STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 3/4[64-65]/2017

CONTENTS

EDITOR'S NOTE

The current issue englobes two editions, respectively 3 and 4, for the year 2017 (no. 64-65), and comprises a collection of seven papers, to these adding the traditional *CDSSS Agenda, Scientific event* and *the Guide for authors*.

The journal is opened by the rubric ***NATO and EU: policies, strategies, actions***, where Lieutenant Colonel Andrei Zota, PhD Candidate and Captain Diana Șerban reveal aspects on *Cooperation between NATO and the European Union*.

Further on, at the rubric ***Security and Military Strategy***, you can read the material elaborated by Colonel Constantin Nicolaescu, dwelling on the *Efficiency of Special Operations Forces Interoperability in Real Situations*, followed by the article of Colonel (AF) Ștefan-Daniel Cotigă, dealing with *Specific Management for Designing and Granting Host Nation Support on Romania's Territory*.

At the rubric ***Geopolitics and Geostrategy: Trends and Perspectives***, Captain (Navy) Cătălin-Mihai Gherman shares with you the results of his study on *Recent Developments in the Wider Black Sea Area Security Environment*, ideas that were presented during the Workshop with the theme *"Military Sciences - Security Sciences - Conceptual Landmarks"*, organized by the CDSSS on October 19, 2017.

Under the title ***Defence and Security Concepts***, we included three articles, the first belonging to our colleague, Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Senior Researcher, who presents our readers the results of her study on *Resilience*, in terms of *Concept, Approaches and Implications*. In the second article, Mrs. Anne Marie Dragomir, PhD Candidate in Information and National Security, deals with another topical concept, *The Fake News Phenomenon in the Social Media Era*. Last but not least, Mrs. Rita Palaghia, PhD Candidate in Military Sciences, approaches the subject *Cross-cultural Competence*, launching the question whether this is a *Unity Factor or Challenge in the Multinational Operational Environment*.

Ms. Raluca Stan presents in the rubric ***Scientific Event***, some aspects of interest regarding three activities organised in the second part of 2017 by CDSSS: *Workshop "Military Sciences - Security Sciences - Conceptual Landmarks", October 19, 2017*; *Workshop "Satellite as an Enabler for C4ISR", November 14, 2017* and *International Conference "The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment", 7-8 December 2017*.

In turn, ***CDSSS Agenda*** for the period July-December is brought to your attention by our colleague, Andra Pînzariu.

In the end, we signal the ***Guide for Authors***, a useful lecture for those interested to disseminate the results of their research in *Strategic Impact* quarterly.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is an open access publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University (available at http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm) and is a *prestigious scientific*

journal in the field of Military Science, Information and Public Order, according to National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published four times per year, for 17 years in Romanian and for 13 years in English, approaching a complex thematic: security and defence related issues; security and military strategies; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; political-military topicality; geopolitics and international relations; future of conflict; peace and war; information society, intelligence community. Readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

The journal is distributed free of charge in main security and defence institutions, as well as in national and international academia in Europe, Asia and America.

Regarding international visibility – an important objective of the journal –, recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA), Index Copernicus International (Poland), WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, but also by its presence in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad such as NATO and of universities with military profile from Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

We hope that this introduction shall be a motivation not only to read this issue of the journal, but also to inspire you with new topics for your research endeavours, which we look forward to receiving for the prospect publication in *Strategic Impact*.

Florian CÎRCIUMARU
Editor in chief,
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Andrei ZOTA*
Diana ȘERBAN**

The strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is necessary to meet the security challenges, given the regional instability in the eastern and southern neighborhoods of the two organizations. Over the last four years, there has been a stronger relationship between NATO and the EU, with a focus on strengthening cooperation, coordinated planning and information sharing across seven strategic areas. However, there are many political obstacles, such as those generated by national - especially economic - interests, public opinion on the allocation of defense budgets, and the fact that Member States view regional threats differently.

Keywords: NATO, EU, NATO-EU cooperation, information, security, partnership, crisis management.

Preliminary considerations

In the current strategic security environment, closer and more effective cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has become essential. The two international organizations are confronted with unprecedented challenges, complex risks and threats, both conventional and hybrid, generated by state and non-state actors, mainly from the East and South. Security efforts within NATO and the EU are interlinked.

Together, the two organizations can efficiently mobilize a wide range of resources and tools to respond to threats in areas of common interest. Neither of the two have the full range of tools to deal with these security threats on their own, so NATO and the EU need to be better complemented in terms of security in order to respond in a uniform and effective manner to the new threats, multidimensional and unprecedented.

At the same time, cooperation between the two organizations is vital, especially in the area of hybrid threats in the European space, as well as countering politics and cyber-attacks, which are also a cause for concern[1]. While the risk of weakening the Transatlantic link and solidarity between EU Member States persists, the strategic approach to Russia should be strengthened.

Unlike relations between NATO and the United Nations (UN), NATO-EU ties can be considered more profound if we take into account the European identity of most of the member states of the two organizations, both of which are indispensable in ensuring the security of Europe and their citizens. Adapted to the changes following the fall of the Iron Curtain

---

[1] **** Report on EU-NATO relations (2017/2276 (INI)), Committee on Foreign Affairs*, European Parliament, http://www. europarl. europa. eu/ sides/ getDoc. do? type= REPORT &reference= A8-2018-0188&format=XML&language=EN, accessed on 28 May 2018.

*Lieutenant-colonel Andrei ZOTA is PhD Candidate in Intelligence and National Security with "Carol I" National Defence University and employee of Headquarters Multinational Division South-East, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: andrei.zota@mndse.nato.int

**Captain Diana ȘERBAN is employee of Headquarters Multinational Division South-East, Bucharest, E-mail: diana.serban@mndse.nato.int

and subsequent events, NATO has been a major factor for stability and security for Europe. Such a feature also arises from the fact that, since 1990, most of the European states have first become NATO members before joining the EU[2].

The European Union is a unique and essential partner for NATO, especially as the two organizations share 22 Member States, a situation that offers the two international actors the opportunity to complement and support each other in matters related to international security. Close cooperation between NATO and the EU can only have positive consequences for both parties, underpinning the comprehensive approach to crisis management operations and operations and missions that also involve a civil response, in addition to involvement from a military point of view.

Indeed, NATO-EU cooperation is one of the EU's priorities in order to strengthen European defense and security as part of the implementation of the document Shared Vision, Common Actions: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy presented by the Vice-President of the European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 28 June 2016.

Romania has consistently supported the development of a strong partnership between NATO and the EU, respecting the autonomy of the two organizations and multiplying the effects of their policies and actions. An eloquent example is the statement of a member of the European Parliament who stressed the necessity and importance of cooperation between the two entities in the field of information exchange, stating the following at the plenary session of 4 July 2017: NATO and the European Union need to work together. We are not enemies, we must invest and work together to defend Europe and defend the world. I welcome the launch of the European Defense Fund[3]. But before any plan of

a common army, there is the need for an increased exchange of information between intelligence agencies. I know that intelligence agencies are reluctant to make a full exchange of information with all the services in the Member States – this is a matter of trust, and it is a sensitive matter – but it is vital that the volume and quality of this information exchange grow[4].

1. Aspects on the historical cooperation between NATO and the EU

The major challenges posed by the changes that took place since 1989 in the European space have led to an ever closer rapprochement between NATO and the EU, a cooperation materialized in 1993 through NATO's decision to make its military capabilities available to the EU. This has created the possibility for the EU to engage in missions on its own, but using the capabilities of the NATO Alliance. These were Petersberg missions, which include humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions and combat forces missions for crisis management, including peacemaking[5].

However, relations between NATO and the EU were institutionalized in 2001 on the basis of the steps taken in 1990-1999 to promote greater European accountability in the defense field. The 2002 EU-NATO Joint Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)[6] established the political principles underpinning the relationship of the two organizations and reaffirmed EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for EU-led military operations. Also,

Europe's defence capabilities *(European Commission - Press release,* http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_ro.htm, accessed on 28 May 2018.

[4] Monica Macovei's declaration at the plenary sitting of the European Parliament on 4 July 2017, *Thematic debate: The defence plan of the European Union and the future of Europe*, (authors' translation from Romanian language), https://monicamacovei.eu/nato-si-uniunea-europeana-trebuie-sa-lucreze-impreuna-pentru-apararea-europei-si-lumii/, accessed on 28 May 2018.

[5] *Glossary EUR-LEX, Petersberg Missions*, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html?locale=en, accessed on 02 May 2018.

[6] In 2009, changed its name to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

---

[2] Exceptions – States that are not NATO members but who have joined the EU: Sweden (1995), Malta (2004), Finland (1995), Cyprus (2004) and Austria (1995).

[3] In June 2017, the European Commission launched a European defence fund worth 5.5 billion a year to stimulate

the implementation of the agreement established a joint working agenda of the two international actors, as well as the concrete modalities of joint consultations, cooperation and action transparency.

In 2003, the so-called "Berlin Plus" arrangements laid the foundation for NATO's support for EU-led operations and missions, where NATO as a whole was not engaged[7]. On 31 March 2003, Operation Concordia led by the EU took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led Allied Harmony Operation in the Republic of Macedonia. This mission, ended in December 2003, was the first Berlin Plus operation in which NATO resources were made available to the EU.

Based on the results of Operation Concordia and following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU initiated a new mission, called Operation Althea, on 2 December 2004. The EU Force (EUFOR) operates under "Berlin Plus", relying on NATO's planning experience and the other resources and capabilities of the Alliance. Deputy Supreme Commander of the NATO Alliance in Europe (DSACEUR) is commander of Operation Althea, and the EU Operations Headquarters (OHQ) is located at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)[8].

NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo, Kosovo Force (KFOR), since 1999. The EU has contributed for years to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)'s civilian activities and has taken over the UN's police component. The European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, held in December 2008, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The central objective is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the field of rule of law, especially in the police, judiciary and customs, working closely with KFOR. The EULEX mandate was

prolonged until 14 June 2020[9].

NATO-EU cooperation outside of European space also took place in Afghanistan. Over the last decade, NATO and the EU have played a key role in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan as part of the wider efforts of the international community to implement a global approach to supporting the country. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helped create a stable and secure environment in which the Afghan government and other international actors can build democratic institutions, extend the rule of law and rebuild the country. Both ISAF and its successor since 1 January 2015, Resolute Support Mission, have co-operated with the EU Police (EUPOL) Mission, which worked in Afghanistan between June 2007 and December 2016. EUPOL Counselors within the Afghan Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Afghan National Police have supported the reform and development of civilian policy. The EU also initiated a judicial reform program and contributed to the financing of civilian projects in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) under NATO co-ordination, each of them having as leading nation an EU member state.

Another example of cooperation outside the European area is represented by joint efforts against piracy in the Horn of Africa. NATO's naval forces under Operation Ocean Shield (2008-2016) and EU naval forces (Operation Atalanta) worked alongside other actors off the coast of Somalia for anti-piracy missions.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO's New Strategic Concept[10] was adopted, in which allies underlined the determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership. The 2010 Strategic Concept has compelled the Alliance to work more closely with the EU on crisis prevention, conflict management and post-conflict stabilization.

---

[7] *** *Relations with the European Union*, https://www. nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm, accessed on 20 May 2018.

[8] *Ibidem.*

[9] *The new EULEX mandate*, http://www.eulex-kosovo. eu/?page=2,10,836, accessed on 08 June 2018.

[10] *** *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon - Active Engagement, Modern Defence,* https://www.nato.int/ lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, accessed on 12 May 2018.

In 2016, other notable progress was made in deepening NATO-EU cooperation relations. Thus, in February 2016, a technical agreement on NATO's Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and EU's Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU) was signed, and the operative and tactical arrangements between NATO's Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the European Union's European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) were initialed in March 2016.

The latter are particularly useful in the context of launching joint NATO-EU efforts to combat illegal trafficking in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. NATO Defense Ministers decided on 11 February 2016 to deploy naval forces in the Aegean Sea to support Greece and Turkey and elements of the FRONTEX agency in their efforts to address the refugee and migrant crisis. The NATO Maritime Permanent Group 2 (SNMG2) conducts recognition, monitoring and surveillance activities in the waters of Greece and Turkey, as well as in international waters. The development in the Aegean Sea aims to support international efforts to reduce trafficking in human beings and illegal migration. NATO ships provide real-time coastguard information and relevant national authorities in Greece and Turkey, as well as FRONTEX, helping them in their efforts to cope with this crisis. In order to achieve maritime security, in October 2016, defense ministers agreed to extend NATO's presence in the Aegean Sea and also decided that the new NATO operation, Sea Guardian, would support the EU Sophia operation in the Central Mediterranean, contributing to raising awareness and providing the necessary logistical support.

In the context of the deterioration of the security situation in Europe (cyber threats, hybrids, the situation in Ukraine / Crimea, the rise of terrorist threats, especially after the attacks in Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in March 2016), on 8 July 2016, the EU and NATO at the Warsaw Summit, signed a declaration to strengthen cooperation, coordinated planning and information sharing in seven strategic areas, as follows: hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cyber security, defense capabilities, industry and research, joint exercises, enhanced joint capabilities.

In essence, the Warsaw Summit laid the foundations for close cooperation between the two organizations, giving political weight to strategic development decisions in terms of common defense. These decisions could have considerable effects in the future. The signed document indicates the desire to streamline visions, to reconcile the means and to enhance decision-making cooperation, all of which are driving Europe to a defense action unit.

2. Towards a deeper strategic partnership

The upward trend of deepening cooperative relations was reconfirmed in December 2016 when Allied foreign ministers issued a Declaration on the implementation of the NATO-EU Joint Statement of July 2016, highlighting, inter alia, the importance of strong Transatlantic ties, continued partnership development (which remains a priority issue), and the fact that a strengthening of European defense and EU capabilities also contribute to NATO's consolidation. The declaration was accompanied by a joint set of 42 measures for the seven priority areas identified in July 2016 to advance NATO-EU cooperation[11], including:

• Measures to strengthen resistance to hybrid threats, from misinformation campaigns to acute crises;

• Development of operational cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea through the two maritime operations - NATO Operation Sea Guardian and Operation EUNAVFOR Sophia;

• Exchange of information on cyber threats and the exchange of best practices on cyber security; Ensuring the coherence and complementarity of mutual defense planning processes;

• Coordinated and parallel deployment of exercises;

---

[11] *** *Council conclusions on the implementation of the Joint Declaration, General Secretariat of the European Union Council*, Brussels, 06 December 2016, http://data. consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15283-2016-INIT/en/pdf, accessed on 12 May 2018.

• Efforts to support local partner countries' capabilities in the security and defense sectors.

In order to ensure and consolidate progress in all areas previously agreed on 5 December 2017, the two organizations approved a new Joint Declaration, a set of new proposals, including a further 32 Joint Actions[12].

This common approach also addressed three new themes. The first refers to operational mobility, which aims to ensure the rapid movement of forces and equipment across Europe, if necessary. This requires procedures for rapid border crossing, sufficient means of transport and solid infrastructure (roads, railways, ports and airports).

The second new concept aims to exchange information in the fight against terrorism and strengthen the coordination of counter-terrorism support for partner countries.

The third issue involves promoting the role of women in peace and security (reiterating the important role of women in CSDP and NATO missions, especially in contact with women and children in conflict zones, and recommending to proactively promote gender diversity in NATO and EU structures and operations.

By implementing the Joint Declaration, the two organizations make a more effective exchange of information on each individual's activities in order to gain better mutual knowledge and understanding. Co-operation is now the established norm and daily practice, which fully corresponds to the new level of ambition mentioned in the joint declaration, providing a solid basis for strengthening future interaction.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General presented three interim reports on the implementation of joint actions agreed by the NATO and EU Councils, the first two on 6 December 2016 and, respectively, on 5 December 2017. The last report was published on 31 May 2018 with a view to the forthcoming meeting of the European Council of 28-29 June 2018 and the NATO Summit of 11-12 July 2018[13] highlighting the main achievements of EU-NATO cooperation and highlighting its added value in various areas aimed at enhancing citizens' security. Following the presentation of the interim reports, a series of conclusions can be drawn, structured on the seven areas presented above:

a. Hybrid threats

Combating hybrid threats remains of major importance, while 20 of the 74 current co-operation proposals focus on this area. The European Centre Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki[14] contributes effectively to strengthening EU-NATO cooperation in this area.

b. Operational cooperation including in the maritime field

EU and NATO staff are involved in exploring ways to enhance maritime coordination, complementarity and cooperatively, using Shared Awareness and De-Confliction in the (SHADE MED)[15] as the main forum for sharing information and coordinating efforts.

c. Cyber security

Active interaction among staff focuses on developing concepts and doctrines, existing and planned training and education, threat indicators, alert exchange and threat assessments, cyber-crisis management and regular meetings. At the end of 2017, the EU participated for the first time with specialized cyber defense personnel at the NATO Cyber Coalition exercise. Also in April 2018, specialized personnel from the EU took part in the Locked Shields cyber defense exercise at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn[16].

---

[12] *** *Relations with the European Union,* https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm, accessed on 20 May 2018.

[13] *** *Third Progress Report on the Implementation of Common Action Plans adopted by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017*, published 31 May 2018, Brussels, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35578/third-report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf, accessed on 2nd June 2018.

[14] *The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats*, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/, accessed on 02 May 2018.

[15] *EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia*, https://www.operationsophia.eu/shade-med/, accessed on 02 June 2018.

[16] *NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence*, https://ccdcoe.org/, accessed on 28 May 2018.

d. Defense capabilities

Efforts continue to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of planning tools and processes, namely the European Capability Development Plan (CDP)[17], the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)[18] process and NATO processes, such as the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) and the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process. NATO and EU staff work together to ensure coherence and synergy between NATO and EU efforts to improve mobility in military action.

e. Defense and research industries

EU and NATO staffs continue the dialogue on defense industry issues, which includes periodic updates on NATO and EU activities in the field. The information exchange focuses on the periodic updating of NATO and EU efforts, in particular on industry practices, including access by small and medium-sized enterprises to defense procurement, innovation, and industry involvement in certain areas.

f. Exercises

The following parallel and coordinated exercises, with the EU leading them, will be held in November 2018[19]. Similar to those of last year, these exercises will be based on a hybrid scenario including cybernetic elements, and will have the same general objective - synchronizing the crisis response actions of the two organizations, especially in a hybrid context. Regarding participation as observers in its military exercises, NATO invited EU staff to the following exercises to be held in 2018: Trident Junction 18, Trident Jaguar 18, Cyber Coalition 18, and Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise 18. At the same time, the NATO team

---

[17] *European Defence Agency's Capability Development Plan (CDP)* https://www.eda.europa.eu/DOCS/DEFAULT-SOURCE/EDA-FACTSHEETS/2017-06-20-FACTSHEET-CDP.PDF, accessed on 02 May 2018.

[18] *European Defence Agency's Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD),* https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card), accessed on 02 May 2018.

[19] *** *EU-NATO cooperation - Factsheet, European External Action Service,* Brussels, 04 June 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headQuarters-homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en., accessed on 05.06.2018.

participated with a team of observers in the European Union exercise, MILEX 18, held in April 2018.

g. Consolidated joint capabilities

Partner assistance in capacity building, especially in the Western Balkans and our eastern and southern neighborhood, is a common goal of NATO-EU cooperation. Exchange of information has intensified, including informal political consultations on the three pilot countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova and Tunisia), but also Ukraine, Georgia and Jordan. Recent initiatives include cooperation on strategic communication efforts in the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans. Other consultations concern education and training, including online education, as well as democratic control of the armed forces of Tunisia.

Also, in 2017, the European Union has decided to contribute 2 million euros to the NATO Integrity Building Program, which aims at reducing the risk of corruption and promoting good governance in the defense and security sector.

Conclusions

Close cooperation between NATO and the EU is an important element in developing a global approach to crisis management operations, which requires the efficient use of military and civilian means.

NATO-EU maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas demonstrate the nature of the cooperation between the two organizations. In this context, the collection and exchange of information significantly influences the dynamics of NATO-EU interactions. Effective cooperation between NATO and the EU in the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea relies heavily on the close interactions between NATO and FRONTEX. Informal platforms for data exchange form the backbone of NATO-EU cooperation. For example, the adaptation of the SMART platform, designed to allow for the exchange of information between the European

External Action Service (EEAS), NATO, FRONTEX and other national organizations, has significantly improved the level of knowledge of the common situation and coordination.

However, NATO and the EU continue to face difficulties in coordinating Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. The European Union does not currently have sufficient ISR resources and therefore has important deficiencies in knowing and understanding the situation. This has become particularly evident in the EU's efforts to operate efficiently in Libyan waters (EUNAVFOR MED – Operation Sophia). Consequently, collecting and sharing information remain, at the same time, some of the biggest barriers to more effective cooperation between NATO and the EU in the Mediterranean and Aegean areas, and it is also an area of interest for future collaboration.

Currently, in NATO, NATO is largely benefiting from the efforts of the EULEX mission. While NATO ensures peace and security for on-the-spot cooperation and dialogue, EULEX complements the Alliance's efforts, striving to establish the rule of law, to destroy the criminal networks and systemic corruption affecting the country, to enable Kosovo to achieve a certain degree of stability and sustainable economic prosperity.

In the first half of 2018, meetings on issues of mutual interest became more frequent and covered the following topics: on the one hand, aspects of EU cyber policy, the results of the strategic review of the Atalanta operation, EU Training Missions (EUTM) and the EU Capacity (EUCAP) Building Missions in Somalia; on the other hand, NATO operational activities - ongoing military operations, the Western Balkans, Iraq, energy security, the role of the Alliance in the maritime field, etc.

Synergic cooperation between NATO and the EU is necessary in today's complex international security environment. This cooperation should be carried out in a spirit of transparency and complementarity, respecting the various mandates of the organizations, decisional autonomy and institutional integrity.

However, there are many political obstacles: the EU still lacks common resources among its members, and the concept of the EU Battle Groups remains anchored in theory rather than put into practice. However, the EU continues to demonstrate its willingness to act in the field of security.

In addition, although NATO and the EU have many opportunities to strengthen their capacity building efforts, there are many challenges. NATO members and the EU appear to place themselves in different groups of states with profound differences in the perception of regional threats. This divergence may enhance strategic separation in the EU and NATO and may also influence attempts to bring together capability requirements. For example, capacities considered necessary in Spain or Italy may not be regarded as such by the Baltic States.

Moreover, issues related to defense investments and perceptions of threats are closely linked to national interests and national strategies of NATO and EU member states. In many cases, states have different interests and priorities, especially in the defense field. This is especially true when it comes to defense spending. Another challenge for the creation of NATO-EU joint defense capabilities is represented by public opinion and economic issues. Increasing defense spending and common military capabilities will probably be more critical because of European public opinion.

Further, collective efforts are needed from both organizations, such as the development of mechanisms for knowing the situation and streamlining the coordination of response to hybrid threats. NATO and EU member states need to realize that it is time to strengthen political-military cooperation, with the prerequisites and opportunities available nowadays to take common steps to ensure common security.

BLIOGRAPHY

1. *** Third Progress Report on the Implementation of Common Action Plans adopted by NATO and the EU Councils on 6 December 2016

and 5 December 2017, published 31 May 2018, Brussels, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35578/third-report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf.

2. *** Press release of the European Commission on the launch of the European Defense Fund, Brussels, 07 June 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm.

3. *** Council conclusions on the implementation of the Joint Declaration, General Secretariat of the European Union Council, Brussels, 06 December 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15283-2016-INIT/en/pdf.

4. *** Glossary EUR-LEX, Petersberg Missions, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html?locale=en.

5. *** Report on EU-NATO relations (2017/2276 (INI)), Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2018-0188&format=XML&language=EN

6. *** EU-NATO cooperation - Factsheet, European External Action Service, Brussels, 04 June 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headQuarters-homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en.

7. *** Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon - Active Engagement, Modern Defence, https://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

8. BĂRBULESCU, Iordan Gheorghe; RĂPAN, Daniela, Trilingual Explanatory Dictionary of the European Union, Polirom Publishing House, Iaşi, 2009.

9. MESTERHAZY, Atilla, Report on NATO-EU cooperation following the Warsaw Declaration, NATO Defense and Security Committee, 07 October 2017, https://www.nato-pa.int/downloadfile?filename=sites/default/files/201711/2017%20DSCTC%20%20163%2017%201%20E%20rev%20EU%20fin%20%20COOPERATION%20and%20%20NATO%20REPORT.pdf 20MESTERHAZY%.

10. EULEX Kosovo official website, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,10,836.

EFFICIENCY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEROPERABILITY IN REAL SITUATIONS

Constantin NICOLAESCU*

As we are living in a very unstable security environment, a thorough analysis of the operational elements efficiency in real situation is more than welcome for identifying the key aspects that need to be changed immediately and also for taking into consideration the experience gained in similar situations to efficiently apply the lessons learned. We also consider important and necessary to highlight one of the most successful operational examples where a significant success factor was the inter-agencies special operations forces interoperability efficiency: Operation Enduring Freedom. The model is to be considered also because of its applicability in complicated and challenging operational environments like the hybrid one.

***Keywords**: interoperability, efficiency, Operation Enduring Freedom, special operations forces (SOF), unconventional operations.*

1. Conceptual landmarks

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, flexible and agile operational elements designed to carry out national strategic level missions in ambiguous, austere and dynamic environments for relatively short periods of time[1]. The new operational environment demonstrates the need for synergistic effects as a result of the integration of conventional and special operations at all levels of combat, tactical, operational and strategic, and the special operations forces play the role of a catalyst and are the binder needed to achieve this, being the only ones created to be able to complete the key tasks[2].

SOF are highly specialized, have a reduced imprint, can be used punctually, to solve major, strategic issues whose effects on the assigned goals have a strong media impact. They are the ones that have continuity in most types of conflicts, and their effects are greater than the marks (by mark we mean not only the size imprinted by the conducted intervention, but also the number of personnel actually involved in the intervention. The SOF are generally less visible, and the execution of missions is difficult to detect).

Starting from the hypothesis that SOF are effective in the current conflicts, this aspect can be easily proven by the need to involve them in solving seemingly intangible and stringent issues. By the quality of obtaining the intended outcome, without necessarily following the established procedure of solving the problem, these forces bring the necessary supporting arguments for the hypothesis. In our opinion, efficiency is demonstrated by the action that produces its desired effect following the well-established and well-known steps.

---

[1] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05:* Special Operations, 16 July 2014, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, p. I-5, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf, accessed on 10.08.2017.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. I-5.

Colonel Constantin NICOLAESCU, Phd Candidate at "Carol I^st" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania is the 6th SOF B-de Chief of Staff. E-mail: conic0905@yahoo.com

The differences between how it needs to be done and what needs to be done in order to solve problems generate effects in the medium and long term. The immediate effect is clearly defined by the speed of execution. But not always the fastest solution is the best one. The subsequent effect of the actions may often have repercussions. A properly executed action is much better assimilated because it is the product of a cause-action-effect analysis that aims to diminish de facto negative reactions.

Such actions require, at a given moment, due to the multitude of factors affecting their conduct, the involvement of several SOF elements either multinational or interagency, which, without a minimum allowable interoperability level, are not able to cooperate effectively.

An unanimously accepted definition of interoperability is that it is the ability of some temporarily constituted military elements, generally multinational and/or joint, to collaborate coherently and efficiently for the successful accomplishment of the assigned missions, which "is possible under the conditions of the similarity/compatibility of the organizational structures, the procedures specific, the weaponry and the equipment"[3]. To these we add the usage of a common operating language, so that interaction would not pose language barriers when performing a joint mission.

From the point of view of interoperability, which is indispensable for the functioning of a combined multinational structure, the actions must focus on three main directions:
• the technical factor: weapons systems, combat technology, ammunition, hardware and, last but not least, maintenance;
• the procedural factor: from operating procedures (often referred to as standard, although they are in fact verified and tailored to each unit/sub-unit), document templates, means of reporting and communication to doctrines;
• the human factor: level of execution skills, experience, language, terminology, etc.

