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EDITOR'S NOTE

The first edition in 2017, no. 62, comprises a collection of nine papers, to these adding an Opinion Editorial, a Book Review, a Scientific Event Report, the CDSSS Agenda and the Guide for Authors.

In the **Opinion Editorial**, I intended to present, in a synthetic but comprehensive analysis, *The Framework and Nature of Future Conflicts*, emphasizing their complexity and hybrid nature.

The first rubric, **NATO and EU: Policies, Strategies, Actions** comprises two articles on security and defence. In the first one, Colonel Alin Bodescu, PhD, currently Director of Crisis Management and Multinational Operations Department within our University, who served in EUMS between 2012 and 2016, elaborated an article on *EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability*, launching the question *Duplication or Complementarity with NATO?* In the second article, our colleague, Ms. Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD, Researcher within CDSSS, approaches *EU Security and Defence in the Post-Brexit Context, from the Treaty of Rome (1957) to forging a new way ahead for the EU*.

Next, there comes the rubric **Geopolitics and Geostrategies – Trends and Perspectives**, where Mrs. Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD Senior Researcher within CDSSS approaches the topical subject of the *Refugees in Europe*, making the following inquiry: *Multiple Perspectives, one Reality?* In a second article, Natalia Bekiarova, PhD Professor, Chief of National and International Security Department in “Rakovski” National Defence College in Sofia (Bulgaria) analyses *The Growing Military Activity in the Black Sea Region as a Security Threat*.

In this edition, we introduced a new rubric, **Defence and Security Concepts**, in which we included three vivid materials. Thus, Mr. Marius Potîrniche, Phd. Colonel, Ret., currently Researcher with CDSSS, approached *War Terminology* on the following pattern: *Clarification, Confusion, Usefulness*. Then comes along a provocative article, in which Alexandru Lucinescu, PhD Lecturer with the Security and Defence Faculty in our University made *an Inquiry into a Partly Misleading Conceptual Correlation*, showing that *Defence Diplomacy is not Always Diplomacy*. A constant contributor of our journal, Ms. Mădălina Virginia Antonescu, PhD Researcher with the Romanian Diplomatic Institute in Bucharest, introduces the *Concept of “Biosphere Security”*, advocating the trend *Towards a Global Diplomacy of Biosphere Security*.

At **The Terrorist Threat** rubric of this edition, Colonel Janos Besenyo, PhD Lecturer, Head of the Scientific Research Centre of the Hungarian General Staff, contributed with an *Overview on the Economical Character of Current Terrorism*, in turn launching a question – *Low-cost Attacks, Unnoticeable Plots?*

In this edition's **Book Review**, we were offered the opportunity to present our readers a recent editorial release by the Routledge Publishing house, entitled *European Military Culture and Security Governance – Soldiers, Scholars and National Defence Universities*, authored by the scholar Tamir Libel, PhD, having a background in History, Political Studies and Military Sciences.

At the rubric **Scientific Event**, you will find out, from our colleague Raluca Stan, details from the *Workshop on Strategy* organised on March 23, 2017 by the CDSSS/NDU entitled “Interagency Cooperation Towards Security”.



As always, we bring to our readers attention *The CDSSS Agenda* for the period January-March, signalling the scientific activities for 2017.

In the end, we included the *Guide for Authors*, useful to those who wish to disseminate the results of their research in our journal.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is an open access publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University (available at <http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm>) and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of Military Science, Information and Public Order*, according to National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published four times per year, for 17 years in Romanian and for 13 years in English, approaching a complex thematic: security and defence related issues; security and military strategies; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; political-military topicality; geopolitics and international relations; future of conflict; peace and war; information society, intelligence community. Readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

The journal is distributed free of charge in main security and defence institutions, as well as in national and international academia in Europe, Asia and America.

Regarding international visibility – an important objective of the journal –, recognition of the publication’s scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA), Index Copernicus International (Poland), WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, but also by its presence in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad such as NATO and of universities with military profile from Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

I hope that this brief introduction shall act as a stimulus not only to read this issue of the journal, but also to inspire you with new topics to tackle in your research endeavours, which we look forward to receiving for the prospect of future inclusion in *Strategic Impact* and in the upcoming *Strategies XXI International Scientific Conference*.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD
Editor in Chief,
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

Translated by Daniela Rapan, PhD



THE FRAMEWORK AND NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICTS

*Stan ANTON, PhD**

The increased complexity of modern conflicts was the reason behind the reconceptualization of military thinking in the past decade or so, the most prominent result of this transformation and adaptation, or response to this new reality being the emergence of new concepts such as compound war, asymmetric conflict, hybrid threat, hybrid war or hybrid warfare etc. But there is nothing entirely new in the manifestation of the conflicts. The thin boundary between conventional and asymmetric or hybrid character of conflict is only reflecting the need to consider the whole range of actions an actor may use for the achievement of its strategic objectives. Apart from the technological advance, emergence of new doctrines, strategies, tactics and techniques, what it is important to recognize is that the understanding of new realities and perceptions changes over the generations and historic ages.

In future conflicts, in order to accomplish their goals, actors will induce various challenges to the ability and operational capacity of the opponent's forces, materialized in a whole range of threats (combining conventional, irregular and asymmetric threats) simultaneously in time and space, targeting the will and cohesion of the adversary. Over the past conflicts, seeking asymmetry – be it doctrinal, technological or operational – in one's own advantage, was

a condition and requirement for achieving success.

The character of the conflict will follow a trend of continuous evolution: technology offers new ways and means, the increasingly globalized “village” presents new threats and challenges, and international and social norms undergo a direct influence on the unfolding of conflicts.

Nevertheless, the nature of the conflict will remain unchanged, constituting a unique and unpredictable human social action with political, economic, cultural and civilization, social, technological and military determinations. It is an axiom that conflict can be a policy agent, and, once triggered, it can model politics. The new military conflicts will continue to be the violent expressions of political, economic and social conflicts. Their main characteristic is dependency, in the sense that they are increasingly conditioned by political, economic and social relations and realities.

Unlike the nature of the conflict, the framework of conflicts is constantly changing, the complex of factors that individualize it including: new political-economic and strategic situations of insecurity, new political and strategic goals, new objectives, forces and means of action, a greater intensity, a different attitude towards the opponent, different spaces

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of deployment, a very wide range of dominant types of action and increasingly sophisticated and unexpected ways of manifestation of violence, being fundamentally dependent on the strategic operational environment. As a result, the differences between the inter-state conflict and irregular conflict will be reduced considerably. The strategic operational environment of the future is expected to be characterized by an extreme dynamic induced by internal and, above all, external factors; it will be disputed in order to secure the initiative and exercise control over the operational areas and areas of interest from the opposing parties, the participating forces acting predominantly joint, interconnected in technological, operational and conceptual terms, being in some cases ideologically driven.

As proved by the harsh realities of the beginning of the 21st Century, globalization increases the probability of conflict with the involvement of non-state actors and failed states. The inter-state conflict will not disappear, but its character is already changing.

Trans-national conflicts are already displaying the asymmetric tactics such as those belonging to the political, financial, economic, information and cybernetic domains, and proxy actions, instead of a direct military confrontation and will play an increasing role in overcoming the military advantages of conventional military capabilities.

The interference in the national political processes, manipulation of public protests against governments, altering the flow of goods and raw materials, interdiction and anti-access actions to resources, attacking electronically the communications nodes and cyber infrastructure of national and international financial institutions, manipulation of capitals, markets and stock exchanges are contributing to an increased uncertainty and complexity of the operational environment in which governments and armed forces are set to operate in the future. In the prospective conflicts, will be more commonly to plan and execute an offensive operation using, as initial employment or part of the shaping phase of the operation framework, the cyber strikes instead of airstrikes; the political influence and

gaining the public opinion using covert actions and manipulation of perception using the social media and mass media will contribute vastly to rapid dynamics, complexity and uncertainty.

Massing information using various channels, both governmental and public, will outmaneuver, from the cognitive perspective, the political decision makers and military commanders alike, making increasingly difficult the requirement to balance the need for intelligence with the necessity to act quickly and decisively at the right time and place. More than that, mounting large scale information operations, complemented by efficient strategic communication campaigns can be regarded as conditions of success for any military operation and campaign. Massing information against the opponent may play a definite role in achieving success in the same way as it does the concentration of force, all presumable actors in a conflict, be they state and non-state actors alike, having access to new technologies which allow such behavior.

Strategic shocks are likely to happen as the complexity and indistinctive nature of threats will prevail. Possibly new climate conditions, natural disasters, technological accidents, or a lack of understanding due to the manipulation of perception on large scale contribute to cumulative effects which can make up a strategic shock.

More and more, the irregular forces, combined with the regular forces of the states are directed in a more integrated and comprehensive design to influence, manipulate, manoeuvre and outmaneuver the opponents not only on the battlefield “classical” dimensions but also in the cognitive, cyber and information domains.

At strategic level, the asymmetric, composite, and hybrid type of conflict will represent the norm and not the exception, whilst the tactical level of war will manifest the use of the armed violence in classical ways, with tactics, techniques and procedures pertaining to conventional use of armed forces.

The range of threats will extend from WDM to cyber space or the development of innovative weapons systems and the persistence of irregular threats, asymmetric or terrorist actions. It will also seek to promote state asymmetry resulting



from the combined use of cyberwar capabilities, anti-satellite and anti-missile programs and anti-missile systems, potentiated by the nuclear threat. The incidence of intra-state violence, with state actors, proxy/third-party states or non-state actors will remain a continuous theme of analysis.

In order to achieve their goals, adversaries in a conflict (state actors, proxy/third-party states or non-state actors) will carry out activities that will result in a reduced and indiscriminate perception of their action in the confrontational environment, the conflict continuously influencing the participants (and especially the population), which will be coordinated in a centralized manner and executed locally or decentralized.

Maintaining the support of the public opinion will be essential in ensuring the success of military operations, the minimum conditions to be met in this respect being the legitimacy of the actions and ensuring the protection of the forces. Among the goals targeted by the opponents will be the electronic communication lines, as well as the physical communication lines. The growth and proliferation of communications and high-tech systems will increase the ability of opponents to influence not only the forces deployed in theaters of operations, but also the society as a whole. Therefore, information operations will make a decisive contribution to achieving success both in operations and in providing public support for the actions and activities in which the armed forces are engaged.

Future conflicts could involve a number

of trans-national, state, group and individual participants who will focus and operate both globally and regionally or locally. In some conflicts, we are likely to experience inter-community violence, terrorism, insurgency, generalized crime and public disorder on a large scale. Tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies will continue to converge as opponents quickly adapt to benefit and influence, including through economic, financial, legal or diplomatic means. Adversaries, displaying an adaptive character of their actions, will try to manipulate each other's media and political systems to gain advantages, especially at the strategic level, by permanently adjusting tactics, techniques and procedures. They will also try to disperse into an increasingly complex battleground, to include the population, where efforts will be concentrated to dominate the operational environment. The "human terrain", with its distinctive traits – ethnic, linguistic, ideological, tribal, sectarian etc. – will remain extremely complex.

The conflict will likely remain a space of friction and uncertainty, involving a mosaic of adversaries, threats and responses to them. Engaging in a potential conflict will fundamentally change the way of use and the operational, conceptual, doctrinal or other paradigms on which the armed forces are currently being prepared and that cannot be fully controlled or at least anticipated. Applying the principles of adaptability and flexibility are ways to maintain the operational capacity of the forces.



EU MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY. DUPLICATION OR COMPLEMENTARITY WITH NATO?

*Alin BODESCU, PhD**

EU has a permanent military planning capability, but does the EU need it? As long as EU has ambitions to launch autonomous operations and missions in pursuit of its political objectives, which need to be monitored and possibly extended or refocused, the answer is yes. Is there any risk that such a capability duplicate existing NATO similar capabilities, thus undermining NATO core task and security guarantee of collective defence?

This paper makes a short presentation of EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability's role and competencies by comparing it to NATO similar structures and brings forward a few arguments in support of non-duplication thesis.

Keywords: *CSDP, EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability, duplication.*

Introduction

On 6th of March 2017, following a tasking of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy proposed and the Council of the European Union approved the establishment of a permanent operational planning and conduct capability at the strategic level for non-executive military

missions¹, as an initial step towards a broader objective of developing the necessary structures and capabilities for permanent planning and conduct of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations².

But, does the EU need a permanent Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)? The answer is yes, taking into account the EU's ambitions to launch CSDP autonomous operations and missions in pursuit of its political objectives, which need to be monitored and possibly extended or refocused. However, a true EU planning capability at the strategic level should be civilian-military in nature and the recent experience of Activated Operations Centre

¹ Depending on the nature of the crisis, EU-led military intervention could be executive (military operation) or non-executive (military mission). Executive: the operations mandated to conduct actions in replacement of the host nation; non-executive: the operation is supporting the host nation with an advisory role only. According to ***, European Union Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions, Council of the European Union, 19 December 2014, URL: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17107-2014-INIT/en/pdf>, accessed on 20 April 2017.

² ***, Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations, Council of the European Union, 6 March 2017, URL: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2017/03/st06881_en17_pdf/, accessed on 20.03.2017.

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(OPCEN-A)³ with the missions and operations in the Horn of Africa showed its relevance. If the comprehensiveness of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is to be synergistically exploited, then the activities of all levers of power under CFSP, including CSDP, with its both civilian and military dimensions, conflict prevention, sanctions, development aid, strategic communication and individual member states' efforts should be coherently anticipated, planned, monitored and consolidated⁴.

Establishing an EU military planning capability was a long time anticipated ambition of the Europeanists states of the EU that has been regularly tempered by the Atlanticists, most notably the UK⁵. As with other ambitious projects in the area of CSDP, it has taken only a political favourable moment to push it forward. That moment came within the context of Brexit, although UK's defence secretary had expressed his country's opposition to any EU attempt to duplicate NATO planning capabilities.

1. Duplication or Complementarity with NATO?

When it comes to EU ambitions to take on a more active role in the international security arena, and tempting to resort to military means to support the diplomatic lever of power, NATO, through US, has expressed clear concerns and reservations. It was Madeline Albright in 1998 who coined the 3 non-D principles of no

decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination⁶. In terms of planning for military operations, no permanent EU military capability was assessed as necessary as long as military operations could be planned and conducted from the existing NATO structures i.e. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Situation somewhat changed in the aftermath of the crisis in Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina), when conditions were favourable for the EU to start planning for military capabilities, in the framework of Headline Goal.

In 2002, NATO had to make a concession to the EU, given its strong opposition against EU developing command and control capabilities. That was the so called "Berlin +" Agreements, which, as far as planning capabilities were concerned, provided for EU access to NATO planning capabilities at the strategic level within SHAPE. Operations CONCORDIA (2003) and ALTHEA (launched in 2004 and still ongoing) were planned from there by an EU Planning Element, testing the newly established suggestions for crisis management procedures, a EU comprehensive planning doctrine.

To ensure non-duplication with NATO, EU military affairs are dealt with in committees and working groups, following similar structures in NATO with some of the national representatives attending parallel meetings of those committees. Particular emphasis is put on the Politico-Military Group (PMG) that covers the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, and, as all other committees, keeps an active eye on the risk of duplication with NATO when it comes to concepts, capabilities and operations and missions.

At the same time, in the EU, the military level of ambition has been, if not resisted, at least tempered by the civilian side of the house, a situation that could be interpreted as both a form of democratic control of the armed forces at a supranational, intergovernmental level and a way of emphasising the EU inclination toward using soft power. This approach was recently highlighted by the president of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in the context of US

³ ***, EU Operations Centre Horn of Africa & Sahel, 1 June 2015, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-operations-centre/docs/factsheet_eu_opcen_23_06_2015.pdf, accessed on 20. 03.2017.

⁴ Humanitarian assistance carried out by Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) is debatably not part of the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management given that the principles of humanitarian assistance cannot be connected to any political agenda/ objectives.

⁵ For an analysis of Atlanticists and Europeanists views on the need of an EU planning capability, see Luis Simon, "Command and control? Planning for EU military operations", EU ISS Occasional Paper 81, January 2010, p. 17.

⁶ Yannis Stivachtis, "The State of European Integration", Ashgate Publishing Limited, UK, 2013, p. 26.



increased pressure on NATO European member states to spend 2% of their GDP on defence, who inferred that when it comes to security, funding made available by the EU for development and humanitarian aid should be seen as a form of modern foreign policy by other means than defence spending, although he did not exclude the necessity of the latter.⁷

In terms of crisis management, NATO is primarily a hard-power military alliance of 28 nations that cooperates with various civilian actors involved in a crisis area. Therefore, NATO does not own civilian means employed in a crisis response, but integrates their effects into operations plans. EU is primarily a soft-power economic partnership among 28 (27) members states and owns a multitude of civilian assets, like development programmes and humanitarian aid and assistance to countries affected by the crises. If there is a need for a military response to some of the crisis manifestations, the military will be brought to bear along existing civilian intervention on the ground. Therefore the employment of all EU instruments is sought in a correlated manner and comprehensively integrated in a single vision (even though not in a single plan).

2. Planning at the Military Strategic Level

To manage a crisis, at the top of a military organisation, there should be a strategist, responsible to implement political objectives (ends) by military activities (means), hence the level of operations – strategic. It does that by interpreting or transposing the political direction and guidance into operations plans (OPLAN) – meaningful documents for military people – that encapsulate the best possible options for a given situation (ways). In modern times, such a strategist is represented by relatively large composite headquarters, led by an experienced general officer commanding. These multidimensional organisations are bidirectional structures in what

they are designed, in case of a potential need to make recourse to military force, to advise the political masters on what is militarily feasible, on the one hand, and to design military objectives and allocate resources derived from the political end state for the operational level headquarters, on the other hand.

In case of NATO, such headquarters at the strategic level are SHAPE. It is from there that SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), traditionally an American four-star general, deputised, also traditionally, by a British four-star general (DSACEUR), commands all NATO military operations across the globe, at the strategic level⁸, based on the political vision provided by the North Atlantic Council and military direction and guidance provided by the Military Committee from the NATO Headquarters. Strategic plans are then “operationalised” by the Joint Force Commanders (JFC), located in Brunssum (the Netherlands) and Naples (Italy) – the operational level of planning. Finally, the execution of these plans requires boots on the ground (sometimes only planes in the air, as it was the case in 2011, with NATO Libya campaign) and the ability to direct these assets to the effects imagined by the operational commanders – tactical or component level. This framework of standing headquarters at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is known as “NATO command structure”.

In case of the EU, until 6 March 2017, there was no similar *permanent* command structure, but rather an ad-hoc, flexible yet cumbersome one (Figure no.1). At the military strategic level, the EU had two military command options (autonomous and with recourse to NATO) manifested in four variants. In case of autonomous operations, first variant required the activation of one of the five national headquarters, voluntarily offered by the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Greece. When activated to command an EU-led military operation, such headquarters mount the EU flag and become EU Operation Headquarters (EU OHQ), commanded by an Operation Commander (OpCdr). The second variant was the activation of a dormant Operations Centre

⁷ Esther King, “Juncker: EU must resist US bullying on NATO spending”, in *Politico*, 2 February 2017, URL: <http://www.politico.eu/article/jean-claude-juncker-eu-must-resist-us-bullying-on-nato-spending-james-mattis/>, accessed on 20.03.2017.

⁸ According to the website of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, <https://www.shape.nato.int/about>, accessed on 20.03.2017.




Figure no. 1: EU Military Command and Control Structure, 2015¹¹

(OPSCEN) for EU Battle Group – size military operations, in particular, where a joint civil-military response was required and where no national HQ was identified⁹. The third variant for the first option was the establishment of a Mission Headquarters (MHQ) to command a non-executive mission. In case of the second option, EU would make recourse to the existing NATO planning capabilities at SHAPE, under “Berlin plus” Agreements. All variants operated at the military strategic level, except MHQ which spanned both the strategic and operational levels. At the operational level there were several national headquarters offered by some member states to set Force Headquarters (FHQ) in the area of operations. At the tactical level, the EU concept of command and control identified component headquarters responsible for the execution of missions and tasks assigned by the

Force Commander (FCdr)¹⁰.

The non-permanent character of these headquarters required a very well established procedures for activation, augmentation from a small nucleus of planning capability to full scale and manning of EU operations headquarters. This atypical situation needed innovative solutions to allow a proper functioning. One of the solutions was the role assigned to EU Military Staff (EUMS) in contributing to planning at the political-strategic level (develop Military Strategic Options and Initiating Military Directive), and, subsequently, fill in the planning capability gap until the nominated OHQ reached its full capability to deal with an operation. The EUMS had also a critical role in securing a smooth transition from political-strategic to military strategic level, when the activated OHQ lack awareness, cohesion and ability to kick-off planning effectively¹².

⁹ OPSCEN has never been activated for its envisaged purpose but to improve coordination and strengthen civil-military synergies among running civilian and military CSDP operations in Horn of Africa, hence its changed acronym OPCEN-A, for Activated. According to: ***, EU Operations Centre Horn of Africa & Sahel, 1 June 2015, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-operations-centre/docs/factsheet_eu_opcen_23_06_2015.pdf, accessed on 20.03.2017.

¹⁰ ***, EU Concept for Military Command and Control, European External Action Service, Brussels, 5 January 2015, URL: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5008-2015-INIT/en/pdf>, accessed on 20.03.2017.

¹¹ Source: *ibidem*, p. 13.

¹² Luis Simon, “Command and control? Planning for EU military operations”, EU ISS Occasional Paper 81, January 2010, p. 14.

3. MPCC – the Next Level of EU Planning Capability

With effect from 6 March 2017, the EU military command and control structure slightly changed (Figure no. 2) to respond to the political will of the European Council expressed on 14 November 2016, with the occasion of the

The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence justifies the setting of MPCC on the need to *improve current shortcomings and address the gap at the strategic-level for the conduct of non-executive military CSDP missions*.¹⁷ The shortcomings derived from a series of situations, like the hybrid nature of the MHQ covering all levels of operations, from the strategic down




Figure no. 2: EU Military Command and Control Structure, 2017¹⁶

endorsement of the *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*¹³. Head of states and government decided to “*improve the EU’s capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, as part of an effective EU’s Comprehensive Approach*”¹⁴ and reiterating the principle of avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO, agreed the establishment of “*a permanent operational planning and conduct capability at the strategic level for non-executive military missions, working jointly and ensuring an integrated-military CSDP engagement*”¹⁵.

to the tactical level or the location of Mission Commander who has been deployed far away from Brussels institutions and relevant bodies – EU Council, Political and Security Committee (PSC) and EUMC (EU Military Committee) – to whom the commander had to report regularly and seek support and guidance. Traveling back and forth over long distances and getting involved in non-operational, administrative business have been not only tiring, but also unproductive for a commander that had an immediate role in directing the Force on the ground. On the other hand, one should be aware that given the

¹³ ***, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Council of the European Union, 14 November 2016, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, accessed on 12.03.2017.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 25.

¹⁵ ***, Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations, Council of the European Union, 6 March 2017, p. 2, URL: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2017/03/st06881_en17_pdf/, accessed on 20.03.2017.

¹⁶ The figure illustrating EU Military Command and Control Structure after March 2017 was designed by the author based on the previous structure.

¹⁷ ***, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Council of the European Union, 14 November 2016, Action 7, p. 26, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, accessed on 12.03.2017.



increased ambition of the EU to build partners' security and defence capacities, these type of non-executive engagements will increase in importance and number in the future.

Although it did not change dramatically, the current state of affairs in the planning domain, MPCC is the first phase of a longer term permanent military planning and conduct capability at the military strategic level. For this phase, MPCC has a clear and limited focus: planning for and conducting non-executive missions, which will greatly support one of the priorities identified by the *Global Strategy for European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* and reiterated by the Council in its conclusions on 14 November 2016.¹⁸

MPCC will have, for non-executive missions, a similar role played by the OHQ for executive operations. More specifically, MPCC will carry out operation planning at the military strategic level (e.g. development of the CONOPS/OPLAN, ROE, SOR) and will run current operations by, inter alia, providing strategic direction and guidance to support the Mission Force Commanders at the operational and tactical level in theatre.

MPCC is imagined as a prop to civil-military planning capability, specific to the EU. The Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC), composed of staff from EUMS and Civil Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) will be the vehicle by which the civil-military synergies will be substantiated. The JSCC will be a formal framework for day-to-day cooperation between civilian and military planners at the strategic level. This will ensure improved commonality in procedures, a rapid flow of information and coherent planning products.

MPCC is not offered new facilities and relies almost exclusively on existing human resources, rerolling some of them, to form up what the

¹⁸ Capacity building of partners is the objective of CSDP missions or operations with tasks in training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector. Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence, 14 November 2016, URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14-conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/>, accessed on 20.03.2017.

document call a *core staff*. Director General EUMS will wear the hat of Director MPCC as well; 10-15 officers will be reassigned to specific positions in MPCC or will be double-hatted (a similar practice in case of OPSCEN, where some 20 officers were earmarked to fill dedicated positions in case of activation); 8-10 officers from former OPCEN-A, pending confirmation from the sending states and 5-7 officers voluntary contributions of the member states. Additional functional resources could be attracted or used from other directorates of EUMS or from the current mission headquarters. Therefore, a maximum of 32 strong core staff will be the basis for a subsequent augmentation, possibly making use of existing database of manning the EU HQ.

Although civilian and military chains of command remain, administratively speaking, two parallel lines, both MPCC and JSCC could be interpreted as small steps towards further streamlining EEAS crisis management structures and decision-making, anticipated by the "EEAS review" in 2016¹⁹. The ad-hoc posture of MPCC might create ambiguity and potential gaps in communication: the double hatted role of director MPCC who is also Director General EUMS²⁰, the separate chain of command for Director General EUMS, who reports directly to the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP), whereas directors Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and CPCC report to Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and crisis response and finally, the fact that JSCC is co-chaired by the chiefs of staff in MPCC and CPCC.

¹⁹ ***, Implementing of the EEAS Review: Progress Report of the High Representative to the Council, 11 January 2016, p. 7, URL: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5113-2016-INIT/en/pdf>, accessed on 20.03.2017.

²⁰ "This will introduce an additional entity in the chain of command that reports to the PSC and informs the EUMC and is capable of rendering the appropriate command, control and support to the non-executive military Missions in theatre". For details, see: ***, Military Advice on the Concept Note on Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations, 16 February 2017, URL: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6403-2017-INIT/en/pdf>, accessed on 20.03.2017.



Conclusion

Is there any risk of duplication with NATO and where? The answer is not simple. On short term, there is no duplication at all, as MPCC represents an initial solution to fill the gap of a capability to plan for and conduct non-executive missions at the strategic level and to create conditions for civilian counterparts to plan for the civilian effects – the so called civil-military synergies. On the long run, there might be a risk of duplication, given that the MPCC is a preliminary step towards a future fully-fledged EU strategic military headquarters, which might step onto NATO's toes. On the other hand, what is the big fuss with duplication? For years, the official narrative on non-duplication in the EU circles was the unnecessary waste of resources whereas the unofficial one was the diminished role and control of the US in Europe. None of these two situations are valid today. They have been mainly denied by the Brexit and the foreign security priorities of the new US president that seem to encourage a more autonomous military EU. Moreover, there is a clear and loud political message transpiring from all relevant documents in the recent EU security and defence package that reiterates the EU strong belief in transatlantic link and complementarity with NATO.

A common defence policy is the ultimate EU level of ambition in the field of security, as enshrined in the art 42 (2) of the Treaty on the European Union. With no more pressure from the UK and with an US pushing for EU to take its security more seriously on its own, new gates on the road to defence integration have been opened. A common defence policy, will require a complete set of military capabilities to include distinct military planning capabilities, at least at the strategic level, in Brussels. EU is not yet there but steps have been taken with the development of the MPCC which could be regarded as a huge leap forward given the fierce or ambiguous opposition expressed by some of the EU Member States in the past.

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FROM THE TREATY OF ROME (1957) TO FORGING A NEW WAY AHEAD FOR THE EU. POST-BREXIT SECURITY AND DEFENCE

*Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD**

The celebration of 60 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957) establishing the European Economic Community and the European Community of Atomic Energy happened in a period of heated debates on European Union's future, marked by strong Eurosceptic attitudes, but also by efforts of finding a sufficiently strong bond in order to continue the European project in a viable form, capable of coping with the current challenges.

Departing from the regional and international context, the present paper analyses a range of matters which have been the hotspots of the assessments of EU's evolution trends. In this line of thought, a first subject approached in this paper refers to the implications of "multispeed Europe", trying to discern not only its real significance based on EU legislation, but also the reasons for which its re-emergence in the public discourse gave birth to some member states' virulent reactions of discontent. A second subject addressed in the following pages is related to the evolutions of the European security and defence domain, laying an emphasis on the particularities of differentiated integration in this area. The two main subjects are meant to support the conclusion that EU's institutional

flexibility is one of the few ways of ensuring the continuity of the European project despite all the challenges the organization is facing nowadays.

Keywords: *multiple crises, Brexit, multispeed Europe, differentiated integration, permanent structured cooperation.*

1. Context

On March, 25th, 2017, the EU celebrated 60 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which laid the fundamentals of the European Economic Community and of the European Community of Atomic Energy, which, together with the European Community of Coal and Steel (1951) represent the origin of the European Union. At that time, six states (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg) convened to develop a generalized common market and to manage together atomic energy related matters.

60 years after, EU's leaders organize an anniversary summit, meant to be a framework to discuss EU's pathway, in a context in which maintaining EU member states solidarity, finding a viable bond for the relations between them and advancing an optimistic vision on the future of the

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organization are increasingly difficult to reach. It is a context forged by a multitude of successive and concomitant crises, having eroded not only the trust of the European citizens and of the member states in Brussels institutions' capacity to guarantee peace and prosperity, but also EU's image as relevant international actor.

It goes as a matter of course that the context created since 2008, the year in which the economic and financial crisis reached its peak, is not the sole period of time in which the Union faced both internal and external crises. The entire evolution of the European Community/Union has been marked by turning points, questioning its utility, efficiency, and legitimacy. Nevertheless, anyone would find it difficult to identify another point in EU's history characterized by a similar pressure to change and adaptation.

This pressure is determined by a multitude of crises with a rapid sequencing and a major impact on the European security environment, exposing the limits of the organization in following its basic purposes: guaranteeing peace and prosperity for its member states. A brief enumeration of such crises would include the world economic and financial crisis, the "Arab spring", the Ukrainian crisis, the European refugee crisis, as well as the numerous terrorist attacks on European states' territory, everything peaking in Brexit.

Additionally, a series of events happened at international level also had a high influence on European security. One of the most relevant is the fact that EU's main strategic partner, the US, has begun, under D. Trump mandate, to question the incumbency of complying with NATO's Article 5, due to the failure of some of the European allies to respect the financial engagement assumed in relation to the Alliance. And all this, under the conditions in which EU's relations with the Russian Federation have been degrading constantly on the background of the Ukrainian crisis.

