of the BRI and the meeting point between geography and mobility, which makes it necessary for us to refer to economic and geographical connectivity and their role in the context of international relations.

'Infrastructures shape complex systems of human activity, including economic, cultural and political systems. That is, infrastructures affect the behavior of individuals, firms, households, and other organizations by providing and shaping the available opportunities of these actors to participate in these systems and to interact with each other.'[6] Connecting this aspect with the power projected by China within the BRI through


Figure no. 2: Highways network of CPEC[7]

East. Therefore, the economic relations promoted during the 'Columbian Europe' reached a new phase nowadays under the Chinese control. We can talk about control because the development of the BRI projects leads to an increase of the mobility of the Chinese power inside the countries crossed by the BRI with the support of its connectivity infrastructures, whether we speak about charisma, technology, finances or military elements.

Connectivity is brought into light by the correlation between mobility and power, as their effect. Concretely, it represents the origin

the infrastructure projects, we may observe that this exertion of its power is meant to lead to a transborder community that shares infrastructures with social value and amplitude, based in China. The Chinese government has the command of this initiative however remote geographically are the projects that compose it.

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[6] Brett Frischmann, *Infrastructure. The Social Value of Shared Resources*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, p. xi.

[7] ***, *Highways Network of CPEC*, Monographic Study On Transport Planning 2013-2030, Pakistani Ministry of Planning and Reform, URL: http://cpec.gov.pk/map-single/1 , accessed on 08.06.2018.

China's control over remote areas allows it to also maintain its influence over natural resources sectors (necessary to its own development), situated on the track of the infrastructures of road, railway, energy mobility developed by Beijing, but also over the allocation and distribution of the access to these resources. Both CPEC and the BRI as a whole, have turned into promotion and industrial production networks, which increase China's power capital on their routes.

As Mackinder states, not only that Columbus's Europe enlarged its economic relations, but it also improved its defence system inside and outside its own borders. As the comparison between the European system of the XVIth century and the economic system created by China goes further, one may observe also the geographical dimension of the defensive rationale of the BRI and CPEC. Geographically speaking, the corridor connects China and Pakistan from the Kashgar region of China and crosses the Pakistani land to the Port of Gwadar. The corridor transforms the city of Shanghai into an economic Asian centre, not only to China, but also to Central-Asian countries and Pakistan. Shanghai is also the host city of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), perceived as an eastern alternative to NATO[8], although its defensive dimension emerged and developed in order to promote cooperation among the governments of its member states and the ethnic minorities from their perripheral provinces. Based on the objective that the perripheries capture the central interest[9] both within the organization and inside the member states (so that for example the regions mostly populated by ethnic minorities could be integrated into a system that gives them primary attention), the SCO seems rather a structure that intends to gravitate around the ample world wide initiative against

terrorism, initiated after the 9/11 events. In this context we may mention that although Pakistan has become a member of the SCO in 2015 and it is also a NATO partner in the region, the defence dimension of the relationship between China and Pakistan and of their common trade is provided under distinct military agreements. Pakistan′s geography plays an important role in the security structure of the region and of the BRI.

China's geographical condition before the implementation of the first BRI projects offers the image of a country which is surrounded by mountains and deserts to the north, west and south and by disputed maritime zones to the east. We may not know if China considered itself economically blocked or ′caged′, according to Mackinder's writing about Europe before the Columbian discoveries, but one may observe the massive multiplication of the Chinese influence outside its own borders, in spite of the hostile space surrounding it and of the adverse public reactions to its rapid growth. The hostile geographical space that the BRI crosses from China to the Port of Gwadar, through Central Asia and beyond entails the mountanous Himalaya chain at the southern Chinese border or Takla Makan desert in Xinjiang province in north-western China. The BRI projects cover millions of square kilometers from China to Spain and the Middle East, offering a clear picture of the lack of attention of Beijing to the public criticism that considers that all goes under the Chinese attempt to transform the SREB space into a compact market submitted to China's own interests. CPEC extends to the Port of Gwadar which offers an opening to the Hormuz Strait, Persian and Oman Gulfs and the north of the Indian Ocean, an opening necessary to connecting the Chinese eastern market and industrial production to the regional resources and mobilities. Through the development of the mentioned port, China assured itself not only the access to markets from the region of Gwadar, but also to undisputed waters, that Pakistan, its longtime friend and neighbour, is open to assure.[10]

[8] Mohan Malik, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, p. 73.