Moreover, if we add the interagency factor to those listed above, the difficulty of solving the issues seems to increase exponentially.

In according with another definition, interoperability is "the ability of military structures to effectively cooperate towards achieving missions"[4], and is manifested in a common, multinational, and/or interagency environment.

When discussing the interoperability of special operations forces, we need to consider all the forces available, regardless of their origin. Almost all military and/or paramilitary structures have special purpose forces that have lately been called "special operations forces" or derivatives. The requirement of their common use is given by the new dimension of the conflict, which has issues conducted in the "gray area", at the boundary between peace and war, where the combined, consecutive or simultaneous use of these forces for the achievement of the political-military objectives is extremely necessary.

It is precisely the interagency cooperation that poses a problem, and not just at the level of the special operations forces. The national cooperation stops at the level of the working groups that often do not produce actual measures or results. The legislation regulating the crisis response is complicated and difficult to implement, and the establishment of a number of specialized headquarters does nothing more than fragment the cooperation, encourage redundancy of the forces and hinder the implementation of the single command principle.

Moreover, understanding the need to create a suitable and proven common procedure is far from being achieved. The requirements in this area refer to the development of standard procedures rather than functional procedures. Special operations forces are strongly affected by standardization, since their training and formation are based on imagination and non-standard approaches.

The differences generated by the implementation of standard procedures at the expense of those which were verified, functional, based on lessons learned and experience, are reflected in the skills development and training and even in encouraging the initiative in research and innovation.

---

[3] Dexonline, https://dexonline.ro/definitie/interoperabilita-te, accessed on 13.08.2017.

[4] Dexonline, https://dexonline.ro/definiție/interoperabilita-te, accessed on 12.08.2017.

We believe it is necessary to recall that the current leaders who coordinate the specialized forces often show them to create a favorable image for the institution because these forces having a strong classified nature and this kind of actions are not in their own benefit.

2. Case study: Operation Enduring Freedom

To analyze the importance and the dimensions of the interoperability of the special operations forces in real situations, we suggest studying the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The case study brings to the forefront the efficiency of the interagency SOF in implementing a single strategic plan, under a single command, in order to achieve objectives that would have been unachievable under different circumstances.

We intend to reach three goals, namely: to discuss the type of specific operation in terms of doctrine, to recognize the importance and the potential of the command, control and communications unit, to maintain support in such an environment, and last but not least, to explain the importance of the interoperability and the cohesion from the strategic level to the tactical one.

We approach this issue in order to resume all the aspects that define the level of interoperability and efficiency of the interagency special operations forces that initially participated in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in northern Afghanistan, in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif (MeS), to be able to use these aspects in constructive simulations in the future, in support of the historical analysts and the widening of the research horizon, as well as to begin using the acquired experience and the lessons learned.

We mention that the case study has been conducted before, but from different perspectives. In 2002, US General Tommy Ray Franks, USCENTCOM Commander at that time, initiate the project, focusing in particular on unconventional warfare, perhaps because of the fact that for the strategic operations, the conditions for exercising a single and coherent command have already been set, but above all because the special operations forces of the various inter-agencies prove an excellent level of interoperability. Subsequently, in 2004, US General Peter Jan Schoomaker ordered that the study be used as an educational tool in the training centers of the United States Army.

Therefore, the novelty we bring by resuming this case study is the efficiency of the interoperability of the special operations forces in real situations.

The case study is a pedagogical experience where the student encounters a real situation in order to achieve certain educational goals. It contains reflections based on primary analyses or decision-making processes in order to finalize the results, or both. Long before our time, a Chinese Confucian philosopher said the following: "Tell me and I will forget. Teach me and maybe I will remember. Involve me and I will learn"[5], which erroneously was attributed to Benjamin Franklin, a proverb that gives us an idea of the importance of the achieved experience and its subsequent exploitation. Later, Edgar Dale, in the study "Pyramid of Experience"[6], tells us that by reading one only remembers 10% of the information, 30% by viewing and up to 90% by actually participating. So by implication we are able to efficiently use the experience which sometimes is achieved through sacrifice, in order to avoid or minimize the possibility of remaking previous errors.

The study begins at a time when the tasks and the structure are not clearly defined. It can be considered as a starting point for future research or it can be a reference at least in the analysis of the command and control architecture.

Afghanistan has been a mystery and it may continue to be so for a long time. The multitude of spoken languages, the homogeneous and impenetrable ethnic groups that only rarely

---

[5] Xun Kuang apud https://www.quora.com/Where-and-when-did-Benjamin-Franklin-say-Tell-me-and-I-forget-teach-me-and-I-may-remember-involve-me-and-I-learn, accessed on 10.01.2018.

[6] Edgar Dale, *Piramida experienţei*, www.queensu.ca/teachingandlearning/modules/active/documents/ Dale_Cone_of_Experiences_summary.pdf, accessed on 10.12.2017.

mixed, an extremely rough terrain, hard to imagine that it can be inhabited, and, in addition to what has been said, a disastrous road networks that has improved only due to the effort of the coalition forces during the actual Operation Enduring Freedom. We add that the governance does not represent the nation, but only Kabul, being, without discussion, dependent on a potential foreign aid, which has led to a strong local autonomy and has significantly reduced the relevant initiatives for independence.

The strategic challenges that initiators faced during the planning of the operation were conditioned by meeting the objectives set at these levels.

If the triggering factor (for the planning initiated on September 12, 2001, immediately after the September 11 attacks) constituted the need to defeat (neutralize or destroy) the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, a prerequisite for achieving this goal was to eliminate the possibility of unleashing a war against Islam, in general. A second objective was to defeat the Taliban movement, the condition for its fulfillment being not to declare war to Afghanistan (which implies the need to involve the special operations forces, so that they would not be perceived as an occupation force because of their small mark). The need for massive involvement of the local forces has been identified, of course through techniques and procedures associated with the concept of train, advise, assist and accompany[7] in combat, an aspect which could only be solved by the physical presence of the military forces in the territory (a mission specific to the special operations forces, deriving from military assistance). Thus, unconventional operations or unconventional warfare, according to the United States doctrine, meets all the criteria necessary for the fulfillment of the above-mentioned objectives, but we cannot ignore the fact that this type of mission is enduring, as has been shown in history, in Central and South America, whereas

---

[7] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05:* Special Operations, 16 July 2014, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, p. II-10, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine /pubs/jp3_05.pdf, accessed on 10.08.2017.

9/11 called for a quick response.

In view of the above, we consider it necessary to emphasize that a conventional operation was almost impossible to accomplish because no neighbor would have accepted the pre-deployment of the necessary forces before the beginning of the war, and the distances between the aircraft carriers or the land air bases would have made the air support necessary for the land forces very difficult. Thus, the time required for conducting unconventional operations becomes less expensive than the conventional operation itself (the air operations could be triggered immediately, but could not remove the Taliban movement, while the conventional land intervention could do so but with a significant delay).

In accordance with our analysis, maintaining an objective point of view, we tried to identify common goals of the United States and the Afghan leaders:
• destabilizing the Taliban governance;
• changing the balance of power towards other ethnic Afghan groups;
• kill or capture Osama bin Laden;
• installing a liberal, democratic, multi-ethnic, secular government in Kabul;
• dismissing the Taliban movement and the Al-Qaida outside Afghanistan;
• kill or capture all members of the Al-Qaida terrorist organization;
• kill or capture all members of the Taliban movement;
• suppressing the opium production in Afghanistan;
• preparing a suited new leader to be the new President, Prime Minister or King of Afghanistan like Karzai, Sherzai, Fahim Khan, Ismail Khan, Kalili, Donstun, or an unknown other one.

The rules of engagement have identified major issues. For establishing them, the necessary conditions for applying the right to legitimate defense, whether individual or collective, respecting the principles of necessity or adequacy of the use of force, determined the identification of various problems related to constraints, confusion, missed opportunity and

potential losses among the friendly forces. For example:

• the long endorsement process;

• the reduction of collateral losses and collateral victims;

• clarifying the efforts needed to isolate the potential targets before engagement;

• identifying the targets and taking responsibility for the mistakes resulted from engaging them, in particular because the unconventional warfare requires covert operations, defining time-sensitive targets;

• missing target engagement due to the time required to obtain approval;

• prioritizing top value targets;

• analyzing the balance between the possibility of not engaging the targets due to the time needed to obtain the clearance and the possibility of receiving the reinforcements required by them in the same time span.

US Secretary of State George W. Bush's statement of October 7, 2001 on the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan defines the strategic mission to ban the use of Afghanistan as an operational terrorist base and to attack the military capabilities of the Taliban regime, mission which was accomplished by a multinational coalition[8], that our country joined a few years later. The joined multinational context already raised the first functional problems in terms of interoperability, later resolved by the North Atlantic Alliance by imposing unanimously accepted minimum standards.

In addition, the White House press-release includes the operation in the campaign against terrorism[9], noting that other national power tools are used in this front, adding intelligence and law enforcement structures to diplomacy and finance. Here is how, from our point of view, a third dimension is introduced which is important to our research, namely the interagency operational elements.

The initial coalition was formed by the contributing nations, the USA and the UK, mainly, and Canada, Australia, Germany and France, on the other hand. Moreover, many countries have contributed by making their airspace and land territory available for transit and intelligence. The coalition begins with an almost unanimous desire to mitigate the effects of the international terrorism.

The strategy was clearly presented at the operational level, the reestablished mission of the coalition forces was to remove the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its infrastructure in Afghanistan, to split the Taliban movement and to destroy its command and control architecture in order to prohibit sheltering, sponsoring and/ or protecting the terrorists, while ensuring humanitarian aid. With the onset of tactical planning, the decision makers had the first doubts, especially in terms of the need to physically have eyes and boots on the ground.

The planning continued at the tactical level, and the Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 595 is assigned the mission to conduct unconventional war in support of General Dostum[10] in order to create unsafe conditions for the Taliban movement and the terrorist organizations in the established area of operations.

Trying to come up with our own definition of the term *unconventional warfare* (used by the United States Army, since the term used by the alliance is "unconventional operations"), we assert that it is largely an operation executed in the opponent's area by means of guerrilla or subversive actions and tactics and supported, at least partially, by forces outside the established area of operations[11].

This type of mission exists because a public military intervention on another state generates

---

[8] President George W. Bush, *Presidential Address to the Nation*, The Treaty Room, The White House, October 2001, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html. accessed on 15.08.2017.

[9] *** *Cronologie: Afganistanul, o ţară măcinată de trei decenii de conflicte*, www.mediafax.ro/externe/cronologie-afganistanul-o-tara-macinata-de-trei-decenii-de-conflicte-12393663 accessed on 15.08.2017.

[10] Patrick Cockburn, "Rashid Dostum: The treacherous general", in Independent, Saturday, 1 December 2001, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/ra-shid-dostumthetrecherous-general-9224857.html, accessed on 11.07.2017.

[11] "Unconventional warfare." *Dictionary.com*, Dictionary.com, www.dictionary.com/browse/unconventional-warfa-re accessed on 08.09.2017.

far too many international negative reactions. In the military culture, this type of mission is conducted by the special operations forces and/or the intelligence services and is highly classified without any publicity. However, it is worth mentioning that, although effective, it is a time-consuming operation, an inconvenience which has long been discussed by the conventional forces that conduct rapid reaction operations and immediately achieve the initially set target, even if the medium and long-term effects are disastrous.

Thus, an operational detachment alpha with very few niche areas support elements[12], in cooperation with interagency specialized elements leaves an extremely small ground mark, but which will ultimately prove highly effective. Initial planning is adjusted with the establishment of the initial contacts and the objective assessment of the forces at the disposal of General Dostum, which will result in the initiative to form the alliance. One of the lessons learned during the execution of the operation by these interagency special forces is that of mutual trust, which does not characterize their operating or planning mode (forces relying exclusively on their own capabilities, especially in non-permissive operating environments). The need for collaboration, the interdependence of decentralized actions and the lack of communications and rapid means of maneuvering lead to the full mutual trust among the respective forces.

Command, control and communications, as well as the support for the unconventional war operation performed in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif are unique. It is difficult to explain what centralized planning and decentralized execution mean because most military leaders are accustomed and educated to have a minimum control over the conducted operations.

The control of the operation in question was minimal, executed mainly through non-standard

means of communication, and the means of movement in a rough terrain at altitudes above 1500 meters were not only non-standard but quite traditional.

In addition, we need to briefly highlight some relevant issues that have made the accomplishment of the mission possible:

• small formations, such as special operations detachments, have been the means through which it was possible to carry out a multinational and joint coalition mission;

• special forces operators have been in permanent contact with the guerrilla forces, which has ensured the pursuit and fulfillment of the established objectives;

• initial alliances of the United States: long-term relations with the Persian Gulf states, bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan, personal relationships between the operators and the local population;

• exploitation of the specific elements of the Afghan culture, a tribal population, dominated by interethnic hatred, but who immediately sides against a common enemy;

• interdependencies required for an operational group consisting of: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents, multinational SOF, aviation component attached to the special forces and belonging to the United States Air Force and to the other categories of forces, communications and logistics, as a unit of measure of efficiency;

• rules of engaging the targets were initially extremely restrictive also in terms of airspace use;

• the information operations required for the intelligence preparation of the battle space prior to the beginning of the unconventional war were executed with a limited number of friendly forces and more abroad, at the neighbors (Pakistani);

• long range aviation, dependent on in-flight refueling;

• smart ammunition could initially be used only by a limited formation of the air force in support of the land forces;

• land formations have succeeded in increasing the effectiveness not only of the entire

---

[12] We consider the specialists in niche areas to be: forward air observers, dogs specially trained to detect improvised explosive devices, operators specialized in collecting information from human or electronic sources, negotiators, etc.

operation but also of the smart munitions;

• fire support and ground maneuvering were complementary and necessary only to close combat;

• atypical logistics requirements for operators in the field consisting in horse harness and horse food[13].

Due to the classified status of the entire mission until the conduct of the offensive operations meant to remove the Taliban movement will approach from a doctrinal point of view the stages of the performed operation and the cooperation between the components of the operating forces.

Operations of this kind begin with a psychological preparation of the operational environment, a complex of subversive actions of sending a set of messages to the population and to the potential followers of the future resistance movement complemented by the provision of immediately needed humanitarian aid. This set of actions was instrumented by the field agents of the intelligence services and/or army structures in a permanent and necessary connection to adjust the set of measures according to the development of the situation.

Subsequently, when appropriate, the initial contact with the resistance elements is initiated, a moment which triggers the initial assessment and initiates the preparation of the area of operations for infiltrating the operators. The actions were conducted under a single command and required a minimum level of interoperability between the military structures and the agencies, without which it would have been impossible to achieve the desired end state.

The beginning of the actual military operation by means of infiltration does not imply that the intelligence structures actions terminate, rather they continue the operation in support of the special operations forces. Next comes organizing the resistance movement, establishing the legal constraints, setting up the intelligence agency, initiating the resistance training in line with the

initial assessment and establishing the resistance chain of command. This whole set of measures implied close cooperation between the agencies, requiring an excellent level of procedural and technological interoperability.

The mission continued with the development of the operational capabilities required for the resilience that progressively passed from small-scale operations, aimed at building confidence in their own strengths, to planning large-scale missions. Cooperation between agencies has been maintained, especially for collecting information, but also for minimally equipping the resistance.

Major missions begin with operators as advisers, and end up to be executed almost unilaterally by the resistance movement. The moment is best defined by the North Alliance against the Taliban refugees in November 2011 near Kunduz[14] which, with US air support, dramatically limited the organization's ability to respond effectively.

With the creation of the favorable conditions for involving the conventional forces to carry out the stability, support, transition and reconstruction phase, the interagency cooperation initiated the process of demobilizing the resistance movement and helped the newly installed authorities to reintegrate the militants into the society while delegating the area of operations to the conventional actors.

By showing the complexity of these issues, we consider the learning outcomes initially identified accomplished, namely the relevance of the unconventional operations in real situations, the acknowledgement of the importance of a command, control, and communications system and single support, and the importance of the strategic alliances (between the United States and the states neighboring Afghanistan), but also of the tactical ones (the Northern Alliance[15]). In

---

[13] Donald P. Wright, et al., *The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) October 2001–September 2005, A Different Kind of War*, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/DifferentKindofWar.pdf, accessed on 15.08.2017.

[14] Terry McCarthy, "A Volatile State Of Siege After a Taliban Ambush", in *Time magazine*, Kunduz, Sunday, Nov. 18, 2001, https://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,184982,00.html, accessed on 15.08.2017.

[15] *** "Alianța Nordului a lansat o nouă ofensivă asupra Kunduzului", *Adevărul.ro*, 24.11.2011, http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/alianta-nordului-lansat-noua-ofensiva-kunduzului-1_50abf5887c42d5a663832ba6/index.htnl, accessed on 15.12.2017.

addition, the effectiveness of the interagency cooperation was unique and unmatched in a relatively short time and under the extreme conditions of northern Afghanistan.

Understanding the complexity of the multinational interagency interoperability is imperative, because the Ministry of Defense is constrained to such a mission as the sole actor. Even if the military structure defines the term "unconventional war", it is clear that it is reflected on the other national security agencies. In support of the above, we mention the lessons learned by our strategic partners during the Soviet-Afghan war between 1981-1989, when, in order to support the resistance against the Soviet occupation, the security agencies carried out a very expensive plan, without directly involving any soldier in this operation, which eventually proved to be a failure[16]. An important aspect to be highlighted is that security agencies conducted covert operations and the involvement of the United States was kept hidden, while the visible effects were the operations carried out by the Afghan Mujahideen[17].

The covert support offered to the Mujahideen was totally different during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, when Special Forces were infiltrated in the field alongside intelligence agents, including other than those belonging to the army, who in fact prepared the area of operations for the mission. The statement made by the US presidential administration that the United States intended to overthrow the Taliban government proves the open involvement of the state with the Special Forces militaries, whose actions were subjected to the laws of war, wearing the uniform and the proper insignia in plain sight, even though the operation was classified. Essentially, the intelligence agencies executed

covert operations while the militaries conducted overt operations, maintaining the classified nature of the operations, sharing their responsibilities with maximum efficiency.

Conclusions

Afghanistan operational environment complexity has been a determining factor in choosing an unconventional approach to solving the problem. In addition, the SOF succeeded in building a complicated and functional "puzzle", made up of the components of the original counter-terrorist coalition. One of the few common pictures of these, multi-national, combined and interagency elements was the minimally accepted level of interoperability established during the planning of the operation and which proved to be essential to the mission.

In addition, the unity of command assured not only the key tasks execution, but also the achievement of the desired end state: the removal of Taliban governance, the neutralization of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and set up the initial conditions for a sustainable and efficient reconstruction.

The excellent manner to accomplish the assigned mission by a conglomerate of multinational and interagency special operations forces in cooperation with joint support elements is an example to be studied and followed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. *** "Alianța Nordului a lansat o nouă ofensivă asupra Kunduzului", Adevărul.ro, 24.11.2011, http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/alianta-nordului-lansat-noua-ofensiva-kunduzului-1_50abf5887c42d5a663832ba6/index.html.

2. *** "România și războiul neconvențional", Radiojurnal, Radio România Actualități, 26.05.2016, www.romania-actualitati.ro/romania-si-razboiul-neconventional-90346.

3. *** *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) V1.0.* Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 2007.

---

[16] Thielenhaus, R. Christopher, MAJ, Covert Actions vs. Unconventional Warfare: Differences and Questions for Policymakers, 2017 Special Operations Student Essays, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 17-7, The JSOU Press, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 2017, p. 28.

[17] Combatants of paramilitary units fighting against the enemies of Islam. They fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet troops, https://dexonline.ro/definitie/mujahedin, accessed on 10.08.2017.

4. *** Strategia de Securitate Naţională a României, Bucureşti, 2006, http://old.presidency. ro/static/ordine/CSAT/SSNR.pdf.

5. *** Strategia naţională de apărare a ţării pentru perioada 2015-2019 - O Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume, http://www.presidency. ro/files/userfiles/Strategia _Nationala_de_ Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf.

6. *** U.S. Department of the Army, *Hybrid Threat*, Training Circular 7-100, Washington DC, November 26, 2010, https://wss.apan.org/s/ TRADOCTraining/ACETI%20 Publications/ TC%207-100%20Hybrid%20Threat%2026%20 Nov%202010%2017%20 jan%2012 .pdf.

7. *** United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf.

8. *** United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05:* Special Operations, 16 July 2014, Washington, D.C. Department of Defense, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf.

9. *** *Little green men: a primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare*, Ukraine, 2013-2014, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), 2017, www.jhuapl.edu/ ourwork/nsa/papers/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf

10. COCKBURN, Patrick, "Rashid Dostum: The treacherous general", in *Independent*, Saturday, 1 December 2001, https://www. independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/rashid-dostumthetrecherous-general-9224857.html

11. Dexonline, https://dexonline.ro/definitie/ mujahedin

12. Dictionary.com, "Unconventional warfare." *Dictionary.com*, www.dictionary.com / browse/unconventional-warfare

13. ENACHE, Iuliana, "Cronologie: Afganistanul, o ţară măcinată de trei decenii de conflicte", 3.04.2014, Kabul, Mediafax, www. mediafax.ro/externe/cronologie-afganistanul-o-tara-macinata-de-trei-decenii-de-conflicte-12393663

14. McCARTHY, Terry, "A Volatile State Of Siege After a Taliban Ambush", *Time magazine*, Kunduz, Sunday, Nov. 18, 2001, https:// content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171, 184982,00.html

15. MINCULETE, Gheorghe; RĂPAN, Daniela, "Approaches on current risks and threats to the international security environment", *Science and Military*, no. 2 (Volume 7)/2012, Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Ratislav Stefanik, Slovak Republic, http://sm.aos.sk/ images/dokumenty/archiv_cisel/2_2012/2.pdf

16. NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty" *NATO*, www.nato.int /cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_17120.htm

17. THIELENHAUS, R. Christopher, "Covert Actions vs. Unconventional Warfare: Differences and Questions for Policymakers", *2017 Special Operations Student Essays*, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 17-7, The JSOU Press, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 2017.

18. WRIGHT, Donald P. et al., The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), October 2001-September 2005, A Different Kind of War, http://www.armyupress. army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Different KindofWar.pdf

SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT FOR DESIGNING AND GRANTING HOST NATION SUPPORT ON ROMANIA'S TERRITORY

Ştefan-Daniel COTIGĂ*

The purpose of this article is to bring into discussion the topic of specific management for designing and granting Host Nation Support on Romania's territory.

The Host Nation Support has very ambitious aims and objectives and the implementation of this concept at the levels of both the North Atlantic Alliance and our country, under the specific conditions to each multinational activity taking place on the national territory, offers the possibility of using the resources available under the same conditions of accessibility and price as host nation, where, when, and in what amount these forces need. In order for the Host Nation Support process to proceed as planned, one of the essential conditions to be met is that the management system of this process be a coherent one, effectively supported by functional information flowing smoothly between the civilian structures and military components involved in this process.

Keywords: *Host Nation Support (HNS), management system, multinational logistics, granting Host Nation Support potential areas, multinational force, NATO.*

Introduction

Romania's NATO membership implies the huge responsibility of defending the eastern border of North Atlantic Alliance and requires a permanent concern in identifying and implementing the most appropriate measures to combat threats to national, regional and international security.

"The space-time dimension of the military action is more dynamic than any other. A significant impact upon it have both factors determined by the specific of military actions, as well as those related to characteristics of the environmental in which these actions are conducted. Therefore, taking both sets of factors into account in the design and materialization of military action is an urgent necessity."[1]

In order to significantly reduce the influence of this spatial and temporal dimensions on the evolution of military actions in the territories of other states, NATO strategists have adopted a series of concepts and principles specific to multinational logistics.

According to NATO doctrine, multinational logistics is a tool that, depending on the operational requirements and the specific situation, can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of troops

---

[1] Gheorghe Minculete, Daniela Răpan, "Some approaches to the space-time-technology correlation specific to the war of the future" in *Strategic Impact* no. 1 (42) / 2012, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defence University, p. 84, available at https://cssas.unap.ro/en/pdf_periodicals/si42.pdf, accessed on 12.10.2017.

*Colonel (AF) Ştefan-Daniel COTIGĂ, Head of the Host Support Office in Air Force Staff, is PhD candidate in Military Sciences at "Carol I" National Defense University in Bucharest. E-mail: cotigastefan@yahoo.com

used for participating in expeditionary military activities. Thus, the benefits of multinational logistics are:

• reducing total costs and logistics footprint;

• the ability of nations to equitably contribute to troop support;

• improving the force flexibility;

• preservation of limited local resources;

• greater influence of the commander of force or NATO force component;

• better use of specific national expertise[2].

NATO doctrine encourages nations participating in military activities outside their national territory to reduce their logistical footprint in the area of action by sharing certain multinational logistics capabilities and arrangements.

Recent military conflicts have shown that *Host Nation Support* is a very complex factor, which can decisively determine the accomplishment of missions by a multinational NATO force participating in a joint and multinational military action.

Host Nation Support concept is implemented in all NATO member states through the MC 334/2 NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support and the Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support AJP-4.5 (B), documents in which Host Nation Support is defined as "*The civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis and conflict by a Host Nation (HN) to allied forces and organisations which are located on, operating in or transiting through the HN's territory*"[3].

In NATO conception, the following principles must be respected for the planning and granting of Host Nation Support as efficiently as possible: responsibility, supply, authority, cooperation, co-ordination, economy, transparency, and reimbursement[4].

Host Nation Support can be granted on the territory of Romania either to the armed forces belonging to NATO or EU member states as well as to other organizations, partner countries MoU) or Technical Arrangements (TAs) in place.

1. Situations of granting HNS and potential areas to support allies and partners

Some of the current threats can be countered only by military means, but most of them involve the use of complex military and civilian capabilities, combining institutional instruments, both national and multinational. Military capabilities are rarely sufficient, but often necessary, with the potential for rapid response, expeditionary and sustainable capacity, with sufficient flexibility and mobility to cover a wide range of missions[5].

Planning and granting Host Nation Support is an extremely important part of the logistical support necessary for foreign armed forces participating in every multinational activity taking place on Romania's national territory.

For the successful progress (reaching the final state) of multinational operations, through the planning process, in all its phases, there are established for each level of logistic support the necessary structures and measures to ensure the forces involved in the multinational operation with all that is necessary for living and performing missions[6].

We believe that Romania, through specific national legislation, offers to allied armed forces a much more effective option for them to acquire and use the necessary goods and services in the area of military activities under the same conditions as for their own armed forces.

[2] *NATO Logistics Handbook*, 2012, NATO, Brussels, p. 81, available at https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/logistics_hndbk_2012-en.pdf, accessed on 12.10.2017.

[3] Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support, Edition B, Version 1, AJP-4.5 (B), NATO Standardisation Agency, May 2013, Brussels, NATO, available at nso.nato.int/nso/zPublic/ap/ajp-4.5%20edb%20v1%20e.pdf, accessed on 12.10.2017, p. 13.

[4] *Ibidem*, pp. 14-16.

[5] Gheorghe Minculete, Daniela Răpan, "Approaches on Current Risks and Threats to the International Security Environment", in *Science and Military*, no. 2 (Volume 7)/2012, Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Slovak Republic, p. 5, http://sm.aos.sk/images/dokumenty/archiv_cisel/2_2012/2.pdf, accessed on 13.10.2017.

[6] Translation by author from Sorin Pînzariu, Aurel Iliuţă, "Levels of logistical support in UN-led multinational operations", *Bulletin of "Carol I" National Defense University*, March, 2015, p. 65, available at https://spodas.unap.ro/revista/index.php/revista/article/viewFile/101/80, accessed on 12.10.2017.

