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Contact address:

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CONTENTS

EDITOR'S NOTE

Stan ANTON, PhD..... 5

NATO AND EU: POLICIES, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

The Challenge of a New EU Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy

Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD..... 7

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES

European Refugee Crisis. Beyond Prejudice

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD..... 16

Geography, Defence and Security in The Aegean Sea Region

Florin DIACONU, PhD..... 23

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Adaptation of the Czech Republic Defence Policy to the Dynamics of the Security Environment

Josef PROCHÁZKA, PhD

Lukáš DYČKA..... 34

Planning Programming Budgeting Evaluation System as a Decision Support System in Managing Defence Resources

Maria CONSTANTINESCU, PhD..... 40

ANALYSES, SYNTHESSES, EVALUATIONS

Drugs – Risk Factor in Modern Conflicts..... 47

Sorin OPREA, PhD

STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Migration Issues and Refugee Crisis

Gabriela LEU..... 58



BOOK REVIEW

*Between Geopolitics and Molding Experiences: Robert D. Kaplan
and Prudence in Strategy*

Mihai ZODIAN, PhD..... 65

SCIENTIFIC EVENT

International Symposium “Major Challenges for the Security of the Euroatlantic Area”

Raluca STAN

Irina TĂTARU, PhD 68

CDSSS AGENDA

*Activities of the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
April-June*

Raluca STAN 70

GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

72

#WithRefugees- 20 June 2016 – World Refugee Day 75



EDITOR'S NOTE

The second edition in 2016, no. 59, comprises a collection of six papers delivered on the occasion of scientific manifestations organised by CDSSS in the period December 2015 – May 2016, grouped thematically, to which add other materials of interest, enriching the current contents.

The journal opens with the rubric **NATO and EU: policies, strategies, actions**, where Cristina Bogzeanu, Senior Researcher exposes the *Challenge of elaborating a new EU Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*, a paper which she presented during the Symposium in May this year, whose theme was *Major Challenges for the Security of the Euroatlantic Area*.

Next comes, at the rubric **Geopolitics and geostrategies – trends and perspectives**, another research paper held at the recent Symposium, in which Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD Senior Researcher debates the hot issue of the *European Refugee Crisis, beyond prejudice*.

Mr. Florin Diaconu, PhD Associate Professor sent for this issue his contribution for the Workshop in March, on the theme *The Correlation Military Geography - Geostrategy - Geopolitics in Security Studies*, his paper presenting issues on *Geography, Defence and Security in the Aegean Sea region*.

The rubric **Security and Military Strategy** comprises two articles, the first being presented at the Symposium in May 2016, by Mr. Josef Procházka, PhD. Dipl. Eng. and Mr. Lukáš Dyčka from the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies within University of Defence in Brno, Czech Republic, referring to the Adaptation of the Czech Republic defence policy to the dynamics of its security environment.

The second article belongs to Mrs. Maria Constantinescu, PhD. Associate Professor, bringing forward the *Planning Programming Budgeting Evaluation system as a decision support system in managing defence resources*.

The edition continues with a few materials of interest, as follows. A consistent cooperation with UNHCR in Romania has materialised in a **Strategic dialogue** on *Migration and the refugee crisis* with Mrs. Gabriela Leu, Responsible with Communications and Public Information.

At the rubric **Book review**, Mr. Mihai Zodian, PhD. Researcher has reviewed two best sellers of the renowned journalist and analyst Robert Kaplan – *The Revenge of Geography* (2013) and *In Europe's Shadow* (2016), grouped under the title *Between geopolitics and molding experiences: Robert d. Kaplan and prudence in strategy*.

The Scientific Event, making reference to the recent Symposium in May, – as well as **CDSSS Agenda** for the period April-June are signed by Mrs. Tătaru and by our new colleague, Raluca Stan.

At the end, Mrs. Daniela Răpan, PhD signals the updated **Guide for authors**, useful to those who wish to disseminate the results of their research in our journal.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is an open access publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University (available at <http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm>) and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).



STRATEGIC IMPACT

The journal is being published in Romanian for sixteen years and for twelve years in English and approaches a complex thematic: security and defence related issues; security and military strategies; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; political-military topicality; geopolitics and international relations; future of conflict; peace and war; information society, intelligence community. Readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), to these adding recently WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, but also by its presence in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad such as NATO and of universities with military profile from Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

Strategic Impact journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in main security and defence institutions, as well as in national and international academia in Europe, Asia and America.

In the end, I would like to encourage the persons interested to publish in our pages to prospect and evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of the security environment.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD

Editor in Chief

Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies



THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW EU STRATEGY ON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

*Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD**

The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is expected to provide a European Global Strategy in July 2016. The present paper is an analysis on the context in which EU Global Strategy is to be presented and implemented, arguing that the very effort of designing such a vision constitutes a challenge in itself. This paper is meant to be neither an argumentation for or against the necessity of such a project, nor a set of recommendations in this respect. The main purpose of this demarche is to emphasize the multiple challenges attached to the project of a new EU security strategy.

In order to meet this objective, the paper comprises an introduction containing a brief narrative of the evolution of the project of a new European security strategy, followed firstly by a chapter setting some theoretical landmarks in the area of strategy and, then, by the two central parts consecrated to the external and, respectively, to the internal challenges. The conclusions reveal there is a considerable risk for the European strategy to have a lower impact on foreign and security policy than expected.

Keywords: *Strategy, strategic partnerships, close neighbourhood, strategic autonomy, crisis, conflict, Brexit, capabilities.*

1. Preliminary considerations¹

Designing a new EU strategic vision on foreign and security policy has been for a long time in the centre of concern for those interested in European security issues. As broad the awareness regarding its necessity, as numerous the challenges posed by the drafting of a strategic vision of the EU, meant to be the framework guiding the Union's actions abroad. The increased number of Member States, the adoption and ratification of a new Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (Lisbon Treaty), the economic and financial crisis and its repercussions are only a part of the arguments put forward to justify the need for a new strategic document at the Union level.

This state of affairs lays at the basis of the current situation in EU's foreign and security policy, where there is a single document which can be considered a strategy, namely *European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World* (2003), even though it was followed by the *Report on implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World* (2008). However, the latter document is an assessment of the stage of implementation of the 2003 strategy.

¹ The present paper was presented during CDSSS/NDU Symposium, held on May, 26th, 2016.

** Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD, is Researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) "Carol I" National Defence University (NDU), Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: bogzeanu.cristina@unap.ro*



The strongest warning on the need for a new vision in foreign policy and security came in the context of the international economic and financial crisis. Under those circumstances, the most important strategic partner of the Union – USA – announced its strategic interests pivoted toward the Asia-Pacific region. Subsidiarily, it was sent the message that, given the relative stability of Europe, Washington expected a reconsideration of the Euro-Atlantic partnership based on equality, especially regarding European security burden sharing. US expected the European partners to invest more in defence capabilities, so that they could become able to assume more responsibilities in guaranteeing their security and that of the close proximity without mainly depending on Washington's contribution. Smart defence and pooling and sharing initiatives (2012) came to reinforce this idea and provide the necessary framework for achieving this objective.

European Council of December 2013 approached *in extenso* the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) challenges and invited the High Representative to design a report on the changes of the international environment and the challenges and opportunities generated for Europe². This part of the European Council's conclusions was interpreted as a request to elaborate a new strategy, adapted to the transformations of the regional and international security environment.

In June 2015, after Europe had passed through another range of challenges (Ukrainian crisis, the European refugee crisis), EU High Representative presented such a report – *The European Union in a changing global environment. A more connected, contested and complex world*³. The document concludes that EU needs a common,

comprehensive and consistent global strategy. Subsequently, the European Council of June 2015 commissioned the High Representative to “continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to prepare an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with the Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016”⁴.

However, this is a moment flowing with so many challenges, both on the internal and on the external levels, that make the very process of elaborating a European strategy a challenge in itself.

2. Theoretical landmarks

The term “strategy” originates in Military Science, referring initially to a state's military strategy in case of war or to the manner in which military leaders used resources to win wars.

Strategy represents a global vision referring to, containing, and reflecting 4 major aspects: a) international security environment's characteristics; b) the actor's interests; c) the available resources; d) the manner in which those interests will be promoted and defended. Strategy refers to the manner in which leaders will use international actor's power resources in order to exert control over a certain set of circumstances so that they would reach the objectives supporting the respective actor's interests⁵.

Arthur F. Lykke drafted a three pillar theoretical model of military strategy: a) objectives (what has to be obtained); b) strategic concepts (how the objectives will be reached by using resources); c) resources (what resources are to be used in applying the concepts for reaching the objectives). The risk illustrates the gap between what is supposed to be achieved

² ***, European Council, 19-20 December 2013, Part I, paragraphs 1-22 of the European Council conclusions, URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf, p. 5, accessed on 10 April 2016.

³ ***, *The European Union in a changing global environment. A more connected, contested and complex world*, 30 June 2015, URL: http://www.eas.europa.eu/docs/strategic_review/eu-strategic-review_strategic_review_en.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2016.

⁴ European Council meeting (25-26 June 2015) – Conclusions, URL: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-22-2015-INIT/en/pdf>, accessed on 10 April 2016.

⁵ H. Richard Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model”, in *US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues. Vol I: Theory of War and Strategy*, J. Boon Bartholomees (editor), Jr., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010, pp. 45-46.

through the respective strategy, on the one hand, and the available concepts and resources for reaching the objective, on the other (see Fig. no. 1)⁶. According to Lykke's theory, the three pillars have to be in balance in order to reduce risks.

The mission assumed by the High

flexibility, realism and connecting resources to ends⁸.

EU's relevance as a great power has often been subject of intense debates due to its evolving nature, to the continuous character of integration, being considered an association of a series of




Figure no. 1: Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.'s theoretical model of strategy⁷

Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy consists in drafting the equivalent of a grand strategy at EU's level. Generally, the grand strategy is considered the attribute of great powers, with over-stretched vital economic, political and military interests. All these interests are related to a series of immediate or long-term threats.

Also, the grand strategy isn't as much the ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the international security environment as approaching the eventual imbalances between the three fundamental pillars of strategy. Having a grand strategy supposes always keeping in mind long term objectives, while continuously adapting to present difficulties. Consequently, grand strategy's most important features are

state actors following, within this framework, their own national interests.

This theory doesn't lack solid argumentations if we consider, for instance, the maintenance of the inter-governmental decision-making in Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)/ Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), areas in which Member States keep full sovereignty. However, EU certainly developed as a notable actor of the international arena and its influence is visible not only in the economic, but also in the political and even military domains.

One of the most eloquent examples in this respect can be considered the Ukrainian crisis, as, at its origins can be found, among other factors, Brussels' efforts to attract Kiev towards a greater degree of integration through the Association Agreements (in late 2013). Ample street protests and the Ukrainian president's flee were followed by an act of territorial annexation (Crimea) and to a separatist war on Ukrainian territory, all of

⁶ Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy", in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989 *apud* J. Boon Bartholomees (ed.), Jr., *US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues. Vol I: Theory of War and Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010, pp. 48-50.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

⁸ Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, James Lacey (editors), *The Shaping of Grand Strategy. Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, pp. 1-7.



them events with geopolitical value.

The over-stretched nature of EU's interest has been visible as early as 2003, when its first strategy was titled "A secure Europe in a better world". The document is characterized by a clear idealist rhetoric, which can be resumed at "the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states"⁹. EU developed having at its basis an idealist discourse, focused on universal values (human rights, free market economy, democracy, rule of law, climate change etc.), as well as common interests. This type of discourse underlay, marked and continues to mark the destiny of the European construction.

European Security Strategy (2003) was based on the belief that European states' security depends on the existence of democratic and well governed states. The main tools for reaching this objective were considered the economic, political and diplomatic ones, namely the levers through which the EU itself was engineered and developed, the levers through which it exerted its soft power on the actors surrounding it and which allowed the gradual enlargement of the organization.

But the main flaw of the above mentioned document was its lack of the intuition that, in a world of geopolitical competition, economic support and compensations aren't enough for developing democratic and well governed states¹⁰. Brussels, as most of Western actors, acted on the international arena as if "geopolitics and power politics had ceased to exist"¹¹, trying to approach international relation beyond the geopolitical issue of territory and military power, focusing on aspects such as world order, free market, non-proliferation, human rights, rule of law, climate change, etc.¹².

⁹ ***, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 10, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed on 10 May 2016.

¹⁰ Sven Biscop, *Geopolitics with European Characteristics. An Essay on Pragmatic Idealism, Equality and Strategy*, Egmont Paper 82, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, March 2016, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

¹² Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of Revisionist Powers", in *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2014.

Walter Russell Mead argues that, until the Ukrainian crisis, the EU had lived in a post-historical moment, acting on the international arena departing from F. Fukuyama's thesis, described in the famous volume "The end of history and the last man". Nevertheless, states in its Eastern vicinity, former Soviet states, have been living in a different context, marked by geopolitical reasons, in a set of circumstance in which the illegal annexation of Crimea and the separatist war in Eastern Ukraine are just the most recent events which can be named in a list of arguments which could also include frozen conflicts, the Russian-Georgian war (2008), etc.

Therefore, a first challenge of drafting a new EU strategy is finding the middle way between its specific in approaching international relations, the idealist nature of European rhetoric, to the dynamic of international and regional security environment, revealing increasingly clearer its realist mechanisms.

3. External challenges

Evolutions of international and regional security environment impose reconsidering EU's relations with two types of actors – great powers and actors in its close vicinity. US strategic shift to Asia-Pacific, the Ukrainian crisis and the major deterioration of relations with the Russian Federation represent the main pressure points in this respect.

As far as relations with great powers of the international arena are concerned, the main challenge of the new European strategy is setting directions of action on the long term, in the context of a series of crises in full process.

A first indicator of the need to reconsider the coordinates of transatlantic partnership was represented by Washington's decision to announce, under the circumstances of the world economic and financial crisis, the change of its strategic priorities. On a second plan, it was also conveyed the idea that it was time the Europeans became capable of acting as security providers both for their own territory and for their neighbourhood. In other words, the US prospected for the development of the European



“strategic autonomy”¹³, namely the capacity of initiating actions, of taking the initiative, at least regionally, with US support, but without US major contribution.

Even under these circumstances, one of Euro-Atlantic partnership’s main characteristics is its major importance for both sides. Europe’s stability and security is, beyond any doubt, one of Washington’s major interests, a fact emphasized by the reassurance measures undertaken in the context of Ukrainian crisis¹⁴. In this particular situation, it is about a situation whose escalation risked to endanger NATO Member States’ security. US pivot to Asia-Pacific gains reliance when it comes about the security and stability of the regions neighbouring NATO and EU Member States. In other words, “if once again the territory of Europe itself were directly threatened, he [US] would charge to the rescue, because that directly concerns American vital interests. But in the absence of such a threat, the real focus of US strategy is now on Asia and the Pacific”¹⁵.

A second component of the challenge consists in defining relations with the Russian Federation, in the context of a progressive degradation of the relations between Moscow and the West, of a genuine political crisis at this level and in which the EU maintains the economic sanctions set in the Ukrainian crisis framework. Lifting these sanctions is conditioned by the full implementation of Minsk II Agreement. EU Council decision of December, 21st, 2015 prologues the economic sanctions until July, 31st, 2016¹⁶. Moreover, forging a middle way, based on

a win-win approach will be even more difficult to achieve as Moscow’s vision on Western politics in the common neighbourhood, the EU included, is marked by a competitive attitude.

Concerning the close proximity, EU’s approach was mostly based on the economic, social and political dimensions, being oriented towards the development of the self-governance capacity of states in this region, towards their long-term stabilization. The fact that European strategy and the Russian Federation’s interests and strategies in the region are incompatible is visible if we consider Moscow’s role in maintaining frozen conflicts in this space. Fuelling instability and even the direct political, economic, social, and military destabilization of the states experiencing such conflicts represent one of Russia’s main levers for keeping its influence in the region¹⁷.

EU actions in this area were driven on its normative power, on its capacity of generating stability, security and development by exporting norms, values and principles laying at the basis of its own creation. In this respect, Brussels initiated a range of initiatives such as European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), also including Eastern Partnership (2009), and Black Sea Synergy (2007), all of them meant to contribute to enhancing relations between the envisaged states and the EU, to getting them closer to the European political, economic and security standards.

After the Ukrainian crisis, EU’s political approach of this region is expected to change substantially, as events in Eastern Ukraine constitute an unquestionable proof of EU’s failure in this respect. Even more, popular riots in Northern Africa and Middle East, begun in late 2010 and known as the “Arab Spring”, culminating with the crisis and Libya, Mali or Syria, can be equally considered demonstrations of European strategy’s lack of efficiency in stabilizing states in its vicinity.

¹³ Sven Biscop, *Peace without Money, War without Americans. Can European Strategy Cope?*, Ashgate Publishing, UK, 2015, p. 73.

¹⁴ For details regarding NATO reassurance measures in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, see: NATO Assurance Missions Fact Sheet, URL: <https://www.shape.nato.int/land>, accessed at 10 May 2016; NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, May 2015, URL: https://www.shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/2015/misc/20150508_factsheet-rap-en.pdf, accessed at 10 May 2016.

¹⁵ Sven Biscop, *op. cit.*, 2015, p. 6.

¹⁶ ***, Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months, Press release, 21 December 2015, URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/21-russia-sanctions/>, accessed at 15 May 2016.

¹⁷ For details, see Cristina Bogzeanu, *Rolul Uniunii Europene în gestionarea conflictelor înghețate din vecinătatea granițelor sale*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 7-20.



EU's capacity of generating stability, development and security through integration has been proved only through the success achieved on the European arena through its enlargement policy, through the positive effects triggered for the states having become, in sequence, its Members. The same vision also represented the basis of its neighbourhood policy, meant to allow the export of European values and principles, but without promising these states a future within the EU. This approach has been often considered the main law of EU Neighbourhood Policy, being criticized for focusing too much of technical aspects to the detriment of major political aspects, for being centred rather on "low politics" than on "high politics"¹⁸. As far as Eastern vicinity is concerned, drafting and implementing an efficient EU strategy was hindered not only by the difficult relation with the Russian Federation, but also by the differences between Member States' foreign policies regarding Moscow.

Additionally, the pressure of strategic clarification, of the development of strategic autonomy, of adapting foreign policy discourse in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis also occurs against the maintenance of the risk for the frozen conflicts to re-burst, as the history of these conflicts reveal the tendency to periodically "melting down".

One of the most recent examples in this respect is the resumption of military clashes between Armenian and Azeri forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, on April, 1st, 2016. The events in early April determined international community to call repeatedly for the cease of fire, as they were considered the most violent clash on the Line of Contact ever since 1994. Resumption of military activities in Nagorno-Karabakh contributes to regional destabilization and has major strategic implications.

Ukraine can also become the scene of a frozen conflict in Donbas. This even more as, beyond the ethnic and separatist dimension of the crisis, of Russia's involvement in its escalation, but also the implementation of Minsk II Agreement

is protracted. Frozen conflicts have often been defined by reaching a fragile, no peace, no war state, following the military victory of minority communities (with external help)¹⁹. Their independence is not recognized at international level and remains subject of the infringement of international law²⁰. This manner of defining frozen conflicts reveal one of their main characteristics – they don't suppose only the "freeze" of a state of conflict, but rather a "freeze" of the afferent peace processes.

Ever since the signing of Minsk II Agreement (February, 11th, 2015), its provisions have been broken repeatedly, as there are sources according to which, despite this agreement, over 400 persons were killed in this conflict since its entry into force²¹. One of the most recent events took place in late April 2016, when five civilians were killed and another ten were wounded in confrontation in Eastern Ukraine²².

Separatist conflicts in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia remain potential sources of regional destabilization.

Eastern and Southern vicinity are spaces where EU's strategic autonomy should firstly take shape. It is the conclusion of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ever since the end of 2013: "The EU needs to protect its interests and promote its values, and it needs to be able to act as a security provider both in its neighbourhood and at the international level"²³. Consequently, the challenge of the European strategy regarding its neighbourhood

¹⁹ Natalie Tocci, *The EU and conflict resolution. Promoting peace in the backyard*, Routledge Publishing, New York, 2007, pp. 2-3.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Carla Babb, "Pentagon: Despite Minsk II, More Than 400 Ukraine Troops Killed", 2 March 2016, *VOA News*, URL: <http://www.voanews.com/content/pentagon-ukraine-russia-minsk/3217502.html>, accessed at 15 May 2016.

²² Cătălin Marchievici, "Ucraina: Unul dintre cele mai grave incidente din ultimele luni", in *Cotidianul*, 27 April 2016, URL: <http://www.cotidianul.ro/ucraina-unul-dintre-cele-mai-grave-incidente-din-ultimele-luni-280304/>, accessed at 15 May 2016.

²³ ***, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on her Final Report on CDSP, 15 October 2013, Brussels, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_01_en.pdf, accessed on 16 May 2016.

¹⁸ Sven Biscop, *Game of Zones – The quest for influence in Europe's neighborhood*, Egmont Paper 67, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Academia Press, June 2014, p. 7.



is to develop strategic autonomy in its vicinity (namely, assuming the role of security provider, of the leadership in maintaining peace and security), in a time when its stability and security are at the lowest level ever since the end of the Cold War.