[9] Xu Qinhua, "SCO and Russia-China-India Triangular Relations", in *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, April-June 2008, p. 23, URL: http://www.himalayanresearch.org/pdf/2006-7-8/vol12%20N2final.pdf, accessed on 10.05.2018.

[10] China received the concession of the Gwadar Port from the Pakistani government for 20 years, with revenues of 91 per cent for China, and 9 per cent for Pakistan. The port which has become a free trade zone between China and Pakistan is now administered by China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC).

Moreover, China's power in the region could also be translated through its capacities to influence events and to put its print over the manner in which parties reach and seal agreements in some of the regional conflicts. This manifestation of the Chinese power may become concrete in several regions that face conflicts within the BRI and outside it.

According to Mackinder, there is also the defensive dimension resulting from the correlation of power and mobility. Therefore, is BRI a belt that isolates China from a potential threat? If so, how does China operate a defensive isolation and its opening to the outside world so necessary to its economic growth? ′Song Xiaojun (military expert from Beijing)


Figure no. 3: Railways network of CPEC[11]

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[11] ***, *Railways Network of CPEC*, Monographic Study On Transport Planning 2014-2030, Pakistani Minister for Planning, Development and Reform, http://cpec.gov.pk/map-single/2, latest accessed 08.06.2018.

suggested an economic reason: ′China has an increasing request of resources and energy, and some of these resources need to be imported from abroad. If their transportation and trade are threatened, industrialization and urbanization will be questioned.′[12]

Comparing this statement to what Mackinder emphasizes in his article from 1904, we might draw the conclusion that the defence of the Chinese projects comes with the economic growth and with the mobility that they create in order to prevent any foreign interference or threat that may reduce the resources and energy, with consequences on the Chinese industrialization and the urbanization. In case they are affected, China's development and its own security could be in danger and thus even the ability to rule of the Chinese leaders could be in question. Therefore, the BRI needs to be protected from the insufficiency or failure of its ′material conditions of mobility′.[13] The infrastructures of the BRI need to transport resources and energy which are later transformed into industrialization and urbanization, just like blood circulates nutrients through the body, giving it the necessary energy and resources to grow and move. Any absent or disfunctional component may lead to the unsustainability of the whole system. CPEC especially has a defensive military component, as the Chinese and the Pakistani armies have developed a strong relationship. For example their mobility was proved in multiple cases when Chinese workers on the corridor needed protection on the Pakistani territory in order to finish their work on the projects. ′Although China's foreign policy has shown flexibility, it is important to note that Chinese presence in the Global South is driven by certain national and economic interests. China has shown willingness to forgo its non-interference stance if its economic and national interests necessitate it. In Pakistan, China showed this flexibility by pushing for the security establishment's takeover of the security issue of CPEC. Involving the Pakistani military was also in China's national interests.′[14]

During an interview with the author, answering a question related to the parallel between Mackinder's view on ′mobility of power′, CPEC and the role of NATO in this context, General (r) Philip Breedlove states that the Chinese ′have this very long-term view of their problems and are less interested with a result next week. They are more interested in a lasting result that will happen in two or three years. And so, as they look at these corridors like the Chinese-Pakistani corridor [...]; they have decided that there are strategic assets in that area and as you know, they have significant holdings in northern Afghanistan in minerals and mineral rights and so they [the Chinese n.a.] think on a long term of ′how do I access those markets?′, ′how do I access those mineral rights?′ [...], that is why they are taking again this long view of ′how do I invest in order to assure my access in the region, to the minerals etc.′[15]