Within the EU, given the lack of Brussels institutions' capacity of managing the consequences of the phenomena mentioned above, all these evolutions reflected in the decrease of member states' and European citizens' trust in

the viability and necessity of the organization, in the visible erosion of European cohesion, in the recrudescence of nationalism, as well as in the measures pointing out the weakening of the European construction in areas considered standard examples of integration success. For instance, Schengen space viability was seriously doubted in the context of European refugee crisis, when some EU member states resumed temporarily border controls (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Sweden), while others built barbed wire fences on their borders with other EU member states (Hungary)¹. Similar doubts were expressed regarding the viability of the Euro Zone, under the circumstances of the world economic and financial crisis, when it was raised the issue of a Greek withdrawal from this area of cooperation.

British citizens' vote to leave the EU, expressed within the referendum of June, 23rd, 2016, has represented the strongest impetus to a reorientation of the Union's way of organization and functioning. Thus, together with the centrifugal trends described above, there also appeared a range of initiatives directed towards finding solutions, meant to act as coagulants at European level.

Soon after British citizens' pro-Brexit vote, a series of EU summits were organized in order to concentrate the efforts of leader-states plan EU's economic, political, social, and military pathway after UK withdrawal, in a time when the fact that the EU is going through an existential crisis seems to be unanimously accepted within the EU fora.

The President of the European Commission opened his speech on the state of the European Union in 2016 as follows: "there is not enough Europe in this Unions. And there is not enough Union in this Union. (...) Our European Union is, at least in part, in an existential crisis. (...) But never before have I seen such little common ground between our Member States. So few areas

¹ For details, see: Alexandra Sarcinschi, "Criza Europeană a Refugiaților", in *Evaluare Strategică 2016*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017.



where they agree to work together”². Under these circumstances, in which the celebration of 60 years since the signing of one of EU’s fundamental treaties became an opportunity for a harsh assessment, for a calculus in the most realistic terms of the advantage of EU membership and of the EU *raison d’être* itself, was launched one of the documents triggering the most ample and heated debates at this level: *The White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*³.

2. “Multispeed Europe” – Beyond the Concept

The five scenarios on EU’s future have been one of the hotspots of the public debates in the academic, political and mass-media environment, most of them being bent to assess their probability of turning to reality on the short and medium term. The scenario with the highest probability has been thought to be the third one⁴, based on “multispeed Europe” concept, triggering indignation and apprehension, especially in Central and Eastern European states, where this scenario was equalled to an attempt for them to be left at the periphery of the EU.

However, “multispeed Europe” has a long history within EU’s evolution and refers to a method of *differentiated integration*, by which a group of EU member states, having the capability and the will of deepening their integration, follow a set of common interests, the other member states being expected to follow them subsequently, when they would have acquired the necessary capacity and will⁵. Moreover, the

“integration” concept itself doesn’t refer to an event, to a singular moment, but to a process, which has its beginning before and continues after the actual adhesion to the EU. It is a process consisting in the economic, social, political, juridical harmonization of the states having or aiming at achieving EU membership. Thus, “multispeed Europe” also includes the idea that EU member states are at different levels in their integration process.

Additionally, “multispeed Europe” refers to an EU policy and legislation specific feature – *flexibility*, manifesting in various forms: opt-outs (London’s decision to remain outside the Euro area), consolidated cooperation, cooperation between member states outside EU’s institutional framework (Euro Plus Pact⁶). The fact that flexibility can take different shapes doesn’t necessarily illustrate a bipolar system functioning at different speeds, but a multipolar system functioning at different speeds of cooperation and abstention⁷. Differentiated integration finds a legal basis within the text of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997): “Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Community”⁸.

eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/multispeed_europe.html, accessed on 29 March 2017.

⁶ Euro Plus Pact is a Franco-German initiative, launched at the peak of the world economic and financial crisis. The Pact was thought as an inter-governmental solution to increase Member States’ economic and financial discipline. Subsequently, Euro Plus Pact was included within the Euro Zone institutional framework. For details, see: The Euro Plus Pact. How Integration into the EU Framework can Give New Momentum for Structural Reforms in the Euro Area, in *European Political Strategic Center Strategic Notes*, No. 3/2015, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/strategic_note_issue_3.pdf, accessed on 24 March 2017.

⁷ Steven Blockmans (ed.), *Differentiated Integration in the EU. From the Inside Looking Out*, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2014, p. 6.

⁸ ***, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, 2 October 1997, pp. 22-23, URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>, accessed on 29 March 2017.

² ***, State of the European Union: An “Existential Crisis”, Address by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission delivered to European Parliament, Strasbourg, September 14, 2016, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Nov. 2016, Vol. 82, Issue 11, p. 328.

³ ***, The White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, European Commission, 1 March 2017, p. 15, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-385_en.htm, accessed on 5 March 2017.

⁴ For a short description of the five scenarios, see: *Dinamica Mediului de Securitate*, februarie – martie 2017, available on-line at URL: <http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/dms.htm>.

⁵ Eur-Lex. Access to European Union Law, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/multispeed_europe.html, accessed on 29 March 2017.



According to the text of the Treaty, this form of cooperation had to comply with a series of conditions, as follows:

a) to be aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and at protecting and serving its interests;

b) to respect the principles of the Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union;

c) to be used only as a last resort, where the objectives of the Treaties could not be attained by applying the relevant procedures laid down therein;

d) to concern at least a majority of member states;

e) to not affect the *acquis communautaire* and the measures adopted under the other provisions of the Treaties;

f) to not affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those member states which do not participate therein;

g) to be open to all member states and to allow them to become parties to the cooperation at any time, provided that they comply with the basic decision and with the decisions taken within that framework.

Even more, this procedure (differentiated integration/“multispeed Europe”), institutionalized by the Treaty of Amsterdam, is the one laying at the basis of the functioning of the Euro Zone and Schengen Space. Both of them are forms of consolidated integration, aiming at furthering the Union’s objectives and open to all its member states, provided they develop the capacity and will to comply with the specific decisions.

This procedure also represented one of the main means by which candidate countries, which wouldn’t have completely met the conditions of admission imposed by the Euro Area and the Schengen Space, could become EU member states, being expected to join the two forms of cooperation when meeting the conditions. Subsequently, a multispeed Europe doesn’t suppose exclusion, but differentiation depending on each member state economic, social, and political capacity of deepening integration. In this line of thought, EU’s common institutional framework provides a common direction of

evolution, while differentiated integration, also known in the European jargon as “multispeed Europe” allows the states having the capacity and will to take further steps towards the consolidation of the Union, before others.

However, this phrase generated ample discussions, being either embraced as solution for the continuation of the European project or regarded with anxiety. For instance, France and Germany repeatedly expressed their belief that a multispeed pathway is the sole solution for carrying forward the European construction and expressed their engagement in this respect⁹. On the other hand, states in Central and Eastern Europe, among which Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, have openly asserted that multispeed Europe would mean focusing of the development of EU’s core to the detriment of less developed states, which would be marginalized.

In our opinion, this tendency was determined by an analysis of the five scenarios’ probability in the current international and regional context, excluding the ones seeming less probable or even impossible.

Departing from this assumption, we consider that “multispeed Europe” determined such fervent discussions due to the specific of the European economic, social, and political context shaped under the conditions of the world economic and financial crisis. Measures implemented during its peak point, slow economic recovery, austerity measures or the decisions made under the European refugee crisis made a favourable terrain for the recrudescence of nationalism and populism which grew together with Euroscepticism.

Broadly speaking, it is about an erosion of the capital of trust given to European institutions together with the ascension of political orientations verged mainly toward national interest in the detriment of the involvement on

⁹ For the details, see: ***, “Support for Multi-Speed Europe”, in *Deutschland.de*, 7 March 2017, URL: <https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/support-for-multi-speed-eu>; Eric Maurice, „Germany and France endorse multi-speed Europe”, in *EU Observer*, 2 March 2017, URL: <https://euobserver.com/institutional/137080>, accessed on 15 March 2017.



the international arena. A study of Pew Research Council (2016) showed that the vision on the state's orientation towards international affairs or to domestic issues varies depending on the political direction. This demonstrates that the emergence of right wing political opinions is correlated with an increasingly high tendency to believe that state should focus on domestic issues and not on supporting other states. Thus, participants in the study responded in high majority that other countries should be left to deal by themselves with their problems (Greece: 83%, Hungary: 77%, Italy: 67%, Poland: 65%)¹⁰. Also, excepting Italy, these countries' governments have a nationalist and populist orientation.

Additionally, there are European states in which right wing parties have known an increasingly noticeable ascension in the last years, accompanied by the development of Euroscepticism¹¹. Eloquent examples in this respect are France (*National Front*), Germany (*Alternative for Deutschland*), UK (*United Kingdom Independence Party*).

In this line of thought, Brexit could be considered only the most visible symptom of this phenomenon begun in the first years of economic and financial crisis and growing with every other crisis Europe faced. It is eloquent in this respect the fact that, after 2009 elections, many of the European Parliament seats were occupied by representatives of such parties, with a political discourse¹² contradicting the values laying at the basis of the European construction – multiculturalism, “unity in diversity”, equality, all of them implying the appreciation of the added-

value brought by alterity, as well as a significant degree of tolerance.

This is the general political background on which *The White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025* was launched, comprising the five scenarios designed and agreed within the European Commission. As mentioned in its first lines, the document is meant to be the Commission's contribution to the Summit of Rome (March, 25th, 2017), aiming at launching a public debate on EU's pathway in the context of multiple challenges.

The time chosen to launch *The White Paper* also coincided with a pre-election period in France, Germany and Netherlands (another states in which nationalist and Eurosceptic parties registered good results in public opinion surveys), a favourable context for debating EU's future.

The fact that the third scenario came out as the most possible of the five formulated by the Commission is due not only to the adhesion expressed by France and Germany, but also to the scale reached by nationalism and populism on the European arena. The current European political and social context allowed and favoured the development of an anxious attitude regarding the third scenario, revealing the significance of “multispeed Europe” only partially. In other words, it has been often omitted that, actually, it is just another name for the political and institutional flexibility specific to European construction, that it has been a constant aspect along its entire history, and that it has never ceased to exist.

Moreover, *The White Paper* itself constantly reiterates the idea of unity: “The starting point for each scenario is that the 27 Member States move forward together as a Union”¹³, resumed by the *Declaration of Rome*, in which the leaders of EU's 27 member states, of the European Council, European Parliament and European Commission express their will and engagement to EU's

¹⁰ Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, “Europeans Face the World Divided. Many question national influence and obligation to allies, but share desire for greater EU role in Global affairs”, Pew Research Center, June 2016, pp. 5-6, URL: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-face-the-world-divided/>, accessed on 23 March 2017.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 6.

¹² Approximately one quarter of the European Parliament seats are presently occupied by populist members. For details, see: Heather Grabbe, Stefan Lehne, “Can EU Survive Populism?”, Carnegie Europe, 14 June 2016, URL: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/14/can-eu-survive-populism-pub-63804>, accessed on 24 March 2017.

¹³ ***, *The White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*, European Commission, 1 March 2017, p. 15, available on-line la URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-385_en.htm, accessed on 5 March 2017.



institutional framework, flexibility/“multispeed Europe” being just a part of it. “Unity is both a necessity and our free choice. Taken individually, we would be side-lined by global dynamics. Standing together is our best chance to influence them, and to defend our common interests and values. We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible”¹⁴.

3. European Security and Defence: from Fragmentation to Momentum of Coagulation

The multiple crises context triggered not only a proclivity for questioning EU’s viability and *raison d’être*, but also gave birth to a range of coagulant efforts, manifesting especially in security and defence area. Every one of the above mentioned crises reverberated on this dimension, generating an increase of the sense of insecurity and, later, an extension of the efforts to guarantee security, despite all the fragmentation forces acting at EU’s level.

Each one of the crises passed through revealed EU’s lacks, but they also brought a concomitant and congruent effort to limit and mitigate the scale and seriousness of the generated effects and to find solutions for EU’s problems disclosed in the respective context. For instance, the world economic and financial crisis was followed by the launch of *pooling & sharing* initiative, the Ukrainian crisis by the economic and diplomatic sanctions to Russia, but also by the increasingly clear understanding of the need of gaining more autonomy in this area. Finally, the simultaneity of crises has led to a boost of security related preoccupations at the level of member states and Brussels also.

Although the economic and financial

dimension is only the top of the iceberg as far as Brexit consequences are concerned, European security and defence is at least equally significant for the EU. British citizens’ pro-Brexit vote equalled to the increasingly clear perspective for the greatest EU military power, nuclear power, and member of UN Security Council and NATO to withdraw from the EU. In spite of the fact that London has constantly and vehemently opposed to developing EU security and defence dimension, arguing that it would had only doubled NATO’s functions, pro-Brexit vote gave a new momentum to EU’s security and defence dimension enhancement. Eloquent examples in this respect are the numerous occasions of with the subject was approached by Brussels, as well as the wide range of documents and decisions made in this area.

The brief inventory (see Table no. 1) is meant to illustrate de continuity of the idea of developing this dimension, as well as the engagement shown by the EU in this direction. When scanning the agenda of discussions and the content of the enacted documents, it becomes obvious that, at EU’s political-military level, there are taken actual steps towards the development of European defence’s *hard* dimension. Under these conditions, in our opinion, there are two aspects with high relevance brought regularly in the forefront of preoccupations in this area: the European armed force and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO).

The question of a European armed force and of a European defence community seems to have lingered for a long time in the debates on European security and defence. Treaties laying at the basis of the Union’s organization and functioning preserved the assertion that member states set themselves to evolve towards a common defence, a concept including in itself the idea of an EU armed force. We reckon that, for the time being and at least on the short and medium term, this would remain a utopic desideratum. EU’s institutional framework, the intergovernmental nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the implications of creating such a structure on member states’ sovereignty have

¹⁴ ***, The Rome Declaration. Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, 25 March 2017, URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2017/3/47244656633_en.pdf, accessed on 26 March 2017.



NATO AND EU: POLICIES, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

Table no. 1: Main EU documents on security and defence issued between June 2016 and March 2017

Date	Document	Content
June 2016	A Global Strategy for European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) ¹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Based on a realist assessment of international and regional security environment, marked by the succession of numerous internal and external crises and on the assumption of challenges and responsibilities determined by this dynamic; - Main priorities: security of European citizens, resilience, integrated conflict management, regional cooperation based on cooperation, development of global governance; - Identifies European interests in parallel with highlighting the related challenges and with shaping EU action lines to promote and defend them; - A major focus on developing EU <i>hard power</i>, presented as an essential condition for maintaining and increasing Europe's credibility; - Developing capabilities, especially military ones, deepening security and defence integration are among the red wires of the document; - Integrating and capitalizing on core EU security concepts: comprehensive approach, strategic autonomy, mutual assistance and solidarity, etc. - The perspective of extending EU crisis management and conflict management missions; - The central role of relations with actors in neighbouring regions, increasing EU's involvement in maintaining their security and stability according to the specificities of the challenges faced by each of them; - Developing EU's partnerships with the major players of the international arena: NATO, UN, OSCE, Russian Federation, China.
July 2016	EU-NATO Joint Declaration ¹⁶	<p>Reiterates the need for enhancing cooperation between the two organizations in the context of the current security challenges: Sets 7 major objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Boost the ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience; b) Broaden and adapt operational cooperation including at sea, and on migration; c) Expand coordination on cyber security and defence including in the context of missions and operations, exercises and on education and training; d) Develop coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects; e) Facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic; f) Step up coordination on exercises, including on hybrid, by developing as the first step parallel and coordinated exercises for 2017 and 2018; g) Build the defence and security capacity and foster the resilience of our partners in the East and South.
September 2016	Bratislava Roadmap ¹⁷	<p>There are set the following EU priorities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) migration and external borders; b) internal and external security; c) economic and social development and youth.

¹⁵ ***, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, Bruxelles, June 2016, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2017.

¹⁶ ***, EU-NATO Joint Declaration, 8 July 2016, URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08-eu-nato-joint-declaration/>, accessed on 21 March 2017.

¹⁷ ***, The Bratislava Declaration, 16 September 2016, URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/16-bratislava-declaration-and-roadmap/>, accessed on 20 March 2017.



September 2016	The six page Franco-German proposal to re-launch European defence ¹⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - higher rapidity and efficiency of the deployment EU missions and operations; - a permanent EU Military Headquarters, a joint civil and military capacity to plan and conduct operations; - facilitation of EU Battlegroups deployment, EU's rapid response force created in 2007 but never used; - member states who want and have the capacity to share their defence capabilities within the permanent structured cooperation, without the opposing states to be able to prevent them from doing so; - a medical headquarters to pool and share resources; - a European transport and logistics hub; - developing a European Defence Fund to fund military-related programs and stimulate research and innovation in this field.
November 2016	Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) ¹⁹	<p>Set of actual actions meant to allow the EU to reach the level of ambition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) responding to external conflicts and crises; b) building the capacities of partners; c) protecting the Union and its citizens.
December 2016	Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration ²⁰	<p>A set of proposal for putting into practice NATO-EU Joint Declaration (July 2016).</p>
March 2017	EU Council on security and defence: review of progress and agreement to increase support for military operations ²¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) agrees to set a Military Planning and Conduct Capability; b) engagement to implement permanent structured cooperation (PESCO); c) agrees to set a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); d) enhancement of EU rapid reaction tools, including EU Battlegroups and civilian capabilities.

¹⁸ Alain Barluet, "Le feuille de route franco-allemande pour relancer l'Europe de la défense", in Le Figaro, 11 Septembre 2016, URL: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/09/11/01003-20160911ARTFIG00140-la-feuille-de-route-franco-allemande-pour-relancer-l-europe-de-la-defense.php>, accessed on 20 February 2017.

¹⁹ ***, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Council of the European Union, 14 November 2016, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, accessed on 12 March 2017.

²⁰ ***, Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 6 December 2016, URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm, accessed on 21 March 2017.

²¹ ***, Security and defence: Council reviews progress and agrees to improve support for military missions, URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/06-defence-security/>, accessed on 6 March 2017.

been the main pillars of demonstrating that EU armed forces will keep their status of a very long-term objective for a long time²².

After the pro-Brexit vote, the subject has gained a certain popularity in mass-media, as well as in the academic and political environment. One of the contexts in which this idea was resumed at an official level was the Franco-German 6 page proposition of enhancing defence cooperation (September 2016), when the defence ministers of Paris and Berlin submitted a proposal to re-launch European defence, returning to the idea of European armed forces. This initiative which basically regarded the enhancement of operational and industrial cooperation between the two countries also has a symbolic value: "The fact that we are losing an important member is

²² For details, see: Petre Duțu, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Reforma instituțională a UE din perspectiva Politicii de Securitate și Apărare* Comune, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 42-45.



not a reason for going forward separately”²³.

At 6th of March 2017, EU Council reuniting defence and foreign affairs ministers of EU member states, agreed to create an EU headquarter for CSDP military training operations: Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). This Capability was designed in such a manner that it would not double NATO’s functions. Additionally, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Frederica Mogherini, emphasized: “not the European army – I know there is this label going around – but it’s a more effective way of handling our military work”²⁴.

MPCC will conduct EU non-executive military operations. Presently, EU has three such operations under way – in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Mali. Therefore, even though one could find a correlation between the conclusions of March 2017 EU Council, on the one hand, and the Franco-German six pages proposal (September 2016), the object of the headquarters designed in March 2017 is differs from the one considered six months before. The latter supposed that EU military missions (e.g. Operation Sophia, meant to disrupt the smugglers’ networks, or impede the business of people smuggling on the central Mediterranean route, or the counter-piracy mission Atalanta) shall be conducted by a joint military headquarters, not on a rotational basis, by EU member states. However, within EU Council, it was agreed to create such headquarters only for EU military training missions.

MPCC is to be set within EU Military Staff, in Brussels, initially having a small staff of about 30, and is part of the efforts to respond to the decrease of military cooperation level between EU member states, despite the assumed engagement that they will do more together.

The conclusions of the EU Council (March 2017) also show increasingly clear that the

solution for the development of European defence doesn’t reside yet in creating a European defence community or a European armed force, but in the implementation of a solution stipulated for a long time in the Treaty on the organization and functioning of the EU: PESCO. Nevertheless, under the current political and social trends described in the previous chapter (nationalism, populism, Euroscepticism), one could hardly find a less favourable context in this regard.

Permanent structured cooperation is defined under the aegis of EU political and juridical flexibility, as a form of differentiated integration, finally representing a manifestation of “multispeed Europe”. PESCO is enshrined in the text of the Lisbon Treaty, but it has never been put into practice. Article 42(6) of the treaty stipulates that: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework”²⁵.

The Treaty also contains a protocol on PESCO, stipulating five general engagements which participant states will have to assume:

a) agreeing on the level of defence investment expenditure on defence equipment;

b) bringing their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities;

c) taking concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures;

d) working together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to cover the shortfalls, including through multinational approaches;

²³ Our translation from French.

²⁴ James Kanter, “EU Moves to Create Military Training Headquarters”, in *The New York Times*, online edition, 6 March 2017, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/eu-military-headquarters.html?_r=2, accessed on 20 March 2017.

²⁵ ***, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, p. 39, URL: <https://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/emeriti/pukelsheim/bazi/OJ/2012C326p13.pdf>, accessed on 9 March 2017.



e) taking part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency²⁶.

PESCO initiatives shall be coordinated by the European Defence Agency (EDA), meaning that they will concern especially the development of military capabilities. Also, PESCO supposes a modular approach, based on practical projects, to which certain member states will engage. In this respect, Mogherini declared that there are already made efforts to establish a set of precise criteria, engagements and programs, the basis on which member states will make decisions in this regard²⁷.

PESCO is not a new concept, not only from the perspective of its mentioning within the pages of the Treaty of Lisbon, but also in relation with the similarities with the initiative launched in the area of defence planning in the context of the world economic and financial crisis: pooling & sharing. This initiative supposed the decision of a range of states to contribute financially to building or acquiring military equipment (“pooling”) which would subsequently be used in common by EU member states (“sharing”).

However, the main difference between pooling & sharing and PESCO resides in the fact that the latter allows a certain group of states to realize an increased degree of integration, supposing that the others will catch up with them later, when they would have developed the necessary capabilities, while the former has an European extent, supposing that all EU’s member states benefit of the capabilities resulted after this initiative, all states participating at its implementation in accordance with the capabilities they already possess, with their capacity to take part in this type of European projects and with the interests defined at national and European levels.

Bringing PESCO again into the centre of attention has to be regarded, as mentioned before,

²⁶ Ibidem, pp. 276-277.

²⁷ James Kanter, “EU Moves to Create Military Training Headquarters”, in *The New York Times*, online edition, 6 March 2017, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/eu-military-headquarters.html?_r=2, accessed on 20 March 2017.

in the general European context taking into account Trump’s governance programme, Russian Federation’s actions and Brexit. We consider that currently PESCO is one of the tools for EUGS implementation. Strategic autonomy principle is strongly connected with the development of EU power’s *hard* dimension. Moreover, none of the aspects of EU’s level of ambition as set by IPSD can be achieved in the absence of military capabilities. This trend was summed up by M. Barnier (security and defence advisor, European Commission) shortly after EUGS was issued as follows: “there can be no prosperity without security; there can be no strategic security without defence; no strategic defence without capabilities; no strategic capabilities without a competitive European defence industry”²⁸.

The fact that France and Germany set themselves out as the most visible supporters of this project could be explained through their status as European leader-states, especially after Brexit, as well as through the fact that, in the absence of the UK, they remain the biggest EU military powers. Even more, Berlin set as an objective in the *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (2016) to strive “to achieve the long-term goal of a common European Security and Defence Union”²⁹, and PESCO is mentioned as part of the solution in this regard.

Also, the document identifies the main CSDP areas where is necessary to make progresses:

- a) enhancement of its structures;
- b) integration of civilian and military capabilities;
- c) strengthening of the European defence industry.

Regarding France engagement on this type of defence initiatives, one shall consider that, despite nationalism strengthening, Paris has

²⁸ Michael Barnier, “The European Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and its implications on defence”, in *Impetus. Magazine of EU Military Staff*, European External Action Service, Brussels, Issue No. 21, Spring/Summer 2016, p. 21.

²⁹ ***, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, The Federal Government, 2016, p. 73, available on-line la URL: <https://www.bmvg.de/>, accessed on 10 March 2017.



one of the most extended military presences in the world³⁰. This kind of European security and defence trends would constitute a basis for a greater European actors' involvement in the crises happening in different parts of the world, and therefore for lowering the weight on France in this respect. Also, it is eloquent that France's call on the mutual defence clause in the context of November 2015 terrorist attacks implied calling for other EU member states to offer support for French operations in Syria and Iraq, as well as in other regions of the world.

Conclusions

Recently, "multispeed Europe" has been referred to either as a solution for overcoming the turning point at which EU is placed nowadays, in which challenges tend to be increasingly numerous, originating both within and outside the EU, or as a sure way towards fragmentation. In this context, two completely different perspectives emerged: Multispeed Europe is a viable solution for the continuation of the integration project, respectively a measure that will lead to a deepening the gap between EU member states, generating either hope, or serious concern. In our opinion, for understanding the two major tendencies, it is necessary to consider them in the general context, containing the conditions for their formulation.

The two perceptions potentiate each other. Fragmentation widening, nationalism recrudescence make it possible for the differentiated integration is among the few viable solutions for preserving the European project; also, differentiated integration is turned to advantage as reason for fragmentation. It is illustrative that multispeed Europe was thought as a solution for preserving the European construction, interpreted as a sure way towards

fragmentation and marginalization, determined some states' indignation, which was basically a reassertion of the will to belong to the EU.

The increase of insecurity sense at European level due to the multiple crises contributed to the formation of the two antagonistic visions on this subject. In this respect, a major importance shall be given to the fact that "multispeed Europe" supposes indeed differentiated integration, but not different integration. The premise of keeping the Union remains constant.

As far as security and defence is concerned, "multispeed Europe" has a correspondent in the efforts to implement the procedure of permanent structured cooperation. It is an area in which the opposing opinions are not so virulent and is also an area where Brexit is considered to have positive effects too. Despite being Europe's greatest military power, UK withdrawal from EU institutional framework is often related to the disappearance of the greatest opponent to EU security and defence development. In this area too, evolutions have to be assessed in the context of the abundance of security challenges, to which shall also be added US and Russia foreign policy dynamic, with high impact on European security.

Although we consider it necessary to keep a healthy dose of scepticism regarding the future success of the recent European security and defence evolutions, overall, EU political-military level delineates as one of the most active and dynamic, going into a clear direction of development. It is one of the areas revealing EU's capacity of adapting, even under Brexit conditions.

At the same time, one could also make a parallel between EU's current convulsions and its beginnings. Although we are celebrating 60 years since the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Community of Atomic Energy, maybe we shall also remember the creation of the European Community of Coal and Steel (1951). Its aim was to determine two of the greatest WWII enemies to manage together the coal and steel production, two of the basic resources for producing armament. Subsequently,

³⁰ This issue was brought up in the context of the terrorist attacks in late 2015, when France called, for the first time in EU's history, art. 42(7) of Lisbon Treaty. For an analysis of its implications, see: Stan Anton, Cristina Bogzeanu, "A Comparative Analysis of Mutual Defence and Collective Defence Clauses", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 4 [57]/2016, pp. 7-17.



the integration project also made progresses in the economic area, which, together with NATO's primary role in the European security equation, eclipsed the importance of cooperation in defence industry. Nowadays, European states are not combatant, but they are bent to alienate from each other. Again, cooperation in security and defence and, especially, in the area of defence industry sets itself up as priority on Brussels' top priorities agenda and encounters the least opposition from its member states.

Jean Monnet mentioned in his memoirs that Europe will be forged in crises and it will be the sum of the solutions found for those crises. Thus, EU's entire history has been certainly accompanied by crises and, each time, it has survived. And the main reason for this is that, despite all misunderstandings between member states and despite the all the critics brought to EU, it is in the interest of its member states to preserve this organization.

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MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES, ONE REALITY? THE CASE OF REFUGEES IN EUROPE

*Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD**

This paper is focused on a highly topical theme placed at the heart of international debates on regional security, namely the case of refugees in Europe. Approaching this theme is not the result of testing a purely theoretical assumption, but rather a reactive process driven by the need to understand a multitude of perspectives on one single reality.

In this context, the author identifies a series of five so-called perspectives on the case of refugees in Europe and dissects each of them in order to detect their common and distinct features. This approach is completed by the clarification of terms used in this area and the theoretical framework on social construction of reality.

Keywords: *migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, Europe, social perception, social construction of reality.*

Introducing the Perspectives¹

Migrant, refugee or asylum seeker? These are the terms used by mass-media and various persons and personalities in presenting and analyzing a social phenomenon that has been

¹ This research theme was the subject of the public lecture held by the author on March 15, 2017, at the Palace of the National Military Circle under the aegis of the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies and the National Military Circle.

exposed to the public opinion in the past two years, even if its history is much older: the flow of refugees/migrants/asylum seekers entering European Union countries since the end of 2014. Nevertheless, the pressure on EU borders has decreased from 1,800,000 detections of illegal bordercrossing to approximately 500,000 in 2016². This feature is not only the result of the large number of asylum seekers in the EU countries, but also of the significance given to this phenomenon: from an alarm on the humanitarian situation in African and Asian countries to a conspiratorial and dark outlook for the future of Europe.

We can identify five main perspectives useful for the analysis of this phenomenon: a statistical, clear and “cold” perspective; a humanitarian perspective focusing on those affected by wars; a conspiracy perspective that brings to the forefront the hidden interests of certain actors to destabilize the EU and what it represents; the destination country’s population perspective, which is in contact with a new culture and a new way of living; not least, the perspective of the country of origin’s population (the victims of conflicts).

These perspectives can derive from a statistical

² Frontex, *Risk Analysis for 2017*, Risk Analysis Unit, Warsaw, 2017, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf, accessed on 10.03.2017.

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reality or can induce and potentiate one another. The order in which they are presented is random, so we do not want to suggest that a perspective is more important than another, or that one flows from the other one. The only targeted action is to introduce into the analysis of each perspective a statistical component to help us identify parts as close as possible to a reality which we cannot yet define with certainty.

1. Definition of Terms

Although the number of immigrants from non-EU countries to the EU countries was lower in 2016 than in the previous year, the mass-media visibility and exposure to this phenomenon was significantly higher, with the media speculating particularly for negative attitudes towards refugees and the existence of a supposed link between the flow of people and the recent years' terrorist attacks.

A UNHCR study by the Cardiff Journalism School in 2015 analyzes how the press in five European countries (Spain, Italy, Germany, UK and Sweden) presents the European refugee crisis³. The research includes articles published in 2014-2015 that analyze the existence of a variety of approaches in terms of journalistic sources, language, grounds for increasing the flow of refugees and suggested solutions, among the five countries that do not have homogeneity in dealing with the subject.

Thus, the authors of the study identify the terms "refugee" and "asylum seeker" used predominantly in Germany and Sweden, while "migrant" is used in the UK and Italy, and "immigrant" in Spain. Moreover, the Swedish press is identified as having the most positive attitude towards refugees and migrants, while the British press has the most negative and polarized attitude. In Italy, humanitarian themes have been dealt with more frequently than in the British, German or Spanish press, and the themes that

correlate this phenomenon with threats to welfare or culture in the country of destination prevailed in Italy, but also in Spain and the UK.⁴

Therefore, beyond the devastating humanitarian implications, the case of refugees in Europe polarizes the public opinion as any other topical issue does. Pro and against opinions are born regardless of the degree of knowledge of the subject by the audience, but in close correlation with the socio-cultural characteristics and the life experience of each member of the society. However, the terminology is clear and we consider that it is necessary to introduce it in order to create common premises for approaching this phenomenon.