4. Internal challenges

Recent evolution in regional and international security environment are not the only reason for which drafting a European security strategy is a challenge in itself. The dynamic of European security, the relations between EU Member States build a difficult context for drafting a strategy and can constitute triggers of new changes at European construction's level.

One of the most eloquent examples in this respect is represented by the referendum of the United Kingdom leaving the EU, which is to take place on June, 23rd, 2016 – moment coinciding with the deadline set for the presentation of European Global Strategy. Brexit, as this event is widely known, has a special relevance for the European security from multiple perspectives. “Uncertainty about the future of the UK in the European Union is a destabilizing factor”²⁴. UK withdrawal from the Union would stand as a proof not only for the liberal nature of the EU recognizing and functioning according to democratic principles, but also for the fact that EU's institutional crisis has reached a peak point, and that European institutions have lost their credibility. Additionally, the re-emergence of nationalism can also be identified in other cases as there is a wider range if EU Member States manifesting centrifugal tendencies.

If, after the referendum in June 2016, British citizens opt for the UK to leave EU institutional framework, EU context and strategic evolution will experience substantial changes. Due to its status as UN Permanent Council Member, to its economic and military power, UK withdrawal

²⁴ Letter by President Donald Tusk to the European Council on the issue of a UK in/out referendum, 7 December 2015, URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/07-tusk-letter-to-28ms-on-uk/>, accessed on 10 May 2016.

from the EU will contribute to the decrease of EU relevance as security actor. Even more, according to a Clingendael Institute analysis, “after Brexit, the EU should make amends and adjust to a new geostrategic reality”²⁵. In other words, Brussels would find itself in the situation in which it would have to amend its security strategy even before having begun implementing it.

At the same time, Brexit can be considered a warning sign on the Brussels' flawed management of the re-emergence of nationalism. Occurrences of this phenomenon took place ever since the first years of the world economic and financial crises, when managing crisis' effect at national level seemed to have become a priority not only for the states with a high economic development, but also for those experiencing vulnerabilities and coping with more difficulty with this phenomenon. The relation between Germany, EU's main economic engine, and Greece, one of the states most seriously affected by the economic and financial crisis, can be considered an eloquent example in this respect. Additionally, in this context, one shall also consider the divergences between European states when faced to the European refugee crisis.

However, European states' potential to show cohesion, solidarity in certain crisis situations shall not be underestimated. Their reaction to the Ukrainian crisis is eloquent in this respect. After the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the crisis escalation in Eastern Ukraine, EU Member States established economic and diplomatic sanctions to Russia, irrespective of the extent in which they depend on the Russian energy resources or of the nature of the relations established previously with Moscow²⁶.

²⁵ Peter van Ham, *Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe. A Scenario Study. Clingendael Report*, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Hague, February 2016, p. 25, URL: <http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Brexit%20Report%20February%202016.pdf>, accessed on 9 May 2016.

²⁶ EU Member States relations with the EU don't have a uniform nature, as they vary from close cooperation to cold relations, even hostility prone. For details, see: Mirela Atanasiu, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Relația Occidentului cu Federația Rusă*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 24-25.



Another instance of internal challenges regarding the project of a new European security strategy is anchored in the area of resources. As mentioned before, the current context makes it necessary for the European states to increase their strategic autonomy regarding their neighbourhood, also implying developing their capacity of acting decisively and autonomously as security providers where necessary, for defending their interests, inclusively through projection of force²⁷. Experts' opinions²⁸ usually converge to the idea that the framework the European states choose for meeting this necessity – NATO or EU – isn't as important as the fact of responding to this need, to adapt to this imperative imposed by the current characteristics of the international and regional security environment. Moreover, the development of EU's security and defence dimension has to be continued under financial austerity conditions, as European states have been prone to invest less in defence, excepting Eastern European states after the Ukrainian crisis.

Even more if after June 2016 referendum, the British will choose for the UK to leave the EU, this objective would be even more difficult to be achieved as UK is one of the largest European military powers²⁹. Subsequently, UK withdrawal from the EU would considerably reduce CSDP credibility and would create the tendency for CSDP to become even less ambitious or even "sub-strategic"³⁰.

Until presently, the EU developed its own manner of acting and intervening in international relations, based on its soft power, and, in crisis situations, on comprehensive approach, which has a solid preventive component, due to the

fact that the Union has a much wider range of diplomatic instruments and of civilian crisis management. It is a vision complementary to the Idealist discourse that has been characterizing European manner of reporting to international relations ever since its beginning. Thus, if the EU has to define a new rhetoric adapted to the tendencies of international and regional security environment, another challenge will consist in developing a manner of intervening accordingly in international relations, inclusively in the military area.

In this respect, it is necessary to also consider the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon brought a range of substantial changes in EU's foreign and security policy and their efficiency hasn't been fully tested yet.

Conclusions

In brief, the EU is in full process of drafting a new strategy, in a context where there is an increasing pressure to the development of strategic autonomy (also implying the development of military dimension), where its approach of security in its neighborhood has turned out to be inefficient and where, at its borders, there is an ongoing political-military crisis with serious geostrategic implications. Additionally, there is also the significant degradation of its political, diplomatic and economic relations with one of the greatest regional powers – the Russian Federation. At the same time, EU faces serious challenges within its own borders – its Member States solidarity has been often questioned, while there is also a credibility crisis regarding its institutional efficiency and capacity of acting as security provider or as a relevant security actor on the international arena.

All these make it difficult to imagine a more challenging context for elaborating a new European security strategy. However, international security environment has never been characterized by stagnation, simplicity and lack of challenges. Dynamism and continuous change have never ceased to characterize international relations.

²⁷ ***, Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence. Final Report by the High Representative/ Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Brussels, 15 October 2013, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf, accessed at 18 May 2016.

²⁸ For details, see: ***, "Strategic Dialogue with Daniel Fiott regarding EU Global Strategy 2016", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 4 [57]/2015; Sven Biscop, *Peace without Money, War without Americans. Can European Strategy Cope?*, Ashgate Publishing, UK, 2015.

²⁹ ***, *The Military Balance*, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 71.

³⁰ Peter van Ham, *op. cit.*, p. 5.



Analyzing the causes of the external and internal challenges the EU is facing nowadays, one could easily conclude that they are rather the result of inefficient or even absent strategies, of avoiding or not being able to act at the opportune moment, than the consequences of recent evolutions at the international level.

Taking as a premise that the document the EU High Representative has to present until the end of June 2016 is the equivalent of a Grand Strategy, this project can only be a challenge in itself. Adapting the strategic vision to the new characteristics of international and regional security environment is only a part of this challenge, the highest difficulty being represented by the need to approach the potential imbalances between resources, interests, and ways of actions under the conditions in which the EU is already going through a stage when this imbalance has reached a critical point.

EU's flexibility, its capacity of adapting to the changes of international environment, its Member States' capacity of showing solidarity when faced to common challenges, as well as the fact that the EU is one of the few ways, if not the only one, in which European actors can act on the international arena as great powers – all these constitute advantages and strengths for EU, preventing it to lose significance on the international arena.

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EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS. BEYOND PREJUDICE

*Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD**

Europe, especially EU, is currently experiencing a problem for which there was no preparation: a massive flow of refugees from Asian countries in conflict. In this crisis, both the EU and the Member Countries became aware that administrative tools, even if they were completely functional, they are not sufficient to manage the psychosocial representation of its citizens on the issue of refugees/immigrants. The lack of managing these issues may give rise to and exacerbate extremist and xenophobic attitudes; currently, stereotyping the general immigration issues is a subject on nationalistic and separatist political agendas. In this context, the aim of this paper is to clarify some of the most widespread prejudices formulated at the level of common sense to the alleged threat to Europe represented by the flow of refugees, by comparing statistical data published by specialized international organizations, in order to avoid slipping into the trap of hatred and discrimination.

Keywords: migration, refugees, stereotypes, prejudices, terrorism, xenophobia.

Foreword¹

The issue of large flow of war refugees, who take shelter in the neighbouring countries,

¹ This paper was firstly delivered during the International Symposium: *Major Challenges for the Security of the Euroatlantic Area*, organized on 26th of May, 2016 by the CDSSS/NDU.

but also in other parts of the world, is not new. History proves that, in many cases, the social change – not only the quantitative, but also the qualitative change – was triggered by the territorial mobility of population. Also, the amplitude of this type of territorial mobility is not new. The 2015 worldwide statistics show that the total number of refugees, asylum-seekers and others of concern to UNHCR, by the destination criteria, is 14,441,674 persons, from which half are taking shelter in Asia, 30% in Africa, 12% in Latin America and Caribbean and only 8% in Europe².

What is new, especially for the contemporary period, is the massive increase in the number of refugees in the past two years in European countries. EUROSTAT records the increase in the number of asylum applications by non-EU-28 nationals from 234,675 people in 2005 to 1,321,560 people in 2015³. Between 2013 and 2015, this figure has tripled, and between 2014 and 2015, the figure has doubled. Countries of

² UNHCR, *Mid-Year Trends 2015. Table 1. Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum, mid-2015 (or latest available)*, URL: <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>, accessed on 13.05.2016.

³ EUROSTAT, *Asylum Statistics. Data extracted on 2 March 2016 and on 20 April 2016*, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Source_data_for_tables_and_figures_.28MS_Excel.29, accessed on 13.05.2016.

*** Mrs. Alexandra SARCINSCHI is Senior Researcher at the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) from “Carol I” National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: sarcinschi.alexandra@unap.ro**

origin of the applicants which registered the highest growth are Syria (from 119,000 asylum-seekers in 2014 to 362,000 in 2015), Afghanistan (from 37,900 asylum-seekers in 2014 to 178,200 in 2015) and Iraq (from 14,800 asylum-seekers in 2014 to 121,500 in 2015)⁴.

Out of this brief introduction, one can draw the following ideas:

- First of all, the European countries do not constitute the most concerned countries of destination for refugees, asylum-seekers and others of concern to UNHCR, but the Asian ones, particularly those neighbouring countries where armed conflicts are conducted or natural disasters occurred (*Figure No. 1*).




Figure No. 1: Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, returnees, 2015⁵

- Secondly, and derived from the first, the main problem of Europe is not attracting the largest number of refugees and asylum-seekers of all continents, but the dramatic increase of their number in the last two years. Moreover, the on-going migration crisis has increased the EU's visibility in the fields of migration, multiculturalism and human rights, but affected its image as not living up to its own standards (*Figure No. 2*).




Figure No. 2: Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2005–2015⁶

- Thirdly, it must be pointed out that, between 2014 and 2015, it is not the number of Syrian refugees that registered the most impressive growth, but the number of the Afghan and Iraqi refugees, although their absolute numbers are lower than the Syrians (*Figure No. 3*).




Figure No. 3: Asylum-seekers in Europe by top three origin country, 2014 - 2015⁷

In this context, we suggest a brief analysis of the main coordinates of the current flow of refugees, taking into account both the quantitative dimension and the psychosocial representation on the population of refugees in countries of destination. The aim of this analysis is to clarify some preconceptions formulated by the common

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ UNHCR, *Mid-Year Trends 2015. Table 1. Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum, mid-2015 (or latest available)*, URL: <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>, accessed on 13.05.2016.

⁶ EUROSTAT, *Asylum Statistics. Data extracted on 2 March 2016 and on 20 April 2016*, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Source_data_for_tables_and_figures_.28MS_Excel.29, accessed on 13.05.2016.

⁷ *Ibidem*.



sense regarding a presumed threat to Europe. It is important to note that the target population for the analysis includes labour migration, family migration and forced migration, and also both legal migration and illegal migration.

1. Statistics and destination countries

The analysis of quantitative dimension of the current flow of immigration to Europe considers the above data, but also elements relating to migration routes, favourite destination countries and the quota system for refugees.

According to FRONTEX, illegal migration to Europe, particularly the EU, is conducted on eight main routes, of which the most populated one is the Eastern Mediterranean Route which, in 2015, registered 885,386 immigrants, over 17 times more than the previous year, mainly from Syria (586,405 people) and Afghanistan (266,872 people)⁸. The next route is Western Balkan Route which recorded 764,038 refugees in 2015, also over 17 times more than compared to 43,357 refugees in 2014⁹.

For the first quarter of 2016, statistics register an increase of about five times against the same period last year. The largest growth is registered on the Eastern Mediterranean Route: 11 times more immigrants in the first quarter of 2016, compared to the first quarter of 2015¹⁰. However, compared with the last months of 2015, February and March 2016 are marked by a dramatic drop in the number of immigrants¹¹, with a drop of the number of asylum applications in the second half of March following the EU - Turkey agreement aimed at reducing the number of illegal immigrants (signed on 18.03.2016, in force since 20.03.2016).

⁸ FRONTEX, *Risk Analysis for 2016*, Warsaw, March 2016, p. 6, URL: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf, accessed on 13.05.2016..

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ FRONTEX, *FRAN Quarterly. Quarter 1. January-March 2015*, Warsaw, June 2015, URL: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2015.pdf, accessed on 14.05.2016.

¹¹ UNHCR Statistical Data Base, URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html>, accessed on 14.05.2016.

The first quarter of 2016 begins with a change, significant in some cases, in the position of EU Member States towards the asylum issue. Notable is the modification of national legislation by the German Parliament in February 2016¹² in order to speed up asylum procedures and to ease the way to deport migrants whose application was not recognized by the German state. We must underline that Germany is the main destination for refugees and asylum-seekers¹³ (2015: 1,000,000 asylum applications most of them from Syrian refugees).

The consequences of this events were various: from setting an EU quota system for refugees (which is not accepted by all EU Member States) to temporary bringing into force the national border controls (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, etc.), from securing EU internal borders and NATO monitoring (Greek and Turkish coastline) to building razor wire barriers at the national borders.

These events created the proper environment to bring into question the potential dissolution of the Schengen Area, but analyses have shown that such a decision would cause financial and economic costs far greater than those related to the management of the refugee crisis.

2. Beyond statistics: people and opinions

Regarding the psychosocial dimension of the current flow of migration to Europe, we shall focus on the psychosocial representation of migrants, especially refugees, in the population of the destination country. By monitoring the online Romanian and English language media during the analysis initiated in October 2015 at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic

¹² DW, *German cabinet approves asylum legislation package*, URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/german-cabinet-approves-asylum-legislation-package/a-19021974>, 03.02.2016 and DW, *German Parliament approves stricter asylum regulations*, URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/german-parliament-approves-stricter-asylum-regulations/a-19072311>, accessed on 25.02.2016.

¹³ International Organization for Migration, *Migration, Asylum and Refugees in Germany: Understanding the Data*, 22.01.2016, URL: <https://www.iom.int/news/migration-asylum-and-refugees-germany-understanding-data>



Studies and published in the periodical *Dynamics of the security environment*¹⁴, we have identified a number of judgments relating to refugees, formulated especially by population of destination countries. These judgements, when placed face-to-face with statistical data analysis, prove to be nothing but prejudice. Unfortunately, the term *prejudice* contains a strong negative meaning, referring generally to unfavourable attitudes towards certain ethnic or racial categories¹⁵.

These prejudices are the result of a process of social labelling that implies that “a human action is deviant not because of its intrinsic characteristics, but because of the social reaction that it arouses”¹⁶. Furthermore, in this process might intervene ethnocentrism, which involves issuing value judgments on other groups through exclusive reporting to its own group’s norms and values; the result is defining different cultures as inferior or less important.

Among the identified prejudices, the most important are those on the type of migration and the risks posed by this refugee flow to the European security. *It is crucial to emphasize that the identified prejudices fall within a broader context that includes considerations about a possible “source” and therefore a possible “routing” and a “concerted action” regarding the flow of refugees. In the absence of concrete data to confirm or refute these allegations, we keep analyzing only the premise that beyond the potentiality of being possible “tools” to implement a “plan for destabilization of Europe”, refugees are human beings who are trying to build a better life, far from the horrors of war.* The other aspects fall under the laws of national security and are not the subject of this analysis.

¹⁴ CDSSS, *Dinamica mediului de securitate (Dynamics of the security environment)*, URL: <http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/dms.htm>, accessed on 14.05.2016.

¹⁵ Gheorghe Nicolae, “Stereotip” (*stereotype*) in *Dicționar de sociologie (Dictionary of sociology)*, Eds: Cătălin Zamfir and Lazăr Vlăsceanu, Babel Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 603.

¹⁶ Ion Ungureanu, “Etichetare socială” (*social etiquetting*) in *Dicționar de sociologie (Dictionary of sociology)*, Eds: Cătălin Zamfir and Lazăr Vlăsceanu, Babel Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 218.

The first of identified preconception is on *the economic nature of the current European refugee flow*. About economic migration in Europe as the predominant form of migration one could argue until 2014, when the number of asylum applications in EU countries began to increase dramatically, remaining on this upwards trend. Previous to the outbreak of refugees flow, economic migration occurred both between EU member countries and between non-EU – non-European countries – and the EU. For instance, in 2013, the estimated number of immigrants in EU countries was 3.4 million immigrants, of which 1.4 million citizens of non-EU countries, 1.2 million citizens of member countries, approximately 830,000 cases of return migration and about 6,100 stateless persons¹⁷. In 2015, FRONTEX has registered 1,820,000 of illegal entries along the external borders of the EU; most migrants are from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq¹⁸ – some of the main areas of conflict in the world. Along with immigrants from these countries, which account for over 50% of the migrant population, are citizens of Kosovo (5.32%), Albania (5.25%), Pakistan (3.69%), Eritrea (2.63%), Nigeria (2.38), Iran (2%), etc. Therefore, it is observed that not all immigrants of this flow can be divided into categories of refugees or asylum-seekers, although their number prevails. Thus, we can argue that *the nature of the current flow of migration in Europe is mixed and the predominantly component is refugees and asylum-seekers*.

Therefore, the phrase characterizing this flow is not “follow the money” but “run from conflict”.

Another prejudice or prejudgement identified during the analysis is that *the existence of this flow of immigrants increases the risk of terrorist attacks in the countries of destination*.

¹⁷ EUROSTAT, *Migration and migrant population statistics*, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Migration_flows, accessed on 13.05.2016.

¹⁸ FRONTEX, *Risk Analysis for 2016*, Warsaw, March 2016, p. 6, URL: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf.



Such an assessment is illustrated by European Commission's Eurobarometer series which measures public opinion in the EU. The evolution of public opinion in regard to the psychosocial representation of threats to the residence country and to the EU highlights not only the growing importance of immigration and terrorism as security risks in the eyes of European citizens, but also a possible correlation between them.

The Spring 2013 Eurobarometer registered the following answers to the question "What do you think are the two most important issues facing our country at the moment?": the most frequent mentioned two items out of a list of 13 issues (such as unemployment, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, government debt, crime, health and social security, immigration, taxation, pensions, educational system, housing, environment/climate change and energy, terrorism) are economic situation and unemployment; immigration is the 7th most frequent mentioned item and terrorism is the least frequent mentioned item, even if Europe had already been the victim of four major terrorist attacks that followed the September 11, 2001¹⁹.

At the same survey, the important issues facing the EU ("What do you think are the two most important issues facing EU at the moment?") are considered, in this order: economic situation (48%), unemployment (38%), public finances of EU Member States (30%), rising prices/inflation (13%), immigration (10%), terrorism (7%), EU influence in the world (7%), crime (7%), taxation (6%), climate change (3%), energy (3%), environment (3%) and pensions (3%)²⁰.

Since autumn 2014, the significance of these issues was revalued; immigration climbs in the top national issues in 3rd place, and in 4th place in the top of EU issues, while terrorism remains in last place in importance at national level and climbs ranks 5 as importance to EU²¹.

¹⁹ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 79. Spring 2013*, 2013, URL: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/>, accessed on 14.05.2016.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 82. Autumn 2014*, 2014, URL: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/>, accessed on 14.05.2016.

At one year distance and three quarters of interviews before the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, European public opinion is structured completely differently: at national level, the first two issues represented as important for that country at the moment are immigration (36%) and unemployment (36%), while terrorism climbs 7 positions in the 6th place, with 11% of responses; at European level, immigration and terrorism occupy the top two positions of the ranking with 58% and 25% of total answers²².

Thus, the correlation of the two items in the psychosocial representation of the most important issues facing these countries and the EU is obvious. The evidence is stronger, especially for countries that have been recently facing Islamist terrorist attacks, such as Belgium (immigration 61% and terrorism 25%), UK (immigration 61% and terrorism 34%), France (immigration 49% and terrorism 27%) and Spain (immigration 39% and terrorism 24%), but also in countries that have not had such unfortunate events, such as Hungary (immigration 68% and terrorism 34%), Bulgaria (immigration 61% and terrorism 38%) and Romania (immigration 47% and terrorism 43%)²³.

Another argument used by the media to justify this type of judgement is the demographic composition of the refugee population, the UN statistics showing that, at least in terms of the most populated route (the Mediterranean one), the male population is 49% of the total and the group of 18-34 years prevails²⁴.

Some of the most important reasons for this situation is that, on the one hand, in Syria is in place the conscription system, which imposes youth to involve in a complicated war against a terrorist group, and on the other hand, young males are most able to cope with an extremely difficult trip to pave the way for the whole family. Furthermore, a study by the International Organization for Migration, over 50% of the

²² European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 84. Autumn 2015*, 2016, URL: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/>, accessed on 14.05.2016.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ UNHCR, *Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean*, 2016, URL: <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>, accessed on 14.05.2016.



target population (Syrians and Iraqis) answered that they have relatives in the country chosen as the destination (in most cases, Germany)²⁵.