3. Reactions and Plans of NATO, EU and Russia Regarding the BRI

The BRI projects have extended in the last years in Europe as well, crossing its territory from east to west, including some of the Balkans' states which are attempting to obtain the membership of NATO and/or the EU. The mobility of the Chinese power inside Europe is generated on two major dimensions equally important to Beijing, which can be found in the whole idea of BRI: connection to the Global North and protection to the Global South. The attention for the poor south was a prerogative of the Chinese foreign policy since Mao Zedong. Nowadays this prerogative also aims for the opening to the access to resources by the transport routes developed by China in the south of Africa, in the south of Europe and in South America. But in order to really mediate the relationship between the two, mostly between the rich and the poor, China connected itself to the North through the pipelines, railways and road transport in the north of Europe and in Russia. These endeavours aim

[12] Edward Luttwak, *The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy*, Cambridge Massachussetts/London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 70.

[13] Halford Mackinder, *op. cit.*, April 1904.

[14] Maham Hameed, "The Politics of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor", in *Palgrave Communications*, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2018, p. 8, URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0115-7, accessed on 05.05.2018.

[15] Interview of the author with Philip M. Breedlove, General (ret.) in the United States Air Force and of NATO Supreme Ally Comandament, June 2018.

not only to facilitate China's desired peaceful rise so that it does not raise resentments or resistance (although they are already present on the BRI routes), but also to build/design the Chinese image, ′face′, charisma as much as possible and, if possible, as prudent as possible, just as Deng Xiaoping tried during his mandate at the lead of the Chinese Communist Party from the end of the 1970s to 1997. Russia does not intend to project its ′face′, charisma or mobility outside its borders as China does. Moscow's interest is to impose its political options by creating relationships based on the dependence of hydrocarbures from its territory. China is trying to build an integrative system of international relations where the Russia Federation has its own role, but it also delimits itself from the Russian tendencies to build its own infrastructures for the transport of resources (which compete with the Chinese routes). Central Asia which was once considered as belonging to the USSR also became permeable to BRI projects and one of its strong links. Moreover, the pragmatic approach used by the two great powers to each other also contains the dynamic of their own relationship with the U.S. The relationship between China and the U.S. became more tense because of the customs taxes imposed by the American president to some products and raw materials exported by China to the U.S., a measure to which China reacted by applying its own restrictions to American imports to China.

Regarding NATO's approach to CPEC, gl. (r) Breedlove assesses that ′first maybe we should not just talk about NATO, but talk about the West in general so of the Western nations, so broader than just NATO, EU nations and others. We all have an interest in peacefully cooperating with China in the future. We all have an interest in not causing conflict over China's right to try to have access to parts of our world.′[16] Therefore, he considers that ′NATO needs to understand that it is just one piece of many pieces like the EU and others that have to be concerned with how to find a peaceful way forward with China that does not either exclude China from its international rights, but also that actions by China not precluding

NATO, EU or other countries to the same access. [...] NATO should work in a way with the EU and like the EU that does not provide exclusionary rights to China or other places to make sure that this is a zone of free and open trade, not exculsionary trade.′[17]

The EU is looking for solutions to become more independent from the Russian gas, but the relationships developed by Russia inside the European community and in the Balkans hinder the process and facilitate the Chinese investments as an effect of the need for capital and infrastructure from countries where the accession process to the EU developes legthily. Commercial relations, investments and infrastructures for development, have become an option both for countries from the EU and for other European countries from outside the EU such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,[18] FYROM, Muntenegro or Serbia.[19] These countries will be probably accepted to the EU having already the status of components of the BRI, which is a pre-accession status to which Brussels has not been confronted before in the previous accession processes. And China, who marked its commercial space and who will further develop it in order to prepare it for the trade network that it has created, it will not hesitate to use its economic and defensive power, already mobile inside the EU. (The mobility of the Chinese trade and industries along the BRI in Europe extends from the eastern flank of the EU to the western side in the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands and in Spain). We will see how will NATO and the EU manage the ′fragmentations′ that will emerge inside their space as a consequence of this mobility.

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[16] *Idem*.

[17] *Idem*.

