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CDSSS AGENDA

EDITOR'S NOTE

The third edition in 2016, no. 60, comprises a collection of six papers, part of them having a rather theoretical character, while others represent analyses on aspects we are currently dealing with.

The journal is opened with the rubric *Geopolitics and Geostrategies – Trends and Perspectives*, where Mr. Răzvan Munteanu highlights aspects on *the impact of Yemen crisis on the Middle East' regional security*.

Next comes the rubric *The Terrorist Threat*, where our constant collaborator in Hungary, János Besenyő, PhD, approaches the topic of organised crime, in an article entitled *The Islamic State and its human trafficking practice*.

There follows, under the heading *Intelligence studies*, Mr. Ionel Stoica, PhD, who presents *challenges of the intelligence analysis' practice*.

Further on, at the rubric *Information society*, Mr. Zbigniew SKWAREK, PhD, from Poland, focused on *conceptual considerations on Internet usage*.

The issue then continues with the heading *Analyses, syntheses, evaluations*, containing two complementary articles. In the first one, Mr. Daniel Roman, PhD, approaches the issue of *societal security under the impact of the contemporary educational system's transformation*, while in the second article, Mr. Tomasz Kośmider, PhD, presents reflections on *security and freedom – through the lens of a historical perspective and current perceptions*.

As always, we bring to our readers attention *The CDSSS Agenda* for the period July-September.

In the end, Mrs. Daniela Răpan, PhD, Deputy Editor in Chief, signals the updated *Guide for authors*, useful to those who wish to disseminate the results of their research in our journal.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is an open access publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University (available at http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm) and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published in Romanian for sixteen years and for twelve years in English and approaches a complex thematic: security and defence related issues; security and military strategies; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; political-military topicality; geopolitics and international relations; future of conflict; peace and war; information society, intelligence community. Readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), to these adding recently WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, but also by its presence in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad such as NATO and of universities with military profile from Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia

and so on.

Strategic Impact journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in main security and defence institutions, as well as in national and international academia in Europe, Asia and America.

In the end, I would like to encourage the persons interested to publish in our pages to prospect and evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of the security environment.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD
Editor in Chief
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

YEMEN CRISIS IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST' REGIONAL SECURITY

Răzvan MUNTEANU*

The situation in Yemen has attracted public attention because of the escalating internal crisis earlier this year. Ever since the founding, in 1990, the country was faced with problems that have affected all levels of national security, turning it into an insecurity generator in the region. Yemen became the main terrorist hub from the Middle East and an important pivot for the piracy in the Horn of Africa. Above all, future internal developments in this country would be able to change the entire status quo of the Persian Gulf area. This evolution could transcend regional security developments, having also global implications.

Keywords*: Yemen, security, geopolitics, Middle East, Houthi, failed state.*

Argument

The end of the Cold War led to a security paradigm changing, transforming the international relations' scene of one bipolar to unipolar one, and then multipolar. Finally, the World Wide Web development and emphasizing of the process of globalization have strengthened state interdependencies, shaping the whole world like a *global village* where national boundaries/borders are transcended by economic interconnections.

All these created some positive effects, such as the speed of communication, the liberalization of markets or the promotion of democratic values, as well as some negative ones, such as: the development of cross-border criminality, asymmetric threats or the unequal distribution of revenues.

National states, that under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 became the main actors of international politics and by default the main security suppliers, have adapted differently, according to geopolitical and internal social-political-economic context, cataloguing into categories of *pre-modern states* (with a tribal structure and underdeveloped economy), *modern* (with political thinking in the classic sense of the balance of power) and *post-modern* (countries that give up part of their sovereignty to create supranational structures, such as the European Union)[1].

Among these, post-modern states, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Central African Republic, and so on, take the risk of turning, as a result of social anomy and weak governance, into *failed states* insecurity generators – on short term – at regional level and – on medium and long term – at international level. The model of Afghanistan is perhaps the best known example in the train of the circumstances created for the

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development of terrorist network Al Qaeda and international Jihadism, putting the United States and several European countries in the position of having to fight thousands of kilometers away from national boundaries in order to protect their own security.

In 2014, the index of failed states organized by *Fund for Peace*[2], placed Yemen on the eighth place among the states noted with *High Alert*, but recent events positioned it in the *Very High* category, fact that tells us that Yemen presents a large insecurity at regional and even global level.

Therefore, Yemen, a country in bloom of a general crisis, becomes our subject of interest in the desire to understand the impact of recent events on regional security and to provide relevant conclusions concerning possible developments.

1. The failure of good governance

The current situation that brought Yemen on the brink of secession and civil war has its roots early on state founding, when North Yemen and South Yemen were unified.

The event took place in 1990 was achieved through a political consensus between North, which assigned Ali Abdullah Saleh as President, and South which claimed the appointment of Ali Salim al-BEIDH as Vice-president. However, the form of government will turn into a failure, emphasizing social-economic issues/problems and bringing the country to a civil war won by SALEH, fact that led to al-BEIDH`s run in Oman[3].

Southern tribes' political marginalization, corruption and economic underdevelopment are some of the main causes which eventually determined the resignation of SALEH once the Arab Spring covered Yemen. Consequently,

former Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur HADI, general belonging to the Southern tribes, is elected on February 27th 2012 as President of Yemen. While it was being backed by Arab states and the West, HADI`s mission announced to be extremely difficult, putting him into position to avoid the outbreak of a new civil war. *The National Dialogue Conference* that he initiated it proved to be a failure in the end, especially because the exclusion of Houthi group from the negotiating table caused their military advance, first initiated in September 2014 and resumed again at the beginning of year 2015 when for the second time they occupied capital Sana`a and brought about HADI`s flight to Saudi Arabia..

Following the escalation of social tensions, particularly as a result of Houthi rebels` advance towards the Gulf of Aden, an important strategic point, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia which also includes Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Pakistan (*as an observer*) launched, on March 25th 2015, the operation Decisive Storm, focused on effectuating airstrikes against the rebels. In this operation, the US have involved only by supplying with logistical support Saudi FA.

Thus, in political terms, secession and return to borders before 1990 remain the biggest threats, such perceptions being manifested mainly by several Sunni tribes from South, unified under the name of Hirak Movement[4]. However, it is hard to believe that such a scenario can be implemented without a civil war in which the South to come out the winner.

First, Hirak itself does not have a uniform policy, being divided between the majority militants of secession and the autonomy or federalization supporters, and then, both Houthi, and Northern tribes are not, at least for now, willing to accept the costs of returning to pre-1990 borders, because they would lose access to

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[2] For more details, you can acces the Raport of Fund for Peace, 2014, available at http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf.

[3] Martin Reardon, *South Yemen and the question of secession*, Al Jazeera, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/ south-yemen- question-secession-201412351732176656.html, accessed on 10.06.2016.

[4] The Hirak movement was formed in 2007 in the former South Yemen as militant for secession and return to the old borders, motivating their actions as a consequence of the political marginalization of several Sunni tribes, but also as a consequence of the incapacity of the government to consolidate the national economy and to improve the standard of living.

oil fields in the South, which still provide over 75% of Yemenite GDP[5].

Regarding the resignation of former president

the geographical location in a region rich in hydrocarbon resources, Yemen's oil reserves are estimated to run out in 2018-2020. The economic

Figure no 1: Yemen: The complexity of the current political scene[6]

SALEH, it has not proven to be a role model for the countries over those the Arab Spring spread, as Barack OBAMA said that it should happen in Syria and Iraq. Although Yemen has avoided a violent spring, SALEH managed to get an international agreement that confers him immunity for any action taken during the period when he served as president[7]. Therewith, keeping some close leaders in government leadership gave SALEH the possibility to control his former party, the General People Congress *(GPC/General People's Congress)*, with whom he founded an existing political alliance with Houthi.

Economic security is seriously affected, being characterized by a negative report in the relation between imports and exports, while, despite

recovery plan initiated in 2006, which sought to diversify economic sectors or the financial support came mostly from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), failed to enhance the national economy marked by annual budget deficits.

Even though in July 2014, the government decided to eliminate fuel subsidies, causing protests all around the country, and acquired a loan worth 570 million dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), insecurity arisen primarily as a result of authorities inability to control the national territory, stopped any chance of economic growth[8]. Tourism, a possible economic alternative for a country rich in cultural and architectural vestiges, whose two cities are UNESCO world heritage sites, is almost inexistent because of frequent kidnappings and terrorist attacks.

Air raids carried out by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia have generated catastrophic effects for Yemenis who, beyond the lack of electricity

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[5] *Idem.*

[6] Sursa: European Union Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ Brief_9_Yemen. pdf, accesat 17.09.2016

[7] Farea Al-Muslimi, "Don't look to Yemen model for solutions in Iraq", *Al Monitor*, available at http://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/yemen-model- failure-iraq.html, accessed on 01.06.2016.

[8] CIA, The World Factbook, *Yemen Economy*, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/ym.html, accessed on 01.06.2016.

and drinking water, had to turn to practices specific to nineteenth century including the use of carts to transport the wounded or medicines[9].

From the social point of view, the unemployment rate (27-30% of the population), the high number of illiterate people and those living in poverty (54-60%) in conjunction with the inflation rate (17% in 2015)[10] and the economic situation deliver a social structure vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalism, while accelerated reduction of water resources are becoming the greatest threat to the security of environment. At the societal level, it can be found a deep fracture within social cohesion resulted due to the amplification of tensions not only between North and South but also between Shiite and Sunni communities, which brought forth numerous conflicts that have ended with internal migration of more than two million people, according Red Cross experts[11].

With a population rate of 99, 1% Muslim, of whom 65% are Sunnis and 35% Shiites [12], the military advance of Houthi rebels is viewed as an increased Shiite political influence.

The group was formed among Zaidi tribe located near the border with the Saudi Arabia, in 1990, taking the name of its founder, Hussein Bader Addian al-HOUTHI, who met his end in 2004, killed by Yemeni Armed Forces to the order of SALEH president who accused him to planning the proclamation of a Shiite state in the north side of the country[13]. Although he ordered, as a president, six raids targeting the rebels and he offered a 55 000 US dollars reward for

murdering Bader al-Houthi, currently, through the alliance made by the General Congress of the People with Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, Saleh becomes their political ally[14].

Concerning the major military risks and threats to national security of Yemen, these are the outcomes of poor capability to action of empowered armed forces.

Since 1978, when he became the president of North Yemen, Saleh has strengthened armed forces, increasing the contingent from 3.000 to 66.000 soldiers, keeping control of the institution until the outbreak of the Arab Spring. For all those, he did not hesitate to encourage military involvement in oil smuggling, food and other goods, underlying system dysfunctions, visible in time[15].

General Ali Mohsen coming, as like as Saleh, from the same Sanhan tribe, but not the same clan, was the main leader of the Army, being seen quite as a potential substitute of the former president. His influence was diminished in 2000, time when Saleh named his own son, Ahmed Ali, chief of Republican Guard, one of the best equipped military units, thing that fragmented the Yemeni Army into three spheres of influence: one subordinated to Mohsen, another subordinated to Ali and a third one which oscillated between the two camps and, by default, among the advantages offered by these[16].

Though at the end of 2012 Saleh succeeded in dissolving the two structures, appointing MOHSEN personal adviser and giving to Ali the mandate of Ambassador to United Arab Emirates, the Yemeni Army remained weakened and not enough well organized, while some voices from Sana`a did not hesitate to accuse Ali for supporting Houthi rebels[17].

2. Regional effects: Piracy and Terrorism

The evolution of the above, the tribal organization of state and the incapability of

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[9] *Saudi war brings Yemen's economy 'a century' backwards: Report*, PressTv, May 15, 2015, available at http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/05/15/411184/KSA-Yemen-economic-backwards-century-report, accessed on 03.06.2016.

[10] *Idem.*

[11] Ahmed Alwly, *After 10 years of war, are Yemenis hopeless?*, Al Monitor, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/yemen-war-displaced-refugee-camps.html#ixzz4Eky2ZIuD, accessed on 10.07.2016.

[12] *Idem.*

[13] Jacques Neriah, *Yemen Changes Hands. Will an Iranian Stronghold Emerge Near the Entrance to the Red Sea?*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 32, October 07, 2014.

[14] Farea Al-Muslimi, *op. cit.*

[15] Florence Gaub, Whatever happened to Yemen's army?, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief, April 2015.

[16] *Idem.*

[17] *Idem.*

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the government to strengthen social cohesion determined, in the same time, the inability of authorities to control the entire national territory, generating the inevitable security vacuum amid which piracy and terrorism developed.

Located in the southern Arabian Peninsula, directly bordering the Indian Ocean and near to the Horn of Africa, Yemen represents a theater of operations for Somalis pirates who do not cease to use the island of Socotra in order to support their activities in the Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Then, taking advantage of the absence of an operational Yemen Coast Guard, not infrequently the pirates steal the Yemenis fishermen boats which they use in clandestine activities.

Only in 2008, a total of 815 Yemeni sailors were kidnapped by Somali pirates, and for a year later, fishery, providing an important source of food, to reduce by 60 % as consequence of these types of events[18]. But, while piracy in the Horn of Africa was increasingly limited in recent years due to the military missions of NATO or those of the European Union, the escalating crisis in Yemen is likely to foster insecurity in the area of Aden and Bab el Mandeb Strait, one of the most important strategic points through which energy resources are dispersed from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

The attack at the beginning of 2015 directed against an oil tanker in Kuwait prompted maritime security experts to consider the possibility of avoiding routes linking the south of Arabian Peninsula to the Suez Canal through Bab el Mandeb, at the expense of a route bypassing the Cape of Good Hope[19]. Such a scenario would mean a surplus of distance of over 8.000 km of oil tankers coming to the Mediterranean[20], which would mean both rising fuel prices and prices of other consumer products on the Western market.

Currently, global shipping companies pay no more than 18 billion USD per year, due to the phenomenon of piracy in the Horn of Africa, most of the money resulting from special salaries, insurances and security costs[21].

If as for piracy it can be asserted that Yemen is a pivot and not an actor itself, not the same thing can be said about the terrorism, Yemen being positioned as the strongest hub of Al Qaeda group, where operates its most active branch: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

In July 2014, AQAP announced that a new Islamic Emirate will be proclaimed, based on the strict interpretation of Sharia in the Eastern Hadramout[22] Also, after they captured the Al Mukalla Harbour, in May, this year, jihadists have forbidden the *khat* leaves consumption to the locals[23], since this drug, originary from Africa, was very popular among them. Although the group was founded in 2009, when the Al Qaeda factions from Yemen and Saudi Arabia had united, Yemen had a very important role in the evolution of Jihadism, AQAP being preceded by an entire chain of terror from the *Islamic Jihad in Yemen* (1990-1994) - the *Army of Aden Abyan* (1994-1998) and *Al Qaeda in Yemen* (1998-2008).

All of these aspects help us understand why the most prisoners at Guantanamo[24] were coming from this country, Yemen territory being for AQAP the most useful for its own development, while successfully building its positions by taking advantage of the poor governmental authority and the social and economical problems. If in

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[18] *Yemen: Pirates threatening lives and livelihoods*, IRIN, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/82989/yemen-pirates-threatening-lives-and-livelihoods, accessed on 20.05.2016.

[19] Farouq Al-Kamali, *Could Yemen become the next base for pirates?,* Al Araby, available at https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/2/16/could-yemen-become-the-next-base-for-pirates, accessed on 20.01.2016.

[20] Mihai Ştefan Dinu, *Securitate în zona estică a Mării Mediterane,* Bucureşti, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I", 2012, p. 7.

[21] *Idem.*

[22] Al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, Global Security, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida-arabia.htm.

[23] Rick Gladstone, "Yemen: Al Qaeda Outlaws a Stimulant", The *New York Times*, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/world/middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-outlaws-a-stimulant.html?_r=0, accessed on 01.06.2016.

[24] Guantanamo or Camp Delta represents the most famous detention center of the American armed forces for jihadist prisoners. Established immediately after the attacks on September 11, 2001, the jail is positioned on the Southern part of the Cuban bay Guantanamo, under the administration of the USA, as a consequence of the American-Cuban treaty in 1903.

2009, Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula, counted more or less than 300 fighters members, in 2014 their number exceeded 1.000 persons[25], and at the beginning of 2016 it is expected to be twice more, taking into account the continuing growing crisis in Yemen and the support that they can receive from the Sunnites tribes from South, to which the AQAP represents a strong alternative against the Houthi rebels advance.

3. Geopolitical aspects

Over the last decade, the states members in the Cooperation Council of the Gulf have repeatedly and straightly accused Iran for involving in the internal affairs of Yemen. An important part of these accusations was, also, the fact that Houthi had become a paramilitary group in 2004, and, of course, the transition from a moderate to a conservative vision, shortly after Bader al-HOUTHI came back from his visit at Qom[26], an important religious temple of Shiism, established in Iran.

These accusations preceded the suspicions according which the Tehran would have supported the AQAP and Hirak, resembling here a great interest for Yemen, a state that even is not rich in natural resources is an important geopolitical actor, due to its access to Bab el Mandeb Bay and Red Sea. Although these accusations that had been brought to Iran of supporting the two groups were not strongly sustained by public evidence, either a united Yemen controlled by Houthi or one divided between the South and the North controlled by the same Shiites rebels would give Iran indirect access to the Red Sea, from where it could support much better the Palestinian cause, of course by arming the Hamas.

In this way, beyond Hormuz, Iran would control, indirectly, the second most essential point in the hydrocarbons traffic from the Persian Gulf to the West, gaining an extraordinary ability to project power and national interest in the region, by exporting the *Islamic Revolution or awakening Shiite axis*, which may provoke

protests of the Shiite communities, especially in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, but mostly in Bahrain, which is ruled by the Sunni minority, although over 75% of its population are Shiite.

