

**“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY  
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES**



# STRATEGIC IMPACT

**No. 4[53]/2014**

Quarterly academic journal acknowledged by CNATDCU,  
Indexed in CEEOL, ProQuest, EBSCO, IndexCopernicus  
international databases

**“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING HOUSE  
BUCHAREST**



## EDITORIAL COUNCIL

Gabriel-Florin MOISESCU, PhD professor, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania, Chairman  
Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, PhD professor, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania  
Ion ROCEANU, PhD professor, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania  
Vasile BUCINSCHI, PhD professor, “Henri Coandă” Air Force Academy, Romania  
Florin DIACONU, PhD assistant professor, University of Bucharest, Romania  
Stan ANTON, PhD lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania  
Mircea TĂNASE, PhD., General Staff, Ministry of National Defence, Romania  
Pavel NECAS, PhD professor eng., Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the European Union, Belgium  
Bohuslav PRIKRYL, PhD professor, National Defence University, Czech Republic  
John L. CLARKE, PhD professor, “George C. Marshall” European Centre for Security Studies, Germany  
Ilias ILIOPOULOS, PhD professor, Naval War College, Greece  
Adrian GHEORGHE, PhD professor eng., Old Dominion University, USA  
Georgi DIMOV, PhD associate professor, National Defence Academy, Bulgaria  
Boguslaw PACEK, PhD associate professor, National Defence University, Poland  
Dana PERKINS, PhD, UN Security Council, USA  
Gabor BOLDIZSÁR, PhD, National University of Public Service, Hungary  
Dario MATIKA, PhD, Institute for Research and Development of Defence Systems, Croatia

## SCIENTIFIC BOARD

Mirela ATANASIU, PhD researcher	Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD senior researcher
Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, PhD senior researcher	Visarion NEAGOE, PhD professor
Cristina BOGZEANU, junior researcher	Toma PLEȘANU, PhD professor eng.
Florian CÎRCIUMARU, PhD lecturer	Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD senior researcher
Ioan CRĂCIUN, PhD professor	Eduard VITALIS, PhD lecturer
Pascu FURNICĂ, PhD	Mihai ZODIAN, PhD junior researcher

## EDITORS

Stan ANTON, PhD lecturer, editor in chief  
Daniela RĂPAN, deputy editor in chief  
Mihai ZODIAN, PhD, editor in charge of “Colocviu strategic” supplement

### Contact address:

Șoseaua Panduri, nr. 68-72, Sector 5, București, România

Telephone: +4021-319.56.49, Fax: 4021-319.57. 80

E-mail: [impactstrategic@unap.ro](mailto:impactstrategic@unap.ro)

Websites: [http://cssas.unap.ro/index\\_en.htm](http://cssas.unap.ro/index_en.htm), <http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm>,

[http://impactstrategic.unap.ro/index\\_en.html](http://impactstrategic.unap.ro/index_en.html)

### Disclaimer:

Opinions expressed within published materials belong strictly to authors and do not represent the position of CDSSS/ “Carol I” NDU.

Authors are fully responsible for their articles' content, according to the provisions of Law no. 206/2004 regarding good conduct in scientific research, technological development and innovation.

ISSN 1842-9904 (on-line); ISSN-L 1841-5784



# CONTENTS

<b><i>EDITOR'S NOTE</i></b> .....	5
<b><i>POLITICAL-MILITARY TOPICALITY</i></b>	
<b><i>Political-military Crises in the Wider Black Sea Area: from Chronic to Acute</i></b> Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD.....	7
<b><i>Trends in Arms Production, Transfers and Trade</i></b> Florin DIACONU, PhD.....	18
<b><i>The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</i></b> Marin DĂNCĂU, PhD.....	26
<b><i>NATO AND EU: POLICIES, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS</i></b>	
<b><i>2014 NATO Summit – Future Implications</i></b> Daniel-Nicolae BĂNICĂ.....	34
<b><i>CSDP Development Dynamics: Reference Points and Future Scenarios</i></b> Valentin IACOB.....	43
<b><i>The Current Global Economic Environment's Impact on Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing Concepts' Implementation</i></b> Gheorghe STOIU, PhD.....	54
<b><i>SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY</i></b>	
<b><i>Is Hybrid Warfare Something New?</i></b> Crăişor-Constantin IONIŢĂ, PhD.....	61
<b><i>Comprehensive Approach' Operationalization in Counterinsurgency. Aspects of Military Contribution</i></b> Marius Valeriu PĂUNESCU, PhD.....	72



**ANALYSES, SYNTHESSES, EVALUATIONS**

*The Problematic Sovereignty of Failed States: Crisis Management Lessons*  
Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU, PhD ..... 83

*Gulf Crisis and War Reparations Process*  
Ecaterina MAȚOI ..... 94

*The Role of Discourse in Intelligence Analysis*  
Ruxandra BULUC, PhD ..... 106

*Observations Regarding the Actuality of the Hybrid War. Case study: Ukraine*  
Alba Iulia Catrinel POPESCU ..... 118

**BOOK REVIEW**

*The Last Mission*, author: Ion DUMITRAȘCU  
Daniela RĂPAN ..... 134

**SCIENTIFIC EVENT**

*STRATEGIES XXI “The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment”, 25-26 November 2014*..... 136

**CDSSS AGENDA**

*Activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, October-December 2014* ..... 138

**GUIDE FOR AUTHORS**..... 140



## EDITOR'S NOTE

Dear collaborators and readers,

The current edition – the fourth and last of 2014 – at the same time, the amplest of the year, subscribes to the usual thematic of the publication.

Our colleague Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Junior Researcher opens the Rubric **Political-Military Topicality** with an analysis of the pungent topic of the *Political-Military Crises in the Wider Black Sea Area*, seeing it developing *from Chronic to Acute*.

The second article, signed by Associate Professor Florin Diaconu, PhD from the University of Bucharest and Senior Researcher with the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, approaches the theme of weapon proliferation, in an article titled *Trends in Arms Production, Transfers and Trade*. The paper was delivered at the Workshop organised by CDSSS on September 25 with the theme “Post-Crisis Geo-Economical Trends”.

In the same rubric, we included a contribution on the problematic linked to *The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*, signed by Colonel Marin Dăncău, PhD.

Under the umbrella of **NATO and EU Policies, Strategies, Actions**, there are three articles, the first bringing into our readers' attention the topics discussed and decided at 2014 NATO Summit held in UK and respectively the future implications for the Euro-Atlantic security, composed by Colonel Daniel-Nicolae Bănică.

The second article, signed by Colonel Valentin Iacob deals with *CSDP Development Dynamics*, from the point of view of *Reference Points and Future Scenarios*. The rubric ends with a paper in which Gheorghe STOIU, PhD analyses *The Current Global Economic Environment's Impact on Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing Concepts' Implementation*.

In the section **Security and Military Strategy**, we bring to the readers' attention the *Hybrid War* concept, Colonel Crăişor-Constantin Ioniţă, PhD tackling the subject in an article in which he tries to answer the question *Is Hybrid Warfare Something New?*

In the following paper, Major Marius Valeriu Păunescu, PhD Lecturer presents his research results on *Comprehensive Approach' Operationalization in Counterinsurgency* from the perspective of *Military Contribution*.

The last but not least important rubric – **Analyses, Syntheses, Evaluations** – includes four papers different but complementary regarding the topics approached: Lieutenant Colonel Iuliana-Simona Țuțuianu, PhD analyses *The Problematic Sovereignty of Failed States*, suggesting a few *Crisis Management Lessons*.

Next, Mrs. Ecaterina Mațoi deals with an interesting subject, namely *War Reparations Process*, exemplified by *the Gulf Crisis*.

Then, Ruxandra Buluc, PhD Lecturer dwells on *The Role of Discourse in Intelligence Analysis*.

And in the last article we resume the concept of Hybrid War, seen this time through the analytic lens



of Mrs. Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu, who advances some *Observations Regarding the Actuality of the Hybrid War*, suggesting a *Case Study on Ukraine*.

The book we chose to present in this issue, though the rubric **Book Review**, written by the Deputy-Editor-in-Chief Daniela Răpan, bears the short but impactful title *Last Mission*, that is a generous testimony of the experiences lived by Commodore (R) Ion DUMITRAȘCU in a relevant position at SHAPE/NATO, quoting from the foreword of Major-General (R) Iordache Olaru.

Also, in the section **Scientific Event**, we present the audience a few conclusions resulted from the *International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI with the theme The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment* – organized by the CDSSS on 25-26 November 2014.

As usual, **CDSSS Agenda** presents, through our colleague Irina Tătaru, the latest publications from the period October-December 2014, as well as the recent and future activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies.

The edition closes with the **Guide for Authors**, a useful material for those who wish to publish in our journal.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is a publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to The National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published in Romanian language for fourteen years, and for ten years in English language and has been approaching a complex thematic – political-military topicality, security strategy, military strategy, NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions, the issue of peace and the war of future, informational society, elements and aspects regarding the intelligence community. The readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations at strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication’s scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), but also by the presence in virtual catalogues of libraries in prestigious institutions abroad, such as NATO and universities with military profile in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

*Strategic Impact* journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in the main institutions involved in security and defence, scientific and academic environment in the country and abroad – in Europe, Asia, America.

In the end, I would like to bring my thanks to all those who contributed this year to maintaining the scientific quality of the journal, this including the scientific articles contributors, the Editorial and the Scientific Boards, the Editorial Team, the Publishinghouse and the Printinghouse of “Carol I” National Defence University. I invite you to read the materials advanced by us in this edition, at the same time encouraging Bachelor, Master Degree and PhD students to send articles for publication in the monthly supplement of the journal titled *Colocviu strategic* (Strategic Colloquium), available on the Internet at <http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/cs.htm> and coordinated by Mihai Zodian PhD Junior Researcher.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD.  
Editor in Chief  
Director of Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies





# POLITICAL-MILITARY CRISES IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA: FROM CHRONIC TO ACUTE

*Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD\**

*Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) frozen conflicts have constituted ever since the '90s a permanent source of instability and insecurity in the region. Caused, inter alia, by ethnic based activities of separatist movements, they turned into real political and military crises, with regional echo, especially through the involvement of Russia on the side of the separatists and of the Euro-Atlantic actors on the side of central governments. Political-military crises in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, despite overcoming the maximum escalation phase of direct armed conflict, have not been resolved. The parties cannot reach a compromise, which determined them to enter in a chronic phase.*

*The present analysis focuses on the potential of Ukraine crisis which is still in process to deepen the existing crises in the region. After a brief overview of the key moments that make up the Ukrainian crisis, it is argued the idea of its predictability. Subsequently, the analysis is directed to Ukraine's crisis potential to become chronic, namely a new frozen conflict in the region, another way of maintaining Russian influence, as well as and the potential of the events in Ukraine to reignite tensions between the breakaway republics and central governments in WBSA.*

**Keywords:** *frozen conflict, Ukraine, Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, interests, geopolitics.*

## Introduction

At the end of 2013, a series of street protests began in Kiev, caused by the decision of the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, to cancel the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, as a result of the economic pressures exerted by Moscow in this respect. Authorities' attempts to put down the protests by the use of force, resulted in a considerable number of dead and injured civilians, were followed by a long series of sanctions from the international community on the Russian Federation, determining eventually the flee of the Ukrainian President in Russia.

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2014, invoking the need to protect Russian citizens, Putin ordered the occupation of Crimea peninsula. The annexation of the peninsula was followed by armed conflicts in southern and eastern Ukraine. In Donetsk and Luhansk, protests of pro-Russian and anti-government groups escalated to a separatist armed insurgency and the declaration of independence of the two provinces from Ukraine. Subsequently, a referendum was organized, whose results, officially recognized by Russia only, showed the public support for the Declaration of Independence.

At the time of writing this article, there are still armed confrontations in the region between the Ukrainian government forces, on the one hand, and, on the other, separatist groups supported by

---

\* *Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD. is junior researcher at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: bogzeanu.cristina@unap.ro*



the Russian Federation, although the extent and content of this support isn't officially assumed through Moscow official statements. Despite this, the fact that the Russians supply military equipment, weapons, money, and human resources to separatist groups was clear from the views expressed by the Western governments: "We are concerned much of this equipment will be transferred to separatists, as we are confident Russia has already delivered tanks and multiple rocket launchers to them from this site"<sup>1</sup>. The statement issued after the NATO summit in Wales (September 2014) confirms the existence of certainty regarding the military support offered by Moscow to separatists in southeastern Ukraine: "We demand that Russia (...) halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists"<sup>2</sup>.

Overall, the situation in Ukraine can be described as a major regional political-military crisis, with a considerable potential to maintain a state of uncertainty, insecurity, tension in the Wider Black Sea Area. The series of events led to repercussions on regional and even global level, if we consider the increasingly strained relations between Russia, on the one hand, and the Euro-Atlantic community actors, on the other, following the repeated condemnations and sanctions against Moscow's actions.

### 1. Ukraine (2013-2014) – a chronicle of a foretold crisis

As far as Ukraine's political and military crisis is concerned, there are two types of approaches in the academic environment. On the one hand, there are experts ranking it as "strategic shock" (a

low probability, unpredictable event, determining major strategic discontinuities in developing societies) or as "strategic surprise"<sup>3</sup>.

In a different approach<sup>4</sup>, the crisis in Ukraine is considered to have been predictable, expected, especially in terms of Russia's action and reaction. From this perspective, NATO and EU enlargement Eastwards, the efforts of promoting democracy and strengthening relations with Russia's border states have only fueled a latent crisis, Russia's reaction being comparable with Washington's response in the hypothetical situation in which China would have built an impressive military alliance and would have tried to include Canada and Mexico.

Moreover, even those considering Russia's actions in Ukraine as a strategic shock<sup>5</sup> identify in the recent history a series of indicators of this type of behavior – Russia's position unto the decisions of NATO Summit in Bucharest (2008), the war in Georgia (2008), the support of Serbia regarding the breakaway province of Kosovo. Therefore, the annexation of Crimea and the conflicts that have followed in eastern Ukraine can be considered to have a strategic impact only from the perspective of Russia's turning to this

---

<sup>1</sup> \*\*\*, *Russia's Continuing Support for Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine's Efforts Toward Peace, Unity, and Stability*, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, July 14, 2014, URL: <http://www.state.gov/t/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229270.htm>, retrieved at 16 December 2014.

<sup>2</sup> *Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales*, 5 September 2014, URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease), retrieved at 6 December 2014.

---

<sup>3</sup> See: Stan ANTON, „Crimea 2014 – Between Strategic Shock and Strategic Surprise”, in *Proceedings of International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, 12<sup>th</sup> Edition, "The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment"*, Vol. 1, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2014, pp. 97-105; Christopher DAVIS, "Not by Force Alone: Russian Strategic Surprise in Ukraine", URL: <http://www.warcouncil.org/blog/2014/5/5/not-by-force-alone-russian-strategic-surprise-in-ukraine>, 17 May 2014, retrieved at 10 December 2014; Magnus CHRISTIANSSON, *Strategic Surprise in the Ukraine Crisis. Agendas, Expectations and Organizational Dynamics in the EU Eastern Partnership until the Annexation of Crimea 2014*, Swedish National Defence College, URL: <https://www.fhs.se/PageFiles/6100/strategic-surprise-in-the-ukraine-crisis-m-christiansson.pdf>, retrieved at 10 December 2014.

<sup>4</sup> John J. MEARSHEIMER, „Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusion that Provoked Putin”, in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014, online edition, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-west-s-fault>, retrieved at 15 November 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Stan ANTON, *Op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.





instrument in an age when international relations' watchword is cooperation and diplomacy is preferred to the military in the pursuit of national interests.

*The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* (2008) and the *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* (2010) have clear provisions on the importance attached by Russia to the former soviet states, especially to Ukraine and Georgia, as well as on Moscow's attitude unto the relations between these states, on the one hand, and NATO and EU, on the other. Thus, despite of repeatedly emphasizing the need for enhancing the relations between Russia on the one hand and NATO and EU on the other, these documents mention, with an undeniable clarity, Kremlin's limits in this respect. "Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle of equal security, leads to new dividing lines in Europe and runs counter to the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of joint work in search for responses to real challenges of our time"<sup>6</sup>. In the list of foreign military dangers, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010) firstly mentions "the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc"<sup>7</sup>.

Ukraine's relevance for the manner in which Russia relates to its own security has often been stressed, one of the most famous studies in this respect belonging to Z. Brzezinski (1997), who

defines Ukraine as a "geopolitical pivot", an actor whose importance is not given by power and motivations, but by its location on the world map, which may prevent access of global players to an important area or resources or which can play the role of a shield for a state or vital region<sup>8</sup>.

In the historical context of 1991, Ukraine's independence was Russia's largest loss in geopolitical terms, depriving it of its dominant position in the Black Sea, requiring a rethinking of Russian political and ethnic identity<sup>9</sup>. Throughout history, there was a clear tendency to consider Ukraine part of Russia, the state's name itself leading to this theory (in Russian, *kraina* means *border*). Moreover, the same idea was reiterated by V. Putin in his speech in front of the State Duma after the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent referendum: "After the revolution, the Bolsheviks (...) added large sections of the historical South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine. This was done with no consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population, and today these areas form the southeast of Ukraine. Then, in 1954, a decision was made to transfer Crimean Region to Ukraine (...) on the whole, (...) this decision was treated as a formality of sorts because the territory was transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two separate states"<sup>10</sup>.

Thus, in the period when he wrote his famous work, Brzezinski claimed that US attempts to support the democratization of Ukraine and to strengthen relations with Kiev on the eve of 1994 were seen in Moscow as an affront to its vital interests, despite the fact that Russia itself was going through a process of Westernization. Also, Brzezinski emphasizes the need to find a balance in US-Ukraine and US-Russia relations, arguing not only the need to include both of them in European cooperation formats, but also the

---

<sup>6</sup> President of Russia, *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, 12 July 2008, URL: <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>, retrieved at 10 December 2014.

<sup>7</sup> *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on 5 February 2010, URL: [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia\\_military\\_doctrine.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf), retrieved at 10 December 2014.

---

<sup>8</sup> Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1998, p. 41.

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem, pp. 92-93.

<sup>10</sup> *Address by President of the Russian Federation*, 18 March 2014, Kremlin, URL: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889>, retrieved at 4 December 2014.



need of being democratized, sensing, however that Russia “should be continuously reassured that the doors to Europe are open, as are the doors to its eventual participation in an expanded transatlantic system of security”<sup>11</sup>.

Black Sea’s importance in Russia’s geopolitical calculations, as well as in Romania’s ones, and this space’s destabilizing potential was also approached by Gheorghe I. Brătianu. Within the course held at the University of Bucharest (1941-1942), “The question of the Black Sea”, the Romanian geo-politician argued that as far as the Black Sea is concerned, there are two key positions that Romania had to include in its geostrategic calculations: a) Bosphorus entry and b) Crimea which, with its natural harbors, with its cities of ancient times, with the advanced maritime bastion it represents in the Black Sea, is obviously a controlling position throughout the entire maritime complex. This was the reason for which Gheorghe I. Brătianu concluded that he who owns Crimea can rule in the Black Sea. He, who doesn’t own it, cannot control the Black Sea<sup>12</sup>.

In a more recent work, speaking of Mackinder’s vision on East-European states, I. Bădescu describes Ponto-Baltic isthmus as a buffer area between the Eurasian power and the European one, stressing the importance for the European security of maintaining the independence of the states in this region. In the view of the Romanian geopolitician, East-European states constitute the “geopolitical stroke which can fell great states’ geopolitical oak”<sup>13</sup>.

Recent events clearly show that Russia’s

attitude towards its close proximity has not changed much from the period when “The Grand Chessboard” was written. In addition, Russia’s actions in Crimea and their aftermath have been interpreted as manifestations of deep changes in Russia’s political thinking<sup>14</sup>. In this regard, I. Zevelev identifies three main schools of thought. Firstly, there are post-Western liberals, whose main purpose was Western integration. Secondly, there are the realists, whose main objective is to strengthen Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and reduce US global influence. Thirdly, there are the nationalists, composed of two groups – neo-imperialists and ethnic-nationalists. Neo-imperialists’ objective initially consisted in resetting Russia within the former USSR borders (in the first half of the ‘90s), subsequently limiting to creating a buffer zone consisting of post-Soviet protectorates around the current borders of Russia. Ethnic-nationalist vision is based on the idea of aligning Russia’s political and ethnic boundaries, as they currently do not coincide, a fact perceived as a significant security threat.

Zevelev argues that Kremlin’s foreign policy has been successively influenced by all the three visions as follows: between 2003 and 2008 by realists, between 2009 and 2011 by realists and liberalists, between 2012 and 2013 by realists and, in 2014, by realists and nationalists, reflected in its actions on the international arena. Therefore, the actions in 2014 were conducted on the basis of a range of key concepts such as the protection of compatriots outside the borders, division of Russian citizens, belief in the existence of a Russian civilization and even of a Russian world.

Therefore, Ukrainian crisis is based on a context which consists in a number of factors such as:

- Ukraine’s geostrategic importance – transit area for hydrocarbons exports from Russia to

---

<sup>11</sup> Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

<sup>12</sup> \*\*\*, “Viața și activitatea lui Gheorghe I. Brătianu”, Asociația Europeană de Studii Geopolitice și Geostrategice “Gheorghe I. Brătianu”, URL: <http://www.aesgs.ro/page.php?id=8&s1=67>, retrieved at 16 December 2014 (author’s translation).

<sup>13</sup> Ilie BĂDESCU, “Geopolitica Heartlandului Eurasiatic. Rusia: O Perspectivă Non-Ideologică”, in Ilie BĂDESCU, Lucian DUMITRESCU, Veronica DUMITRAȘCU, *Geopolitica Noului Imperialism*, Mica Valahie Publishinghouse, 2010, Bucharest, pp. 287-288 (author’s translation).

<sup>14</sup> Igor ZEVELEV, “The Russian World Boundaries. Russia’s National Identity Transformation and New Foreign Policy Doctrine”, in *Russia in Global Affairs*, 7 June 2014, URL: <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-World-Boundaries-16707>, retrieved at 9 December 2014.

Europe, relevance for the Russian influence in the Black Sea, the “host” of Russian Black Sea Fleet;

- the growing influence of Western actors (US, NATO and EU), enhancement of cooperation relations, democratization process, rise of increasingly strong pro-Western parties in Ukraine’s leadership, multiple cooperation initiatives in various formats with NATO and the EU;

- changes of the vision underlying the Russian foreign policy and its orientation towards a predominantly ethnic-nationalist and realistic direction. Additionally, there is also the fact that Western actors minimized the importance of Russia’s warnings regarding NATO and EU getting closer to its borders, the support given to countries in Russia’s area of influence, the support for “colored revolutions” (Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004), these states’ tendency to strengthen relations with the West rather than cooperating with Russia in the existing or newly created cooperation formats (Eurasian Union);

- Ukraine has a population of over 44 million, of which: 77.8% are Ukrainians, 17.3% are Russians<sup>15</sup>, a fact which was fully turned to account within the predominantly nationalist discourse in recent years<sup>16</sup>; it is also relevant the fact that the majority of Russian speakers are concentrated in regions that made the object of Russia’s recent actions (see Figure no. 1).

---

<sup>15</sup> According to the data provided by CIA World Factbook, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>, retrieved at 3 December 2014.

<sup>16</sup> An eloquent example in this respect is V. Putin’s speech held on March, 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014: “the total population of the Crimean Peninsula today is 2.2 million people, of whom almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language, and about 290,000-300,000 are Crimean Tatars, who, as the referendum has shown, also lean towards Russia”, *Address by President of the Russian Federation*, 18 March 2014, Kremlin, URL: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889>, retrieved at 4 December 2014.

### LINGUISTIC DIVISION IN UKRAINE



**Figure no. 1:** Linguistic divisions in Ukraine

Source: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/conscripted-soldiers-of-west-ukraine-refuse-to-fight-against-donbass-rebels/5393190>

The manner in which the cumulus of these factors determined the political-military crisis in Ukraine is summarized in V. Putin’s speech to the Duma, in March 2014: “with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line (...) they were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea (...) Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from”<sup>17</sup>.

### 2. Towards a new frozen conflict?

In the case of WBSA, frozen conflicts refer to those political and military crises broken out in the context of USSR disintegration, in which it was reached a ceasefire agreement, but which are not considered closed, as peace negotiations have not yet identified solutions acceptable to all parties. In this category, we can include the four frozen conflicts in the region – those in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. All of these are separatist republics, claiming autonomy in relation to central governments, usually justified through ethnic reasons. These conflicts escalated to armed confrontation between separatists and government authorities in the ‘90s, being considered similar to the struggle for independence characteristic, at that time, to

---

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.





the former Soviet republics.

One of the specifics of these movements in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia is Russian intervention on the side of the separatists, justified by the need to protect the threatened minority groups. Thus, eventually, these provinces, autonomous entities recognized only by Russia and its partners, have become de facto Russian protectorates.

Moscow's actions in Ukraine are similar to Kremlin's strategy in the post-Soviet era to maintain its influence in the near abroad, where it has privileged interests. Basically, each and every time, Russia intervened in separatists' favor, supporting them, recognizing the autonomy of republics, placing them under his direct influence.

V. Putin's speech to the State Duma on March, 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014, reveals a similar logic underlying the intervention in Ukraine and, therefore, raises the question whether this country will become the territory of a new frozen conflict in the Black Sea region. Will the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the armed confrontations in the East be followed by a "freezing" phase of the impossibility of compromise, of seeking a solution acceptable to all concerned? Will Ukraine become a new case of "chronic" crisis?

The dynamic of events indicate, in our opinion, the existence of this possible course of the crisis. Although it is the first time when Russia actually annexed a territory, Ukraine's crisis stake is similar to that associated with the maintenance of other ethnic conflicts in the region – keeping the country on Russia's geopolitical orbit. The extreme measure of annexation is actually an expression of the strategic importance which Ukraine has for Moscow as well as of the degree of risk posed, in Kremlin's vision, by the enhancement of the relations between Kiev and the Euro-Atlantic actors.

The annexation of the Crimean peninsula was the reason for a long series of economic sanctions imposed by Brussels and condemnations from NATO. UN expressed its support for Ukraine's sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity and called to the cease of

and abstention from actions directed towards the partial or total undermining of Ukraine's territorial integrity<sup>18</sup>. UN resolution expressing this position was rejected by Russia, which considered it counterproductive and credited the number of states having approved this document to Western states' pressures, political blackmail and economic threats<sup>19</sup>.

Similarly, the EU called on the engagement of the parties in a dialogue aimed at the de-escalation of crisis, considering the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula an act of violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine in accordance with the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine (1997). Subsequently, the EU undertook a range of diplomatic measures (G8 Summit was held in Brussels and not in Sochi, as planned, and the EU-Russia Summit was canceled), asset freezes and visa bans, bans of Crimea and Sevastopol originating imports, economic sanctions and economic cooperation freeze<sup>20</sup>.

Russia's actions were deemed a threat to national and NATO security, a violation of UN Charter principles and a threat to peace and security in Europe. The Alliance expressed its support for Ukraine and urged Russia to end "its military activities and its threats"<sup>21</sup>.

---

<sup>18</sup> United National General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014 no. 68/262. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, URL: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262), retrieved at 6 December 2014.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Reuters, „Russia criticizes U.N. resolution condemning Crimea's secession”, 28 March 2014, URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/28/us-ukraine-crisis-un-russia-idUSBREA2R0DA20140328>, retrieved at 6 December 2014.

<sup>20</sup> For details, see: \*\*\*, *EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis*, URL: [http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu\\_sanctions/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm), retrieved at 6 December 2014.

<sup>21</sup> \*\*\*, *Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen before the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission*, 2 March 2014, URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_107663.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_107663.htm), retrieved at 6 December 2014.



The idea is reiterated within in NATO Wales Summit Declaration: “We condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine and demand that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from inside Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border. (...) We do not and will not recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea. We demand that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border”<sup>22</sup>.

Thus, there can be delineated a set of distinct discourses concerning Ukraine, revealing the antagonistic positions of Russia and of the Euro-Atlantic actors<sup>23</sup>. The vehemence transpiring from the two approaches reveals a diplomatic crisis, which doesn’t announce the possibility of cooperation between the two parties in this respect.

Meanwhile, clashes between pro-Russian separatist and government forces continue in eastern Ukraine, despite a ceasefire agreement (Minsk Protocol, September, 5<sup>th</sup>, 2014). Separatists receive help over the border, including weapons and military equipment from Russia under the form of humanitarian support. Actually, this is the manner in which Russia acted and contributed to the maintenance and escalation of all separatist conflicts in WBSA. It is a repeating scenario that, in the previous cases, determined the conflicts to “freeze”, giving birth to separatist regions, and autonomous territories within sovereign states, recognized only by Russia.

---

<sup>22</sup> *Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales*, 5 September 2014, URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease), retrieved at 6 December 2014.

<sup>23</sup> A clear image on the accusations duel is provided by NATO official web site: \*\*\*, “Russia’s accusations – setting the record straight (July 2014)”, URL: [http://wayback.archive.org/web/20140717024045/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_111767.htm](http://wayback.archive.org/web/20140717024045/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_111767.htm), retrieved at 7 December 2014.

Since diplomatic relations between Russia on the one hand, and NATO, EU, US, on the other, are blocked, suspended, characterized by a level of tension without precedent in the post-Cold War era, and Russia masses troops near Ukraine’s borders, while NATO is taking defensive measures in this regard, the prospect of finding a solution acceptable to both Moscow and Kiev is unlikely on the short and medium term.

Consequences for Ukraine seem to be gloomy from political and economic perspective. Conflict, either frozen or hot, or a political-military crisis on its territory will keep Kiev away from Euro-Atlantic integration project, will prevent it not only from implementing the necessary reforms for achieving this goal, but also from stabilizing the domestic situation. Moreover, from the economic point of view, the annexation of Crimea by Russia means that Ukraine will not benefit of preferential hydrocarbons prices, offered by Moscow in return to hosting the Black Sea fleet. A considerable relevance in this respect is attached to the fact that Ukraine’s separatist east is also the country’s industrial area, which will have consequences on its economic performance.

### 3. The contagion potential

One of the most legitimate questions in the context created in Ukraine refers to the potential of this crisis to reignite the frozen conflicts in the region. This is all the more as the domino effect of the “Arab Spring” in North Africa and the Middle East (2010-2012) is still fresh in everybody’s memory. Even more, in a recent speech, German chancellor warned that Ukraine’s destabilization questions the entire European peace, as this crisis doesn’t concern exclusively Ukraine, but also Moldova and Georgia, and even the Western Balkans<sup>24</sup>.

In our opinion, any defreeze of the conflicts in the Black Sea region could occur by two causes.

---

<sup>24</sup> \*\*\*, “Angela Merkel warns Russia could seek to destabilize ‘whole of the European peaceful order’”, in *The Telegraph*, URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/11236622/Angela-Merkel-warns-Russia-could-look-to-destabilise-whole-of-the-European-peaceful-order.html>, retrieved at 7 December 2014.



The first one consists in the application by Russia of a similar strategy in the case of countries with strategic importance near its borders, with pro-Western tendencies and the second cause would be the reclamation of Ukraine precedent to exacerbate separatist tendencies characteristic to the Wider Black Sea Area. The entire region is marked by a sense of highly volatile and flammable hostility, as confirmed by the recent developments in the field of security.

On the territory of the states experiencing separatist tendencies, there are stationed the so-called Russian peacekeeping forces, amounting to approximately 13,000 Russian militaries stationed in these regions, without including in this number the ones supporting pro-Russian separatist forces in eastern Ukraine nor the military fleet in Sevastopol (approximately 13,000 troops). Thus, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, about 7,000 troops are stationed after the war in August 2008. In Armenia, Russia has an air and a land base, totaling 3,303 troops, while, in Transnistria, the number reached 1,500 Russian soldiers<sup>25</sup>.

Nagorno-Karabakh enclave has a special place in this context, since it involves a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which doesn't equal to the fact that Russia has no interest in this space or that there is no Moscow involvement in this conflict. Considered one of the main pillars of Armenia's national security, Russia has maintained the conflict, having been selling arms to both parties since the beginning of the conflict until presently. "Moscow wants to avoid any renewal of territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, yet arms sales proceed to both sides"<sup>26</sup>. In addition, as long as involved in this conflict, Armenia will not ask Russia to withdraw its troops from its territory nor shall it approach the West. In this context, Yerevan's decision to become part of the Eurasian Union in 2013, under the conditions in which it had already concluded the negotiations for the Association Agreement

with the EU, is easily explicable.

The relations of all these countries with Western actors are another important factor in analyzing the potential of these conflicts to burst out again in the context created by the crisis in Ukraine. Most of these countries experiencing separatist tendencies have gradually strengthened relations with the EU and NATO. Brussels created special instruments in this purpose, consisting in the European Neighborhood Policy, Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy, meant to favor the evolution of these states towards stability and prosperity and to constitute the framework of cooperation with the EU. Even more, during the Bucharest Summit (2008), NATO also expressed its intention to integrate Ukraine and Georgia and to intensify dialogue with them, generating, at the same time, negative reactions from Russia. Actually, all the three great powers contiguous of this space "employed different means, from accession negotiations to the construction of pipelines and supporting friendly governments or undermining unfriendly ones, to strategically position themselves in the area, to expand their influence and secure economic and political dominance"<sup>27</sup>.

Despite Russia's economic pressures meant to prevent the signing of Association Agreements with the EU within the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius and its effort to attract them towards joining the Eurasian Union, Georgia and Moldova concluded these agreements in 2013, respectively in 2014. Azerbaijan cooperates with EU in energy projects, already exporting gas to Europe, via Georgia and Turkey, through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and also developing an alternative project – the Trans-Anatolian pipeline which is to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe via Turkey. The project was already launched in 2012 and is expected to become operational in 2018.

Moreover, except for Armenia which claims that the referendum in Crimea expresses peoples' right of self-determination, all WBSA states experiencing

---

<sup>25</sup> The data used in this analysis were provided by \*\*\*, *The Military Balance 2014*, Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, Routledge Publishinghouse, London, 2014, pp. 161-200.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, p. 168.

<sup>27</sup> \*\*\*, *A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region. A Report of the Commission for the Black Sea*, URL: <http://www.ctsp.vt.edu/publications/data/a%202020%20vision%20for%20the%20black%20sea.pdf>, p. 23, retrieved at 10 December 2014.





separatism on their territories rallied, more or less vehemently, to Western position, condemning Russia's actions and expressing support for Ukraine. Therefore, if, on the short-term, Russia's involvement in other frozen conflicts in WBSA is unlikely due to the economic implications, on the medium and long term, we may witness a "melting" of frozen conflicts in this region due to these states' tendency to get closer to the West.

Russia's military interventions in favor of the separatists, meant to maintain its influence in the former Soviet republics, generated, most often, the opposite effect – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova have gradually strengthened relations with the West, being bent to increasingly clear over the reliance on Russia and Ukraine is expected to know a similar phenomenon<sup>28</sup>. However, in our view, given the geostrategic importance of this area for Kremlin and the clear deterioration of the relations between Russia, on the one hand, and US, NATO and the EU, on the other, it is possible for these crises to maintain their frozen nature, with rhythmic, time-bound re-bursts, thereby maintaining a climate of uncertainty, instability and a poor level of security in the region.

If at the central government level, the trend is predominantly pro-Western, separatist republics have a different direction. Eloquent in this regard is the reiteration of the idea that Transnistria should be included within Russia's territory. Thus, the President of Transnistria's Parliamentary Forum made such an application immediately after the annexation of Crimea, but was withdrawn shortly.

The level of instability appears to have increased within Russia-Georgia-Abkhazia relations. Almost completely overshadowed in the media coverage by the crisis in Ukraine, Abkhazia was the scene of a popular uprising against the government of the breakaway republic (May-June 2014), at the basis of which there were complaints about Abkhaz population's living conditions, poverty and corrupted leaders. The protests ended with the mediation of Russia.

---

<sup>28</sup> Jeffrey MANKOFF, "Russia's Latest Land Grab. How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine", in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014, on-line edition, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab>, retrieved at 6 December 2014.

As far as the relations between Russia and Georgia are concerned, more consistent relevance is attached to the conclusion of a strategic partnership between Russia and Abkhazia (November 2014), which provides closer cooperation between the two entities in the social, economic and humanitarian, as well as in issues related to foreign policy, security and defence. Additionally, according to data published in the media, the agreement includes references to the harmonization of their foreign policies and that the Abkhaz armed forces will be led by a Russian commander.

The agreement was condemned not only by Georgia, but also by NATO and the EU, arguing that this partnership compromises the chances of stabilizing the situation of stability in the region, violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and contradicting international law. Moreover, the government in Tbilisi denounces even an attempt to annex Abkhazia.

At the same time, while the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh can be still exploited by Russia in order to maintain its influence on Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is not the case of Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia. All of them are republics, yet included in the territory of states with a clear pro-Western orientation. Recent developments in Transnistria and Abkhazia reveal the tendency to strengthen relations with Moscow and even to claim their territorial inclusion in the Russian Federation, a trend coming either from inside (Transnistria) or inherent to measures undertaken on bilateral relations' level (Abkhazia). Also notable is the similarity between the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Georgian breakaway republics, both involved in the Russian-Georgian war (2008), both recognized as independent states by the Kremlin and considered Russian occupation zones, in Tbilisi government's view.

### Conclusions

Russia's actions in Ukraine, although predictable, although inferred by theorists of geopolitics and often indicated by Kremlin's strategic documents and actions is certainly a strategic shock, merely because no one expected



a territorial annexation at Europe's edge, because the use of armed force has been related, in Euro-Atlantic actors' vision, predominantly to the fight against international terrorism. Moreover, Europe is still in course of recovery after the economic shock of the crisis in this domain started in 2007. Not long ago, within the academic environment, there were debated the consequences of US interests' pivot to Asia-Pacific region, due to the emerging centers of power in this area and it was raised the issue of the need to redefine NATO and NATO-EU relation under the imperative for Europeans to assume more responsibility for their own security, both within the Alliance and EU. In 2012, there were launched initiatives in the area of defense planning directed to achieving this goal.

The events in Ukraine demonstrate NATO missions' timeliness and mark the beginning of a new period as far as the approach of security is concerned, confirming, once again, the cyclical nature of history. Undoubtedly, Europe faces a new source of instability at its borders, determining, on good reasons, concerns about its security safety. At the same time, the ongoing political-military crisis in Ukraine hinders, delays the cooperation projects meant to promote stability, predictability and prosperity in EU neighboring countries.

It becomes necessary to analyze the dynamic of East-European security environment not only in reference to the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, but also taking into account the substantial likelihood that, similarly to Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, Ukraine would become the scene of a new frozen conflict. Moreover, the potential of this crisis to reignite the other frozen conflicts in the region is significant and even confirmed by the recent developments in these countries. Another aspect to be considered is the link between the political and military instability, on the one hand, and, on the other, the social and economic vulnerabilities of the countries affected by separatism.

Therefore, with the events in Ukraine, Europe's eastern neighborhood has become characterized by difficulties in terms of negotiating a solution acceptable to all parties, with the potential to reignite latent conflicts in vicinity and create an environment favorable to transnational security risks and threats.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ANTON, Stan, "Crimea 2014 – Between Strategic Shock and Strategic Surprise", in *Proceedings of International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, 12<sup>th</sup> Edition, "The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment"*, Vol. 1, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2014, pp. 97-105.

2. BĂDESCU, Ilie; DUMITRESCU, Lucian; DUMITRAȘCU, Veronica, *Geopolitica Noului Imperialism*, Editura Mica Valahie, 2010, Bucharest, pp. 287-288.

3. BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1998.

4. CHRISTIANSSON, Magnus, *Strategic Surprise in the Ukraine Crisis. Agendas, Expectations and Organizational Dynamics in the EU Eastern Partnership until the Annexation of Crimea 2014*, Swedish National Defence College, URL: <https://www.fhs.se/PageFiles/6100/strategic-surprise-in-the-ukraine-crisis-m-christiansson.pdf>.

5. CIA World Factbook, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>.

6. DAVIS, Christopher, "Not by Force Alone: Russian Strategic Surprise in Ukraine", URL: <http://www.warcouncil.org/blog/2014/5/5/not-by-force-alone-russian-strategic-surprise-in-ukraine>, 17 May 2014.

7. MANKOFF, Jeffrey, "Russia's Latest Land Grab. How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine", in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014, on-line edition, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab>.

8. MEARSHEIMER, John J., "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusion that Provoked Putin", in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014, on-line edition, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-west-s-fault>.



9. ZEVELEV, Igor “The Russian World Boundaries. Russia’s National Identity Transformation and New Foreign Policy Doctrine”, in *Russia in Global Affairs*, 7 June 2014, URL: <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-World-Boundaries-16707>.
10. \*\*\*, *Russia’s Continuing Support for Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine’s Efforts Toward Peace, Unity, and Stability*, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, July 14, 2014, URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229270.htm>.
11. \*\*\*, “Angela Merkel warns Russia could seek to destabilize ‘whole of the European peaceful order’”, in *The Telegraph*, URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/11236622/Angela-Merkel-warns-Russia-could-seek-to-destabilise-whole-of-the-European-peaceful-order.html>.
12. \*\*\*, “Russia’s accusations – setting the record straight (July 2014)”, URL: [http://wayback.archive.org/web/20140717024045/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_111767.htm](http://wayback.archive.org/web/20140717024045/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_111767.htm).
13. \*\*\*, “Viața și activitatea lui Gheorghe I. Brătianu”, Asociația Europeană de Studii Geopolitice și Geostrategice „Gheorghe I. Brătianu”, URL: <http://www.aesgs.ro/page.php?id=8&s1=67>.
14. \*\*\*, *A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region. A Report of the Commission for the Black Sea*, URL: <http://www.ctsp.vt.edu/publications/data/a%202020%20vision%20for%20the%20black%20sea.pdf>.
15. \*\*\*, *Address by President of the Russian Federation*, 18 March 2014, Kremlin, URL: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889>.
16. \*\*\*, *Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen before the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission*, 2 March 2014, URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_107663.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_107663.htm).
17. \*\*\*, EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis, URL: [http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu\\_sanctions/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm).
18. \*\*\*, President of Russia, *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, 12 July 2008, URL: <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>.
19. \*\*\*, Reuters, “Russia criticizes U.N. resolution condemning Crimea’s secession”, 28 March 2014, URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/28/us-ukraine-crisis-un-russia-idUSBREA2R0DA20140328>.
20. \*\*\*, *The Military Balance 2014*, Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, Routledge Publishinghouse, London, 2014.
21. \*\*\*, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on 5 February 2010, URL: [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010\\_russia\\_military\\_doctrine.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010_russia_military_doctrine.pdf).
22. \*\*\*, United National General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014 no. 68/262. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, URL: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262).
23. \*\*\*, *Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales*, 5 September 2014, URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease).

#### Acknowledgement:

This work was possible with the financial support from the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822, with the title “**Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence and Public order and national security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers – “SmartSPODAS”.**”



# TRENDS IN ARMS PRODUCTION, TRANSFERS AND TRADE

*Florin DIACONU, Ph.D. \**

*The study explores, extensively using several types of clearly complementary open sources, several recent significant facts and trends, all of them relevant, in our opinion, for a better understanding of the way in which military production, international arms trade, plus other types of transferring military technologies are methods aimed at influencing – and sometimes at massively shaping or changing – power distribution and major geo-strategic evolutions on the international arena.*

*The paper starts by exploring two potent examples proving how important the consequences of arms trade and arms transfers can be. Then the article explores data and figures present in *The Military Balance 2013*, edited by IISS in London. The volume underlines that military spending in Asia-Pacific region and in the Middle East is growing, while in Western Europe and the U.S. is decreasing, as a direct result of economic crisis generating new, less ambitious and less expensive procurement policies. The same volume offers significant figures for a better understanding of the trends in international arms trade.*

*The final conclusion of the paper is that a careful study of the trends in arms production and arms trade is a must for better understanding major evolutions on the world arena.*

**Keywords:** *major powers, military*

*technologies, arms race, U.S., Russia, China, India, balance of power.*

## **Introductory considerations**

At this very moment, the pace of many sorts of trends on the world arena is deeply influenced by the military industrial capacity (ability to manufacture large amounts of good quality weapons and ammunition), and by both arms trade and other means and methods of transferring military systems of different types (more or less advanced; fit for attack or fit for defensive operations; tactical or strategic; to be used by land forces, by air forces or by navies) to allied or partner countries of the state(s) manufacturing and selling the weapons we are speaking about. This massive – and sometimes decisive, or at least potentially decisive – role of the international arms trade and arms transfer(s) in shaping (or in reshaping) the geo-strategic global landscape is nothing new in international affairs<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The following text represents an upgraded version of a paper called “Tendințe geo-economice în domeniul militar - programe de înarmare, cazuri de competiție regională, costuri militare, contracte internaționale” (“Geo-economic tendencies: procurement programs, regional competition, military costs, international military contracts”) written for – and publicly presented at – a workshop on geo-economics, organized by the CDSSS at the end of September, 2014.

**\* Florin DIACONU, Ph.D. in Political Science, is Associate Professor (tenured position) at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest (FSPUB), Senior Researcher (CR II / CS II) at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute (IDR) and Director for Strategic Analysis & Forecasting at the Hans J. Morgenthau Center E-mail: [florin.diaconu@fspub.unibuc.ro](mailto:florin.diaconu@fspub.unibuc.ro), [florin.diaconu@morgenthaucenter.org](mailto:florin.diaconu@morgenthaucenter.org)**





A few examples might seriously facilitate a better understanding of this very topic. Along the most overheated part of the Cold War, Middle East was a theatre of active confrontation of the two superpowers, acting by directly and massively reinforcing their regional allies: the United States helped Israel a lot, while the U.S.S.R. sold and delivered to the ‘front-line’ Arab-Muslim countries (Egypt and Syria) really huge amounts of weapons and ammunition, also granting the recipients of this massive and strategically significant arms transfer immensely important knowledge, mainly by means of intensive training and of ‘advisers’ at all levels, including that of small tactical units.