The importance of the frequency of words to illustrate media representations of certain issues or groups in society is recognized in lexicology, although not all experts are confident in the effectiveness of this technique⁵. By correlating this tool with the findings of the study on the media coverage of migrants/refugees in Europe, we are able to outline the basics of the image that the analyzed phenomenon has in the English language media. In order to significantly narrow the search, we will join the terms identified in the analysis for UNHCR the key-words "European", in order to define the analyzed region, and "crisis", in order to delineate in time the phenomenon of migration which originates in the history of mankind.

A simple query of the Google search engine with the phrases "European migration crisis", "European immigration crisis", "European refugee crisis" and "European asylum -seekers crisis" shows that the difference between their occurrences is significant: if the first term occurs by 30,500 times, in the specified form and at the date of the operation (March 20, 2017), the second appears 25,200 times, the third 277,000 times, and the fourth only seven times, under the same conditions of form and time. The investigation does not include the type of sources identified by the search engine, nor the correlations between

³ Mike Berry; Inaki Garcia-Blanco; Kerry Moore (Eds.), *Press coverage of the refugee and migrant crisis in the EU: a content analysis of five European countries. Report prepared for the UNHCR*, Cardiff School of Journalism, December 2015.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 8.

⁵ Dawn Archer (ed.), *What's in a word-list? Investigating word frequency and keyword extraction*, ASHGATE, 2009, pp. 159-162.



them, but only the occurrence of the four terms in order to identify the most used one. It is obvious that the phrase “European refugee crisis” prevails.

According to the UN, “a *refugee* is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence; a refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group”; the status of refugee is governed by: the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), the Convention Protocol (1967) and the Statute of the Office of UNHCR (1950)⁶.

Migration is a much broader phenomenon, consisting in moving mass of people from one territorial area to another, followed by relocation and or engaging in a form of activity in the area of destination; any migratory act is, at the same time, an *immigration* (the ensemble of entrances) and an *emigration* (the ensemble of exits)⁷. There is also a distinction between *legal migration*, when the process complies with immigration laws in the country of destination, and *illegal migration*, when these laws are not respected by the immigrant who intends to remain in that country. An important issue is the distinction between the illegal migrant and the refugee because the status of that person involves the application of a certain type of measure. If that person is defined as an illegal migrant, the law in most countries of destination compel to detention and deportation of this person. If that person is defined as a refugee or, in legal terms, as an asylum seeker, the authorities of the country of destination are required to apply the provisions of the UN Convention on Refugees, to verify his/her, to process him/her application and, in most cases, to allow him/her in that country. Basically, anyone has the right to go to a border-crossing point and ask for the protection of that state, but migrants have a socio-economic motivation, while refugees flee from persecution. Most

⁶ UNHCR, *What is a refugee?*, <http://www.unrefugees.org/what-is-a-refugee/>, accessed on 05.03.2017.

⁷ Traian Rotariu, “Migrație” in *Dicționar de sociologie*, C. Zamfir and L. Vlăsceanu (Eds.), Babel Publishinghouse, 1998, pp. 351-353.

of the time, illegal migrants and refugees use the same routes to reach a certain destination country and, if they fail to enter legally, they resort to trafficking networks. Due to these comprehensive dimensions of migration, the term *mixed migration* emerged. Migration can be “mixed” from a number of reasons: motivation can be mixed in the sense of simultaneously seeking to improve the quality of life and escape from a repressive society, or the means may be mixed in the sense that immigrants and refugees use the same migratory flows, etc.⁸.

The phrase “European asylum seekers crisis” has the least occurrences in Google’s space, although asylum seekers are the easiest to count because this status implies that the person has formulated an asylum application. Therefore, the *asylum seeker* is defined as a person who claims to be refugees seeking international protection in order to escape persecution or serious threats in the country of origin. According to UNHCR, each refugee is initially an asylum seeker, but not every asylum seeker will automatically be recognized as a refugee, but while waiting for their claim to be accepted or rejected, these people are called asylum seekers⁹.

Finally, for our analysis, the concept of *internally displaced people* (IDPs) is also important because it refers to those individuals or groups of people who have been forced to leave their homes especially as a result of armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations or anthropogenic disaster but did not cross any international border. IDPs remain legally under the protection of their own government, even if that government can be the reason they left their home. As citizens, they preserve all their rights and protection under international humanitarian law and human rights.¹⁰

⁸ Nicholas Van Hear, “Mixed Migration: Policy Challenges”, in *The Migration Observatory*, University of Oxford, 21.03.2011, <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/primers/mixed-migration-policy-challenges/>, accessed on 05.03.2017.

⁹ UNHCR, *Asylum seekers*, <http://www.unhcr.org/asylum-seekers.html>, accessed on 05.03.2017.

¹⁰ UNHCR, *Internally displaced people*, <http://www.unhcr.org/internally-displaced-people.html>, accessed on 05.03.2017.

So, which of these phrases is the “correct” one? The one with most occurrences, namely the “European refugee crisis”? The one that illustrates a measurable phenomenon, such as the “European asylum seekers crisis”? The first phrase is the most used on the Internet and possibly the one with the biggest emotional impact due to the meaning of the term “refugee” that immediately brings the idea of a person forced to depart from his/her community in order to escape persecutions or the horrors of war.

At the same time, in the case of EU countries, the strong impact on the media is not necessarily given by those persons who have received refugee status as a result of analyzing their asylum demand, but the volume of the entire population legally or not entering the Union area. An asylum seeker whose application is rejected will not be considered a refugee, but will have a status similar to those entering a country with a short-term visa and exceeding the legal stay period. The situation is even more confusing, as international agencies, such as Frontex, use in public statistics phrases such as “illegal border-crossings” where multiple passes of the same person can be counted.

However, if the terminology is copied and reproduced, the information will reach the audience in a less altered form, allowing a representation of the phenomenon as close to *reality* as possible.

2. Can we Identify “Reality” Behind Those Multiple Perspectives?

It is obvious that reality is socially constructed¹¹ and refers to “a quality of phenomena that we recognize as independent of our will (we cannot «make them disappear»)”¹². In other words,

¹¹ We recommend the work of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann “The social construction of reality”, originally published in 1966 that is considered by the International Sociological Association to be the fifth important book on sociology of 20th Century (<http://www.isa-sociology.org/en/about-isa/history-of-isa/books-of-the-xx-century/>).

¹² Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *Construirea socială a realității*, Art Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2008, p. 9.

reality is both subjective and objective.

The *objective dimension* of the “European refugee crisis” is represented by the statistics published by various international organizations. For instance, Frontex (the European agency monitoring the Union’s external borders) regularly publishes statistics on illegal border-crossings across EU countries. These statistics show that over the past two years, the number of illegal border-crossings has decreased significantly (Figure no. 1).

2017 (Jan.-Mar.)	2016	2015
19,554	511,371	1,822,177

Figure no. 1: Illegal border-crossings across EU countries 01.01.2015 – 03.03.2017, according to Frontex¹³

Frontex also provides data on the seven main migration routes to the European Union countries: the Eastern Borders route, the Eastern Mediterranean route, the Western Balkan route, the circular route from Albania to Greece, the Central Mediterranean route (includes an eighth route, Apulia and Calabria), Western Mediterranean route, and Western African route. Of these, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Central Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes are the most used ones.

Frontex statistics available at the beginning of 2017 refer to the 2016 data and indicate a significant decrease in the number of illegal crossings of the EU member states borders compared to the previous year, except in the Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean routes where there was a greater number of immigrants from the African countries (Algeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Eritrea, etc.). At the same time, the number of detected illegal border-crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans routes,

¹³ Frontex, *Risk Analysis for 2017*, Risk Analysis Unit, Warsaw, 2017, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf, accessed on 10.03.2017.

mainly used by immigrants from Asian countries (Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, etc.), significantly decreased (Figure no. 2).

Eurostat). At EU level, the 18-39 age group predominates, but the group 0-13 years is also important (Figure no. 3).

	Eastern Mediterranean route	Western African route	Western Mediterranean route	Central Mediterranean route	Circular route from Albania to Greece	Western Balkan route	Eastern Borders route
2016	182,534	671	10,231	181,126	5,121	122,779	1,349
2015	885,386	874	7,164	153,946	8,932	764,038	1,920
2014	50,830	275	7,840	170,760	8,840	43,360	1,270
2013	24,800	250	6,800	40,000	8,700	19,950	1,300
2012	37,200	170	6,400	15,900	5,500	6,390	1,600
2011	57,000	340	8,450	64,300	5,300	4,650	1,050
2010	55,700	200	5,000	4,500	35,300	2,370	1,050
2009	40,000	2,250	6,650	11,000	40,000	3,090	1,050
2008	52,300	9,200	6,500	39,800	42,000	n.a.	1,335

Figure no. 2: The main routes used by refugees, according to Frontex¹⁴




Figure no. 3: Age distribution of the non-EU refugee population in EU and EFTA countries (2015), according to Eurostat¹⁵

In addition to these statistical data, the statistic perspective also provides information on the age structure of the refugee population (statistics published by the EU statistical office,

Looking in-depth, we note that out of the total refugee population, over 50% are men and the

¹⁴ Frontex, *Migratory Routes Map*, <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/>, accessed on 10.03.2017.

¹⁵ Eurostat, *Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)*, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en, accessed on 13.03.2017.

percentage of women is low (Figure no. 4).




Figure no. 4: Structure by gender and age of the refugee population (2016), according to Eurostat¹⁶

For a better understanding of the phenomenon, these data should be correlated to those relating to the composition of the population in the countries of origin on the




Figure no. 5: Illegal EU border-crossings by country of origin (%) in 2016 and sex ratio in the country of origin (2017)¹⁷

¹⁶ *Idem*.

¹⁷ Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2017, Risk Analysis Unit, Warsaw, 2017, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf, accessed on 10.03.2017; CIA, World Factbook 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook>, accessed on 10.03.2017.

independent variable of gender. The following figure (Figure no. 5) illustrates the composition of the reference population on the country of origin criterion, completed with the sex ratio in the population, according to CIA The World Factbook 2017.

There has been a tendency for the growth of the male population in Asian countries since 2000 contrary to the one existing in the world. While the sex ratio in EU countries is favorable to women, the proportion of boys born in Asian countries has actually begun to grow since the 1970's but was not identified earlier due to lack of data¹⁸. Starting from the statistical perspective and analyzing the presented data, we can conclude that world is experiencing a humanitarian crisis. Besides the large number of people of different ages, ethnicity, religion and nationality, there is also correlated a large number of losses of human lives in this dramatic attempt to escape the violence and horrors of war. For instance, on Mediterranean routes, although the number of refugees dropped to one-third from 2015 to 2016, the number of victims increased (Figure no. 6).

The humanitarian perspective is promoted by international organizations (UN, EU) and a range of smaller NGOs that promote policies and programs to manage this phenomenon with a focus on refugee relief solutions. Interestingly, not all member countries of these organizations agree on the proposed solutions (for example, countries opposing the relocation and resettlement scheme, such as Poland and Hungary, and those applying it partially, such as Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia¹⁹). At the same time, these organizations also adopted restrictive measures (an example is the revision of the Schengen Information System II introducing systematic border controls for all persons, including EU citizens since the end of 2016²⁰).

¹⁸ Christophe Z. Guilmoto, *Sex-ratio imbalance in Asia: Trends, consequences and policy responses*, LPED/IRD, Paris, 2007, p.1.

¹⁹ European Commission, *Relocation and Resettlement: Steady progress made but more efforts needed to meet targets*, Brussels, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-908_en.htm, accessed on 12.04.2017.

²⁰ EU, *The Revision of the Schengen Information System II*, 2016, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-the-revision-of-the-schengen-information-system-ii>, accessed



2017 (Jan.-Apr.)	2016	2015
826	5,096	3,771

Figure no. 6: Deaths and disappearances in the total refugee population arriving via the Mediterranean Sea, according to UNHCR²¹

The issue of migration has been formally preoccupied the EU since 2004 when it introduced the *Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy*²², which provides member countries with an optional framework for formulating policies to integrate immigrants. Thirteen years later, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights assesses the effectiveness of these principles in an enlarged Union with another 13 states and a net migration rate of 2.5²³ instead of 1.5 in 2004²⁴. The report “Together in the EU. Promoting the participation of migrants and their descendants”²⁵ is intended to be a response to the wave of hatred and xenophobia that has developed in Europe fueled by the increasing cultural and religious diversity of the population, but also by the increase in the number of terrorist attacks in EU countries.

One main conclusion is that the 2004 principles were only partly implemented and

on 12.04.2017.

²¹ UNHCR, *Mediterranean: dead and missing at the sea*, 2016, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53632> and <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>, accessed on 10.03.2017.

²² Council of the European Union, *Press Release 2681th Council Meeting*, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 19 November 2004, pp. 15-25, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf, accessed on 12.04.2017.

²³ CIA, *The World Factbook 2017*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html>, accessed on 10.03.2017.

²⁴ CIA, *The World Factbook 2004*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2004/index.html>, accessed on 10.03.2017.

²⁵ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Together in the EU. Promoting the participation of migrants and their descendants*, Vienna, 2017, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-together-in-the-eu_en.pdf, accessed on 10.03.2017.

the references to integration as a bidirectional process, as it was thought 13 years ago, are insufficient. In addition, one of the identified problems is that school segregation exists in at least half of the member countries, which, along with the immigrant’s residential over-concentration, translates into marginalization and the creation of parallel social spaces: “Instead of living together, we end up living apart”²⁶.

The implications of this state were recently illustrated at the constitutional referendum held in Turkey with the aim of abolishing the cabinet of the Prime Minister and changing the existing parliamentary system with a system where the president is both the head of state and government; 63.07% of the Turkish immigrants in Germany (preliminary results, one day after the vote)²⁷ voted in favor of these constitutional amendments which, in the view of European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), configure the risk of degeneration in an authoritarian presidential system, although each and every state has the right to set up its own political system²⁸. In other Western countries where the Turkish community includes even the third generation of immigrants were recorded percentages over 60% in favor of constitutional change: Belgium – 74.98%, Austria – 73.23%, Holland - 70.94% and France - 64.85%²⁹.

Therefore, comparing the international positions, which call into question the democratic course of Turkey in implementing the proposed changes, and the vote of Turkish immigrants living in full democratic countries³⁰ abroad, we

²⁶ *Idem*, p. 63.

²⁷ N.A., *Referendum 2017/Overseas*, <http://secim.aa.com.tr/>, accessed on 18.04.2017.

²⁸ Venice Commission, *110th PLENARY - Turkey - Proposed constitutional amendments “dangerous step backwards” for democracy*, <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=2369>, accessed on 10.03.2017.

²⁹ N.A., *Referendum 2017/Overseas*, URL: <http://secim.aa.com.tr/>, accessed on 18.04.2017.

³⁰ According to the British publication *The Economist*, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands are countries with full democracy, Belgium and France are flawed democracies, and Turkey is a hybrid regime. See *The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index*, 25.01.2017, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/01/daily-chart-20>, accessed on 17.03.2017.



will notice that the integration policies may not have been given the results expected at European level. However, the factors that contributed to the configuration of this outcome in the Turkish diaspora are multiple (some factor could be constituted by the diplomatic dispute generated by the refusal of certain Western governments to organize electoral campaigns in favor of the referendum on the territory of their countries, or to postpone the moment of Turkey's accession to the EU) and completes the partial failure of the integration policies.

Opposing the humanitarian perspective, is what we might call *conspiracy perspective*. According to this perspective, the media promotes hypotheses such as: the triggering of this flow of refugees was facilitated by a great power, namely Russia³¹, or by an important actor, namely the billionaire George Soros³², with the aim of destabilizing the EU, or the Islamic State is using this flow to infiltrate a large number of terrorists in the EU countries³³. Of course, issues such as *fake news*, *post-truth politics*, or *information warfare* can be discussed here. One source of the first hypothesis is General Breedlove, the former SACEUR and EUCOM Commander, who, in a statement made in March 2016, argued that certain types of weapons used by Russia and Syria do not have “military value to hit precise targets and instead serve to terrorise those living in rebel-held territories” as part of a strategy “get them on the road” and “make them a problem for someone

³¹ Lizzie Dearden, “Russia and Syria ‘weaponising’ refugee crisis to destabilise Europe, Nato commander claims”, in *The Independent*, 03.03.2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russia-and-syria-weaponising-refugee-crisis-to-destabilise-europe-nato-commander-claims-a6909241.html>, accessed on 12.03.2017.

³² N.A., “George Soros wants to take over the world using the ‘refugee crisis’ – and Obama and Hillary Clinton are his biggest cheerleaders”, in *Freedom News*, 16.08.2016, <http://www.freedom.news/2016-08-16-george-soros-wants-to-take-over-the-world-using-the-refugee-crisis-and-obama-and-hillary-clinton-are-his-biggest-cheerleaders.html>, accessed on 12.03.2017.

³³ Nick Gutteridge, “Rise of European jihadis: EU admits ISIS is exploiting refugee crisis to infiltrate Europe”, in *The Express*, 06.04.2016, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/658508/EU-migrant-crisis-Islamic-State-ISIS-refugees-Syria-Greece-Italy-terror-Paris-attacks/>, accessed on 12.03.2017.

else” and, moreover, “together Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponising migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”³⁴. At the same time, Russia accuses the EU of failing to manage this crisis³⁵. As for the involvement of billionaire Soros, it is possible that the source of speculation is in the funds the one of its NGOs offers (500 million USD) to help migrants and refugees in Europe³⁶.

Regarding the third hypothesis, a recent EUROPOL report quoted by part of the international media as a justification of the conspiracy perspective concludes that:

- The Islamic State (IS) terrorist cells operating in the EU are mostly internal based.
- The long process of radicalization is replaced by rapid recruitment.
- In setting targets, IS seems to have a preference for easy targets because they are more effective than attacks on critical infrastructure or military and police targets, causing more fear among the civilian population.
- The the nature and structure of IS training allow its agents (including returning people) to carry out terrorist attacks in a manner of emotional detachment.
- There is no evidence that terrorists travel to EU countries using the flows of refugees (exception, 2 out of the 7 persons who carried out the Paris attack, in Nov. 13, 2015, out of a total of 211 unsuccessful, prevented or achieved terrorist attacks in the EU countries during 2015).
- Two thirds of those arrested (63%) for terrorist activities are EU citizens, and over half of them are born in EU countries (58%)³⁷.

³⁴ Lizzie Dearden, *Cit. Art.*, 2016.

³⁵ Howard Amos, “Russia refuses to help Syrian refugees”, in *The Telegraph*, 10.09.2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11856922/Russia-refuses-to-help-Syrian-refugees.html>, accessed on 12.03.2017.

³⁶ Keren Blankfeld, “Billionaire George Soros Earmarks \$500 Million For Migrants And Refugees”, in *The Forbes*, 20.09.2016, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerenblankfeld/2016/09/20/billionaire-george-soros-earmarks-500-million-for-migrants-and-refugees>, accessed on 12.03.2017.

³⁷ Europol, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016*, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2015>, accessed on 12.04.2017.

Moreover, Reinoud Leenders, Associate Professor of International Relations and Middle East at King's College in London, does not consider IS would involve "in such a convoluted scheme to carry out attacks or be a threat in the West": IS has "a huge reservoir of sympathizers who all have Western or European passports and who were born or raised there" and the argument of facilitating the entry of terrorists into the EU was used by interest groups seeking to limit the number of refugees from the Middle East³⁸.

Moving on to the analysis of the refugees' image in the EU countries, we extract from various surveys conducted by famous institutions and institutes, the guiding lines in the *perception and psychosocial representation on refugees*. Although the dominant psychosocial perception is that the risk of terrorism in the EU countries will increase (Figure no. 7), specialized analyzes conclude that despite the magnitude of messages of the right-wing politicians, statistics show that refugees are less willing to engage in criminal activities against the natives of the destination countries. This phenomenon has been studied in detail in Germany, the main destination country in the EU, with a focus on refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The conclusion was not only that Germans are more prone to criminal behaviors than refugees, but also that refugees fear more than their hosts due to the fact that the number of attacks against refugee shelters has tripled since the end of 2014³⁹.

It is noted that the perception of terrorist risk in countries with a large number of refugees and

asylum seekers (Germany, France, Sweden⁴¹) is lower than in countries where their number is significantly lower (Hungary and Poland⁴²). In fact, terrorism and immigration, correlated as the two main problems faced by the EU, have been declining since the end of 2015, i.e. the early 2016 (Figure no. 8); in turn, the concern for socio-economic problems have been increasing,




Figure no. 7: The perceived effects of the flow of immigrants in EU countries, according to PEW Research⁴⁰

as shows the *Eurobarometer* series of polls made by the European Commission.

A trend on the prevailing of the socio-economic issues is also observed in the case of the two main issues facing the respondents' country: the psychosocial representation of immigration as a problem is declining from the end of 2015, while the representation of terrorism is fluctuating in the last year (Figure no. 9).

³⁸ Christina Boyle, "Are terrorists posing as refugees to reach Europe? Probably not", in *Los Angeles Times*, 13.09.2015, <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-europe-refugees-security-20150913-story.html>, accessed on 10.04.2017.

³⁹ Kenneth E. Miller, "5 Myths About Refugees", in *Psychology Today*, 23.01.2017, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-refugee-experience/201701/5-myths-about-refugees>, accessed on 07.03.2017.

⁴⁰ PEW Research Center, *Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey*, 2017, <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/14095942/Pew-Research-Center-EU-Refugees-and-National-Identity-Report-FINAL-July-11-2016.pdf>, accessed on 12.03.2017.

⁴¹ UNHCR, UNHCR Statistics, *The World in Numbers*, 2015, <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>, accessed on 07.03.2017.

⁴² *Ibidem*.




Figure no. 8: “What do you think are two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?” (QA5), according to Standard Eurobarometer 78/2012 – 86/2016⁴³

Equally important for understanding the world around us is the *perspective of the population from the country of origin*. Statistics show that in three Asian countries the number of people forced to leave their homes due to external factors exceeds 10% of the population of EU countries (Figure no. 10). These three countries are the main countries of origin for the current flow of

refugees, although many African countries also face the same horrors of war.

Given that each of the statistics invoked in this analysis has a secondary reality composed by human beings, the main question that can be synthesized is what causes a person to leave his/her home?




Figure no. 9: “What do you think are two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” (QA3a), according to Standard Eurobarometer 78/2012 – 86/2016⁴⁴

⁴³ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 78/2012-86/2016*, <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD&yearFrom=1974&yearTo=2017>, accessed on 09.03.2017.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.



A psychological study conducted in Germany on the population of Syrian immigrants⁴⁵ reveals that over 70% of the asylum seekers have witnessed violence, and 50% were themselves victims of violence. More than half of the reference population suffers from post-traumatic stress and depression, and over 40% of adults have nightmares and flashbacks with traumatic events related to the war from home. 40% of the evaluated children were witnesses of violence and 26% of them saw how their families are being attacked, so that 1 in 5 Syrian children suffer from a psychological disorder as a result of a trauma.

services and other benefits that Western countries offer. In fact, psychology studies show that they rarely want to leave their places of origin because they lose their homes, possessions, communities and neighborhoods, the sense of belonging and even their identity⁴⁷.

3. Instead of Conclusions: Can we Spot the Reality Behind the Exposed Perspectives?

Analyzing the perspectives outlined above, we note that each of them has a specific public for which the correlation between them is neither obvious nor relevant unless a different

Estimation of December 2016 - February 2017	Syria	Iraq	Afghanistan
People in need for humanitarian assistance	13,500,000	11,000,000	3,200,000
Internally displaced persons	6,300,000	3,000,000	26,000
People who left their country	5,000,000	260,000	2,700,000
Dead and wounded	400,000	251,000-1,000,000	11,400
Number of total population	33,332,025	38,146,025	17,185,170

Figure no. 10: Number of forced people to leave their homes due to armed conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, according to CIA, UNHCR, UNOCHA, UCDP⁴⁶

Moreover, the German study shows that these people are subjected to three traumatic experiences: the war in Syria, the refugee status and the status of a foreigner in another country. Other points of view on the European crisis argue that refugees are looking for employment opportunities and take advantage of the social

perspective, such as the statistical one, can provide a justifiable basis for their own opinions. In fact, the content of public opinion depends to a large extent on the values accepted or rejected by the respective societies. Thus, it is easy to see from the media rhetoric of the last two years, as well as from the rhetoric of certain European leaders (Marine LePen, France; Geert Wilders, The Netherlands; Matteo Salvini, Italy, etc.) that there is an increasingly wave of populist extremism that speculates its specific public's fears, such as the increase in ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of Western society, determined

⁴⁵ N.A., "Half of refugees traumatised: German psychotherapists", in *Medical Express*, 16.09.2015, <https://medicalxpress.com/news/2015-09-refugees-traumatised-german-psychotherapists.html>, accessed on 08.03.2017.

⁴⁶ This table includes data from the following statistics accessed during the period 01.03.2017-15.04.2017: CIA, *The World Factbook 2017*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>; UNHCR, *Figures at a glance*, <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>; UNOCHA/ReliefWeb, *Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria*, <http://reliefweb.int/countries>; UCDP, *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, <http://ucdp.uu.se>.

⁴⁷ Kenneth E. Miller, "5 Myths About Refugees", in *Psychology Today*, 23.01.2017, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-refugee-experience/201701/5-myths-about-refugee>, accessed on 08.03.2017.



and favored by the massive migration flow of recent years (the conspiracy perspective).

From the analysis of the five perspectives, we observe that each of them calls on the statistical one to justify the expressed opinions, especially the humanitarian and the conspiracy ones. Also, the perspective of the population in the country of destination, as well as in the country of origin, can be divided on the basis of public opinion polls in terms of humanitarian or conspiratorial perspectives, as the case may be. Therefore, there is a close inter-correlation between these perspectives in which the statistical one is the basis of the explanations.

In this context, we might be tempted to think that statistics are “the only reality” explaining this phenomenon, but we would fall into a trap of “objectivity” exacerbation. However, we consider that the statistical perspective is not “the only reality”, but also the opinions and attitudes arising from the interpretation of the statistical data, although this type of reporting to reality lacks the objective component; the opinions are not based on the critical understanding of the respective situation/state, and the attitudes are highly subjective and personalized. Subjective understanding determines “reality” by its consequences, according to Thomas Theorem (W.I. Thomas and D.S. Thomas, 1928), which states that a situation defined as real becomes real by its consequences.

Consequently, there is no “objective” reality excepting the statistical one, but its effects on the social cannot be understood without correlating to a subjective type of perspective that will eventually determine actions, strategies, policies and programs in support of the predominant perspective defined as the “reality” of the analyzed phenomenon. Unfortunately, an increasingly predominant feature of reality is that the world continues to be highly conflictual, generating, spontaneously or through external stimuli, persecutions and violence that move large masses of the population. This is the place of the international organizations that, in our opinion, should be the inhibitor of the potentially extremist perspectives and the potentiator of the general human values that must guide us in any crisis situation, no matter how big it gets.

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THE GROWING MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION AS A SECURITY THREAT

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The current situation in the Black Sea Region is extremely complex due to the deep crisis in Ukraine, the continuing fires in Donbass, Russia's role in the "frozen conflicts", intensifying militarization of Crimea and the entire region. Russia has often used armed forces outside its borders as an instrument of its foreign policy pressure. The creation of territorial buffer zones in the Black Sea Region is becoming an element in the behaviour of Kremlin. Arms race between Russia and NATO has entered into a peculiar spiral whose end is not visible. This is a serious risk to the security of the region, having a destabilizing impact on the NATO – Russia relationship and does not contribute to reducing the escalation of tensions in South-Eastern borders of the Alliance.

Keywords: *militarization, instability, frozen conflicts, power factors, separatism.*

Introduction

Currently, there are two regional crises creating dangerous tensions at the borders of Europe, as well as at the southeastern flank of NATO. One is the war in Syria and the accompanying refugee crisis. The other regional crisis remains that in the Black Sea Region.

After the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the increased militarization of the peninsula, the strategic importance of the region amplified significantly with the increasing instability. This picture is further complicated by strategic uncertainty on the EU's future after Brexit and especially after the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential race. There are eligible changes in NATO's policy and some uncertainty about the future of the transatlantic relations is anticipated.¹ The complex current state of the Black Sea Region is strongly subordinated to a number of key factors, as we are going to discover further on in the paper.

1. The Economic Collapse of Ukraine

Currently, the situation in Ukraine is very complicated because of the ongoing conflict in Donbass. The isolation of the country and the current economic collapse has increasingly clear outlines. In the last months of 2016, the country registered a record in the unemployment rate and falling incomes. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the gross domestic product

¹ Statement by President Donald Tusk on the outcome of the Presidential elections in the United States, in European Council, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/09-tusk-statement-outcome-us-elections/>, accessed on 15.11.2016.

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(GDP) in 2015 fell by 9.9%².

The industrial production decreased by over 13.4% compared to the end of 2015. The income of the citizens has drastically curtailed and due to the high inflation of over 40%, people's purchasing power has fallen by nearly 150%. In the country, there was performed an unprecedented increase in tariffs, as a result of which gas for domestic consumption rose by an average of 300%.³ Currently, nearly 40% of Ukrainians say that it is impossible to further reduce their standard of living.⁴ In practice, cooperation with the EU doesn't bring benefits to society, and an export to Europe is shortened by nearly 25% in 2015.⁵ Foreign investments fell by over 13%. People live hard and bad.⁶

The issues that concern ordinary Ukrainians are mostly the war in Donbass, which is the most important topic for 71.6% of the citizens. Next problem is the standard of living that interests above 60.5 %, and the economic situation in the country which disturbs 45.9% of the citizens.⁷ There are many reasons for the complicated situation, but the first one is the ongoing war in

eastern Ukraine. According to the minister of finance Natalie Yaresko, the war costs Ukraine roughly \$7 million a day, or around \$2.52 billion annually.⁸

After the beginning of the crisis, Ukrainian foreign business withdraw much of their capital from the country. This made the local companies do the same, increasingly looking to invest abroad because they do not see serious prospects for the development of the domestic market. In September 2015, Ukraine declared "technical bankruptcy" ceasing to pay its debts, which affected mainly Russia. Regardless of the allegations that the country will not go bankrupt factually, it is increasingly losing status as a reliable partner and cannot count on generous financial support from external donors. One of the deepest problems of Ukraine are very high levels of corruption and this has been recognized by both the EU and the USA.

In a detailed analysis, the German edition *Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten* states that "despite the great efforts of the International Monetary Fund to rehabilitate Ukraine in the eyes of the world, the threat of hyperinflation in the Ukrainian economy is preserved and the country quickly comes to insolvency".⁹

Important moral comfort to the citizens of Ukraine is the Resolution of the UN General Assembly from 15 June 2016 concerning the Human Rights on the Crimean Peninsula. According to the document, Russia has illegally occupied Ukrainian territory. The resolution is supported by 73 countries, among them Bulgaria. Moreover, the International Criminal Court in The Hague admitted Russia to be a party in an "international armed conflict in Crimea." According to the report, the situation

² Ukraine. Economy – overview, in *World Factbook*, available at <https://cia.gov/2016/11/12/the-world-factbook/geos/up/>, accessed on 16.11.2016.