This problem of direct correlating the wave of refugees with the increased risk of terrorist attack within the countries of destination becomes more complicated as the official investigations have shown that the terrorist attacks – that changed largely psychosocial representation on the problems faced by EU member countries and the EU itself – were performed by French, Belgian or Danish citizens in their second generation in those countries, educated by the Western education system and supposed to be social integrated in those countries. In this context, it is important to analyze the possibility of terrorist networks, which are already acting on the territory of EU countries, to recruit members from the refugee population that is permeable to radical messages because the discrepancy between their expectations and actual conditions of living in refugee camps.

Therefore, *on short-term, the correlation between the flow of immigrants and the risk of terrorist attacks in the countries of destination is not supported by statistical data and constitutes a prejudice or prejudgement until it is proved otherway.*

Conclusions

The issue of the current immigration flow to EU member countries is complex. It has significant effects on destination countries, transit countries and, of course, on origin countries. Effects are both opportunities and challenges on human resources, economy, environment, social issues, etc. There are also the problems mentioned above, such as the possible “targeting” on the EU countries by the flow of refugees for international power reasoning, the “infiltration” of Islamist terrorists within groups of refugees or recruitment of future terrorists by existing networks, but they are not subject to the present analysis due to the fact that this type of issues fall under intelligence area.

²⁵ IOM, *Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond. Analysis: Flow Monitoring Surveys*, 2016, URL: <https://www.iom.int/>, accessed on 14.05.2016.

The two identified main preconceptions are not supported by statistics, but their usage could unfortunately transform them into reality, becoming concrete by their consequences. One of the most important challenges in this context is the possibility of escalating individual and collective attitudes from the emotional component – stereotypes – to the cognitive one – prejudice – and to the actional component – namely, discrimination –, leading to the rebirth of xenophobia, ethnocentrism and extreme nationalism. Unfortunately, once triggered these collective behaviors, victims of extremism and xenophobia will become also European immigrants already integrated on the labour market who chose living in other EU Member States.

Jean-Claude Juncker has stated few days ago that the maximum number of refugees that EU is able to integrate is around 2 millions, despite the tensions between Member States on this issue. Unfortunately, International Monetary Fund forecast shows that, by the end of this year, another 4 millions refugees will arrive in the EU. It is obvious that is extremely difficult to integrate them all into society and the labour market in particular. The reduced capacity for integration is one of the main reasons for a new approach of the politicians of the countries targeted by the flow of migrants; the change must be toward a clarification of the migrants status (refugees or economic migrants) in order to provide humanitarian aid to those in need and establish clear conditions for return of refugees to countries of origin after the end of the respective war.

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GEOGRAPHY, DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN THE AEGEAN SEA REGION

*Florin DIACONU, PhD**

In the extended region of the Aegean Sea, encompassing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and the Black Sea as well, we can easily identify, along several millennia, three important geographic axes: the East-West one, the North-South one, and the third one linking, on the general direction leading from Southwest to Northeast the Aegean and the Black Sea. The study briefly presents some historical episodes which are relevant for a better understanding of the manner in which the already mentioned geographic axes are operating in the long run (as direct support for the exercise of political will and for defence and security concerns of various political entities), strongly underlining the perennial relevance of the geographic factor in international relations and grand strategy, and in security and defence studies as well.

Keywords: *the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, geographic axes, directions, straits, geostrategic relevance, perennial role, historical repeatability.*

Introduction¹

In strictly geographic terms, the Eastern Mediterranean stretches between the coasts of Sicily (in the West) and the coasts of Syria

¹ This paper was presented within the framework of the workshop “*The Correlation Military Geography - Geostrategy - Geopolitics in Security Studies*”, organized on March 25, 2016 by CDS/SS/NDU.

and Israel (or, according to a study used here², of the historical Palestine) in the East. And the Aegean Sea, which is to be regarded as one of the elements of the Eastern Mediterranean, is stretching from the Dardanelles, in the North-East to an imaginary line connecting, in the South, Cape Aspro, Rhodes, Crete and southern tip of Greece; the same Aegean Sea lies, on the East-West axis, between mainland Greece (which is the most southern part of the Balkan Peninsula) and Asia Minor (now Turkey)³.

Eastern Mediterranean, and in particular the Aegean Sea are in direct connection - through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, as well as through the Sea of Marmara - with the Black Sea, and they form, in quite many occasions along the world history *an obviously functional unit* (not necessarily in strictly geographic terms, but especially in political-military terms and even in security terms, in the broadest possible sense) with *significant* (and *sometimes really major*) *geostrategic relevance*.

The main goal of this study is that of investigating, even if only with very limited means (and in a text of rather modest size), the way in which *defence* issues, in the broadest sense,

² According to the paper: International Hydrographic Organization, *Limits of Oceans and Seas (Special Publication no. 23)*, third edition, Monte-Carlo, 1953.

³ International Hydrographic Organization, *Limits of Oceans and Seas (Special Publication no. 23)*, third edition, Monte-Carlo, 1953, pp. 15, 18.

*** Florin Diaconu is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest (FSPUB) and Director of the Hans J. Morgenthau Center. E-mail: florin.diaconu@fspub.unibuc.ro**



have been interfering, along several segments of world history, with *security*⁴ issues (also in a wider sense) in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea, (which simply is, in our opinion, a geographical, geopolitical and geostrategic extension of the Mediterranean maritime space). We have particularly insisted on some priority and perennial directions for action, with an important role in some political and military circumstances repeated on several occasions over almost three millennia.

An important part of the episodes summarized and discussed in this text have their geographic center of gravity exclusively in the Aegean and other are linking (again, in terms clearly relevant for defence and/or security issues) the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Somehow, with all *limitations* and *precautions*, we are speaking about a number of moments in world history which are projecting an extremely powerful light on a type of reality with a lot of geostrategic relevance which we can call, without any reservation, *historical repeatability*. We are speaking about a repeatability in which the details (or obviously secondary elements, if you prefer another term) are substantially different, while *the bulk* of the similarities is composed of elements belonging to geography, and also of elements of political-strategic decision, determined, too, by geography in the broad sense (with one special mention: *some* geographic elements are subject to very little change, even over very long intervals of time⁵).

1. North-South and East-West axes

In the Aegean we are dealing, in general, on *many occasions* with repeating episodes (or

⁴ In order to define security, we have deliberately chosen the notorious definition tailored, quite many years ago, by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde – see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea: un nou cadru de analiză*, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2011, pp. 41-42.

⁵ Several *major* works in the field of International Relations are emphasizing the perennial nature of the geographic constraints and windows of opportunity. See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni: Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, p. 151, 153.

even trends) that take place along two important geographic axes: East-West and North-South (noting that the geographical sense of the actions can be, along these axes, in both directions - from West to East or from East to West, and from North to South but also from South to the North).

Among the episodes of this type at least partially confirmed by history, *the first* truly relevant one is the establishment and operation of a special type of significant geostrategic reality we are usually calling *Minoan thalassocracy*. Thucydides tells us, very clearly, in his notorious and immensely influential politico-military history work, that Minos, in a very distant past, was the first who prepared and used a fleet, seized on a very large expanse of the Hellenic sea, exercised complete domination over the Cyclades and was the first founder of most cities there, after he drove out Carians, then placing his own sons as rulers of the new cities. And, the ancient author is also stating, Minos wiped out pirates and piracy, in order to make his income grow larger and larger⁶.

We mention here the following elements: the Cyclades are, all of them, *north* of Crete, so that Cretan power expansion – with a duration and intensity that are not too clear, but with consequences that can not be questioned⁷ – takes place along the North-South axis, and on the South-North direction. It collides with a previous colonization action, that of the Carians⁸, which took place on the East-West axis, from the East (Asia) to the West (Aegean islands). According to the historical tradition, the influence of Minos (it's less important if we are talking about a real king or about one rather imaginary) extends to

⁶ Thucydides, *Războiul peloponesiac*, Editura Științifică, București, I, 4.

⁷ J. B. Bury, Russell Meiggs, *Istoria Greciei până la moartea lui Alexandru cel Mare*, Editura Bic All, 2006, p. 7 – their opinion is between 2,000 and 1,550 BC the Aegean islands under Cretan domination had a civilization more developed than that present in continental Greece.

⁸ In ancient times, Caria was the name of a region in the Western and South-Western part of Asia Minor (Anatolia, nowadays), not far away from Rhodes to the South – see map at <http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Ancient-Greece-the-Aegean-e1408142803949.jpg>.



Athens, whose inhabitants had to send to Crete seven young men and seven maidens “every nine years”⁹. We also know – even if indirectly – the expansion of the Cretans to the North was one particularly effective, the best piece of evidence being the large palatial buildings in Crete (see, for example, those in Knossos and Phaistos) have never been fortified, but were instead very rich¹⁰. Consequently, at least in this case, proto-imperial type of expansion (to the North, through and over the Aegean) is a condition of societal security, and also a condition of abundance and wealth, if we compare Minoan Crete and societies in mainland Greece.

Many centuries after the early episode of the Minoan thalassocracy, the Aegean North-South axis is again active, on several occasions, on the North-South direction. This happens, for example, when we take into account *the first large naval expeditions of Athens against Sparta at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War*. More specifically, says Thucydides, while the Spartans invaded Attica with massive ground forces, causing consistent – but limited – damage in farmland districts, Athenians went to the South in massive strategic raids conducted with 100 Athenian triremes, plus other 50 ships provided by two of Athens’ privileged strategic partners, Chios and Lesbos, as well as a number of ships that carried 300 horses. The raiding force launched, along the North-South axis, against Peloponnesus was strong: “four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred horsemen”. With such massive forces (about half of those mobilized at the time of the Battle of Marathon, in 490), the Athenians attacked and pillaged large areas in the Peloponnese: Epidaurus, plus territories of three cities other on the seashore (*all these places are located on the shores of the sea*). Then the Athenians attacked Prasiai, a city located on the coast of Laconia, “devastated the land around it, took the city and ransacked

it”¹¹. The fact that the *grand strategy*¹² design on which these major raids were based was later on abandoned does not mean in any way that the raids have not been effective. On the contrary, while the Spartan army was simply blocked under the impregnable walls of Athens, Athenian forces with high strategic and tactical mobility undertook actions that strongly eroded not only the prestige of Sparta, but also its security – in the broadest sense of the word – and the security of its allies.

After a long time - about two millennia - the Aegean space is, also on the North-South axis (and particularly on the North to South direction, but in some situations in the opposite direction as well), the area of major confrontation between the Christians and the Ottomans. Crete is, again, a *central* geographic position: not as an actor in expansion, but this time as target of expansion of the Turks. Ottoman power, out in force in the Aegean Sea, went down to the South, trying to conquer the island of Crete, at that moment a Venetian possession. On several occasions, the Venetian naval counteroffensive – led with skill and courage, but in conditions of clear inferiority, if we compare the power resources of Venice to those of the Ottoman Empire, at the peak of its great power status – reached regions including the extreme Northern Aegean, mainly the Dardanelles area (where several large naval battles took place, in 1656 and 1657, for example). After a campaign lasting from 1645 (when the Turks landed in Crete) to 1669, Candia, the last Christian bastion on the island, falls, Venice being forced – at the end of a grueling war – to conclude peace with the Ottomans¹³ and the Aegean become, for several centuries, what we could call a ‘*Turkish lake*’.

Later on, a few decades ago, the Aegean space is *again* one where enormous political and military pressure is exercised, coming from the

⁹ “Călătoria lui Theseu în Creta”, in N. A. KUN, *Legendele și miturile Greciei Antice*, Editura Științifică, București, 1958, p. 184.

¹⁰ J.B. Bury, Russell Meiggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

¹¹ Thucydides, *op. cit.*, II, 58 (1-6).

¹² See the definition of *grand strategy* in B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategia: Acțiunile indirecte*, Editura Militară, București, 1973, p. 334.

¹³ Helmut Pemsel, *Von Salamis bis Okinawa: Eine Chronik zur Seekriegsgeschichte*, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, München, 1975, p. 64.



North and aiming Crete. In the spring of 1941 (May, more precisely), an operation took place leading, after the quick conquest of mainland Greece, to the expulsion of British troops from Crete, the conquest of the island by the Germans and to converting the Northern half of the Eastern Mediterranean, for several years, into what we might call a 'German lake'¹⁴ (even if not in full, because the Eastern shores were controlled by Turkey, a neutral power in those years). The fact that the massive attack of German paratroopers was *very* cost-intensive (if we are speaking about combat casualties) does not, however, have much importance to the central topic of this of our debate.

Along the East-West axis occurs, in the Aegean, in the first part of the fifth century BC, the high intensity and large-scale conflict we are usually calling *the Persian Wars* (or wars of the Greeks against the Persian Empire). Around 499, the Athenians sent 20 triremes to support the revolt of the cities in Asia Minor led by Miletus (or Miletos)¹⁵. This form of pressure (one of *modest* size, by the way), from the West to the East, strongly irritated the Persians who forcefully retaliated, organizing, in 490, the expedition which landed at Marathon, where a major battle was fought later on. The Persian expedition which has been ordered to conquer Athens and Eretria started by concentrating a large ground force, that moved westward across the Aegean aboard a fleet of "600 triremes", plus many "ships to transport horses"¹⁶. Several cities on the Aegean islands have been conquered by the Persian, and after landing on the beach at Marathon, the Persians who had a large army,

including cavalry, engaged a tough battle against the Athenians and Plataeans. The Athenians lost 192 people, including Callimachos, a very senior official and Stesileos, one of the 10 *strategoï* (commanding generals), and the Persians lost around 6,400 people, plus seven ships captured by the Greeks, Herodotus is telling us¹⁷.

Immediately after this early victory, Athens tried again to exert pressure *eastwards* across the Aegean, Miltiades wanting to conquer the island of Paros. He departed from Athens with a fleet of 70 triremes (but after a siege of 26 days, Miltiades had to withdraw unsuccessfully)¹⁸. After 10 years, in 480, the Persian Empire attacked Greece again, and again its forces were crossing the Aegean, to the West (even if a detour through Northern regions of the sea was chosen, exclusively because of logistic reasons). Ancient sources say, obviously exaggerating, the Persians led by Emperor Xerxes have mobilized about 1.7 million people in the land forces¹⁹ (of which approximately 80,000 were cavalrymen, plus an unspecified number of camels and war chariots²⁰), plus 1,207 triremes (the largest naval contingents being the Phoenician and Cypriot ones, with 300 and 150 warships)²¹. Other 674 ships were used, Herodotus is reporting, for the construction of two bridges across the Hellespont (Dardanelles)²². The total manpower of the Persian invasion force (including non-combatant manpower) is estimated - obviously exaggerated, again - by Herodotus to be 5,283,220 people²³. Against this huge effort, Greeks initially deployed at Artemision 271 triremes (of which 127 were Athenian, with Athenian crews, and other 20 were also Athenian, but with crews from Chalcis)²⁴.

For the central defensive episode of the war against Persia, the naval battle at Salamis, the total number of Greek vessels substantially

¹⁴ For details on the Battle for Crete in 1941 see, for example, Winston Churchill, *Al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Saeculum I.O., București, 1996, vol. 1, pp. 415-422 (chapter XX, *Creta*); and B. H. Liddell Hart, *Istoria celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Orizonturi, București, vol. 1, pp. 186-192.

¹⁵ J.F.C. Fuller, *Military History of the Western World*, volume I: *From the earliest times to the battle of Lepanto*, Da Capo Press, 1987, pp. 18-19, and Herodotus, *Istoria*, vol. II, Ed. Științifică, București, 1964, V, XCIV și XCIX (here the 20 Athenian ships are accompanied by five triremes sent by Eretria).

¹⁶ Herodotus, *op. cit.*, VI, XCIV-XCV.

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*, VI, CXIV, CXVII.

¹⁸ For the expedition against the island of Paros, see Herodotus, *op. cit.*, VI, CXXXII-CXXXV.

¹⁹ Herodotus, *op. cit.*, VI, LX.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*, VII, LXXXVII

²¹ *Ibidem.*, VII, LXXXIX-XC.

²² *Ibidem.*, VII, XXXVI.

²³ *Ibidem.*, CLXXXVI.

²⁴ *Ibidem.*, VIII, I-II.



increased, reaching 376 triremes (of which 180 were Athenian with Athenian crews and 20 are also Athenian, but with non-Athenian crews)²⁵.

In the following year, rearguard Persian forces were beaten at Plataea, where Greeks have deployed, says Herodotus, 110,000 soldiers (of which 38,700 hoplites, 10,000 of them Spartans and 8,000 of them Athenians) and Persians have deployed (the figure is exaggerated again) about 350,000 people, of which about 50,000 were military from Greek cities subjected to Xerxes²⁶. Immediately after the expulsion of Persians from continental Greece, Greeks went to strategic counteroffensive including crossing over the Aegean, but eastward, and they defeated the Persians again, at Mycale²⁷.

Immediately thereafter, the Spartans withdrew in their own country and Athenians remained in the area near the Hellespont, to besiege the city of Sestos. And, some authors say, the fall of the city was the beginning of the Athenian empire, to which Peisistratos and Miltiades had strongly supported much earlier²⁸. In addition, the Persian-Greek competition for hegemony in the Aegean came to an end after several difficult episodes, by means of pushing the sphere of influence and control of major city-states in mainland Greece more eastwards than ever before, up to the shores of Asia Minor. And the Aegean thus became, de facto, for a time, a 'Greek lake'.

Closer to our times (in the final part of the 19th century, as on many occasions in the 20th century), on the East-West axis of the Aegean Sea is felt, with changing results, the presence of an *intense political competition between the Greek political idea (embodied by the Greek modern state) and Ottoman political idea (Turkish one, later on)*. Both states had important claims and interests in the Aegean and tried, even if only with modest successes (and this because the political will of both countries was not supported by actually sufficient economic resources and budget allocations, likely to lead to truly decisive results).

²⁵ *Ibidem*, VIII, XLIII, XLVII, XLVIII.

²⁶ For the total number of soldiers at Plataea, see Herodotus, *op. cit.*, IX, XXVIII-XXXII.

²⁷ Herodotus, *op. cit.*, IX, XCVI-CVII.

²⁸ J. B. Bury, Russell Meiggs, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

Without going into too many details on this matter, we mention here some issues connected to the intense naval competition between the two countries. In 1867, for example, *Thames Ironworks* launched, for Greece, the battleship (ironclad) *Basileus Georgios*, with a displacement of 1,800 tons (noting that only the armor plates that protected vital parts of the ship had about 330 tons), with mixed propulsion (sailing, plus a steam engine that developed 2,400 horsepower), with a speed of 13 knots and having two 9-inch (229 mm) guns as main armament, arranged in a hexagonal central battery. The literature indicates that "for its size" this ship had better offensive and defensive capabilities than any other ironclad of the time²⁹.

Exactly one year later, the Ottoman Empire replied: shipyards in La Seyne (France) launches *Assari Tewfik*, an ironclad with a displacement of 4,687 tons, mixed propulsion and a speed of 13 knots, and 8 nine-inch guns as main armament³⁰.

The arms race (which illustrates in an easy to understand way *the very intense strategic competition in the Aegean, along the East-West axis*) continued at a rapid pace, the Greek Navy receiving, one year later, in 1869, a new battleship, *Basilissa Olga*, with a total displacement of 2,060 tons³¹.

The competition went on in later years as well: immediately before the Balkan Wars, Greece buys - with cash, thanks to the patriotism and wealth of a very rich merchant - a *Pisa-class* armored cruiser, built in Italy: the *Averoff* had a total displacement of about 10,000 tons, a maximum speed of 23 knots and an artillery with four main guns (10-inch ones) and other 8 secondary guns (7.5-inch ones) and 16 3-inch guns³². This ship was intended to *balance* the purchase by Turkey, from Germany, in 1910, of the armored ships

²⁹ Tony Gibbons (general editor), *The encyclopedia of ships*, Silverdale Books, U.K., 2001, p. 230.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 228.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 230.

³² For these data see *Pisa class (G.Averoff)*, data and plans at the internet address <http://forum.worldofwarships.eu/index.php?/topic/547-pisa-cllasgaverof/>, and *Jane's Fighting Ships of World War I*, Jane's Publishing Company, 1919, reprinted 1990, 1997 (Random House, U.K.), p. 292.



Turgut Reis and *Haireddin Barbarossa* (they had served before in the German Navy under the name *Weissenburg*, respectively *Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm*, and each of them had a displacement of 9,901 tons, a speed of less than 17 knots and a main armament consisting of six 11-inch guns - four of them with 40 caliber-long barrels, and two with only 35 caliber-long barrels)³³.

Turkey succeeded in 1914 to regain clear superiority in the Aegean (as in the Black Sea) when imperial Germany transferred to the Ottomans, at the very beginning of hostilities, the mighty battle-cruiser *Goeben* (immediately renamed *Sultan Selim*), with a total displacement of 22,640 tons, a maximum speed of 27 knots and a main armament consisting of ten 11.5-inch naval guns, each of them with a 50 caliber-long barrel³⁴.