For example, “from 1954 to 1966 the Soviet Union provided about \$2 billion in arms and military equipment to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Yemen; between June 1967 and October 1968 deliveries reportedly totaled \$2.5 billion”. In real terms, Laqueur clearly states, “during the same period... Soviet military aid... has been from four to five times greater than economic assistance”<sup>2</sup>. Speaking about the magnitude of the process of transferring Soviet weapons to the Middle East in the Cold War era, we are also to remember that “the Soviet Union, by offering barter deals, broke the Western monopoly, and made possible for larger purchases. It supplied some 2,000 to 3,000 tanks to the Arab states, as well as missiles, missile-firing vessels, Ilyushin and TU-16 tactical bombers, and the most recent MiGs, and other sophisticated equipment”. More than this, “after June 1967 new [Soviet] deliveries were made on a very big scale to replace the material that had been lost or damaged”, and “some 4,000-5,000 Soviet military advisers supervised the reorganization of the Arab armies and the establishment of new munitions industries”<sup>4</sup>.

More recently, mainly along the past 10 years, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), meaning the ANA (Afghan National Army), plus the various forces belonging to the Afghan Police received really large amounts of military equipment from abroad. Some figures

are very clear: almost 10 years ago, U.S. Major General Robert Durbin, appointed “in late 2005 to head the office in charge of training the Afghan police and army” (and institutional entity called Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan) asked the U.S. Congress “a total of \$8.6 billion for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police: \$5.9 billion for fiscal year 2007 and \$2.7 billion for fiscal year 2008”<sup>5</sup>; let us not forget how huge this amount of money really is – “astounding, more than the gross domestic product of about fifty countries”<sup>5</sup>. And the ongoing trends in Afghanistan, the recipient of a massive amount of American military hardware of all sorts is not the first occasion the U.S. is decisively reshaping the strategic balance in the AfPak region by means of mobilizing funds and transferring arms. A quite recent study reports that “shortly after the Soviet invasion [in Afghanistan], the U.S. Congress secretly provided large sums of money that incrementally increased funding of the U.S. effort. These funds amounted to \$30 million in 1981, \$200 million in 1984, \$470 million in 1986, and \$630 million in 1987 and were matched dollar for dollar under an agreement the United States negotiated with Saudi Arabia. The funding provided hundreds of thousands of weapons, including Lee Enfield .303 rifles, Chinese AK-47s, vast quantities of Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (RPG-7s), 60-millimeter Chinese mortars, 12.7-millimeter heavy machine guns Soviet-origin SA-7 Surface-to-Air Missiles, (SAMs), and 2,300 Stinger SAMs to Afghan mujahedeen groups. The weapons to arm the mujahedeen were purchased by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through global arms markets and from the Egyptians and Turks, so as to avoid any U.S. connection to the weapons on the world stage. The Chinese intelligence services also provided weapons to support the U.S. effort”<sup>6</sup>.

---

<sup>5</sup> Seth J. JONES, *In the Grave of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*, New York, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2009, 2010, pp. 168-169.

<sup>6</sup> Paul KHURI, “The Foreign Policy of U.S. Arms Transfers”, *Georgetown Security Studies Review* (online edition), June 10, 2014, at the Internet address <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/06/10/the-foreign-policy-of-u-s-arms-transfers/>, text last accessed on November 29, 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Walter LAQUEUR, *The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-1968*, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1969, 1972, Penguin Books, p. 164.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 169-170.



### 1. Basic figures in IISS *Military Balance*

In order to better understand some present and future geo-strategically significant trends and facts, we can legitimately rely a lot on data and figures present in the yearly volumes called *The Military Balance*, written by eminent specialists working for the notorious London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The 2013 edition, for example, offers a lot of significant information about military industrial output in different countries (mainly great powers and world powers<sup>7</sup>) and regions, and also about international arms trade and international arms transfers of many other types.

In a quite long and very interesting press statement, delivered in mid-March, 2013, the IISS acting Director-General said, speaking directly about military spending, procurement and arms trade, that “while the Middle East region is clearly in a state of flux, all around it the global redistribution of military power is continuing. Reflecting the subdued global economic climate, total defence spending actually fell in real terms in 2012 for a second year running. However, real increases were seen in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia and Eurasia, Latin America and in Asia, while real declines were seen in North America and Europe. As we predicted this time last year, 2012 saw nominal Asian defence spending overtake that of NATO European states for the first time”. On the same occasion, Dr. Chipman said, speaking about the quickly reshaping global strategic landscape, that “this is not simply a result of Asia spending more; it is as much a result of states in Europe spending less. In 2012, European NATO members’ defence spending was, in real terms, around 11% lower than in 2006. This reduction continues to shape military capabilities, and especially in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain which account for almost 70% of European

---

<sup>7</sup> For better understanding the features and capabilities of different types of powers (actors / states on the international arena) see, for example, Martin Wight, *Politica de putere* [original title: *Power Politics*], Chişinău, Editura Arc, 1998, pp. 31-88.

spending”. And the Director-General of the IISS also said, speaking about Iran, that Tehran “is believed to have acquired a licensed production line for anti-ship missiles”, and “the creation of hybrid systems based on outdated weapons, but supplemented with modern subsystems, and deployed using asymmetric tactics, has the potential to surprise adversaries”<sup>8</sup>.

For a better understanding of some global trends in the area of arms production, Table 1 (*2012 Top Defence Budgets, in U.S. \$Billion*) shows with all necessary details which are the countries with the largest Defence Budgets on the world arena.

Analysing the data, we can conclude the following:

a. the U.S. defence budget, even if dramatically compressed by the sequestration, is the largest in the world (in 2012, six times larger than the Chinese one, and more than 10 times larger than the Russian one);

b. within NATO, the notorious ‘capability gap’ separating the U.S. and its European allies is enormous: the U.S. defence budget was, in 2012, almost 4 times larger than the combined military budgets of the U.K., France, Germany and Italy;

c. in the Middle East, several countries do have massive military budgets – among the top 15 defence budgets in 2012, no less than three are belonging to major powers in the region: Saudi Arabia (with a level of military spending larger than that of France and Germany), Iran and Israel; and

d. in the Asia-Pacific region, military budgets are simply immense: that of the U.S. (with a huge coast line at the Pacific), and the Chinese, Indian, Russian (with quite a long border at the Pacific), South Korean and Japanese one.

---

<sup>8</sup> For all fragments quoted along this paragraph see “Press Statement: Remarks by Dr. John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 14, 2013”, text accessed at the Internet address <http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2013-61eb/march-c5a4/military-balance-2013-press-statement-61a2>, last accessed on November 29, 2014.





Table 1: 2012 Top Defence Budgets, in U.S. \$Billion<sup>9</sup>

No.	Country	Defence Budget
1	United States	645.7
2	China	102.4
3	U.K.	60.8
4	Russia	59.9
5	Japan	59.4
6	Saudi Arabia	52.5
7	France	48.1
8	Germany	40.4
9	India	38.5
10	Brazil	35.3
11	South Korea	29.0
12	Australia	25.1
13	Iran	23.9
14	Italy	23.6
15	Israel	19.4
16	The rest of the world	approx. 315.0

Table 2 (2012 Top 15 Defence & Security Budgets as % of GDP) shows us, also by means of some very clear figures, which were, in 2012, the fifteen countries in which Defence and Security budgets were very large (more than 3,6 % of the Gross Domestic Product – GDP).

From the analysis of the data, we can reckon:

a. the first two countries listed here are Iraq and Afghanistan, the recipients of really massive amounts of military technologies bought from abroad (mainly from NATO and other Western countries);

b. several countries on this list are belonging to one of the most volatile, unpredictable and dangerous ‘powder kegs’ of our times – the Middle East, with its almost continuous conflicts of all sorts: Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Yemen and Bahrain; and

c. the military budget of the U.S. is really immense, but a quite important number of countries are mobilizing for national defence a larger share of the GDP than the U.S. does.

<sup>9</sup> The Military Balance 2013: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 41 (for all figures).

Table 2: 2012 Top 15 Defence & Security Budgets as % of GDP<sup>10</sup>

No.	Country	Defence Budget
1	Iraq	11.28%
2	Afghanistan	10.54%
3	Oman	8.24%
4	Saudi Arabia	7.99%
5	Israel	7.85%
6	Jordan	5.58%
7	United States	5.18%
8	Iran	4.95%
9	South Sudan	4.69%
10	Yemen	4.55%
11	Algeria	4.54%
12	Myanmar	4.21%
13	Bahrain	3.88%
14	Armenia	3.71%
15	Singapore	3.61%

Table 3 (Composition of Real Defence Spending Increases in 2011-2012, Top 10 Countries and Regions, in % of World Total) indicates which are the countries and regions where the most significant pace of defence spending increases is concentrated. Such countries can be in two different situations: a. either they feel themselves threatened, so they try to balance the foreign threat by means of strongly increasing military budgets; or b. they are prepared for a deliberate effort aimed at upgrading their power status, or even at regional or trans-regional hegemony.

Analysing the data, we can underline:

a. China and Russia, concentrating almost 40 % of the global increase of military budgets, are clearly interested in reshaping regional and trans-regional power balances (Russia mainly in Europe, and China mainly in the Asia-Pacific region);

b. Australia, Indonesia and India are obviously preparing to balance, as much as they can, the increasing Chinese bid for regional hegemony; and

c. Europe – mainly Western Europe, or the European part of NATO – concentrates a really small share of the military budgets increases; if we compare the less than 4 % of the total global

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, p. 41 (for all figures used here).



increase of military budgets concentrated in Europe with the share Russia has in the same process of increasing defense budgets – more than 17 %! – it is not at all difficult to understand that Moscow estimated that it might have a significant window of opportunity in any attempt to expand its sphere of influence to the West once more. And it acted accordingly, both in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine, starting with early spring of 2014, directly threatening other countries on the Eastern border of NATO as well.

**Table 3:** Composition of Real Defence Spending Increases in 2011-2012<sup>11</sup>

No.	Country or Region	% of world total
1	China	19.1%
2	Russia	17.2%
3	Australia	5.3%
4	Oman	5.2%
5	Indonesia	5.0%
6	India	5.0%
7	Israel	4.1
8	Venezuela	3.8
9	Syria	3.7
10	Europe	3.2

Table 4 (Composition of Real Defence Spending Reductions in 2011–2012. Top 10 Countries and Regions, in % of World Total) is a tool enabling us to better understand the trends so strongly suggested by Table 3. It is important – but also not very difficult – to understand that changes of power distribution on the world arena are generated not only by the deliberate increase of military budgets operated by some countries, but also by the complementary decrease of the military budgets of other countries. In such a situation, *some countries are clearly becoming more powerful, while other actors of the international system are concomitantly becoming weaker and weaker, as a direct result of domestic political decisions based on all sorts of reasons.*

After analysing the data, we can develop some new ideas: **a.** The evolution of the defence budget of the U.S. strongly confirms the formula

<sup>11</sup> Top 10 Countries and Regions, in % of World Total. Source: *Ibidem*, p. 42: total increases of defence budgets in the entire world had reached (at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates) no less than U.S. \$34.7 billion.

Paul Kennedy used some decades ago, when he estimated that the United States is, at global level and in terms of power, an obvious “Number One in relative decline”<sup>12</sup>; **b.** while Russia’s military budget was sharply increasing in 2012, the military budgets of several NATO countries in Europe – the region most directly impacted by any aggressive move operated by the decision-makers in Kremlin – were becoming smaller and smaller (see the case of several great powers, but also the situation of quite many smaller NATO members); **c.** Iran seemed to be confronted with some severe problems, as long its notorious bid for regional hegemony was not accompanied any more by a significant increase of its military budget, as in many of the previous years; **d.** the Chinese bid for increased influence in the Asia-Pacific region was helped a lot by the fact that in large parts of Asia, the defence budgets contracted in a significant way, in a moment when the Chinese military spending concentrated almost 20 % of the global military budgets increase.

**Table 4:** Composition of Real Defence Spending Reductions in 2011–2012<sup>13</sup>

No.	Country Or Region	% of World Total
1	United States	77.2 %
2	Iran	3.7%
3	Italy	3.5%
4	Spain	3.4%
5	Canada	2.4%
6	Other NATO Europe	2.1%
7	Asia	1.9%
8	U.K.	1.8%
9	Germany	1.2%
10	Non-NATO Europe	0.9%

<sup>12</sup> Paul KENNEDY, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, p. 514.

<sup>13</sup> A.N. Top 10 Countries and Regions, in % of World Total. Source: *The Military Balance 2013: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics*, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 42: total reductions of defence budgets & spendings in the world had reached (at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates) U.S. \$65.5 billion, almost two times more than the total increases in real defence spending listed in Table 3.



The same work offers a lot of detailed data dealing with different regional situations. In the *Middle East*, for example, the Syrian government “continued to receive military equipment from Russia and there were reports of Iranian expert, financial and material assistance”<sup>14</sup>. The anti-Assad opposition received a lot of help as well: “As well as providing financial support and reportedly some material assistance of unknown type, Gulf states and Saudi Arabia have allowed discreet fundraising on their soil. Western governments feared that weapons would end up in the hands of radical groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates, so they limited assistance to non-lethal equipment such as communications sets”<sup>15</sup>. Dealing with the evolution of naval forces in the Middle East, *The Military Balance 2013* clearly states: “Beyond East Asia, other states are also expanding or improving their fleets of conventional submarines, particularly in the Middle East. Israel took delivery of its fourth Dolphin-class (German Type-212 variant) submarine in May 2012, as part of its plan to double the size of its three-boat fleet. Algeria similarly doubled its two-boat fleet with two improved Kilos in 2010. Iran continues to maintain its three-vessel Kilo-class fleet”<sup>16</sup>

In the *Asia-Pacific* area, *The Military Balance 2013* reports, some regional powers “are ordering new boats some for the first time, others are updating ageing fleets, and still others are increasing the number of hulls in service in a concerted effort to expand their sub-surface capabilities. Countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, Japan, India and Pakistan are all expanding their existing fleets or creating new ones. For states surrounding the South China Sea – the location of a number of disputes over territory or maritime boundaries – or those perceived as potential regional rivals to China, these procurements are a reaction to Beijing’s growing surface and sub-surface fleet. Procurements of these advanced capabilities may also spring from a desire to improve military capabilities in

the wake of economic growth, while there are a number of subregional rivalries and military

competitions that also go some way to explaining procurements”<sup>17</sup>. Also in Asia-Pacific, *sharing (or simply selling) modern military know-how* is a method aimed at transferring strategically significant technologies. See, for example, the fact that “China... will co-produce with Pakistan AIP [air-independent propulsion system] technology for Islamabad’s future submarines”<sup>18</sup>. In the same region, arms trade and technological transfers are not the only tools leading to increased military capabilities. *Industrial espionage (together with its direct consequence called reverse engineering) is sometimes successfully used*. The open source we are quoting here states: “Weapons are also improving. Torpedoes have become quieter, faster and able to operate at greater depths. Like submarines, torpedoes are manufactured by a relatively small number of countries, meaning various states will use the same type. In the heavyweight torpedo market, for example, Raytheon’s Mk 48 is now in service in 29 countries officially (and unofficially in China as the unlicensed, reverse-engineered Yu-6/Yu-7)”<sup>19</sup>. For our discussion here, the situation in the Asia-Pacific is interesting and important, mainly because many of the new ships bought in order to balance the increasing Chinese capabilities are imported, so that we are speaking about *a region where international arms trade connected to really major geo-strategic realities is very intense*.

## 2. Some brief comments on international arms trade

As we have already stated, arms trade has significant consequences on the world arena: a. it strongly consolidates the power status of the arms producers and exporters; b. it is a major ingredient of many power distribution changes at regional level; c. it is a tool enhancing more or less visible and more or less globally relevant strategic partnerships.

*The Military Balance 2013* offers the really careful reader many interesting general elements and details, all of them allowing a better and deeper understanding of the role of

---

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 12.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 12.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 23.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 24.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 24.



arms trade in maintaining or changing the way in which power is distributed at regional and / or global level. Table 5 (Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations. Leading Recipients in 2011) clearly shows us an impressive set of major military contracts with really immense market value. The same set of figures is relevant for understanding which regions of the global arena are quickly becoming more dangerous as a direct consequence of massive arms imports / military technologies transfers. The regions we are speaking about were (in 2011), first of all, the Middle East (a region where some countries were trying to balance Iran, while others received large amounts of military help from their major strategic partners in order to offer the regional strategic landscape a certain degree of stability and predictability – see the case of Egypt, helped a lot by the U.S., because of obvious and perennial geo-strategic reasons, and the case of Syria, a country where Russia was – and still is – pouring a lot of ‘military aid’), and then South Asia (where both India and Pakistan were – and are, at the present moment – buying very large amounts of advanced weapons of all sorts).

Table 5: Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations. Leading Recipients in 2011<sup>20</sup>

No.	Country	Cost of Arms Received (in U.S. \$bln.)
1	Saudi Arabia	2.8 U.S. \$billion
2	India	2.7 U.S. \$billion
3	Pakistan	1.8 U.S. \$billion
4	UAE	1.7 U.S. \$billion
5	Venezuela	1.7 U.S. \$billion
6	Algeria	1.5 U.S. \$billion
7	Egypt	1.3 U.S. \$billion
8	Iraq	1.3 U.S. \$billion
9	Morocco	1.3 U.S. \$billion
10	Syria	1.0 U.S. \$billion

But arms sales and real deliveries are not at all the only ‘ingredient’ the international arms

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 555 (see “Table 26”).

trade is ‘pouring’ into the process of (re)shaping the world arena. Long-term agreements, to be fulfilled along many years, can be, at least sometimes, as important (or even more important, in some occasions) as the *real* delivery of some weapons to another country, with some clear consequences in the area of changing the way in which military and political power is distributed within a certain geo-strategic region. The potential impact of such long-term agreements is strongly suggested by Table 6 (Global Arms Transfer Agreements Leading Suppliers in 2011). The same table clearly shows that a very limited number of great powers (some of them world powers / global powers, if we are to use the terminology tailored some years ago by Martin Wight, some of them trying to reach – or to reach again – world power status / global power status) is decisively controlling the global arms trade. In this field, *the U.S. is still enormously strong, easily dominating the most important share of the global arms market*: in 2011, bilateral agreements reached by the U.S. and many other countries had a total value more than three times larger than all the agreements of the next 9 globally important arms producers and exporters put together. *Even more recently, the U.S. is still dominating the global arms market. An open source offering statistics reports that, between 2009 and the end of 2013, the market share of the U.S. as a major exporter of weapons has been 29 %, and that of Russia – 27 %. Germany exported 7 %, China – 6 %, France – 5 %, U.K. – 4 %, Spain, Ukraine and Italy – 3 %, each of them, and Israel – 2 % of the weapons exported on the global market<sup>21</sup>. In spite of an increase of the Russian and Chinese shares of global arms exports, the West (the U.S. plus its strategic partners in Europe and outside Europe) is the largest major weapons exporter along the past 5 to 6 years.*

<sup>21</sup> For these figures see “Market share of the leading exporters of major weapons between 2009 and 2013, by country”, on the webpage *Statista: The Statistics Portal. Statistics and Studies from more than 18,000 Sources*, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.statista.com/statistics/267131/market-share-of-the-leading-exporters-of-conventional-weapons/>, last accessed on November 30, 2014.





**Table 6:** Global Arms Transfer Agreements  
Leading Suppliers in 2011<sup>22</sup>

No.	Country	Value of Arms Transfer Agreements (in U.S. \$bln.)
1	United States	66.274 U.S. \$billion
2	Russia	4.8 U.S. \$billion
3	France	4.4 U.S. \$billion
4	China	2.1 U.S. \$billion
5	South Korea	1.5 U.S. \$billion
6	Italy	1.2 U.S. \$billion
7	Ukraine	1.1 U.S. \$billion
8	Turkey	0.8 U.S. \$billion
9	Spain	0.5 U.S. \$billion
10	U.K.	0.4 U.S. \$billion
11	Israel	0.4 U.S. \$billion

**Conclusions**

Political power and military power are significantly supported – and made possible – by arms production and international arms trade. A careful study of the data accurately showing who is producing arms of all sorts, who is exporting weapons of all sorts, who is importing weapons of all sorts is an *obvious must* for anyone wishing to really understand facts and trends on the international arena. The same data and figures are a must in *any* serious process of *strategic forecasting*, one of the really vital activities of both civilian and military researchers, anywhere in the world.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY:**

1. JONES, Seth J., *In the Grave of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan*, New York, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2009, 2010.

2. KENNEDY, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York, Vintage Books, 1989. KHURI, Paul,

“The Foreign Policy of U.S. Arms Transfers”, *Georgetown Security Studies Review* (on-line edition), June 10, 2014, at the Internet address <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/06/10/the-foreign-policy-of-u-s-arms-transfers/>, text last accessed on November 29, 2014.

3. LAQUEUR, Walter, *The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-1968*, Baltimore, Penguin Books, Penguin Books, 1969, 1972.

4. SOKOLSKY, Richard D. (editor), *The United States and the Persian Gulf: Reshaping Security Strategy for the Post-Containment Era*, Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 2003.

5. WIGHT, Martin, *Politica de putere* [original title: *Power Politics*], Chişinău, Editura Arc, 1998.

6. \*\*\*, “Market share of the leading exporters of major weapons between 2009 and 2013, by country”, on the webpage *Statista: The Statistics Portal. Statistics and Studies from more than 18,000 Sources*, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.statista.com/statistics/267131/market-share-of-the-leading-exporters-of-conventional-weapons/>, last accessed on November 30, 2014.

7. \*\*\*, “Press Statement: Remarks by Dr. John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 14, 2013”, <http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2013-61eb/march-c5a4/military-balance-2013-press-statement-61a2>, last accessed on November 29, 2014.

8. \*\*\*, *The Military Balance 2013: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

<sup>22</sup> *The Military Balance 2013: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 555 (see “Table 29”).



# THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT

*Marin DĂNCĂU, Ph.D.\**

*The major changes caused by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria represent a great aspiration to dissolve the borders between the two countries, in order to achieve a strong Islamic state. This aspiration could become viable when there shall be sufficient sustainable economic resources.*

**Keywords:** *Islamic Caliphate, Al-Nusrat Front, Islamic State, Sunni insurgency group.*

## Introduction

The stability of the Middle East is perceived as a very delicate balance. Experts consider that the source of stability is a function of economic interdependence, the spread of democracy and the emergence of institutionalism or resistance to the presence of military forces that generate the security strategies of several countries in the region<sup>1</sup>. Following the traditional or newer phenomena, the Middle East is characterized by a high degree of instability. The political, economic, social and religious tensions, the interfaith disputes and the fighting for regional hegemony added to the older issues (terrorism, Iran's nuclear program).

In recent years, the region has experienced a phenomenon called "Arab Spring" in different stages of intensity and which is now underway in some states.

Another problem facing the Middle East is the Syrian crisis which acquired the capacities of a conflict that has become extremely complex and its effects propagate beyond the Levant, marking the change of behavior of regional actors such as Iran Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Amid these problems, the attention of the international community focused on the recent organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, while the group took control over some important areas in Iraq and Syria.

## ISIL Implications in the Region

Given the failures of several areas controlled by affiliated groups who applied methods of implementing rigid Salafi ideology and aware that public support is the key to success, the current leader of Al-Qaeda has called for measures in order to win public trust and support.

The request was made in line with the current strategy of the organization Al-Qaeda, known as the "Glocal – think globally, but act locally". This strategy aimed at establishing the Great Caliphate by adopting the type and mode of action to the local customs.

Almost all leaders of the affiliated groups have put Al-Qaeda leader's intention into

---

*\* Colonel Marin DANCĂU, Ph.D. in Military Sciences, works at Educational Management Section within "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: marin\_dancau@yahoo.com*

---

<sup>1</sup> Isabela ANCUTĂ, "Reactivarea competiției regionale în Asia-Pacific. Disputele teritoriale din Marea de Sud și Est a Chinei", *Infosfera* nr. 2/2013, București, p. 49.



practice; however, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq – transformed into Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant, acted aggressively on the people of Iraq and Syria by speeding to impose the Islamic law in a rigid form.

Due to a fragmented and dysfunctional opposition, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emerged as Emir of the new Islamic state, and in 2010, after its former leaders were killed in an attack by US and Iraqi troops, he became leader of the organization in Iraq.

Although the organization was in a decline in its evolution, it was “revived” in 2011 by the Sunni revolt in Syria, as well as by a series of attacks that were planned in Iraq and Syria.

Taking advantage of the growing tensions between the Sunni minority and Shia government in Iraq, and Syria engaging in an intra-jihadist civil war with Jabhat al-Nusrat, Ahrar al-Sham and other groups, on April 9, 2013 took place the founding statement of the Islamic State in Iraq. Al-Qaeda Organization in Iraq and Al-Nusrat Front, active jihadist group in Syria, will merge to form the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.<sup>2</sup>

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS, IS) is a Sunni insurgent group affiliated to Al-Qaeda<sup>3</sup>, operating in Iraq and Syria and an Islamic state that is not recognized, with the capital in Ar-Raqqah in Syria<sup>4</sup>.

Finally, al-Nusrat Front refused to accede to this new entity, the two groups worked separately, and since January 2014, they have been in armed conflict.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant challenged the authority of Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, rejecting his request to

focus only on Iraq and leave Syria, to the Al-Nusra Front, considering that, by its actions, it undermines the ideology and the strategic objectives set by the leader of Al-Qaeda.

Charles Lister, a researcher at the Brookings Doha Centre, shows that, at the time, the organization had about 5,000 fighters in Iraq and 6,000 fighters in Syria.

Gradually, their number increased, and during June-December 2014, IS controlled northern Iraq. Previously, cities like Deir of Zawr and Raqqa – in Syria and Mosul, Ramadi, Fallujah – Iraq were captured, as exemplified in Figure no. 1.



**Figure no. 1:** Territories controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Source: Syria Needs Analysis Project, The Economist

<sup>2</sup> Iulian ENACHE, „Cine sunt rebelii din SIIL, gruparea radicală ce luptă în Irak și Siria”, <http://mediafax.ro/externe/>, Iuliana Enache, Mediafax 16 iunie 2014, accessed on the 18th of August 2014.

<sup>3</sup> „Opt membri ai grupării teroriste SIIL, arestați în Spania”, *Adevărul* apud Mediafax, 16 iunie 2014, <http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/> accessed on the 18th of August 2014.

<sup>4</sup> „Iraq crisis: Isis changes name and declares its territories a new Islamic state with ‘restoration of caliphate’ in the Middle East, *The Independent*, iulie 2014, <http://independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-est/>, accessed on the 18th of August 2014.

Following the threats by IS militants, the Iraqi Christians began to leave the city of Mosul, being threatened that unless they convert to Islam or pay a protection fee, they will be executed. The deviant behavior of IS militants made Al-Qaeda to deny this group, saying that the new Islamic state of Iraq violates Sharia laws. The rapid advance of fundamentalists in Iraq and the creation of a caliphate and the impact they have on the Middle East has appalled the whole world.



If we compare the annual budget of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is estimated to be somewhere between 60 and 300 million dollars, 200 to 400 million of Hezbollah and even the 300 that FARC manages to gather, then we can say that Islamic militants are the richest terrorists in the world. An example of this is the interview of an Iraqi security service officer, for The Guardian reporters, who reported that last strike of the group has brought a capital of 800 million dollars, although the figures provided by Mosul authorities estimated the damage at a much smaller sum, around 300 million. In conclusion, the budget available to SI is estimated to be between one and three billion dollars<sup>5</sup>.

Besides the bank robbery, the Islamic group has created a very well organized system in terms of traffic and blackmail so important gains in both Syria and Iraq allowed the organization to expand their illegal activities and to maintain or even to increase its budget for military actions. At first, the group has obtained funds from donations from wealthy individuals in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in order to support its fight against President Bashar al-Assad.

According to current reports, the main income of IS comes from the oil areas eastern Syria under their control following the sale of part of these resources by the very Syrian government.

Since 2004, the group has consolidated its power by the powerful influence on the actions of the group Al-Qaeda until they have been excluded due to attacks carried out even against Muslims.

Expert in the field of terrorist organizations, Myriam Benraad considers that some Gulf states would finance IS activities, but this amount does not exceed 10% of the total militants' funding. However, he believes that most of the money comes from donations from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Recent studies conducted on reports, letters and personal archives of the militants who were captured show that the impressive budget

was collected mainly from illegal activities on the territory of Iraq. According to reports, the organizations were obliged to send 20% of profits from extortion and kidnappings to upper echelons. In turn, commanders distributed the funds according to priorities and needs of each subsidiary to undertake further terrorist attacks<sup>6</sup>.

Brown Moses, the observer of the terrorist groups in the Middle East, has estimated that the money the group obtained from the bank robbery in Mosul ensures the recruitment of more than 50 thousand soldiers paid \$ 500 a month. Also, the group is suspected to receive considerable financial support from the sale of raw materials, as well as archaeological artifacts found on Syrian territory. To attract more donations, from 2012, ISIL has produced an annual report on the financial situation, like the large corporations or states.

Once it received the oil-rich territories in Syria, ISIL continued the same effort in Iraq, especially in the north, where oil resources are abundant.

A Sunni tribal leader in Iraq, who wishes to remain anonymous, stated that ISIL began to conquer territories in Iraq when the Sunnis had to choose between defending themselves, being killed or fleeing. To defend themselves, they could either join the Islamic group or procure arms.

Recently, the group has experienced a considerable military success. In January 2014, taking advantage of the tensions that arose between the Sunni minorities in Iraq and the government led by Shiites, it managed to control the city of Fallujah located in the western province of Anbar, with the majority Sunni population. It also managed to control much of the capital of Ramadi province, and also a large number of cities nearby the borders with Turkey and Syria.

In the controlled areas, IS is known as repressive. The conquest of the city of Mosul, in June 2014 had a substantial impact. The Iraqi forces left the city when the Islamic militant group advanced. In this context, the fall of another city under the IS authority was seen as a threat to the Middle East.

---

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/un-investigators-iraq-islamic-state-atrocities>, accessed on the 18th of August 2014.

---

<sup>6</sup> *More than 300 bodies found in Syrian town of Darya*, Al-Arabiya, 26 august 2012, <http://www.alarabiya.net>, accessed on the 18th of August 2014.



If at first IS sought financial funds (by the means we have shown above), they are now focusing their efforts on its ideology and religion, believing that thereby they will manage to attract many followers, especially young Iraqi communities.

The religious dimension through which IS seeks to raise many followers is minimized for two reasons: the first is that because religion plays an important role, it is recognized that steps cannot be taken to halt the spread of the Islamic group. The second reason that can not be answered yet, is that if IS is associated with religion, then how is it that the majority of Muslims condemn this move?<sup>7</sup>

Regarding the IS ideology, it can be defined as: the fight against leaders who were recruited by the West; the fight against those who try to suppress or kill other Muslims; the fight against those who are not believers; the glorification of the caliphate based on Salafist theology (the state should be headed by a caliph and governed by the precepts of Islam as interpreted by IS); defeat Iran in the Arab world amid historic rivalry between Persians and Arabs used to advance the idea that Iran intends to control the Sunni-populated territories in Syria and Iraq, and also the domination over Lebanon and Yemen.<sup>8</sup>

The gains, that have grown steadily, as well as the victories, made IS to draw attention to all the states that have interests in the region. In this respect, IS is considered as the group joining national security interests of some players like Iran, Syria, the United States, Russia, Jordan, Israel, the EU and the Gulf countries. All of these are threatened by its evolution, organization, boldness and, last but not least, its ability to become one of the most funded terrorist groups in the world.

The events in recent years have shown that the Islamic group brutally executed many of its opponents, including Muslims and other religions.

In this context, the international community has taken firm resolve to defeat this extremist group. The announcement was made in commemoration of the 9/11 victims, when US President Barack Obama announced the strategy for reducing the power of Islamic State and destroying it.

In September 2014, in Paris, an international conference was held, attended by delegations from 30 countries, in order to form an international coalition. Besides the European countries, Russia, China, Japan, Turkey, Canada and the US, as well as Arab countries participated.

After discussions, it was concluded that IS poses a threat not only to Iraq, but also to the entire international community. Also, the participating States condemned the crimes committed by this group and mass violence and pledged to support the Government of Iraq to fight Islamic group by all necessary means.

However, there are different and even divergent objectives among coalition members. The US does not want to be seen pursuing unilateral military action against IS, while the coalition partners have common vision and goals.

Unlike the US, Russia and China, and also some European and Arab countries, oppose the deployment of military attacks on Syrian territory, which are considered a violation of the sovereignty of this state.

Because Iran did not participate in the Paris Conference, at present, it is unknown its role and participation in the campaign against the Islamic group. In this regard, US officials said that Iran's presence would not be appropriate due to its involvement in the war in Syria, which is also the most important regional ally of Al-Assad regime. However, its influence both in Iraq and in Syria means that Iran has a special role in the global or regional war against terrorism.

The quite visible disagreement among American leaders, and the contradictory vision regarding the US role in the campaign against IS has created some confusion among partners, encouraging in a way the Islamic militants. In this context, the stated objectives, and the

---

<sup>7</sup> Geneive ABDO, Lulwa RIZKALLAH, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/beware-the-sirien-song-ISIS-11665>, accessed on the 14th November 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem.



strategy against the Islamic group appear to be unrealistic. Although air strikes were carried out on areas controlled by the IS, regional and international powers should work with domestic partners in Iraq and Syria to be able to reach a broad political understanding.

Following public debates, and also the news in the media, IS is considered as the richest terrorist organization in the world. Under its ideology, lies a significant wealth obtained from illegal activities.

### **The role of regional actors in combating ISIL**

#### ***Turkey***

The historical and cultural ties, more than 1600 km border with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and nearly 10 million Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, make Turkey an actor involved in regional affairs.

Lately, Turkey has intensified its political, cultural and economic presence in the Balkans and the Middle East. This process is a priority, as a response to changes in the post-Cold War international relations and a consequence of its geopolitical position. In this context, Ankara has readjusted its principles of domestic and foreign policy in line with the major changes in world politics.

To set this goal, Turkey aims: “to become a status quo power in the Islamic world. In this respect, it will use all the tools at its disposal, in order to create vectors in three directions: the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East.”<sup>9</sup>

Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister claimed that “the twenty-first century must be approached as a period of restoration, construction and cooperation: restoration, for the purpose of developing a spirit of joint action and reconstruction, as a way of overcome last decades frustrations and respond to the challenges of the next period.”<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Fuat E. KEYMAN, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy-Turkish”, in *Foreign Policy 2009 and Beyond*, [http://sam.gov.ro/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/efuat\\_keyman.pdf](http://sam.gov.ro/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/efuat_keyman.pdf), accessed on 29.11.2014.

<sup>10</sup> Ahmet DAVUTOGLU, “Reîntregirea Balcanilor. O perspectivă turcească asupra viitorului spațiu Balcanic”, în *Foreign Policy România*, nr. 25, noiembrie/decembrie 2011, p.63.

Considered the largest Muslim power in the region and also a geopolitical pivot, it wants to replace the Al-Assad regime with a Sunni regime, and thus to regain influence in the Arab world.

After the outbreak of war in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic state, Turkey faces serious problems at the border with Syria and Iraq, where Iran has a predominant influence on the two Arab states.

Aware of the ethno-religious structure in Iraq and Iran’s influence in the region, Ankara is increasingly interested in the US military action in Syria more than in Iraq. Moreover, Turkey is aware that its interests will conflict with those of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Turkey is obliged to cooperate with Qatar, having the same common perspective in the region.

Another major issue for Turkey is the armed conflict with the Kurdish militants. Although so far it has led a firm policy against the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, now it inclines to accept the possibility of establishing such a state that could play a buffer zone, relatively stable, between its borders and the current areas of conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. Beyond that, the Turks and Kurds began to work against the Syrian government forces<sup>11</sup>.

Moreover, Turkey is concerned about the general elections in June (2015), elections to be held amid declining economic growth over the previous year, an increase in unemployment rates and the increasing number of criticisms against the foreign policy pursued by the ruling Justice and Development Party.

In conclusion, we consider that by its reluctance in the military field, and by supporting the Islamist group, Turkey will move away from most of the Arab world.

#### ***Iran***

For Iran, it is important that its Shiite allies to cooperate with the Kurdish population in order to dominate in Iraq, and in Syria the government led

---

<sup>11</sup> Valentin VIDU, “Turcia și-a deschis frontiera pentru kurzii sirieni refugiați din calea grupării Statul Islamic”, *Mediafax*, 19 septembrie 2014, <http://mediafax.ro/externe/>, accessed on the 15th November 2014.





by the Alawi government should not lose power. From this point of view, IS should be removed from Iraq, and in Syria these forces should be reduced, but not eliminated, so as not to be able to project their power in Iraq.

The IS existence in a conglomeration of groups serves Iran's interests to keep the rebels divided and to present this resistance as a Jihadist approach, which in turn would limit the US support for the rebels and would prevent Saudi Arabia to use Syria as a launching ramp for its undermining in Iran and Libya.

### ***Saudi Arabia***

The geopolitical position of Saudi Arabia in the region is unfavorable, because it is threatened by the Shiites in Iran, the Arab Spring phenomenon, and also by the rising Republican Islam and the Jihadist fight led by SIIL group.

In order to remove the Al-Assad regime from power, Saudi Arabia uses SI, known for its anti-Shiite attitude, reducing thus the power both in Iraq and in Syria. The problem is that they do not control IS.

The main goal of Saudi Arabia that competes with groups, such as IS and AQ for the concepts of Salafism and jihad, is the overthrow of the Al-Assad regime. Although it has no control over the SI, it uses the anti-Shiite group to reduce power both in Iraq and in Lebanon.

While Turkey is facing problems, the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, will try to fill the void in the region, in order to secure the interests of Sunni Arabs. These measures are also taken because they can not rely only on the US to defend them.

### ***Qatar***

The strategy adopted by the Doha leadership is based on two principles. First, Qatar doesn't want the Saudi hegemony in the Sunni Arab world, and second, it aims to be a regional player. To achieve this, Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood group in the entire region. It has also an influence on the Salafist jihadist groups, including Jabhat Al-Nusrat group considered in Syria as an Al-Qaeda branch.

Unlike the Saudis and Iranians, it wants the US to destroy the IS so that the national Islamic forces can record a rise in Syria and eventually to be able to be part of a power-sharing agreement with the regime in Syria.

Over the last century, the availability of American public opinion on global military involvement varied. In this context, a study was conducted on support for air strikes against IS, showing that 76% of respondents agreed with the air strikes, while 21% oppose such intervention.

Regarding the support of ground forces in Iraq, the percentage is much lower – 45% agreeing, while 53% are opposed. Based on these studies and the analysts view, the US contribution to the defeat of the Islamic State jihadist group will be a limited one in the sense that it will involve major land operations.

In their view, the greatest contribution must come from countries in the region, such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which will have to leave aside their differences and assume responsibility for managing the situation in the region on long term.

Compared with Al-Qaeda actions, combating the Islamic State, which controls the territory of Iraq and Syria will be more difficult because its methods of action are different from those of AQ.

Consequently, the US role will be of minor importance and limited in time and space compared to that of the powers in the region. Although these countries have different objectives to reconfigure the region in the fight against IS group, they should be involved to maintain their security and interests in the region.

### **Conclusions**

The success of ISIL is a source of inspiration for the Salafist-jihadist groups in neighboring Syria (Lebanon, Iran, Jordan), given that they are aware that the Syrian front enables them to increase funding and fighting experience in a real field, elements that will constitute germs of radical terrorist phenomenon in countries of origin. This form of jihadist salafism tends to undermine the



authority of the Members of the analyzed area, to radicalize a significant part of the population and become a threat less dramatic but with more powerful effects. In this respect, the growing power and influence of ISIL created a regional disagreement on the nature of the threats posed by extremist jihadists.

Although the US has invested considerable effort in the past two years, however IS continued to receive resources, either by Turkish border, either by Gulf. Lately, the situation has improved, but much more needs to be done to achieve a uniform cooperation from regional allies in this effort. To do this, states with interests in the region will need to focus their efforts to carry out a political, diplomatic, economic and military cooperation.

US participation in IS mitigation is possible, but at the same time, it is unlikely that these regional actors act together to establish a new regional order to control the caliphate.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ANCUȚ, Isabela, "Reactivarea competiției regionale în Asia-Pacific. Disputele teritoriale din Marea de Sud și Est a Chinei", *Infosfera* nr. 2/2013, București, Editată DGIA.

2. BARBU, Mircea, "Statul Islamic-cea mai bogată organizație teroristă din lume. În spatele ideologiei se ascunde o avere impresionantă", 8 iulie 2014, <http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/statul-islamic-cea-mai-bogata-organizatie-terorista-In-spatele-ideologiei-ascunde-avere-impresionanta>.

3. DAVUTOGLU, Ahmet, "Reîntregirea Balcanilor. O perspectivă turcească asupra viitorului spațiu Balcanic", in *Foreign Policy România*, nr. 25, noiembrie/decembrie 2011

4. DUMITRU, Elena, "Al-Qaeda se dezice de SIIL, califatul și conducătorul său. Ideologii al-Qaeda spun că noul stat islamic din Irak încalcă legile sharia și este deviant", in *Adevărul*,

[http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/al-qaeda-dezice-siis-califatul-conducatorul-sau-ideologii-al-qaeda-spun-noul-stat-islamic-incalca-legile-sharia-deviant\\_53be5afb0d133766a84c5301/index.html](http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/al-qaeda-dezice-siis-califatul-conducatorul-sau-ideologii-al-qaeda-spun-noul-stat-islamic-incalca-legile-sharia-deviant_53be5afb0d133766a84c5301/index.html), 10 iulie 2014.

5. KEYMAN, E., Fuat, "Globalization, Modernity and Democracy", in *Turkish Foreign Policy 2009 and Beyond*, [http://sam.gov.re/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/efuat\\_keyman.pdf](http://sam.gov.re/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/efuat_keyman.pdf)

6. GLODEANU, Antonio, "Statul islamic îi alungă pe creștinii irakieni: „Vă convertiți la Islam sau muriți”, in *Adevărul*, 21 November 2014.

7. GRUMAZ, Alexandru, „Un nou stat islamic în Orientul Mijlociu”, *Adevărul*, 20 November 2014.

8. HASSAN, Hassan, "Political reform in Iraq will stem the rise of Islamists", *The National*, <http://www.thenational.ae/>.

9. MALIȚA Mircea, (editor) *Statele lumii*, Editura științifică și enciclopedică, București, 1985.

10. MARIN, Viorica, „Jihadiștii vor să-și extindă califatul până în Balcani, inclusiv în România” *Adevărul*, 30 June 2014, <http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/>.

11. NAFEEZ, Ahmed, "Syria intervention plan fueled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concerns", *The Guardian*, 30 August 2013

12. RADU, Cătălin, „Turcia, noul pivot geopolitic din Orientul Mijlociu”; *Foreign Policy 2009, România*, October 2011.

13. RUSU, Diana, „Bătălia pentru Bagdad. SUA și Iran, pregătite să se implice militar”, în *Adevărul*, <http://adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/Irak>.

14. VIDU, Valentin, „Gruparea Stat Islamic este organizată ca un adevărat stat. Cine sunt conducătorii grupului terorist”, *Mediafax*.

15. WITHNALL, Adam, "Iraq crisis: Isis changes name and declares its territories a new Islamic state with 'restoration of caliphate' in Middle East", *The Independent*.





16. \*\*\*, “Iraq crisis: Isis changes name and declares its territories a new Islamic state with ‘restoration of caliphate’ in Middle East”, *The Independent*, <http://independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/>.

17. \*\*\*, *ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as Islamic State*, <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News>.

18. \*\*\*, Islamic State, Wikipedia Encyclopaedia, [http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statul\\_Islamic](http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statul_Islamic).

19. \*\*\*, *Profilul-grupării-isil-siimplicatiile-regiune*, <http://adevărul.ro/international/foring-policy/Profilul-grupării-isil-siimplicatiile-regiune>.

#### **Acknowledgement:**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title “*Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.*”



# 2014 NATO SUMMIT – FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

*Daniel-Nicolae BĂNICĂ\**

*A war ended and another has begun. Like a bridge between Afghanistan and Ukraine, the NATO summit 2014 held at Newport brought in spotlight the force, cohesion, unit of action and the Allies wish of defend and preserve the organization. If the NATO summit held in 2008, at Bucharest, was marked by the conflict in Georgia and Chicago summit in 2012 marked the Arabian Spring, the Newport summit was marked by the unaligned, hybrid and atypical war in Ukraine.*

*The exponential development of military techniques and technology, as well as the introduction in the warfare equation of the newest doctrinal concepts imply a prompt and adequate reaction of the Alliance, proving that NATO remains the basic pillar of global stability.*

*NATO Readiness Action Plan to increase the responsiveness capability shows a chess reaction on the chessboard of the present world polarity and emphasis the fact that forces assume a posture or change it for another depending on the anticipated movements of the adversary.*

*By implementing the rapid reaction force, collective defence gains coherence, vision, and training and enhanced exercises to meet a capability able to be credible, reactive and effective.*

*At the beginning of a century characterized by technological boom in all fields, especially in the military, the Newport referential signifies the Alliance command and control redefinition*

*in terms of cyber space a resettlement of power balance in terms of forces.*

**Keywords:** *Alliance, security, forces, threats, readiness action plan, collective defence, joint task force, short notice.*

## 1. General information

NATO summit in Newport, the first summit on Wales's realm, United Kingdom, was a summit of heads of state and government which on one hand, has marked the end of the mission in Afghanistan and on the other hand, has defined the Alliance future military missions after completion of the operations in Afghanistan.

The summit was marked by historical milestones: 100 years since the outbreak of the First World War, 75 years since the onset of the Second World War, 25 since the the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, and by Russian aggression against Ukraine, shaped as what was named *hybrid warfare - the new challenge of the XXI century.*

With a large participation of 10,000 guests attending the summit works, including 60 heads of government and ministers, heads of state from the 28 NATO member countries as well as leaders from 33 partner countries of the Alliance and of Member States participating in the mission in Afghanistan (ISAF) – to be ended by the end of the year – , special attention was

---

*\* Colonel Daniel-Nicolae BĂNICĂ works at J7, General Staff, MoND and is PhD student in Military Sciences at National Defence University "Carol I", Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: dnl\_banica@yahoo.com*



needed regarding the security, that was provided by approximately 9,500 British policemen, supported by considerable security forces and air defence to protect and defend the bilateral meetings.