[18] N.A.: Kosovo province has unilaterally declared its independence in 2008 and is presently recognized by most of the Euro-Atlantic Community, except by Serbia, Romania, Spain, Cyprus and Greece.

[19] Horia Ciurtin, *A Dragon in the Powder Keg: China's Mercantile Quest in the Balkans,* Policy Paper, published by the *New Strategy Center*, March 2018, https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NSC-Policy-Paper-China-in-Balcani-A4-_03.2018.pdf, p. 7.

Conclusions

The analysis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor under the view of ′mobility of power′ emphasizes a series of aspects that contribute to the shaping of another perspective on the economic and geographical motivations which lie behind the corridor and the BRI as a whole. Of course there are other motivations as well, and the ′mobility of power′ is a term that needs further and more detailed research. For now, this term offers a view on the Asian regional dynamic and on the evolution of the relationships and projects inside and outside the CPEC, within the BRI. As a bridging gap between the belt and the road, the CPEC assures and requires a certain degree of terrestrial and maritime mobility, as it represents the shortest route from China too the Persian Gulf and the north of the Indian Ocean.

Although Mackinder's view on the ′mobility of power′ dates back in 1904, it can be correlated to an updated nowadays' competition from the sphere of the international relations and security. The parallel between the European context in the XVIth century and the context that China has created in these past years facilitates the understanding of some of the rationales of the massive investments achieved by Beijing under the BRI. While the European context mentioned by Mackinder was different than the one today, in a way that allowed the defence of trade through multiple alliances among the political entities of the time and maintained a total control over the territories that had ust been discovered, China activates nowadays as a singular actor which confronts itself with the challenge of proposing its economic and especially industrial initiatives through the routes and infrastructures that it has built, acquired or has been using on the territories of sovereign countries from Africa, Europe and Asia. The nowadays' reversed context finds the Chinese projects fragmented by the national borders and by the various national interests on the routes of its projects, which cannot be controlled as in the Columbian times. Therefore, as Mackinder states, the Europe of the XVIth century could act like a single block at different occasions in order to defend its trade network from outside its borders. Since the territorial realities and not only them have enormously changed since then, one of China's major challenges will be that of assuring its usual commercial flux and the access to the resources that guarantee its growth. (But China's access to those resources and to the destination markets for its final goods and merchandises will be a continuous challenge for the West as well.) Access routes to the zones where resources are located are not a new idea. What is new is the Chinese industrial access routes-based ascension and the challenge to keep them viable and functional in the actual world wide context. In this case, when the lands crossed by the BRI are less cohesive than the lands once controlled by Europe (which in time have opted for their independence and imposed Europe the restrain of its borders of control), and the borders of China and not only seem to gain more fluidity as an effect of the infrastructure projects and the mobility of the trade that is developed on them, one may wonder what situation reversals history prepares and which would be the role of ′mobility of power′ and China's priority if Beijing is faced with the case in which the defence of its economic interests along the routes and countries of the BRI and the defence of its own politico-geographical configuration would exclude each other.

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
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LIKE WAR – THE WEAPONIZATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA

There are certain outstanding inventions and innovations in the history of mankind that made a great impact on the course of history and greatly influenced the development of the world. Tesla's radio, the airplane of the Wright Brothers or János Neumann, laying the groundwork for modern computer technology, just to name a few. Referring particularly to the field of security and defence, we could mention Vauban's innovations in fortification, the appearance of the machine gun or the creation of the atomic bomb. They all brought great contributions to where we are today. Although the first three examples were not meant for military use like the other three, they were quickly adapted to serve military purposes.

The topic of *LikeWar – The Weaponization of Social Media*, the recently published book of P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, was made possible by the use of an invention originally meant for the military, later "set free" to be used by the masses, then finally to become used for military purposes, once again. Not too long after the Internet became widely available and used throughout the globe, a new phenomenon appeared online in various shapes and forms: the social media, and caused greater changes than anyone would have imagined before.