Such a scenario would mean for Iran the change of the regional status-quo and its conversion into the true hegemonic power in the Middle East, fact that reveals us the importance of Yemen file in a geopolitical game of Shiite and Sunni axes, interconnecting the Levant crisis with the Southern Arabian Peninsula one. In fewer words, the entire Middle East faces a repositioning and geopolitical reorganization situation, while the Yemen is so important, although apparently it has no importance in the regional equation.

Conclusions

The poorest Arab country, Yemen, also has the highest demographic explosion in the region. According to statistics, the population will double, reaching the threshold of perhaps 50 million over the next two decades, which will create so-called *hunger area* at GCC border, where Yemen is not a member, having only observer status. However, it is expected that the Gulf states to maintain labor restrictions on Yemeni workers due to their poor qualifications and training, but mostly in order to avoid the import of Islamic fundamentalism. From this perspective, the stability in south of Arabian Peninsula becomes crucial.

Riyadh adopted a wrong policy concerning its southern neighbor, fearing the emergence of a strong state with which it still has territorial disputes. After the Union in 1990, the Saudis wanted to weaken the social cohesion and to maintain the secessionists requirements, founding the nowadays crisis, even they have not proposed to create a failed state precisely in order to avoid such risks on regional security that Yemen generates[27]. But this entire vision of transforming the GCC into an island of stability surrounded by a sea of instability creates a demographic pressure for the states in the Gulf.

The complexity of the crisis and hence its solution, resembles from the multitude of the

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[25] Council on Foreign Relations, "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula", *Policy Brief*, 19 March, 2015.

[26] Jacques Neriah, *op. cit.*

[27] Abubakr Al-Shamahi, *Saudi Interest in its Yemeni Neighbour*, Fair Observer, February 20, 2012.

involved actors and also from their self-claimed legitimacy. The Saudis legitimate the military intervention, since they fight against the threats to their own national security; HADI, supported by the West and the Arab states arrogates the right to rule the country for theirselves, as a result of winning the presidential elections in 2012, while Saleh, the ex-president brings up into discussion the Constitution in order to explain his need for being re-elected. Finally, the Hirak Group is considered legimate to demand their right to self-determination, while Houthi claims its actions during the Arab Spring. Obviously, Iran assigns its right to protect the Shiite population.

At this point, we can identify four main scenarios, regarding the Yemeni crisis:

- The conflict will stay the same intensity and the Arab coalition seeking to limit the Houthi influence, fact that will inevitably increase the AQAP capacities;

- The conflict will become more intense after a land intervention of the Arab coalition, in order to eradicate the Houthi group;

- Houthi will gain the armed conflict and will assign the right to govern, which will lead either to the acceptance of the secession (the most unlikely option), or to the beginning of a civil war;

- Houthi will be co-opted into government, as part of a process of solving the crisis through dialogue.

Whatever the scenario, Iran will have a very important role. Moreover, it is impossible to believe the crisis can be solved through a consensus without the presence of Tehran. The Saudis have largely lost this opportunity and they can only regain it through a possible military eradication of Houthi rebels.

In this sense, it will take into account the land intervention, which would mean a risky decision in view of desert and mountainous terrain of Yemen. Nasser's military expedition of 1960, when Egypt lost 10.000 soldiers in Yemen is perhaps the best example given by history. A possible failure would raise many questions about the capabilities to project power of the Monarchies, while some Yemeni tribes might perceive intervention as one of occupation, confederating against Arab states.

In the present context, from piracy to Jihadism or to risks of changing the regional *status-quo,* Yemen remains a generator of insecurity in the Southern Arabian Peninsula, which tends to become a global threat, since not few analysts designated as *Afghanistan of tomorrow*.

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THE ISLAMIC STATE AND ITS HUMAN TRAFFICKING PRACTICE

János BESENYŐ, PhD*

Simultaneously with the growing concern over the European terrorist networks that are linked to Middle-Eastern radical groups, in spite of the recent actions and measures taken by NATO and other supranational organizations, Islamic State still longs to maintain its influence in the occupied territories with diverse methods. Among these is human trafficking, that represents a major threat from both humanitarian and international security perspective. In this article, I aim to present a series of aspects related to human trafficking, while highlighting the most important motivators for the practice. Although a prior motivation is personnel supply to the Syrian front, trafficking in persons serves several other purposes for the terrorist organization, such as extensive business, out of which come huge amounts of income (transport-specialized units, money-laundering and smuggling businesses); enslavement of women for sex, recruitment of children to infiltrate members of the terrorist organization to create forward bases in Europe.

Keywords: Islamic State, ISIS, human trafficking, smuggling, enslavement, kidnapping, sex trafficking, migration.

Introduction

In the recent years, accompanying the ongoing negotiations about possible responses, NATO addressed the problems generated by the reigning power of the terrorist organization and launched multidimensional counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism raids. Besides, partner states responded by military and soft-power support both at national and international levels. Although many aspects of the threat (for example territorial gains, worldwide propaganda, etc.) should be countered by the traditional and modern diplomatic, economical or military response methods, there are still segments that are waiting to be discussed and responded – still in the queue for comprehensive solution.

Additionally, the Islamic State terrorist organization became notorious for its fundamentalist ideology, brutality, worldwide-spread propaganda, recruitment success and its capabilities for activating moderate or unstable Muslims of the European continent in order to plan and commit attacks in their country, as well as persuading thousands of people to join the Syrian terrorist groups as foreign fighters. As we had to experience in the last months terror attacks, the radical organization managed to prove its presence among current and settled migrants, thereby highlighted the threat of the hardly detectable human trafficking operations and the widespread and hugely connected networks of Middle-Eastern and European terrorist cells.[1]

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[1] Besenyő János; Prantner Zoltán; Speidl Bianka; Vogel Dávid, *Az Iszlám Állam - Terrorizmus 2.0: Történet, ideológia, propaganda, [The "Islamic State": Terrorism 2.0 – History. Ideology. Propaganda.],* Kossuth kiadó, Budapest, 2016, pp. 16-20.

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Even if migration is powered by various factors, we may (and can) not forget the fact that its link with organized crime can contribute to the destabilization of the European continent in the long run.

The radical organization's primary area of operation is located in Syria and Iraq, but as the recent terrorist attacks on Paris, Brussels and Nice showed, they also prepare and execute terrorist acts in Western territories. On the basis of their radical interpretation of the Quran, they call every Muslim to continue jihad actively and participate in their war against the *kafirs* (non-believers). Besides the active participation in the Syrian and Iraqi clashes, they also execute diversified stabilizing, social and institutional services for citizens. For instance, we should mention payment of soldiers and their families as well as the establishment of a functioning governing and public administration system.

Financing this multi-tasked terrorist organization requires huge amount of money, which is only partly covered by financial assistance of individual donors[2]. The rest of the required budget is to be self-financed. Throughout the evolution of the organization, ISIS developed a well-functioning basis for these transactions. It earns income from several operations (selling seized artifacts or looting banks) and also has sovereignty on some industrial facilities (for example oil and wheat industries) whose products are being sold to partners. According to some estimates, the organization's revenues were dropped from $80 million in mid-2015 to $56 million in March 2016[3]. Human trafficking not only supplements these financial sources, but also produces other benefits for the terrorist organization. In the followings, I shall highlight and detail the three most important motivators for trafficking in persons.

1. Financial benefits

Maintaining a moderate standard of living in territories under the authority of the Islamic State, providing basic social services and simultaneously planning and executing the active war and operation of the terrorist organization requires huge amount of income. Besides, jihadists are assured to earn monthly payment between $200 - $600 per operative, according to the operative's nationality and family size and up to $2,000 for administration personnel in senior management positions[4]. The terrorist organization is, thereby, forced to take part in various, billion-dollar' financial transactions in order to maintain its authority and strength.

The recent flow of migrants has laid the foundation for a hardly-checked possibility to expand the thriving international system for illegal trade and smuggling. Either people, money, black-market items or artifacts are considered, several links can be detected between illegal trafficking and various terrorist organizations. In my analysis, I concentrate mainly on the human trafficking contexts, but the other mentioned aspects should also be added to understand the economic situation and the relevant profits of the organization.

Although their propaganda rather highlights the ideological aspects of trafficking in persons, the Islamic State itself admittedly earns huge amount of income from human trafficking. Smuggler groups of migratory routes are said to be linked up with the leaders of the terrorist organization, which can be a highly profitable agreement for both sides. The approximate value of human smuggling in Libya had risen from $8m to $20m in 2010 to $255m to $323m in 2014[5].

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[2] Brooke Satti Charles, "Funding Terrorists: The Rise of ISIS" in *Security Intelligence*, 2014, available at: https://securityintelligence.com/funding-terrorists-the-rise-of-isis/, accessed on 25.07.2016.

[3] IHS, "Islamic State Monthly Revenue Drops to $56 million", in *IHS Says*, 2016, available at: http://press.ihs.com/ press-release/aerospace-defense-security/islamic-state-monthly-revenue-drops-56-million-ihs-says, accessed on 30.05.2016.

[4] *ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization,* The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2014, p. 155, available at http://www.crethiplethi.com/files/cp_0115.pdf, apud: Richard Barret, Senior Vice President, "The Islamic State", The Soufan Group, November 2014, p. 50, accessed on 26.05.2016.

[5] Orlando Crowcroft, *Isis: People trafficking, smuggling and punitive taxes boost Islamic State economy,* 2015, available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-people-trafficking-smuggling-punitive-taxes-boost-islamic-state-economy-1506473, accessed on 27.05.2016.

The route from Syria to Turkey could reach over $8,000 for an individual, which indicate that the millions of trafficked persons generate a considerable amount of income for the ISIS and linked groups. According to the analysis of the *Sahan Foundation* and the *IGAD Security Sector Program* (ISSP), some smugglers may also charge $400 to $500 to "insure" migrants against abductions[6]. According to some analysis, the trafficked Syrian and African migrants generate over $320m yearly income for the terrorist organization[7]. It should be also added that human trafficking is highly linked with the similarly serious problem, the oftentimes mentioned organ trafficking, which also contributes to the financial revenues of the terrorist organization[8].

While the operative work of human trafficking is carried out by hardly-detectable individuals, the organization provides a safer background with its expanded equipment, information and other capabilities. However, among the persons involved in trafficking, we may also mention those who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State's ideology from the beginning and thereby are ideologically driven for supporting the organization in every possible ways (in this case, trafficking persons).

The terrorist organization has provided guidance to its fighters regarding how many female slaves they are allowed to maintain and sets up regular auctions where mostly women and children are for sale[9]. According to a document issued by the ISIS, Christian and Yazidi girls,

between 1 and 9 years old, are sold for $172. Girls that are 10 to 20 years old might be bought for around $129, while those 20 to 30 years old are on sale for about $86. ISIS sex slave prices for women that are 30 to 40 is about $75 and for those 40 to 50 is $43[10].

In parallel with its other financial and economic operations[11], human smuggling business is difficult to detect, as routes and methods are diverse and constantly adapting to the current political, environmental and financial situation. Thereby, this business should provide a secured way of income with minimal risks for the organization.

2. Societal reasons

Distracting and destabilizing the local communities are considered as a key element in the process of the possible future followers' radicalization. In order to gain authority and press its fundamental ideology on the locals, the terrorist organization declared war on *kafirs* (non-believers) and on those who do not full heartedly obey the given strict rules of the extremist group. Thereby cleansing the gained and maintained territories adds a big amount of individuals (mainly Yazidi and Christian women[12]) for human trafficking operations.

As we see in Nigeria or Iraq today, trafficking highly intimidates population, generates fear and contributes to the push-factors of migration. Enslavement and rape of women were used as tools of war in the past (for example in Bosnia)

[6] *Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route*, Sahan Foundation, 2016, p. 16, available at http://igad.int/attachments/1284_ISSP%20Sahan%20HST%20Report%20%2018ii2016%20FINAL%20FINAL.pdf, accessed on 26.05.2016.

[7] Orlando Crowcroft, *cit. art.*

[8] János Besenyő, Zoltán Prantner, Bianka Speidl, Dávid Vogel, *Az Iszlám Állam - Terrorizmus 2.0: Történet, ideológia, propaganda [The "Islamic State": Terrorism 2.0 – History. Ideology. Propaganda.],* Kossuth kiadó, Budapest, 2016, p. 45.

[9] *Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),* FATF, 2015, pp. 12-13, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf, accessed on 26.05.2016.

[10] *Exclusive: ISIS document sets prices of Christian and Yazidi slaves*, Iraqinews, available at http://www.iraqinews.com/features/exclusive-isis-document-sets-prices-christian-yazidi-slaves/, accessed on 26.05.2016.

[11] For example oil sales and bank robberies, smuggling artifacts or imposing taxes upon local residents. Source: Besenyő, János; Prantner, Zoltán; Speidl, Bianka; Vogel, Dávid, *op.cit.,* p. 45.

[12] Ashley Binetti, *A New Frontier: Human Trafficking and ISIS's Recruitment of Women from the West,* Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security, 2015, available at: https://giwps.georgetown.edu/sites/giwps/files/I2A%20-%20A%20New%20Frontier%20-%20Human%20Trafficking%20and%20ISIS's%20Recruitment%20of%20Women%20from%20the%20West.pdf, accessed on 27.05.2016.

and also presents a humanitarian problem nowadays.

Women living under the authority of the Islamic State are sold as slaves (wives) for jihadists, thus fighters' needs and the demand for a solid family background are secured, while in the long-run, the next generation of jihadists is granted. In 2014, the terrorist organization operated an institutionalized process for abduction and sale of women slaves, according to the report of the OHCHR, ISIS had abducted up to 2,500 civilians, predominantly women and children, but also some men from Sinjar, Tal Afar, the Ninewa Plains and Shirkhan. Teenage children (both males and females) were being sexually assaulted[13], while many of the young boys were taken on a daily basis to unknown locations[14]. Sale centers are operating in central hubs of the trafficking routes outside Syria and Iraq, such as in Antep, Turkey[15].

Furthermore, ISIS seeks to recruit Western women online, creating a constant human trafficking route from the West into Syria for forced marriages[16]. Beside the questionable force of the call for a possibly exciting lifestyle, propaganda convinces women to feel themselves honored to be a mother of a future jihadist. According to Carolyn Hoyle, among the approximately 3,400 foreign fighters (data from 2015) in Syria,

approximately 550 are women[17].

In his statement in 2015, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned all the listed actions against women and the process of human trafficking in general, and claimed "trafficking in persons undermines the rule of law and contributes to other forms of transnational organized crime, which can exacerbate conflict and foster insecurity" [18]. Starting from his thoughts, we have to add that it is also a proven fact that human trafficking also represents an option for radical fighters to reach targeted destinations in Europe undetected[19], which further stresses the international community to reach universal reaction against the unchecked inflow of migrants to European territories. Ideologically driven, these fighters may assimilate in the crowd and optionally convince others sympathize with the organization. Although, as the last months' terror attacks on European soil demonstrated, direct recruitment is not the most urgent problem, however, this should highlight one of the negative aspects of uncontrolled immigration, which – among others – is still in line for a universal and effective solution.

3. Trafficking as a weapon of war

Since 2011, the society of the fragile state of Syria suffers from both internally and externally detectable migrant waves. According to the data of the U.S. Department of State, in the given time period (from 2011 to 2015) over 7.6 million Syrians were displaced internally, while simultaneously over four million refugees fled the

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13 Christopher H. Smith, *Fulfilling the Humanitarian Imperative: Assisting Victims of ISIS Violence*, The House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations, 2015, available at https://foreignaffairs. house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-fulfilling-humanitarian-imperative-assisting-victims-isis-violence, accessed on 25.05.2016.

[14] *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July to 10 September 2014*, OCHCR, 2014, p. 27, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_POC_Report_FINAL_6July_ 10September2014.pdf, accessed on 25.05.2016.

[15] Bulut Uzay, *ISIS Selling Yazidi Women and Children in Turkey,* 2015, available at http://www.gatestoneinstitute. org/ 7078/turkey-isis-slaves, accessed on 25.05.2016.

[16] Jenni Hankel, *ISIS: One of Many Contributors to Trafficking in Syria and Iraq*, Human Trafficking Center, 2014, available at http://humantraffickingcenter.org/posts-by-htc-associates/isis-one-many-contributors-trafficking-syria-iraq/, accessed on 25.05.2016.

[17] Carolyn Hoyle, *Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS,* Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015, p. 8, available at www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_ Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF, accessed on 26.05.2016.

[18] Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/ PRST/2015/25, UN Security Council, 2015, available at http:// www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2015 _25.pdf, accessed on 26.05.2016.

[19] Further analysis on this topic can be found in: Kis, Álmos Péter (ed.), *Afrikai terrorista- és szakadárszervezetek,* Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Kutatóhely (HVK TKH), Budapest, ed. 2015.

country[20]. Although these processes involve the general and abovementioned human trafficking motivations (financial and social considerations), it must be also highlighted that human smuggling is used to be an asset for a better position in the war[21].

The Islamic State regularly claimed that thousands of its followers are blended among the unchecked crowd of the trafficked and fled migrants. After the recent months' and years' organized or self-planned terrorist acts and the known expansion of insurgencies, the international community may not afford excluding the possible threat, there is a need for an adequate level of reaction. Law enforcement agencies, border authorities, bodies in charge for security of the European region and the affected bordering states are operating with increased attention and capabilities, as many examples present that their work against the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations' infiltration is not unnecessary.

In order to legitimate its kidnappings and human trafficking methods, ISIS has regularly advertised its involvement in human trafficking in its own publications such as Al Dabiq[22]. Thereby it enhances determination and increases the morale of its own troops. Moreover, ISIS uses abductions and human trafficking as an option for eliminating the opponents' human capabilities. For example on 9 July 2014, the organization kidnapped at least 60 former Iraqi Army officers from southern and eastern Mosul to pre-empt the potential rebel strike[23].