Among the participants there were the president of the United States, Barack Obama, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, the president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, as well as the president of Ukraine, Petro Porosenko, who, before the summit works, has pronounced his decision for Ukraine to resume the NATO joining process.

NATO summit in Newport has been carried out in the context of the anniversary of 65 years of the existence of the Alliance and the main theme of this summit has been the withdrawal of the most part of the international forces in Afghanistan after 12 years of war and the set up of the training for the Afghan National Security Forces mission (ANSF), foreseen for 2015, which would involve the presence in this Asian country of about 14,000 soldiers of the Alliance<sup>1</sup>.

The Events of the year 2014, and here it should be highlighted the unusual points of the war without limits conducted in Ukraine and the bloody deeds of the so-called Islamic state created conditions for NATO to manifest itself, in the first place, like a well balanced and powerful organization, liable, exercising its fundamental mission to defend its members of any damage, no matter from what direction it may come from.

This was a summit of solidarity, a summit that revitalised the organization and which gives an extremely powerful signal that the organization is ready to work and fulfill its fundamental mission, on grounds of Article 5<sup>2</sup>. At the summit there have

been reiterated the commitment to fulfill all the three basic tasks defined in the Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management and security through cooperation<sup>3</sup>. On the occasion, a message was launched, which in addition to those of solidarity and increase of the ability to react, has established that freedom is not for free, and each Member States must have a consistent participation in achieving security, in order to be able to take advantage of a common security umbrella. The message marked that each nation must be aware of the need for an allocation of at least 2% of the GDP and a revival of the defence industry as well.

In essence, the summit has been motivated by the wish to show to the whole world the solidarity of the Alliance when there is tension in the proximity of the eastern European border and to underline again, if required, the responsiveness of Alliance members subject to the existence of an imminent threat to its integrity.

At the NATO summit in Newport, there has been adopted a consistent number of documents, whereof some came into prominence<sup>4</sup>: the Walles Summit Declaration; the Declaration on Transatlantic Bond (showing the commitment of the United States to Europe and of Europe to the Partnership with the United States); the NATO-Ukraine Common Declaration; the Declaration on Afghanistan, and the Declaration on armed forces<sup>5</sup> (showing the solidarity towards those who have fallen in the service of country on the battle fields opened by the Alliance and the gratitude to their families).

### **2. Considerations on the main directives of NATO summit**

A number of directives, made public by the NATO Summit Declaration, have been discussed, debated and agreed during the summit works.

Presented during the works of the summit,

---

<sup>1</sup> The Epoch Times, *NATO Summit in Walles, under the sign of withdrawal from Afghanistan and Ukraine crisis.* (youtube.com), <http://epochtimes-romania.com/news/summitul-nato-din-tara-galilor-sub-semnul-retragerii-din-afghanistan-si-al-crizei-din-ucraina---222897>, accessed on 13 September 2014

<sup>2</sup> The Declaration made by the president of Romania, Mr. Traian Băsescu, at the end of the works of the North-Atlantic Summit 2014 in Newport, Walles, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nothen Ireland, on 5 September 2014, [http://www.presidency.ro/?\\_RID=det&tb=date&id=15214&PRID=ag](http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=15214&PRID=ag), p 1, accessed on 25 September 2014.

<sup>3</sup> The Summit declaration adopted by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council in Wales in 4 and 5 of September 2014, [www.presidency.ro](http://www.presidency.ro), accessed on 15 September 2014.

<sup>4</sup> Idem 3, pg. 2, accessed on 28 September 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem 3, pg. 2, accessed on 28 September 2014.



these directives of reference are of particular importance for the modernisation, adaptation and strengthening the Alliance. However, from the point of view of an increasing responsiveness level in relation to an imminent threat from the Russian Federation, i.e. the ballistic missile defence, there is a number of five directives of reference which has been remarked at the end of the summit.

### 2.1. RAP Approval

NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) aims to enhance NATO's responsiveness in the levels of reaction, provides a coherent and comprehensive package of measures needed to respond to security environment changes from NATO close and remoted borders<sup>6</sup>, which is a concern for Allies, answering to Russia's challenges and strategic implications derived.

A series of measures encapsulated within the Action Plan aim at:

- a significant increase of responsiveness capability of NATO Response Force (NRF) by resizing and development of force packages able to act quickly and respond rapidly to the potential challenges and threats through the establishment of a multinational group of forces with a very high level of reaction – Very High Reaction Joint Task Forces (VHRJTF), as a new Allied common force, able to deploy at very short notice to answer the challenges that may arise particularly at NATO peripheric territory;

- a consistent presence of the command and control elements anytime available on the eastern edge of the Alliance, and some groups of forces in the field, built on each Ally contribution on rotational basis, focusing on the planning scenarios and collective defence exercises;

- enhancing NATO capacity to strengthen quickly and efficiently the eastern flank Allies, including infrastructure preparation, equipment and means of supply pre-positioning, in conjunction with the designation of specific bases;

---

<sup>6</sup> Summit Declaration in Wales adopted by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council at Wales. September 4 2014, par. 5, pg. 1, [www.presidency.ro](http://www.presidency.ro), accessed on 15 September 2014.

- host nation support - HNS, which will be extremely important in establishing a substantial presence of NATO forces on its eastern border;

- strengthening the regular naval forces to gain a better maritime situational information in real-time, and to achieve the capability to conduct the full spectrum of conventional maritime operations;

- developing an intensified program of exercises focused on collective defence exercises, where practicing comprehensive responses to civil-military complex scenarios is included, based on Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), agreed at the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012;

The NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP), to enhance the responsiveness level is the backbone of NATO summit in Wales, in the context of an increased demonstration and development of a hybrid war in Ukraine. RAP is a pledge for the fact that NATO complies with its allies and, by means of actions taken to strengthen the eastern part of the Alliance, including a solid presence in the Black Sea, proves that the Eastern border is the first significant alignment facing a possible Russian invasion.

By adopting the Action Plan and its implementation starting with 2016, NATO brings into effect a triangle defence shield composed of Poland, Romania, and Turkey in opposition to Russian Federation intentions, representing the projection vectors of NATO future forces to be deployed in this region.

By subsequent materialisation of RAP, by stages, there shall be established a *buffer zone* between Russia and the Western Europe, composed of Baltic States, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

NATO is maintaining its credibility of the most powerful alliance of the world, though it could not prevent the Crimea annexation<sup>7</sup> by the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2014.

---

<sup>7</sup> Maria Dejevsky, *News of a Russian Arms Buildup Next to Ukraine is Part of Propaganda War*, article published in *The Guardian*, on 11.04.2013, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentsisfree/2014/apr/11/russian-arms-buildup-ukraine-propaganda-war-nato/>, accessed on 09.12.2014





The “spearhead”, the ultra-fast response force, which will be developed through RAP implementation, is aimed to deter from a potential attack of Russia. The response force will become fully operational in 2016. Until then, when the readiness level will be reached, an interim structure capable of rapid reaction<sup>8</sup> will be provided.

### ***2.2. The Hybrid war in Ukraine***

The new challenge of 21<sup>st</sup> century represents a referential landmark, a point of inflection for the meaning of the new approach of future military actions. In this atypical conflict, NATO must be able to address proactively and effectively the challenges, which involves the use a wide range of open and undercover military, paramilitary and civilian actions, within a high degree of integration architecture.

In this respect, it has been decided to implement the following measures: the development and modernization of strategic communications, together with the development of exercise scenarios to counteract the hybrid war; strengthen the coordination between NATO and other organizations, complying with relevant decisions adopted, with a view to improving the information exchange, political consultation process and internal coordination.

The hybrid warfare (HW) has transformed the geometry of the modern conflict foundations. Accordingly, the new type of conflict, like the one in Ukraine, involving a coordinated and broad range of opened or under cover actions, including, but not limited to civil and military means, make use of conventional and unconventional means within an ambiguous attack against another state. Nowadays, on one hand, combat forces could be seen facing such fully new challenges to cope with, and on the other hand, conflicts have won in duration and certitude/ predictability.

From the point of view of the international

---

<sup>8</sup> Eliza Frâncu, *What will NATO do for Ukraine and what will it do for its own members*, Radio France International, Nord-Atlantic Council Meeting, 2 December 2014, <http://www.rfi.ro/stiri-politica-54216-ce-va-face-nato-ucraina-ce-va-face-proprii-membri>, accessed on 7 December 2014.

law, Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and acts subversively in Ukraine in order to make it unstable; Russia sustains the eastern separatists trying to maintain Ukraine within its own sphere of influence to stop NATO enlargement; Russia desires to maintain a buffer zone between the borders of Russian Federation and NATO, trying to extend its own boundary as a counter offer to the American missile shield.

The idea according to which Moscow long-term strategy is to keep Ukraine away from the European security and maintain Kiev in Russia’s sphere of influence continuing to stay clear of European Union and NATO significance, becomes increasingly looming.

### ***2.3. Defence expenditures***

Defence expenditures is a particularly sensitive aspect, which must know an increasing trend, in such a way that the budgets of European allies have to comply with the reference value of NATO and return to minimum percentage of 2% of the gross domestic product - GDP on defence:<sup>9</sup> NATO recommends that Member States should spend more than 20% of their budgets for the defence on equipment of major importance, including research activity, development, and technological innovation.

The Allies who spend far less than 20% of their annual budgets for defence on equipment of major importance must establish as objective that, during the coming decade, to increase their yearly investments up to 20% or beyond; all Member States must ensure that their Land, Air and Naval Forces correspond in capacity of deployment, sustainability and other quantifiable results to the guidelines agreed at NATO level; NATO Member States must ensure each other that their armed forces are capable to operate effectively together, including through implementation of standards and doctrines agreed by NATO.

---

<sup>9</sup> Declarația de presă a președintelui României, domnul Traian Băsescu, la finalul lucrărilor Summitul Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord (NATO) de la Newport (Țara Galilor, Regatul Unit al Marii Britanii și Irlandei de Nord), 5 septembrie 2014, [http://www.presidency.ro/?\\_RID=det&tb=date&id=15214&\\_PRID=ag](http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=15214&_PRID=ag), pag. 1, accessed on 25 Septemehr 2014.



After NATO accession, year after year, most eastern European states have reduced considerably their budgets, so that, in 2013, their situation has come to be alarming from the point of view of the defence potential.

The defence industry of European Union states have suffered mainly as a result of the economic crisis occurred between 2008 and 2013.

The unequivocal task the summit designed is that all European states have to allocate at least 2% of the GDP to defence, and revival their own defence industry to be able to defend their national territory, at least until the arrival of NATO Forces.

The defence industry revival, in conjunction with exercises enhancement supported financially at the agreed level will lead, in the light of 2020s, to a redefinition of own defence capability.

### **2.4. Russia - NATO relationship**

NATO Common Declaration made at the Newport Summit condemns Russia's increasing military intervention in Ukraine and makes appeal to Russian Federation to stop the aggression and withdraw its forces from across and along Ukraine's borders.

In the spirit of NATO summit Common Declaration, the Alliance has expressed its concern for Russia's failure to comply with the International Law, *id est* the UN Chart, and Russian behavior towards Georgia and the Republic of Moldavia, moreover the violation of European fundamental safeguards commitments and arrangements, including those of the United Nations Chart and the Helsinki Final Act raised questions.

The refusal to put into effect for a long time the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the recourse to military and other instruments in order to force the neighbors represents dangerous precedents for future NATO - Russia relations <sup>10</sup>.

The Alliance has shown its support for the sanctions imposed by the EU, G5, G7, G 20 and

other organizations so as to prevent Russia to escalate the crisis and to reach a political solution. It is considered that a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for international law would be of great strategic value. But as the conditions for a normal NATO-Russia relationship are not satisfactory, NATO's decision to suspend any civil and military cooperation between NATO and Russia is still in force. Here, it was strongly reiterated that the North Atlantic Alliance does not want the confrontation and does not constitute a threat for Russia and there was no reference to the Treaty for the establishment of a NATO-Russia Council.

During the 1990s period and the beginning of the 2000s, the Russian Federation lacked national and international power. Meanwhile, EU and NATO have extended over a large part of Russian Federation neighborhood, by the accession to the EU and NATO of certain of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

Between 2005 and 2010, the Russian Federation has changed. Political and security bodies have been reconsolidated under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, the economy has recovered due to high prices on energy and Kremlin had a greater maneuver space in terms of foreign policy (in particular across the former Soviet area) as a result of US and Western Europe focus on Afghanistan and Iraqi wars. The Russian Federation counteracted Western Europe by defeating Georgia in the war of August 2008, suppressing "colored" revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and launching in 2010 its own block, known as Customs Union, encompassing the Republic of Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The Russian Federation took advantage of these advances to return to its legitimated status of a regional power, forcing former Soviet countries and even Europe to take account of its interests. However, this ascent, along with the end of Iraqi and Afghanistan wars, convinced the Europeans and the United States to focus on Russian Federation and keep under control its renewal. All of this culminated in a rebellion in Ukraine against the pro-Russian regime, which was extended to other states of the former Soviet

---

<sup>10</sup> The Wales Declaration adopted by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council of Wales, 4 and 5 September, 2014, 18 par., pg. 3, [www.presidency.ro](http://www.presidency.ro), accessed on 15 October 2014.



Union<sup>11</sup> and led to current stalemate between the Russian Federation and Western Europe.

NATO is still in progress in achieving the ballistic missile shield and Russian Federation brings its land forces in Crimea and naval forces in the Black Sea in order to be closer to NATO.

In my opinion, the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation will remain tensed for as long as the two biggest boxers will mutually control, balance and render inactive their strategic movements.

The variant according to which the Russian Federation did not want to be directly involved to forward presence operations in Ukraine and to attract Western tougher answers, mainly new sanctions and a NATO more visible presence. This means that the Russian Federation will continue to support separatist forces in order to maintain the military action threat as an influence tool upon Kiev.

### **2.5. NATO - Ukraine relationship**

NATO-Ukraine relationship has known new and positive reference marks. The Alliance has encouraged Ukraine to persist in promoting a consistent and transparent political process, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law. In the light of the prospective, NATO shall encourage Ukraine to implement the Annual National Program and will support the security and defence sectors reforms, in order to promote a greater interoperability between Ukraine and NATO forces.

On the long term, USA perceives the Middle East crisis as being a greater threat addressed to western security than Ukraine crisis is.

Despite the Ukrainian crisis, “in the future, the fundamental purpose of NATO will be to manage problems at the global level, outside its area of responsibility”<sup>12</sup>.

Notwithstanding the resolute statements of

---

<sup>11</sup> STRATFOR, *The care of ex- Soviet Union states after two decades since the Union had been dissolved*, 21.09 2014, <http://www.stratfor.com>, accessed on 18 December 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Reuters, *The new missions of NATO will not solve crises in Ukraine and Iraq*, 07.09 2014, <http://www.reuters.com>, accessed on 21 December 2014.

NATO leaders on the decision reached, NATO Alliance is unable to settle the conflict between Ukraine and separatists supported by the Russian Federation.

### **2.6. Alliance' capabilities development**

The development of Alliance' capabilities refer to several aspects:

*Development of the NATO BMD system*, which refers to the fact that:

- the missile proliferation threat addressed to populations, territory and European forces of NATO continues to increase, and therefore missile defence is a part of a broader response to cope with this type of threat;

- the deployment of the elements of the Aegis Ashore system at Deveselu in Romania, respects the pre-established schedule which foresees that this stage should be completed during the last semester of 2015 and made available for NATO providing a significant increase in NATO BMD. In addition, an advanced deployment of Aegis ships endowed in BMD capability has been achieved in Rota, Spain;

- a number of Allies develop, by international cooperation included, or acquires additional defence capabilities against ballistic missiles (BMD) and the command and control systems of Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) and their extent to defend the territory are eligible for common funding.

North Atlantic Council should track regularly the implementation of NATO BMD capability to draw up a comprehensive report on the progress and problems requiring attention for future development, until the next NATO summit in 2016.

*NATO Forces 2020* should become modern, flexible, dynamic, interconnected, equipped, trained, and controlled at top level: the objective remains a priority and NATO reaffirms its commitment to fulfill them. The Alliance Action Plan for an increase in the levels of reaction complements and strengthens *NATO Forces 2020* by improving the readiness level of the Alliance.

The Ballistic Missile shield represents, in reality, the main pretext of the Russian Federation



discontent, which, on a number of occasions has claimed that the shield is a threat to it.

The dislocation of missile systems in Crimea that Russian Federation made, associated with a massive presence of fleet at the Black Sea provides a powerful vector of reaction against the Ballistic Missile Shield, being a direct threat on the Ballistic Missile elements situated in Poland, Romania and Turkey. From Crimea, the Russian Federation may develop simultaneously or successively on the three directions referred to above, swift, powerful, and reactive actions, to address the elements of the Ballistic Missile shield.

The advanced placement of the present Ballistic Missile system, in particular the Deveselu elements threaten to fundamentally alter the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia.

The new configuration of the Russian Ballistic Missile Defence is based on the automated control system of the Air Force and Space Defence, designed by the Almaz Antei company.

The intercept surface-to-air missiles, as well as the mobile defence systems and radars will be connected to the Common/Joint Control Centre. Thereafter, all the new Ballistic Missile systems, such as S-500 missiles and new radars are to be integrated into this system<sup>13</sup>.

The summit documents show a series of **significant objectives for Romania, among which I mention:**

- adoption of the Action Plan for increasing the operational capacity of NATO, through which it has been decided a NATO presence on the territory of the member states of the Eastern border of NATO, including the territory of Romania, makes reference to: intensify the training process of the NRF national elements; improve/prepare the training and exercises infrastructure; develop an extended program of national long-term exercises; formulate the requirements for the annual training and “short notice” exercises for VJTF; support the “Atlantic Resolve” operation; provide Host Nation Support - HNS for carrying

out some of NATO exercises; carry out further training under hybrid warfare conditions;

- participation in the achievement of cyber security;
- improvement of interoperability through participation in Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) *id est* participation in NATO training concept during 2015-2020 period, participation in TRJE 15 high visibility exercise and involvement in Exercises Programme starting with 2016;
- participation in individual and collective training within Resolute Support Mission, in Afghanistan starting with 2015;
- support for Ukraine to facilitate its participation in NATO exercises;
- effective participation in increasing the interoperability with NATO partners through training support;
- participation in maritime security by enhancing the training at the Black Sea.

### 3. Future implications of the decisions adopted on 2014 Summit

Since the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO continued its reform through the establishment of new policies, reshaping and resizing its own structures and simplifying the procedures to improve the efficiency and to ensure that the Alliance is modern and improved, dynamic and versatile, adaptable and reactive, and capable to respond to various and multiple challenges and threats addressed and, mainly to those it will be facing in the near future. Therefore, by its permanent transformation, NATO enabled a continuum in financial reform, capitalized the International Staff and Military International Staff efforts, developed the Command Structure and met a high coherence among its agencies.

Hereafter, the work will continue in domains as materialisation of common financing capabilities, qualitative administrative reform, increase of transparency and responsibility, mainly NATO financial resources management. The Alliance remains the transatlantic dedicated format for a strong collective defence and is the essential and widely recognised forum for security consultation

---

<sup>13</sup> Mihaela Toth, Agerpres, 15 May 2013, <http://www.agerpres.com>, accessed on 27 December 2014.





and decision making process of the Allies. NATO will remain a transatlantic bridge continuing to cement the transatlantic relationship, providing the resources, capabilities, and political will to ensure that the Alliance is ready to face any challenge, anytime, and anywhere. The Newport Summit is the last summit chaired by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the ex-Danish Prime Minister as NATO General Secretary, as his five years mandate ended on 1<sup>st</sup> of October 2014, and his position was taken by the Norwegian Jens Stoltenberg, who attended the summit as observer.

As a result of this summit, Romania has a Contingency Plan and an Action Plan if it were attacked, under the conditions in which NATO military personnel under the command of SACEUR, the Supreme Command of NATO Forces in Europe, has elaborated scenarios according to which Romania's security could be affected, and they are focused on sea, land, and air attack against Romania. In the same context, the Action Plan gives the solutions and counteractions adopted by the Alliance to defend Romania in conjunction with its own Armed Forces<sup>14</sup>.

The Romanian Armed Forces are ready to receive new military equipments. We have a defence industry still able to produce heavy vehicles, modern heavy tracked vehicles, armored personnel carriers, endowed in high technology, provided that the military could receive financial resources from the state budget to accomplish herein before mentioned actions<sup>15</sup>.

The actions encompassed in the Action Plan will be defined through a significant and continuous presence of Air, Land, and Naval Forces, where Special Forces are included, and

under these circumstances, NATO Forces in military personnel on Romanian territory will augment.

The American fleet will ensure a consistent presence, able to conduct joint exercises with Romanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish national military fleet<sup>16</sup>. The program to locate the elements of the Ballistic Missile Shield will be continued and the Deveselu basis will be operational by the end of 2015, and later will be passed over under NATO command when the investment as a whole will be completed, third phase included.

Once again, the summit has demonstrated that NATO remains the single viable option able to answer the Russian Federation arsenal. The three main benchmarks of the summit agenda – Afghanistan, Ukraine and Middle East, ISIL included, form an instability triangle and insecurity centre, a belt of fire surrounding the Russian Federation, creating at Moscow a concern regarding a tangible junction of Russia and NATO. Even if the American level of ambition is high regarding the Ukrainian area, the Russian Federation will not allow NATO to bring its border up to the buffer area and will try to maintain a conflict area on Eastern Ukraine, a permanent warfare field, a chessboard on which the strategic interests of the Russian bear will be played against the American eagle.

### Conclusions

The 2014 NATO summit has marked officially a new beginning and a referential approach in addressing future relations between NATO and the Russian Federation. At the NATO summit in Newport, the Alliance has recognized, unofficially, that without an increase at a level of at least 2% of the internal GDP in defence budgets of NATO member countries, in particular of European ones, the Alliance cannot maintain a proper response to a at random and massive challenge.

As the war hybrid in Ukraine is an element of novelty, with which the Alliance was not

---

<sup>14</sup> Declaration of Traian Băsescu, President of Romania, at the press release held at Cotroceni Palace, on Sunday, 7 September 2014, [http://www.presidency.ro/?\\_RID=det&tb=date&id=13875&\\_PRID=](http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=13875&_PRID=), accessed on 31 October 2014.

<sup>15</sup> Declaration of Traian Băsescu, President of Romania, at the press release held at Cotroceni Palace, on Sunday, 7 September 2014, [http://www.presidency.ro/?\\_RID=det&tb=date&id=13875&\\_PRID=](http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=13875&_PRID=), accessed on 31 October 2014.

<sup>16</sup> President Barack Obama Declaration at the works of NATO Summit, 3-5 September 2014.



confronted until now, the agenda of NATO's summit in September 2014 knew ad-hoc adjustments. At the summit, a new race between the two military blocs has been formally inaugurated and it has been launched a new approach to future conflicts which will be marked by human beings' actions before the start of specific military actions.

It has also shown that, no matter when and where, the balance of power may change within a relatively short time, and the ability to surprise by military actions and ingenuity could represent the winner's hidden ace. The decision to build up two Headquarters at Division and Battalion level on Romanian territory, a stationary force of more than 600 Marine personnel on Mihail Kogălniceanu base, as well as the presence at the Black Sea of American battle ships, corroborated with the elements of the Ballistic Missile shield at Deveselu, settles Romania on a NATO vanguard position, in my opinion, with all the risks and threats deriving from this status. By the annexation of Crimea, Russia took a step forward and opened a possible, new arms race; the elements of the American Ballistic Missile Shield placed in Poland, Romania and Turkey, as well as at the Black Sea could be countered, in the case of missile launching within the missile acceleration area, i.e. much easier, by Russian elements of missile shield located in Crimea and mounted on Russian ships, which are increasingly more numerous at the Black Sea and in the frozen North, which also is dominated by Russia.

In the next 10 or 15 years, we are going to witness a massive force relocation re-positioning, rapid deployment and re-deployment of forces, defined local and regional scenarios and challenges, realignment of alliances and new types of technique/ordnance experiments, all made by the great military and economic powers, at the expense of peoples and populations.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Agerpres, [www.agerpres.com](http://www.agerpres.com)
2. DEJOVSKY, Maria, *News of a Russian Arms Buildup Next to Ukraine is Part of Propaganda War*, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentsisfree/2014/apr/11/russian-arms-buildup-ukraine-propaganda-war-nato/>
3. NATO Chiefs of Defence give direction and guidance to implement Wales Summit decisions, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news/>
4. NATO website, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news/).
5. Press declarations of Romanian President, Mr. Traian Băsescu, 5 and 7 September 2014, at the end of the NATO Summit, <http://www.presidency.ro/>.
6. Reuters, [www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com)  
Stratfor, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com)
7. The Epoch Times, *Summitul NATO din Țara Galilor, sub semnul retragerii din Afganistan și al crizei din Ucraina*, <http://epochtimes-romania.com/>;
8. Wales Summit Declaration, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm)

### Acknowledgement:

This work was possible with the financial support from the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822, with the title *“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence and Public order and national security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers – “SmartSPODAS”.*”



# CSDP DEVELOPMENT DYNAMICS: REFERENCE POINTS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

*Valentin IACOB\**

*This article examines potential European security alternatives over the next 15 years with particular emphasis on military domain. The global shift in the balance of economic power away from Euro-Atlantic area, increased dependence on fossil fuel imports, the U.S. rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific, and challenges in Europe's neighborhood will put EU cohesion to the test and shape its common security development. Europe is at a strategic crossroads and the future of its Common Security and Defence Policy is likely to be determined by decisions made in the next five years.*

*Four alternative scenarios explore available strategic options by examining five drivers with the uncertainties they generate. These drivers are likely to influence outcomes as far as year 2030 when the EU could become an influential regional and, potentially, global security actor or it could drift into irrelevance, leaving the U.S. without reliable partners in addressing global security threats.*

**Keywords:** *European Union, security, strategic, defence, scenarios, drivers, energy, capabilities.*

## **Introduction**

Year 2014 marked the centenary anniversary of the beginning of the First World War which

triggered a period of unprecedented turmoil in world history. The 20<sup>th</sup> century's brutal debut continued with the Second World War and witnessed a strategic stalemate unfolding on both sides of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the re-unification of Germany gave Europe a chance to reconcile and explore a unique opportunity to overcome past rivalries that stained the Old Continent's history with wars. The emerging trend in intra-European cooperation led to positive developments in the last decade of the century and the European Economic Community re-branded into the European Union (EU), blasted through all the barriers of the past to move ahead at higher speed in a much desired integration process.

In just over a hundred years, Europe moved from the "bloody" struggles aimed at establishing nation states during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, to a "soft" struggle to diminish the role of states towards the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century revealed new global security challenges: threats associated with terrorism, failing states, weapons of mass destruction, and later cyber, scaled up to a new magnitude in an era of unparalleled technological progress. Globalization continuously boosted the world's economy and empowered new emerging nations to assert a more active role in

---

*\* Colonel Valentin IACOB is chief of staff in a Land Forces brigade located in Tirgu-Mureş, Romania.  
Email: iacobval@yahoo.com*



the international geopolitical arena. The world became more interconnected than ever before and the “cascade” effect of the financial crisis that started in America in 2007, highlighted some of the hidden dangers of the interdependency which could also trigger serious consequences on security.

After going through an accelerated enlargement process in the recent years, at the end of 2013, the EU numbered 28 members and a population of 505.7 million<sup>1</sup>. According to the World Bank, in 2012 the EU had the highest GDP in the world at \$16.69 trillion, recently surpassing the United States (U.S.) and China.

The aggregate number of military personnel in the EU was, in 2012, 1.45 million<sup>2</sup>, slightly higher than 1.43 million<sup>3</sup> in the U.S. Armed Forces. In spite of recent reductions, the military personnel strength is still significant but, so far, the EU has been inclined more to leverage its economic power in addressing security challenges favoring the use of “soft” power over “hard” military power. The EU has enjoyed a relatively successful present, but the future does not look promising as significant shifts are expected in the global economic environment.

In accordance with the projections of the International Monetary Fund, China’s economy was on course to overtake the U.S. economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms<sup>4</sup> at the end

of 2014 while, just over a decade ago, it had only a third of America’s GDP.

The rapid expansion of the Asian economies will move the global economic center of gravity from Atlantic to Pacific significantly reducing, in the process, the traditional influence European large countries used to have in the world. Moreover, these dramatic shifts in the global economic landscape are likely to trigger security challenges leading to changes in the existing world order and depicting different scenarios for the future of the EU security.

At the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century, the U.S. surpassed the British Empire to become the world’s leading economy. Since then, and mostly after 1990, the U.S. has been leveraging its dominant position to tackle global security threats, largely supported by economically strong European allies.

With China taking the economic lead and the U.S. having diminished support from less economically strong European countries, it is reasonable to expect changes in the way international security questions are addressed.

The EU currently faces a significant energy challenge which is likely to shape its foreign policies for years to come because of its increased dependency on fossil fuel imports. According to the European Commission, oil imports reached 84.7% in 2010, with gas at 62.4%<sup>5</sup>. Russia’s unpredictable behavior and instability in the Middle East prompted the EU to diversify its energy reliance portfolio. However, diversifying sources and exploring new options have associated risks and the EU must be able to address them in order to achieve energy security.

### **1. The evolution of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)**

Europe has been through a remarkable transformation process since the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. Under a looming Soviet threat, protected by NATO’s security umbrella, the European

<sup>5</sup> European Commission, *EU energy in figures*, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, 2012), p. 20, [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2012\\_energy\\_figures.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2012_energy_figures.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>1</sup> Eurostat Press Office, “European demography,” *News release 173* (2013), [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_PUBLIC/3-20112013-AP/EN/3-20112013-AP-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-20112013-AP/EN/3-20112013-AP-EN.PDF), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>2</sup> European Defence Agency, *Defence Data 2012*, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/defence-data-booklet-2012-web>, p. 5, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, *Table 509. Military Personnel on Active Duty by Location: 1980 to 2010*, <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0509.pdf>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>4</sup> World Economic Outlook Database, *Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP*, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2012&ey=2019&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=924%2C111&s=PPPGDP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=73&pr.y=8>, accessed October 30, 2014.





Community evolved slowly, gradually moving towards a single market and adding new venues of cooperation.

Shortly after the collapse of communism and the reunification of Germany, the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 created the EU based on three pillars: the European Communities (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters<sup>6</sup>.

Before the end of the Cold War, the European Communities needed about 40 years to increase from 6 to 12 members; after 1993, the EU evolved exponentially adding 16 new members in just 20 years.

The global financial crisis that started in America in 2007 moved to Europe the following year, exposing the fragility of European economic and fiscal policies. It also revealed the hidden dangers of attempting to fast-forward through integrating new members and many domains in a very short period of time. In the past five years, Brussels devoted much energy to ensuring the Union fiscal stability, virtually “stalling” any progress on common defense.

The idea of establishing an integrated European defense was proposed as early as 1950 when the French Prime-Minister René Pleven advocated for “the creation of a unified European Army”<sup>7</sup>. The Pleven Plan did not get any traction as it came too soon after the war and America regarded it as potentially undermining NATO. However, it contributed to the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1952 which, two years later, evolved into the Western European Union (WEU).

The intra-European debate about common defense continued but did not translate into any tangible results. NATO was unanimously considered the only security architecture guarding Europe against the Soviet threat in a bi-polar world.

---

<sup>6</sup> “Treaty of Maastricht on European Union,” Summaries of EU legislation, 1992, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/institutional\\_affairs/treaties/treaties\\_maastricht\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>7</sup> Stefan Gänzle and Allen G. Sens, ed., *The changing politics of European security: Europe alone?* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 7.

The process of creating a common security architecture leaped forward in 1992 when the Treaty on European Union devoted the second foundation pillar to common foreign and security policy. The treaty empowered WEU to be developed as the defense component of the EU and included “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”<sup>8</sup>

The range of missions envisioned was captured in a list known as the “Petersberg tasks”, covering mostly humanitarian, disarmament, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks<sup>9</sup>.

The level of ambition was raised through the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal which addressed the need for developing, by 2003, a capability “able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks . . . , in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons).”<sup>10</sup> The objective proved to be “a bridge too far” at the time and the EU never came even close to establishing such a capability. However, this ambition has not completely disappeared from the European mindset and one of the scenarios will revisit this strategic goal.

The 2003 European Security Strategy titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World” provided the conceptual framework for the CSDP and outlined five main threats. The strategy did not single out any physical conventional threat. It placed at the top of the list terrorism and WMD proliferation, mirroring the U.S. National Security Strategy from this perspective. However, the strategy was not “inclusive” enough to address the concerns of Central and Eastern European states, still worried

---

<sup>8</sup> “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,” Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 - 0390, Article 24, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>9</sup> “Petersberg Tasks,” Summaries of EU legislation, 1992, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/glossary/petersberg\\_tasks\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>10</sup> European Union, External Action Service, *About CSDP - Military Headline Goals*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/military\\_headline\\_goals/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/military_headline_goals/index_en.htm), accessed October 30, 2014.



about Russia and its unpredictable behavior.

Consistent with its preference for “small steps approaches”, the EU lowered its previous level of ambition to establishing “battlegroups” in order to “be ready to share the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”<sup>11</sup> This new target was captured in the 2010 Headline Goal which directed the formation of battalion-size combat units of 1,500 personnel. The EU battlegroups had to be able to deploy and be sustained for 30 days with an extension to 120 days in the theatre if re-supplied. The concept was born following a Franco-British proposal soon endorsed by Germany. Its value was revealed during the EU-led Operation Artemis executed under U.N. mandate in the summer of 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

To better coordinate defense integration efforts, in 2004 the EU Council established the European Defense Agency (EDA) “to improve the EU defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy.”<sup>12</sup> The agency represented an important step towards creating the institutional framework for cooperation in crisis management, armaments cooperation, industrial and technological base, and research. The head of EU foreign policy was dual-hatted as head of the agency and, thus, created premises for better coordinating the voice and the actions of the EU on security matters.

The Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, amended previous provisions of EU treaties and incorporated some of the themes advanced in the un-ratified Constitutional Treaty of 2004. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) replaced the former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the initial task list established for EU operations was expanded to incorporate joint disarmament, military advice

and assistance, and post-conflict stabilization<sup>13</sup>.

In addition, the treaty extended the competencies of EDA and established a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to reflect members’ commitment “to developing their defence capacities more intensively and to supplying combat units for planned missions.”<sup>14</sup> In force since 2009, the treaty of Lisbon contributed towards creating the framework for a future common defense policy with potential to evolving into an actual common defense.

“The key security policy ambitions of the Lisbon treaty can be summarized in two words: coherence and capabilities”<sup>15</sup>, declared Anand Menon, a former special advisor to the U.K.’s House of Lords EU committee.

A progressive addition to the treaty was the common assistance clause stipulating that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”<sup>16</sup> Many have viewed it as duplicating NATO Art.5 but it should be regarded more like a commitment to cohesion. The treaty made the distinction between the two and considered mutual assistance as being compatible with NATO provisions.

Following the reintegration of France into NATO military structures in 2009, the EU defense policy received a new boost through the Lancaster House Treaties signed in 2010. Building on the previous initiatives captured in the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration, the UK and France entered into a 50-year security defense

<sup>13</sup> “Common Security and Defence Policy,” Summaries of EU legislation, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/institutional\\_affairs/treaties/lisbon\\_treaty/ai0026\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0026_en.htm), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Anand Menon, “European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya,” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 53 no. 3, June-July 2011, p. 76.

<sup>16</sup> European Union, Official Journal, *Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon*, 2007, Art. 27(7), [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C\\_.2007.306.01.0001.01.ENG#C\\_2007306EN.01015302](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2007.306.01.0001.01.ENG#C_2007306EN.01015302), accessed Oct 30, 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*, “A secure Europe in a better world”, 2003, p.1, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP*, 2004, Article 2, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32004E0551&from=EN>, accessed October 30, 2014.



and security cooperation agreement. The main motivation was eloquently summarized by the British Defence Secretary, Dr. Liam Fox: “There are many reasons why this co-operation makes sense. We are Europe’s only nuclear powers. We have the largest defence budgets and are the only two countries with real, large-scale expeditionary capability.”<sup>17</sup>

Looking at these developments from a CSDP perspective, the “Anglo-French cluster” could play in European defense the role the U.S. plays in NATO as it could galvanize support and provide the engine that would move the EU members forward on the security and defense cooperation tracks. Two treaty provisions are particularly important from this point of view: the development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) and ability to deploy, by the early 2020s, an integrated carrier strike group.

Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 represented a first test for the new Anglo-French military relationship. Although a NATO operation, the intervention in Libya was important to the EU for multiple reasons: two of its “heavyweight” members were leading a NATO combat operation with the U.S. supporting; the naval and airlifted capabilities were mainly from the forces designated for the future Anglo-French carrier strike group (the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and to the British Response Force Task Group around the HMS Ocean<sup>18</sup>); the operation provided valuable experience and assessment for future EU-led interventions. In addition, the lessons identified were going to contribute to further developing the future CJEF.

Towards the end of 2013, the future of CSDP was reshaped by two significant events: the third Eastern Partnership Summit held in Vilnius, Lithuania on 28-29 November 2013 and the European Council meeting in Brussels, Belgium

---

<sup>17</sup> U.K. Government, Ministry of Defence, *UK-France Defence Co-operation Treaty*, 2010, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-make-final-step-towards-co-operation-treaty--2>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>18</sup> Embassy of France in U.K., *Defence Cooperation, Steps towards French and British cooperation*, 2012, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Defence-cooperation>, accessed March 30, 2014.

on 19-20 December 2013.

The summit focused on assessing results achieved following a decade of implementing the “neighborhood policy” and made use of the EU’s “soft power” to offer, as former EU president Barroso said, “a new perspective to citizens in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.”<sup>19</sup> The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements (DCFTA) represented the new perspective for the above-mentioned countries. While the EU was successful with Moldova and Georgia, it failed in the case of Ukraine. The ineffectiveness of the European approach precipitated the current crisis and revealed the limits of Europe’s “magnetic” power to attract partners by heavily relying on the economic and diplomatic instruments.

The overarching theme of the second event was “defence matters” and the European Council emphasized that “the EU and its Member States must exercise greater responsibilities in response to those challenges if they want to contribute to maintaining peace and security through CSDP together with key partners such as the United Nations and NATO.”<sup>20</sup> Among the most important issues discussed were the need for a competitive European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), the requirement to establish an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework and to draft an EU Maritime Security Strategy, calling for “further strengthening cooperation to tackle energy security challenges.”<sup>21</sup>

After Lisbon, the CSDP has already made notable progress and 34 missions and operations on three continents were carried out under the EU banner.<sup>22</sup> Cooperation with NATO has continuously evolved and it is reaffirmed

<sup>19</sup> European Commission, “Third Eastern Partnership summit, Vilnius 28-29 November 2013”, *Press Releases Database* (2013), [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-13-1169\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1169_en.htm), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>20</sup> European Council, Meeting 19-20 December 2013, *Conclusions adopted*, p. 2, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* p.5.

<sup>22</sup> CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership, hosted by ISIS Europe, *CSDP Map - Mission Chart*, 2014, <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart>, accessed October 30, 2014.





periodically by leaders from both organizations currently sharing 22 member countries.

The “Berlin Plus” agreement provides the EU access to NATO planning, collective assets, and capabilities for crisis management operations. The U.S. view on CSDP has improved significantly over time. The Brookings Institution noted in 2011 that both sides of the Atlantic changed attitudes in only a decade: “In stark contrast to the early years of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy, when then British Prime Minister Tony Blair would try to reassure the Clinton and Bush administrations that EU defense cooperation was in the interest of the United States, in the run up to the United Kingdom’s general election in autumn of 2009, officials within the Obama administration were trying to convince the British Conservative Party that EU defense efforts were in the interests of the United Kingdom.”<sup>23</sup>

So far, the EU has drafted a security strategy, built framework institutions, established battlegroups, conducted operations and, recently, received a new impulse through a closer Anglo-French military cooperation. Still, all these notable efforts did not offer the EU a robust capability to support implementation of its foreign policy and defend its interests. Was the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal of 15 brigades a miscalculation or just unrealistic?

Currently, the CSDP seems to have reached a crossroads and important decisions are expected in order to better position the EU to address future challenges.

### **2. Key drivers shaping the future of European security**

There are five key drivers relevant for the scenarios developed in this paper: economic challenges, energy security, Europe’s neighborhood security environment, the U.S. rebalancing strategy, and the EU cohesion. These

---

<sup>23</sup> Clara M. O’Donnell, “The Future of EU-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation: What Lies Ahead?”, Brookings Institute, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2011, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/10/03-us-eu-defense-odonnell>, accessed October 30, 2014.

drivers are likely to influence the decisions making the future of CSDP and any further steps towards military integration.

#### **2.1. Economic challenges**

Future CSDP evolution relies on economic prosperity which depends on how the EU succeeds in forwarding its interests in an interconnected world, as well as on its ability to implement efficient internal reforms.

With the world’s largest GDP, the EU currently has four members in the top ten economies: Germany ranked 4<sup>th</sup>, France 5<sup>th</sup>, United Kingdom 6<sup>th</sup> and Italy on the 9<sup>th</sup>.<sup>24</sup> In a linear projection, taking into account present trends, a PricewaterhouseCoopers study predicts that in 2030, Germany will be the only EU country remaining in the top seven economies of the world (in 7<sup>th</sup> place), while Russia is expected to become the strongest European economy by 2020 and rank 5<sup>th</sup> in the global standings.<sup>25</sup> The UK will be in 9<sup>th</sup> place and France closes top ten in the 10<sup>th</sup> place.

The projections for 2050 look even less encouraging for the top EU economies as the only two countries expected to remain in top 10 are Germany in 9<sup>th</sup>, and France in 10<sup>th</sup>. If the study is accurate and projections become reality, none of the current European G-7 members will actually be in the world top seven economies; this could trigger world-wide debates about the relevance of the G-7 and cause significant shifts in the global economic balance of power.

The EU has just been through the first economic crisis since the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and this highlighted the risks of an accelerated integration process. The introduction of the common currency without building a framework and structures to ensure fiscal responsibility caused tremendous turmoil. It proved that the EU is still vulnerable both on the

---

<sup>24</sup> The World Bank, *European Union*, 2012, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/EUU>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>25</sup> PricewaterhouseCoopers Economics, “The BRICs and beyond: prospects, challenges and opportunities, *World in 2050*, January 2013, p. 2, [https://www.pwc.com/en\\_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf](https://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.





inside due to lack of cohesion and internationally due to globalization.

In December 2013, the President of the European Council noted at a meeting in Monaco: "... we now live in a truly interdependent world. And we could not have seen it more clearly than in the financial crisis, whose thunderous eruption quickly spread around the globe. It brought us to the edge of the abyss!"<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the crisis that started in 2007 in the U.S. and reached Europe a year later, nearly collapsed the euro and highlighted the dangers of interconnecting economies and finances.

Moreover, globalization and interdependence are increasingly capping the effectiveness of the EU's "soft power" arsenal which heavily relies on economic tools. In the past, threat of economic sanctions was, in some cases, enough to change the behavior of a "bad actor". The sanctions seemed to work when the U.S. was an uncontested economic leader and powerful allies from Europe were in support. As the global economic "Top 10" is about to change due to the "rise of the rest", a legitimate question arises whether economic sanctions are still going to be as effective without the backing of "hard power" coercion tools.

Another facet of the economic interdependence in a multi-polar world is related to the size of the economy. When targeting an important actor, as in the present case with Russia, sanctions are likely to become very costly, probably much more expensive for the one imposing them than investing, over time, in a credible military capability. Therefore, the use of economic instrument might be just as costly for the one employing it, as for the one targeted by sanctions.

Democratic countries with a high GDP per capita, enjoying a high standard of living and running costly social programs, might experience severe constraints. The voters might not be willing to pay the price for their government's policy towards a bad actor which spells painful

<sup>26</sup> Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, (6<sup>th</sup> World Policy Conference, Monaco, December 2013), p. 2, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140091.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140091.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.

political capital losses and, possibly, defeat in elections.

Demography is becoming another source of concerns with potential severe impact on European economies. Eurostat projections indicate an increase in the population aged 65 and over from 17.5% in 2010 to 24.5% in 2030 and 29.9% in 2050.<sup>27</sup> Budgets are likely to face additional pressures to cover the cost associated with a population that lives better, healthier, and longer while fertility is far below the 2.1 rate required for a self-sustaining population.

Europe requires coherent immigration policies to ensure further economic development. The last report published by the European Commission in 2010 reveals that population increase is mainly driven by migration which is set to double the proportion of migrants and their descendants by 2060.<sup>28</sup>

### **2.2. Energy security**

In January 2006, Russia cut the gas supplies transiting through Ukraine in a calculated political move. The event caused concerns in Brussels and Washington and exposed the strategic energy vulnerability of the EU. A year later, "the EU Parliament demanded that the EU speak with one voice on strategic energy matters, avoid bilateral deals and push its relations with Russia ... to avoid ... political manipulation of the oil and gas supplies"<sup>29</sup>.

There has not been, so far, EU cohesion regarding energy and Russia fully exploited this vulnerability. The consequences of lacking unity are best depicted in the recent headlines

<sup>27</sup> Europe in figures - Eurostat yearbook 2008, "Demographic change: challenge or opportunity?", p. 92, [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_OFFPUB/KS-CD-07-001-SPOT/EN/KS-CD-07-001-SPOT-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-07-001-SPOT/EN/KS-CD-07-001-SPOT-EN.PDF), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>28</sup> European Commission, *EU population older and more diverse*, 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=502&newsId=1007&furtherNews=yes>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>29</sup> Graeme P. Herd, "Europe and Russia: From strategic dissonance to strategic divorce?" in Thierry Tardy, ed. with the support of Geneva Centre for Security Policy, *European security in a global context: internal and external dynamics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 104.



on the current dispute over Ukraine. One of the headlines read: “Russian-controlled natural gas giant Gazprom has threatened to disrupt gas supplies to Europe following warnings by John Kerry and others that harsh economic sanctions could be imposed on Moscow, as the Ukraine crisis threatens to spiral into a trade war.”<sup>30</sup>

Acute dependence on fossil fuel imports is likely to play a major role in the EU’s future decisions on defense and security. Future trends outlined in the EDA Capabilities Development Plan indicate that by 2025, “Europe will be externally dependent for 90% of its oil and 80% of its gas.”<sup>31</sup>

“Strong dependence from a single external supplier”<sup>32</sup> is considered “the most pressing energy security of supply issue”<sup>33</sup> in the recently adopted EU Energy Security Strategy (EESS). There have been, in recent years, initiatives to diversify EU’s energy portfolio both in terms of sources but also in terms of production looking at renewable alternatives.