And even closer to our times, the same axis is again activated, with notable effects on the security of Central-Western geographical Europe (which broadly means the EU), by the *migration flows which, just last year, have 'pumped' into Europe about one million people coming from the Greater Middle East*. In more peaceful terms than before and *without* a clear state-based premeditation, this trend is strikingly resembling (even if the differences are not at all missing), two millennia and a half away, with another major demographic pressure coming from the regions of Asia (that of the Persian Empire in the era of the Wars against Greece), which has been stopped (even if *only* by means of great efforts, which is not at all difficult to understand if you read Herodotus very carefully) before it managed to acquire a new space for action and expansion in Europe.

The UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, founded on

³³ For these Turkish (and ex-German) ships see *Jane's Fighting Ships of World War I*, Jane's Publishing Company, 1919, reprinted 1990, 1997 (Random House, U.K.), p. 253.

³⁴ *Jane's Fighting Ships of World War I*, Jane's Publishing Company, 1919, reprinted 1990, 1997 (Random House, U.K.), p. 253, and also Peter Hore, *The World Encyclopedia of Battleships: an illustrated history of battleships and their evolution*, Hermes House, London, 2014, pp. 22-23 and 168.

December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly, reported on March 20, 2016 that an increasing number of refugees and migrants are desperately trying, using boats that are not really suitable for navigation at sea, to reach Europe³⁵. The *main* routes across the Aegean of the moving migrants, were, according to the official sources we are using here, three: one in the South, leading from the Bodrum area, across the sea, directly to Athens; and two other ones to the north, leading from the coasts of Turkey to Chios and Lesbos (the ancient island of Lesbos) or possibly directly to Kavala, east of Thessaloniki.

The total number of people who decided, in spite of massive risks, to cross large portions of the Aegean has been, in recent years, rising fast. In January 2015, for example, 1,694 people have crossed the Mediterranean on all possible routes (the most widely used being those in the Aegean Sea). This year, also in January, the number of migrants who have used the same routes was 67,415. For February, the situation is equally worrying, with 2,873 migrants in 2015 and 57,066 this year. Existing figures for the first part of March are equally dramatic: 7,874 migrants last year, and almost 23,000 in the first week of March 2016. Since the beginning of the year, just in Lesbos (the ancient Lesbos) have arrived from Turkey (mainly from areas north of Izmir), 85,515 migrants; Chios was reached by 33,912 migrants; Samos – by 10,000; and Leros – by 8,545 migrants³⁶.

Subsequently, the situation has somewhat improved. In May 2016, for instance, a NATO official text was stating that “NATO Defence Ministers took swift decisions on 11 February 2016 to deploy ships to the Aegean Sea to support Greece and Turkey, as well as the European Union’s border agency Frontex, in their efforts to tackle the refugee and migrant crisis”. In this context, the authors of the NATO text are stating, “the number of migrants crossing the Aegean Sea

³⁵ See UNCHR, *Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean*, updated on March 20, 2016, at the internet address <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83>, accessed on March 23, 2016.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.



has decreased significantly”³⁷, if compared to that in the previous period.

2. The geostrategic axis from South-West to North-East, to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits

On some occasions, also relevant ones, we have to deal with episodes (or trends covering longer intervals) which take place along *the general axis leading from the South-West (Greece, broadly and / or the Western Aegean Sea) toward the North-East, to the Straits (Dardanelles and Bosphorus) and, through them, to the Black Sea and the territories on its shores.*

The first episode of this type is present in historical legends of ancient Greece – we are talking about stories (it’s less important if stark real ones, imaginary ones or combines reality with some fantasy) on the *expedition of the Argonauts* (or, in other words, aimed at *searching for the Golden Fleece*). According to the legend, the journey taken by Jason and the other crew members of his small ship (a relatively small galley, with 25 rowers on each side) until reaching “the banks of the river Phasis in faraway Colchis”³⁸ has its starting point in the city of Iolcos, in Thessaly, on the “shores of a sea bay like the blue sky”. The legend tells us, among other things, the size and prosperity of the city relied on the “fertility of the fields”, but above all on “commerce and navigation at sea”, sectors of economic activity that brought the city of Iolcos “considerable wealth”³⁹. The extreme length and the difficulty of the route to be traveled along explains, among other things, why Jason asked to come with him what ancient texts describe this way: “never has seen Greece such a gathering of heroes” (among which, let us not forget, were some demigods, including Heracles or Hercules, Castor and Pollux, and also Calais and Zethes, who were sons of the

god Boreas⁴⁰). All these arrived, finally, after many adventures and by means of facing many hardships, to contemporary Georgia, crossing the Aegean, sailing through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and then crossing the Black Sea until reaching its North-Eastern coast.

Arriving there, tells us Tim Severin, a researcher and writer very interested in the history of navigation (for example, he has build a perfect copy of an ancient galley with 50 rowers, strictly following writings and representations from antiquity, in order to replicate Jason’s journey), even today we can see, in the mountain region called Svaneti, in which way alluvial gold is recovered from local rivers by placing “sheep’s skins with wool up”; these skins are “stretched and fastened on some trays ... deep in the riverbed and fixed so that the flow of water to flow over them” Tim Severin also tells us that “when water passes through wool, trickles of gold, being heavier than the sand and silt, are caught in sheep’s hair” and “sometimes, in the richest areas, the first wool placed near the top of the stream was so impregnated with gold dust that was actually a golden fleece”⁴¹. Clearly, this episode, even if partially imaginary, tells us something about the reality of some basic concerns in the world of the early Greeks: to acquire a significant amount of extra wealth (which means prestige, and also individual and collective security) using a political and trade relationship with some partners far away, at the North-Eastern end of the great axis leading from the Aegean to the Black Sea North-Eastern coast.

A second episode of roughly the same type, even if over a shorter distance (only until close to the Dardanelles) takes place during the conflict that we call today *the Trojan War*. The main story of this episode begins with the journey of prince Paris, across the Aegean Sea from Troy (placed near the Dardanelles) to the South-West, “sailing near Salamis and Mycenae”, until “he finally reached the shores of Laconia”, where the Trojan prince where he “stopped his boat at the mouth of the river Eurotas”⁴².

³⁷ See Fact Sheet: *NATO’s Deployment in the Aegean Sea*, May 2016, at the internet address http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_05/20160519_1605-factsheet-aegean-sea.pdf

³⁸ N.A. Kun, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 211.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 212.

⁴¹ Tim Severin, *Expediția Iason: în căutarea lânii de aur*, Editura Meridiane, București, 1989, p. 293.

⁴² N. A. Kun, *op. cit.*, p 244.



When the Greeks decided to go to war (initially just to “take revenge on Paris”⁴³ because of his deeds), they concentrated their land and naval forces near Aulis. Crossing the Aegean was made but in the direction leading from South-West to North-East, by means of using a very large fleet, presented by Homer as having “1,186 ships”⁴⁴. Clearly, we are not dealing with an episode that’s only based on the fact that Menelaos (or Menelaus) was irritated by Helena’s decision to run away with the younger Trojan prince. The *real* central topic of the great international conflict narrated by Homer (it does not matter if he was an individual, or a collective author) is not at all a soap opera that contains a love story and a lot of violence, but *a direct reference to the major interests - even vital ones – of city-states in Greece, along the direction leading from the Aegean, through the straits, toward the Black Sea.*

As we already know from earlier historical episodes (see at the expedition of the Argonauts), the region around the Black Sea was *very* important for the Greek world, because it supplied a lot of grain, timber, metals, perhaps honey and slaves, and also was a market for Greek manufactured goods, mainly expensive ones (popular among various chiefs in the barbarian world) and, possibly, for Greek wine and olive oil. But, says N. G. L. Hammond, the vital route leading from Greece, through the Aegean and the Straits, towards the Black Sea, was naturally – and probably in an irritating way for the Greeks – controlled by Troy. The city was well placed to control sea traffic through the Hellespont and, in addition, it also controlled, as far as we know, the Bosphorus as well, where crossing to the Black Sea was hampered for seafarers in the Bronze Age by a sea current with a speed of four knots, and by winds that are blowing from the North in the summer months⁴⁵. Therefore, the Trojan War might have been a war waged not only for reasons of

prestige⁴⁶, but one *aimed at forcefully removing a disturbing competitor from a trade route vital to the prosperity* – and, to some extent, for the security – of many socio-professional groups in the city-states of the archaic Greek world.

The third relevant episode, along the same direction (the one that leads from the South-West to the North-East, from the Aegean to the Black Sea), constituted one of the major segments of the large-scale and long-lasting process usually called the *Great Greek Colonization*. In connection with the colonization of shores of the Black Sea, an academic paper tells us that there is no reason to think that seafarers and merchants from Greece did not travel to the Black Sea long before 700s B.C⁴⁷. Settlement expansion in this area of the world was linked to the ‘hunger for extra land’ (meaning the need to get extra food, mainly agricultural products the Greek world produced in quantities insufficient to support population growth and the quite explosive dynamics of some major urban settlements), and also by the need to encourage trade with metal extracted from rich mines in Northern Asia Minor, Armenia and Caucasus⁴⁸.

Finally, the colonization of shores of the Black Sea involved several major city-states in the Greek world: Miletus, Focaea (or Phocaea), Samos, Megara, Chios etc⁴⁹. Exactly starting from the early colonization of the Black Sea shores, archeological evidence proves, since the late sixth century BC, a *progressive increase in the presence of Athenian products, especially ceramics*⁵⁰. In the same century, Athens decided to enter the Hellespont and even to take possession of the region, and did this to be sure that strategic checkpoints along a sea route whose commercial

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 245.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 249.

⁴⁵ N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 b.C.*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1967, p. 53.

⁴⁶ But political moves aimed at getting prestige *do* exist on the international arena – see Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 116-128.

⁴⁷ John Boardman, *Grecii de peste mări: colonizarea greacă și comerțul timpuriu*, Editura Meridiane, București, 1988, pp. 309-310.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 310.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 310-315, and 318-337 (for the stages of the colonization process and list of new cities emerging on the shores of the Black Sea).

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 315.



importance for it was growing are going to be, all of them, in Athenian hands⁵¹.

The fourth episode which proves how important, *strategically* and in terms of *security* (in the broad sense of the concept), the route leading from the Aegean to the North-East through the Straits is, was the process of *incorporating and maintaining the cities on the shores of Black Sea in the in the sphere of influence of imperial Athens*: it has been a geostrategic action greatly strengthened by the naval expedition led by Pericles himself in the Black Sea area. The episode is recounted in a compact but enlightening way by Plutarch, who tells us that Pericles, sailing to the Black sea with a large and strong fleet, managed to accomplish all his goals and was asked by all Greek city-states there to protect them. The ancient author wrote Pericles treated all these small states with great kindness, and foreign (non-Greek) peoples and their kings and masters had been shown them the “size of power”, the “lack of fear” and the “courage” of the Athenians, who sailed where they wanted and brought under their control the whole sea. In the city of Sinope (or Sinop) the Athenian left 13 ships led by Lamachos, and soldiers to be used against the tyrant Timesilaos. And after Timesilaos and his friends fell from power, Pericles settled to send to Sinope six hundred volunteers, who were supposed to live there, strengthening even more the Athenian influence in the Black Sea region⁵². This huge *show of force* (accompanied by the beginning of a process of *colonization undertaken by the state and based on state strategic interests*) stabilized in the long term the Black Sea Area, and all the Straits stayed for a long time within the Athenian sphere of influence, which was vital to the *strategic* interests of Athens, as for its *security* of the city in the broad sense (including here economic and food security, an absolutely remarkable achievement). We are also mentioning here that implementing and reinforcing complete control of the vital route leading from the Aegean to the Black Sea was also made possible, in the

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 348.

⁵² “Pericle”, in Plutarh, *Vieți paralele*, Editura Științifică, București, 1960, vol. I, XX.

context of the great strategic naval raid in 436 BC, by means of occupying some strong and useful positions, including the fortified cities of Chersonesos, Byzantium and Chalcedon (or Chalkedon), which became members of the Athenian confederation⁵³.

Episode number five, also illustrating the relevance of geographical and geo-strategic axis leading from the Aegean to the Black Sea, is *the very way in which, after several decades of indecisive confrontation, the Peloponnesian War came to an end*. Xenophon, who continued Thucydides’ work, tells us very clearly that the so-called battle at Aigos Potamoi, where the Athenians had around 180 ships and the Spartans, clearly more (Persians had openly advised Spartan Admiral Lysandros not to start any major action against the Athenians until he had more numerous ships⁵⁴). And the central goal of confrontation was, in the end, controlling the route used to bring from the Black Sea region large amounts of grain, vital to the very survival of Athens.

The completely unexpected victory of the Spartans, who captured all Athenian ships (with the exception of 9 triremes, including the official ship *Paralos*), while crews were ashore to replenish the food reserves⁵⁵ was immediately completed by the fact Spartans and their allies occupied the cities of Byzantium (now Istanbul) and Chalcedon⁵⁶. Moreover, says the text, the soldiers of the Athenian garrison, like any other Athenian which Lysandros discovered, was sent to Athens, giving them free passage of shipping only in that direction, knowing that the more people will gather in the city and in Piraeus, the more speedily will massive famine occur⁵⁷. Finally, to cut the access of Athens to any possible food source, Lysandros, after raiding Salamis, anchored 150 ships near Piraeus, to stop by means of this blockade any ship bringing food to

⁵³ J. B. Bury, Russell Meiggs, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

⁵⁴ Xenofon, *Hellenicele*, Editura Științifică, București, 1965, II, 1 (14).

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, II, 1(27-28).

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, II, 2 (1).

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, II, 2 (2).



Athens⁵⁸. In these circumstances, the Athenians no longer had any ships, allies and wheat and in the city many were dying of hunger⁵⁹. After slightly more than three months of complete blockade⁶⁰ – which clearly constituted not only a military problem but a more serious one, placing under a huge question mark not only the food security but the very survival of the whole population – Athens was forced to make peace, destroying its own fortifications and decommissioning the battle fleet, and also abandoning independent foreign policy: all these because, Xenophon tells us, there was no more delay possible, because of the crowds massively dying from hunger in the completely blocked city⁶¹.

Much closer to our days, the same axis is *again* extremely active on *two* distinct occasions. The first of them takes *place in the time of World War I*, for example when the naval forces of the Entente tried, with great efforts and serious losses to force the Dardanelles in order to reach Istanbul and through the Bosphorus the Black Sea⁶². Even today, *the same axis leading from the Aegean to the Black Sea is overactive again, while the geostrategic competition between Russia's neo-imperial ambitions and NATO is increasingly acute*. The geographical axis we are talking about is active in *both* directions, with NATO ships of (particularly US Navy ones, but also combat vessels belonging to other states) 'rotating' with relative regularity in the Black Sea (under legal conditions compatible with logic of the Montreux Convention), both to provide open support to NATO countries in the Black Sea area, countries that feel themselves threatened by the resurgence of Russian expansionism, and to operate, if necessary, as a *strategic deterrent* intended to temper the Kremlin's bellicose enthusiasm;

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, II, 2 (9).

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, II, 2 (10-11).

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, II, 2 (16).

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, II, 2 (21).

⁶² For details on these operations in March-May 1915 see, for example, Helmut Pemsel, *op. cit.*, pp 202-203, dar și E. B. Potter (editor), *Sea Power: a naval history*, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, second edition, pp. 212-218 (the attempt to break through the Dardanelles Turkish defensive works) and 221 (the Gallipoli landing).

and the Russian vessels transporting troops and military equipment to Syria or, if we talk about combat warships, those deployed to Eastern Mediterranean offer a significant addition to the geostrategic relevance of certain claims Moscow has over the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.

These Russian claims, we strongly underline, were already visible in the 18th and 19th centuries, but also in the writings of Admiral Gorshkov, published more recently (several decades ago). This author, for example, wrote in an article published on 25 February 1972 in the main professional magazine of Soviet Navy (*Morskoi Sbornik*): "The ancestors of the Russian people appeared for the first time in their ships in the Mediterranean as early as the 6th and 7th centuries. More than once they participated with the Byzantine fleet in combat operations off the coast of Italy, Sicily, Crete and Cyprus. In the following centuries, cruises by Russian ships to the Aegean Sea and to the shores of Asia Minor continued. Owing to these cruises, political, cultural and trade relations were maintained with the peoples of the Mediterranean countries"⁶³.

Brief conclusions

Over several millennia – practically since the Minoan era until today – the several axes described here (North-South, East-West and one from South-West to North-East, through the Straits) are, in the Aegean and the Black Sea, and in the Straits as well, the immediate geographic context in which diverse defence and security concerns of some political entities of different sizes, power ranks and organizational forms are operating. The regularity with which the axes presented in this text are active in the Greater Aegean Sea area, in the most diverse circumstances, very clearly underlines the *perennial relevance of geography, geopolitics and geo-strategy for the grand strategy, and for defence and security studies as well*.

⁶³ "Russia's Road to the Sea: Peter I to Napoleon", in Sergei G. Gorshkov (Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union), *Red Star Rising at Sea*, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1974, p. 17.

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ADAPTATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC DEFENCE POLICY TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

*Josef PROCHÁZKA, PhD**

*Lukáš DYČKA***

The present paper assesses the scope of changes in the pursuit of the Czech Republic defence policy adaptation to the change in its security environment. It stipulates new set of strategic assumptions on which new conceptual approach to defence policy formulation and execution is build. In addition to that, it identifies several risks associated with the new policy implementation.

Keywords: *defence policy, security environment, defence, security, scenario, strategic assumptions, risks, defence paradigm.*

Introduction¹

As Albert Einstein once said “*The world is a dangerous place to live; not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don’t do anything about it*”. The present article aims at answering this serious problem within the Czech Defence Sector as one of the outcomes of research project STRATAL conducted by the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of the University of

Defence in Brno (CZE) from 2016 following the project TRENDS completed in 2015. The intent of these two projects is to inform the adaptation of defence policy of the Czech Republic and support continuous transformation effort of its Armed Forces.²

The main objective of this contribution is to assess the scope of changes in the pursuit of the Czech Republic defence policy adaptation to the wide spectrum of security challenges, which are both military and non-military in their nature. Amid growing dynamics in strategic environment the Government of the Czech Republic has adopted several strategic documents and policy concepts and taken a handful of measures with the aim to strengthen its contribution to collective defence and to enhance resilience of the whole society against potential threats.

The fundamental conceptual framework for formulation and execution of foreign, defence, internal affairs and economic policies provides the Security strategy.³ Security strategy clearly states that the main concern of the Czech Republic Government is economic and

¹ The current material was delivered at the Symposium with international participation “*Major Challenges for the Security of the Euroatlantic Area*” on 26.05.2016, organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, “Carol I” National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania.

² Project results were used during the elaboration process of the Czech Armed Forces Development Concept adopted by the Government in December 2015.

³ Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2015. ISBN 978-80-7441-007-9. Available at: http://www.mzv.cz/file/1483514/Security_Strategy_CZ_2015.pdf

*** Dipl. Eng. Josef PROCHÁZKA, PhD is Deputy Director of the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies within University of Defence in Brno, Czech Republic. E-mail: josef.prochazka@unob.cz**

**** Lukáš DYČKA, PhD Candidate, works at the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies within University of Defence in Brno, Czech Republic. E-mail: Lukas.dycka@unob.cz**



social development. However, one of the most significant preconditions for its prosperity today and in the future is a credible provision of security of its population, fully operational defence arrangements for ensuring our sovereignty and territorial integrity and open access to foreign markets and trades with vital raw materials.

That is, of course, nothing new in this kind of political thinking and policy considerations in many of European capitals. After the end of Cold war, for more than two decades, economic interests prevailed defence issues and peace dividend were taken irresponsibly especially in the time of economic austerity. Long term underfinancing of defence impacted the performance of defence sectors and armed forces capabilities almost of all Europeans allies. The Czech Republic Armed Forces (CZAF) were not saved from these developments. The CZAF capabilities are constrained by understaffed structures, insufficient training, aging equipment and infrastructure and limited scope of stock (especially ammunition).⁴

Moreover, the Czech Republic political and military ambitions stipulated in its Defence Strategy 2012 were subject to several adjustments as an outcome of resource driven strategy to safeguarding its defence and provision of its defence sector capability.⁵

⁴ White Paper on Defence 2011 in reaction on dramatically shrinking defence budget proposed many unpopular changes in terms of termination of some non-essential military capabilities, White Paper on Defence 2011, available at: http://www.mocr.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/whitepaperondefence2011_2.pdf

⁵ The Czech Republic political military ambitions: (1) Defence of the state territory and national sovereignty – all forces and assets of the Czech Republic Armed Forces (CZAF), including liability to conscription will be employed; (2) North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 operations, if its territory is not directly endangered – land and air forces units assigned to NATO in core of a brigade task force; (3) North Atlantic Treaty Non-article 5 operations (Crisis Response Operations - CRO) – a battalion task force, a land company task force (or air force equivalent, forces up to battalion level assigned for stand by duty (NATO Response Force - NRF, European Union Battle Groups - EU BG, ...) and special forces task team and other specialist or expert groups, See Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2012.