LikeWar – The Weaponization of Social Media touches an ever-interesting topic that has been continuously examined from various aspects in order to appreciate its contribution to freedom of speech, to understand its mechanisms and strength, the book being reviewed this time setting the scope of the examination of the threats and the destruction that can be caused by the different players of the world of social media.

The authors – both defence experts – are Peter Warren Singer, a Strategist at *New America* and an editor at *Popular Science Magazine*, with five books previously published, who has been named by the Smithsonian as one of the 100 leading innovators of the United States, besides being among "The 100 most influential people in defense issues" by the Defense News[1], and Emerson T. Brooking, former Research Fellow at the *Council on Foreign Relations*, writer of several articles for *The Atlantic, Foreign Policy* and *Popular Science*.[2]

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[1] Biography of Peter Warren Singer, URL: https://www.pwsinger.com/biography.

[2] Emerson T. Brooking, "About me", URL: https://www.

Through the little more than 400 pages, the book introduces the reader to the world of social media, from a general prospective to the very particular examples of how it has been used for purposes other than connecting people and sharing memories. The nine chapters – which include the more than 100-page-long "Notes" giving extra details about the facts mentioned before in the main body of the chapters and also a very useful "Index" that makes searching and cross-referencing much easier – guides us into the labs and the masterminds of those who want to take advantage of the enormous power and potential that social media holds. A great set of carefully selected real life events illustrate through their details how reused pictures, out-of-context videos, brilliantly edited imagery, used in a timely manner in the required quantity can manipulate millions of readers, viewers or even ordinary bystanders who just happened to be put in a situation where they cannot avoid but to bump into propaganda material designed to influence their behaviour and approach to certain topics.

The terrorist group "Islamic State" was used as a perfect object-lesson to demonstrate the methods and also the magnitude of how well-crafted and timed "inputs" can have previously unprecedented effect on the affected population. Back around May-June 2014, the just emerging terrorist group – even before being self-proclaimed caliphate – used its own means with the help of outsider "fellow supporters" in order to launch a social media campaign like a weapon of psychological operations to break the will and the strength of the enemy. But the campaigns on Twitter, Facebook and other social media platforms were even more successful: according to surveys, US citizens were more scared of terrorism than they had been after the attacks of September 2001, when their own country was attacked, claiming lives of thousands and not an "unknown" city, Mosul, ten thousand kilometres away.[3]

This "snapshot" was soon followed by what could be called the thesis statement of the book: "Attacking an adversary's most important center of gravity – the spirit of its people – no longer requires massive bombing runs or reams of propaganda. All it takes is a smartphone and a few idle seconds. And anyone can do it."[4] This quote perfectly illustrates the new innovative nature of social media's dark side. However, this can be only one of the main statements, since the book does not only deal with war and terror. The authors also look behind the scenes of the Donald J. Trump phenomenon, focusing on the most important milestones of the TV show celebrity Trump of 2009 becoming the 45th president of the United States of America eight years later. Answering questions like how a US invention – the Internet – was used against the United States, how the effects of hacked information can be multiplied by fake news sites and bot farms to shape public opinion.

In order to give a more comprehensive picture about the "new roles" of social media, the book digs into other conflicts such as the Russia versus Ukraine war or the fights of the Middle East. In the case of the latter one, analysing how the opposing forces of Israel and Hamas (and their respective supporters) used the means of social media during Operation Pillar of Defense in order to win the third front of the war besides the "physical" and the "cyber" fronts: "the world of social networks". The only area where the Israeli Defense Forces were not prepared enough shows a perfect example how leadership and consequent planning can tackle new challenges in a fairly short amount of time. This part of the book describes it perfectly how the conflicts of a relatively small area, concerning a relatively limited number of population can raise global awareness and shape global attitude towards the players and the region.[5]

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etbrooking.com/about.

[3] P. W. Singer; Emerson T. Brooking, *LikeWar - The Weaponization of Social Media*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2018, pp. 8-9.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 18.

[5] A.N.: it needs to be mentioned that although the authors' description of the situation seems to be thorough, they mistakenly state that the Iron Dome is a "US-provided defense system", while it is on the contrary, both designed and manufactured solely by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries, *ibidem*, pp. 193-201.