The Market Observatory for Energy reports shows that in 2005, EU top sources of crude oil were Russia (31.12 %), (Middle East (21.59 %), and Africa (19.38 %). In 2012, crude oil imports from Russia maintained the same level, but imports from Africa reached 25.58% while Middle East imports decreased to 15.63%.<sup>34</sup> The increase in imports from Africa came as a move to reduce reliance on an unstable Middle

East where Europe had little influence. However, source diversification require the EU to be able to address security challenges menacing its energy partners and to protect its interests wherever the situation demands intervention.

### 2.3. *Europe’s neighborhood security environment*

The security situation around Europe is more challenging than ever: most North African countries are struggling after the Arab Spring, the situation in Libya is volatile, Egypt is an unstable “demographic weapon,” the security of Suez canal is constantly under threat, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is hampered by bursts of violence, Syria is experiencing a full scale civil-war. In addition, Iraq is threatened by the ISIL<sup>35</sup> appearance and expansion, Cyprus remains a divided island, frozen conflicts shadow progress in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, while Moldova is threatened by the Transnistrian separatist movement, and Russia’s bullish attitude towards Georgia in 2008 changed for the worse in the case of Ukraine.

The security landscape looks like an endless list of threats that need to be addressed before they engulf more countries and people, spreading in Europe’s backyard. At the European Council meeting on defense on 19 December 2013, Herman Van Rompuy called for more EU action: “There are new threats; the strategic landscape is changing fast. Our countries are expected to assume more responsibility in our wider region; we have seen that several times in the past years, with Libya and in the Sahel”<sup>36</sup>.

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), launched by the EU in 2004 and revised in 2010, represents a strategy for medium and long-term engagement having the overarching goal of “blurring” the dividing lines between the

---

<sup>30</sup> Paul Joseph Watson, “Trade War: Gazprom Threatens to Disrupt Gas Supplies to Europe”, Infowars.com, 2014, <http://www.infowars.com/trade-war-gazprom-threatens-to-disrupt-gas-supplies-to-europe/> accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>31</sup> European Defence Agency, *Future Trends from the Capability Development Plan*, 2008, p. 20, [http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure\\_cdp.pdf](http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure_cdp.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>32</sup> European Commission, *European Energy Security Strategy*, 2014, p. 2, [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528\\_energy\\_security\\_communication.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_communication.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> European Commission, “EU Crude oil imports”, *Market observatory & Statistics* (2013), available at [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import\\_export\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import_export_en.htm), accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>35</sup> ISIL is the acronym for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant also known as / translated as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

<sup>36</sup> Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, (remarks following the first session of the European Council, Brussels, December 19, 2013), p. 1, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/presdata/en/ec/140239.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/presdata/en/ec/140239.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.



Union and its neighbors. There are currently 12 countries fully participating in the ENP and over half of them are part of the previously described “security challenges” list.

Limited in ends and means, and conceived primarily to address economic and social challenges rather than a tool for crisis management, the ENP has produced, so far, mixed results: it registered modest successes in the case of Moldova and Georgia but failed badly in the case of Ukraine. Is it the right solution for cases involving unstable actors or ill-intended neighbors?

All previous EU “milk and honey” scenarios for ex-Soviet states were rendered obsolete by the “boldness” of president Putin and Russia’s stand-off with the EU, NATO and the U.S. The dispute over the Crimea and Ukraine could have significant strategic consequences for the future of EU security, particularly in reference to the means employed in achieving the ends.

### **2.4. The U.S. rebalancing strategy**

Driven by dramatic reductions in budget, with a commitment to slash \$500 billion in 10 years, and conducting the “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. global strategic posture envisions reducing the military footprint in Europe. American troops in Europe will draw down to about 65,000 and only two brigade combat teams.<sup>37</sup>

Initially, there were many fears among European allies over the new strategic posture, as the security environment around Europe hardly could be described as manageable with less military presence. From a different perspective, however, there might be a positive collateral effect as the Europeans might feel compelled to “patch” with something the large “exit wound” created by the reduction in American troops stationed on the Old Continent.

Having a reduced U.S. military presence leaves the EU at a strategic crossroads. Muddling through the financial crisis, the European countries

have already conducted significant reductions both in budgets and in numbers in recent years, while Russia increased military expenditures by 16% in 2012 and aims to allocate a staggering 4.8% of GDP to its military budget in 2015.<sup>38</sup>

The EU still enjoys a high-tech relative superiority and, pending further developments, the military technological hub is likely to remain in the North-Atlantic. With further personnel reductions expected, the Europeans have the opportunity to compensate for lack of numbers with more euros spent per soldier on equipment, advanced weapons, deployable capabilities, and military R&D.

However, will Europe take this opportunity and invest more in defense? The U.S. has been pressing European allies for a long time to share the burden of security commitments and, ultimately, the drawdown could represent the most persuasive argument.

### **2.5. EU cohesion**

This is arguably the most influential driver for the future of European security but also the one with the highest level of uncertainty. The term cohesion has been used in the recent years in conjunction with a policy designed to boost economic growth. Used here, the meaning refers to the political unity and solidarity required to make decisions for a stronger and closer union. It serves as a catalyst that binds the EU members enabling them to act together.

Cohesion has lately been put to the test enabling the EU to survive the Euro crisis and supporting members to overcome associated economic, financial and social “shocks”. More recently, it has helped the EU to confront Russia over the crisis in Ukraine. The success of the EESS depends on cohesion and one of its pillars is “speaking with one voice in external energy policy.”<sup>39</sup>

As described earlier, the challenges of the

---

<sup>37</sup> John Vandiver and Jennifer Svan, “Panetta: 2 Army combat brigades will leave Europe”, *Stars and Stripes*, January 13, 2012, <http://www.stripes.com/news/panetta-2-army-combat-brigades-will-leave-europe-1.165867>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>38</sup> Sam Perlo-Freeman, Elisabeth Sköns, Carina Solmirano and Helén Wilandh, *Trends in world military expenditure 2012*, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2013), p. 5, <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf>, accessed October 30, 2014.

<sup>39</sup> European Commission, *European Energy Security Strategy*, 2014, p. 3, [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528\\_energy\\_security\\_communication.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_communication.pdf), accessed October 30, 2014.



near future are just as severe and probably more demanding in terms of political “fallout”.

Will the EU show the same level of cohesion in moving on with the CSDP? Exploring the alternative scenarios could potentially offer an answer to this question and also articulate how cohesion-related uncertainties shape the future of European security.

### 3. Brief overview of alternative future scenarios

“The world will continue to grow more complicated, interconnected, and in many cases, more combustible. The challenges and choices before us will demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over the present”<sup>40</sup> said the former U.S. Secretary of Defense in a speech at the beginning of 2014. The next two decades are crucial for the security of the EU.

Future alternatives depicting the outlook until 2030 combine the extremes of two main drivers: economic prosperity and EU cohesion. The first main driver impacts decisions regarding the depth and magnitude of defense integration, while the second influences political will and the speed of the process.

The combination of these drivers create four alternative future scenarios:

- Scenario I - “Business as usual (progress in slow motion)” depicts an EU positive economic outlook hampered by lack of cohesion.
- Scenario II - “Defense nationalization (the sum of all fears)” portrays an EU in disarray over its future security options due to an economic downturn and no unity.
- Scenario III - “Unity in scarcity (faster integration)” looks into a potential CSDP progress in harsh economic conditions but strengthening cohesion.
- Scenario IV - “European Army (Pleven reloaded)” highlights the positive impact of synergy between economic results and high cohesion upon the future of CSDP.

Fragile economic conditions and lack of support for a common energy policy may still lead to progress with the CSDP if Europeans maintain unity or could stall the CSDP due to lack of coherence in protecting interests and addressing threats. Economic prosperity and coherent implementation of an energy security strategy are likely to accelerate the progress of the CSDP if consensus is reached on security challenges; however, it could lead to less long term cooperation and military integration if EU members do not develop a common perspective.

### Conclusion

EU is at a strategic crossroads and its security depends on actions and decisions made within the next decade. The four scenarios previously outlined offer a hypothetical macro level view of potential alternative futures. Separating them becomes increasingly difficult as boundaries tend to become blurry when adding more variables and a longer outlook.

In addition to the main drivers, there are a multitude of other factors that could “steer” the future of European security decisions turning into reality one scenario or another. Economic prosperity, energy security, cohesion and commitment to a deeper integration process will determine how CSDP is likely to evolve.

A follow up study<sup>41</sup> will explore in detail the four scenarios attempting to identify potential “markers” that could indicate whether EU is ready to move forward with CSDP and what direction is likely to take.

### SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. COTTEY, Andrew, *Security in 21st Century Europe*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
2. GÄNZLE, Stefan; SENS, Allen G., editors, *The changing politics of European security: Europe alone?*, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

---

<sup>40</sup> Chuck Hagel, U.S. Secretary of Defense, (speech at Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 01, 2014), <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1828>, accessed October 30, 2014.

---

<sup>41</sup> N.A. The study exploring in detail the four scenarios will be included in Strategic Impact no. 1/2015.





3. HERD, Graeme P., “Europe and Russia: From strategic dissonance to strategic divorce?” ed. with the support of Geneva Centre for Security Policy, *European security in a global context: internal and external dynamics*, London and New York, Routledge, 2009.
4. HILL, Christopher; SMITH Michael, *International Relations and the European Union*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.
5. MCCORMICK, John, *Understanding the European Union: a concise introduction*, 5<sup>th</sup> edition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
6. MENON, Anand, “European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya,” in *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 53 no. 3, June-July 2011, London.
7. MÉRAND, Frédéric; FOUCAULT, Martial; IRONDELLE, Bastien, *European security since the fall of the Berlin Wall*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2011.
8. MERLINGEN, Michael; OSTRAUSKAITĖ, Rasa, *European security and defence policy: an implementation perspective*, London and New York, Routledge, 2008.
9. O’DONNELL, Clara M., “The Future of EU-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation: What Lies Ahead?”, Brookings Institute, 2011, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/10/03-us-eu-defense-odonnell>.
10. PERLO-FREEMAN, Sam; SKÖNS, Elisabeth; SOLMIRANO, Carina; WILANDH, Helén, *Trends in world military expenditure 2012*, Stockholm, SIPRI, 2013, <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf>.
11. PricewaterhouseCoopers Economics, “The BRICs and beyond: prospects, challenges and opportunities, *World in 2050*, January 2013, [https://www.pwc.com/en\\_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf](https://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf).
12. TARDY, Thierry, ed. with the support of Geneva Centre for Security Policy, *European security in a global context: internal and external dynamics*, London & New York, Routledge, 2009.
13. VAN EEKELEN, Willem, *From words to deeds: the continuing debate on European security*, Brussels and Geneva, Centre for European Policy Studies and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006.
14. European Commission official webpage, [http://ec.europa.eu/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm).
15. European Defence Agency official webpage, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/>.
16. European Union official webpage, [http://europa.eu/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/index_en.htm).
17. International Monetary Fund official webpage, <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>.
18. U.K. Ministry of Defence official webpage, [https://www.gov.uk/government / organisations/ministry-of-defence](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence).



# THE CURRENT GLOBAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT'S IMPACT ON SMART DEFENCE AND POOLING AND SHARING CONCEPTS' IMPLEMENTATION

*Gheorghe STOIU, Ph.D.\**

*The technological and military cooperation remains a viable solution for carrying out the current Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA). The concepts of Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing promoted by NATO and the European Union are part of the current Revolution in Military Affairs, where there are plans for the creation and implementation of evidence underlying the capabilities of the new RMA. Any project launched within the two concepts is a challenge for the NATO / European Union members to implement the RMA. The budgetary restrictions in recent years have had a major influence in completing certain stages set within the two concepts.*

**Keywords:** *Revolution in Military Affairs, smart defence, pooling and sharing, economic crisis, banking crisis, military spending.*

## **Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing - current concepts for NATO and EU**

The concept of *Smart Defence*<sup>1</sup> and *Pooling and Sharing* are important steps performed

---

<sup>1</sup> *The concept has been adopted at NATO Summit in Chicago, between 20-21 May 2012*

by international actors in their concern to ensure security and defence as a result of the significant changes occurring in the international environment. The Inter-European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation has acquired a new dimension with the adoption of the two concepts, giving rise to initiatives in the field of the rather complicated defence planning. This cooperation is the core concept through which NATO and the European Union seek to unite efforts in order to acquire and use their joint capabilities.

The term “efficiency” best describes the relations that are intended to be covered in the defence planning within the two structures in the context created in the recent years, that of a financial and economic crisis worldwide.

Adopted in order to rebalance the defence spending between the US and the European Union, *Smart Defence* targets those capabilities that require substantial expenditure related to the instruction and force protection, anti-ballistic defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance<sup>2</sup>, while the *Pooling and Sharing* adopted by the EU through the

---

<sup>2</sup> *These capabilities of crucial importance for NATO were adopted at the Summit in Lisbon in 2010.*

**\* Lieutenant-colonel Gheorghe STOIU, PhD, works for the Security and Defence Faculty within “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: gigi\_stoiu69@yahoo.com**



European Defence Agency (EDA) proposes a number of projects such as surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, information, military communications via satellite. The framework through which the multinational programs should be implemented in Smart Defence was created by the establishment in 2012 of a similar EDA-NATO agency for procurement. Both initiatives presented themselves through the projects proposed as a viable solution for managing security and defence in the current international circumstances.

The budget allocations and the way the funds are spent are major concerns both for NATO and the EU. Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing aim to uniting the efforts (including financial ones) in order to establish and share the security and defence capabilities required by the Member States. The economic reason was the foundation of the adoption/implementation of Smart Defence concept.

The complementary efforts to support the two initiatives are focused on developing strong defence industries. In order to implement the commitments on this line stated at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, clear conditions were set for the Member States. Thus, the reference value in defence spending relative to gross domestic product (GDP) is considered 2%. The allies that are below this value “will fix the objective to move towards providing reference value of 2% within a decade to achieve the NATO Target Capabilities and to eliminate NATO shortcomings in capabilities”.<sup>3</sup>

One of the major projects covered under the Smart Defence is one on NATO missile defence capabilities. Initiated by the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 and confirmed in an interim alternative at the Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the project is a clear example of routing investments of the NATO members at the defence level and the optimization of the capabilities that Allies have at the national level. Romania is part of this project which foreshadows the Aegis ashore

<sup>3</sup> Summit Declaration of Wales adopted by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic in Wales. 4 to 5 September 2014, <http://www.mae.ro/node/28465/24.11.2014>

deployment in Deveselu<sup>4</sup> at the end of 2015, thereby contributing to a significant increase in the capability of NATO missile defence.

For the next period, military spending will have a number of priorities which will focus on “enhancing training and exercises; command and control, including requests for air operations; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; NATO missile defence capabilities ... including voluntary national contributions; cyber defence; and improving the robustness and training of the land forces for both collective defence and for crisis response.”<sup>5</sup>

The purpose of *Smart Defence* Initiative meaning the pooling of resources for acquiring distinct advantage in terms of capacity and operational effectiveness, cost effectiveness simultaneously, was reaffirmed at the Summit in Wales in September 2014. The Welsh JISR<sup>6</sup> system, the land surveillance system, the airborne early warning system and control of NATO are multinational projects transposing the smart defence at the Members level. The involvement of more countries in the field of logistic support and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection also aims to reducing costs and promoting interoperability.

The European Union through EDA has developed a series of programs for the adoption of some capabilities different from those promoted by NATO and the missions set/entered. Under the *Pooling and Sharing* initiative a series of projects have begun in order to strengthen the term itself meaning the creation or acquisition of a military equipment (“pooling”), and then

<sup>4</sup> Romania’s involvement will take place from Phase II of the program EPAA. This includes hosting on the Romanian territory at Deveselu, Olt county, land-based interceptors or interceptor missiles SM3 -IB (Standard Missile 3 Block IB type), which will become operational since late 2015. Phase II of the EPAA by Deveselu base, the system will be the Initial capability of NATO system, after the declaration of interim capability at the Summit in Chicago

<sup>5</sup> Summit Declaration of Wales adopted by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic in Wales. 4 to 5 September 2014, <http://www.mae.ro/node/28465/24.11.2014>

<sup>6</sup> The Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance



the use of multiple states (“sharing”), such as: the cell Brokerage Satellite Communications, air refueling, maritime surveillance network, hospitals, helicopters Training program, Future Military Satellite Communications, pilots training, Intelligent ammunition, Logistics, Surveillance- Reconnaissance- Intelligence and Naval Training<sup>7</sup>.

The two concepts have gained momentum in the economic context created in the recent years, but not without a number of efforts in overcoming obstacles. Regarding *Smart Defence*, they were mainly aiming to the political side because any project/capability required to fulfill the Security commitments assumed total confidence between states<sup>8</sup>. Another barrier to the implementation of the concept is represented in Jakob Henius’ vision and Jakopo Leone McDonald<sup>9</sup> by the specialization of the Member States. According to the source the specialization has an impact on: a) the strategic flexibility of each state; b) the political freedom of states to act or not to act and any negative effects arising from it; c) the increasing of the complexity of education and instruction of military personnel; d) the defence industries of the Member States (some of them will have to give up to manufacture certain products in favour of some others); e) the establishment of the criteria that underlie the composition of specialized forces.

### **The effects of financial and economic crisis on the implementation of the two concepts**

Although significant progress in the implementation of programs has been recorded,

the two initiatives have faced difficulties arising mainly from the crisis triggered in 2007. Named by some analysts the developed world crisis, it

had common features for both the US and Europe. Both are financial crisis and they appeared as an increasingly trend to put under the financial sign the economic life. In the midst of this crisis is the banking crisis – the constant element and the true cause of the crisis. The “official” moment in which the crisis broke is the bankruptcy of a major bank, Lehman Brothers, which occurred in September 2008. Almost simultaneously, despite the fact that the public opinion had “eyes” focused on America, the UK’s largest bank in the world was facing big financial problems. It was the Royal Bank of Scotland which recovered through the state intervention<sup>10</sup>.

The first decade of the XXI century changed the world quickly and, implicitly, the equation of the security and defence issues that will be addressed in the future. Thus, the BRIC<sup>11</sup> countries recorded growth rates much higher than the US or Europe. If, at the beginning of the decade the proportion of the GDP in the global emerging countries was 38%, today this share is 50%<sup>12</sup>. We see a trend of transition from a unipolar international system configuration (there are countries with comparable power resources but one powerhouse with more numerous ones than other players’ capabilities) to the multipolar (characterized by the presence of several power centers that have resources that can be internationally compared). We refer to the emergence of a new political reality, namely the emerging world era amid falling the US power and influence.

The crisis was seen in the developed societies’ lack of concern for their own future, in their debts, in a decrease, frequently reported, of the level of education, in the state of infrastructure, in the demographic decline and, not lastly, in the low percentage of investments<sup>13</sup>.

The military field was no exception from the

---

<sup>7</sup> European Defence Agency, *EDA, Pooling and Sharing*, 30 November 2014, [www.eda.europa.eu](http://www.eda.europa.eu).

<sup>8</sup> Teodor Frunzeti, Vladimir Zodian (editors), *Lumea 2013, Enciclopedie politică și militară (Studii strategice și de securitate)*, București, Editura RAO, 2013, p. 50.

<sup>9</sup> Jakob Henius, Jacopo Leone McDonald, *Smart Defence: A critical Appraisal*, NATO Defence College, Roma, Editura Deltamedia Group, 2012, pp. 26-47

<sup>10</sup> Paul Dobrescu, *Un deceniu cât un secol. Secolul lumii emergente*, București, Editura Comunicare.ro, 2014, p. 13

<sup>11</sup> BRIC- Brazil, Russia, India, China. In addition to these a number of countries have experienced a dynamism that has imposed: Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Mexico and they make up the broad emerging world

<sup>12</sup> \*\*\*, „The Great Deceleration”, *The Economist*, July 27, 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Paul Dobrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 16.





negative consequences of this crisis. This was the context in which the main contributor to the NATO budget – namely the US –, claimed for a rebalancing among the Alliance partners regarding defence spending; thus was forged the *Smart Defence programme*.

Similarly, EU *Pooling and Sharing* initiative agreed a method of acquiring and sharing of the expensive military equipment by merging the financial resources of the Member States. At the same time, the existing investments in other nations were avoided and thus it focused on those capabilities that allowed both national strategic objectives and conservation of Europe as a major security player.

managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), warned at the meeting in Davos in January 2014 that, despite the apparent increase, the possibility of a return to the difficulties of the developed world economy that had just passed was not excluded<sup>14</sup>. A genuine recovery involves the restarting of the economy itself and this requires massive investments, as the financial activity may not go faster than the economic one.

Considering the approach of the crisis of different economies, the analyst David Sainsbury, observed the list of the countries that opted for “competitive industries” and based themselves on “competitive services” at the international level<sup>15</sup> (see Table no. 1).

**Table no.1:** Compared situation concerning competitive industries in proportion to competitive services at the international level

Competitive industries at international level	Competitive services at international level
Germany 46	Germany 7
Sweden 35	Sweden 14
UK 18	UK 27
US 17	US 44

Seven years after the outbreak of the crisis, we propose ourselves to deliver a brief review of the major economies that may influence the development of some programs in NATO or the European Union. According to specialists in the field, it can be said that the results are neither disastrous, nor encouraging. In support of this idea is the issue of interest rates - they remained very low in order to stimulate investments while the growth was a shy one, falling between 1-2 percent.

Of the top six most powerful economies in the world, the only one which exceeded the maximum level before the crisis is Germany; the USA is at a similar level as in the pre-crisis period, with a slight overshoot, and France, Japan, the UK and Italy are below this level. Christine Lagarde,

One can notice a reversed picture, meaning that it is clear that who embraced an area (such as industry) does not appear on the leading places when it comes to services. Also, another conclusion one can draw is that those countries which opted for “services” encountered more difficulties during the crisis and vice versa. From the few positions taken on major strategic options of, Germany stands that one of the former Bundesbank president Axel Weber, who speaks about the German *manufacturing* option, concurrent and complementary to the services of

<sup>14</sup> Idem., p. 133.

<sup>15</sup> Sainsbury, David, *Progressive Capitalism: How to Achieve Economic Growth, Liberty and Social Justice*, Biteback Publishing, 2013, p. 143.



other European countries: “Germany has chosen to focus on industrial activity, leaving the other countries to become stronger in the service sector.”<sup>16</sup>

We presented this data in order to understand the contribution of countries to implement the concepts of *Smart Defence* and *Pooling and Sharing*. For the same idea, we can appeal to a World Bank report, even if the figures presented are for the year 2011. The data refer to the largest economies of the world and the situation is as follows: EU, US, China, Japan, Germany, France, Brazil, Britain, Italy, Russia, India and Canada<sup>17</sup>. If we exclude the BRIC countries and Japan, we can see the crucial role of the US economy, and indeed the main NATO contributor and Germany’s leading position among the European countries.

According to the authors of a reference work in the field, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, the recovery periods following some crises, such as the one which began in 2007, involve “a pronounced and prolonged contraction of the economic activity and calls to a maximum of the state resources”<sup>18</sup>. Due to the immediate taken measures (massive restructuring of banks, substantial financial funds contributions), we can consider that the American crisis reached its peak in 2008-2009. In Europe, although felt at the same period, the peak of the crisis is considered to be 2012, when the so-called “sovereign debt”<sup>19</sup> and the banking crisis deeply hit the economies of the continent. Europe’s reaction to the banking crisis was a slow, slightly delayed one in contrast to that of the US. Thus, the recovery process is a different one and the upswing or consistent economic growth is estimated for the European continent in the years 2016-2018.

On the economic crisis background, Germany became the financial strength number 1 in Europe. Its net contribution to the EU net budget

is of 7.5 billion euros, 4.9 billion compared to France – 4.9 bln, Italy – 4.8 bln, UK – 4.7 bln, Netherlands – 1.9 bln, Sweden – 1.1 bln<sup>20</sup>. Many specialists consider that the role of power and detached main contributor to EU funds is given by the so-called contrast with the times.

More specifically, the other major European countries face particular problems: France has economic problems, Italy has financial difficulties, UK, in addition to economic issues, is undecided in terms of EU membership. On the other hand, Germany was little affected by the crisis due to its guidelines and options. An example would be its choice as a priority in the field of renewable energy development and the development of technology for green energy production abandoning, at the same time, the nuclear energy path. *The Economist* magazine predicts that, by 2050, 80% of Germany’s electricity shall be produced by the mentioned sources<sup>21</sup>. The production level and that of unemployment reported in 2013 are two other chapters in which Germany excels, compared to other European countries.

Its financial strength defines the role of Germany in the EU. If in other European countries, the recent years have been devoted to the lack of liquidity, Germany recorded financial surpluses, and mainly acted as lender of Europe. The justification of the surplus is given just by the option they chose, that of exports, sustainable in turn by the option for industry. Accordingly, the three defining features that give luster to Germany are given by the powerful industry, strong exports and, therefore, financial surpluses.

The year 2013, according to data announced, was one of the overall decrease of the global military spending. In fact, 2012 and 2013 were the first years after 1998 when the military spending worldwide was cut. In 2012, there was a decrease of 0.4% compared to 2011 and in 2013 it was further decreased to 1.9% compared to 2012<sup>22</sup>.

---

<sup>16</sup> Paul Dobrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

<sup>17</sup> \*\*\*, *World Development Report, Gender Equality and Development*, World Bank, 2012, <http://data.worldbank.org>.

<sup>18</sup> Carmen Reihart, Keneth Rogoff, *De data asta e altfel*, Editura Publică, București, 2012, p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> Sovereign debts are debts incurred by the State or guaranteed by it.

<sup>20</sup> George Parker, Peel Quentin, „Exasperated Allies”, *Financial Times*, November, 2012.

<sup>21</sup> „Germany, Europe’s eluctant Hegemon”, *The Economist* (Special Report), June 15-21, 2013.

<sup>22</sup> According to SIPRI (International Institute for Peace Studies at Stockholm)



Despite a decline of 7.8% of expenditures dedicated to the defence field for 2013 their US level (the state with the largest NATO budget allocation) reached 1,250 billion euros. The decrease or increase in these expenses is strictly related to the objective requirements of each state for security. The US, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France and Britain are countries which allocated the largest funds in the sectors of defence<sup>23</sup>. We see at the top of this ranking, alongside with the contemporary world superpower-US, the authoritarian presence of two powers of continental size – China and Russia.

In the context of lower military spending, we believe that *Smart Defence* initiatives and *Pooling and Sharing* are for the participating European states a viable alternative to ensure its own security.

### Conclusions

Having in mind the cuts in security and defence budgets, it is imperative to have a close cooperation, and the initiatives *Smart Defence* and *Pooling and Sharing* refer precisely to the ways this goal can be achieved.

The exchange of ideas and transparency within the institutions that ensure the framework for the two initiatives leads to a good NATO-EU relationship, that can provide the so much desired interoperability. This interoperability has been supported and it must continue through frequent meetings of the heads of the two bodies engaged in monitoring the efforts using *Smart Defence* and *Pooling and Sharing*, European Defence Agency (EDA) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

In December 2012, the European Council adopted a series of measures that aim to strengthen European defence and helps the complementarity of the two organizations (NATO, EU) in the implementation of the two concepts.

The main problem to be passed over in

---

<sup>23</sup> Sorin Popescu, the US continues to cut the defence budget, while Russia and China increase it, April 14, 2014, Agerpres, [www.agerpres.ro/externe](http://www.agerpres.ro/externe), accessed on 10.10.2014.

applying “smart defence” is that related to the removal of some economic imbalances created at the Members level in the military field (the defence industry of a country may suffer negative sanctions by surrendering one project for another).

The successful implementation of both initiatives is given by the important role European countries have and the relations between them. The idea of nation and sovereignty has become a sensitive issue for EU Member States, since the crisis. Although the economic success has been the main element of building up the Union, it has eroded itself as the economic crisis escalated and “Europeans” have not been a reality (psychological, mental, social) just as safe as before. In other words, in certain situations the EU citizens were “European” and in others they were “Germans”, “British” or “French”<sup>24</sup>.

The crisis accentuated the stagnation of the Union in expressing its strategic option: federation or simple common market. This delay is caught in an article by Dominique Reyna: “Neither a member country nor Europeans did really refuse the way to a more cohesive Union; but equally, none of the countries nor the Europeans wanted the transition to federalism. Europe lacks political dynamism, be it of the sovereignty and federalism bill”<sup>25</sup>.

Despite the negative results of the economies of NATO member states and EU, the economic and financial crisis appointed a favourable framework for the implementation of the concepts of *Smart Defence* and *Pooling and Sharing* and their projects carried out under their dome bring economical and military benefits.

---

<sup>24</sup> Thoma Riise, „An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Indicators”, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the EUSA, March 27-30, 2003, [http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~atasp/texte/030322\\_europe\\_public.pdf](http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~atasp/texte/030322_europe_public.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> „La renaissance douloureuse de l’idée européenne, dans *L’opinion européenne en 2012*, dirige par Dominique Reynie, Editions Lignes de Repères, Paris, 2012, p. 29.



**BIBLIOGRAPHY:**

1. DOBRESCU, Paul, *Un deceniu cât un secol. Secolul lumii emergente*, București, Editura Comunicare.ro, 2014.
2. FRUNZETI, Teodor; ZODIAN, Vladimir (editors), *Lumea 2013, Enciclopedie politică și militară (Studii strategice și de securitate)*, București, Editura RAO, 2013.
3. HENIUS, Jakob, MCDONALD Jacopo Leone, *Smart Defence: A critical Appraisal*, NATO Defence College, Editura Deltamedia Group, Roma, 2012.
4. PARKER, George, QUENTIN, Peel, "Exasperated Allies", *Financial Times*, november, 2012.
5. POPESCU, Sorin, *SUA continuă să-și reducă bugetul pentru apărare, în timp ce Rusia și China îl sporesc*, Agerpres, 14 aprilie 2014.
6. REYNIE, Dominique "La renaissance douloureuse de l'idée européenne, dans *L'opinion européenne en 2012*, Editions Lignes de Reperes, Paris, 2012.
7. REIHART, Carmen; ROGOFF, Keneth, *De data asta e altfel*, Editura Publică, București, 2012.
8. RIISE, Thomas, "An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Indicators", paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the EUSA, March 27-30, 2003, [http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/-atasp/texte/030322\\_europe\\_public.pdf](http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/-atasp/texte/030322_europe_public.pdf).
9. SAINSBURY, David, *Progressive Capitalism: How to Achieve Economic Growth, Liberty and Social Justice*, Biteback Publishing, 2013.
10. *Declarația Summit-ului din Țara Galilor adoptată de șefii de stat și de guvern participanți la reuniunea Consiliului Nord Atlantic din Țara Galilor*. 4-5 septembrie 2014, <http://www.mae.ro/node/28465/24.11.2014>.
11. European Defence Agency, *EDA's Pooling and Sharing*, 30 November 2014, [www.eda.europa.eu](http://www.eda.europa.eu).
12. "Germany, Europe's eluctant Hegemon", *The Economist* (Special Report), June 15-21, 2013.
13. \*\*\*, "The Great Deceleration", *The Economist*, July 27, 2013.
14. \*\*\*, *World Development Report, Gender Equality and Development*, World Bank, 2012, <http://data.worldbank.org>.

**Acknowledgement:**

This work was possible with the financial support from the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822, with the title "Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence and Public order and national security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers – "SmartSPODAS"."





# IS HYBRID WARFARE SOMETHING NEW?

*Craișor-Constantin IONIȚĂ, Ph.D.\**

*The question how the future conflict will look like seems to be the current preoccupation of many, if not of all Western military theoreticians. At the end of 1980's, several military specialists launched the idea of the Forth Generation of Warfare (4GW), meaning the blurring nature of future conflict, especially the blurring of war and peace, as well as between combatants and non-combatants.*

*The September 11<sup>th</sup> event of 2001 and the beginning of the Twenty-one Century came up with new concepts regarding the future of warfare, describing the rise of non-state willing and its possibility to be able to change the legitimacy of the state. New theories, like "new wars", "compound wars", "unrestricted warfare", "robotic warfare", "political warfare", have been launched trying to capitalize the changes that occurred in the international security arena and in the diminishing of the international organization's power to manage those situations.*

*The Second Lebanon War of 2006 was the trigger that matched the views of many military analysts who have suggested that future conflicts will be multi-modal or multi-variant, by combining of increasing frequency and lethality. The new construct, known as the "hybrid warfare", was exacerbated by the current crisis situation in Ukraine and the Russian intervention in Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine.*

**Keywords:** *hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, hybrid conflict, hybrid challenges, political warfare, compound wars.*

## Introduction

In the aftermath of the evolution conflicts have known at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, with the trend of changing their physiognomy, both in sophistication and character, many military analysts are calling for grater attention to more luring and blending of war forms and combinations of increasing frequency and lethality. Known as the *hybrid warfare* theory, this new form of war embraces a unique combination of hybrid threats (failed states and non-states actors sponsored by states), which will exploit a combination of challenges by employing all forms of war and tactics, more often simultaneously.

There is a large group of military theoreticians, led by Frank Hoffman and dr. Russ Glenn, who consider that hybrid wars are not quite new quite new, but current ones are different and much more complicated by both the compression of the levels of war and a simultaneous convergence of modes.<sup>1</sup> They also mention that this reality is more than facing the hybrid threat, because it conceptualizes the future of conflicts as well.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Frank Hoffman, "Further Thoughts on Hybrid Threats", in *Small Wars Journal*, [www.smallwarsjournal.com](http://www.smallwarsjournal.com), accessed on 01 Nov 2014, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem, p. 6.

**\* Colonel Craișor-Constantin IONIȚĂ, PhD in Military Sciences, works as Branch Head within J5, Romanian General Staff. E-mail: [ionitacc@yahoo.com](mailto:ionitacc@yahoo.com)**



Some military writers, mostly British and Australians have gone even further, doing specific research on civil wars as hybrid conflicts. The result of their research was incorporated in a new definition of the irregular war, by adding some hybrid threats within.

Even so, no American doctrine or official document has incorporated this theory as a new form of future conflicts, up to now. There are still in use terms like “Compound Wars”, “Political War”, “Unrestricted Warfare” or “Four-Block War”, all comprising some elements of the hybrid warfare.

I consider hybrid warfare theory to be a new approach of unconventionality against the very-high theology, in which states or groups of non-state actors could reach their interests and strategic objectives by blending a variety of tactics and technologies in an original way to crash modern Westernized Armed Forces. By blending both the modes and levels of warfare, using hybrid tactics and techniques to obtain strategic effects and achieve political objectives, this theory is considered by specialists an innovative one and a new type of warfare.

The Industrialization Era of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century’s brought symmetrical and proportionate armies confrontations, which was called “traditional/conventional conflict”. The Information Era, characterized by the reduction in that human mass, the huge technological potential of few states, which, in turn, developed technological gap between states, together with a substantial reduction of the military budgets and more restrictive access to resources and information, has changed the nature of the armed conflicts into an irregular (type war of coalition/alliance against an enemy-state) or asymmetric one (international terrorism), being disproportionate not only in terms of economical and technical potential employed, but also in terms of high-tech equipment and well-trained personnel. In order to counter such discrepancies, the adversary (either state or non-state actor) has to mix conventional, irregular and terrorist actions with specific information confrontations.

The emergence of new players in the modern battlefield, like so-called non-state actors (either adversaries: terrorist organizations, organized crime, paramilitaries of “militia” forces, or neutral: local populations, NGOs and international organizations), along with rapid developments in the information technology have led to the increasing influence of mass-media on political and military leaders, causing them to take into account, during the decision making process, national and international public opinion’s reactions as new hybrid threats. It also highlights the tendency of increasing the degree of complexity of military actions, by adding non-military components on the modern battlefield, which, in turn, transformed pure joint military operations into inter-agencies ones (the so-called Comprehensive Approach - CA).

“At the same time, due to the technological development, the traditional three-dimensional battlespace (land, air and sea) will be transformed into a multidimensional one, adding space and electronic dimensions, which are interconnected and interdependent with the informational one.”<sup>3</sup>

As a result, more and more military analysts consider that future military conflicts will manifest three trends, particularly depending on the combatants’ ability and willingness to face the new demands of the modern battlespace: conventional super-technical, ultra-fast and highly expensive warfare, which can be sustained only by a limited number of countries (most economically and militarily developed); hybrid warfare, in which a mix of new technology and old fashion doctrines will be used, blending different types of tactics and technologies in innovative ways and combining the war forms to increase lethality and frequency; generalization of asymmetric conflicts, where there will be employed conventional and unconventional forces, as well as atypical means (terrorism and organized crimes included).

---

<sup>3</sup> Ion Coscodaru, “Posibile evoluții în fizionomia conflictelor militare viitoare. Operații și forțe expediționare”, in *Strategic Impact* nr. 2/2005, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, p. 63.

### 1. Short History of the Hybrid Warfare Theory

The Americans were the first military analysts who came, after the transformation of Al Qaeda into an international terrorist organization,

highlighted in Figure no.1.

The hybrid threat was defined as a problem not as an operating concept that presented a solution. Therefore, some military theorists of the future conflicts linked what they have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan as an accelerated




Figure no. 1: Steps in Warfare and Capabilities (Source: David Johnson 2009, RAND OP295-1)

with the theory of *hybrid threats*, pointing out Iraqi insurgents, fanatic and faith-based factions within the Middle East (like Hezbollah and Hamas) and jihadist foreign fighters in Afghanistan.

Later, using their experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the consequences of the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and Chechnya War of 2008, the US Joint Force Command added failed states into the definition, describing the hybrid threat as “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battlespace. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be comprised of a combination of state and non-state actors.”<sup>4</sup> The definition is

learning cycle by insurgents and terrorists (as hybrid threats) in acquiring and effectively employing tactical techniques or adapt IEDs to the operational environment, which was defined as *the hybrid conflict*. For them, “conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors, using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.”<sup>5</sup> This definition put together hybrid threats with hybrid challenges (traditional, irregular, terrorist, and disruptive), as well as the physical and conceptual dimensions of conflict – the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the

<sup>4</sup> Definition adopted in support of U.S. Joint Forces Command during the *Hybrid War Conference*, held in Washington, D.C., February 24, 2009

<sup>5</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006, p. 14.



support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community.

Expanding those concepts of *hybrid threat*, *hybrid challenge* (to express the future security environment as described in Figure no. 2 and *hybrid conflict* to include non-governmental and inter-governmental agencies, international organizations, relevant commercial enterprises, and other pertinent parties during a campaign and considering that current models for Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency (COIN) were inadequate for the types of conflict seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, some American scholars went forward with the theory, arguing that there is going to be a further blurring of warfare categories. This blending of capabilities is being hailed as hybrid warfare and defined as “any enemy that uses simultaneous and adaptive employment of a complex combination of conventional weapons, irregular warfare, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battlespace to achieve political objectives. Hybrid wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”<sup>6</sup>

Even so, until the end of 2012, the term Hybrid Warfare was not found in any official doctrinal publications, being considered as a non-doctrinal term unaccepted by military planners. It was the recent crisis in Ukraine, when the Russian Federation employed a new concept of warfare, which was considered the practical use of hybrid war theory by NATO military theorists. It expressed, in fact, luring and blending Special Forces to conduct unorthodox and varied techniques with Information Campaigns and the exploration of Ukraine internal weaknesses, which have been dubbed hybrid warfare. Russia waged a *hybrid war* by importing commandos to liaise with local volunteers in an attempt to play for achieving her political objectives.

“This is a so-called new type of war, a hybrid war, where armies do not always take on the

---

<sup>6</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges”, in *the JFQ Magazine*, www.ndupress.ndu.edu, accessed on 02 Nov. 2014, p. 4.

role of direct aggressor. Instead, they serve to intimidate, while imported sabotage groups [do the fighting] together with local extremists and criminal gangs fight on the ground.”<sup>7</sup>

As James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman mentioned at the US Naval Institute almost a decade ago, hybrid wars are now different, even if they are not new.

What differentiates them from the past is the blurring of forces into the same force, as well as the fact that those forces are applied in the same battlespace. Not being a unique phenomenon during the history, this combination of irregular and conventional capabilities at the operational and tactical levels represents a great challenge.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. What makes Hybrid War the Future Conflict?

The future conflicts are characterized by an evolving character, comprising distinct challengers and threats. Even if the traditional conflict is considered to be the most demanding in scale and very dangerous for the civilization, the paradigm of high-technological Armed Forces facing less developed and equipped state and non-state actors force adversaries has forced the latter to blur and blend different methods or modes of warfare in order to mitigate the technological discrepancies.

This represents the most distinctive change in the character of modern wars.

Modern Armed Forces will face a widening number of distinct hybrid challenges provided by hybrid threats, into the future security environment. Figure no. 2 presents how those challenges are converged into hybrid wars.

---

<sup>7</sup> Oleg Shynkarenko, “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine”, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/russias-hybrid-war-ukrain>, accessed on 03 Nov. 2014, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 2005), pp. 30-32.





**Figure no. 2:** Future Security Environment (Source: The Future Security Environment 2008-2030, Part I, <http://publications.gc.ca/pub?id=365586&sl=0>, p. 3)

The hybrid construct is about conceptualizing the post-Iraq and Afghanistan operating environment. It does not match some concepts experienced by Russians during the Ukrainian crisis, like involving irregulars with coordination and support from Moscow or the use of commandoes pretending they are not Russians. Moreover, the new hybrid approach of the Russian Federation for the crisis in Ukraine avails the emerging of new hybrid threats, like energy, cyber, media, or even *these strange green human beings*.

Hybrid wars lure state conflicts with irregular warfare, by blurring the lethality of one with the fanatic and protracted character of the other. In the Information Era future opponents, like states and non-states actors (either sponsored by states or self-funded), could easily obtain unrestricted access to all types of modern military capabilities. This could include the easy exploitation, by states, of high-tech capabilities, such as encrypted command systems and modern lethal systems (man-portable or deployable), blended with a

large variety of protracted insurgent and terrorist tactics, like ambushes, information and cyber warfare, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or coercive assassinations directed against financial or international targets. Destabilizing, decapitating administrations, creating the space for influence are not new tactics, but they have strategic effects.


Hybrid challenges are not limited to state or non-state actors. This is really true because the crisis in Ukraine goes well beyond its borders. They can include regional or even international actors which lose their neutrality or impartiality. What effectively Putin has repeatedly said is that “the defense of ethnic Russians does not lie in the countries in which they reside or with their laws, government or constitution, but with Russia”<sup>9</sup>, blowing a hole in what the international law is about. That, in turn, imposed OSCE, NATO and the EU to take adequate measures for sanctioning or mitigating the threat to their member states.

<sup>9</sup> Hybrid War, Hybrid Response?, video available at [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed on 10 Nov. 2014.

Hybrid wars overlap state-on-state conflicts with irregular tactics undertaken by other armed groups. They incorporate various forms of conflict that put in practice the specificity of hybrid threats, involving, also, numerous international organizations for security. The role and place of the hybrid warfare is shown in Figure no. 3, where it is highlighted how both states and a variety of actors could choose from a wide range of modes of warfare to achieve their goals and objectives. Hybrid threats are blended in a mix

the levels of war. The innovative adaptations of existing systems further complicate the hybrid threats. Its complexity is maximized by the so called Hoffman’s convergence of the physical and psychological, of the combatant and noncombatant, of violence and nation-building, of the kinetic and informational approach. He believes that the most significant convergence, however, is within the modes of war and foresees hybrid conflicts during which states and non-state actors simultaneously exploit all modes – conventional, irregular, terrorist, disruptive, or criminal – to destabilize an existing order.

Even if the idea of blurring a wide variety of techniques and different levels of war is considered to be a new approach of the modern warfare, Russia already did it in the Estonian cyber attack in 2007, as well as during the invasion of Georgia in 2008. These hybrid actions demonstrate that the hybrid warfare theory has been developed by the Russian military theorists since 2004, as



**Figure no. 3:** How Hybrid Warfare emerges (Source: GAO analysis of DOD military concept and briefing documents and academic writings)

of conventional capabilities with irregular tactics and formations, including terrorist acts and cyber attacks.

The hybrid warfare is complex in character, convergent of modes and synergy of effects. The complexity of this new type of warfare is given by the lower level of execution and the synergistic effects obtained in both physical and psychological dimensions of conflict. The simultaneous convergence of modes is achieved by separate units, or even by the same unit, which is small in dimension. Even so, these small units necessitate thorough direction and coordination at operational and tactical levels within the main battlespace, in order to gain effects at all levels of war. This is called the compression of

the future conflict concept to counter NATO’s expansion to the East and the installation of the US Anti-Missile Shield in Europe. It was either overtly experimented, with obvious moves, or using more subtle moves, with official covered experts to conduct economic warfare and cyber attacks. What the recent crisis in Ukraine shows to the experts is the combination of them as a convergence of tactics that has been innovatively experienced to one degree or another, for the last five or six years.

It is worthwhile to note that both the Russian information warfare and Russian media has helped all unconventional tactics and techniques used by Ukrainian separatists, focusing on *Russian political myths and ideologised*



*propaganda actions*. This is the new crystallized Putin doctrine, described by Jolanta Darczewska from the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw as “geopolitical, Eurasian, anti-liberal and oriented towards rivalry with the West and Russia’s dominance in Eurasia.”<sup>10</sup>

### 3. What should NATO, EU and Member States do to counter Hybrid Warfare?

The current national strategies, warfighting concepts and force structures are ill-suited for this emerging blend of warfare. It is also valid for NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, joint doctrines and concepts development and experimentation, as well as for the EU’s 2003 Security Strategy and 2009 Treaty. Security organizations, their Member States and military remain intellectually and institutionally unprepared for the changes in war.

A response to a conventional land, sea or air forces’ attack is usually clear to be addressed by a strong security organization like NATO or a Member State. Even if an asymmetric attack, either terrorist or insurgent occurs, it is more difficult but also clear how to react. But what happens when it is attacked by a mixture of conventional forces and irregular adversaries? Is there any best response?

“Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate technologically advanced systems into their force structure and strategy, and use these systems in ways that are beyond the intended employment parameters. Operationally, hybrid military forces are superior to Western forces within their limited operational spectrum.”<sup>11</sup>

One should argue that being flexible and adaptive is the best approach of countering both hybrid threats and challenges. Flexibility relies in understanding and efficiently responding to the new threats like energy, cyber, media, or irregular actors. NATO and member states should do that on time, not after something happens.

Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO’s top military commander recommends that the best way to counter this is to invite a stronger, not weaker response. “What creates de-escalation is a strong response that causes Russia to think twice about going any further, stabilizes a tense situation and then allows it to de-escalate.”<sup>12</sup> What happened so far within NATO, the EU and member states is that all have still been very reactive, very slow.

To complicate the situation, the debate over *the military contribution to countering hybrid threats* overlaps with several other simultaneous debates within NATO, such as the need to develop a Comprehensive Approach (CA) to security problems, as well as identification of emerging security challenges, as described in Figure no. 4. Not all member states fully agree in these two areas either. In the former case, there are differences over what NATO (as opposed to other actors) should do, and whether new capabilities are needed. In the latter case, your sense of threat is rather different if you are large or small, adjacent to Russia, located in the Mediterranean, or far away in North America. Overlaying all of this are the additional complexities of potential synergy and potential competition between NATO and the EU (not to mention the differences among European states towards both institutions).

To confront such hybrid threats with the best effect security organizations and member states must better fuse all elements of power in the campaign plans and strategic actions. The political, social, diplomatic and informational components of power must provide bedrock support for the military organization. The leadership must encourage and resource a CA to deter conflicts through statecraft, while also developing and maintaining a robust military capacity to defend their vital interests. They should employ all elements of power at their disposal to pursue indirect approaches such as building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces to prevent problems before they become crises. This will serve

---


<sup>10</sup> Oleg Shynkarenko, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> William. J. Nemeth, USMC, “Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare”, a study of *the Naval Post-graduate School*, Monterey, CA, June 2002, p. 12.

---

<sup>12</sup> John Vandiver, “SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia ‘hybrid war’”, *www.stripes.com*, accessed on 04 Nov. 2014, p. 1.





**Figure no. 4:** Countering Hybrid Threats in NATO

Source: University of Lincoln: Lincoln Depository <http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/6278>

to isolate the threat by attempting to shape, influence, and stabilize the global environment through partnership and engagement.

Looking internally to expand their ability to address the non-military aspects of conflict, governments must improve the interagency planning and integration process by coordinating military efforts with appropriate civilian agencies and by engaging expertise in the private sector, including non-governmental organizations and academia. Beyond diplomatic and military power, governments must build a better and more integrated stabilization and reconstruction capacity by first fully resourcing and then coordinating the efforts between civilian agencies and military services.<sup>13</sup>

To address the changing character and hybridization of warfare, some military theorists recommend the adaptation of the operational

art to face the combination of conventional and irregular warfare, as well as the review and refine of warfighting concepts. This adaptation should express to what the center of gravity might be in such conflicts and it validates the emphasis on CA and lines of operations. Success in hybrid wars also requires small unit leaders with decision-making skills and quick-adaptive equipment that can best exploit advantages and opportunities, faster than tomorrow's adversaries. In order to do so, extensive investments in diverse educational experiences should be addressed, as well as to adapt the organizational knowledge and learning.

The greatest implications will involve force protection, as the proliferation of IEDs suggests. Future adversaries will focus on winning the mobility-counter-mobility challenge to limit our freedom of action and separate friendly military from close proximity to the civilian population. The ability of hybrid challenges to exploit the

<sup>13</sup>Russell W. Glenn, "Thoughts on 'Hybrid' Conflict", [www.smallwarjournal.com](http://www.smallwarjournal.com), accessed on 04 Nov. 2014, p. 6





range and precision of various types of missiles, mortar rounds, and mines will increase over time and impede our plans. The exploitation of modern information technology will also enhance the learning cycle of potential irregular adversaries, improving their ability to transfer lessons learned and techniques from one theater to another.<sup>14</sup>

Critical to achieving this crucial objective is preparing the military's highest leaders with a holistic grasp of the profession of arms and its relationship to strategy and policy. In facing the challenge of preparing for conflicts that are uncertain in form, location, level of commitment, contribution of allies, and nature of the enemy, the military planning must be more adaptive and responsive to the strategic context. Planners must engage in more inclusive planning methods that seek to gather a wider range of advice. Therefore, education and training must extend beyond traditional military and government schools to include the study of history, anthropology, economics, geopolitics, culture, law, and strategic communications. Accordingly, NATO and governments should reach out to academia, think-tanks, and advisors to develop this more holistic educational foundation. While expanding their intellectual horizons, leaders must continue to understand the profession of war and the projection of military force, while also improving their ability to think critically and creatively in acquisition and resource allocation.

In conjunction with reviewing and adjusting strategies and warfighting concepts, the defense community must reevaluate the force structure needed for future conflicts and build adequate capabilities. With a wider range of threats that may require the need to employ various capabilities simultaneously, NATO and member states must continue their effort to strive for greater joint operations and possibly inter-dependence. With the EU support, they must transform their industrial-era organizational structures into

more agile, information and knowledge-based enterprises, which requires a large investment in ideas, technology and people.

While the Western military will continue to be technologically enhanced, it becomes even more important that it is well manned with trained and ready personnel. Leaders, staffs, and conventional forces must be more capable of performing across the spectrum of military operations. To do so, the force needs a command and control structure that is net-centric with built-in redundancies. There must be a larger investment in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, particularly human intelligence capabilities. Also, NATO and member states must be able to collect and fuse information from a wider variety of sources and establish systems to share intelligence across services, allied governments, and with partners. Added to these capabilities, the military, in order to address the wide variety of future threats, must develop a greater precision targeting and engagement capability while ensuring a high level of protection for its forces, supporting civilians, partners and allied citizens.

The force necessary to provide these capabilities must be balanced and versatile, not a single-mission force. The military should accelerate the growth of its special operations forces and the transformation of its general purpose forces to a professional, more agile, "multi-purpose" force with flexibility and credible combat power, able to conduct conventional and irregular and to perform partner security force assistance, reconstruction, stabilization, and peacekeeping simultaneously. This enhanced force must be capable of operating independently at increasingly lower echelons, with or without support from civilian agencies.

In many cases, small company or battalion-sized teams of highly-trained and equipped combat forces, picked for both their combat and specialized civilian skills will look to capacity building in stability operations or providing humanitarian assistance during disaster relief actions. To secure and stabilize the indigenous population, the intervening forces must immediately rebuild or restore security, essential

---

<sup>14</sup> Brian P. Fleming, "The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art", a study at *the School of Advanced Military Studies*, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 2011, pp. 53-57.



services, local government, self-defense forces and essential elements of the economy. If the environment turns more hostile from any overt source, these same teams are readily capable of shifting ways and means to a more tactically focused use of direct force.

The use of combined arms fire together with tactical maneuver represents one successful way when fighting with irregular opponents. These hybrid threats create a qualitative challenge that demands combined arms fire and maneuver at lower levels, despite their generally small-unit structures. Furthermore, the introduction of sophisticated weapons (e.g. ATGMs, MANPADS) could radically escalate the challenges faced by Allied forces in the hybrid warfare. This is also true when hybrid warfare opponents operate “among the people” and the combined arms fire, even very precise, is not sufficient to solve the issue. It is necessary to mix it with a responsive and adequate air and artillery fire support, as well as with air maneuvering with UAVs and ground maneuvering with multiple-protection transport vehicles. The well-practiced capacity to integrate these capabilities is a precondition for success.

The use of heavy forces to fight hybrid enemies that have moderate training, organization, and advanced weapons is also a key element. These forces consist of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Light and medium forces can complement heavy forces, particularly in urban and other complex terrain, but they do not provide the survivability, lethality or mobility inherent in heavy forces. Quite simply, heavy forces reduce operational risks and minimize friendly casualties.

By building up pre-crisis capabilities to deal with hybrid approaches, allied nations will be better able to assign responsibility to an aggressor nation, which is key to triggering NATO involvement in a crisis. As Gen. Breedlove mentioned “we need to build the nations’ ability to fight through that first onslaught, attribute to an aggressor nation, and then NATO Article 5 kicks in.”<sup>15</sup> NATO members, especially those states that border Russia must also take into account the necessity to build the capacity of other arms

of government, such as interior ministries and police forces, to counter unconventional attacks, including propaganda campaigns, cyber assaults or homegrown separatist militias.

### Conclusions

Even if historical evidences acknowledge regular and irregular operations in many if not most wars, military theorists sustain the idea that next century war will comprise a kind of hybrid war, projecting all elements of national power along a continuum of activities from stability, security and reconstruction operations, to armed combat. Both Romanian and Alliance decision-makers are aware of this new kind of war that can be applied in all former Soviet states and much of the European countries. Being developed by Russian military theorists to counter NATO and experienced in Estonia and Georgia, the scale and scope of the events, first in Crimean Peninsula and later throughout Eastern Ukraine, caught us unprepared and in defensive, which has created a considerable advantage to Russian decision-makers and allowed them to continue the military intervention, without fear of concerted retaliation by the Allies or serious sanctions from international organizations.

Romanian Armed Forces have gained some experience against hybrid opponents in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The lessons from these experiences should be completed with the Allied experience in Lebanon and Gaza, as well as with ones from the crisis in Ukraine, to become relevant to understanding the capabilities the Romanian Armed Forces will require in the future. The use of combined arms fire with tactical maneuver is fundamental for gaining and maintaining the initiative against sophisticated hybrid opponents. Additionally, when hybrid warfare opponents operate “among the people”, it is necessary to mix the precision, stand-off fires with a responsive and adequate air and artillery fire support, as well as with air and ground maneuver. Finally, the use of heavy forces is paramount to fight against modicum trained and equipped opponents, to reduce friendly casualties and operational risks.

---

<sup>15</sup> John Vandiver, *op.cit.*, p. 2.



Moreover, international and regional security organizations such as NATO, EU, UN and OSCE were taken by surprise and acted very late. This was influenced by the Russian Federation important membership of the UN and OSCE as well as the special status within NATO and the EU. Thus, the international reaction was “soft”, without jeopardizing the Russian military continuous involvement in Ukraine or the measures taken to solve this crisis. In fact, military experts often addressed the question of “how international security organizations should adapt to such attacks?” We must not forget the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea proximity, which are serious issues of insecurity in the region, nor the volatile situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which poses special demands to military planners, regarding: the complexity of the battlespace; a large variety of actors and interests; the cultural diversity (clash of civilizations); volatility, dynamism and flexibility of the security situation in the region. These characteristics of future conflicts impose a thoroughly mix of conventional forces, almost entirely professionalized and capable of conducting joint and inter-agency actions, with religious fanatics using asymmetrical actions as efficient as possible, and integrated with active strategic communication and information campaign actions in a complex environment, in which could also operate other actors, almost unknown in conventional conflicts.

Hybrid warfare has been an integral part of the historical landscape since the ancient world, but only recently have analysts categorized these conflicts as new. Great powers throughout history have confronted opponents who used a combination of regular and irregular forces to negate the advantage of the great powers’ superior conventional military strength. Moreover, hybrid wars are labour-intensive and long-term affairs. They are also the most likely conflicts of the twenty-first century, as competitors use hybrid forces to wear down Western military capabilities in extended campaigns of exhaustion.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY:**

1. COSCODARU, Ion, “Posibile evoluții ale fizionomiei conflictelor militare viitoare. Operații și forțe expediționare”, in *Impact Strategic* nr.3/2005, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”.
2. FLEMING, Brian P., *The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art*, a monography published at the School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 2011.
3. GLENN, Russell W., *Thoughts on “Hybrid” Conflict*, an article published by *Small Wars Journal*, LLC on its site, <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com>.
4. GRAY, Colin S., *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006.
5. HOFFMAN, Frank G., *Further Thoughts on Hybrid Threats*, an article published by *Small Wars Journal*, LLC, <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com>.
6. HOFFMAN Frank G., *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges*, in *JFQ Magazine*, <http://www.ndupress.ndu.edu>.
7. NEMETH, William. J., USMC, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002.
8. SHYNKARENKO, Oleg, *Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine*, 11 June 2014 on the site of the Institute for War&Pace Reporting, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/russias-hybrid-war-ukrain>.
9. VANDIVER, John, *SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia ‘hybrid war’*, *Stars and Strips Journal*, <http://www.stripes.com/>.
10. \*\*\*, *Hybrid War, Hybrid Response?*, video, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Russia-Ukraine-crisis-war/EN/index.htm>.



# COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH' OPERATIONALIZATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY. ASPECTS OF MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

*Marius Valeriu PĂUNESCU, Ph.D.\**

*The possibilities of understanding and using the instrument of military power in those areas characterized by a crisis and a conflict that has an insurgent - counterinsurgent aspect represents a very important field of research for the Euro-Atlantic military thought system. For insurgent - counterinsurgent operating environment, there are two main tendencies of interpreting the military actions: the traditional approach, in which the security problems are taken into consideration from a politico-military point of view, creating a binominal battlefield (friendly forces – the adversary) and the constructivist approach, which tends to analyze the problems of the security component in terms of securing the political, military, economic, social and environmental fields, creating a trinomial battlefield (friendly forces – the civilian population – the adversary).*

*Taking into consideration the fact that the military forces are organized and trained mainly for being able to plan and execute military activities that are characteristic for the conventional (traditional) war, the main goal of the present study is to describe some of the most important aspects about the various understandings that some of the NATO member countries offer to the insurgency - counterinsurgency environment of operations and, therefore, to underline some new concepts and procedures which are used in this*

*kind of operations.*

**Keywords:** *insurgency, counterinsurgency, doctrine, comprehensive approach, EBO.*

## Introduction

To identify, to describe and to understand the essential peculiarities of the operational environment of insurgency – counterinsurgency represents a complex and extremely difficult process at the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Millennium. This situation is caused by the extremely various spectrum of its practical forms of manifestations and also by the diversity of its theoretical formulas elaborated so far.

Taking into consideration the fact that in the post Cold-War military activities the knowledge based of information and the technology of information represent the main mean of innovation, the Euro-Atlantic philosophical and military school of thought became more and more preoccupied of identifying new ways to conceptualize and to use the traditional power resources used by a country: the national resources (technology, enterprise, human resources, financial/ capital resources, and physical resources), the capacity of national performance (the possibilities a nation has to establish and to reach the goals it desires) and the military capability (the strategic resources and

---

*\* Major Marius Valeriu PĂUNESCU, Ph.D. is lecturer at the Security and Defence Faculty within “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: paunescu.marius@unap.ro*





the capacity the military has to convert them into fighting power)<sup>1</sup>.

From this point of view, the fighting power of an armed force which fights with an asymmetric opponent is no longer analyzed based only on the mere physical capacities which can be developed by using the strategic resources that one has available (the budget for defense, the number of people involved in the operations, the equipment, the military infrastructure, the research, development, testing and evaluation institutions, the defense industrial base and the warfighting inventory and support), but also based on the power the nation has to convert these physical capacities into military capabilities which are prepared to offer adequate answers to a very large spectrum of challenges and, as a logical consequence, to fight with a huge variety of opponents.

Taking into consideration what Alvin and Heidi Toffler said about the determinism created between the economic affairs revolution and the military affairs revolution, *the way in which we make war is the perfect mirror of the way we make our wealth*<sup>2</sup> and taking also into account that the effects created in the insurgent – counterinsurgent battlefield must follow the advice of Thomas Edward Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”) who said the following words during the First World War - *the permanent damage should be as small as possible, because the man that today we call enemy will be our tomorrow client and our ally on the day after tomorrow*<sup>3</sup>, the present study aims to present a few aspects about the way in which the insurgency – counterinsurgency environment is defined by some of the NATO member countries and, therefore, to show the differences which appear at the level of conducting operations and to describe the military structures which are involved in the peculiar actions of this particular kind of war.

---

<sup>1</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Line, Mellisa McPherson, *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age*, RAND Corporation, 2000

<sup>2</sup> Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), p.3

<sup>3</sup> B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte*, Editura Militară, București, 1973, p. 364.

### Definitions of insurgency

The United States of America (USA) considers insurgency as being “an organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region”<sup>4</sup>. In other words, insurgency is an organized politico-military fight which is carried on through subversive means and through fight in order to weaken the control and the lawfulness of the central and local authorities that are governing and to substitute them with their own sympathizers.

The United Kingdom (UK) considers insurgency as “the actions of a minority group who are intent of forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people (normally within a state) to accept such a change”<sup>5</sup>. Therefore, insurgency is seen as a form of a fight which uses weapons, brought at a political level, a battle that has the purpose to achieve goals that can be extremely various.

According to the Canadian doctrine, insurgency is a competition that involves the existence of at least one non-country participant and which uses violent means in order to achieve its own political objectives, acting against the governmental authorities.<sup>6</sup>

The French thinkers consider insurgency as a protest against a legitimate political authority, which is put in motion under the shape of a fight, that resembles the guerilla and the terrorism acts.<sup>7</sup> So, insurgency represents, according to the French perspective, dissidence against the existent political authorities and which can turn into extreme violent scenarios in certain conditions.

---

<sup>4</sup> *Joint Publication 1-02*, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2010 (As Amended Through 15 November 2014), p. 123.

<sup>5</sup> *AFM*, Volume 1, *Combined Arms Operations*, Part 10, *Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)*, 2007, p. A – 2 – 1.

<sup>6</sup> *B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations*, Canada Land Force, 2008, p. 2-1.

<sup>7</sup> *Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level*, Armee de Terre, France, 2010, p. 11.



The German doctrine defines insurgency as the process of destabilization created by political, economic and social requests, which affect both the lawfulness and the efficiency of the government.<sup>8</sup>

Taking into account all this different definitions of the term “insurgency”, one can identify some of its most essential characteristics: insurgency is a movement which uses violent means of action like the fight, the guerilla war and terrorism; insurgency implies the undermining of the political authorities that are ruling at that time by planning conspiring actions meant to destroy the order and the public peace; insurgency is carried on by a minority and it seeks to gain the support of the neutral majority, by offering a new political system to organize the society, which is a different one from the existing one.

### Definitions of counterinsurgency

For the NATO’s member countries the concept of counterinsurgency has more than one meaning. In the “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions”, counterinsurgency, which is also called “counter-insurrection” or COIN, represents those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency<sup>9</sup>. In the USA dictionary of acronyms<sup>10</sup>, counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined as the “comprehensive civil and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and its root causes”.

The USA doctrine regarding COIN<sup>11</sup> uses the definition written in the dictionary of acronyms (JP 1-02), but, at the same time, it brings up several important details, that modulates the perspective. Therefore, COIN is, first of all, a political

action which consists of a numerous activities, among which the safeguard is just one of them; COIN’s efforts may include specialized, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, legal, military, paramilitary, psychological and civil actions, but these are not the only ones that can be used; the main focus in COIN must be represented by the protection of the population, the neutralization of the insurgent actions, the reinforcement of the Host Nation’s lawfulness, the construction of the HN’s capacities; the civil actions must be more important than the military ones and the unity of effort must be realized through the integration of all the participants in counter insurgency.

The UK Army manual talks about the problems of counteracting insurgency and it understand COIN<sup>12</sup> as “political, social, economic and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the authority of a legitimate government”. In order to have success in counterinsurgency, the security forces must act in support of the civil authority of a legitimate government.

The French doctrine defines counterinsurgency<sup>13</sup> as that chosen course of action which reduces the liberty of movement for an organization which displays armed and violent activities that are peculiar to guerilla warfare and terrorism. The level of involvement in this specific type of fight must take into consideration three elements: the national or international political option, the ratio rapport of forces that one side can hold on the battlefield and the attitude of the population. It’s important to notice the fact that the first publication of the manual of counterinsurgency had the title of “Doctrine de contre rébellion”. But, out of the necessity to avoid confusions in applying the principles, the procedures, the tactics and the techniques in counterinsurgency, the French term of *contre rébellion* was translated by “counterinsurgency”, even if the American and British meanings of this word are closer to the French word “stabilization”.

---

<sup>8</sup> *Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency*, German Army Office, June 2010, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *AAP-6 - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), Listing terms of military significance and their definitions for use in NATO*, NATO Unclassified, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), 2010, pp. 75-76.

<sup>10</sup> *Joint Publication 1-02*, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2010, p. 85.

<sup>11</sup> *Joint Publication 3-24. Counterinsurgency Operations*, October 2009, p. 29

<sup>12</sup> *British Army Field Manual*, Volume 1, Part 10, *Countering Insurgency*, 2009, p. 12.

<sup>13</sup> *Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level*, Forces Employment Doctrine Center, Paris, April 2010, p. 9.



Germany is extremely cautious when it must define the concept of “counterinsurgency”. For the German military organization, this word is replaced by the phrase “establishing security and state order in crises areas”<sup>14</sup> (*Herstellung von Sicherheit und staatlicher Ordnung in Krisengebieten*) and represents the “entirety of political, economic, social, legal, executive and psychological measures taken by civilian actors and/or military forces to eliminate the causes of insurgency”<sup>15</sup>.

In Romania, the Ministry of National Defense elaborated two documents which take into consideration the problem of insurgency – counterinsurgency: the Doctrine about the participation at multinational operations against insurgency – S.M.G. 36/2012 (elaborated by the General Staff Headquarters) and the Manual of the counterinsurgency operations – F.T.-5/2012 (written by the Land Forces Headquarters).

According to the Romanian conception, counterinsurgency is the totality of political, economic, social, military, civil, psychological and informational actions, together with all the actions to reinforce the law, adopted in order to defeat insurgency and to solve the main unrest causes<sup>16</sup>. For NATO, the endorsement and the publishing of the doctrine for the non-article 5 crisis response operations (Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, AJP-3.4(A), October 2010), in which insurgency and counterinsurgency are placed in the chapter counter irregular activities, right after the peace support operations (PSO), allowed the elaboration and the ratification of NATO’s doctrine about counterinsurgency (Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4, February 2011).

With the help of these doctrines (AJP-3.4(A)<sup>17</sup> and AJP-3.4.4<sup>18</sup>), NATO defines

---

<sup>14</sup> Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency, German Army Office, June 2010, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> S.M.G.36 - Doctrina privind participarea la operații multinaționale împotriva insurgenței, 2012, p.11

<sup>17</sup> AJP-3.4(A). Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, NATO Unclassified, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), October 2010, p. 48.

<sup>18</sup> AJP-3.4.4. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency

counterinsurgency as “the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and to address any core grievances”. AJP-3.4 (A) underlines the importance of understanding properly the term “defeat”. Therefore, the term of “defeat” in COIN represents the action of diminishing “the effectiveness of an individual, group, or organization to extent that it is either unable or unwilling to continue its activities or at least cannot fulfill its intentions”.

From analyzing these definitions, one can notice the fact that the term “counterinsurgency” has similar meanings (the doctrine of NATO, USA and UK), but also different meanings (for the doctrine of UK, France and Germany). The causes for these similarities and differences are not surprising. This situation is caused by the differences in terms of linguistic (the translation of the term “counterinsurgency” with the French phrase *contre rébellion* being a telling example), by the different perspectives on counterinsurgency which appeared during the years (AAP-6(2010)-NATO *Glossary of Terms and Definitions* considers that COIN is represented by those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological and civil actions taken in order to neutralize (counteract) insurgency, while AJP-3.4.4 (2011) - *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency* defines it as the set of political, economic, social, military, of law reinforcement, civil and psychological actions carried on in order to defeat insurgency and to solve the real reasons of discontentment), but also by the different political, military, economic, cultural and social perspectives of the member countries which were asked to offer solutions for the situations of insurgency - counterinsurgency operating environment.

Scott Moore, in his book *The Basic of Counterinsurgency*, pointed out the lack of precision and the confusions caused by the use of a large number of notions and concepts

---

(COIN), NATO Unclassified, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), February 2011, p. 62.





for the new forms of fight for the forces and the participants involved in counteracting insurgency: stability operations, counter-guerrilla operations, countering irregular threats, small wars, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, asymmetric warfare, low-intensity conflict or military operations other than warfare, which made nothing else but to create confusions and to bring up all sort of matters. That is why Moore considers that it is necessary, for a general understanding of the term “counterinsurgency”, to be used a comprehensive approach, which should start from the essential premises of insurgency and to arrive up to the nominalization of the planned effects that must be operationalized.

According to Moore’s research, counterinsurgency is a coherent set of political, economic, social and safety measures taken in order to stop the armed violence and to prevent its reemergence and to create and maintain a stable atmosphere for a political, economic and social point of view, able to ensure the solving of the main causes which created insurgency and to establish and maintain once again the durable security<sup>19</sup>.

### **The comprehensive approach, the asymmetric war and the military contribution**

Comprehensive approach (CA) is an expression one can find more and more often in the asymmetric war field, particularly in the insurgency – counterinsurgency type of conflict. It appears not only at the level of diplomatic discussions between different countries, but also at the level of international organizations (UN, NATO, EU etc.). Although the CA may seem a very modern concept, which appeared as a result of the modifications of several conventional and unconventional peculiarities of post-Cold-War conflicts, this approach is not a new one at all. In the course of the time, the military and civil participants involved in various wars during the ages have been preoccupied with finding solutions for the following question: How can one build an organization capable to engage efficiently

enough instruments of diplomatic, economic, military and any other kind of power in order to achieve the desired political objectives?

The solutions given in time had answers which mainly tried to solve the following problems: to ensure the unity of action (named also unity of command, of effort, of purpose etc.); to efficiently utilize the available instruments and means (diplomatic, economic, military, informational, psychological, social etc.); to establish objectively the political purposes.

All this three hints can be identified even today in the declarations of the diplomats from UN, NATO and EU in the regards of the comprehensive approach of the security problems. For example, in 2001 the President of the UN Security Council<sup>20</sup> underlined the need to find the possible ways for getting peace that needs a comprehensive, focused and determinate approach, able to solve the causes of conflicts, including the economic and social aspects of them and which must include the action of the important participants in that particular field.

In 2011, during the meeting held in order to evaluate the efficiency of using the *Instrument for Stability* (IfS) in conflict prevention and crisis management, Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission stated: “the IfS is an important tool with which the European Union can help prevent or respond to crises and emerging threats globally. It is an integral part of our comprehensive approach to external relations and crisis management, particularly in dealing with the threats of political instability and insecurity due to conflict, terrorism, organized crime and natural or man-made disasters”<sup>21</sup>.

For NATO, the experiences accumulated after the operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan showed that solving the problems in the particular

---

<sup>19</sup> R. Scott Moore, *The Basic of Counterinsurgency*, Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy, f.l., f.a., p. 14.

---

<sup>20</sup> “Security Council Addresses Comprehensive Approach to Peace Building”, in the President Statement (Statement Deals with, among Others, Integrated Strategy, Interrelationship among Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding); Press Release SC/7014, Disponibil: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7014.doc.htm>.

<sup>21</sup> “Conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building: a busy year for the EU Instrument for Stability”, UE Press Release, 24.07.2012. Disponibil: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-12-832\\_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-832_en.htm?locale=en).





area of crisis and/or conflict it is not only a matter of correctly applying the specific military forces, or just about individual involvement, which can be impartial and independent from various agents and international organizations of security, but it is also a matter of efficient and coherent collaboration between the all participants involved, generically called – the comprehensive approach.

From a military perspective, the concept of comprehensive approach is linked to the doctrines and the manuals that present the practical ways of systematic analyze of the modern battlefield.

The USA developed the concept *Effects Based Operations* (EBO) in its` attempt to keep and use at a maximum level the strategic advantage given by the technologic and the informational capabilities from the continuous spectrum of the conflict *peace – war – the new peace*. EBO<sup>22</sup> makes the transition from the concept “weapons on targets” to the concept “focused actions” because it deals with the importance of understanding the behavior of your own forces, of the neutral participants and of the opponents during peace time, crisis and/or war time.

Using the concept EBO, the USA unifies the civil and the military actions, gathering the central kinetic ideas of planning and executing the military operations (destroying the key targets, the attrition of the opponent etc.) with ideas that offer the possibility of a non-kinetic military involvement, in order to reinforce the cohesion and to unify the national efforts, done at a political, economic and military level. Therefore, the philosophy which is developed through the use of the EBO concept proposes two ways of actions during the process of optimizing combat efficiency: 1. by concentrating the efforts into destroying the opponent`s will to fight (the desired result – to limit as much as possible the kinetic components in the active fight); 2. by applying network-centric operations not just to combat but across the all spectrum of conflict (*peace – war – the new peace*)<sup>23</sup>.

---

<sup>22</sup> Eduard A. Smith, *Effects Based Operations - Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War*, CCCR Publications Series, f.a, p.108

<sup>23</sup> Eduard A. Smith, *op.cit.*, p.105

NATO proposed a new alternative for EBO, called *Effects Based Approach to Operations* (EBAO)<sup>24</sup>. EBAO<sup>25</sup> represents the coherent and comprehensive application of various instruments of the alliance together with the practical cooperation of the non-NATO participants involved in the operations area, in order to create the necessary effects to accomplish the objectives of the campaign and to arrive at the planned (desired) end-state. This concept, that NATO uses, offers the organizational and the practical requested frame for a civil and military cooperation, effective at the all possible levels (strategic, operational and tactical) of the military field (the armed forces), the political one (diplomacy), the economic area (penalties, support and investments) and the civil one (police, justice, education, health, public information, civil administration and infrastructure).

Even if they were an essential part for the apparition and the development of the comprehensive approach, the concepts EBO and EBAO were mainly focused on the analytical and systematical identification of the methods and the processes of optimizing the military actions and not on the civil-military actions. The complex elements, like the space of engagement, the analysis of the system of the systems, the development of the critical informational plan, the security of the decisional superiority, the pattern of synchronizing the actions and the effects of the operation are hard to be used by the civil participants of the member countries of NATO and/or by the civil/military partners (non-NATO) because of, at least, two reasons: 1. the procedures, the terminology and the instruments that are used require a very high level of knowledge which cannot be reached in the time and the space one has in order to prepare an operation; 2. the access and the transparence of the civil-military actions are limited by the process of accessing

---

<sup>24</sup> Abordarea pe Baza Efectelor privind Operațiile (Traducere în limba română a conceptului EBAO) <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/romanian/interview.html>, accessed 10.10.2014

<sup>25</sup> Brook SMITH-WINDSTOR, *NATO's Effects Based and Comprehensive Approach to Operations*, NATO Defence College Research Paper no. 38, Rome, 2008, p.2



the necessary data (the principle “need to know” has its own limits in several situations).

By using the comprehensive approach one tries to surpass not only these obstacles, but also other problems that influence the EBO or the EBAO procedures in correctly determining the effects in an asymmetric operational environment.

If the concept of comprehensive approach has been extremely used in the past few years, not the same thing is happening with EBO, which is less and less used in doctrines and in the American articles. In 2007, in the first revision of the doctrine for the land forces of the USA (*Field Manual 3-0*), the authors concluded that EBO<sup>26</sup> is no longer useful for the operations purposes. On the contrary, they admitted the importance of understanding the influence of political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructural participants within the operating environment. Therefore, the present doctrine of the USA for the land forces reduces the use of EBO to the conceptual context through that can enlarge the vision of the classical “mission analysis”. In this new light, the concept<sup>27</sup> may facilitate:

1. a better understanding of the operational environment that is done by knowing the culture and the history of the local people, by identifying the specificity of the interactions between the military structures and the other governmental and non-governmental organizations from the action field, by analyzing its functions from a political and economic point of view and by analyzing other participants that contribute to the military efficiency.

2. the foreseeing of the commanding officer’s intention by looking at the desired effects ensures the unity of action (the principle of the centralization of the command and the decentralization of the execution);

3. new ways of engaging targets (the criteria of selecting the targets);

4. the analysis of progress (periodical

---

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *Doctrine Update #1*, Army Doctrine Update, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Arm TRADOC, 24 February 2007, pp.4-5.

<sup>27</sup> U.S. JOINT Force Command, *Assessment of Effects Based Operations*, Norfolk, 14 August 2008, pp.5-6.

inspections on the relation between the established objective – the gained result and the necessary measures).

### **The application of military force in the asymmetric war: the transition from Clear-Hold-Build to Secure-Control-Support**

NATO’ member states developed the concept *Clear-Hold-Build (C-H-B)* in order to adjust the military activities to the particularities of the asymmetric warfare, like the insurgency – counterinsurgency one, taking into considerations two essential patterns. The first one is developed based on Carl von Clausewitz famous phrase: “the war is a continuation of the policy by other means”<sup>28</sup>, while the second one belongs to David Galula: “counterinsurgency is only an effect of insurgency. Furthermore, counterinsurgency cannot be defined except by reference to its cause”<sup>29</sup>.

The concept C-H-B appeared as a consequence of the strategies the USA adopted towards the armed conflict from Iraq<sup>30</sup> and it was implemented in the counterinsurgency national doctrine (FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2006). At the beginning, it took very little out of what a change of the perspective of the militaries’ thinking could have meant, a transition from the philosophy “win by destroying” to the philosophy “win by supporting”, because it remained limited to the well-known precepts of the core functions of a fight: Find, Fix, Strike (F-F-S).

This is the reason why the American doctrine is still talking about the implement of C-H-B operation mainly in the areas that are influenced by the insurgents<sup>31</sup>, an aspect which implies, from a military point of view, the same binomial situation, friendly forces – the adversary (the

---

<sup>28</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, London: Penguin, 1832/1968, p.119.

<sup>29</sup> David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice*, University Place New York, 1964, p. 3

<sup>30</sup> Stephen C. Phillips, *ESTABLISHING A SUITABLE TACTICAL DESIGN MODEL FOR CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009, p.1

<sup>31</sup> FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, USA, 2006, pp.5-18.



main goal being the physical destruction of the enemy) and not the trinomial one, friendly forces – the population – the adversary (in which the main purpose is to protect the population against security threats).

As to the binomial aspect, although the C-H-B concept brings different perspectives about the main directions of the military action and its effort (like the guarantee of the local security of the civil population against the violence of the insurgents or of the criminal organizations, the rebuilding of local security structures, the support of the governmental actions that aim at satisfying the basic needs of the civil population), the effective planning and execution of the military operations are done through that end-state which is specific for the pattern “win by destroying”; in other words, first think which must be done is to identify, assess track and engage the adversary. In this regard, it is extremely relevant the definition of the term clear – “tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area”<sup>32</sup>; at the same time, also the definition of the term “hold” becomes relevant: it means to maintain the conquered areas by using force<sup>33</sup>.

As to the trinomial aspect, the data about the military involvement are different, because C-H-B concept is seen from a different perspective and it means the implement of the strategic objective of securing the civil population by supporting its capacities of functioning in the security, governmental and economic fields. In this regard, the focus of the military operations is to support the long-term development of the central and local governmental capacities, which are able to ensure not only the safety of the citizens, but also the fair access to the means considered capable of satisfying the basic needs of the population. Therefore, in counterinsurgency, the term “clear” has new meanings and it must be understood as an equivalent for “secure”: to protect the actions, the objectives and the personal resources against

the destructive forces of the opponent<sup>34</sup>; at the same time, “hold” becomes synonym with the term “control”, which is the securing of all the capacities that are able to influence the course of events and which has the purpose to support the stability and to prevent its lost in favor of the enemy<sup>35</sup>.

This is the reason for which, when one is taking into consideration the operational frame of insurgency – counterinsurgency, it is important to identify the change of paradigm which transforms the thinking process and the way of applying the military force from the C-H-B concept (which is nothing else but a new denomination of the classical F-F-S concept and which is still fixed in the same old constant – kill (destroy) the enemy/the opponent), to the S-C-S concept (Secure-Control-Support), that is focused on protecting the civil population and on supporting it in recreating the necessary conditions of safety.

If one agrees with this new perspective of the C-H-B concept from a theoretical point of view, the use of S-C-S concept at the level of military actions, for a tactical, operational and strategic use, can be a very difficult process because of a few realities.

On the first hand, the trinomial friendly forces – civil population – adversary implies the necessity of applying different procedures during the planning and the development of the actions in the counterinsurgency environment. One needs knowledge and skills that have almost nothing to do with the conventional military actions. And because the majority of the permanent military structures, before being involved in those actions that are specific to the insurgency, is preoccupied, first of all, to train the soldiers in order to make them able to face offensive and defensive actions that are specific to the conventional (traditional) war, one can consider that it is pretty hard to make a very quick transfer of the requested knowledge and skill (at an individual and collective level) to

<sup>32</sup> FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, USA, 2006, pp.5-19.

<sup>33</sup> FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Revision Issue Paper #3, Clear-Hold-Build, US Army Counter Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2012, p.3.

<sup>34</sup> FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Revision Issue Paper #3, Clear-Hold-Build, US Army Counter Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2012, p.2.

<sup>35</sup> FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Revision Issue Paper #3, Clear-Hold-Build, US Army Counter Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2012, p.3.



the specific forces that are going to be involved in counterinsurgency.

Secondly, the tactical level in the insurgency-counterinsurgency operational environment is the one component which decides the necessary *tempo* to implement the strategic objectives, because the population is seen as the main element of the situation and it is not involved in the official channels of decision. Therefore, to gain the population's support at a strategic level is being realized through the tactical interaction civil-military, an interaction that is done at two different levels: the quantitative level and the qualitative one.

From the quantitative perspective, there are a lot of opinions and essays which established, from a binomial or a trinomial point of view, the necessary number of counterinsurgents in order to make sure that this kind of operation can be successful. David Galula<sup>36</sup> considered that the French failure from Indochina was caused by the fact that the necessary balance of forces in counterinsurgency was not satisfied (10-20 counterinsurgents for 1 insurgent). David Gompert<sup>37</sup> studied 89 insurgencies which took place after the Second World War and he identified that a correct ratio of forces is of at least 9:1: seven out of nine insurgencies had a positive result for the counterinsurgents in these conditions. A ratio of forces between 3:1 and 9:1 assured the success only for 13 counterinsurgency actions. John McGrath<sup>38</sup>, in his ample study about the necessary number of counterinsurgency forces, concludes that one needs at least 13 counterinsurgents for one thousand civilians in order to have the favorable conditions for success. All this studies are showing the fact that, in order to have success in counterinsurgency, the ratio of forces must be

a lot bigger than the one known and accepted in the conventional military actions (at least 3:1).

From the other perspective, the qualitative one, the tactical interaction civil-military requests a considerable effort from the counterinsurgent because of the political, military, economic, informational and psychological objectives that must be achieved, on the one hand and because of the cultural, linguistic and human interrelations' limits, on the other hand.

The operating conditions of this specific environment created changes and adaptations for the governing and controlling structures which have the goal to support the decisions and to ensure the independence of action even for the smallest tactical structures (the company, the battalion), but they also produced changes in the training and the educational programs for the soldiers, which are now focused on the development of knowledge of all the military personnel. An eloquent example is the concept created by the general Charles Krulack<sup>39</sup> – “the tactical strategist” or “the strategic corporal”. It is focused on the fact that, in the informational era, all the tactical actions can be extremely important at a strategic level. This is the reason why it is mandatory to pay more attention in analyzing the implications generated by the tactical decisions and actions at the operational and strategic levels and not the other way round.

Although S-C-S can really support the coherence of the civil-military actions in order to protect the civil population and to restore stability in the conflict areas (through guaranteeing the unity of government, reducing the effort, combining the different means and capabilities), this concept may be hard to use in reality because of many constraints generated by the lack of a common practice, a component not very well trained by the all type of participants involved in the asymmetric wars.

---

<sup>36</sup> David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice*, University Place New York, 1964, p. 32.

<sup>37</sup> David C. Gompert, John Gordon IV, *War by Other Means - Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, RAND National Defence Research Institute, 2008, pp. 373-396.

<sup>38</sup> John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006, pp. 91-109.

---

<sup>39</sup> James E. Szepesy, *The Strategic Corporal and The Emerging Battlefield - The Nexus Between the USMC's Three Block War Concept and Network Centric Warfare*, The Fletcher School, 2005, pp.1-5.





### Conclusions

To use armed forces in order to solve the insurgency-counterinsurgency conflicts is no longer a fixed concept, but it is now seen from a different perspective, at the level of the organizational frame of the military actions, the used means, the techniques and the procedures that must be applied, but also at the level of the effects that must be accomplished by the military structures. The operational environment in counterinsurgency is characterized by a very close relation between all the members from the military forces, the population and the opponent and this element transforms the philosophy of engaging the military forces from the concept “win by destroying the will of fight of the adversary” to the concept “win by helping the population that is in danger to secure its own stability”.

In this particular context, the success of the military actions in the operational environment characterized by the insurgency-counterinsurgency conflict becomes a relative concept. If in the traditional war, one can measure the success directly on the battlefield and it is shown by the number of killed soldiers and destroyed equipment and means from the opponent, in this asymmetric insurgency-counterinsurgency war the success one gets by the direct involvement of the insurgent forces is no longer an important one. In this case, to measure the efficiency of military actions can be done only by identifying the contributions the armed forces brought to stabilize the political, economic and social environment from the conflict zone in each one of the three stages of the operation: secure, control, support.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. AAP-6 - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), Listing terms of military significance and their definitions for use in NATO, NATO Unclassified, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), 2010.
2. AJP-3.4(A). Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, NATO Unclassified, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), October 2010.
3. AJP-3.4.4. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), NATO Unclassified, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), February 2011.
4. AFM, Volume 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines), 2007.
5. B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations, Canada Land Force, 2008.
6. British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10, *Countering Insurgency*, 2009.
7. Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, Armee de Terre, France, 2010.
8. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, USA, 2006.
9. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Revision Issue Paper #3, Clear-Hold-Build, US Army Counter Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2012.
10. JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2010.
11. Joint Publication 3-24. Counterinsurgency Operations, October 2009.
12. Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency, German Army Office, June 2010.
13. S.M.G.36 - Doctrina privind participarea la operații multinaționale împotriva insurgenței, 2012.
14. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *Doctrine Update #1*, Army Doctrine Update, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Arm TRADOC, 24 February 2007.
15. U.S. JOINT Force Command, *Assessment of Effects Based Operations*, Norfolk, 14 August 2008.
16. BÉDAR, Saída *apud* MUREȘAN, Mircea și VĂDUVA, Gheorghe, *Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2004.



17. B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte*, Editura Militară, București, 1973.
18. CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von, *On War*, London: Penguin, 1832/1968.
19. GALULA, David, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice*, University Place New York, 1964.
20. GOMPERT, David C., GORDON IV, John, *War by Other Means - Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, RAND National Defence Research Institute, 2008.
21. MCGRATH, John J., *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006.
22. MOORE, R. Scott, *The Basic of Counterinsurgency*, Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy, f.l., f.a.
23. PHILLIPS, Stephen C., *Establishing a Suitable Tactical Design Model for Clear-Hold-Build Counterinsurgency Operations*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009.
24. SMITH, Eduard A., *Effects Based Operations - Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War*, CCCR Publications Series, f.a.
25. SMITH-WINDSTOR, Brook, *NATO's Effects Based and Comprehensive Approach to Operations*, NATO Defence College Research Paper no. 38, Rome, 2008.
26. SZEPESEY, James E., *The Strategic Corporal and The Emerging Battlefield - The Nexus Between the USMC's Three Block War Concept and Network Centric Warfare*, The Fletcher School, 2005.
27. Tellis, ASHLEY J., Bially, JANICE, Line, CHRISTOPHER, McPherson, MELLISA, *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age*, Rand Corporation, 2000.
28. TOFFLER, Alvin and Heidi, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993).
29. VĂDUVA, Gheorghe, *Simetria, disimetria și asimetria în conflictele militare actuale*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, 2008.

### **Acknowledgement:**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title **“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”**.



# THE PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY OF FAILED STATES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT LESSONS

*Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU, Ph.D.\**

*This article examines how weak and failed states, through their continuing sovereignty, have the potential to promote regional and international conflicts and terrorist networks. Legality of the use of force and the morality of combating violence with violence are underlined themes, and explain how the rules of the Westphalian game have changed: no longer does sovereignty mean non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.*

*The paper also presents a legal approach to an increasingly persuasive theory of a post-Westphalian sovereignty based on interdependence. An example is provided by the growth of international criminal courts which have rights to put sovereign representatives from weak states in the dock in support of the rights of victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes. This is an important development in terms of the international community's capacity to manage current international crisis.*

*Finally, this article discusses some controversies surrounding the management of "out-of-area" international crisis, using examples of precarious security situations in failing states, and highlights some solutions to the problems of weakening traditional sovereignty.*

**Keywords:** *sovereignty, security, failed state, conflict, military intervention, crisis management, justice, responsibility.*

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The problem of security and its implications for the lives of individuals was agitated by the Copenhagen School in the 1990s. Theorists like Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, focused their analysis not merely on the military, but on the economic, social, political and environmental security impact. NATO recognized the importance of this approach in the final declaration of its 1995 Summit which registered the fact that security relates directly to the five above mentioned dimensions. This new constructivist grid, which still conforms to traditional principles, has helped to broaden the security research agenda by studying non-state actors and the influences generated by the psycho-sociology regarding identity, beliefs and values.<sup>2</sup>

The question of "weak" and "failed" states has acquired special strategic relevance in the international system that is succeeding the bipolar world. The events of September 11, 2001

---

<sup>1</sup> Parts of this article have been previously published by the author in Simona Tutuianu, *Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World*, T.M.C. Asser Press/ Springer, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Ole WAEVER, Barry BUZAN, Morten KELSTRUP, Pierre LEMAITRE, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, St Martin's Press New York and CEU Budapest, 1993.

*\* Lt.-Col. Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU, Ph.D. is a senior researcher and chief of the Defense Strategies Office with the Romanian Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History (IPSDMH) in Bucharest. E-mail: simonajul@yahoo.com*



demonstrated that the modern Westphalian meaning of the nation state was obsolete: the reality is that the failing states lack socio-political and identity coherence, and governments cannot effectively control national territory and impose on their citizens' compliance with the rule of law. The phrase "failed states" has been frequently used in the texts about security strategies of major international actors, so as to pragmatically highlight the threat of such states to national and international security.<sup>3</sup>

The erosion of state authority, the failure of authoritarian regimes to meet the needs of the population, the phenomenon of corruption, the repressive methods against political opponents, the collapse of the social system, the crimes amid extreme poverty, serious violations of human rights, here are just a few characteristics of failed state. The international community is deeply concerned about the proliferation of these entities, which exercise an increasingly visible restraint over social progress within their own national territory and threaten international peace and security. *The Fund for Peace*, an independent research organization, and *Foreign Policy* magazine developed a list of 59 such countries vulnerable to violent internal conflicts.<sup>4</sup> These figures reveal the disorder of the XXI century, demonstrating that issues related to the conduct of the weak and failed states are very serious, requiring a concerted effort by the international community to manage them rationally.