Romania grants Host Nation Support for foreign armed forces participating in activities on their national territory in the following cases:

• collective defense military operations, carried out on the basis of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

• Crisis Response Operations (CRO), including Peace Support Operations (PSO), headed by NATO, UN and/or OSCE, not covered by Article 5/Washington Treaty;

• transit operations;

• military operations within ad-hoc coalitions;

• Emergency Assistance Operations;

• the establishment, in time of peace, of the combat and/or logistical capabilities belonging to NATO or to NATO's strategic partners;

• the establishment of NATO headquarters;

• NATO-led bilateral or multinational military exercises[7].

Romania has the full range of drill facilities and training ranges, with the capacity to ensure the proper evolution of all types of military exercises.

In our opinion, it is extremely important that the personnel from the structures with responsibilities in the field of planning and granting Host Nation Support in Romanian Armed Forces should know the potential fields and facilities specific to granting this type of support. In our country, the following potential areas of granting Host Nation Support were identified, as follows:

• direct support capabilities of forces Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration - RSOI process;

• drill facilities, training ranges;

• pre-positioning of equipment and material stocks;

• national transport infrastructure;

• communication and information infrastructure[8].

As it can be seen, they fully cover the areas of logistic support which is a requisite for foreign armed forces participating in military activities on Romanian territory. Due to the great diversity of these areas, it is necessary to establish and verify the fulfillment of specific responsibilities at the level of all responsible echelons for the management and modernization of the military capabilities and facilities available with allied armed forces deployed in our national territory (Land Forces Staff, Air Force Staff, Naval Forces Staff, Joint Logistics Command, Communication and Information Command, etc.).

We believe that, by increasing and modernizing their own logistical support capacities, NATO member states, Romania implicitly, can ease at a large extent the work of allied commanders participating in military actions on the national territory to be prepared and become thoroughly ready to fulfill their tasks, as it is aiming to develop a logistic support of their activity.

2. Approaches of management system for granting Host Nation Support

In Romania, the authority for regulation, planning and coordination in Host Nation Support field is the Ministry of National Defense, with its integrating role of the specific activities in this field, with the unique national contact point for the Host Nation Support, represented by the Logistics Directorate of the Defense Staff[9]. The principle of the uniqueness of the national HNS contact point is specific to our country, and it states that Romania's connection with the structures dedicated to Host Nation Support from NATO is made only through this Host Nation Support Single Point of Contact (HNS SPOC).

During military operations, management activity at the level of large units and military units requires command and control of all forces and means for fulfilling the mission.

---

[7] Translation by author from "Concepţia şi procedurile specifice privind acordarea de către România a sprijinului naţiunii gazdă (HNS) pentru acţiunile militare ale statelor membre NATO şi partenere pe teritoriul naţional, ediţie revizuită, aprobată prin Hotărârea Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Ţării nr. 102/2010" (*The Concept and specific Procedures concerning Romania's granting of Host Nation Support (HNS) for the military actions of the NATO and partner states on the national territory*, revised edition, approved by the decision of the Supreme Council of National Defense no. 102/2010), art. 28, p. 12.

[8] *Ibidem*, pp. 20-22.

[9] *Ibidem*, art. 11, p. 8.

The Host Nation Support management system represents the set of decision-makers, relations, responsibilities, and actions from decision-making plan related to planning and granting Host Nation Support. The purpose of this system is to initiate decisions and actions in HNS specific field, from the perspective of the processes and mechanisms involved in the Host Nation Support. HNS management system includes HNS integrated management system of authorized NATO commands and HNS management systems of Host Nations-HNs and Sending Nations-SNs, NATO members[10].

Customizing, through activation of Romanian management system of Host Nation Support, the structures and decision makers and executive factors, both military and civilians, will participate in the process of planning and supporting the specific activities for granting Host Nation Support to foreign armed forces involved in military activities on Romanian national territory.

Romania's Host Nation Support management system consists of:

• Inter-ministerial Commission for Relations with Foreign Armed Forces (ICRFAF);

• Co-ordination Committee for Host Nation Support in the Defense Staff (CC-DS-HNS);

• Cell for Host Nation Support during the exercise;

• The structures dedicated to logistic support in the Ministry of National Defense and civil entities which provide goods and services;

• Relations between the components of the system during the planning and execution of specific Host Nation Support activities[11].

The leading and coordination of public authorities' activities in our country are aimed to facilitate the progress of military activities on Romanian national territory by the foreign armed forces. These two roles are carried out by the Inter-ministerial Commission for Relations with Foreign Armed Forces (ICRFAF), consisting of representatives of Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Public Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs and other public institutions, as the case may be[12], with a Ministry of National Defense secretary of state as chairman of the commission.

At the level of the Defence Staff, the Co-ordination Committee for Host Nation Support from Defense Staff (CC-DS-HNS) provides the analysis of the Host Nation Support documents, as well as the coordination and the unitary monitoring of the implementation of the plans for granting Host Nation Support by the structures of composition and subordinated to Defense Staff. It consists of representatives from all the structures from composition and subordination of the Defense Staff with competences in planning and delivering processes of this kind of logistic support[13], chaired by the Head of Logistics Directorate from Defense Staff and having the secretariate staffed by personnel from Host Nation Support and Agreements Office in Logistics Directorate.

---

[10] Translation by author from Vasile Popa, Sprijinul națiunii gazdă (*Host Nation Support*), Centre for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 20, available at https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/sprijinul_natiunii-gazda.pdf, accessed on 13.10.2017.

[11] Translation by author from "Concepția și procedurile specifice privind acordarea de către România a sprijinului națiunii gazdă (HNS) pentru acțiunile militare ale statelor membre NATO și partenere pe teritoriul național", (*The Concept and specific Procedures concerning Romania's granting of Host Nation Support (HNS) for the military actions of the NATO and partner states on the national territory*), art. 62, p. 23.

[12] Translation by author from Legea nr. 291 din 2 noiembrie 2007 privind intrarea, staționarea, desfășurarea de operațiuni sau tranzitul forțelor armate străine pe teritoriul României, republicată, Monitorul Oficial al României, nr. 758, București, 2007/ Monitorul Oficial al României, nr. 321, București, 2014, art. 9-11 (*Law no. 291 from 2 November 2007 regarding the entry, stationing, carrying out of operations or transit of foreign armed forces on the territory of Romania*), republished, Official Gazette of Romania, no. 758, Bucharest, 2007 / Official Gazette of Romania, no. 321, Bucharest, 2014, art. 9-11, p. 3.

[13] Translation by author from Concepția și procedurile specifice privind acordarea de către România a sprijinului națiunii gazdă (HNS) pentru acțiunile militare ale statelor membre NATO și partenere pe teritoriul național, (*The Concept and specific Procedures concerning Romania's granting of Host Nation Support (HNS) for the military actions of the NATO and partner states on the national territory*), art. 66, p. 24.

CC-DS-HNS is responsible for drafting laws and other normative acts specific to Host Nation Support, drafting agreements, MoUs, TAs, Joint Implementation Arrangements (JIAs) and plans for granting Host Nation Support and for training of the military and civilian personnel within the structures of composition and subordinated to Defense Staff in Host Nation Support domain.

In crisis and war situations, in order to plan, organize and coordinate the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) of foreign armed forces on Romanian national territory, a Co-ordination Center to Ensure the Host Nation Support during the entry, staying, operation and transit of Romania's territory by the foreign armed forces is constituted and its role is to establish the emergency, siege, mobilization or war state (ROU-HNS-CC), which is subordinated to the Military Command Center and whose mode of organization and functioning is established through Government decision[14].

At the North Atlantic Alliance Summit in Wales on 4-5 September 2014, with the approval of NATO's Readiness Action Plan (RAP), the heads of State and Government of NATO member countries decided to set six regional command units, each of which staffed by about 40 specialists from the host nation state and other allied states, called NATO Integrated Force Unit (NFIU). NFIUs have the role of facilitating the deployment of allied forces on host nation's territory and of participating in the process of collective defense planning. Thus, in our country, NFIU ROU, in cooperation with the host nation, the frame nation and troops contributing nations,

---

[14] Translation by author from H. G. nr. 1078 din 11 decembrie 2013 privind înființarea Centrului de coordonare pentru asigurarea sprijinului națiunii-gazdă pe timpul intrării, staționării, desfășurării de operațiuni și tranzitării teritoriului României de către forțele armate străine și funcționarea acestuia la instituirea stării de urgență, de asediu, de mobilizare sau de război, Monitorul Oficial al României, nr. 825, (*Decision of the Romanian Government no. 1078 from 11 December 2013 regarding the establishment of the Coordination Center for the Host Nation Support during the entry, stationing, operation and transit of Romania's territory by the foreign armed forces and its operation at the establishment of the emergency, siege, mobilization or war state*), Official Gazette of Romania, no. 825, Bucharest, 2013, art.1, p. 1.

has the task of identifying logistic support requirements to ensure a rapid deployment of NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and is an important supporting element for conducting joint and integrated multinational military training and exercises on Romania's national territory under NATO leadership. It is obvious that the planning and support activities of the host nation, carried out by the structures of the Romanian Armed Forces with attributions and responsibilities in the field, have a decisive role in NFIU ROU mission accomplishment.

We can conclude that granting Host Nation Support by Romania involves the Ministry of National Defense and other ministries, in particular Ministry of Public Finance, Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as other public institutions, depending on the type, size and complexity of the activity carried out.

At international level, the National Territorial Commanders Committee (NTCC) is an informal organization set up for exchanging information and for receiving consultation on multinational topics of mutual interest, with main tasks consisting in coordinating the process of granting Host Nation Support and assisting partner countries in planning, managing and executing this type of logistical support, developing instructions to facilitate the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) of allied and partner nations' forces in transit or operating on territory of a NATO member state. This body is responsible for the coordination of operational access to host nation's national lines of communication, as well as for coordinating the delivery of defense and intergovernmental resources for operations, exercises and contingents of the Sending Nations (SNs).

NTCC was founded in 1986 by six nations, and today it is made up of high-ranking military commanders and representatives from 24 allied and partner countries, including Romania. The organization aims to improve cooperation with host nations and to increase the capabilities of NTCC member countries needed to respond

satisfactorily to the need for assistance with exercises, contingency situations or other military operations.

The NTCC mission is to rationalize the coordination of Host Nation Support (HNS) among member nations, and its goal is to become a multinational leadership network for planning and providing Host Nation Support. By sharing information and collecting identified lessons and then validating them as lessons learned, NTCC members are trying to transform operational processes to create a system of best practices to rule procedures and manage capabilities intended for Host Nation Support.

NTCC participation in multinational logistics planning conferences at NATO schools and allied and joint exercises helps building up confidence at regional level and among partners in the area of planning, managing and implementing logistical support granted by host nation.

NTCC commanders meet annually for the Reunion of National Territorial Commanders Committee. During this meeting, commanders vote on important issues referring to the organization and execution of tasks set out by the NTCC Steering Committee. The NTCC Steering Committee meets twice a year and is chaired by a Permanent Secretary (PERMSEC). The NTCC Secretariat has been provided by Romania between May 2013 and May 2014.

A particular case in HNS process is the reimbursement of logistic support to United States military forces participating in military activities on our territory, a process that is carried out in accordance with the Agreement between the Romanian Ministry of National Defense and the US Department of Defense (US-ROU-02), signed in Bucharest on November, 28th, 2012 and in Stuttgart on December, 5th, 2012 and published in the Official Gazette of Romania, no. 161, Bucharest, 2013.

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) is negotiated on a bilateral basis by the US with its allies or coalition partners, and it allows US forces to easily get the most used types of logistics support, including food, fuel, transport, ammunition, and equipment. In this Agreement, it is stipulated that, concerning shipments of logistic support, the parties will agree on payment, which will be made either in cash, or by replacement-in-kind or by equal-value exchanges (EVE) and it also provides mechanisms for price setting.

When a final order price is not set in advance, a maximum level of responsibility for party requesting logistic support, goods and services will be established, until it is agreed. Then the parties involved will negotiate the final price. The price for logistic support, goods and services under this Agreement shall not be higher than the price for the same logistic support, the same goods and services as available under any other Agreement between the Parties or their Governments[15].

The command of logistic support, goods and services which will be made either by US Armed Forces representative or by Romanian Armed Forces representative must contain some essential minimum information. This information and the standard order form (known and used as ACSA form) to be used for transactions made under the Agreement on Procurement and Mutual Services for Mutual Logistic Support are detailed in the Agreement between the Ministry of National Defense of Romania and the Department of Defense of the US on procurement and mutual services (US-ROU-02).

Agreements on procurement and mutual services diminish logistic tasks and are considered to be key elements of logistics, giving local NATO commanders increased interoperability, increased operational availability and effective joint support.

---

[15] Translation by author from H.G. nr. 93 din 13 martie 2013 pentru aprobarea Acordului dintre Ministerul Apărării Naționale din România și Departamentul Apărării din Statele Unite ale Americii privind achizițiile și serviciile reciproce (US-ROU-02), semnat la București la 28 noiembrie 2012 și la Stuttgart la 5 decembrie 2012, Monitorul Oficial al României, nr. 161 (*Decision of the Government of Romania no. 93 from March 13, 2013 for the approval of the Agreement between the Romanian National Defense Ministry and the US Department of Defense on procurement and reciprocal services (US-ROU-02)*, signed in Bucharest on 28 November 2012 and in Stuttgart on 5 December 2012, Official Gazette of Romania, no. 161), Bucharest, 2013, art. 5, pp. 6-7.

The US partner draws up annual reports which cover all transactions made on the basis of ACSA in the previous fiscal year and designs the requirements for the next fiscal year.

The authority of Procurement and Reciprocal Agreements allows the commanders of US Expeditionary Forces to quickly access logistic support, goods and services provided by other countries' armed forces to meet the requirements of the US Armed Forces deployed in the territories of these countries.

Effective Host Nation Support planning begins when the Host Nation Support Request (HNSREQ) is received from the authorized allied forces' structure for a military operation or for an exercise. In NATO concept, the obligatory steps to be taken into Host Nation Support planning process are as follows:

• 1st phase: sending the Host Nation Support Request (HNSREQ) and development of the HNS Memorandum of Understanding (MoU HNS);

• 2nd phase: development of the Concept of Requirements (COR);

• 3rd phase: development of the Initial Statement of Requirements (SOR);

• 4th phase: development of the Technical Agreement (TA) for granting Host Nation Support;

• 5th phase: development of the Joint Implementation Arrangements (JIAs) for granting Host Nation Support[16].

Regarding the Defense Staff, the Headquarters of Services, Joint Logistics Command, Communications and Informatics Command and other central structures, departmental/office level structures operate in order to manage the planning, organization and execution of activities and to support specific information flows for granting Host Nation Support process.

All documents that will be developed during the Host Nation Support planning process will be drafted and circulated only through the single national HNS point of contact.

Conclusions and proposals

We consider that Host Nation Support system in the Romanian Armed Forces is a functional system, well represented and supported by specific information flows that normally run smoothly between ministries, agencies, governmental and non-governmental structures and national and foreign military logistics structures involved in the process of planning and implementing the Host Nation Support.

In order to improve the process of managing Host Nation Support by Romanian Armed Forces logistic structures, we propose to set, at all levels, especially at the tactical one, specialized structures dedicated to grant Host Nation Support, their organization chart covering all HNS specific domains. These structures' personnel should be trained in logistics through specific courses organized within "Carol I" National Defense University, the Application School for Logistics, or in specialized NATO bodies (NATO Support and Procurement Agency – NSPA). It is also necessary to step up NATO standardization process in logistics, particularly by setting the path towards continuing to accept and implement NATO standards in the Host Nation Support domain.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. AJP-4.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support, Edition B, Version 1, May 2013, Brussels, NATO.

2. Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine, Bucharest, 2012.

3. L-2, Manual of Logistic Support Management in Joint Operations, Bucharest, 2007.

4. General concept and procedures regarding Romania's granting of Host Nation Support for the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of Foreign Armed Forces participating in operations on the national territory, Bucharest, 2015.

5. Concept and specific Procedures concerning Romania's granting of Host Nation Support (HNS) for military actions of NATO and

---

16 AJP-4.5 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support*, Edition B, Version 1, May 2013, Brussels, NATO, pp. 31-38.

partner states on Romanian national territory, revised edition, approved by the decision of the Supreme Council of National Defense no. 102/2010.

6. NATO Logistics Handbook, 2012, Brussels, NATO, https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/logistics_hndbk_2012-en.pdf.

7. MINCULETE, Gheorghe, "Host Nation Support - Priority objective of the army's logistics. Capabilities and logistics facilities that can be made available to NATO forces", Military Logistics. Transformation and remodeling, Bucharest, National Defense University "Carol I" Publishing House, 2006.

8. POPA, Vasile, "Host Nation Support", Bucharest, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, 2006.

9. PÎNZARIU, Sorin; ILIUȚĂ, Aurel, "Levels of logistical support in UN-led multinational operations", Bulletin of "Carol I" National Defense University, March, 2015, https://spodas.unap.ro/revista/index.php/revista/article/viewFile/101/80.

10. MINCULETE, Gheorghe; RĂPAN, Daniela, "Some approaches to the space-time-technology correlation specific to the war of the future", in *Strategic Impact,* no. 1 (42) / 2012.

11. MINCULETE, Gheorghe; RĂPAN, Daniela, "Approaches on Current Risks and Threats to the International Security Environment", in *Science and Military*, no. 2 (Volume 7)/2012, Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Slovak Republic, http://sm.aos.sk/images/dokumenty/archiv_cisel/2_2012/2.pdf.

12. MC 334/2 - NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support (HNS), 2004, Brussels, NATO.

13. Law no. 291 of 2 November 2007 regarding the entry, stationing, carrying out of operations or transit of foreign armed forces on the territory of Romania, republished, Official Gazette of Romania, no. 758, Bucharest, 2007 / Official Gazette of Romania, no. 321, Bucharest, 2014.

14. Decision of the Government of Romania no. 93 from March 13, 2013 for the approval of the Agreement between the Romanian National Defense Ministry and the US Department of Defense on procurement and reciprocal services (US-ROU-02), signed in Bucharest on 28 November 2012 and in Stuttgart on 5 December 2012, Official Gazette of Romania, no. 161, Bucharest, 2013.

15. Decision of the Romanian Government no. 1078 from 11 December 2013 regarding the establishment of the Coordination Center for the Host Nation Support during the entry, stationing, operation and transit of Romania's territory by the foreign armed forces and its operation at the establishment of the emergency, siege, mobilization or war state, Official Gazette of Romania, no. 825, Bucharest, 2013.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Cătălin-Mihai GHERMAN*

The annexation of Crimea by Russia is a historical event that marks the transition from the post-Cold War era to a multipolar one, where emergent powers of the past two decades, especially Russia, exercise a growing geopolitical influence. Russia justifies Crimea's annexation on the basis of the fundamental democratic principle - the right to self-determination – but also on historical reasons, including Kosovo.

The Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) security environment has deteriorated significantly, with 2014 as a major turning point in recent post-Sovietic history - a reaffirmation of Russia's claims on its former influence areas, supported by an accelerated arming process.

By extension, Russia's annexation of Crimea and its accelerated militarization represent a major threat to the WBSA security, forcing the remodeling of security strategies on the European continent.

Russia is not willing to lose control over Ukraine, which makes that, in a medium and long term, a "cold front" is foreshadowed in the WBSA, with Romania on its forefront.

***Keywords**: Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA), Crimea, Russia, security risks, interests, trends.*

Introduction

The Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) continues to be an area characterized by political-military uncertainty and the confluence of various actors' interests, riparian and external. This uncertainty is determined and supported by a number of causes, including: violation of the territorial integrity of another state (Ukraine), through Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea, an unprecedented action in the post-Cold War era, and subsequently the feeding of the conflict in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Lugansk; accelerated building of significant military capabilities in the region, both by Russia (in the Crimea) and by NATO (strengthening the eastern flank, deploying elements of the anti-missile shield on the territory of Romania); economic and social problems faced by the former Soviet states bordering the Black Sea, artificially maintained or provoked by Russia in order to maintain its influence in these countries through various methods (the perpetuation of frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh with the possibility of reactivating them, economic blackmail, use of corruption to influence political decision-makers, etc.); maintaining or feeding risks and vulnerabilities caused by separatist movements, territorial disputes, organized crime, illegal migration.

1. Trends in the WBSA security environment

In the short and medium term, an increase of tensions in WBSA is foreseen, generated by Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea. Also, the WBSA will continue to be the scene of political and economic confrontations between the main internal and external actors, among which

*Commander Cătălin-Mihai GHERMAN works at "Callatis" Radio-Electronics and Surveillance Brigade of the Romanian Naval Forces Staff, Constanta. E-mail: ghermancm@yahoo.com

the hegemonic confrontation between Russia and the US and the Russia-EU energy confrontation will play a key role. These confrontations are determined by the divergent interests of the actors in the region.[1]

1.1. Interests of US, EU and NATO in WBSA

Political, economic, energy, military, security interests of Western countries and organizations such as US, EU, NATO in the WBSA often compete, or even collide with those of Russia. Among the most important can be included:
• Consolidating the security and stability along their South-Eastern borders (EU and NATO);
• Strengthening the control over the Black Sea transport corridor of energy resources in order to diversify the sources of energy supplies from the Caspian and Central Asia to the European and global markets (US, EU, NATO);
• Protecting and promoting the interests of national and transnational companies on the regional markets (US, EU);
• Creating a secure corridor for transporting troops and materials through the region to provide political and military support to military operations in Asia and the Middle East (US, NATO);
• Use of the region as a platform or vector for extending influence to neighboring regions of the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as for strengthening the global power status in general (US, NATO).

1.2 Interests of Russia in WBSA

Russia's political, economic, military actions in the Black Sea region after the annexation of the Crimea denotes its long-term interests in the region, among which can be highlighted:
• Reaffirmation of Russia as a great power in the international arena and regaining influence in its western neighborhood, including by resorting to armed force (Georgia, 2008; Crimea, 2014) or in the form of hybrid war (Crimea, Donbass);

• Integration of Crimea within the structures of the Russian Federation, redrawing the maritime border and exploitation of resources in the Black Sea in the context of a new configuration of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone[2, 3];
• Setting up a buffer zone along its southern border to limit Western influence (EU, US, NATO) in the region and to halt the process of EU and NATO enlargement to the East, including through the creation of a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine, as an element of pressure on decision-makers in Kiev;
• Maintaining its influence on the former Soviet states (Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia) and preventing the integration of these states into NATO and the EU, including through the perpetuation of frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh), thus feeding a state of insecurity in the region;
• Preserving its monopoly over the energy resources supplies to European markets and using this monopoly as a foreign policy instrument.

---

[1] Gheorghe Calopăreanu, "Complexul de securitate Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre", "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2012.

[2] A.N.: After annexation of Crimea, the right to manage the energy resources of the peninsula was given to Gazprom and it took over the assets of Chornomor Naftogaz (including its marine drilling platforms), the Crimean subsidiary of Ukraine's Naftogaz Ukrainy. Source: *** "The energy dimensions of Russia's annexation of Crimea", available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/Ukraine-energy-independence-gas-dependence-on-Russia/EN/index.htm, accessed on 15 November 2017. Later, Russia has moved on to explore and exploit energy resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which it considers to belong to Crimea but which overlaps (on the west part) with Ukraine's EEZ. Source: *** "Russia continues illegal exploration in Ukraine's marine economic zone", 17 July 2016, available at: https://economics.unian.info/1422168-russia-illegally-exploration-in-ukraines-marine-economic-zone.html, accessed on 10 November 2017.

[3] From a legal point of view, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted on 6 May 2014 a law declaring Crimea, including its territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf adjacent to the peninsula as "temporarily occupied territory". For detailes, see „Law of Ukraine On Securing the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine, 26 May 2014, available at: http://usa.mfa.gov.ua/ mediafiles/sites/usa/files/2014.05.26_Law_on_occupied_Crimea.pdf, accessed on 10 November 2017.

1.3 Interests of Turkey in WBSA

Turkey has its own interests in the Black Sea area, taking into consideration its geostrategic position and its economic and military power. These interests may come in contradiction with those of other actors. Among the most important interests of Turkey are:

• creating and strengthening a stable security environment;

• strengthening its position in the region as a military-balance factor, as well as expanding its influence in the Muslim world (including states that were part of the Ottoman Empire);

• holding the leading role in formulating regional development and security strategies in the region, along with promoting cooperation and good relations with other states.

Turkey's relations with US show a steady trend of deterioration, while political initiatives in the region tend to grow. A good example of this trend is shown by dissensions between Ankara and Washington as a result of US refusal to extradite Muslim cleric Fethullah Gullen – considered by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the organizer of the failed coup d'état in July 2016. At the same time, Turkish authorities are dissatisfied with the US support for Kurdish fighters in Syria, who oppose the Islamic State terrorist organization, while Turkish authorities claim that the main goal of Kurds is to establish a Kurdish state which is supposed to include Turkey's south-estern territories. In fact, the fear of creating a Kurdish state was one of the reasons why in 2003 Turkey refused to allow US to launch a land offensive in northern Iraq from its territory.

On the other hand, Turkey's relation with Russia have recently been re-heated, following a period of tensions caused by November 2015 air incident (when the Turkish Air Force shut down a Russian fighter aircraft that violated Turkey's airspace at the Syrian-Turkish border).

In order to secure its interests, Turkey uses political, economic and security mechanisms: it establishes constructive relations with the states in the region, maintains control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits; actively promotes security initiatives; takes initiatives in the field of energy resources transit routes in order to turn its territory into a strategic transit platform.

1.4 Interests of Ukraine in WBSA

In 2014, Ukraine's relations with Russia significantly deteriorated because of Russian armed aggression launched in Crimea and the eastern region (Donetsk and Lugansk) of Ukraine. As a result of this crisis, pro-Western political forces have come to power in Kyiv, which have changed the Ukraine's foreign policy vector and announced the country's intention to join European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, an orientation that significantly contravenes Russia's interests.

The Crimea annexation and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine made Ukrainian authorities to seek financial and economic support from EU and NATO military support (in the form of arms, equipment and military expertise). In order to get this support, Kyiv authorities have launched an ample process of economic and military reform, aiming to ensure interoperability with NATO structures and subsequently integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The military reform process is being carried out in parallel with the development of new security programatic documents (security strategy, military doctrine, etc.). This procces is carried out over several years (beyond 2017, as the Ukrainian president initially announced). The ample reform of the armed forces announced by the Ukrainian authorities will most likely be conditioned on the allocation of necessary resources, including the supplementing of reimbursable/non-reimbursable funds received from the EU, NATO and other states. However, the military expenditures determined by the conflict in the eastern part of the country will probably lead to delays in the implementation of reform measures and, in particular, those of rearming Ukrainian Armed Forces with modern military equipment and weapons.

1.5 Interessts of Georgia in WBSA

The August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, followed by the self-proclaiming independence of the two separatist regions, South Ossetia

and Abkhazia, reflects the continuing Russian influence over Georgia that could not be accepted in Tbilisi. All these generated a virulent anti-Russian feelings, including the break-up of diplomatic relations between the two countries, in August 2008. Under the leadership of former President Mikheil Saakashvili, whom political, diplomatic and military goal was to integrate Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures, the country was considered a reliable Western ally.

In the period 2013-2014, there was a change in Georgia's foreign policy. Georgian authorities have shown a desire to improve relations with Russia, an evolution that coincided with the rise of businessman Bidzina Ivanisvili as Prime Minister and continued with his successor, Irakli Garibashvili. These internal political frictions generated a change in Georgia's foreign policy, authorities attaching greater importance to the normalization of relations with Russia. This trend continued to manifest after 2014, despite tense relations between the two countries[4], [5].