³ Mehreen S. Khan, "Inflation hits 44pc in Ukraine amid economic collapse", in *The telegraph*, available at <http://html.thetelegraph.com/2015/12/29/Inflation-hits-44pc-in-Ukraine-amid-economic-collapse/>, accessed on 12.12.2016.

⁴ Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine May 28–June 14, 2016, available at http://www.iri.org/2016/07/08/ukraine_poll_shows_skepticism_glimmer_of_hope.pdf, accessed on 13.12.2016.

⁵ Export of Ukrainian goods and services to EU down by 25% in 2015, available at https://www.unian.info/03/30/2016_https://economics/1304596-export-of-ukrainian-goods-and-services-to-eu-down-by-25-in-2015.html/, accessed on 12.12.2016.

⁶ Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine May 28–June 14, 2016, available at http://www.iri.org/2016/07/08/ukraine_poll_shows_skepticism_glimmer_of_hope.pdf, accessed on 13.12.2016.

⁷ European Commission, Support Group for Ukraine, Activity Report, The first 18 months, Data collected up to June 2016, published October 2016, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/ukraine/20161028-report-sgua.pdf>, accessed on 9.12.2016.

⁸ Devin Ackles, "This Is Why Ukraine's Bailout Is a Very Risky Business" available at http://ru.hromadske.ua/2015/07/17/This_is_Why_Ukraine_Bailout_is_a_Very_Risky_Business/, accessed on 9.12.2016.

⁹ 44 Prozent Wertverlust: Ukraine auf dem Weg in die Hyperinflation, in *Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten*, available at <https://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2015/12/29/44-prozent-wertverlust-ukraine-auf-dem-weg-in-die-hyperinflation/>, accessed on 9.12.2016.



in Crimea is the equivalent of an armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia. It began in late February 2014, when Russia activated “personal composition of their armed forces to get control over a part of the territory of Ukraine without consent of the Ukrainian government”.¹⁰

2. “Neither Peace nor War” in Donbass

The situation in Donbass is also complicated. The economy of the separatist republics of Lugansk and Donetsk is totally dependent on Russia. Buildings and infrastructure are completely destroyed or damaged as a result of the military operations. The majority of citizens live hard and bad. People are confused and frustrated by their vague future. These shelling between pro-government and separatist forces in Donetsk and Lugansk in the summer of 2016 rose by nearly a third.¹¹ According to the experts, it is not about deploying a large amount of military forces by the Ukrainian government, but mainly provocations that were made by various pro-Ukrainian voluntary battalions.¹² They shoot, including heavy weapons. So, regardless of the Minsk agreements, fighting in Donbass has never stopped completely and a full-scale war may again erupt any time. The lack of satisfaction on both sides is indicated as the main reason for this. Each of them has ambitions to prize more territory from the so called “neutral zone.”¹³ The general opinion of citizens is that in the region there is a “silent war”, which is advantageous

for the combatants.” The Ukrainian side uses the situation in the southeast regions to receive grants from the West and separatists entirely rely on support from Russia.” Other analysts describe the situation as a “delicate balance” because Ukrainian forces don’t organize offense, fearing the intervention of Russia. On the other hand, pro-Russian separatists don’t have capacity and capability for offense without support from the Russian army.¹⁴

These events confirm the words of the expert from the Brookings Institute and former US Ambassador in Kiev, Steven Pifer. According to him, the interests of Moscow impose the conflict in Donbass to remain with a low intensity or even lead to its “freezing”.¹⁵ That would be the best option for pressure on the Ukrainian government. The aim of Kremlin is not to conquer Donbass. The most important is the ability to act on the policy of Kiev and to prevent European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

In my opinion, the constellation “neither peace, nor war” suits the interests of the opponents. The conflict will periodically activate, but it will not lead to its resolution. Kiev’s main tactic in the confrontation with Russia has been procrastination: faced with a disadvantageous 2015 Minsk agreement imposed by Russian arms. Parliament in Kiev isn’t in a hurry with the adoption of a law to secure the special status of the separatist republics. Russia, which is involved in the conflict in Syria, also did not show any activity. To Moscow now are important the possible changes in the foreign policy of the United States as a result of the policy of the new President, Donald Trump.

¹⁰ UN committee adopts resolution recognizing Russia as occupying power in Crimea, available at <http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/11/16/un-resolution-russia-occupying-power-in-crimea-mejlis-crimean-tatars-human-rights/>, accessed on 9.12.2016.

¹¹ Ukraine: The Line, in “*International Crisis Group*”, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/2016/07/18/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/ukraine-line/>, accessed on 11.12.2016.

¹² Tikhata voĭna, Rusiya vdiga zalozite v Ukraĭna. Tselta ne e razpalvane na konfliktka, a zasilvane na pozitsiyata v pregovorite, available at http://capital.bg/2016/08/26/2817915_tihata_voina/, accessed on 12.12.2016.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Luke Johnson, “Does Anyone Want Ukraine’s Donbass?”, available at <http://imrussia.org/2015/09/10/2406-does-anyone-want-ukraines-donbass/>, accessed on 13.12.2016.

¹⁵ Pifer, St. “Russia, Ukraine, and the West: A Geopolitical Tug of War”, in *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, available at <https://thechicagocouncil.org/2015/01/28/russia-ukraine-and-west-geopolitical-tug-war/>, accessed on 9.12.2016.



Russian Activity in the Area of “Frozen” Conflicts

From 2nd to 5th April 2016 the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning Nagorno-Karabakh has been “defrosted”. The decisive intervention of Moscow led to a new “freezing”. To this conflict we should add the conflicts in Transnistria, a separatist entity in the Republic of Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, separatist entities in Georgia. Each of them has its own specific, but what unites them is the role of Russia. Depending on its interests, Russia has a specific policy for each of the conflicts. For example, Moscow is actively supporting the citizens of the separatist regions of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, giving them Russian citizenship and Russian passports since the ‘90s and supports separatist regimes with arms, material and financial resources.

Russian policy on frozen conflicts decisively “hardens” after the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. Moscow states clearly its intention to restore the Russian Federation as one of the main centres of the multipolar world. A number of steps for political, economic and military integration of the post-Soviet countries within the Eurasian Union with centre Moscow have been implemented. The organization of the Collective Security Treaty develops in accelerated pace and is increasingly becoming a military-political union with real military power.

In the new National Security Strategy of Russia, a serious concern is expressed about the fact that, in international relations, the role of power factors increases and it is emphasized particularly that the military capability of NATO is growing and the organization is increasingly taking up global functions. A concern is expressed about the fact that NATO is expanding eastward, and its military infrastructure is getting closer to Russia’s borders. A strong concern is also the growing role of NATO in the Baltics and the area of the Black Sea region. This is qualified as a threat to the security of the country. Kremlin accuses the USA and NATO that they have

adopted the practice to over throw legitimate political regimes.¹⁶ That’s why an important part of security policy of Russia is stopping the expansion of the Western integration projects and in particular those of NATO and the European Union in the area of direct Russian interests. This applies above all to the post-Soviet space.

To accomplish its political aims Russia is using a wide range of tactical means, which include all known hybrid methods of imposing influence and control. They range from granting special preferences, incentives, favourable credits and loans to threats and use of direct military force.¹⁷ This Russian policy is implemented in the name of Moscow’s control over the political orientation and security policy of the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Destabilizing individual post-Soviet states Russia seeks taking them away from NATO membership, because the lack of political stability and control over the territories of the candidate countries is likely to drag on or to interfere with their membership in the Alliance. So the regulation of frozen conflicts is an important tool for the imposition of Russian geopolitical influence.

Russia establishes and maintains its military contingents in the separatist regions. On the territory of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic serve about 1,200 Russian peacekeepers. Since 2010 Moscow builds its two military bases in the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is the fourth Russian base in South Ossetia and 7th military base in Abkhazia, with headquarters in the town of Gudauta. A Russian naval basing point is built near the coastal town of Ochamchir and Russian ships are patrolling near Abkhazia.

On March 17, 2015 Russia and South Ossetia sign an agreement on comprehensive

¹⁶ Russian National Security Strategy, available at <http://www.ieee.es/2015/12/31/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf/>, accessed on 13.12.2016.

¹⁷ Janusz, Bugaiski, “Russia’s foreign policy under Putin”, in *Diplomacy*, Diplomatic institute, no. 14/2015, Sofia, Ministry of foreign affairs Republic of Bulgaria.



cooperation.¹⁸ On November 24, 2014 Russia and Abkhazia signed a strategic partnership agreement, under which both countries formed a common space for defence and security and are obliged to establish joint military forces.¹⁹ On the territory of Armenia Russia settles its 102nd Russian base in Gyumri.

Spiral of Militarization

Russia carries out extensive work on the militarization of Crimea. The peninsula has a strategic importance for the defence of the country. This allows Moscow to exercise control over the Black Sea, the approaches to the Straits and the Mediterranean.

By the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the military superiority of Turkey in the Black Sea area exceeds that of Russia by 2 to 3 times, and according to Russian experts, superiority of Turkey in the Black Sea fleet over unions of Ukraine and Russia at 4.7 times.²⁰

The situation after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula is changing. On the one hand, an accelerated modernization of the existing Russian naval forces is initiated. On the other hand, an update with modern ships and weapons is accomplished quickly. A second naval base in Novorossiysk is being constructed. A radar station near Sevastopol is being restored. A change of missile complexes, which are equipped warships, acquires a particular significance. Updated is also the airport infrastructure for the needs of naval aviation. According to Russian sources,

¹⁸ Monica Moyo, "Russia Signs Integration Treaty with South Ossetia" in *American Society of International Law*, available at asil.org/2015/03/20/russia-signs-integration-treaty-south-ossetia/, accessed on 11.12.2016.

¹⁹ Thomas Barrabi, "Russia Abkhazia Treaty: Russian Parliament Approves Military, Economic Agreement With Georgian Province" in *International Business Times*, available at <http://ibtimes.com/2015/03/01/russia-abkhazia-treaty-russian-parliament-approves-military-economic-agreement/>, accessed on 12.12.2016.

²⁰ Deniz Kuvvetleri, "Turkish Naval Forces" in *Global Security*, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/2016/globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/tu-navy/>, accessed on 14.12.2016.

by the end of 2015, the personnel of the Russian Black Sea fleet increased to nearly 25 thousand people.²¹

According to the Chief Black Sea Navy of Russia, Admiral Vitko, in 2015, the Black Sea Navy received more than 200 new units of military equipment, and various types of ships. The fleet is completed with 4 (of 6 planned) new diesel-electric submarines of class "Varshavyanka."²² Two boomers and two submarines are equipped with the most modern cruise missiles Caliber-NK. As an armament, there were introduced the Bal coastal missile complexes. The fleet grows also with newly-arrived two small missile ships, 10 military motor boats and 20 auxiliary ships. Moreover, for the Black Sea Navy are provided over 30 aircrafts including modern multipurpose fighters Su-30SM. The coastal forces are equipped with 140 units of panzer armoured equipment.²³

In 2016, the Black Sea Fleet gets two frigates of new generation. This is the ship "Admiral Grigorovich '745, which is the first warship bunker that the Black Sea Fleet received over the past 35 years. The second patrol ship is the frigate "Admiral Essen". The frigate "Admiral Makarov" is expected to join them.

The accelerated militarization of Crimea is presented as being of a primarily "replacement character". It is emphasized that in the past because of the many restrictions imposed by Ukraine there wasn't upgrading of ships and submarines. It is recognized that there is still a powerful military force in the Black Sea which is Turkey. It is possible in the foreseeable future this balance to be changed.

The process of militarization of Russia does not only relate to the Black Sea area. Moscow announced that it would strengthen its armed

²¹ Igor Delanoë, "Military Balance in the Black Sea Region", in *Russian International Affairs Council*, available at <http://russiancouncil.ru/2016/blackseamilitary/>, accessed on 12.12.2016.

²² Ibidem.

²³ Dmitry Gorenburg, "Black Sea Fleet projects power westwards" in *Russian Military Reform*, available at <https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2016/07/20/black-sea-fleet-projects-power-westwards/>, accessed on 12.15.2016.



forces “from the western borders to the Kuril Islands.”²⁴ The Minister of Defence, General Sergei Shoigu in person says that this is done in response to the deployment of NATO forces near Russian borders. In this regard, at the beginning of 2016, the Ministry of Defence of Russia announced the formation of three new divisions and one Panzer Army on the west direction.²⁵ It is expected that only in this direction to be provided 1100 new weapons systems as well as aircraft, military helicopters, panzers and others. The coastal troops of the Russian Federation are being strengthened by anti-aircraft complexes S-400. The serial production of fifth-generation fighters T-50, which in 2017 will be in the composition of the Russian armed forces has begun. Most advanced hypersonic weapons are being tested. The whole military-industrial complex of Russia is working hard.

If we look at the analysis of the political situation in the Black Sea region, a disturbing picture can be seen. Along with a systematic and massive increase in military power in the Black Sea area, Russia has often used armed forces outside its borders as a key instrument of its foreign policy pressure.

The military support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine and the direct military intervention on the side of separatists near Ilovaisk and Debaltsevo in the spring and summer of 2014 were not sporadic acts. Provocative military actions of Russian warplanes and ships towards those of NATO and other countries, and the military intervention in Syria strongly suggests that the use of armed forces is done by Moscow primarily to achieve certain political goals.

Moreover, the Russian military activity in the Black Sea region is not just a demonstration of

military power, but mainly a policy of coercion through military means for the negotiation process and the specific concessions in the interest of Moscow. As a rule, there is no total military power applied which is not intended to destroy the enemy, but to force it to sit at the table for negotiation and to accept dissection favorable to Russia. This blurring of the boundary between war and peace, creating “gray areas” of instability and the persistent lack of political regulation of the conflict poses a potential threat.

The creation of territorial buffer zones in the Black Sea region is becoming a key element in the behavior of Russia, which is a threat to its political opponents. In my opinion, there exist zones of non-security along Russia’s southern borders such as the unrecognized republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, also we have Russia’s participation in an ongoing active conflict in Dombas.

Accelerated militarization, many military exercises absorb huge funds and this is reflected dramatically on social payments and lowering the citizens’ living standard. The complicated economic situation and the huge inflation result in a dramatic fall of GDP. According to the World Bank GDP per capita in 2014 it was \$ 15,390 and a year later it was \$ 8,181.²⁶

The complex economic situation in Russia raises serious concerns. There are deep structural problems of the Russian resource-oriented economy, lower oil prices on the world market and the economic sanctions imposed on the country significantly affect the quality of life. It has become known that President Trump will prolong the sanctions against Russia until Russia returns the control of Crimea to Ukraine.

This will further complicate the socio-economic situation in Russia. The living standard of large social groups in Russia is very low. The

²⁴ Thomas Grove, “Russia Says It Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO Moves” in *The wall street journal*, available at <https://wsj.com/2016/05/04/russia-says-it-is-creating-three-new-divisions-to-counter-nato-moves/>, accessed on 14.12.2016.

²⁵ Russia to deploy new divisions on Western flank, form nuclear regiments, available at <http://reuters.com/2016/01/12/us-russia-army-idUSKCN0UQ0YA20160112/>, accessed on 13.12.2016

²⁶ Russia Economic Outlook in “*Economic Forecasts from the World’s Leading Economists*”, available at <http://focus-economics.com/2017/01/10/country-indicator/russia/>, accessed on 07.02.2017; The Russian Economy Inches Forward: Will That Suffice to Turn the Tide?, in *World Bank*, available at <http://worldbank.org/2016/11/09/country/russia/publication/rer/>, accessed on 07.02.2017.



gross domestic product for 2015 fell by 3.7% and in 2016 to 0.8%.²⁷ Meanwhile, the gross domestic product per capita has fallen dramatically, and the ruble is greatly impaired. The high inflation leads to a drop in real incomes by more than 10% and of consumption - by 10.1%. In 2015 the poor have increased by 3.1 million people to a total of 19.2 million in a 144-million country. In 2016 the poverty keeps higher levels than before. In the first half of 2016, 21.4 million people, or 14.6 percent of the population, had incomes below the national poverty line.²⁸ Such a situation could lead to unpredictable domestic political problems. The social power of the poor mostly neutralized by the mantra of the victims, the state and the population, which should be made in the name of national security. Often attention is diverted by another conflict. In this regard, some of the most serious threats to the security in the Black Sea region are social and even ethnic tensions bearing a serious potential. Moscow's policies to divert the public power through another "small conflict" and the next buffer zone, which Kremlin creates near its borders, is now working successfully. The near past shows that the traditional Russian nationalism, combined with authoritarianism and the ideas of "protecting the national security" may be exhausted. Russia is likely to try to establish a geopolitical control on other areas in the "near abroad" around the Black Sea.

NATO in the Black Sea Region

After the events in Crimea for the USA and NATO Baltic and the Black Sea region acquire strategic importance. First is the "containment" of Russian expansion and possibly "the ejecting" of Russia from the region. Important is the closeness of the Black Sea to the areas of conflict in the Middle East. The military presence of the USA and NATO in the Black Sea should ensure the safety of the partner countries of the region

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ The Russian Economy Inches Forward: Will That Suffice to Turn the Tide?, in *World Bank*, available at <http://worldbank.org/2016/11/09/country/russia/publication/>, accessed on 07.02.2017.

as well as the reliability of energy flows from Central Asia to Europe.

In response to Russia's aggressive policy, the USA increased its military presence along the borders with Russia in the Baltic region and the Black Sea. Therefore, there occurs an impression of the reconstruction of the "iron curtain" from the Barents and Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. At NATO Summit in Wales (2014) was observed the need to strengthen the position of the alliance on the east side. A base for missile defence has been functioning in Romania, near Deveselu, since the end of 2015. The number of American soldiers and Air Force components in bases in Romania and Bulgaria increases.²⁹ The land military infrastructure also amplifies. In the region of Burgas, a focal point for the security of maritime borders works. NATO is expected to trigger a part of expeditionary forces and especially the second operational tactical naval group. Along with the four international battalions of NATO in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia the formation of a multinational brigade in Romania, which will have staff up to 5 thousand people, is provided.³⁰

The increased naval presence of NATO is maintained most consistently and grounded by Romania. In this regard, Bucharest offers up a Black Sea fleet on a regional basis, uniting the forces of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. From the Bulgarian side, the proposal was not supported. The position of Sofia is to participate only in the initiative within NATO.³¹

Now the challenge for NATO in the Black Sea Region is associated with the lack of clearly

²⁹ Megan Eckstein, "Marines Adding Tanks, Artillery to Black Sea Rotational Force to Reassure Against Russian Threat" in *U.S. Naval Institute*, available at <https://usni.org/2015/08/17/marines-adding-tanks-artillery-to-black-sea-rotational-force-to-reassure-against-russian-threat/>, accessed on 7.12.2016.

³⁰ Irina Popescu, "NATO Secretary General: We'll turn a Romanian brigade into a multinational force", available at <http://romania-insider.com/2016/07/08/romanian-brigade-multinational-force-nato/>, accessed on 7.12.2016.

³¹ Margarita Assenova, "Bulgaria's Black Sea dilemma", available at <http://cepa.org/2016/07/20/Bulgaria-Black-Sea-dilemma/>, accessed on 7.12.2016.



established security architecture. Among NATO member states, the big and strong militarily Turkey is engaged in the military conflict in Syria and for Ankara the region is not a priority. The other two countries – Romania and Bulgaria don't have the necessary military capabilities. They have a small numbered Navy. Alarming is the issue of lack of funding and the limited defence budgets of both countries. Partner countries Ukraine and Georgia also did not have an adequate capacity.

A serious legal problem is created by the Montreux Convention (1936), which does not allow warships of non-regional countries in the area of The Black Sea for more than 21 days. The passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles of aircraft carriers and submarines to countries that do not border the Black Sea is prohibited. There are restrictions in terms of tonnage of seagoing vessels, too. Perhaps this will be changed with the digging of Istanbul canal by 2023, because the Convention does not apply to artificial sea routes.

There is an unprecedented growing of the number of trainings, naval and air patrols of both Russia and NATO in the Black Sea. The military race has entered into a peculiar spiral whose end is not visible. During this activity there are real risks of errors, uncontrollable escalation of tension and direct military clashes. These risks increase with every taken step. Similar activity has a visible destabilizing effect in the relationship between NATO and Russia and does not contribute to reducing the escalation of border with Russia.

The Bulgarian Position

In Bulgaria, the idea of demilitarization of the Black Sea gained popularity.³² This is a good idea, but is untenable and unrealistic because of the situation in the region. Another relevant aspect consists in the election of the new Bulgarian president Rumen Radev, supported by the leftists and mainly by the Bulgarian Socialist

³² Bulgaria wants to play a two-sided game with Russia and NATO, available at <http://katehon.com/2016/07/13/bulgaria-wants-play-two-sided-game-russia-and-nato/>, accessed on 9.12.2016.

Party (BSP). This is because he is known to be sympathizing with Russia. This choice, however, has nothing to do with the policy of the BSP or the attitudes of Bulgarian citizens. In my opinion, it is the result of the disappointment of the majority of people in the EU policy, in the fight against illegal migration and refugees, low living standards, slow pace of economic development and lack of reforms.

As for Bulgaria, the conscientious fulfilment of allied obligations within NATO has no alternative. To implement its commitments, the country primarily should strengthen and modernize its military, particularly naval forces. It's logical for the government of the country to plan the restoration of underwater fleet. Bulgaria took commitment to contribute one battalion with up to 400 people in the multinational brigade in Romania.

The first thing to begin with is the increasing of the military budget. By 2024, it should be increased from the current 1.34 to 2% of the GDP. It is expected that up to 20% of the funds should be used for the acquisition of new equipment and weapons. 1.4 billion \$ are planned for short-term modernization.³³ The purchase of new corvettes type Lightning is expected, as well as repair and modernization of the 18 vessels of Navy. A purchase of reliable multi-purpose fighters for the combat aviation is ahead. This is the most realistic way for Bulgaria to fulfil its obligations as a full member of NATO.

Conclusions

The brief overview of the key security issues in the Black Sea does not leave any ground for optimism. The trend in military activity shows a clear picture of direct confrontation and lack of détente in the relations between Russia and NATO. For now, one should not expect any reduction of military activity from Russia and NATO.

³³ David Adesnik, "NATO's European Members Should Increase Defense Spending. The target is 2 percent of GDP" in *National review*, available at: <http://nationalreview.com/2016/07/08/nato-members-defense-spending-must-meet-target/>, accessed on 9.12.2016.



I do not think that it is possible for Russia to peacefully return annexed Crimea to Ukraine. In my opinion, the militarization of Crimea and the high military activity in the Black Sea area poses real threats to the long-term viability of security in the region. Right now there are no direct threats to Romania and Bulgaria, but potential ones should not be overlooked.

Security issues in the Black Sea region are far beyond the military activities and the balance of power. They have a direct impact on the European and the global security. For this reason, attitudes towards events and their assessments are of great importance. Escalation of the arms race in the Black Sea area cannot continue forever. The parts should seek a reasonable level of tolerance, that is some balance and to make mutual concessions and compromises. This is the only way to avoid confrontation and to protect the interests of the countries also, peace and stability in the region. It needs political dialogue and initiatives to stop the escalation of armaments and demonstration of force in the form of military exercises. This is not an anti-NATO and pro-Russian position. Such initiatives would protect national integrity and promote economic interests of all countries in the Black Sea region. This requires political will and negotiation process in order to adopt a package of measures for the de-escalation of the tension. Among them, should be found a place for measures limiting military activity in the Black Sea, that is the introduction of an acceptable restrictive regime of military forces and weapons between NATO and Russia, calls for avoiding accidents, strengthening the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and many others.

Such a policy does not contradict the desire of the Black Sea countries to develop their military potential and modernize their fleets. This is especially true for countries members of NATO. Strengthening the military potential of Bulgaria and Romania will contribute to meet their commitments to NATO and strengthen its power. National security is a direct function of effective cooperation within NATO countries.

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WAR TERMINOLOGY – CLARIFICATION, CONFUSION, USEFULNESS

*Marius POTÎRNICHE, PhD**

The purpose of this article is to bring into debate the tendency of defining and classification of warfare, as opposed to the practical element, planning and conducting war. Why do we need to define each conflict? Is warfare changing its essence? The answer is negative, so why is it important or where does the necessity to define each type of warfare rise from? How does a certain war classification help from the operational point of view? Why don't we find in military regulations steps or procedures for each conflict that the analysts are bringing into attention? Warfare is a way to clear up a political or geostrategic dilemma. Is that enough? Principles that describe the new warfare characteristics and typology are the result of the modern general laws of the military conflicts and the current and future society issues, and these bring into our analysis elements under continuing development and changes that are hard to define.

Keywords: *warfare, hybrid warfare, modern warfare, asymmetric conflict, proxy war, fourth generation warfare, network centric warfare.*

1. Types of Wars

In this article I will try to draw the attention on a phenomenon, which is the tendency to categorize the war. Both military and especially the politico-

military analysts find out “comprehensive” names for certain types of military actions, and it is to be believed that this thing happens to clarify and to understand better the war phenomenon. The conclusion will be that this concern doesn't help the military staff but, moreover, it can create confusion as long as some characteristics, as they are treated by the military, are common, some entirely included but bearing different name.

Let us consider some types of wars starting with *hybrid warfare*. At a recent event sponsored by NATO and organized by the Atlantic Council, attendees were told that “there is no agreed definition of terms related to hybrid warfare. [...] How can NATO leaders expect to develop an effective military strategy if they cannot define what they believe is the threat of the day?”¹ A staff officer doesn't operate with such definitions when planning military actions.

According to a definition, “*hybrid war* is a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they simultaneously – and more decisively – attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing

¹ ***, “Hybrid war – does it even exist?”, *NATO Review*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/>, accessed on 17.03.2017.

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and stabilizing them (stability operations)”². This differs very much on the Russian army’s vision “the tactic of undertaking barely disguised aggression has become known as “*hybrid warfare*”³. This Russian definition is very well connected with one of the major Russian concept that will be tackled further in the paper. Another definition of the “*hybrid war*” makes the fog even denser: “any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain their political objectives.”⁴

Even though there is no accepted definition, meaning there is no accepted comprehensive elements of this concept, everybody is discussing with resolution and is writing a lot of articles on this topic (the expression might be very comprehensive for what is wanted to be expressed) by the people less familiar with the subject. Why this combination of elements of this type of conflict is better to be named *hybrid warfare*? What is the element that is so specific? What if, in the complexity of the battlespace, a new element arises, that is not hybrid? To bring more confusion to this matter, the reason why a definition is not agreed on is that the same concept is used when we discuss about “conventional military operations” or, more recently “political objectives” of a military operation. I have to mention that these examples characterize in fact the “modern warfare”.

The modern warfare concept is warfare using the concepts, methods and military technology that have come into use during and after World War II. The concepts and methods have assumed more complex forms of the 19th and early 20th

century antecedents, largely due to the widespread use of highly advanced information technology, and combatants must modernize constantly to preserve their battle worthiness.⁵ Why don’t we want to accept the evidence that along with the human society evolution, everything was new for a specific period. When gunpowder was discovered it was “modern” and also “modern” was the first aircraft when it was invented. It is interesting that the stage of military modernism starts after the Second World War. What would say Bruce A. Elleman, the author of “Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989”? The Chinese people have led a modern war for more than 200 years, while in other parts of the world this thing has happened only for 60 years. Moreover, some analysts say that everything started with the Russian invasion in Crimea. If the concept is new it does not mean that warfare is modern.

Another concept is the “*asymmetric war*”. This concept was introduced by Andrew J. R. Mack in 1975, in his article “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars” published in *World Politics*, in which he analyzed a series of conflicts that he considered as being conflicts between two actors who had obvious different economical and military power. For a long time, his analysis was ignored and in 2001 the United States Army started taking it into consideration. Therefore, these concepts imply the non-state actor, political activity and moral aspect of the conflict. From the nation state concept (concept from XVII century), *asymmetric war* represented an exception and not a rule. In the last decades, once inter states and intra state conflicts arose and the weapons became more and more sophisticated and expensive, the accent was laid down on asymmetry.

The issue that must be analyzed is why governments are involved so much and with so bad results in asymmetric conflicts. Having this background of *asymmetric war* we can bring into debate the issue of military or/and political competence in such conflicts. The debate on such subject is getting complicated as the military analysts and some military commanders start

² John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars”, *Military Review*, March-April 2008, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, pp. 107 - 108.

³ Max Boot, “How to Wage Hybrid War on the Kremlin”, *Foreign Policy*, December 13, 2016 <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/13/how-to-wage-hybrid-war-on-the-kremlin/>, accessed on 20.03.2017.

⁴ Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats”, *War on the Rocks (blog)*, July 28, 2014, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/>, accessed on 21.03.2017.

⁵ Martin Van Creveld, “Technology and War I: To 1945”, in Charles Townshend, *The Oxford History of Modern War*, New York, USA, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 206.



to associate this concept with guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

Some military analysts tend to focus on explaining two puzzles in asymmetric conflict. First, if “power” determines victory in conflict, then why would weaker actors decide to fight stronger actors?

Key explanations include: a) weaker actors may have secret weapons; b) weaker actors may have powerful allies⁶; stronger actors are unable to make threats credible; the demands of a stronger actor is extreme⁷; the weaker actor must consider its regional rivals when responding to threats from powerful actors⁸.

Second, if “power”, as conventionally understood, leads to victory in war, then how is the victory of the “weak” over the “strong” explained? Key explanations include: strategic interaction; willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs; external support of weak actors; reluctance to escalate violence on the part of strong actors; internal group dynamics⁹ and inflated strong actor war aims, evolution of asymmetric rivals’ attitudes towards time¹⁰. Since 1950, weak actors have won a majority of all asymmetric conflicts.¹¹ One popular explanation commonly circulated is that asymmetrical

combatants are either mentally deranged, morally depraved, or a combination of both.¹²

Fourth generation warfare is a concept used to describe the decentralized nature of modern warfare. The simple definition of this new form of warfare is that a conflict involves at least one non-state actor.¹³ It looks like asymmetric conflict. Core characteristics of the *Fourth Generation warfare* are a mix of war politics, civilian combatants, conflicts – peace, battlefield, reconstruction. The concept can be viewed as close in meaning with terrorism and asymmetric warfare, involving complexity, terrorism, direct attack on the enemy’s culture, sophisticated psychological warfare through media manipulation, political, economic, social and military pressure, asymmetric operations, enemy weaknesses exploitation and few more as we read different military thinkers. It involves actors from all networks, the dilemma being represented by non-combatants.