In addition to the foregoing motivations, the Islamic State have used trafficking to collect and recruit children, who then are being sent to training camps and to the front lines[24]. Besides the abductions of young children by ISIS, the Syrian army, pro-government militias, opposition forces and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) are also involved in similar processes. The later mentioned organizations consider children mainly "only" as an asset for human intelligence, providing information on local environment and conditions. Based on the current situation, we can say that, in spite of the increased efforts, the growing amount of child soldiers in the Middle-East and Africa remained an unsolved problem of the international community[25].

Conclusions

Considering the seriousness of the human trafficking business of the terrorist networks, international community continuously expresses its views and initiatives for countering trafficking in persons. The long-standing procedure in the recent years evolved to a multidimensional support for radical organizations, whose profits can be measured in material (e.g. human capital), financial (million dollar revenues) and ideological aspects.

It also must be added that human trafficking is not only connected with the Islamic State itself, but became a diverse and extensive network of the terrorist organization and other specialized groups, for example organ traffickers, drug smugglers or black market dealers. Thereby countering the terrorist group's operations alone is a significant, but not satisfactory response.

As it was mentioned before, it is proven that the ISIS linked up with traffickers and organized

[20] *Syria - 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,* U.S. Department of State, 2015, available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2015/243543.htm, accessed on 27.05.2016.

[21] David M. Luna, "Convergence: Human Trafficking and Criminal Exploitation by Da'esh of Women and Vulnerable Youth", in NATO ARW Responses to Female Migration to ISIS, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/2016/256682.htm, accessed on 25.07.2016.

[22] For example in *Dabiq* No 5. p. 17 or *Dabiq* No. 11. p. 31.

[23] *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July to 10 September 2014*, OCHCR, 2014, p. 8, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_POC_Report_FINAL_6July_10

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[24] *Modern slavery as a tactic in armed conflicts,* U.S. Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/250876.pdf, accessed on 27.05.2016.

[25] *Syria - 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,* U.S. Department of State, 2015, available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2015/243543.htm, accessed on 27.05.2016.

smuggling groups inter alia in Libya and Turkey, in order to facilitate the human trafficking transactions of their militants through the smuggling routes of the Mediterranean Sea and the Eastern-Mediterranean territories. ISIS runs a well-organized illegal immigration network and according to their propaganda and several experts' research, trafficking routes are also used as militant supply routes (both for sending supporters to Europe and collecting jihadists from the western states). Its militants' aim is to persuade migrants fighting for them in Libya and Northern Africa in spite of 'risking their life' through the travel. Although these routes mainly correspond with the basic migrant and transport routes, the channels are dynamically adapting for the current changes, thereby their tracking and elimination requires a complex counter-trafficking procedure.

ISIS practices kidnapping and enslaves (mostly Yazidi and Christian) women and a number of girls from the West in order to meet the needs of its fighters. Sex trafficking, forced marriages and sexual assault became a well-known and often used practice in the occupied territories.

Collecting the future's jihadists, ISIS regularly abducts children and transport them to one of its training camps for further ideological lectures. Considering the support of their war on kafirs, besides the training of the new generation of jihadists, Islamic State often use the enemy's kidnapping as a propaganda method and a way for preempting local countermeasures.

Summarizing the foregoing, the Islamic State's trafficking in human procedures can be addressed as a tripartite threat:

• It generates income for both the linked organized crime groups and, indirectly, for the Islamic State.

• It improves morale among jihadists, ideologically legitimates actions against its enemies, thereby human trafficking improves the propaganda.

• By human trafficking, the terrorist organization's military actions should be intensified and capabilities should be further increased.

Although, in the recent years, NATO, the responsible UN bodies and several specialized organizations discovered and addressed the threat, more intense and effective responses are still to be seen. While the European Union and African officials are striving to find ways to prevent the escalation of the problem, enhanced cooperation and international understanding is needed to handle the serious and urgent issue of the Islamic State's human trafficking practice.

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CHALLENGES OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS' PRACTICE

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This paper attempts to explore the complexity of the interactions between intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of their products, to underline the incongruence that marks these interactions, as well as the consequences generated by these difficulties. We intent to do that from both protagonists perspective, seen as personalities with distinct goals and interests (not always in harmony or consensus) and from the development at the institutional level represented by the protagonists themselves, respectively the intelligence process and the political and politico-military decision-making process.

In pursuing this aim, we will examine the constraints and endeavors that the intelligence analyst faces in successfully fulfilling his mission, starting with his profile. We will compare these constraints and endeavors with the needs, expectations and exigencies of the decision-making factors. After that, we will analyze the differences in approach, as well as the impact that these differences have on the interactions and on fulfilling the mission by each of the involved parts.

Keywords: intelligence analysis, intelligence products, beneficiaries of the intelligence products.

Introduction

Ideally, interactions between those who provide analytical products – intelligence analysts – and the political and politico-military decision-makers, as beneficiaries of those products, are governed by a range of strict rules, norms, principles of conduct and specific working procedures. However, these rules, norms and principles should not be understood as a rigid framework regulating the activities of those persons. While, from the perspective of the persons working in the intelligence field, such an approach would not face any resistance, as they are used to work under numerous restrictions, from the political and politico-military decision-makers' side, such an approach would be perceived as inacceptable, because of several factors of organizational, institutional, political, social etc. nature (for instance, professional background, specific working medium, assumed role, personal goals).

In practice, disobeying norms, principles and procedures regulating the relationship between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence products leads to a range of differences in the mutual approach of the protagonists.

1. Intelligence analyst: profile, role, personal constraints and endeavors

The minimal skills for an analyst are knowledge in one or more specific fields, appropriate linguistic skills, as well as editorial skills at a level considered acceptable (especially

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the concision of the analytical text is of interest). These represent the basic skills on which, in time, strong analytical skills are built.

An important request for an analyst aims an objective reflection of the analyzed situations. Analysts have their own opinions regarding the issues treated in their papers, but this aspect should not be noticed. Analysts are listened and trusted because of their expertise accumulated in time and not because of their personal opinion's strength. In fact, the disclosure of their own opinions would represent a trespassing of the line that separates the intelligence activity from that of the political field. In order to overcome this drawback, analysts should learn to distinguish their own opinions from the facts presented.

The intelligence analyst often works with information that is contradictory, wrong or even misguided from different points of view. The ability with which the analyst manages this information depends on his training degree, as well as the analytical platform he uses (through analytical platform we understand the analysis and assessment process of the information used inside an organization). Consequently, the analysts' training is an essential process for the success of the mission of any intelligence organization.

Unfortunately, the intelligence organizations do not have enough time to train the analysts within some programmers especially designates to this goal. Thus, analysts have to train on their own, at the working place. Analysts arrive in these organizations with certain skills learned in the tertiary cycle of their education that they adapt to the specific of the intelligence activity. Here they learn, between other things, the basic requirements and the preferred means of expression. These vary from one organization to another.

By carrying out a research activity, the analyst often has intellectual ambitions. In fact, he wants his work to receive an attention in line with the effort consumed in that sense. Here intervenes a first problem for the analyst. Each analytical product elaborated in an intelligence community is the result of a collective activity and represents in itself an important stake for the entire organization. As Kay Oliver stated, "there is an inherent tension between the intellectual autonomy of the analyst and the institutional responsibility for each product"[1].

In order to be listened and trusted by the beneficiaries of his work, the intelligence analyst has to establish some personal desiderates that we present as follows.

1. *To add value to the abundance of information existing on different mass-media channels.* Current technological developments allow decision-makers to inform themselves, sometimes even faster than the intelligence analysts can do regarding a certain event or phenomenon in every point on the Globe. The analyst has to be aware of this fact and to act in consequence. His response to this challenge aims at elaborating analytical products with an added value to the information existing on the global flows of news[2].

2. *To exceed the analytical abilities of the beneficiaries of his products.* The dissemination of a large volume of news at global level permits for a large spectrum of persons to develop the analytical abilities, as well as the capacity to decode the hidden messages (from the diplomacy field, but not only). Evidently, among those persons are also the beneficiaries of the intelligence products. As such, in order to be listened, the analyst needs to make sure that he is always one step ahead the decision-makers or that he has an understanding of the message that the latter do not have[3].

3. *To focus on the main ideas*, as well as on contextualizing and interpreting these ideas, and not on the relation of the punctual information[4].

4. *To develop imagination, keeping, at the same time, its realism.* The development of the

[1] Kay Oliver testimony in Gates hearings, cited i*n Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA analysts resist managers*, in International Journal of intelligence and counterintelligence No, 1, 1997, Spring, p. 19.

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imagination permits the analyst to elaborate possible scenarios for the analysis of the future events[5]. These scenarios represent a very useful device in preventing the strategic surprise. However, the analyst does not have to slip towards uncertainty. For that, he has to understand well in what conditions a hypothesis has real chances to materialize[6].

The development of the critical thinking is essential in order to reach all above mentioned endeavors.

When he elaborates a paper, the intelligence analyst often asks himself questions like: how relevant are the information he posses?, how significant are those for a specific issue?, how fast he has to elaborate an analytical product?, what kind of information has to transmit to a certain beneficiary?, how detailed has to be an analytical product?, what is the best way to transmit an information? etc.

2. Differences between the intelligence analyst and the decision-makers

The paramount goal of the intelligence analysis consists of informing the decision-making factors in order to improve the quality of the decisional act. From this perspective, it is shaped the necessity of a close relationship between the one to provide intelligence and the one to receive intelligence (either he requests it or not). As one of the role that intelligence analyst has to fulfill is that of advising the decision-making factors, this relationship should be based on the acknowledgement by the first of the latter's needs.

In practice, this aspect is especially important. A simple look on the profiles of the two actors reveals important differences between the actors, linked to interests, professional background, political belongingness, working environment, assumed roles, personal and professional expectations. In practice, these differences are potentially generators of frustrations among analysts, preconceived ideas among decision-makers and, in the end, misunderstandings between the protagonists of the relationship.

A first difference consists in defining the success of the mission from each perspective. The success can represent different things (or different perspectives) for the two actors. Thus, the decision-making factors define the success as an advance in the submitting their own agenda. The success of the governmental agenda has to be measurable (quantifiable) and proved in ways easy to bring political gains. It is important here to recall that national security policy is elaborated inside a political system and process, whose last reward is keeping, gaining and regaining the domestic political power.

On the other hand, the intelligence community defines its own goals in a different way. Sherman Kent stated that the intelligence analysts have three desires: to know everything, to be listened and to influence positively the political and/or politico-military decision-making process, as they understand it[7].

We would add that the intelligence analysts wish to keep their objectivity as far as the political field is concerned as well. This latter aspect tends to become increasingly difficult to prove in the current international context (political, economic, social, cultural and ecological), characterized by controversies in a great number of issues on the states' agenda. In these circumstances, the intelligence analysts risk to face a moral dilemma: either they reflect the truth as they know it, as competent researchers, but assuming the risk of being disapproved even by their bosses (and not only by the decision-making factors, in their quality of beneficiaries of the intelligence activity), or they choose to present things in a

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[5] Jack Davis, *Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence*, Sherman Kent Center, Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 2, Jan. 2003, p.10.

[6] There are two possibilities to illustrate uncertainty: one consisting of an subjective assessment of the probability, and the other in using statistical data. Verbal expressions such as possible, likely, unlikely can represent forms of a subjective assessment of the probabilities, and the delivering of the data as percents uses the statistical way. Thus, intelligence agencies rarely use quantitative terms and verbal expressions referring to probability are considered irrelevant. Often, the values that the reader gives to these expressions depends on the context in which they are used.

[7] Jack Davis, *Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations*, Sherman Kent Center, Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 3, Jun. 2003, p.14.

manner that will please decision-making factors, fueling themselves with the belief that their straying from the scientific truth serves a noble cause (supporting state interests) [8].

Another difference between the intelligence analyst and the decision-making factors refers to the motivational resorts of the two. The analyst's imperative is of intellectual nature, respectively to produce assessments that reflect the truth regarding a fact or a situation (on the basis of providing credible proofs)[9].

On the other hand, the beneficiaries' imperative is often of political nature, respectively to make political decision and obtain results, as well as the quick and effective action.

The different responsibilities promote and support different attitudes. In order to identify solutions to the problems they face, the beneficiaries of the intelligence activities have the tendency to keep as many options open as they can (sooperating with what the intelligence analysts consider „the incompatible objectives").

Such an approach suggests an optimist attitude. On the other hand, intelligence analysts are inclined towards pessimism, as the risk of their reputation to be affected is greater if they fail in foreseeing a negative evolution of one issue than if they make a warning that eventually proves to be exaggerated or wrong.

The time horizon at which the two actors report their mission fulfilling is also different. The objectives and the interests of the politicians are more often defined on short term (usually a mandate) as they are evaluated in accordance with the results obtained in that period. The careful and rigorous intelligence analysis needs, in exchange, more time of reflection. For that, more important than the time horizon to which they react is its objectivity.

At the same time, the beneficiaries of intelligence products are most often interested in the informative products that cover a short horizon of time (usually, up to a month), that is of what we usually name current analysis. Of course, this

Table no. 1: Differences between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence products

	Intelligence analyst	**Beneficiaries of the intelligence products**
Basic profile	is informative, analytic, works under a plan established by the beneficiaries of his work	is actional, synthetic, has a well determined goal
Assumed role	develops analytic products meant to assist the beneficiaries in making informed decisions	is decision-making political or politico-military factor
Personal skills	analytical spirit, high level of general culture, good knowledge of foreign languages and of different informatics programs, creativity, developed language	comes from diverse environment, varied professional background, is orientated towards efficiency, is concrete and factual

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[8] Kenneth Lieberthal, *The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy. Getting Analysis Right*, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Washington, D.C., 2009, p.18.
[9] Richards Heuer, *Psychology of the intelligence analysis,* Washington D.C., Washington, 1999, p.89.

aspect represents an advantage for the analysts working in this sector of the intelligence analysis (the current analysis), but a reason of frustration for those analysts working in the medium and long term intelligence analysis. Thus, a conflict

appears between what the decision-making factors want to read and what the intelligence analysts want to treat in their papers.

Shortly, the differences between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence products are presented in Table no. 1.

Least but not last, the analysts' desire to make their expertise on a certain geographical areas or issue known, as well as the analytical skills they have gained face the disinterest, the unavailability and the incapacity of the beneficiaries to detach on the current problems, otherwise pressing. The best analysis could be usefulness if they that have the authority to act do not use.

3. The report between intelligence analyst and the beneficiaries of their work

The interaction between the beneficiary and the intelligence analyst is not only one of offering and receiving of intelligence and assessment, but it also represents a permanent dialog. Therefore, the analyst has to wait for questions and judgments from the decision-making factors. Within this permanent dialog, the analyst does not always have to provide concrete responses, but rather focus on the identification of the major directions of evolution of a phenomenon or on the possibilities of actions of a foreign actor. As well as that, the analyst has to explain the limitations imposed by the insufficiency of data and information that he uses[10].

The clear distinction between the political activity and that specific to the intelligence field leads to questions linked to the manner in which the workers in the intelligence field and those working in the political arena have to relate. The core of the problem is the desirable degree of proximity between the two communities.

At present, two points of view prevail regarding this aspect. A first point of view is that the intelligence analyst has to keep a certain distance towards the decision-making factors, as they avoid the risk of providing information lacked of objectivity or that favors a certain

options (political or military). The adepts of this point of view support that such a position presents the risk of the decision-making factors to interfere with the intelligence activity, and this interference would aim at stimulating the production of analysis that support or oppose to certain political lines. Therefore, they consider that a too closed relation between the intelligence analysts and the decision-making factors raises the risk of the politicization of the intelligence analysis.

The other point of view argues that a too big distance between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence production creates the premise for the first to be less aware of the needs of the later and thus the analytical products would be less useful. The adepts of this point of view argue that the adequate training, but also the periodical internal analysis and assessment can lead to the avoidance of the politicization of the intelligence analysis.

Within this interaction, the two actors mutually shape their attitudes. Thus, the beneficiaries influence the thematic and the structure of the analytical paper, the language used the editorial style and the length of the paper. On the other hand, the intelligence analyst chooses the argumentation that supports his conclusions, the possible scenarios, makes up the prognosis on the issues treated and, sometimes, makes recommendations for the decision-making factors.

4. The role of the intelligence analysis in the decision-making process

Information means power, it is often said. This statement is not always or in any context true. Not always information speaks from itself. In addition, information can sometimes be wrong or simply irrelevant. Other times, the information can contain in itself the germens of power, but that who possess it either do not correctly or completely understand it (sometimes it is needed that the information be decoded), or he or she do not know how to use it in order to reveal the power.

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[10] Christopher A. Ford, *Relations between Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Lessons of Iraq*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC 2009, pp. 6-7.

In order to produce the desired effects, information should be implemented through the decision-making process. Consequently, the power of information depends on its degree of accuracy, but also on the manner in which those who poses the information know how to use it. In other words, in order for information to generate power it is not enough for it to be correct and complete, but it also has to be opportune, contextualized and communicated to those that, on the basis on the authority with which they have been invested, can give it power[11].

In a world that abounds in information and in which those invested to take decisions are most often too busy to reflect at the daily avalanche of information, it is difficult to identify which information is worth to be treated carefully and which isn't. The surest way to persuade someone that a piece of information should be carefully treated is to give it an added value to that assigned on other channels of information. That is usually realized by personal interpretations. Consequently, the power of information depends sometimes on knowledge of the elements of power by the intelligence analyst[12].

The last idea brings the intelligence analyst closer to the beneficiaries of the intelligence products. Instead, on the other hand, this closer relationship presents the risk of contaminating the analytical products with the presuppositions or the preferences of the beneficiaries.

Some authors and intelligence experts consider that the beneficiaries of the intelligence products are not part of the intelligence process. Their main argument is that once the intelligence product has been delivered to the beneficiaries, the intelligence process, as such, is over.

We consider that it would be a mistake to skip the beneficiaries of the intelligence products from the intelligence process. The role of the beneficiaries of the intelligence products do not limit to the receiving some intelligence products; they shape the intelligence activity during the intelligence process. Indeed, without a constant reference to the political or military action, the intelligence activity would not make sense. It can be said, without the fear of being wrong, that the beneficiaries of the intelligence products can play a decisive role in every phase of the intelligence process.