One can argue that the political mind-set in last two years is evolving and several trends are changing their patterns. Current complex security problems require also complex solutions that reach beyond the horizon of one government. Hence, the provision of defence must be an important issue for all democratic parties and governments.⁶

In case of the Czech Republic, there are three pillars worth noting on which defence of the Czech Republic is currently based: (1) Responsible approach by the state to the defence and international commitments (collective defence); (2) capable Armed Forces and (3) National Defence as a Civic Duty.⁷ Regarding the responsible approach to defence the declination trend in defence expenditure is supposed to be reversed and Czech Government committed itself to allocate 1.44% GDP for defence by 2020. In terms of the CZAF capability development The Midterm Plan is approved and about 14% of defence budget in average will be invested for the modernisation effort. One of the priorities is to ensure security of supply for CZAF. In the framework of the third pillar, the *reserves* concept is being implemented. In addition to that, Government has introduced a program for preparation of young generation in order to develop necessary skills for emergency situations.

1. Shifting Defence Paradigm and Strategic Assumptions

While after 1993 Czech defence policy and military strategy has been built on the assumption that a direct military attack against the Czech Republic and its allies is not probable and it will be easily predictable, which would make preparation for such situation easier.

Today, the situation evolved if not dramatically, than at least fundamentally. Lessons learned from current armed conflicts in Georgia 2008 and especially Russian aggression in 2014 in Ukraine prove that growing instability of strategic environment and its unpredictability

⁶ White Paper on Defence, Ministry of Defence, (MoD), 2011, Prague, p. 6.

⁷ Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2015.



require more prudent approach to defence provision.

As a response to that defence paradigm shift, following three new strategic assumptions are going to lead the Czech defence policy in years to come:

- The risk of direct military attack on the Czech Republic remains low – nevertheless, the possibility that some of the NATO allies or EU members might be confronted with an immediate military threat cannot be ruled out.

- Threats of a military nature are stemming from the aspirations of Russia tending to show a disregard for the international order and basic principles of international law in its pursuit of power.

- The probability that the Czech Republic will be involved in the military kind of confrontation at NATO periphery is increasing and time for effective – the most likely – multinational reaction is significantly shortened. We speak today about weeks or months rather than years.

This set of strategic assumptions has significant military implications on preparedness and readiness including growing demand on available resources.

2. Revival of Forgotten Scenario – Major Armed Conflict

Different set of strategic assumptions influence the way the CZAF might be employed in order to mitigate wide spectrum of potential security risks and defend the country vital and strategic interests.⁸

The mission and main tasks of the CZAF are well set out in the Act no. 219/1999, on the Czech Armed Forces and they stemmed from NATO and EU membership. In addition to that a capability development process of the CZAF is oriented by the political – military ambitions and multinational commitments e.g. capability targets as an outcome of NATO Defence Planning Process.

⁸ Concept Development of the Czech Republic Armed Forces, MoD, Prague 2015, available at: http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/KVA__R_ve_ejn__verze.pdf

The most dangerous scenario, however still less likely, the CZAF must responsibly plan against, is the high-end fighting in Article 5 Operation at the NATO periphery.⁹ It requires balanced spectrum of capabilities and rapid augmentation of professional CZAF by personnel and all necessary materiel resources. Inherent part of this scenario is also a hybrid kind of activities targeting the country centre of gravity (hearts and minds of its population and country's critical infrastructure). Therefore, the peacetime establishment capability of the CZAF must allow for building up a credible war time command and force structure and enhancement of national security and defence system capability and capacity including protection against cyber threats and misleading propaganda.

In response to that, following measures are to be taken: (1) enhancing preparedness and readiness of existing professional CZAF (rapid force projection, including strategic distances); (2) modernisation of existing capabilities and developing stock of material and ammunition for credible deterrence; (3) building up and keeping relevant reserves in scope and quality in order to generate forces for large combat multinational operations (up to corps level); (4) reintroducing of reliable processes enabling to call for duty of entire available population and for effective management of mobilisation.¹⁰

3. Combination of Threat and Resource Driven Military Strategy

Balancing requirements and resources is still a well-known resource allocation dilemma. Nevertheless, the era of doing more with less has become obsolete by Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its role in the Ukrainian crisis afterwards. One of the potential effects is that the total global defence spending rose by 1% in real term in 2015. It is the first increase since 2011. The world military expenditures were 1676 billion USD in 2015.

⁹ North Atlantic Treaty, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

¹⁰ The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030, MoD, Prague 2015, available at: http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/Dlouhodob__v_hled_pro_obranu_2030.pdf



Allies should focus on commitments stemming from Article 3 North Atlantic Treaty. They should develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. It reminds us that defence begins at home, that all NATO members must contribute to collective defence, and that each nation has a responsibility to maintain their capability for their own defence.¹¹

However, allocation of resources differs considerably even among NATO nations. The European nations with most powerful military e.g. UK, France (FR) and Germany (DE) indicate their intent to spend more on defence in the foreseen future to fulfil their defence pledge commitments made in Wales.¹² On the other hand, smaller NATO European allies defence spending is still falling – albeit by meagre 1.3% annually. This does not apply for the Central/Eastern European NATO member states, which increased their defence spending substantially by 13% in average. Yet, there are exceptions such as Poland which increases its defence budget by 22% in 2015. Thus, it seems that a new trend is set out in the Alliance. Whether this is a sign of NATO fragmentation remains to be seen. What is sure, however, this mismatch is a result of different threat perception that NATO faces today.

To make this matter even more challenging, the European allies are under climbing pressure from the US to spend recommended 2% of their GDP on defence. The US alone allocates approximately 75% (in real terms 583 billion of USD) of total NATO defence expenditures.¹³ The most often used argument is that in order to maintain solid transatlantic relations in longer term, the European pillar in NATO should do more for credible collective defence and provide meaningful contribution to it.

In defence sector administration is a growing feeling that the time when various reforms were launched and implemented in order to strengthen effectiveness and in the same time deliver savings is inevitably over. One can argue that operational requirements will be the main drivers for defence expenditure allocation for the years to come.

But the amount of expenditures is only one part of the equation, the unhealthy structure of defence expenditures is the other. To fix this problem requires that hard decision must be made in order to support development of the most pressing priorities. Also, more resources must be freed up for modernisation of aging military equipment and infrastructure. Most of allies defence budgets have been “eaten” by climbing personnel expenditures and there is only limited flexibility to change this worrying trend.

In terms of defence expenditure, the Czech Republic intends to return to the structure 50 – 30 – 20, which means that personnel expenditures should not be more than half of its defence budget. In time of growing economy and hard competition on market with human resources accompanied by poor fitness of young population, it will be a challenge to do so!

4. Mitigation of Associated Risks

Implementation of the updated Czech Republic Defence Policy is inevitably associated with several risks (political, military, administrative, economical, societal) which should be mitigated if the country wants to safeguard its national defence effectively and become a security provider and not exclusively its consumer.

4.1. Political risks

In our view, political risks are the following: formulation of incorrect defence policy and strategic objectives in addressing current and future security challenges; fading political commitments to allocate adequate level of resources to defence in order to ensure country fair share on collective defence;¹⁴ nonexistence

¹¹ U.S. European Command Posture Statement 2016. United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, February 25, 2016.

¹² Trends in World Military Expenditures 2015, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2016, available at: http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=512

¹³ Defence News. *US Army Pivots to Europe As Russian Threat Grows*. February 15, 2016.

¹⁴ Odehnal, J. (2015). Military expenditures and free-riding in NATO. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 21(4), 479-487.



of a clear vision on role of the armed force in relation to provision of its internal security.

4.2. Military risks

Military risks are about the military inability to identify and justify new requirements to mitigate existing capability mismatch in short-, mid- and long-term perspective and nonexistence of rigorous and sound defence planning.

4.3. Administrative risks

Administrative risks refer to poor performance of existing acquisition system and its inability to ensure right capability delivery on time and on budget; ensuring value for money to taxpayers; establishment of smart customer framework and support to life cycle management; Human Resource Management able to implement personnel policy in its complexity and to grant skilled and motivated people for each function; understaff command and force structures, lack of motivation, declining knowledge, inadequate age structure of military personnel.

4.4. Economic risks

Economic risks – economic growth combined with low unemployment will increase competition on labour market; limited defence industry capabilities to support armed forces modernisation effort and significantly extending requirements on security of supply.

4.5. Societal risks

Societal risks refer to non-proper linkage between professional armed forces and rest of society; declining support to armed forces mission, goals and tasks; aging population and limited physical fitness of young population.

Unfortunately, there is no common approach to defence policy adaptation even among European pillar of NATO. In the worst case scenario, it might be the case for potential beginning of EU and Alliance fragmentation. NATO Summit in Warsaw should therefore demonstrate Alliance cohesion and ability to deter any military threat to North-Atlantic area.

With regard to the Czech national reaction, it seems that the Czech political leadership attitude to defence matters has evolved dramatically over the last two years, mostly due to the Russian aggression, influx of refugees and increasing scope of terrorist activities in European capitals. The outcome of this might be split to several areas. First of all, the decline of defence budget has been stopped and hopefully will be reversed in the near future (from current 1.06% to 1.44% of GDP by 2020), yet still far away from NATO benchmark of 2%. Secondly, several strategic documents were amended so they reflect new security realities and implications – Development Concept of the Czech Armed Forces is based on different set of strategic assumptions. Thirdly, the capability of armed forces is a subject of reconsideration in order to enhance its preparedness and readiness. In addition to that, the defence system, as a whole, requires enhanced resilience and proper functioning in terms of mobilisation of all society resources.

Nevertheless, implementation of updated Czech defence policy faces significant obstacles on political, military, administrative and last but not least societal level. Success of defence policy implementation relies heavily on careful management of those challenges in many years to come – it is a long term deliverables for public and allies.

Conclusion

Authors of this paper intended to assess the scope of changes in the pursuit of the Czech Republic defence policy adaptation to the wide spectrum of security challenges, which are both military and non-military in their nature. This assessment was conducted in context of wider NATO response to the dynamic change of global security environment. Data collected proves that,

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PLANNING PROGRAMMING BUDGETING EVALUATION SYSTEM AS A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM IN MANAGING DEFENCE RESOURCES

*Maria CONSTANTINESCU, PhD**

The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), used for managing defence resources in several countries, faced throughout its existence both support and fierce criticism. Over time, the initial system has been adapted and transformed in the US in the form of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), while in Romania it is known as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System. PPBES can be approached from a restricted perspective as a tool for budget development and management and from an expanded perspective as a decision support system. The intention of this paper is to provide an analysis of the challenges in using PPBES as a tool for managing defence resources, with emphasis on the interactions between strategic planning at the military-political level and resource planning.

Keywords: *system, decision making, integrated framework, defence, planning, and resources.*

1. Introduction

Throughout its existence, the Planning Programming Budgeting System – PPBS, as it was originally named, has been praised and

criticized in equal measure. On the plus side, it was considered as an effective way of defence resources allocation, while on the minus side was criticized as the biggest bureaucratic nightmare and the most convoluted way of developing a budget. The intent of this paper is to provide an analysis of the challenges generated by the use of the PPB system as a tool for defence resources management, with focus on the interactions between the strategic planning at political military level and the resource planning level. The PPBS has evolved in time into PPBES, keeping most of the original ideas behind the process, while trying to adapt to the current challenges.

2. PPBES: budgeting tool vs a management tool

PPBES has been defined an annual cyclical process of determining the financing requirements and allocation of defence resources¹, or according to a different definition, as a comprehensive decision making instrument...that requires the articulation of explicit goals, purposes

¹ Acquimedia, <https://dap.dau.mil/acquimedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=10fdf6c0-30ca-43ee-81a8-717156088826>, accessed on 15.05.2016.

** Maria CONSTANTINESCU, PhD in International Economic Relations, is Associate Professor with the Regional Department for Defence Resources Management Studies, Braşov, România. E-mail: mconst@crmra.ro*



and objectives from which strategic programs are identified ...that generates output budget information from which effective resource allocations can be made². In Romania, PPBES “consists of the integration of efforts of the Ministry of National Defence structures for the efficient use of the available resources in order to achieve the planned military capabilities. PPBES ensures the management needs at department level, as well as the development of the planning documents requested at NATO/EU level”³.

In its original meaning, PPBS was developed, under Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, by Charles Hitch, as a system designed at improving the resources management within the United States Department of Defence. In this sense, PPBS was defined as “an integrated management system that places emphasis on the use of analysis for program decision making... with the purpose of ...putting program decisions into operation through integration of planning, programming and budgeting functions”⁴.

In effect, the PPBS phases were designed after the main functions of management, and the novelty of the system was not in the phases themselves, but in the way they were related to each other and in the emphasis placed on linking goals with budgets. The primary focus was to develop a system in which the achievement of goals set in a strategy was closely linked with the level of the budget and the way the resources were allocated.

One of the purposes of introducing PPBS was to strengthen the role of the minister of defence in resource allocation and to provide a more rational resource allocation basis, following a more centralized top-down approach. Within PPBS, decisions in the field of strategy and defence resources allocations are to be made on the grounds of clearly formulated national security and defence goals and objectives, in opposition to previous manner of making decisions as

a result of the interactions between various interests from services, or other structures within the department/ministry of defence. Also, PPBS is supposed to provide the link with the military requirements, derived from the main strategic planning documents and ranked according to priorities.

In time, PPBS has evolved, and from 2003 the System of Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution was implemented in the United States Department of Defence, with the intent of emphasizing the planning phase, involving more heavily the Combatant Commanders in the process, by requesting and using their inputs, focusing on capabilities and facilitating the review of the execution of past decisions and the consequent actions. Its intent was to provide the most effective mix of forces, people, equipment and logistical support, within the boundaries of financial ceilings, by making the link between strategies at political military level, prioritized capabilities and available resources.

PPBES placed a greater importance on getting feedback, on assessing and reviewing the performance of the programs, in order to measure the progress towards the achievement of the established goals and objectives. The inputs gained from the feedback phase were designed to be used for further decisions regarding resource allocations in the next cycle, together with inputs from the other relevant processes, namely the requirements generation process and the acquisition process.⁵

In Romania, PPBES was introduced under the name of Planning Programming Budgeting and Evaluation System, keeping the original PPBS framework but adapting it to the specifics of the national military and financial system.

The planning phase is aimed at defining the framework for the resource allocations, in terms of ways ahead for the main defence programs and establishing financial allocation ceilings for the next 10 years, through the main defence planning documents, together with studies, analyses and long term plans.

² Jerome McKinney, *Effective Financial Management in Public and Nonprofit Agencies*, Praeger Publishers, June 2004, p. 330.

³ MoD website, <http://dpap.mapn.ro/pages/view/112>, accessed on 12.05.2016.

⁴ P. DonVito, *The Essentials of a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System*, RAND Corporation, 1969, p. 1.

⁵ Steven Grimes, *PPBS to PPBE: a process or principles?*, U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2008, www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA479670, accessed on 12.05.2016.



The programming phase is aimed at developing the main defence programs, within the established financial limits, in order to provide a view regarding the resources allocations needed for the achievement of the established objectives.

The budgeting phase focuses on the development of a financial plan, used to provide the necessary resources for the development and maintenance of the military capabilities in the first year of the program, while the evaluation phase is aimed at providing feedback on the implementation and achievement of the objectives established for the first year of the programs, within the financial limits set in the budgeting phase, in order to make the necessary corrections⁶.

Generally speaking, PPBES emerged in order to provide a way of reconciling two opposed approaches to defence planning:

- the *requirements based approach*, which postulated that the threats to national security are the determinants of military strategies and requirements, while the aim of the budget is to provide the necessary resources for the achievement of the strategies' objectives. The issue generated by this approach is linked to the scarcity of the defence resources, as planning for defence just on military considerations, without taking into account the financial limitations, leads to difficulties in the implementation of the plans.

- the *budget based approach* starts from the available budgetary resources, on which bases a force structure shall be build, while the military strategy has to accommodate the resource limitations, regardless of the threat environment. This approach, although very useful from an economic and financial point of view on short term, is not viable on medium and long term from a military point of view, as it may compromise the achievement of the main defence goals and objectives. Budgets should be used as tools for the achievement of objectives, and not become objectives in themselves.

The rationale behind PPBES was to build a system that should consider the military needs and costs at the same time, as decisions regarding

the force levels can not be dissociated from the available resources. Making decisions regarding forces and technological sophistication levels, without considering the available budgets, can only result in a planning process totally disconnected from the reality. At the same time, making these decisions on short term, solely on the basis of available budgets, does not allow for building an efficient military and the achievement of the long term strategic objectives. Also, the budget-based approach creates the premises of inefficient financial decisions, as medium term and life cycle costs considerations are not analyzed, leading to short term savings that sometimes generate medium term economic losses.

This is one of the areas where the original PPBS approach, as it was designed for the defence area, differs from the more widely known approach to it as a *budgeting tool*. As a budgeting system, PPBES is mainly used as a tool within the ministry of defence, with military requirements - as output of the military planning, being tailored after the budget limits.

An interesting definition of PPBS from an accounting dictionary outlines very well this point of view: PPBES is described as a "planning-oriented approach to developing a program budget... meaning a budget in which expenditures are based primarily on programs of work and secondarily on character and object"⁷. Thus, the primary goal of PPBES seems to be the development of a budget (specifically a program budget) and not the rational decision making process of allocating resources for the achievement of objectives, as initially designed. The definition acknowledges that "the major contribution of PPBES lies in the planning process", but then considers that the PPBES planning process is "the process of making program policy decisions that lead to a specific budget and specific multi-year plans". In other words, the goal of planning is to produce more

⁶ MoD website, <http://dpap.mapn.ro/pages/view/112>, accessed on 10 May 2016.

⁷ AllBusiness, Program-Planning-Budgeting System (PPBS), Dictionary of Accounting Terms for: Program-Planning-Budgeting System (PPBS), http://www.allbusiness.com/barrons_dictionary/dictionary-program-planning-budgeting-system-ppbs-4945821-1.html, accessed on 10.05.2016.



plans, keeping in mind that programs are actually medium term resource allocation plans, while the budget is in itself a short term plan, an estimate of revenues and expenditures for a specific future period of time.

3. PPBES as a *decision support system*

PPBES strength actually lies in its use as a *management and decision making tool*, employed at the level of the ministry of defence to allocate resources for the achievement of national defence goals, but also as a way of providing the political military decision makers (which are the ones that establish the defence objectives and strategies) with a transparent tool to estimate the resource implications of their decisions for medium term, not just for the near future. In McNamara's words, although national security is impossible to price, "policy decisions must, sooner or later, be expressed in the form of budget decisions on where to spend and how much"⁸.

When dealing with long term, strategic defence decisions, whose specific results will only become apparent after a number of years, it is often tempting for the political decision makers to ignore the costs and the affordability of reaching a certain objective and fall into the trap of wishful thinking. On the other hand, without a clear vision and strategy, accompanied by precise accountability, many political decisions tend to be made on short term considerations, such as the annual budget restrictions, while the costs and consequences of those decisions will only become visible and will have to be dealt with some years on the future, when they will become the responsibility of different decision makers.

The system of PPBE can be used as a tool that would allow the modification of defence objectives, should they largely exceed the resources available, or the allocation of additional resources for the achievement of crucial objectives. Without this framework underlying the security and defence strategy, goals and objectives would continue to be set independently by senior political decision

makers, while the task of putting them into practice (sometimes with inadequate resources) would continue to be seen exclusively as the job of specialists and decision makers within the ministry of defence. The consequences of such an approach are a continuous imbalance between goals, capabilities/forces and the available resources, propagated from one year to the next, in a kind of application of the "ostrich policy", leading to defence risks due to inadequate forces, but also to the inefficient use of the existing funds. In this respect, if used properly, one of the system's goals was to provide *top-down accountability* for the decisions made, not only at service level or within the ministry of defence, but at all levels of decision.

The planning phase of PPBES is the first focus point and can be viewed as the crucial point of all the process. From the point of view of the functions of management, *planning* is viewed as "deciding in advance what to do, how to do it, when to do it and who is to do it...it bridges the gap from where we are to where we want to go"⁹. Planning is the first step in any managerial enterprise, as it is geared towards identifying the future course of actions in order to achieve the established goals and objectives.

Within PPBES, programming (that can be viewed from the management point of view as medium term planning) plays the crucial role of providing the link between goals, strategy and resources. Often in the public sector, budgeting becomes the main focus of decision makers, as it is closely related to the present, with its problems and challenges. Still, without a clear image about the desired future state, budgeting can only ensure that an amount of money has been spend and not that the amount of money spent has also generated results.

Although the need for planning was often emphasized by military strategists and management experts alike, planning is not an easy process, as it involves dealing with uncertainty, trying to anticipate future goals, conditions and courses of action. Done properly, planning is the foundation of any activity, while if done

⁸ Robert McNamara, *Remarks before the American Society of NewsPaper Editors*, Washington, D.C., April 20, 1963.

⁹ Harold Koontz, Cyril O'Donnel, *Principles of management: an analysis of managerial function*, 5th ed, New York, McGraw Hill, 1972, p. 113.



improperly, it becomes disconnected from reality, a mere bureaucratic nuisance, papers to be filled with words and numbers that, once produced, nobody take a second look at.

In the area of defence, the planning phase of PPBES was designed to overcome the problems generated by a lack of a commonly agreed course of action and strategy. Without a common, integrating framework, planning in the defence area is often done independently, at the level of the services or various structures within the ministry of defence. Even when planning is centralized at a level of a single structure, the situation in which several unaligned planning documents, strategies and doctrines are in force at the same time may arise, generating a lack of correlation and overlaps.

