STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 1[58]/2016

CONTENTS

EDITOR'S NOTE

In the edition no. 58 of *Strategic Impact*, first one this year, I would like to signal the readers, from the beginning, some novelty aspects: changes in the composition of the Editorial Board, expansion of the number of scientific reviewers, thus the thematic area being more effectively covered – noting that in one edition we only include those who contributed to reviewing articles in that issue, changing the name of the "Editorial Council" in "Editorial College" and, especially beneficial for contributors, the increase in the number of international databases, to the four already known ones being added two more databases.

I also mention that this issue is opened by three of the papers presented at the International Scientific Symposium "Atypical Conflicts of the XXI Century" organised by CDSSS on December 8, 2015.

Thus, at the rubric *Geopolitcs and Geostrategies: Trends and Perspectives*, Mr. Silviu Neguţ, PhD Professor, made a comparative analysis of the concepts *Geostrategy and Geoeconomy*, continued and complemented by Mr. Marius-Cristian Neacşu, PhD Associate Professor, with a presentation on *Geoeconomic vs. Geostrategic Conflicts. Case Study: Russia – Western World*.

At the rubric *Security and Military Strategy*, Florin Diaconu PhD Associate Professor focuses on *Atypical Conflicts of the 21st Century*, from the point of view of *Significant Difficulties in Reaching Victory by Using Traditional Means and Methods*. Our colleague, Mirela Atanasiu, PhD Researcher, presents *Recent Developments of Islamist Terrorism and Effects on Regional Security*. Subsequently, two collaborators from "Rakovski" National Defence Academy, Dimitar Y. Dimitrov, PhD. Chief Assistant Professor and Svilena S. Darova, Senior Lecturer realised a thorough study on the *Structure of the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire MLQ 5X*.

The rubric *Analyses, Syntheses, Evaluations* comprises, in turn, three materials on different, but complementary subjects. Thus, Răzvan Grigoraş, PhD advances an analysis on *Romania's National Defence Strategy – between Optimism and Pessimism*. Lieutenant-colonel Daniel Roman, PhD. Superior Instructor continues the study on *Critical Infrastructure Protection* – he published in the previous edition as well an article on the subject – this time, he focused on *their Protection from a Systemic Perspective*. In the end, Colonel Filofteia Repez, PhD Associate Professor and Mădălina-Steluţa Pătrăşescu Neacşu approach a subject that has not been published in our journal for a long time – *Food Security* – advancing the *Information System on Food Security in Public-Private Partnership to Ensure Sustainable Development*.

Our colleague Irina Tătaru, PhD chose for the rubric *Book Review* a best-seller on environmental security written by the Canadian Naomi Klein, entitled "This Changes Everything. Capitalism vs. the Climate".

The rubric *Scientific Event*, also signed by Mrs. Tătaru, presents main conclusions following the Workshop on *The correlation Military Geography - Geostrategy - Geopolitics in Security Studies*, organised on 25 March 2016.

Last but not least, from the ***CDSSS Agenda*** you can find out the scientific events we planned for 2016.

Last, but not least, there is the ***Guide for Authors***, useful to those who wish to disseminate the results of their research in our journal.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is an open access publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University (available at http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm) and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published in Romanian for sixteen years and for twelve years in English and approaches a complex thematic: security and defence related issues; security and military strategies; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; political-military topicality; geopolitics and international relations; future of conflict; peace and war; information society, intelligence community. Readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), to these adding recently WorldCat and ROAD ISSN, but also by its presence in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad such as NATO and of universities with military profile from Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

Strategic Impact journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in main security and defence institutions, as well as in national and international academia in Europe, Asia and America.

In the following edition of *Strategic Impact*, you shall read about the Symposium in May and a *Strategic Dialogue* with UNHCR on the topical issue of migration.

In the end, I would like to encourage the persons interested to publish in our pages in 2016 to prospect and evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of the security environment.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD.
Editor in Chief
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

GEOSTRATEGY VS. GEOECONOMY

Silviu NEGUŢ, PhD*

Although the concepts of "geostrategy" and "geoeconomy" are rather old, they have been eclipsed for a long while by the terms "strategy" and "geopolitics", capturing the attention of the general audience just recently, due to the spectacular mutations which occurred in an ever-increasingly turbulent and complex world. Overall, starting with the deepening of the globalisation process, the power elements in international relations are transferred from the political-military side to the commercial-military one. In other words, power is no longer based exclusively on military might and control over a specific territory, larger or smaller (depending on the classical "sphere of influence"), but on the ability and capacity to integrate into the global economy. This study aims to clarify the terminology in this field and highlight the rather complicated relationship between geostrategy and geoeconomy.

Keywords: *geostrategy, geoeconomy, geopolitics, military geography, the territorial-political-military world, the commercial world, hard power, soft power.*

General remarks

Although, apparently, the two concepts are relatively new, in fact, they are rather old, especially the *Geostrategy* one.

The *geostrategy* concept was mentioned for the first time even before the *geopolitics* concept: in the year 1846 by the Italian officer Giacomo Durando (in the work *Della nazionalita italiana*); the *geopolitics* concept was used for the first time by the Swede Rudolf Kjellén, in 1899.

"I used a word – wrote Durando – which I do not think has been used until today, *geostrategy* (our highlight), each time I needed to assess the terrain in an abstract fashion and outside the use of organised forces, but naturally always in relation with them. Thus, I speak about the *geostrategic* and *geotactical* (our highlight) conditions of Italy and Spain when I study abstractly the terrain's structure and characteristics, but I talk about movements on strategic or tactical operations axes when the subject is that of military operations executed over determined points of the terrain. As a result, I separate through reasoning and for a greater clarity these two ideas which, in fact and in application, are never disjointed."[1]

Although the notion of *geostrategy* was also incidentally used by other authors, out of which two Iberians (the Spaniard Manuel Castaños y Montijano and the Portuguese Miranda Cabral), the concept did not impose itself. The explanation could be found in the fact that, in that era, *military geography* was more spectacular, which turned out in the end to be the precursor of *Geostrategy*.

The merit for "reinventing" the notion of

---

[1] *Apud* Ferucio Botti, "Le concept de géostratégie et son application à la nation italienne dans les théories du général Durando", in *Stratégique*, 58, 1995-2, p. 129.

*** Silviu NEGUŢ is PhD Professor at the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: silviu.negut@gmail.com**

geostrategy, almost after 100 years since its mentioning by the Italian Giacomo Durando, is reserved to American analyst George B. Cressey, in the work *Asia's Lands and Peoples. A Geography of One Third of the Earth and Two-Thirds of its People* (1944). Afterwards, more and more analysts looked into this field, some of whom became rather well known names, such as:

– the French: Pierre Célérier (*Géopolitique et géostratégie*, 1955), Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (with three papers having the term *Géostratégie* in the title, dedicated to the following oceans: South Atlantic, 1985, Pacific, 1987 and Indian, 1993, André Vigarié (*Géostratégie des océans*, 1990, *La Mer et la géostratégie des nations*, 1995) and René Besnault (*Géostratégie de l'Arctique*, 1992);

– the Brazilian Golbery do Couto e Silva (*Geopolitica e geoestrategia,* 1959) and the Argentinean Justo P. Briano (*Geopolítica e geostrategia americana*, 1966);

– the Americans Saul B. Cohen (*Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, 1963), Colin S. Gray (*The Geopolitics of Nuclear Era*, 1976), John G. Pappageorge (*Maintaining the Geostrategic Advantage*, 1977), Zbigniew Brzezinski (*Game Plan. Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest*, 1986) and others.

In fact, only because of these American analysts, the name *Geostrategy* was going to finally win its place.

1. Geostrategy

As in the case of Geopolitics, in Geostrategy there are certain assessments, contradictory definitions, more or less restrictive approaches. Geostrategy is considered to be a *science* or a *scientific discipline*, either a *theory* or only a *phenomenon* or *method*. Some people reduce it towards the point it merges with *military Geography*, while others see it as being equivalent to *Geopolitics* or only a branch of it. We consider it an independent scientific discipline and define it as follows: *all of the means chosen/implemented in order to arm or on the contrary defuse an existing or soon to occur conflicting situation of any nature (political, military, economic, ideological etc.)*. With regards to the means, these differ depending on the nature of the conflicting situation and register a certain degree of spatial and especially temporal variability (a changing reality, usually in a very short timeframe).

Another thing to add would be that both *Geostrategy* and *Geopolitics* encapsulate an important *geographical component*: if Geopolitics mentions what needs to be won and preserved, Geostrategy says whether or not this is possible, how and with what, focusing on the decisive points of spatial configuration.

"There has always existed a territorial stake – highlights a specialist in the field –, a certain configuration of the theatre of operations, exploited by the actor that knew it best. This (n.n. the territorial stake) is a constant which we can find in all historical eras and which continues to produce effects despite of the prodigious evolution of the means of communication"[2].

The great variety of geostrategic points stands out: straits, channels, mountain passes, valleys and mountain and hilly peaks etc. The terrain's characteristics influence, as we know, the placement of the types of military operations: terrain, the weapon of the least equipped, can annihilate technical superiority; this was felt by the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan.

We can also include here the victory of the Moldovan ruler Ştefan cel Mare over the army of Constantinople's conqueror, the Sultan Mehmet II at Vaslui, on January 10th 1475, with significant European echoes, Pope Sixt IV calling him an "Athlete of Christ". The Moldovan army, having only 40 000 troops (mostly peasants) and 20 cannons defeated the invading Turkish-Wallachian armies that had 120 000 troops and a large number of cannons.

The essential mutations in the contemporary world have also extended and complicated the area of geopolitical confrontations. Together with an older, but always new, issue of the spheres of interest and influence, we are witnessing a heating

---

[2] Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de Géostratégie, 6eme édition,* Paris, Edition Economica, 2008, p. 759.

up of older or newer rivalries, both economical and ethnical in nature, between states, as well as within various state factions.

In many cases, the stakes of the game do not target territorial claims as such, but rivalries of power, having a territorial projection on large spaces, transnational (economic, political, military communities), but also on more reduced spaces, within states, or even on narrower territories such as the urban (Los Angeles, USA) or even rural ones (Costeşti, Romania).

The issues of conflicts and, implicitly, of chosen geostrategies vary greatly: from an unified state to a federal state, from a state which just managed to come out of a state of dependency to a former colonial power. Power rivalries and the study of force ratios can also target other situations, such as: relations between ethnic or religious minorities and the majority of population; conflicts between the aboriginal population and immigrants.

In an order of such high complexity, geostrategy is, thus, linked to the increase in complexity of the society's evolution itself. It is about the diffusion of strategies in an ever more complex environment, increasingly less noticeable, in which military victory can be accompanied by a political defeat – the war in Algeria being a relevant example. Sometimes the military weapon can prove useless against the economic one – as demonstrated by the oil crisis in 1973.

Thus, we arrive to *Geoeconomy*.

2. Geoeconomy

For several millennia, the policy of force, the pre-eminence of military power prevailed in international relations. Even currently, the differences between the countries in the world are set, mainly, based on their ability "to wage war", although not in classical terms (number of soldiers, tanks etc.) but modern ones (medium or long-range missiles, Space based support points etc.).

However, together with the deepening of the globalisation process, power elements in international relations are transferred from the political-military side to the commercial-cultural side. That is why we talk about *geoeconomy* and *geoculture*, the commercial blocks and civilization areas becoming a sort of "identity cards" of the modern world. Unfortunately, this meaning is overloaded and even exploited by some analysis like Samuel Huntington with his "civilizations cleavage".

Obviously, today power is no longer based exclusively on military might and control over a specific territory, larger or smaller (depending on the classical "sphere of influence"), but on the ability and capacity to integrate into the global economy. An analyst in this field, the American Richard Rosecrance says that after the First World War the planet was divided into two distinct entities:

• on the one hand, *the territorial-political-military world* based on the principle of maximising the state's sovereignty and increase the level of autarchy, respectively the *Soviet model*;

• on the other hand, *the commercial world* based on mutual growth of commercial benefits and on being integrated in a free, global market, thus the *Western model*.

In the second half of the 20th century, the number of countries in the second category has rapidly increased, while the others were doomed to fail.

At the beginning of the current century, a new category of states appeared – the states that witnessed a large economic dynamic in a short timeframe, in comparison with the already famous ones –, respectively the *emerging economies*. The BRICS group is already emblematical, which at first was only BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), while the current formula dates back to 2010, when South Africa joined. Thus were nominated the countries which in the first decade of this millennium greatly exceeded the economical growth rates of developed countries (USA, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain and other Western Europe countries), irrespective of the other countries undergoing development. It is no less true that these emerging economies are

either great powers (Russia, China), or regional powers (Brazil, India and South Africa), India having already a large number of power assets. Meanwhile, many other countries from South-East Asia (Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia etc.), a region which has lately been the most dynamic in the world, affirmed themselves in the same spirit.

Nevertheless, this does not stop here. It is well known that, since the second half of the last century (with a deepening of the phenomenon in the last decades), the global political and economical scene gravitated towards a *power mix*, where the ever present state was joined by new actors (among which mainly associations/ regional blocks like the European Union and large corporations/multinational companies). In fact, this does not automatically mean, as it was rumoured, the replacing of the state-centred world. Practically, we are witnessing the *simultaneous existence of the two worlds* as the American analyst James N. Rosenau refers to: "The Universe of global politics is formed on two interacting worlds: a world with multiple decision centres, with various actors, relatively equal and a state-centred world, in which the national actors are still essential".[3]

One can say that currently but also in the near future, despite the new actors, some of which very strong, the games on the global scene, it would appear, are and will be made by the *great powers*[4] that know how to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the other newly joined actors. We have already a relevant recent example regarding the battle to split the global market, basically the main element of Geoeconomy, which is the radical change in hierarchy of the great powers with regards to economic force: in 2014, for the first time in history, China had the largest GDP

(for purchasing power parity), of 18 090 bn.\$, overtaking the USA (17 350 bn.\$), who reigned supreme for more than 100 years. And in third place we find India (7 411 bn.\$), overtaking Japan (4 767 bn.\$), who used to occupy this position until several years ago.

Coming back to the theoretical part, according to some analysts *Geoeconomy* is a "*discipline at the border between economic sciences and geography* (more precisely, economic geography). Geoeconomy studies the *relationship between the trinomial space-politics-economy*, the interaction and interdependency between politics, economy and geography (...). In many ways, geoeconomy interferes with geopolitics, the boundary between the two disciplines being rather fluid"[5].

Unfortunately, frequently enough the concept of geoeconomy is used, only in Romania, as a synonym of economic geography, being considered a shrinkage of the two terms: *geo* and *economy*. In fact, *economic geography* focuses mainly on studying the dynamic of economic spaces and analysing the changing economic map, not on the balance of power generated by economic competition on a macro-economic level.

In this context, we would like to remind that, just as in the case of *Geostrategy*, the concept is not a very new one. We can find it in the form of *ecopolitics* from the Swede Rudolf Kjéllén (the one who "baptised" *Geopolitics* in 1899) in the work "State as a form of life" (1916), but did not manage to establish itself. Nine years later it is used as such, *Geoeconomy*, by the German geopolitican Arthur Dix. However, in what regards its essence, geoeconomy was defined long before the mentioning of the term geostrategy by Durando, respectively in 1840, by the German economist Friedrich List, in the work "The national system of political economy".

The beginning of the 21st century strengthens the assessment that technological development and capital accumulation are very important factors in defining the main actors on the global scene, more important than the classical ones, such as area, population, army etc. This should mean a shift from a long historical period in which

---

[3] James N. Rosenau, *Turbulenţa în politica mondială. O teorie a schimbării şi continuităţii*, Editura Academiei, Bucureşti, 1994, p. XVIII.

[4] See also: Mircea Maliţa, *Între război şi pace*, Editura C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2007 and *Jocuri pe scena lumii*, Editura C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2007; Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*, Fontana Press, Glasgow, 1994; Pierre Lorrain, *L'incroyable alliance Russie – États-Unis*, Édition du Rocher, Paris, 2002; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Triada geostrategică*, Editura Historia, Bucureşti ş.a., 2006.

[5] Oleg Serebrian, *Dicţionar de geopolitică*, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2006, p. 103.

one more powerful country after another crowned themselves masters of the world, towards a more mature one, an open world, characterised by strong and unlimited commercial exchanges, bi and multilateral relationships, alliances (but not military in nature), competitive advantages etc., but also by a new type of foreign policy – and the associated diplomacy – which would lead to a continental and intercontinental balance which is stable and long-lasting. The traditional policy of expansion and influence translated from conquering new territories (either in a colonial meaning by taking over territories in the New World, or by imposing a protectorate over weaker countries) to exercising a more hidden and subtle control, almost imperceptible, but decisive.

In the context of the discussions about geoeconomy, we also have to mention the *economic warfare*. Many analysts consider that the most terrible war taking place currently across the planet is not the one that leads to death and injuries (armed warfare), but the war of economies, or more precisely *economic warfare*, which results from the economic conflicting state and is part of what we can call continuous or permanent war. If the Prussian general von Clausewitz defined war as a continuation of politics with violent means, more precisely a violent method of shaping a policy into the world around, some contemporary strategists claim that war is not a continuation of politics, but its finale since weapons do not continue political dialogue, but rather come into play when and where this dialogue ends.

Economic warfare was in fact always present, from Sun Tzu (in *The Art of War*) and Kautilya (*Arthashastra*) and almost all doctrines and forms of expression of medieval, modern and contemporary military art contain aspects of this kind of war. Thus, in modern times, during the Cold War, the United States of America put in place a strategy called *containment* against the Soviet colossus which in essence was a strategy of economic warfare. This type of war implies a complex belligerency and multiple strategies, most of which are indirect strategies that flow through the political, but especially through the financial components and aim at conquering markets and achieving domination of resources.

A natural question is born: is it that simple the road from a world of military conflicts to one of economic competition? Are great powers like the United States and Russia, old powers like (Great Britain, France, Germany) and emerging powers (China, Japan, India and others) renouncing so easily to the "right" to impose rules on the international scene? It is difficult to provide a straightforward answer to such questions, especially when the hope to shift from *hard power* (so characteristic to humanity) to *soft power* was shattered lately by events such as those in the Caucasus (Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh), Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Middle East (Islamic State, the Syrian civil war etc.), the possible thawing of conflicts in the South China Sea etc.

There are also optimist analysts, such as the Romanian-born American Edward Nicolae Lutwak (geostrategist and international relations specialist) who believes that we must and can achieve a predominance of the economic over the political. According to him, expressing adversarial attitudes of states should be done more and more with the help of the "economic weapon". Besides, Lutwak is one of the founders of *Geoeconomy*. It is thus symptomatic the dispute he had with Bill Clinton, the American president claiming that, in any confrontation, there is a winner and a loser, while Lutwak contradicted him and claimed that both entities can be winners giving as an example the competition between Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola.

Conclusions

Putting the two concepts in antithesis leads to the following conclusions:
• Although apparently new, Geostrategy and Geoeconomy are rather old concepts, the first being mentioned in 1846 (by the Italian Giacomo Durando), while the second in 1925 (by the German geopolitician Arthur Dix; but under the form of *ecopolitics* since 1916 by the Swede Rudolf Kjellén).
• Often confused with Geopolitics, *Geostrategy* proves to be an independent scientific discipline. Conversely, both embed a significant *geographical component*: if Geopolitics says what must be won and preserved, Geostrategy says if

this is possible, how and with what, focusing on the decisive points of spatial configuration.

• With the deepening of the globalisation process, the power elements in international relations are transferred from the political-military side towards the commercial-cultural side, bringing into discussion *Geoeconomy* and *Geoculture*. Geoeconomy mainly refers to the ability and capacity to integrate in the global economy.

• Despite of the power mix, which is an often discussion topic, the sharing of the global market, which is Geoeconomy's backbone, is still being done by the great powers, the recent changes in the global hierarchy of economic powers proving the point: China overtaking the USA for the first place, India in third pushing Japan in fourth position.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BEAUFRE, André, *Introduction à la stratégie*, Paris, Hachette, 1999.

2. BOTTI, Ferucio, "Le concept de géostratégie et son application à la nation italienne dans les théories du général Durando"*, in *Stratégique*, 58, 1995-2.

3. CELÉRIER, Pierre, *Géopolitique et Géotratégie*, Paris, PUF, 1955.

4. CHAUPRADE, Aymeric; THUAL, François, *Dicţionar de geopolitică: state, concepte, autori*, Bucureşti, Ed. Corint, 2004.

5. COHEN, Saul Bernard, *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.

6. COSTEA, Mircea, *De la geopolitică la geostrategie*, Sibiu, Ed. Academiei Trupelor de Uscat, 1999.

7. COUTAU-BÉGARIE, Hervé, *Traité de Stratégie*, *6eme édition,* Paris, Edition Economica, 2008.

8. NEGUŢ, Silviu, *Geopolitica*, Bucureşti, Editura Meteor Press, 2015.

9. NYE JR., Joseph S., *Viitorul puterii*, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2012.

10. PARKER, Geoffrey, *La Géostratégie*, in O'LOUGHLIN, John (editor), *Dictionary of Geopolitics,* Westport, Connecticut, London, Greenwood Press, 1994.

11. ROSENAU, James N., *Turbulenţa în politica mondială. O teorie a schimbării şi continuităţii*, Editura Academiei, Bucureşti, 1994.

12. SEREBRIAN, Oleg, *Dicţionar de geopolitică*, Iaşi, Ed. Polirom, 2006.

GEOECONOMIC VS. GEOSTRATEGIC CONFLICTS. CASE STUDY: RUSSIA – WESTERN WORLD

Marius-Cristian NEACŞU, PhD*

Among atypical conflicts, this article analyses two case studies, highlighting at the same time two types of conflicts – geoeconomic and geostrategic –, which were used by Russia as tools for managing the dynamics of the geopolitical frontier with the Western World, which got dangerously close to its borders over the last few years. Using an entire arsenal of tactics and strategies, both in the geoeconomic and in the geopolitical-geostrategic spheres, has allowed Russia, with the events in 2014 (annexation of the Crimean Peninsula) to leave the geopolitical recoil it was in after the USSR's implosion and shift from a passively-defensive strategy to an active-aggressive one. Analysing the geopolitical phenomenon from the last two decades and a half has shown that this tactical reversal had all the elements of a preemptive geostrategy.

Keywords: *geoeconomy, geostrategy, geopolitics, geoeconomic conflicts, geostrategic conflicts, Russia, Western World.*

Introduction and brief history of the research

The events we are now witnessing – let's say the reality of the last two decades of post-Cold War evolution of the regional and global geopolitical systems –, have established a label of "hybrid"[1],

applied both to the geopolitical phenomenon itself manifested in the field and to the theoretical concept as well. This label was used, on the one hand, to identify on-going events – resulted from the dynamic of the geopolitical frontier between the Western World and Russia (but also applicable to other regions) –, that "escaped" the classical analysis methods and, on the other hand, to shape the specificity of the new phenomenon: similar to the classic one, but with something extra that differentiated it (from structural aspects, actors towards evolution and effects).

From a theoretical standpoint, this *hybridisation* or *atypicality* could highlight a new approach in geopolitics – *new geopolitics*[2] –, being enough to review the terms used in geopolitics studies over the last few years: *geopolitical axes*[3] (vs. sphere of influence), *strategic partnership* (vs. military alliance), *geopolitical actors* (vs. states), *frozen conflicts*[4]

---

[1] See Marius-Cristian Neacşu, "Russia and the Dynamics of the Regional Security Environment", Proceedings of the *International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI*,

(Editors Stan Anton, Iuliana Simona Ţuţuianu), Conference theme: *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS), June 11-12 "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 7-12.

[2] *Idem*, p. 8.

[3] Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Constantin Diaconescu, "Geopolitical Stakes and Games on the North-West – South-East Axis (Western World – Turkey)*, in *Lucrările seminarului geografic <Dimitrie Cantemir>*, no 31, 2011, pp. 131-143.

[4] Silviu Neguţ, "Conflictele îngheţate. Studiu de caz:

* Marius-Cristian NEACŞU, PhD is Associated Professor at the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest, Romania and the Director of the Geopolitics and Business Master's Program in the same institution. E-mail: marius.neacsu@ase.ro

(vs. wars), *coloured revolutions*, *gas wars*[5], *gas pipeline war*[6], *hard energy*[7], *pre-emptive gas pipeline*[8], *pre-emptive geostrategy*[9], *Arab spring*, *Siraq, geo-eco politics*[10], *hybrid war, atypical conflicts, "economic" refugees* etc.

Even from this enumeration – a minimal and selective one, at best – we will focus on the concept of *atypical conflict*, which is the subject of this research, by analysing and performing two case studies: *geoeconomic conflicts* and *geostrategic conflicts*. The space-time context is also well individualised: the dynamic of the geopolitical frontier between the Western World and Russia, which, over the last few years, established itself in the perimeter of the Black Sea, became more acute as it got closer to Russia's borders and culminated with the events of 2014-2015, respectively the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula[11] by the Russian Federation.

The novelty of the research is thus shaped by addressing this new concept – *hybrid/atypical conflict*. It is atypical because it is far from typical, common, conventional: no embassies are closed, no official declaration of war takes place, weapons are used but it is not a war, soldiers are used but not armies, "rebels", "separatists" are used but without military symbols, the logistics are insured but through "humanitarian convoys" etc. At the same time, it is also a hybrid, mixed conflict: state and non-state actors are directly involved, paramilitary structures etc.

The novelty of the research is imposed by the temporal context – the events of 2014-2015 –, respectively the *Euromaidan*[12] and the perspective of "losing" Ukraine, which from the point of view of geopolitical consequences and meanings represented the moment of reversal for the Russian geostrategy: from a defensive and pre-emptive one (mostly geoeconomic – using natural gas as a geopolitical tool for slowing down the Eastern expansion of Euro-Atlantic structures and especially Ukraine's accession to these structures: the orange revolution in Ukraine, 2004 vs. the gas war, 2006, 2008, 2009) to an offensive-aggressive one (mostly geostrategic-military – grey area, buffer area, separatist region, frozen conflict, hybrid war, territorial annexation, the latter culminating in 2014-2015, as a reply to the *Euromaidan* phenomenon in 2014).

The analysis of this dynamic and phenomenon individualised the *purpose of this study* as follows: shaping as case studies the two types of *atypical conflicts – geoeconomic conflicts* and *geostrategic conflicts –*, different from the conventional ones and which, in both cases, marked two different but gradual types of reaction and response from Russia to the post Cold War geopolitical evolution. Moreover, we also notice the complementarity of the two geostrategic instruments used by Russia both individually and in conjunction, as the Euro-Atlantic structures kept advancing towards the Black Sea and the Federation's border.

The applicative value of this research is obvious: from a theoretical standpoint – enriching specialised literature with new concepts (*gas war, gas pipeline war, hard energy* or *energetik, pre-emptive gas pipeline* etc. from the geoeconomic sphere and *separatist region, buffer area, frozen conflict, geopolitical Transnistria, pre-emptive geostrategy* from the geopolitical and geostrategic spheres). From an operational standpoint, the study can represent a useful geopolitical analysis guide for any international clerk, diplomat, international relations or securities research fellow.

Transnistria", in *Economistul*, nr. 49-50, 15-31 December, 2014, p. 60.

[5] Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, "Gas war", in *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, year 11, nr. 2/2009, pp. 176-189.

[6] Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Silviu Neguţ, "Gas pipelines war", in *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, year 12, nr. 1/2010, pp. 29-46.

[7] Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *op. cit.,* 2009, p. 176.

[8] *Idem*, p. 39.

[9] Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *op. cit.,* 2015, p. 95.

[10] Marius-Cristian Neacşu, "Anul geoeconopolitic 2014", in *Economistul*, year 12, nr. 49-50 (199-200), 15-31 December, 2014, pp. 11-13.

[11] Silviu Neguţ, "Conflictele îngheţate. Studiu de caz: Crimeea", in *Economistul*, year 12, nr. 47-48 (197-198), 1-14 decembrie, 2014, pp. 60-62.

[12] Marius-Cristian Neacşu, "From the <<Euro-Maidan>> to the <<Russian-Maidan>>", in *Terra*, Year XLV (LXV), nr. 1-2, 2014, pp. 89-97.

1. Post Cold War geopolitical evolutions in the Western World-Russia relation. Elements of new geopolitics

The end of the Cold War as a major event of the end of the 20th century (1989) implied a series of nuances and metamorphoses of classical geopolitical concepts. The international relations system itself was undergoing considerable changes: from a *bipolar world* (the US block vs. the USSR), which defined the structure of power during the Cold War (1945-1989), to a *unipolar world*, centred on the American hegemony (*Pax Americana*) which continued until 2001 (the "September 11" event), followed by a short transition period until 2010 (when Hilary Clinton makes an "offer" to China to participate in managing the world), when the first signs of an intensely hybrid world appear, *a multipolar world*, with several poles and networks of power.

The changes occurred on several levels: *actors, players, games, concepts*.