5. Assessment of the analytical products

Starting from those presented above, there appears the following question: what represents a good intelligence product? To this question does not exist a response clear or unanimously accepted by the researchers in the field. But there are, however, several elements generally accepted to be the ingredients of a good intelligence product. These are: *objectivity, opportunity, concision, clarity and coherence[13]*.

We did not include here *accuracy*. That is not because accuracy would not represent an important criterion in decryption a good intelligence product, but because it often represents criteria difficult to measure in order to be used in the evaluating process of the intelligence products. Generally, no one desires to make mistakes, but, at the same time, no one is infallible. As such, it is difficult to imagine a viable standard for accuracy that can serve to the evaluation of a good intelligence product. If we would continue the list of the significant attributes that make an intelligence product a good one, we would notice that other metrics also do not prove to be enough useful for this goal.

This does not mean that there are not enough clear ways to recognize a good intelligence product. Usually, two elements make the difference between a good intelligence product and a regular one – the quality of the writing and the impact upon the reader.

The quality of the writing is a skill that the analysts gets and improves it over time. As such, as far as these characteristics of a good intelligence product are regard, the problem is solvable. Instead, as far as the impact upon the reader is considered, the issue is questionable, as

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[11] Michael Herman, *Intelligence services in the information age. Theory and practice*, Frank CASS, London Portland, 2001, p. 212.

[12] Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence. From secret to policy*, CQ Press, 2000, pp. 152-165.

[13] Mark M. Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

it is not always the sole concern of the analyst. The availability of the beneficiary for the reading of the information presented in a paper, the time allocated to understand it, the professional background and, not least, his or her intelligence culture represents important factors in defining the impact upon the beneficiaries of the intelligence products[14].

If we take into consideration the fact that the analyst and the beneficiaries of the intelligence products use different sets of tools in evaluating the analytical products, we can deduce that this process is put under question.

This question mark put on the evaluation of the intelligence analysis by its beneficiaries should not represent a reason of frustration for analysts. They have to understand that, on the basis of a personal sustained effort, they can realize useful analytical products for current decision, but the exceptional analytical products can be realized very rarely. In fact, no one can be all the time exceptional, but this does not have to be the main concern of the intelligence analysts. The realization of a consistent and relevant intelligence product is a more feasible goal for the intelligence analysts and, at the same time, an appropriate goal for the beneficiaries of the intelligence products.

6. The feedback from the decision-makers

Ideally, the decision-making factors in the political and military fields have to provide to the intelligence community a frequent, clear, coherent, objective and constructive feed-back regarding the utility of the intelligence products they have received.

But in reality, the intelligence community receives this feed-back more rarely than it wants and it does not receive this feed-back systematically. This practice is based on some explanations.

The first explanation is that only a small part of the beneficiaries of the intelligence activity

considers that the feed-back is necessary. This attitude is also a consequence of the fact that these beneficiaries do not take part into defining the intelligence requirements.

Another explanation is that decision-making factors are often too busy in order to make time to transmit such kind of response. Often, these persons simultaneously manage more problems and have a limited time to reflect particularly at what was inappropriate or incomplete for an intelligence product that they have received.

A third explanation for the lack of the feed-back is that the beneficiaries of the intelligence products and the intelligence analysts have different institutional and personal expectations regarding the issues with which they operate. Beneficiaries are concerned with the development and implementation of the social, economic or security policies and programs and they hope to get further benefits (promoting in their career, reelection in the electoral campaign) as a result of the success of these policies. For them, the information delivered by the intelligence agencies does not represent more than a tool for the sustenance of their decisions. On the other hand, intelligence analysts are not responsible for the elaboration and implementation of the policies or for its success, but they focus on the filling the gaps in their personal training, in finding out new information regarding an event etc. Therefore, receiving a feedback represents a landmark in the analyst's training and, at the same time, a signal regarding the directions for the efforts that they have to study further.

A fragmentary feed-back can have two important consequences for the activity of an intelligence agency. The first is that the intelligence agency develops the collection plan starting from the presuppositions, and not from the certainties. In this case, there can appear the conflicting situations between the analysts and the beneficiaries of their products because of the discrepancies between the intelligence agency's supply and the expectations of the beneficiaries. The second important consequence is the distortion of the analytical message so that this to serve the preferences and the political interests of the beneficiaries, but not the objectivity. In

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[14] Teitelbaum Lorne, *The Impact of the Information Revolution on Policymakers' Use of Intelligence Analysis*, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 2011, pp. 134-145.

this case, it appears the risk of the subjectivity (politicization) of the intelligence analysis.

7. Conflict generator elements between analysts and beneficiaries

The differences between analysts and beneficiaries in terms of interests, training, political belonging, working environment, assumed roles, expectations etc. can lead to divergences in the views of the protagonists, as well as to preconceptions as far as the beneficiaries are concerned.

The differences (the uneven approach) between decision-makers and the intelligence community and the preconceived ideas with which beneficiaries sometime operate can generate divergences between the later and the intelligence analysts and even tensions between the two groups. These divergences in views can appear in each stage of the intelligence cycle, as follows in the next lines.

In the information requirements stage. The information requirements are not simple phrases. In fact, they represent the agenda of the political decision-makers. Therefore, the intelligence community expects that the decision-makers to orientate the intelligence activity by clearly establishing and delivering the priorities of the political agenda, of the information requirements, so that the collection and the delivering of the data and information to be possible and useful. But, in practice, things do not happen in this way all the time. When these requirements do not come from the decision-makers, the intelligence community has to establish on its own the information requirements that it considers necessary. Instead, this approach creates the premises for some further disagreements as far as the resources allocation is concerned, particularly when the intelligence community does not succeed in covering an issue which becomes important for the decision-makers in a very short time.

At the same time, there is not an intelligence community that allows itself to completely neglect an issue, even if that is not on the top of the decision-makers preferences. The reasons are most often linked to the changing in the dynamics of the issue in discussion, as well as to the "game of interests" of the powerful states. An illustration of this fact is the changing in the interest of the former US State Secretary, James Baker for The Middle East region. Baker announced, in 1989, that he is not interested too much in the region, and only a year after his statement, Iraq invaded Kuwait, event that immediately and significant changed the US position towards the region[15].

In the collection stage. Beneficiaries are not interested in the details regarding data collection (the sources from this data are obtained), if this does not involve political sensibilities. Instead, their practical concerns consist, in the first line, of establishing the budget allocated to the collection of data and information, as this activity consumes important financial, technical and human resources. At the same time, beneficiaries have the tendency to wrongly suppose that every issue is covered by the intelligence community at least at a basis level. Thus, when an issue with a low level of importance grows up quickly in importance, the beneficiaries of the intelligence products expect that a certain level of collection to be already in place and the collection phase can be rapidly intensified. These suppositions are evidently false.

The collection of data and information represent the basis of the intelligence activity and, from this perspective, any intelligence organization is interested to extend this activity as much as possible. Nevertheless, when the beneficiaries of the intelligence products, in their responsibility of political decision-makers, impose limits to the collection, the intelligence community obeys these limits, even if the preferences of the later are evidently for intensifying the collection. Eventually, the intelligence community cannot consume more resources for collection than it receives from the political community.

The officials in the intelligence community are aware of the fact that they do not have enough resources to collect any kind of data and information. Therefore, they periodically take

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[15] Mark M. Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-211.

the decision of excluding some issues from the collection process. The usual practice is that the political community to set its own limits on the resources allocated to the collection which, many times, is below the level that the intelligence community wants.

In the analysis stage. As far as the analysis activity is concerned, there are some aspects that can lead towards tensions between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of their products.

People working in the intelligence branch frequently operate with ambiguities and uncertainties of varied nature. In fact, if a situation or an issue were known, there would not be need for intelligence. Consequently, intelligence reports underscore uncertainties and ambiguities.

This situation is rarely accepted by the beneficiaries of the intelligence activity, at least for two reasons. One reason is that an intelligence activity marked by uncertainties and ambiguities will be less useful (perhaps useless) for an informed decision-making process by the beneficiaries.

The second reason is linked to the fact that beneficiaries do not know the features of the intelligence activity. The later cannot understand why (or they cannot accept how) the intelligence community, which consumes huge financial resources from the state's budget, cannot know these issues.

As political decision-makers, beneficiaries of the intelligence products have political preferences and – from their own perspective – it is natural to prefer information that support their preferences or allow them to adopt the political decisions they want. However, this attitude becomes questionable when they ignore the information they receive from the intelligence community.

Sometime, the analysis, information or assessments of the analysts can limit the political options of the decision-makers. For instance, when these assessments suggest that certain courses of political action are either unsustainable or have undesirable effects or results or are dangerous. This situation can represent an area of friction between the two communities.

The above examples illustrate the potential for conflict between the two groups. Some of these divergent opinions can be avoided or eliminated if both parts give more time and effort in order to transform the intelligence production into a process from which both parts can learn. In the last resort, the aim of the intelligence analysis should be established in accordance with realist expectations and rules of engagement accepted from the beginning.

8. Presuppositions of the beneficiaries regarding the intelligence analysis

As stated above, the differences between the analysts and the beneficiaries of their products can determine preconceptions for the latter regarding the activity of the former. We present, in this sense, the most important preconceptions.

Intelligence agencies know the informative priorities of the political and politico-military decision-making factors. In reality, these organizations cannot guess these priorities, if they have not been timely transmitted by those that further require them.

The analysis and the assessments elaborated by the intelligence agencies cannot be trusted. The truth is that then the information delivered by the intelligence agencies undermines the certitudes of the decision-making factors, they bother the latter. As a reaction, the latter often put the responsibilities for the failure of their actions on the intelligence agencies' activity. They can do this quite easy as they know very well that the intelligence agencies will not protest. The best example is the 11 September 2001 events.

Intelligence agencies know everything. This is far from true, although sometimes the intelligence analysts behave as nothing is unknown for them. These organizations know only what it was required them to find out (to monitor). Even if the intelligence services have learnt how to be increasingly effective, they are seldom succeeding in covering the full range of information required by the decision-making factors in a state. The characteristics of the

current international framework (including the interdependency and the transnational character of a range of important and controversial issues) make almost impossible to gather valued information referring to all the complex issues that concern a state. It can be stated, up to an extent, that these entities have lost the monopoly upon the information and they have to face new competition and new private intelligence actors from which they have to learn and with which they have to coexist[16].

Intelligence agencies have to provide solutions to the identified problems. Beneficiaries have great expectations from the intelligence community, as well as exigencies according to these expectations. From the beneficiaries' perspective, the intelligence community's function is not only to inform the decision-making factors related to risks, threats and dangers, but also to represent an effective and genuine tool in the decision-making process at the strategic level and to prepare a response to the threats that it identify.

The intelligence approach is a universal panacea. Generally speaking, the decision-making factors have learnt how to make up questions, but they rarely know how to make up questions adapted to the informative requirements. Not least, the decision-making factors do not understand the activity of an intelligence agency is different from that of a strategic studies center. No one, even the intelligence analysts, can foresight the future. In the last instance, it depends on the decision-making factors to base on right deeds provided by the intelligence community, to choose between more possible scenarios and to define their own policies.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis does not have negative effects. This aspects is especially important, therefore we will treat it at large in this paper.

A main cause of these preconceptions has its roots in the lack of intelligence culture of the decision-making factors. Because they do not have intelligence knowledge, the decision-making factors do not understand what the

intelligence agencies are, what are the principles that govern its activity and, implicitly, what are their constraints and their possibilities of action. They have not been trained in this direction. The decision-making factors often think that the intelligence analyst is an expert in geopolitics or security, when, in fact, it is an "expert in access to protected information".

9. Facets of politicizing the intelligence analysis

To politicize a deed means to give it a political tone or character or to transfer it to the political field. In the intelligence field, politicization means distorting the existing information in order to serve to some specific preferences or goals. Politicization of the intelligence analysis has negative consequences upon accomplishing its mission because it undermines its fundamentals, according to that the intelligence judgment has to be objective and scientific.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis has a double origin: it can be the result of some judgment errors from the intelligence analysts' side, but it also can be the result of some efforts from the beneficiaries of the intelligence products aimed at determining the intelligence analysts to conform to the interests or preferences of the former.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis is based on several causes. From the perspective of the analyst, these causes are: losing the objectivity related to the analyzed issue; the preference for some specific options or results; the desire to support these options or results; interests linked to the promotion in their career. From the beneficiaries' perspective, the main reason staying behind the politicization of the intelligence analysis is linked to promotion of a certain political agenda.

From another perspective, politicization of the intelligence analysis by the analysts can be the result of an intentional effort, aimed at answering the content and/or the significance of the information obtained through collection in order to support their preferred options, or it can be an unaware act.

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[16] Michael Herman, *Intelligence services in the information age. Theory and practice*, Frank CASS, London Portland, 2001, pp. 48-52.

When it is an deliberated act, politicization of the intelligence analysis is a mistake that has to be sanctioned, even if it is based on the best intentions, in other words, it serves a noble goal, which is superior to the intellectual probity. Instead, when it is the result of an unintentional act, politicization of the intelligence analysis can be regarded as an innocent gesture. But even in this situation, it can produce effects that are more difficult to identify and combat than when it represents a deliberated act.

In practice, politicization of the intelligence analysis by the analyst is more subtle because it does not compulsorily involve the fact that it has to overcome the line that separates the intelligence activity from that of the political field. In fact, most often, the analyst adjusts his or her analytical product so that this to be more favorable (to close as much as possible) to the political options of the beneficiaries. The analyst knows that, at the higher levels of the intelligence community, the line that separates the intelligence activity from that of the political field is not so clear and supposes that his or her professional chiefs, being more often in contact with the decision-making factors, want an analysis that satisfies the preferences of the later.

Politicization of the intelligence analysis is more difficult to prove and combat than it appears at first sight. Some experts argue even that politicization is an unavoidable contradiction from the analyst side. In case of the controversial issues (and almost all major issues in the current international relations are controversial), any pertinent analysis risks to be charged, at least partially and at least implicitly, from politicization, regardless of the statements, conclusions or prognosis it supports. The different disputes raised around the intelligence analysis – if it is valid, what arguments from those used are correct and what are unclear or false, what are important and what are irrelevant, in what context should the presented facts be understood – are aimed, directly or indirectly, at the political dimension. It can be said that, the more important is the intelligence analysis, the more politicized it is.

A more nuanced point of view considers politicization as a form of contamination of the intelligence analysis with the political predispositions of the beneficiaries.

Regarding politicization of the intelligence analysis by the decision-making factors, it can be said that it can also have several forms – from the direct expression of some preferences that support a certain course of action, to the selective use of the information received from the intelligence community or forcing the gaining of some analytical conclusions that support their political preferences or interests. For instance, the bush Administration has exercised pressure, in more or less subtle ways, upon the CIA analysts, in order that the later to state their believe in the existence of some links between the activists of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein[17].

Not least, politicization of the intelligence analysis is also a problem of perception. In principle, there can be reached an agreement to what politicization represents or how a politicized intelligence product looks like, but, in practice, it is more difficult to prove whether a certain intelligent product fits to the accepted definition or not.

Conclusions

The three desires of the intelligence analysts – to know everything, to be listened and to positively influence the decision-making process – expressed by Sherman Kent – aim at the core of the relationship between the analysts and the decision-making factors, as beneficiaries of intelligence products.

The constraints and the personal motivations shape the activity of the involved parts. For the intelligence analysts, the main concern is to be listened and believed by the legal beneficiaries of their activity. For the latter, the challenge is to learn how to effectively use intelligence products.

When tensions between the two parts appear, politicization of the intelligence analysis is often brought into discussion. The root of

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[17] In this sense, Bush Administration insistently asked to CIA analysts to focus on the indices suggesting these links. The Vice-president of that moment, Dick Cheney, paid several visits the CIA Headquaters in order to analyse and disscuss on this subject and the suggested alternative interpretations from the analysts' side. (Source: Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence. From secret to policy*, CQ Press, 2000).

the controversy linked to politicization of the intelligence analysis is based on the existing differences between the dynamics of the analytical process in the intelligence filed and that of the decision-making process in the political and/or politico-military field, the professional norms and the political utility, as well as in the differences between the applied standards in the intelligence analysis, respectively in the political arena.

Ideally, the relationship between the political community and the intelligence community has to be symbiotic. For that to happen, the intelligence analysts have to carry out their role as "advisers" of the decision-making factors; in turn, the latter have to communicate in due time the informative requirements to the intelligence community.

In practice, the result of the interactions between the intelligence analysts and the beneficiaries of the intelligence activity depends on the political culture of those working in the intelligence filed and by the intelligence culture of those working in the political field. The differences between the normal functioning of the relationship between the two actors can be remediated through a mutual effort aimed at better knowing the particularities of each filed and through a better communication process at the top level.

The interaction between the intelligence analyst and the decision-making factors, as beneficiaries of the intelligence products provided the firsts, is not a game between the equals. This game is deeply affected by the preferences and interests of the beneficiaries, which often impose their own point of view on the way in which the relationship between the two protagonists is governed. This asymmetrical relationship is based on the acknowledgment of the fact that the decision-making factors can exist and can work without the support of the intelligence community; conversely, the situation is not valid. In other words, the existence of the intelligence community cannot be discussed outside the political community; in turn, politics can exist even without intelligence. However, this last observation needs an important correction: without intelligence, the political and/or politico-military decision is neither effective nor sustainable for a state.

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CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS ON INTERNET USAGE

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The article focuses on the issues concerning security aspects as far as the Internet is concerned. Firstly, the essence of information revolution is shown, starting from opinions and assessments of key experts. Secondly, the information society is presented. Finally, cyberspace as a new area of threats is described and evaluated.