In the theory of PPBES, the planning phase had a few crucial planning documents designed to provide the framework for the future: the National Security Strategy (accompanied/replaced in some countries by the National Defence Strategy), the National Military Strategy and various directives (the Strategic Planning Guidance or the Defence Planning Guidance used in Romania). Most of the states which have adopted PPBES use similar documents to underline the planning phase. Still, in reality, various other planning documents were in time adopted outside the PPBES framework, such various strategies for the transformation of the armed forces, strategic plans or strategic level defence review documents. While each of these strategic planning documents serves a specific need and purpose, having multiple strategic planning documents is not facilitating the efficient use of the PPBES.

The classical principle of unity of command, used from Sun Tzu to modern times, in civilian and military organizations alike, should be kept in mind in the context of defence planning and management. The principle was defined by Sun Tzu as follows: “if a general who heeds my strategy is employed he is certain to win. Retain him! When one who refuses to listen to my strategy is employed, he is certain to be defeated. Dismiss him”¹⁰. The modern military view the principle of unity of comand as “having all forces

operate under a single commander with the required authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose”¹¹. The principle is at the same time a cornerstone of modern management, forbidding the duality regarding the hierarchical positions and objectives. In this context, the underlying condition for an effective planning phase is the development of correlated, clear, financially realistic, future focused planning documents that provide clear guidelines, establish the objectives to be achieved and provide feedback regarding the progress made.

Political level documents usually are, by definition, more general and generic, but this does not mean they should not provide clear guidelines for the future. The more we shift from the political/military level to the military and resource planning, the more focused, detailed and realistic the strategic planning documents should be, with the service-level planning based on a commonly agreed course of action and priorities, especially regarding defence wide missions and capabilities and not just on service specific requirements.

There is no golden template to be followed; each country should find the most suitable way of develop its strategic planning framework. Still, the number of strategic planning documents should be kept to the minimum, as a few clear and comprehensive reference planning documents, agreed upon by all the stakeholders in the ministry of defence, are preferable to a host of parallel, sometimes overlapping and sometimes disconnected strategic planning documents, developed by different structures or following different planning approaches.

One of the challenges faced by decision makers is how to reduce the time allocated for the decision making process, without compromising the quality of the decisions or disregarding relevant information. This is especially true for the programming phase of the system. In this respect, the defence program can be viewed as the “official record of the major resources allocations decisions... supposed to capture all important decisions affecting current and future

¹⁰ Samuel Griffith, *Sun Tzu: the Art of War*, Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press. Inc., 1963, p. 66.

¹¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (11 August 2011). “Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0)” (PDF), Washington, DC. p. A-2.



defence budgets... including documentation and data bases that are supposed to capture all formal decisions”¹².

A decision making tool needs to provide effective ways of dealing with different types of decisions:

- structured decisions (routine decisions, that can be anticipated or that have been taken before, often related to specific policies, procedures, or actions that can be identified to help make the decision);

- unstructured decisions (referring to new, unique problems, for which there are few or no programmatic or routine procedures);

- a combination of the two types above (decision scenarios that have some structured components and some unstructured components).

In the case of structures decisions, PPBES can offer the advantage of the availability of information and decisions already recorded in the previous years’ programs, as the main defence programs are not developed completely from scratch each year - they roll from one year to another, based partly on previous data already analyzed and calculated. Programs for the future years are build on a combination of previous and new assumptions, analysis and decisions, offering a framework for easier decision making. In regard to unstructured decisions, the system offers the advantage of the use of alternatives analysis, based on both cost and effectiveness considerations, drawing upon previous cost estimation experience, methodology and catalogues. Still, the process is labor, resource and time intensive and the advantage can be capitalized only if the system works properly and there are enough experts, information, time, software tools, manuals and databases to support it in providing a reliable and useful recommendation on the course of action to be followed.

One of the purposes of PPBES was to provide decision makers with a rational and objective way of making unstructured decisions, based on detailed analysis of historical data, estimations

and simulations of the future and a clear outline of facts and assumptions accompanying a specific situation. This may be one of the system’s advantage and at the same time a great weakness. Sometimes the analysis process becomes a goal in itself and analysts are overwhelmed with the amount of work to be done in a limited time, while decision makers are overwhelmed by the sheer size of the information that is presented to them in order to make a decision. In this case, processes may gain precedence over results and decision makers’ challenges are shifted from too little information and insight into the future to overwhelming amount of information, sometimes difficult to understand if the experts are less skilled in translating the results into “plain language”, accessible to the non-specialist.

In effect, one of the challenges on the road of making PPBES effective as a decisions support system is moving from its original role of supporting data driven decisions to a more effective one, in supporting data informed decisions. Data and information is an invaluable tool in supporting decision making, but too much information can be as bad as no information, in regard to decision making, as it may lead to information overload and decisional paralysis. The complex PPBES structure in regard to the flow of information was designed to assist the decision making process, with analyses performed at lower levels and decision based on the filtered recommendations from the experts. In reality, when the purpose of the process is not properly understood and is not adapted to the specifics of a particular country, it may lead to an overflow of information towards the higher levels of the hierarchy. Good decision makers, at any level, need access to reliable data, but they also need to have a birds-eye view on the overall process, so the right balance has to be struck between reliance on data and analysis and decision maker’s knowledge, experience, expertise and abilities. Statistical analysis, cost effectiveness analysis, cost estimating etc are just tools, to be used for better decision making, not as drivers of the process. In effect, good decisions are not produced just as a result of calculations or computer simulations; they are taken by people, based on relevant information resulting from the use of analytic tools.

¹² Leslie Lewis, Robert Roll, *Strategy-to-Tasks: A Methodology for Resource Allocation and Management*, Rand papers, 1993.



Conclusions

Although the PPBES concept is half a century old, it has proved unusually resilient in the area of defence resources management, perhaps because it's numerous changes and updates.

There are two main approaches regarding the PPBE process: it can be viewed in a narrower sense, as a budgeting tool, with the advantage of attempting to link budgets with objectives. Still, as a mere budgeting tool, PPBES proved to be a rather ineffective, convoluted and bureaucratic way of producing a budget. If the goal is just developing a budget, then all the planning and identification of objectives, multi-year programming based on laborious cost estimates, alternatives analysis and cost effectiveness analysis, the complex process of evaluation etc, become redundant and useless.

A second approach to PPBES is as a management tool, in the area of defence resources management. As such, the strength of PPBES lies in its use as a decision making system, linking political security and defence goals, military requirements and available resources into an integrated framework, continuously updated based on the feedback provided by the evaluation phase. The underlying condition for this approach to PPBES to be effective is the understanding of the complex interactions that take place within it, not just within the Ministry of Defence, but also at political military level, that provides the starting guidelines for the entire process.

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DRUGS – RISK FACTOR IN MODERN CONFLICTS

*Sorin OPREA, PhD**

In a world that constantly facing to profound changes, drugs have come to be a constant negative presence of everyday life, dominating diverse backgrounds, from large urban areas, to the virtual space. We find ourselves in front of a true phenomenon, adversely affecting society, family balance, safe school environment and the community. Illicit drug use affects a person's health, financial position, its economic efficiency, but also its social relations.

The study aims to show the drugs are a risk factor in modern conflicts.

Keywords: *drugs; traffic; conflict; war.*

1. Preliminary considerations¹

As proved by the analysis, financial dimension of the drug phenomenon is colossal. According to a report prepared by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, it is estimated that “the amount involved laundering of money coming from cocaine, heroin and cannabis could be higher than GDP resulted from three quarters of the world's economies”².

In this equation, a special place is allocated for local and regional conflicts, which, on one hand are supported by money from drug trafficking,

¹ The work was presented in the Symposium: *Atypical conflicts of XXI century*, held by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) on 08.12.2015.

² United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), “Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses”, *UNRISD Briefing Paper No. 2*, World Summit For Social Development, November 1994, p.15.

and on the other hand, the by state of chaos causes breaches in national control systems, creating new markets for drugs, and simulating consumption and social problems generated by it.

Usually, illicit drugs transiting from less developed areas of the world to developed countries where the drug has the highest prevalence. As in recent years, global development of legal business has been facilitated by the globalization of financial systems and relationships in the market, producers and drug traffickers have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by macro-economic environment, which changes permanently. They are globally organized and have placed a significant part of their profits from drug trafficking in financial institutions, which offered instead discretion and attractive investment.

In this way, using the PC and next-generation technologies have facilitated the expansion of drug trafficking and also protection of illicit business. Thus, drug traffickers have been able to “launder” illegal profits, transferring them from one bank to another, using electronic systems, subject usually to lower national control. In doing so, they were helped by the existence of easy borders as a result of national policies to encourage trade and investment.

We can say that in the last decade, the new Internet technologies have acted as a real facilitator of online drug market. Historically,

*** Quaeator Sorin OPREA, PhD is the director of National Anti-Drug Agency in Bucharest, Romania.
E-mail: sorin.oprea@ana.gov.ro**



if markets selling traditional drugs have worked very precisely defined spaces, development of virtual markets has changed the dynamic process of sale, providing an opening potential to a wider and wider audience.

On the other hand, at societal level, consumption, production and trafficking of illegal drugs have a lot of socio-economic and political negative effects. Sometimes, they could undermine the legal economy (eg contributing to a overvalued exchange) and may contribute to increase crime and social unrest.

2. Drug throughout history

Drug use has never been an undiscovered problem, it appeared and was developed in the same time with development of human societies. Quoting Andrew Malcolm, “more than 4,000 plants generate psychoactive substances, of which 60 were constantly consumed somewhere in the world, throughout history”.³

Present in human life since archaic societies, drugs have played different roles: on one hand by producing outstanding states of consciousness, to facilitate the relationship with divinity or other occult forces within religious rituals, and on the other hand, as curative intent to relieve pain or treat certain diseases.

As stated by Louis Lewin in his famous work “Phantastica”, “in an avowed or unconscious search, the man sought by drug an artificial paradise to escape the conditions of its existence, to ease the physical and moral pains, to communicate with the gods, for sacrificial ritual to escape the boredom of a too balanced ego or too little structured one.”⁴

Although it may seem unbelievable, the first evidence of the opium use dates from the Neolithic period. About 7000 years ago, poppy, used to produce opium and its derivatives, was mentioned in Sumerian tablets from Mesopotamia, where there is an ideogram representing a poppy flower, called “joy plant”. Through Babylonians

therapeutic properties of opium are known then in Persia and Egypt. In turn, the Greeks and Arabs were using opium for therapeutic purposes (eg as an analgesic to relieve pain, cough and diarrhea). In Greece, opium was considered a symbol of fertility. However, according to historical sources, in the first century BC the Roman pharmacologist Pendaru Dioscrone of Anazarbe recommended a poppy syrup called “diacodion” while a century later (in the late second century BC), the Greek physician Heraclides of Taranto recommended taking massive doses of opium against venomous snakes bites⁵. In the Middle Ages, an important contributor to the spread of drug use (mainly opium) was the Swiss physician and alchemist Paracelsus, who called opium as “stone of immortality”. He is the one who created a potion of opium powder, called “laudanum”, which was used for intestinal painkillers. Also, Theophrastus (373-287 BC) reminds a poison made of hemlock and poppy juice that kills easily and without pain. Thanks to the properties, in this period, opium is also used to eliminate political opponents, being used even by Emperor Nero to kill Britannicus.

Regarding the use of coca leaves, chewing them is practiced since 3000 BC. In the historical sources of the Inca Empire, cocaine was the sacred symbol the sun god gave to his son, the great Inca. In 1859, Paolo Mantegazza, Italian physician and anthropologist, described the effects cocaine produces and characterized it as one of the strongest toning for nervous system.⁶ Freud is among the promoters of cocaine in Europe, suggesting its use as an anesthetic. At the end of the nineteenth century, cocaine was used against respiratory diseases, as well as those of tuberculosis, asthma and respiratory failure.

In turn, cannabis is mentioned for the first time in a document, around 2700 BC, the Chinese emperor Sheng Nung, as treatment for various

⁵ Apud Romanian Professors Association, Interferences in education – magazine, <http://www.asociatia-profesorilor.ro/droguri-scurt-istoric.html>, accessed on 12 November 2015.

⁶ Pharmacy Law: Combating trafficking and abuse of illicit drugs, course “Ovidius” University Constanta, Faculty of Pharmacy, <http://documents.tips/documents/combatare-a-traficului-si-consumului-ilicit-de-droguri-nr-3.html>, accessed on 12 November 2015.

³ Jenică Drăgan, *Drugs in Romanian life*, Bucharest, Magicart Design, 1995, p. 11.

⁴ Idem.

diseases, but it is supposed it was used very long ago. Thus, in the existing ruins of a village in China 10,000 years ago, fragments of a vessel with twisted hemp fiber were found. In turn, the Greek historian Herodotus describes the practice of Mongolian tribes to throw hemp seeds on a hot plate and to “get drunk” with the resulting smoke. An important contribution to the expansion of cannabis use in Europe was of Napoleonic troops stationed in Africa.

3. Evolution of global drug production

3.1. *Opium poppy crops*

Growing poppy (opium is extracted from it) is done on large areas, especially in the Near East, Middle East and Far East. After flowering, the plant forms a round-oval capsule containing seeds. The capsules were aged about 10 days, after which shall be cut and a milky white latex is extracted from them. By drying, it's color gets brown and hardens, acquiring a rubbery consistency. This crude form of opium is being shaped in lumps or so-called “bread”. The color varies between brown and black. After processing, raw opium may be eaten, drank, smoked or injected. Opium contains about 40 different active substances, known as alkaloids. The main alkaloid is morphine, which is extracted directly from white poppy (germ. Opiummohn) or from the intermediate product.⁷

According to data from the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), can be distinguished two periods with different evolutions of areas of opium poppy in the world: a period between 1987 and 2001 and a period between 2002 and 2014. Since Afghanistan is the main producer of opium poppy in the world, we analyze the dynamics of opium poppy worldwide in line with the development of these types of crops in Afghanistan. Thus, during 1987-2001, the total area of opium poppy in the world is at very high rates. After their peak in 1991 (281560 hectares global cultivated area) in the coming years slight oscillations occurred, but the extent of opium poppy continued to record high levels until 2000, and in 2001 recorded one historic lows (142094 hectares). Similarly, areas planted with poppy in Afghanistan are an almost perfect “symbiosis” with the global evolution, but with a more pronounced growth rate, reaching “peak” in 1999, when the area in this region was of 90583 hectares. In 2001, a sharp drop of this indicator takes place in poppy areas in Afghanistan registering one of the lowest historical values (7606 hectares).

Although in 2002-2014, the dynamics of opium poppy areas worldwide resumes its upward trend, it is a dynamic pace much slower than the previous period and is marked by three regression moments - one in 2003, when there was a decrease of 6% from the previous year, one




Figure no. 1: Evolution of opium poppy worldwide and Afghanistan in 1987 – 2014⁸

⁸ Source: Processing of data provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), available at <https://data.unodc.org/>, accessed on November 13, 2015.

⁷ Idem.



in 2005, when there is the most significant decline (23%) and achieves a minimum of the total opium poppy area, and one in 2009, when records a decrease of 13% from the previous year. Then, the total opium poppy area has steadily increased from 191,000 hectares (ha) in 2010 to 207,000 ha in 2011, as in 2013 it reached 296,720 hectares, and in 2014 to be 310,891 hectares, becoming the largest opium poppy area since 1930 until nowadays (according to the Global Drug Report 2015).

In terms of opium poppy area in Afghanistan in the 2002-2014 period, it follows the same trend as the global cultivated area, but with a larger chain dynamic rhythm, resulting in a gradual reduction of the ratio between the two surfaces. The share percentage of the opium poppy area in Afghanistan, the total opium poppy area worldwide increase from 14% in 1987 to 42% in 1999, falling in 2001 to 5%, then grow sharply to 41% in 2002, reaching in 2006 and 2007 to the maximum of 82%.

previous year. After 2008-2009, when there is a reduction in opium poppy areas in Afghanistan an increasing trend of opium poppy is resumed, the greatest growth was recorded in 2013, when areas cultivated increased by 36%.

Between 2011-2014, Afghanistan registered increases for the fourth year in a row in respect of opium poppy (from 154,000 hectares in 2012 to 209,000 hectares in 2013 to 224,000 hectares in 2014).

After two successive increases by 14% in 1987, respectively by 24% in 1988, between 1990-2001, the evolution of dynamic chain rhythm indicator for global opium poppy areas reveals relatively small changes from year to year, in the range of -2% 9%. The most important change of this indicator takes place in 2001 (36% decrease), and later, in 2002, registered an increase of 27%.

In the first period 2002-2014, there is a fluctuation in the rate of dynamic chain for global opium poppy areas, and, since 2010, an increasing




Figure no. 2: Trend in the percentage of opium poppy area in Afghanistan, the total worldwide opium poppy area⁹

The most significant increases in opium poppy reported from Afghanistan were recorded in 2002, when the cultivated area increased almost 9 times, then in 2004, there is a 64% increase, and in 2006, when crops in Afghanistan increased by 60% compared to the

trend appeared which will continue until 2014. Thus, the values recorded for the dynamic chain rhythm indicator showed in 2004 a 16% percent increase followed by a decrease of 23% in 2005. In 2006 there is a change of trend, marked by

⁹Idem.



2-years of successive percentage increases from 33% in 2006 to 17% in 2007. Between 2008-2009, there is a new trend change, when the opium poppy area decreases first with 10%, then 13%, and in 2010, to record again an upward trend, with a percentage increase by 3%. In 2011, we see a retention rate of dynamic chain, the opium poppy area increased by 9%, continued in 2012, with a percentage of 13%, followed by another 26% in 2013 and by another of 5% in 2014.

Afghanistan still remains the main cultivator country, the opium poppy area representing in 2014 about 72% of the opium poppy crops reported worldwide, while the People's Democratic Republic Laos and Myanmar in Southeastern Asia cover 18, 5%, and Mexico reported poppy crops of only 3.5%.

Enforcement Agency - DEA Kabul reports that in general, opium is sold between 100 US\$ and 140 US \$ per kilogram (price for dry opium is much higher than when fresh).

DEA Kabul reported heroin prices at about US \$ 2,000 / kg of high quality white heroin.

3.2. Coca bush crops

Most of the cocaine on drug market comes from the three Andean countries: Colombia (54%), Peru (30%) and Bolivia (16%).

During a long period, coca bush crops trends have evolved differently in the three Andean countries. Coca bush crop has decreased both in Peru and in Bolivia in the second half of the 90s, but recorded a new trend at the beginning of the new millennium. However, in Colombia,




Figure no. 3: Distribution of areas cultivated with opium poppy globally reported in 2014 by main source countries, percentages and hectares¹⁰

Under the Taliban leadership, opium has rapidly increased from 35% (1995) of the world area to 82% (2006, 2007). Taliban government formally taxed opium traffickers to 20% of their income. Opium prices ranged from \$ 300 US / kg to less than 100 US dollars/kg. Interdiction to grow opium came into force in July 2000 to improve the international image of the Taliban and the opium inflated prices. There is no available list with fixed price, however, the Drug

coca bush cultivation increased in the 90s and fell sharply thereafter.

In 1987, illicit coca bush cultivation has been globally estimated at 230800 hectares, increasing slightly compared to 1996. During 1998-1990, the coca bush area continued to grow, reaching 300,400 hectares. 1991 marks the beginning of the downward trend in global coca bush area, which is maintained with small inflections until

¹⁰ Idem.



1999 when reached a historic low of this indicator. After 2000, when recorded a 21% increase in the coca bush area, resumes a downward trend, which is maintained for 3 years until 2004. In 2004, there is a minor increase (+ 3%) of global coca bush areas.

In 2005, the total coca bush area in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia was of 159600 hectares so far, stable compared to the previous year (+ 1% compared to 2004). However, the coca bush area was below the 28% level recorded in 2000 (221300 ha), lower than it has ever been in the 90s.

After four consecutive years of decline, during which coca bush cultivation declined in Colombia, the total coca bush area in this country increased from 6,000 hectares (8%) to 86,000 ha. This increase occurred despite the government efforts to eradicate supported by Colombia, which resulted in more than 130,000 hectares being constantly subjected to the fumigation and 32,000 hectares were subject to unprecedented

(with -4% less than the previous year). Bolivia, which is the smallest of the three coca producer countries reduced the area from 27700 hectares in 2004 to 25,400 hectares in 2005. The eradication operations continued in Bolivia and in Peru.

In 2012, coca bush cultivation, which remains limited to the three Endives states, continued to decline. Net area of these types of crops was 133700 hectares, being 14% more than estimates from last year and the smallest value recorded since 1990, the first year for which estimates are available. This decrease is mainly due to a decrease of 25% in coca bush areas in Colombia, from 64,000 hectares in 2011 to 48,000 hectares in 2012. In 2012, the Colombian government has made manual eradication of 34.486 hectares of crops and eradication by aerial spraying of 100549 hectares. The decline observed in coca bush crops continued in 2012 in the Multinational State of Bolivia (25,300 ha in 2012 to 27200 ha in 2011) and Peru (60 400 hectares in 2012 to 62,500 hectares in 2011).




Figure no. 4: Evolution of coca crops globally and in key states cultivators, in the period 1997-2014¹¹

manual eradication effort.