However, the main priority for the Georgian authorities is to regain control over the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia[6]. At the same time, this goal is the most significant obstacle for normalizing Georgian relations with Russia. As a result, it is expected that the policy promoted by Georgia in its relationship with NATO and the EU, on the one hand, and with Russia on the other hand, will have a duplicate

tinge. The Georgian government is likely promoting a model of foreign policy similar to that of Slovakia, which is a devoted member of NATO and the EU, but has strong trade and friendship relations with Russia.

1.6 Interests of Republic of Moldova in WBSA

Republic of Moldova ranks 98th out of the total of 178 fragile states in the world[7], being identified a number of risks to national security, to include: economic underdevelopment, energy dependency, Transnistrian conflict, intervention of foreign forces in domestic politics, criminogenic factor and corruption[8].

The signing of the Association Agreement with the EU at the Brussels Summit (27 June 2014) represented a turning point for Moldova's future. Western-oriented political option offered important development opportunities for Moldova, but also the pretext for Russia's "retaliation", which finaly conducted to the election of a pro-Russian politician as president of the country.

The election of Igor Dodon as the President of Moldova caused new tensions on the internal political scene, because of radically different foreign policy orientations between the president (with a pro-Russian orientation) and the government (with a pro-European orientation). This situation is an important challenge for the pro-European path of the country[9], but also a decrease of Moldova's significance on the

[4] Ana Dvali, Mariam Gachechiladze, "2016 In Georgian-Russian Relations and Future Prospects", 22 February 2017, available at: http://regional-dialogue.com/en/2016-in-georgian-russian-relations-and-future-prospects/, accessed on 10 December 2017.

[5] Archil Sikharulidze, "Analysis Russian–Georgian diplomatic relations – to be or not to be?", 10 March 2017, available at: http://oc-media.org/russian-georgian-diplomatic-relations-to-be-or-not-to-be/, accessed on 10 December 2017.

[6] Restoration of the territorial integrity of the country is the most important goal and is included in two strategic planning documents approved by the Georgian government, namely the National Security Concept of Georgia (available at: http://www.mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/NationalSecurityConcept.aspx?lang=en-US, accessed on 10 December 2017) and *Strategic Defence Review 2017-2020* (available at: https://mod.gov.ge/assets/up-modul/uploads/pdf/SDR-ENG.pdf, accessed on 10 December 2017).

[7] According to "Fragile State Index" produced by The Fund for Peace in May 2017. 1st rank represents the most unstable state, available at: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/14/fragile-states-index-2017-annual-report/, accessed on 15 November 2017.

[8] *** Proiectul Strategiei Securității Naționale a Republicii Moldova (Project of National Seecurity Strategy of Republic of Moldova), p. 7.

[2] Igor Dodon has repeatedly argued that Moldova should adhere to the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union at the expense of the European Union and pleads for the denunciation of the Moldova-EU Association Agreement. Such a statement can be found in the article "Dodon's Program: Denunciation of the Association Agreement with the EU", 29 September 2014, available at: http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/programul-dodon-denuntarea-acordului-deasociere-ue-1_54290b810d133766a88382bc/index.html, accesed on 15 November 2017.

regional and international arena.

At political level, at least in the short term, the political instability in Moldova will continue, because of a fragile level of democracy in that country, lack of a real separation of the judicial power from the political one, and where the institutions of the rule of law are victims of political interests.

The draft of National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova issued in June 2016 states that European integration remains the irreversible strategic objective of Moldova's internal and external agenda, having as main challenge consolidation of citizens' security and prosperity and the defense of the country's territorial integrity. [10] However, the election of Igor Dodon as president in November 2016 will probably make the National Security Strategy Draft – a programmatic document of paramount importance that promotes a pro-Western political orientation – undergo major changes to highlight the new orientation of Chisinau.

The fragility of the political factor in this state constitutes, to a significant extent, the expression of the pro-European Moldovan politicians' in-ability to assume certain demands of democracy, such as decisional transparency, fight against cor-ruption, the parliamentary control of the secret services, the independence of justice, etc.

On economic level, Moldova has benefited of investments from Russia, US and some EU countries, including Romania, but those investments have proved to be largely ineffective because Chisinau failed to promote a balanced policy among big investors and failed to implement structural reforms required by the EU and the IMF.

**2. Actions/strategies of main actors
for reaching their objectives**

2.1 Actions of US, EU, NATO in WBSA

The crisis caused by the annexation of Crimea and destabilizing actions of Russia in Donetsk

and Lugansk regions of Ukraine led to an intense degradation of the relations between NATO and Russia. At NATO Summit in Wales (4-5 September 2014), although Alliance members did not revoke the Founding Act on NATO-Russia Relations (27 May 1997), it was decided to revise defense plans to increase military presence at the eastern border of the Alliance. On the basis of these plans, NATO has stepped up its military presence in the Central and Eastern European countries, by supplementing the forces deployed in the Baltic States, Poland and Romania, increasing the number of allied military ships carrying out missions in the Black Sea, but also by increasing the number, the scale and complexity of military exercises in these countries[11].

Also, it was decided an increase in the implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), a program aimed at strengthening Georgia's defense capabilities by developing cooperation and interoperability of the Georgian Armed Forces with those of NATO member countries[12]. Much of the work is under the leadership of the new Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) in Krtsanisi, set up in 2015 as an element of the SNGP. Two other training facilities shared with NATO forces are planned to be set up at Vaziani and Senaki[13].

At the same time, the international community has decided a series of economic sanctions against Russia. Although they had limited effects on the policy promoted by Moscow in the region, the sanctions had important repercussions on the Russian military industry. As a result, Russia had to look itself towards the Asian market for the procurement of military components and equipment, mainly in microelectronics domain. Russia also had to use only internal manufacturing

---

[10] Author's translation from Proiectul Strategiei Securității Naționale a Republicii Moldova (Draft of the **National Se**curity Strategy of the Republic of Moldova), p. 7, available at: http://presedinte.md/app/webroot/proiecte/SSN16.pdf, accesed on 15 November 2017.

[11] *** NATO Assurance Measures, available at: https://shape.nato.int/nato-assurance-measures, accesed on 15 November 2017.

[12] "Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP)", avail-able at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_12/20151209_151209-factsheet-nato-geor-gia-package.pdf, accessed on 10 December 2017.

[13] Eduard Abrahamyan, "Georgia after Montenegro's NATO Accession", 11 July 2017, available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/georgia-montenegros-nato-accession/, accesed on 10 December 2017.

components in the construction of the Russian nuclear-powered submarines. For example, no imported components are anymore used for "Borei" project, and for the "Iasen" project, there was abandoned the use of components from a factory in Ukraine and from one in the Republic of Moldova. Russia also gave up (at least temporarily[14, 15]) the construction of three of the six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates for the Black Sea Fleet after Ukraine stopped supplying the propulsion turbines.

2.2 Actions of Russia in WBSA

One of Russia's main strategies in the Black Sea Area is to maintain its influence on the former Soviet states, respectively Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

The aggression upon Ukraine greatly complicates the security arrangements in the area, requiring a redefinition of the strategies and directions of action of the main actors: NATO / US, Russia and EU. By annexing Crimea, Russia violated at least two major international agreements: the Memorandum on Security Assurances (December 1994)[16] and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine (signed in 1997 and prolonged in 2010)[17]. The

failure to comply with Russia's commitments in the Budapest Memorandum represents not only a serious violation of the fundamental principles on relations between states, but also decreases the whole international system of nuclear non-proliferation. Russia's Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, said that "in response to the US rapid global attack strategy, we could modernize our strategic nuclear, naval and aerospace forces."[18] Thus, the revised plans for Russia's Armed Forces military procurements aim at modernizing the entire strategic nuclear arsenal (100%) by 2020 (before the crisis, the target renewal target of the strategic component was only 70%).[19]

The restructuring program of the Russian Armed Forces, initiated in 2008, had significant effects on the Russian military system as a whole and on the military units deployed in the Black Sea region in particular. Thus, it was decided the operational re-subordination of the arms services to the four joint strategic-operational commands established at the end of 2010: West (Sankt Petersburg), South (Rostov-on-Don), Center (Ekaterinburg) and East (Habarovsk). Based on that decision, the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) was re-subordinated from the Navy Staff to the South Joint Strategic-Operational Command.[20]

Starting 2011, there has been a progressive expansion of naval activities in the Black Sea, culminating in 2013, when the Russian Operational Maritime Task Group of the Mediterranean was established under the command of

[14] "Russia to resume the construction of the "last three" Project 11356 frigates in 2018", 03 June 2017, available at: http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2017/june-2017-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/5253-russia-to-resume-the-construction-of-the-last-three-project-11356-frigates-in-2018.html, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[15] "Yantar Shipyard Launched Two Project 11356 Frigates in Kaliningrad", 16 November 2017, available at: https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2017/november-2017-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/5729-yantar-shipyard-launched-two-project-11356-frigates-in-kaliningrad.html, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[16] "Ukraine. Memorandum on Security Assurances", Budapest, 05 December 1994, available at: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ukraine._Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[17] "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation", available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian%E2%80%93Ukrainian_Friendship_Treaty, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[18] "Russia Announces Plans to Upgrade Nuclear, Air Defense Forces", 10 September 2014, available at: https://www.defensenews.com/article/20140910/DEFREG01/309100040/Russia-Announces-Plans-Upgrade-Nuclear-Air-Defense-Forces/?odyssey=nav%7chead, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[19] Hans M. Kristensen, "Russian Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Status, Trends, and Implications", 29 September 2014, available at: https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Brief2014-Paris-RussiaNukes.pdf, accessed on 29 November 2017.

[20] "Russia sets up four strategic commands", in *Sputnik*, 14 July 2010, available at: https://sputniknews.com/military/20100714159810197/, accessed at 28 November 2017.

RBSF[21]. Russia's military involvement in Syria (September 2015) led to a significantly increase of Russian naval activities in the Mediterranean Sea. Currently, Russia is maintaining a group of at least 4-5 combatant and auxiliary ships in the east of the Mediterranean Sea, although some times the number of ships deployed was much higher. Military systems and equipment transportation in Syria on the Novorossiisk-Tartus route has also been intensified by both LSTs (including the Baltic and Pacific fleets) and civilian ships, in the so-called "Syrian Express" operation. [22, 23]

At the same time, the Russian military procurement program by 2020 provides for the provision of RBSF with 21 naval platforms equipped with KALIBR cruise missiles and ground attack (with a range of 2,000 km), namely: 6 KILO II-class submarines, 3 Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, 12 PGGs (6 x Sviyazhsk-class and 6 x Bykov-class). [24] Those vessels will create a disproportionately force compared to the naval forces of the other Black Sea riparian states and, implicitly, the extension of the RBSF area of operations.

Given the range of KALIBR missiles, we can assess that they will be an essential component of the A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) concept along with the other components (Bastion and Bal E coastal defense cruise missile systems, S-30 multirole aircraft and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers) [25, 26], which Russia is implementing in a high rhythm since 2014.

The Crimea militarization process is taking place at an accelerated pace, targeting all components: air, land, and maritime. This process aims at creating a "complete and independent joint force" in the Crimea. This "joint independent force" will probably consist of military units belonging to all categories of forces, including airborne and airspace troops. [27] The "independence" of the structure will probably entail the ability to carry out autonomous joint operations in the Black Sea area, without the support of military structures deployed in the mainland. The group will probably be subordinated from the operational point of view to the Southern Military Region, not to the General Staff.

2.3 Actions of Turkey in WBSA

After the Soviet Union collapse, Turkey became a major actor in the Black Sea region. Cultural links with Muslim populations have boosted this position and underpinned the further development of economic relations with the countries on which Muslim minorities live. At the same time, Turkey was the initiator of various regional cooperation organizations in the Black Sea, including the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), Black Sea Naval Force (BLACKSEAFOR) and Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH). [28]

[21] "Russia Plans a Permanent Naval Task Force for the Mediterranean", Defense Update, 04 March 2013, available at: http://defense-update.com/20130304_permanent_russian_naval_force_med.html, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[22] John C. K. Daly, "Russia's Syria Resupply Route Through the Turkish Straits: Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack?", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume 14, issue 73, The Jamestown Foundation, 05 June 2017, available at: https://jamestown.org/program/russias-syria-resupply-route-turkish-straits-vulnerable-terrorist-attack/, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[23] "Russia builds up forces in Syria", *Reuters*, 07 October 2016, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-exclusive/exclusive-russia-builds-up-forces-in-syria-reuters-data-analysis-shows-idUSKCN1271YO, accessed on 28 November 2017.

[24] Initially, the program aimed to equip RBSF with 15 new ships and submarines by 2020 ("Russian Black Sea Fleet to receive 15 new combatant vessels by 2020" in *Sputnik*), 23 June 2010, available at: https://sputniknews.com/russia/20100623159538260/, accessed on 29 November 2017), but it was later decided to equip RBSF with an additional number of PGGs equipped with KALIBR missiles.

[25] Loic Burton, "Bubble Trouble: Russia's A2/AD Capabilities", 25 October 2016, available at: https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/10/25/bubble-trouble-russia-a2-ad/, accessed on 29 November 2017.

[26] Byron Chong, "The Role of the Black Sea in Russia's Strategic Calculus", 02 April 2017, available at: http://cimsec.org/role-black-sea-russias-strategic-calculus/31805, accessed on 29 November 2017.

[27] A detailed articol on Militarization of Crimea ("Militarization of Occupied Crimea – A Threat to Global Security", Defense Express, 26 April 2016) is available at: https://defence-ua.com/index.php/en/ publications / 914-militarization-of-occupied crime-a-threat-to-global-security, accessed on 29 November 2017.

[28] Selim Koru, "Turkey's Black Sea Policy: Navigating between Russia and the West", Foreign Policy Research

The Crimea annexation did not trigger a harsh reaction from Turkey, although this had direct repercussions on the Crimean Tatar community, supported by Turkey, mainly due to its interests in the field of energy resources.[29]

The process of accelerated militarization of the Crimea and modernization of RBSF significantly affects the balance of forces in the Black Sea in favor of Russia. The unrestricted

very clear until November 2015, when the air strike, which led to the collapse of a Russian aircraft that violated Turkey's airspace on the Syrian border, conducted to tensions between the two countries. Shortly after the incident, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said (at a security conference in Istanbul) that the Black Sea became a "Russian lake" and called on NATO to strengthen its posture in the region. [30]

Figure no. 1:The range of KALIBR missiles
Source: http://theriseofrussia.blogspot.ro

access to Sevastopol (Crimea) and Tartus (Syria) ports offers Russia the possibility to deploy forces to the north and south of Turkey, which dislikes the government in Ankara. However, the Turkish authorities did not express their concerns

Institute (FPRI) 18 July 2017, available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/turkeys-black-sea-policy-navigating-russia-west/, accessed on 11 December 2017.
[29] *Ibidem*. At that time, Turkey imported about 50% of natural gas from Russia and tried to use its geographic position to obtain substantial advantages as a transit country for Russian and Caspian energy resources.

Tensions between the two countries began to diminish at the end of June 2016, when Erdogan sent his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, a letter in which he formally expressed regret for the aircraft's shutdown and expressed willingness to act to relaunch relations bilateral. This was added to the support that Putin offered to the Turkish president after the failed military coup in July 2016. In a telephone conversation with Erdogan, shortly after the failed coup, Putin stressed that

[30] *Ibidem.*

"the coup is unacceptable, whether in Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen or in another country."[31]

At the same time, the relaunch of Turkey's relations with Russia was bolstered by Western criticism of President Erdogan's antidemocratic skirmishes following the coup d'etat, disagreements with the EU over Syrian refugees and the US refusal to extradite the Muslim cleric Fethullah Gullen.[32]

At the military level, the relaunching of relations between the two countries culminated with the signing of an agreement for buying by Turkey S-400 air-defense missile systems (September 2017).[33] Another example of the rapproachment between the two countries on the military level can also be considered the visit paid to Novorossiisk in April 2017 by two Turkish combatants (FFGs Barbaros and Buyukada).[34] On the same occasion, commander in chief of Turkish Naval Forces, Adm. Veysel Kösele visited Russian FFG Admiral Grigorovich in Novorossiisk.[35]

Recent developments in Turkey-Russia relations suggest that if Turkey-West disputes are perpetuated, Ankara can be attracted more easily in a closer partnership with Russia, even though this will diminish Turkey's influence in the region.

2.4 Actions of Ukraine, Georgia and Republic of Moldova in WBSA

After the 2014 crisis, Kiev's authorities have clearly expressed their option of approaching European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. This implies broad economic and military reforms that involve high financial and social costs. Ukraine is dependent on the financial support of international bodies (EU, IMF, World Bank). As a result, it is not excluded that social effects of the reforms may cause at least part of the population to no longer support the pro-Western orientation of the country. At the same time, the annexation of Crimea and Russia's involvement in Donbass conflict are elements that can provoke a deep anti-Russian sentiment among the population.

As a result, in order to maintain a pro-European orientation among the Ukrainian population, it is essential that Kiev's authorities succeed in maintaining a certain standard of living, while implementing the reforms required by international bodies.

As far as Georgia is concerned, it is expected that this country will try to maximize the benefits of the geostrategic importance it has received for NATO after 2014. Probably Tbilisi's authorities will try to get consistent military support from NATO. However, given the current tensions between Russia and the West, it is expected that NATO/US will refrain from providing substantial military support to Georgia and from further promoting its accession to the Alliance in order not to provoke Russia's reaction.

The political scene in Chisinau will continue to be affected by major disagreements between president and government on the country's foreign policy orientation. Probably, Russia will try to exacerbate these divergences through various methods (information campaigns in the press, economic blackmail, funding of pro-Russian political forces, etc.) in order to bring this country back into its sphere of influence.

---

[31] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation website, "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of Portugal Augusto Santos Silva, Moscow, July 18, 2016", available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/2356678, accessed on 11 December 2017.

[32] Selim Koru, "Turkey's Black Sea Policy: Navigating between Russia and the West".

[33] Carlotta Gall, Andrew Higgins, "Turkey Signs Russian Missile Deal, Pivoting From NATO", *The New York Times*, 12 September 2017, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/europe/turkey-russia-missile-deal.html, accessed on 11 December 2017.

[34] "Turkish Warships Make 'Unofficial Port Call' to Russia's Novorossiysk", *Sputnik*, 03 April 2017, available at: https://sputniknews.com/world/201704031052230460-turkey-warships-novorossiysk/, accessed on 11 December 2017.

[35] *** "Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces visited the Admiral Grigorovich frigate", Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 04 Apri 2017, available at: http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/navy/news/more.htm?id=12117083@egNews, accessed on 11 December 2017.

Conclusions

The evolution of the WBSA security environment has been and continues to be marked by Russia's tendency to reaffirm it as a great power on the international arena. The Crimean Peninsula annexation was an unprecedented act of aggression in the post-Cold War period. This act was considered a military aggression against a sovereign and independent state in Europe, and determined developments in the military strategies of all actors with interests in the region, contributing to the accentuation of a rearming process and repositioning of the forces.

The prolonged crisis in Ukraine maintains and accentuates instability in the region. The internal policy of this state will continue to be crushed by pro-Western and pro-Russian antagonist political forces with limited prospects of improvement in the short and medium term.

Deterioration of NATO-Russia relations has major repercussions on the security configuration in the area. Russia's action has triggered deterrence measures taken by NATO and, given the difficulties the two sides have encountered in resuming relations after the Ukrainian crisis, it is expected that this behavior of the actors will continue at least in the short term.

The rapid and significant development of Russia-Turkey relations, including the sale of S-400 air-defense missile systems, along with the degradation of Turkey's relations with US and EU and the risk of a new wave of refugees from the Middle East to Europe, are variables that can influence security developments in the region.

All these aspects suggest that, in the medium and long term, the WBSA will remain an area characterized by instability, and the possibility of creating a new "cold war front" with Romania on the demarcation line can not be excluded.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ABRAHAMYAN, Eduard, "Georgia after Montenegro's NATO Accession", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11 July 2017, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/georgia-montenegros-nato-accession/.

2. BURTON, Loic, "Bubble Trouble: Russia's A2/AD Capabilities", Foreign Policy Association, 25 October 2016, https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/10/25/bubble-trouble-russia-a2-ad/.

3. CALOPĂREANU, Gheorghe, "Complexul de securitate Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre" (Security Complex Wider Black Sea Area), "Carol I" National Defense University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2012.

4. CHONG, Byron, "The Role of the Black Sea in Russia's Strategic Calculus", 02 April 2017, http://cimsec.org/role-black-sea-russias-strategic-calculus/31805.

5. DVALI, Ana; GACHECHILADZE, Mariam, "2016 in Georgian-Russian Relations and Future Prospects", Caucasian House, 22 February 2017, http://regional-dialogue.com/en/2016-in-georgian-russian-relations-and-future-prospects/.

6. GALL, Carlotta; HIGGINS, Andrew, "Turkey Signs Russian Missile Deal, Pivoting From NATO", *The New York Times*, 12 September 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/europe/turkey-russia-missile-deal.html.

7. KORU, Selim, "Turkey's Black Sea Policy: Navigating between Russia and the West", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 18 July 2017, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/turkeys-black-sea-policy-navigating-russia-west/.

8. KRISTENSEN, Hans M., "Russian Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Status, Trends, and Implications", 29 September 2014, https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Brief2014-Paris-RussiaNukes.pdf.

9. SIKHARULIDZE, Archil, "Analysis | Russian–Georgian diplomatic relations — to be or not to be?", 06 March 2017, http://oc-media.org/russian-georgian-diplomatic-relations-to-be-or-not-to-be/.

10. *** "Fragile State Index" issued by Fund for Peace in Mai 2017, http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/14/fragile-states-index-2017-annual-report/.

11. *** "Militarization of Occupied Crimea – A Threat to Global Security", 26 April 2016, https://defence-ua.com/index.php/en/publications/defense-express-publications/914-milita-

rization-of-occupied-crimea-a-threat-to-global-security.

12. *** "Programul lui Dodon: denunțarea Acordului de Asociere cu UE", 29 September 2014, http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/programul-dodon-denuntarea-acordului-deasociere-ue-1_54290b810d133766a88382bc/index.html.

13. *** "Russia Announces Plans to Upgrade Nuclear, Air Defense Forces", 10 September 2014, https://www.defensenews.com/article/20140910/DEFREG01/309100040/Russia-Announces-Plans-Upgrade-Nuclear-Air-Defense-Forces/?odyssey=nav%7chead.

14. *** "Russia builds up forces in Syria", 07 October 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-exclusive/exclusive-russia-builds-up-forces-in-syria-reuters-data-analysis-shows-idUSKCN1271YO.

15. *** "Russia's Syria Resupply Route Through the Turkish Straits: Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack?", 05 June 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/russias-syria-resupply-route-turkish-straits-vulnerable-terrorist-attack/.

16. *** "Yatseniuk: Ukrainian army to switch to contract service, de-facto become part of NATO", 11 February 2016, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/323978.html.

17. The official website of NATO Supreme Allied Command in Europe, URL: http://shape.nato.int

18. The official website of NATO, URL: http://nato.int

19. The Russian Ministry of Defense official website, URL: http://eng.mil.ru/

20. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation official website, URL: http://www.mid.ru/en.

21. The Georgian Ministry of Defense official website, URL: http://mod.gov.ge/

22. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, URL: http://mfa.gov.ge/

23. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, URL: http://mfa.gov.ua/

24. The official website of Moldova's President, URL: http:// presedinte.md/

25. The website of Navy Recognition, URL: https://www.navyrecognition.com

26. The website of Russia Today TV channel, URL: http://rt.com

27. The website of Russian Sputnik News Agency, URL: https://sputniknews.com

RESILIENCE: CONCEPT, APPROACHES AND IMPLICATIONS

Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD*

"Resilience" is one of the terms most commonly used in security discourse recently. The objective of the present paper is to study the meanings and implications of this notion, whose origins lay in the exact sciences and to analyse how it is applied in security studies. The hypothesis of research is represented by the fact that resilience is one of the concepts allowing the international actors to adapt to the security environment's dynamics. Thus, the analysis is framed in the current international context, characterized both by major interdependencies among international actors and by the increasing scope and forms of conflict. At the same time, to capture and highlight the implications of the concept in question and how it is implemented, the paper also includes an analysis of NATO and EU vision, emphasizing both the common aspects and the various shades resilience can acquire at the level of each of the two organizations.

Keywords*: flexibility, resistance, hybrid aggression, NATO-EU cooperation, inter-organizational cooperation.*

1. Context

When trying to define the international and regional security environment in just some major directions, one would certainly focus on the increasing level of conflict and of its complexity, as well as on international actors' efforts to develop the necessary means to meet this trend. For example, a recent report by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) shows a trend towards rising military expenditures of the main actors in the international arena, a phenomenon that will remain valid at least until 2021. The trend is justified by the constant pressure on defence budgets, where threats continue to increase, and geopolitical tensions further fuel global arms trade[1].

Furthermore, since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis (2013), one can no longer speak of a safe and stable environment in Europe, where the possibility of a military conflict was considered almost null. There are deterrent measures at the eastern border of the EU and NATO, and security analyses are increasingly centred on the idea of hybrid aggression, which means "a possible action of a state or non-state adversary which uses adaptive and concerted political, military, economic, social or informational means, in combinations of unconventional and conventional methods, in order to achieve the objectives pursued"[2]. In addition, one of the specific aspects

---

[1] For details, see: *** Global Defence Perspectives 2017. Updating the Map of Defence Prioritization in a Challenging World, November 2017, URL: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/government-public-sector-research/pdf/global-defense-perspectives-2017.pdf, accessed on 10 October 2017.

[2] Dan-Lucian Petrescu, "Advanced model for configuring hybrid aggression", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 2 [63]/2017, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defense University Publishing house, p. 45, available at URL: https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is63.pdf, accessed on 12 October 2017.

*Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD, is Senior Researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: bogzeanu.cristina@unap.ro

of this type of aggression is that "practitioners of hybrid warfare are often less intent on seizing and holding territory than destroying or disrupting the ability of societies to function"[3].

Thus, if we follow the implications of a policy run under the slogan "America First!", the meanings of Brexit, the development of deeply anti-European political outlooks, far from being able to be considered liberal, as well as the rise of extreme left-wing parties or extreme right (Germany, France, Austria, Hungary, Poland) among the EU Member States, the increasing attractiveness of the adoption of a multi-speed Union development strategy or the recent turn in Turkey's foreign policy and in relations with the other Western actors, we could find that the organizational and institutional foundation of our own security is increasingly fragile. It is a fragility whose source is found in the deepening lack of cohesion among the actors of the Euro-Atlantic community and which can be accentuated and exploited by and for the benefit of third-party actors, which are in opposition to the specific values and interests of this community.

All this adds to the instability of the neighbouring regions, which have a major influence on European and Euro-Atlantic security. The instability in the East, strongly marked by the evolution and subsequent stagnation of the Ukrainian crisis, is only the tip of the iceberg in this respect. The Republic of Moldova remains incapable of functioning in the conditions of a political life split in two seemingly irreconcilable directions: pro-European and pro-Russian. Georgia's goal of becoming a member of NATO and the EU and its efforts in this direction are hampered by separatist aspirations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, supported and encouraged by Russia. In the Western Balkans, Montenegro's accession to NATO, as well as Serbia's desire to join the EU, are drawing aggressive statements from Russia. For example, when Montenegro became the 29th NATO member state, the international press published a statement of Russia's Foreign Ministry in which Montenegro's adherence to the Alliance was described as a "hostile course" and in which was asserted: "the Russian side reserves the right to take retaliatory measures on a reciprocal basis"[4]. Beyond that, Middle East is the scene of a civil war in full progress (Syria), where major powers support opposing sides directly involved in the conflict, a continual war zone and a scene of multiple humanitarian tragedies.