Keywords: *Internet, cyberspace, security environment, information revolution.*

Introduction

In recent years, there has been rapid progress in the development of the Internet, which brings together billions of users. At first, there were just simple web pages and communication programs, and now we have access to very sophisticated websites and social networking sites.

The Internet has been revolutionising and is changing the world and people's lives. These changes also apply to education, economy, recreation, entertainment, social life, politics and culture, etc. Skilful use of the Internet not only facilitates and enriches people's lives, but also - and above all - reduces the effort needed to achieve some objectives and allows to use multiple sources of information.

The result of this revolution is the creation, the rapid development and spreading of the global Internet network, which has a considerable impact on the modern world, giving the foundation for functioning of "information society".

Thanks to the Internet, which can be treated as a communication platform, entirely new conditions developed for changes in education, especially education for security. The increasing use of Internet in various areas of life makes this technology the one thanks to which we have unlimited access to information. This is why "information revolution" transformed the state's security environment, generating a new type of threat, related mainly to many different IT systems. These threats constantly evolve and require permanent identification and analysis of their impact on national security.[1]

1. Information security and information revolution

Spreading of new technologies as a result of technological developments in consumer electronics, computing and telecommunication has a huge impact on the functioning of modern societies. Technological progress introduced a revolutionary change in the functioning of the state, being one of the most important factors determining its security and conditions for implementation of security policy as a notion defined differently depending on the author

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[1] Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo teleinformatyczne wyzwaniem dla Polski, Komentarz Międzynarodowy Pułaskiego* (Information security being challenge for Poland), Vol. 2, 2011, p. 2. Source: http://pulaski.pl/images/publikacje/kmp/2011/pulaski_policy_papers_no_2_11_en.pdf.

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or source. These changes can generally be described as *information revolution*. Since in English the same term is used for revolution in both information itself and in IT, the term is used for both concepts and it will be described in the further part of the considerations within this article.

The same applies to using the term *information security*. As noted by Marek Madej, indeed 'when trying to describe and evaluate this complex and multi-faceted impact, researchers use a variety of terms and phrases.'[2] Therefore, it is important to clarify the relationship between fundamental concepts to describe the relationship between technological progress and national security: *information revolution* and *information security* on the one hand, and the revolution of information technology and IT security on the other.

Any combination of these terms comes primarily from the fact that, thanks to the development of the field of IT, which provides unlimited provision of services (communications, surveillance systems and management, data archiving, entertainment) in the modern world, and telecommunication technologies, which are primarily their carrier, information transmitted in data communication networks started to play a key role together with ensuring its protection. Information has become 'tangible asset'. The desire to improve living conditions, thereby creating a similar or better living conditions, forces the need to access information[3]. According to Christopher Liderman, *existence of modern, technologically advanced societies depend largely on the information, mostly processed, stored and transmitted in ICT* (Information and Communication Technologies) *systems*.[4]

Accordingly, information revolution not only refers to technological changes in ways of storing, processing and transmitting information, but above all the use of the digital recording of data. It emphasizes the significant raise in the importance of the role of information in the functioning of the state, increasing the possibilities of sharing it in the media, particularly mass media, as well as political and social processes, production of wealth, and thus national income, or as a component of the power of the state, not the very technological changes, enabling increase of the importance of information.[5]

In view of the growing importance of information, different areas of security are becoming increasingly dependent on the area of information security, which is the basis for broadly defined national security, which comprises not only military security, but above all non-military security, including range of systems without which the state cannot function in the field of, among others, economy, finance, society, etc.[6]

The term *information security* is understood by practitioners as protection of information against unauthorized (accidental or deliberate) disclosure, modification, destruction or disabling of its processing. The security measures taken by the entity (for example the state) are intended to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of the information. Their goal is to eliminate the threat. This applies to any kind of effort to protect owned information, affecting the functioning of the state structures and society, essential in the context of security and above all providing information superiority by acquiring new or more current data and conducting disinformation against potential adversaries (state or other entities).[7] Information security,

[2] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo teleinformatyczne państwa* (Information Security of the State), Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa, 2009, p. 17.

[3] Agnieszka Bógdał-Brzezińska, Marcin F. Gawrycki, *Cyberterroryzm i problemy bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego we współczesnym świecie* (Cyberterrorism and Information Security Problems in the Modern World), Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych, "Aspra-Jr.", Warszawa, 2003, p.17.

[4] Krzysztof Liderman, *Bezpieczeństwo Informacyjne* (Information Security), Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa, 2009, p.17.

[5] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., p. 18.

[6] Stanisław Jaczyński, Mariusz Kubiak, Mirosław Minkina [ed.], *Współczesne bezpieczeństwo polityczne* (Contemporary Political Security), Uniwesytet Przyrodniczo-Humanistyczny w Siedlcach, Instytut Nauk Społecznych, Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa, Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne Oddział w Siedlcach, Warszawa-Siedlce, 2012, pp. 244-245. source: http://www.liedel.pl/?p=13

[7] US Army created Netwar and Cyberwar – elements used

understood this way, or even information security dimension, has been present in the state policy, although in the last period its rank has increased significantly, with the result that it has come to be regarded as a separate element of security policy.[8]

Considering these terms, it should be noted that 'information revolution' and 'information security' have narrower scope of meaning. This is due to the strict and indissoluble integration of the physical telephone communication network with the IT infrastructure of states – it will be more precise to use the term IT revolution/ security[9]. They put emphasis on technological changes and rapid spread of specific methods of processing and transferring data, which is one of the main reasons and also condition for growing importance of information (for the functioning of the state, society) and the consequent implications in the field of security, while they do not increase the rank of the information itself.[10]

The term IT encompasses issues such as telecommunications, utilities and other technologies that are used for getting, selecting, analyzing, processing, managing and transmitting information using 'hardware and software at any time and place.'[11] Magdalena Witecka stresses the importance of telecommunications, which Anthony D. Kenny defines as one of the 'parents' of information technology. The domain of telecommunications is the transmission of information over a distance, the methods of processing (encoding) of information and telecommunications equipment itself.

Currently, telecommunications to a greater extent depends on the IT solutions and begins to play an increasingly more important in computer networks. Such interdependence in the operation of telecommunication systems with information technology has created a term related to IT, which is ICT,[12] emphasizing communication aspect stronger than IT.[13]

The term *information society*[14] comes from Japan. It was introduced in 1963 by the Japanese T. Umesao (original version 'jōhōka shakai') in an article on the theory of the evolution of a society based on information technology, and popularized by K. Koyama in 1968 in the essay 'Introduction to Information Theory', shortly after becoming the subject of analysis of the government of this country and national purpose of Japan for the year 2000.[15] This term came to Europe and the United States in the late 70's and 80's, when in 1979, the US National Academy of Sciences released a report announcing the beginning of a new period in the history of the world – the so-called information age. New opportunities, their impact on the organization of societies, the effects of the changes of civilization have also become the subject of – published in 1982 – report of the Club of Rome.[16]

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to conduct warfare (or even war) in information area. The issue of cyberwar was described in third chapter on cyberthreats to contemporary world.

[8] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., p. 18.

[9] For the rest of the paper, the term "information" will be used together with "IT" to emphasize the fact that information systems are connected by IT networks in complex structures; Jerzy Depo, Juliusz Piwowarski, *Bezpieczeństwo Informacyjne. Informacje niejawne. Cz.1 oraz cz. 2 (*Information Security. Classified Information), Katedra Filozofii i Teorii Bezpieczeństwa, Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i Indywidualnego „Aperion", Kraków, 2012, p. 89.

[10] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., p. 19.

[11] Magdalena S. Witecka, *Zagrożenia asymetryczne a technologie informacyjne* (Asymmetric Threats and Information Technologies), Zeszyt Problemowy, Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej, 2011, vol. 4(68), p. 37.

[12] ICT (ang. Information and Communication Technologies) – All activities related to production and usage of IT and telecommunication equipment and accompanying services, as well as the collection, processing, sharing of information in electronic form using digital techniques and all electronic communication tools. Source: Agnieszka Bógdał-Brzezińska, Marcin F. Gawrycki, *Cyberterroryzm…*, op. cit., p. 336.

[13] Magdalena S. Witecka, *Zagrożenia…*, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

[14] Information society – society where information becomes object of trade, which is treated as special intangible asset, with same value or even more valuable than tangible assets. Development of services related with transmission, processing and storage of information is forecasted. Source: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spo%C5%82ecze%C5%84stwo_informacyjne

[15] Magdalena S. Witecka, Zagrożenia…, op. cit., p. 41.

[16] Agnieszka Bógdał- Brzezińska, Marcin F. Gawrycki, *Cyberterroryzm…*, op. cit., p. 31.

The term information society was and still remains an area not sufficiently precise to form a definition satisfactory to researchers, which is why a variety of alternative terms operate. At this point there is 'cybernetic society', 'digital society' or 'multimedia society'. P. Druckner wrote about the 'knowledge society', J. Martin of 'telematic society', P. Tobera of 'global society'.[17] However, the term that is most accepted in recent years is the 'network society' introduced by the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells. He stresses that *the essence of the information society is not information and knowledge, because these are with us since the dawn of our history*. What is, according to him, relevant and qualitatively new is widespread, ubiquitous, dense network connecting people, things and events.[18] According to Castells, modern civilization is characterized by the presence and domination of the global network of information, power and wealth flow.[19]

It should be emphasized that information society works on many levels and covers various areas of life and science. Among them leading areas, there can be distinguished:

• *Technology* – relates to the infrastructure and applied technology. This includes the availability of facilities for the collection, storage, processing and sharing of information, multiple channels of data transfer and the ability to combine them in a variety of configurations;

• *Economics* – relates to the information sector of economy, which means branches of production and services that deal with the production of information and information technology, as well as their distribution. Information society is characterized by a large share of these branches of economy in the GDP;

• *Social* – due to the fact that there is a high percentage of people using IT at work, school and home. Related to the high education level of society;

• *Cultural* – is a consequence of the high level of information culture, which means a degree of acceptance of information as a strategic asset, as well as the appropriate level of IT culture.[20]

Herbert Kubicek, in order to organize and systematize the issues, presents information society by means of a layered model (Figure no. 1), the core of which are the IT technologies, surrounded, in turn, by a layer of phenomena associated with the use of information technology by economy, and all this happens in an environment created by the socio-cultural and political phenomena.

According to the definition adopted for the 'Strategy of development of information society in Poland until 2013', information society is defined as a *society in which information processing with the use of information and communication technologies has significant economic social and cultural value*.[21]

Comprehensive impact of these areas shapes the quality of the information society, while new technical measures affect, among others:

• *higher level of health care by improving access to specialized medical services;*

• *reducing the cost of universal primary education and access to attractive teaching methods, increasing the possibilities of self-education, and to facilitate knowledge acquisition for residents outside the large cities;*

• *broadening the scope of direct democracy and easier access for citizens to administrative procedures;*

• *more effective methods to increase the security of citizens.*[22]

What is very important, all these transformations occurred both at the local level, on a national scale, internationally and finally

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[17] Ibidem, p. 31.

[18] Manuel Castells, *Teoria społeczeństwa sieci*, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2012, p. 141.

[19] Ibidem, pp. 141-148.

[20] Tadeusz Jemioło, Jerzy Kisielnicki, Kazimierz Rajchel [ed.], *Cyberterroryzm nowe wyzwania XXI wieku* (Cyberterrorism. New challenge for 21st century), Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji, Warszawa, Wyższa Szkoła Policji, Szczytno 2009, p. 179.

[21] *Strategia rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Polsce do roku 2013* (Strategy of development of information society in Poland until 2013), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, Warszawa, 2008, p. 2.

[22] Agnieszka Bógdał-Brzezińska, Marcin F. Gawrycki, *Cyberterroryzm…*, op. cit., p. 36.

Figure no. 1: A layered model of information society[23]

globally. These included, above all, the most developed countries belonging to the so-called 'Western civilization', including Poland, which no doubt significantly influenced and still influences the situation and functioning of all other societies of the world.[24]

2. Cyberspace as a new area of threats

The development of information technology and the infrastructure functioning on the basis of it, gave rise to an entirely new sphere of social activity, and also the area of possible conflict and rivalry, meaning cyberspace.[25]

Unlike most concepts of computer science, the concept of cyberspace does not have a fixed and unambiguous definition. Although

the term cyberspace is still considered to be very modern, its history goes back longer than 30 years. For the first time this term was used in 1982. William Gibson, author of the science fiction novel that introduced the term in the story entitled *Burning Chrome*. Two years later, in his novel *Neuromancer*, Gibson again invited his readers to cyberspace, describing it as: "a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts … a graphical representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system; unthinkable complexity; lines of light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constellations of data."[26]

Gibson used the term "cyberspace" to name the information space created by computers linked together[27], with an immersion virtual reality, meaning the world not spatial in the physical sense, immaterial and non-geographical.

Further increase in popularizing the concept of cyberspace came with the explosion of the development of the Internet at the turn of the twentieth/twenty-first century, under the influence of what came to be called Internet as a whole. This is a simplified understanding, and based on it can

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[23] Source: Michał Goliński, Społeczeństwo informacyjne: problemy definicyjne i problemy pomiaru (Information Society: Problems of definition and measurement issues) [in:] Materiały ogólnopolskiej konferencji naukowej: Polskie doświadczenia w kształtowaniu społeczeństwa informacyjnego: dylematy cywilizacyjno-kulturowe (Materials after conference on Polish experience in the development of the information society: the dilemmas of civilization and culture), Krakow, 28 September 2001; source: http://winntbg.bg.agh.edu.pl/skrypty/0037/cz0-r11.pdf

[24] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., p. 21.

[25] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., p. 28.

[26] Source: http://www.thecybernaut.org/2010/11/definitions-of-cyberspace/

[27] Magdalena S. Witecka, *Zagrożenia…*, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

be concluded that the cyberspace is entered in the moment of connection to the Internet.[28]

According to American directives, signed by President George W. Bush in 2008, National Security Presidential Directive (NSDP) 54 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 23 Cybersecurity Policy define cyberspace as a broadly understood network infrastructure of information technology, apart from the Internet, including telecommunication networks, computer systems and a variety of processors and controllers, closely related (SCADA) with critical infrastructure of the state.[29]

In the European Union, the official electronic dictionary of concepts of the information society following, proposed by the European Commission, the definition of cyberspace can be read: 'Virtual space in which the electronic data of worldwide PCs circulate.'[30] A 'virtual space' has become fundamental element of this definition. This logically separated (non-existent physically) space is created by the sum of data, files, web pages, applications and processes, contained in systems, which are accessible only

through ICT systems.[31]

In summary, cyberspace should be understood as a whole set of linkages in the sector of human activities involving information and communication technologies (ICT). Such an understanding of cyberspace in the 'human' and 'technical' dimensions tends to reflect different specificity, which differs from the physical reality, which means that operations taken within it also have different specificity.

Factor influencing this difference is the virtual nature of cyberspace, 'devoid of geographical parameter, which makes it being immeasurable and unlimited.'[32] Independence from geographical limitations applies also to operations conducted in this space. Such activities, aimed at the security of any country or a particular subject, can be initiated basically from anywhere in the world. The only requirement is a technical opportunity to join the network, and thus 'the entrance to the cyberspace', which sets the framework and limits of continuously variable level of development of information technology and the degree of 'cross-linking' of the world.[33] Also the current shape of the environment, which has foundation primarily in the Internet, provides the individual devices, connected at a given moment with the network (host)[34], access to other circuit elements regardless of their geographic location, relatively rapid, identical reach as other participants of the same status. Thus, every action, especially affecting computer systems can be as effectively carried out from one's own territory, as well as from the area in a completely different part of the globe.[35]

Another crucial element for carrying out the actions, undertaken in the framework of cyberspace, is low and steadily decreasing cost of such operations, mainly due to the technological progress, especially in science. Lower hardware

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[28] Network in a general sense is a set of interconnected elements that depend on the specific network. Networking in cyberspace are open structures, able to spread without limits, integrating new elements as long as they are able to communicate on the network, meaning as long as they are able to share the same communication codes (for example the values or objectives). Typology determined by the network shows that the distance (or the intensity and frequency of interaction) between two points (or social positions) is shorter (or more frequent) if both points are elements in the network than if they did not belong to the same network. At the same time, flows between elements within the network does not separate any distance or is about the same distance. Thus, distance (physical, social, economic, political, cultural) for the point or position is set to zero (for each element on the same network) or infinity (for every point outside the network): Robert Białoskórski, *Cyberzagrożenia w środowisku bezpieczeństwa XXI wieku. Zarys problematyki* (Cyber threats in the security environment in XXI century), Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Cła i Logistyki, Warszawa 2011, pp. 14-15.

[29] Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, Larry K. Wentz, *Cyberpower and National Security, Center for Technology and National Security Policy*, National Defense University Press, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C. 2009, p. 26.

[30] Source: http://ec.europa.eu/ information_society/tl/help/glossary/index_en.htm#c.

[31] *Przegląd bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego 9/13*(Overview of internal security), Wyd. Biuro Logistyki Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Warszawa 2013, p. 229.

[32] Robert Białoskórski, Cyberzagrożenia…, op. cit., p. 16.

[33] Ibidem, p. 16.

[34] Host – any computer connected to network.

[35] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., p. 29.

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costs and easier access to the appropriate 'malware'[36] which does not require a huge financial investment.[37] In addition, regardless whether the scope of activities undertaken will be individualized (for example directed against a specific device or user) or multiple (striking all network participants using specific software, in a certain area) it has no effect on the duration of the operation.[38] Cyber attack is done with unbelievable speed, within approx. 300 milliseconds cybernetic impulse is able to circle the globe twice.[39]

However, the decisive factor which differs cyberspace from physical reality is a relatively high possibility of anonymity by the entity making an attack or other malicious actions. This is mainly due to the current structural model of Internet, which creates the organizational skeleton of cyberspace. Basic rules, defining the methods and manner of presentation and transfer of data on the Internet were not in fact formulated taking into consideration the dangers threatening the network and affecting its functioning from the inside.[40] The fourth version of the system of assigning Internet addresses (so-called 'The Internet's address assignment system') IPv4, now universal, greatly hinders the already complex identification of network users via the IP address of their computers. In addition, a cyber attack can occur through the use of so-called 'PC-

zombie.'[41]

The result is that there is no requirement for compulsory authorization for the system while the entity carrying out the operation (for example the perpetrator of the attack) cannot be always and uniquely identified.[42]

Conclusions

The main considerations in the article were focused on security aspects regarding Internet usage. In the first chapter, of key importance were the reflections on information revolution and information security. Also, presented were definitions and main issues.