---

<sup>3</sup> US National Security Strategy of May 2010 considers that national security interests are threatened by the so-called "failing states" (see the section titled "*The Strategic Environment - The World as it is*"; [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf), accessed on 2 August 2014). Similarly, the EU Security Strategy identifies the failed state as a main threat to international community security, along with international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts and organized crime (*European Security Strategy*, 12 December 2003; <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed on 2 August 2014).

<sup>4</sup> *The 2013 Annual Special Report by the Fund for Peace* -, available on *Foreign Policy* website, at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed\\_states\\_index\\_2012\\_interactive](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive), accessed on 3 August 2014.

## 1. Restricted sovereignty of failed states

In the 1990s, the term "failed state" was used mainly in connection with crises in third world countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and Haiti. By the end of the millennium, however, the term had superseded the concept of the developing nation. The connotations of this new label not only included the economic and humanitarian aspects, but became associated with security problems and the prospects for military intervention. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan accelerated the use of this terminology construct, not only through academic studies, but also by promoting popular discourse that imprinted in the international public awareness the dangers of existence and proliferation of such states.

As promoters of international terrorist networks and regional conflicts, failed states directly contribute to the export of instability in regions in their more or less immediate neighborhood, hence the common notion of globalization of insecurity. The international community is increasingly concerned about the areas characterized by a power vacuum, the external intervention being most often a clue of the bankruptcy of a state, without ruling out the hypothesis of creating prerequisites of such bankruptcy. The presence of foreign military forces on the territory of a failed state entails - complementarily or independently of other economic or political sanctions - a limitation of that state's sovereignty.

In short, the historical causes of a failed state are found in the collapse at the end of the Cold War, the oppression of the colonial heritage and in failures of economic and technological modernization. These factors are, in turn, fully interconnected with the fundamental issues of human rights and sovereignty of nations. After the Cold War, interventionist measures to stop the internal conflicts in other countries, civil wars, famine, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism have been frequently used. Humanitarian interventions, although controversial from strategic and geopolitical considerations, have become a constant in the





contemporary security environment. The Western protectorates based on the early colonialism model, reflect the hope of normalizing the poor situation faced by the weak and failed states.<sup>5</sup> In this context, the legality of the use of force, especially when a sovereign state is concerned, and the moral aspects of combating violence with violence are of high relevance. The evolution of the security environment, usually marked by numerous economic and socio-political crises and military conflicts indicates that legal and moral arguments lose their consistency on a “hard” power background, and this emphasized how the rules of the Westphalian game - sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states - have been modified.

Some analysts believe that the obsession with weak states was always more of a mania than a sound strategic doctrine.<sup>6</sup> At least in case of the United States, which for a decade and a half, from the mid-1990s through about 2010, has built its dominant national security narrative on the dangers posed by weak or failing states. It has massively engaged in state building of other states on a neo-imperial scale. Removing the Taliban government from power in Afghanistan and the preventive war against Iraq both demonstrate the reality that sovereignty no longer provides absolute protection. Similarly, the military interventions in Libya and those of France, under the UN mandate in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali prove this point.

The case of Kosovo versus South Ossetia, and alternatively Crimea, is also relevant. Today, world public opinion sees these episodes as in a mirror, as examples of changing the Helsinki territorial *status quo*, even if this parallelism is exaggerated. NATO did not incite to separatism nor did it provoke Serbia through military actions at its borders in the same way that Moscow

acted in South Ossetia against Georgia. From a post-Westphalian perspective, the bombing of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia) is not a violation of sovereignty, but an airstrike to impose certain behavior, as happens in most wars. But there was no interference in the internal affairs of Serbia, no taking over of the Serbian state leadership, even if, ultimately, this intervention led to the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. It is one thing to impose behavior and quite another to deprive a state of its own sovereignty, i. e. to breach the principle of sovereignty.<sup>7</sup> However, Kosovo remains a questionable exercise by NATO, given the fact that there was no mandate from the UN, although the reason for the lack of such mandate was the attitude of the Russian Federation, the same country which now destabilizes the situation in Ukraine.

The comparison between Kosovo and Crimea is not logically sustainable. Kosovo emerged as the consequence of the ethnic cleansing of Albanians by the Yugoslav Army, whilst the realities on the ground indicate that the Russians were not expelled from Crimea. Moreover, in Kosovo the use of force happened after years of diplomatic means without any results. Finally, the legal approach shows that the Kosovo episode changed no boundary, the separation from Serbia taking place in the context of post-war negotiations, a situation which is quite different from that in Ukraine in 2014. See also the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, which states very clearly the autonomy of Kosovo and that it has the same rights as the Yugoslav republics, including the right to secession. The 1992 referendum recorded the vote of the Albanian population, whose overwhelming percentage of 95 percent was ultimately determinative of independence.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Simona ȚUȚUIANU, *Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World*, Springer, 2013, p.92.

<sup>8</sup> Kosovo proclaimed its independence in 2008, being now recognized by US and 23 out of 28 EU member states. Despite the fact that Serbia contests Kosovo’s independence, in April 2013 Pristina and Belgrade reached a EU-facilitated agreement of principles governing the normalization of their relations. This evolution has made Romania’s position more flexible. It is now increasingly inclined to join the big European states’ family that recognizes the independence of the region.

---

<sup>5</sup> In the specialized literature the phrase “neo-trusteeship” is used to designate these protectorates of the West. James D. FEARON și David D. LAITIN, „Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States”, in *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 4, 2004, pp. 5-43.

<sup>6</sup> Michael J. MAZARR, „The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm: Requiem for a Decade of Distraction”, in *Foreign Affairs*, Jan-Feb. 2014.



The international law principle of self-determination, promoted by Woodrow Wilson at the end of the First World War presents multiple nuances of interpretation and hence implementation. Applied logically, it will certainly produce major consequences for the future of a number of minority regions as far apart as Xinjiang, Catalonia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The international community would be very reluctant to embrace such developments. Unfortunately, international law cannot even record a consensus about the implementation of this relatively straightforward principle, so there is ambiguity about secession and the emergence of new young states. In this unsatisfactory view, the difference between Kosovo and Crimea is precisely nothing, save one of political expediency. Thus, viewed from the West, self determination for Kosovo was expedient but for Crimea it was not.<sup>9</sup> NATO intervention in Kosovo is considered by many analysts as a positive example of Wilsonian self determination, in which an alliance of states chooses to “violate” the sovereignty of another state (Serbia) in order to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide. By contrast, the genocide in Rwanda and more recently in Darfur (Sudan), as well as the serious humanitarian crisis in Syria and eastern Ukraine demonstrate the downside of the idea that sovereignty is inviolable.

The global economic crisis, the Arab Spring revolutions, the recent conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Ukraine appear to refute the well-known axiom of modern political thinking that was developed by American professor Francis Fukuyama. His apocalyptic essay entitled “The End of History?” - published shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, during the wave of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa - announced radical positive changes by releasing humanity from social and political constraints of the past, and by

---

<sup>9</sup> Matthew PARISH, „Kosovo And Crimea: What’s The Difference? – Analysis”, *TransConflict*, 2 June 2014; available at: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/03062014-kosovo-crimea-whats-difference-analysis/>, accessed on 10 August 2014.

the universal promotion of democratic liberalism, market economy and respect for human rights. A quarter century later, a chastened Fukuyama speaks of a post-history, when the events continue to happen in a positive way, analyzing those of recent years in terms of a revision of his own ideas. Therefore, the Arab Spring has not failed, but it needs extra time to reach its ideals, upon the model of the “Spring of Nations” (European Revolutions of 1848, which needed 70 years to record their success). According to Fukuyama, the recent events in the Middle East, and Russia’s conduct in the international arena, will put increased pressure on the autocratic regimes, everyone being now aware of the need for democratic values, even including leaders like Vladimir Putin or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the spiritual leader of Iran.<sup>10</sup>

Weak and failed states are unable to provide the very essence of what people want from their government: personal security, economic prosperity and efficient functioning of public services such as health, education and related infrastructure. In addition, democracies depend on good leadership, the ability of people to fight for a strong and independent judiciary and, not least, on “*sheer good luck*”.<sup>11</sup>

## **2. Normative political thinking on the legal meaning of Westphalian sovereignty**

International criminal law has become a major challenge to sovereignty as understood in its classical meaning. By way of example, beyond the Milosevic precedent, cases such as Charles Taylor and Al Bashir have a particular resonance in the context of demolishing the traditional immunities that have hitherto been associated with sovereignty.

In fact, we are witnessing the emergence of positive post-Westphalian elements in international criminal law, which allow the

---

<sup>10</sup> Francis FUKUYAMA, „At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy”, in *The Wall Steet Journal*, 6 June 2014, available at: <http://online.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661>, accessed on 15 August 2014.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*.



exercise of national sovereignty of states in a constructive and interdependent manner. These elements suggest the emergence of a credible theory of post-Westphalian sovereignty based on interdependence, which in essence does not abandon the classical theory, but rather shows how it can be revised and redesigned. Such a model would explain, for example, UN Security Council resolutions no. 1970 (referral of the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court) and no. 1973 (NATO undertakes “all necessary measures” to protect civilians from a regime that lasted forty years in this country). The international criminal courts should be regarded as institutions acting in full support of the rights of citizens of countries confronted with situations of genocide and crimes against humanity, and not as institutions that diminish the national sovereignty of these states.

The activity of international criminal courts is however restricted by a number of factors that seriously concern the international community in its attempt to ensure a proper procedural framework for the 21<sup>st</sup> century realities. First, they do not have coercive powers, no police force and no means to make arrests and collect the evidence. This is why strengthening the nexus between international criminal justice and national capacities for combating impunity is imperative. Second, the will of states to adhere to these international courts is very important too. For example, the great powers – the U.S., the Russian Federation and China – still refuse accession to the Rome Statute. However, positive developments can be foreseen, if we take into account that the U.S. was hostile to universal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) during the tenure of George W. Bush, while the Obama administration is now inclined to give moderate support. Third, another important phenomenon is the development of regional organizations: in Europe there is the European Court of Human Rights; in Latin America, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; in Africa, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Evidence show that it is much easier for

Africans to accept the jurisdiction of a tribunal composed of African judges than the ICC’s jurisdiction, with judges from all over the world. Nigeria has been heavily criticized for failing to refer Charles Taylor case to the African Union, instead taking the unilateral decision to hand over the case to a “white man’s Court” located at The Hague.<sup>12</sup> More recently, in October 2013, in Addis Ababa, during the African Union Summit, its officials agreed unanimously that no African head of state can be forced to face a trial during his tenure. Thus, they advocated the rejection of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta case (whose trial will begin on October 7, 2014), arguing that, while the mandate of the ICC is global, only Africans have been affected so far by the Court’s proceedings. It should be noted that there is also the question of the withdrawal of Kenya from the Rome Statute, thereby creating a worrying precedent for the future and relevance of the ICC.<sup>13</sup> Finally, the tradition of exile of former heads of state is still contemporary. This is the case of the former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, whose exile has protected him from the consequences of a real trial held in Tunisia.

Although it is too early to herald the end of impunity, we are witnessing an encouraging “justice cascade”.<sup>14</sup> Trials conducted during recent crises and conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate that nobody is above

---

<sup>12</sup> See declaration by Olenka FRENKIEL, *Africa’s test for international justice*, BBC News, 26 February 2008, available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this\\_world/7259238.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/7259238.stm), accessed on 23 August 2014.

<sup>13</sup> As for the situation in Kenya, there is a positive development in ICC functioning, namely that the Office of Prosecutor used for the very first time “*propriu motu*” powers to initiate the investigation, without any request made in advance by a Rome Statute member state or UNSC.

<sup>14</sup> “Justice cascade” is a concept developed by Ellen L. LUTZ and Kathryn SIKKINK, in their work titled “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America”, published in *Chicago Journal of International Law* 2, no.1, 2001, pp. 1-34. The authors identified between the end of 1970s and mid of 1990s, a consistent normative shift in Latin America, that led to a regional consensus concerning the trials of those responsible for human rights abuses.



the law, regardless of his political rank or financial power. Hosni Mubarak, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali or 37 Gaddafi family's followers were tried for war crimes by national courts, while Laurent Gbagbo, the former president of Ivory Coast, is a precedent in history, as the first former head of state being tried by the ICC (now the example of Kenya is to be added here). It is a fact that many sovereign states in the Arab region remain outside the Rome Statute's system. Based on this reason, unfortunately the ICC's jurisdiction can not be extended to these countries. Hence the frequency of discussions about the authenticity of the trials conducted in national format, if we consider the adequate applicability of the ICC principle of complementarity (the Court acting only where the national system is unable or unwilling to investigate or refer the cases to justice). Therefore, the national justice mechanisms continue to have primary responsibility for prosecuting the committed crimes, despite of their inadequately developed juridical systems. In this case, the legal action is based on the assumption that trying the defendants is a question pertaining to their own justice and their national sovereignty (see Libya case, for example).

The states on the European continent are not exempted either from international criminal responsibility when it comes to crimes against humanity. The crisis in Ukraine has come to the attention of the ICC with the case of the former President Viktor Yanukovich. The national Parliament of Ukraine has decided to refer the case to the ICC, a request that seems to be improperly grounded for at least two reasons, namely the gravity threshold of the committed offenses and the complementarity doctrine of the Court. We should remember that the ICC judges hardly admitted the case of Kenya, where over 1,000 people lost their lives in a series of post-election violence, which indicates that this threshold is very strict. Also, given the discontent over the dismissed president, the Ukrainians may well insist that he should be tried by the national courts. By contrast, in Syria since the start of conflict in March 2011, over 162,000 people were killed, according to the estimates by the Syrian

Observatory for Human Rights. At present, 58 states are supporting France's proposal to refer the crimes committed by the warring parties in Syria to the ICC. In this case, however, even if there is clear evidence showing that the Syrian government officials, including President Bashar al-Assad are responsible for crimes against humanity, the very fact that Syria is not a member of the ICC requires the validation by the Security Council for any international investigation based on UN gathered evidence.

Following Israel's *Operation Protection Edge* in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority is threatening to join the ICC. This could be an empty threat, if Hamas objects to having its own war crimes investigated. On the other hand, it would be indeed a great challenge for the ICC to finally overcome the geopolitical veto of "victors' justice" and also the current problems related to its jurisdictional authority. That is because many argue that the leading states possess a geopolitical veto over what the ICC can do, and they could claim that the Palestinian Authority was not a real state or at least one that could ratify the ICC Treaty.

It is true that, compared to the virulent crises that occur throughout the world, international criminal tribunals will always be too small and too weak to solve the problems of humanity, which result from failed states, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to organized crime and regional conflicts. They do rather have moral authority than executive capacity. Therefore, the primary responsibility to prosecute crimes against humanity remains the responsibility of the national states. The formal legal definition of national sovereignty has not become obsolete, but the state itself has achieved a high degree of maturity in terms of its prerogatives, realizing more than ever the need to strengthen international criminal law. Sovereignty has become a function of responsibility within a system of identities and wills that coexist, including the will to find a resolution to interstate disputes. In conclusion, the Westphalian sovereignty which is exercised by the state over its own citizens has not been delegitimized, but restricted by becoming a subject to appeal to the





international legal community.<sup>15</sup>

### 3. Managing “out-of-area” international crisis

Unfortunately, the state building networks have not generated outstanding changes, as there is a massive cleavage between theory and practice. The main obstacles are commitment to the conservation of boundaries and the conflicts that arise from ethnical and religious identities of different populations. The ethnic conflicts are the most severe, with a huge impact on the fate of the weak and failed states. Milosevic provides the most convincing example of the use of ethnic myths in the process of legitimating political power.

The conduct of “outlaw” states may lead to concerted repressive actions by certain coalitions of states, in order to avoid crises that are likely to threaten, through the spill over effect, the entire international community. International consensus on humanitarian intervention is reached with the existence of two basic criteria: on the one hand, development or anticipation of massive loss of life, as a result of deliberate state policy, state negligence and inability to act, or state failure; on the other hand, development or anticipation of systematic policy of ethnic cleansing through murder, terror, mass expulsion or rape.<sup>16</sup> Today sovereignty is directly related to the notion of responsibility. It is all about the emergence of a fundamental principle in the international relations system, namely the responsibility to prevent, directly targeting the states that defy the rules imposed by the international law. And this responsibility is a collective one, “a collective duty to prevent nations without internal checks on their power from acquiring or using WMD.”<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU, *Apusul Westphaliei? Statul național în sistemul relațiilor internaționale în anii post-Război Rece*, Military Publishing House, 2011, pp. 177-178.

<sup>16</sup> Gareth EVANS, Mohamed SAHNOUN, “The Responsibility to Protect”, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.81, no.6, 2002, p.103.

<sup>17</sup> Lee Feinstein, Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER, “A duty to Prevent”, in *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2004, p.26.

Consequently, reinventing sovereignty is based on the coordinates of the idea of responsibility - the responsibility to protect, coupled with the responsibility to prevent. The negligence of international community entails the spreading of state bankruptcy, and cases in West African are most in point.

The inability of failed states to transform their nominal sovereignty into effective governance requires the involvement of the international community, including the use of coercion, to restore political control and regional stabilization. The preventive commitments formalized in the EU Security Strategy by the phrase “preventive engagement” could be assimilated to an innovative revision of the classical concept of “self-defense”, the defense being now equivalent to involvement in international “out-of-area” crisis management.

The recent developments, however, seem to show that the era of the interventionist state building, promoted especially by the U.S., is coming to an end. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said bluntly that the international community is guilty of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, for not interfering in time to prevent it (many states citing the possibility of repetition of the Libyan scenario). The former UN peace envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, believes that Syria is becoming a failed state, ruled by militarist leaders, a development presenting an imminent danger to the Middle East. Moreover, the conflict in Syria is spreading in the region due to diplomatic failures, causing destabilization of the security situation in Lebanon and Iraq, and posing potential threats to Jordan and Turkey. The biggest geopolitical challenge of our times is the confrontation between great actors (U.S. versus the powers that oppose globalization, namely Russia and China) and a theatre of clashes between regional powers (Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran). The spill over from Syria causes serious damage to Iraq, where ethnic divisions and sectarian violence complicate the security situation. Iraq is becoming a failed state, in the sense that is no longer able to protect its own citizens. At the time of writing, a humanitarian intervention



is conducted by the US in this country, where a second round of airstrikes hit Erbil, the main objective aiming at protecting local religious minorities from crimes against humanity committed by the Islamists. It is interesting to note that there has been no immediate objection from China or Russia or any other quarter that usually supports a strict interpretation of state sovereignty: this is further evidence that state practice, a foundation of international customary law, is permitting humanitarian intervention in failing states in order to stop war crimes.

At the same time, spill over is self-evident in the case of the actions the Islamic State is taking on the border regions of Iraq and Syria, as well as Turkey more recently. These actions are meant to undermine the sovereign state control over these territories that ISIL is controlling militarily and socially by putting in place an alternative political and social agenda. The NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014 led to the creation of a *core-coalition* that is currently involved in air-bombing missions against ISIL targets on the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish border, with the tacit consent of the Russian, Chinese and even Syrian regimes – the latter’s sovereign territory often being the target of core-coalition bombing missions against ISIL members.

Today’s Ukraine is a failing state too, essentially an object of great power diplomacy.<sup>18</sup> The Danish publication *Jyllands-Posten* argues that democracy has failed, and the country is close to bankruptcy. Its experts believe that in this case we are speaking about an unsustainable and insolvent state, which is moving towards the status of a second Somalia. It remains to be seen if the pro-Russian separatists will turn the east of the country into a new Somalia, or whether NATO will intervene, but on any view Ukraine is now more than ever, vulnerable to external influence.

The crash of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 that was brought down by separatists was

---

<sup>18</sup> Dmitri TRENIN, „As Ukraine stares into the abyss, where is Europe’s leadership?“, in *The Guardian*, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/20/ukraine-stares-abyss-europe-leadership>, accessed on 25 August 2014.

a historic moment particularly relevant for the cohesion of international relations system and the European security. This humanitarian tragedy overwhelmingly influenced international public opinion, questioning Vladimir Putin’s influence in the international community. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. presidential adviser on security issues, invoked the authority of international criminal courts for war crimes (International Criminal Court) to investigate the facts and punish those responsible for the plane crash.<sup>19</sup> In his opinion, Putin launched a new Cold War, but quickly found himself in a “*horrendous jam*”. Many Russian citizens have become concerned about the current status of Russia in the international arena, its economic decline and the threat of becoming a satellite of China. These developments could lead to self-isolation and the discrediting of the Russian Federation. In this line of analysis, it could be said that Russia and not Ukraine falls into the category of failed states.<sup>20</sup> An eventual Cold War would impede the cooperation between the U.S. and its European partners with the Russian Federation to resolve certain strategic issues related to the crisis in Syria and the Iranian nuclear problem. Therefore, the powers of public international diplomacy should be exploited in the wisest way possible as for Vladimir Putin to reassess his expansionist conduct, avoiding the outbreak of a war in Europe. In the pessimistic scenario in which the containment against Putin fails, the option of *ad hoc coalitions* can be taken into account. Brzezinski argues this time that what is currently happening in Ukraine could prevent this course of action, if a strong and intelligent collective position with Europe on Russia and Ukraine is reached.

---

<sup>19</sup> See the interview for CNN: *Zbigniew Brzezinski on Putin: “He has gotten himself into a horrendous jam”*, 20 July 2014, available at: <http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/20/zbigniew-brzezinski-on-putin-he-has-gotten-himself-into-a-horrendous-jam/>, accessed on 28 August 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Vadim SHTEPPA, “Russia, Not Ukraine, is a Failed State”, in *The Interpreter*, 8 May 2014, available at: <http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-not-ukraine-is-a-failed-state-shtepa-says/>, accessed on 12 September 2014.



A major concern of the international community is Israel's 2014 offensive in Gaza. Also in this case, the military logic of solving the crisis gains ground as the peace efforts promoted by the U.S. and neighboring Arab countries are ineffective. Crises in Ukraine and Gaza demonstrate the risks posed by aggressive policies, both being the result of an action promoted by governments that authorize the violence especially motivated by domestic policies that promise short-term domestic popularity, but risk losing international credibility and gaining adverse consequences in a long run. Thus, Israel could find itself, not too far in the future, in a confrontation far more dangerous than Hamas, that cannot be defeated by quick punitive expeditions such as those used in Gaza and Lebanon in the last decade, accepted by the domestic population and tolerated by Western governments. These attacks which have become routine for Israelis, could contribute to a radicalization beyond the Gaza Strip and even beyond Israel-Palestine bilateral relations. For Benjamin Netanyahu, the real problem is not just Hamas, but the extreme instability of the Greater Middle East, where violent conflicts cause disasters in Syria and Iraq, and the stability of Jordan (absolutely crucial to the stability of Israel) is becoming increasingly exposed to risk. According to the British analyst Julian Lindley-French, three types of battles are currently carried in the Middle East, all together threatening the peace in the region: the state versus the anti-state (a hint to the Islamic State, whose existence threatens all the other states throughout the region, its main objective being to destroy the whole system of states as to replace it with a Caliphate); the battle for regional-strategic dominance by states (the strategic ambitions of Iran complicates the political landscape which is already inflamed); and, the struggle between interpretations of Islam within *failing states*.<sup>21</sup>

As Robert Gates told President Bush and Condoleezza Rice in 2007, the challenge of the early twenty-first century is that "crises don't

---

<sup>21</sup> Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH, „Dangerous Connectivities: Why Mid-East War is Imminent”, 15 July 2014; available at: <http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.ro/2014/07/dangerous-connectivities-why-mid-east.html>, accessed on 15 September 2014.

come and go – they all seem to come and stay”. Witnessing violent crises all around the world and states' dissolution, one might realize how these crises that “come and stayed” extend backward, deep into the 1970s: “*The Iranian Revolution of 1978 set loose the Islamist wave that swept away the old American-backed order in the Middle East, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the following year provoked the opposition of Muslim warriors whose spiritual descendents, decades later, would pilot their hijacked airliners into American skyscrapers*”.<sup>22</sup> The recent book by Gates titled “Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War” offers a portrait of two worlds – Cold War and post-Cold War – that are often mistakenly treated as separate and distinct.

The current worrying security developments will certainly re-launch the West's debates on the Responsibility to Protect concept. The mandate of international security organizations on crisis management should be revised, the *soft* tools being exceeded in the current geopolitical context characterized by the general caution of the Western powers, the weakening of U.S. commitments on European security, an increasingly fractious European neighborhood and major financial problems on a planetary scale.

### Conclusions

The traditional sovereignty axiom, defined as the combination of international legal sovereignty (interstate mutual recognition) and Westphalian sovereignty (territorial inviolability and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states) no longer has the reality of yesteryear.<sup>23</sup> This is due to the fact that in many countries, the central authority is a state of collapse, weapons of mass destruction have become more readily available, there are anarchic ungoverned spaces, and some national governments operate inefficiently and violate human rights.

---

<sup>22</sup> Mark Danner, „How Robert Gates got away with it”, In *The New York Review of Books*, Summer Issue, August 14-September 24, 2014 Volume LXI, Number 13, p.78.

<sup>23</sup> Stephen KRASNER, „Sharing sovereignty: New institutions for collapsed and failing states”, in *International Security*, Vol. 29, No.2, Fall 2004.



The prevention of a state's failure depends almost entirely on international political will, relying largely on external early recognition that the internal turmoil of that state has a destructive potential. When the collapse comes, however, the state destroys its own people's confidence and cripples its institutions, and subsequently this requires intensive and sustained reconstruction efforts, backed by sufficient political will, time and external assistance - sustainable technical and economic commitments. Importantly, the contributing nations should not abandon the cause of reconstruction before the hard work in the field is being completed and the failed state works properly for several consecutive years. In case of armed conflict, a lasting ceasefire must be achieved as a first step to "cure" a failed state.<sup>24</sup> Then, it is essential to disarm and demobilize the combatants, a very important step, which was unfortunately omitted in Somalia in 1993. Moreover, the recovery of the rule of law is a process that takes place in stages, and requires direct support by the local population.

If the public diplomacy efforts do not produce the desired effects, the donor countries, international agencies, the UN and regional groupings such as the European Union (EU), are forced to resort to drastic measures such as: stopping the economic assistance, imposition of "smart sanctions" - travel bans for leaders and officials who disregard international law and order, and freezing their accounts abroad (the sanctions that have been recently imposed by the EU and the United States to the Russian Federation).

The contemporary security challenges - endemic instabilities of the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East - can not be managed effectively in the absence of strategic partnerships that operate on the basis of strong institutional projections. The general trend is to promote a doctrine of integration, which supports multilateral cooperation focused on the main threats to

<sup>24</sup> Robert I. ROTBERG, "Failed States in a World of Terror", in *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002, available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58046/robert-i-rotberg/failed-states-in-a-world-of-terror>, accessed on 20 September 2014.

international security. The central pillar of this doctrine consists of a legitimate international legal framework that defines strict rules and even good practice principles, in an attempt to impose proper regulation for the benefit of all members of the international community.

In conclusion, the international community and its responsible decision-makers face the major challenges of developing functional intervention capabilities in failed areas, in order to respond to inadequate security conditions, and must build rule of law mechanisms able to control and manage these anarchic spaces. To increase the crisis management potential requires a planned institutional engineering effort that efficiently combines soft power resources with the hard ones, based on a balanced distribution of tasks among the relevant involved actors, capable of stabilizing the security environment.

The range of solutions to problems related to the weakening of traditional sovereignty and the increasing number of weak and failed states includes multiple measures - for example political and economic assistance, dangerous political regime change, reforming international institutions. The interconnections among them, the complications which occur during implementation processes and the major security consequences indicate the inextricable relationship between sovereignty, autonomy and intervention, and also the need to reconfigure the international Westphalian state system.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ARMATTA, Judith, *Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic*, Duke University Press, 2010.
2. CHOMSKY, Noam, *State eşuate. Un abuz al puterii și un atac asupra democrației*, Antet, 2007.
3. EZROW, Natasha M., FRANTZ, Erica, *Failed States and Institutional Decay: Understanding Instability and Poverty in the Developing World*, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.





4. GATES, Robert M., *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, Knopf, 2014.
5. GHANI, Ashraf, LOCKHART, Clare, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, Oxford University Press, 2008.
6. KRASNER, Stephen, *Problematic sovereignty, contested rules and political possibilities*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001.
7. RATNER, Steven R., ABRAMS, Jason S., *Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law*, Oxford University Press, 2001.
8. ROBERTSON, Geoffrey, *Crimes against humanity: The struggle for global justice*, Fourth Edition, Penguin, 2012.
9. SIKKINK, Kathryn, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011.
10. ȚUȚUIANU, Iuliana-Simona, *Apusul Westphaliei? Statul național în sistemul relațiilor internaționale în anii post-Război Rece*, Military Publishing House, 2011.
11. ȚUȚUIANU, Simona, *Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World*, Springer, 2013.
12. WAEVER, Ole, BUZAN, Barry, KELSTRUP, Morten, LEMAITRE, Pierre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, St Martin's Press New York and CEU Budapest, 1993.

**Acknowledgement:**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title **“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.**”



# GULF CRISIS AND WAR REPARATIONS PROCESS

*Ecaterina MAȚOI\**

*The current paper is a research on the very special case of 1991 Gulf crisis and the following process through which UN imposed a structured and institutionalised compensation payment mechanism, on a war reparation logical basis. What makes the Iraqi case so special is an unprecedented UN involvement and surveillance regarding transitional justice, as well as political motivation of international actors, that use this system to control the Iraqi economy and influence its military, political and economical potential.*

**Keywords:** *war reparations, Gulf crisis, Saddam regime, transitional justice.*

## 1. War reparations concept

„War reparations” thematic is part of the larger domain „reparations”, an essential element of of „transitional justice” processes. It refers to various cases in which balancing of abuses and violence produced in conflict period is considered, be it from state or non-state actors. As a consequence, whenever “transitional justice” procedures are implied, “reparations” are considered a central topic, for they consider victims’ situation, human factor and a compensatory moral component. Not only do reparations try to compensate losses, human and material, but they also contain a symbolic conscience component in that wrongful agent admits and recognises reprehensible actions. The objective of balancing compensation is to finally rebuild a space for dialogue, trust and

respect towards moral and juridical values and norms between actors involved in a transitional justice process. The perpetuated injustice in considered cases, such as violent actions, conflicts, human rights violations must be anathematized through an almost psychoanalytic process, but which should have real and explicit forms, meaning those of establishment of mechanisms and reparation processes for victims.

Therefore, transitional justice process is utilised to revert to normality in post-war and post-crisis situations, integrated in the larger context of socio-political and economic recovery that offers a real normative and functional basis to start it. Obviously, transitional justice and reparations phenomenology is extremely varied, the most classic cases being those of civil wars and conflicts or autocratic regimes. Concerning reparation forms, especially the ones formalised in international law and implying the existence of national and international institutional mechanisms for their de facto implementation, there are three categories according to Lisa Magarrell: a) reparations through administrative programs; b) material and symbolic benefits; c) collective and individual reparations<sup>1</sup>.

The term „war reparations” refers to compensations received by states, organisations, public or private institutions, persons, after an aggressive and guilty state has been defeated.

<sup>1</sup> Pablo de Greiff, „Justice and Reparations”, in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), *The Handbook of Reparations*, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 451-477.

*\* Ecaterina MAȚOI is PhD student at “Carol I” Național Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: cepoi.ecaterina@myunap.net*



From the legal point of view, they are justified by establishing an action (war, conflict, invasion, aggression), illegitimate from the perspective of international law. Financial compensation is seen as a justice form, beyond classic geopolitical settlement regarding disputed territories. It is very often imposed during peace treaties, like in the case of Germany after World War One, where important compensations had to be paid.

As for the Gulf conflict, it is to be established if post-conflict situation follows the same logic of a post-war settlement stated through a conventional treaty that legitimates regional order. As many analysts conclude<sup>2</sup>, UN Resolution no. 687 from April 1991, establishing end of hostilities and war obligations and reparations Iraq had to assume can be considered the equivalent of a classical peace treaty, formalising legally a new regional and international order, peace between parties and conditioned re-admission of Iraq in the international community. As a consequence, Resolution 687 will be referenced during the research, as it is the normative reference regarding *war reparations* and compensations issue, in post-conflict situation.

From international law point of view, post-conflict reparations were adopted through „Law of the Hague”, in 1907, which states that „responsibility for any wrongful act committed in violation of the Regulations by members of the armed forces must be incumbent upon the Governments they serve (...) A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces”<sup>3</sup>. Analysing their juridical directions and application ways, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard considers that war reparations come in three forms: *Restitution*, *Compensation*

and *Satisfaction*<sup>4</sup>, that are mentioned as well in *Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law*.

Accordingly, *Restitution* aims at reverting back to the situation before illegitimate actions: liberty, equal rights, property and house, familial and societal status etc. Under this category, there are situations in which recovery is not possible to the full value before conflict; it constitutes however a fundamental presupposition of any war reparations action.

It is sometimes complemented with *Compensation*, a financial assignment from the aggressor meant to cover the losses produced through its actions: „Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as: (a) physical or mental harms, (b) lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits, (c) material damages and loss of earnings, (d) moral damage, (e) costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services”<sup>5</sup>.

Concerning *Satisfaction*, to the material component is added a moral one, addressed to a person or state; it can take the form of *Official Apologies*, recognition of unjust character

---

<sup>2</sup> Lisa Magarrell, *Reparations in Theory and Practice*, International Center for Transitional Justice, pp. 3-7.

<sup>3</sup> Bardo Fassbender, „Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of the UN Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq”, *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 237-303, <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/13/1/468.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Apud Ameer Zemmal, „Reparations for victims of violations of international humanitarian law”, in *Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Maastricht, 1992, p. 65, <http://www.uu.nl/faculty/leg/nl/organisatie/departementen/departementrechtsgelcerdheid/organisatie/onderdelen/studieeninformatiecentrummensenenrechten/publicaties/simspecials/12/Documents/12-07.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, „Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 85, No. 851, pp. 529 –553, [https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc\\_851\\_gillard.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_851_gillard.pdf)



of actions performed by aggressor and even punishing guilty officials.

Last but not least, *Guarantees of non-repetition* are also considered. On this basis, war reparations are analysed in the context of Gulf crisis and subsequent UN decisions obligating Iraq to remuneration.

## **2. The Gulf crisis and conflict**

Occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 was primarily a result of the Iraqi-Iranian war, but also of changes at international relations level, produced by collapse of the Communist bloc and disappearance of Cold War<sup>6</sup>. Its main causes are described in next sub-chapters.

### **2.1. Economic motivations**

The central issue of Iraq after war with Iran – on which depended both its internal stability and regional position, was the necessity to solve the economic situation. Eight years of conflict have caused the downfall of Iraqi economy and an external debt of 80 billion dollars, from which 40 towards to the Arab countries, especially Gulf monarchies. It is a dramatic change of Iraq's status, as in the 70s it was one of the major creditor countries not only in its region, but also internationally, and now it is transformed into a borrower. In the middle of the eighth decade, oil crisis resulted in decrease of Iraq's revenue, three times. To this were added the difficulties of war with Iran: inflation, increased military spending, destruction of economic and civilian infrastructure due to Iranian offensives, increasing dependence on imports of food and raw material resources, closing the pipe-line passing the Syrian territory – which affected the export of petroleum products on the Northern path, to the extent that South was witnessing a military conflict. Between 1980 and 1985, military expenditures were \$ 94 billion,

---

<sup>6</sup> *Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law*, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx>

losses of oil revenues estimated at \$ 55.5 billion, losses of gross national product estimated at 26.2 billion; synthesized, all of them meant annual 87% of the Iraqi GDP<sup>7</sup>. In total, it is estimated that the war with Iran costed Iraq 452 billion dollars. After the end of hostilities with Iran in 1988, Iraq inaugurated an intensive restoration process of the state and civilian infrastructure, seriously affected during the conflict; but this required massive investments, which the country wasn't able to finance out of its own resources, while international creditors, Arabs in the first place, were demanding return of their debts. Army demobilisation, that numbered now around 1 million soldiers, was also a problem for the Iraqi decision-makers, as long as it required social and professional reintegration policies. Yet, after the end of war with Iran, Iraq had asked from OPEC countries an increase in the oil price to facilitate a post-conflict recovery of its country but, on the contrary, it decreased, because the Arab countries and Iran were not interested to decrease production. It is about a radical break between two petroleum strategies inside OPEC, illustrated by Iraq and Kuwait: this duality will contribute in a decisive manner to increase conflictual climate between the two countries in the coming months, preceding the Kuwait invasion. States like Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, but especially Saudi Arabia were in favour of policy based on massive exports, in search for a fast foreign exchange, at the expense of a strategy that focuses on a moderated controlled production, in order to maintain a high price of oil.

The effect is visible in first part of the year 1990, when barrel price switches from 18,84 \$ in December 1989, to only 14,02 \$ in June 1990. Kuwait is one of the main responsables for this drop in price, for it throws on the market large quantities of petroleum, in an act of disobedience to its quota laid down in OPEC: with more than 1 million barrels per day above limits imposed by the organisation. Considering that maximalist export policy directly affects his own financial

---

<sup>7</sup> Walid Khalid, „The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1991, pp. 5-28.





interests and politics for the restoration of Iraq, Saddam Hussein started to interpret step by step strategies of partners from the Gulf as a personal insult and even as elements of an economic war against Iraq, backed by the United States or Israel. Keeping in mind the problems with extraction capacity, processing and distribution of petroleum of Iraq, that were being affected partially by war, and the transit restrictions imposed by Syria, or the difficulties posed by Kurdish resistance in the north, it was perfectly understandable that Baghdad desired to give priority to a higher price rather than to quantity. Considering the background of Gulf countries refusal to moderate or renounce petroleum policy, the Iraqi leader begins more and more to put pressure and threats, together with an attempt to build a field of regional sympathy around Iraq's difficulties.

The solidarity conjuncture with the GCC during war with Iran was outdated already and Bagdad propaganda resumes old slogans relating to the decadence of emirs and power holders in the Middle East, seen as traitors of the Arab cause and agents of Westerns and Zionists. Already in February 1990, during the Summit of Arab Cooperation Council, Iraq has expressed for the first time explicitly its request to the Gulf Arab Emirates not only to delete the loan but even provide a reward of 10 billion dollars, as support for defending the "Arab nation"<sup>8</sup>. During the Arab League Summit in May 1990, held in Baghdad, Iraq reiterates its request to „petroleum“ emirates, arguing that it is motivated by massive economic crisis of the country, resulting from OPEC's refusal to increase oil prices. For Saddam, the decrease of 1 dollar per barrel was equivalent to an annual loss of 1 billion dollars for Iraq; he suggests \$ 25 per barrel as a new right reference price. More than that however, it is for the first time when Iraqi leader suggests that a continuation of the petroleum policies by Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia, that were affecting in a disastrous way their country – is equivalent to a

---

<sup>8</sup> Abbas Alnasrawi, „Oil Dimensions of the Gulf Crisis“, in Ibrahim Ibrahim (coord.), *The Gulf Crisis: background and consequences*, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992, p. 49

conventional war. In July 1990, Saddam Hussein accuses the emirate to have extracted illicitly Iraqi oil from Rumeilah field, which is located in the "neutral area" between the two countries and asks for damages of 2.4 billion dollars, starting already to bring first troops at the border. Kuwait refuses to give the amount requested as well as to cancel the debts of Iraq to emirate(\$ 10 billion) and being afraid of an Iraqi military intervention, asked for international and Arab help. But all attempts to resolve the dispute that followed did not have positive results: nor could Saddam be persuaded to give up his requirements, neither proved Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabbah to be more flexible.

### ***2.2. Geopolitical imperatives***

From a geopolitical point of view, Iraq's action pursued both increasing hydrocarbon resources and achieving an older desideratum to have full access to Persian Gulf. One of major geopolitical obsessions of Bagdad was to broaden its access to the Gulf waters. With the exception of little Umm Qasr harbour, which is located effectively on Gulf's seaside, the Iraqi transport and inland navigation are carried out through Basra harbour, which is located on Chatt el-Arab, 70 km away from the Gulf waters. This is forcing Iraq to export a large part of its petroleum by land, through pipelines that convey neighbours often hostile (in 1982 the pipes passing through Syria to the Mediterranean are closed, being diverted to Turkey). The insurmountable problem for Iraq is that the islands Warba and Boubyane, where channel Shatt el-Arab flows into the sea, belong to Kuwait, blocking the opportunity for achieving a goal of an Iraqi heavy navigation to the Gulf waters and also extending Kuwaiti maritime boundaries for oil exploitation.

### ***2.3. Ideological motivations***

Finally, 1990 crisis is the consequence of pan-Arab Ba'athist vision's persistence and especially of Saddam Hussein's regional ambitions. Recognising opportunities offered by the fact that Soviet influence in the Middle East



was weakening<sup>9</sup>, feeling that the main effect of latter was the stepping up of American military presence in the region, Iraqi leader is coming back to the old project promoted by Nasser, namely the creation of a strictly Arab new regional order, obviously with Iraq holding the hegemonic role, in particular due to its military supremacy<sup>10</sup>. Reiteration of an intense anti-imperialist and Arabic rhetoric had as main effect winning more supporters from the Iraqi population, that see in Saddam's mobilisation a sign of promoting national interests; this propaganda with double dimension, nationalist and Islamic-revolutionary, will find a strong receptivity, especially among young disadvantaged population from the Arab countries, in particular in Palestinian territory and Maghreb.

After February 1990, Baghdad starts a virulent anti-American and anti-Zionist campaign, caused in particular by Saddam's suspicions, believing that there is a Western plot used against him. To justify his lack of availability to pay debts toward his creditors, mostly Arabs, Saddam resumes old speech, which is portraying his country as protector of the "Eastern flank of the Arab World" against the Iranian and Shi'a threats and pretends to have cancelled his country's obligations towards Gulf states, explaining that Iraq has been affected directly a long period by the war against Iran<sup>11</sup>. In fact, the Iraqi President's intention to occupy the neighbouring emirate has been encouraged at the beginning by the ambiguous attitude of some USA officials<sup>12</sup>. The Kuwait invasion was based on hope, made possible by these ambiguous signals that the United States will not intervene in the case of occupying the little emirate. However, at the end of Iran-Iraq war, American strategy towards Iraq was going to change. Washington backed intensively Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq conflict, as long as this strategy served its own

interests in the region, i.e. locking Iranian policy to destabilise the Gulf region. Now, with an Iran re-centred on national dimension, with changed Russian strategies after the end of Cold War in Arab World, American policy in the Middle East has chosen to increase its hegemonic positions that Iraq claims, more and more and in which it is substituting itself to Iran as the main power that threatens the status quo in Gulf region and security of Gulf monarchies. There are three major factors that have produced a cooling of US relations with Iraq: continuous production and build-up mass destruction weapons, the inability of American governments to effectively control Saddam, despite the financial military and political support which they have offered during the whole period of war with Iran, the increasing demand of Baghdad for the Western capital, even the insolvency of the regime, which raises questions on the possibilities and effective means with which the Iraqi regime would have re-coursed to pay back. To these are added an increasing criticism of the Jewish lobby in America, particularly in Congress, who accuses Iraq that they are using Western funds to increase the arming program<sup>13</sup>.

On the other hand, political culture of Saddam Hussein, despite his long experience in leadership, was deeply rooted in regional specificities and he foresaw the wrong action limits that the international community was prepared to accept from a second-hand actor, as Iraq was perceived. The decision to invade Kuwait was par excellence the idea of Saddam Hussein's regime and a circle of close collaborators from the Revolutionary Command Council, excluding major Iraqi military decision makers<sup>14</sup>. The invasion idea was based on misinterpretation of signals sent by American diplomacy and especially on the belief that Iraq being the largest military power in the region, it was unlikely that a pure Arabic alliance would be formed against it. The invasion from 2<sup>nd</sup> of August, 1990, which happened immediately after last failed discussions between

---

<sup>9</sup> Gresh Alain, Vidal Dominique, „Golfe: clefs pour une guerre annoncée”, *Le Monde*, 1991, p. 202.

<sup>10</sup> Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, Routledge, 1993, pp. 51-54.

<sup>11</sup> Saint Prot, *Saddam Hussein: un gaullisme arabe?*, Albin Michel, 1987.

<sup>12</sup> Christine M. Helms, *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World*, Brookings Institution Press, 1984.

---

<sup>13</sup> Judith Miller, Laurie Mylroie, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Omar Ali, *Crisis in the Arabian Gulf: An Independent Iraqi View*, Praeger Publishers, 1993, p. 86.



the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August, at Jiddah in Saudi Arabia, lead to the military occupation of the emirate and rapid take over Kuwait's administrative control.

Al Sabah, the regal family fled to Saudi Arabia, and on August 8<sup>th</sup>, Saddam Hussein announced that Kuwait becomes "nineteenth province" of Iraq. Through this, Baghdad came to occupy second place in the world regarding petroleum reserves (19 %) and in terms of production (7 %); in addition, the price per barrel will have doubled instantly, passing from 16 dollars in July to 30 in August and 40 dollars in September<sup>15</sup>. Occupation of the emirate and installing here a puppet regime, led by Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin and faithful collaborator of Saddam, had three immediate positive effects for Iraq: deleting any Iraqi debt to Kuwait, massively increase of the Iraqi oil capacities, which allowed development of projects for the recovery of damages occurring in the war against Iran and, finally, a significant part of its military personnel, was still left in activity. Iraqi military presence in the emirate and intention to integrate this little area in Iraqi state has been accompanied by political reprisals against the Kuwaiti civilian population (a few thousand persons arrested and other several hundred killed), especially on the background of popular tests of resistance. The confiscation of goods both from civilians as well as from Kuwaiti state institutions has been carried out on a large scale; this being not only the expression of disparate excesses from Iraqi civilians and military forces, but especially the result of assumed strategies.