The state which had individualised itself as a geopolitical actor exclusively in the bipolar world and in the ideological Cold War is currently facing an unprecedented multiplication of the geopolitical actors, all of them eroding its sovereignty and reducing its duties. At the same time, with the process of revaluating the state's duties a series of non-state geopolitical actors gained the spotlight (trans-national corporations – TNCs, regional blocks, international bodies, NGOs, terrorist organisations, paramilitary groups etc.), some of which demonstrated an extraordinary dynamic and capacity to store power, although they were not geopolitical actors as such, their purpose wasn't exercising power, but the effects produced were geopolitical – it is the case of TNCs, which we can call without the risk of being wrong pseudo-geopolitical actors[13] or of regional blocks, economical – EU or military – NATO.

Some of these actors became powerful players both regionally and globally. Moreover, they became true networks and structures of power, contributing to an ever less predictable world.

Not even the games are classical anymore: if, in the bipolar world, the *zero sum games* prevailed (I win, the ideological enemy loses), a shift occurred later on towards *win-win types of games* (we win together), while currently we are witnessing a hybridisation of these games: a combination of games and geostrategies, of geopolitics and geostrategy and geoeconomy (armed assaults vs. economic sanctions), hard power and soft power, which means a combination resulting in a smart/intelligent power[14] etc.

Obviously, this evolution of geopolitical reality and phenomenon was followed by research, the academic environment as well as mass-media popularising new concepts and notions, some being entirely antithetical, but which best represented reality. Thus, the phrase "economic refugee" which is seeing much use at the moment, places on the same side of the formula two antithetical notions: "refugee" – which in classical geopolitics had a purely political connotation and made reference to a person politically persecuted from various points of view – identity, cultural etc. who "took refuge" (forced to run) to save his life/identity – and the "economic immigrant", that mostly represented a premeditated choice, a decision targeting mainly material wealth. This hybrid – "economic refugee" – is, at the same time, an immigrant but also a refugee and has both economic and political goals. Such a reality can no longer be captured with a classical analysis tool.

Coming back to this study's topic – atypical conflicts – the beginning of the 21st century highlighted two separate categories in these types of conflicts: *geoeconomic conflicts* and *geostrategic conflicts*.

Geoeconomic conflicts manifested themselves mostly in the first decade of the third millennia

---

[13] See also Gelu Hanganu, *Suportul geografic al structurilor geopolitice mondiale*, University of Bucharest, PhD thesis, 2011, pp. 193-206.

[14] See also Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, "From <<hard power>> to <<soft power>>. Intelligent power", in vol. *The International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, Bucharest, November 22-23, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 216-226.

(the years 2000), while *geostrategic conflicts* in the following decade (2010). Both were triggered by the dynamic of the geopolitical frontier between the Western World and Russia, which as it advanced eastward towards the Black Sea and Russia's borders respectively ("Europe's march towards the East"[15] as it was described by Oleg Serebrian), forced the latter to change focus from the geoeconomic dimension (the gas wars with Ukraine, 2006, 2008, 2009) towards the geostrategic-military one (the territorial annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, 2014).

In both cases, the "geo" prefix had a deep meaning. Geoeconomic conflicts were not only economic, since there were not involved only private corporations competing for market share, but states, governmental strategies, foreign policy instruments for achieving geopolitical objectives through the economic tools. Economy was used as a lever, a tool, while the stakes were geopolitical: the Western World used the concept of "energy security" (securing the supply of the European market with natural gas), but targeted expansion into Russia's former sphere of influence, Russia targeted slowing down and ultimately blocking altogether the EU's and NATO's expansion towards its borders. How? Initially, through preferential prices for natural gas for the countries in the "near abroad": gas *versus* political concessions (remaining in Moscow's sphere of influence, delaying or renouncing the objectives of joining the EU and/or NATO).

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, in 2004, which only meant a tendency towards westernisation and a pro-European geopolitical route, was answered by Russia with the triggering of the gas "war" (2006, 2008, 2009) and with the termination of natural gas deliveries to Ukraine (the scenarios was also used at the beginning of the years 2000 against Georgia). Geography (closeness between Russia and Ukraine) was essential: the presence of NATO military structures at Russia's borders was intolerable. Furthermore, in 2009, Ukraine officially renounced its objective of joining NATO.

In the case of geostrategic conflicts, geography was, again, essential. The *Euromaidan* phenomenon from the beginning of 2014 (actually a replay under a new form of the Orange Revolution ten years ago) found Russia much better prepared. It no longer used the geoeconomic tool (termination of natural gas deliveries), but intervenes with its military and annexes Crimea – one of the three geopolitical "keys" of the Black Sea (together with the Straits and the Mouths of the Danube), Pontus Euxinus being also the "southern clip" through which Russia maintains its Eurasian dimension[16].

With the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine fulfilled the role of a geopolitical pivot at the Black Sea, for Russia being vital to maintain control over Kiev and, up to a point, it seemed that the geoeconomic instrument was sufficient. Without the Crimean Peninsula Ukraine loses this function, being a country "captive" in Moscow's gravity, surrounded by Russian territories or territories within its sphere of influence, like a "rimland". Moreover, Russia took increased guarantees, triggering on Ukraine's territory a frozen conflict (Donbass and Luhansk), designed to secure from a geographical (through a terrestrial corridor) and geopolitical (by cancelling any of Ukraine's geopolitical ambitions) standpoint access to the Crimean Peninsula and through it to the Black sea which was, anyway, in a full remilitarisation process (both Russian and Western).

Thus, from a new geopolitical perspective another hybrid concept which Russia knew how to masterfully use was the one patented in Transnistria – *the frozen conflict*, with its intermediary phases (separatist region, buffer zone etc.) –, with which Russia could pursue its long-term geopolitical goals and, at the same,

---

[15] Oleg Serebrian, *Despre geopolitică*, Editura Cartier, Chişinău, 2009, p. 172.

[16] More recent studies tackled this theme: see also Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *op. cit.*, 2015, pp. 90-96; Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *op. cit.*, 2014, pp. 89-97; Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Silviu Neguţ, "Black Sea Area – a new <<grey area>>?", in *Impact Strategic*, nr. 2/ 2013, CSSAS, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", pp. 37-47; Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Damian Florea, "Project Nabucco in the power games", in vol. International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, November 22-23, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2012, p. 473.

time keep at bay the Western structures. Not coincidentally, the concept used by Russia, which gained a general value as a geopolitical tool for action in the last two decades in the Black Sea perimeter could take the name of *geopolitical Transnistria*[17].

2. Geoeconomic conflicts: the gas and gas pipelines "wars" vs. the Orange Revolution

Replacing the ideological competition with the economic one was still a goal at the beginning of the third millennium, but the closing of the Euro-Atlantic structures to Ukraine and Russia's borders gave the possibility to the latter to replace the word "power" in the concept of *hard power* with that of "energy", respectively *hard energy*[18]. The invasion of the Soviet tanks (attribute of hard power) was not replaced with an economic weapon with geopolitical effects just as strong: shutting down the natural gas tap. Why? The deal was off: *natural gas at a preferential price* for Ukraine and other ex-Soviet countries close to the Russian Federation's borders and the ex-Soviet sphere of influence (at the beginning of the years 2000 the natural gas price paid by these countries was 50 dollars/thousand cubic metres, while for the European market, it was higher than 300 dollars) vs. *political concessions* (not joining NATO and the EU; Ukraine's problem was a clear preoccupation in Kremlin: it had

a direct border with Russia, it had Crimea and the Northern seashore at the Black Sea – which insured its pivot role and presence in the Black sea power games – and above everything else its proximity to the Mouths of the Danube). Furthermore, at least two problems needed urgent solutions: the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol (accommodation, rent and afterwards its withdrawal) and the fact that natural gas was transiting Ukraine, which under the conditions of the disagreements between Russia and Ukraine affected the European market.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) – as a tendency towards westernisation and a pro-European geopolitical evolutionary path – triggered Russia's reply with the gas "war" (with its three stages, 2006, 2008, 2009)[19]. The context was extremely favourable: Europe was experiencing economic growth and seemed that it just discovered the benefits of using natural gas, a resource it increasingly needed and which was imported from Russia (the EU's average dependency on natural gas imports from Gazprom was around 50%[20] and many countries were fully dependent); Ukraine – as a main transit route for natural gas towards Europe – seemed to be geopolitically oriented towards the West (but it was on Russia's borders, it inherited the Crimean Peninsula and the best part of the Black Sea shoreline, which also had the Russian Federation's fleet "hooked"); Russia exited its period of indecision and seeking from the time of Boris Elţîn and entered the one in which it returned to "the big scene" of Vladimir Putin.

The main *actors* of the conflict are, thus, individualised: the European Union ("the demand"), Russia ("the supply") and Ukraine (the middle-man, "the transit space"). The conflict seemed to be a regional one, Eurasian, but its consequences had a much broader impact. *The conflict's object*: Europe's energy security (listed on the European Union's diplomatic agenda as a national security component).

"The clash" which crystallised the conflict's object was between the different visions for guaranteeing energy security as it was seen by

[17] Marius-Cristian Neacşu, "Conceptul de <<transnistrie geopolitică>>", in *Terra*, Year XLVI (LXVI), Nr. 1-2, 2015, pp. 65-70.

[18] An entire series of studies tackled the concept of "hard energy" and more other notions from the same family of theories ("gas war", "gas pipeline war", "energy pincer", "energetik", "pre-emptive gas pipeline", "Blue Stream vs. the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline" "South Stream vs. Nabucco" etc.): Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Silviu Neguţ, *op. cit.*, 2013, pp. 37-47; Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Damian Florea "Nabucco. Sfârşit?", in *Terra*, Year XLIV (LXIV), Nr. 1-2, 2013, pp. 90-95; Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Damian Florea, *op. cit.*, 2012, pp. 426-440; Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Silviu Neguţ, *op. cit.*, 2010, pp. 29-46; Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *op. cit.*, 2009, pp. 176-189; Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Viorel Mionel, "European Union's Dependency on Russian Energy. Geopolitical considerations", in *The Romanian Economic Journal*, nr. 25 bis, 2007, pp. 265-284 ş.a.

[19] Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *op. cit.* 2009, pp. 176-189.

[20] *Ibidem*.

the various actors involved: Russia wanted to play the role of sole supplier of natural gas on the European market (but it depended on the transit through Ukraine) and it resorted to an entire set of strategies that would not allow the forming of a joint energy market while the European Union was seeking to diversify its suppliers and transport routes.

Although the problem was the same – supplying the European energy market and securing it in report with the dynamic of the evolution of the geopolitical relations between Russia (supplier) and Ukraine (transit space) – the position of the two actors was radically different. Thus, on the one hand, *the European position* was oriented towards profit (moreover, financing the Western gas pipelines, like *Nabucco*, had mostly private financing), in a geoeconomic calculation (diversifying the supply sources by accessing the Caucasus and Central-Asian areas, respectively Non-Ukrainian transit), in the spirit of a "win-win" type of game (Europe is supplied with natural gas brought through pipelines which are not controlled by Gazprom and Russia remains an important supplier on the European market (but not the only one).

On the other hand, *the Russian position* was, in essence, geopolitical and geostrategic. From a *geopolitical* standpoint, it was seeking to recover its former sphere of influence, especially the ex-Soviet countries close to its borders, avoiding Ukraine's westernisation and, moreover, the removal of the danger that it would join NATO (NATO's presence at Russia's border was inconceivable. From a *geostrategic* point of view, Moscow used the (geo)economic instrument – preferential prices on natural gas sourced to Russia and access to the Russian market of various products on Russia's market in exchange of political concessions. Russia was not seeking mainly economic profit, but also to increase Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas, eliminate the middle-men, such as transit countries – Ukraine for example or other potential Central-Asian or Trans-Caucasian suppliers – Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Russia's game was a zero sum one: supplying the European market only with Russian gas or with Caspian and Central-Asian natural gas but with Russia as the middle-man, through pipelines controlled... by Russia.

With regards to the *conflict's stakes*, these were *geoeconomic* for the Western world and *geopolitical* and *geostrategic* for Russia. As a result, *the conflict's meaning* was rather important: braking or delaying at first, followed-up by blocking the expansion tendencies towards the East of the Euro-Atlantic structures, respectively near Russia's borders.

The natural gas *conflict unfolded* nearly identically in 2006, 2008 and 2009. Masking the geopolitical meaning under an economic dispute: Ukraine wants to be more Western-like, Gazprom increases the fees for the natural gas supplied towards the Western neighbour, Ukraine refuses to pay and requests the payment of a higher transit tax, Gazprom stops natural gas supply, Ukraine affects the transit of natural gas towards the Western world, it results the need to find alternative solutions[21].

Both Russia and the Western world were aligning in the issue of "bypassing Ukraine" as a transit area. In other words, the natural gas conflict triggered another one, more spectacular from the power games point of view, which, at that time, was going to be named in specialised literature the *gas pipelines* "*war*"[22]. All the coordinates of the gas conflict were maintained but interesting nuances appeared: the Western world wanted to access the hydrocarbons deposits in the Caspian area and extend the energy-diplomatic corridor, built in the 90s, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum

[21] It is incredibly relevant in this context Vladimir Putin's speech in Soci, in 2006: "If our European partners expect us to allow them to access at our most prized possession, energy, to do with it as they will, then we request concessions that would help us with our own development. (...) Access to infrastructure, production and transport? But what type of access are we talking about? Where is your production, what deposits and large pipelines are we allowed access to? If you do not have anything of the above we will have to find a replacement solution which would allow us to engage in mutual exchanges in the interest of both sides. We granted Ukraine subsidies for fifteen years. If the Western world wants an Orange Revolution they should have the kindness to pay for it. Do you think we are stupid?".

[22] Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Silviu Neguț (2010), *op. cit.,* pp. 29-46.

(Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey), at both ends, both on the supply end – the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project – as well as at the exit point towards Europe, through the headlines project *Nabucco*. The Russian competitors were not to be outdone: *Blue Stream,* a gas pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea, "small, but with a large symbolical value"[23], which brought natural gas from Russia directly in Turkey (vs. the Western Trans-Caspian gas pipeline), a *Peri-Caspian gas pipeline* (vs. the Western *Trans-Caspian* one, a project resumed by the Western world in the context of supplying the new Nabucco pipeline), which carried natural gas from Turkmenistan – an important natural gas producer in Central Asia, East of the Caspian Sea, which the Western world would have wanted to connect through the Trans-Caspian corridor to the European market, *South Stream* (vs. *Nabucco,* Western, "the natural gas bridge connecting Europe to Asia", obviously without Russia vs. *Nabucco West*, the 2012 version of the initial gas pipeline)[24].

We will not go over the games again[25], as

---

[23] Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Liviu Bogdan Vlad, "The Geopolitics of Strategic Energy Resources", in *Impact Strategic*, nr. 1, 2007, p. 25.

[24] We summarise the main coordinates of these projects: *Nabucco* – Western project, capacity of 31 billion m³, length 3 300 km, diameter 1 400 mm, costs 7-8 billion Euro, private financing, supply sources: Azerbaijan (?), Turkmenistan (?), Iraq (?), Iran (?), Egypt(?), chronology: launched in 2002, resumed in 2012, failed in 2013; *Nabucco West* – Western project, capacity of 10 billion m³, length 1 300 km, diameter 1 200 mm, private financing, supply sources: Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz 2), chronology: launched in 2012, failed next year; *South Stream* – Russian project direct competitor to *Nabucco*, capacity of 63 billion m³, length 2 380 km, diameter 810 mm, costs 16 billion Euro, mostly state funded supply sources: Russia, chronology: launched in 2006, signing the final investment decisions and starting the off-shore part of the construction in 2012, put on hold (temporarily) in 2014 (in 2015 the Blue Stream 2 project will also be put on hold); *North Stream* – Russian project direct competitor to *Nabucco*, capacity of 55 billion m³, length 1 224 km, diameter 1 220 mm, costs 15 billion Euro, mixed financing (30% Russia, state, 70% Germany, private), supply sources: Russia, chronology: launched in 1997, first pipeline is finished in April 2011, start of deliveries in November 2011, inauguration of the second pipeline in November 2012, launch of *North Stream 2* in 2015.

[25] For more details see also Marius-Cristian Neacşu, Silviu Neguţ, *op. cit.,* 2010, pp. 29-46.

---

the results are more relevant here: no Western project succeeded while Russia managed to bypass Ukraine and directly connect Germany, thanks to the *North Stream* gas pipeline (the new "Ribbentrop-Molotov" pact as the project was denounced by the Poles)[26] and through *South Stream* – whose role was mainly to pre-empt the Western project – managed to stop the construction of the *Nabucco* pipeline.

The effects of the 2008 economic crisis which resulted in a decrease of natural gas consumption in Europe, renouncing the Nabucco gas pipeline and the 2014 events in Ukraine – the *Euromaidan* phenomenon – have somehow of overshadowed these geopolitical conflicts and shifted the focus towards a new category of atypical conflicts, the geostrategic ones.

3. Geostrategic conflicts: geopolitical "transnistria" vs. *Euromaidan*

We previously mentioned that for Russia's Eurasian dimension the Black Sea and Ukraine – through the shoreline inherited from the USSR, respectively: the Crimean Peninsula, regional geopolitical key and proximity to the Mouths of the Danube –, in the context previous to the year 2014.

As a result, what is happening in the central part of Kiev in the first days of 2014 cannot leave Kremlin as a passive spectator. *Euromaidan* – a sort of "Ukrainian spring" and a sequel to the idea of the "Orange Revolution" ten years ago – "forced" Russia to resolve the "Ukrainian problem". For this purpose, it used an instrument patented in Transnistria, but which was generalised in the Caucasus-Black Sea area, surrounding the Black Sea with *frozen conflicts*.

We are framing the "frozen conflicts" in the *geostrategic conflicts* category, as well as *atypical conflicts* – actually, the concept of "hybrid warfare" was crystallised in Ukraine. But, in the case of the Crimean Peninsula (March 2014) we

---

[26] An interesting friendship relation between Vladimir Putin and Gerhard Schröder, Germany's former chancellor, was behind the *North Stream* project – see also for details Marius-Cristian Neacşu, "Doctrina Gazputin", in *Economistul*, Nr. 9 (159), 17-23 March, 2014, pp. 26-30.

witnessed an evolutionary continuation of the "frozen conflict" concept, respectively military thawing and territorial annexation by the Russian Federation. Practically, the "frozen conflict" only represented a "timer", a geostrategic instrument which had the role of delaying a still unsettled situation by the Kremlin until a favourable moment appeared. It is what Oleg Serebrian called in the case of the Balkan wars of the 90s, "the war is over, the conflict continues"[27], meaning a state of "neither peace, nor war".

If we follow during the whole post-Cold War period all those territories in which frozen conflicts were "installed" – Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and recently Crimea, Donbass and Luhansk – we observe a series of similarities[28]:

– all are marginal geographical spaces (compared with the post-Soviet state capital), relatively small in size, with an absent or complicated identity and more often than not, obscure;

– they are situated in the Black Sea or Caucasus-Black Sea geopolitical area;

– the population is usually mixed, having a certain percentage of Russian, Russified or Russophile components;

– have a past under the Soviet rule (as parts of the ex-USSR they shelter reminiscences of the Soviet Empire: troops, weapons, military equipment etc.);

– can easily escape the gravity of an emerging centre of power (Chişinău, Kiev etc.);

– all were used by Russia through, interestingly enough, Western argumentation (protecting the "small" – Russophile population – against the "large" – the capital which legally administered the territory – human rights, fight against international terrorism, Kosovo precedent etc.;

The evolutionary and functional algorithm was also perfected to a model applicable everywhere it was needed:

– Moscow's claim of some legitimate rights over the region: Soviet past or reminiscences –

troops of the former Red Army (the Transnistria situation, the Caucasus space), Russia's Black Sea fleet (Crimea) etc.;

– economic dependence and political servitude: gas, energy, market vs. political concessions (the situation of Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia etc.);

– any attempt towards "westernisation" (meaning a geopolitical orientation towards the West) is interpreted by Kremlin as high treason, so the "coloured revolutions" are promptly punished (for example: the "gas war" with Belarus and Ukraine or the thawing of "frozen conflicts" such as the one in Transnistria);

– Russian intervention was carried out at a lobby level, intervention in internal affairs through financing political and media forces up to the "proxy war" (using "separatists", "secessionists", "rebels") or through direct intervention (the recent case of the Crimean Peninsula);

– if the pro-Western orientation persists, the *territorial fragmentation* of the respective republic is initiated, first of all through forming a separatist region, which no longer acknowledges central authority, even if it benefited of a certain degree of autonomy and which proclaims itself independent (Transnistria, Crimea, Donbass, Luhansk and so on);

– escalation of an armed conflict is catalysed or frozen by Moscow, on a case by case basis, seeking to internationalise the conflict and insure strong negotiation positions, as well as the presence in any future negotiations for a peace solution;

– using "Western" arguments and solutions – self-determination through referendum, federalisation (the trap of asymmetrical federations – see the "Kozak plan" for finding the solution to the conflict in Transnistria) –, Russia becomes involved in the conflict resolution so that it keeps at bay the Western structures;

– in extreme situations, like the "Euromaidan" and the potential loss of Ukraine and through Crimea, the strategic access to the Black Sea, Kremlin reserves the right to carry out the final step: *territorial annexation*.

If this entire evolutionary scheme generalises Transnistria's model to the level of a scientific

---

[27] Oleg Serebrian, *Geopolitica spaţiului pontic*, Chişinău, Ed. Cartier, 2006, p. 154.

[28] To follow the *geopolitical transnistria* concept in Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *op. cit.*, 2015, pp. 65-70.

concept, Crimea represents a subsequent evolution. From the definition of the *geopolitical transnistria* concept – "a region with a high geostrategic meaning used by a great power (Russia) either to brake [or block] ongoing geopolitical tendencies (expansion of the Euro-Atlantic structures towards Russia's current borders), or to regain influence in its former ideological space"[29] – it also results the *object* or *geopolitical stake* of these geostrategic conflicts.

Similarly to geoeconomic conflicts which for Russia also had a (geopolitical and) geostrategic stake, geostrategic conflicts maintain the same meaning. At least in the case of the Crimean Peninsula, it was about regaining strategic access[30] to the Black Sea – Russia's southern security anchor – with or without Ukraine. A Westernised Ukraine (member of the EU and NATO) would have meant the confinement of Russia's Eurasian geopolitical dimension.

Conclusions

This study and the comparative analysis between *geoeconomic conflicts and geostrategic conflicts as types of atypical conflicts* have led to a series of conclusions highlighted below.

The last two decades and a half elapsed from the end of the Cold War attest new realities. We can observe how the entire geopolitical phenomenon, both at the level of what really happens in the field, as well as conceptually has been heavily *hybridised*, if we were to compare it with what was happening in the Cold War. Although the geopolitical goal/objective remains the same as always – maximising power – hybridisation occurred at the level of geopolitical actors (an amazingly dynamic combination of state and non-state actors), of games (seems to be a power game with "no rules"), of concepts

---

[29] *Idem*, p. 68.

[30] It is not only about physical access to the Black Sea, Russia having its own piece of the shoreline, albeit lacking: it is a double barrier, physical-geographical (the Caucasus mountains) and human (Islamic population). It is about strategic access, respectively owning one of the three "keys" of the Black Sea, in the case at hand the Crimean peninsula.

(these are no longer as rigid as during the Cold War, but extremely flexible and highly dynamic semantically).

Russia is no longer in a geopolitical recoil. If, during most of the time elapsed from the end of the Bipolar World, Russia was in a "geopolitical recoil" situation (observable by probing theoretical notions that tried to better explain the new realities in the international relations system – *Cold Peace*, *New Cold War* etc.), trying to minimise or counter the eastwards expansion of the Euro-Atlantic structures, towards the ex-Soviet sphere of influence and moreover, towards Russia's current borders, the 2014 events – as a cumulative result of Russia's evolution in this period – proved the fact that the "legitimate heir to the USSR" is no longer in a tactical withdrawal and minimisation of losses state, but is on the offense: it braked and afterwards blocked the eastwards expansion of the EU and NATO, regained Crimea, fractured Ukraine, remilitarised the Black Sea (as well as the Baltic Sea due to the *North Stream* gas pipeline) in an attempt to protect the buffer zone next to its borders.

As a result, *Russia switched from a passive-defensive strategy to an active-aggressive one – pre-emptive geostrategy*. In addition to the braking/blocking process of the Western structures and regaining the "near abroad" Russia, in spite of economic sanctions and the reduced oil prices (which fuel a large part of the state budget), capitalising on the Western structural and identity crisis (from the *Grexit* and *Brexit* to "economic refugees", USA's weakness) regained its capacity to intervene at a global level (active involvement in the Syrian situation).

Russia used *new and hybrid geopolitical instruments* which can be grouped in two categories: from the *geoeconomic* sphere (hard energy, natural gas "war", gas pipeline "war", energy pincer, pre-emptive gas pipeline etc.) and from the *geostrategic* one (separatist region, buffer zone, frozen conflict, geopolitical "transnistria") and so on. These were used with the same geopolitical goal: minimising the losses sustained when the Soviet colossus imploded ("the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th

century" as Vladimir Putin himself characterised it), blocking the "Eastwards march" of the Western structures and securing the "near abroad" as a buffer zone for its borders.

All these (previously mentioned) *new geopolitical instruments were used in direct relationship with the Black Sea.* For Russia, the Black Sea represents the Southern security anchor and is an essential component for its Eurasian dimension.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. HANGANU, Gelu, *Suportul geografic al structurilor geopolitice mondiale*, University of Bucharest, PhD thesis, 2011.

2. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian, "Russia and the Dynamics of the Regional Security Environment", Proceedings of the *International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI*, (Editors Anton, Stan, Ţuţuianu, Iuliana Simona), Conference theme: *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS), June 11-12 "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2015.

3. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian, "Conceptul de <<transnistrie geopolitică>>", in *Terra*, Year XLVI (LXVI), Nr. 1-2, 2015.

4. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian, "Anul geoeconopolitic 2014", in *Economistul*, anul 12, nr. 49-50 (199-200), 15-31 December, 2014.

5. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian, "From the <<Euro-Maidan>> to the <<Russian-Maidan>>", in *Terra*, Anul XLV (LXV), nr. 1-2, 2014.

6. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian, "Doctrina Gazputin", in *Economistul*, Nr. 9 (159), 17-23 March, 2014.

7. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian; FLOREA, Damian, "Nabucco. Sfârşit?", in *Terra*, year XLIV (LXIV), nr. 1-2, 2013.

8. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian; FLOREA, Damian, "Project Nabucco in the Power Games", in *International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI – The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS), November 22-23 "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2012.

9. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian; DIACONESCU, Constantin, "Geopolitical Stakes and Games on the North-West – South-East Axis (Western World – Turkey)", in *Lucrările seminarului geografic <Dimitrie Cantemir>*, nr. 31, Iaşi, 2011.

10. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian; NEGUŢ, Silviu, "Gas pipelines war", in *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, year 12, nr. 1, 2010.

11. NEGUŢ, Silviu, "Conflictele îngheţate. Studiu de caz: Crimeea", in *Economistul*, anul 12, nr. 47-48 (197-198), 1-14 December, 2014.

12. NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian; NEGUŢ, Silviu, "Black Sea Area – a new <<grey area>>?", in *Impact Strategic*, nr. 2, 2013.

13. Silviu NEGUŢ, Marius-Cristian NEACŞU, "From <<hard power>> to <<soft power>>. Intelligent power", in vol. *The International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI, The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, Bucharest, November 22-23, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, 2012.

14. NEGUŢ, Silviu; NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian, "Gas war", in *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, year 11, nr. 2, 2009.

15. NEGUŢ, Silviu; NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian; MIONEL, Viorel, "European Union's Dependency on Russian Energy. Geopolitical considerations", in *The Romanian Economic Journal*, nr. 25 bis, 2007.

16. NEGUŢ, Silviu; NEACŞU, Marius-Cristian; VLAD, Liviu Bogdan, "The Geopolitics of Strategic Energy Resources", in *Strategic Impact*, nr. 1, 2007.

17. SEREBRIAN, Oleg, *Despre geopolitică*, Chişinău, Editura Cartier, 2009.

18. SEREBRIAN, Oleg, *Geopolitica spaţiului pontic*, Chişinău, Editura Cartier, 2006.

ATYPICAL CONFLICTS OF THE 21ˢᵗ CENTURY: SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING VICTORY BY USING TRADITIONAL MEANS AND METHODS

Florin DIACONU, PhD*

This article focuses on the limited effectiveness of airstrikes launched until the end of 2015 against the Islamic State (ISIL) targets in Syria and Iraq, and against ISIL forces operating in these two countries in the Middle East. We think insufficient forces used to hit ISIL, the diffuse and sometimes uncertain character of targets worth hitting, and also in the context of significant constraints exerted by the rules defining political correctness today, it's unlikely air bombing – a method which has produced important results in several previous large scale and high intensity wars – can rapidly lead to really decisive results against ISIL. To substantiate even more this conclusion, we will briefly present some important elements in the history of strategic theory and practice directly connected to strategic bombing, along the past nine decades, starting from the 1920s.