This type of war uses tactics of insurgency and guerrilla. Viewed in the context of military history, fourth-generation warfare is highly irregular. “Asymmetric” operations, in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatants and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets – are a defining characteristic of fourth-generation warfare. Some military thinkers wrote about the sorts of enemies that confront in fourth-generation warfare. They usually present few, if any, important vulnerable targets to conventional attack, and their followers are usually much more willing to fight and die for their causes. They seldom wear uniforms and may be difficult to distinguish from the general population (there are elements of the hybrid war). They are also far less hampered by convention and more likely to seek new and innovative means to

⁶ Thazha Varkey Paul, “Asymmetric conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers”, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁷ Michael A. Allen, Benjamin O. Fordham, “From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More Powerful States”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 4 (55), 2011.

⁸ Michael A. Allen, Sam R. Bell, K. Chad Clay, “Deadly Triangles: The Implications of Regional Competition on Interactions in Asymmetric Dyads”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2016.

⁹ Zhao et al., “Anomalously Slow Attrition Times for Asymmetric Populations with Internal Group Dynamics”. *Physical Review Letters*. APS. 103 (14), 2 October 2009.

¹⁰ Uri Resnick, *Dynamics of Asymmetric Territorial Conflict: the evolution of patience*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013, p. 287.

¹¹ Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the weak win wars - A theory of asymmetric conflict”, *International Security*, Vol. 26, no.1, pp. 93-128, <https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001.pdf>, accessed on 20.03.2017.

¹² Clark R. McCauley, *The Psychology of Terrorism, Social Science Research Council/After September 11 Essays*. <http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/mccauley.htm> accessed on 20.03.2017.

¹³ Michael Sebastian, “What is Fourth-Generation Warfare (4WG?)”, July 28, 2016, <http://www.returnofkings.com/91743/what-is-fourth-generation-warfare-4gw> accessed on 03.03.2017.



achieve their objectives. All these characteristics are very familiar with the hybrid warfare.

The difference between Fourth Generation wars and ancient warfare is that Fourth Generation wars make full use of modern technology¹⁴. Some analysts say that the terrorist attack in Berlin in the Christmas Market is a kind of such conflict.

And, to make the discussion about warfare even more provocative, we have even the *Network Centric Warfare* concept, which is the best term developed to date to describe the way we will organize and fight in the Information Age¹⁵. Network Centric Warfare was an emerging theory of war, a concept that, at the highest level, constituted the military's response to the Information Age.¹⁶ If we have to characterize this terminology we should take into account that this comprises all the necessary elements to conduct a war. The basic aim is increasing the speed of command by delivering the right information to the warfighter at the right time and the right place. Because the command system is the one that unifies all the efforts on the battle space and processes data in a way that can be useful for a warfighter and a system, *Network Centric Warfare* seemed to be the concept that was able to integrate all other concept mentioned above. *Network Centric Warfare* changes the planning and development of future wars radically, regardless their spectrum and offers a new view on the leadership of all the components of a state participant in the war, of forces deployed in the theatre of operations.¹⁷

Not new, but not that much in analysts' attention since the concept of hybrid war has come into military terminology, *proxy war* is a concept that describes the conflict between two states or non-state actors where neither

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 13.

¹⁵ David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Frederick P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, 2nd Edition, p. 2, CCRP Publication Series.

¹⁶ Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Transformation, interview with Frank Swofford, *Defence AT&L*, March-April 2004.

¹⁷ Petrisor Jalba, "Network Centric Warfare and some particular aspects of logistics based on networking", *JoDRM* Volume 6, Issue no. 1 (10), April 2015.

entity directly engages the other. While this can encompass a breadth of armed confrontation, its core definition hinges on two separate powers utilizing external strife to somehow attack the interests or territorial holdings of the other. This frequently involves both countries fighting their opponent's allies, or assisting their allies in fighting their opponent. This led to the practice of arming insurgent forces, such as the funneling of supplies to the Mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War.¹⁸ A recent example of this type of war is Syria where the United States is supporting the Syrian rebels (opposition) that are proxy for them, whilst Russia is supporting the Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad, which is proxy for Russia.

2. New Generation War

In looking at the future of warfare, the former Secretary of State of the USA, Aston Carter, in a interview, used the term "Cyber Com", a weapon tested against ISIL for the first time and he was very optimistic concerning the results and the future of this weapon (mainly, he referred to Unmanned Aerial Vehicle)¹⁹. Many experts no longer hesitate to use phrases like "the second Cold War"²⁰, that could mean State-to-State conflict. New forms of warfare will result from what is called "emerging tensions".

As these emerging tensions begin to lay the groundwork for future war scenarios, it is important, firstly, to recognize certain crosscutting themes that will most likely be at play in all future conflicts. These would include the use of

¹⁸ ***, "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d., <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1499983/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan>, accessed on 03.03.2017.

¹⁹ Nicholas Thompson, "The former secretary of defence outlines the future of warfare", *Security* (online), 19.02.2017, <https://www.wired.com/2017/02/former-secretary-defense-outlines-future-warfare/>, accessed on 23.03.2017.

²⁰ Evan Osnos, David Remnick and Joshua Yaffa, "Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War", *The New Yorker, Annals of Diplomacy*, March 6, 2017 Issue, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/trump-putin-and-the-new-cold-war>, accessed on 23.03.2017.



big data and artificial intelligence for purposes such as surveillance and planning, robotics, drone-related technologies, use of outer space and nano-technological mechanisms and cyber-war. “In other words, it is more than likely that warfare in general will witness the application of these features, whatever the types, dimensions and dynamics of forthcoming wars”.²¹ It is a need to act not only against people but also against all these assets, which are impassive in assessing what is occurring and do not perceive to what a person reacts.²²

While the West is concerned to make military war terminology much more interesting, Russia is following up what it developed with diligence at the beginning of ‘60s, namely *reflexive control*. A Russian doctor of pedagogical sciences and a member of the Academy of Military Science argues that the operation in Syria is equally a classic example of Russia exploiting *reflexive control theory*, noting that the operation caught the West by surprise.

Reflexive control is a method of influencing an opponent to think or behave in a certain manner for the benefit of achieving strategic gains. It is believed that Russia’s use of reflexive control is apparent in the lack of foresight on the part of the western regarding the surprise use of military power to support the regime in Damascus. Kremlin wanted the West to see the situation in a way, whereas the outcome was rather different. Thus, experiments conducted during the Syria operations are helping the Russian General Staff to refine the introduction of network centric capability while providing a testing ground for numerous hard and soft power tools.²³ While the West was busy to understand how was possible to happen that in Ukraine and had difficulties to define the hybrid war, Russia had already crossed

into a new stage of *reflexive control* in Syria.

Three surprising actions, all three as a result of the *reflexive control theory* – Georgia, Ukraine, Syria – must be analyzed to clarify to which concept they belong to. Did the West learn its homework? Is any interest or any group discussion to anticipate next move from the military perspective of the Russian army as a result of the application of this theory? For Russians, “the most dangerous manifestation in the tendency to rely on military power relates more to the possible impact of the use of reflexive control by the opposing side through developments in the theory and practice of information war rather than to the direct use of the means of armed combat.”²⁴ The *reflexive control theory* concept has its meaning near the concept of perception management and not information operation. What is doing the military concerning the perception management?

Conclusions

In conclusion, for which of the conflicts should we prepare the army? Which of the concepts presented so far is more topical or is most probable to happen? This concepts must be viewed from the planning officer perspective, the one evaluating the situation based on data he receives in order to fulfill his mission. A captain or a major from a Battalion or Brigade staff planning group is less interested in which war his unit is involved. Warfare, whether asymmetric or modern, hybrid or not, is always complex and can hardly be subsumed into a single adjective. Any effective strategy should take this complex environment into consideration and find ways to navigate it without oversimplifying. It becomes obvious that an army can embrace in rapid development of conflict categories but, some times, conceptualizing is very hard to understand when there are very few tides with regard to operational planning, or when there is less ties

²¹ Dr Randolph Kent, “The future of warfare: Are we ready?”, *International Review of the Red Cross. The evolution of warfare*, p. 13.

²² Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military”, *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 2004.

²³ Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Network-Centric Warfare Experiment” in *Syria Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume: 13 Issue: 76.

²⁴ A. A. Prokhozhev and N. I. Turko, ‘Osnovi informatsionnoi voini (The Basics of Information Warfare),’ report at a conference on “Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Theory and Practice,” Moscow, February 1996, p. 251.



with a staff officer tasks or a fighter that have to accomplish his mission. There is no set of operational procedures to rely on in the moment the conflict is hybrid, asymmetric, proxy or irregular. For all these concepts, the planners are using standard procedures. For example, few elements that needs to be considered by the planners when analyze transnational issues concerning the global geo-political situation, in terms of possible threats and risks security interests, are: (a) threats or acts of armed attack or aggression; proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism/extremism; instability from failed and failing states; environmental and humanitarian disaster; security of vital resources; organised/transnational crime, for example human trafficking and narcotics; hostile information activities and propaganda; cyber threats.²⁵ He is less interested about de war category and what the name is.

All these concepts are interconnected having common elements that makes hard to say which conflict is of a type or another. The simple fact that we use different terms for every conflict it does not make, in any way, the military action much easier, it does not justify the objective set up for the operation and also there is justification for any cost. It looks clearly that playing with concepts does not help any planners and commanders in accomplishing their mission. Raising the level of public security is an objective of policy makers and sometimes seems to be explained through new concepts of war in order to justify the military expenditures.

It is recommended to concentrate future analysis on *reflexive control theory*, a theory that is too often regarded as information warfare, because Russia seems to rely upon this concept extensively and can strike again and surely, as it is so challenged, it will do it. Where, when and how is an issue that military annalists should find out, a challenge for years to come. The next conflict will be neither hybrid nor asymmetric or

fourth generation, it is not predicted yet. Could be a proxy war, or a new concept might appear, but for sure it will have elements of network centric warfare. It is much more useful to clear up with military assets, and I mean operational procedures, what is next and is going to happen instead of looking up for a new term for a conflict, empty in consistency.

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DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IS NOT ALWAYS DIPLOMACY: AN INQUIRY INTO A PARTLY MISLEADING CONCEPTUAL CORRELATION

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The assumption that defence diplomacy is a form of diplomacy seems to naturally result from the composed structure of the former term, but this paper calls into question the rightness of this assumption and develops an argument against it by contrasting the concept of diplomacy with the concept of defence diplomacy.

To this purpose, it is first conducted an examination of the meaning of diplomacy that is grounded on a distinction between two theoretical understandings of it and that is operated through the criteria of reliance on coercive military force. This examination makes possible the identification of the connections between diplomacy and the negotiations for establishing and maintaining a military alliance and allows for the dual instrument to be introduced as a class of instruments of foreign policy.

Secondly, the meaning of defence diplomacy is analysed in relation with its objectives that fall within or outside the logic of realpolitik and in line with this division the defence diplomacy is characterised in terms of negotiations on military issues conducted with respect to international agreements.

By comparing diplomacy and defence

diplomacy at definitional level, the paper concludes that defence diplomacy is diplomacy only if diplomacy is defined as encompassing reliance on coercive military force and that, for the most part, defence diplomacy is not diplomacy, but a dual instrument of foreign policy if diplomacy is defined as excluding reliance on such force.

Keywords: *defence diplomacy, diplomacy, international negotiations, military alliance, instruments of foreign policy.*

Introduction

In order to provide a definition for the term “defence diplomacy”, one could start from the assumption that, given its compound form, it designates diplomacy when applied to defence issues and consequently hold the view that it simply refers to a peculiar aspect of diplomacy. This reading of defence diplomacy seems sound enough to make useless any further definitional investigation.

However, the mere reliance on language is sometimes misleading as it happens in case of some compound nouns, such as “butterfly”,

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whose meaning is not the same with the sum of the meaning of its constitutive parts. The possibility for defence diplomacy to be a misleading word in this sense, albeit apparently highly improbable, is seriously considered in this paper which aims at separately analysing the meaning of diplomacy and of defence diplomacy in view of a subsequent comparison between them. But this contemplated investigation seems to be compromised from the outset because, as pointed out in the first section, it looks very difficult to precisely determine what diplomacy is.

1. Ambiguities of the Concept of Diplomacy

Someone eager to rapidly discover the meaning of diplomacy would be disoriented by Sir Peter Marshall's assertion that such an undertaking unveils an ironical situation arising from the contradiction between the high relevance attributed to precision within the field of diplomacy and the fact that the term *diplomacy* itself is "monstrously imprecise"¹.

Long before Marshall, in the interwar period, another British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson, remarked the confusion surrounding the use of the term *diplomacy* by the general public from the Great Britain and explained it as a result of its traditional lack of interest for the field of international affairs². Nicolson identifies five meanings usually attributed to diplomacy: foreign policy, negotiation, processes and machinery necessary for carrying out the international negotiations, a branch of Foreign Service and the ability proven in international negotiations to skilfully manage them or to be cunning³.

¹ Peter Marshall, *Positive Diplomacy*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1997, p.7.

² According to Nicolson, the general public from the United Kingdom became constantly preoccupied with the events from the realm of international affairs only after the First World War, when it was clearly acknowledged, on one hand, that certain policies followed by a country could entail inescapable commitments to other countries and, on the other hand, that the terrible sufferance produced by the modern warfare equally affects the members of the armed forces and the ordinary citizens (Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, London, Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 11).

³ Harold Nicolson, *op.cit.*, pp. 13-14.

Almost fifty years later, the Portuguese diplomat José Calvet De Magalhães pointed out that the confusion among ordinary people about the meaning of diplomacy persisted, but also that it was common even among scholars of international relations⁴. He mentioned four meanings attributed to diplomacy by renowned scholars: foreign policy (e.g. Hans J. Morgenthau), the only instrument/technique of foreign policy (e.g. Jacques Chazelle, Kalevi J. Holsti), international negotiations (e.g. Charles de Martens, Ernest Satow, Raymond Aron, Harold Nicolson) and the activity of diplomats (e.g. Morton Kaplan)⁵. De Magalhães equally revealed the incoherent manner in which international relations scholars used the meaning they attributed to the concept of diplomacy; thus, he mentioned Raymond Aron and Harold Nicolson who sometimes equated diplomacy to foreign policy albeit they explicitly rejected this identification⁶.

The ambiguity that mars the concept of diplomacy is considered to be the consequence of a low level of theorising which, in its turn, is responsible for the marginal status of diplomacy within international relations theory⁷. Among the explanations provided for the under-theorising of diplomacy, one could mention:

- most authors writing on diplomacy are practitioners or historians and thus they are not preoccupied with theory-building⁸;
- the in-depth development of theorising in international relations took place during the Cold War, when diplomacy was seen as a less relevant instrument in the conduct of foreign policy⁹;
- the characterisation of diplomacy as an obsolete institution in the present day highly technologized world¹⁰.

⁴ José Calvet De Magalhães, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*, New York, Greenwood Press, 1988, p. 1.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 49-52.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 2, 4.

⁷ See for example Christer Jönsson, Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 1-4, 12-19 and José Calvet De Magalhães, *op.cit.*, pp. 6-8.

⁸ Christer Jönsson, Martin Hall, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 2.



The loose meaning of the concept of diplomacy makes difficult any attempt to specify its logical relationship with the concept of defence diplomacy, so that the next section is devoted to an extensive critical analysis of the concept of diplomacy.

2. Diplomacy – in Search of Definitional Clarity

Depending on how the relationship between the military force as a coercive factor and diplomacy is conceived, the various definitions of diplomacy could be roughly classified in the following two categories:

- 1) definitions which exclude from diplomacy any reliance on coercive military force and
- 2) definitions which make the reliance on coercive military force an element of diplomacy.

It is generally considered that the definitions belonging to the first class present diplomacy as an exclusively peaceful activity, while the definitions included in the second class describe it as an activity both peaceful and violent. As it will be explained later, such a characterization of these definitions is not quite exact, but it could be relied on for providing a general orientation through the theoretical approaches to diplomacy. These opposing views on the nature of diplomacy represent a relevant controversy within the theory of diplomacy which, alongside the above mentioned factors, hampers definitional clarity¹¹.

In order not to create a new source of ambiguity, it should be noted that reliance on coercive military force, as will be later explained, encompasses a wide range of actions, the use of the armed force against a state being only one of them.

2.1. Diplomacy as an Activity Short of Reliance on Coercive Military Force

The idea that diplomacy is nothing but a peaceful activity (i.e. an activity which excludes reliance on coercive military force) is considered to be the dominant view among old and even

new scholars, as Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst have remarked: “The literature on diplomacy exhibits a somewhat celebratory streak when it suggests that diplomacy is about peaceful communication and dialogue” between international actors which is undertaken through their diplomats¹².

As examples of scholars holding such a view, one could mention Harold Nicolson, José Calvet De Magalhães, Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, Geoff. R. Berridge and Alan James, Geoff. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper and Thomas. G. Otte.

Harold Nicolson advanced the following definition of diplomacy: “the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of diplomatist”¹³. In a more concise definition, Nicholson designates diplomacy as simply “the art of negotiation”¹⁴. To make his view on diplomacy more explicit, one has to specify that, by international relations Nicolson means the relations among independent states¹⁵ and that by method he understands the machinery used for negotiation together with its underpinning theory¹⁶. Albeit he does not explicitly compare this definition with the five meanings he identified as being attributed to diplomacy by the British general public, one could observe that there are preserved herein the second, the third and last one.

Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne maintain that diplomacy is a completely peaceful activity consisting in an organised dialogue among political entities that is carried out by

¹¹ Christer Jönsson, “Theorising Diplomacy” in Brian. J.C. McKercher (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft*, London, New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 15-16.

¹² Corneliu Bjola, Markus Kornprobst, *Understanding International Diplomacy. Theory, Practice and Ethics*, London, New York, Routledge, 2013, p. 4.

¹³ Harold Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 15, Nicolson mentions that this definition is not his own but that it is provided by the Oxford English Dictionary.

¹⁴ Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, Leicester, Diplomatic Studies Programme, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester, 2001, p. 2.

¹⁵ Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 80.

¹⁶ Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, p. 2.



diplomatic agents mutually accredited¹⁷. Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan argue that diplomacy is a peaceful instrument of foreign policy operated by diplomatic agents who engage in various forms of communication, prominent among them being negotiations¹⁸. Also Geoff. R. Berridge and Alan James characterise diplomacy as a peaceful instrument of foreign policy managed by diplomatic agents and aiming at enabling communication among states¹⁹.

Geoff. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper and Thomas. G. Otte maintain that diplomacy is opposed to violence and represents a form of communication between states that is carried out by diplomats and which consists mainly in negotiations. They also indicate that diplomacy could be carried out even in times of war, the parties to the conflict making use of it in order to reduce violence and achieve a peace which they all find acceptable; it follows that diplomacy cannot be used in the context of war to support the war effort for achieving victory, a fact which perfectly accords with its peaceful nature²⁰.

The definition of diplomacy advanced by De Magalhães is one of the most elaborated from this class of definitions and his scientific endeavour was hailed by the reputed US diplomat George Kennan as a landmark contribution to the development of diplomatic theory²¹. Therefore, an in-depth critical analysis of his conception of diplomacy is necessary for better understanding the conceptualization of diplomacy as a purely peaceful activity.

2.2. The definition of diplomacy by José Calvet De Magalhães – a critical analysis

José Calvet De Magalhães grounds his view on diplomacy on a dual distinction, namely that between the peaceful and the violent instruments of foreign policy and that between various types of negotiations. With respect to the first distinction, De Magalhães takes foreign policy to mean all activities of a state undertaken beyond its borders and aiming at accomplishing objectives in relation with other state(s); the foreign policies of all states make up what he terms as international politics²².

De Magalhães further specifies that an instrument of foreign policy designates an institution which is used to perform the activities encompassed by foreign policy and turns the reliance on coercive military force as clear cut criteria for discriminating between peaceful and violent instruments of foreign policy, the former excluding any reliance on coercive military force while the latter being entirely based on it. In a synthetic manner, De Magalhães argues that all peaceful means are designed to convince a state, while all violent means are meant to constrain a state²³.

The peaceful instruments are described by De Magalhães as forms of peaceful contact which could bring together either two or more states through their appointed representatives or through their politicians holding a political office, or one state and the population of another state; in the former case, the contact is a dialogue, given that it takes a bilateral/multilateral form while in the latter case it has an unilateral form where the active part is being played solely by the state and therefore I suggest that one could call it a monologue²⁴.

De Magalhães uses the broadest meaning of the term negotiation²⁵ to designate any type

¹⁷ Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy. Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*, London, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 1.

¹⁸ Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, *International Relations: the Key Concepts*, London, New York, Routledge, 2002, pp.79-81.

¹⁹ Geoff. R. Berridge, Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 69-70.

²⁰ Geoff. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper and Thomas. G. Otte, "Introduction" in Geoff. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper and Thomas. G. Otte, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p.1.

²¹ José Calvet De Magalhães, *A Diplomacia Pura*, Venda Nova, Bertrand Editora, 1996, 2ª edição, pp. 10-11.

²² José Calvet De Magalhães, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*, pp. 6-7.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

²⁵ The narrow meaning of negotiation is described by De Magalhães as the whole demarche undertaken by two or more states to compose differences with the purpose of reaching an agreement between them, most commonly in writing, about a certain issue of common interest (José



of dialogue among states undertaken by their official representatives or by their politicians and identifies three types of negotiations:

- direct negotiations - involving only politicians,
- diplomacy - involving only mutually recognized representatives appointed by each state and who have no political power in this capacity (i.e. diplomatic agents),
- mediation - involving politicians or/and diplomatic agents of a given state acting as intermediaries between some other states²⁶.

To clearly differentiate the meaning he attributes to diplomacy from various other different meanings given to this term, De Magalhães designates it as *pure diplomacy*²⁷.

De Magalhães mentions that, within the framework of pure diplomacy, the concept of negotiation is to be taken mainly in its narrow sense and also that pure diplomacy aims solely at building and developing friendly relations among states and at finding peaceful solutions to disagreements that may arise between states; as examples of subjects of these negotiations, he mentions the building up of political alliances, the building up of military alliances and the establishment of commercial relations²⁸.

Consequently, De Magalhães maintains that pure diplomacy excludes rudeness, ideological confrontation and the creation and maintenance of international tensions, of international disintegration and of international rivalries given that it fosters international cooperation and unity in a respectful manner; by abandoning these specific objectives for the pursuit of converse ones, pure diplomacy degenerates into what De Magalhães calls combat diplomacy, an instrument intimately associated in his view with the Byzantine Empire, the Russian Empire and the USSR²⁹.

With respect to what has been termed monologue, De Magalhães differentiates between propaganda (which represents the action of a state to propagate ideas serving its foreign policy among the population of another state), espionage (illegal collection of information from a state by the secret agents of another state), economic intervention (the use by a state of economic means for affecting another state) and, finally, political intervention (the influence exercised by a state over another state with the help of covert political means)³⁰.

As for the violent means of foreign policy, presented as types of violent contact between states, De Magalhães discriminates between the following five ways in which a state could rely on its coercive military power in connection with another state(s):

- deterrence (the capacity of a state to turn the mere presence of its acquired military capabilities into a mean for preventing another state from acting against its own interests),
- threat (explicit menacing a state with the use of military force),
- economic war (applying economic sanctions backed by use of military force in case of noncompliance),
- military pressure (actions such as general mobilization, military manoeuvres, and grouping military forces in border areas for the purpose of bearing upon the actions of another state) and
- war (military attack of one state against another state)³¹.

It is to be remarked that economic war and military pressure are, in fact, implicit threats with the use of military force. In the case of economic war, the implicitly threatened states are those targeted by economic sanctions and those willing to provide to them economic support while, in the case of military pressure, the implicitly threatened states are those the state undertaking them has a serious dispute with (e.g. the neighbour state close to which borders various military manoeuvres are organised against the background of a serious dispute between the two states).

Calvet De Magalhães, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*, pp. 2, 51).

²⁶ José Calvet De Magalhães, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*, p. 11.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 84-86.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 11-12.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 12.



De Magalhães accepts that pure diplomacy could make recourse to various forms of threats in the framework of negotiations but argues that none of them encompasses that of the use of military force³². A second characteristic of these non-military threats results from De Magalhães' conception of diplomacy: they should not prevent the development of friendship relations among states and impair the international cooperation and unity.

The clear separation established between peaceful and violent means of foreign policy prompts De Magalhães to denounce the meaningful existence of a coercive diplomacy conceived as incorporating the threat of use of military force as a factor designed to apply pressure on a state during a process of negotiation³³. As already mentioned, for De Magalhães, negotiations are an absolutely peaceful instrument and, therefore, they cease to exist as soon as any reference to violence against the other party(s) is brought in as an argument for achieving a certain outcome; consequently, he argues that coercive diplomacy is, in fact, a violent instrument of foreign policy, namely threat.

As already mentioned, De Magalhães includes in the scope of pure diplomacy the negotiations for the establishment of military alliances. The implicit underpinning argument is that a military alliance brings together friendly states and consolidates their good relations. Even if these negotiations, which herein should be understood in the narrow sense of the term, deal with the use of military force against certain other states, they do not presuppose the reliance on military force to determine a state to become part of the alliance since, in such a case, pure diplomacy would be turned into coercive diplomacy. It is thus assumed that all negotiating parties willingly participate in these negotiations, that the solution which is finally reached is mutually agreed and beneficial, and that there is no room for rudeness there.

It follows that the negotiations for the setting up of a military alliance meet De Magalhães'

criteria for pure diplomacy but only if they are considered solely from the viewpoint that the parties involved have on their mutual relationship. But considered from the viewpoint that these parties have on their relationship with the states the alliance is build up against or with potential rival states, as well as from the viewpoint of these two types of states, the negotiations leading up to the military alliance are a violent instrument of foreign policy because they enhance the coercive military power of the allied states and thus they uphold international rivalries and tensions and promote unfriendly relations.

After the alliance is established, the diplomatic agents representing the participating states continue to negotiate for enabling the alliance to function properly and under the scope of these negotiations are included issues from the area of military assistance and military cooperation which are designed to increase their military power. For the same reasons as in the case of the negotiations for setting up a military alliance, the negotiations for maintaining the alliance fulfil the criteria for pure diplomacy, if considered from the perspective the allied states have on how they relate with each other, and simultaneously they also fulfil the criteria for the violent instruments of foreign policy, if considered from the viewpoint of their potential or actual rival states and also from the viewpoint on these states held by the members of the alliance.

In sum, the negotiations for establishing and maintaining a military alliance are conceived as both a peaceful instrument (pure diplomacy) and a violent instrument of their foreign policy by the negotiating parties, depending on which states these negotiations are considered to refer to, while the same negotiations are perceived by the states directly or indirectly targeted by the alliance as being exclusively a violent instrument of the foreign policy of the states involved in negotiations. Of course, this dual reading is possible under the assumption that the theoretical framework developed by De Magalhães is shared by all states affected by negotiations and informs how they perceive them.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 4.

³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 3-4.



The negotiations for establishing a military alliance and those conducted within such an alliance could be carried out both in times of peace or against the background of an ongoing war in which all or just some of the negotiating parties are involved in. In each of these situations, the negotiations are perceived as pure diplomacy by those ones taking part in them and as a violent instrument by various other third parties.

Following De Magalhães' logic, negotiations conducted in times of peace, when conceived as a violent instrument of foreign policy, could be classified either as deterrence, or as threat. By negotiating in view of establishing a military alliance, the states involved attempt to increase the military potential they may rely on if needed and thus they are engaged in an effort towards achieving a deterrence effect on the states the alliance does not explicitly aim at. For those states the alliance explicitly refers to, negotiations are designed to enable the negotiating parties to use their armed forces against them in case they act in a certain manner and thus these negotiations are interpreted as a threat.

In particular circumstances, negotiations could refer to the role of the alliance in enforcing economic sanctions against a certain state or to activities designed to increase the combat readiness of the alliance in the context of a serious international dispute; in both cases, the targeted states read these negotiations as an implicit threat with the use of force, namely economic war, respectively military pressure.

When the already formed alliance is engaged in war, then the violent signification of the negotiations conducted within its framework are perceived by enemy states as part of the war effort and therefore they could read it as belonging to the violent instrument of war.

Given that, depending on the perspective they are interpreted from, negotiations for establishing a military alliance have a dual nature (peaceful instrument and violent instrument) it clearly follows that they cannot be truly pure diplomacy but a different type of instrument which does not figure in the classification operated by De Magalhães. A third category of instruments of

foreign policy has therefore to be introduced in between the already existing ones and I consider that it could be adequately called the dual instruments of foreign policy. It is to be mentioned that the diplomatic agents conducting all these negotiations could be civilians, but they could also be military personnel.

The fact that for De Magalhães, the negotiations in view of establishing a military alliance are entirely included in the category of pure diplomacy proves that, for classifying the instruments of foreign policy, he does not take into account the perspective of those states that these instruments are employed in relation with but only the perspective of states making use of these instruments. The mentioned negotiations also highlight that his one-sided account of the instruments of foreign policy is even narrower in case of defence diplomacy when it is taken into account only how negotiating states perceive this instrument when they employ it in their mutual relations. The mentioned negotiations also highlight that his one-sided account of the instruments of foreign policy is even narrower because he takes into account only how negotiating states perceive this instrument when they employ it in their mutual relations and leaves aside how they perceive it when they consider it as being employed in relation with the states it is directed against.

At this point, one has to recall that the above mentioned perspective on diplomacy put forward by Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte implies that in times of war, diplomacy cannot be used as an instrument for achieving military victory, which means that it is consistent with their understanding of diplomacy to maintain that the negotiations carried out during war in connection with a military alliance are not to be considered an instance of diplomacy but of a violent instrument of foreign policy. But if De Magalhães conceives such negotiations as pure diplomacy and fails to acknowledge their violent dimension, Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte read them as a violent instrument and fail to observe their peaceful features so that both perspectives are incomplete and obscure the dual nature of



these negotiations.

The negotiations for establishing and maintaining a military alliance and the pure diplomacy cannot be simultaneously employed in relation with the state(s) the alliance directly or indirectly aims at and the incompatibility between these two instruments follows from their distinct characteristics. The development of friendly relations with a certain state that is achieved through pure diplomacy is undermined when unfriendly relations with the same state are promoted as a result of violent instruments being employed. For this destructive effect not to take place, it is to be assumed that the two types of instruments are perfectly separated, but such an understanding of their relationship is untenable, because it entails that the state is not a unitary international actor and, consequently, that it deliberately weakens the effectiveness of its foreign policy by acting in a contradictory manner.

2.3. Diplomacy as an activity encompassing reliance on coercive military force

A contemporary of Harold Nicholson, the British diplomat Ernest Satow, developed a perspective on diplomacy, defined as an art of persuasion exercised through negotiations, which made room for the reliance on coercive military force. Satow argues that there is an essential difference between the diplomacy which brings together civilised states and the diplomacy which connects civilised states with non-civilised ones³⁴. In the former case, it is about the diplomacy of the Great Powers which use their diplomats to settle disagreements between them by negotiations conducted in a civilised manner, that is by striving to persuade one another with the help of oratorical art alone. As for the latter case, diplomacy means negotiations that, when necessary, go beyond oratorical art to include the threat of use of force by diplomats of the Great Powers in order to advance the interests of the state they represent; Satow maintains that in

negotiations with states like China and Japan, the Great Powers cannot progress unless they prove ready to use military force in support of their contention.