The greatness of the book resides in the fact that it is not just a retrospective glance at events that have happened so far, the authors do not feel comfortable only showing the mistakes (which in itself is of course an important part of the learning process), but they also focus on the next steps necessary in order to avoid similar incidents or further escalation of such "attacks of LikeWar". Namely, they raise the questions how national governments are responsible for education and for raising awareness against fake and manipulated media items and also, to impose enough control over the social media providers. Talking about the companies, it is also highlighted how the stakeholders of social media, the owners of brands like Facebook, Twitter, Reddit or YouTube and such have a huge responsibility towards their users and especially for the very ideas that originally guided the innovators at their launching.

For those who are still undecided whether to read *LikeWar* or not, but do not know what is meant by Anonymus "Expect us." or what is behind SMEIR in Fort Polk, Louisiana, or how revolutions around the world have been connected with the Internet since the end of the last millennium, it is definitely a must read. And last but not least, for all of us, we cannot forget that, although, the "Battle of the internet is continuous, the battlefield is contiguous, and the information it produces is contagious. The best and worst of human nature duel over what truly matters most online: our attention and engagement."[6], but it is always us who make the decision.

János BESENYŐ PhD [*]
Dávid VOGEL PhD [**]

[6] *Ibidem,* p. 261.

[*] **Colonel (ret) János BESENYŐ PhD, Assistant Professor of Óbudai University, Budapest, Hungary. E-mail: besenyo.janos@gmail.com**

[**] **Dávid VOGEL PhD, independent Researcher, Budapest, Hungary. E-mail: divad.legov@gmail.com**

THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM

The common thread that links all of Timothy Snyder's work is that it is of paramount importance to study of history, especially the history of Central and Eastern Europe, as a means to understand the evolution and the involution, respectively, of these states on the road to democracy. A reputed historian, T. Snyder is a professor at Yale University in the United States, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in the US. He is the author of works such as *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (2010), *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning* (Penguin, 2015), *On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century* (Penguin, 2017).

In his recently published book, entitled *The Road to Unfreedom. Russia, Europe, America*, Timothy Snyder presents his theory regarding the political changes that have occurred recently, the increasing popularity of nationalist and separatist movements in the European Union, as well as the rise of nationalism in the USA. He starts from two concepts that he considers defining for contemporary politics: *the politics of inevitability* and *the politics of eternity*. From his point of view, the USA and Western Europe have been guided by the politics of inevitability[1] in the 20th century. This politics assumes the view that the future is similar to the present, the laws of social and economic progress are known, there are no viable alternatives to the *status quo*, so no action is necessary on the part of the states, alliances and citizens to ensure the perpetuation of democracy and rule of law. The politics of inevitability is based on the democratic principle of free elections which inevitably leads to a change in the ruling political class so that, even if the voters' expectations are deceived, the politicians' term-in-office is finite and the promise of a better future is achievable by replacing them in the electoral cycle.

The inertia caused by the trust in the well-functioning of the democratic system and in the inevitability of change has left these countries vulnerable and exposed to the rhetoric and ability to manipulate the past and the present that the representatives of the second type of politics, the politics of eternity, make use of. This politics is intensely promoted by the Russian Federation.

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[1] Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom. Russia, Europe, America*, Tim Duggan Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC, New York, 2018, pp. 7-10.

The politics of eternity place a nation at the center of a cycle of victimization[2], which is based on recycling and reusing the same past threats to create a state of perpetual tension and to eliminate any responsibility on the part of the governments to do anything to develop society. The politics of eternity alters the purpose of governance to ensure progress and social welfare and replaces it with the role of protector against foreign threats to the nation's values and interests. In this system, politicians create crises and manipulate emotions to distract people's attention from the lack of reforms, the underperforming economy, and underperformance of social protection. With the help of mass media, the citizens are enticed to live in a perpetual cycle of elation and outrage which distracts their attention from the future and focuses it on the present.