Developments at international level generate changes in how security issues should be managed and lead to the identification and development of solutions accordingly. "When war changes, so must defense"[5]. Comprehensive approach (NATO and the EU) and even the integrated crisis approach (EU) are among the solutions often mentioned in this context. Along with these, "resilience" is gaining more and more weight in security studies and analyses, not only in terms of frequency, but also of conceptual development and the implications it generates or should generate operationally.

Similar to other concepts commonly used in security research over a certain period of time, neither the term "resilience" itself, nor its significance is recent or fundamentally innovative. However, its significance is closely tied to the recent developments in the international and regional security environment and its operationalization can help increase security and stability.

[3] Franklin Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Dan Hamilton, "Defend the Arteries of Society", in *US News and World Report*, 9 June 2015. Apud. Guillaume Lasconjarias, "Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared", ETH Zürich, URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/ac42738-f524-462a-bb16-18e5eba459ef/pdf, accessed on 12 October 2017.

[4] David Brunnstrom, "Russia threatens retaliation as Montenegro becomes 29th NATO member", in *Reuters*, 6 June 2017, URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nato-montenegro/russia-threatens-retaliation-as-montenegro-becomes-29th-nato-member-idUSKBN18W2WS, accessed on 9 October 2017.

[5] Guillaume Lasconjarias, "Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared", ETH Zürich, URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/ac42738-f524-462a-bb16-18e5eba459ef/pdf, accessed on 12 October 2017.

2. Conceptual landmarks

"Resilience" is a term encountered in theoretical developments and practical concerns in the field of engineering, psychology, ecology, disaster response, emergency management, etc., which makes this concept to have a wide variety of definitions, which differ not only depending on the scientific field in which they are developed, but also on the evolution over time of the term's vision and knowledge.

In exact sciences, resilience refers to the quality of a substance or object to return to its original form, after being subjected to a pressure, to the ability of a material to absorb energy when it is deformed and to release energy when the pressure is removed[6]. In the field of psychology, resilience defines the ability of individuals to recover from a disturbing experience, maintain their full functionality in the face of stressors, adapt and successfully cope with trials in hard social conditions or under severely unfavourable conditions[7]; it also implies acquired and developed over time skills, vision, knowledge as individuals overcome adversities and face challenges[8].

Resilience is also a commonly used term in environmental studies and in relation to specific risks, particularly as regarding the capacity of communities to resist and recover from natural disasters, but also the way in which development human societies causes imbalances in nature, eventually leading to the production of those disasters[9].

In the field of security studies, resilience has emerged in relation to fragile states, seen as the opposite state to fragility, as the level to which they should evolve. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development defines resilience as "The ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty. Resilience is about addressing the root causes of crises while strengthening the capacities and resources of a system in order to cope with risks, stresses and shocks"[10]. It is a definition that has been taken up with small variations by most international actors.

In another definition, resilience refers to "the ability of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while crossing a period of change so as to retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and reaction"[11]. We consider it relevant as it stresses that the shock is received, the crisis is felt with all its consequences, but that when dealing with resilient systems, this set of circumstances also functions as an incentive for change, reformation, adaptation, while the system maintains its full functionality.

The term was also included in the strategic visions of international actors, being related to the security of their own territory. For example, the 2010 US National Security Strategy defines resilience as "the ability to adapt to changing conditions and to prepare, resist and recover rapidly after disturbances"[12]. In this vision, resilience is part of a strategy that makes possible to address the unforeseen threats and dangers of committed engagements, including international terrorism, natural disasters, large-scale cyber-attacks and pandemics. The aforementioned document also lists the operational steps towards the development of resilience: a) strengthening

---

[6] *** Collins English Dictionary – Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition, URL: http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ resilience, accessed on 10 October 2017.

[7] M. Windle, "Critical conceptual and measurement issues in the study of resilience", in: Glantz D. Meyer, Jeanette L. Johnson, (editors), *Resilience and development, positive life adaptations*, Springer Science & Business Media, New York, 1999, pp. 161–176.

[8] D. Saleebey, "The strengths perspective in social work practice: extensions and cautions", in *Soc Work.*, 41(3)/1996, pp. 296–305.

[9] For details, see: Stockholm Resilience Centre. Sustainability Science for Biosphere Stewardship, URL: http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/our-research-focus.html, accessed on 12 October 2017.

[10] *** Risk and resilience, OECD, URL: http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/risk-resilience/, accessed on 12 October 2017.

[11] B. Walker, C.S. Holling, S.R. Carpenter, A. Kinzig, "Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social-ecological systems", in *Ecology and Society*, No. 9(2)/2004, p. 5.

[12] *** National Security Strategy, May 2010, Washington D.C., p. 18, URL: http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf, accessed on 12 October 2017.

---

national security; b) effective management of emergency situations; c) empowering communities to counteract radicalization; d) strengthening and expanding public-private partnerships; e) involvement of communities and citizens.

The 2017 US National Security Strategy maintains the same basic understanding of the term, but the context is expanded and adapted to the changes in the international security environment and to those brought by the new presidency. Thus, beyond deliberate attacks, accidents and natural disasters, there are also taken into account unconventional tensions, shocks and threats to the economy and the democratic system[13]. Moreover, there are also approached issues such as the use of informational tool by certain actors (such as the Russian Federation) to undermine the legitimacy of democracies, targeting the media, political processes, financial networks and personal data. According to this document, priority actions for strengthening resilience consist of: a) improving risk management; b) building a culture of alertness, continuous training; c) improving planning; d) motivating the sharing of information.

On the whole, regardless of the area in which the concept of resilience is used, its meaning implies a number of aspects that are constant:
• a vulnerability of the system;
• the existence of an external factor (risk, threat), which can seriously affect the system's normal state (usually acting on a vulnerability);
• a high level of knowledge of both vulnerabilities and possible external factors that can affect the system's normality – resilient systems are based on knowledge and analysis;
• the ability of that system to survive and maintain its essential functions, even under shock or crisis conditions – concentrating resources to strengthen critical points in order to maintain the functionality of that system;
• the ability to adapt to the situation and to recover later;

• the ability of a social system to adapt and to deal with change without losing its essential functions.

Although resilience implies managing events with low predictability, developing this type of system is a reason-based process, assuming, to a large extent, analytical and planning activities. In this direction, resilience was likened to a Trojan horse[14], because it has a number of implicit features.

Thus, first of all, resilience implies the existence of redundancy, even though in part, in terms of each institution's attributions, supposing an institutional multiplicity. Each of the components of the system must develop its own resilience and thus cope with change. The relations between them must be designed so that when a component is seriously affected, the others may be able to take over its responsibilities and the system would continue to work. Institutional multiplicity refers to several institutional regimes whose activities overlap to a certain extent, so that if one of the institutions becomes incapable of supporting one of the critical activities, it can be taken over by another institution.

In this respect, developing a common vision on the strategic environment, coordination in terms of attributions, responsibilities and actions, and even the conduct of joint actions can be factors contributing to the development of resilient systems. Therefore, inter-institutional cooperation is another factor contributing to the development of resilience. This is particularly the case where risks and threats can have effects on several security dimensions, and aggression on a certain actor may be hybrid, a situation that is defined by a diffuse character, involving multiple power tools and generating effects on multiple plans.

Secondly, resilience implies developing a certain proactive way of thinking about change. Far from being a concept with purely reactive connotations, resilience also supposes overcoming fragility as a process of social and institutional

---

[13] *** National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 14, URL: https://www.white-house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, accessed on 10 December 2017.

[14] Frauke de Weijer, *Resilience: A Trojan Horse for a New Way of Thinking*, Discussion Paper No. 139, January 2013, European Centre for Development Policy Management, p. 5.

evolution. Resilience also involves capitalizing on the opportunities associated with a certain situation and not necessarily a major control over its evolution. When talking about resilient systems, change is addressed holistically and multidisciplinary, recognizing the interactions between the components of those systems[15].

Therefore, in an international context characterized by fluidity, amplification and expansion of multi-level conflict, uncertainty and ambiguity, with a recent history of strategic shocks becoming more and more common, the attempts to modify the way of responding to change, shaping strategies of resistance, adapting and capitalizing on change are natural and necessary.

3. Resilience in NATO vision

The idea of resilience has been present in the Alliance's view from the beginning: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Article 3 / Washington Treaty[16]). Much later, during the Warsaw Summit (8-9 July 2016), the Heads of State and Government of NATO member states signed a commitment to strengthen resilience[17]. The engagement is defined in relation to the whole range of threats, including hybrid ones, being presented as "an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks"[18]. In this perspective, resilience would entail the maintenance and protection of critical civilian capabilities, together with support for military capabilities, as well as the

"whole of government"[19] cooperation. Resilience aims, in NATO's view, on the government's ability to continue to operate, to provide critical services to the population, and civilian support for military operations. To this end, there are seven fundamental areas on which it is necessary to focus efforts towards resilience development: a) continuity of government and critical government services; b) resilient energy supplies; c) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; d) resilient food and water resources; e) ability to deal with mass casualties; f) resilient communications systems; g) resilient transportation systems[20].

Even without an in-depth analysis, from the two references, we can see the strong emphasis on military security in the approach of the Washington Treaty. The turn of emphasis from the military dimension of resilience (Washington Treaty) to the civilian dimension (Commitment to enhance resilience, Warsaw) can be understood through the different historical contexts in which the two documents were drafted. Switching from a purely military threat to hybrid threats is reflected in the shift from the "capacity to resist" to resilience. Beyond the diffuse nature of the current threats, the difficulty to distinguish between peace and crisis or conflict in the context of hybrid aggression, another factor in shaping the importance of resilience is the conduct of a military operation involving a major contribution

---

[15] *Ibidem.*
[16] The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
[17] Commitment to Enhance Resilience, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm, accessed on 12 October 2017.
[18] *Ibidem.*

[19] At national level, "whole of government" approach refers to the cooperation between ministries and government departments in order to improve the way in which certain challenges are addressed and managed. At the level of international organizations, the "whole-of-Government approach" involves a series of efforts to harmonize the activities of various international and local actors to ensure a unified approach to a particular problem. For details, see Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nugelhus Schia and Ståle Ulrisksen, Norway's Whole-of-Government Approach and its Engagement in Afghanistan, Report, Security in Practice, No. 8/2009, p. 12, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, URL: https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/47107380.pdf, accessed on 10 October 2017.
[20] *** "Resilience: a core element of collective defence", in *NATO Review*, URL: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.htm, accessed on 14 October 2017.

---

of civilian services – infrastructure and transport of goods, telecommunications, water and food supplies, etc.[21]. All of these are vulnerable to attacks because they were designed to generate maximum profit, which means that resilience measures in times of crisis were not a priority.

In other words, with regard to NATO, we can observe that resilience contains two major dimensions. The first and most important out of these is the continuity of the government and civilian services' functioning, and the second is the maintenance of their ability to carry out their functions of supporting military operations. The importance of resilience in the current international context can also be deduced from the development of arguments, at least in the academic environment, in favour of the idea that resilience should become, together with collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security another core task of the Alliance[22].

Resilience has also been seen as a civilian correspondent of deterrence. Thus, if deterrence has, first of all, a military dimension, both conventional and unconventional, referring to the means and capacity to respond to external threats, then resilience refers to the level of civilian preparedness that allows the military to carry out its mission[23]. In this line of thought, deterrence would refer to actions to prevent a military attack, while resilience would have a similar significance, at civilian level. Moreover, given the interdependence between the two dimensions in the security efforts, resilience can be considered part of deterrence.

In our view, no matter how important resilience is in the context of hybrid aggression, it can be developed as an integral part of the three fundamental tasks already defined in NATO Strategic Concept. Thus, resilience can be considered part of collective defence. In terms of crisis management, the importance of resilience is highlighted, for example, by the highly significant role of certain services provided by civilian actors (communications services, GPS, transport infrastructure, cyber infrastructure, etc.) in the conduct of a military operation. Last but not least, the emergence of resilience could be an integral part of the third fundamental task – cooperative security. Encouraging and supporting societies and states in developing resilience can help promote and maintain a stable environment in the vicinity of the Alliance. However, this is a much more developed approach at EU level.

4. Resilience in EU vision

At EU level, the idea of resilience has begun to occupy an increasingly important place in security discourse, with the publication of the Global Strategy for EU's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS 2016). Within this framework, we can also note two major dimensions of the concept under discussion – one referring to its own resilience ("the resilience of our democracies") and the second referring to the resilience of the states in the immediate neighbourhood.

When mentioned in relation to EU democracies, EUGS 2016 emphasizes the importance of respecting the values, closely related to the credibility and external influence of the organization. From this perspective, the implications of the concept become similar to those developed at NATO level. In this case, increasing resilience is seen as a result of the cumulus of three major actions: a) developing cyber-capabilities; b) encouraging investment and skills development through cooperation in research and innovation programs, training, exercises and procurement; c) developing the full range of military capabilities needed to respond to external crises.

---

[21] In large-scale operations, 90% of military transport, 40% of military satellite communications are provided by the commercial sector and 75% of all host nation support is dependent on the use of locally procured infrastructure and services. For details, see: *** Civil preparedness, 26 April 2017, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq / topics_49158.htm? SelectedLocale = en, accessed on 15 October 2017.

[22] Franklin Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Dan Hamilton, "NATO's New Strategy: Stability Generation", Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, September 2015, URL: http://www.mat.hu/eng/downloads/docs/NATOs_new_strategy_web.pdf, accessed on 15 October 2017.

[23] Guillaume Lasconjarias, *op.cit*.

Resilience of states and societies in the eastern and southern neighbourhood is the second priority of external action, following the security of the Union. Thus, we can consider that the EU is developing the concept in question in an "whole-of-society" approach, which assumes the premise of the importance of individuals, local communities, their interactions, as well as relations with intergovernmental organizations, civil society, academia, media, etc.[24].

The significance that resilience gets in the EUGS can be understood by reference to the evolution of EU's security vision since the publication of the European Security Strategy 2003 (ESS 2003), as influenced by the regional dynamics of security risks and threats. For the EU, resilience is developed first of all in relation to states beyond its own borders. Thus, we can make a parallel with ESS 2003, considering resilience a development of ESS 2003 strategic objective of "building security in our neighbourhood" under the influence of recent developments in risk and threat at regional level. Thus, ESS 2003 mentioned: "Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations"[25]. However, 2016 EUGS addresses the same subject in the following terms: "It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests"[26].

The difference between the two approaches lies in the Union's degree of involvement in promoting security and stability in neighbouring regions. It is the result of accepting the limits of EU normative action, of its ability to promote the European type of society and state beyond its own borders (demonstrated by the succession of severe crises in these areas), but also the limits to identifying ideal solutions for managing instability in neighbourhood. It is a decrease of the level of ambition in terms of democratizing the neighbouring states and a token of acknowledging this state of facts[27].

According to EUGS 2016, resilience implies the ability of states and societies to reform so as to withstand and recover from internal and external crises, creating the premises for sustainable development and evolution of societies, being both to the advantage of the Union and countries in neighbouring regions. Further, a resilient society is characterized by the embracing of a democratic system of governance, by population's trust in institutions and sustainable development[28]. Finally, resilience is presented, in relation to the eastern neighbourhood strongly marked by Russia's influence, as the ability of an actor to unilaterally define his relationship with the Union[29].

One shall also take into account that, as far as the EU is concerned, resilience was not a concept used only after the publication of 2016 EUGS. Previous developments can be found in the protection of critical infrastructure[30] or food

[24] Darren Brunk, "Whole-of-society peacebuilding: A new approach for forgotten stakeholders", in *International Journal*, no. 7/2016, pp. 70-72.

[25] *** A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, Brussels, p. 6, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world, accessed on 12 November 2017.

[26] *** Shared vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, Brussels, p. 23, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world, accessed on 12 October 2017.

[27] Sven Biscop, "The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics", Security Policy Brief, No. 75/2016, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, p. 2, URL: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/ 2016/06/SPB75.pdf?type=pdf, accessed on 12 October 2017.

[28] *** Shared vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, Brussels, pp. 23-24, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world, accessed on 12 October 2017.

[29] *Ibidem.*

[30] Commission Staff Working Document on a new approach to the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection Making European Critical Infrastructures more secure, Brussels, 2013, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2013/EN/10102-2013-318-EN-F1-1.PDF, accessed on 20 August 2017.

security[31]. However, EU has recently proposed a so-called Strategic Resilience Approach to help increase the impact of the EU's external action and to support the achievement of the Union's objectives in terms of development, humanitarian assistance, foreign policy and security[32].

Thus, resilience becomes one of the central concepts of meeting EUGS 2016 strategic objectives. The term marks a reformulation of the European Neighbourhood Policy objective of having "a well-governed and prosperous circle of states" around EU borders. After 2016, this goal could be paraphrased by creating a "circle of resilient states" around the EU's borders. Practically, it addresses chronic vulnerabilities and fragility, specific to Europe's extended neighbourhood, which can enhance the impact of security challenges. In this direction, climate-induced pressures, environmental or migration challenges that come out of state control, economic shocks, social erosion due to weak institutions and poor governance, conflicts, violent extremism, destabilizing actions of other powers against actors considered enemies[33]. Supporting resilience in the neighbourhood of the EU translates into support for internal actions stemming from within the concerned societies or countries. The Union's interest in this is to increase its own security by avoiding situations where these actors, when destabilized, would put pressure on the EU.

Resilience is not just about the manner in which the Union addresses neighbouring countries' security and stability as part of the effort to enhance its own security, but also the way in which it relates to its own security and stability. In this respect, five priority areas are identified: a) hybrid threats; b) cyber security; c) strategic communication; d) terrorism and violent extremism; e) critical transport infrastructure; f) developing cooperation with NATO and the OSCE[34].

So, from this point of view, resilience is considered to be a diffuse, unclear, misleading concept, as a result of the EU's attempt to adapt its strategic vision to recent developments in the regional and international security environment[35]. The EUGS 2016 preserved the typical European principles and values of a highly liberal nature (democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, market economy), but also gave birth to the concept of "principled pragmatism", framed in a realistic logic. The result was, however, the creation of a diffused and complicated concept, oriented towards individuals and society. Resilience implies the fight against poverty and inequality which, over time, could lead to positive changes even within these countries. However, the way of implementation, the solutions for the operationalization of this concept are not identified, though, from the EU's political instrument toolbox, enlargement policy and European Neighbourhood Policy would be the most suitable in this respect, given the need for an extremely specific approach, tailored to the particularities of each individual society.

Furthermore, resilience development is also an important part of NATO-EU cooperation. NATO-EU Joint Declaration (July 2016) mentions resilience both as part of the joint effort to counter hybrid threats and in relation to neighbouring countries in the south and east of the two organizations[36]. The document stresses that developing resilience to hybrid threats requires NATO and the EU to cooperate in early intelligence analysis, prevention, detection and

---

[31] *** Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, Brussels, 3 October 2012, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/ policies/resilience/com_2012_586_resilience_en.pdf, accessed on 14 October 2017.

[32] *** Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action, European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, 7 June 2017, p. 2, URL: https://ec.europa. eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint_communication_a_ strategic_ approach_to_resilience_in_the_eus_external_ action-2017.pdf, accessed on 20 August 2017.

[33] *Ibidem*, p. 3.

[34] *Ibidem*, pp. 15-17.

[35] Sven Biscop, *op. cit.*

[36] *** Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 8 July 2016, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/ official_texts_133163.htm, accessed on 12 October 2017.

early warning, and information sharing. Given that the two organizations bring together a considerable number of Member States jointly, targeting at a considerable extent the same territory and confronting common security challenges, inter-organizational cooperation in the development of resilience becomes at least as important as inter-institutional cooperation at national level. Strengthening a common NATO and EU vision, with compatible or complementary elements, where appropriate, on what resilience is, on what measures are supposed to be taken, and on what features should be pursued becomes a central element for both organizations.

Conclusions

In order to understand the significance and implications of resilience, as it is currently being developed at the level of state actors and regional security organizations, it is necessary to frame it within the wider regional and international security environment context and, in particular, taking into consideration the implications of hybrid aggression. Actually, with the emergence of hybrid aggression, we can also talk about an increase in pressure to develop flexible, adaptable systems as a defensive counterpart of this kind of aggression.

Broadly speaking, we can define resilience as being the ability of people, societies or states to survive major shocks and crises, to maintain vital functions, to limit their impact on their own functioning, and to improve upon experience. Resilience implies flexibility, endurance, and durability, and is often metaphorically described as the ability of a system, when subjected to pressure, to bend without breaking.

Although it generally refers to situations with a certain degree of unpredictability, resilience does not exclude planning. On the contrary. The development of resilient systems, whether we look at states, societies, organizations, critical infrastructures, or even individuals, depends on the quality of our analysis of the context, of the vulnerabilities, risks and threats, the rational planning of resources and actions. At the same time, improvisation, adaptation of actions and reactions to the events' evolution creating the pressure must not be excluded, in the context in which systems have to prove resilience.

The purpose of resilience is to allow a certain system (state, society) to operate/maintain the main features enabling it to operate in crisis conditions, but also to rapidly recover afterwards. Withal, another constant issue is related to the existence of at least a vulnerability of the reference system, together with the existence of a risk or threat, which may involve the exploitation of that vulnerability. Therefore, we can define resilience by reference to vulnerability, but it shall not be considered an antonym of vulnerability. Resilience implies reducing vulnerability, "covering" those "gaps" that determine vulnerability, while developing the capacity to identify crisis-solving opportunities, hence the flexibility of the concept. Thus, resilience implies not only not being overcome by hostile conditions and the adaptation to this type of environment, but a combination of all the above, the ability to identify and exploit these opportunities included in adverse conditions and to continue evolving.

Whether we refer to state actors or organizations, resilience is an internal matter, it is the responsibility of each state, even when it comes to third-party actors. An eloquent example is the vision developed by NATO and the EU in this regard. For the EU, the inclusion of resilience in foreign policy actions is equivalent to the support of inward, country-specific actions that are not initiated by the Union. In this context, all these are specific actions, adapted to the political, economic and social specific of each state.

Resilience is a concept that develops into an era of complex interdependencies, whether we refer to internal and external security, to security dimensions, to regional and international organizations, state actors or national institutions with security responsibilities. Inter-institutional cooperation, as well as inter-organizational cooperation are, therefore, essential in any approach aimed to increase the resilience of a particular system. However, in this sense, resilience also presents an inherent risk, which is also characteristic to inter-organization cooperation – redundancy. Planned and optimally

managed, redundancy may be that dimension of inter-institutional and inter-organizational cooperation with a decisive contribution to increasing the resilience of the respective system. However, deficiencies in planning and management can make redundancy a source of resources waste or unnecessary conceptual complication, for instance, the proposition that resilience should become the fourth NATO core task. Also, concerning NATO – EU cooperation, there is a fine line between this aspect of resilience and the unnecessary duplication of functions.

Developed both at NATO and EU level, resilience is one of the issues embedded in the security agendas of both organizations, being mentioned as a central area of cooperation between them. Nevertheless, our analysis reflects both similarities and differences in the manner in which the two organizations approach this concept. Both of them frame resilience not only in the wide context of multiple interdependencies, but also in the one of hybrid aggression, and the visions reflect the role plaid by the deterioration of the relations with the Russian Federation. However, given that resilience at EU level is predominantly developed in relation to the immediate neighbourhood, the deterioration of the relations between the West and Moscow is more visible, at least as regards the formulation of official documents.

The concept has different nuances also in the way inter-institutional cooperation is developed by the two organizations. Thus, the Alliance uses the term "whole of government", while the Union has rather a "whole of society" approach. The difference can be explained not only by the very nature of the two organizations, but also by their goals and objectives. For NATO, resilience refers to the ability of the government to maintain its functionality and civil services to be able to perform the support function for military operations. For the EU, it is important that neighbouring countries evolve towards democratic systems, which must start within those societies. In addition, "resistance" to external influence is one of the objectives of resilience defined not only for the societies of the

neighbouring states, but also for their own.

However, in our opinion, resilience can bring added value not so much in terms of relations with neighbouring states, but especially in terms of actions to strengthen our own security. The five priority areas for foreign action reflect the Union's effort to respond to security challenges, where the Union has proved to be the most vulnerable and could be exploited to being destabilized. Advancing resilience as a strategy to promote stability and security in the neighbouring region really marks a change in the approach developed under the European Neighbourhood Policy, a reduction in the level of ambition, but also a decrease in the degree of involvement in the internal development of the concerned countries.

It is clear that the way in which Brussels develops the concept of "resilience" is under the influence of recent developments in security and defence. Of these, there are of high relevance: the hybrid risks and threats, an aggressive Russia, the questioning of US engagement in NATO under Trump's mandate, EU Member States with strong centrifugal, anti-European, illiberal tendencies. Thus, deepening integration in security and defence paying more importance to hard power, the tendency to identify and consolidate an EU core to support these developments can be considered efforts to increase the Union's resilience, without naming it so formally.

The development of this concept can be seen as an attempt to compensate for the fact that, until recently, we have reported our own security as an enduring, stable state, not being threatened by immediate risks and threats. As a result, the concerns to cope with major crises similar to those experienced in the recent period were minimal. However, the succession of crises in recent years has made it necessary to identify a solution, and resilience may be part of the response to this state of facts.

Resilience is itself a fluid, adaptable concept, which is visible from the nuanced approaches and the evolution of conceptual developments. Basically, wherever we deal with a system that has at least one vulnerability and is exposed to

a risk or threat, resilience defines and gives the measure of its ability to continue its existence by means of reliability in maintaining vital functions and flexibility in all the other aspects. Resilience can be understood by associating it with the implications, in terms of scope and complexity, of concepts such as hybrid aggression, comprehensive approach or integrated approach.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. *** Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition, URL: http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ resilience.

2. *** Global Defence Perspectives 2017. Updating the Map of Defence Prioritization in a Challenging World, November 2017, URL: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/government-public-sector-research/pdf/global-defense-perspectives-2017.pdf.

3. *** National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

4. *** National Security Strategy, May 2010, Washington D.C., URL: http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf.

5. *** Risk and resilience, OECD, URL: http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/risk-resilience.

6. BISCOP, Sven, "The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics", Security Policy Brief, No. 75/2016, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, URL: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf?type=pdf.

7. de WEIJER, Frauke, *Resilience: A Trojan Horse for a New Way of Thinking*, Discussion Paper No. 139, January 2013, European Centre for Development Policy Management.

8. KRAMER, Franklin; BINNENDIJK, Hans; HAMILTON, Dan, *NATO's New Strategy: Stability Generation*, Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, September 2015, URL: http://www.mat.hu/eng/downloads/docs/NATOs_new_stra tegy_web.pdf.

9. LASCONJARIAS, Guillaume, "Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared", ETH Zürich, URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/ services/digital-library/articles/article.html/ac42738e-f524-462a-bb16-18e5eba459ef/pdf.

10. MEYER, D. Glantz.; JOHNSON, Jeanette L. (editors), *Resilience and development, positive life adaptations,* Springer Science & Business Media, New York, 1999.

11. NATO official web page, URL: https://www.nato.int/.

12. Official web page of Stockholm Resilience Centre. Sustainability Science for Biosphere Stewardship, URL: http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/our-research-focus.html.

13. PETRESCU, Dan-Lucian, "Advanced Model for Configuring Hybrid Aggression", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 2 [63]/2017, Centre for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house, pp. 45-51, https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is63.pdf.

14. Reuters official web page, URL: https://www.reuters.com/.

15. SALEEBEY, D., "The strengths perspective in social work practice: extensions and cautions", in *Soc Work*., 41(3)/1996, pp. 296–305.

16. WLKER, B.; Holling, C.S.; Carpenter, S.R.; Kinzig, A., "Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social-ecological systems", in *Ecology and Society*, No. 9(2)/2004.