Underpinning Satow's account of diplomacy is the idea that the actual use of military force (i.e. war) is what differentiates the peaceful from the violent means of foreign policy. It is to be remarked that diplomacy bringing together the Great Powers corresponds to what De Magalhães calls pure diplomacy, while diplomacy practiced by the Great Powers in relation with the so called non-civilised states could take the form of what is called "coercive diplomacy".

Coercive diplomacy was also analysed by Alexander L. George, who is considered one of its most important theorists. According to him, when a party to a negotiation resorts to coercive diplomacy, it employs means short of coercive military force (positive stimuli for complying with a demand) but, when it deems useful, it equally employs coercive military force (threat with the large-scale use of military force (war) or limited use of military force to demonstrate the seriousness of threat) in order to determine a state to stop or undo an action that violates the right of another state in a way which endangers international peace or which already amounts to aggression against that state³⁵.

For George, coercive diplomacy, despite encompassing coercive military means, is a peaceful instrument of foreign policy which therefore represents a form of persuasion which he calls, without creating an oxymoron, coercive persuasion³⁶. It follows that, for George, the only violent instrument in foreign policy is war and that any military mean short of it, albeit designed to intimidate, is a peaceful one.

How George, as well as Satow, conceive diplomacy proves, in turn, the inadequacy of excluding from the class of peaceful activities those definitions of diplomacy which describe it as incorporating reliance on coercive military force.

³⁴ Thomas. G. Otte, "Satow" in Geoff. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper and Thomas. G. Otte, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, pp.141-143.

³⁵ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, pp. 4-6.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 4.



Within Satow's perspective on diplomacy, when conducted in peacetime, the negotiations for establishing and keeping functional a military alliance are not a dual instrument of foreign policy, because both the negotiating states and states directly or indirectly targeted by the alliance, be them civilised or non-civilised, read them as a peaceful instrument. This is true, albeit the targeted states perceive these negotiations as deterrence or threat because these ones fall within the sphere of diplomacy and not in that of violent instruments of foreign policy. For the same reasons, the mentioned negotiations have the status of a peaceful instrument also within the conception of diplomacy developed by Alexander George.

With respect to negotiations on a military alliance conducted during war, it could be argued, consistent with Satow's and George's understanding of diplomacy, that they are differently read by the negotiating parties and those states targeted by the alliance. Thus, for the latter states and for how the negotiating states relate to the targeted states, these negotiations are part of the war effort and, therefore, represent a violent instrument of foreign policy. But, for the mutual relations between the negotiating parties, these negotiations are part of their diplomacy and consequently represent a peaceful instrument of their foreign policy. The mentioned negotiations fall in between war and diplomacy and cannot be captured by the classification of instruments of foreign policy corresponding to the theoretical perspectives advanced by Satow and George; the need for a class of dual instruments of foreign policy encompassing these negotiations becomes thus apparent. It is to be mentioned that, as in the case of the conception of diplomacy developed by De Magalhães, it is here assumed that all states affected by these negotiations share the conception of diplomacy advanced by Satow or George which informs the way they read these negotiations.

The clear distinction between diplomacy and war as operated by Satow and George is called into question by other scholars such as Raymond Cohen, Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst, who turn diplomacy into a both peaceful and

violent instrument of foreign policy; they all use the negotiations on and within a military alliance conducted during war as an argument in support of this reading of diplomacy.

According to Raymond Cohen, the idea that diplomacy is but a peaceful instrument is only a peculiar feature of Western culture which stands in contrast with a practice that goes far back in time up to the Ancient world when the Greek, Indian or Mesopotamian diplomats were fully involved in supporting the war effort of their states by fostering military alliances and striving to consolidate them³⁷. The persistence of this function attributed to diplomacy is proved for Cohen by the similar role played by the British diplomats within the UK-USA cooperation against the Axis Powers during the Second World War. Based on such examples, Cohen concludes that, in times of war, diplomacy is an "appendage to war, not an instrument of peace"³⁸.

Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst also highlight the connections between diplomacy and war which take the form of the negotiations conducted by diplomats in view of establishing military coalitions for waging war.³⁹

Bjola and Kornprobst, as well as Cohen interpret these negotiations as a violent activity belonging to war because they take into account the viewpoint of states targeted by the alliance and the way the allied states intend to use the alliance in relation with those other states. But their broad view on diplomacy enable them to equally integrate in it how the allied states perceive these negotiations in their mutual relationship and thus to read them also as a peaceful activity. The dual nature of negotiations on military alliances could be completely accounted for by this understanding of diplomacy which takes over the functions of the dual instrument of foreign policy whose existence as a distinct class of instruments of foreign policy is no more justified under this reading of diplomacy.

The findings on the connections between

³⁷ Raymond Cohen, "Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD" in Jan Melissen (ed.) *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 1999, p. 4.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

³⁹ Corneliu Bjola, Markus Kornprobst, *op.cit.*, p. 4.



diplomacy and the negotiations for setting up and maintaining a military alliance could be summarised as follows:

a) when diplomacy is conceived as a peaceful activity which excludes any reliance on coercive military force, these negotiations are not diplomacy, but a distinct instrument of foreign policy, namely a dual instrument, which lies in between the peaceful and the violent instruments of foreign policy;

b) when diplomacy is conceived as a peaceful activity which includes the reliance on coercive military force short of war, the negotiations under scrutiny are diplomacy as long as they are conducted in times of peace, but when conducted in times of war they are no more diplomacy but a dual instrument of foreign policy;

c) when diplomacy is defined as an activity both peaceful and violent, the mentioned negotiations are diplomacy, irrespective of being conducted in times of peace or during war.

By exploring, in the next section, the relationship between negotiations conducted in connection with a military alliance and defence diplomacy, the way defence diplomacy and diplomacy are linked will become apparent.

3. Defence diplomacy

Andrew Cottery and Anthony Forester discriminate between two different but related functions that the armed forces and the defence ministries of a state could have in the field of foreign policy⁴⁰. The first function, which enables them to carry out actions such as deterrence and war, is to be prepared to use force against enemy states and to effectively use force against them. The second function consists in military cooperation with and/or military assistance provided in times of peace for non-enemy states within the framework of alliances, partnerships or other types of bilateral or multilateral military agreements; with respect to military assistance, it is considered to encompass activities such as

⁴⁰ Andrew Cottery, Anthony Forester, *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*, London, New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 5-12.

the provision of military and related equipment, and the provision of training for both military personnel and civilian personnel working in the field of defence.

According to Cottery and Forester, a state practices defence diplomacy when it uses its armed forces to perform the second function and, by doing that, it could follow the logic of realpolitik and simply aim at increasing its power or it could pursue other objectives which do not have a confrontational nature and which thus go beyond realpolitik. When defence diplomacy is employed solely in view of increasing power, Cottery and Forester designate it as old defence diplomacy and, when objectives falling outside realpolitik are pursued through defence diplomacy, they call it new defence diplomacy⁴¹.

The origins of the practice of old defence diplomacy have not precise historical boundaries. Cottery and Forester argue that it emerged prior to the 19th century within European state system⁴² while Donald Stoker maintains that these practices appeared in Europe after 1815 and cite the pioneer French military mission to Egypt established in 1824⁴³. As for the practice of new defence diplomacy, the chronological aspects are considered by Cottery and Forester to be definite, the end of the Cold War marking its beginning⁴⁴.

Cottery and Forester indicate that through old defence diplomacy states attempt to increase their power by pursuing the following objectives: counterbalance and deterrence

⁴¹ One could remark that only the activity of the state providing military assistance is considered to represent a form of defence diplomacy so that the activity of the state receiving that assistance is not regarded as belonging to defence diplomacy; this means that defence diplomacy is associated exclusively with the state which has more military expertise. Based on this logic, it is possible to argue that, in the case of military cooperation, all states involved practice defence diplomacy given that this type of military relationship is supposed to bring together states whose military potential is better balanced.

⁴² *Ibidem*, pp. 6-7.

⁴³ Donald Stoker, "The History and Evolution of Foreign Military Advising and Assistance" in Donald Stoker (ed.) *Military Advising and Assistance. From Mercenaries to Privatization 1815-2007*, London, New York, Routledge, 2008, pp. 2-4, 16.

⁴⁴ Andrew Cottery, Anthony Forester, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.



directed against their enemies, preservation of spheres of influence, backing friendly regimes confronted with internal opposition, promotion of their commercial interests abroad and enabling military alliances to properly function⁴⁵. As examples of old defence diplomacy they mention the military cooperation and assistance in the framework of alliances established between various European states in the modern era, in the framework of alliances formed during the Cold War (e.g. Warsaw Pact, NATO, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between U.S. and Japan), and within the type of agreements which today bring together the U.S. and states where democracy and human rights are disregarded (e.g. Saudi Arabia and states from Central Asia)⁴⁶.

With respect to new defence diplomacy, Cottery and Forester indicate three objectives that states engaged in this type of diplomacy could follow: establishment of a cooperative engagement with former or potential enemies (strategic engagement), support for the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces in states which lack experience in that field and development of capabilities for conducting peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in states where they are absent or inchoate⁴⁷. Of various examples they provide, one could retain the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme developed by NATO and the following initiatives of the United States: the development of military cooperation with China and the Russian Federation, the establishment of the Expanded International Military Education and Training Programme and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative⁴⁸.

Cottery and Forester point out that each state practices old defence diplomacy so that in the foreign policy of those states that equally practice the new defence diplomacy, both dimensions of defence diplomacy coexist and, as a result of their fundamentally different nature, they potentially and actually conflict with each other⁴⁹. Thus,

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 8, 14.

they indicate that the United States enhances its power, including in relation with China, through the military cooperation with Japan within the framework of an alliance, but that simultaneously the United States is involved in a cooperative engagement with China, which obliges it to limit the enhancement of its power and which results in a decrease of its ability to protect Japan against a potential attack on the part of China. Cottery and Forester argue that, following the terrorist attacks from 9/11, there is a tendency among Western states, most visible in the case of the United States and of the United Kingdom, to abandon the new defence diplomacy and return to the old one⁵⁰.

At this point, the interplay between defence diplomacy and diplomacy could be finally subjected to an examination that the final section of this paper is devoted to.

4. Diplomacy and defence diplomacy

Defence diplomacy could take place within the framework of military alliances or broader alliances incorporating military aspects, as well as within the framework of other agreements that are strictly military or which encompass military elements. The existence and functioning of all these institutionalised relationships are made possible through negotiations conducted by diplomatic agents, be them civilians or military, so that what essentially defines defence diplomacy are the negotiations on this issues. These negotiations give rise to *old* defence diplomacy when they bear on military assistance and cooperation which serve realpolitik objectives and to *new* defence diplomacy when they refer to military assistance and cooperation which do not follow the logic of realpolitik.

Given that defence diplomacy refers only to peacetime military cooperation and assistance, negotiations conducted on these issues take place exclusively in times of peace; when conducted during war, these negotiations fall outside the scope of defence diplomacy.

The connections between defence diplomacy and diplomacy are to be established based on an

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 8.



analysis of the relationship between different meanings given to diplomacy and the reading by participating and by third states of the negotiations on military cooperation and assistance conducted for establishing and maintaining the types of international agreements mentioned above.

When conducted in the framework of old defence diplomacy, the relationship between diplomacy and the negotiations on military cooperation and assistance follow the logic of the already considered relationship between diplomacy and the negotiations for establishing and maintaining a military alliance.

Consequently, old defence diplomacy is not diplomacy when diplomacy is defined as a peaceful instrument of foreign policy which excludes any reliance on coercive military force, because in this case, negotiations are a dual instrument of foreign policy, as a result of them being read as pure diplomacy by participating states in their mutual relations and as deterrence or threat by targeted third states and also by participating states in relation to targeted states.

Old defence diplomacy is diplomacy when diplomacy is defined as a peaceful instrument of foreign policy which includes reliance on coercive military force given that in a situation like this the negotiations are no more a dual instrument of foreign policy because both the participating states and the targeted third states read them as a peaceful activity. Regarded from the viewpoint of the mutual relations among participating states, negotiations are an activity short of reliance on coercive military force, while regarded from the perspective of targeted third states and from the perspective the participating states have on these third states, negotiations are an activity which relies on coercive military force (deterrence or threat) but all these multiple points of view are facets of diplomacy.

As for the new defence diplomacy, it is diplomacy irrespective of how diplomacy is defined, because all states that these negotiations bear upon take part in them and, as participating states, they all read them as an activity which relies on non-coercive military force that is covered by both ways of defining diplomacy.

Defence diplomacy as a whole is diplomacy when considered from the point of view of diplomacy defined as a peaceful activity encompassing coercive military force and, equally, is not diplomacy when considered from the perspective of diplomacy defined as a peaceful activity short of coercive military force. The fact that the new defence diplomacy is increasingly replaced by the old defence diplomacy has important consequences on the relationship between defence diplomacy as a whole and diplomacy within the framework of the latter definition of diplomacy.

Within the framework of the latter definition of diplomacy, the fact that old defence diplomacy increasingly replaces new defence diplomacy makes defence diplomacy as a whole be less and less diplomacy. However, at close examination, this understanding of diplomacy allows for old and new defence diplomacy to coexist only as long as they are not simultaneously practiced with respect to the same states because, as previously argued, a state cannot simultaneously and with respect to the same state employ in its foreign policy the peaceful instrument of pure diplomacy and any violent instrument. Taken into account that, especially in case of strategic engagement, both dimensions of defence diplomacy target the same states at the same time, it follows that, under the reading of diplomacy as excluding any reliance on coercive military force, defence diplomacy is almost not at all diplomacy, but what has been defined as a dual instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, given that in the Western culture diplomacy was traditionally conceptualized as excluding reliance on coercive military force, and also given that this reading of it is still the most widespread one among Western scholars, it follows that both traditionally and generally defence diplomacy is not diplomacy within this cultural space.

All these connections established between defence diplomacy and the two theoretical perspectives on diplomacy assume, on one hand, that these perspectives are not just an academic undertaking, but are shared by representatives of all states and, on the other



hand, that all these representatives hold only one of these perspectives. Both assumptions could be questioned, but a defence of them goes beyond the purpose of this paper.

Conclusions

The argument developed in this paper explored the highly important but neglected consequences that the negotiations on establishing and maintaining military alliances have on the definition of diplomacy, on the typology of instruments of foreign policy, and on the relationship between diplomacy and defence diplomacy. Instead of the usually narrow reading of these negotiations, which takes into account how they are perceived by the negotiating parties in their mutual relations or in their relations with targeted states, but fail to consider how these latter states perceive the negotiations, this argument advances a broad reading of the mentioned negotiations which not only includes all three perspectives on them, but examines these perspectives together.

For the case when reliance on coercive military force marks the dividing line between peaceful and violent instruments of foreign policy, this approach provided solid grounds for, on one hand, rejecting the view that the negotiations for setting up and keeping functional a military alliance belong to the peaceful instrument of diplomacy and, on the other hand, for arguing that these negotiations are neither a violent instrument of foreign policy, but represent a distinct and overlooked class of such instruments for which the name of *dual instrument* was suggested. Equally, based on the broad reading of the negotiations on a military alliance, it was proved that these negotiations could be understood as falling under the scope of diplomacy, when reliance on coercive military force is made part of peaceful instruments of foreign policy, and it was argued against the view that these negotiations have only a violent dimension when diplomacy and war are no more kept apart. The potential of the established connections between diplomacy and the negotiations on military alliances is

exploited to refute the apparently unproblematic relationship between defence diplomacy and diplomacy with the result that defence diplomacy is proved to be, for the most part, a dual instrument of foreign policy and by no means diplomacy, when diplomacy is conceived as excluding any reliance on coercive military force, and also with the result that defence diplomacy is proved to be diplomacy if this concept is defined as encompassing reliance on such force.

The fact that the new defence diplomacy is gradually replaced with the old defence diplomacy together with the fact that in the Western world diplomacy is traditionally conceived as excluding reliance on coercive military force are both used to ground the idea that defence diplomacy is traditionally not diplomacy in this cultural space and that herein it is presently less and less diplomacy.

The final conclusion is that defence diplomacy is not always diplomacy, so that when it comes to the concept of defence diplomacy, the language should not be uncritically trusted and the idea that *defence diplomacy* is like a *butterfly* should be taken more seriously.

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THE CONCEPT OF “BIOSPHERE SECURITY”. TOWARDS A GLOBAL DIPLOMACY OF BIOSPHERE SECURITY

*Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU, PhD**

Due to the constant developments in the international law, especially marked by the adoption of a revolutionary pattern (sustainable development in the organisation and general functioning of human habitats), we notice new possibilities of exploring concepts as the “biosphere security”.

This concept presents common links with other concepts as “human security” and “environmental security” but, in the same time, it maintains the inner originality.

We propose a new approach to the so-called “solidarity rights” (as the right to peace, the right to a clean, healthy and protected environment, the right to development), in our efforts to reveal the essence of the “biosphere security” concept.

Also, the paper makes an approach about the general features of a global diplomacy devoted to the need of improving the protection of the biosphere beyond the present legal provisions.

Keywords: *biosphere security, human security, environmental security, global diplomacy of biosphere security.*

1. The Concept of “Biosphere Security” (between Human Security and Environmental Security)

Numerous documents and reports issued in particular under the aegis of the UN establish a direct connection between poverty in underdeveloped or poorly developed countries and the level of environmental degradation (sometimes with irremediably destructive effects). The connection between the chronic issues of the global human society and the environmental quality, at the beginning of the 21st century, is reflected by the fact that the UN member states assumed certain objectives as a “priority” (with objectives such as countering poverty and, in particular, extreme poverty being ‘the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development’, which requires a decisive partnership from all the countries and private actors’) in key documents at the beginning of the 21st century, such as Agenda

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2030¹. As noted by the doctrine², the populations of underdeveloped countries or of developing countries receive polluting technologies from the advanced countries, which often choose green technologies and adopt an environment-friendly lifestyle.

The Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-2015 Agenda of sustainable development, entitled *The Road to Dignity*³, outlines the 6-pillar architecture, resumed later in the *Agenda 2030* document (dignity, the people, prosperity, the planet, justice and partnership). Regarding the “planet” pillar, the Report states the responsibility to ‘to protect our ecosystems for all societies and our children’. Emphasis is placed on shared responsibility regarding the development (the Report determines a direct connection between the right to development and ‘the removal of major sources of non-freedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance and overactivity of repressive states⁴’). In addition, the Report notes the need to invest in integrated institutions, human resources capable of implementing the sustainable development strategies.

The Preamble of the 2030 Agenda, another major international document, issued under the Aegis of the United Nations, the second pillar (“the planet”), following the first pillar (“the people”) – stating the objective to eradicate poverty and hunger, in all its forms and dimensions and mentioning ‘the human right to fulfil the entire potential with dignity and equality and in a healthy

environment’ – specifies the objective to protect the planet from degradation, with changes in the production and consumption patterns (moving on to sustainable production and consumption, to a sustainable type of management of natural resources, taking urgent measures concerning the climate changes, for the planet to be capable of supporting the needs of present and future generations).

The present paper proposes the phrase “biosphere security” as a legal term, with applications in the security studies and in international relations. Of course, related phrases such as “*environmental security*”, “*security of terrestrial ecosystems*” and “*security of a certain natural habitat*”, under the destructive intervention (intentional or unintentional) of the state and non-state actors, are also applicable.

The term “*biosphere*” refers to “the totality of ecosystems, at planetary level”, provided that the ecosystems are “larger or smaller parts of the living nature, plants and animals – biocenosis, the biotic community – forming an integrated entirety, a functional unit”⁵.

In addition, we note the current doctrine is open to understand the environmental law as “*an interactive law*, which tends to connect to all the fields of law, in order to introduce the idea of environment”⁶. According to the doctrine, the term “environment” is quite broad, actually including “all the aspects of human activity, in the human being-nature relationship, on the same planet – Earth – with new aspects constantly emerging”. Thus, the doctrine highlights the connection between progress and poverty, both directly involving the environment, with a close interdependence among the global environment and pollution, water and air degradation, thinning of the ozone layer, desertification, toxic waste and radioactive products and others⁷. According to the doctrine, the term “environment” is broad, actually

¹ General Assembly, UN, Resolution adopted on 25 September 2015, distrib. 21 October 2015, A/RES/70/1, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, accessed on September 28th 2015.

² Daniela Marinescu, *Tratat de dreptul mediului*, 4th edition, revised and amended, Universul Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 9-17.

³ United Nations General Assembly, A/69/700, distr. 4 December 2014, Synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, *The road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet*.

⁴ Idem.

⁵ Idem, pp. 44-45.

⁶ Daniela Marinescu, quoted title, p. 49.

⁷ Ion Avram, Dragoş Şerbănescu, “Mediul înconjurător al Terrei, încotro?”, in the *Romanian Journal of History and International Studies*, January-February 1989, issue no. 1/1989, p. 30, quoted in Daniela Marinescu, quoted title, p. 47.



including “all the aspects of human activity, in the human being-nature relationship, on the same planet – Earth – with new aspects constantly emerging”. Thus, the doctrine highlights the connection between progress and poverty, both directly involving the environment, with a close interdependence among the global environment and pollution, water and air degradation, thinning of the ozone layer, desertification, toxic waste and radioactive products and others⁸.

The 1972 Stockholm Conference defines “the fundamental right of the human being to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being”, which entails the obligation of the states to “defend and improve the environment for the present and future generations”⁹.

Thus, the phrase “*biosphere security*” is the reflection of a legal and organic connection between the *determined human communities and planet Earth* (defined as “biosphere”, as a “living organism, formed of the totality of terrestrial ecosystems”, in a permanent natural, fragile, unique balance). At the same time, it is a phrase denoting the organic connection (also expressed in legal terms of rights and obligations, responsibilities of the humanity, among the state and non-state actors that interfere with the environment) between the humanity, the human civilization overall and planet Earth. The quality of life and the very life of the human species depend directly and vitally on the quality of this planet, acknowledged in the UN documents (such as the 2030 Agenda) as the “home of humanity”, “our home”¹⁰.

Biosphere security is therefore interconnected to human security, to security of states,

⁸ Ion Avram, Dragoș Șerbănescu, “Mediul înconjurător al Terrei, încotro?”, in the *Romanian Journal of History and International Studies*, January-February 1989, issue no. 1/1989, p. 30, quoted in Daniela Marinescu, quoted in, p. 47.

⁹ Daniela Marinescu, quoted title, p. 49.

¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *World Charter of Nature*, A/RES/37/7, shared on October 28th 1982, www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37, accessed on September 7th 2016.

environment security (of various elements forming the biosphere).

The 21st century, an age of transition from the knowledge-based industrial civilization, it is recommendable (as emphasized by the UN in their documents) that the human civilization, that each community in turn focus on observing and the correct implementation of a new relationship, a relationship of *harmony between the human being and nature*, *harmony between the human societies* (state and non-state actors performing concrete activities at these companies) and nature, following the paradigm of a *sustainable* development, in which the social, economic and environmental aspects are the three essential pillars.

In our opinion, the “biosphere security” phrase entails *the highest level of accountability for state and non-state actors* (given the technical, scientific momentum, particularly in the field of military applications and the very view of the war, in the 21st century), awareness of the risks (irreparable destructions, in certain cases such as the case of mass destruction attacks, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological attack) caused by the decisions, strategies, measures or conflicts and wars¹¹ involving states, non-state actors of all kinds (combatant cells, paramilitary groups controlling a certain territory, transnational corporations) *to the environment*.

We consider that there is *an implicit legal connection* between the concept of “biosphere security” and the solidarity rights (as human rights in an individual sense, as well as collective rights), such as the human right to a peaceful, safe international environment, the right to development, the right to peace, the right to a clean, healthy, protected and renewed environment. Unless the states and non-state actors observe such rights (considered to be part of the third generation of human rights) a correct understanding of the “biosphere security” phrase cannot be conceived.

¹¹ Emil Străinu, *Războiul geofizic. Tehnici de modificare a mediului înconjurător în scopuri militare*, Bucharest, Editura Solaris Print, 2009, pp. 15-31, 56-57.



2. The Right to a Clean, Sustainable Biosphere, Rich in Resources, Safe, Renewed, Peaceful (not Affected by Conflicts and Wars)

We propose a new human right in the present work, *a substantially improved* “right to a clean, healthy environment”.

Secondly, *with the legal customization of nature and planet Earth*¹² in the 21st century (by declaring them subjects of law, in the global environmental law – a group of global regulations, including penalizations, far better developed than the current international environmental law), we can *also discuss the rights of the nature or the rights of the biosphere (the rights of planet Earth)*, not only rights of the human being and of the peoples, in relation to nature, to the biosphere.

The great change in vision of the 21st century human civilization, in relation to nature, also entails *an ethical leap, as well as a holistic perception*¹³ (nature – a living body, with ecosystems in a permanent and fragile balance and interdependence, in which the human being is an element, a component, as the existence of the human being depends on the planet, the biosphere, the balance among the ecosystems of the biosphere).

This change in vision entails the definition of the “human right to a clean, healthy, renewable safe biosphere (planet), rich in resources” (the traditionalist “only the human being has rights, nature is an object” legal relationship), as well as the new legal relationship (“the human being is part of nature and nature is a subject of law as much as the human being”, in order to protect itself against the destructive, irresponsible intervention of the human civilization), in the future environmental law. This new legal relationship gives rise to *the right of nature and*

¹² Mircea Duțu, Andrei Duțu, *Dreptul de proprietate și exigențele protecției mediului*, Universul Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 33.

¹³ General Assembly, UN, Resolution adopted on September 25th 2015, shared on October 21st 2015, A/RES/70/1, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, accessed on September 28th 2015.

the biosphere (planet Earth) to be protected against the destructive intervention of the human civilization (including the state and non-state actors, not only the human being as an individual or organic community), their right to be clean, healthy, safe, renewed, rich in resources, not affected by conflicts and wars.

It is *an authentic evolution of the 21st century global environmental law*, which overcomes the obsolete, corrupted, patrimonial conception, according to which the human being is the absolute master of nature, with no responsibilities regarding his/her own behaviour, which results in abusive and destructive use of the nature and planet, as the human being selfishly affects the terrestrial ecosystems, endangering the fragile balance among these ecosystems¹⁴.

The paradigm of sustainable development *sets a threshold, a limit* to the development of the peoples and states, *which must not be regarded as an absolute right, isolated from other rights* (from the right to a peaceful, safe international environment; from the right to a healthy, sustainable environment, rich in resources).

3. Towards a Biosphere-securing Global Diplomacy

In our opinion, the 21st century may see the shaping of a “*green diplomacy*”, given the legal customization trend of nature, of planet Earth (in the sense of being receiving the legal quality of subjects of the global environmental law). Such green diplomacy can be construed from several viewpoints, which we consider interdependent:

- “*Green diplomacy*” *developed officially by the states* (in the sense of *consolidating* the current lines of external politics, focused on complying with the provisions of the 2030 Agenda, in the sense of the UN states observing certain specific legal engagement regarding the concrete implementation of sustainable development, both at national level and in international cooperation)

- “*Green diplomacy*” *developed by non-state actors* (through an extension of the very

¹⁴ Mircea Duțu, Andrei Duțu, quoted title, pp. 11-12.



concept of “diplomacy” which, in a century of globalization, is no longer a monopoly of the states; instead, it becomes more flexible, in the sense of being exercised *de facto* by non-state actors as well, by corporations in particular and more, in the sense of *their involvement in the public-private partnership and in the implementation of the global solidarity principle, defined in the 2030 Agenda*). The participation of the non-state actors in implementing the global-level paradigm of sustainable development, which goes beyond the responsibility of the states, becomes a global requirement in this sense.

- “Green diplomacy” developed directly at global level, by specific global institutions, specifically created to protect the rights of nature, of planet Earth, which become subjects of environmental global law and whose interests are protected directly. Such protection is ensured the states and the non-state actors, through *high representatives for the protection of nature and the rights of the biosphere (or the rights of planet Earth)*, focusing on the development right of the peoples, on armed conflicts and natural calamities, major disasters which may have long-term or irremediable effects on the quality of life and of the biosphere. It is necessary that, besides the creation of a *Global Protection Council for the Rights of Planet Earth (or the Rights of the Biosphere) and the Rights of Nature*, a World Charter for the Rights of the Biosphere and Nature, as well as a Global Convention for the Protection, Improvement and Restoring of the Biosphere through Sustainable Development be signed and ratified by the states and signed by a Global Council of the non-state representatives. For the first time, *the convention should involve both state actors and non-state actors* (following the principle of concrete implementation of the global public-private partnership and the principle of global solidarity, defined in the 2030 Agenda).

- 21st century global development of a global specific “green diplomacy”, distinct from the diplomacy of the states and of the non-state actors (integration organizations, even at supranational level), crystalized in the form of

a *Global House of Green Diplomacy*, where the members (global diplomats) are independent from the states and from the non-state actors, representing the rights of nature and the biosphere (planet Earth), in relation to the states (with special certification and representation). These “green diplomats” are also attached to *the large global non-state actors, including them in the efforts to correctly implement sustainable development at global level, through the common, responsible, aware action of the states and non-state actors.*

- Given the fundamental importance of protecting nature and the planet, in the process of ensuring the quality of life, in the survival of the human civilization on this planet and the planet itself, the global environmental law can be based on strong penalization attributes assigned to the Global Protection Council for the Rights of the Biosphere and the Rights of Nature, since the momentum of engineering and science at global level, as well as a corrupted perception of *the right to development as an “unlimited isolated right, which does not depend on other rights”* (the right to a peaceful and safe international and national environment, the right to a healthy, clean, renewed environment) require such attributions.

Thus, the 21st century requires the development of a “green diplomacy” at global level, *focused on the paradigm of sustainable development, which identifies the common ground and global lines to ensure sustainability in the international relations, to include non-state actors in the green aspect of the international politics, amplify and consolidate the public-private partnership at global level, in the spirit of the principle of global solidarity, defined in the 2030 Agenda.*

The need to improve the biosphere protection beyond the current legal provisions (included in the international environmental law) *will underlie the development of global green diplomacy and the setup of a Global House of Green Diplomacy, with attributions and diplomats with highly consolidated competences in relation to the states and the non-state actors* (transnational corporations, paramilitary and combatant groups, commercial integration organizations etc.), in order to *permanently ensure a concrete balance*



among the right to development, the right to a peaceful and safe international environment and the rights of nature and biosphere to be protected from abuses and destructive actions (intentional or unintentional, but with destructive long-term or irreparable consequences), the right of the planet and nature to be renewed, purified, refreshed, preserved, in order to ensure a high quality of life, for the present and future generations.

4. The Security Aspect of “Green Diplomacy”

It is interesting to analyse the potential developments of the “green diplomacy” phrase, particularly regarding its application in the field of security. Thus, the 21st century will be an era of *various forms, methods, instruments, strategies, institutions, bodies, agencies protecting the rights of nature and the biosphere, able to act globally, regionally, nationally or locally*, following and imposing (subject to clear, penalizing regulations, in the global environmental law) *clear limitations* to the rights of the individuals, local communities, states and non-state actors with destructive behaviour (groups of combatants, paramilitary groups controlling territories, on large areas of armed conflicts, transnational corporations etc.)¹⁵, *regarding their actions and inaction in relation to the environment*, in order to maintain such actions within the framework set by the 2030 Agenda (harmonious human being – nature relationship, enforceable *erga omnes*)¹⁶.