Against this background, in the second chapter the reflections on cyberspace were presented. It should be stressed that Internet is different from cyberspace. The latter is the complex enviroment susceptible to actions of variety of players in security domain.

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[36] Malware – malicious software, name used for different types of viruses; Agnieszka Bógdał-Brzezińska, Marcin F. Gawrycki, *Cyberterroryzm…*, op. cit., p. 331.

[37] Enormous disproportion between offensive and defensive techniques should be mentioned. Attack techniques are characterized by a low level of advancement, and thus small costs, which in the case of the simplest viruses is only 175 lines of codes (LOC) with not comparably higher level of complexity – approx. 5-10 million LOC (occurring in commercial applications) and the expenditure incurred for the development and implementation of defense techniques: Robert Białoskórski, *Cyberzagrożenia…*, op. cit., p. 32.

[38] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

[39] Robert Białoskórski, *Cyberzagrożenia…*, op. cit., p. 32.

[40] Marek Madej, Marcin Terlikowski, *Bezpieczeństwo…*, op. cit., p. 30.

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[41] Virused and remotely controlled computer, usually taking over the entire network of machines, which together form the so-called botnet - a network of virus-infected machines used most frequently to carry out massive attacks DDoS type, guaranteeing the anonymity of the perpetrator; Robert Białoskórski, *Cyberzagrożenia…*, op. cit., p. 81.

[42] Ibidem, p. 32.

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SOCIETAL SECURITY UNDER THE IMPACT OF THE CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM'S TRANSFORMATION

Daniel ROMAN, PhD*

Technological development, changes in the world economy, terrorist actions, migration of the civilian population from the conflict areas – all these are just some of the causes that led to significant changes in the security of the contemporary societies. These international circumstances demand new conceptual approaches on security, and regarding the following terms: vulnerability, threat, risk, economic and social stability. Thereby, it is required to rethink the ways of approaching the understanding, the identification, the protection and the optimization of the societal security.

We consider that an integrative approach from the perspective of the educational system of all the factors of influence from within or from outside a certain society can achieve a comprehensive view of the dynamics of causes and effects, based on predictable algorithms and processes.

Therefore, it is necessary to review the education system and to consider it as a basic factor able to generate national stability, to perpetuate the intrinsic values of a nation which is in a contextual contemporary framework which is difficult to characterize.

Keywords*: society, security, education, sociological perspective, critical infrastructure, risk, danger, threat.*

1. Societal Security – Conceptual Framework and Definition

Under the impact of the contemporary transformations resulting from the complexity of the multiple challenges, the global security environment has become much more unstable and harder to define under the strict constraints given by the geopolitical and military dimensions. The recent conflicts and the terrorist events in the states facing the magnitude of the phenomenon related to the refugees from the war zones of Syria are just a few highlights concerning the study of security from a new perspective, that of societal security. The efforts of the theoreticians to identify the new types of threats to the states and the international communities have focused on the segment of societal identity and cohesion which, if disturbed, can generate sources of instability at the level of any society, seen as a whole.

The relatively new concept of "societal security" was expressed within the security studies of the 1990s, by the Copenhagen School and consists in correlating the non-military threats with non-military solutions, when the topic of interest is no longer given by *the state* (in the sense of national security), nor by its *population* (human security, safety) but directly

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by the *society*[1].

The Copenhagen School managed for the first time to move the conceptual framework of security by strictly delimiting the security studies from the strategic studies and the international relations in which the state is the central element of security, to a new "area of interest", much more explicit and with a more comprehensive approach applied at the level of society.

There were several definitions, including that according to which "*the societal security* refers to the ability of a society to subsist in its essential character under constantly changing conditions and faced with possible or present threats"[2]. Such a definition indicates that the security ultimately becomes threatened when "the societies perceive a threat in terms of identity." We can also deduce that, in the same sense of defining societal security, it represents a new dimension which is conceptually built, making the connection between the state security and the human safety as a whole[3].

In the conceptual formulation of societal security, Barry Buzan played an important role through his paper "People, States and Fear"[4], in which he shows that the societal security represents one of the pillars of security, together with the military, political, economic and environmental security. Thus, according to Barry Buzan, the societal security brings an important contribution to the security of the state, in the sense that, alongside the military, political, economic and environmental dimensions, the society is an important dimension where the state can be threatened.

In his paper "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe"[5], Ole Waever argues that Barry Buzan's approach on the security of a State being built on five pillars (political, military, economic, environmental and societal) cannot remain topical in the context of the conceptual transformation of security. Ole Waever has shown that the state-society duality was established as a contemporary reality that requires the interpretation of the societal security as a object of study in its own right, in the sense that the state security is perceived in terms of threats to its sovereignty (if a state loses its sovereignty, it can no longer survive) and the societal security is considering the threats to the identity of a society (if a society loses its identity, it will not be able to survive). By similarity, if the state represents a reference element for the military, political, economic, environmental and societal sectors, than "the society" shall be set up as single reference element for the societal domain.

By definition, societies are groups of people, strongly united by the firm sense of collective identity and are characterized by a perpetual expression of the notion "we are". Due to this expressed notion, through the presence of the feeling of belonging to a group and the identification of the existential ideals of that group, the societies are different from other structures, such as states, international organisations or other forms of individuality and can act/interact within the international system as units, can have a common history/ past, present and, consequently, future. From the perspective of the establishment of societies, we can interpret several criteria for the formation of groups and their adherence according to such principles as ethnicity, religion, gender, age etc. In this context, the societal security is faced with maintaining, asserting and preserving the identity of the society and the cohesion within it. On this model of interpreting a society, actual results have been obtained regarding the elements of conservation of the religious and ethno-cultural identities. Therefore, the study of the societal security needs to be achieved in terms of threats, of the changes in the environmental conditions: natural or artificial which touch upon the identity of the

[1] Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security*, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, pp. 79-93.

[2] Weaver O., Buzan B., Kelstrup M. And Lemaitre P., *Identity, migration and the New security Agenda in Europe*, London Printer, p. 23.

[3] Henriette Riegler, Swedish Emergency Management Agency, *Societal Security and Crisis Management în the 21st Century*, Stockholm, Sweden, 2004, p. 23.

[4] Barry Buzan, "Popoarele, statele şi frica", Editura Cartier, Chişinău, 2014 (Second edition)".

[5] Ole Waever, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Editura Pinter, 1993 – Political Science, p. 187.

group, such as its cohesion and uniformity.

Another way of interpreting the societal security can be achieved in the light of the large number of factors that may influence the group's own expression or diminish the ability of the group to reproduce through generations. Examples in this regard, of threats that may be at societal level are made through ethnic or cultural cleansing, etc. Depending on the size of the group and on its geographical location, we can interpret the cultural purge as a systemic approach for the annihilation or the limitation of the institutions (their role or their power), of the cultural symbols which are important to the identity of the group. In the second example, the ethnic cleansing, we can study the physical method of the deliberate intentional and violent attack, crimes or deporting the members of a society to another society. The deportation, defined as the forced displacement of the masses, can be studied under several forms of forced migration, namely refuge from the military conflict zones, or natural calamities etc, or amicable migration, such as labour force migration etc.

From an analytical point of view, the threats to the identity and the cohesion of a group cohesion will refer directly to the societal security on two identified directions, valid in both ways: from high to low and from low to high, depending on the political interests and the support coming from outside the concerned society. The manifestations of the threat on the identity of the group can be studied under different forms such as: undermining the cultural and religious identity, the manifestation of extremism, nationalism, falsification of historical background, changing the official language, or transforming the rights of the minorities in both ways (decrease or exacerbation).

Regarding the cohesion factor, can be recorded changes in the demographic patterns, regionalization, anarchy, low economic status (poverty), migration, affecting the family pattern or separatism.

In both cases, an analysis of the factors of accomplishing a threat against the society may have a dual nature, taking in consideration what is real and what is perceived, according to how the identity or the cohesion of the group is affected. The position of the threat against the society can cause different reactions and, by default, different security measures. The sociologists have acquired an important role in the interpretation of social events and have been watching with great interest how the societies are seeking solutions for solving a wide variety of typical, atypical, symmetrical, non-symmetrical or hybrid threats.

The recent history of military conflicts has demonstrated that there are important changes in the ways of conducting armed conflicts, where the hybrid war is approached as a new form of warfare appeared in the military literature. In the context of the hybrid war, the societal security is interpreted differently, in the sense that it may be an analytic leverage when it comes to delicate political, military, economic, infrastructure or information processing changes which can become threats and potential causes for an extended military conflict.

2. Implications of the Contemporary Educational System Transformations on Societal Security

The different modalities of perception and representation of safety among large masses of people are, more often, influenced by historical events, by what happened at the level of the analyzed community. According to Waever, internationally, the societal security means the ability of a society to subsist under the conditions of the change or accomplishment of direct or indirect threats. In other words, societal security can be understood through the sustainability of a group of people organised under normal conditions for evolution, on a traditional model of culture, language, association, national and religious identity, or habits[6]. In the broad spectrum of international political relations, the direct concern for global security can be studied through its intrinsic elements, such as *mutual trust, predictability and promoting common interests*

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[6] Henriette Riegler, Swedish Emergency Management Agency, *Societal Security and Crisis Management în the 21st Century*, Stockholm, Sweden, 2004, p. 23.

associated with *classical tools of adequate public diplomacy.*

The conceptual positioning regarding the expression of the societal security can be taken to extremes and perceived as a threat, such as the application of *discriminatory social actions*. Although discrimination, known as the classical form of reaction to strengthen the identity on the principle of achieving the cohesion of a majority group, can be interpreted as a point of departure towards the fulfillment of the direct threat to the societal security and even a first step towards a violent conflict with loss of human life.

Many contemporary cases are known in which the political leaders have used the power for asserting and maintaining the identity and the cohesion of a majority group. For example, Radovan Karadzic who, based on ethnic criteria, has retaliated to extermination on the principle of "ethnically cleansed territory". In an interpretative way at the level of societal security, in this case the application of the ethnic extermination, could have been generated by the so-known *security dilemma*. This dilemma can be generated by a false or exaggerated situation, in the context of the *ways of perceiving* threats, based on the actions of increasing societal security in the neighbouring countries, in terms of other systems of social values. In this case, the social values can be viewed as mechanisms involved and connected with other energetical systems, i.e. the educational system. Through education/indoctrination are formed the multitude of convictions and beliefs over the surrounding reality and thereby, a determination of the masses for the acceptance and the support of extreme acts of purification of a society on behalf of a questionable security.

In order to understand the need for a societal security, it must be "placed" in the context of the systems of values where the group/traditional community was formed and is seeking to settle down following a certain education. In his sociological papers, A. Comte refers to the impact of the revolution as a social phenomenon, with the potential of producing social disruption, ruled by "political tyranny." As an example, the

Enlightenment and the Revolution did not bring new social forms but, rather, they have destroyed the old ones.

According to F. Tonnies, the community and the society represent the poles of a quantum of variations, which may be assigned a meaning and a historic direction, a migration at a conceptual level from community to society. F. Tonnies defines society as "a group of people who, living and maintaining, as well as community, in a pacifist manner one towards the other, are not organically unified, but organically separate; while in the community they remain united, despite any form of separation, in the society they are separated, in spite of any connection"[7]. The determinant causes are the ones that lead to the formation of the group consciousness and the "glue" of the ties mentioned by F. Tonnies, where all focused represent the total of the efforts of the sociologists for developing the fields of sociological research. In this sense, several landmarks can be identified, according to which the man involved in the process of economic exchange in a "capitalist perspective" has became a societal subject.

In this context, we consider that the community forms are the only conceptual frameworks with the power to conserve the memory and the tradition of a particular group, which represent the convertible values only through a certain educational system customized at the level of the individual, the group and their future generations.

From the perspective of the *educational system* of a certain specific community, different values can be assigned to the security concept, which can be interpreted either as reflections of the organic will, or as reflected will to exist as a distinct entity. Since the foundations of a community can be identified as being the sum of values, norms, actions and behaviours that determine its confluence, coexistence and its unity vector, then we don't need to do anything other

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[7] Ilie Bădescu, *Istoria sociologiei. Perioada marilor sisteme*, Universitatea Oradea, 1998, p. 54 http://www.scribd.com/doc/25530912/Ilie-Badescu-Perioada-marilor-sisteme-Curs-de-istoria-sociologiei#scribd, accessed on 10.03.2016.

than an assessment and a determination of our own education system that defines the community it sets on spatial and temporal coordinates[8].

For the purpose of defining the societal security from the perspective of the educational system, it is important to apply a comprehensive approach and to place security in the context of contemporary crises and blockings that need to be urgently resolved. Resolving a crisis must be worded in such manner so as not to generate or to degenerate into another similar or different crisis. Therefore, we concider the educational factor to be important in the process of settling down a crisis and restoring security at state-level or international community-level. We are referring to the educational factor as a fundamental element of the crystallization of the societal structures, around which are born the existential ideals of that group or society. The elements of culture and traditions of a group represent the reflections of the feelings accumulated at the level of conscience of that group, without which it cannot exist. Any direct or dissimulated threat to the value system of a community can be interpreted as a direct assault on the very existence of the community in question and, therefore, we can expect the most violent reactions. Adversaries in an ideological conflict are energically supported by the values of their own educational system. To this end, we draw the attention on the case of "Je suis Charlie".

The ideological values represent the final products of a perpetual educational process. Education itself represents a fundamental influence on the level of group consciousness. When the group's existential ideals are affected, we can expect very different reactions ranging from press statements up to very bloody terrorist attacks.

The contemporary forms of education under the impact of modern technologies are undergoing a radical transformation of the societal feature. Thus, it could be about the "radicalization of an individual or of a small group of people" which

Figure no. 1: Caricature done in response of the terrorist attacks of 7 January 2010 in Paris[9]

is out of the institutionalised educational system. The educational values are contaminated, and the products of a pseudo-culture having religious background can materialize in the most radical behaviors in the sense of committing the terrorist act of kamikaze. Thus, we demonstrate that the societal security can be deeply affected by the breaches and the weaknesses of its own educational system.

After we have identified and pointed out that the educational system is one of the important factors for the societal security, it is necessary to switch to identifying the sector-specific measures which are required from the perspective of a sustainable development, for the interpretative purpose of "the cessation of a crisis cannot be accepted as the beginning of another crisis of a smalles or more controllable scale." The very *imperfection of the educational system* may be the cause of a more or less profound crisis, in all aspects of the security pillars: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information.

Under the influence of the group and its ideals, education is one of the fundamental elements of life, in the sense of the representation of "the mechanism of producing" the feeling of safety and security. The two feelings, safety and security, at group level, may have different energy values, depending on the group's relating to a particular value system, which was formed using

[8] Iulian Chifu, Bosnia-Herţegovina: Societal-cohesion, the scene of the national reconstruction end the road towards European integration, Europa XXI nr. 6, 2008, pp. 17-22.

[9] http://www.mediafax.ro/cultura-media/textul-je-suis-charlie-a-invadat-internetul-dupa-atacul-terorist-de-la-paris-13753563, accessed on 27.06.2016.

sustained educational actions. Therefore, we can affirm that there are two types of education, as formative system: an education from within the community, based on cultural traditions, and another education-from outside the community, based on cultural influences.

Altering the ratio at the level of traditions and influences from an educational point of view, can generate major imbalances on a group's or even an individual's perception of safety and security and, consequently, a change in their behavior. As a result of the educational cultural imbalance, there can be conflict situations, such as those of ethnic cleansing as "the Radovan Karadzic case" or individual terrorist attack as the case of "Je suis Charlie". In both cases given as an example, at the level of societal security, we can consider as major causes of incidents a particular state of conviction at the level of individual or masses. The so-called states of conviction, taken as the foundation of the actions, are the product of a particular educational system. How exactly these "guidances" to antisocial actions are produced and which is the trigger mechanism to the radicalization of individuals who conduct attacks, terrorist kamikaze-type acts, still remains an unknown variable. What is certain is that the bases for smaller or larger antihuman and antisocial actions are the personal beliefs or the beliefs of the group (the existential ideals of the group). As we have stated, the existential ideals of a group are the certain result of a comprehensive educational process, institutionalised or less institutionalised.

For example, the economic perspective in terms of the technological development of the economic branches by the involvement of the education system "missed the start against technology" so that the contrast of the social well-being was emphasized, in the sense of making the rich states richer and making the poor countries poorer. Education means not only access to certain cultural values and traditions but, rather, a formation of certain attitudinal states towards acceptance and integration of the elements of progress, in case of economies – the technology. Through education the economic effort is supported and achieved for the purchase of new technologies with the potential for increasing production and thereby obtaining a state of high well-being, which reflects upon security as well. In another terms, of promoting societal security values through the educational system, the latter must be provided for and carried out with new specific skills. "Scattering the individuals" in the educational sector, whatever the social criteria of discrimination might be, may be one of the directions of study in order to limit the adverse effects specific to a society, namely being careless with their own educational system. The dropout crisis and failure to integrate all individuals in the institutionalized system can be one of the causes for future major crisis latent at the level of communities. Notwithstanding the fact that "education is done anyway just the values change" it is required to involve the results of the sociological studies for the determination of the predictable directions in which the society will migrate from a state of normalcy to the so-known state of social danger.