17. EU official web page, URL: https://europa.eu/.

18. European Commission official web page, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/

THE FAKE NEWS PHENOMENON
IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA

Anne Maria DRAGOMIR*

The emergence and rapid development of social media has led to a radical change in the manner people communicate and get informed, driven by the fundamental characteristics of these tools: instant messaging, the possibility of viralisation, the high degree of interaction, unlimited access, and inexpensive information. The use of social media platforms, both for personal and professional purposes, has come to be a part of the everyday life of people globally. This dynamic and complexity of social networks allowed the configuration of new types of security risks and threats. Among them is the phenomenon of fake news, an old phenomenon, but with new valences in the context of the digital revolution. The present article proposes a conceptual analysis of the phenomenon by defining the fake news phrase, illustrating the mechanisms of functioning in the social media context and presenting some perspectives and directions of action of the companies that hold the main social media platforms as well as the ones of the European Commission.

Keywords: fake news, social media, misinformation, US presidential election (2016), Russia, Facebook.

1. Social Media Dynamics

The emergence and rapid development of social media has led to a radical change in the ways that people communicate and get informed. This new method of communication is characterized by the speed with which the message is transmitted. Also, social media offers the highest degree of interaction that a means of communication can provide to the user. Access to information is unlimited and inexpensive, and the lack of a forum to regulate online content, unlike for the one broadcasted through traditional media channels makinges the online environment extremely permissive.

Regarding the penetration capacity of the social media platforms, the statistical data provided for the year 2017 show a considerable increase in relation to the previous years, but also a prognosis for the continuation of this course. According to the information published in January 2018 by *WeareSocial* in partnership with *Hootsuite*, there are about 4 billion internet users, representing more than half of the world's population, a quarter of them gaining access to the Internet in the last 12 months. As far as social networks are concerned, in 2017, there was an increase of 1 million users per day, meaning 11 new users per second. In terms of percentage, we see an increase of 13% compared to January 2017. Facebook has 2.1 billion users; YouTube, 1.5 billion; WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, 1.3 billion each; Instagram, 800 million; Twitter, 330 million; Skype, 300 million; and LinkedIn, 260 million. [1]

---

[1] 2018 Digital Yearbook report, developed by We are Social, in partnership with Hootsuite, https://www.slideshare.

*Anne Maria DRAGOMIR is PhD Student in the field of Information and National Security with "Carol I" National Defense University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: anne.dragomir@gmail.com

The statistical data portal Statista has made an infographic briefly presenting the interactions processed in just 60 seconds in the online environment of 2017. So, in just 60 seconds, over 400 hours of content has been uploaded to YouTube, 243,000 photos on Facebook, 65,000 on Instagram, 350,000 tweets published, 29 million messages sent to WhatsApp, 2 million minutes of Skype calls, while Google more than 3.8 million searches have been made.[2] Fundamental features of social media platforms in conjunction with statistical data outline a fairly clear picture of the role that social media has gained globally, be it personal use, or addressing them for professional reasons.

Equally, the dynamics and complexity of social networks have allowed new types of security risks and threats to be confronted. The issue has been widely debated in close association with the use of social media platforms by terrorist organizations, the prototype being the Islamic State (ISIS). ISIS has used and abused social media mechanisms, proving itself to always be a step forward in terms of exploitation. From propaganda messages to recruitment and even funding, ISIS has built a real strategy for the new communication and information resource. However, the triggering factor of the overall interest in the negative impact that social media has been generated by the notoriety gained by the globally known phenomenon of fake news, an old phenomenon, but which has become ubiquitous in everyday life, along with the digital revolution of recent years.

The article starts from the premises of the necessity to carry out a series of research efforts around this ample phenomenon. The debates are still at their beginning and the conceptualization of the phenomenon is also at an early stage, so a first step in identifying the solutions that help fighting against the phenomenon is becoming aware and understanding its functioning mechanisms

in the context of the social media dynamics. Social media has completely reconfigured both the news channel concept and the information delivery process. "Now, a tweet, which at most is 140 characters long, is considered a piece of news, particularly if it comes from a person in authority".[3] We will start at a first stage from defining the concept of fake news and integrating this phenomenon into the issue of how social networks work. We are considering illustrating the negative impact that fake news can have by briefly presenting the findings delivered by the the technology giants in front of the United States Congress as a result of suspicions of sabotaging the elections that took place at the end of 2016. We will conclude our approach by presenting European approaches to fake news, with particular attention to the Report published on 12 March 2018 by the European Commission's High Level Expert Group, a group mandated by the Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society.

2. The Evolution of the Fake News Concept

While at first glance understanding the concept of fake news may seem to be a matter for everyone, the phenomenon raises major conceptualization problems. The very association of the word "news" with the adjective "fake" can lead to a series of debates. From a journalistic perspective, a news story is supposed to be true and is not made public until it is verified from multiple sources. Therefore, the phenomenon can not be explained by simply defining and understanding the separate words forming the phrase that has gained notoriety both in the academic environment and in the everyday life of online users.

Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow define fake news as "...news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers."[4]

net/wearesocial/2018-digital-yearbook-86862930, accessed on January 10, 2018.

[2] Infographic: Done in 60 Seconds, by Dyfed Loesche, published by Statista on March 7, 2018, https://www.statista.com/chart/13157/what-happens-in-the-digitalized-world-in-one-minute-in-2017/, accesed at March 9, 2018.

[3] Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling „Defining <Fake News>", *Digital Journalism*, 2017, 6:2, pp. 137-153, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143, accessed on February 9, 2018.

[4] Hunt Allcott, Gentzkow, M., *Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election*, p. 3.

This is a simple and straightforward definition that makes direct reference to the content delivered and to the effects that it can have on users, without getting into the details about the complexity of the mechanisms and goals. Thus, defining fake news involves two valences, distorting authenticity and intent. "First, fake news includes false information that can be verified as such. Second, fake news is created with dishonest intention to mislead consumers. This definition has been widely adopted in recent studies."[5]

In an article published in July 2017, in the *Intelligence* magazine, Flavius Sichitiu defines fake news as "the presentation of untrue information or a mixture of lies and truth as a legitimate news. Their manifestation evolves rapidly, from satire to deliberate misinformation (propaganda) - that is, information that is deeply biased or untrue."[6] One of the characteristics of fake news lies in their founding on a kernel of truth, which makes it difficult to filter them. This is one of the fundamental arguments brought by the critics of conceptualizing the phenomenon under the term 'fake news'. The information provided is not always completely false, but on the contrary, it uses various real aspects that contribute to the credibility of the message and its viralisation. Such an example is given by the EUvsDisinfo[7] platform, the online resource for the campaign aimining to fight this phenomena, conducted under the aegis of the European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force. *Russia Today* announced on April 21, 2018 a news about Ukrainian's President Petro Poroshenko intention to withdraw the citizenship of the population living in the Crimea. According to EUvsDisinfo, the information provided falls under fake news. Poroshenko aimed indeed at amending the legislation, but the scope was guaranteeing Ukrainian citizenship to a person that is compulsorily granted a second citizenship. Under current legislation, a Ukrainian citizen loses nationality when (s)he voluntarily obtains another one.[8] This is a concrete example of how authenticity is distorted. Despite the fact that the intention to modify the legislation existed, the result is opposite from the one promoted by *Russia Today*. This category of fake news is based on distortion of authenticity. An event, an action that really took place is presented in an intentionally deformed manner, with the purpose of transmitting credible, but erroneous information.

Fake news have a number of features that make it easier for the user to engage into information dissemination, without considering the possibility of an erroneous message. They strictly follow the pattern of a true news, from how it is reported 12to .aspects related to its structure and presentation. "Fake news hides under a veneer of legitimacy as it takes on some form of credibility by trying to appear like real news."[9]

Because of the complexity of the issues, the conceptualization approaches of fake news begin to be drawn around what we call the effects of the phenomenon, namely misinformation or erroneous information. The terms *disinformation* and *misinformation* have completely different meanings. Disinformation is the deliberate creation and propagation of information known to be false, while misinformation involves the misrepresentation of false information.[10] Thus, the concept of fake news presents a series of valences, from deliberate misinformation and for precise purposes, whether it is about influencing the ideas, perceptions, concepts and actions of well-defined groups, or it is a major negative

[5] Kai Shu, Amy Sliva, Suhang Wang, Jiliang Tang, Huan Liu, *Fake News Detection on Social Media: A Data Mining Perspective*, September 3 2017, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.01967.pdf, accesed on January 9, 2018.

[6] Flavius Sichitiu, „Adevărul, între democratizare şi cenzură", *Revista Intelligence*, July 25, 2017. http://intelligence.sri.ro/adevarul-intre-democratizare-si-cenzura/, accesed on January 9, 2018.

[7] Platforma online EuvsDisinfo, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/, accesed on on January 14, 2018.

[8] Disinfo cases: President Poroshenko proposes Crimeans be deprived of Ukrainian citizenship, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/president-poroshenko-proposes-crimeans-be-deprived-of-ukrainian-citizenship/.

[9] Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling, *op.cit.*.

[10] Claire Wardle, *Fake news. It's complicated*, February 16, 2017, https://medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79, accessed on March 9, 2018.

effect on values democratic issues and issues ranging from individual and national shortages to unintentional misinformation by propagating messages without verifying the credibility of the source and its veracity. Deliberate misinformation, corroborated with misinformation from the negligence of the user who distributes content without prior assessment, but also with a viral capability characteristic of socialization platforms alone, can generate a series of risks and threats which, at least until this moment, have no efficient answer.

The vague definition and conceptualization of fake news, as well as the inability of the term to encompass all aspects of this phenomenon are increasingly leading analysts and specialists in the field to avoid using it.[11] Research efforts are becoming more precise on various forms of misinformation driven by digital space engines. Verstraete and Bambauer consider that "The term has been used to refer to so many things that it seems to have lost its power to denote at all; as a result, several media critics have recommended abandoning it entirely."[12]

As for the rapid reputation that fake news has gained over the last two years, the concept was proposed in 2016 by the Australian dictionary Macquarie, which defines fake news as "disinformation and hoaxes published for political purposes or to drive web traffic, the incorrect information being passed along by social media."[13] In 2017, it came to the Collins Dictionary to give the word of the year title to the fake news phrase, based on a 365% increase in usage over 2016. The definition given by Collins is: "false, often sensational information provided

under news coverage"[14]. Fake news, delivered either in the form of a statement or a charge, was an inevitable reality this year, contributing to undermining society's confidence in the news,"[15] said Helen Newstead, head of Collins' linguistic content department, according to BBC News.

Certainly, the United States President Donald Trump has made a major contribution to popularizing the concept. He has been using it with an extremely high frequency in order to describe his relationship with the American press. Donald Trump lifted the concept of fake news to another level and he literally made a top of the journalists and media channels who excelled in spreading fake news about his mandate. On January 18, 2018, the US President posted, on his official Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, the results of the *Fake News Awards*[16]. The top is populated with the most notorious US publications internationally. Journalists and notorious newspapers reached Trump's blacklist: Paul Kruhman (The New York Times), ABC News, CNN, Time, The Washington Post, Newsweek. According to the top, CNN appears to be the biggest fake news propagator, occupying no fewer than four positions in the top 10. "While it is currently used to describe false stories spreading on social media, fake news has also been invoked to discredit some news organizations' critical reporting, further muddying discourse around fake news."[17]

But perhaps the most interesting point of the debate about this type of threat has emerged around Russia's propaganda during the 2016 US presidential elections' campaign through social networking platform. Facebook recognized the existence of over 126 million organic posts over two years, of which 3000 messages were promoted by various online users in Russia. The misinformation reached the highest levels

---

[11] A.N. The High Level Expert Group of the European Commission, in order to conceptualize the phenomenon and identify solutions to combat it, supports the complete abandonment of the *fake news* phrase.

[12] Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer, & Jane R. Bambauer, "Identifying and Countering fake news", p. 4, (t.n.) https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/asset/document/fakenewsfinal_0.pdf, accessed on March 9, 2018.

[13] Macquarie Dictionary, Word of the Year 2016, Fake News – disinformation and hoaxes published for political purposes or to drive web traffic, the incorrect information being passed along by social media.

[14] Collins Dictionary, Word of the Year 2017, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/woty.

[15] BBC News *What is 2017's word of the year?*, November 2, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41838386, accesed at January 30, 2018.

[16] The official Twitter page of US President Donald Trump, @realDonaldTrump.

[17] Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling, *op.cit.*.

around the vote, when messages about the voting mechanisms sprouted the Internet. Clinton's voters were given a much easier way of exercising their right to vote by sms, and they were encouraged not to waste time at the queues at the polling stations. The approach obviously undermines the fundamental principles of American democracy.

3. The Information Ecosystem and the Functioning Mechanisms of Social Media

One of the questions that arises when starting an analysis of the phenomenon of fake news is whether it is a cause, an effect or a simple variable of the digital environment in which we build our existence, both personally and professionally. Thus, to address this issue, it is necessary to thoroughly understand the communicational and informational ecosystem set in motion by the digital revolution, as well as the functioning mechanisms, resources and tools in the online space. The viral nature of messages distributed in the online space radically reconfigures how disinformation takes place and how to combat it.

Martin Moore, director of Media Studies Studies at King's College, London, has identified a number of factors that determine the current informational ecosystem: the digital space monopoly owned by a small number of giants of technology which based their business on the collection and exploitation of personal data, the existence and popularity of extremist groups, the filtering of information determined by the engagement degree of the messages, the knowingly use of social media by state actors such as Russia in order to interfere with the democratic mechanisms of other states, such as elections, the undeniable existence of a considerable amount of fake news, even if, according to Moore, we can not definitely identify the impact at this time, the decline of the traditional media outlet model, the existence of echo chambers who influence ideas and, last but not least, the lack of penalties for those who help the proliferation of messages from the fake news category. [18] "Facebook echo

cameras are a metaphor that describes very well what happens: we are isolated in a virtual room where we are delivered only the information we like and where we agree, where we interact with ʻfriends' sharing the same ideas and values."[19]

Moore places much of the responsibility on the giants of technology. He believes that "Our understanding of the current phenomenon is, however, severely constrained by the technology platforms themselves. The data that would inform our understanding of the nature and extent of the problem, and its effects, is proprietary. Until platforms make this data available for independent research, it will be impossible to assess the problem properly."[20]

In an interview we had with Mr. Marco Ricorda[21] in December 2017, one of the questions addressed was how the European Union should respond to the challenges of social networking. [22] He pointed two directions of action "Two things: 1) Reinforce dialogue with tech companies 2) Work out a policy together with Member States, which currently are the only actors who act upon these challenges. There needs to be a European shared strategy to face all those challenges, since digital threats know no physical border. Regulations should not create breaches in freedom of speech. Tech companies need to be more transparent about their algorythms and the way they create "echo-chambers" where the users are "served"

[19] Dan Barbu, "Facebook în era post-adevărului", *Revista Intelligence*, http://intelligence.sri.ro/facebook-era-post-adevarului/, accessed on 18 January, 2018.
[20] Dan Barbu, "Facebook în era post-adevărului", *Revista Intelligence*, http://intelligence.sri.ro/facebook-era-post-adevarului/, accessed on 18 January, 2018.
[21] Marco Ricorda is the head of the European Parliament's ALDE Group Communication Department, a former social media manager at the European Commission's Research Center, a social media analyst at the European Commission's Directorate-General.
[22] Interview conducted by the author with Marco Ricorda on December 16, 2017, in order to document the elaboration of the PhD thesis "Social Networks - Threats and Opportunities in the Field of Security". Question: "How do you think the European Union should react to the emergence of different types of challenges and genuine threats (hate speech, false news, propaganda, ISIS manipulation and recruitment machine)? The fight against these threats is exclusively the responsibility of technology giants or should the EU work on a set of regulations?"

[18] Martin Moore, Inquiry into Fake News Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power King's College London, p. 9.

content according to their supposed preferences. Without transparency from tech companies over these mechanisms, the challenges you mentioned can hardly be taken." [23]

Regulations should not create violations of freedom of expression. Technology companies need to be more transparent about the algorithms behind the platforms and how the "echo chambers" are created, these being the place where the user is given the so-called personalized content according to his preferences. We will return to the active role and contribution that giants of technology can have in combating this phenomenon in the following pharagraphs, when we will conduct a brief analysis of Facebook, Twitter and Google representatives' hearings in front of the United States Congress.

As far as the understanding of the functioning of social networking mechanisms is concerned, we have outlined a general framework for their functioning. Of course, each social platform has its own features and applies a number of different algorithms that configures a unique user experience. The existence, continued development and perpetuation of social networks is based on three major pillars of functioning: socialization, entertainment and information. Socialization and relationship are the basic goal for which social networks have been achieved. The information and entertainment components subsequently emerged as a result of how the platforms were handled by the user. However, these goals in themselves have gained considerable ground in the early years of their operation, informing through social networks becoming a determinant reason for their massive use. Independent of the purpose for which users choose to use social networks, their actions in the online space generate content, which is one of the fundamental features that differentiates social media from the traditional media – user-generated content. The content, more or less viral, with a penetration capacity determined by the source it comes from, is always the reflection of perceptions, ideas, values, and especially the interests of the generator. These users may

be individuals, influential, bloggers, vloggers, media trustees, news streams, state institutions, international organizations, communities set up on the basis of common interests, interest groups, companies, and so on. State and non-state actors deliver every second incredible amounts of content that bombs the online space, transforming social networks into a true platform, a source of Big Data. All this volume of content, presented in different forms, texts, videos, audio, graphics, infographics or visuals, dictated by the content generator's interests, produces a number of effects with a strong social, political, but also security impact. Effects of content propagated through social networks can take both the form of opportunities and threats, both at the individual level and upon security in general.

By following this social networking logic, fake news is a simple type of content category that the user accesses through social media. The effect it generates in return – disinformation – can raise multiple challenges, even of political, social and economic nature. Thus, disinformation can be voluntary or involuntary and it is characterized by the rapid dissemination of information once it arrives in the online space. The involuntary propagation of a false-type message is driven by multiple engagement resources of users towards a message. Like, share, post, comment, or retweet are the means of engagement that the user has at their disposal when they come in contact with a message. A high degree of engagement can lead to a credibility of the message, especially if it comes from the user's direct acquintances.

Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow have identified six types of messages that are related to fake news: unintentional report of an erroneous news; rumors that are not based on a news article; conspiracy theories, the initiators believing them to be true; satire; false statements by politicians; accounts based on truth, but which are biased or misleading.[24] We believe that this type of messages can also produce the same effect as those in the category of fake news, namely disinformation. An important variable in

---

[23] Marco Ricorda.

[24] Hunt Allcott, Gentzkow, *M. Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election*, p. 214, http://www.nber.org/papers/w23089.pdf, accessed at March 9, 2018.

avoiding fake news is also the ability or, better said, the inability to filter out the volume of information delivered, those real data. This is one of the reasons why we believe and support that between the phenomenon of fake news and disinformation can not be a sign of equality. Fake news is a mechanism in itself, and disinformation – both a purpose of the source of the message and a possible effect. The disinformation generated by a fake news is indirectly proportional to the level of digital literacy of social networking users.

Kaplan and Haenlein have clearly highlighted a type of social networking communication that justifies the facility of the fake news messages spread. This is the *push-push-pull communication* concept that refers to a cascade information transmission. A user publishes an information (push) that is then taken over by other users, and they decide instantly to share it on their own profile (push). Posts later raise the interest of other users who decide, based on the brief information received, to look for more details about the subject (pull).[25]

Following a broad analysis of the specialized articles made available on the Google Scholar platform, Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling extracted six ways to exploit fake news: satire, parody, manufacturing, manipulation, propaganda and advertising.[26] These manifestations of fake news are distinguished by the types of artisans who may be state or non-state actors and their financial intentions in the case of companies or in order to discredit personalities, institutions, states or international organizations to intervene in politics domestic violence, to create cleavages, to propagate hate speech and to destabilize, in the case of state actors, but also of some organizations or individuals.

As we mentioned at the beginning, one of the most debated cases of foreign intervention in a state's internal policy is the case of the 2016 US elections. The multitude of fake content distributed through social networks and the lack of reaction of the platforms have generaterd vehement reactions towards the giants of

technology, both domestically, in the US, and globally. We consider this case the triggering factor of all the debates that have begun later, including in the European area.

4. The Effects of the US Election

On October 31, 2017, representatives of Facebook, Twitter, and Google were summoned to hearings by the United States Congress. Colin Stretch, Facebook vice president, Sean Edgett, Twitter's attorney, and Richard Salgado, head of the Information Security department at Google, have been put in the difficult situation to answer questions raised by Russia's involvement in the US elections, making use and abuse of the tools made available by social media, networks that have their motherland in the United States. The hearings were long, intense and certainly difficult to manage even by representatives of the leadership of these companies. The fundamental question is how another state may intervene in the United States' internal policy by exploiting communication and information tools developed and managed by US companies. The instruments were designed, as the representatives of the giants maintain, to unite and not to divide.

We have chosen to present and analyze the interrogations at the Congress, being, so far, a unique opportunity to observe the approach of discussions between the representatives of the technological giants and legislators. Hearings began with a plea of the three, followed by a series of questions from members of the Congress.

Colin Stretch has begun his speech reiterating Facebook's fundamental mission, namely, assuring the safety of Facebook users, stating firmly that "there is no place on Facebook for terrorism and hate."[27] Stretch also emphasized the important role that Facebook plays both in the economy of the democratic game and in the fight against terrorism, which also attracts

---

[25] *Ibidem*, p. 107.
[26] Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling, "Defining <Fake News>", Digital Journalism, 2017.

[27] Colin Stretch in the opening hearing in front of the United States Congress, decryption: Watch: Facebook, Google and Twitter testify to the Congress about Russia and the 2016 elections, October 31, 2017, live streaming https://www.recode .com / 2017/10/31/16570988 / watch-live-stream-facebook-google-twitter-russia-trump-2016-presidential-election-senate.

a responsibility from the company. The Vice President has positioned technology in general, and Facebook, as part of the solution to the fight against global terrorism.

As for the US presidential elections held in 2016, Stretch synthesized that indeed foreign actors have exploited socializing platforms "to undermine elections directly, contrary to Facebook's core values."[28] The Mechanism was a very simple one, false accounts were created, propaganda content was published, and these messages were promoted to reach as many users as possible. Paradoxically, he pointed out that although "our purpose is to bring people together, these external actors have tried to remove people."[29]

Edgett began his speech in the same way, reaffirming Twitter's commitment to democratic values. Also, Twitter's representative recognizes and is concerned that "several actors misused the platform to influence presidential elections in the United States, undermining confidence in the democratic process."[30] Edgett points out the need for cooperation as a basis for solutions to prevent such events in the future. "As with most of technological threats, the best approach is to compile information and ideas in the form of collective knowledge."[31]

Salgado had a shorter intervention, perhaps justified by the fact that his predecessors pointed out the most thorny problems. He has made specific references to the amount of content propagated through YouTube. No less than one billion hours of content was delivered daily, 400 hours per minute were uploaded to Google's video platform.[32] Salgado has attempted to justify a lower guilt of YouTube itself, underlining the fact that YouTube can not target a specific country, but video content has been propagated through other social networks.

All three representatives pointed out to the term "abuse". Platforms have been misused,

contrary to the values on which they were designed.

We want to emphasize that it is only at the end of 2017 and only in front of the United States Congress that this type of threat coming from social networks is vocally addressed, assumed as a challenge by the three giants of the new media.

One of the major issues addressed by members of the Congress was the promotion of paid messages. According to figures, over 5 million advertisers promote messages exclusivelly on Facebook on a monthly basis. The capacity or, rather, the inability of social platforms to identify and nominate the initiators of these messages was the main vector of the events that took place during the elections. Despite the assumption of transparency, none of the three representatives had the capacity to respond affirmatively to the challenge of identifying the origin of the content, Sen. Kennedy pointing out: "You do not have the ability to know who these advertisers are."[33] The justifications of the three representatives did not impress the Congress, who were convinced that despite the complicated configuration of the messages promoted, there were very obvious alarm signals, such as commercials paid in rubles (the Russian currency) coming from Russia. Senator Franken wondered rhetorically "how could you not link these two dots? You put together millions of data, the most sophisticated, but you can not associate rubles with political information?"[34]

Regarding the impact that the three companies have on society and the resulting responsibility, Senator Kennedy said: "Gentlemen, I am very glad that the three companies you are representing today are American companies and I think you do enormous good, but your power sometimes scares me."[35] Leahy has pointed out the responsibility that platform owners should assume "you have a great responsability....people can die"[36].

Of course, the focus of the problem is defined by the distributed content. Asking if the three

---

[28] *Ibidem.*
[29] Colin Stretch.
[30] Sean Edget.
[31] Sean Edgett.
[32] Richard Salgado at the hearings in front of the US Congress in October, 2017.

[33] Senator Kennedy.
[34] Senator Franken.
[35] Senator Kenedy.
[36] Patrick Leahy.

Companies they represent are part of the content industry, only Stretch admitted a percentage of less than 1%, underlining that the vast majority of content distributed through Facebook is user-generated content. Both Edgett and Salgado said neither Twitter nor Google are part of the content industry.

The conclusions were drawn by Graham, who asked the three what is the lesson they learned. Stretch said, "I've learnt the seriousness of this Committee and its approach to this topic." [37]. Edgett pointed out "I've learnt we have a lot more work to do and we are focused on doing that"[38] Salgado once again stressed the importance of cooperation: "I think that it's quite clear that this is a problem that's gonna take the work of all the companies policy members, law enforcement and NGOs to solve"[39].

What have we learned from the hearings? The presidential election in the United States has once again demonstrated the impact that social networking uses have on socio-political space and how the tools and mechanisms of social networking platforms can be used to divide societies through fine manipulation mechanisms.

There is a need for transparency with regard to promoted messages and paid advertising. It is very important to know who is behind a message in order to assess the relevance of the message. The relevance of the information is given by the nature of the source. Also, as far as the target group is concerned, companies have made a number of changes, making it impossible to promote messages in other countries than the one in which the content generating account is created. Are these measures sufficient? Certainly not, because there are a number of methods by which messages can be propagated, confusing one or another of these operating algorithms. In the context presented, in a fully-technologized and digitized world, the focus must be redirected to the human resource. The human filter can be a more feasible solution in eliminating this type of threat, essentially from the distributed content

and not from the propagation mechanisms. Thus, all three companies have announced an increased interest and major investment in teams of experts able to evaluate distributed content, identify patterns of online behavior, distinguish between abusive content generators, lawyers, and those who are manipulate and influence to distribute false, instigatory content. These steps are absolutely necessary, primordial, in order to reach, at later stage, the eradication, but especially the prevention of such threats. At the same time, cooperation between private companies and public institutions is equally important. The exchange of information and knowledge can strengthen, as Edgett said, the knowledge about the challenges of the continuous development of technology and lead to a common language, absent at this time, but so necessary. Facebook announced the Congress that at that time they had a team of 10,000 specialists, estimating to double it in 2018.[40]

5. European Approaches

On 13 November 2017, the European Commission announced in a press release the establishment of a High Level Expert Group (HLEG) in order to develop a strategy against fake news, with the results to be released in April 2018. [41]

The working group met for the first time on January 15, 2018 and consisted of 39 experts from different fields of activity – representatives of civil society, social networking experts, journalists and academics. Among them, there is also Romanian Ph.D. Professor Alina Bârgoanu, Dean of the Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, within the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest. The group is chaired by Madeleine de Cock Buning, Ph.D. Professor at Utrecht University.

---

[37] Stretch.
[38] Edgett.
[39] Salgado.

[40] Decryption: Watch: Facebook, Google and Twitter testify to Congress about Russia and the 2016 election, October 31, 2017, live streaming https://www.recode.net/2017/10/31/16570988/watch-live-stream-facebook-google-twitter-russia-trump-2016-presidential-election-senate, accessed on January 20, 2018.
[41] *Ibidem.*

The report[42] was released one month earlier than the initial estimate, on 12 March 2018, and had a double objective –, to define and conceptualize the phenomenon of disinformation in the digital environment, but also to identify solutions and means both to raise awareness of the phenomenon at a large scale, and combat it. It is important to note that the report is built around the concept of disinformation, HLEG being positioned in the category of researchers who consider that the phrase *fake news* proves to be insufficient to be able to encompass all the aspects of this old phenomenon triggered by new instruments of social media. Disinformation is defined as "false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit."[43] These actions are considered to "potentially represents risks for our democratic processes, national security, social fabric, and can undermine trust in the information society and confidence in the digital single market"[44].