Kuwait was one of the richest countries in the region, which caused for decades its neighbor's envy. Hundreds of thousands of Arab and Asian workers were permitted to leave the country, passing through Iraq and then in Jordan; instead, the larger part of the Palestinian population from the emirate, which was representing especially the educational, intellectual, industrial, engineering, elite, remained in the country. As a result of Saddam Hussein's policy and pro-Palestinian

<sup>15</sup> Baram Amatzia, „The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Bagdad”, in Amatzia Baram, Barry Rubin, *Iraq's Road to War*, St. Martin Press, 1993, pp. 5-36.

rhetoric, the Palestinians have had a positive position towards new Iraqi authorities and even collaborated with them, position that affected dramatically their destiny after liberation of Kuwait, when they have been expelled in full and their wealth confiscated. Iraq closed foreign embassies in Kuwait and sent officials in Baghdad by force.

Iraqi action determined an unprecedented international mobilization against it, hardly seen during the Cold War, marked in particular by the adoption of a common position joining both the United States and the Soviet Union. Already on August 2<sup>nd</sup>, the UN Security Council will adopt, in an emergency meeting, the Resolution 660 which required "the complete and unconditional withdrawal" of Iraqis. On August 6<sup>th</sup>, a new resolution (661) will impose rigorous trade sanctions into and out of Iraq, while the resolution 662 on August 9<sup>th</sup> will declare void the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq<sup>16</sup>.

At this point an extensive diplomatic process started, to which participated almost all great powers, including Arab and Asian countries, in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to Kuwaiti crisis. Since August 6<sup>th</sup>, 1990, the United States, which after the initial ambiguities, will adopt a determined and unequivocally attitude against the violations committed by Iraq, will persuade King Fahd that the threat from Iraq may be extended including to Saudi Arabia petroleum areas and shows its willingness to send troops in the Saudi kingdom to block a possible Iraqi invasion.

On August 10<sup>th</sup>, in Cairo, twelve Arabic leaders take the decision to send a pan-Arab force in Saudi Arabia; in its turn, the UN Security Council adopted on November 29<sup>th</sup> resolution 678 which authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures against Iraq if it does not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15<sup>th</sup>, 1991. Saddam Hussein's refusal to leave unconditionally Kuwait has led to the implementation of resolution 678, first by bombing Iraqi targets on January 17<sup>th</sup>, 1991, that caused large human

<sup>16</sup> Robert Springborg, „The United Nations in the Gulf War”, in Tareq Y. Ismael, Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.), *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, pp. 40-51.



losses among civilian population. On February 24<sup>th</sup>, land offensive in Kuwait started, initiated by international coalition and led by the United States, that after three days, on February 27<sup>th</sup>, would lead to liberation of Kuwait and issue of a cease-fire agreement with Iraq.

### **3. Regional and international consequences of the Gulf crisis**

Political, economic, human consequences of the Gulf War have been disastrous, for Iraq in the first place, then for Kuwait and the entire region. Over 100,000 civilians and military troops have been killed between August 1990 and February 1991 and more than 300,000 were injured. 2.5 million people have been displaced, either intentionally or voluntarily in the two countries. At the level of damage, Iraq has suffered direct losses and destruction estimated at 170 billion dollars, which have increased a more dramatic economic situation and, at the same time, condition of civil population. In his turn, Kuwait has suffered damages estimated at 60 billion dollars, representing earth, resources, state and the civilians that have been seized or stolen by Iraqis, petroleum resources directed to Iraq, as well as destruction in the conflict from January and February 1991. Here is also included the sabotage of 700 oil wells, torched by Iraqi forces during withdrawal and which has produced serious environmental consequences, requiring intervention of international community. According to estimates made by American Congress, the United States (whose military troops and auxiliary represented 74% of the total international coalition forces) have been involved in the management of crisis and conflict at a level of over 61 billion dollars but from which, however, most part was provided by other countries. In the first place, 36 billion were provided by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other states in the Gulf, while Japan and Germany have provided, in their turn, 16 billion dollars.

At the economic and social level, conflict has affected in an important manner foreign labour force from Kuwait and Iraq, and therefore, in correlation, situation of the states from which workers came. 200,000 Palestinians have been expelled from the emirate, after release, including

those who had resident status and lived for tens of years there; their fortunes have been fully seized by the state. There are also 150,000 Egyptians, and 600,000 Asians (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) to be considered. In the case of Iraq, situation was also serious, because they have been forced to dismiss 350,000 Egyptians, came here in previous years in order to work in agriculture, providing that an important part of male population of Iraq was away on the battlefield. Egypt is the main supporter of Arab anti-Saddam offensive, therefore Iraqi government has decided to expel them. All the same, approach and support for Iraq by Yemen, in moment of crisis, has led to cooling relations with Saudi Arabia: 700,000 Yemeni workers from the Kingdom were dispatched in the second half of 1990. All these have affected financial resources and income of states which they came from, in the years that followed: only population of Bangladesh has lost over 1.4 billion dollars through deposits seized or remained in Kuwait, in addition to that it has ceased the sending process of foreign currency toward metropolis. Jordan, which has been the sole Arab neighbour of Iraq and has tried to maintain a neutral position, was among the most affected. The Kingdom lost petroleum received at preferential price from Iraq, the position of transit space (Aqaba) for a large part of the products that were brought to Iraq, more than 500 million dollars received from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well as banned commercial relations with the states in the Gulf. Turkey has limited drastically commercial relations with Iraq, especially in agricultural products and closing pipeline in the moment of crisis affected its own supply with Iraqi petrol. Already in March 1991, a report drawn up by Overseas Development Institute offered a statistics on losses suffered by developing countries up to that time (e.g. Yemen – 830 million dollars, Pakistan - 855 million dollars, Jordan – 1.77 billion dollars, Turkey – 3.46 billion dollars, Egypt – 985 million dollars, Morocco – 410 million dollars, etc., in total, 12.1 billion dollars)<sup>17</sup>. In subsequent years, these figures will increase, contributing to persistence

---

<sup>17</sup> Overseas Development Institute, *The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Developing Countries*, Briefing Paper, March 19, 1991, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6770.pdf>





of economic unbalance at international level generated by the crisis of 1990-1991.

#### 4. Legal and institutional mechanisms of *War Reparations* process

This is the general context on which Gulf conflict was projected; the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq has had not only major political consequences but also economic; it affected the whole international field to a significant extent, exactly in an overall context marked by disappearance of the communist bloc and by geopolitical and geoeconomical repositioning of Central and Eastern European states and those from the Middle East and North Africa. Regardless the very complicated and questionable complex of factors that led to invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which has, as we have shown, the origin in very complex realities of Gulf regional relations from postcolonial period, the action of Baghdad has been unanimously considered by international community, but firstly by the UN, as an act of aggression.

The question of damages caused by the Iraqi action, in the first place in Kuwait, the country directly affected, and then in other states and third party entities, has been discussed and formalized from the very first legal positions taken by the UN, in the moments immediately following invasion. Resolutions 665, 667 and 670, in 1990, stated that Iraq is guilty of “unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property, environmental damages and other human violations, and therefore, violating international law, including human right law, humanitarian law and diplomatic immunities”. But the most important has been Resolution 687 of the UNSC from 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1991, which certified the end of hostilities between Iraq and international coalition and imposed mainly four restrictions and obligations to Iraq: identification and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, final settlement of the relations with Kuwait – the boundaries establishment and official recognition of emirate’s sovereignty, releasing Kuwaiti and other nationalities citizens still

jailed on the Iraqi territory and finally, regulation of financial obligations between Iraq and the institutional mechanisms by which they should be implemented. In the years that followed, from the imposed conditions, Iraq complied with only the recognition of Kuwait as a state, and this especially under the international community pressure, in November 1994. As for the problem of war reparations, text of the resolution said, “Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to August 2<sup>nd</sup>. 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as the results of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”<sup>18</sup>. Still, in the same resolution, paragraph 18, the United Nations decided to create a special fund and a commission that will be in charge of managing compensation process on behalf of Kuwait to Iraq: United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)<sup>19</sup>.

The Commission has been constituted and has acted/acts as a body depending directly on the UN Security Council; in the forthcoming period, its role and legislative framework and operation have been covered by other Security Council resolutions, 692 (1991), 986 (1995) or 1483 (2003). Role of the Commission has been/ is to manage war reparations processes and payment of compensation for the losses and damages suffered by individuals, governments, companies, international organizations; it worked not as a court but rather effectively as an administrative structure. It consists primarily of a Governing Council, formed by all members of the UN Security Council – and plays the role of coordinating actual activities of the Commission. In the first phase, after setting up the Commission and the Governing Council, a set of commissioners was installed, who worked in panels, with the

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 687, Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991*, paragraph 16, <http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.uncc.ch/>



function to make recommendations and verify the amounts of the required compensation. Another structure was/is the Secretariat, composed of an Executive Secretariat and a set of juridical consultants, collecting and checking the massive number of complaints submitted to the Commission. Finally, there was a fund as such, responsible for compensation payments.

The Commission has established five major categories of claims in respect to which it has ordered payment of compensation, from individuals to governments and international organizations<sup>20</sup>.

*First-class (A)* includes applications for individuals who had no choice but to leave Kuwait and Iraq between the invasion time and conclusion of the conflict; the amounts to be awarded by the Council have been established between 2,500 dollars per person and 5,000 per family. Applications had to be submitted by national governments of those affected, and they had to be done within certain conditions: presentation of evidence that they have been harmed and that they are due to Iraq's action, etc.

*The second category (B)* included complaints from individuals who have suffered, they or their family members, serious personal injury; for these cases the compensation has been established for 2,500 dollars per person and 10,000 per family.

*The third category (C)* comprised complaints from individuals, divided in 21 major categories, relating to different types of damages such as: physical, mental, economic, real estate, for those from Kuwait and Iraq: the sums granted might be up to 100,000 dollars. Managed by commissioners, the war reparations process has been often very difficult, for there were uncertain or insufficient proves.

*A fourth category (D)* comprised individuals that are in the same situation as the ones in C, but they had asked for compensation over 100,000 US dollars – from the point of view of formalities, they were the same as in C.

*Another category (E)* included complaints from legal companies state or private owned, affected by crisis and then by the conflict (in construction, services, petroleum industry); a difference was made between the Kuwaiti and the foreign ones.

Finally, *a last category (F)*, comprised the complaints and requests from governments and international organizations, divided into four subcategories: F1 – complaint regarding evacuation expenses, lost property; F2 – complaint only for Saudi Arabia and Jordan, F3 – complaints from Kuwaitis; F4 – complaints relating to damage to the environment and the current state of the environment. Due to a massive number of applications, in particular for categories A and B, the Commission has used a series of additional ways for checking the information; in order to facilitate settlement of cases, to a large extent the dossiers were quite quickly executed and the amounts for compensation awarded. Situations were more complicated in the last category, where large amounts and governments were involved, and big companies took a more accurate analysis of each individual case.

In a concrete manner, the process of war reparation has been established through Resolution 687, at paragraph 19: “directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present Resolution, recommendations for the full load to meet the requirement for payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a program to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the full load; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed the figure to be suggested – Allow drive to The Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the

---

<sup>20</sup> Francis McGovern, „Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission”, *Harvard Negotiation Law Review*, Vol. 14, No. 171, pp. 171-193, [http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2910&context=faculty\\_scholarship](http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2910&context=faculty_scholarship).



economy help; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the full load; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, yield mapping claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above". Therefore, in accordance with these rules, the Security Council has delegated the compensation Commission, in its Resolution 705 of August 1991, the task to retain 30 % of oil revenues of Iraq, designated to serve as a financial source for the actions for compensation (they have been reduced to 25% in 2000 and, after 2003, had fallen to 5 %). The remaining 70% of petroleum revenues have been designated to be managed by the UN, within the framework of program "oil for food", the same principle, i.e. entry of funds from the sale of petroleum to an account of the United Nations, who assume the task of establishing products and their purchase, in order to be used by Iraqi civilian population. Immediate application of such rules of the United Nations was blocked by Saddam Hussein, which in the early years refused to accept decisions of international community which, in its Resolution 706, in August 1991, claimed that Iraq has the right to sell oil only worth 1.6 billion every half a year with a deposit of all these revenues into a fund managed by the United Nations. It was only in April 1995 when a compromise was reached, with the resolution 986 of the Security Council, which established the program Oil-for-food, that authorise sale of petroleum 1 billion per quarter – from this moment 30% of the revenue were intended, through UNCC, for applications of compensation payments. As more analysts find<sup>21</sup>, this is the first time when the UN Security Council would lay the foundations for a system of compensation, based on creation of a payments fund for compensation, managed by the UN and supplied through oil revenues of Iraq. UNCC has started to operate in 1991: a total of 2.686.131 complaints have been filed with the total sum

<sup>21</sup> Monday Dickson, „Legal Issues in the United Nations Compensation Commission on Iraq”, *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization*, Vol. 14, 2013, pp. 21-30.

of more than 350 billion dollars but from which only 52 billion has been established as amount to be paid from Iraqi oil revenues. The UNCC privileged, from the very beginning, applications from individuals, according to a logic of a justice system based on humanistic principles, leaving the situation of companies and governments in secondary frame. Iraq has paid, over the years, during the period of Saddam and after, on average about one billion every six months. Up to 2014, in accordance with UNCC site, compensations have been offered for 1.5 million applications, worth 46.7 billion dollars, out of which almost 12 billion for individuals. In a foreseeable way, official and private applications from Kuwait have been the most, equivalent of 37 billion of the total 52 billion. "What was left of the payment yet, worth 5.7 billion, represents the equivalent loss suffered by the Kuwaiti petroleum company. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, in 2003, on the background of deep economic and social crisis in Iraq, continuing in fact a tendency from previous years, there have been several initiatives, in the first place under the supervision of Paris Club, to cancel the Iraqi debts and especially its financial obligations in the process of war reparations. A large part of the States concerned have accepted their deletion or to find a new formula for compensation, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. On the other hand, Kuwait, which has received up to the present time more than 30 billion dollars, still continued to persist in the request for compensation, through citizens and various public and private entities, which, after Iraqi estimates, must be completed in 2015<sup>22</sup>.

### Conclusion

What the Gulf crisis has brought for the first time as a special element in comparison to previous situations is the Reparations issue under Compensation form, that was made structurally dependent on the Chapter VII of the UN Charter (*Action with respect to threats to the peace*,

<sup>22</sup> AFP, „Iraq to finish Kuwait war reparations in 2015”, *Gulf News*, May 31, 2013, <http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iraq/iraq-to-finish-kuwait-war-reparations-in-2015-1.1190919>



*breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression*)<sup>23</sup> and especially that the Security Council was directly involved in managing the process of compensation.

This is a situation that goes beyond the classic cases, in which the issue of Compensation and War Reparations is rather a bilateral agreement between aggressor and the aggressed country – to whom is made the payment of damages. In this case, the Security Council, through the special institution that was created for this case, the United Nations Compensation Commission, is not just the referee and supranational agent responsible for compliance and enforcement of agreements between actors in conflict but the authority, that is setting rules and their application in the War Reparations process. Furthermore, Iraq, even if it was the aggressor, had no role in negotiation but was forced to obey the decisions of the Security Council. Finally, and perhaps the most important and special in this case, was taking as a justification support the norms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, limiting the Iraqi sovereignty to the extent that the entire economy of Iraq passed under an international *tute-lage*. This overbid of the Security Council's role, in a visible distance to previous situations, was legitimated formally by the idea that Iraq has been guilty of international crimes, so the issue of regulating regional security and Compensation exceeds the classical situation of relations between the aggressor and aggressed, i.e., only Kuwait and Iraq. On the other hand, as it was visible from the very beginning after installation of the UNCC, this direct involvement policy of the Security Council, to control the economic and military realities of Iraq, was beyond the mere issue of compliance with international law and international order. This policy was also a result of international actors' intention, primarily the United States and Great Britain to rein Iraq, both in terms of military and resources potential. The ninth decade of the last century was characterised by an uninterrupted cooperation between the biggest companies and international privileged

oil exporters from the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Therefore, maintaining a continuous *tutelage*, legitimised through post-conflict Compensation mechanisms established in 1991, was beyond the classical framework of a compensatory justice. On the contrary, as the years passed, the oil embargo and control of oil production, along with tight limits on the Iraqi imports led to aggravation of economical situation, that affected Iraqi population at all levels, the legitimacy of this process started to be questioned more and more.

The same doubts reappeared after 2003, with continuation of outstanding payments: the question was now to what extent a new regime and especially the civilian population was required to bear the consequences of actions taken by a former authoritarian regime. Justice shows in such cases its questionability, when judged in terms of humanitarian consequences and political systems that determine significant dynamics in the Middle East, not only destiny of states, but especially of people, very often first and most important victims both during war and peace time.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ALNASRAWI, Abbas: "Oil Dimensions of the Gulf Crisis", in Ibrahim Ibrahim (ed.), *The Gulf Crisis: background and consequences*, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992, p. 49.
2. AFP: "Iraq to finish Kuwait war reparations in 2015", *Gulf News*, May 31, 2013, <http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iraq/iraq-to-finish-kuwait-war-reparations-in-2015-1.1190919>
3. ZEMMALI, Apud Ameer: "Reparations for victims of violations of international humanitarian law", in *Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Maastricht, 1992, p. 65, <http://www.uu.nl/faculty/leg/nl/organisatie/departementen/departement>

---

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>





rechtsgeleerdheid/organisatie/onderdelen/  
studieeninformatiecentrummensenrechten/  
publicaties/simspecials/12/Documents/12-07.pdf

4. FASSBENDER, Bardo: "Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning of the UN Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq", *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 237-303, <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/13/1/468.pdf>

5. AMATZIA, Baram: "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Bagdad", in Amatzia Baram, Barry Rubin, *Iraq's Road to War*, St. Martin Press, 1993, pp. 5-36.

6. HELMS, Christine M.: *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World*, Brookings Institution Press, 1984.

7. *Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law*, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005.

8. GILLARD, Emanuela-Chiara: "Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law", *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 85, No. 851, pp. 529-553, [https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc\\_851\\_gillard.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_851_gillard.pdf)

9. MCGOVERN, Francis: "Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission", *Harvard Negotiation Law Review*, Vol. 14, No. 171, pp. 171-193, [http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2910&context=faculty\\_scholarship](http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2910&context=faculty_scholarship).

10. GRESH, Alain and VIDAL, Dominique: *Golfe: clefs pour une guerre annoncée*, Le Monde, 1991, p. 202.

11. MILLER, Judith and MYLROIE, Laurie: op. cit., p. 9.

12. MATTHEWS, Ken: *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, Routledge, 1993, pp. 51-54.

13. DICKSON, Monday: "Legal Issues in the United Nations Compensation Commission on Iraq", *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization*, Vol. 14, 2013, pp. 21-30.

14. ALI, Omar: *Crisis in the Arabian Gulf: An Independent Iraqi View*, Praeger Publishers, 1993, p. 86.

15. DE GREIFF, Pablo: "Justice and Reparations", in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), *The Handbook of Reparations*, Oxford University

Press, 2006, pp. 451-477.

16. NOUSCHI, André: *Pétrole et relations internationales depuis 1945*, Armand Colin, 1999, p. 170.

17. Overseas Development Institute, *The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Developing Countries*, Briefing Paper, March 19, 1991, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6770.pdf> Official Website of Overseas Development Institute, London, accessed 15.09.2014.

18. SPRINGBORG, Robert: "The United Nations in the Gulf War", in Tareq Y. Ismael, Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.), *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, pp. 40-51.

19. SAINT-PROT, Charles: *Saddam Hussein: un gaullisme arabe?*, Albin Michel, 1987.

20. United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 687, Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991*, paragraph 16, <http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf> United Nations official website accessed 15.09.2014.

21. WALID, Khalid: "The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1991, pp. 5-28.

22. <http://www.uncc.ch/> United Nations Compensation Commission website, accessed 15.09.2014.

23. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx> United Nations- Human Rights official website accessed 15.09.2014.

24. UN website, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> United Nations official website accessed 15.09.2014.

#### **Acknowledgement:**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title "**Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - "SmartSPODAS".**"



# THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

*Ruxandra BULUC, Ph.D.\**

*Intelligence analysis, like any other field of human endeavour, relies on and is shaped by discourse. However, the extent to which discourse affects the process of intelligence analysis has seldom been tackled in research on this issue. The present article contends that critical discourse analysis would be a vital tool for intelligence analysis in two respects: firstly, in deciphering the cultural and ideological mechanisms at work in the discourses that analysts receive from the field, and, secondly, in the production of intelligence reports themselves. The article then focuses on the errors that might arise in the production of these reports and identifies two main categories to which they pertain: those related to the analysts' cognitive limitations and those pertaining to the discursive level per se. The aim of the article is to identify the means by which critical discourse analysis could be used to alleviate the effects these errors may have on the intelligence analysis process and suggests several coping mechanisms and techniques for analysts in this field.*

**Keywords:** *critical discourse analysis, context, context models, ideology, culture, mindsets, cognitive closure, discourse failure.*

## Introduction

The role of discourse *per se* has seldom been approached in intelligence analysis. More focus has been placed on the cognitive mechanisms that operate within and shape the analytical process, to

their advantages and drawbacks. Our contention is that intelligence analysis, like any domain of human study, relies heavily on and is moulded by discourse. In fact, this article aims to prove that the role of discourse in intelligence analysis is two-fold. Firstly, analysts have to interpret the discourses they receive from various sources and identify the ideological, cultural, political components that underlie them and that may, at times, come into conflict with the ones they hold and cause cognitive closure, mirror imaging and confirmation biases. Secondly, analysts have to produce intelligence reports and, at this level, they are faced with another series of cognitive pitfalls that may affect the quality and reliability of their products: the narrative fallacy, oversensitivity to consistency, coping with uncertainty, biases in favour of causal explanations, illusory correlations, the shortcomings of language. In many cases in history, intelligence failures were caused by dysfunctions at one or both of these two levels of discourse either analysis or production.

We will examine in depth the ways these two aspects of discourse function within the domain of intelligence analysis starting with interpreting discourses.

## 1. Analysing discourse

In intelligence analysis, discourse must be viewed critically at all levels, that is it must be carefully deconstructed in order to identify its inner cultural, ideological components, which

*\*Ruxandra BULUC, Ph.D. is University Lecturer at the Security and Defence Faculty within "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: buluc.ruxandra@myunap.net*



bear great influence on the way the data are then interpreted and utilised in reports. With this contention in mind, we would argue that critical discourse analysis (CDA), with its focus on the power relations and ideological load of discourse may be the best tool for the analysts when they receive the raw data from the field, from agents or from on-line sources. However, in order to apply CDA to intelligence analysis, one must select certain aspects of this theoretical framework that are best suited for its purpose. This is the first aim of the present paper.

As Norman Fairclough<sup>1</sup> points out, discourse analysis starts with a clear view of semiosis as encompassing all meaning-making forms beginning with language but also addressing visual images and body language. MacNulty<sup>2</sup> further pinpoints the elements to be included in semiosis when referring particularly to the field of intelligence. She claims that all conversations, of whatever type, should be listened to: those taking place on the web, in chat rooms, on blogs, on YouTube, on terrorist websites, in movies or videos, on television channels as well as real life conversations in coffee shops and market places. Jokes and cartoons can also reveal truths about the way people construct their worlds through discourse.

All of these aspects of semiosis constitute genres that Fairclough defines as “diverse ways of acting, of producing social life in the semiotic mode”<sup>3</sup>. Semiosis as the representation and self-representation of social practices forms discourses or as MacNulty<sup>4</sup> puts it, the stories that guide people’s perception of the events unfolding around them. These discourses are inherently positioned depending on the point of view from which social actors regard the world around them. Intelligence analysts have to be highly aware of these discourses as stories and examine them in order to ascertain the roles the social actors play and their purposes, while, at the same time, being

aware of their personal positioning intrinsic in their own social practices.

Two aspects which CDA addresses at length are of vital importance for intelligence analysis: the context the information comes from and the ideology or cultural elements that are embedded into and inherent to the discourse. These two aspects inform and define each other to a great extent as the context dictates the ideological load.

Context could be defined as situated meaning, as the factors that accompany and shape language-in-use<sup>5</sup>. Words and their meanings do not exist independently of a context, on the contrary, the latter dictates their usage, forms, actuated meanings. Context could be broadly seen as the meeting place of different actors with various social relationships (based on ethnicity, gender, culture, history, institutions, economy, politics, etc.) of the language that comes before and after the examined piece of discourse. Van Dijk<sup>6</sup> explains that context models are similar in cognitive structure to other mental models and they control the properties of discourse production, topic choice, local meanings, coherence, as well as speech acts, style and rhetoric. He hints at a possible classification of context into levels, but this classification is refined by Wodak. She states that context has four levels:

1. the immediate, language or text internal co-text;
2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
3. the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’;
4. the broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to.<sup>7</sup>

The role played by context becomes clearer and more important in light of these four levels.

---

<sup>1</sup> N. FAIRCLOUGH, “Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research”, in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 121-138), Sage Publications, London, 2001, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> C. MACNULTY, “Truth, Perception, and Consequences”, *The Proteus Monograph Series*, 2007, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> N. FAIRCLOUGH, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>4</sup> C. MACNULTY, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> J. GEE, “An Introduction to Discourse Analysis”, London & New York: Routledge, 2005, p.57.

<sup>6</sup> T. van DIJK, “Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity”, in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 95-120, London & New York: Sage Publications, 2001. p. 109.

<sup>7</sup> R. WODAK, “The discourse-historical approach”, in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 63-94), London & New York: Sage Publications, 2001, p. 67.





It is the interface between the knowledge stored in people's minds, their shared ideologies and culture and the meanings constructed in discourse through language and other non-linguistic means. As Van Dijk emphasises, context is organised into models which allow participants not to express all the information they have about a given situation, event, or person as this information is shared with the other participants implicitly. However, this implicitness may also be the origin of intelligence analysis failures, as the context is shared only by the members of a group, and it does not permeate discourse explicitly. Hence the analysts may be unaware of it as they do not share the same context model. For the purposes of this analysis we shall refer to two levels of discourse from the ones suggested by Wodak: the immediate textual one and the broader, social, historical, ideological one. Two barriers in ascertaining the exact meaning and implications of a discourse thus become obvious: the first one is linguistic, and the second ideological and cultural.

In order to overcome the linguistic barrier, the analysts must be well-acquainted with the given language, not solely at an academic level but also at the level of daily usage, including semantic and semiotic peculiarities such as slang. Only by being proficient in a language does not entail that the analyst has internalised the cultural mechanisms that support it and ground it in a specific context. For which reason, ideological and cultural proficiency is also needed to overcome this second barrier, and at this level the knowledge required is more complex, as ideologies and cultural infrastructures are more abstract and less tangible; they govern discourse from behind the scenes.

It is important at this point to explain the meanings of ideology and culture as the two terms will be employed further in this paper. Culture is a verified, generally accepted system of values that exists at a societal level; cultural values permeate society and society is shaped by them. Unlike culture, ideologies belong to restricted social groups, which are generally quite active and which put forth new militant ideas. Ideologies compete amongst themselves,

they create affinities and enmities, delimitations within societies. Their aim is to change the *status quo*, while culture represents this *status quo*.

Words and discourse are associated with cultural models, which can be viewed as a partially or even totally "unconscious explanatory theory or 'storyline.'"<sup>8</sup> These cultural models are in fact expressions of various ideologies that are active at any given time in social discourses within a given culture. This storyline is not homogeneous across a group; rather it could be piecemeal reconstructed by analysing the discourses that the members of that group partake in. However, the role of these cultural theories as representations of ideologies is paramount in discourse as they are what helps the members of a group make sense of the world and events around them and what dictates their courses of action. CDA focuses on the study of ideologically biased discourses and the ways in which they dictate the separation between groups, or, as Van Dijk<sup>9</sup> puts it between ingroups and outgroups, between us and them.

Philosopher Paul Feyerabend explains that no concepts of any kind are divorced from emotions. They do not have only a logical content "they also have associations they give rise to emotions, they are connected with images. These associations, emotions and images are essential for the way in which we relate to our fellow human beings."<sup>10</sup> Their removal from any form of interpretation may impede information analysis, especially when dealing with cultural and ideological concepts, whose emotive, close-to-the-heart component is extremely powerful as they are deeply intertwined with people's sense of personal identity and group affiliations.

Culture and ideology need to be an integral part of intelligence analysis. For analysts the task is double in the sense that they must be aware both of their inherently held beliefs as well as of those of the groups they are investigating. If they do not make this differentiation, mirror-imaging (projecting one's own cultural values on those of

---

<sup>8</sup> J. GEE, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-1.

<sup>9</sup> T. van DIJK, p. 103.

<sup>10</sup> P. FEYERABEND, "Against method", London and New York: Verso, 1993, p. 124.





another group), a most common and serious error in intelligence analysis, will occur. As MacNulty exemplifies, people belonging to Western cultures, particularly to the American one, “tend to believe that there is only one truth and that others see and understand as we do.”<sup>11</sup> Human perception of events unfolding in the world is influenced and guided by the “lens of the story in which we live.”<sup>12</sup> People are usually unaware of this distortive lens as they share perceptions with members of the same group whose views are coloured by the same ideologies and cultural values. However, the lens may become visible when confronted with another group’s perceptions and this may lead to interpretive errors. In this case of incongruence, although held beliefs may appear insufficient to explain a given situation, they are still resistant to change, as Heuer<sup>13</sup> argues. He is less optimistic than MacNulty when explaining that mindsets (i.e. fixed cognitive constructs based on culture and ideologies) are difficult to become aware of and counteract. The mind seeks consistency and once this has been achieved by means of a mindset it is seldom relinquished. The conflicting information is overlooked or distorted to fit the pattern, rather than seen as an exponent of another group’s ideology. This is what Hatlebrekke & Smith term “cognitive closure,”<sup>14</sup> which is the inability or unwillingness to look beyond one’s own perceptions, beliefs, and mindsets and to accept that others may exist that do not fit into the rigid categories one’s own ideology and culture promote. Cognitive closure also arises in these authors’ opinion from the fact that intelligence organisations are perceived as “cut off from the rest of society and the world.”<sup>15</sup> Despite the fact that this separation may be needed to a certain extent due to secrecy constraints, it is

not complete. Intelligence services operate in and the analysts’ minds are shaped by the societies in which they carry out their work and which they serve. Thus, the nature of these services may appear paradoxical at first glance: the demand for secrecy and the strain of uncertainty may easily lead to cognitive closure but the members of these services need to be aware of human psychology and their own cognitive, cultural and ideological limitations in order to prevent this closure from arising. It is a difficult balance to strike but the only one that might prevent discourse failure. This term is of great relevance for the present paper as it encapsulates the grave danger which threatens intelligence analysis. *Discourse failure*, as Hatlebrekke and Smith<sup>16</sup> define it, refers to the fact that analysts may tend to overlook discourses they cannot account for, whose ideologies are unclear to them, thus limiting the sources they employ in their reports and possibly overlooking risks and threats.

It is our contention that discourse failure stems from the fact that analysts do not have a clear understanding of the ideology of the groups they are monitoring and may evaluate their actions in light of a different ideology, completely misreading not only the groups’ interests but also the lengths to which its members would go to achieve those interests. CDA focuses on discourses, starting from the premise that there is an ideology behind them and slowly works its way to understanding the mechanisms of this ideology by looking at language, context and the social positioning of the participants. In other words, CDA may teach intelligence analysts that a bottom-up approach, which reconstructs ideology from the evidence found in the discourse, may be more fruitful than the traditional top-down one which may start from the unconscious but wrong premise that people share the same core values. This method may help prevent some errors in intelligence analysis, but the first necessary step is to analyse the types of errors that could occur in order to determine their nature and to what extent CDA may help avoid them.

---

<sup>11</sup> C. MACNULTY, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Idem*, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> R. HEUER, *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999, p. 63.

<sup>14</sup> K. HATLEBREKKE, & L.R. SMITH, “Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure”, *Intelligence and National Security* 25:2, 2010, p. 157.

<sup>15</sup> *Idem*, p.157.

---

<sup>16</sup> *Idem*.



## 2. Errors in intelligence analysis

Errors in intelligence analysis could be divided into two main categories: those deriving from the analysts' cognitive limitations, and which are common to all fields of study dealing with uncertainty and prognosis; and those that are specific to discourse and to the integration of information into a format. We shall analyse them in turn.

### 2.1. Errors derived from cognitive limitations

Several errors can be ascribed to this category: cognitive closure, oversensitivity to consistency, coping with evidence of uncertainty, the bias in favour of causal explanations.

As Hatlebrekke & Smith<sup>17</sup> argue, *cognitive closure* is, in fact, a human defence mechanism that protects people against ambiguity and uncertainty by upholding order, structure and stability even if this entails disregarding certain elements that might upset them. Cognitive closure promotes quick decisions that eliminate ambiguity and close-mindedness as "the unwillingness to have one's knowledge confronted (hence rendered insecure) by alternative opinions or inconsistent evidence."<sup>18</sup> This does not mean that cognitive closure is an entirely condemnable process; in fact, without it, decisions would seldom be reached. The key, however, is to know when to let it run its course and that is never at the beginning of the intelligence analysis process. The orthodoxies, assumptions and habits that cognitive closure relies so heavily on should be countermanded in intelligence analysis, should become its focus themselves so that the process could free itself from them as much as possible.

*Situational logic*<sup>19</sup> is an operating mode that intelligence analysts broadly use and that may compensate for cognitive closure to a certain extent. It implies the generation and analysis of hypotheses starting from the concrete elements of a given event, irrespective of possible similarities

with past events, which is basically the bottom-up approach we have argued for in the previous section. Each situation is seen as unique, with its one-of-a-kind logic and its individual causes are traced to their possible effects. "The analyst identifies the goals being pursued and explains why the foreign actor(s) believe certain means will achieve certain goals."<sup>20</sup> However, situational logic does exhibit some weaknesses, the most important being the one discussed in the previous chapter: it is difficult to understand the ideologies and mental processes of foreign nationals (governments, leaders, activist groups, etc.). Insight into their assumptions, beliefs and values is required and this is the point where CDA becomes a valuable asset. Focus on foreign discourses may secure the identification of ideological and conceptual frameworks rather than the projection of the analysts' own onto them.

*Oversensitivity to consistency* is a precursor to cognitive closure and it is based on the human need for consistency, for patterns that can bring confidence in our judgements. As Tversky & Kahneman<sup>21</sup> explain, people may formulate various scenarios to explain one situation, but they are inclined to accept the one that accounts for the largest amount of the evidence provided. Although this mechanism may appear innocuous at first sight, in intelligence analysis, consistency is more often deceptive as one must take into account the adversary's deceptive measures and tactics that may falsely induce a sense of consistency only to hide real goals.

Another reason why consistency may be deceptive is because the information has been collected from a very small sample from an otherwise heterogeneous group, as Heuer<sup>22</sup> explains. This creates the illusion of validity, but the basis for it is unstable. Relying on the "law of small numbers" (put forth by Tversky & Kahneman 1974), Heuer states that, due to the fact that

---

<sup>17</sup> *Idem*, p. 157.

<sup>18</sup> *Idem*, p. 149.

<sup>19</sup> R. HEUER, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>20</sup> *Idem*, p. 33.

<sup>21</sup> A. TVERSKY, & D. KAHNEMAN, "Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", *Science vol.185*, 1974, p. 1974.

<sup>22</sup> R. HEUER, *op.cit.*, p. 120.



people are not good intuitive statisticians they do not comprehend the inherent inadequacies of using small samples to draw valid general conclusions. This pitfall in intelligence analysis can be avoided by making sure of the size of the group the information originated from and bearing it in mind when processing that information so as to avoid overgeneralisation for the sake of consistency.

*Coping with evidence of uncertainty* is another error that stems from the fact that the human mind is not able to deal well with the complex mechanisms of statistics. It entails that people tend to assign a perfect accuracy or inaccuracy value to any piece of information. In other words, as Heuer<sup>23</sup> explains, analysts tend to make a simple “yes” or “no” decision when faced with uncertain and possibly inaccurate data. That is, if the data is accepted, it is accepted wholly or, if it is rejected, it is rejected completely. This reduces the burden of uncertainty which blocks cognitive processes of interpretation. But it is also nothing more than an educated “best guess” that assigns a 100 percent degree of certainty to information that analysts may be, in fact, only partially certain of. Once the decision has been made to consider data as certain, cognitive closure has occurred, and other contradictory evidence may be disregarded. There is more than one consequence of this process. Firstly, it has been psychologically proven that once information has been deemed certain, the amount of data needed to contradict it increases exponentially due to the fact that the human mind clings to consistency. Secondly, even if the evidence manages to be discredited, the impressions it has formed still persist and influence future interpretations. Consequently, analysts should be encouraged to preserve the percentage of certainty they have initially assigned to a piece of evidence so that they might postpone cognitive closure as much as possible.

Another very frequent error that is partially derived from the need for consistency and that affects intelligence analysis is the bias in favour of causal explanations. What it basically means

is that humans need to believe that things happen for a reason, that there are patterns in events which can be uncovered. Causal explanations are the most convenient, facile and sought after. As Heuer posits “coherence implies order, so people naturally arrange observations into regular patterns and relationships. If no pattern is apparent, our first thought is that we lack understanding, not that we are dealing with random phenomena that have no purpose or reason. As a last resort, many people attribute happenings that they cannot understand to God’s will or to fate.”<sup>24</sup> It is difficult to see events as random or unconnected, disjointed. But this bias leads analysts to overestimate the extent to which other countries’ or groups’ actions follow a logical, rational pattern, are goal-oriented and thus predictable. Analysts ignore the fact that causal relationships, although existent in all cultures, manifest themselves differently depending on the world views those cultures are based on and determined by.

The causes that westerners may see as leading to a certain event may in eastern cultures conduct to an altogether different outcome. Causality exists as the basis of many cognitive processes but its actualizations are influenced by other factors as well. Moreover, there exists the tendency to think that an economic cause will have an economic effect, a small cause will have a small effect and so on, more precisely that there is a correlation between the nature and size of the cause and that of the corresponding effects. However straightforward and rule-of-thumb this assumption may appear, linchpin theory has proven it to be a fallacy in many cases, and Nassim Taleb has based his entire “black swan” theory on its invalidity. Events that have shaped our world today (either for the better or for the worse) are events that have not respected this correspondence between the nature of the cause and that of the result.

This kind of illusory correlation appears at another level as well, that is when intelligence analysts make common sense assumptions about the way people and governments normally

---

<sup>23</sup> *Idem*, p. 122.

---

<sup>24</sup> *Idem*, p. 129.



behave. “Much intelligence analysis is based on common-sense assumptions about how people and governments normally behave. The problem is that people possess a great facility for invoking contradictory ‘laws’ of behavior to explain, predict, or justify different actions occurring under similar circumstances. ‘Haste makes waste’ and ‘He who hesitates is lost’ are examples of inconsistent explanations and admonitions.”<sup>25</sup> Human need for causality, for explanations may lead analysts to wrongly posit that such a pattern exists independently of the language and culture of the group. This error may lead to the over-interpretation of data in light of a non-existing pattern. However, this error may be preventable if several sets of eyes examine the same events independently of each other and bearing in mind cultural differences. If the results they reach differ, it may mean that the events are random and should be treated as such.

Hatlebrekke & Smith insist on the fact that intelligence failure may not be solely a consequence of the technical aspects of the intelligence cycle (the collection of the data, the reliability of the sources, the scarce availability of the information). In fact, more weight should be assigned to intelligence analysts’ cognitive processes, that is, to discourse failure seen as “the failure to identify, analyse and accept that a significant threat exists.”<sup>26</sup> To this end, and in light of philosophical recommendations, the two researchers also suggest that humbleness and less orthodoxy are needed in order to comprehend and respect that the world we live in is complex and not easily understood. Analysts should thus be aware both of their methodological limitations and of their cognitive constraints, accept them humbly and perform their tasks in light and in keeping with this awareness. Large-scale and surprise attacks such as the London attacks of 2006,9/11, Pearl Harbour, to name just a few, have reshaped the discourse of intelligence analysis, have made analysts hyper-sensitive to possible threats but, as Taleb<sup>27</sup> explains, operators have become alert only to threats they know about, that fall into previous patterns of experience. This may in

fact be yet another drawback, another limitation because the main characteristic of black-swan-type incidents is that they are unpredictable, they re-shape patterns, not respect them. The only conceivable way to deal with patterns is to critically examine them, to humbly accept their existence and the boundaries they establish in an attempt to move beyond them. It is our belief that a close analysis and control over discourse may help analysts fulfil this goal.

### **2.2. Errors at the discursive level**

The cognitive errors discussed above lead to and are reflected into errors that appear at the level of discourse. As Feyerabend notices, there is basically no separation between noticing a phenomenon and encasing it in a linguistic matrix. Any division between these two levels is abstract and serves little purpose as an event cannot be analysed if it does not have an appropriate descriptive statement. As he explains, this unity is the end result of learning the language in childhood. “The teaching procedures both shape the ‘appearance’, or ‘phenomenon’, and establish a firm connection with words, so that finally the phenomena seem to speak for themselves without outside help or extraneous knowledge. They are what the associated statements assert them to be. The language they ‘speak’ is, of course, influenced by the beliefs of earlier generations which have been held for so long that they no longer appear as separate principles, but enter the terms of everyday discourse, and, after the prescribed training, seem to emerge from the things themselves.”<sup>28</sup> The world does not exist outside or independently of our discursive representations of it, and it is coloured by the beliefs we hold, by the laws we have proposed to govern it, by the traditions that help us understand and master it. The identity between statements and the world they represent may lead people to believe in the former’s objectivity but this is never the case. As CDA so strongly argues, all discourses exhibit an ideology more or less explicitly or, at the very least, the cultural framework in which they were developed. This is an inescapable fact but what intelligence analysts should be able to do is to identify these ideological and cultural components in the discourses they

---

<sup>25</sup> *Idem*, p. 144.

<sup>26</sup> HATLEBREKKE & SMITH, *op.cit.*, 152.

<sup>27</sup> N. TALEB, “The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable” (2nd ed.), New York: Random House, 2007.

<sup>28</sup> P. FEYERABEND, *op.cit.*, p. 57.





receive as previously discussed in section 1.

However, this is not the only contentious issue with respect to experience and facts grounded in discourse. Discourse mirrors human cognitive errors and limitations in its structure. These pitfalls can be eliminated as discourse is controllable. The most prevalent discursive error is the quest for coherence which mirrors the cognitive need for consistency. Van Dijk explained this relationship between the local and global coherence of discourse not as the functional relations between the parts of the text but by the relations between the facts presented in discourse such as cause-effect relations. He stresses the fact that coherence does not exist solely at the level of discourse as an interaction between the facts presented; rather it is both textual and meta-textual, or, in his words, coherence lies in “the ways the facts are defined or interpreted by the language users in their mental models of these facts. These interpretations are personal, subjective, biased, incomplete or completely imaginary. In other words, discourses are interpreted as coherent relative to the mental models the users have about the events or facts referred to.”<sup>29</sup> Psychologically speaking, it is language users who define and interpret facts and events so as to fit them into these relationships and these interpretations are inherently personal, subjective, biased, incomplete and possibly irrelevant. It is interpreters who give coherence to facts when introducing them into their personal discourses. Once in discursive forms, these facts are imbued with the interpreters’ mental representations, assumptions, beliefs and experience and they are also altered by these. It is the task of the analysts to filter through these to get as close as possible to the facts themselves and in order to do this, they must employ critical analytical tools.

Two discursive errors stand out above all others as they are the most pervasive and also the most difficult to control of all: *the narrative fallacy* and *cause and effect biases*. The former refers to the fact that people perceive reality as a story, that is simplified, reduced to the information that can be mastered and interpreted.

---

<sup>29</sup> T. van DIJK, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

“The fallacy is associated with our vulnerability to over-interpretation and our predilection for compact stories over raw truths. It severely distorts our mental representation of the world; it is particularly acute when it comes to the rare event.”<sup>30</sup> Analysts generally deal with such rare events, or with the possibility of their coming to happen, and, as such, they are even more susceptible to fall prey to narrative fallacy. This fallacy stems from the limited ability of human memory to hold on to information without trying to fit it into an explanatory pattern, into a logical sequence that makes sense. Meaning-making is the basis of any narrative and its goal is to generate understanding and aid memory.

Disparate information that is not neatly connected takes up a lot more memory space than “an orderly, patterned, narrativized series of symbols.”<sup>31</sup> Heuer explains that the need to identify causal links between events originates from the same need to create a coherent story to support the facts. The analyst constructs “a plot for previous events and this plot then dictates the possible endings of the incomplete story.”<sup>32</sup> The need to ascertain what the outcomes of certain data may be encourages the analyst to resort to narratives (which are based on preexisting patterns) in an attempt to produce a story in a logical and coherent form and as consistent as possible with the available evidence. Heuer draws attention to the fact that “the use of coherence rather than scientific observation as the criterion for judging truth leads to biases that presumably influence all analysts to some degree. Judgments of coherence may be influenced by many extraneous factors, and if analysts tend to favor certain types of explanations as more coherent than others, they will be biased in favor of those explanations.”<sup>33</sup> Just as all patterns, narrative and causal ones are also subject to cultural constraints and, consequently, biased from the start.

The need for coherence, however, cannot be overlooked or discarded. The large amount

---

<sup>30</sup> N. TALEB, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>31</sup> *Idem*, p. 68.

<sup>32</sup> R. HEUER, *op.cit.*, pp. 128-9.

<sup>33</sup> *Idem*, pp. 128-9.



of information the analyst is confronted with needs to be reduced and two very efficient means to this end are narrativity and causality, which “make time flow in a single direction”<sup>34</sup> and thus more manageable. Taleb also suggests ways to avoid the traps of narrative fallacy, “the way to avoid the ills of the narrative fallacy is to favor experimentation over storytelling, experience over history, and clinical knowledge over theories,”<sup>35</sup> which is a plea in favour of empiricism. The second is to embrace causes as what they are and not transform them into stories; they may be bold speculations or the result of experiments but they must be presented as such. This is advice that intelligence analysts should put to good use when writing their reports: the facts should be presented as they stand and their deductions as such, not combined to form a narrative that would be difficult to contradict or verify. Heuer provides a solution to the issue of narrativity that is somewhat similar to Taleb’s; he strongly recommends avoiding verbal expressions of uncertainty (e.g. adverbials, modals, indefinite quantifiers, etc.) as they communicate nothing and encourage speculation and the appearance of fallacies. Instead, analysts should employ “the language of numerical probability or odd ratios”<sup>36</sup> that can help alleviate the consequences of causality and narrativity by bringing to the fore the issue of low-probability and high-impact dangers that narratives would most likely leave aside as improbable and difficult to fit into a preexisting pattern.