Another approach to societal security can be achieved in terms of the involvement of the educational system based on the development of the communication technologies, like the internet. It is recognized that this "informal education on the internet" may substitute, within certain limits, the real educational system, which is institutionalised and the promoter of the real social values. Neglecting the decision makers of the educational system can determine "the migration" of the individuals of a society to other concepts and norms of life, towards damaging or even destroying the fundamental life values, such as adopting that behavior intended for acquiring a "true salvation." The phenomenon of recruiting through the internet members for certain asymmetric- military terrorist groups can be interpreted as a weakness of the system of censorship over the digital data, but also a great error of planning the institutionalized education system. The lack of formal social and civic education can be the "ally" of present terrorist actions and neglecting this sector may be an amplifying factor of the ongoing crisis or of the crisis which might arise.

The role of education is to train and develop skills, ethical and moral characters and to implement that set the necessary practical knowledge based on theoretical background, historically formed at the specific level of the community that we refer to. In this regard, the development of the Internet may have dual character, both beneficial and disastrous.

Whatever the manner of conducting or failure to conduct education as a whole, both at community level and at individual level, it constitutes one of the principal factors generators of security. By combining the priority elements of interest: national security, individual security, safety and security, more directions of research can be extrapolated, according to the chart of


Figure nr. 2: Diagram of relations concerning the relationship of security at a conceptual level: MACRO-MICRO-national security and individual security[10]

Accessing the "free" databases and the "open source" techniques can lead to the training of all levels and feature outside the school, school being perceived here as the only institutionalized educational element. Who and for what purpose makes possible that unbundled access to "education through the internet" must realise that if major crises are not necessarily caused by these practices, clearly they can maintain and sustain dormant future social disasters. "The informal educational offer of the Internet" has gained momentum, and detailed rules for the control of migration from areas of extremist behavior and materialisation of the terrorist act (based on digitally supplied models) will become even more difficult to put into practice.

relations in Figure No. 2.

Through education attitudes and behaviours are formed both in front of accidental or deliberate events having a major impact on the safety and security of the individual or the group. The transition from macro to micro and vice versa, of all security-related concepts, will be achieved in the light of the risks and vulnerabilities that can be identified at a particular time. Against this background, we can see the typology of several classes of vulnerabilities, which can be

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[10] Ulrike Kastrup, *Societal Security and Crisis Management in the 21 st Century*, CRN Workshop Report, Stockholm, Sweden, 2004, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Report_CRN_Stockholm.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

deciphered at a particular time and subsequently integrated either at community level or at the level of the individual. "The integration of these vulnerabilities" at the level of consciousness, is generating behaviors and reactions to external stimuli.

By extrapolating the impact which can be achieved in the wake of a possible full materializations, we can artificially construct, using "educational tools", several types of individual or collective behaviors. Therefore, it is possible to notice an occurrence of events generating crises, due to a state of insecurity induced through educational mechanisms. The directions in which an individual or a society is heading as a result of the action or lack of action the educational factors can be predictable, or, in other words, both an individual and a society can be manipulated exactly by building certain "pseudo-educational systems". The argumentation of how exactly such "an educational machine" can be constructed and how it can function will be the subject of a subsequent study.

Conclusions

In the interpretation of the relationship between *diversity, multiculturalism* and *social cohesion*, we consider that there must be some form of manifestation of the institutionalized educational act. How the educational act will be achieved will represent how the society will be prepared or not to face future challenges to the societal security.

The crises can be overcome only with well prepared social forces, trained to respond to new types of threats in the wide spectrum of activity from environmental disasters up to small or large scale terrorist action. Taking into consideration the dual manifestation of the concepts of multiculturalism and social cohesion of two or more cultures that tolerate and help each other, they can promote new sets of values and by using diversity as a reference point, a substantial improvement of the society as a whole can be achieved.

Institutionalized education will be able to contribute to the determination of mutual respect within the current relations between states under all relationships: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure or information. Thus, the educational system needs to be reformulated, in order to be able to respond to a high level of readiness, of integration adapted to the new requirements of the labour market, together with the need to preserve the historically achieved cultural heritage.

At the end of our approach, we appreciate the attempt to conceptually reposition the notion of societal security, in terms of the contemporary educational system transformations. We affirm that, in spite of the exhaustible natural resources, the human resource under its historic transformation ratios can intervene and act because of its strong adaptability to the environment, supported by education. The societal security will not find its real role in the system of threats, risks and vulnerabilities, until the educational system will get its due place in the priorities of a community, regardless of its nature.

The philosophy of differences, of enemy and the other's dominance will continue to be distortedly claimed until the educational act will be seen as a priority policy of a state, a real and sustained intervention where the values, the convictions and the beliefs of any kind are born.

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SECURITY AND FREEDOM – HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND CURRENT PERCEPTIONS

Tomasz KOŚMIDER, PhD*

The article focuses on the issues concerning the essence of the security and freedom, as far as the security environment is concerned and regarding the roles to be played by key entities, i.e. states. The historical perspective is shown, focusing on the approaches by respective philosophers. Further, the globalization and information revolution issues are described as the factors/ tools of influence. On one hand it is about to disseminate modern technologies, improving management methods and ways of finance, but on the other hand it is about to create new challenges and threats for security both in military and non-military realm. On this backdrop the author stresses, that the democracy cannot be considered only in terms of a system of institutions but also as a phenomenon of culture which implies the dominance in the public life of certain values and in consequence behavior in the political life also in relation to security issues

Keywords: *security environment, freedom, safety, personal security, democracy.*

Introduction

"There are two values indispensable for worthy, satisfying or at least tolerable human existence. One of them is freedom, the other security. One cannot do without the other: security without freedom equals bondage,

whereas freedom without security means chaos, the feeling of loss, ordeal of uncertainty and humiliation caused by lack of knowledge what to do and practical inability to fight it."[1] The snag is, as Zygmunt Bauman pointed out attention to, that "as much as these values need each other for its self-fulfillment, however, living in peace or alliance with each other somehow does not work. Both of them may be lost at the same time. Nevertheless, neither our ancestors nor us have made them both flourish and grow simultaneously (…). The more freedom the less security and the more security the less freedom. After all, security means stability, a firm ground and belief that what is right and useful today will remain as such tomorrow and later, what one has today will not be lost tomorrow, consequently a conviction that in the morning after the waking up one will see the world as in the evening before going to sleep. And freedom, however it is defined, means the ability to spread one's wings and fly, that things can be different, that the world could be improved – but also, as it always happens when one travels into the unknown, it consists in fear against the risk of making an error".[2] To sum up,

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security brings the peace of mind, freedom of change, it is a prescription for anxiety. "On the other hand, freedom means the possibility of self-definition and self-determination when security means submission to decisions taken by others and performing within the boundaries defined by these decisions"[3].

The complexity of problems under consideration seems to deepen as soon as it is taken into account that the role of the state, as many philosophers have claimed, is to organize welfare – a good living. The state aims at ensuring its citizens appropriate living conditions, work, rest, access to common goods and facilities, as well as preventing unemployment, social stratification or social conflicts. Meeting these needs enforces putting forward optimal solutions on all concerned both from the point of view of efficiency and cost-effectiveness as well[4]. Globalization and information revolution favour spreading modern technologies, improving management methods and ways of finance. They create an opportunity for democratization and enable economic and social progress. However, the effect of these new trends are new challenges and threats for security both in military and non-military aspects.

1. Ambiguity of the security notion

The notion of security is understood quite ambiguously and is used in various situations and contexts. If it is applied without additional terms, as a rule it means the lack of threat against life, health and existence of either an individual or humanity as a whole. In modern inclinations for a pluralistic perception of security and its polysemantic definition, the differences often consist in: reliability (technical sciences), stability and certainty of existence (humanities), durability and existence (life sciences) or freedom, peace

and comfort as well as undisturbed coexistence with other people or natural environment and also health, property, well-being and certainty of the future[5].

A very important distinction in comprehending security is to distinguish between personal and structural security and safety. The first category refers to particular individuals and includes all categories containing lack of threat towards human life, health, work, belongings, property and freedom. The conceptual range of personal security and safety is certainly much wider than "non-adjectival" security. In turn, structural security concerns certain entireties, constructions which men are related to. These structures include first of all the state, nation, local community, as well as natural environment. The way of these structures' or systems' functioning affects people's lives, their personal safety including[6].

As far as validity and superiority of the mentioned above security and safety categories are concerned, it is difficult to decide an explicit standpoint. A kind of human duality poses a certain ontological-axiological difficulty, on the one hand there is a person, an individual, on the other an immanent part of a larger whole and social structures, beyond which he/she is unable to function, as noted by Aristotle: "a man is by nature created to live in a state. The one who by nature and not by chance lives outside the state is either a wretch or a superhuman being"[7]. This idea corresponds with the view called universalism which claims that the interest of the state, society

[3] Zygmunt Bauman, *Skrzypce wolności*, [in]: *Potrzeba wolności: sztuka europejska po 1945 roku. 30 wystawa Rady Europy* (Violin of Freedom in: Need for Freedom: European Art after 1945. 30th Exhibition of the Council of Europe), Kraków 2013, p. 34.

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[6] Ryszard Rosa, *Zarys polskiej filozofii bezpieczeństwa* (Outline of Polish Security Philosophy), Siedlce 2008, p. 13; Wojciech Rechlewicz, *Elementy filozofii bezpieczeństwa. Bezpieczeństwo z perspektywy historii filozofii i filozofii polityki Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem*, (Elements of Security Philosophy. Security from the Perspective of Philosophy History and Politics Philosophy. Security Management), Warszawa 2012, p. 29.

[7] Arystoteles, *Polityka*, (Politics) transl. by L. Piotrowicz, Warszawa 2006, p. 27.

or nation is more important than the interests of individual people. Thus structural security takes precedence over personal security and safety. Individualism perceives a human being as the highest value opposes that view as that cognitive attitude treats personal security and safety as the superior form of security. It is not difficult to notice that both of these cognitive approaches, namely an individualistic and universal one clash with each other also in an individual dimension, most of all in a situation when a man is faced with a choice between their own physical individual survival versus risking their life in the name of such values as the nation, the state or religion[8]. As the history of the Polish nation in particular teaches us, we have been experiencing such situations many times, the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 can provide an example of such situations and dilemmas.

No matter how to look at the security issue, it should be noted that it must be perceived as a value worth striving. It was already known in the antiquity, at least from the time when philosophy's point of gravity shifted from the nature onto the human being and culture and since that time we have been dealing with rational thinking, so characteristic of the Western culture.

2. From Sophists to St. Thomas

The first thinkers to deal with the issues of the state and law were Sophists. According to them, these values developed as a result of an unwritten social contract and a man becoming a member of a society took on particular obligations created by a given community. Thus laws and moral principles were changeable, depending on circumstances. A certain novelty in the discourse on security was introduced by Socrates living in Athens in 469–399 BC. That philosopher strongly supported meeting obligations for the state even in direct life or health threatening situations. Socrates' thoughts affected the final shape of an

ideal state concept created by his disciple Plato[9].

His views concerning what today is defined as national security or security of the state were presented by Plato in his dialogues "Republic", "Statesman" and "Laws". Recognizing a deeply rooted among the Greeks principle that man is a social being and may find fulfillment only in a political community, he tried to understand and define the sense of the existence of the state and design its functioning so as to make it functional mainly from the point of view of public welfare. The state should provide its citizens with good life perceived not only in a material dimension but in spiritual one as well[10].

In spite of being an interesting project, the Platonic conception of the state is not possible to be implemented in practice. However, it may provide inspiration guiding into the direction of critical thinking on the issues of wielding power, functioning of the state and democracy. The concept of an ideal state suggested by the Greek philosopher should be treated as a prototype of conceptions which recognize the primacy of the state over its citizens, which claim that an efficient functioning of the state is more important than people's rights, happiness and prosperity.

Plato – a classic of objective idealism permanently entered the canon of Western philosophy and his thoughts are priceless also from the point of view of developed social and political theories. The dilemma that he indicated concerning the issue of relations between the state and an individual would return during the following centuries. The philosopher is also a precursor of the foundations of ethics how to act in a situation of a military confrontation[11].

Like Plato, Aristotle also believed that man cannot function outside the state and is fulfilled only in a community of a political character.

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[8] Łukasz Zamecki, *Społeczne podstawy ładu politycznego* (Social Bases of Political Order), Warszawa 2011, pp. 11–12; Wojciech Rechlewicz, op. cit., pp. 29–30.

[9] Marian Cieślarczyk, *Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania problemów bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa* (Theoretical and Methodological Bases of Research on Security and Defence of the State Problems), Siedlce 2011, pp. 47–48.

[10] Platon, *Państwo, Prawa* (Republic, Laws), transl. by W. Witwicki, Kęty 1999, p. 39.

[11] *Historia filozofii* (A History of Philosophy), vol.1, *Grecja i Rzym*, (Greece and Rome) transl. by H. Bednarek, Warszawa 1998, p. 299; Wojciech Rechlewicz, op. cit., s. 65.

Moreover, the role of the state is to organize a good life. However, this welfare should not differ much from the good of its citizens. Aristotle in his views diverged slightly from Plato's theories which assumed a dominant position of the state whose good in general should be treated much higher than its citizens' prosperity. The suggested idea of the state supervision over its citizens is far more moderate in comparison to Plato's views. Aristotle supported the reconciliation of the requirements of the state with personal interests of individuals. Defining freedom through a political institution derives from him[12].

Is it possible to live pleasantly if there is a threat posed by other people – Epicurus living almost at the same time as the founder of Liceum in Athens, a representative of hedonism wondered. "In order to feel safe among people, it is a natural approach to believe that the good is everything which leads to it", he believed. Security and safety in Epicurus' philosophy are ones of the most highly respected values although "providing security and safety for people are useless if phenomena taking place up there and under the ground and in infinite universe bring us terror"[13]. Surprisingly, in Epicurus' works one can notice basic security issues which can be found today and mainly associated with a Swiss scholar Daniel Frei, i.e. objective and subjective security[14].

The Stoics also discussed the issues of security and freedom. The safety and security of individuals, social groups and even states are uncertain. In their understanding the concept of absolute security and safety does not exist. Moreover, human fate could be uncertain. Therefore one should be ready for any scenario, even the worst one and not despair or doubt. The one who gets rid of passions is a free man.

While considering security problems, particularly safety issues, one cannot forget to mention St. Augustine and St. Thomas. They perceived security, peace, functioning of the state and development of the society through the prism of God's gifts which cannot be treated as the highest values due to their instrumental character facilitating salvation. Therefore breaching the state of security or safety, the same as all suffering or misery should not be treated as an ultimate evil as the earthly life is not the human destination. The highest value is to reach ultimate good.

3. From Niccolo Machiavelli to Friedrich Nietzsche

Niccolo Machiavelli's views were in complete opposition to the views presented by the doctors of the Church as they concerned deeply the issues of structural security. The main problem that this theoretician dealt with was security of the state, as well as independence and freedom. Machiavelli drew a lot of attention mostly to looking for effective means to achieve these values. At the same time he treated politics as an autonomous area of human activity, independent of morality or any philosophical or religious systems. There are often accusations that the methods of operation proposed by him are negatively tinged and are explicitly associated with immorality, opportunism, deceit and ruthlessness. Do politics and actions carried out for structural security or personal safety have a close connection with morality? It is difficult to give a simple answer. However, indisputably, many of the recommendations of the author of "The Prince" appear both in the past and present political practice[15].

Niccolo Machiavelli's views from the very beginning triggered numerous comments and remarks or even outrage. The sixteenth-century lawyer, politician and philosopher Jean Bodin accused him, among others, of sanctioning

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[12] Arystoteles, op. cit., p. 27, 201; K. Drabik, *Bezpieczeństwo personalne i strukturalne* (Personal and Structural Security and Safety), Warszawa 2013, p. 310.

[13] Diogenes Laertios, *Żywoty i poglądy słynnych filozofów* (Life and Views of Famous Philosophers), transl. by. I. Krońska, K. Leśniak, W. Olszewski, Warszawa 1988, pp. 652–653.

[14] More in Dieter Frei*, Sicherheit. Grundfragen der Weltpolitik,* Stuttgart 1977.

[15] Niccolo Machiavelli, *Książę* (The Prince), trans. by. C. Nanke, Kęty 2007, pp. 50–64; Idem, *Rozważania nad pierwszym dziesięcioksięgiem historii Rzymu Liwiusza* (Discourse on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius) trans. by. K. Żaboklicki, Warszawa 2009, pp. 332–356.

despotism and tyranny. Church circles opposed his primacy of the interest of the state, whereas supporters of strong royal power accused him of republican sympathies.

The 16th and 17th century gave birth to political projects and theories which looked at the issues of the organization of the state, security and functioning of the society in a different way from Niccolo Machiavelli's propositions. The concept of an ideal state did not lose its popularity and was developed by Renaissance utopians St. Thomas More, Francis Bacon, and Tomasso Campanella[16]

The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who lived on the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, tried to define the state as a creation which emerged due to a social contract or violence. He claimed that freedom is the human natural right - ius naturale unlimited freedom is an attribute of the state of nature. Some other philosophers referred to the proposed by him concept of the social contract which may guarantee structural security and personal safety such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, who defined freedom in a political perspective, and John Locke whose political theory emphasized individual freedom and the right to property (the precursor of political and economic liberalism). According to Władysław Tatarkiewicz, "Locke was one of those who believed that people seek only their own interest and he thought that it is right as long as they seek judiciously"[17].

Locke's contractualism reveals a smaller rift between the naturalistic freedom and normatively conditioned security in the state than it was presented in the works of Hobbes. Freedom and equality are fundamental rights stemming from nature, whereas the organization of political community serves primarily to create individual and collective safety and security.

Jean Jacques Rousseau believed that common good of each society must be based on freedom. Man by nature is free nobody should control it or limit it even in a situation of threat. The essence of the social contract is the dedication of those who sign the contract to be led by common will. The social contract is not an empty formula if "it contains default commitment which alone can give power to other obligations, namely, if anyone refuses to obey the common will, they will be forced by a (political) body, which means that they will be forced to freedom"[18].