Keywords: ISIL (Islamic State), air bombing, the U.S., France, Britain, Syria, Iraq, effectiveness of military action.

Introduction[1]

This article is aimed at discussing some of the issues briefly described by the title, but without the pretense of completeness (given the relatively small editorial space which has been available). In addition, I feel the need to clearly state, from the very beginning, that the conceptual apparatus used in this text is one of *Strategic Studies* viewed from the very perspective of *Political Science*, and not that of Military Science. As long as these clearly distinct fields of knowledge overlap, in part (and sometimes rather in a vague way), it is obviously possible that some readers might find inside the text, in a way perfectly legitimate from the point of view of the *military* profession, a number of observations and formulations which can be placed under a significant question mark. But such observations and formulations are *entirely legitimate* in the professional world I am belonging to – one that is intensely preoccupied by the systematic study of power on the international arena (a broad topic which

[1] The text is a slightly upgraded version of a presentation delivered on the occasion of the International Symposium "Atypical Conflicts of the 21st Century", which has been organized by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) on December 8, 2015.

* Florin DIACONU, PhD is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Romania and Director of the Hans J. Morgenthau Centre. E-mail address: florin.diaconu@ fspub.unibuc.ro

includes the professional – and more broadly, the intellectual – need of taking into account the very existence, the dynamics and the ways of using the military component of power). I am also deliberately emphasizing that the study of power I am currently involved in is conducted within the theoretical framework of Political Realism, and in a *civilian* (non-military) institution.

I also feel the need to will focus primarily on recent events in Syria and Iraq (linked, in most cases, to the dynamics of activities and actions of various types of the entity that we usually calling Islamic State or ISIL). I opt for such an approach because a very simple reason: the other major ongoing atypical conflict, respectively that illustrated, among others, by the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea, and subsequently by the triggering, by the same Russian Federation – which is now in an obvious stage of renewed efforts aimed at reviving a hegemony of imperial type, at least at regional level – of a massive separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine is, almost naturally (taking into account several elements, for example the geo-strategic context in the Wider Black Sea Region, but also Romania's legitimate concerns as a NATO member, but also as a minor power[2] on the international arena), much more present in the public debate, as well as in intensely specialized (academic and policy-oriented) discussions in Bucharest, within various institutional frameworks.

1. Important elements of the theory and practice of air bombing with decisive strategic role

Over the past decades, both the political-military theory and practice do have a strong common denominator, when we are talking about the *air* component of national power: that it is seen as a *possible* instrument of *decisive strategic victory*.

When the first really serious theorist of strategic bombing, an Italian general (who started his career, let us not forget this, as an artillery officer), wrote almost 100 years ago about the huge potential of air bombing missions, he said, among others, that the air war is one of the "instruments" to achieve the largest possible effectiveness by means of using minimal means[3]. The same 'founding father' of the theory of strategic bombing was also stating that before the era in which air war became possible, in order "to defeat [the enemy]... it was necessary to break a line of forces and open up a passing through it"; but that "behind these lines, beyond a certain distance, determined by the maximum range of firearms, the war was not able to make its consequences directly felt", mainly because "beyond that distance no harm can penetrate, and life can go on in complete safety and in relative tranquility". In other words, Douhet thought the traditional "battlefield was clearly limited"[4].

But in completely new conditions, when war may be fought by means of using massive air forces, "no longer there may be areas where life can be conducted in complete safety and in relative tranquility. Battlefield can no longer be limited; it will be circumscribed by the boundaries of the nations at war; all of them become combatants, because all of them are subject to direct harm by the enemy; a division between the belligerents and non-belligerent nations can not subsist any more"; more than this, "ground victory is not able any more to avoid air injuries caused by the enemy forces"; and the only real guarantee of complete victory is by means of "actually occupying enemy territory to totally destroy what gives life to enemy air forces"[5].

---

[2] "Minor power(s)" is a concept used, for example, by Martin Wight, *Politica de putere*, Editura Arc, Chişinău, 1998, pp. 69-75; the author is clearly stating, in a special chapter of his work, that most states are not great powers, and also that minor powers are of different types – some of them with strong military forces while others are almost completely lacking the ability of influencing or coercing any other actor on the international arena. I have deliberately chosen this concept in order to smoothly go beyond the need to evaluate, with *many* details, the *real* power status of Romania.

[3] G. Douhet, "Noi mijloace tehnice", in Colonel (r) dr. Simion Pitea, colonel dr. Gheorghe Tudor, *Pagini din gândirea militară universală*, vol. III, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1988, p. 167.

[4] G. Douhet, "Noua posibilitate", în Simion Pitea, Gheorghe Tudor, *op. cit.*, vol III, p. 170.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 171.

Openly supporting the idea that future wars will be decided, in the end, by the sheer size and the quality of the air forces, Douhet also asserted "the airplane, by its independence from the terrestrial surface and by swiftness of movement, superior to that of any other means, is the offensive weapon par excellence", and that the most consistent benefit of an offensive attitude in military air operations "is to take the initiative of operations, an initiative that is focused on freely choosing the point of attack and on the opportunity to concentrate the largest share of your own forces in the given point"[6].

Douhet also managed to lay down some clear rules – very rational, anyway – to be used as a guide by all those with responsibilities in planning and leading air war.

• The first one is that "targets of airstrikes should always be large: small targets have little importance and generally are not worth being object of concern".

• Secondly, air bombing "must completely destroy the attacked target, in such a way that one and the same target is not required to be hit" on several successive occasions.

• And the third rule - or rather axiom - is that "airstrikes' targets will generally be well determined areas" on which "official buildings, homes, factories etc. and a certain population" are placed[7].

The wars that followed have clearly confirmed an *important* part of the elements of Douhet's text, compiled and published in 1921. But it is worth highlighting the fact – not at all less important, including for a better understanding of some facts that are happening today – that a quite large part of the *central* assertions of the Italian author were strongly refuted by subsequent military practice. For example, Douhet wrote that in order to get a really decisive victory, would be enough the use of about 1,000 airplanes; and 500 of them used every day in combat operations would provide those who use such a force "the possibility to

proceed on daily basis to the destruction of 50 centers of any kind, located within range of air squadrons"[8].

The lines above are clearly indicating Douhet strongly believed that 10 bomber aircraft might be sufficient to completely destroy a "center of any kind" (such as, for example, a large industrial facility, or a central area of a large and important city). But we know, nowadays, for example, that even small (or very small) targets can be completely destroyed only by means of concentrating significantly larger air forces.

In some occasions, along the past few decades, even pinpoint targets could have been destroyed only as a result of really *massive* airstrikes. In World War Two, along the early stages of the Japanese offensive in the Pacific, the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battlecruiser *Repulse* were sunk on December 10, 1941 by an air attack conducted by no less than *86* aircraft; they took off from airfields located near Saigon[9] (the total number of these planes is, let us not forget this, about 10 times larger than that which Douhet thought, two decades earlier, that might be sufficient to completely remove from service *any* important target).

There are also situations of *another* really significant type. For example, the successive air bombing raids against the large ball-bearing plant in Schweinfurt are very clearly showing how limited are, in some occasions, results obtained by means of using a large number of bombers (let us also mention here that the average bomber aircraft in the World War Two could easily carry a total bomb payload far larger than that carried by bombers in the years immediately following the First World War): on August 17, 1943, 500 U.S. heavy bombers bombed Schweinfurt, plus an aircraft factory in Regensburg. Both factories were seriously damaged. In addition, 565 Germans and 86 foreigners (forced labor workers) were killed. But the factory was very quickly rebuilt, and therefore Americans hit it back again, on October 14, 1943, with 228 heavy

---

[6] G. Douhet, "Arma ofensivă", in Simion Pitea, Gheorghe Tudor, *op. cit.*, vol III, p. 176.

[7] For all these rules see G. Douhet, "Ordinea de mărime a ofensivelor aeriene", in Simion Pitea, Gheorghe Tudor, *op. cit.*, vol III, p. 180.

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 182.

[9] John France, *Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power*, Yale University Press, 2011, p. 338.

bombers. Little damage was caused, and along the next three months, without other airstrikes, production of ball bearings was brought again to full capacity. In late February 1944, the ball-bearing plant in Schweinfurt was hit again, by several hundred airplanes (at least 300 bombers, plus several hundred long-range fighters). Again, however, relatively quickly (within a few days to only a few weeks), the output returned to a level at least acceptable, as in the case of other plants hit by massive Allied airstrikes[10].

Other air bombing episodes are also showing a clear lack of really decisive results, despite the massive resources used. See, for example, the way in which the confrontation at Monte Cassino is significant for such an outcome of airstrikes. On February 15, 1944, 400 tons of bombs were dropped on the monastery in less than four hours, but without the expected results: even if a large part of the buildings were destroyed, German military units deployed there remained broadly unaffected, managing to throw back, without any major problem, Maori, Indian and Gurkha units[11]. On March 15, 1944, the monastery was even more intensely hit intense - 992 tons of bombs were dropped on it in 3.5 hours (some authors claim it probably was the most intense air bombing episode in World War Two, against a target with a so small total area); then a massive artillery bombardment took place, in which around 195,000 shells of all sizes have been used, but the Germans could not be pushed back from their strong defensive positions[12]. Only later on, on May 18, the Germans were definitively forced to abandon the ruins, but that happened only after almost six months of continuous fighting[13].

To some extent, along the entire Second World War, the clearest proof of the fact that even the air bombing missions perceived as completely being devastating have really generated severely limited results is constituted by air attack against Dresden, on February 13, 1945. In the fall of 1944, an attack with 796 *Lancaster* bombers has been planned[14]. On February 13, 1945, in the evening, in just 15 minutes, over 881 tons of bombs were dropped on the city of Dresden (57% explosive and the rest incendiary ones)[15]. A few hours later, other 550 bombers dropped other 1,750 tons of bombs[16]. And the next day, on February 14, 1945, other 431 American *B-17* bombers attacked the city, using more than 1,000 tons of bombs – 680 tons of explosive ones, and 400 tons of incendiary bombs[17]. And on February 15, 1945, more than 200 American bombers that would have had to attack a chemical plant near Leipzig attacked Dresedn again, simply because weather conditions denied them the chance to accurately hit their primary target[18]. Quite clearly, all these four airstrikes, put together, constituted the destructive Allied air attack after the bombing raid that had destroyed Hamburg in 1943[19]. In Dresden, a total number of almost 12,000 homes, plus other objectives of all sorts – several hundred administrative and industrial facilities, plus a lot of vital infrastructure – have been destroyed or badly damaged; but in only a few days, rail links with the rest of Germany were already partly functional; and in the case of some industrial facilities, work resumed in a few weeks, or at most in two months (albeit at a lower level than before the airstrikes)[20].

We are also dealing, in *quite many* occasions, with a *clear deficit* of *really* decisive results of air bombing missions at another level as well – that we are usually calling grand strategy. Oxford professor Michael Howard, one of the greatest historians of our times, makes it clear that only along the last years of the war the Allies have secured air supremacy over Germany, sufficient to enable them to cause havoc on the entire German

---

[10] Martin Gilbert, *The Second World War: A complete history*, Henry Holt abd Company, New York, 1989, pp. 453, 467, 500-501.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 498.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 509.

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 526.

[14] Frederick Taylor, *Dresda: Marţi, 13 februarie 1945*, RAO, 2007, Bucureşti, p. 270.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 324.

[16] For more complete data (number or aircraft, ammount of ammunition used) see *Ibidem*, pp. 347-349.

[17] For the American raid see *Ibidem*, pp. 391-392.

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 419.

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 433.

[20] For the obviously limited consequences see *Ibidem*, pp. 437-439.

territory, on a scale predicted, many years before, by early prophets of air bombing. But, Howard is also stating, civilian morale remained broadly intact even in such dramatic conditions, and the war effort of the German people went on until the very end of the war[21].

Similarly, we know – mainly from what Albert Speer wrote – that the *direct* effect of the campaign of continuous strategic bombing against the Reich, in 1944, was a notably diminished military production: 35% fewer tanks, 31% fewer planes and 42% fewer trucks than the previously planned figures[22] have been manufactured. But all these figures can be read in another way as well: in all these vital areas, production exceeded (or at least was close to) two thirds of the previously planned level, *despite* the really huge efforts of the Allied air forces.

Another recommendation openly delivered by Douhet in the 1920s has also not been confirmed by the conflicts on the international arena that occurred later on, along the past more than 90 years: that one predicting a trend inexorably leading to "progressively diminishing Army and Navy and progressively increasing Air Forces" as a measure aimed at achieving a really decisive victory. Douhet wrote that in order "to ensure national defense is necessary and sufficient, in case of conflict, to place ourselves in a position enabling us to get a complete domination of the airspace", which is meaning that "the values of land forces and naval forces are about to decline if compared with those of the air forces"[23].

In connection with *this* assertion openly expressed by Douhet, we feel the need to make some potentially useful clarifications. When Germany attacked France in 1940, the quantitative ratio between the various components (or elements) of the military power of the Reich was clearly in favor of the land forces (and air forces were more than 4 times smaller, if we take into

account the size of military personnel resources). On May 10, 1940 Germany had altogether 157 Army (or land forces) divisions, with 4.2 million people. Air forces – which also included really massive air defense units (mainly anti-aircraft guns of all sorts) – had only about "one million"[24] people, which represented slightly less than 20% of all existing human resources in land forces and air forces put together.

In an more recent (and also relevant) conflict – the First Gulf War, which took place at the beginning of 1991 (as a reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) – the U.S. has deployed 279,000 soldiers in the ground forces (plus at least 200 heavy tanks, 2,300 other fighting vehicles and 2,000 artillery pieces); its Navy units had almost 90,000 people (crews of more than 108 vessels of all types); and the USAF had deployed only 46,000 soldiers (plus 1,200 aircraft and 1,500 helicopters)[25]. So that, if we compare the total manpower of all the three armed services which had deployed units to the Middle East in that context, the percentage represented by USAF is still quite low. The same situation can easily be identified, in the same conflict, when we are speaking about the British contingent (27,000 soldiers in the ground forces, plus 6,000 belonging to the Royal Navy, plus only around 2,000 soldiers in the RAF units deployed to the Persian Gulf[26]).

2. Comments on the airstrikes campaign of the West (and its regional allies in the Middle East) against the ISIL forces and positions in Iraq and Syria

Today, the very nature (or, more precisely, *some* key features) of the threat posed by the Islamic State (ISIL) makes *almost* impossible any repetition (or renewed version) of the *important* results obtained by means of using

---

[21] Michael Howard, *Războiul în istoria Europei*, Editura Sedona, Timişoara, 1997, p. 144.

[22] Frederick Taylor, *Dresda: Marţi, 13 februarie 1945*, RAO, 2007, Bucureşti, p. 504.

[23] G. Douhet, "Consecinţe externe", in Simion Pitea, Gheorghe Tudor, *op. cit.*, vol III, pp. 187-189.

[24] Karl-Heinz Frieser, *Mitul Blietzkrieg-ului: campania Wehrmacht-ului în Vest. 1940*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2010, pp. 58-59.

[25] *** Institutul de Istorie şi Teorie Militară, *Războiul din Golf: Studiu politico-militar*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1991, pp. 91-94.

[26] *Ibidem*, p. 95.

the air forces on some previous occasions. I am also emphasizing here that, of course, a *really effective* political-military formula would be one in which airstrikes are to be accompanied by a strong presence of Western ground troops ('boots on the ground'). But we already know that, even now, the U.S. – which is the *main* political and military power of the Western world – does not have the intention of sending to Syria and Iraq large numbers of ground combat units. This attitude is, as far as we know, an important topic of very intense political debates in the U.S., in the context of the 2016 Presidential elections.

With some more details, the situation was, in late autumn of 2015, as follows: on November 30, 2015, *CNN* was reporting, two of the most important leaders of the Republican Party in the U.S. have openly recommended an American military intervention with ground troops in Syria, both in order to defeat the Islamic State and in order to remove President Bashar Assad (whose criminal regime, let us remember this, is openly supported by the theocracy in Tehran and by Putin's Russia) from power.

The two political leaders we are speaking about are U.S. Senators John McCain (former Republican nominee in the 2008 Presidential elections) and Lindsey Graham. McCain, an Arizona senator, declared in an extremely popular televised broadcast: "It's very simple: We're going to fight them there or we're going to fight them here in Washington, D.C., or Phoenix, Arizona. And they are metastasizing". While visiting Irbil, in Iraq, Graham said on the same occasion: "I'm suggesting that we create a regional army to go into Syria because there's nobody left in Syria to destroy ISIL. And if we don't destroy ISIL in Syria they're going to hit the American homeland". Graham also said "that if the U.S. leads a regional force to fight ISIS in Syria and remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, it will find support from Arab leaders", *CNN* was reporting. Graham also stated the current king of Saudi Arabia had previously said, for example, speaking to McCain: "You can have our army, you just gotta deal with Assad". And the Emir of Qatar, Graham also stated, had said:

"I'll pay for the operation", with one condition: "But they're not going to just fight ISIL and let Damascus fall into the hands of the Iranians. Assad has to go". Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton – most likely the candidate of the Democrats for the November 2016 Presidential elections – said, on December 1, 2015 that she "cannot conceive" any situation that would really require the presence of American ground combat troops in Syria and Iraq, according to *ABC News*. She said that a US military presence in Syria might strongly backfire: "I think it gives ISIS a new recruitment tool if we get back into the fight". Therefore, she said, "we're not putting American combat troops back into Syria or Iraq. We are not going to do that". According to open sources, Hillary Clinton also wanted – and was publicly supporting – an increased cooperation with Russia, and also a postponement of any final decision regarding the fate of Assad. Finding out what Hillary Clinton had declared, Jeb Bush, who at that moment wanted – exactly like Graham – to get the support of the Republicans for the Presidential elections, has Tweeted an immediate response: "Hillary Clinton limiting ISIS attack options shows she'll continue Obama's containment. I have plan to defeat them"[27].

I was estimating at that moment, taking into account the statements quoted above, that most probably the set of topics connected to the fight against ISIL – and, in a broader and more general sense, connected to the geo-strategic role of the U.S. in the Greater Middle East – could 'overheat' even more the political confrontation, which was an already extremely tough one in the United States.

We know not only that at that very moment any U.S. intervention (or any intervention of other nations in the Western world) in the Middle East, with large numbers of ground troops was highly unlikely, but also that *the air forces used by the West, at least at that moment, against ISIL, were*

---

[27] For the opinions of significant Republicans and Democrats on ISIL see, for example, pieces of news at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/30/politics/john-mccain-lindsey-graham-isis-syria/ and also http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-opposed-us-combat-troops-iraq-syria/story?id=35506875

completely insufficient for defeating the Islamic State, and that the number of aircraft used in airstrikes was small or even very small. And that lack of really adequate military resources went on, even if any senior decision-maker in the West knew very well that ISIL was still controlling, in spite of some territorial losses, roughly half of the Syrian territory and about 35-40% of the Iraqi one. To offer just a few data vividly illustrating how limited were, at that moment, the air forces used against ISIL, let us remember that on November 16, 2015, the U.S. Air Force has launched a total of 23 airstrikes against targets and positions controlled by ISIL, both in Syria and in Iraq, according to a press release of the command structure called Combined Joint Task Force.

According to what we know from official sources, six of these airstrikes have severely damaged an oil and natural gas cracking plant near Abu Kamal, and also three other targets near the town of Dayr Az Zawr. Let us remember, in this context, that the oil extraction, processing and exports are one of the main permanent income sources of ISIL, and damaging or destroying oil facilities of all sorts, including some pipelines or storage facilities, could obviously mean that ISIL might be able to use only fewer financial resources in future aggressive actions of all kinds. On the same occasion, in Iraq, other U.S. airstrikes have strongly hit 17 different fortified positions, roads, ISIL tactical units, as well as a command post somewhere in the Sinjar region.

Also in November 2015, the French intensified the pace of their airstrikes against ISIL, but their contribution was also not a large one. Specifically, sources within the French Ministry of Defense said that on the night of November 16 to 17, 2015, French military planes bombed for the second time, just a day after the first mission of the same sort, a command center and a recruitment center for jihadists in of Raqqa, the main ISIL stronghold in Syria. The same sources also said these airstrikes have been directly ordered by the French President Francois Hollande.

According to several open sources, the French airstrike involved "10 fighter jets" previously deployed to airfields in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Jordan, and the U.S had also significantly intensified the intelligence sharing process, enabling in this way the French air forces to identify and hit ground targets more accurately than before[28]. We also know that when Great Britain decided to effectively join the quite large international coalition conducting airstrikes against ISIL targets, and also against the ISIL forces deployed in Syria, the contribution of London was also a *very* modest one. More specifically, on December 3, 2015, when Britain joined, too, the international coalition already fighting for more than a year against ISIL, only *a few* (six, most likely) British *Tornado* jets took off from the Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Akrotiri in Cyprus, immediately before dawn, just a few hours after the Parliament in London voted (397 votes for, and 223 against) to support the plan of Prime Minister Cameron to expand British airstrikes to Syria (until that moment, in early December 2015, some British combat aircraft have been used only in Iraq).

On that occasion, official sources were saying that British airstrikes have hit oilfields used by the Islamic State to financially support its actions, *Reuters* was reporting. Very senior officials in the Ministry of Defence in London also said "there are plenty more of these targets throughout eastern, northern Syria which we hope to be striking in the next few days and weeks". According to open sources, British authorities had the intention of deploying other 8 fighter jets to Cyprus, thus increasing the number of aircraft that can easily attack targets in Syria[29].

[28] For these U.S. and French airstrikes in mid-November 2015 see, for example, some *Reuters* pieces of news, on November 17, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/17/us-mideast-crisis-usa-airstrikes-idUSKCN0T61FI20151117#z W3QWCSVD8fZlqzu.97 and also at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/17/us-france-shooting-idUSKCN0T22IU20151117

[29] For the early stages of British airstrikes in Syria see *Reuters*, December 4, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-britain idUSKBN0TL00M20151204#o4325dlQg5mtUPfv.97

Conclusions some possible
Policy Recommendations

After exploring and reviewing all the elements listed along the previous pages, our conclusions are: firstly, in order to obtain *truly decisive* (or at least really important) results in the fight against ISIL, *the total number of combat aircraft used, and the total number of combat missions should noticeably increase (several times the current level, or maybe even a whole order of magnitude)*. On the other hand, given that most of the targets controlled by ISIL are *of totally different types* and with *different characteristics* if we compare them with targets to be usually found in a typical or traditional military conflict, it's hard to believe that any decisive results can be obtained, in strictly military terms and / or at the political-military level, without a really large military intervention of Western powers (and of their regional partners) with *ground* troops.

Taking into account what many open and some official sources are more or less clearly stating, it's quite easy to understand that the rather *insufficient* nature of the Western military effort against ISIL is based on two components that cannot be ignored: firstly, the preoccupation of the political elites of Western countries *to avoid substantial costs*; and secondly, political elites in Western countries are deliberately *avoiding some serious domestic political consequences* (public opinion – or the voters, in the end – is, in many occasions, animated by a set of rather peaceful attitudes, strongly rejecting war and military interventions; this very feature of the average voter/citizen in the Western world has already been *very* visible, for example, in the U.S., some years ago, when President Barack Obama came to power after eight years of Republican administration, *precisely* in a context in which most voters were deeply irritated by the inevitably large financial costs and military losses, directly triggered by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).

All these, put together, are showing with great clarity that the political elites of the Western world have now the elementary obligation – in terms of defense and security, at continental and hemispheric levels – to reinforce their own political will, and to persuade the public opinion that in the end, *it's cheaper and more effective to fight with sufficient means against ISIL* (by means of truly massive air bombing, and by means of using a substantial amount of ground troops), than hoping that clearly insufficient efforts could ever produce decisive results. *More specifically, the West must learn again that victory is possible, but that it requires a lot of political will, and also large costs*.

But, in our opinion, any costs are actually much smaller than a situation in which the West might be confronted with unacceptably low security levels. Not acting decisively, in a massive and swift way against the very large destructive and destabilizing potential ISIL has is, we think, an attitude with potential consequences *at least* as serious as what we are usually calling, when we refer to the so challenging interwar period (the 1920s and the 1930s), by means of using the concept of *appeasement*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. *ABCNews*, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-opposed-us-combat-troops-iraq-syria/story?id=35506875.
2. *CNN*, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/30/politics/john-mccain-lindsey-graham-isis-syria/ .
3. DOUHET, G., "Noi mijloace tehnice", in PITEA, Simion; TUDOR, Gheorghe, *Pagini din gândirea militară universală*, vol. III, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1988.
4. FRANCE, John, *Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power*, Yale University Press, 2011.
5. GILBERT, Martin, *The Second World War: A complete history*, Henry Holt and Company , New York, 1989.
6. HOWARD, Michael, *Războiul în istoria Europei*, Editura Sedona, Timişoara, 1997.
7. FRIESER, Karl-Heinz, *Mitul Blietzkrieg-ului: campania Wehrmacht-ului în Vest. 1940*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2010.
8. WIGHT, Martin, *Politica de putere*, Editura Arc, Chişinău, 1998.
9. TAYLOR, Frederick, *Dresda: Marţi, 13 februarie 1945*, RAO, 2007, Bucureşti.

10. *Reuters*, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/17/us-france-shooting-idUSKCN0T22IU20151117; http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-britain-idUS KBN0TL00M20151204#o4325dlQg5mtUPfv.97

11. ***, Institutul de Istorie şi Teorie Militară, *Războiul din Golf: Studiu politico-militar*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1991.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM AND EFFECTS ON REGIONAL SECURITY

Mirela ATANASIU, PhD*

Islamist terrorism is the most popular and widespread form of manifestation of religious terrorism. This type of terrorism is proliferated with increasing aggressiveness by fundamentalist Islamic entities, which places it among the major threats to security and stability throughout the world. Its effects are visible in particular in the Middle East, where take place systemic crisis, but lately these attacks specific to Islamist terrorism occurred increasingly frequently in European countries with established democracies, like France or Belgium, which arouses concern about the future of European security.

In the present paper, we want to present a blueprint of the current developments in Islamist terrorism and some effects in the regional security plan of the states of the Middle East and Europe.

Keywords: *Islamist terrorism, Middle East, threat, security, Europe, ISIL, Al-Qaeda.*

Introduction

The most popular and widespread form of manifestation of religious terrorism is the fundamentalist Islamic, underlying the conduct of many conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, between Shia and Sunni in Maghreb, Middle East and Near East[1], between Russia and Dagestan or

Chechnya, between Serbs and Muslim Bosnian or Kosovar Albanians.

Regardless of the organizations that proliferate it, by its fundamentalist religion essence that makes it attractive to the followers, its atypical forms of manifestation and level of aggression shown by this type of terrorism is not only a "public danger"[2], but also a major threat to national security and regional and international stability.

1. Islam, Islamism and Islamist terrorism

Islam is a monotheistic religion that conveys "the acceptance of and obedience to the teachings of God (Allah) revealed to Prophet Mohammed"[3], which is governed by its own code of laws and standards of behaviour, the followers who support and follow the laws of Islam calling themselves Muslims.

---

[1] Over time, the dispute between Shiites and Sunnis sparked bloody fratricide. Theological dispute between them is based on the fact that the Sunnis are directly following the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed, unrecognizing the mediation offered by clerics, and Shiites who recognize Ali as the first successor to the Prophet and awaits the coming of the Mahdi (Messiah). See largely: http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/islam-conflictul-interconfesional-povestea-farasfarsit-1_520f634bc7b855ff56e73980/index.html, accessed on 12.02.2016.

[2] Cf. Art. 1, *Law no. 535 on the prevention and combating terrorism* (in Romanian: Legea nr. 535 din 2004 privind prevenirea şi combaterea terorismului), published in Official Gazette no. 1161 on December 8, 2004.

[3] I. A. Ibrahim, *A brief Illustrated Guide to Understand Islam,* Second edition, Darussalam, Publishers and Distributors, Houston, Texas, USA, 1997, p. 45.

* Mirela ATANASIU, PhD is Researcher within the Center for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. Email: atanasiu.mirela@unap.ro

Muslims believe that Allah revealed by the prophets his laws in various historical stages of mankind, therefore supports, in addition to *Quran* - considered to be the perfection of the whole sacred teachings (as Islam is considered the religion which perfects all other religions)[4] -, and other scriptures such as the *Torah of Moses*, the *Psalms of David* and the *Evangel of Jesus*, although it considers impure and distorted, even inferior[5].

Islamism is an ideology that requires full adherence of man to the law of Islam and rejects outside influence, with some exceptions (such as access to medical and military technology). Islam manifests a deep antagonism toward non-Muslims and expresses a special hostility to the West[6]. It offers a mean of approach and control of state power to lead society and to shape the individual, constituting a direct result, but also a vehicle of conversion for the Muslim world.