In the 21st century, we note the creation of bodies, agencies, agencies and institutions, not only at global level, but also *at national level, in the “green states”*, i.e. the states that concretely assumed the engagements resulting from the 2030 Agenda, transitioning to *a new pattern of production and consumption*, overcoming the flawed consumerist and polluting model, in favour of “green” economies, industries,

technologies and agriculture. The new model ensures the protection, preservation and renewal, improvement of the nature affected by the industrial and consumerist, highly polluting civilizations. The institutions in question are the following:

- *Global Military Body for the protection of internationally protected natural areas*, in the context of reduction in water resources, of the breakout of conflicts and of food and water crises;

- *National and global bodies and guards (which can be assisted by bodies of Green Volunteers) for the protection of terrestrial ecosystems, regional natural resources (with transnational competences for the protection of these resources – which are not only the sovereign property of the states, but also the right of future generations to benefit from them, in the paradigm of sustainable development, which counters an unlimited, abusive development right of the present generations; with competences for the penalization, monitoring, as well as concrete improvement in environmental quality, for the reforestation of abusively and massively deforested areas, for the restoring of ecosystems and habitats affected by the intensely polluting industrial and consumerist models);*

- *Global and regional bodies and guards for the protection of cultural goods (world cultural environment) considered historical vestiges, the cultural heritage of the humanity, goods of historical and cultural value of the respective cultural space, therefore goods requiring a significantly improved type of protection, as compared to the protection provided by a state;*

- *Bodies and guards of global environmental protection, focused on restoring the ecosystems affected by wars: environmental-post-conflict restoring, environmental-building, environmental-keeping (on an area affected by war, by applying and monitoring environmental protection rules and the strategic resources for the entire region and its stability – water, petroleum, which must not be destroyed, burnt, poisoned – in times of conflict/war);*

- *Bodies and guards for global protection*

¹⁵ Emil Străinu, quoted title, pp. 36-60.

¹⁶ *Harmony with Nature, Report of the Secretary General, UNGA, A/67/317, distributed on August 17th 2012. Chronology of Harmony with Nature, www.harmonywithnatureun.org/chronology.html, accessed on September 7th 2016.*



(assisted locally by bodies of environmental volunteers), for environmental restoring (restoring the environment, the habitats affected by conflicts, wars, drought and natural calamities).

It is self-evident that these bodies cannot function outside the global public-private partnership, implemented and defined in the 2030 Agenda, following the principle of global solidarity. The 2030 Agenda introduces the paradigm of durable development at global level, as a new paradigm for the UN states, plus the corporations (through corporate social responsibility, as well as through environmental corporate responsibility). It is therefore *a common effort of the state and non-state actors*, in the process of implementing *a new global pattern (post-consumerist, non-polluting) of production and consumption, in the global functioning* of the entire 21st century human society. It is a major challenge for the human civilization, the challenge to raise awareness on the danger that the current patterns of production and consumption will affect the quality of life on this planet and the planet itself, with all its unique ecosystems, in a fragile balance. *The human being must reconsider his/her position as part of nature, not as a being broken separated from it, in order to improve the responsibility towards the planet, towards the environment.*

The holistic view (the harmonious human being-nature relationship, with the human being as part of nature) *causes* the current patterns of production, consumption, organization of the human societies, based on highly industrialized or agricultural yet highly polluting civilizations or consumerist civilizations, which have permanent and severe impact on the environment. In addition, better protection of nature and the planet is required, *with the aid of global bodies created specifically for this purpose, facing the advance of engineering and science, of technologies with military application, weather modification weapons being the most dangerous, climatic modification or meteorological technologies, with impact on the very fragile balance among all the terrestrial ecosystems, therefore affecting the life*

on this planet, on the long run. Armed conflicts as well as unconventional technologies, which are not recognized as such or covered by a clear, ample definition at international level, *in order to provide the adequate protection* to the planet and its ecosystems, against the irresponsible behaviour of the human civilization, still bent on solving its issues aggressively, still reporting few global institutions for peaceful resolution and global mediation, with no authentic global institutions that protect *the rights of planet Earth and nature* against the human civilization (with state actors, non-state actors, human beings as individuals and as organic communities, as well) are factors that continue to affect the quality of life and the very planet, in the 21st century.

Conclusions

The commitments made by the states (as well as by the non-state actors) based on the principle of global solidarity defined in the 2030 Agenda and the announcement of the global public-private partnership are particularly ambitious. *Increasingly greater importance is paid to the human right to live on a safe, peaceful, sustainable and healthy planet*, as the human civilization evolves from *a corrupted, obsolete, harmful production pattern, to patterns of production, consumption and operation based on sustainable development* (expressed through the *interconnection* of the right to development to the right to a healthy, renewed, clean environment). The right to development no longer has to be regarded as isolated, unlimited, and leading to abuses, with serious, sometimes irreparable consequences for nature and the unique habitats of the planet. The states and corporations observing the spirit and letter of the 2030 Agenda show *increased responsibility* towards the fate of the planet and the human civilization itself.

Consolidation of the current international environmental law, *its transformation* in an authentic global environmental law, in which *planet Earth and nature have legal personality* (as subjects of global environmental law), being granted *the right to have special representatives*



in court, to defend themselves from the destructive behaviour of the states, corporations (some justified by the right of the peoples to development or by the right to armed defence against aggression, others by the logic of acquiring markets, the logic of profit) are some of the trends currently taking shape.

In addition, *the occurrence of certain global as well as national and local institutions such as bodies, entities, agencies*, for the protection, improvement, renewal of the affected nature or the penalization, monitoring of behaviours towards nature and concrete habitats, displayed by states, corporations, paramilitary groups, terrorist cells and other non-state actors taking actions with destructive consequences (intentional or unintentional) for nature, such occurrence is another necessity of the 21st century, in the process of enforcing the 2030 Agenda. *The occurrence of “green diplomacy”, for the protection and promotion of the rights of nature and the rights of planet Earth*, in relation to state and non-state actors, with special competences, with national-level representation and attached to the international organizations (to the financial, commercial and economic organizations, in particular), in order to achieve a better level of accountability among the global and regional actors towards their involvement in the protection and renewal of terrestrial ecosystems, nature and the planet, and for their *concrete involvement in the global strategies for sustainable development*, such occurrence is another necessity of the future century.

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LOW-COST ATTACKS, UNNOTICEABLE PLOTS? OVERVIEW ON THE ECONOMICAL CHARACTER OF CURRENT TERRORISM

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„Kill one, frighten ten thousand”.

Sun Tzu¹

Counterterrorism efforts have seen an increasing demand all over the world. Given the increasingly sophisticated detection equipment, terrorists chose between two options: surpass authorities at technological level or revert to simple techniques that outwit detection abilities. Tendencies show that they incline to choose the second option. It is not only cheaper to produce “bombs in the kitchen of one’s mum”, but when taking into account the accessibility, detectability and transportability of conventional military equipment, it is the only “logical” way to a global jihad. While counterterrorist authorities are thinking about the next phase of “arms race”, a similarly important question is the increased use of the simple equipment on a global level. In the field of prevention, the simpler a weapon, the harder it is to detect. In this article, my aim is not to give ideas to future fighters, but to highlight the issue of low-cost attacks.

Keywords: terrorism, terror attacks, bombings, knife-attack, Al-Qaeda, IS.

Introduction

In the 1990s and early 2000s, jihadist fighters in Europe operated in groups and planned bomb attacks with certain types of explosives. Their ideological link to the “mother cell” was strong, they mostly had prior incidents in connection with their beliefs and their incompatibility with the mainstream social norms. Financing and preparing the past decade’s incidents were mostly long-planned, in recent years, however, more terrorists have worked as a “lone wolf”, separated geographically and logistically from the organisations’ main area of operation. Moreover, it can be seen, that they frequently used a broader repertoire of weapons besides bombs, including knives, axes and handguns as well². As it is written in the first publication of Al Qaeda’s *Inspire*

¹ Defence Viewpoints, *Terrorism from Sun Tzu onwards – Part 1*, 2009, available at <http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/terrorism-from-sun-tzu-onwards-part-1>, accessed on 20.03.2017.

² Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, *The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2014, available at <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/388/html>, accessed on 07.02.2017.

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magazine in 2010, terrorist organizations aim to broaden the apparatus of applicable weapons, in order to reduce the dependence of individuals to the main logistics system.

In 2010, Al Qaeda inspired its followers with the following sentences: “Can I make an effective bomb that causes damage to the enemy from ingredients available in any kitchen in the world? The answer is yes”³. Followingly, it teaches various methods for making an explosive device. The instructions are clear, the ingredients cost next to nothing. Facing the issue of these hardly controllable processes, both counterterror agencies and leaders expressed their concern for the poor detectability of future terror plots.

Former President Barack Obama addressed the nation in 2015 on domestic and international terrorism, claiming: “Over the last few years, however, the terrorist threat has evolved into a new phase. As we have become better at preventing complex, multifaceted attacks like 9/11, terrorists turn to less complicated acts of violence like the mass shootings that are all too common in our society. It is this type of attack that we saw at Fort Hood in 2009, in Chattanooga earlier this year and now in San Bernardino. As groups like IS grew stronger amidst the chaos of war in Iraq and then Syria, and as the Internet erases the distance between countries, we see growing effort by terrorists to poison the minds of people like the Boston Marathon bombers and the San Bernardino killers”⁴.

Al-Qaeda has been instrumental in shaping the threat from Jihadi terrorism in Europe, but as of 2014, new and powerful actors were on the rise. At the same year with the Obama speech, in 2015, FBI Director James Comey added, that “it’s not the al Qaeda of old. The al Qaeda of old was interested in the multipronged, national landmark-based, careful, long-planned attack with carefully vetted operatives. We still face

that challenge, but the Al Qaeda of old was very different of what we see today. (...) IS thinks about their territory in a different way. They’re not focused on landmark multipronged, long tail event. He want people to be killed in their name”⁵.

The editors of a special edition of the al Qaeda’s on-line magazine, *Inspire*, boast that what they call “Operation Hemorrhage”⁶ was cheap and easy. “Two Nokia phones, \$150 each, two HP printers, \$300 each, plus shipping, transportation and other miscellaneous expenses add up to a total bill of \$4,200. That is all what Operation Hemorrhage cost us. (...) On the other hand this supposedly ‘foiled plot’, as some of our enemies would like to call [it], will without a doubt cost America and other Western countries billions of dollars in new security measures”. The magazine warned that future attacks will be “smaller, but more frequent”⁷.

Based on the trends Petter Nesser and Anne Stenersen identified early in 2014, besides bomb attacks and armed assaults the most likely tactical innovation is a combination of several crude methods such as arson and small bomb attacks in the future operation of the organisation. This assumption was proven to be right. Moreover, there were also new tactics, which could not be seen in the repertoire of terrorism in Europe before. These tactics for instance include the vehicle-ramming, which was represented in the 2015 Graz, and 2016 Nice and Berlin attacks. Such method was previously frequently implemented in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, vehicles were also used in another context (suicide car bombs) during the Afghan and Iraqi operations as well. Such attacks could be used to target locations where large numbers of people congregate,

³ Al Qaeda, *Inspire*, Issue 1, 2010, p. 33. available at <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-inspire-magazine-volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf>, accessed on 09.02.2017.

⁴ Youtube, *Obama Addresses Nation On Terrorism - Full Speech*, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r88oQkL0Ocg>, accessed on 09.02.2017.

⁵ James Comey, *Politics and Public Policy Today*, July 30, 2015, available at https://archive.org/details/CSPAN3_20150730_190000_Politics_and_Public_Policy_Today/start/0/end/60, accessed on 09.03.2017.

⁶ In October 2010, jihadists were able to sneak bombs hidden in printer cartridges onto two cargo planes. Due to strong intelligence efforts, authorities disabled both bombs before they were set to explode.

⁷ Al Qaeda, *Inspire*, Issue 3. 2011, pp. 4-17, available at <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/inspire-magazine-3.pdf>, accessed on 09.02.2017.



while ramming offers terrorists with limited access to explosives or weapons an opportunity to conduct an attack with minimal prior training or experience⁸.

The simpler the attack, the harder to detect. Law enforcement forces and military units face the challenge of hardly identifiable targets and unpredictable places of attacks. Although, we might assume some kind of “primary” of those individuals with symbolic value or cultural institutes, that represents the main strategic locations in the Christian (or Western) culture, but when considering the prior motivations behind terrorist attacks, defining the targets become a difficult question. Jihadist individuals, following the radical ideology of organizations in Europe will prefer attacking sub-national communities rather than societies at large, in order to generate discomfort and instability⁹. Choosing the best location for a strike is still an important part of the tactical planning of radical organizations, but since the means and nature of global terrorism changed, the only basic assumptions we may stick to when trying to counter and prevent an incident are the motivations of radical attacks. These are:

- Disseminating fear in the targeted population, and in those who are neutral to the cause.
- Assuring that the targeted groups reach mass confusion.
- Creating negative financial effect.
- Generating political discomfort and forcing government to change the policy.
- Enhancing publicity, using the elements of media.
- Psychological effects: the “good cause” versus the “bad”, legitimising ideas on conspiracy, acting in absence of remorse, “the herd instinct”¹⁰.

⁸ USA Department of Homeland Security (*U//FOUO*) *DHS-FBI Warning: Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming Tactics*, 2010, available at <https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-dhs-fbi-warning-terrorist-use-of-vehicle-ramming-tactics/>, accessed on 09.02.2017.

⁹ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, *op.cit.*, 2014.

¹⁰ Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Chapter IX. The Herd Instinct*, 1922, available at <http://www.bartleby.com/290/9.html>, accessed on 08.03.2017 and Maj. Guy Berry, “A Question of Sanity,

Returnees may also bring new technologies and tactics to the European sphere, thereby the limitation and check of arriving individuals is a must. Since no good solution had been found to the prevention of the infiltration of radicals, in the conclusion, I aim to propose some countering steps for preventing their possibly to execute actions. In the light of the stability of the current societal structure and environment, we also have to concentrate on the problematics of the arriving individuals’ sectarian dimension of the attacks, targeting mostly Shias or Kurds. The most dangerous scenario is that IS or like-minded groups launch and execute a sporadic but intense campaign of international terrorism as a response to Western military involvement in the conflict¹¹.

1. The Declining Cost of Recruiting

Realising the efforts and achievements of modern terrorist propaganda, we have to evaluate our countering-radicalisation mechanisms. Although radicalism is not equal to terrorism, it is a preliminary step towards fundamentally motivated acts or preaches against targeted groups. To be effective in combating radicalisation and terrorism, it is needed to recognize that the nature and cost of inspiring and radicalising individuals changed in parallel with the modernisation of telecommunication and travel opportunities.

Modern day preachers are not only found in safe heavens of the Balkans or the “no-go-zones” of France. They are able to take advantage of the reduced (or no) cost of internet, as well as the possibility to reach and instruct people by words from thousand kilometers.

The costs of propaganda increase in line with the improvement of the chosen future terrorist’s determination. During the first steps, online propaganda and personal contacts are satisfactory to strengthen the basic ideology in the individual. Concentrating on the costs of terrorism, we have to add that the basic needs for attracting and

Invalidating Terrorism” available at https://www.academia.edu/11050576/The_Sanity_of_Terrorism, accessed on 08.02.2017.

¹¹ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, *op.cit.*, 2014.



recruiting young individuals or those who should provide sufficient resupply for the act of the organisations became inexpensive through the free modern media, internet and the cheap pieces of electronic equipment. On the other hand, it is clear that maintaining the extensive propaganda requires financial support. It is not the ways of transporting ideology, but the experts hired, the professional work and institutions set up that cost a fortune in this relevancy.

In November 2014, a short film showing the beheading of 22 Syrian prisoners was published. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC), and the Quilliam Foundation think tank launched an investigation on the costs of the film and the results pointed out that since it was professionally recorded, including many hours of filming and professional editing, the cost of producing was about USD 200,000¹². But as soon as military success decline, the organisation needs to adapt the changing financial structure and cut back on its expenditures. Thus, since August 2015, sums spent on propaganda are in sharp decline as well¹³.

While choosing vulnerable groups, experts determine risk factors that include psychological, social and economic details. Although, in terms of vulnerability, no general pattern clearly categorises their characteristics – supporters of radical organizations come from a wide range of social and economic backgrounds¹⁴ –, some basic risk factors might be in favour of terrorist organisations’ “HR specialists”.

According to Fathali M. Moghaddam, radicalisation is a process with five stages (levels). Those at the lowest level experience relative

poverty and limited social mobility, which is associated with pressure from the hostility and oppression of society mainstream. Stepping upwards on the phases, perception of exclusion is further strengthened. It is followed by the support of the radical ideology, the categorization of enemies and ultimately the execution of terrorist act. The author points out that individuals rarely reach the fifth (actual execution of terrorist acts) phase^{15, 16}.

When reaching higher levels of radicalisation, terrorist organisations are forced to attract supporters by materialistic means. Although economic motivation is just one of the long list of reasons that may inspire individuals for joining radical organisations it is a key element when it comes to maintaining the human power of the radical forces. Thereby, radical organisations – such as al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS) – have millions of monthly salary expenditures.

According to the estimates of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in 2015, the IS reportedly payed its fighters on average 350-500 USD per month determined by several factors, including their particular skills and nationality. Multiplied with the estimated number of fighters in its employ (20-30 thousand), this alone would represent a monthly 10 million USD expenditure. Of course, we also have to take into account those suicide bombers whose deep commitment towards terrorist actions make specific operations (relatively) free. In addition to the salary, IS is also reported to provide stipend for each family member of a fighter and regular payments to the families of members killed or captured¹⁷. Since the operational territory shrank and the number

¹² Gabi Siboni, Daniel Cohen, Tal Koren, “The Islamic State’s Strategy in Cyberspace” in *Military and Strategic Affairs*, Volume 7, No. 1, p. 132. Available at http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/7_Siboni_Cohen_Koren.pdf, accessed on 08.03.2017.

¹³ Scott Shane, “IS Media Output Drops as Military Pressure Rises, Report Says”, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/world/middleeast/islamic-state-media-propaganda-IS.html?_r=0, accessed on 08.03.2017.

¹⁴ Randy Borum, “Assessing Risk for Terrorism Involvement” in *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, American Psychological Association, 2015, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 63–87, available at <https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/tam-tam0000043.pdf>, accessed on 08.03.2017.

¹⁵ Nóra Pákozdi, György Nógrádi, “The significance of family connections during the process of radicalisation” in *Honvédségi Szemle* 2016/4.

¹⁶ Fathali M., Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism – A Psychological Exploration” in Randy Borum (ed.): *Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research*, *Journal of Strategic Security*, Volume 4, Winter 2011, p. 40, available at <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=jss>, accessed on 08.03.2017.

¹⁷ FATF, *Financing of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (IS)*, 2015, pp. 29-30. available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-IS.pdf>, accessed on 08.03.2017.

of the fighters reduced significantly, IS gradually reduced its payment for “employees”¹⁸.

2. Choosing the Target

Planning and executing a terrorist plot requires deep knowledge about the to-be-attacked environment. By focusing on discriminate targets, organisations could not only specify their interest, gain supporters and shed light on the preferred and available methods, but also a “well chosen” target may reduce the costs of an attack. Such an approach was mentioned in

move towards activities designed to boost the group’s legitimacy¹⁹.

Financial assets of a given terrorist group should assign some indicators on preferred types of targets. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have the ability to mobilize a huge group of financial donors, besides, the amount of their income is still higher than younger militias or other terror organisations.

After the 9/11 attack on the United States, international community’s efforts against “traditional” terror plots inspired radical groups to implement a change of attitude. Targeting




Figure no. 1: Target types of terrorist incidents in the MENA region and Europe in-between 2001-2015²⁰

connection with the al Qaeda’s shift towards directed, ‘strategic terrorism’ in a publication by Peter R. Neumann and M. L. R. Smith in the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, which implies that terrorist groups will eventually shift away from indiscriminate violence with mass-casualties and

military or police forces were frequent, but the amount of soft target attacks were still the most common (see: Figure no.1 and no. 2) in Europe and the MENA region.

¹⁸ Agence-France Presse and Reuters, “Islamic State to halve fighters’ salaries as cost of waging terror starts to bite”, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/20/islamic-state-to-halve-fighters-salaries-as-cost-of-waging-terror-starts-to-bite>, accessed on 08.03.2017. and Josie Ensor, ”IS stops paying Mosul fighters’ salaries in hint at funding shortage”, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/05/IS-stops-mosul-fighters-salaries-just-battle-city-intensifies/>, accessed on 08.03.2017.

¹⁹ Peter R. Neumann, M. L. R. Smith, “Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies” in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28: 4, pp. 571-595, 2012, available at <https://reassessingcounterinsurgency.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/rainsborough-strategy-of-terrorism-its-framework-and-its-fallacies.pdf>, accessed on 13.03.2017

²⁰ Data from the Global Terrorism Database, Search criteria: between 2001-2015, all incidents regardless of doubt, region: Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Middle East & North Africa.




Figure no. 2: Frequency of terror attacks in the MENA region and Europe, by target in-between 2001-2015²¹




Figure no. 3: Target types of terrorist incidents in the MENA region and Europe between 2001-2015²²

²¹ *Ibidem.*

²² Data from the Global Terrorism Database, Search

On 21 May 2016, IS-linked al-Furqan Media released a speech by Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, in which he called on Muslims to dedicate holy month of Ramadan (6 June – 5 July 2016) to jihad, to kill unbelievers by any means available to them in their place of residence, should they be prevented by the ‘tyrannical system’ (Western governments) from joining IS in the territory under its control. He further highlighted the importance of civilian targets since, according to him, even the smallest acts to terrorise unbelievers in the West have a big impact, the aim is to fill the

Kosovar Arid Uka’s attack against a shuttle bus carrying U.S. soldiers at Frankfurt international airport in March 2011, followed by Mohammed Merah’s killing spree in France in March 2012, and the soldier stabbings in the U.K. and France in 2013²⁵. In February, 2017, Abdullah Reda Refaei al-Hamamy took arms (a machete) against France’s soldiers and police officers²⁶.

The advantage of soft targets can be found in many aspects. Jihadi are still interested in targeting crowded areas, even if they do not seem to target public transportation and airplanes as




Figure no. 4: Frequency of terror attacks in the MENA region and Europe, by target between 2001-2015²⁷

lives of Westerners with terror so ‘the neighbour fears his neighbour’²³. Similarly, according to the evaluation of the FBI, civilian targets were primarily aimed by terrorist attacks in the United States as well²⁴.

Threats and hoaxes against military personnel and facilities remained frequent. Moreover, there has been an increased tendency to target military personnel after 2008. Such incidents were the

often as before²⁸. While reducing costs, terrorist organisations must count on the additional costs of countering security personnel and security equipment systems as well. Soft targets are easily accessible, which also mean that the number of casualties could be higher than in a separated area.

3. Cost of Preparations

Although the cost of recruitment and planning were reduced significantly by the informational revolution and the modern technology of the 21st century, stable financial background is still a

criteria: between 2001-2015, all incidents regardless of doubt, region: Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Middle East & North Africa.

²³ Paul Kamolnick, “Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s May 21, 2016 Speech”, *Small Wars Journal*, 2016, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/abu-muhammad-al-adnani%E2%80%99s-may-21-2016-speech>, accessed on 17.03.2017.

²⁴ FBI, *Increase in Number and Diversity of Terrorist Plots Against the United States Since 9/11*, 2011, available at https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/image/terrorist-plot-diversity-chart/image_view_fullscreen, accessed on 23.02.2017.

²⁵ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, 2014.

²⁶ The Local France, “Louvre machete attack just latest to target soldiers and police in France”, 2017, available at <https://www.thelocal.fr/20170203/islamist-attacks-against-police-and-soldiers-in-france>, accessed on 13.03.2017.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, 2014.



need for executing a terrorist attack on European soil. Tendencies show that in parallel with the increase in attacks on civilian targets, jihadists tend to use cheaper tactics, while maintaining (or even aggregating) the amount of victims with the well-chosen time and place. This tendency raises the question of the controllability and detectability of terrorist plans, since monitoring the national or international flow of conventional weaponry only contributes to the reduction of possible attempts. Due to the increased usage of home-made or non-conventional equipment, a new era of counter-terrorism operations began.

In the following paragraphs, we shall concentrate on the changes in methods of attacks, while in the next section.

Considering the unplannable scenarios, operatives of terrorist groups must be backed with additional reserves while preparing and implementing actions. One of the July 2005 suicide bombers in London, a 22-year-old part-time worker at a fish-and-chips shop left an estate worth \$240,000 after he blew up a subway train. Neither his family nor authorities could explain from where he got the money. We also have to take into account those previously donor individuals who got enough financial resources not to be dependent only on the central logistics system. For example, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Belgian-Moroccan radical who took part in the Paris terror attack, was relatively well-off, lived and studied in an upper-middle class environment.

Many of the terrorist plots were primarily planned to be cheap, others happened to be executed cheaper than planned. In Spain, the cell responsible for the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid needed \$80,000 to finance the plot, according to Spanish court documents. But they had access to more than \$2,3 million worth of hashish and other illegal drugs that they could have sold to raise more money, the documents showed²⁹.

Similarly, many of the al-Qaeda's executed attacks were over-budgeted, sourcing from

²⁹ Craig Whitlock, "Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism On the Cheap", *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 2008, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/23/AR2008082301962.html>, accessed on 07.03.2017

Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from donors, primarily in the Gulf region. In the Analysis of John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille is claimed, that prior to 9/11 the largest single al Qaeda expense was support for the Taliban, besides Bin Laden also used money to train operatives in camps in Afghanistan, create terrorist networks and alliances and support the jihadists and their families. Finally, a relatively small amount of money was used to finance operations, including the approximately \$400,000–500,000 spent on the September 11 attacks, \$10,000 for the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa; and approximately \$20,000 for the 2002 Bali bombings^{30, 31}. An NBC analysis of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 showed it similarly cost just \$20,000³².

Terrorist networks and embeddedness play a crucial role in expenses of a terrorist organisation. In a 2002 interview Salah Shehada, the founder of Hamas's Qassam Brigades claimed that a terrorist operation could cost \$3,500. A Hezbollah member has noted that it cost between \$665 and \$1,105 to conduct a terrorist attack. Other estimates for the cost of Palestinian terrorist attacks range from \$150 to \$50,000³³.

4. Precedents for Low-Budget Attacks

4.1. Bombings

Methods changed from precision to effectiveness, from detailed plans to relatively cheap execution. Bombings are still common type

³⁰ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, *op. cit.*, 2014.

³¹ John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, Serena Wille, *Monograph on Terrorist Financing, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf, accessed on 23.02.2017.

³² Robert Windrem, "IS Is the World's Richest Terror Group, But Spending Money Fast", *CNBC*, 2015, available at <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/20/IS-the-worlds-richest-terror-group-is-spending-money-fast.html>, accessed on 23.02.2017.

³³ Joshua Prober, *Accounting for Terror: Debunking the Paradigm of Inexpensive Terrorism, Policy #1041*, 2005, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/accounting-for-terror-debunking-the-paradigm-of-inexpensive-terrorism>, accessed on 07.03.2017.



THE TERRORIST THREAT

Table no. 1: Estimated cost of a fragmentation bomb. The estimates above are enough for approximately four suicide vest³⁸

	Amount	Cost (dollars) ⁴¹
Nails	100 pieces	0.79
Gun powder	5 kgs	100
Switch	1 piece	1.56
Mercury thermometer	1 piece	21.99
Acetone	8 liters	16.32
Sum		140.66

of terrorist act, including typically, improvised explosive devices, which are inexpensive and easy to make. This shift towards homemade weaponry for terrorist activity on European territory already began at the July 7, 2005, London transit bombings, when the ABC News aired photographs of bombs found in one attacker's car, made from glass bottles packed with explosives and nails. Components that were – according to the al-Qaeda's initiative – made from household materials³⁴. Home-Made Explosives have become more common after 2008, considering the "Nicky Reilly" (2008), "Mohammed Game" (2009), "Underwear bomber" (2009), "Doukajev" (2010), "Abdulwahab Stockholm" (2010), "Kosher Supermarket" (2012) executed attacks³⁵.

Few days after the London bombings in July 2005, terror hit the UK's capital again, but the plot to detonate four bombs was foiled. Quoting *The Economist*, "The young men who tried but failed to detonate homemade bombs on London's transport system on July 21 packed explosives into cheap plastic containers...

³⁴ Jeff Edwards, Ryan Parry, "16 more bombs", *Mirror*, 2005, available at <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/16-more-bombs-551710>, accessed on 14.03.2017.

³⁵ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, 2014.

the sort of things that housewives use to store leftover curry"³⁶. The most frequently used types of bombs are TATP (Triacetate Triperoxide), ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel oil), TNT, HMTD (C₆H₁₂N₄, hydrogen peroxide, citric acid), and C-4 based explosives.

According to a Palestinian official, the following elements are needed for an effective attack: a young, healthy man/woman, nails, gun powder (explosive), a switch, mercury (accessible from thermometers) and acetone³⁷.

Although it seems easy to collect, thermometers with mercury were banned from commercial market of the EU in 2011 and restricted in other parts of the world (Philippines, Australia, and the USA) as well³⁹. According to

³⁶ *The Economist*, *Looking in the wrong places*, 2005, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/5053373>, accessed on 14.03.2017.

³⁷ S. Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism" in *The Washington Quarterly*, 29, no. 2:69, p. 1537. 2003.

³⁸ Counter Terrorism Guide, *Methods & Tactics*, available at <https://www.nctc.gov/site/methods.html#sarin>, accessed on 07.03.2017

³⁹ European Chemicals Agency, *Background document to the opinions on the Annex XV dossier proposing restrictions on Mercury in measuring devices*, available at <https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/20f4ee0a-6bcf-4ed0-a271-6674cd333710>, accessed on 16.03.2017.



THE TERRORIST THREAT

Table no. 2: Estimated cost of an ANFO bomb

	Amount	Cost (dollars) ⁴²
Nitrogen-based fertilizer	50 kgs	16.75
Gasoline	10 liters	13
Sum		29.75

Table no. 3: Estimated cost of a home-made “napalm-B” bomb

	Amount	Cost (dollars) ⁴³
Benzene	10 liters	12.9
Gasoline	25 liters	38.4
Polystyrol	100 liters	6.89
Sum		58.09

the estimates of Marie-Helen Maras, preparing a bomb costs no more than \$150⁴⁰. Taking into account the ingredients, this low sum can be accepted. Below there are represented some estimates about three types of explosives.⁴¹

We also have to add that in countries without current war environment, additional costs should be added to the preparation. Testing the perfect amount of mixtures, the reaction of these unstable materials to natural changes (for example heat) is needed, thereby a testing facility or territory is also a must for a bomb attack.

Quoting the manual on Latin-American guerilla warfare of the Brazilian Marxist, Carlos Marighella, we should agree that modern

⁴⁰ Marie-Helen Maras, *A terrorizmus elmélete és gyakorlata*, Antall József Tudásközpont Tankönyvműhely, Budapest. 2016, p. 399.