Huigh de Groot (Hugo Grotius) considered similar issues to Hobbes'. He claimed that social drive is an inherent feature of human nature which is expressed in the willingness to live together with other people in a peaceful manner and meeting commitments. He opposed the view that people are selfish by nature concentrating exclusively on achieving their own benefits. He perceived the state as a union of free people, united in order to achieve common good and use of law. He saw the role of power as service functions for its citizens. Obedience to power is not binding if its orders are contradictory to the natural or God's laws. The possibility of citizens' disobedience towards the state power was also considered by other researchers such as David Hume. He allowed for such a scenario in a situation when the state did not meet the task entrusted to it[19].

Immanuel Kant claimed that the state and individual are moral entities that have the right to autonomy, freedom and respect. The philosopher from Königsberg did not see a real antinomy occurring between politics and morality, not taking into account a certain subjective dimension resulting from human inclinations. In Kant's ethics, the sense of moral obligation comes to

[16] Frederick Copleston, *Historia filozofii*, t. 3, *Od Ockhama do Suareza*, tł. H. Bednarek, S. Zalewski, Warszawa 2001, s. 312–315.

[17] Tomasz Hobbes, *Lewiatan, czyli materia, forma i władza państwa kościelnego i świeckiego* (Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth), Warszawa 1954, pp. 108–111; W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii* (History of Philosophy), vol. 2, Warszawa 2011, p. 142.

[18] Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Umowa społeczna. List o widowiskach* (Social Contract. Discourse on the Arts) , transl. by. A. Peretiatkowicz, (Social Contract ...), W. Bieńkowska (Discourse …), Warszawa 2010, p. 25.

[19] Ryszard Rosa, Małgorzata Lipińska, Mariusz Kubiak, *Filozofia bezpieczeństwa personalnego i strukturalnego. Tradycja – współczesność – wyzwania* (Philosophy of Structural and Personal Security and Safety. Tradition – the Present Time– Challenges), Siedlce 2007, pp. 85–93; Wojciech Rechlewicz, op. cit., pp. 170–171.

the fore as it strengthens the internal structure of a republican state and levels the disharmony between individual freedom and personal and structural security. He defined the concept of freedom in terms of an individual's public functioning. Individual safety can be considered only in reference to structural security conditions. He also advocated the idea of perpetual peace[20]. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, who perceived war as an indelible element of the dialectics of history, opposed Kant's thesis.

The role of the state, as claimed by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, cannot be only to provide security and safety for individuals but to create conditions to enable them a proper moral development. However, such activities were connected with the necessity of the state to interfere in public life, thus restricting the freedom of citizens.

For Friedrich Nietzsche, culture and nation appeared far more important. The nation is apparently shaped by great artists and great ideas, being a kind of collective spiritual will. The state, however, is based on mundane lust, it appropriates culture by trivializing it and deprives it from its due reverence. In his work "Untimely Meditations" he wrote that the state cannot be the highest goal of the humanity, therefore, it seems unreasonable to claim that the service for the state is the most important obligation of man [21]. The man does not have to be someone more than a citizen of the state. Nevertheless, they must be submerged in the state and its culture. According to Nietzsche, cruelty lies at the core of every culture, in so called higher cultures it is over-spiritual. Cruelty adopted the man to live in a society, wars hardened them. Confrontation and danger enhance life, bring real freedom understood as "the desire of self-responsibility (…), indifference to hardships, privation, severity even for life. This is the readiness to sacrifice others and ourselves for the cause"[22].

Nietzsche calls for activism, building a new order based on a different reverse system of values, what will happen along with the advent of new philosophers.

Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas still in the Belle Epoque drew a big response, initially in artistic circles associated with modernism, expressionism and also symbolism. Soon Nietzsche became a spiritual leader for post modernism and he also inspired existentialists. A separate discussion is required about the achievements of the author of the superman were used by Nazi Germany's propaganda.

Nietzsche's philosophy closed a certain stage in the history of philosophy. "It rejected almost all previous values in the name of primacy of life, creative conquering power". It appeared from Nietzsche's point of view that differences between previous philosophies were not so essential as they seemed. Most of them in fact accepted in different variants such Socratic values as wisdom, good, virtue, reason and truth. Philosophy based on these values was questioned by Nietzsche. The stance he opposed stipulates the existence of "an objective higher order of the world and combined with it axiological order, it also presents the man as the one who should be subordinated to that order"[23].

4. Towards contemporary considerations of security and freedom

A clear growth of interest in security phenomena appeared in the 20th century, especially in its last decades. One of "the pioneering trends in the development of thinking on this subject is the philosophy of structural and personal security. This philosophical perspective of security thinking exceeds the categories of war and peace philosophies encountered so far"[24] due to the description and anticipation of security threats of a particular individual or a group, as well as security and safety of their broadly understood environment. The interest of research

[20] Immanuel Kant, *Wieczny pokój* (Perpetual Peace), trans. by J. Mondschein, Toruń 1992, p. 78.

[21] Fryderyk Nietzsche, *Niewczesne rozważania* (Untimely Meditations), trans. by L. Staff, Kraków 2003, pp. 143–144; Idem, *Tako rzecze Zaratustra. Książka dla wszystkich i dla nikogo* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra), Poznań 2006, p. 45.

[22] Fryderyk Nietzsche, *Zmierzch bożyszcz czyli jak*

filozofuje się młotem (Twilight of the Idols), trans. by S. Wyrzykowski, Warszawa 1991, p. 101.

[23] Wojciech Rechlewicz, op. cit., pp. 269–270.

[24] Marian Cieślarczyk, op. cit., p. 17.

is broadened not only by a subject aspect of security but object dimension as well[25].

The issue of relations taking place between security and freedom of a human being, as well as establishing the relationship and impact of personal freedom on security are very important in the considerations of security problems. Freedom should not be understood as a possibility to do anything what a man wants to do but responsibility for their existence. One has to agree with Włodzimierz Kubiak who claims that "the boundary of freedom is determined by another man and security and safety are contained within it". Is it eligible to claim that security without personal freedom is fictitious? Is a man whose "freedom is suspended in the name of social system's security ever safe?" [26] It can certainly be assumed that man is a social being and their development, apart from innate features, to a large extent depends on acquired, behavioural characteristics, therefore they are significantly affected by the environment in which a man functions.

The political and systemic proposal containing desired institutional and legal aspects, as well as democratic patterns of elites' and society's behaviour is called a consolidated democracy[27]. In Philip C. Schmitter's opinion, the mentioned above consolidation is a process of transforming temporary solutions that appear in the course of transformation into solidly established and practiced and voluntarily accepted cooperation relations taking place between all participants of a democratic political system[28].

The social aspect of democracy consolidation including the pro-democratic beliefs and attitudes is absolutely essential what is particularly important from the point of view of the common good idea. According to Maria Urban, deeply internalized pro-democratic attitudes in favourable institutional conditions create a democratic personality supporting a democratic political system, whereas changes in "political culture have their origin in changes on the level of individuals and the aggregation of individual attitudes may lead to the generalization on the level of society"[29].

The level how much the principles of a democratic state's functioning are accepted influences the readiness to sacrifice personal rights and freedoms for the sake of the common good, which the state or civic structures are. The literature of the subject-matter contains model psychological portraits of a democrat, defined as democratic personalities or democratic orientations which are created by the following mechanisms:

- attitude to the democratic system;
- conviction with reference to relations taking place between people (individualism of identity, tolerance, social trust, a positive attitude to the common good);
- cooperation in order to achieve the social good (engagement in activity in organizations);
- normative beliefs;
- non-specific personality traits (resistance to fears, cognitive openness);
- motivation of affiliation and achievements[30].

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[25] Krzysztof Drabik, *Bezpieczeństwo personalne i strukturalne* (Personal and Structural Security and Safety), Warszawa 2013, p. 10–11.

[26] Wojciech Kubiak, *Kilka uwag o bezpieczeństwie, wolności i śmierci*, w: *Współczesne bezpieczeństwo. Perspektywa teoretyczno-metodologiczna* (A Few Remarks on Security, Freedom and Death), ed. Stanisław Jaczyński, Mariusz Kubiak, Mirosław Minkina, Warszawa-Siedlce 2011, pp. 77–78.

[27] *Kultura a demokracja* (Culture and Democracy), [in]: *Kultura ma znaczenie* (Culture Matters), Lawrence E. Harrison, Samuel P. Huntington (eds), Poznań 2000, pp. 149–157; Jan Garlicki, Artur Noga-Bogumilski, *Kultura polityczna w społeczeństwie demokratycznym* (Political Culture in a Democratic Society), Warszawa 2004, p. 57.

[28] Phillippe C. Schmitter, The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups, „American Behavior Scientist" 1992, no. 35, p. 424.

[29] Maria Urban, *Demokratyczna osobowość. Model i jego urzeczywistnienie w warunkach polskiej demokracji*, Warszawa 2013, s. 12.

[30] Janusz Reykowski, *Ukryte założenia normatywne jako osiowy element mentalności* (Hidden Normative Assumptions as Mentality's Axian Element), [in]: *Orientacje jako element mentalności* (Orientations as an Element of Mentality), Janusz Reykowski, Krystyna Skarżyńska, Marek Ziółkowski (eds), Poznań 1999, pp. 11–48; Jan Garlicki, *Tradycje i dynamika kultury politycznej społeczeństwa polskiego* (Traditions and Dynamics of Polish Society's Political Culture), [in]: *Dylematy polskiej transformacji* (Dilemmas of Polish Transformation), Jan Błuszkowski (ed.), Warszawa 2007, pp. 155–173; Maria Urban, op. cit., p. 13.

These attitudes seldom occur in new democracies as their citizens, according to Dieter Fuchs (b. 1946), tend to "mix democracies with autocratic elements"[31].

The concept of the common good in modern times was expressed in Jean Jacques Rousseau's considerations who believed that the basis of the functioning of the state is to strive for the comprehensive development of political community and its good. A different way of thinking was presented by supporters of liberalism such as John Locke, Charles Louis Montesquieu or Alexis de Tocqueville, who mainly focused on the importance of the idea of individual freedom and defining the limits of the government operation, paying less attention to on social and economic content contained in Rousseau's concept. Freedom, as referring to the relationship between the citizen and the state, occupies an important place in projects relating to the institution of the state and democracy theories stemming from Rousseau's thought, as well as deeply rooted in liberalism. According to Rousseau, a free citizen is the one who actively engaged in politics, in lawmaking and obedience to the law. The idea of freedom is associated with thinking of the state as a political community and its security. A logical relationship between freedom and autonomy is outlined. The essential values include equality, justice and the common good. Realising these values creates conditions for the development of positive freedom and allows the reconciliation of the free will of an individual with freedom of others and actions for the common good[32].

5. Looking into the future – summary

The efficient functioning of the state largely depends on the level of civic culture manifested in applied methods of solving public issues and crucial social matters. It particularly refers to

democratic states whose power is expressed in their citizens' moral values and their tendencies to act pro-socially and the recognition of the common good's primacy over individual aspirations.

The image of the citizen, like everything else in the modern world is redefined. Analyses of Postmodernists provide interesting observations because traditional citizen identity gets muddied in their views, whereas the present times set new contexts of citizenship. In the past the sense of belonging to a nation or state determined a general background for shaping the identity and readiness for sacrifice and dedication, whereas nowadays more and more often a person is a citizen of several communities. The boundaries of citizenship are becoming more and more open both in the territorial but also social and political areas[33].

The civic identity in a democratic society is shaped in conditions of dynamic social and cultural transformations. Being a citizen is connected with an involvement in public matters while respecting the rights of individuals. The dissonance between actions for the good of a society and enjoying the rights of particular citizens is generally defined by two approaches to citizenship, i.e. liberal and republican (communitarian) ones.

The concept of liberalism stresses the freedom and primacy of the citizen over the state. A citizen is an active subject who may independently define and change his self, whereas the society is created by engaged in political activity citizens. The common good is understood in a procedural way. The communitarian approach rejects the emphasis on laws at the cost of duties. The participation in the service for the nation or for the local community is an expression of a social engagement and patriotism is one of cardinal civic virtues[34].

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[31] Dieter Fuchs, *Paradygmat kultury politycznej* (Paradigm of Political Culture), [in]: *Zachowania polityczne* (Political Behaviour), Russel J. Dalton, Hans-Dieter Klingenmann (eds), vol. 1, Warszawa 2010, pp. 212–213.

[32] Jacques Thomassen, *Wartości demokratyczne*, w: *Zachowania polityczne*, red. nauk. Russel J. Dalton, Hans-Dieter Klingenmann, t. 1, Warszawa 2010, s. 481–492; Maria Urban, op. cit., s. 20–21.

[33] Elżbieta Budakowska, *Międzynarodowe migracje a współczesne zagrożenia. Europejskie dylematy*, w: *Problemy społeczne w grze politycznej*, red. nauk. Jadwiga Królikowska, Warszawa 2006, s. 127–128; *White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland,* Warsaw 2013, pp. 134 i 136.

[34] Janusz Mariański, *Młodzież między tradycją i ponowoczesnością* (Youth between Tradition and Post-Modernity), Lublin 1995, pp. 19–38; Maria Urban, op. cit., s. 24–25.

In the perspective of political community, freedom and security are closely linked and the correlation of freedom and security implies the identity relation between individual and common security and safety. Violating the balance in this area in the direction of either state intervention or individual liberalism could result in the deconstruction of the meaning of freedom and security. It must be added that the dilemma of freedom and security is an integral part of contractualist theories built on the axiom stipulating the necessity of move from the state of nature to the political state and supremacy of security over the need of unlimited freedom. The strength of the mentioned above dilemma consists in the citizen's anti-social or social dispositions and in the definition of freedom itself which is often identified with naturalistic freedom or with the meaning imposed by the normativism of a political structure. The thesis on individual's anti-social attitude leads to a conclusion that the political state is unnaturally forced by the necessity to ensure personal safety and security[35].

From the point of view of the research problem, the issue of effective functioning of the state and its social institutions as well as the network of social ties, norms of reciprocity and social trust are of fundamental importance. This feature of social structures was defined as social capital by James Coleman and Robert Putnam[36]. A particular type of political (civic) culture emerged in countries of consolidated democracies. This culture is created by the community of citizens which, according to Harold Lasswell, is characterized by an open ego, ability to respect unfamiliar values, pluralistic approach in the sphere of values, trust to the social environment and relative insusceptibility to fears. The attitudes of

rational activism are common thanks to this type of political culture[37].

The dominant institutional approach to security causes that expectations of citizens – the primary recipient of services in this area are often divergent from preferences of institutions' actions aiming at ensuring this security. In the contemporary society, there undergoes evolution of the so far existing concept of security, based on the primacy of the state and narrow military categories, according to which the security of the state, not the individual, is the most important. In the states of consolidated democracy there is a concept of alternative public security which in a larger extent responds to the social expectations. The society often feels threatened by economic or social factors than the military ones[38]. The protection of natural rights in a political structure is connected with setting limits for their binding.

Maria Urban pays attention to the fact that the axiological aspect of democracy "rises controversies mainly concerning the notions of freedom and equality." According to this positive concept of freedom, there is a logical link between freedom and autonomy, participation and democracy. The idea of freedom "is connected with thinking of the state as a political community". Here we are dealing with "positive freedom" which allows the reconciliation of an individual with the freedom of others. Individualistic views on freedom are called negative freedom, understood as the lack of constraints from restrictions imposed by other persons, the state including[39].

It is worth reminding that civic freedoms are the basis of liberal democracy, which aims at comprehensive development of the community. Democracy cannot be considered only in terms of a system of institutions but also as a phenomenon

[35] Krzysztof Drabik, Marcin Mazurek, *Polityczno-spo-łeczny wymiar bezpieczeństwa w teorii umowy społecznej* (Political and Social Dimension of Security in the Social Contract Theory), Warszawa AON 2012, p. 34.

[36] Janusz Czapiński, *Kapitał społeczny* (Social Capital), [in]: *Diagnoza społeczna 2005. Warunki i jakość życia Polaków* (Social Diagnoses 2005. Poles' Conditions and Quality of Life), ed. J. Czapiński, T. Panek, Warszawa 2006, p. 204.

[37] Phillippe C. Schmitter, Terry Lynn Karl, *Czym jest de-mokracja ... i czym nie jest* (What Democracy Is... and is Not), [in]: *Władza i społeczeństwo. Antologia tekstów z zakresu socjologii polityki* (Power and Society. Anthology of texts in the area of sociology of politics), selected by. J. Szczupaczyński, Warszawa 1995, p. 35.

[38] *Ameryko, idziemy razem* (America – we are going together) – B. Obama's speech given on 28 August, 2013, [in] „Gazeta Wyborcza" of 31 August 2013, p. 26.

[39] Maria Urban, op. cit., pp. 20–21.

of culture which implies the dominance in the public life of certain values and in consequence behaviour in the political life also in relation to security issues. The crisis of liberal democracy triggers considerations concerning alternative to liberal form of democracy which, while preserving basic democratic institutions would limit civil freedoms, would strengthen positions of power towards the citizen, delegitimize certain liberal values such as individualism, internationalism or multiculturalism.

Man occupies a central place in a democratic state and their advantage over the structure is expressed in the fact that the citizens through their activity create certain states of matter. Citizens are not only the recipients of orders expressing the will of power, but rather the state authorities are supposed to express the interests of citizens.

Homeland security and creating its social bases require a common effort both from the state and the society. Without the recognition of the primacy of the state power by the society it is impossible to ensure a proper level of that security. Following Amanda Dory, one can risk a statement that security in the internal dimension is part of the country's culture and "necessary requirement of peaceful democratic co-existence of citizens". In a democratic state it is security and social development that matters here, not the choice between freedom and democracy[40].

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JULY - SEPTEMBER 2016

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In English by Raluca STAN and Daniela RĂPAN, CDSSS.

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