To support our earlier statement is the logical finding that Islamism became a political force that leads governments by the means of Islamic law in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Sudan, and was therefore called political Islam, framing Islam as a whole, as, "rather political ideology than religion"[7]. Also, for the Islamists[8] "Islam is a faith that has a say in the way in which politics and society must be organized and in the way in which Muslim world should work in the contemporary period"[9].

On the idea of violence (namely the kind manifested by terrorism), there are two contradictory statements, generating controversy even among Muslims. On the one hand, in the Quran, Islam affirms as "a religion of mercy, which does not permit terrorism"[10]. On the other hand, Islamism by the Islamic law (*Sharia*) states that "Muslims deserve to dominate because their way of life is superior"[11], and states that do not follow Sharia, whether they belong to the Muslim world or the West, and put man above God in their legislative and social policies, should either be converted or destroyed.

From our point of view, religions cannot be compared in this way, as neither cultures can be compared, we cannot say that one is better than another, which shows once again that Islamism is more than Islam, it does not only pursue goals of the faith itself (total submission to Allah by the followers) but also affecting other faiths and Islamization of their followers, whether the means used to this end are violent, and the process occurs by force.

Islamism conveys the idea that "Islamic law should be determined by *Jihad* (holy war), which may include terror and terrorist acts, towards which every Muslim must be ready to sacrifice"[12]. Moreover, from different paragraphs[13] of the

---

[4] Lajna Imaillah, *Pathway to Paradise. A Guidebook to Islam*, Lajna Imaillah, USA, 1996, available online at: https://www.alislam.org/books/pathwaytoparadise/LAJ-chp1.htm, accessed on 08.03.2016.

[5] The Quran (*Coranul* in Romanian), pp. 177, 347, 812, available online at: http://ar.islamway.net/SF/quran/data/ The_Holy_Quran_Romanian.pdf, accessed on 24.03.2016.

[6] Daniel Pipes, *Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism,* Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 30, 1998, available online at: http://www.danielpipes.org/954/distinguishing-between-islam-and-islamism, accessed on 09.03.2016.

[7] See: Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World,* University of Michigan Press, USA, 2008, p. 2.

[8] In the context of differentiating between Islam and Islamism, we believe that the expression should be taken into account and the separation in the terms used when referring to followers of religion and ideology, respectively Muslims and Islamists.

[9] Mohammed Ayoob, *op. cit.*

[10] I. A. Ibrahim*, op. cit., p.* 59.

[11] Ami Isserof, „Islamism" in *Encyclopedia of the Middle East*, December 20, 2008, available online at: http://www. mideastweb.org/ Middle-East- Encyclopedia/islamism. htm, accessed on 10.03.2016.

[12] Ibidem.

[13] For example, in the Quran translated into English by prof. Shehnaz Shaikh and Kausar Khatri, *The Glorious Quran Word-for-Word Translation to facilitate learning of Quranic Arabic,* available online at: https://ia800800.us.archive.org/12/items/TheGloriousQuranWordToWordTranslationInEnglish/TheGloriousQuran.pdf, the following paragraphs appear: "*To him (Allah, author's note) belong all of heaven and earth. Allah is the greatest, most praiseworthy"* (p. 16, para. 29); "Do not you know that to Allah belong the kingdom of heaven and earth? And that besides Allah you have no protector or helper?" (p. 31, para. 107); "To him belongs all that is in heaven and on earth. All are his humble listeners" (p. 33, para. 116).

Koran was created an entire Islamist doctrine whose core idea is world domination by Islam. Therefore, we believe that Islamism has fundamentalist and radical nature, promoting terrorism as a means of achieving the ultimate goal of the acceptance of Islamic law in a global Islamic state.

Simplistically, terrorism is the mode of manifestation of an organization seeking to obtain political goals and strengthening its image and structure by the use of violence and inducing fear among masses of large populations, which makes it tempting to use for members of Islamist organizations and which, amid Islamist ideology, gains notoriety, increasing its success rate in gathering followers.

Islamist terrorism combines Islam and policy and is a means of coercion to eliminate or converte "infidels" (*Kuffar*)[14] used in the context of waging jihad (holy war). Its promoters are Islamist radicals (*jihadists*) who find it "morally" and "legitimately" justified by Islamism ideology based on circumstantial interpretation of Islam's religious precepts taken out of context or "adjusted" to serve political purposes.

Thus, this type of terrorism, by extrapolation from those already presented, is a violent form of manifestation of some Islamist fundamentalist groups pursuing final political goal – the imposition by force and terror of Islam –, as unique religion and Islamism ideology worldwide.

2. The spread of Islam religion and internationalization of Islamic terrorism

Religions spread throughout the world have shaped cultures, nations, peoples and populations, geographical regions and international relations, on their behalf countless conflicts taking place.

In a study of the *Pew Research Centre* there is shown that, in 2010, Christianity was the most widespread religion in the world, with an estimated 2.2 billion followers, almost a third (31%) of 6.9 billion people on Earth. Islam was ranked second, with 1.6 billion followers, representing 23% of the world population. For 2050, it is estimated that the number of Muslims will equal that of Christians around the globe[15].

In the same study, it is estimated that the European continent will be the only one in the world to record a decline in total population, Muslims reaching to 10% of the whole European population[16], and, at the time of the survey pursued by specialists of Pew Research Centre, the accelerated exodus of large masses of ethnic Muslims toward the old continent was not taken into account, which could radically change the religious structure of Europe's future.

Broadly, the concept of "international terrorism" is agreed to imply the disruption of citizens from several countries, therefore, has transnational nature and is defined by extrapolating the concept of "domestic terrorism" considered as originating and proceeding within the political systems of certain states.

After US 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western perception underwent a change in the domestic-international dichotomy, acknowledging the fact that physical borders cannot be landmarks in the delineation and definition of terrorism[17]. On the same occasion, international terrorism is associated with Islamist terrorism promoted by Al-Qaeda.

---

[14] Robert Spencer, Director of Jihad Watch, the author of the book „The Complete Infidels' Guide to the Koran" identifies in an interview that "infidels are considered the polytheists and part of and Hebrew and Christians". See: Jamie Glazov, *The Complete Infidel's Guide to the Koran, Robert Spencer's new book delivers a chilling warning call,* October 6, 2009, available online at: http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/25251/complete-infidels-guide-koran-jamie-glazov-jamie-glazov, accessed on 10.03.2016.

[15] *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050,* Pew Research Centre, 2015, p. 7.

[16] *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050. Why Muslims Are Rising Fastest and the Unaffiliated Are Shrinking as a Share of the World's Population*, April 2, 2015, available online at: http://www.pewforum.org/ 2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/, accessed on 22.03.2016.

[17] Devyani Srivastava, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, *Book Review Theorizing Transnational Terrorism,* edited by Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova, New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2009, available online at: http://www.ipcs.org/books-review/terrorism/terrorism-patterns-of-internationalization-250.html, accessed on 28.03.2016.

After the attacks on the *World Trade Centre* in 2001, triggering the fight of antiterrorist coalition led by the US, a series of terrorist acts have held known to be initiated by jihadists Islamists – (especially members of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State group) or Western followers of those – on civilian targets in transit or target countries for immigrants coming mainly from failed states ravaged by civil wars of the Middle East.

In 2010, in the *Pew Research Centre* study already mentioned, it is shown that most European states had Muslim communities in their territories, the largest being found in Germany and France (each with about five million ethnic). Muslim minorities representing approximately 5% of the indigenous peoples were also in the United Kingdom (about 3 million people), Italy (about 2.2 million), Bulgaria (about 1 million), Netherlands (about 1 million), Spain (about 1 million), Belgium and Greece (about 600,000 people each), Austria and Sweden (about 450,000). As for Romania, it was home to 70,000 ethnic Muslims, representing 0.3% of the population[18]. The origin of Muslim ethnic with citizenship in European countries was priory from Turkey, Kosovo, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia.

In 2015, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq were major sources of immigrants to Europe (over 80%[19]), and countries that received most asylum applications were Germany, Sweden, Hungary, France, Italy and Austria[20]. Thus, Germany has received more than 1.1 million asylum seekers in 2015 and hundreds of thousands of immigrants were on route to Germany and the Nordic countries, crossing Hungary, Croatia, Austria, Serbia or other routes. Also, between 2,000 and 5,000 immigrants were camped in the French port

of Calais, with UK as final destination[21]. Later in September 2015, EU interior ministers approved a plan to relocate 120,000 immigrants[22] across the continent in the next two years, assigning mandatory quotas also to some countries such as Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

In a study of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted in 2003, it was noted that "international terrorism is, given its cross-border dimensions, a problem created by migration"[23]. Multiplying of terrorist acts in countries hosting immigrants have only served to reinforce this idea. Among the most violent terror attacks after 9/11 on the European continent were: Madrid - March 11, 2004, London - July 7, 2005, Paris - November 2, 2011, Toulouse - March 2012, London - May 22, 2013, Brussels - 24 May 2014 Paris - January 7, 2015, Turkey - July 20, 2015, Turkey - October 10, 2015, Paris - November 13, 2015, Brussels - March 22, 2016, all claimed by Islamist terrorist organizations. As a result, migration of large groups of Muslims to the West sparks concern among security and international relations specialists, given that the phenomenon catalyses the trend of terrorism internationalization, with predilection the Islamic type.

Islamist terrorist organizations operate all over the world, while in Asia, Africa and, in particular, in the Middle East are regions which host most of them and have a high number of ethnic Muslims (hence a broad base of recruitment of potential followers)[24]. US and

---

[18] Conrad Hackett, *5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe*, November 17, 2015, available online at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/, accessed on 20.03.2016.

[19] *Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?*, March 3, 2016, available online at: http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-24583286, accessed on 22.03.2016.

[20] *Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts,* March 4, 2016, available online at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911, accessed on 23.03.2016.

[21] *Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?*, art. cit.

[22] *Annex. European schemes for relocation and resettlement,* 2015, available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_ european_agenda_on_migration_ annex_en.pdf, accessed on 29.03.2016.

[23] *International Terrorism and Migration,* International Organization of Migration, June 2003, p. 2, available online at: https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/tcm/Int_terrorism_migration.pdf, accessed on 21.03.2016.

[24] According to Constitutional Rights Foundation, Islam is the religion of more than 80% of the population in North Africa, Middle East and Central Asia. See: *Islamist Terrorism*

Europe have on their territories a number of terrorist organizations, but not because of them suffer most, but because of attacks organized from the traditional regions of Islamist terrorism (i.e. Middle East and North Africa) by terrorist networks that internationalized and have the necessary resources to support attacks in Western countries.

So, some of the Islamist terrorist organizations operate in smaller areas, with timely goals. The most popular groups in this category are as follows:

• *Hezbollah* (active in Lebanon and Iran), political party including on its agenda the destruction of Israel and the elimination of Western intervention in the Middle East[25];

• *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad* acting in the occupied Israeli territories;

• *Taliban* (Afghanistan) aiming to overthrow the government in power;

Pakistan);

• *Boko Haram* (Nigeria).

Besides, there are transnational terrorist networks with more ambitious goals, pursuing global jihad and implementing Islamic ideology on large territories across national boundaries; some examples are:

• *Muslim Brothers* organization (*Hamas* is recognized as a wing of it - acts in Egypt, Syria, the occupied Palestinian territories, etc.);

• *Al-Qaeda*[26] and

• The newest and fervent terrorist organization of the momentum, the self-proclaimed *Islamic State* (based in the Middle East but with sympathizers and recruits in the Western states as well).

As regards Al-Qaeda, in 2013, BBC published an article in which were showed the major regions in which that Islamist terrorist organization acted at that time (see Figure 1), namely the Arabian

Figure no. 1: Map of Al-Qaida extent in the world[27]

• *Tamil Tigers* (Sri Lanka), *PKK* (Turkey, Iraq);

• *Armed Islamic Group* (Algeria), *Tehrik-i-Taliban* (activating to the Afghani border to

Peninsula, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Syria,

From 1945 to the Rise of ISIS, SUA, 2016, available online at: http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/islamist-terrorism-from-1945-to-the-death-of-osama-bin-laden.html, accessed on 19.02.2016.

[25] Anghel Andreescu, Nicolae Radu, *Organizaţiile teroriste Conceptualizarea terorii vs securitatea europeană*, Bucureşti, Editura MIRA, 2008, p. 101.

[26] Al Qaeda aims to rid the Muslim world of Western influence, destroy Israel and establish an Islamic caliphate that would stretch from Spain to Indonesia, space on which to enforce Sunni Sharia law. See: *Mapping Militant Organizations. Al Qaeda*, Stanford University, 2016, available online at: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21, accessed on 15.02.2016.

[27] *Al-Qaeda around the world,* August 5, 2013, available online at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-13296443

East Africa, North Africa and Western Europe – United Kingdom, Germany, Spain – , and Asia-Pacific region.

Later, in 2016, a study achieved by a group of experts from Stanford University confirms that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have terrorist bases in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, Mali, Libya, Niger, Tunisia, Morocco and Nigeria[28].

While daily newspapers as *Express* in the UK[29] showed that, in 2015, the terrorist organization Islamic State (or affiliated groups) controlled a number of regions in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria, had influence in Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon, with potentially worsening situation in various other countries (Russia, Bosnia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia), in March 2016, sources like *Foreign Policy*[30] or *IHS Jane's 360*[31] show that, although in 2014, ISIS controlled a third of Iraqi and Syrian territories, in the current year, it has lost control of 22% of the occupied territories.

This leads us to believe that the evolution of terrorist organizations tends to be exaggerated by the mass-media on the background of negative psychological effects experienced by the affected population, particularly in European countries that have suffered major trauma, such as Spain, the UK, France or Belgium. At the same time, we believe that monitoring trends of such expansion is more than necessary.

---

[28] *Mapping Militant Organizations. Al Qaeda*, Stanford University, 2016, available online at: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21, accessed on 15.02.2016.

[29] Tom Batchelor, Levi Winchester, *Mapped: Terrifying growth of ISIS in just ONE year...and how Asia & Russia is next target,* available online at: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/598626/Islamic-State-map-areas-terror-group-control, accessed on 03.03.2016.

[30] Henry Johnson, *Mapped: The Islamic State Is Losing Its Territory – and Fast,* March 16, 2016, available online at:http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/, accessed on 16.03.2016.

[31] *Islamic State loses 22 per cent of territory,* March 16, 2016, available online at: http://www.janes.com/article/58831/islamic-state-loses-22-per-cent-of-territory, accessed on 16.03.2016.

3. "Islamic State" terrorist organization

Founder of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) group is considered to be Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who formed Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004, an organization use brutal methods which have alienated many leaders Al-Qaeda[32]. Subsequently, the group claimed responsibility for a number of acts of violence in which civilians were indiscriminately killed in bombings and soldiers were tortured and executed with extreme cruelty.

About three years after Saddam was captured by US forces, al-Zarqawi was killed in US air strikes on Iraq in 2006. Subsequently, AQI leadership was taken over by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who gave to the group the name of *Islamic State.*

This group, consisting therefore a branch of Sunni jihadist Al-Qaeda, was distinguished by its ideology, which combines two of the most powerful ideas of Islam, *the return of the Islamic empire* and *the end of the world,* that shapes the strategy and inspire their own army. Islamic State group promotes religious extremism, anti-Western attitude and the use of violence in all its forms. The group aims to create an Islamic state governed by Islamic law - Sharia -, in the region that includes Iraq, Syria and the entire Levant[33]. The main point of difference between the terrorist organization Islamic State and other Islamic militant groups such as Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, was that the group has targeted Shiite community using violent tactics similar to the ones used against government and external alleged enemies.

Islamic State group is one of the most lethal groups of jihadists in modern history, surpassing even Al-Qaeda, thousands of its followers are in

---

[32] Dion Dassanayake, *Islamic State: What is IS and why are they so violent?,* February 17, 2015, available online at: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/558078/Islamic-State-IS-what-is-ISIS-why-are-ISIL-so-violent, accessed on 03.03.2016.

[33] Information about the book of Joseph Spark, *ISIS Taking over the Middle East,* 2014, available online at: http://fox.kinolover.com/top100ebooks/54243-isis-taking-over-the-middle-east-lights-out-book-pdf.html, accessed on 03.03.2016.

Syria and Iraq, and in other geographic areas of Europe, Asia or Africa. The used methods include beheadings and mass killings led to terrorize millions of individuals, mainly in the MENA region, but several thousand followers of this organization spreads terror in the West as well.

The Islamic State group, unlike other terrorist groups, has developed deep roots in the Middle East, Maghreb, Turkey and Western Europe, where it recruited several thousand jihadists. In this regard, experts of Carnegie Institute state that "The largest jihadists contingents come from the Middle East (5,800), the countries of the Maghreb (5,300), the EU (between 2,600 and

and means of financing, the ability of recruiting followers, equipment owned, military training and terrorists motivation, as well as their capabilities of operations are much more sophisticated than any other similar groups that West faced so far.

4. Effects of Islamist terrorism on international security

The Religion of Peace[35] website shows that, across the globe, only during 2015, actions of Islamist terrorists recorded 2,858 attacks in 53 countries, in which 27,588 people were killed and 26,136 injured[37]. The source states that, at

Table 1: Situation of Islamist terrorist attacks in-between January 2001- March 2016[36]

Year	Number of attacks	Number of state targeted by attacks	Killed people	Injured people	Observations
2001	177	13	3,537	3,561	
2002	667	24	2,849	6,055	
2003	870	33	3,273	6,772	
2004	1,115	38	7,166	14,574	
2005	1,845	38	7,625	12,855	
2006	2,779	43	15,245	19,496	
2007	**3,096**	46	20,478	27,317	
2008	2,212	42	10,798	18,088	
2009	2,131	40	9,176	18,612	
2010	2,023	48	9,233	17,461	
2011	1,986	**58**	9,086	16,921	
2012	2,480	57	11,546	20,254	
2013	2,821	50	16,774	**29,577**	
2014	3,001	55	**32,863**	27,522	
2015	2,859	53	27,594	26,145	
2016	493	39	5,170	6,803	January, February and March
Total on 28.03.2016	**30.555** (from which in 28.042 were recorded killed people)		192,413	283,329	

3,000) and Turkey (somewhere between 400 and 1,000)" [34], warning, also that, perhaps, figures reported by official are substantially higher. Also, the latest attacks on Europe showed that the current strategy, including the military one of the Islamic State group, their way of organization

---

[34] Marc Pierini, *The European Union Must Face the Islamic State*, October 2, 2014, available online at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=56821, accessed on 25.03.2016.

---

[35] The *Religion of Peace* website affirms to be pluralist, non-partisan, preoccupied by political and religious teaching of Islam. See: http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/pages/site/about-site.aspx, accessed on 24.03.2016.

[36] The data are taken from the Religion of Peace website, available at: http://www.thereligionofpeace.com.

[37] *List of Islamic Terror: 2015,* 2016, available online at:http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/attacks/attacks.aspx?Yr =2015, accessed on 22.03.2016.

the time of 9/11 in the US in 2001, a total of 28,042 violent terrorist attacks[38] were recorded and claimed by Islamist organizations. Based on data taken from the same source, we present the evolution of Islamist terrorist activity to identify some trends shown by developed indicators, such: number of armed attacks, number of states across which attacks occurred, the number of killed people and the number of injured people (see Table 1).

From the acts committed in this period, most were aimed at targets in areas traditionally affected by radical Islamist terrorism (Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Israel, etc.). In 2007, there were perpetrated the most Islamist terrorist attacks (3,096), values close to the maximum being observed since 2013. Another observation is that the number of dead and wounded rose sharply in 2013-2015, and for 2016 forecasts are equally bleak. Only in the first quarter of this year there already occurred terrorist attacks in 39 countries in the world, with numerous victims.

Middle East terrorist incidents have repeatedly drawn the states of the region in systemic crisis. For example, in 2015, Syria[39] joined the ranks of failed states that do not have an effective central authority over the entire national territory, as evidenced by the critical worsening registered to political, social and economic indicators considered to the achievement of Fragile States Index[40], and Iraq was in this position since previous years. Amid boosting conflicts, humanitarian crises and political fragmentation, is pursuing a remodelling of the entire region.

As a result, changes announce in the manner of regional security approach once with the Arab League's decision to build its own collective security architecture. In this regard, in January 2015, the establishment of a Joint Arab Force (Joint Arab Force – JAF) rapid intervention to combat terrorism was proposed and beyond it[41]. In fact, JAF wishes to be a similar NATO structure, including 40,000 soldiers[42] from various types of forces and carry out missions of rapid military intervention and other military tasks by which to counter challenges on the security of Arab League member states.

After the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, Islamic extremists coming from the Middle East began to consistently act outside their region of origin, boldly attacking high-profile targets, killing indiscriminately, thus, increasingly terrorist actions were registered in Western Europe in democratic countries, many of them active in the anti-terrorist coalition.

The hardest hits by the scourge of Islamic extremist terrorist were supported by: United Kingdom (37 attacks of this kind), France (32), Germany (14), Belgium (8) and Denmark (5) (See details in table below). Kosovo (13), however, is a special case given its historical background, its unstable political regime and amalgam of religions in the region, which does not include it among the targets of future organizations like Al-Qaeda or Islamic State, because is not a direct enemy, as was repeatedly stated by the respective organizations; they are not regarded as developed Western countries that initiated anti-terrorist campaigns and raids in Syria, for example.

In the first period of our analysis, most violent acts in European (especially Western) countries were executed by Muslim radicals, acts consisting in disparate and punctual incidents motivated, primarily, by the desire to "wash the honour of a family" following an incompliance with the rules of Islam by some members of Islamic communities (women who wanted to divorce, inadequate clothing, alcohol consumption, etc.) or the renouncement from the respective religion and racist acts of revenge on individuals followers of other religious cults.

---

[38] *Islamic Terrorists,* see: http://www.thereligionof-peace.com/pages/site/about-site.aspxIdem, accessed on 24.03.2016.

[39] *Fragile States Index 2015,* The Fund for Peace, Washington DC, USA, p. 11, available online at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf, accessed on 21.03.2016.

[40] Fragile States Index is realized by the Fund for Peace, an independent organization, based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators established by a group of social scientists.

[41] Florence Gaub, *Stuck in the barracks: the Joint Arab Force,* Brief 31/2015, EU Institute of Strategic Studies, October 2015, p. 1.

[42] Ibidem.

[43] The data are taken from the Religion of Peace website, available at: http://www.thereligionofpeace.com˙

Table 2: Situation of Islamist terrorist attacks on European countries during January 2001-March 2016[43]

An	Number of attacks in the European states																		
	UK	France	Belgium	Holland	Spain	Sweden	Denmark	Germany	Italia	Switzerland	Norway	Austria	Azerbaijan	Bulgaria	Ukraine	Bosnia	Georgia	Kosovo	Macedonia
2001	1																		
2002	1																		
2003	2	1																1	
2004	4		1	1	2													4	
2005	3	1					1	1	1									1	
2006	1	1																3	
2007	4																		1
2008	5	1					1	2										1	
2009	3	1	3					2											
2010	4	2						2		1			1		1		1	1	
2011	1							1		1			1	1				1	
2012	2	6	2			1		2			1		1		1		1	1	1
2013	3	1		1			1	1											
2014	1	2	1													1	1		
2015	1	15					2	2	2			1				1			1
2016	1	1	2					1											
Total	37	32	8	2	2	2	5	14	3	2	1	1	3	1	2	2	3	13	3

Subsequently, the types of Islamist terrorist acts multiplied and became more frequent, gaining paroxysmal features and violence began to be applied by increasingly organized groups, with sophisticated armed means and increasingly more casualties recorded. The terrorist organization Islamic State uses increasingly more recruits or extremists who are citizens of those states (such as those from Europe), therefore with freedom of movement throughout the EU and beyond. They were the base of terrorist cell that initiated bloody attacks on citizens of their adoptive states, as demonstrated by investigations conducted in the wake of fairly recent tragic events in France and Belgium.

Support networks that these terrorist groups are building within European states for fundraising, recruitment and propaganda activities could become an increasingly dangerous element and a base for terrorist attacks on European soil. The more dangerous potential prove to be terrorists adopted by Western societies, as opposed to cells shipped from the Middle East, they know much better how to increase the capacity of hitting and casualties studying vulnerabilities of their adoptive societies.

Terrorist acts proliferated in recent years (2013 - March 2016) show that the trend is for multiplication and diversification of the modes of operation of Islamic terrorists. In addition, radical Islamist groups have multiplied in the Muslim world[44] and among Muslim immigrants in the West[45].

---

[44] US Defense Department shows that only in-between 2014 - March 2016, there were created 8 new Islamist terrorist organization. See details at: *Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, available online at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ des/123085.htm, accessed on 29.03.2016.

[45] See Caroline May, *More than 30 Immigrants Admitted to the U.S. Recently Implicated in Terrorism,* http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/12/15/30-immigrants-admitted-u-s-recently-implicated-terrorism/; Wallid Shoebat, *BREAKING: 400 More ISIS Terrorist Infiltrated Europe. Trump Was Right. Learn Why It Is Impossible To Stop The Bombings Unless We Ban Muslim Immigration Completely*, March 23, 2016, available online at: http://shoebat.com/2016/03/23/breaking-400-more-isis-terrorist-infiltrated-europe-trump-was-right-learn-why-it-is-impossible-to-stop-the-bombings-unless-we-ban-muslim-immigration-completely/; Liam Stack, Palko Karasz, *How Belgium Became Home to Recent Terror Plots*, March 23, 2016, available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/ 11/15/world/europe/belgium-terrorism-suspects.html?_r=0, accessed on 29.03.2016.

We believe that one of the urgent measures to be taken by EU Member States is changing the laws on immigration in order to improve internal security. In this regard, expulsion procedures should be simplified, applications for asylum should be analysed quickly and decisively, and visas should be denied to members of groups who use or support terrorism and terrorists and, on the other part, the criminal penalties related to false documents (visa, passport, etc.) should be tightened.

Conclusions

Islam is a religion with its own code of conduct, to be followed by its Muslim true believers. Islamism is an ideology that uses Islamic religious texts, most often taken out of context, to achieve a political purpose. So, Islamism is grounded in Islam, but has nuances that exceed the limits set by religious teachings, due to its politicization.

On the one hand, in its most restricted sense, terrorism is a means of achieving political ends through terror; on the other hand, Islamism has also outlined a supreme political purpose - to convert the "infidels" and punish those who oppose - for which purpose its followers does not hesitate to use violence and terror.

Islamist terrorism is a manifestation of jihad as an instrument for the widest imposing of Islamist ideology that circulates the idea of Islam supremacy over other religions and of traditional Islamic society on other civilizations, predominantly the Western, which it perceives as its antagonist.

The Islamic State group represents the most serious jihadist threat post-Al-Qaeda against the regional security, by the fact that it meets some elements that coalesce as an organization: it is a pseudo-state with its own army, it has access to finance, it has logistical capacity and it sets administrative and economic structures, it holds an ideology based on an extended religion and an ability to launch and inspire mass terrorist attacks anywhere in the world.

Fervency of the self-proclaimed terrorist

group ISIL (Islamic State) threw the Middle East deeper into turbulence, confusion, instability and sectarian violence. The group dramatically altered the political and security landscape of the region and the entire international community, especially Westerners by actions (genocide, beheadings, anti-Semitism, crimes against humanity, etc.) far exceeding legal limits of international law, infringing fundamental human rights and the integrity and sovereignty of states of law.

In the current geopolitical context, the threat of Islamist terrorism in the EU is influenced to some extent by developments in conflict zones and in politically unstable countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. At the same time, the EU is used as a platform for preparing and initiating terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world.

However, by the fact that ISIL is a common enemy for all international actors and regional players who want to limit or cancel its actions and effects are built cooperative relationships between partners, outside this framework, have antagonistic interests. One of these examples is that, after successive interventions in Syria - a coalition made up of five EU member states (France, UK, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands) and the US leading an air campaign against ISIL, and Russia – which did not bring pacification to the Syrian state, in 30 October 2015, the foreign ministers of the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey met in Vienna to discuss the definition of a common political settlement of the Syrian crisis. Moreover, Iran has accepted the invitation of Russia agreed also by the US to participate in round of talks to resolve the Syrian crisis, which is the start of formal negotiations wherein participating US and Iran on issues different of nuclear topic. Despite their efforts, a cease-fire in Syria signed between the warring parties (except the State Islamic, al-Nusra and other groups regarded as terrorist organizations) was hardly signed to be implemented since February 29, 2016. Subsequently, in March 2016, the Russian defence minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry met in Moscow,

during which they agreed to take immediate steps to strengthen the ceasefire and to stop the belligerent attempts of the parties.

Signing an armistice and ending the war in Syria will limit the humanitarian crisis in the region and diminish the flow of immigrants from the Middle East, which will be an improvement of the situation not only regionally, but also the international security.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. *Law no. 535 on the prevention and combating terrorism* (in Romanian: Legea nr. 535 din 2004 privind prevenirea şi combaterea terorismului), published in Official Gazette no. 1161 on December 8, 2004.

2. IBRAHIM, I. A., *A brief Illustrated Guide to Understand Islam*, Second edition, Darussalam, Publishers and Distributors, Houston, Texas, USA, 1997.