⁴¹ Estimates of the author, based on prices of ingredients, costs available on the internet.

strategies of terrorism have a long history both on precedents and ideologies, all over the world. According to Marighella, “Terrorism is an action, usually involving the placement of an explosive or firebomb of great destructive power, which is capable of effecting irreparable loss against the enemy. Terrorism requires that the urban guerrilla should have adequate theoretical and practical knowledge of how to make explosives. (...) Terrorism is a weapon the revolutionary can never relinquish”⁴⁴.

⁴² Estimates of the author, based on prices of ingredients, costs available on the internet (Gasoline price estimate - Hungary – 1,29 USD/liter).

⁴³ Estimates of the author, based on prices of ingredients, costs available on the internet.

⁴⁴ Carlos Marighella, *Terrorism*, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, 1969, available at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch30.htm>, accessed on 15.02.2017.



In the recent years, the al-Qaeda had already prepared several free documents and know-how-s on the preparation of an explosive, and the internet also decreases the cost of training future bombers⁴⁵. Unlike guerilla warfare, the Palestinian radical organizations claim that suicide attacks were much more effective. According to a survey conducted in May 2002 among the Palestinian population, the second Intifada had more results for them than the previous years' diplomatic negotiations⁴⁶.

The Paris (November 13, 2015) and Brussels (March 22, 2016) suicide bomb attacks⁴⁷ have shown that terrorists are able to plan relatively complex attacks quickly, cheaply and effectively. In both series of attacks, international victims were aimed to be attacked (football stadium, metro station, an airport), thereby a multiplier effect generated worldwide media attention⁴⁸. In addition to the human cost it paralyzed tourism, economy and social morale.

As jihadis continue to operate in conflict zones, it is likely that the repertoire of bomb-making techniques will widen further. It is also likely that sophisticated internet sites will provide online learning techniques. However, in the short to medium-term, the innovations in bomb-making techniques in Europe will come as a result of training abroad, rather than online courses.⁴⁹ While home-made explosives (HMEs) remain the most commonly used explosives in IEDs, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and illicit trafficking in explosives from former conflict areas present a significant threat to the EU⁵⁰.

4.2. Knife and firearm attacks

Besides explosives, there has been a relative increase in knives and firearms attacks in recent years. Such terrorist attacks were represented in 7.3% of plots during 2001–2007, and in 33% of plots after 2008. The number of plots involving knives and handguns increased by 26% after 2008, while the number of bomb plots decreased by only 13% in the same period⁵¹.

The rise in knife and firearm plots is part of a more general trend towards diversification of attack types and choice of weapons among jihadis in Europe. Supporters of radical Islamist groups (considering mainly lone wolves) are more likely to prepare their attacks on a lower budget. The first call for such attacks was made by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani (the IS's official spokesperson) in 2014 to kill Westerners in every possible ways. He ordered supporters to kill "non-believers" in Western countries, saying: "If you can kill a non-believing American or European – especially the (...) French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other non-believer from the non-believers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be. If you are not able to find an IED or a bullet, then single out the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of his allies. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him, or poison him"⁵².

In addition to the speech of Al-Adnani, supporters of IS were also given written help on the best ways for knife attacks. In the IS's *Rumiyah magazine's* 2nd issue, the author writes: "Knives, though certainly not the only weapon for inflicting harm upon the kuffar, are widely available in every land and thus readily accessible. They are extremely easy to conceal and highly lethal, especially in the hands of someone who knows how to use them effectively. Also, due

⁴⁵ Benedek József Kis, *Dzsihadizmus, radikalizmus, terrorizmus – A globális terrorizmus*, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2017, p.148.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 178.

⁴⁷ The explosives used in the Paris and Brussels attacks were TATP (Triacetone Triperoxide).

⁴⁸ Europol, "Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State – revised", Europol Public Information, 2016, p.6. Available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/modus_operandi_is_revisited.pdf, accessed on 17.03.2017.

⁴⁹ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, *op.cit.*, 2014.

⁵⁰ Europol, 2016. p.13.

⁵¹ Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, *op.cit.*, 2014.

⁵² Counter Extremism Project, *Abu Muhammad al-Adnani*, available at <https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abu-muhammad-al-adnani>, accessed on 07.03.2017



to their accessibility, were a person to conduct a campaign of knife attacks, he could dispose of his weapon after each use, finding no difficulty in acquiring another one”⁵³.

The first precedent for knife attacks was executed in 2010, when a Danish-Somali jihadi attempted to kill the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard with an axe (coded as knife in the dataset). Four years later, in the name of the IS, the 18 year-old Abdul Numan Haider stabbed two police officers in Melbourne (Australia) on 23 September 2014. In 2015 and 2016, knife attacks became increasingly “popular”. In June 2016, Larossi Aballa Moroccan-born French migrant stabbed a policemen and his wife to death. One month later, in Würzburg, the 17 years old Afghan Muhammad Riyad attacked train passengers with an axe. On the 26th of July, in Normandia, Adel Kermiche and Abdel Malik Petitjean took hostages and killed the priest with a knife. The line of the 2016 knife attacks were continued by the Charleroi attacker, who killed two policemen with a machete. Besides, killings also took place in Reutlingen, where attacker wounded and killed a woman.

Al-Qaeda’s strategic leadership in the al-Sahab video “You are only responsible for yourself”, issued in June 2011, specifically encouraged Muslims in the West to carry out such attacks: “You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check and, most likely, without having to show an identification card.”⁵⁴ Moussa Coulibaly took arms against French soldiers in front of a Jewish shop in Nice, wounding two officers. He later tried to travel to Syria, but had been turned back at the Istanbul airport⁵⁵.

⁵³ IS, “Just Terror Tactics”, *Rumiyah*, 2016, p. 13, available at <https://clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Rumiyah-IS-Magazine-2nd-issue.pdf>, accessed on 17.03.2017.

⁵⁴ Sudip Bhattacharya, *Al Qaeda video resurfaces claiming how easy it is to buy guns in U.S.*, *CNN*, 2013, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/11/politics/al-qaeda-video/index.html>, accessed on 07.03.2017

⁵⁵ BBC, “French soldiers wounded in Nice Jewish centre attack”, 2015, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31118020>, date of download: 07.03.2017 and Global Terrorism Database, *The incident occurred at*

Moreover, despite the increase in diverse cheaper equipment, automatic firearms still seem to be the weapons of choice of terrorist cells committing large scale attacks, because of their relative ease of access (mainly from the near neighborhood of Europe), use and effectiveness. The first such attack was the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004. The assailant, Mohammed Bouyeri shot van Gogh numerous times with a semi-automatic pistol, and subsequently tried to decapitate him. Firearms nowadays can be obtained from criminal sources, in some cases from those the terrorists already know from their own criminal past. In addition, it is possible to obtain firearm parts legally via the internet, as well as de-activated firearms to be converted back later for operational use. The current situation concerning the availability of weapons in countries neighbouring the EU, particularly in Ukraine and the Western Balkans and the MENA, may lead to a significant increase in weapons on the black market, posing a significant threat in the near future⁵⁶.

4.3. Assassinations

Although, in modern times, assassination lost from its “reputation”, the tactic is still used by nearly all terrorist groups. Assassination is mainly centered on the will for change in political-military leadership, highlighted individuals such as public officials and religious or media representatives.

Historically, terrorists have assassinated specific individuals for psychological effect⁵⁷. Assassins were either near to the target individual, thus possessed a trustful environment where plots could easily be executed (for example concubines), or in the backstage, in order to distance themselves from the victim in every

Massena Square, available at <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201502030092>, accessed on 07.03.2017.

⁵⁶ EUROPOL, *TE-SAT*, 2016, p.8, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf, accessed on 17.03.2017.

⁵⁷ Brian P. Bennett, *Understanding, Assessing, and Responding to Terrorism: Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Personnel*, 2007, p. 131, available at <https://goo.gl/jvSLn1> accessed on 28.04.2017.



possible ways. Assassination techniques were always diverse, including choking to death, poisoning or shooting.

Even though in Europe we didn't face such attacks in recent times, the possibility of assassination is still real. Modern-day famous assassinations' list includes high ranking political officials (USA President John F. Kennedy, Russian Ambassador to Ankara Andrey Karlov, Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov) and also, concurrent family members (Kim Jong-nam).

Terrorist units are rather in favour of causing social disruption, thereby one-to-one assassinations are not the main elements of their repertoire in the European region. However, we still face the challenge of the assassination or kidnapping of foreigners in crisis zones, mainly people of the media (for example Kayla Mueller) or charities. Besides, concerning returning jihadists, the EUROPOL warns: "From an IS perspective, the terrorist attacks carried out in Belgium and France in 2015 and 2016 were successful and effective. Given this fact and a general assumption that IS retains both the will and the capability to strike again, further attacks in the EU, both by lone actors and groups, are likely to take place in the near future". The EUROPOL also warns, that the modi operandi jihadists employ in Syria and Iraq, could be exported to the EU at some point. One example is the use of suicide bombings in the Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015 and 2016.⁵⁸

4.4. Arson and Firebombing

Arson and firebombing are also easily conducted by terrorist groups⁵⁹. Incendiary devices are as cheap as the knife-attacks, while ingredients can also be found "in everyone's kitchen". Between 1968 and 2005, 55 terrorist organizations can be named who, either solely or in combination with other devices, effectively applied fire during their attack. After 2005, in recent years, this tool earned a significantly growing importance in the arsenal of several

radical groups. Fire is an extremely powerful weapon that is hardly manageable, extinguishing it requires the involvement of high amount of personnel, and as long as flammable material is given, it is able to destroy everything. It does not require long-term training, it is relatively low-cost and can be carried out by a small number of people. In appropriate conditions (weather, wind, etc.) it has extremely high destructive ability since devices are given at the location, as well as extinguishing requires massive fire-fighter forces.

Examples on the combined use of fire in terrorism begins with the 2008 arson attempt against the *China Southern Airlines CZ 6901* plane, continues with the 2001, September 11 attacks against the New York *World Trade Center*, the November 2008 Mumbai *Taj Mahal Hotel* attack and the 2012 siege on US diplomatic office in Benghazi in Libya. The method, which relies on the conventional equipment (firearms) combined with the use of fire is primarily an improved version of what had been implemented during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, thereby European precedents of wildfires and arson attacks across can be seen as advanced successors of Palestinian and Israeli tactics.

Concentrating on Europe, in 2014, the Palestinian Abbas C. brought arson as a method of terrorism to the high importance. The 27-year-old ambulance driver set fire to the Naouri kosher supermarket in Sarcelles, a heavily Jewish suburb of the French capital, on July 20th⁶⁰. Al-Qaeda has been blamed for a recent series of forest fires across Europe. Alexander Bortnikov, official of the Russia's Federal Security Service said, according to state news agency RIA Novosti, at a meeting of heads of security agencies⁶¹. Between January 1st and September 16th 2012, according to Spanish agriculture ministry, "more than 184,000 hectares of land in Spain alone were destroyed by

⁵⁸ Europol, *op.cit.*, 2016, pp.3-6.

⁵⁹ Terrorism Research, *Types of Terrorist Incidents*, available at <http://www.terrorism-research.com/incidents/>, accessed on 17.02.2017.

⁶⁰ Forward, *French Kosher Grocery Arsonist Gets 4 Years in Prison, 2014*, available at <http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/208515/french-kosher-grocery-arsonist-gets-4-years-in-pri/>, accessed on 17.03.2017

⁶¹ Meira Svirsky, "Al-Qaeda Claims Responsibility for Starting Israel Fires", *Clarion Project*, November 27, 2016, available at <https://clarionproject.org/al-qaeda-claims-responsibility-starting-israel-fires/>, accessed on 17.04.2017.



fires between the highest amounts in a decade, forced authorities to evacuate around 2,000 people from their home⁶².

It is also an interesting addition to the possible use of the motivational issue towards fire arson, that it may help terrorist organisations back their actions and destroy evidence in an undetectable way. Last year (2016) in Belgium, Forensic Lab was set on fire by an individual, thereby the lab's entire cache of hair samples and thousands of other pieces of evidence critical to the prosecution of hundreds of criminal and terrorism suspects were burned down⁶³.

As the method seemed to be effective on the Palestinian scene, both Al-Qaeda and IS called on their supporters to join the jihad with the use of arson besides previously mentioned methods.⁶⁴

4.5. Vehicle Terror

Seemingly, vehicle terror is the most modern method in the repertoire of terror, however, we should again broaden our focus from Europe to the Palestinian-Israeli⁶⁵ and the Middle-Eastern⁶⁶ regions where driving into the crowd of civilians or military personnel is much more frequent.

One of the online magazines of IS, the *Rumiyah* (Arabic for Rome) has introduced a section "Just terror tactics", dedicated to training militants on how to launch cheap terror attacks. Previous edition (issue 3) have included a tutorial on how to launch the most effective truck

ramming attack.

When observing details of European attacks with a truck on civilians, we have to acknowledge the serious influence of media propaganda on foreign radicals. Every detail that have been written in the issue were more-or-less fulfilled in the attack. On the 14th July in Nice, an IS follower (Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel) left 85 dead and several hundreds wounded, showing the devastating potential of a lone-actor attack. A half year later, the Tunisian asylum-seeker Anis Amri, the attacker of the Berlin Christmas market left 12 people killed when rammed into the shopping street with a truck⁶⁷.

Vehicle terror is understandably a hardly noticeable way for law enforcement agencies, since trucks and vehicles are in daily use, hijacking them or renting a new one should not cost more than a several tens of dollars.

4.6. Cyberterrorism

In addition to the acts of violence presented above, there are also numerous other types of violence that emerged in the 21st century. Terrorist groups have increased their ability to extort modern technology, thereby besides the easy flow of online propaganda, cyberterrorism became a continuously renewable and hardly controllable asset of radical groups.

The cost of such an attack is relatively low, the basic needs involve an easily assembled PC and internet connection. Even though hacking skills require motivation and a previous high level knowledge about a series of hacking methods; in the modern world, these factors are easily accessible, through free online courses or by lectures from a professional.

Even though countries expand their counter-terrorism assets, the need to refresh cyber-defence is so acute, that unless sums are set aside directly for this aspect, keeping up the rhythm with the accelerated modernization of cyber terrorism is hardly possible. In this regard, cyberattacks mean an asymmetric challenge, where the cost of attacks are considerably smaller than countering

⁶² "Al-Qaeda blamed for Europe-wide forest fires", *The Telegraph*, 2012, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9585098/Al-Qaeda-blamed-for-Europe-wide-forest-fires.html>, accessed on 17.03.2017

⁶³ Milan Schreuer, *Arson at Belgian Forensic Lab May Set Back Terrorism Cases*, 2016, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/world/europe/belgium-arson-forensic-lab-terrorism.html>, accessed on 17.03.2017

⁶⁴ IS, *Rumiyah* – issue 5, 2017, pp.8-9. Available at <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/rome-magazine-5.pdf>, accessed on 17.03.2017.

⁶⁵ Source for example: "Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs", *Wave of terror 2015-2017*, 2017, available at <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx>, accessed on 17.03.2017.

⁶⁶ Source for example: Kevin Cooper, Emily Anagnostos, *Iraq Situation Report: November 9-17*, 2016, Institute for the Study of War, available at <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/iraq%20SITREP%202016-11-17%20PDF.pdf>, accessed on 17.03.2017.

⁶⁷ Kate Connolly, Chris Stephen, "Berlin attack suspect Anis Amri had been on watchlist since January", *The Guardian*, 2016, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/21/berlin-attack-suspect-anis-amri-under-monitoring-since-january>, accessed on 07.03.2017.



them. This type of terrorism is not as high profile as other types of terrorist attacks, but its impact can be very destructive, considering that critical infrastructure, political and military communications, social services and other vital aspects of a state might be in risk.

Conclusion - Results of the Changed Nature of Terrorism

The number of terrorist attacks is in a global increase. Conflict zones and their effects on the near-surrounding and farther lying states shape the perception and presence of terrorism worldwide given the time, where internal conflicts' bursting balloons are combined with global fear, aggression and various interests.

We thereby in the defence industry may not stick to our well-established conventional way to solve crises; continuous adaptation to the current security challenges and environment is a must.

Countering conventional threats today have both the organizational background (e.g. NATO and national defence institutions) and the improving equipment capabilities. However, when we consider the modern tendencies, the intangible nature of terrorism became such an underlying problem, that law enforcement agencies and counter-terrorism units not only have to modernize their set of tools but also their thinking. Namely, because the use of methods that are detectable through existing policing systems are decreasing, while paralelly, undetectable, unconventional, hardly predictable methods are in rise. As a tendency, we may add, that the massive, well-planned strike on the European region has, largely, been replaced by a series of lone wolves-attacks on a minimal budget.

Although detection and monitoring of such attacks became more difficult for responsible agencies, our duty is to prevent and prepare. In this relevancy, we have to highlight the importance of preparatory trainings (for example, close combat trainings or the application of alarming systems) for civilians as well, such as the security guards of social institutions, critical infrastructure or basic

social meeting points (e.g. shopping malls).

In this analysis, I aimed to highlight the issue of easily accessible, not prohibited equipment for a possible strike on Europe, because the effects of low-budgeted preparations appear globally. We have to think about possible solutions for the problematics of such tendencies and in parallel, we should not forget the fight against global radicalization and the flow of terrorist ideologies. Although policing and counter-terrorism agencies' work in the past years were unable to prevent some attempts against countries – such as the Paris or Brussels bombing, or knife-attacks against civilians and police – we also have to take into account those foiled plots, that were less-spread in the media. A total of 211 failed, foiled or incompleated attacks were reported by six EU Member States in 2015, and almost half of them (103) by the UK⁶⁸.

At the end of my analysis, I would like to reach back to the proverb of Sun-Tzu, presented in the beginning of the analysis. While the terrorist strikes happen at a certain time, in a certain location, the hardships come with their butterfly-effects, such as disruption of social perception of stability and the rise of xenophobia. As Sun-Tzu years back described, with killing one, they frighten thousands. The nature of terrorism recent years infiltrated our perception of security. Keeping in mind that recent methods are a reflection of a mainly realist policy of terrorist groups and their leader individuals, we have to trust counter-terrorisim and intelligence units, develop the corresponding system of prevention and on our level accept, adapt and answer to the existing security challenges.

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⁶⁸ TE-SAT 2016.



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EUROPEAN MILITARY CULTURE AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Soldiers, Scholars and National Defence Universities



We have the pleasure to share with our readers a few ideas about a new and interesting editorial release. In the following, we will present the review of Tamir Libel's work entitled *European Military Culture And Security Governance – Soldiers, scholars and national defence universities*.

Tamir Libel has a background in History, Political Studies and Military Sciences. In 2010, he obtained a PHD degree at Bar Ilan University with a thesis specialized on *The Professionalism of the Education and Training of Combatant Officers in the Post-Modern Western World*. Former Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at University College Dublin (UCD) in the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRE)¹ and Legacy Heritage Fellow within Dan Shomron Center², now he is a Research Fellow at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Intrenational (IBEI) also within a Marie Curie cofounded programme – Beatriu de Pinós.³ Tamir Libel's other affiliations are: non-Resident Fellow at the Centre for War

Studies, University College Dublin⁴, membership/affiliation at research groups and associations such as International Studies Association (ISA), Association for Israel Studies (AIS), European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS).⁵ He also has an international teaching experience (both at undergraduate and graduate levels) in fields like Security Studies, International Relations, Political Sciences, by course held at European universities (Germany, Ireland), US and Israeli ones. Also, Tamir Libel is involved as reviewer in the activity of Journals such as: *Defense & Security Analysis*, *Armed Forces & Society*, *Mediterranean Policies*, *The Middle East Journal*. T. Libel had

¹ Official website of Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), http://www.ibeii.org/en/tamir-libel_14540, accessed on 25.04.2017.

² Official website of University College Dublin, available at <https://www.ucd.ie/warstudies/members/tamirlibel/>, accessed on 25.04.2017.

³ Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI).

⁴ *Ididem*.

⁵ *Ibidem*.



an important role in the emergence of the Association of Civil-Military Studies – Israel.⁶

In terms of research, his areas of interest are: military education, comparative study of civil-military relations, airpower, Israeli military doctrine and intelligence studies, EU's security policies.⁷

As the author ascertains, the aim of this book was to “examine the merging of Europe's military cultures by studying the advent of a new European-wide concept of military education”⁸, introducing the new educational emergent concept of National Defence University (NDU).

In order to accomplish this objective, T. Libel analyzes a few post-Cold War era military education key providers belonging to the following states: UK, Germany, Finland, Romania and the Baltic States. This mix of countries selected for analysis allows the development of a much more comprehensive perspective and less biased one over the European military culture. In order to fully understand this logic, we appeal to the direct assertion of T. Libel: “Although recent years have witnessed a significant rise in literature on European security, the CSDP⁹ and CFSP¹⁰ as well as NATO-EU relations, little has been written about the transformation of European armed forces beyond the «big three» (the UK, France and Germany). The result is an implicit bias in literature towards the latter at the expense of smaller member states generalized in order to draw conclusions on other European militaries... This study has shown that if the many smaller member states' armed forces are excluded from comparative analyses, contemporary trends in European military cultures may not be observed correctly.”¹¹ He further argues that some innovative ideas and policy diffusion can emerge from smaller states, giving especially the example of the Baltic Defence College.¹² Therefore, by this more differentiated mix of countries analyzed, the book accomplishes to offer “the first systematic, comparative analysis of military education and training in Europe within the context of the post-Cold War security environment”¹³, as the publishing house remarks.

From structural perspective, the present work is composed of eight chapters. The 1st chapter aims to highlight that European's security paradigm is changing and the author uses for this purpose an overview of the European research on security. Other goals of this chapter include the aim to present an innovative conceptual framework on how national military systems are affected by important changes and how this framework can be implemented through a research design. Key elements of this framework are: “the civil-military relations, strategic culture and the sociology of knowledge to explain how changes in military education facilitate the transformation of strategic culture”¹⁴.

The next five chapters describe and analyze military education key providers, each one referring to a specific space/country as follows.

Thus, the 2nd chapter studies the case of UK (as one of the main military powers of EU and one of the most committed to NATO¹⁵), starting with the reforms performed in military education and analyzing the most interesting case of the Defence Academy, a “unique model of integrating public,

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Official website of Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), and Official website of University College Dublin, *op. cit*.

⁸ Tamir Libel, *European Military Culture and Security Governance - Soldiers, scholars and national defence universities*, Oxon, New York, Routledge Publishing house, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016, p. 1.

⁹ CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy.

¹⁰ CFSP = Common Foreign and Security Policy.

¹¹ Tamir Libel, *op. cit*, 2016, p. 215.

¹² Tamir Libel, *op. cit*, 2016, p. 215.

¹³ ***, About the Book, Routledge Publishing House, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016, <https://www.routledge.com/European-Military-Culture-and-Security-Governance-Soldiers-Scholars-and-Libel/p/book/9780415732659>, accessed on 14.02.2017.

¹⁴ Tamir Libel, *op. cit*, 2016, p. 2.

¹⁵ Tamir Libel, *op. cit*, 2016, pp. 22, 28.



private, academic and military assets to meet the challenging needs of the defence sector”¹⁶.

The 3rd chapter explores a conservative model of military education provider, the Federal Armed Forces Command and General Staff Academy, which “integrates the traditional Prussian-German military tradition with the evolving concepts of joint, combined and inter-agency operations.”¹⁷ The Finnish case is analyzed within the 4th chapter, where the Finnish National Defence University presents “a truly new concept of European military education ... in which the consolidation of the various military colleges has led to a unified innovative organisation.”¹⁸

The 5th chapter examines the case of Romanian higher education provider, “Carol I” National Defence University, this being an analysis of great interest most of all because it represents an external perspective integrated to the European dimension over our country’s case. In this chapter, T. Libel analyzes the path of reforms that lead to the current organization form of “Carol I” National Defence University. Firstly, he remarks some contextual elements from the recent history that had an influence on further transformation of military educational system and asserts that even though Romania had a military education system based on a Soviet style, the fact that our country was able “to maintain a semi-autonomous position within the Eastern Bloc”¹⁹ reflected in maintaining “an ethos and sense of professionalism akin to that of Western armed forces”²⁰. That served as a ground for the set of reforms to be implemented after the 1990. T. Libel observes that after the Cold War, the Ministry of Defence carried out a series of reforms in the security sector, in order to accomplish NATO standards, by using the military education system which has the role deliver certain “values, attitudes and knowledge of officers and public servants”²¹. In order to do so, the military education system itself had to undergo some important transformations. One of the core reforms was consolidating independent military colleges by unifying them within “Carol I” National Defence University²² which to provide educational programs both for military and civilians. T. Libel considers that this university “was constructed to facilitate the «Westernisation» of the Romanian armed forces and to adapt the officer corps to a Western version of military professionalism and civil-military relations”²³. This was possible with foreign assistance (NATO, EU) and the process was shaped also by internal and external factors of change such as national transformations in legislation, Bologna Process, etc. T. Libel offers both the perspective of success on this evolution path but (its contribution to the integration of Romanian forces into NATO, EU, OSCE military structures²⁴; shifting toward the role of experience provider for other nations that desire to cooperate/join NATO or EU) and also the one of the challenges brought by core transformation (“civilianization” of the military education: the accent on defence rather than military that can lead to decreasing in knowledge, skills and ethos of young officers specific to military area, which “could result in an «expertise deficit»” at future high levels, reflected in the ability to “fight and win the nation’s war”²⁵). The author concludes that “Carol I” National Defence University is a demonstration of innovation in terms of the NDU concept especially because of the fusion between “academic and military education” and “the settings of a higher education institution”²⁶.

¹⁶ *Idem*, p. 22.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 105.

¹⁹ *Idem*, p. 23.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *Idem*, p. 131.

²² *Idem*, p. 23.

²³ *Idem*, p. 131.

²⁴ Tamir Libel, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Idem*, p. 131.



BOOK REVIEW

The 6th chapter analyzes the case of the Baltic States, which in the 1990 decided to unite their security goals, because of the perceived Russian threat and NATO aspiration and this is how the Baltic Defence College emerged. It “served as a regional centre of mid-career and senior military education”²⁷ and it is a unique model based on collaboration extended to the West.

Further on, 7th chapter explores the comparative dimension of the military education, insisting on the emergent concept of NDU at European level. Even though not all the case studies presented have all the specific characteristics of NDUs, convergence can still be observed at European level in drivers of reforms (changes in the military operations nature, budget cuts) which led in the first place to openness towards Bologna Process. The emergence of NDU had implication in terms of national military culture in Europe. The last chapter represents the conclusions.

By its complex approach, Tamir Libel’s work represents a contribution to the literature both from the theoretical-methodological perspective (contribution to the 4th generation of strategic culture²⁸; the conceptual framework) and the empirical one (by the comparative perspective; NDUs development, Bologna Process implications, etc.). Therefore, we invite you to discover a new interesting and actual approach and to develop your own views on the subject. We hope that having an example of external perspective over one of the main Romanian’s military education provider to motivate you to pursue in this demarche.

*Stan ANTON, PhD**

²⁷ *Idem*, p. 24.

²⁸ *Idem*, p. 25.

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WORKSHOP ON STRATEGY

“INTERAGENCY COOPERATION TOWARDS SECURITY”

- March 23, 2017 -

The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University organises annually, since 2014, two workshops, one at the beginning of each academic semester. Events of this type are addressed to researchers and academics, as well as PhD students, MA students and students interested in security and defence. CDSSS activities provide a framework in which they can gain access to the experience and opinion of notable personalities from the academia, governmental institutions or civil society, being a good opportunity for exchanging ideas and knowledge on the issues addressed, as well as for deepening some issues related to the subject.



The workshop in strategy, held on 23rd of March, with the theme “Interagency Cooperation towards Security” is part of academic events series that debate the most topical issues on national and international security environment, thus enjoying the presence of representatives from different structures, from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence.



At the activity there lectured Chief Commissioner Bogdan Budeanu from the Romanian Border Police, his presentation dwelling on “National and International Cooperation at the Romanian Borders”, from the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Dănăilă spoke about the “Challenges and Solutions of Emergency Situation Management”, while Colonel Mirel Ristea and Captain Bogdan Ghinea presented

“Aspects on the Assessment of Disaster Risks at National Level in a European Context”. Further on, Colonel Viorel Ilie lectured on “Public Authorities Announcement and Warning the Population about the Danger of Air Strikes” and, last but not least, Lieutenant-Colonel Adrian Gheorghe from Brigade 10 Geniu “Dunărea de Jos” discoursed on “Interinstitutional Cooperation in Ensuring the Effectiveness of National Crisis Prevention Systems”.



At the same time, Colonel Damian-Mihai Zbranca from the General Staff participated with a paper on “Aspects of Interinstitutional Cooperation Specific to the Operations Field - Present and Perspectives” and Colonel Adrian Ricu PhD, from the National Military Command Center, spoke about “Integrated Crisis Management in the Context of Hybrid Threats to National Security”.

The main issues discussed in the strategy workshop are those related to the risks and threats that go beyond the national borders, their effects in the political, economic, social and military fields.

We believe that this event has enjoyed a high level of expertise and specialisation and has achieved its primary objective of disseminating the results of practical experience in interinstitutional cooperation and to create new frameworks of dialogue in the academia.

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CDSSS AGENDA

JANUARY - MARCH 2017

In the following, we are going to present our readers the scientific events organised by the CDSSS and the publications issued in the period January – March 2017, as well as the agenda for the next period.

From the beginning of the academic year, *Strategic Colloquium*, the monthly supplement of *Strategic Impact* journal, published in January an article related to national and international security on “*Trends in developing a common energy space at European Union level*”, developed by Adrian Claudiu Motoc, Master Student of Security and Defence Faculty within “Carol I” National Defence University and in February an article on “*The concept of resilience in relation with counter-terrorism*” developed in co-authorship by Cristina Bodoni together with Brigitte Monika Surgun, both Master Students of Security and Defence Faculty within “Carol I” National Defence University. Those interested in publishing can submit proposals to Strategic Colloquium at catalina.todor@unap.ro.

Furthermore, the monthly public lectures series at the National Military Circle was continued with the following themes: *The EU’s Global Foreign and Security Strategy: Major vision and trends*, was presented by Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Researcher; *Influence of North African and Middle East conflicts on European security*, delivered by Mirela Atanasiu, PhD Researcher and *Multiple perspectives, one reality? The case of refugees in Europe*, exposed by Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD Senior Researcher.

The most important activity in the first quarter of 2017 was the Workshop in strategy on the theme *Interagency Cooperation towards Security*, organized on 26 March, in which were presented lectures by representatives from Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence.

The next point in the CDSSS Agenda, the International Scientific Symposium with the theme *Interagency Cooperation as a Tool of National and International Security* will be held this year on May, 25.

In the second half of this year, CDSSS will organize a second workshop on *Military Sciences - Security Sciences - Conceptual Landmarks* on October, 19 followed by the broadest activity, the International Scientific Conference **STRATEGIES XXI**, with the theme *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment* on December 7-8.

Details of all scientific activities organized by CDSSS will be announced on the website at: <http://cssas.unap.ro/en/events.htm>.

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- Title (centred, capital, bold characters, font 24).
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Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year). *Example of article:* John N. Nielsen, “Strategic Shock in North Africa”, in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at <http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/>, accessed on 10.03.2017.

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Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010.

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