Instead, in Peru, where the coca bush area increased in 2004, reaching 50300 hectares (2005 was the highest since 1998) cultivation of coca bush decreased slightly, covering only 48100 ha

3.3. Cannabis crops

The extent of cannabis cultivation in the world and the lack of surveillance systems crops

¹¹ Source: Processing of data provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), available at <https://data.unodc.org/>, accessed on November 13, 2015.



prevent an accurate assessment of the site and crops importance. Indirect indicators on cannabis can nevertheless put into light some aspects of this problem. The origin of seized drugs helps to identify the main countries producing cannabis. On the other hand, the seized number and quantities indicates an increase in cannabis crops available worldwide.

Overall, cannabis production estimates are approximations derived from areas based on fieldwork (sampling on the ground) and aerial or satellite surveys. But these estimates have some important limitations, linked for instance with variations in yield figures due to the difficulty of crops monitoring.

Cannabis is produced in almost every country around the world and is the most common illicit drug. The highest levels of production of cannabis grass - about 25% of global production - is recorded in Africa, especially in Morocco, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Gambia, Kenya and Tanzania. The next are North and South America, each of these continents is responsible for 23% of global cannabis.

In recent years, due to low detection possibilities, but also the advantage of achieving more crops per year, the „indoor” cannabis production is increasing. This type of production is concentrated in North America, Europe and Oceania.

According to the World report on drugs in 2013¹², herbal cannabis (marijuana) cultivation and production of remains widespread, while production of cannabis resin (hashish) remains limited to few countries in North Africa, Middle East and Asia Southwest. Thus, Morocco has reported 47196 ha of cannabis cultivation in 2013, a slight decrease compared to 52,000 ha reported in 2012, plus a significant area of Mongolia reported 15,000 hectares of land planted with cannabis.

Cannabis is also cultivated in Afghanistan. With 10,000 hectares planted with cannabis plants in 2012 (compared to 12,000 ha in 2011),

producing over 1,400 tons of cannabis resin, Afghanistan is one of the largest producers of cannabis resin. Hashish originating from Afghanistan is trafficked in the regional and international markets. Most of the hashish is for the international market, being trafficked through Pakistan and Central Asia.

4. Drugs in the world's conflicts

Relations between military expeditions, conquest wars and conflicts between peoples and drugs are more ancient than the use of these substances.

Inca (XIII-XVI centuries BC) rewarded their victorious captains by giving them the privilege to cultivate coca tree.

However, drugs played a role in the Indian rebellions, from the late eighteenth century against the Spanish empire. During the siege of the rebel Indians led by Julian Apasa, named Tupac Katari of La Paz, coca plays a decisive role in the economy of war, the Indians refusing to fight if were not rewarded with coca leaves¹³. Similar behavior happens during the War of Independence started in 1809 against Spanish rule, when royalist forces established a patriotic outstanding contribution by selling coca to obtain funds for weapons.

Other conflicts involving drugs were so-called “opium wars” of Britain against China. The first of these was during 1839-1842 and the second from 1856 to 1860. In both wars, England aimed to force the Chinese to open ports for the opium trade, which represent the payment for British imports from China - silk, porcelain and, above all, tea.

The relationship between drugs and conflicts has its roots in history, but only after the Cold War a special feature has taken. Thus, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this link was widespread and can be found in most local conflicts, helping to shape them. The specificity of these relationships brings into question the ways of trafficking drugs and, in particular, “climbing profits” that allows

¹² UNODC, (2015), *World drug report 2015*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Viena, 2015.

¹³ Labrousse, Alain, „Drogues et conflits: éléments pour une modélisation”, in *Autrepart* (26), 2003, pp. 141-156.

armed groups to engraft points of articulation of the various stages of drugs production and processing, as well as those of passing through different obstacles along the routes linking production areas to consumer markets.

of funds from the drug trade influenced the guerrillas led by Sendero Luminoso to turn into a terrorist movement and to involve the political leaders in mafia system and in the national and international banking system. In 1990, the state



Figure no. 5: Map of the world conflicts¹⁴

Examples such as Colombian guerrillas and Afghan Taliban, suggests that when the fight takes place in the areas of drug production, defense against drug producers is used as an alibi to infiltrate into the production and trafficking of drugs. In this way, the conflict groups are involved in trafficking, risking to be incriminated and not escape the forces of repression.

Also, after Colombia and Bolivia, the Peruvian region was shaped by the alliance between drug trafficking and terrorism. History of the Region Alto Huallaga demonstrates how family agriculture deflected the late 70s in a massive production of coca, by turning peasants of Sierra, Costa and Amazon into cultivators of coca bush and thus by creating a “matrix” production of this drug, which allowed the Alto Huallaga region to become number 1 in the world in the cocaine export. Subsequently, collection

launched a ruthless war against drug trafficking, destroying more than 80% of the coca bush areas. Violence collision was such that today there is no family to count their dead, while the area is largely deforested and the land is very degraded.

In the early stages of financing a conflict using the drug, i.e. in stages related to drugs production and processing, the most important aspects are: the producing country, space control and supply routes, protecting the native population.

In fact, the ‘classic’ guerrillas, in Latin America (Colombia, Peru), Africa (Senegal, Liberia) and in Asia (Philippines, Sri Lanka) working mainly on this pattern, that of a “captive markets” and geostrategic.

However, the conception these insurrections were described during the 1980s (especially by the US officials) as “narco-guerrilla” is wrong. The use this name for such groups would claim that traffic is an end and not a means.

In fact, not only that these groups have long operated in a political sense, but contacts with

¹⁴ From *Aviation Week Defense Technology International*, available at <http://awin.aviationweek.com/Portals/aweeck/media/adconflictmap/ad1.html>, accessed on 13 November 2015.



illegal drug production are often a key element of growers support.

Only if the power perspectives shall be removed or when ideological references fade, these groups are criminalized.

5. Economic link between drugs and conflict

By most estimates, illegal drug trafficking brings the greatest profits in the world. Value of money came from drug trafficking, estimated at about 500 billion per year, exceeds that of international oil trade, being preceded only by the guns trade¹⁵. Thus, the drug trade is an important part of the underground economy in the world, being a peerless financial gain for producing countries. The specific nature of drugs, the central place they occupy in certain states, as well as links with other forms of international crime turn trafficking into an undeniable geopolitical problem that requires a comprehensive action plan.

An UNODC report estimated the total flows of dirty money of organized crime over a trillion dollars¹⁶. According to analyzes conducted by the IMF in 2009, the best overall estimate of amounts from money laundering is the equivalent of about 2.7% of world GDP (2.1 - 4%) or \$ 1.6 trillion in 2009. From this figure, the amounts related to transnational flows of organized crime activities is equivalent to about 1.5% of world GDP and 70% of them were available for laundering through the financial system. The highest revenue for transnational organized crime seems to come from illicit drug trafficking, it represents one fifth of the total amounts related to specific organized crime offenses.

One of the important features of trafficking illicit drugs is the “profits escalate”. Thus, from the producer to the consumer, the price of the drug is multiplied by an average of 1,000 times.

¹⁵ United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), (1994), “Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses”, UNRISD Briefing Paper No. 2, World Summit For Social Development, November 1994.

¹⁶ UNODC, (2011), „Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes - Research Report”, Viena, p. 5.

In the case of cocaine and heroin, the price from the manufacturer to the consumer is multiplied on average 2,500 times. In this way, the beneficiaries’ profits for each stage of production, processing and marketing of drugs are significant, representing, according to sociologist Alain Joxe, “a place of power accumulation, especially military power”¹⁷.

The second form of articulation between drugs and conflict is the “barter” with guns for drugs. This ranges from the using trafficking networks in order to purchase weapons, up to “classical” payment of weapons for drugs, and sometimes even continuing with “resale” of weapons for drugs. Each time, following any such transaction an important capital gain is achieved.

Global analyzes show that only 10-15% of drugs are intercepted, so that the percentage of seized money is approximately 0.5%, which means that the remaining money from the global drug market freely move and becomes part of money flows worldwide, taking advantage of the financial legal system capabilities.

The third widely used way is that the seller offers his client, both arms and drugs. Escalating of profits generated by drugs sale provides a guarantee the seller will pay his client the weapons by reselling drugs.

This practice also has the advantage of not double the networks of drug / weapons and therefore to ensure better security of those involved.

Conclusion

Drug trafficking involves producers and consumers. Between the two categories are “the processors” and marketing networks. Armed groups and those who combat them use the link of this drug chain to finance.

Conflict resolution financed by drug trafficking – for which, sometimes, the resources from this source promotes their sustainability, while initial

¹⁷ Joxe, A., *Narco-strategie: “De l’île de la tortue à l’espace mondial”*, in Labrousse A., Wallon, A. (sous la dir. de) *La planète des drogues: organisations criminelles, guerres et blanchiment*, Paris, Seuil, 1993.



reasons disappear – firstly involves a solution to the problems of illicit drugs.

Developing conflicts and trafficking networks that are inherent to them, do not obey local and autonomous logic.

The expansion of drug market is equally the weakness of rich countries to end these local or regional conflicts.

On the other hand, socio-economic impact analysis suggests that the most serious consequence from drug trafficking is, first of all, perpetuation and promotion of conflict status.

Secondly, studies indicate that socio-economic costs related to drug abuse are twice higher than the income generated by drug trafficking; and in some countries (USA, UK) they are even 3 times higher.

Therefore, the idea that the high demand for drugs in rich countries is a fundamental factor for the production of drugs in poor countries gains more territory in the world of specialists and policy makers. In this regard, regional strategies (European and US) promote focusing efforts on reducing this demand by investing in social policies, prevention, assistance and rehabilitation of drug users.

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STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

with Gabriela Leu, UNHCR Romania

Migration Issues and Refugee Crisis

Mrs. Gabriela Leu is in charge of Communications and Public Information at the UN Agency for Refugees – Representation in Romania. She has over 20 years' experience in refugee and development assistance work. In 1999, in her capacity of implementing partner for UNHCR, she was the Refugee assistance Programme Coordinator at Sărata Monteoru Refugee Centre hosting Kosovar refugees relocated from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. From 2003 to 2006 she worked for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Albania. Since 2007 she has been working with UNHCR, both within the Regional Representation for Central Europe based in Budapest (2009-2011) and the Representation in Romania. She graduated the Faculty of Sociology, Psychology and Pedagogy, Bucharest University and holds a Master Degree in Psychoterapy.

About three years ago, EUROSTAT published a number of approximately 400,000 asylum applications of non-EU citizens in EU Member States. Between 2014 and 2015, that number tripled and the issue of asylum seekers and refugees has become one of the main topics on the European security agenda. UNHCR was among the first organizations to observe this transformation, highlighting since 2012 both the increasing number of asylum seekers from Syria to European Union countries (over 16,000 requests between January 2011 and August 2012) and the importance of safeguarding the

principles of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Now, in 2016, the war in Syria is the largest source of refugees in Europe, even if displacement' growing trend is globally recorded.

1. Strategic Impact (SI): To start with, please introduce our readers with the work of UNHCR in Romania.

Gabriela Leu (GL): “We work to protect the most vulnerable” – UNHCR is the UN Agency for refugees, created in 1950, during the aftermath of the Second World War, to help millions of Europeans who had fled or lost their homes. It had three years to complete our work and then it was planned to be disbanded. Today, over 65 years later, our organization is still hard at work, protecting and assisting refugees around the world. This is not surprising though. Our recent *Global Trends Report for 2015* shows that a record number 65, 3 million were affected by forced displacement at the end of 2015 – which is the highest number since UNHCR was created.

The UNHCR Representation in Romania was established in 1992 – one year after Romania signed the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. We have an advocacy mandate which means that, in cooperation with the government and nongovernment organizations, we aim at transforming policies and services that affect persons forced to flee due to conflict.

The State has the primary responsibility for refugee protection, therefore, we offer technical



assistance and expert advice to consolidate the asylum system and the refugee integration policies. We work in close cooperation with government and non-government partners to ensure that any person in need of international protection has unhindered access to Romania's territory and is able to lodge an asylum application. We monitor and advise the authorities for the improvement of the living conditions for the asylum-seekers in the reception centres and ensure they are treated with respect, particularly where age, gender, diversity and special needs are issues of concern. We work to ensure that refugee status determination procedures are fair and efficient; that asylum legislation and practice reflect international legal standards and that functioning integration and resettlement policies and programmes are in place. For example, since 2008, in cooperation with the General Inspectorate for Immigration, we developed a quality assurance and evaluation mechanism for the asylum decisions made at administrative level. Another project, "Response to Vulnerability in asylum" implemented in partnership with the authorities increased the asylum procedure capacity to identify and respond to the needs of vulnerable applicants.

One significant project we implement in Romania is the Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) Timisoara, opened in 2008. The ETC is jointly managed by UNHCR with the Romanian government and the International Organisation for Migration – based on a Tripartite Agreement – and has been the first such facility in the world. The ETC is a place where refugees at risk in their first country of origin are hosted temporarily, in view of resettlement to another country. That's why the name: *transit centre*. As soon as the relocation procedures are over, refugees depart. So far, more than 2,040 refugees arrived here and most of them already went to their resettlement country. During their stay in Timișoara, with help from *Generatie Tânără* (Young Generation) – our local partner – we provide all the necessary assistance from food and medical care to education and recreational programs.

Last but not least, through media and public work, we promote a social climate that welcomes

refugees and rejects xenophobia and racism. We use various channels to give refugees a voice, telling their stories and promoting their cause. This year, on World Refugee Day celebrated on 20 June, our Office run the global campaign *#WithRefugees*, inviting the public to learn more about the plight of refugees and sign a petition asking governments to show solidarity and assume their part of responsibility towards helping refugees all over the world.

2. SI: *History shows that massive waves of migration/refugees are triggering factors for change in society. In our days, nations react completely different from each other: from German "open doors" policy to the Hungarian razor-wire fencing and border controls. Which do you think is, at the EU level, the meaning of change?*

GL: There is, undoubtedly, a need for more understanding, more solidarity and shared responsibility. There is a need for Europe to act together to grant protection to those in need.

There is room for change. EU, as a union of states, should stand together in solidarity to give a humane answer to refugee arrivals. The best answer to the refugee crisis is to act with humanity, compassion and care, to apply the human values which are universal. If EU states wish to act according to these values and the international and European laws, the victims of conflict and persecution, upon arrival must have access to mechanisms protecting them. States cannot opt out, cannot say they do not care and their actions must be based on compassion.

Europe's struggles to manage the more than one million refugees and migrants who arrived by sea dominated the attention of the media in 2015, nonetheless the *Global Trends Report 2015* shows that the vast majority of the world's refugees were elsewhere. Overall, 86 per cent of refugees under UNHCR's mandate in 2015 were in low and middle income countries close to situations of conflict. Take the example of Lebanon, where refugees make up 20 % of its population. Turkey is another example hosting the largest refugee



population, 2.5 mil refugees. These figures show that in fact, Europe is not the destination for the vast majority of the refugees, overall, most of them (nine of the ten) being hosted in the global South, led by Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon.

One often overlooked impact refugees have on the host communities has to do with economic growth. A number of studies indicate that host societies benefit tremendously from the presence and contribution of refugees – economically, socially and culturally. Providing refugees with meaningful support, rights and opportunities that enable them to play a full role in the society, will not only lead to successful integration but will also foster a change of attitude, positive perceptions towards refugees.

3. SI: *Regrettably, there are voices saying that migration, particularly the refugee component, is the cause of increased terrorist threat in Europe, ignoring the fact that, in reality, most of the refugees are victims of persecution, terror and war. However, it is an undeniable assertion that the terrorist threat has amplified in the last three years in EU countries. Do you consider that immigrants really pose a terrorist risk to the security of European countries or that we are all victims of dangerous biases?*

GL: Firstly, we should keep in mind that refugees are people who are fleeing conflict, persecution and/or abuses of their human rights and they have a right under international law to seek asylum in other countries. Many are forced to embark on dangerous journeys along routes rife with abuse and exploitation by smugglers and traffickers. All they want is to rebuild their lives in peace and safety.

In many cases, large arrivals are seen as a “crisis” which generates fear and negative reactions. Often, security concerns seem to prevail over the humanitarian and protection considerations which translates into restrictive border policies, barriers to entry including fences and walls, push-backs at borders and increasing detention. Such measures often introduced in the name of security concerns or rooted in domestic political agendas are unrelated to the actual

presence of refugees.¹

Any country experiencing an influx of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants may face challenges from a security and law enforcement perspective. But, for the most part, refugees are fleeing terror and violence themselves and therefore deserve to be treated humanely.

It is possible for States both to protect refugees and to address security concerns in line with legal principles and standards. European States are responsible for registering and processing asylum claims of new arrivals. Adequate reception and screening allows legitimate security concerns to be address while ensuring refugees’ welfare and protection.

Moreover, there are safeguards built into the 1951 Refugee Convention to address national security concerns. For example, combatants/fighters are not entitled to refugee status, those involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity or other serious crimes may be excluded from refugee status and refugees may be expelled under certain circumstances.

Taking these into account, the growing and misguided focus on the threat from refugees and asylum-seekers has enormous and damaging repercussions. On the run from war and conflict at home, refugees may find themselves confronting hostility in their places of exile, cast as scapegoats for any number of problems, and perceived as threats to their host communities’ way of life.

We know from the past that refugees cannot be stopped from fleeing for their lives. The question is, when they arrive here, how well and how humanely we manage their arrival and presence here.²

4. SI: *In the context presented, please comment the aggravation of this situation, despite the measures taken at EU level.*

GL: The rising panic drive growing number of people in the hands of populists and xenophobes which, in some cases, are turning to

¹ Security and international refugee protection UNHCR’s perspective Volker Türk, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection 44th INTERPOL European Regional Conference Prague, Czech Republic, 18 –20 May 2016.

² Ibidem.



violence. These trends deeply affect the refugees who are fleeing from conflict, not seeking one. Therefore, amidst today's climate of fear, we must stay focused on where the biggest threats lie: to individual refugees and their families. If we want to stop those threats from multiplying, metastasizing and spreading, we need to sow the seeds of a return in peace to their homelands. We do that by providing protection and support, and by helping people not only to survive, but to thrive.³

5. SI: *UNHCR promotes the integration of refugees in Romania as a dynamic and multifaceted process leading to full and equal membership rights in the host society. However, one of the latest public opinion polls conducted by INSCOP Research (Truth about Romania Barometer, March 2016) shows an increase of nearly 20% during six months (September 2015 to March 2016) of the proportion of people who disagree for the refugees/immigrants to settle in Romania or in the respondent's place of residence. How do think that refugees perceive the negative opinion against them? What measures does UNHCR undertake in the attempt to remedy this shortcoming?*

GL: Let's start by trying to put ourselves in the shoes of a refugee family who was forced to leave everything behind and it is now struggling to move on. In order to do that, refugees need welcoming environments and communities which allow them to restore dignity and stand on their two feet again. The fear of *the other* leads to the scapegoating of *the other*, breeds discrimination and even violence against people who are different because of their skin color, faith, minority status or sexual orientation. Fear triggers racist and intolerant sentiments and clearly diminish the protection space through stigmatization of refugees.

Opposing negative views and addressing xenophobia requires political leadership and strong condemnation of violence and

discrimination against refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants. UNHCR alone cannot change such sentiments or attitudes therefore working in partnership remains crucial.

Against this backdrop, we use communications and public information and work together with our partners and allies to generate greater understanding and support towards refugees. Refugees are people like us, with dreams and hopes. We give them a voice by telling their compelling stories. This should help the public better understand who refugees are, why they are here and why our support is important. The recent European crisis sparked renewed debate on refugees and migrants, at times dominated by fear and prejudice. UNHCR was part of the debate to the extent possible, bringing the refugee perspective at the table and asking the society and communities to open up towards *the other*. Behind every refugee there is a story so we work with the media to tell refugees' stories. We run public awareness campaigns, such as the *#WithRefugees Campaign* launched this 20 June, for the World Refugee Day. We believe that better knowledge about refugees' plight would bring better understanding and also compassion.

6. SI: *The signing in March 2016 of the Agreement between the EU and Turkey to reduce or even stop the flow of irregular migration triggered a series of controversies, but also led to a significant reduction in the flow of refugees along the Balkan route. In this context, which alternative routes do you think will record values comparable to those recorded prior to the signing of the Agreement on the above mentioned route?*

GL: The question is what happens whenever one route gets closed and no other legal ways are opened for people to reach safety? Is this going to stop people from trying to save their lives? Not really. Instead, they will resort to even more dangerous routes and ways to travel and the smugglers are going to exploit the situation. We have already seen what happened end of May 2016: almost 880 people died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. If we look at the flows, most

³ Antonio Guterres, https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2015/Kickoff_2015/ST_Feb2015_single_page_Kopie_.pdf, accessed on June 12, 2016.



of the people are coming from refugee producing countries. On a Mediterranean-wide-basis, the odds of dying on the crossing are as high as 1 in 81 and getting worse. The North Africa-Italy route is dramatically more dangerous: the 2,119 lives lost so far this year among people making this journey, made the odds of dying as high as 1 in 23. These grim statistics highlight the importance of rescue operations as part of the response to the movement of refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean, and the need for real, safer, legal alternatives for people needing international protection. And, when rescue happens, those who wish to seek asylum should be given access to asylum.