3. Lajna IMAILLAH, *Pathway to Paradise. A Guidebook to Islam*, Lajna Imaillah, USA, 1996.

4. The Quran (*Coranul)*, http://ar.islamway. net/SF/quran/data/ The_Holy_Quran_Romanian. pdf.

5. PIPES, Daniel, *Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 30, 1998.

6. AYOOB, Mohammed, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World,* University of Michigan Press, USA, 2008.

7. ISSEROF, Ami, "Islamism" in *Encyclopaedia of the Middle East*, December 20, 2008, http://www.mideastweb.org/Middle-East-Encyclopedia/islamism.htm.

8. Glazov, Jamie, *The Complete Infidel's Guide to the Koran, Robert Spencer's new book delivers a chilling warning call*, October 6, 2009, http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/ 25251/ complete-infidels-guide-koran-jamie-glazov-jamie-glazov.

9. *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050*, Pew Research Centre, 2015.

10. *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050. Why Muslims Are Rising Fastest and the Unaffiliated Are Shrinking as a Share of the World's Population,* April 2, 2015.

11. Devyani Srivastava, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, *Book Review Theorizing Transnational Terrorism,* edited by Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova, New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2009.

12. *Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?,* March 3, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-24583286.

13. *Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts,* 4 March 2016, http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.

14. *Annex. European schemes for relocation and resettlement,* 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/ docs/communication_on_the_european_ agenda_on_migration_annex_en.pdf.

15. *International Terrorism and Migration,* June 2003, International Organization of Migration, https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/ site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/ activities/tcm/ Int_terrorism_migration.pdf.

16. BATCHELOR, Tom; WINCHESTER, Levi, *Mapped: Terrifying growth of ISIS in just ONE year... and how Asia & Russia is next target,* http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/598626/ Islamic-State-map-areas-terror-group-control.

17. DASSANAYAKE, Dion, *Islamic State: What is IS and why are they so violent?,* February 17, 2015, http://www.express.co.uk/news/ world/558078/Islamic-State-IS-what-is-ISIS-why-are-ISIL-so-violent.

18. PIERINI, Marc, *The European Union Must Face the Islamic State*, October 2, 2014, http:// carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=56821.

19. Official site of *Religion of Peace,* http:// www.thereligionofpeace.com.

20. *Fragile States Index 2015, The Fund for Peace,* Washington DC, USA, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf.

21. GAUB, Florence, *Stuck in the barracks: the Joint Arab Force,* Brief 31/2015, EU Institute of Strategic Studies, October 2015.

22. Official site of US Department of Defense, http://www.state.gov.

23. MAY, Caroline, *More than 30 Immigrants Admitted to the U.S. Recently Implicated in Terrorism,* http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/12/15/30-immigrants-admitted-u-s-recently-implicated-terrorism/.

24. SHOEBAT, Wallid, *Breaking: 400 More ISIS Terrorist Infiltrated Europe. Trump Was* breaking-400-more-isis-terrorist-infiltrated-europe-trump-was-right-learn-why-it-is-impossible-to-stop-the-bombings-unless-we-ban-muslim-immigration-completely/.

25. STACK, Liam; KARASZ, Palko, *How Belgium Became Home to Recent Terror Plots*, March 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/belgium-terrorism-suspects.html?_r=0.

26. *'All relevant actors' gather in Vienna for decisive Syria talk*s, October 30, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/320106-syria-vienna-international-talks.

27. *Russia, U.S. agree to speed up Syria peace effort,* March 24, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-kerry-idUSKCN0WQ0PG.

FACTOR STRUCTURE OF THE MULTIFACTOR LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE MLQ 5X

Dimitar Y. DIMITROV, PhD*
Svilena S. DAROVA**

The article aims to evaluate the factor structure of the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire MLQ 5x (short). The empirical apparatus is built on the theoretical model for transformational leadership, operationalized by Bernard Bass. The latest version of the questionnaire MLQ 5x, consisting of 45 items is used for this research. The analysis is carried out by the alternative of the three-factor model (three factors are correlated). The results of the analysis confirm the content of the scales of the leadership styles (transformational, transactional and passive avoidant), the outcome of officers' activities, as well as the staff of their components.

Keywords: *transformational leadership, MLQ 5x, questionnaire factor structure.*

1. Theoretical overview

Leadership is one of the central issues, which are a subject of research in the field of Social Psychology. The great variety of approaches suggests also differences in the conceptualization of the matter of leadership, as well as the attempts for it to be defined. The achievements and outcome of scientific researches over the past century in terms of leadership demonstrate the abundance of existing psychological theories.

Each of them is a product of their time and the significant – then – peculiarities.

The *transformational leadership theory* is a reflection and carrier of some features of the last decade of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, namely the restructuring of the political and social reality, based on the democratic values spread worldwide. A basis was provided for the development of meaningful leadership practices deriving from the authentic leadership, which is characterized by honesty, integrity, openness, ethics and professionalism. They are demonstrated through the organizational values and supported by the leaders' personal example. The transformational leadership has the potential to lead to a change in the attitude and behavior to work activities of particular groups of people, organizations and, in some cases, whole societies[1]. The achievement is mediated through building of meaningful work relationships and communication connections between the leader and their followers. This is the way to achieve a high level of collaboration in the teams where the responsibilities towards the development of the joint will for meeting the goals are shared.

---

[1] Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998.

* Dimitar Y. DIMITROV, PhD in Psychology, is Chief Assistant Professor in Leadership Department, Rakovski National Defense Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria. E-mail: dimitrovrdsc@mail.bg
** Svilena S. DAROVA is Senior Lecturer, English Language Chair, Foreign Languages Department, "Rakovski" National Defense Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria. E-mail: svilenadarova@gmail.com

Summarizing a number of scientific studies related to transformational leadership, Bass and Riggio[2] conclude that the popularity of the theory and the ensuing empirical apparatus due to the unique combination of the inner motivation, personal and professional development of the people in the organizations. It is also essential to acquire higher levels of awareness and motivation, minimization of personal goals for the sake of the common goal, inspiration and greater activity[3]. The shared opinion is that the major driving force for the success of the transformational leadership is a result of the leaders' ability to change people's associations connected with the activity, developing their sense for overcoming problems.

According to Bernard Bass, this process of transforming the followers' attitude to work mainly refers to values, emotions, ethics, standards, and long-term goals[4].

From a theoretical point of view, Bernard Bass[5] further develops the starting positions of James Burns[6]. Bass examines the leadership style as a process in which the leader behavior is described as *transformational*, *transactional* and *passive/avoidant*.

The classic idea of *transformational leadership* is characterized by the added emphasis on the moral values of the followers, provoking their sensitivity to ethic problems and mobilizing their energy for reforming institutions.

The *transactional style* motivates the

followers through their private interest.

The *passive-avoidant style* is specified by passivity to emerging problems and, in certain cases, even neglect in the performance of tasks. It can also occur as a lack of sensitivity in regard to the needs of others in the area of leadership impact[7].

The many years' collaboration between Bernard Bass and Bruce Avolio[8] leads to the design and development of the relevant empirical apparatus – *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire* whose latest version is MLQ 5x. The questionnaire is used to assess the leadership behavior.

Thus, *three leadership* **constructs** *are set – Transformational, Transactional and Passive-Avoidant*.

They are formed by *nine leadership components: Idealized Influence (Attributes), Idealized Influence (Behaviors), Inspirational Motivation, Intellectual Stimulation* and *Individual Consideration*; the Transactional style of *Contingent Reward* and *Management by Exception (Active)*, and the Passive/Avoidant style of *Management by Exception (Passive)* and *Laissez-Faire*.

2. Research methodology

Avolio and Bass[9] analyze eight factor models in working with the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. A characteristic of the first three of them is reporting generally the particular components of *transactional* leadership. In the other five models, they derive and retain the grouping of the *transformational* leadership components in a separate factor. Furthermore, according to the authors, all scales assess leadership behavior, while only those relating to

---

[2] Bernard M. Bass & Ronald E. Riggio, *Transformational leadership*, second edition, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, USA, 2006.

[3] Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: theory and practice*, sixth edition, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage, 2013.

[4] Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998; Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*, third edition, Mind Garden, USA, 2004.

[5] Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998

[6] James M. Burns, *Leadership*, New York: Harper and Row, USA, 1978.

[7] Bernard M. Bass & Ronald E. Riggio, *Transformational leadership*, second edition, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, USA, 2006.

[8] Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*, third edition, Mind Garden, USA, 2004.

[9] Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*, third edition, Mind Garden, USA, 2004.

---

charisma have the character of impact.

Empirical data gathered from applying the questionnaire in various cultures and organizations rather confirm its psychometric indices[10]. The type of the factor models and characteristic peculiarities in grouping the items in subscales are considered.

At the beginning, Bass[11] reports only the two leadership styles – *transformational* and *transactional*. They include seven leadership components – *charisma, inspirational, intellectual stimulation, individual stimulation, individual consideration, contingent reward, management by exception, laissez-faire.*

The empirical studies show some specific features. For example, high correlation is found between the components *Charisma* and *Inspirational*, but due to the conceptual difference between them, they are in separate scales. Moreover, in assessing the five-factor version of the questionnaire, some researchers find also a high correlation between the components of the transformational leadership, but a low correlation with the results of the leaders' performance.

An essential feature relates to the structure of the components of charisma. Empirical data exists where the items of *Inspirational Motivation* are added to those forming *Charisma*. Another component derives from their combination. It is called *Charismatic-Inspirational Impact[12]*.

A separate component, called Inspirational Motivation is not differentiated in the five - and six - factor structures of the questionnaire. The components of the transformational leadership are three – charisma, intellectual stimulation and individual consideration[13]. Subsequently, the development in the scientific research of Bass et al. (from 1985 to 1999), as well as the studies of other scientists, only confirm the value of the initial version of the questionnaire MLQ (Form 1) from 1985 with some additions which have found their application in the latest version – MLQ 5x[14].

The psychometric features of the multifactor questionnaire MLQ 5x are successfully validated by a sample of over 7000 respondents in the USA. The questionnaire is adapted in more than 22 countries in Europe, North America, Asia and Oceania. Difficulties in confirming the full nine-factor structure of the questionnaire are reported in some studies. According to the analysis of Antonakis et al.[15] the discrepancies may be due to the high heterogeneity in the samples of respondents in the different cultures, organizational specifics and differences arising from organizational levels. A presence of correlation between the subscales in the leadership styles is reported which value is usually at $r \geq 0.5$.

Aim

The current research **aims** to seek confirmation of the factor structure and internal consistency of the multifactor leadership questionnaire MLQ 5x (short) through a sample of military personnel (in a military environment).

Research tasks:

1. Through factor analysis to analyze and assess the scales and subscales of MLQ 5x questionnaire.

2. To evaluate the internal consistency (reliability) of MLQ 5x questionnaire.

[10] Francis J. Yammarino & Bernard M. Bass, "The effects of transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership characteristics on subordinate influencing behavior", in: *Basic and applied social psychology*, no. 11/1990, pp. 191-203.

[11] Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*, third edition, Mind Garden, USA, 2004, pp. 6-13, pp. 47-52.

[12] Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*. (Third edition). Mind Garden, USA, 2004, pp. 52-65; Bernard M. Bass & Ronald E. Riggio, *Transformational leadership*, second edition, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, USA, 2006, pp. 21-25.

[13] Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998.

[14] Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set.* (Third edition). Mind Garden, USA, 2004.

[15] John P. Antonakis & Bruce J. Avolio; Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam, "Context and leadership: An examination of the nine-factor full-range leadership theory using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire". In: *The Leadership Quarterly*, 14/3/2003, pp. 261-295.

Approach

At the initial adaptation of the questionnaire in 2011, a confirmation of the nine-factor model was sought[16]. All nine scales forming the respective components in Bernard Bass theoretical model of transformational leadership are reported present. The derivate subscale *Charisma* is a product of the components *Idealized Influence* and *Inspirational Motivation*. The components constituting the leader's performance are also successfully confirmed.

Another approach is chosen for the current research – the one of the three-factor model[17]. In this analysis, initially, the items forming the scales of the three leadership styles will be differentiated, namely – transformational, transactional and passive-avoidant. Next, the deeper data analysis is to lead to determining the subscales for each of the components of leadership styles in accordance with the theoretical model.

The questionnaire consists of 45 items. The first 36 refer to the leadership style and the rest 9 of them to the satisfaction with the leader performance. The items are evaluated according to a five-degree scale of Likert type.

Sample

The research covers officers in various forms of training at G.S.Rakovski National Defence Academy in 2013. The total number of respondents is 363, officers only. Of them, 90.6% are males, 9.4% – females; the average age is 38.8; senior officers - 61.4%, junior officers - 38.6%.

The used statistical package is SPSS 19.

3. Outcome

The first stage of the research is to assess whether data is *one-dimensional*, with no rotation analysis[18]. The factor analysis explained variation is of 63.06% and describes a major part of the variables. In this case, KMO and Bartlett`s Test coefficient (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy) is 0.898 which indicates an acceptable sample adequacy. The values in the matrix referring to *Anti-Image Correlation* indicator exceed 0.779 which in turn are indicative for an acceptable inclusion of the variables. The total number of factors is 10. The leading factor is described by all items, and the weight coefficients are acceptable with values over 0.31. All data mentioned above provides the grounds to assume that one-dimensionality exists regarding the measured value *leadership style*.

The further detailed analysis aims to examine the assumption for the presence of several scales correlating among each other – these of the three leadership constructs – transformational, transactional and passive avoidant. Therefore, three factors are rendered an account, again with all 36 items included. Each factor matrix is a subject to a short angle rotation. The assumption is the factors which constitute the scales of the leadership styles to be in a correlation with each other. This analysis will be called **primary** for short.

Table 1 shows the data acquired. The first of them – Factor 1 is described by 19 of all possible 20 items. The explained variation is over 22% – a fact which emphasizes the weight of the assessed variation. Item 2 is reduced[19]. The content analysis of the items[20] allows us to conclude that they correspond in terms of content and describe the scale of the transformational leadership style.

The acquired results for factors 2 and 3 include respectively the items of the passive avoidant and transactional leadership stiles. The items the grouping and content analyses confirm the essence characteristics of the two mentioned styles. The item location and weight are acceptable. The dispersion in the data, in total, is over 26%.

---

[16] Dimitar Ya. Dimitrov, Georgi S. Karastoyanov, "Adaptatsia na vaprosnik za liderski stil MLQ 5x za voenna sreda", v: *Psihologichni izsledvania*, no 1/2012, pp. 143-164.

[17] Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*, third edition, Mind Garden, USA, 2004, p. 49.

[18] Krasimir B. Kalinov, *Statisticheski metodi v povedencheskite i sotsialnite nauki*, Sofia: NBU, 2010.

[19] For a greater data purity, all items with weight coefficients lower than 0.25 are filtered in the factor analysis.

[20] In accordance with the license agreement with "Mind Garden", Inc, the content of the items is not published.

Table no. 1: Items` structure in the *primary* three-factor analysis

Accepted name of factor	Items	Factor 1 $\alpha = 0.866$ *Weight coefficients*	Factor 2 $\alpha = 0.768$ *Weight coefficients*	Factor 3 $\alpha = 0.735$ *Weight coefficients*
Transformational leadership style (Trf L Style) Total number of items: 19	13, 9, 26, 14, 36, 25, 10, 34, 21, 15, 32, 30, 6, 29, 19, 31, 23, 8, 18	from 0.732 to 0.299	-	-
Passive Avoidant leadership style (Pass-Avoid L Style) Total number of items: 8	20, 12, 28, 5, 7, 3, 33, 17	-	from 0.732 to 0.269	-
Transactional leadership style (Trsa L Style) Total number of items: 8	22, 24, 27, 4; 11, 16, 35, 1	-	-	from 0.677 to 0.280

Summarizing the outcome of the primary analysis, they can be accepted as a strong indicator for confirming the identification of the three scales of the questionnaire, which respectively form the leadership styles – *Transformational*, *Transactional* and *Passive-Avoidant*. Most of the accounted items and their characteristic weight coefficients have values over 0.5. There are indicators confirming the reliability of the applied statistical assessment procedure.

The data in the correlation matrix gathered during the primary factor analysis supports the assumption for interdependence between the scales in the questionnaire. A low *positive* correlation is found ($r = 0.31$) between the scales of the transformational and transactional styles, as well as a low *negative* correlation ($r = –0.35$; $r = –0.25$) with the factor describing the passive avoidant style. The correlation coefficients correspond with the theoretical assumptions in Bass theory.

Defining the component structure of the transformational leadership style

The confirmed one-dimensionality and content of the source scales of the questionnaire are the basis for a detailed analysis of the three-factor analysis model with content assessment of the forming components in the oncoming *secondary* analysis. The first step is content assessment of the subscales of the transformational leadership style.

In terms of theory, *charisma* is a key characteristic of the transformational leadership style. In the questionnaire it is a result of a particular combination between components and the items forming them. To determine it, all constituting for the transformational leadership style items are introduced. Orthogonal rotation is applied to extract the two-factor structure. The reason is based in the primary data analysis with factors *5, 4, 3* and *2*, as the last one being the most significant. An assumption is made that two non-one-dimensional factors exist, one of which is expected to contain the characteristics of charisma. The obtained outcome proves that the model is successful (dispersion 42.50%; KMO and Bartlett`s Test = 0.892). The weight coefficients of the involved items is over 0.41. The logical analysis of the included 10 items in factor 1 lead to reporting the content of the characteristics related to *Idealized Influence* and *Inspirational Motivation*[21], as for factor 2 which contains 7 items – the characteristics of the "Individual Consideration" and "Intellectual Stimulation". Items 18 and 23 are excluded. The acquired results are a positive indicator to determine the derivative subscale *Charisma*. Further data analysis is expected to be in support of the assumption made.

---

[21] Factors "idealized" and "inspirational" impact will be called **Charisma** for short.

Substructure of factor 1 – Charisma (idealized and inspirational)

The next stage requires determining the structure of factor 1 subscales *(idealized and inspirational)*. All 10 items are included in the analysis. Short angle rotation is applied (it is assumed that the components are in correlation). The factor analysis is described by 64.59% of the dispersion, and KMO and Bartlett`s Test is 0.849.

structure of the subscale *Inspirational Motivation* is an essential feature. It is characterized by high dispersion – 41.37% and high item weights – over 0.584, including all four items. This specific characteristic places the *Inspirational Motivation* component at a position of a leading feature of the *Charismatic* leadership.

By summarizing the obtained above results we can conclude not only the identification of the

Table no. 2: Items` structure of the secondary factor analysis of factor 1

Accepted name of factor	Items	Factor 1 $\alpha = 0.779$ *Weight coefficients*	Factor 2 $\alpha = 0.511$ *Weight coefficients*	Factor 3 $\alpha = 0.770$ *Weight coefficients*
Inspirational Motivation (IM) Number of items: 4	9, 26, 36, 13	from 0.854 to 0.584	-	-
Idealized Influence (Behaviors) (II-B) Number of items: 3	6, 14, 34	-	from 0.950 to 0.359	-
Idealized Influence (Attributes) (II-A) Number of items: 3	10, 21, 25	-	-	from 0.828 to 0.720

Table no. 2 presents the main results from the item analysis and the derived factors. The identified three factors are characterized by a good, but expressed to a different extent, dispersion. The analysis of the pooled items forming the factors confirms the structure of the scales – *Inspirational Motivation, Idealized Influence*

derivative subscale *charisma*, but also to position it as a central characteristic of the transformational leadership style.

Substructure of factor 2

The obtained results after the analysis of Factor 2 from the two-factor item structure of

Table no. 3: Items` structure in the secondary factor analysis of factor 2

Accepted name of factor	Items	Factor 1 $\alpha = 0.691$ *Weight coefficients*	Factor 2 $\alpha = 0.663$ *Weight coefficients*
Individual Consideration (IC) Number of items: 3	19, 29, 31	from 0.837 to 0.445	-
Intellectual Stimulation (IS) Number of items: 3	32, 30, 8	-	from 0.690 to 0.269

(behaviors) and Idealized Influence (attributes) corresponding with factors 1, 2 and 3. The items`

the *transformational* leadership construct are presented in Table no. 3. Short angle rotation is also set as one of the components of the

Table no. 4: Factors` structure of transformational leadership style components

Name of the structuring subscale in the analysis	Factor components	
	Factor 1	Factor 2
	Weight coefficients	*Weight coefficients*
Inspirational Motivation (IM)	0.858	
Idealized Influence (Attributes) (II-A)	0.793	
Idealized Influence (Behaviors) (II-A)	0.776	
Individual Consideration (IC)		0.895
Intellectual Stimulation (IS)		0.782

transformational leadership style. The factor analysis is meant to derive two factors. In this case 58.55% of the dispersion is described, and KMO and Bartlett`s Test is 0.839. The total number of items is six.

The obtained factors` structure consists of factor 1 with approximately 45% of the data dispersion, and factor 2 - 13.99%. In turn, factor weights in Factor 1 are also with high coefficients and vary from 0.837 to 0.445, and in Factor 2 vary from 0.690 to 0.269. Item no. 15 is excluded. Interfactor correlation coefficient is moderate, at $r = 0.506$. Assessing the structure of items with the two factors, allows us to conclude that the first of them takes into account the characteristics of the component *Individual Consideration*, and the second one – of *Intellectual Stimulation*.

Summarizing the information provided above, we can conclude that there are reasons to consider the structure and composition of the components constituting the transformational leadership style as proved.

The acquired results are used as a basis for further assessment of the pooling character of subscales that build the *Transformational* leadership style. Through factor analysis further confirmation will be sought of the found above components of *Charismatic* leadership, as well as data to be acquired that supports the relations between the subscales of the transformational leadership. The results demonstrate acceptable analysis coefficient values: KMO and Bartlett's Test – 0.765; general dispersion – 73.21%; item weights – over 0.669. The first factor is characterized by high dispersion – 57.02%, and the second – 16.19%. Grouping the structure

elements in Factor 1 rotation matrix contains the subscales of *Inspirational Motivation, Idealized Influence (behavior) and Idealized Influence (attributes)*. Factor 2 is respectively built up by the subscales of the *Individual Consideration* and *Intellectual Stimulation*. The acquired results additionally confirm the structuring of the subscale *charisma*, which should be rather called *charismatic-inspirational*. Table 4 presents the results.

Identifying the component structure of transactional leadership style

Based on the assumption for a potential one-dimension of the scale *Transactional* leadership style, the short angle rotation is applied, proceeded from the presumption that the components are interrelated. The analysis includes all eight items (Table 1). The identified dispersion 51.52% and KMO and Bartlett`s Test – 0.791 are a positive indicator for an acceptable sample adequacy (Table no. 5).

The first factor indicates dispersion of 37.36%, and item weights are over 0.542. The number of structuring items is 4. The second factor is characterized by dispersion of 14.16%. The weight values are within the range from 0.379 to 0.816. The assessment of the items included in the leading Factor 1 brought to the conclusion that it is specified by the transactional leadership component" *Management by Exception (active)*", and for Factor 2 – *Contingent Reward*. The correlation coefficient between the factors is moderate, at $r = 0.514$. The obtained results are expected and support the assumption

Table no. 5: Items` structure of factor 3 in the primary factor analysis

Accepted name of factor	Items	Factor 1	Factor 2
		α = 0.688	**α = 0.627**
		Weight coefficients	*Weight coefficients*
Management by Exception (Active) (MbEx-A) Number of items: 4	27, 22, 4, 24	from 0.851 to 0.542	-
Contingent Reward (CR) Number of items: 4	16, 11, 35, 1	-	from 0.816 to 0.379

for an interrelation between the components of transactional leadership – *Management by Exception (active) and Contingent Reward.*

assumption for a relation between the subscales in the leadership construct. On these grounds, we can assume that the components structuring Laissez-Faire leadership style are confirmed.

Table no. 6: Items` structure of Factor 2 in the primary factor analysis

Accepted name of factor	Items	Factor 1	Factor 2
		α = 0.674	**α = 0.683**
		Weight coefficients	*Weight coefficients*
Laissez-Faire (LF) Number of items: 4	28, 5, 7, 33	from 0.695 to 0.608	-
Management by Exception (Passive) (MbEx-P) Number of items: 3	3, 20, 12	-	from 0.439 to 0.373

Identifying the subscales of Passive Avoidant leadership style

The assessment of the components of the third leadership style - *Passive Avoidant,* follows the same analogy as the transactional style assessment. The obtained outcome describes 56.08% of dispersion, and KMO and Bartlett`s Test is 0.856. In this case, again, Factor 1 is distinguished by well-expressed explained variation – 38.66%, and factor weights are over 0.608 (Table 6). Factor 2 is characterized by lower, but still acceptable values. Item no. 17 is excluded from the analysis. Reading the item structure of the subscales, the identified components of the passive avoidant style are the following – *Laissez-Faire* and *Management by Exception (passive)* which correspond with factors 1 and 2.

The identified correlation coefficient in the matrix is positive, rather defined as a moderate - $r = 0.49$ (at lower bounds). This confirms the

Identifying the subscales of leadership performance (extra effort, efficiency, satisfaction)

Nine items are included in the analysis. They constitute the dimension of the *Leadership performance satisfaction*. The acquired results after the factor analysis confirm non-one-dimensionality in the component matrix. This lead to applying orthogonal rotation, which is defined by a dispersion of 64.48%, and KMO and Bartlett`s Test is 0.892 (Table 7). The identified three factors are constructed respectively by 4, 3 and 2 items. Their content analysis allows to be recognized the corresponding subscales – *Effectiveness*, *Extra Effort* and *Satisfaction.*

A major fact is the high percentage of explained variation of Factor 1 at 45.88% which characterizes the component *Effectiveness*. This peculiarity, on the background of the other two factors which dispersion sum makes fewer than 20%, demonstrates that the respondents definitely recognize the leadership result *Effectiveness.*

Table no. 7: Items` structure of leadership performance

Accepted name of factor	Items	α = 0.846		
		Factor 1 45.88% α = 0.781	**Factor 2** 10.31% α = 0.666	**Factor 3** 8.29% α = 0.501
		Weight coefficients	*Weight coefficients*	*Weight coefficients*
Effectiveness (EFF) Number of items: 4	40, 37, 45, 43	from 0.779 to 0.363		
Extra Effort (ExEff) Number of items: 3	44, 39, 42		from 0.916 to 0.552	
Satisfaction (SAT) Number of items: 2	38, 41			0.784 0.374

This is a quite natural result. Effectiveness at work, as a result of the used leadership practices is crucial for organizational life. In the armed forces the leadership behavior to be combined with activities that lead to a desired result for the military organization or to a new state after a successful completion of tasks is associated as being a particular indicator. In this sense, based on the *integrative leadership model[22], leadership influence should facilitate the improvement of acquired results (including effectiveness) of the common effort in the chain of command.*

Summarizing the presented above results we accept as confirmed the scales and subscales constituting the leadership styles (transformational, transactional and *passive avoidant*), their structure components as well as results of the leadership performance. All of them correspond with the set theory model and the application requirements prescribed by the authors of the questionnaire Bruce Avolio and Bernard Bass[23]. Thus, we consider the **first** research task accomplished.

Assessment of the structural coherence among the questionnaire scales

Pirson`s correlation coefficient "*r*" is used for examining the structural coherence among the scales and subscales of MLQ 5x questionnaire.

A moderate positive correlation between the scales of the *Transformational* and *Transactional* leadership styles is identified (*r* = 0.58). In turn, the correlation coefficient between the scales of the *Passive Avoidant* leadership style and those of the *Transactional* and *Transformational* styles is two-tailed negative –0.21 < *r* < –0.41, and the values are defined respectively as *very low* or *low* negative correlation. The negative correlation between the constructs of the *Transformational* and *Transactional* styles with the *Passive Avoidant* style is an indicator for discriminant validity among the structure forming questionnaire scales.

The secondary correlation analysis focuses on analyzing the interrelations among the *components* of the three leadership styles (Table 8). The assessment of correlation coefficients among the subscales of the *Transformational* leadership style identifies *moderate positive* correlation (0.57 ≤ *r* ≤ 0.61) between the structural components of charisma (II-A, II-B, IM), as well as between those of the *Intellectual Stimulation* (IS) and *Individual Consideration* (IC) (*r* = 0.54). The correlation dependence among the subscales of the *Transactional* leadership style (MbEx-A и CR) identifies *low positive* correlation (at upper limits) r = 0.47. Then, among the components of the *Passive Avoidant* style (MbEx-P и LF) – *moderate positive* (at upper limits) r = 0.66.

---

[22] Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine, Canada, Ottawa: DND, 2005, p. 121.

[23] Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*, third edition, Mind Garden, USA, 2004.