The report is structured in five parts and includes the definition of the issue, the measures taken up to date, short and long-term objectives, a series of measures to prevent and combat the phenomenon and conclusions. As far as the objectives set by the HLEG, these are built with reference to one of the fundamental principles of democracy, freedom of expression. The limitations they face in managing the issue of Internet communication have contributed to expanding the propaganda capacities of non-state and state actors, such as Russia. "While consolidating domestic media control Moscow skillfully exploits the pluralistic nature of the media in Western Societies and the fact that Western governements have little control over the media in their countries."[45]

The two major objectives of the online disinformation response strategy are: 1. "to increase the long-term resilience of EU citizens, communities, news organisations, Member States and the EU as a whole to empower Europeans and help them proactively recognize various forms of disinformation"[46], and 2. „to ensure that responses to disinformation are always upto-date, which requires to constantly monitor the evolving nature of the problems at hand, continuously innovate in designing adequate responses, and evaluate their efficiency."[47]

The HLEG identifies five areas of action in addressing disinformation: enhancing transparency of online news, promoting media and information literacy, developing tools to empower users and journalists to tackle disinformation and contribute to positive online engagement, protecting the diversity and sustainability of the European news media ecosystem, promoting ongoing research and monitoring of the phenomenon to identify the most effective and clear action steps, to evaluate measures taken by different actors and constantly adjust the necessary responses.[48] Improving communication with technology giants and co-operating with them is the foundation for transparency. A better understanding of the algorithms of operation, explained by their creators, along with the provision of data, facilitates the Commission's research and can then lead to the implementation of the whole strategy outlined by the HLEG. Solutions to combat disinformation stem from close cooperation between social media companies and public authorities.

Of course, the HLEG report is only a first step in assessing the issues of disinformation through online mechanisms, but it is certainly one of the most comprehensive tools to raise awareness, understanding and conceptualization of the phenomenon so far, as well as sketching an

---

[42] *Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation*, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation, March 2018, p. 10, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation, accessed on January 20, 2018.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 10.

[44] *Ibidem*, p. 10.

[45] NATO Reports – committee on the Civil Dimmension of Security, *The Social Media Revolution: Political and Secu-*

rity Implications, October 2017, p. 9, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-social-media-revolution-cordy-report-158-cdsdg-17-e-bis, accessed on January 9, 2018.

[46] *Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation*, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation, March 2018, p. 19.

[47] *Ibidem*, p. 19.

[48] *Ibidem*, p. 5; 22.

---

action plan on the basis of which the EU Member States can develop strategies to combat the risks that the spread of disinformation can bring.

Conclusions

The communication and information mechanisms that emerged with the development of digital space have also generated opportunities and threats, both at an individual level and at state and global level. Social media users are exposed to an impressive volume of information, and their filtering becomes more and more difficult, allowing the emergence and consolidation of fake news, which results in disinformation on a smaller or larger scale. Users rely on filtering the messages coming from online space and redistributing them on a type of credibility given by the degree of engagement these messages have in the online space. The degree of credibility is directly proportional to the degree of engagement of their acquaintances part of their restricted circle of users or of those people with notoriety. Consequently, they can become victims of disinformation and generators, in turn, of misinformation.

One of the most important debates around the phenomenon refers to the fact that the terms used does not have the ability to cover its complexity. Thus, HLEG has replaced, since the beginning of the report published in March 2018, the phrase *fake news* with *disinformation*, justifying it by the capacity of the disinformation concept to explain more clearly the mechanisms of action of this phenomenon, so present in the past year.

Although the concept of disinformation plays a fundamental role in understanding the phenomenon of fake news and can lead to the implementation of effective solutions to combat it, we believe that the debate on the conceptualization of the phenomenon should continue because between the two phenomena can not be put a sign of equality. From the perspective of our analysis, fake news is a mechanism, and disinformation has an effect.

Since the conceptualization of the phenomenon is at an early stage, there are currently no clear lines of action to combat disinformation through social media with verified results. Even at this early stage, we believe that first steps should be taken to educate users through digital literacy programs. Users should be encouraged to develop critical thinking when choosing to get informed in the digital environment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ALLCOTT, Hunt; GENTZKOW, Matthew, "Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Volume 31, Number 2, Spring 2017, pp. 211–236, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211 doi=10.1257/jep.31.2.211.

2. Facebook, Twitter și Google representative's hearings in front of the American Congress - decryption: "Watch: Facebook, Google and Twitter testify to Congress about Russia and the 2016 election", October 31 2017, live streaming https://www.recode.net/2017/10/31/16570988/watch-live-stream-facebook-google-twitter-russia-trump-2016-presidential-election-senate.

3. BARBU, Dan, "Facebook în era post-adevărului", *Revista Intelligence,* http://intelligence.sri.ro/facebook-era-post-adevarului/.

4. BAUM, Matthew; LAZER, David; MELE, Nicco, Conferința "Combating Fake News: An Agenda for Research and Action" February 17-18 2017, https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Combating-Fake-News-Agenda-for-Research-1.pdf.

5. BBC News, *What is 2017's word of the year?* http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41838386, 2 noiembrie 2017.

6. Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng Wei Lim & Richard Ling (2017) Defining "Fake News", *Digital Journalism*, 6:2, pp.137-153.

7. European Commission, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation – „*Report of the independent High Level Expert Group on fake news and online disinformation*", March 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-

group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation.

8. *Infografic: Done in 60 Seconds*, by Dyfed Loesche, publishe by *Statista*, March 7 2018, https://www.statista.com/chart/13157/what-happens-in-the-digitalized-world-in-one-minute-in-2017/.

9. Interview conducted by the author with Marco Ricorda on December 16, 2017, as a stage in the elaboration of the PhD thesis "Social Media – Threats and Opportunities in the Field of Security".

10. Macquarie Dictionary, Word of the Year, Fake News https://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/news/view/article/431/.

11. MOORE, Martin, "Inquiry into Fake News Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee", Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power King's College London, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/publications/CMCP-Consultation-Submission-for-CMS-Select-Committee-Fake-News-Inquiry.pdf.

12. NATO Reports – committee on the Civil Dimmension of Security "*Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation*", March 2018.

13. Official Twitter Page of the US President Donald Trump, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/953794085751574534?lang=en.

14. *2018 Digital Yearbook* Report, made by the WeareSocial platform, in partnership with Hootsuite, https://www.slideshare.net/wearesocial/2018-digital-yearbook-86862930.

15. RUBIN, V. L. "Deception Detection and Rumor Debunking for Social Media" in SLOAN, L. & QUAN-HAASE, A. "The SAGE Handbook of Social Media Research Methods, London: SAGE", 2017, https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/the-sage-handbook-of-social-mediaresearch-methods/book245370.

16. SHU, Kai; SILVA, Amy; WANG, Suhang; TANG, Jiliang; LIU, Huan, "Fake News Detection on Social Media: A Data Mining Perspective", http://www.kdd.org/exploration_files/19-1-Article2.pdf.

17. SICHITIU, Flavius, "Adevărul, între democratizare şi cenzură", *Revista Intelligence, July 25* 2017, http://intelligence.sri.ro/adevarul-intre-democratizare-si-cenzura/.

18. TAMBINI, Damian, "Fake News: Public Policy Responses", The London School of Economics and Political Science Department of Media and Communications, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73015/1/LSE%20MPP%20Policy%20Brief%2020%20-%20Fake%20news_final.pdf.

19. VERSTRAETE, Mark Verstraete; BAMBAUER, Derek E.; BAMBAUER, Jane R., "Identifying and Countering fake news", James E. Rogers College of Law - University of Arizona, https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/asset/document/ fakenewsfinal_0.pdf.

20. WARDLE, Claire, "Fake news. It's complicated", February 16 2017, https://medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79.

CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE – UNITY FACTOR OR CHALLENGE IN THE MULTINATIONAL OPERATONAL ENVIRONMENT

Rita PALAGHIA*

The aim of the article is to present, analyze and understand the way in which cultural knowledge and the development of cross cultural competence contribute to the participants' training for taking part into multinational joint missions, and also for the increase of their operational efficiency in order to accomplish the given tasks and, implicitly, of the planned objectives.

The article takes into consideration the training methods, stressing the need to understand the strategies and the principles of action, of the way in which cross-cultural competence is developed and checked, in direct connection with the risks and the situational awareness from the theater of operations from Afghanistan and also with a direct relationship, on one hand, among the participating actors and, on the other hand, the relationship between them and the local population.

__Keywords__: cross-cultural competence, multiculturality, interrelationship, interoperability, Resolute Support Mission, cultural understanding.

Introductory Framework

Cultural understanding represents a sum of knowledge and adaptative behavior that facilitate individual functionality in multinational groups, understanding of the environment and accomplishing the objectives.

Notifying the change in the way the modern warfare is conducted, the armies of the participating states to multinational missions initiated, starting with 2001, after the Al Qaida attack upon the United States of America, changes in the provisions of their national doctrines, in personnel policies and regarding their organization, establishing and/or developing language or cultural training centers.

The programmes developed by the language and cultural training centers belonging to the Allied military structures provide a large amount of information about the traditions and behaviors specific to their national cultures. These programmes were very useful for military personnel, negociators, and businessmen and also for the participating volunteers in joint multinational missions. The identification of the common cultural aspects of the participating nations in international missions, to which is added cultural knowledge of the local population, contribute to the increase of the efficiency in the accomplishment of the missions and, implicitly, of the planned objectives.

As part of the cultural training programmes, there was a smooth shift from the general cultural training to specific regional ones, depending

Mrs. Rita PALAGHIA is a PhD Candidate in Military Science with "Carol Iˢᵗ" National Defense University, and serves as a NATO International Civilian Contractor (ICC), Adviser for the Commander of the Base Support Group, Resolute Support Mission HQs from Kabul, Theatre of Operations from Afghanistan. E-mail: rpalaghia@yahoo.com

on the executed military operations. There are strong debates at international level related to this decision, as it is considered that a training focused on regions is a error at the expense of the general cultural training, very useful for the efficiency of the activities executed during multinational joint missions, in which multiculturality is manifested. In our opinion, there is useful a combination of both types of training, focusing on the deployment area of the personnel.

The success of the mission and, implicitly, the increase of interoperability require a correct interpretation of the social interaction and of communication, of the verbal and non-verbal messages, of the symbols and of the perception. For the international personnel participating into multinational joint missions, language knowledge, symbols, rituals and the behavioral patterns are essential. All these elements are part of the general cultural training.

The importance of culture – including here religion – in multinational operations is recognized especially at the national level and is valued more and more at Allied level. Troop Contributing Nations are responsible for the preparation and training of their soldiers for the mission and most of them introduced the cultural knowledge module in the training program for the mission: for example USA, United Kingdom, Norway etc. More than that, the repeated exercises organized by NATO Headquarters, aiming at the preparation of their soldiers for the mission comprise also cultural knowledge modules. But all of these are ad-hoc initiatives. The explanation is that even if cultural aspects are a standardized part of NATO operational planning process, there is no Allied Doctrine to impose cultural training. Commanders apply, to a great extent, specific policies based on their own experience and training, in solving cultural discrepancies, thus getting different results, as a consequence of the interpretation of variables and factors, such as existing situations, in direct connection with what the respect for another culture means.

1. Strategies and principles of action for a common cultural knowledge

Moving forward, we shall underline seven principles of action which ensure a better cultural understanding[1]. In our opinion, these are part of common cultural knowledge.

1. *Being aware of the meaning or of the possible meaning of the conversation, action and context.* The success of the joint missions depends on the capacity of the military to correctly interpret the messages and to interact in a positive way from the cultural point of view.

2. *Paying an increased attention to symbols.* Aspects related to symbols are an additional cause of the difficulty regarding interoperability in joint missions. They can be the cause for the political and cultural conflict at the international level. For example, in some countries, certain symbols represent political parties, thus, citizens can vote knowingly without a need to be literate. Very often, symbols are common elements, such as flowers, birds or colours. Similar colours or symbols that are used by foreign entities on a county's territory can be read as a support for one party or another and can generate misunderstandings and tensions. Special attention is needed in regard to the meaning of symbols for the local population. This understanding can be difficult to achieve, but the absence of understanding those symbols can have devastating effects over a mission, transmitting the opposite meaning of the messages about power, respect and partnership.

3. *Avoiding to assign a reason to an action.* One of the most common aspects underlining the lack of intercultural communication is the assumption that others will act having the same reasons as us. It is difficult to distinguish the reasons of the population, but it has to be taken into consideration that they have to survive also after the mission is ended. All complex situations are generating, on short and long terms, tensions

---

[1] Barbara Adams, D., Jessica Sartori, *Validating the Trust in Teams and Trust in Leaders Scale*, Defence Research and Development, Contract Report (CR-2006-008), Toronto, Canada, 2006, available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/373a/0f8e81b9b816a256917ff7a339dfdcfe04c1.pdf, accessed on 03.09.2017.

influencing the support of local population or even the fight against Coalition Forces. For a joint multinational mission to be efficient, the motivations of the local population have to be very carefully analyzed, such as to avoid assigning reasons to actions in a wrong manner, either negatively or positively.

4. *Culture and conflict management.* Methods of managing conflicts or solving indigenous disputes from the area of responsibility can be different from those used frequently by the International Community. In day to day life, local population and international actors can be confronted with the notion of "rule of law" in utterly opposite ways.

5. *Taking measures so that cultural expectations to be explicitly and correctly understood by participants in the dialogue.* From the beginning, it is essential to have consistent communication with the local population in order to acknowledge reciprocal expectations.

6. *Avoiding to create divisions inside/ outside the group.* By interacting with the local population one may discover divisions existent in a community. Social differences are an important part of human communities. Participants into a multinational joint mission have to be aware that some of those differences can facilitate their work, while some can be harmful. Understanding the limits in between the groups and the achievement of the level of flexibility and permeability is very important for interoperability. Within communities, significant differences will drift down around ethnicity and religion, education, gender, social class, kinship and place of residence.

7. *Being informed in relation to the distribution of power inside the community.* In every community, there are hierarchies and distribution of power, more or less obvious. Differences can be seen regarding the following aspects: who holds social legitimacy, who has the credibility to negotiate and to offer reassurance, who has the power to intervene when there is a need, who are those that can provide reliable advice. Forces participating into joint multinational missions have to understand not only the hierarchies

in a society, but also the distribution of power and expertise in that community. The aim of understanding the structure of power and the local influence is not to change them, significantly, but to find the possible ways in which young people and women from the community can be engaged in those local structures and processes.

Each soldier, disregarding the Armed Forces to which he/she belongs, has to concentrate during the execution of the mission on some important activities: movement, communication, survival, adaptation and fight. Corroborating all of these is increasing the security and efficiency in the operational environment. *Adaptation* has as a main component cross-cultural competence.

The term "cross-cultural competence"[2] was created in order to reflect the amount of language and cultural knowledge, training and experience of individuals that are fighting in multicultural environment. One of the definitions of cross-cultural competence is "the ability of individuals' belonging to distinct cultures to understand rapidly and correctly the incorporated elements of the nearby environment and to engage effectively in getting the desired effects, despite the fact that they do not have a deep knowledge of the culture with which they interract"[3].

Military and civilian personnel that are carrying out an extended activity in a multicultural or bi-cultural environment acquire a certain level of intercultural expertise. That can be achieved attending different forms of training: general, linguistic, cultural, obtained in successive stages through professional training programmes, incorporated into educational curricula and periodic courses – to which are added formal and informal meetings and experiences resulted from the multinational exercises and missions. The expertise is materialized in different strategies and behavioral conducts that help the military to understand, adapt to and integrate more rapidly into the new cultures.

---

[2] Brian R. Selmeski, "*Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concept and Individual Development*", Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, Center for Security, Armed Forces and Society, 2007.
[3] *Ibidem.*

The relationship inside the multinational military community from Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and those of the Afghan Community are aspects that permanently concern the leadership of the Alliance. This concern has intensified with the change of the operation's character, from counterinsurgency (ISAF) into one for training and advice of the Afghan Security Forces and of the personnel from different ministries of the Afghan Government.

To make an introduction into the cultural training process of the military personnel in order to take part in such type of joint missions led by the Alliance, we will present some strategies and principles of cultural knowledge that facilitate cultural learning, which we consider more important.

In the article "Strategies for developing and practicing cross-cultural expertise in the Military", the authors[4] identify seven mental habits organized around *three metacognitive strategies:*

1. The strategy of adopting a cross-cultural stance. This comprises three directions in which the individual has to act in order to acquire a certain degree of cultural knowledge:

a) Self-knowledge and identification of one's own cultural aspects, different from the culture in which they are functioning. This is influenced by personal history, national culture, living environment. Thus, there are emphasized both perspectives of different aspects and the effects over cultural interaction.

b) Knowing the value of *cultural understanding/knowledge.* This is reducing interaction uncertainty among individuals belonging to different cultures, with effects over interaction and accomplishment of the mission. The language of communication is extremely important in building relationships, contributing to consolidating the personnel's security.

c) Defining intercultural interaction as being a learning opportunity. In military missions,

civilian personnel belonging to local cultures is that who provides correct learning and understanding landmarks. The interest to understand and to communicate with the help of translators is an element that consolidates the relationship in between forces participating in the mission and the local population. It is important to understand that experts in cultural aspects are, usually, specialized on certain specific cultural aspects. Thus, corroborating at least two opinions in important cultural issues is a recommended attitude within the process of building educational curricula.

2. The strategy of seeking and extending cultural understanding also comprises three directions on which the individual has to concentrate:

a) Focused attention on surprise and unusual elements. In those situations, experts are focused on data related to history, individual and group relations, the reaction of local population in similar situations, taking into consideration the elements in which the person/tribe has formed and functions. The 'other perspective' increases the ability to discover hidden agreements and allows to obtain positive results in the negotiations.

b) Permanent testing of cultural knowledge is done both during the training period for the mission and during the execution.

c) Reflect on your own experiences, from those focused on the analysis of the details they have only to learn from that. This reflection can be done internally in a form of a dialogue with the participants to the cultural learning.

3. The strategy of applying cultural understanding to guide actions comprises the applied part of interrelationship.

Within this strategy there stands out a specific type of behavior: *adaptation of what you want to express and the way of expression in relation with the environment*. The expert in cultural matters develops a metacognitive way of thinking that starts from the objectives, the way in which (s)he wants to be perceived, getting to the aggregation of knowledge and abilities at his/her disposal. Therefore, it is a reverse thinking process of the whole execution of the action. The process is adjusted during all its period, generated by

---

[4] Rassmunsen L. J., Sieck W. R. & Smart P. R., "*US/UK Mental Models of Planning: The relationship between plan detail and plan quality*", in NATO RTO HFM, Symposium on Adaptability in Coallition Team-work, April 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.

intercultural communication signals (verbal and non-verbal language, clothing, social context, etc.)

For example, I noticed very carefully the way in which Western-Europeans and the Americans conduct meetings. The objectives are clearly defined, the starting and ending time of the meeting is precisely determined, the content is carefully prepared, and the expected result is supported by intense work. In the same context, I have noticed that, for the Afghans, for example, time is a relative notion, orientation being set towards relationship rather than objectives, the purpose of the meeting being measured in the advantage of their family, tribe, and close community. The vision is on a short term. It is a natural cultural pattern, generated by endless conflictual disputes and it represents a survival behavior. That is why, referring to this strategy, patience is a feature that has to be cultivated, a result of cultural knowledge.

In 2002, M. David Merrill published "The first principles of instruction"[5], where he exposed five important principles in structuring training in order to facilitate learning:

• Implicating the students or the personnel in solving some real problems with bi or multi-cultural participation – it is by far more effective than a mere presentation of cultures at theoretical level. Case studies, incidents, narratives based on reality are some of the ways in which cultural contexts are prepared.

• The existence of a previous multicultural experience that is activating the learning process through the interest towards the subject. Selfknowledge is an important process, because is establishing its own cultural limits, stereotypes and cultural conditionings.

• Concrete examples at the expense of a flat rendering of the content. Learning in multinational and multicultural groups offers comparison and adaptation opportunities of a culture with another.

• The staff is to be asked to apply what they

learnt for solving the problems. Performance is increased when intercultural experience is obtained directly from the theater of operations. One of the techniques used in this type of learning is confrontation with one's own action for getting the report in terms of communication with people from another culture (receive a comprehensive description of the expectations from the interaction, establishing the interaction within the exercise –which is filmed – and, after that it is analysed its efficiency and the way in which his/her own culture was adapted to the foreign culture).

• Learning is achieved when what has been tought and practiced is transferred to other participants as part of the cultural exchange, through discussions, teaching and application in real situations.

The benefits of the research results obtained by David Merrill are that they are offering the pedagogical framework of the learning process in its different stages.

2. Development and evaluation of cross-cultural competence

After we approached the aspects related to principles and strategies, we will focus our attention on the learning and developing stages, directions, programmes and tools of cross-cultural competence.

The technical report No. 1284 of U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Department[6] is providing informational recommendations about the way in which the *personnel must be trained from the cultural point of view, the developing directions and the way to evaluate cross-cultural competence.*

Also, the cited authors are identifying two facets of cultural training: learning and cultural agility.

---

[5] David Merrill, *First Principles of Instruction, Educational Technology Research and Development*, 50/2002, https://mdavidmerrill.com/Papers/firstprinciplesbymerrill.pdf, pp. 43-59.

[6] Paula Caligiuri, Raymond Noe, Riall Nolan, Ann Marie Ryan, Fritz Drasgow, Training, Developing and Assesing Cross-Cultural Competence în Military Personnel, Technical Report, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G1, April 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a559500.pdf, accessed on 12.10.2017.

• *Learning* offers the personnel the possibility to rapidly accumulate basic information related to the operational cultural context. Geographic features, resources, economy, social and political structure, symbols, beliefs, communication ways, history, material culture etc. are basic elements of cultural learning.

In the learning process, there are highlighted *five stages of learning:* identifying new perspectives, understanding principles, efficient use within the new system, use of knowledge of the new environment and integration some elements in one's own cultural thinking.

A wide range of *techniques* can be used in the learning process. From those, we mention: domain and events analysis, community map, the analysis of the relationship inside community, life stories, key information holders, the analysis of the critical incidents, the Delphy technique, the technique for rapid rural evaluation, etc[7]. It has been determined that the ability to develop reports is generates the quality of the gained information.

• *Cultural agility* implies effective response in situations that illustrate cultural diversity. Observation and experience are the ways of pathing from theoretical learning stage to that of efficiency. From all the techniques and practices used for developing cultural agility, we mention: the analysis and debrief of the critical cultural incidents, quality contacts in between individuals belonging to different cultures within military training programmes in multinational environments and military coalitions.

There are several directions to develop cultural competence, but we are going to highlight only those that we consider more important:

• Learning by using technology (used as a form of distance learning), through which soldiers assimilate and exercise cultural content. Simulations, thematic games based on experts' information about certain deployment areas or having as subject only valid cultural general rules.

• Learning thorugh social interaction, through direct participation or distance observa-tion of the social interaction.

• Participation in the elaboration and information sharing during conferences, in teams, at the meetings, by phone, in personal conversations in some occasions that generate trust and opening towards intercultural communication. This is a complementary method of formal education.

• Creation of a cultural management system favors the creation of some electronic tools: electronic cultural catalogs that identify individuals, teams, leaders, their level of training and cultural competence, the ability to form other members of the team, the knowledge they gained, the specificity of the area in which the soldiers were traind. To that are added online libraries, with linguistic and cultural content.

All those methods are built and they are under the coordination of linguistic experts and of those from specific cultures from the deployment area.

Another necessary step in the preparation for the missionis is evaluation of the cross-cultural competence – this is an essential stage for all types of cultural training but, because of the costs inflicted, it is not applied in every situation. For each category of ppersonnel and occupied posi-tion within the structure of the organization/mis-sion, there is analysed the need for the evaluation of the cross-cultural competence. In order to have a degree of comparison in between the initial and the final stage of the training, the evaluation is done at the beginning and at the end of the train-ing period. The type of evaluation is different depending on the soldier's level of training, the position for which he is trained and the area of responsibility in which he will operate. The eval-uation is done mainly taking into consideration the following aspects: reactions after the cultural training, the evaluation of the taught content, the individual's efficiency in multicultural situations and the operational results.

We consider those cross-cultural competence strategies and development directions as being useful in projecting training programmes – edu-cational curricula –, both by the stages of the pro-jecting process and by focusing on the efficient behaviors in those stages.

---

[7] *Ibidem.*

Nord-Atlantic Alliance has launched a variety of programmes and established offices, boards, and working groups in order to deal with the issue of interoperability in a standardized way. Until recently, this was an exclusive technical exercise and has not included cultural interoperability.

The ability of the National Armies to prepare their personnel for the military multinational mission depends on the selection of the personnel and the forms of cultural and language training. US Army has developed *DOTMLPF training concept* that comprises: doctrine, organization, training, materiel support, leaders' preparation, personnel and infrastructure. *Doctrines* create the legal foundation and provide the action directions. Organizations are increasing their number of interpreters and experts on the domain. *Training* aims to create cultural competence. *Materiel support* is represented by the funds allocated for personnel and training. *Personnel* must be identified according to the needs, abilities and their stage in the military carrier. *Infrastructure* that is needed for training must be provided during peacetime, and in operational areas.

Developed countries understood the importance of adequate cultural training for soldiers and civilian personnel participating to international missions. We mention some of the training programmes that are functioning, for example, in the US Army: "Cultural Studies Project", "Army 360 Training", "Army Excellence in Leadership Tool", "Combined Action Platoon Program", "Personal Response Program", "Field Support Guides", "Language Survival Kits", "ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) "Pre-deployment regional training", "Cadet Study Abroad", "PMESII- analitic tools" ,etc.

Forming individuals from the language and cultural knowledge point of view starts when joining the Defense System, irrespective of the appointment/position into the organization, and continues with pre-deployment courses for the mission and during the mission, helping for a better knowledge of local traditions and cultural norms. The general responsibility for the initiation of the cultural knowledge process lies with the leaders of the organization. In a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment it is often counter-productive to use troops with a low level of training or that are not familiarized with the culture of the local population. COIN forces are used to mobilize the will of the people against insurgents. Thus, population has to feel protected, not threatened by the counterinsurgency forces' actions and operations.

When troops are operating in a COIN environment, the effort for the information collection has to move from the "enemy centered towards "local population centered Cultural and human environments from the area of operations become key elements of the operational environment.

In order to fully understand the dynamics of the modern fighting ground, NATO is working to increase cultural communication competencies, supports the development of the analysis process and, in this respect, has invested in a Cultural Operational Network (OCN). OCN is a graphical digitized tool based on categories of elements of a society, according to their norms of self-representation (over systems, and sub-systems). OCN operates at three levels (macro, medium and micro) and functions in each of them, according to the socio-cultural analysis process. Each level represents a specific objective of the strategic community. Institutionalization of cultural knowledge competencies will need a change in the organizational culture. The institutionalized implementation concept can be achieved using a multilateral approach that comprises a series of intercultural resources, including:
- professional education and forming;
- evaluations at the individual and unit level;
- information (at local and regional level);
- research and collection of information.

In order to reach interoperability, the existing cultural differences amongst military personnel, NGOs and other participating organizations to the mission have to be anticipated and harmonized based on partnership and mutual respect. The authentic respect and partnership in between international actors and local population impose to the coalition that its actions be contextualized in certain historical experiences of the Community.