The common functional element of these two politics is the fact that they transform facts into narratives, and, in both cases, the past is just the fuel for these narratives that serve the goals of the political systems they promote. In the case of the politics of inevitability, past facts are irrelevant because, no matter what happens, progress cannot be stopped. To the politics of eternity, history and historical facts are simply a reservoir of events from which one can select randomly those that can be used to build the myth of innocence and danger that can distract the citizens' attention from the fact that there are societies in which people are freer, other communities which are better developed and other states in which reforms are functional and improve the citizens' lives.

Although, at first sight, the politics of inevitability seems to be the preferred option in comparison to the alternative, T. Snyder draws the readers' attention to its limitations. The narrative that it is based on is that there are no alternatives, that progress is the only unavoidable path. But the lack of alternatives leads to a negation of individual responsibility and of the role that each individual plays in the coming about of changes and in the understanding of history. In the capitalist view, the politics of inevitability substitutes the free market to other policies that may lead to societal development, which generates economic and other kinds of inequalities and undermines trust in progress. This is, in T. Snyder's opinion, the first step in the shift from democracy to oligarchy.

T. Snyder actually criticizes both types of politics because, to his mind, neither makes use of what he calls "historical thinking", which he considers fundamental for the evolution of society. "To think historically is to accept that the unfamiliar might be significant, and to work to make the unfamiliar the familiar."[3] By means of this direct and conscious involvement in history, people can control politics and the way they are led so that their welfare comes first. Thus, T. Snyder champions the study of history as a direct and conscious quest for progress.

In the six chapters of the book, T. Snyder analyzes the ways in which the politics of eternity appeared and gained ground in the Russian Federation and this country's rising influence in other states, focusing on the events in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014 (Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea), on the effects it had and it still has in other European Union states (BREXIT and the rise in popularity of nationalist parties and movements) and on the way in which this politics led to the election of the 45th American president, Donald J. Trump.

T. Snyder's analysis, somber and occasionally elated, offers some solutions to counter the effects of propaganda and to halt the fall into unfreedom. The first solution is more precise and it is based on encouraging the development of local journalism, which focuses on the concrete problems of the people who live in a certain area. Such news would be difficult to fake since the people are familiar with the events they portray and are less susceptible to fall prey to disinformation. T. Snyder firmly believes that the cornerstone of democracy is the principle of succession. It presupposes a system of governance which stipulates the mechanism through which leaders are periodically replaced, by means of

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[2] *Ibidem*, p. 8, p. 23.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 20.

free elections, by the people they govern. In this context, it is important for the citizens not to lose faith in the electoral system as the basis of the principle of succession. The goal of each election is the promise that if things do not go well, they can be fixed, that human errors can be turned into political predictability which creates a feeling of progress towards a future that we can somewhat control.

To these principles, Russia opposes strategic relativism which is based on the idea that "Russia cannot become stronger, so it must make others weaker."[4] If Russia cannot solve its problems, then at least it can export them so that they become the new normal and they are no longer seen as problems that need to be addressed.[5] And Russia opposes Western democracy and tries to undermine it, because the Russian citizens cannot see that somewhere democracy works and then ask for the same principles of succession to apply in Russia.

The work presents the two types of politics in a harsh light, without creating any illusions regarding either of them. However, the reader's conclusion, which subsumes the author's conclusion, is that the study of international history is paramount in order to have a clear understanding of great state evolution trends, to classify events and to comprehend their consequences on the grand stage of history.

Otherwise, T. Snyder considers, the citizens are blindfolded, and the choices they make can have an impact on social progress in unimaginable ways. The final proposal that T. Snyder makes is to adopt a politics of responsibility, which he does not provide too many details on in this book, but which he had previously tackled in *On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century.*

Ruxandra BULUC, PhD. *

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[4] *Ibidem*, p. 249.
[5] *Ibidem*, p. 195, p. 249, p. 272.

* *Ruxandra BULUC is Associate Professor in the Strategic, Public and Intercultural Department of the Security and Defence Faculty, "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: buluc.ruxandra@myunap.net*

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