Table no. 8: Correlation analysis between the constituent components of the leadership style

	Charisma	II (B)	II (A)	IM	IC	IS	CR	MbEx-A	MbEx-P	LF
Charisma	1									
II (B)	-	1								
II (A)	-	.58**	1							
IM	-	.57**	.61**	1						
IC	.43**	.37**	.35**	.36**	1					
IS	.52**	.43**	.35**	.48**	.54**	1				
CR	.56**	.55**	.45**	.42**	.46**	.48**	1			
MbEx-A	.28**	.26**	.29**	.18**	.33**	.31**	.47**	1		
MbEx-P	-.18**	-.12*	-.19**	-.15**	-.42**	-.34**	-.22**	-.17**	1	
LF	-.31**	-.22**	-.27**	-.26**	-.52**	-.44**	-.28**	-.19**	.66**	1

** Correlation coefficient index at a level of significance $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)
* Correlation coefficient index at a level of significance $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

The presented empirical results assessing the relation among the leadership constructs *Transformational*, *Transactional* and *Passive Avoidant*, as well as among their *components* as a trend and to a great extent as a degree of presence, confirm the interrelation among the scales in the questionnaire and satisfy our expectations as a strength and direction of act.

The data in Table no. 8 provides additional opportunity for analysis of the interdependence among the components of the various leadership styles. There is a positive correlation among all components of transformational and transactional styles. It is evident that the component *Contingent Reward* is characterized by a low (at upper limits) to a moderate correlation with all components of *Transformational* style, as *Management by Exception (active)* – with low (at lower limits). The *Passive Avoidant* style components demonstrate, as we expected, negative correlations with the transformational and transactional leadership. The *Management by Exception (passive)* scales is characterized by less demonstrated negative correlation coefficients compared to *Laissez-Faire* in relation to the components of transformational and transactional leadership. Considering the available in Table no. 8 data can be concluded that there is a trend of a general decrease, in descending order, of correlation coefficient between transformational and transactional styles. On the other hand, the negative correlation with the passive avoidant style deepens.

The data analysis shown in Table no. 9 demonstrates some unison in the values of the leadership styles and their components, limited by the set samples. Leadership performance in the Bulgarian, American and European samples is a demonstrated definitive vector. The *Transformational* style is leading, followed by the *Transactional*, and the *Passive Avoidant* is the least presented. The most prominent leadership components are as follows: *Individual Consideration, Contingent Reward and Management by Exception (passive)*. On the other hand, there are some differences. *Charisma* and its components in the foreign samples have stronger presence, as transactional components leading with average values are those in the Bulgarian sample. The selection of the groups of comparative samples is not random but driven mainly by the fact that the Bulgarian NATO membership requires not only doctrinal interoperability, but also closeness in the ensuing personal notions and attitudes towards the military leaders performance in the post-modern world, where similarity of leadership practices based on the Alliance common values matter a lot.

Table no. 9: Comparative statistics of leadership style constructs and components and the leadership performance with average value of data from foreign[24] samples

Constructs and components of leadership style	BULGARIA N = 363		EUROPE N = 1143		USA N = 3375	
	$\overline{x}$	SD	$\overline{x}$	SD	$\overline{x}$	SD
Transformational leadership style (Trf L Style)	2.86	0.46	2.99	0.54	3.02	0.55
Transactional leadership style (Trsa L Style)	2.84	0.51	2.61	0.66	2.29	0.66
Passive Avoidant leadership style (Pass-Avoid L Style)	1.05	0.56	0.79	0.56	0.84	0.57
Idealized Influence (Attributes) (II-A)	2.59	0.65	2.83	0.55	2.95	0.53
Idealized Influence (Behaviors) (II-B)	2.63	0.62	3.00	0.55	2.99	0.59
Inspirational Motivation (IM)	2.69	0.70	3.00	0.60	3.04	0.59
Intellectual Stimulation (IS)	3.07	0.54	3.02	0.48	2.96	0.52
Individual Consideration (IC)	3.29	0.59	3.10	0.50	3.16	0.52
Charisma (Ch)	2.64	0.55	2.94	0.57	2.99	0.57
Contingent Reward (CR)	3.05	0.51	3.02	0.52	2.99	0.53
Management by Exception (Active) (MbEx-A)	2.63	0.68	2.20	0.79	1.58	0.79
Management by Exception (Passive) (MbEx-P)	0.94	0.70	0.96	0.60	1.07	0.62
Laissez-Faire (LF)	0.84	0.61	0.62	0.51	0.61	0.52
Extra Effort (ExEff)	3.01	0.63	2.85	0.50	2.79	0.61
Effectiveness (EFF)	3.11	0.49	3.06	0.57	3.14	0.51
Satisfaction (SAT)	3.05	0.55	2.96	0.50	3.09	0.55

Assessment of internal reliability

Characteristic for the leadership styles scales is the good internal reliability. Cronbach's coefficient **α** has values greater than 0.74. The maximum even reaches 0.87. Most of the subscales take values higher than 0.63. The transactional component *Contingent Reward* and leadership performance *Satisfaction* subscales make exception. There the coefficients of internal reliability are respectively 0.62 and 0.51. The reported problems may due to a great extent a result of the small number of items (from 2 to 3) presented in the two subscales. We consider as a positive indicator the found correlation coefficients among the related scales and subscales which are noted as "significant" in terms of the degree of expression. This justifies the analysis results to be announced as meeting the MLQ 5x questionnaire requirements for "internal reliability" and "construct validity". Hence we consider the **second** research task accomplished.

Conclusion

The chosen approach to examine the factor structure of the questionnaire, namely the three-factor analysis model, proves feasible. It aims to identifying the leadership constructs, and subsequently deriving their components. The three-factor questionnaire structure of nine leadership components plus one derivative (charisma) is confirmed. The scales read the leadership styles *Transformational* (of 19 items), *Transactional* (8 items) and *Passive Avoidant* (8 items). The constituting components of transformational style are *Idealized Influence (Attributes)* (of 3 items), *Idealized Influence (Behaviors)* (3 items), *Inspirational Motivation* (4 items), *Individual Consideration* (3 items), *Intellectual Stimulation* (3 items). The additional derivative subscale *Charisma* (*idealized-inspirational*) consists of 10 items. In fact, in the Bulgarian adapted version it covers the components: *Idealized Influence (Behaviors),*

Idealized Influence (Attributes) and *Inspirational Motivation*. The identified components of Transactional style are: *Management by Exception (Active)* (4 items) and *Contingent Reward* (4 items), as for *Passive Avoidant style – Management by Exception (Passive)* (3 items) and *Laissez Faire* (4 items). Leadership performance is also confirmed. The subscales are built by the components: *Effectiveness* (4 items), *Extra Effort* (3 items) and *Satisfaction* (2 items). The acquired results prove the research aim accomplished. The questionnaire MLQ 5x successfully can be used for scientific aims and practical application in Bulgarian military environment.

In conclusion, the Multifactor leadership questionnaire MLQ 5x demonstrates efficient psychometric qualities. Its factor structure has been proven and the theoretical assumptions, set in the transformational leadership model by Bernard Bass, have been confirmed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Dimitar Ya. Dimitrov, Georgi S. Karastoyanov, "Adaptatsia na vaprosnik za liderski stil MLQ 5x za voenna sreda", v: *Psihologichni izsledvania*, no 1/2012.
2. Krasimir B. Kalinov, *Statisticheski metodi v povedencheskite i sotsialnite nauki*, Sofia: NBU, 2010.
3. John P. Antonakis; Bruce J. Avolio; Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam, "Context and leadership: An examination of the nine-factor full-range leadership theory using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire", in: The Leadership Quarterly, 14/3/2003.
4. Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998.
5. Bernard M. Bass & Ronald E. Riggio, *Transformational leadership*, second edition, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, USA, 2006.
6. Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. Manual and Sampler Set*, third edition, Mind Garden, USA, 2004.
7. Peter J. Bycio; Rick D. Hackett; Joyce S. Allen, "Further assessments of Bass's conceptualization of transactional and transformational leadership", in: Journal of Applied Psychology, no. 80/1995.
8. James M. Burns, *Leadership*, New York: Harper and Row, USA, 1978.
9. John P. Antonakis & Bruce J. Avolio; Nagaraj Sivasubramaniam, "Context and leadership: An examination of the nine-factor full-range leadership theory using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire", in: The Leadership Quarterly, 14/3/2003.
10. Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine, Canada, Ottawa: DND, 2005.
11. Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: theory and practice*, sixth edition, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage, 2013.
12. Francis J. Yammarino & Bernard M. Bass, "The effects of transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire leadership characteristics on subordinate influencing behavior", in: Basic and applied social psychology, no. 11/1990.

ROMANIA'S NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY – BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM

Răzvan GRIGORAȘ, PhD*

The frailty of strategies was highlighted when the reality of our century overlapped the national patterns of security and defence planning. Constrained by the decrease of expenses and affected by the evolutions of the security in the last two years, states (especially NATO members) successively reconfigured the national approach related to security planning. The redistribution of resources in order to increase the security level gained more and more strict and justified importance (for example optimizing the use of capabilities in NATO). In this context, the article has aims to present the results of a SWOT analysis referring to Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019. The analysis performed highlights some of the results which can improve the process of elaborating the strategy at the national level. In its quest between optimism and pessimism, the analysis sketches the national progress, as well as the problems which should draw the attention of the political leadership. Not last, in the conclusions of the article, I underlined the need of inserting some modern and sustainable approaches in the security planning process, such as evidence-based policies, benchmarking[1]

and identification and capitalization of security opportunities.

Keywords: *security, defence strategy, SWOT analysis, opportunities, risks.*

Introduction

At the beginning of 2016, debates are still flourishing about the way in which the concept of *security* should be understood (if the solution is empowerment and human security, if the method of approach should be a *problem solving*[2] one or if securing is the answer to a society with less conflicts). The expansion of the concept depending on the object of reference – namely if it should be the men, the global vision, the women, the society or the environment – is also subject to discussion. Not last, security theoreticians and practitioners analyse mechanism of developing it – if it is influenced by threats and risks or if the implementation of routine bureaucratic measures may increase the state's security level.

At this stage, we notice that when analysing the need of security, the problem of establishing certain strategic directions to guide the future of a state to "more" security is fundamental for the political leadership. Amid wide international

---

[1] Benchmarking (comparative analysis) represents a method which aims at measuring the quality of policies, products, programs and strategies of an organisation, with the purpose of determining methods to increase their performances. A broad description of this method is done by Fifer (1989).

[2] The concept of *problem solving* (critical analysis for problem settlement) is applied to multiple disciplines, each analysing it from various perspectives. The common feature in all cases is the focus on details specific to problem solving in order to reach a solution.

* Răzvan GRIGORAȘ, PhD in Intelligence and National Security, is Member of World Future Studies Federation association, E-mail: grigoras.razvan@myunap.net

dynamics, each state implemented a specific pattern to elaborate *national strategies*, consisting of tools which are as objective and accurate as possible and completely structured. For most of the states, such a sectorial strategy has as purpose the management of *possible future conditions,* by creating a dependency link between the fulfilment of its *own aspiration levels,* objectives and resources.

We also notice that, at present, in the practice of states, the fundamental document dealing with security can be met under various forms, in absence of a clear cut between security and defence. This is mainly due to legislation specific to member states of the international community, each nation managing this problem in a different manner. For example, The United Kingdom, The US and The Russian Federation opted for a document of *national security strategy* type. France created the French White Paper on Defence and National Security (*Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*)[3] while Spain developed *The National Defence Directive*[4]. At the same time, Finland prepared *a Security Policy* as well as *a Security Strategy for Society*[5]. At the national level, Romania opted, after the end of the Cold War, initially for a security strategy[6] and

later on (after 2004) for a defence strategy[7].

The intensity of international events, but also the succession of political cycles made that the last years bring us novelties in the area of security planning and reconsider the national strategies. Thus, the US President undertook a new Security Strategy in February 2015, after France previously reiterated the White Paper in 2013 and Poland rebuilt its Strategy in 2014. In November 2015, The United Kingdom launched a new Security Strategy and upon December 31st 2015 the pleiad ended – not coincidentally – with the Russian Federation. Romania is also part of this trend, in June 2015 it brought to light a new document, namely: *Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019 – A Strong Romania in Europe and the World (NDS 2015).*

The recent events overlapped on the estimates of NDS 2015 and Romania's dealing with a new balance of regional powers forces us to conduct a more thorough analysis of the algorithm of strategic planning of security and defence, at national level. For such reasons, we set out to conduct, in this article, a balanced analysis of the positive elements, as well as the negative ones which characterise NDS 2015 and its process of production. The *de facto* situation of the year 2016 brings to discussion the analysis of the real progress of planning, as well as its weak points.

1. Frame of analysis

Far from trying to untangle the events which lay at the basis of the current form of NDS 2015, this article sets out – as mentioned above – to create a relevant analysis of Romania's strategy and the process on which this document was

---

[3] *Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, France, http://www.defence.gouv.fr/actualites/la-reforme/livre-blanc-2013, accessed on 10.02.2016.

[4] *The National Defence Directive* of Spain, http://www.defensa.gob.es/defensa/politicadefensa/directivadefensa/, accessed on 10.02.2016.

[5] *Security Strategy for Society*, Finland, http://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases/2011/the_security_ strategy_for_society_now_available_for_download _in_english.4724.news, accessed on 10.02.2016.

[6] The first Post-Communist attempt to prepare a strategy was registered in 1994. The project called *The Integrated Concept regarding Romania's National Security* – although publicly debated - was not turned into an official document. It was blocked by the cleavage within the National Salvation Front [*Fondului Salvării Naționale (FSN)]* as consequence of mineriads and the resignation of the Prime-Minister of that time – Petre Roman. The text of the strategy was endorsed by The National Supreme Council for Defence *[CSAT]* in April 1994, later on not being adopted by the Parliament. The strategy resumed the principle of "strategic sufficiency", favoured the defensive role of the army, as well as the classical vision of UN for peace-keeping. Despite the non-approval of this document in the Parliament, the political leadership initiated – in a

prudent and defensive tone – certain guiding lines for the increase of national security, by being open towards NATO and EU.

[7] In 2004, there was issued the new Law No. 473 on Defence Planning, occasion on which the term for elaborating the strategy was extended by six months and it was decided the change of the name from Security Strategy to Defence Strategy, for a simple reason: the term *security* had been long time associated in the Romanian consciousness with the former Communist political police. Out of the same reasons, no amendment was accepted in reference to the change of the name from The Supreme Council for Defence into that of the National Security Council.

---

based. The presentation of the analysis frame used to this starts from the premises that such a strategic document fulfils the role of connector between present, past and future, as well as that of junction between future possible states, desired states and their resources. In this context, there is the need to identify the strong and weak points, the opportunities and threats specific to strategy. We consider that a SWOT[8] analysis represents one of the most adequate instruments to assess the strategy because it highlights the weak and strong points of the document, as well as the possibilities to improve the planning process. Upon conducting this SWOT analysis, I identified the following lines of study:

• Reflecting the risks, threats and vulnerabilities related to national security in the area of NDS 2015;

• Reflecting the security opportunities in the international environment in NDS 2015;

• Reflecting the predictability of Romania in the international environment;

• The functions of the strategy;

• The strength of the objectives and the outcomes set;

• Correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources;

• Sustainability, acceptability and feasibility of the strategy;

• The continuity of strategies and the connection to the previous strategy;

• The process of consultation regarding the adoption of the strategy;

• The process of regular review of the strategy.

The lines of study resulted from the intersection of four areas of interest, such as (1) legislation, (2) functions of strategy, (3) distribution of resources and (4) process of adoption and review.

1.1. Legislation

The legal ground is the basis of our analysis, because it insures the frame for the preparation of the document and sets out its guidelines. To this end, at the national level, NDS 2015 was adopted based on Law of Defence Planning no. 473, from November 4th 2004. After adopting the

NDS 2015, the Law of Defence Planning was amended[9]. Based on Law 473/2004, the strategy had to contain the following elements[10]:

• Setting out the national security interests and objectives;

• Assessment of international security environment;

• Identification of prospective risks, threats and vulnerabilities;

• Courses of action and main methods to insure Romania's national security.

In this area, the purpose of our analysis was to identify the convergence points of NDS 2015 with Law 473/2004 and to measure their impact on substantiating the national security.

1.2. Functions of a strategy

The functions which a strategy can fulfil in relation to the security of a state represent a highly-debated subject at the international level[11]. By analysing the literature, it results that some researchers and practitioners give an increased importance to the role which the changes of strategy have on stating the intentions in relation to the challenges in the international environment, emphasizing the importance of predictability[12]. For example, RAND Corporation underlined, in a study made for the US Defence

---

[8] SWOT analysis focuses on strong points, weak points, opportunities and threats.

[9] Law 203/2015 on Defence Planning, published in the Official Journal, 1st Part no. 555 from July 27th 2015, accessed on 14.02.2016.

[10] These elements are adjusted by Law 203/2015. Article 4 of the law mentions that "The national strategy of the country's defence contains: (1) values, interests and national security objectives; (2) assessment of the international security environment; (3) potential military risks, menaces and vulnerabilities identified; (4) strategic objectives and priorities in the area of defence; (5) courses of action and main methods to insure Romania's national security in the area of defence."

[11] The endeavours of Decourten, J. (1997) for the identification of the triad of acceptance, deterrence and protection; of Ole Waever and Barry Buzan (2006) regarding the evolutions and future challenges of strategies; of Rasmussen (2010) and Petersen (2012) regarding the interference of risk- related theories and observing them in strategies, are representative.

[12] David C. Gompert, Paul K. Davis, Stuart E. Johnson, Duncan Long, *Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2008, pp. 10-25.

Department, that the strategy represents an element of declaratory answer – "comes in response to external developments such as crises, international realignments, or the rise or fall of adversaries[13]". To this end, a strategy must have an anticipatory role for the other states as well and it must become a tool of communication for them.

In trying to depict as broadly as possible the roles which the strategy plays in reality, identified the following three functions which we focused on in the analysis:

- *The cognitive function* – in the sense in which NDS relies on certain scientifically- based analysis;
- *The prospective function* – in the sense in which NDS is based on the features of the future security environment and reflects the predictability of the state at the international level;
- *Organisational function* – in the sense in which NDS offers the courses of action, to protect the national interests.

1.3. Distribution of resources

A major importance for our endeavour has also the identification of the courses of action and the strategic resources of the state. In the context in which the international community and, implicitly, the practice impose a more and more efficient use of resources to insure the security, their distribution becomes the leitmotif of our analysis[14]. In order to capture the ideas mentioned, we applied, in this case, Art Lykke's analysis pattern of security strategies. He believes that an analysis of the strategies can be made by tracing the relations which are set between the following components of a strategy[15]:

- Objectives (outcomes) – and namely the actions which shall be fulfilled;
- Means of fulfilment (strategic concepts) – and namely how the objectives shall be fulfilled by using the resources;

- Resources – which are the specific resources involved in fulfilling the objectives
- Risks – seen as a window between objectives, means of fulfilment and resources.

Following the connections set between outcomes, resources and the roadmap chosen by the political leadership, I investigated to see whether NDS is the right strategy, convenient[16], feasible[17] and acceptable and admissible[18] at national level.

1.4. Adoption and review process

At the international community level, the states perfected, in a personalized manner, the process of regular review of sectorial strategies. The practice and also the scientific research emphasize the democratic control of forces in the area of security and defence.

Various organisations (for example *Transparency International*) and think-tanks (such as *RAND Corporation*) bring to discussion the ample consultancy process for adopting the strategies, underlining the need of certain lines of talks, in view of adapting the planning to the volatile realities of the 21st century. In the context of such analysis, the concept of *evidence-based policies* gains a robust and necessary regular and transparent revitalisation of strategies. The enforcement of concept becomes a request for strategic planning as an informed public policy. The role of this policy is to highlight the fulfilment of objectives previously set. The concept of *evidence-based policies* initiates the process of planning based on realities and failures of previous strategy. The permanent connection with the reality and the stage of fulfilment of objectives makes of this tool a benchmark of strategic planning. Given the importance character of the interest area, we set out to identify the manner in which the adoption and review of NDS 2015 is made in Romania. Also, we intend to draw the conclusion if, at the national level, tools such as *evidence-based policies* are being applied.

---

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 23.

[14] See the concepts of Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing used at the level of North-Atlantic Alliance.

[15] H. Richard Yarger, *Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,* http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm, website accessed on 08.02.2016.

[16] Will the accomplishment of the strategy have consequences on the fulfilment of the desired effects?

[17] Can the strategy be fulfilled with the means available to it?

[18] Are the costs of the strategy justified in relation to the importance of the desired effects?

2. The results of the SWOT analysis

The performance of SWOT analysis represented a theoretical and also practical challenge, because its results placed us between optimism and pessimism. Thus, we found out significant progress of the strategy that we detailed as strong points, but also problems that need urgent approach, in view of solving them. In Table no. 1 we resumed the main points identified with the help of SWOT analysis:

ever since the end of the Cold War.[19]

• NDS presents a coherent analysis of the main risks, threats and vulnerabilities, in straight line with the evolutions and dynamics of the regional security environment (consisting of the impact of events in the *Eastern Neighbourhood and the Black Sea region*)[20].

• The strategy sets out coherent and comprehensive landmarks regarding defining the risks. The most important risks are the ones which underline *regional instability and nonfulfillment of Romania's objectives of development*[21].

Table no. 1. Summary of SWOT analysis

	Useful elements	Toxic elements
Of internal origin	*Strong points* • Extended approach of security • Risks and threats adapted to the dynamics of the international environment • NDS 2015 provides the predictability of Romania at the international level • NDS 2015 was built based on the national legislation	*Weak points* • Unclear definition of the concepts of "security" and "defence" • NDS 2015 does not make the analysis of the impact of previous sectorial strategies • The lack of a basic continuity of objectives of strategies • No evidence-based policy is enforced • No correlation between objectives and resources • The existence of some evidence related to the lack of transparency in adopting NDS 2015
Of external origin	*Opportunities* • The political support that NDS 2015 enjoyed at the moment of adopting it • The importance that the state offers to non-military dimensions of security • Promoting the predictability of Romania at the external level • Correlating the national security objectives with taking over the 2019 Presidency of the EU Council	*Threats* • Lack of sustainability, acceptability and feasibility of NDS 2015 • The processes of consultation about adopting the strategy and of review have deficiencies • Absence of a system of hierarchy related to the seriousness of risks, threats and vulnerabilities • Presenting the vulnerabilities related to national security • Lack of identifying and capitalizing the security opportunities

We hereinafter broadly present the results obtained by the four main components of the analysis:

2.1. Strong points

• In NDS, the risks and menaces to the national security were assessed by an extended approach, where there can be found, outside military elements, those of economic, social, political, technological and environmental nature. This frame used by the defence strategy places Romania in line with the practice and research in the area of security. At the international level, the security as attribute of the entire society, not only as result of the military deterrence, was promoted

• The strategy identifies 7 categories of political-military menaces, such as *de-stabilizing actions in the Eastern Neighbourhood and perpetuation of frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region*[22].

---

[19] The studies of the Copenhagen school, Paris school, Welsh school, Frankfurt school and Manchester school are representative, offering fertile interpretations of security, starting from the critical image of security and reaching the critical studies of human security and securitization.

[20] The Presidential Administration (2015), Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019 – A Strong Romania in Europe and the World, pp.14-16, www. presidency.ro, website accessed on 10.01.2016.

[21] *Ibidem.*

[22] *Ibidem.*

• *Applying the concept of wider security leads to* structured and diverse identification of vulnerabilities, among which *the absorption of EU funds, the use of public money, energy, critical infrastructure, agriculture, environment protection, justice, health, education and scientific research*[23].

• NDS provides the predictability of Romania in the international environment, by insuring its allies (especially USA) as well as by observing the external menaces (prospective function).

• NDS was built on the national law. Thus, it includes the elements required by Law 473/2004. The strategy (1) sweeps through the interests and national security objectives; (2) assesses the international security environment, connecting Romania to the reality of 2015; (3) identifies possible risks, threats and vulnerabilities; (4) identifies courses of action;

2.2. Weak points

• Unclear definition of the concepts of „security" and „defence".

I mentioned, in the beginning of the article, that the states related in a different manner to the problem of security and defence and that they have different views about the national integration document. In the current frame of security, the strategic documents that focus on national security prove the progressive overlapping between the dimension of defence and that of security and create difficulties in separating the two concepts. We believe that the Romanian specific approach must make the difference between *security and defence strategy,* defence being a concept that is included in security. We believe that a state's security represents a melting pot, much more suitable for asserting the national interests, being based on the multitude of specific theories and schools of thought. The term *security* shall allow us, thus, to be positioned in a systemic frame, where defence shall be seen as a component and arm of security. For such reasons, we believe that the national option reiterated in 2015 by Law 203 referring to Romania's Defence Strategy gives

limited possibilities, from the point of view of undertaking some ambitious objectives. More than that, it can induce the erroneous opinion that the security is only in the charge of the Ministry of National Defence and the Supreme Council of National Defence, being able to create confusion in relation to undertaking specific roles in securing the state through the institutions involved.

• NDS does not make an analysis of the impact which the previous sectorial strategies (of security and defence) had in relation to the de facto state of Romania in 2015. Consequently, the political management cannot assess which was the influence of previous measures upon national security. Namely, it would have been useful to have an analysis of fulfilment of objectives of the previous strategy in order to channel future efforts, but also to establish new strategic post of Romania. The absence of a balance such as *how much we have accomplished from what we set out and undertook*[24] makes it impossible to know objectively the factors which led to today's state. Not last, we cannot even determine if the current position of Romania is the result of a judicious planning or simply the result of an accidental and involuntary circumstance. Examples of best practices in the area are UK's *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*[25], as well as *Sweden's Defence Policy*[26].

• The lack of a primary continuity of the strategies' objectives is also a weak point which results from the analysis of the strategy's text, as well as from the analysis of the adoption process. A prosperous Romania cannot be the result of a sole strategy, but of multiple successive strategies. For the same reason, the constancy of defining the analysis frame of risks also

---

[23] *Ibidem.*

[24] This can be valid even for strategies belonging to other Presidential Administrations; some authors consider it a sine-quo-non condition of the strategy's success (for example Martinescu A.L. - 2015).

[25] CM 9161 - *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015,* www.gov.uk/government/publications, website accessed on 01.03.2016.

[26] *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016-2020*, http://www.government.se/information-material/2015/06/swedens-defence-policy-2016-to-2020/, website accessed on 01.03.2016.

receives a major importance. This is translated in a pre-emptive approach, different and contrary to the reactive one, practised so far. Although NDS is, essentially, a reflection of the political leadership, it must also present the continuity of some measures and development of objectives on the medium and long run, introducing the social sustainable development into practice.

• The lack of analysis on previous strategies, as well as their continuity, leads to the conclusion that, at national level, there is no process of *evidence-based policies* type, where NDS results from. The lack of such process has vital consequences on the future of Romania, the need of an informed practice, from where it results that the regular review of NDS is vital for fulfilling our country's development objectives.

• The correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources: a strategy must be, *avant la lettre*, a tool of transforming the objectives into outcomes, with the use of resources. From the point of view of practice of the document, it must reflect the way in which the decision-makers intend to fulfil the courses of action set by the resource distribution. Unfortunately, NDS 2015 does not make the analysis of resources available (including the financial ones)[27]. The process of enforcing the NDS is also lacking certain techniques and comparative analysis of benchmarking[28] type. To this purpose, NDS becomes a declaratory document and not one based on action. Part of the best practice examples regarding the correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources are The United Kingdom (*National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*) and Finland (*Security*

Strategy for Society - 2010)[29].

• The lack of a transparent presentation of the staff who prepared it and the competences of persons involved in the process of creating the strategy leads to creating a negative opinion about Romania and the democratic control on the national security. Romania has a negative score in the analysis related to transparency in relation to defence and security, conducted by Transparency International, one of the reasons being also this one.

2.3. Opportunities

• The political support that NDS 2015 enjoyed upon the moment of its adoption gives it legitimacy in the public area[30]. This is a *sine-quo-non* condition of the success of a strategy. It is important that all factors involved in security and defence of the state understand and approve the measures proposed as strategy.

• I mentioned, at the beginning of this article, the need to find an intersection between possible future states of the country and the states desired by the political leadership. By connecting the two components, the Strategy makes nothing but to show the level of ambition of the state. When the political leadership undertakes this document, then the state not only can transform the objectives into actions, but it also becomes credible at the international level. The defining character of accepting the political leadership for the courses of action in view of increasing the intensity of security is also observed in the evolution (involution) of planning of defence during the period 2000-2014. Thus, in the context

---

[27] At paragraph 81 of NDS it is reminded the fact that "the fulfilment of its objectives (NDS) involves unified efforts at the level of the political class and the civil society and the efficient use of human, material and financial resources that our country possesses". NDS makes no distribution of resources depending on objectives.

[28] RAND Corporation in the study *Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis* from 2008 made for The US Department of Defence underlines the importance that the benchmarking has next to other comparative analyses and next to the import of policies for the sectors of security where there is no know-how regarding the efficient use of resources and the fulfilment of strategic objectives.

[29] *Security Strategy for Society,* www.defmin.fi, website accessed on 01.03.2016.