7. SI: *The future EU security strategy – EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy – will provide migration and mobility issues a distinct place, recognizing that, until now, the importance of these issues has been undervalued. The aim is that the new Strategy to develop EU capabilities by directing additional resources towards the European agencies, by addressing the long-term causes of the phenomenon and by integrating internal and external dimensions of migration management. What are, in your opinion, the courses of action that will enable the integration of the two dimensions of migration management?*

GL: One of the proposals shared by UNHCR with the EU and the Member States earlier in 2016, aimed at stabilizing the situation of refugees and migrants in Europe, underlines that first and foremost, greater efforts are required to resolve the conflicts that lead to displacement. In the absence of political solutions, the countries that host the vast majority of refugees will continue to need support.

On the *London International Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region* (4 February 2016), the international community pledged more than USD 11 billion to fund activities that can have a stabilizing effect for refugees and their host communities in the region. Similar initiatives would be important to benefit also

Iraqi and Afghan refugees, including those born in Pakistan or Iran. Emergencies in Africa, which remain underfunded, must not be forgotten.

To complement the London Conference, on 30 March 2016, the UNHCR-chaired *Geneva Conference on Syrians* looked at measures to complement existing resettlement or humanitarian admission. Mechanisms such as humanitarian visas, private sponsorship, family reunification, scholarships, medical evacuation and labor mobility schemes would accompany the existing resettlement programmes and help to ensure that quotas are still available for refugees in need from elsewhere in the world.

Modest increase in the number of resettlement and humanitarian admission places was pledged in March bringing the numbers to some 185,000.⁴ These efforts should continue in order to narrow the gap between the existing offer and the estimated needs. UNHCR estimates that at least 10 per cent of the 4.8 million refugees in countries neighboring Syria will need resettling or other humanitarian help to safely move elsewhere before the end of 2018. This includes people considered acutely vulnerable, such as survivors of torture, refugees with serious medical conditions or women left alone with several children to care for and without family support.

At the same time, more efficient management of the situation within Europe is urgently needed.

The majority of European States have not been directly affected by the present situation however, the participation of these States in a collective solution is critical to managing it effectively.

8. SI: *It is obvious that EU Member States have not adopted a common position on the issue of refugees' acceptance. What are the issues on which they have succeeded in outlining a common position? But those in which consensus could not be reached?*

⁴ UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/3/56fc0cf06/geneva-conference-syrian-refugees-ends-new-pledges-places-recognition-challenges.html>, accessed on June 12, 2016.



GL: EU Member states already agreed on a number of solutions for the Europe situation, among which the 2015 decisions on the relocation of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy to other member states, the additional pledges made in March 2016 to increase legal pathways for Syrians to reach Europe and the *March 2016 EU - Turkey Agreement*. These are significant steps and it is important that all these measures are swiftly implemented.

It is against this background, that in March 2016, Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, called for strong leadership and vision to address what he said was “as much a crisis of European solidarity as it is a refugee crisis,” adding that “the collective failure to implement the measures agreed by EU Member States in the past has led to the current escalation in the crisis.”⁵

States response to the recent high level of arrivals varied greatly from one country to another. Take border management as an example. Managing borders is the prerogative of the state but this is not incompatible with refugee protection. It should be implemented in accordance with mechanisms for fair and efficient asylum systems. One could not see that happening across the board. Some countries stepped forward, other allowed the movements without willing to protect those in need. Or, in case they did it, they made it hard for people to actually access protection: strengthened the border, hardened visa requirements and so on.⁶

The answer should be to treat refugees like human beings, asylum is a noble tradition. Refugee protection should be done based on principles without exceptions based on geographical considerations, skin color, religion – everyone should be treated equally.

⁵ UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/3/56d977086/unhcr-sets-detailed-plan-solve-refugee-situation-europe.html>, accessed on June 12, 2016.

⁶ UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/ro/stiri/2016/aproximativ-80.000-de-refugia%C8%9Bi-sosesc-%C3%AEn-europa-%C3%AEn-primele-%C8%99ase-s%C4%83pt%C4%83m%C3%A2ni-din-2016.html>, accessed on June 13, 2016.

9. SI: *Do you consider that the measures envisaged at EU level to penalize the states which refuse to accept additional refugees under refugee relocation scheme will have the desired effect, or will cause a negative chain of reactions towards refugees both in the Member States and in their population?*

GL: All European Member States have an obligation under the international and national laws towards asylum-seekers and refugees. They cannot outsource refugee protection, they are accountable to those who are seeking protection. Refugees should benefit from the guaranteed rights and for that Member States need to demonstrate solidarity, compassion and respect for EU values with no exception. We stand for solidarity and humane approach. EU is based on agreement and we hope that there will be a mechanism to make Member States realize they need to do their part.

10. SI: *What can you tell us about the measures proposed by UNHCR for managing the refugee crisis?*

GL: In March 2016, UN High Commissioner Grandi proposed to EU Member States a *Plan to manage and stabilize the refugee situation*. The plan⁷ includes six key recommendations intended as broad guidance. These recommendations – presented below – should be however complemented by greater efforts to address and resolve the underlying conflicts that are driving people out of their countries:

1. Implement fully the so-called “hot spot” approach and relocation of asylum seekers out of Greece and Italy and, at the same time, return individuals who don’t qualify for refugee protection, including under existing readmission agreements.

2. Step up support to Greece to handle the humanitarian emergency, including for refugee status determination, relocation, and return or readmission.

⁷ “Stabilizing the situation of refugees and migrants in Europe: Proposals to the Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey on 7 March 2016” <http://www.unhcr.org/56d94f7e9.html>, accessed on June 13, 2016.



3. Ensure compliance with all the EU laws and directives on asylum among Member States.

4. Make available more safe, legal ways for refugees to travel to Europe under managed programmes – for example humanitarian admission programmes, private sponsorships, family reunion, student scholarships and labour mobility schemes – so that refugees do not resort to smugglers and traffickers to find safety.

5. Safe-guard individuals at risk, including systems to protect unaccompanied and separated children, measures to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence, enhancing search and rescue operations at sea, saving lives by cracking down on smuggling, and countering xenophobia and racism targeted at refugees and migrants.

6. Develop Europe-wide systems of responsibility for asylum-seekers, including the creation of registration centres in main countries of arrival, and setting up a system for asylum requests to be distributed in an equitable way across EU Member States.

UNHCR's proposals made clear that equitable sharing of responsibility is key to bringing about a managed and orderly solution, and that EU Member States would need to agree a system of

percentages of asylum-seekers for each Member State to take.


At the end of March 2016, the *EU – Turkey Agreement* came into effect. UNHCR is not party to the Agreement, however, continues to advocate for legal pathways of admission to Europe. Adequate safeguards are crucial to ensure that people found in need of international protection find the safety they require. So far, there was progress in both Greece and Turkey which made efforts to enhance their respective asylum and protection systems. UNHCR does not have a role in assisting readmissions under this agreement, but works with the Greek authorities on enhancing the asylum system, reception conditions and registration. At the same time, UNHCR will continue to resettle refugees from Turkey, a process that started years ago and remains essential, resettlement being one of the few long-term solutions available to Syrian refugees.

“Europe has successfully dealt with large-scale refugee movements in the past, during the Balkans Wars for example, and can deal with this one, provided it acts in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility sharing,” said High Commissioner Grandi.⁸

⁸ UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/3/56d957db9/unhcr-6-steps-towards-solving-refugee-situation-europe.html>, accessed on June 13, 2016.

BETWEEN GEOPOLITICS AND MOLDING EXPERIENCES: ROBERT D. KAPLAN AND PRUDENCE IN STRATEGY

Mihai ZODIAN, PhD*



Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography. What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*; Romanian edition: *Răzbunarea geografiei. Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare și lupta împotriva destinului*, Litera, 2014, 480 p.

Robert D. Kaplan, *In Europe's Shadow. Two Cold Wars and a Thirty-Year Journey Through Romania and Beyond*; Romanian edition: *În umbra Europei. Două războaie reci și trei decenii de călătorie prin România și dincolo de ea*, Humanitas, București, 2016, 352 p.

Robert D. Kaplan, the well-known American journalist, distinguished himself by his many articles and books on political and military subjects from all around the globe. Famous after a '90s prediction regarding global social instability's growth, he combines a lively style with many interesting, though somehow hasty, general ideas about politics and society¹. These two works are offering to the reader an original and solid argument about international realities.

In *The Revenge of Geography*, the author attempts to synthesize his experience and reading, into a theoretical scheme. Following the geopolitical tradition, Kaplan contends that space has a constraining effect upon politics and international relations, especially on conflict's origins². Then he attempts to integrate his views into the wider American realist school of thought, but not without problems.

* Mr. Mihai ZODIAN is Researcher at the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) from "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: zodian.vladimir@unap.ro

¹ Robert D. Kaplan, *Anarhia care va veni*, Antet, București, 2002; Simon Dalby, "Environmental change", in Paul D. Williams, *Security Studies*, Routledge, s.l., 2008, pp. 262-264.

² For a synthesis of geopolitics, see Constantin Hlihor, *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2005.



His main idea is thus about the value of geography, which Kaplan combines with the very large domains of history and culture, as an explanation for political events, sending a message of prudence and moderation for national security decision makers. He is evoking Munich and Vietnam as the main strategic metaphors for appeasement and overreaction, two evils to be avoided³. From here, Kaplan is offering us a vast and often interesting picture of today's world and its main tendencies.

As preface author, Paul Dobrescu, and many critics had noticed: the main problem here is common to all geopolitical studies: an oscillation between geographical determinism, easy to reject and the more vague contemporary position shared by the practitioners of these interpretations, which combines ambiguous ideas about power or interests with equivocal statements about spaces and their significance⁴. Kaplan doesn't clarify this issue, stating only that geography constrains, acts as a context, but without further specifications⁵. But general statements about geography are not enough for a good explanation, being more important to underline which factors, how and in what proportion they exercise effects upon international relations⁶.

For example, inside the IR discipline, the Correlates of War project identified a statistical significant relationship between proximity and conflict, using empirical studies and inferences which can be proven or rejected by proofs or rational arguments⁷. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever redefined in a useful way the concept of region, aiming to offer a new explanation of world politics, while Andrei Miroiu created a realist restatement of the same concept for a theory of minor powers⁸. Thus, one should treat this matter with an empirical and rationalistic frame of mind: there are connections between space and politics, but they should be identified with as much precision as possible, while avoiding exaggerations.

Actually, this empiricism characterizes the realist tradition of IR: contrary to Kaplan's arguments, the main founder, Hans Morgenthau, was skeptical towards geopolitics and he even wrote its refutation in his classic *Politics Among Nations*, while recognizing that space has certain influences, as an element of state's power resources⁹. Even if some realists were more accommodating to geopolitics, like Henry Kissinger or John Mearsheimer, the two schools of thoughts are not identical. At the same time, *The Revenge of Geography* is a pleasurable reading, easy to grasp, while the main practical message of moderation in foreign policy is valuable.

In Europe's Shadow. Two Cold Wars and a Thirty-Year Journey Through Romania and Beyond is a very personal book, in which direct experience, geopolitical ideas and various favorite authors offer to Robert D. Kaplan an interpretation for Romania's potential and for the security policies pursued by him, especially since 1980s. His main signposts are domestic changes in culture and politics and the regional and general external environment, determined mostly by the West and Russia. His many visits, starting in the '70s, alongside his attempt to view events from inside allow Kaplan a very good observation point.

³ Robert D. Kaplan, *Răzbuarea geografiei. Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare și lupta împotriva destinului*, Litera, 2014, pp. 60-61.

⁴ See also Paul Dobrescu, "Prefață la ediția în limba română", in Robert D. Kaplan, *op. cit.*; Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, "Lumea explicată românilor: geopolitică", apud Șerban Filip Cioculescu, "O dezvoltare inhibată a teoriei Relațiilor Internaționale în România? Ipoteza rivalității cu geopolitică" in Ruxandra Ivan (editor) *Direcții principale în studiul relațiilor internaționale*, Institutul European, Iași, 2007, pp. 52 and the whole chapter for a synthesis of critics against geopolitics; Darie Cristea, *Metodologia studiilor de Securitate*, Editura Universității din București, 2010, pp. 70-103, for a defence of geopolitics.

⁵ Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 67, 77.

⁶ Vezi Ron Johnston, "The Revenge of Geography...", *The AAG Review of Books*, no. 1, 2013.

⁷ Daniel S. Gellner, J. David Singer, *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 27.

⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Andrei Miroiu, *Balanță și hegemonie*, Tritonic, București, 2005.

⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru paceolirom*, Iași, 2007, pp. 195-196, pp. 151-159.



For example, Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania is seen as an apparently stable country, one very dependent upon the international context and United States-Soviet Union's relationships¹⁰. Kaplan's flavor comes from a combination between thoughts on important political issues with commentaries upon the everyday life of Romanians. He is speaking about the impressions raised by seeing ordinary people on the streets of Bucharest, the various regime's celebrations, several discussions with diplomats.

As most Western reviews have pointed out, the bulk of the book is about Kaplan's various readings, mostly from literature or history, accounts of his conversation with intellectual and political elite members and many direct observations¹¹. The author is attempting a general review of Romania's modern history, which reaches the apogee with the recent events from the Black Sea region. A new assertive Russia seems to change the security environment, but with an eye on past events, one of his goals being to inform the American public on these topics¹².

The Revenge of Geography and *In Europe's Shadow* signal the moment when a public intellectual, previously supporting "a pagan ethos" and an exaggerated view of coercion in international affairs, retracts his views and admits that moderation is essential and that power is subject to constraints¹³. They can be seen as exemplary for the dominant opinion inside US elites in the last decade. At the same time, these two books are a very pleasant reading for anyone interesting in foreign policy problems.

¹⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, *În umbra Europei. Două războaie reci și trei decenii de călătorie prin România și dincolo de ea*, Humanitas, București, 2016, pp. 37-64.

¹¹ See also ***, "In Europe's Shadows", Kirkus Reviews, 2 februarie 2016, <https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/robert-d-kaplan/in-europes-shadow/>, accessed June 2016.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 303-304.

¹³ Robert D. Kaplan, *Politici de război. De ce necesită conducerea politică un etos păgân*, Polirom, Iași, 2002.



INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM “MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE EUROATLANTIC AREA”

The main event that marked the agenda of Center for Defence and Strategic Security Studies (CDSSS) in this period was the sixteenth edition of the International Symposium, held on 26 May 2016, in the Senate Hall of “Carol I” National Defence University. This year’s theme was “Major challenges for the security of the Euroatlantic area”.

The discussions focused on the following topics: the evolution of the international security environment, challenges and vulnerabilities to the Euro-Atlantic area, risks and potential threats to the security environment of certain countries in the region, the challenge of a new EU strategy on foreign and security policy and the European refugee crisis.



The activity was attended by specialists from the military and civilian institutions with theoretical and practical experience in the security environment: Commander Eugen Mavriş, PhD. from the Strategic Planning Directorate, ROU General Staff delivered the paper “Major challenges for the security of Euro-Atlantic Area”; Mr. Florin Diaconu, PhD. Associate Professor from Political Science Faculty,



SCIENTIFIC EVENT

University of Bucharest, presented “Several vulnerabilities of the Western world: an assessment on the political and geostrategic realities”; Mr. Ioan Codrut Lucinescu, PhD. Researcher from “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy attended with the paper “Romanian and Regional Security in the Wider Black Sea Area”; Mrs. Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD. Senior Researcher within CDSSS, presented the paper “European Refugee Crisis. Beyond Preconceptions”; Ms. Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD. Researcher within CDSSS lectured on “The challenges of a New EU Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy”.

The activity was honored by the presence of Mr. Josef Procházka, PhD., Deputy Director of the Center for Security and Military Strategic Studies within University of Defence in Brno, Czech Republic presented the paper “Adaptation of the Czech Republic Defense Policy to the Dynamics of our Security Environment”. There also attended military attaches from Ukraine, Hungary, Serbia and China. Some of these papers can be consulted throughout this issue of *Strategic Impact*.



The symposium brought together in a scientific event specialists from various fields - defence, public order, national security, scientific research and military and civilian higher education - which made the exchange of information and views productive and with a high potential of dissemination in different scientific milieux.

Raluca STAN *
Irina TĂTARU, PhD **

* *Raluca STAN is Expert in the Scientific events and cooperation Department within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest. E-mail: stan.raluca@unap.ro*

** *Irina TĂTARU, PhD is Expert in the Scientific events and cooperation Department within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest. E-mail: tataru.irina@unap.ro*



CDSSS AGENDA

APRIL - JUNE 2016

During this period, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) within “Carol I” National Defence University published a new series of analyses under the name *Dynamics of the security environment*, representing an important part of the scientific research in the field of defence and security.

Thus, the analyses were developed on topical issues related to the regional and international agenda with an influence on Romania’s interests, addressing issues such as:

- *NATO, the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe;*
- *Reactivation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;*
- *The Syrian Crisis and Islamist terrorism;*
- *European refugee crisis (V);*
- *BREXIT. Context and (possible) consequences;*
- *Global Strategy for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe.*

All these analyses can be read in Romanian language on the CDSSS website at <http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/dms.htm>.

This trimester, the series of monthly public lectures at the National Military Circle continued with the following themes: “Risks and threats in the field of strategic energy resources”, delivered by Mr. Cristian Băhnăreanu, PhD Senior Researcher; “Risks and threats against NATO member states in Europe”, presented by Mrs. Mirela Atanasiu, PhD Senior Researcher and “European refugee crisis. Beyond preconceptions”, delivered by Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD Senior Researcher. The public lectures will be resumed from October.

Strategic Colloquium, the monthly supplement of *Strategic Impact* journal, published in April an article related to national and international security on “*Imperatives in the fight against terrorism*”, developed in co-authorship by Colonel (ret.) Lucian Stăncilă, PhD. Professor together with Captain Marius-Iulian Badiu.

Those interested in publishing can submit proposals to *Strategic Colloquium* at cssas@unap.ro and zodian.vladimir@unap.ro.

The most important activity in the second quarter of 2016 was the Symposium with international participation with the theme “*Major challenges for the Euro-Atlantic security area*”, which was held on May, 26, that enjoyed the presence of numerous specialists from the military and civilian institutions, which made the exchange of information and opinions to have a high potential of dissemination in different scientific milieux.

In the first part of the academic year 2016-2017 CDSSS organizes on October 6, 2016, a workshop with the theme “*Cross-border threats and political risk*”.



CDSSS AGENDA

The broadest activity of CDSSS, **International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI** on *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, reached its sixteenth edition and it will be held this year on 24-25 November. People interested in participating are expected to register on the Conference website, <http://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/en/conference-presentation-3>, where detailed information is displayed.

Raluca STAN



GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual academic journal *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

ARTICLE LENGTH may vary between 6-12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE

- Title (centred, capital, bold characters, font 24).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD. title or PhD. candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
 - A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters)
 - 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters)
 - Introduction / preliminary considerations
 - 2 - 4 chapters (subchapters if applicable)
 - Conclusions.
 - Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format as well.

In the case of tables, please mention above “**Table no. X: Title**”, while in the case of figures there shall be mentioned below (eg. maps etc.), “**Figure no. X: Title**” and the source, if applicable, shall be mentioned in a footnote.

- REFERENCES shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of footnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: Joshua S. Goldstein; Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010, pp. 356-382.

Example of article: Gheorghe Calopăreanu, “Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union” in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year). *Example of article:* John N. Nielsen, “Strategic Shock in North Africa”, in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at <http://geopoliticaticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/>, accessed on 10.03.2014.

- BIBLIOGRAPHY shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010.

Example of article: CALOPĂREANU, Gheorghe, “Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union” in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University.



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Familia lui trăiește
de trei generații în exil



Suntem împreună #AlăturiDeRefugiați

Semnează petiția!



#WithRefugees- 20 June 2016 – World Refugee Day

Conflict and persecution caused global forced displacement to escalate sharply in 2015, reaching the highest level ever recorded and representing immense human suffering.

At the end of 2015, worldwide, over 65.3 million people were either refugees - 21.3 million, internally displaced - 40.8 million people or asylum-seekers - 3.2 million. It has been for the first time when the 6 million milestone was hit. Measured against Earth's population, these numbers mean that 1 in every 113 people globally is now displaced.

As war forces increased number of families to flee in search of safety, public anxiety has increased – often resulting in intolerance and misinformation about refugees.

It is therefore becoming increasingly necessary to tell the public who the refugees are and why they need protection.

To help counteract this atmosphere of intolerance, UNHCR launched the #WithRefugees Campaign and its Petition calling for solidarity and shared responsibility towards refugees.

The Petition aims at showing public support for the families forced to flee and will be delivered to the UN General Assembly in September 2016 during an historic meeting addressing large movements of refugees and migrants.

More specifically, the Petition is asking the governments to:

- Ensure every refugee child gets an education.
- Ensure every refugee family has somewhere safe to live.
- Ensure every refugee can work or learn new skills to make a positive contribution to their community.

Every day, war forces thousands of families to flee their homes.

People like you, people like me.

To escape the violence, they leave everything behind – everything except their hopes and dreams for a safer future.

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, believes all refugees deserve to live in safety.

Add your name to the #WithRefugees petition to send a clear message to governments that they must act with solidarity and shared responsibility.

We stand together #WithRefugees.

Please stand with us.

Sign the Petition here:

<http://www.unhcr.org/refugeeday/ro/>