Both for Iraq and Afghanistan, local culture

experts have produced "cultural guides" so called "smart cards", whose use does not need instructors. In our opinion, this attempt can be considered a good idea and is a start, but simplification of concepts on an insufficient cultural foundation does more harm than good. Training centers for the mission extended the cultural training base, leaving it to decision makers to determine whether these guides are to be used or not.

Another cultural knowledge instrument is the programme developed by A.J. Kramer that functions in the form of specific group cultural training. This program includes role playing, lectures, situational analysis exercises, and the group offers a cultural analysis of the discussed situation.

Learning by using video games and simulation is also an efficient method, but, in the initial stages, personnel are focused too much on graphical details and looses from attention the general situation, with its risks and opportunities. "ELECT-BILAT" is a recent simulation teaching programme that facilitates pre-cultural training for the mission for a great number of personnel and with a reduced cost.

In order to put into practice the lessons learnt in the field of cultural knowledge, NATO Resolute Support Mission from Afghanistan initiated the set up of different types of teams: Human Terrain Teams (HTTS), Key Leader Engagements (KLE); Female Engagement Teams (FETs) Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs).

During initial operations in Afghanistan, the matter of collaboration with Afghan women has not been approached and, most probably, not even thought of. As a result, there were no doctrinal foundation, tactics or procedures (TTPs) for the FET activities. Over the time, through experience and adaptation, a wide doctrinal consensus has been reached for FET operations. The direction for action of the FET teams are: finding the needs and the problems of the female gender population; approaching the issues related to their safety and security, and also their potential connections with the insurgents; carrying out intelligence activities, in a respectful cultural way, aiming to build trust and support

for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan / GIRoA) and for Resolute Support Mission. According to the action reports from units that comprise FET teams, it was found that those bring significant advantages in the field of intelligence gathering. FET was used in a variety of operations and activities, including intelligence gathering, search, key leaders' engagement, civil-military programmes, information operation and dissemination consolidation for PsyOps[8]. FET is not the only initiative of the mission's leadership for a close engagement of the Afghan population. FET success has generated the establishment of other gender teams, sucjh as CoIST[9], created as an effort to accelerate the information flow and collection from the company level structures to the General Headquarters. Those are specific cultural issues that represent only a part of the situational awareness of the area.

Another interesting and efficient instrument for the increase of the level of cultural knowledge was the concept named "One family - one soldier". The idea was to generate cultural experience at the lowest level in any domain through day to day interaction of a soldier with an Afghan family. In order to better understand the cultural and social characteristics of the population, it was necessary to observe carefully the following patterns:

• organization of the key groups;
• relationship and interactions among groups;
• ideologies and the stories that are shared by the groups;
• groups'/tribes' etc. values, interests and reasons;
• the way in which groups communicate;
• the leading system of the society.

Before the leadership of the mission started to understand the social and cultural issues of the Afghan population, it was necessary that efforts

---

[8] Steve Israel and Robert Scales, "Iraq Proves It: Military Needs Better Intel", *New York Daily News*, January 7th, 2004. See also Robert Scales, "Culture Centric Warfare",*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October, 2004.
[9] Adda Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft*, New York: Brassey's, 1992, p. 57. Also see Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979.

be focused on intelligence gathering. A concept/instrument known as ASCOPE was used to lead this holistic intelligence collection effort.

A - area: where do people live, work, meet and where is their worship place?

S - structures: what are the important structures in the area? Bridges, mosques, markets, tea-places, net cafés, hospitals etc.

C - capabilities: who is producing inside the community?

O - organizations: what are the diverse groups in the area?

P - people: how do they communicate/interact?

E - events: what is the frequency of appearance of events, when do they appear?

Conclusions

Despite the increased interest of different national defense structures in relation to language and cultural training, the coordination effort to develop the necessary knowledge, skills and competencies in order to understand and interact successfully with a specific population in a certain region is still at an early stage within the Alliance.

In our opinion, cross/cultural competence, in connection with the place and role of cultural knowledge in planning and conducting military operations contributes to a great extent to gaining awareness of the global situation and taking efficient decisions; offers a better understanding of the way in which planned military actions will influence both population and the insurgents; can help in the prediction of the population's behavior; can lead to an increased communication and to the prevention of useless tensions, also contributing to the force protection.

Cultural mistakes and/or actions and the unproper cultural behavior in a mission can escalate easily, being an increased risk for future missions, which is why training participants for multinational joint missions is necessary, and this training should include, in our opinion, cultural training guides in order to develop specific competencies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ADAMS, Barbara D.; SARTORI, Jessica A., *Validating the Trust in Teams and Trust in Leaders Scale*, Defence Research and Development, Canada Toronto Contract Report (CR-2006-008), Canada, 2006.

2. BOOTH, Ken, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., United States of America, 1979.

3. BOZEMAN, Adda, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft*, New York: Brassey's, p. 57, 1992.

4. CALIGIURI Paula; NOE Raymond; NOLAN Riall; RYAN Ann Marie; DRASGOW Fritz, *Training, Developing and Assesing Cross-Cultural Competence in Military Personnel*, *Technical Report*, Rutgers University, April 2011.

5. ISRAEL, Steve and SCALES, Robert, "Iraq Proves It: Military Needs Better Intel", *New York Daily News*, January 7th, 2004.

6. MERRILL, David, *First Principles of Instruction*, Educational Technology Research and Development, pp. 43-59, 50/2002.

7. RASSMUNSEN L. J., Sieck W. R. & Smart P. R., "*US/UK Mental Models of Planning: The relationship between plan detail and plan quality*", in NATO RTO HFM, Symposium on Adaptability in Coallition Team-work, April 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2008.

8. SCALES, Robert, "Culture Centric Warfare", *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October, 2004.

9. SELMESKI, Brian R., "*Military Cross Cultural Competence: Core Concept and Individual Development*", Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, Center for Security, Armed Forces and Society, 16th of May, 2007.

10. STANTON, Martin, "*A Riot in Wanwaylen: Lessons Learned*", *Army*, Vol. 44, No. 12, pp. 24–30, 1994.

BEYOND THE EUROPEAN IDEALISM
A Realist Perspective upon the European Security from the World Economic and Financial Crisis to BREXIT

The book we chose to present our readers in this edition is a specialised work about security in EU, titled *Beyond the European Idealism. A Realist Perspective upon the European Security from the World Economic and Financial Crisis to BREXIT* (original title in Romanian: *Dincolo de idealismul european. O perspectivă realistă asupra securităţii europene de la criza econonică şi financiară mondială la Brexit*), published in 2017, with "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house. The author, Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Senior Researcher, member of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, has over ten years experience in European security and defence field, which translated in lots of studies, scientific articles and communications published not only nationwide, but also internationally.

Hence, this represents a natural and necessary completion of her work, being an analysis of the European security' evolution in the context of the multiple crises occured since 2008, founded on International Relations Theory[1]. ***The hypothesis of the study*** is that at the basis of the internal crisis that the EU has been experiencing for over a decade "is the fact that the EU is, at the same time, the result of the Realist and of the Idealist logics".[2] The volume addresses specialists, those who work in related institutions, as well as students, MA students, PhD students.

The book is structured on three chapters, preceded by an *Argument* and an *Introduction*, and respectively, a chapter of *Conclusions*. Right from the first pages, the writer makes a review of the crises that marked the analysed timespan: the economic and financial crisis debuted in 2007 in the US, with strong effects in the European space as well, the Ukrainian crisis that broke out at the end of 2013 with the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation – which led to the increasingly acute cooling of relations between the West and the latter–, the European refugee

---

[1] According to the description from the catalogue of editorial appearances under the aegis of "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, https://www.unap.ro/ro/asigurare/pagini/editura/ STIINTE%20MILITARE / STIINTE%20MILITARE.pdf

[2] Cristina Bogzeanu, *Dincolo de idealismul european. O perspectivă realistă asupra securităţii europene de la criza econonică şi financiară mondială la Brexit*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", 2017, p. 12.

crisis of 2015 as a result of the Arab Spring, the French terrorist attacks at the end of 2015, resulting in hundreds of dead and wounded[3], the effects of the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016.

The author asserts that "we are witnessing a reconsideration of the military dimension of security", providing the following arguments: "destabilization of Ukraine, Russia's actions on its territory, escalating tensions between Western actors and the Russian Federation, undertaking dissuasive measures at the eastern border of the Alliance, as well as the invocation of France's mutual assistance clause by the end of 2015"[4]. To these add the shift in the US foreign policy[5].

There is also stressed the idea repeatedly reiterated over the past decade about the need for European countries to increase their defense investments to act as security providers without mainly relying on US support.

As the author notes, all these trends are reflected in the EU's Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), a programmatic landmark for the EU in the analysed period, made public almost concurrently with Brexit results. This document is seen as "a link between a Realist vision of International Relations, on the one hand, and the attachment to the values and principles typical of Liberalism", on the other hand, illustrating "the coexistence of the two visions within the EU's functioning", being "able to represent a strategic vision tailored both to the specificity of the Union and to the characteristics of the international and regional security environment."[6]

Chapter I presents, first of all, the *framework of analysis*, with reference to the need to place the study in the realistic paradigm and to an analysis in terms of power of the European Union. The present study reveals valuable information of interest to readers, including a comparative table of theoretical milestones specific to the main paradigms of International Relations (Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism)[7] and elements related to EU power sources: an area of 4324782 km^2, population (July 2016) 515,052,778 – half of the US population, with an increase in aging population as the main challenge, insufficient energy resources (EU imports about 80% of its needs), GDP of 19.19 trillion dollars in early 2017 (second in the world, after China), and from a military point of view, the EU has two nuclear states, France and Britain, spending $ 285 billion for military purposes (less than half the US)[8]. There are shown as well a series of Brexit implications. The author points out, in the second part of the chapter, that within the EU, the concern for the development of military capabilities has increased in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and Brexit. On the other hand, it is also demonstrated that holding considerable power resources does not guarantee the desired goals, referring to Joseph Nye's theory of smart power. In this respect, Cristina Bogzeanu explains the difficulties of operationalizing power resources in order to achieve the set objectives: the lack of cohesion in the EU, in the face of multiple crises, the nationalist tendencies of some Member States, the fact that decisions on CFSP and CSDP are adopted by unanimity of votes.

The conclusion of this chapter is that "if the EU managed to overcome the main impediment of lack of political and socio-cultural cohesion, it would fulfill many of the conditions for affirming itself as a notable actor in the international arena, holding both hard power and soft power [...] for example, the economic and security benefits it can generate"[9]. It is also shown that, in a crisis situation at European level, a strong concern for the development of the hard power has emerged, maintained and even developed."[10]

---

[3] Note: As a result of those terrorist attacks, French President François Hollande invoked the mutual assistance clause, Article 42 (7) of the Treaty of Lisbon, an equivalent article in the content of Art. 5 of NATO Washington Treaty, this being a premiere.

[4] Cristina Bogzeanu, *op.cit.*, p. 12.
Note: All quotes from the book represent the reviewer's translation from Romanian into English.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 36.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 7.

[7] *Ibidem*, pp. 15-17.

[8] *Ibidem*, pp. 22-30 – sources of the data – according to the references in the quoted work.

[9] *Ibidem*, p. 39.

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 39.

The second chapter, entitled *Realism behind European Idealism*, has two parts. First subchapter addresses extensively the theoretical perspectives on the creation of the EU, with reference to Liberalism/Idealism and political Realism, revealing the dual nature of European construction from the point of view of International Relations, with multiple arguments supporting the idea that Realism is the dominant one. In the second subchapter, C. Bogzeanu analyzes the EU's political crisis, claiming that it is derived precisely from the revelation of the realistic forces that formed the basis of the creation and development of the entity as a whole[11], evoking, for this purpose, "a return to national values and identity and the loss of confidence in Brussels' ability"[12] to manage the crises that Europe is facing. There are given two examples, that of Germany's concerning trade and that of Hungary regarding its attitude towards migrant flows in 2015. All these, it is shown in the paper, prompted Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, to state in his speech on the state of the EU the following: "There is not enough Europe in this Union. And there is not enough union in this Union."[13] Furthermore, it is argued that the President of the European Council also sent a letter to the heads of state and government of the EU on the future of the EU on the background of Brexit before the Summit of Malta on 25 March 2017 (the year of the 60th anniversary of the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), a letter referring to three major threats endangering Europe's stability: the global geopolitical context, the internal situation within the EU (referring to the rise of nationalism and xenophobia) and the mood of the pro-European elites[14]. A third

document invoked to reveal the state of affairs mentioned is the *White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*[15], containing five scenarios on Europe's future – linked to these multiple scenarios, the author concludes: "developing these scenarios at the European Commission level is one of the clearest signs of EU fragmentation, reflecting the difficulty in choosing a common path for the 27 Member States of the Union in the context of Brexit (...)"[16].

Under the title "Fragmentation and Cohesion in the EU", *the third chapter* deals with the recrudescence of European nationalism and, on the other hand, the hard dimension of European power, from pooling and sharing to permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). The author points out that "at present, we have to deal with two very strong and seemingly paradoxical tendencies at European level – fragmentation and coagulation, centripetal tendencies coexisting with centrifugal tendencies."[17]

With regard to European nationalism, there are brought arguments which show its ever-growing manifestation[18], such as the rise of right-wing political parties in countries such as the UK, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, on the background of the economic and financial crisis, the reverse of the medal being the degradation of democracy on the European territory and, at the same time, gaining viable levers of influence by centrifugal forces at EU level. In this respect, there is included an eloquent reference for the declining dynamics of democracy scores in EU Member States and candidate countries[19]. Also in the present chapter, the author presents the context and a series of internal arguments that led

---

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 49.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 49.
[13] State of the European Union: An "Existential Crisis", Address by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission delivered to European Parliament, Strasbourg, September 14, 2016, Discurs Junker https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/state-union-speeches/state-union-2016_en, apud Ibidem, p. 52.
[14] "United we stand, divided we fall": letter by President Donald Tusk to the 27 EU heads of state or government on

the future of the EU before the Malta summit, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/31/tusk-letter-future-europe/, apud ibidem, p. 53.
[15] White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, European Commission, March 2017, p. 15, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_ paper_on _the_future _of _europe_en.pdf, apud ibidem, p. 54.
[16] *Ibidem*, p. 55.
[17] *Ibidem*, p. 50.
[18] See Figure nr. 3, p. 63.
[19] See Figure no. 2, p. 61.

to the Brexit result in 2016, noticing afterwards the tendency of an opposite trend to leaving the EU space[20]. It is also discussed the enhanced cooperation procedure, known as "multi-Speed Europe", seen as "one of the few available and viable ways to continue the European project [...] in the light of the need to develop the capacity necesary to ensure European stability and security as a whole ."[21]

The second part of this chapter represents the book's keystone, focusing on the latest achievements in the CSDP: pooling and sharing concept is explained and analyzed, then it is briefly analysed the background that led to the EUGS as well as the document itself, with a focus on two of its central concepts, namely strategic autonomy and principled pragmatism, and then there are reviewed the documents relevant for security and defense issued at EU level between July 2016 and March 2017, among which the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (July 2016) and the six page Franco-German paper on reinforcing European defense (September 2016). Particular attention is also paid to the concept of permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), which "involves a modular approach, based on concrete projects, to which some Member States will engage [...] finally forming a manifestation of "multi-speed" Europe, a solution to boost CSDP development"[22], according to both centrifugal and centripetal forces, denoting "both hope and skepticism"[23].

In the ***Conclusions*** chapter, some of the ideas presented in the previous pages are resumed and emphasised. The aim of the paper, according to the author, is to "identify the real mechanisms behind the EU functioning, which determine its successes and failures, its consistency and inconsistency, as well as the evolution trends of this actor", stressing that "the EU is a dual organism, paradoxical, contradictory" because of the fact that it is based on both Realism and Idealism, both being "in a perpetual balancing", "gaining more or less weight depending on the international context in which the European security environment is shaping up"[24].

C. Bogzeanu concludes that "The EU has to claim its role and place in the international arena, which it now identifies at halfway between Idealism and Realism, according to the idea of principled pragmatism"[25] and that "the present approach reveals that the role and place of the European Union on the international arena most certainly depends on Brussels' ability to increase the cohesion of EU Member States"[26].

I considered that, in order to understand the importance of the subject aproached, it is necessary to present the book's contents in depth. This also helps to point out the substance of the book, all exposed elements complementing one another and serving the reasoning and analysis in the endeavor to expose the state of (in)security in the EU in a radiological manner.

The book recommends itself by its novelty character and timeliness, the pertinent references, the author's specialization in this field for more than a decade, as well as the clear manner in which it is written, bieng suitable either for a research-documentary reading or for being informed and understanding the security-related phenomena that have recently occurred in the EU and their effects, which, undoubtedly, influence our everyday life.

---

[20] See p. 65.
[21] *Ibidem,* p. 71.
[22] *Ibidem*, pp. 88-89.
[23] *Ibidem*, p. 95.
[24] *Ibidem,* p. 93-94.
[25] *Ibidem*, p. 92.
[26] *Ibidem*, p. 92.

Daniela RĂPAN, PhD*

** **Daniela RĂPAN, PhD** is Expert within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: rapan.daniela@unap.ro*

WORKSHOP ON STRATEGY

"Military Sciences - Security Sciences - Conceptual Landmarks"
- October 19, 2017 -

The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) organized, on 19 October 2017, a workshop based on *"Military Sciences - Security Sciences - Conceptual Landmarks"*.

The main purpose of the scientific activity was a conceptual clarification of the terms mentioned in the title, while also, creating new opportunities for dialogue in the academic field.

At establishing a good course and success of this scientific event contributed: Captain Commander Cătălin Mihai Gherman from "Callatis" Radio-Electronics and Surveillance Center in Constanţa, with the paper on "Recent developments in the Wider Black Sea Area Security Environment", Colonel (ret) Stan Anton, PhD, with the topic "Military Science - Past, Present and Future", Colonel Leopold Cerassel Lungu, PhD, Romanian Defense Staff, with the subject: "The United States Missile Defense System" and Lieutenant Colonel Dan Petrescu from "Carol I" National Defense University, with the theme: "National Interest - Leader of Military Science in Achieving Security".

Group photo with the Workshop's participants

WORKSHOP ON STRATEGY

"Satellite as an Enabler for C4ISR"
- November 14, 2017 -

The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, in cooperation with SES Techcom SA from Luxemburg held, on 14 November 2017, at the National Military Circle, the workshop "*Satellite as an Enabler for C4ISR*".

SES is the world-leading satellite operator and the first to deliver a differentiated and scalable GEO-MEO offering worldwide, with more than 50 satellites in Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) and 12 in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO).

The activity was opened by His Excellence, Paul STEINMETZ, Ambassador of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in Romania.

Aspect from the Workshop

The event was attended by teaching staff and researchers, military and civilian specialists in communications, as well as representatives of SES Techcom S.A. and GovSat, Luxembourg.

With in-depth knowledge of industry and new technologies, SES Techcom S.A. provided an overview of the latest technologies related to the satellite industry, frequencies and message transmissions, showed how SATCOM can become a C4ISR support and provided examples of the manner in which satellites can be used in important areas such as defence communications, border surveillance, maritime communications and emergency interventions.

International Conference

"The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment"
December 7-8, 2017

The large-scale scientific manifestation of CDSSS, the International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI, with the theme "*The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*", at the 17th edition, took place on 7 and 8 December, 2017, in the Senate Hall and "Stefan Fălcoianu" Amphitheater within "Carol I" National Defense University.

The event offers each year the appropriate academic framework for exchanging ideas, expressing opinions and communicating the latest research results in the field of security, strategy, and contemporary military phenomenon as a whole.

The scientific activity was honored by the presence of many military and civilian experts in various fields: defence, public order, national security, scientific research and higher education military and civilian, in the country and abroad.

Group photo with the Conference's participants

Within the conference framework were presented scientific papers by representatives of civil and military universities from Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Romanian Intelligence Service, Ministry of Regional Development, Ministry of Public Finance, as well as similar institutions from other countries. The foreign presence consisted of participants from the National University of Public Services in Budapest (Hungary), the Defence and Security Strategic Studies Center within Armed Forces Military Academy "Alexandru cel Bun" in Chisinau (Republic of Moldova), the Defense University of Brno and Masaryk University in Brno, the National Defence Academy in Tbilisi (Georgia), SES Techcom SA in Luxembourg (Luxembourg), Canadian Embassy in Romania, China Embassy in Romania and the Embassy of France in Romania.

Aspect from the Conference

The main issues addressed referred to the new elements in the evolution of the international security environment, the balance of power in the context of international relations developments, potential risks and threats to the security environment, the impact of emerging states on regional and international power centers, the role of nonstate actors in security environment evolution. The debates focused on the following topics: the current geopolitical context and potential implications for Romania's regional interests; demography and security - global reconfiguration in the 21st century; national and international threats in the context of globalization; terrorism - the main threat to Europe's defence and security; armed forces and society - modernisation of the military organisation.

The scientific event was sponsored by SES Techcom S.A., the largest satellite operator in the world. The conference proceedings are available on the conference website, www.strategii21.ro and indexed in the ProQuest and CEEOL International databases.

Raluca STAN *

*Raluca STAN is working in the Scientific Events and Cooperation Department within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: stan.raluca@unap.ro

CDSSS AGENDA

JULY - DECEMBER 2017

During the analysed period, CDSSS organized a series of activities and published two scientific materials.

On October 19, 2017, the Workshop on "Military Sciences - Security Sciences - Conceptual Landmarks" was held at the National Defence University, and on November 14, CDSSS, in partnership with SES TECHCOM S.A. from Luxembourg, there was organized a workshop on the theme "Satellite as an enabler for C4ISR" at the Palace of the National Military Circle.

The monthly public lectures held at the Palace of National Military Club in the first part of the academic year 2017-2018 approached the following topics: in October, "The security dilemma today. The spiral of NATO-Russia Tensions", delivered by Cătălina Todor, Junior Researcher and in November, "Current Security Issues of the Middle East", presented by Mirela Atanasiu, PhD. Senior Researcher.

Aspect from the public lecture on November, 8 at the National Military Circle

The most prominent activity of this period was the International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI, organized by the CDSSS on December 7-8, with the theme "The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment". The conference benefited from international participation and the presence of many military and civilian specialists, which made the exchange of information and opinions a high potential for dissemination in different scientific environments.

Also, during this period, there were published two editions of "The dynamics of the security environment", which includes analyses on topical issues on the regional and international agenda, influencing Romania's interests, such as:

• General trends;

• The European Union: EU Reform directions under the Franco-German leadership and challenges towards the European cohesion; the Catalan crisis;

• Middle East and North Africa: Security developments and trends in the Middle East;

• The Russian Federation: Dialogue and Transparency in NATO-Russia Relations as a result of the most important events in June-September; Actions, reactions and developments with implications for the regional and international security environment of the Russian Federation;

• North Korea: North Korea's nuclear policy: tests, controversies and uncertainties; Tension, strategy and diplomacy in North East Asia

All these analyses can be found on the CDSSS website, at https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/dms.htm.

In the monthly supplement of *Strategic Impact*, *Strategic Colloquium*, an article was published in this time frame, entitled "Local Population - the Key to Success in Stability and Support Operations", published by Major Răzvan Enache, Master of Command and Staff (NDU), and PhD student of "Carol I" National Defence University.

For 2018, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies has on its agenda the organization of a Strategic Workshop with the theme "Scenarios in Strategic Theory and Practice" on March 22, 2018 and the XVII-th edition of the International Symposium, the theme being "Strategic Interests and Objectives in the Wider Black Sea Area ".

We would also like to remind you of the International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI, with the theme "The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment ", which is to be held on 27-28 November 2018. For details regarding registration, you can access the link https://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/en/conference-strategy-xxi/center-of-studies-of-strategic-defense-and-security.

*Andra PÎNZARIU**

***Andra PÎNZARIU works within the Scientific Manifestations Department of Centre for   Defence and Security Strategic Studies from "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: pinzariu.andra@unap.ro*

GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual academic journal *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

ARTICLE LENGTH may vary between a minimum of 6 pages and a maximum of 14 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE

- Title (centred, capital, bold characters, font 24).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD. title or PhD. candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
- A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters)
- 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters)
- Introduction / preliminary considerations
- 2 - 4 chapters (subchapters if applicable)
- Conclusions.
- Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format as well.

In the case of tables, please mention above "**Table no. X**: Title", while in the case of figures there shall be mentioned below (eg. maps etc.), "**Figure no. X:** Title" and the source, if applicable, shall be mentioned in a footnote.

REFERENCES shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of ***footnotes***. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below.

Example of book: Joshua S. Goldstein; Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010, pp. 356-382.

Example of article: Gheorghe Calopăreanu, "Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union" in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year). *Example of article*: John N. Nielsen, "Strategic Shock in North Africa", in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/, accessed on 10.03.2017.

BIBLIOGRAPHY shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below.

Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations,* Longman Publishinghouse, 2010.

Example of article: CALOPĂREANU, Gheorghe, "Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union" in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents. *Example of article*: NIELSEN, John N., "Strategic Shock in North Africa", in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/.

Nota Bene: Titles of works shall be mentioned in the language in which they were consulted, with transliteration in Latin alphabet if there is the case and, preferably, translation in English language of the titles.

SELECTION CRITERIA are the following:
- the theme of the article must be in line with the subjects dealt by the journal: up-to-date topics related to political-military aspects, security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence;
- the quality of the scientific content;
- originality of the paper;
- novelty character – it should not have been priorly published;
- a relevant bibliography comprising recent and prestigious specialized works, including books;
- the text must be written in good English (British or American usage is accepted, but not a mixture of these).
- adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the journal.

SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION PROCESS is developed according to the principle *double blind peer review*, by university teaching staff and scientific researchers with expertise in the field of the article. The author's identity is not known by evaluators and the name of the evaluators is not made known to authors. Authors are informed of the conclusions of the evaluation report, which represent the argument for accepting/rejecting an article. Consequently to the evaluation, there are three possibilities: a) the article is accepted for publication as such or with minor changes; b) the article may be published if the author makes recommended improvements (of content or of linguistic nature); c) the article is rejected. Previous to scientific evaluation, articles are subject to an *antiplagiarism analysis*.

SUBMISSION:
Authors will send their articles in English to the editor's e-mail address, **impactstrategic@unap. ro**, preferably according to the following time schedule: 15 December (no. 1); 15 March (no. 2); 15 June (no. 3) and 15 September (no. 4). If the article is accepted for publication, an integral translation of the article for the Romanian edition of the journal will be provided by the editor.

NOTA BENE:
By submitting their materials for evaluation and publication, the authors acknowledge that they have not published their works so far and that they possess full copyrights for them.

Parts derived from other publications should have proper references.

Authors bear full responsibility for the content of their works and for non-disclosure of classified information – according to respective law regulations.

Editors reserve the right to request authors or to make any changes considered necessary. Authors give their consent to possible changes of their articles, resulting from review processes, language corrections and other actions regarding editing of materials. The authors also give their consent to possible shortening of articles in case they exceed permitted volume.

Authors are not required any fees for publication and are not retributed.

Authors are fully responsible for their articles' content, according to the provisions of *Law no. 206/2004 regarding good conduct in scientific research, technological development and innovation*.

Published articles are subject to the Copyright Law. All rights are reserved to "Carol I" National Defence University, irrespective if the whole material is taken into consideration or just a part of it, especially the rights regarding translation, re-printing, re-use of illustrations, quotes, dissemination by mass-media, reproduction on microfilms or in any other way and stocking in international data bases. Any reproduction is authorized without any afferent fee, provided that the source is mentioned.

Failing to comply with these rules shall trigger article's rejection. Sending an article to the editor implies the author's agreement on all aspects mentioned above.

For more details on our publication, you can access our site, http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals. htm or contact the editors at impactstrategic@unap.ro.