[30] NDS 2015 was adopted with 282 positive votes, one against and one abstention, in six months since the appointment of the President. The lack of some majority decisions accepted in the political area led, in the previous President's mandate, to the situation in which NDS 2006 was adopted by The Supreme Council of National Defence on April 17th 2006 and the joint plenum of the Parliament approved it only on October 14th 2008. It is worth mentioning that Romania had, in 2007, a National Security Strategy approved by The Supreme Council of National Defence. Later on, in 2010, The Supreme Council of National Defence approved a new Defence Strategy caught in the seriousness of political debates.

of political misunderstandings and sterility of the political speech, in the aforementioned period, Romania had a Military Strategy approved in 2000, a White Charter of Defence approved in 2004, a National Security Strategy endorsed by the National Supreme Council of Defence in 2007 and a National Defence Strategy approved by the Parliament in 2008.

• The strategy identifies the courses of action specific to multiple dimensions, as consequence of enforcing the concept of wider security[31]. These dimensions – among which also education, health, diplomacy and economy – reflect a new strategic position of Romania and the importance that the state gives to the non-military dimensions of security. In the practice of security, the states with at least an average level of development focus regularly on the economic development and diplomacy, enrolling in this approach. The shift of the attention also towards other security directions can bring more security to Romania, by the social sustainable development.

• Promoting the predictability of Romania on the external level represents a crucial element for NDS. By reminding the importance that Romania gives to the EU membership and also to the US partnership, as well as the situation from the Black Sea region and Ukraine, NDS becomes the melting pot for presenting the priorities of foreign policy. Thus, it manages to offer a credible and predictable character to the allies, as well as to the hostile elements.

• The correlation of national security objectives with Romania's mandate to hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019. This idea appears at paragraph 19 of NDS and offers the strategy's *raison d'être*, acting as a catalyst for the political leadership, in the sense of justifying the high importance which NDS has in the European trajectory of Romania.

2.4. Threats

• The sustainability, acceptability and feasibility of NDS 2015 represent the neuralgic points of the approach of security planning and

---

[31] Presidential Administration (2015), *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-18.

defence in Romania. To this end, it is ascertained the existence of the declaratory character of the strategy which, unfortunately, is not backed by the organisational function. Thus, NDS does not make the transition from the practical level to the correlation of courses of actions with the consequence of fulfilling the effects. Also, we cannot find out if the defence strategy can be fulfilled by the means available and neither which are the costs necessary to implement the courses of action. The lack of connecting the costs with the courses of action makes it impossible to continuously assess them, in order to highlight the opportunities, lacks, constrains or limitations. Also, the connection of defence with resources only from the competent ministry downwards[32] represents an insufficient perspective for the national security. This happens because the security is not only in the charge of Ministry of National Defence, but in the charge of other institutions as well.

• The process of consultation regarding the adoption of the strategy has various minuses. The transparency and permanent character of security analysis do not seem to be regular, in the practice of adopting the strategy. They proceed artificially and time- limitedly to the adoption of a new strategy. The call for a specialized *know-how*, non-affiliated politically, could offer a fertile expertise in the process of preparing the NDS. The resources and their complex analyses can support the identification of possible future states of Romania and they can assess the impact of possible security measures. The United Kingdom is a good example of best practices in this area. It organizes various debates and public consultations on the subject of security strategy[33].

• The regular review process of the strategy is also absent. The lack of a regular assessment mechanism for the implementation of objectives

---

[32] According to Article 3 of Law 203/2015 on Defence planning.

[33] The Report of the Session 2014-2015 related to the next National Security Strategy (2015) prepared by the Joint Committee of National Security Strategy is representative, available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/national-security-strategy/

of NDS 2015 turns it into a document without power of action, far from being undertaken by the political leadership. The lack of a review process entails also allegations about the imperfections of a real democratic control on defence and security, which affects Romania's international position. In this regard, UK has a very well structured system regarding the annual review of the security strategy (*British Defence and Strategic Review*)[34].

• The absence of a hierarchy system in relation to the seriousness of risks, threats and vulnerabilities makes it impossible to set the priorities of action, in order to address them and fight against them. The lack of hierarchy would be felt more widely if there was a correlation between the courses of action and the resources provided. Thus, the limitation of resources automatically leads to their distribution of priority courses of action.

• Presenting the vulnerabilities of national security can turn into a menace for the Romanian state. If the vulnerability represents a given, negative internal characteristic of Romania, then it must be spread only based on the principle of the need of knowledge. Analysing the sectorial strategies of the US and the Russian Federation, we ascertain that they use the term at general level and not at particular level, with the purpose of identifying a specific feature. Consequently, although the risks and threats are necessary for creating an international predictability of the Romanian state, publishing vulnerabilities in NDS 2015 becomes a potential menace to national security.

• Another element that fills in the field of SWOT analysis is the lack of identification and capitalization of security opportunities in the external and internal environment. In our opinion, *opportunity* represents using the potential of the security environment specific to a system, an entity (environment characterized by specific risks, vulnerabilities and threats) for its own purpose, with the aim of decreasing the intensity of the vector "less" security and augmenting the vector "more" security. Security

opportunities are identified in relation to security features, risks, vulnerabilities and threats. The importance of opportunity is vital, because it offers a proactive character to the strategies and it eliminates the reactive character. Unfortunately, NDS 2015 makes no reference – as, for example, the Security Strategies from 2015 of US and the Russian Federation – to capitalizing security opportunities.

Conclusions and proposals

By overlapping international security environment's dynamics with the process of regenerating security strategies, it is ascertained that the last years forced the world's states to re-think their method of security planning. With obstacles coming from the world's economic crisis, security planning forced political leadership to decrease the budget and to re-think defence as a multi-size component, which can be insured by approaches such as *pooling and sharing* resources.

The evolutions of security in the last two years re-ascertained the need of successive reconfigurations to approach security planning, especially in the North-Atlantic Alliance. The re-distribution of resources for the increase of state's security gained more and more strict and justified values (for example optimizing the use of NATO capabilities).

In this context, the SWOT analysis that we conducted in reference to NDS 2015 represents a useful frame for security practitioners. Following the analysis, we ascertained the progresses that Romania made in the area of security (the concept *wider security*, the new law on defence planning, political support of NDS 2015). The SWOT analysis highlighted the elements which we must focus on. Thus, lack of transparency regarding consultations and the failure to mention the staff who prepared the strategy can bring criticism to Romania. Also, the absence of an initial analysis process of prior strategies' results influences in a negative way strategic planning. In this case, the political leadership cannot guess what was the influence of previous measures on national security. It would have been useful to have the analysis of objectives' fulfilment in channelling

---

[34] In 2015, it was published together with the National Security Strategy.

future efforts, but also in setting out new strategic posts for Romania. We can thus identify the need of a very well informed practice, from which there results the regular review of NDS and obviously the implementation of a process of *evidence-based policies*. At the same time, lack of an analysis on provided resources (including financial ones) is likely to transform the strategy in a declaratory document, without organisational power.

Taking into consideration also the progress made by Romania in the area of security and defence planning, we consider necessary to stimulate the insertion of certain modern and sustainable approaches in this area. From our point of view, a pattern of approach adapted to the needs of 2016 can be identified at the intersection between (1) implementing some *evidence-based policies* that would connect NDS to decisional transparency and regular assessment of elements of analysis; (2) making the correlation between objectives, outcomes and resources by use of the comparative analyses; (3) setting an hierarchy system of the risks, vulnerabilities and threats to the national security and identifying the opportunities which our country has, both internally and externally.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Administrația Prezidențială, *Concepția integrată privind securitatea României*, București, 1994.

2. ***, Administrația Prezidențială, *Strategia Națională de Securitate a României - stabilitate democratică, dezvoltare durabilă și integrare Euro-Atlantică*, București, 1999.

3. ***, Administrația Prezidențială, *Strategia Națională de Securitate a României - Garantarea democrației și a libertăților fundamentale, dezvoltare economică și socială susținută și durabilă, aderare la NATO și integrare în Uniunea Europeană*, București, 2001.

4. ***, Administrația Prezidențială, *Strategia Națională de Securitate a României - România Europeană, România Euroatlantică: pentru o viață mai bună într-o țară democratică, mai sigură și prosperă*, București, 2007.

5. ***, Administrația Prezidențială, *Strategia Națională de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada 2015-2019 – O Românie puternică în Europa și în lume, București*, 2015.

6. ***, CM 9161 – *Great Britain National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, www.gov.uk/government/publications

7. ***, *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016-2020*, http://www.government.se/information-material/2015/06/swedens-defence-policy-2016-to-2020/

8. ***, *Finland Security Strategy For Society*, 2010, www.defmin.fi

9. ***, Session Report 2014-2015 regarding the next security strategy elaborated by Joint Committee of National Security Strategy of Great Britain, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/national-security-strategy/

10. ***, Legea 473/2004 privind planificarea apărării, Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 525 din 25 octombrie 2000.

11. ***, Legea 203/2015 privind planificarea apărării, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I nr. 555 din 27 iulie 2015.

12. ABBAS, Tehmina; ANDERSON, Eva; DIXON, Katherine; MACLACHLAN, Karolina, *Transparency International Results NATO members & partner states –Government defence anti-corruption index*, 2015, government.defenceindex.org

13. BRUGESS, Peter, *The Routledge handbook of new security studies*, Routledge, Oxford, 2010.

14. DE COURTEN, J., *Towards a more secure environment*, ICRC, Geneva, 1997.

15. GOMPERT, David; DAVIS Paul; JOHNSON Stuart; LONG, Duncan, *Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2008, pp. 10-25.

16. MARTINESCU, A. L., *Noua strategie de apărare cu totul insuficientă pentru preşedinţia UE a României din 2019*, 2015, www.romaniacurata.ro

17. PURCĂRUŞ, Alexandru, www.aesgs.ro

18. URAHN, K. Susan (Editors), *Report from the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative: Evidence-Based Policymaking - A guide for effective government*, Washington, 2014, pewtrusts.org/resultsfirst

19. WÆVER, Ole, *Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery*, Montreal: ISA Conference, 2004.

20. YARGER, Richard, *Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model*, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION FROM A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE

Daniel ROMAN, PhD*

Currently, the concept of critical infrastructure has exceeded the early stage of enunciating and clarifying the explanatory elements concerning the form and content. Methodological norms in the identification, designation and protection of critical infrastructures are able to regulate specific activities subjected to the passage of time and the core changes of infrastructure as critical at a certain point in time. The security plan of the operator owning a critical infrastructure is one of the instruments for measuring, analyzing and recording the values of the factors that directly or indirectly contribute to the level of criticality of the designated infrastructure. We consider particularly important that special attention should be given to developing this security document and especially to the working and updating methods. In this regard, we consider appropriate to approach the means of addressing the infrastructures from a systemic perspective, which can open new horizons on the activities of the liaison officer in charge with the Critical Infrastructure Protection.

Keywords: *security, critical infrastructure, scenario, systemic architecture, risk, danger, threat.*

1. Issues on critical infrastructure protection

Even if the domain of critical infrastructure protection is recent, important steps have been taken towards defining the basic notions and clarifying the concepts on vital sectors of the contemporary society as a whole. For answering questions like "who", "what" and "why are some infrastructures identified as critical", several answers have been formulated which are mainly related to their destination and role. Conceptually, critical infrastructures are "usually those infrastructures that the stability, safety and security of systems and processes depend on" or "that have an important role in ensuring the security in the functioning of systems and the conduct of the economic, social, political, informational and military processes"[1].

A first observation is related to one of the important characteristics of critical infrastructures research field, in terms of their manifestation as systems that operate according to well defined processes. These processes are designed to support the viability of a society as a whole and can be customized in accordance with functional areas such as: administration, public services, socio-economic, social assistance and health care institutions, communications and intelligence, army, civil protection and not least, food and water reserves, energy and transport networks, education and research, media.

Due to the complexity of each structure individually, we consider that it is difficult to

---

* Lieutenant-colonel Daniel ROMAN, PhD is Superior Instructor in the Land Forces Department within the Command and Staff Faculty, "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: danutroman2@yahoo.com

achieve a custom analysis and, hence, a security plan without taking into consideration the dynamic nature of the actions and the issues related to the interactions made between the analyzed entity and its environment. In military terms, referring to conducting operations, most often we encounter the concepts *operational framework* and *operational design*, which contain basic elements on the dual character of the actions in the sense of locating the military structure in question in terms of the internal and external interactions. In this regard, several reference documents have been developed and updated, which are mainly based on the concepts of: status, action, protection, background, vulnerability, risk and threat. Given the national priority on the issue of *critical infrastructure protection,* a number of documents have been developed, including the National Defence Strategy – NDS Guidance for the years 2015-

What is important to highlight and what results from the operational framework of the structures responsible for establishing an efficient and sustainable security environment is the so-called *safety culture*, which represents "the entirety of values, norms, attitudes and actions that determine the understanding and the implementation at the society level of the concept of security and the derived concepts: national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy, etc."[3]. In this context, an attitude is understood and developed, having a preventive role of countering risks, identifying potential threats and vulnerabilities of the infrastructures as a whole.

The need to address a systemic study on the topic of critical infrastructure protection results from the operational complexity of the responsible factors and the connections shown in the diagram of relations in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Design of the relations generated by NDS elaboration

Note: National Security Objective (NSO), Courses of Action (CA), Threats, Risks, Vulnerabilities (TRV)

2019, which clarifies the most important concepts used by security professionals. The aim of the guidance is "to facilitate the understanding of NDS and to explain the importance of security for the existence and the development of the society, targeting both the citizen and state institutions"[2].

The support of the actions for critical infrastructure's protection from a systemic

document approved by the Decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence no. 128 of 10th December 2015, http://csat.presidency.ro/?pag=43, accessed on 29.03.2016.
[3] Idem, p. 7
[4] Idem, p.11.

---

[2] Collective, *National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019,*

perspective requires at least a two-way approach, both from outside the analyzed structure and from within. It should be noted that, for designing each structure individually, the protection and safety conditions which describe the functioning of that specific structure have been met. Multiplying the number of factors that may destabilize the functioning of the structure in question can be analyzed from physical, spatial, informational etc. perspectives, which is an important detail in generating the list of potential threats, risks and vulnerabilities. For example, for the protection of the critical information infrastructures, the European Commission has identified five supporting pillars[5] of the protection framework:

1. Readiness and prevention: to ensure a high degree of readiness at all levels;

2. Detection and response: to provide adequate early warning mechanisms;

3. Recovery after incident and mitigation: to reinforce the defence mechanisms;

4. International cooperation: to promote EU priorities internationally;

5. Criteria for the information and communications technology (ICT): to support the implementation of the Directive on the identification and the designation of the European Critical Infrastructures[6].

As no infrastructure can exist in isolation, it must be analyzed in context. This is, from our point of view, the most difficult thing to do while developing the security plan of the operator/owner of a critical infrastructure. Defining the context can be assimilated to describing the operational environment where the concerned infrastructure is located or where it establishes interactions with other entities. Defining the

operational environment involves describing the circumstances, the conditions, and the factors that directly or indirectly influence the employment of the response capabilities of the infrastructure in question. Further on, we intend to analyze the most relevant issues regarding the conceptual integration of the systemic approach to an operator identified as a critical infrastructure.

2. Systemic perspective of critical infrastructures

Our argument on addressing critical infrastructures from a systemic perspective is supported by the strong character of interaction with the operational environment generated by the indispensability of that infrastructure. We start from the premise that the systemic approach can answer the "problem of the location" of an infrastructure from an operational point of view especially by the used notions: system, subsystem, structures, connections, objectives, processes, resources, behavior, mood, trajectory, time, incident, functionality, architecture, etc, which are indispensable notions that we will work with for explaining and arguing the aspects regarding the operator's security plan. Without going into detail on the history of the concept of system, we mention that Ludwig von Berthalanffy believed that "the system is a multitude of elements among which there are *not accidental relations or exchanges* that interact in order to achieve a common objective, which can be a law of nature or a goal set by man"[7].

For example, an economic unit can be defined as a system containing several elements (qualified personnel, manufacturing machinery, installations, energy, etc.) whose purpose is the achievement of certain pre-established goals: obtaining services or products. Depending on the nature of the achieved service or product,

---

[5] Et all, *Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, European Council, European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on critical information infrastructure protection*, Brussels, 2009, p.8 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2009/RO/1-2009-149-RO-F1-1.Pdf, accessed on 07.01.2016

[6] *Directive 2008/114/CE of the Council issued on 8th December 2008 concerning the identification and the designation of the European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection*, Brussels, 2008, http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/directiva114_RO.pdf?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:RO:PDF, accessed on 07.01.2016

[7] Manfred Drack, *Ludwig von Bertalanffy's early system approach,* Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Volume 26, Issue 5, September/October 2009, p. 4566, http://journals.isss.org/index.php/proceedings52nd/article/viewFile/1032/322 accessed on 03.02.2016.

these systems of elements can create economic infrastructure classified as simple, complex or that may become critical under certain well-defined circumstances. Interesting to our analysis are the ways of protecting that structure and its actions towards achieving the set objectives.

In order to understand the systemic nature of the infrastructures in general, we will proceed with a review of the key notions defining the concept of protection and security. When destabilizing factors act from the outside or from the inside, threatening the existence of the infrastructure or the manufacturing of goods or services, we say that the respective infrastructure is in a situation of danger. The state of danger is caused by an imminent incident or several

The systemic approach has two methods of defence or protection that are actually found in the operator's security plan: *the analysis* and *the prediction*. The analysis refers to the experience in terms of what happened, while the prediction uses facts and events that could take place in a near or more distant future. In accordance with the number and the nature of the departments that make up an infrastructure, a series of more realistic analyzes and predictions with an appropriate degree of particularization are conducted, which summed up, may or may not provide realistic and efficient security and protection, depending on the number of the decision makers and on the nature of the relations they achieve with the sensors (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Design of achieving the multiple connections between the analyzed system and its operational environment through the multilevel loops, depending on the decision-maker

incidents whose results are unfavorable or with serious consequences, of partial or total loss of that infrastructure and of the production capability. If we timely identify the potential incident with adverse consequences, and the circumstances, the conditions that may lead to the occurrence of that incident, then we say that we have established a risk. We note that a risk may occur or not, depending on the measures taken to counter or eliminate it. From the systemic point of view, our concern is to see if a structure has or not the potential to defend itself against a threat, namely whether or not the safety and protection conditions are met.

An important observation concerning the system of protecting "the system infrastructure" is linked to the three reference levels: *the control level*, *the policy level* and *the planning and assessment level*. In order to understand the classification level of the infrastructure protection, we must analyze which of the four possible situations that particular structure belongs to:

• *level 1 of protection through the primary loop*, meaning the interaction of the system is limited to direct resource exchanges: action – counteraction, reaction - counteraction;

• *level 2 of protection through the control loop*, where the current or past information is

processed, resulted from the primary loop No. 1, and the effectiveness depends on the ability and the adjustment of the decisions on the current actions of the system;

• *level 3 of protection* includes the feedback, more exactly it analyzes the value of the previous policies and transmits decisions in order to change the inadequate policies, i.e. it corrects the deficiencies between the obtained values in relation to the expected ones. Therefore, the efficiency at level 3 involves the ability of the decision-maker to change the decisions based on the information and the value judgments, relating to the previous policies.

• *level 4 of protection*, a higher level, implies *planning and assessing the functions*, and the results obtained from the system level to the lower levels of the organizational structure, i.e. an analysis at the level of self-control having a sustainability effect.

Regarding the destabilizing factors which generate states of danger to the system, namely to the infrastructure in question, two reaction loops are recorded: through feedback and through feed-forward. *The feedback control loop* involves an adaptation of the measures of adjusting the system and eliminating the danger in light of the actual past experience, either by correcting the negative values (filling the losses) or by adjusting the positive values (redistributing the forces, such as reinvesting the profit). *The feed-forward control loop* is a superior variant of control that operates on the predictions about the results of the future states of the infrastructure in question and it is only possible if there is responsibility for making decisions based on anticipatorily designed situations (the attribute of the monitoring-prediction block), as it can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Design variant of highlighting the role of the loop for adjusting the security status through feed-forward, materializing of the possible area of responsibility of the critical infrastructure protection liaison officer

In the literature, there are other tertiary loop control systems known that can solve real problems for which there are no algorithmic solutions. The so-called expert systems are part of the category of the highly complex systems with artificial intelligence.

Following the steps of quantifying, from a systemic perspective, the statuses in which an infrastructure can fit, regardless of its nature, presenting the feed-forward reaction loop is in terms of the quantifiers/indicators one of the important elements of the security plan. It can be customized after making the scenarios,

meaning after formulating the hypotheses about the possible occurrence of certain events with a negative impact on the specific infrastructure or on the process of achieving that vital service or product which classifies the operator as a critical infrastructure.

By applying the systemic approach, at the level of studying the infrastructure designated as critical, it is important to identify the means of regulating or controlling it, by adjusting the number of sensors and assuming the responsibility of decision-making, learnedly by feedback or, to a higher level, predictably by feed-forward. We appreciate that our systemic approach can support the achievement of the framework for protecting a critical infrastructure through: readiness and prevention, detection and response by providing adequate early warning mechanisms and recovery after incidents through mitigating the effects.

Conclusions and recommendations

Throughout this article, we expressed a number of opinions on how to systemically interpret the infrastructures designated as critical at a certain point in time. We have shown the role of the sensor systems responsible for collecting information and of the decision-maker systems regarding the reaction of the infrastructure to the actions of the disruptive factors for achieving the protection policies through feedback or planning and assessing the functions of that infrastructure in imminent events with negative impacts and serious consequences.

Following our approach, we are confident that the responsibly factors will pay more attention to understanding the place and role of the assigned critical infrastructure security plan and will correctly identify the nature of the loops adjusting the statuses of an infrastructure. In our opinion, it is important to adopt an appropriate behavior of the critical infrastructure to avoid and repel the danger by annihilating the threat or timely taking the most appropriate protection and security measures.

Another defining element is the explanation of the context, i.e. of the operational framework of an infrastructure, an element which can help us in the systemic analysis by determining the vectors of influence in defining the status of the infrastructure, which could be *safety* or *danger*. If the threat can be identified, then the threat associated to the action can be described and the risk can be correctly established. Consequently, only after establishing the risk and analyzing the situation of the specific infrastructure, we can move on to developing the security plan, based on the feedback or feed-forward reaction loops.

Considering the above explained issues, we suggest to identify the best solutions in terms of protecting the critical infrastructures through a systemic approach and a sound understanding of the external and internal security environment. Following the identification and explanation of the interactions, one can enunciate the circumstances of the possible occurrence of an event (favorable or unfavorable), subsequently develop the security plan aimed to protect the infrastructures considered to be critical. Last but not least, we recommend to correctly assess the responsibilities and the potential of the position of critical infrastructure protection liaison officer, and also to develop viable designs containing the information flows of the sensors specialized in monitoring the situations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ALEXANDRESCU, Grigore; VĂDUVA Gheorghe, *Infrastructuri critice. Pericole, ameninţări la adresa acestora. Sisteme de protecţie*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006.
2. BĂLĂCEANU, Ion; MARTIN Iulian, *Câmpul de luptă modern sub impactul tehnologiilor contemporane*, Ars Docendi Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003.
3. BOARU, Gheorghe, et all., *Aspecte ale conducerii sistemelor militare*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999.
4. Et all, *National Defence Strategy Guidance for 2015-2019*, document approved by decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence no. 128 of 10th December 2015.

5. Et all, *Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, European Council, European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on critical information infrastructure protection*, Brussels, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/ transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2009/RO/1-2009-149-RO-F1-1.Pdf.

6. *Directive 2008/114/CE of the Council issued on 8th December 2008 concerning the identification and the designation of the European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection,* Brussels, 2008, http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/directiva114_RO.pdf?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:RO:PDF.

7. DRACK, Manfred, *Ludwig von Bertalanffy's early system approach*, in Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Volume 26, Issue 5, September/October 2009, p. 566, http://journals.isss.org/index.php/proceedings52nd/article/viewFile/1032/322.

8. *GD. 271/2013 for the approval of Romania's Cyber Security Strategy and the national action plan on the implementation of the national cybersecurity system,* The Official Gazette of Romania, no. 296, Bucharest, 2013.

9. LEHACI, Tudorel, *Tendinţe în evoluţia sistemului de comandă şi control la nivel operativ*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

10. LEHACI, Tudorel; STANCU, Marian, *Gestionarea crizelor din perspectiva nivelului operativ de comandă şi control*, National Defence University "Carol I", Bucharest, 2010.

11. MARTIN, Iulian, *Raţionament şi argumentare în planificarea operaţiilor*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015.

12. ROMAN, Daniel, *Modele de lucru colaborative privind funcţionarea sistemelor de foc antiaerian din perspectiva unor armate moderne*, Research paper, Bucharest, 2014.

13. STEPHEN, P. Robbins, *Organizational Theory: Structure, Design, and Applications, Prentice Hall*, New Jersey, 1990.

14. ŞERBAN, Liviu, et all, *Doctrina Armatei României*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012.

15. The White House, *Executive Order 13010: Critical Infrastructure Protection*, 15 July 1996, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo13010.htm.

16. ŢIGĂNESCU, Eugen; MITRUŢ, Dorin, *Modelarea matematică. Rolul ei în cercetarea operaţională*, Course notes – Basics of operational research, Department of Economic Cybernetics, Economic Studies Academy Bucharest.

INFORMATION SYSTEM ON FOOD SECURITY IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO ENSURE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Filofteia REPEZ, PhD*
Mădălina-Steluţa PĂTRĂŞESCU NEACŞU**

Ensuring food security is a key priority of economic policies. Undertaking agricultural production and food production intended to ensure food security is the main objective of these policies. In conditions of accelerating globalization, ensuring food safety has become a cross-border issue, whereas many of the foods we consume come from countries outside the EU.

Based on these aspects, this paper has as general scientific objective to highlight those aspects generating food security and food insecurity with the effects they have on the achievement of sustainable development as well as highlighting relevant aspects of the Information System on Food Security (ISFS[1]) in Romania.

ISFS aims to make available to the beneficiaries of intelligence agro-products, as follows: evolution scenarios from food sector, periodic reports (weekly and monthly), timely alerts on emerging or probable crises (early warnings) and reports issued by experts from related food security sectors.

Keywords*: food security, food safety, food sovereignty, sustainable development,* Food Security Information System (ISFS), partnership.

1. Theoretical aspects on food security, food safety and food sovereignty

A complex definition of *food security* was formulated at the World Food Summit in 1996: "food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels is achieved when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life"[2].

The three pillars of food security recognized by World Health Organization (WHO) are: *availability* (ensuring enough food), *access* (existence of sufficient economic and physical resources to have the proper food for individual dietary needs) and the *use* (enough information about proper nutrition, water and hygiene).

Nowadays, food security became a complex problem of sustainable development. WHO

---

[1] In original (Romanian language, *Sistemul de Informaţii pe Securitatea Alimentară (SISA).*

[2] *Food security: concepts and measurement,* available online at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4671e/y4671e06.htm, accessed on March 5, 2016.

* Colonel Filofteia REPEZ, PhD. is Associate Professor within Security and Defence Faculty/ "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. Email: filofteiarepez@yahoo.com
** Mădălina-Steluţa PĂTRĂŞESCU NEACŞU is Founder President of Agrointelligence SISA and PhD. student within the "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. Email: office@ sisa.ro

considers there is enough food to satisfy the humankind necessities, but the problem is related to distribution. Also, there is an intense debate with pro and con arguments on the following specific issues: food needs can or cannot be covered by actual levels of production; domestic food security is extremely important or is not anymore owed to the global commerce; globalization can or cannot lead to the persistence of food insecurity in the rural communities[3].

Food safety is a component of food security that means "respect for hygienically-sanitary norms in the production-distribution process to guarantee population health by the consumption of safe sanitary food in terms of sanitation and nutrition, with the respect of the environment"[4]. Food safety means the manipulation on all the technological process with the respect of hygiene conditions for food from soil to consumer, thus they do not become a source of sickness of body and to prevent disease. To ensure food safety on national and international plan there is a series of norms, standards, codes of good practices and hygiene codes. WHO signalled that, in the late 50 years, food processing from producer to consumer drastically changed and there are frequent situations where contaminated food affects the health of consumers elsewhere[5].

International Confederation of Peasants (ICP) known as *Via Campesina* (*Peasant Way*) founded at the beginning of '80s, represented on all the continents, intensely promotes the *food sovereignty* concept. In regard to the Confederation, food sovereignty refers to "people's right to healthy food and culturally adequate produced by ecological and sustainable methods, as well as their right to

define own food and agriculture systems"[6]. The six principles of food sovereignty settled by ICP are: food for people, capitalizing the providers of food products, localized food systems, decision-taking locally, better knowledge and abilities and working with nature. Food sovereignty guarantees that the right to use and manage/administrate the land, territories, waters, livestocks and biodiversity must be handled by the producers of food.

2. Sustainable food security – new paradigm

As the world population continues to grow[7], it takes more effort and innovation for sustainable agricultural production, improving supply chain globally, reducing food and waste losses and providing a means of access to nutritious foods for those suffering from hunger and malnutrition. In 2012, almost a quarter of European Union population was exposed to the risk of poverty on a "rich continent"[8]. According to a recent study, 62 richest people in the world have a wealth equal to that of the 3.6 billion poor people of the world population[9].

Low agricultural productivity, low purchasing power, inadequate storage, processing and distribution infrastructure, limited investment rate and declining share of aid from donors for agriculture and rural development, insufficient food intake and inadequate dietary habits are some of the factors contributing to food insecurity and that, concomitantly, are considered the causes of poverty and of low level of economic development.

---

[3] *Food Security*, available online at http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en, accessed on February 15, 2016.

[4] Gheorghe Mencinicopschi, Diana-Nicoleta Raba, *Siguranţa alimentară – autenticitate şi trasabilitate*, Editura Mirton, Timişoara, 2005, p. 25.

[5] *10 facts on food safety*, available online at http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/food_safety/en, accessed on March 5, 2016.

[6] *What is food sovereignty*, available online at http://foodsecurecanada.org/who-we-are/what-food-sovereignty, accessed on March 6, 2016.

[7] On March 6, 2016, world population was 7,413,637,178 in conformity with the website http://www.worldometers.info/world-population.

[8] *Poverty in the European Union. The crisis and aftermath*, March 2016, p.32, available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/579099/EPRS_IDA%282016%29579099_EN.pdf, accessed on March 7, 2016.

[9] Information taken from website http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2016-01-18/global-poverty-oxfam-world-economic-forum, accessed on March 7, 2016.

Finding some new means to combat food insecurity is a constant preoccupation of the European Union. In 2013, the European Parliament and the European Council reached to an agreement as concerns the *Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) Programme* that benefits by a budget of 920 million euros for 2014-2020 period. It is designed to promote a high level of quality and sustainable workplaces, adequate and decent social protection, combating social exclusion and poverty, as well as improving work conditions. Also, through Horizon 2020 Work Program "Food security, sustainable agriculture, marine and maritime research and bio-economy" (one of directions to put into practise „Europe 2020" Strategy), it was set as overall goal the creation in the EU of a solid fundament, designed for food security sustenance on the basis of natural resources and sustainable development direction, adaptation and inovation direction, to identify persistent and eficient alternatives as answer to obsolete economy.

Reaching the overall goal will be done by *four calls* approaching all bio-economy sectors, from the sustainable exploitation of seas and oceans and the development of a *blue economy,* to the *intelligent agriculture climatically adapted* to the new patterns of development in rural areas and new bio goods and services.

• The first call refers to *sustainable food security*, a chain of values resilient and efficient from the resources perspective. It is the call adressed to the resilience and efficiency topic in the framework of food value chain, from primary production to processing healty and dietary food.

• The second call is about *blue growth* to prove a multitude of opportunities. This call will test, prove and rank products and services in order to bring to the market level innovative marine and maritime technologies and, at the same time, will explore interactions between the ocean environment and human health. Also, it will strengthen European capacity to observe and make up maps of oceans and seas basins and will improve professional capacities and competences of people working/training in the framework of blue economy.

• The third call is about *rural revitalization,* that refers to the encouragement of innovation and business opportunities. This call will focus on innovation and engine of rural development, with special emphasis on the framework conditions of innovation and the new business pattern adapted to the rural context and support the development of abilities in the rural community framework;

• And, last but not least, *bio innovation for sustainable goods and services* is about supporting the development of European bio-economy. The call will help to the provisioning of sustainable biomass stock for bio goods and services and will support the future development of bio markets, for example by promoting the engagement of involved parties.

Sustainable food security will support the flagship initiatives with China and partnership initiatives with the countries of East Asia in aquaculture, and with the African countries on food security, nutrition, sustainable agriculture and the creation of an international consortium on animal health.

3. SISA – designed to support sustainable agro-food security and main provider of agro-food security culture at national level

The 21st century is characterized by a knowledge and information society where different agencies or integrated information systems built in public-private partnership have the role to collect, evaluate and analyse data from different sectors in order to measure and estimate the level of (in)security locally, regionally, nationally and globally.

World Food Summit (November 1996) acknowledged the need for a transparent and integrated informational framework on agro-food security to aim the fight against food crises in the new globalization paradigm. Therefore, in 1997, Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS) international

program was achieved to consolidate and disseminate agro-strategic information to the decisional environment and civil society.

Government representatives decided, by the implementation of such integrated systems, to make every effort to reduce by half the number of undernourished people (estimated at 800 million) in the period 2015-2020. Also, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has long been involved in promoting these systems for agro-food security and sustainable agriculture which is directly related to the concept of food security. In many countries, the integration of such systems to help monitor agro-security level was carried out based on a methodological framework accustomed on features of the beneficiary country.

In Romania, a coherent, integrated and efficient nationwide framework in terms of preventing and combating insecurity food by proposing sustainable socio-economic alternatives was performed in 2014 as the Information System on Food Security (ISFS - SISA).

The systems has as goal to put to the agro-food sector beneficiaries' disposal some intelligence products consisting in: evolution scenarios from food sector, periodic reports (weekly and monthly), timely alerts on emerging or probable crises (early warnings), and expert reports issued by experts from related food security sectors (agro meteorology, agro-commerce and agro economy, agro-food production, soil management, soil science, agrochemical, agro genetics, entomology, etc.).

Starting point in the SISA design was to prevent, maintain and develop agro-food security. In this regard, SISA organizes conferences and analysis programs, supports and carries out training in the field, offers advice and provides to the beneficiaries specialized publications to monitor risks and threats on individual and collective level (institutions/organizations). Specifically, SISA means a vast network of partners and collaborators specialized in collecting and analysing data on food security, food safety and food sovereignty. Its purpose

is to enable beneficiaries of agro-food sector to meet agricultural challenges by information and prior knowledge by delivering Agrointelligence information obtained by integrated analysis.

The leading provider of agronomy, agro-technology and strategic consulting, SISA combines innovation with the latest information on the specialists' research.

In Romania, SISA has firstly spread agro-food security culture nationally by organizing tailored agro-strategic programs and events aimed to assess food needs and orientation and implementation of agro-strategic solutions in preventing and combating emergencies or natural disasters. As an element of continuity, first step of SISA was the publication of the book "Agrointelligence. Agro-food security - a new paradigm of globalization", which analyses the food security/insecurity level in Romania and in the Euro-Atlantic area by identifying risks and threats nationally, regionally and globally. Throughout this volume, it tried to define and understand the *agrointelligence* term closely related to the concept of *economic intelligence*, as both concepts are complementary in the new paradigm of globalization, providing a strategic and operational vision over the agro-economic sector.

SISA brings new in matters a practice of informational exchange beyond political and economic interests of investors and multinational corporations oriented to productivity growth, socio-economic environment development and long-term anticipation and prevention of food crises. Agro-strategic information flows create interdependent relations and eliminate possible threats and risks at individual/collective in terms of accessibility, availability, usability and stability of food.

On February 17, 2016, SISA held the first Agrointelligence Café, with the topic "The level of agro-food (in)security in the former communist countries". The subject has been under discussion in the first online brainstorming on agro-food security[10] organized by the same group of SISA

---

[10] In conformity to the SISA official site, http://www.sisa. ro/18-noutati/80-s-a-dat-startul-la-primul-brainstorming-online-pe-in-securitatea-agroalimentar%C4%83.html, accessed on March 10, 2016.

analysis[11]. Given the complexity of the topic and the desire to create an objective analysis by a multi-dimensional/multidisciplinary approach, in the program framework participated a number of renowned experts from various fields, with extensive experience as intelligence analysts or other stakeholders. Assumptions were built starting from the situation before and after the '90s, where they identified common problems of other former communist countries versus the situation in Romania, each expert coming with their vision on the issue[12].

SISA aimed to hold an agro-strategic debate on the concerned subject as the expert method becomes a solution to this problem to identify those interdisciplinary topics (geopolitical, geo-economic, socio-economic, environmental, legal agricultural, etc.). Extending the analysis also to the former communist countries was due to the presentation of the agro-food insecurity risks on national level, which can be fully notified through a comparative approach but also synchronic and diachronic of the evident aspects.

On March 30, 2016, SISA organized the second edition of Agrointelligence Café on "Sovereignty and Food Safety in Romania", wherein renowned experts in the food industry, analysts of intelligence, agro-economists, sociologists and lawyers debated nationally food insecurity issues in terms of access to safe and healthy food[13]. The aim of conducting this event was to find efficient socio-agro-eco-bio-economic solutions in the context of vulnerabilities and threats against the agro-food sector. The directions of analysis were focused on indicators to monitor food sovereignty and security, complementary elements of food safety: agro-commercial sovereignty of Romania in the context of trade globalization; ensuring respect for human rights in a world governed by economic freedoms; role and freedom of the mass-media

in providing useful and relevant information on the factors of agro-food insecurity; priority of local agricultural production to ensure safe and healthy food needs locally, regionally and nationally; keeping small farmers access to land, water resources, agricultural inputs and farm financial resources; biodiversity conservation in the context of agro-industrial development; genetic modification and agrarian reforms to maintain the agro-food stability and utility; the impact of foreign capital investments on food sovereignty and food security at national level; right to information and knowledge in terms of the level of participation of the population in agro-strategic debates; Romania's right to protect itself against agro-food imports at prices too low relative to the cost of domestic production[14].

On April 7, 2016, SISA and the Confederation of Peasants Associations of Romania (CPAR) organized the third edition of Agrointelligence Café, under the theme "Fair agro-food trade in Romania in the context of unmodified Law no. 321/2009 on food marketing". During the event, there were defined and publicly debated several issues of food security: *availability* – sufficient quantity; *access* to sufficient (economic and physical) resources for a proper individual food diet; use – to have enough information about nutrition, water and adequate sanitation; *stability* of the first three conditions. Also, efforts were made to amend and to support the law on food marketing to meet great challenges of the Romanian vegetable sector in the third millennium. The main conclusions at the end of the event were that Romania must implement a number of measures to comply with European requirements on combating structural causes of food insecurity and responding to new challenges and that food safety of the consumer remains a global challenge, which relates to the availability of food and easy access of people to these. It was also revealed that food security and food safety of consumers by food law, providing domestic market and protecting human health is an increasingly important public issue argued

[11] In conformity to the SISA official site, http://www.sisa.ro/18-noutati/81-prima-cafenea-agrointelligence.html, accessed on March 10, 2016.

[12] In conformity to the SISA official site, http://www.sisa.ro/evenimente.html, accessed on March 9, 2016.

[13] The authors of the present article contributed to the activity.

[14] In conformity to the data published by Newsint electronic journal, https://newsint.ro/global-news/romania/bucuresti-sisa-organizeaza-doua-cafenea-agrointelligence/.

by: illnesses related to food, usually infectious or toxic in nature, caused by agents ingested in food; the magnitude of these diseases – how much they are widespread among the population and create public health problems both in developed countries and in developing ones; the overall incidence of illnesses caused by food is difficult to estimate, however, in 2005, according to statistics, 1.8 million people died from diarrheal disease, which is caused largely by food and drinking water; for infants and young children, diarrhoea is caused by malnutrition; in industrialized countries, the percentage of the population suffering from illnesses caused by food is up to 30%[15].

Therefore, SISA cancels errors and uncertainties from the agro-commercial level and trains the increasing of the local, national and regional competitiveness, through access to agro-strategic knowledge and information. This new interdependent approach regards multi-functional aspects on geo-economic and geo-strategic level, aiming to prevent and combat food insecurity. Thus, partial and fragmented information are replaced with complex and useful agro intelligence-type information, reducing bottlenecks in decision-making and creating transparency for the private sector. The new matrix of indicators is based on new concepts and integrated methods, which are aimed at a diagnostics-type analysis on agro-food systems wherein the evaluation of the sector is performed from the perspective of sustainable development at national and European level, development that will propose integrated socio-agro-bio-economic solutions in the new globalized context.

Conclusions

For a long time, food security is a key issue worldwide given that hunger has become a global threat (currently 774,134,943 people are malnourished[16]). Sustainable food security is not only a call to achieve the overall objective specified in the Programme for Employment and Social Innovation, but also a paradigm that can generate the knowledge of rural realities, increasing the contribution of the agro-food sector for the resumption of sustainable economic growth.

Sustainable food security means sustainable systems of food production, safe food and healthy diet, and systems for global food security. By agro-strategic knowledge and information, which may be defined as information management on agro-food security, a possible agro-food crisis would be prevented and combated. Holding information and anticipating agro-strategic developments will result in the management of uncertainty and building some strategies oriented to the development and implementation of integrated solutions to the agro-food sector. This is a strong argument that explains the need for a Food Security Information System (SISA), in public-private partnership to ensure sustainable development at national and EU level.

Furthermore, we present other arguments justifying the need for SISA, as well as facilitating globalization and transparency of agro-strategic information at national and European level and enrolment in the goals set out in the framework of World Food Summit in November 1996. At the same time, it would be provided a simple, adapted instrument to the current geopolitical context, which is in continuous evolution, and could be provided an objective picture of the agro-food insecurity situation in areas already affected by food crises.

In addition, SISA would ensure better management by this integrated approach of vulnerable groups and more effective application of government programs for social assistance to climb the socio-economic crisis. It requires an agro-strategic program for the monitoring,

---

[15] Stefano Guandalini, Haleh Vaziri (eds.), *Diarrhea: Diagnostic and Therapeutic Advances*, Humana Press, Springer, 2011, p. 3, available at: https://books.google.ro/books?id=BstHGdtpb9AC&pg=PA2&lpg=PA2&dq=1.8+million+ people+died+from+diarrheal+disease&source=bl&ots=6GNenh288v&sig=9HBlkOfNx00tZALIPesv5oC2WxI&hl=ro&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi3qfacn67MAhVM0hoKHQxFCnYQ6AEIXTAI#v=onepage&q=1.8%20million%20people%20died%20from%20diarrheal%20disease&f=false, accessed on March 9, 2016.

[16] Worldometers website, http://www.worldometers.info/ro/, accessed on March 7, 2016.

analysis, evaluation and dissemination of agro intelligence that could use to the strategic partnership with the US and EU in matters of agro-food security, but also to the policy makers and civil society at national level. This national program will collect and analyse primary and secondary information from the agro-food sector in order to provide regular early warnings on food availability, accessibility, utility and stability. It is known that private statistical agencies and (non) governmental organizations increasingly need more useful and relevant information to generate efficient socio-agro-bio-economic solutions in the food sector and to manage potential food crisis. Information provided by ministries or other specialized authorities are insufficient in today's complex and asymmetric world, which requires the establishment, in parallel, of integrated systems on food security to proposes regular strategic analyses for the beneficiaries in this sector.

SISA goal is to find the right balance between information generated by both (public/private) parties by monitoring and management of agro-food triggers of insecurity at local, national, regional and global levels. In addition, through this integrated agro-food system is made the forecast of the evolution of the agricultural segment and informing the beneficiaries from the public/ private on operational and strategic methods to halt the factors of agro-food insecurity, which is a competitive advantage for all players in the food markets of national, European and international level.

There is not zero risk, especially in such a sector in which the triggers are unstable and unpredictable. Therefore, SISA provides cooperation with academia environments and public/private partnerships that will help to the gathering of multi-sectorial data about weather changes, changes in crop and agro-economics yields. By performing agro-strategic cafés, it is aimed to integrate relevant and useful information to produce knowledge and create a strategic framework of solutions for decision-making environment in terms of preventing and combating food insecurity in the EU.

In our opinion, new agro-economic models socially and economically sustainable, as the

Information System on Food Security (SISA), are necessary for the preservation of ecosystems, both for the contemporary generation and for the future society. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations at all levels must eliminate the gap between food security, food sovereignty, agriculture, socio-economic security and environmental policies requiring integrated agro-food security at national and global level, designed to manage real-time risks, threats and vulnerabilities of this sector and prevent acute food insecurity, sometimes triggering asymmetric conflicts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. GUANDALINI, Stefano; VAZIRI, Haleh (eds.), *Diarrhea: Diagnostic and Therapeutic Advances*, Humana Press, Springer, 2011.

2. MENCINICOPSCHI, Gheorghe; RABA, Diana-Nicoleta, *Siguranţa alimentară – autenticitate şi trasabilitate*, Editura Mirton, Timişoara, 2005.

3. NEACŞU PĂTRĂŞESCU, Mădălina Steluţa, *Agrointelligence Securitatea agroalimentară – o nouă paradigmă a globalizării*, Editura Institutul European, Bucureşti, 2016.

4. *Newsint* journal, https://newsint.ro

5. Food Secure Canada Website, http://foodsecurecanada.org/who-we-are/what-food-sovereignty

6. UN Website, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/foodagriculture

7. EP Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu

8. SISA Website, http://sisa.ro/

9. EU Website, http://ec.europa.eu/

10. World Health Organization official website, http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/food_safety/en/

11. Wired.co.uk Website, http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2016-01/18/global-poverty-oxfam-world-economic-forum

12. Wordometers Website, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/

THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING. CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMAT

Irina TĂTARU, PhD

How sad is to realise nature speaks and people do not listen!
C`est une triste chose de songer que la nature parle et que le genre humain n'ècoute pas!
Victor Hugo, 1840[1]

Naomi Klein is not only an award winning Canadian author, journalist and climate and environmental activist, she is also well known for often publishing in *The Nation* and *The Guardian,* for her documentaries and for the detailed political analysis and critiques of the global corporatism and capitalism. Her most popular published works are *No Logo* (2000) and *The Shock Doctrine* (2007), the latter being translated in 30 languages.

Her more recent book, published in September 2014, *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate*, is the 2014 winner of the prestigious Hilary Weston Writers' Trust Prize for Nonfiction and has been translated into over 20 languages.

---

[1] Œuvres complètes de Victor Hugo, vol 35, Editura Jeanlouis Cornuz (Paris: Editions Recontre, 1968).

The Romanian translation of Mrs. Klein's book "This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate" was issued by the Vellant Publishinghouse at the beginning of this year[2].

The paper is structured in three parts[3]. The first – **Bad timing** has five chapters, all with illustrative names: *The Right is right. The Revolutionary Power of Climate Change; Hot Money. How Free Market Fundamentalism Helped Overheat the Planet; Public and paid for. Overcoming the ideological Blocks to the Next Economy; Planning and Banning. Slapping the invisible hand, Building a movement; Beyond Extractivism: Confronting the Climate Denier Within.*

The second part – **Magical thinking** – consists of three chapters, namely: Fruits, Not Roots: The Disastrous Merger of Big Business and Big Green; No Messiahs: The Green Billionaires Won't Save Us; Dimming the Sun: The Solution to Pollution Is... Pollution? And lastly, the final part – **Starting anyway** – presents five chapters: Blockadia: The New Climate Warriors; Love Will Save This Place: Democracy, Divestment, and the Wins So Far; You and What Army? Indigenous Rights and the Power of Keeping Our Word; Sharing the Sky: The Atmospheric Commons and the Power of Paying our Debts; The Rights to Regenerate: Moving from Extraction to Renewal.

This is a well-documented book, each chapter being accompanied by numerous bibliographical records worth a total of more than 500 notes. The author herself mentions that it took her five years to write it.

In this volume, the author combines scientific and journalistic investigation with principles from economics, geopolitics, psychology, ethics & activism to create its arguments and to articulate the right questions about the environment. Here, Klein is portraying environmental change as an alarm bell that forces us to improve our economic system, a system which is already outdated in many respects.

N. Klein closely backs her vision: The massive reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) effect emissions represents the solution for diminishing social inequality, the reassembly of destroyed democracies and the reconstruction of local non-functional economies. We already know that if we are allowing GHG emissions to grow from year to year, climate changes will completely transform the world we live in., states the author.

The book presents the neoliberal market fundamentalism hegemony as the main blocker for all essential reforms to stop climate changes and to protect the environment. In democracies led by interest groups, the big polluters will, win while the rest of us will watch the world die in different forms of passivity and complicity. Our economic and planetary system are at war, says Klein.

However, as fully aware of the disastrous implications of climate change, the author also brings up one of the most important questions for the readers: Can we make it till the end? Her answer has hope, empowering the humans when saying: All I know is that nothing is inevitable. Nothing with the exception of the fact that climate change transforms everything. And for a very short time, the nature of this change still depends on us.

Following the launching of the book in the United States, Rob Nixon's opinioned in *The New York Times*: "To call This Changes Everything environmental is to limit Klein's considerable agenda." [4]

The author should also receive massive credits for pulling out the ecology doctrine from the conservationist niche, the way it is usually perceived by many, and for enabling a further fighting platform for social and economic rights through analytical and factual arguments.[5]

Irina TĂTARU, PhD

Translated from Romanian by Iulia Andreea Bolea.

---

[2] Naomi Klein, *Asta schimbă totul. Capitalism vs. Mediu*, Publishing Vellant, Bucureşti, 2016, 419 pages.

[3] https://books.google.ro/books?id=lgZZAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=ro&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/books/review/naomi-klein-this-changes-everything-review.html?_r=1

[5] http://totb.ro/capitalism-vs-mediu/

THE WORKSHOP CORRELATION MILITARY GEOGRAPHY – GEOSTRATEGY – GEOPOLITICS IN SECURITY STUDIES –

- March 24, 2016 -

The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defense University holds annually, since 2014, two workshops: one at the beginning of each academic semester. Events like this are addressed to academics as well as students, MA and PhD students interested in the field of security and defence. CDSSS activities provide a framework in which participants can benefit from the expertise of national specialists and are a good opportunity for exchange of ideas and knowledge on the issues addressed, as well as to deepen certain aspects related to the subject. The workshops are dynamic, interactive, based on discussions and exchanges of views.

At the workshop in March, there attended representatives from "Carol I" National Defence University and the Ministry of National Defence, but also from civilian universities like the University of Bucharest, Bucharest University of Economic Studies and University of Southeast Europe *Lumina* (Light).

In the activity there attended, from "Carol I" National Defence University, the CDSSS Director, Colonel Stan Anton, PhD, who presented a paper on *Military Geography Epistemology and Dialectics*, Lieutenant-Colonel Dorel Buse, PhD professor, from Security and Defence Faculty, with the paper

State *Power Projection in International Relations*, Colonel Laurențiu Grigore, PhD professor, from the Command and Staff Faculty, entitled *Military Geography - past, present and future* and last but not least, Colonel Manuel Dogaru, PhD, from the Centre for War Games and Doctrinal Experiments spoke about *Operational Requirements of Geographic Patterns*.

There also presented papers academics with civilian universities. Thus, Mr Silviu Neguţ, PhD Professor and Marius-Cristian Neacsu, PhD Associate Professor from Bucharest University of Economic Studies presented a paper entitled "Military Geography – Geopolitcs – Geostrategy" and Mr. Florin Diaconu, PhD Associate Professor from the University of Bucharest, the paper "Some issues on Geography, Defence and Security in the Aegean Sea".

The main topics discussed during the Workshop are those related to new elements in the evolution of Military Geography. Thus, there was approached the relationship between Military Geography, Geopolitics and Geostrategy, but also epistemology and dialectics of Military Geography.

We believe that this event has enjoyed a good audience and a high level expertise, and participants understood the importance of Military Geography, Geopolitics and Geostrategy in the context of the new threats of the XXI Century. The activity reached its main objective, which was to disseminate the latest studies and research in the field of Military Geography, Geopolitics and Geostrategy and, at the same time, it promoted the dialogue between scientific community members who took part in the Workshop.

Irina TĂTARU, PhD

Translated from Romanian by Andreea Simona Cucu.

CDSSS AGENDA

Since the beginning of 2015-2016 academic year, CDSSS regularly elaborates, under the name *Dynamics of the security environment,* a new series of analyses on highly topical issues related to the regional and international agenda with an influence on Romania's interests. These analyses are an important part of the scientific research activity in the field of defence and security, designed to respond to the need of understanding the dynamism and complexity of the security environment and the evolution of the contemporary military phenomenon.

Thus, from the beginning of the academic year, such analyses have been developed, addressing issues such as the Middle East and North Africa; Ukraine; International migration; Terrorist attacks in Paris; European refugee crisis; North Korea's nuclear program; The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI); Implications on regional security; Europe under siege by Islamist terrorism; North Korean crisis, between sanctions and escalation; The political crisis in Moldova; Resumption of military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh; European refugee crisis. All these analyses can be read in Romanian language on the CDSSS website at http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/dms.htm.

Furthermore, the series of monthly public lectures at the National Military Circle was continued with the following themes: *Asymmetry and the hybrid character of contemporary wars* presented by Colonel Stan Anton, PhD; *Comparative Analysis of mutual assistance clause and collective defense in the light of recent developments in European security*, delivered by Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Researcher and *Epistemology versus security studies*, exposed by Mihai Zodian, PhD Researcher.

UNIVERSITATEA NAȚIONALĂ DE APĂRARE „CAROL 1"
Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate

DINAMICA MEDIULUI DE SECURITATE
DECEMBRIE 2015 – IANUARIE 2016

CRIZA EUROPEANĂ A REFUGIAȚILOR (III)

PROGRAMUL NUCLEAR AL COREEI DE NORD

GAZODUCTUL TURKMENISTAN-AFGANISTAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA (TAPI). IMPLICAȚII ASUPRA SECURITĂȚII REGIONALE

The most important activity in the first quarter of 2016 was a workshop on *The Correlation Military Geography - Geostrategy - Geopolitics in Security Studies*, organised on March 25, 2016, where were presented lectures both by military and civilian university academics.

CDSSS is holding an international scientific symposium on *Major challenges for the security of Euro-Atlantic area* on May 26 and for the autumn is planned the workshop *Cross-border threats and political risk*, to take place on October 6.

The Annual International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI on *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment* will be organised on November 24-25.

Details of all scientific activities organized by CDSSS will be announced on the website at: http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/manifestari.htm.

Irina TĂTARU, PhD

Translated from Romanian by Andreea Simona Cucu.

GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual academic journal *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

ARTICLE LENGTH may vary between 6-12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE

* Title (centred, capital, bold characters, font 24).
* A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD. title or PhD. candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
* A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters)
* 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters)
* Introduction / preliminary considerations
* 2 - 4 chapters (subchapters if applicable)
* Conclusions.
* Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format as well.

In the case of tables, please mention above "**Table no. X**: Title", while in the case of figures there shall be mentioned below (eg. maps etc.), "**Figure no. X:** Title" and the source, if applicable, shall be mentioned in a footnote.

* REFERENCES shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of footnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: Joshua S. Goldstein; Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010, pp. 356-382.

Example of article: Gheorghe Calopăreanu, "Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union" in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year). *Example of article*: John N. Nielsen, "Strategic Shock in North Africa", in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/, accessed on 10.03.2014.

* BIBLIOGRAPHY shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations,* Longman Publishinghouse, 2010.

Example of article: CALOPĂREANU, Gheorghe, "Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union" in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents. *Example of article*: NIELSEN, John N., "Strategic Shock in North Africa", in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/.

SELECTION CRITERIA are the following: the theme of the article must be in line with the subjects dealt by the journal: up-to-date topics related to political-military aspects, security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence; the quality of the scientific content; originality of the paper; novelty character – it should not have been priorly published; a relevant bibliography comprising recent and prestigious specialized works; English language has to correspond to academic standards; adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the journal. Editors reserve the right to request authors or to make any changes considered necessary.

SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION PROCESS is developed according to the principle *double blind peer review*, by university teaching staff and scientific researchers with expertise in the field of the article. The author's identity is not known by evaluators and the name of the evaluators is not made known to authors. Authors are informed of the conclusions of the evaluation report, which represent the argument for accepting/rejecting an article. Consequently to the evaluation, there are three possibilities: a) the article is accepted for publication as such or with minor changes; b) the article may be published if the author makes recommended improvements (of content or of linguistic nature); c) the article is rejected. Previous to scientific evaluation, articles are subject to an *antiplagiarism analysis*.

DEADLINES: authors will send their articles in English to the editor's e-mail address, **impactstrategic@unap.ro**, according to the following time schedule: 15 December (no. 1); 15 March (no. 2); 15 June (no. 3) and 15 September (no. 4). If the article is accepted for publication, an integral translation of the article for the Romanian edition of the journal will be provided by the editor.

NOTA BENE: Articles shall not contain classified information.

Authors are fully responsible for their articles' content, according to the provisions of *Law no. 206/2004 regarding good conduct in scientific research, technological development and innovation*.

Published articles are subject to the Copyright Law. All rights are reserved to "Carol I" National Defence University, irrespective if the whole material is taken into consideration or just a part of it, especially the rights regarding translation, re-printing, re-use of illustrations, quotes, dissemination by mass-media, reproduction on microfilms or in any other way and stocking in international data bases. Any reproduction is authorized without any afferent fee, provided that the source is mentioned.

Failing to comply with these rules shall trigger article's rejection. Sending an article to the editor implies the author's agreement on all aspects mentioned above.

For more details on our publication, you can access our site, http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm or contact the editors at impactstrategic@unap.ro.