### 3. Avoiding errors in discourse

The question now arises as to how CDA can truly help overcome some of the failings of intelligence analysis. Just as our presentation so far, the answer is two-fold: firstly, because CDA provides the means to uncover the ideological stands in discourses; secondly, because CDA also has a linguistic toolkit that may lead to the production of better, more accurate, authentic

and reliable intelligence reports. We shall analyse them in turn.

As far as ideologically-laden discourse is concerned, Margaret Jäger introduces the concept of discourse position to refer “to a specific ideological location of a person or a medium, proves to be very helpful. Margret Jäger defines the category of discourse position as follows: With discourse position I understand the [ideological] location from which the participation in the discourse and assessment of it for individuals and/or groups and institutions result” (M. Jäger, 1996: 47) quoted in Jäger.<sup>37</sup> This concept is highly useful as it combines the notions of context and ideological load and as it refers to and helps ascertain the discursive circumstances and involvement which individuals are exposed to and which determine them to accept/take on a certain ideological position in their lives. This concept proves useful for intelligence analysis on two levels: the most obvious one is that the analysts need to identify correctly the discourse positions of the targeted groups’ members so as to have a clearer understanding of their thought processes, intentions, goals and also the means they might employ to reach them. The less obvious one is the analysts themselves need to identify their own discourse positions and the ideologies knitted into them so as to be as little biased by them as possible when examining the targeted group’s positions.

CDA helps to expose not only underlying ideologies, but also cultural concepts that may have been taken for granted and whose influence on certain groups’ actions have consequently been overlooked. Feyerabend explains the need for bringing even elusive concepts to light if novel understanding of a situation is to be achieved. His observations pertain to the realm of scientific discovery, but they translate well to intelligence analysis, where new hypotheses need to be generated. He posits that the usual procedure is to take observation statements one at a time and

---

<sup>34</sup> N. TALEB, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

<sup>35</sup> *Idem*, p. 84.

<sup>36</sup> R. HEUER, *op.cit.*, p.153.

---

<sup>37</sup> S. JÄGER, “Discourse and knowledge: theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis”, in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, Sage Publications, London, 2001, p. 49.



analyse their content. However, this technique does not lead to the identification of the concepts that are hidden in the observation statements and that do not reveal themselves so easily. “Concepts, just like precepts, are ambiguous and dependent on background. Moreover, the content of a concept is determined also by the way in which it is related to perception.”<sup>38</sup> There is circularity in play that may be difficult to circumvent because part of the concept is used in the attempts to penetrate it, just as words are utilised to define other words. Feyerabend suggests that there is but one method to escape this circularity and that is the introduction of “an external measure of comparison, including new ways of relating concepts and precepts”<sup>39</sup>, or, in other words, the introduction of a new observation language. A similar move is suggested by Gee<sup>40</sup> when he explains that novel assemblies of concepts and meaning are needed for new contexts, and that this is the way to bring about change in discourse itself so that it may correctly mirror the new circumstances.

In order for this point to be relevant and useful in intelligence analysis, it needs to be refined and customised; a new language of whatever kind cannot be introduced, but what can be done is to accept, internalise, employ the language of the targeted group. This would entail detachment from one’s own linguistically embodied ideologies and a more facile acceptance and understanding of the concepts and ideologies at work in the other group. As language is the vehicle of sometimes unconscious ideological precepts, the best way to identify them is to become accustomed to this vehicle.

When dealing with discourse as such, several aspects must be born in mind: authenticity, accuracy and reliability, which must be used to establish if the evidence received is credible or not. David T. Moore, proposes a set of questions that may prove useful, such as: “Is the evidence what it seems to be?”; “Is there any discrepancy between the source of the information and

the nature of the information?”; “Would different means of collecting the information produce different results?”<sup>41</sup> The same issues with intelligence analysis are addressed by Hatlebrekke & Smith<sup>42</sup> but their focus falls more on the intelligence estimates from reports, which they consider to be nothing more than informed inferences, as they can never be clear or accurate beyond any doubt. As they explain, “Intelligence production involves a set of complex methods that have to be carried out in a complex environment, and collectors and analysts often undertake their duties in a kind of intellectual isolation”<sup>43</sup> and thus the danger of falling prey to cognitive closure is greater than ever. Time constraints, deadlines, the pressure for a report so that a course of action could be initiated, all these factors negatively reinforce the cognitive need to have a definite answer, to eliminate ambiguity, which may lead to erroneous estimates. Moore<sup>44</sup> and Hatlebrekke & Smith<sup>45</sup> provide the same solution for this: critical thinking. Karl Popper<sup>46</sup> applied this method to the scientific discovery process and he put forth the concept of the falsifiability of scientific theories which he considered to be the criterion of demarcation. In essence, his proposal is that a theory must be tested not in order to confirm it, but to see if any statement exists to falsify it. The more such tests a theory undergoes and passes, the stronger it becomes. This critical approach to theories translates easily to the domain of intelligence analysis, where it is difficult and virtually impossible to fully confirm any hypothesis, but only one piece of solid evidence may falsify it. Consequently, the analysts must continually question the evidence they receive as they incorporate it in their estimates. If this information does not falsify

---

<sup>38</sup> P. FEYERABEND, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>39</sup> *Idem*, p. 61.

<sup>40</sup> J. GEE, *op.cit.*, pp. 64-5.

<sup>41</sup> D. MOORE, “Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis”, Washington D.C.: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009, pp. 51-7.

<sup>42</sup> HATLEBREKKE & SMITH, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

<sup>43</sup> *Idem*, p. 160.

<sup>44</sup> D. MOORE, *op.cit.*

<sup>45</sup> HATLEBREKKE & SMITH, *op.cit.*

<sup>46</sup> K. POPPER, “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”, London and New York: Routledge, 2002.



their working hypothesis, then they may be on the right path. Moreover, in light of the fact that the enemy may employ deceptive techniques, and of the fact that the information can be contradictory on occasion, the analysts must also employ another method of critical thinking that questions the very hypothesis they are working with and which is best summed up in one question: if the opposite result from the one I am estimating may be the real one, what evidence would I expect to have in front of me right now? This question, together with an awareness of one's cognitive short-sightedness and biases in matters of prediction could generate a solid foundation for uncovering preconceptions and implicit ideologies. Critical thinking can protect analysts from cognitive closure as Hatlebrette & Smith argue when suggesting the use of Popper's theory in intelligence analysis: "nothing can be left without scrutiny, everything must stand the test of falsification because progress rests with us, with our watchfulness, with our efforts, with the clarity of our conception of our ends, and with the realism of their choice."<sup>47</sup> If intelligence analysis starts to base itself more on self-examination and critical thinking, embedded ideologies and cognitive limitations may impact it less and the resulting estimates could be more relevant and reliable. These are the very tools that CDA proposes for examining social discourse and the ones that we propose are also suitable for intelligence analysis.

### Conclusions

The goal of this article has been to prove that the role of discourse in intelligence analysis cannot be overlooked any longer. It dictates not only what actions will be taken but also what roles the participants play, what ideologies and cultures they represent, and are shaped by. The world does not exist outside the discourses we create to master and comprehend it. Consequently, our claim is that CDA, with its keen interest in critically observing discourse with a view to uncovering

the power plays that fuel it, is a more than worthy approach for intelligence analysis. The role of critical thinking in this domain has been stressed and highlighted by many researchers before, but our contention is that CDA can now also provide the instruments needed to apply it concretely to both the information received from various sources as well as to the discourse of intelligence estimates and reports. The objective is to enhance the reliability of these intelligence products, to fine-tune analysts' awareness of ideologies and cultures (both their own and their targets'), and to produce much clearer and accurate materials that may prevent further threats from becoming actual incidents.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. FAIRCLOUGH, N., *Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research*, in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 121-138), London: Sage Publications, 2001.
2. FEYERABEND, P., *Against method*, London and New York: Verso, 1993.
- GEE, J., *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis*, London & New York: Routledge, 2005.
3. HATLEBRETKE, K. & SMITH L.R., "Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure", *Intelligence and National Security* 25:2, 147-182, 2010.
4. HEUER, R., *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.
5. JÄGER, S., "Discourse and knowledge: theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis", in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 32-62), London: Sage Publications, 2001.
6. MACNULTY, C., *Truth, Perception, and Consequences*, The Proteus Monograph Series, 2007.

---

<sup>47</sup> HATLEBRETKE & SMITH, *op.cit.*, p. 176.





7. MOORE, D., *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*, Washington D.C.: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009.

8. POPPER, K., *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002.

9. TALEB, N., *The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (2nd ed.), New York: Random House, 2007.

10. TVERSKY, A. & KAHNEMAN, D., "Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", *Science vol.185*, 1124-1131, 1974.

11. DIJK, van T., "Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity", in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 95-120), London & New York: Sage Publications, 2001.

12. WODAK, R., "The discourse-historical approach", in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 63-94). London & New York: Sage Publications, 2001.

**Acknowledgement:**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POS DRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title "**Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - "SmartSPODAS".**"



# OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE ACTUALITY OF THE HYBRID WAR. CASE STUDY: UKRAINE

*Alba Iulia Catrinel POPESCU\**

*An atypical, Hybrid War is in progress on Romania's eastern border pitting neighboring Ukraine against an "anonymous enemy" who is a master of the military arts, is supported by a systematized propaganda apparatus, as well as a political, economic and financial system that is sufficiently strong and so widely spread as to limit the reactions of the European third-party states as well as international political organizations.*

*Undoubtedly, we are witnessing a paradigm shift of the political-military relations between Moscow and the NATO allies; the post-Cold War détente is gradually being replaced by the necessity of adjusting to the reality on the field, where Hybrid War is in full progress<sup>1</sup>.*

**Keywords:** *hybrid war, total war, hybrid threats, national security strategy, strategic concept.*

## **Introduction**

The Hybrid War in progress on Romania's eastern border pits the Russian Federation against Ukraine along a wide range of fronts: political-

---

<sup>1</sup> Constantin Duțu, *Șeful NATO: Rusia a aruncat peste bord toate angajamentele internaționale*, 20.08.2014, <http://www.cotidianul.ro/seful-nato-rusia-a-aruncat-peste-bord-toate-angajamentele-internationale-245714/>, accessed on 20.08.2014.

military, financial and economic, propaganda, psychological, and a war of words. In this Hybrid War, Russia has deployed her own troops without insignia, the so-called "green men". The Kremlin is using mercenaries, surrogate fighters, local separatists, her secret services, affiliated political parties both inside and outside Russia, state-run media institutions, plus her extensive network of economic and financial organs.

The Russian government denies that they are active participants in the war, but all intelligence, as well as the comments of the president of Russia, point to active, comprehensive and aggressive action to restore Ukraine to the Russian collection of satellite states, or to paraphrase the words of President Vladimir Putin, to restore the former Soviet Union (USSR)<sup>2</sup> and the system that allows Putin and his oligarch supporters to maintain their personal power. He fears his own "Orange Revolution". Putin's extreme pragmatism is cloaked in fear of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) encirclement of Russia. But, in the last 25 years, NATO has worn what might be called "velvet gloves" in its relationship with Russia, accepting and understanding

---

<sup>2</sup> Oliver Bullough, *Vladimir Putin: The rebuilding of 'Soviet' Russia*, 27.03.2014, BBC News Magazine, <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481>, accessed on 20.08.2014.

*\* Alba Iulia Catrinel POPESCU is medical doctor, PhD Candidate in National Security and Intelligence at the "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: albatanasescu@hotmail.com*



Russian's frustrations toward the loss of the Kremlin's superpower status, even taking a step back at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 when the alliance was scheduled to, but did not open the Membership Action Plan process with Ukraine and Georgia<sup>3</sup>.

The Russian annexation of Crimea represents the *de facto* and *de jure* results of the invasion of a sovereign, UN member state and a critical step toward the restoration of the Soviet Union. The Moscow-supported secessionist movements in eastern Ukraine are the next step towards the country's break-up and its restoration to Moscow's alliance system. The complex means through which Russia's attacks are being executed and their civil and military nature demonstrate the hybridization of the armed conflict.

How should we define hybrid war? What are the differences between hybrid war, compound war and limited war? What are hybrid-type threats? How real is hybrid war in Ukraine? How real are hybrid threats in Europe?

### What is hybrid war?

Hybrid War (HW) is the most complex and, in the future, probably the broadest expression of modern warfare. HW brings together elements of conventional armed conflict as well as unconventional elements – nuclear, biological, chemical, psychological, geo-tectonic, meteorological, informational, propagandistic and image related; on the battlefield, HW incorporates the classical form of armed conflict (typically with insignias...) as well as elements that are specific to terrorism, guerilla warfare, insurgencies, and insurrections, in other words, both symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare.

In its classical form, the essential defining criteria of war are: its collective character – through the involvement of great collectivities, of nations; its organized character – there is a command center, the confrontations being systematized; its legal character – even if it was

declared illegal through a series of international treaties and documents<sup>4</sup>, war, regulated by *jus ad bellum* – laws of war, continues to be a way through which states interact; its armed conflict character – using the term war is unfit in the absence of hard power components.

The concept of absolute war belongs to von Clausewitz<sup>5</sup>, who differentiated between limited war (limited objective, space and duration) and an unlimited one, the absolute war, which has neither neutral space nor non-combatants, the objective being the complete defeat of the enemy and its allies, a purpose for which the entire resources of the nation are made available, under the command of the political leadership.

A hundred years later, in a full expression of Prussian militarism, General Erich von Ludendorff subordinated the political factor to the military command, transforming the paradigm of absolute war into that of total war, crowned by final and complete victory.

In the vision of French sociologist and political scientist Raymond Aron, total war has unlimited objectives when it comes to time and space, it implies the unlimited use of national resources and military strength, without compromise and ending in an imposed peace<sup>6</sup>. He explains that these new forms of political fight are a consequence of the development of the technological and industrial society, and the impact the mass media over public opinion which facilitates general mobilization and creates national unity against war threats.

HW is derived from the total war paradigm, representing a more complex and extremely heterogeneous stage of the latter, in full compliance with the actual technologic and informational progress. HW however is not a complete novelty, hybrid tactics have been used in the past. The current difference is determined by the ample

---

<sup>3</sup> Paul Gallis, *The NATO Summit in Bucharest, 2008*, CRS Report for Congress, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22847.pdf>, accessed on 20.08.2014.

<sup>4</sup> We are speaking about the Kellogg-Briand Pact, (1928) which declared war as being illegal, and about London Charter (1945) and the UN Charter (1945), all of them strongly condemning war.

<sup>5</sup> Carl P.G. Von Clausewitz (2001), *Despre Război*, Editura Antet, București.

<sup>6</sup> Raymond Aron (1954), *The Century of Total War*, Garden City, Doubleday and Company, pp. 9-32.



destructive potential, by the heterogeneity of the means, by the expansion of the phenomena to a global scale, subsequent to the globalization and interlinking of the economic-financial systems, by communications, transport, and by the risk of unleashing a nuclear conflagration, which limits the *hard* power options in favor of *soft* power and smart power ones. Although, from the perspective of international law, we are essentially talking about a symmetric war, its expression mainly involves asymmetrical, hard to manage and hard to counter aspects.

In the 2005 United States (US) National Defense Strategy<sup>7</sup> (NDS) a new spectrum of challenges toward US national security is identified that includes traditional and unconventional threats, terrorism, and disruptive hi-tech threats. In addition, the NDS highlights US vulnerability toward these new types of threats, as well as the necessity of an adjustment of US national defense strategy to these new security coordinates. One of the authors of the US NDS, as well as one of the creators of the Hybrid War Concept, HWC, is *Nathan Freier*<sup>8</sup>, an analyst in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)<sup>9</sup>, and formerly an analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The American journalist and defense analyst, *Frank G. Hoffman*<sup>10</sup> was one of the first promoters of the HWC. In 2009, he published an article, in *Small Wars Journal*, called *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges*<sup>11</sup>, where he pleaded for the use of this concept that allows a concise description of the multivalent, fluid character of this type of warfare, combining insurgency, terrorism and conventional war. In his opinion, the actual

conflicts are characterized by “the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and non kinetic, and combatants and noncombatants (...) military force and the interagency community, of states and non state actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with”.

Hoffman also defines the difference between the concept of *Compound War* and HWC. Compound War means a large-scale war that combines regular and irregular forces under a unique strategic command. A classic example, given by Hoffman, is the one of American Independence War, where the troops lead by George Washington had the characteristics of a regular army while the Colonial forces acting in South Carolina were mostly local militias. The warfare combination between regular army and partisans was noted during in Napoleonic Wars, American Civil War, and the Vietnam War, too. In the case of the HW, this combination becomes more complex, the operations and the tactics are frequently intricate and convergent.

If by definition, compound wars means the synergy is focused at the strategic level, without the operational and the tactical coordination, with irregular forces usually being used as a complement to the regular forces, totally separate at the operational level, then in the case of a hybrid war there is a synergy at all the conflict levels whether strategic, operational or tactical, and with a high degree of diffusion, of blending roles among the actors, of interchangeable tactics, the similarity in operations.

“These hybrid wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded actors) will exploit access to modern military capabilities, including encrypted command systems... and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and coercive assassinations. This could include states blending high-tech capabilities such as anti satellite weapons with terrorism and cyber warfare directed against financial targets” Hoffman says.

<sup>7</sup> *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*, March 2005, <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>, accessed on 23.10.2014.

<sup>8</sup> Nathan Freier, Center for Strategic & International Studies, <http://csis.org/expert/nathan-freier>, accessed at 23.10.2014.

<sup>9</sup> CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/>.

<sup>10</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, Foreign Policy Research Institute, <http://www.fpri.org/taxonomy/term/413/0>, accessed at 23.10.2014.

<sup>11</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges*, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), Issue 52, First Quarter 2009.





In an interview<sup>12</sup> given to a Romanian magazine in the fall of 2014, the president of the Center for European Policy Analysis<sup>13</sup>, Wess Mitchell, says the Russo-Ukrainian war is a limited war meant to question the actual *status-quo*, being in fact a test of the military, economical and diplomatic capacity of the most important political players.

There are opinions that suggest that the hybrid war is actually a limited war, one with minimum risks and costs, which precede the total war. This is totally false. Hybrid War is not a limited war, it is comprehensive and broad, but a limited war can be a hybrid war. HW can extend to global spaces, can use various tactics at the same time, conventional and nonconventional, disruptive hi-tech and terrorist, military and all sort of non-military actors, can be extremely expensive and disruptive, and can last as long as the aggressor power survives. Because all of these reasons, a hybrid war is not a limited war. Actually, the aggressor power in a HW decides whether this is going to be a limited war or not, depending on the level of accomplishment of the principal objectives that generated that war.

### What are the hybrid-type threats?

In an article<sup>14</sup> published by Nathan Freier in *Small Wars Journal*, the CSIS<sup>15</sup> analyst noticed that, nowadays, the security structures are confronted with increasing non-military threats, next to which the operational capabilities and plans form a unique combination of different and incongruent components; a strictly military approach is insufficient enough to cover the entire palette of challenges implied by the paradigm of a hybrid war.

The fact that the threat is non-military does not exclude its violent or devastating character;

soft power means can induce great social, economic and political imbalances in the targeted state, especially when guerilla warfare, terrorism, organized criminality, civic insubordination and insurgency elements are combined. According to Freier, a non-military threat is that which is „not originating in or involving the uniformed forces of enemy states” and „often manifest as complex combinations of unsanctioned violence and human insecurity”.

In this context, Freier identified new hybrid military threats, known as *high-end asymmetric threats (HEAT)*, which can be traditional, unconventional, specific to catastrophic and disruptive hi-tech terrorism. According to a United States Department of Defense (US DOD) official, HEAT describes threats that are generated by regional, emerging powers and by *rogue states*<sup>16</sup> - states or state-like entities that sponsor terrorism and which position themselves outside of the rule of law and international norms – which use very sophisticated technologies to block competing states from gaining resources and expressing power. The same author reminds us that hybrid threats are extremely diverse, with a remarkable destructive and destabilizing potential; because of this reason it is inadequate to label them as major or minor. He concludes that the national and international structures tasked with elaborating security policies should focus, mainly, on these new threats to international security and stability.

Furthermore, according to Freier, these threats can be appropriately defined as “relevant challenges to security, whose origin, character, modus operandi and target domain are difficult to identify and classify”, which require an extended military response; the hybrid character of these threats is given by the heterogeneity of the elements that concur to their definition, while their relevance to security is conferred by the fact that, although not exclusively military, they

---

<sup>12</sup> Octavian Manea, *Războiul limitat al Moscovei și efectele asupra României*, Revista 22, 16.09.2014, <http://www.revista22.ro/articol.php?id=47568>, accessed on 23.10.2014.

<sup>13</sup> Center for European Policy Analysis, <http://www.cepa.org/>, accessed on 23.10.2014.

<sup>14</sup> Nathan Freier, (09.12.2009), *Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe... Don't Define*, Small Wars Journal, [www.smallwarsjournal.com](http://www.smallwarsjournal.com), accessed on 16.08.2014.

<sup>15</sup> CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/>.

---

<sup>16</sup> Nathan Freier, (09.12.2009), op.cit., apud Michele A. Flournoy, *Rebalancing the Force: Major Issues for QDR 2010*, Federal News Service, April 27, 2009, remarks delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, [http://policy.defense.gov/sections/public\\_statements/speeches/\\_usdp/flournoy/2009/April\\_27\\_2009.pdf](http://policy.defense.gov/sections/public_statements/speeches/_usdp/flournoy/2009/April_27_2009.pdf), Accessed December 29th, 2009, p. 7.



target the state's capacity to defend, and exceed the standard concepts of attack, defense, victory, defeat, vulnerability, risk and threat.

According to Freier, the hybridization is not limited to war and to threats, but is extended to other military affairs, as well. In the 2009 „Capstone Concept for Joint Operations”, CCJO, as Freier noticed, combat is only one of four “basic categories of military activity” the other three being “security, engagement, plus relief and reconstruction”. More than that, the present American military doctrine expresses the concept of full-spectrum operations that “involve blended combinations of offense, defense, stability, and civil support activities”<sup>17</sup>.

Freier considered that the response to a hybrid threat should be also a hybrid one, a hybrid-type political-military-economic-informational complex, combining hard power and soft power, military and civilian reaction. He also pointed out that, in 2010, there were gaps in the capacity and capabilities American Government could utilize in defending US from a hybrid attack. These gaps came from the dual, civilian-military type of threats, from the lack of synergy in the defense/counteracting forces and from the need for a unique center of command. Commenting on an operational draft outline issued by US DoD, Freier noted the absence of traditional threats from the hypothetical list of threats listed in the operational draft. Also, he observed that the potential scenarios considered by the defense strategists were limited to the reaction toward externally funded insurgencies, civil war, insurrections, peace enforcement operations, civilian military disaster response, humanitarian assistance, cyber warfare, or Marine Corps (MCO) missions.

Any kind of threat is amplified by the target nation's own vulnerabilities. Unlike other types of threats, hybrid variants are extremely heterogeneous and, subsequently, flexible in relationship to the nature of the enemy's vulnerability. Certain internal vulnerabilities amplify the potential of the aggressor's hybrid threats: they are weak internal social and

political cohesion, frequent economic, financial, social, political, institutional and moral crises; a repressive, plutocratic system; the absence or endemic corruption of the rule of law; the presence of organized crime structures which subordinate or infiltrate the influential institutions of the target state; relative diplomatic isolation; or the status of geostrategic pivot state or buffer state.

In these conditions, an aggressor who simultaneously applies state or non-state, symmetrical or asymmetrical *hard power* and/or *soft power* formulas can overwhelm the target state pushing it to use a wide variety of resources in all operation domains with the intention of exhausting and defeating the target state.

Unlike asymmetrical threats, HW threats are orchestrated by state actors, who use the services of non-state actors, such as terrorist and organized crime organizations, guerilla formations, anarchist organizations, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), transnational or mass media societies, and political parties.

### **How real is Hybrid War in Ukraine and in the European Union?**

In an interview for the German newspaper *Die Welt*, the commander of the NATO allied forces in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, warned about a possible threat to the security of eastern European states coming from the Russian Federation which has already used HW tactics during the process of destabilizing and annexing Crimea. In a concise formulation, the American general described the stages that preceded the beginning of instability through “*organizing the population*” for the purpose of civic insubordination and insurgency, followed by the use of “*little green men*”, respectively soldiers without distinctive national marks<sup>18</sup>. As a matter of fact, it is not the first time Russia has used such an operation; it is known that its security structures were involved in initiating and maintaining frozen conflicts on

---

<sup>17</sup> Nathan Freier (09.12.2009), idem.

<sup>18</sup> *NATO would respond militarily to Crimea-style infiltration: general*, 17.08.2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/17/us-ukraine-crisis-breedlove-idUSKBN0GH0JF20140817>, accessed on 18.08.2014.



the territory of the former Soviet Union, or that it used state-owned gas company Gazprom as an energy weapon.

In May 2014, a scandal broke out in the European Parliament, involving Jobbik's Member of European Parliament, Bela Kovacs, over accusations he was spying for Russia<sup>19</sup>. At first sight, it seems to be an isolated case of espionage; at a more attentive look, we can see a connection between extremist, xenophobe and Euro-Skeptic movements and a cast of Kremlin-affiliated actors. The Jobbik Party is Hungary's second largest political force, having recently rallied 21% of the votes. During the April 2014 electoral campaign for parliament, Jobbik surprised its opponents and observers by mustering inexplicably large financial resources for a niche party. In early March 2014, the Jobbik president, Vona Gabor, Jobbik MEP Bela Kovacs and Jobbik deputy Marton Gyöngyösi, visited Moscow, where they met Russian energy officials as well as geo-politician Aleksandr Dughin, the promoter of the concept of Eurasianism<sup>20</sup>. Dughin is a well known supporter of the de-westernization of Romania, which would force Romania to give up much of Transylvania to Hungary in exchange for reunification with the Republic of Moldova, sans its counties annexed to Ukraine at the end of World War Two<sup>21</sup>. Apparently, some elements of this proposal can be seen in Romanian internal political discussions of the recent past. The Jobbik leader has stated that "*Transcarpathia legally*

*belongs to Hungary*", and, additionally, "*the European Union is a perfidious organization*".

In Latvia, during the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Russian minority party, Harmony Centre, won 30% of the votes, becoming the country's main political force in part thanks to the support of NGOs and mass media institutions that were either created or financed by Moscow<sup>22</sup>.

In Bulgaria, the ATAKA party openly represents Russian interests, especially in the Russo-Ukrainian War, and when westerners worked to block construction of the South Stream pipeline.

As a matter of fact, on May 31, 2014, representatives of the Freedom Party of Austria, the French National Front and ATAKA met the previously mentioned Aleksandr Dughin in Vienna, during an event organized by the Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, under the pretext of celebrating the 200th anniversary of the creation of the 1815 Holy Alliance of conservative monarchs. Malofeev has connections to the Russian secret services and, is accused of financing and organizing the pro-Russian forces involved in the Donetsk separatist movements<sup>23</sup>. The situation is even more facets. The Vienna meeting was attended by several influential people belonging to European political and business worlds: Prince Sixtus Henry of Bourbon-Parma, Serge de Pahlen – representative of a Geneva financial group and the husband of Margherita Agnelli, heir of the Fiat empire, Croatian, Georgian, Flemish, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian nationalists, a Catholic monk whose identity was not revealed, French MEP Aymeric Chauprade, the foreign policy adviser to the National Front's president, Marine Le Pen, and a member of a pro-Russian Belgian NGO known

---

<sup>19</sup> *Eurodeputatul Jobbik acuzat de spionaj avea contacte permanente cu serviciile secrete ruse*, 19.05.2014, <http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/externe/eurodeputatul-jobbik-acuzat-de-spionaj-avea-contacte-permanente-cu-serviciile-secrete-ruse-668514.html>, accessed on 22.08.2014.

<sup>20</sup> *Eurasianismul – o ideologie rusească cu vechi rădăcini*, Radio Europa Liberă, <http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/25299115.html>, accessed on 04.09.2014.

<sup>21</sup> *Viitorul României în viziunea lui Alexandr Dughin, ideologul lui Vladimir Putin: Prin integrarea în cadrul Comunității Eurasiatice această țară își va putea rezolva problemele economice și teritoriale*, Revista 22, 12.03.2014, <http://www.revista22.ro/viitorul-romaniei-in-viziunea-lui-alexandr-dughin-ideologul-lui-vladimir-putin-prin-integrarea-in-cadrul-comunitatii-eurasiatice-aceasta-tara-isi-va-putea-rezolva-problemele-economice-si-teritoriale-39209.html>, accessed on 22.08.2014.

---

<sup>22</sup> Moise Marinescu, *Partidul minorității ruse a câștigat alegerile din Letonia*, 18.09.2011, <http://www.romania-libera.ro/actualitate/international/partidul-minoritatii-ruse-a-castigat-alegerile-din-letonia-238004>, accessed on 22.08.2014.

<sup>23</sup> Courtney Weaver, *Malofeev: the Russian billionaire linking Moscow to the rebels*, Financial Times, 24.07.2014, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/84481538-1103-11e4-94-f3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Avdtwsxw>, accessed on 20.08.2014.





as the Eurasian Observatory for Democracy and Elections<sup>24</sup>; other members of this Belgian NGO are representatives of Jobbik, of the Vlaams Belang, a Fleming nationalist party, and of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)<sup>25</sup>.

There are other European political formations with populist and extremist rhetoric that represent Euro-Skeptic factions and share some common visions with the Kremlin: the Italian Northern League, Syriza, and The Independent Greeks from Greece, Podemos and Ciudadanos from Spain, as well as other political formations from Germany, Great Britain<sup>26</sup>, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The elections for the European Parliament in 2014 demonstrated the efficiency of the Russian influence network, which, in the context of the current economic crisis, led to the unprecedented victory of xenophobic, Euro-Skeptic and populist parties, an important step toward the fragmentation of the European construction.

As a matter of fact, the efficiency of this Russian network can also be seen in the restrained tone of European officials concerning the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine. For example, during a meeting with the EU diplomatic corps in Budapest, Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, stated that *“each day, the European Union is alienating itself from Russia. This is not only bad for Hungary, but for the rest of the EU (...) we will seek the support of EU member states who wish to stop this separation process”*<sup>27</sup>; he estimated that the

European policy of economically sanctioning the Russian Federation is counter-productive.

The lack of a resolute and common reaction is a consequence of the political influence exerted by the above-mentioned groups, as well as of the spread of Russian capital in the majority of European social and economic sectors. The previous lack of concern shown by European leaders toward Russian investment in strategic areas is now reflected in their restraint toward economic sanctions. At the beginning of the 20th century, the ideologist of the Communism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said *“the Capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them”*<sup>28</sup>. European enthusiasm for Russian investment has compromised Europe’s will and capacity to react.

The lack of European unity regarding relations with Russia and the reasons underlying that political behavior have been well-known since 2007. On November 7, 2007, the European Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFR)<sup>29</sup> released a report entitled *“Power Audit of EU- Russia Bilateral Relations”*<sup>30</sup> which highlights that, although Europe is much stronger than Russia in economic terms (15 times), defense spending (seven times), population (three times), Russia is the one that sets the agenda in bilateral relations and the way Russia acts often exceeds the rules. In this regard former German foreign minister and co-chairman of the ECFR, Joschka Fischer, pointed out that lack of European decisional unity allowed Russia to develop its influence within the EU by *divide et impera* - type tactics, such as preferential bilateral energy agreements, by using the Kosovo legal precedents as a basis in political negotiations, or by threatening the world with withdrawal from nuclear non-proliferation agreements. According to the ECFR analysts, the explanation for the current European

---

<sup>24</sup> EODE—Eurasian Observatory for Democracy & Elections, <http://www.eode.org/contact/>, accessed on 20.08.2014

<sup>25</sup> Odenhal von Bernhard, *Gipfeltreffen mit Putins fünfter Kolonne*, Tages Anzeiger, 03.06.2014 <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ausland/europa/Gipfeltreffen-mit-Putins-fuenfter-Kolonnen/story/30542701>, accessed on 20.08.2014.

<sup>26</sup> *Russia’s friends in black, Why Europe’s populists and radicals admire Vladimir Putin*, The Economist, 19.04.2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21601004-why-europes-populists-and-radicals-admire-vladimir-putin-russias-friends-black>, accessed on 20.08.2014.

<sup>27</sup> George Avram, *Premierul Ungariei, avocatul lui Putin la UE*, Expres Magazin, 25.08.2014, <http://www.expresmagazin.ro/premierul-ungariei-avocatul-lui-putin-la-ue/>, accessed on 25.08.2014.

<sup>28</sup> [http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote\\_blog/Vladimir.Lenin.Quote.068C](http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote_blog/Vladimir.Lenin.Quote.068C), accessed on 25.08.2014.

<sup>29</sup> *European Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.ecfr.eu/>, accessed on 25.08.2014

<sup>30</sup> *Analysis reveals that EU disunity allows Moscow to dominate*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 07.11.2007, [http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_pr\\_russia\\_power\\_audit/](http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_pr_russia_power_audit/), accessed on 25.08.2014





lack of unity would lay on a dual perspective toward the relationship with Russia. The first approach perceives Russia as a threat and calls for containing the Eastern neighbor. The other approach supports the need for partnership and the benefits of economic integration between Europe and Russia.

In terms of political behavior towards Russia, ECFR analysts have divided the European states in five distinct categories<sup>31</sup>:

1. Trojan horses - Greece and Cyprus, countries willing to use the *veto* in the EU, to defend Russian interests;

2. Strategic partners - Germany, France, Spain and Italy, countries with specific bilateral economic relations with Russia, who were sometimes at odds with common European interests, such as energy policy or relations with neighboring states;

3. Friendly pragmatists - Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal, countries having significant economic relations with Russia, which require a more cautious policy stance;

4. Unfriendly pragmatists - Czech Republic, Denmark, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, UK, Netherlands, Sweden, countries that have economic relations with Russia but who will not accept compromise that favors Russian interests;

5. New cold warriors - Poland and Lithuania, countries with frozen relations with Russia, always ready to *veto* EU initiatives that would favor Russia.

The conclusions of this report support the need for European unity around long-term strategic interests aimed to oppose asymmetric dependence in relation to Russia, such as:

---

<sup>31</sup> In 2015, Hungary shall join the Trojan Horse group and is possible that in the near future Spain, too, will join if the leftist populist parties Podemos and Ciudadanos win the general election. Moreover, the Czech Republic has become more friendly toward Russia, and Russia's relationship with the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden reached an advanced freeze (shooting down of Malaysian Airlines MH17 flight over Ukrainian rebel controlled territory, Russia's threats to use nuclear weapons against Denmark should the Danes accept anti-atomic shield components on their territory, and tensions in the Baltic Sea between Russia and Sweden).

- Exerting pressure on Russian leaders to implement the agreements and the international standards that they have already signed;

- Conditioning Russia's reinstatement in the expanded G7 on the level of implementation of common agreements;

- Holding European governments to the tenets of principled bilateralism in relations with Russia, especially in the energy policies field;

- Streamlining the EU Neighborhood Policy, especially on the Eastern border of the Union;

- Political support for the European Commission to establish a common energy policy;

- EU support for Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine to implement the *acquis communautaire*.

In the volume entitled "*Gazprom Noua armă a Rusiei*", (Gazprom – Russia's New Weapon) authors Valerij Panyshkin and Mikhail Zygar note the philosophy behind the creation of the economic giant is that *even if a fool is in charge, he can't destroy it*. They also describe the expansion and development process of the pipeline network towards Western Europe, as well as the creation of European dependency to Russian gas delivery, which, in 2006, varied from 100% in Finland and the Baltic states, 90% in Bulgaria and Slovakia, 75% in Austria, 45% in Germany and 25% in Italy and France<sup>32</sup>. Among other things, the authors mention four weighty names<sup>33</sup> of the German political and business communities who are wedded to Gazprom:

- Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who secured guarantees through *KfW Bankengruppe* and *Deutsche Bank* that allowed Gazprom to raise 900 million Euros at low interest rates to build the North Stream gas pipeline. In exchange for his work Schroeder was rewarded with a well-paid position, as a *Gazprom* representative, on the board of the Russian-German consortium *North European*

---

<sup>32</sup> Valerij Panyshkin, Mikhail Zygar (2008), *Gazprom Noua armă a Rusiei*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, p. 247.

<sup>33</sup> Valerij Panyshkin, Mikhail Zygar (2008), *op.cit.*, pp. 244-251.



*Gas Pipeline Company* (NEGPC)<sup>34</sup>, which administers the project.

- Matthias Warnig, Director of the *Dresdener Bank* Russian branch, who became General Director of NEGPC. He was formerly a Stasi<sup>35</sup> officer and one of Putin's contacts from the period in which the Russian was a KGB agent in Dresden.

- Hans-Uwe Kreier, *Gazprom Germany* personnel director, a former Stasi informer, who operated under the code names "Hartman" or "Roland Schreder".

- Felix Strehober, *Gazprom Germany* Financial Director, also a former Stasi informer.

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of June, 2014, in the mist of the Ukrainian crisis, Gazprom announced its decision to completely cut the supply of natural gas to Ukraine, as a consequence of the expiration of the ultimatum given to Kiev Government on payment of debts.<sup>36</sup> The refusal of the Russian side to renegotiate the payment schedule, as well as the omission of the any economic damages that the cut of the gas supply could inflict upon both Ukrainian and Western partners revealed Gazprom as an energy weapon with debilitating economic and social impact. What is more, during September 2014, under the pretext of maintenance work and without prior notice, Russia reduced by 24% the gas flow to Poland, thus forcing the Polish Government to considerably reducing its gas supply to Ukraine<sup>37</sup>.

During October 2014, at a press conference held in Belgrade, Russian President Putin warned

the EU that Russia would stop the supply of the gas to European end users if Ukraine would continue to "steal gas" from Gazprom pipelines that are transiting Ukraine<sup>38</sup>. Whereas gas pipeline theft must first be proved through a lengthy process requires involving an international court, these accusations become instruments of pressure used by the Russians to hamstring European reaction to recent events in Ukraine or elsewhere. Consequently President's Putin allegation of theft is a warning to the Europeans that events of the winter of 2009, when the gas flow to Europe was cut for two weeks<sup>39</sup>, might happen again if the Europeans challenged his actions.

The Russian presence in Europe is by no means limited to the *Gazprom* network. It includes banking structures, fuel production and distribution networks, different companies specialized in IT, communications and telephony, great sport teams, hotel networks etc. Furthermore, large European companies, especially German ones, have developed substantial investments in Russia, in key areas such as vehicle construction, mechanical equipment industry and pharmaceuticals<sup>40</sup>.

An investigation made by Rise Project<sup>41</sup> journalists and The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP)<sup>42</sup>, shared by the international mass-media<sup>43</sup> exposed a money

---

<sup>34</sup> Françoise Thom, *La naissance de l'énergocratie russe*, European Security & Defence, [http://www.european-security.com/n\\_index.php?id=5667](http://www.european-security.com/n_index.php?id=5667), accessed on 20.09.2014; *Nord Stream Gas Pipeline (NSGP), Russia-Germany*, <http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/negp/>, accessed on 04.09.2010.

<sup>35</sup> Stasi - *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* – The Ministry of State Security of the German Democratic Republic

<sup>36</sup> *Ukraine crisis: Russia halts gas supplies to Kiev*, BBC NEWS EUROPE, 16.06.2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27862849>, accessed on 30.10.2014.

<sup>37</sup> Terry Macalister, *Russia stokes tensions with the west by cutting gas exports to Poland*, The Guardian, 10.09.2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/10/poland-russia-gas-supply-cut-gazprom-tensions-ukraine>, accessed on 30.10.2014.

<sup>38</sup> Ilya Arkhipov, Elena Mazneva, *Putin Warns Europe Russia to Cut Gas If Ukraine Steals Supplies*, 16.10.2014, Bloomberg, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-16/putin-warns-europe-russia-to-cut-gas-if-ukraine-steals-supplies.html> accessed on 30.10.2014.

<sup>39</sup> *Russia shuts off gas to Ukraine*, BBC NEWS, 01.01.2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7806870.stm>, accessed on 30.10.2014.

<sup>40</sup> Jack Ewing, Alison Smale, "In Reversal, Germany Cools to Russian Investment", *The New York Times*, 28.12.2014, [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/business/international/in-reversal-germany-cools-to-russian-investment.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/business/international/in-reversal-germany-cools-to-russian-investment.html?_r=0), accessed on 30.12.2014.

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.riseproject.ro/>, accessed on 26.08.2014.

<sup>42</sup> *The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP)*, <https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/about-us/about-us>, accessed on 26.08.2014.

<sup>43</sup> Aaron Eglitis, Andra Timu, *Bankers Targeted in \$20 Billion Moldovan Laundering Case*, Bloomberg, 30.09.2014, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-30/bankers-targeted-in-20-billion-moldovan-laundering-case.html>, accessed on 26.10.2014.



laundering network controlled by Igor Putin, the Russian president's cousin<sup>44</sup>. Between 2010 and 2014, Russian politicians, in collaboration with a cross-border criminal network, laundered 20 billion USD. Besides the political factor, the Russian criminal network included off-shore companies, Russian, Moldavian and Latvian banks, 90 Russian firms connected to FSB<sup>45</sup> officers, underworld leaders and compliant judges from the Republic of Moldova. The role of the Moldavian judges was to "legalize" the cashing of the 20 billion USD in fictional debts by the off-shore chain of companies. The money laundering technique followed a standard track: a company (usually with headquarters in Great Britain) with open accounts in the Belize, signs a fictitious loan contract with another company, the debt being guaranteed by a Russian firm; among this Russian firm's administration, there is a Moldavian citizen, who is the link with the courts of law in the Republic of Moldova. In the scheme, the borrower defaults on the loan, the guarantor is "forced" by the court of law to make whole, with dirty money, the account of the lender. The money path unavoidably included Russkiy Zemelny Bank, Moldindconbank and the Latvian Trasta Komerbanka bank. Russkiy Zemelny Bank is directed by Aleksandr Grigoriev, one of Igor Putin's intimates, with whom he collaborated at the *SU-888* construction company, as well as at *Promsberbank*, where Grigoriev was the majority stockholder, and President Putin's cousin Igor Putin a member of the board. Grigoriev is also connected with the FSB<sup>46</sup>. On March 18, 2014, without additional details, the Central Bank of Russia revoked *Russkiy Zemelny Bank* license

<sup>44</sup> *Investigație marca RISE Project Un văr al lui Putin, implicat într-o uriașă operațiune de spălare de bani*, 22.08.2014, <http://www.cotidianul.ro/un-var-al-lui-putin-implicat-intr-o-uriasa-operatiune-de-spalare-de-bani-245742/>, accessed on 26.08.2014

<sup>45</sup> *FSB - ФСБ - Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации*; transliterated Federal'naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federaii - The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

<sup>46</sup> *The Russian Banks and Putin's Cousin*, OCCRP, 22.08.2014, <https://reportingproject.net/the-russian-laundromat/the-russian-banks-and-putins-cousin.php>, accessed on 26.08.2014.

to operate on charges of money laundering and other legal transgressions. Matter closed, or so they hoped.

An investigation by the Bucharest – based Rise Project revealed just a part of the money laundering operation which originated from criminal activities in the Russian Federation's territory. Estimates claim the amount of laundered money is greater than 60 billion USD for each trimester. There is a very interesting connection between the political leadership, the FSB, the underworld, the bank and the legal systems and the potential effect on the targeted financial markets. The fact that intimates of the current Russian president, with strong connections to the FSB, lead a transnational network of organized crime that, in the end, threatens European monetary equilibrium can be listed as one aspect of hybrid war.

In a 2014 article<sup>47</sup>, published by *Deutsche Welle*, it is claimed that the Russian Federation was acting in the Republic of Moldova through money and "media viruses", for the purposes of obtaining a friendly majority for the Russian interests in Moldova's November 2014 parliamentary elections. The article described the Moldovan mass media, which is subordinated to Moscow, exerted a manipulation and disinformation campaign regarding the advantages of joining the European Union, including rising the specter of a Chișinău "maidan"<sup>48</sup> should voters elect a pro-European parliament.

The fight between Moscow and Europe is also being played out in Bulgaria. According to

<sup>47</sup> *Deutsche Welle: Rusia a invadat Republica Moldova cu viruși mediatici. Vor un alegător speriat și românofob*, 20.08.2014, [jurnalul.ro, http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/externe/deutsche-welle-rusia-a-invadat-republica-moldova-cu-virusi-mediatici-vor-un-alegator-speriat-si-romanofob-675858.html](http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/externe/deutsche-welle-rusia-a-invadat-republica-moldova-cu-virusi-mediatici-vor-un-alegator-speriat-si-romanofob-675858.html), accessed on 26.08.2014.

<sup>48</sup> Two of the pro-occidental TV stations, EURO TV and Alt TV, were bought by businessman Ilan Shor, a Kremlin intimate, who also owned Unibank and was the Chairman of the Board of Directors at Banca de Economii a R. Moldova. *O altă mână a Moscovei în spațiul informațional al Republicii Moldova. Cine sunt pionii?*, 04.06.2014 <http://www.rbnpress.info/wp/o-alta-mana-a-moscovei-in-spatiul-informational-al-r-moldova-cine-sunt-pionii/>, accessed on 04.09.2014.





“Outlook 2020: Bulgaria and NATO in European defense”<sup>49</sup>, a report recently written by Bulgarian Defense Minister officials, “Bulgaria is one of the areas with the greatest concentration of risk and threats(in)theEuro-Atlanticcommunity”, because it is subjected to Russian cyber, informational and propagandistic attacks that is backed up by pro-Russian mass media entities and local political and economic factions. The report mentions that “the active and total propaganda (in support) of Russian policies, especially through Bulgarian political and economic entities, through mass media and NGOs, is an open informatics war which undermines the integrity of the institutions and the state, and is directly attacking democratic values and the national spirit and will”.

In early August, 2014, a press article<sup>50</sup> was released documenting a cyber attack, code named *Epic Turla*, generated by Russian speakers, that targeted classified documents concerning transatlantic security, as well as European energy policy and security. It is worthy of note that, in the case of Romania, the targets, among others, were civil and religious sites from Transylvania and a website that deals with rural entrepreneurship in the Romania’s eastern border regions. As a result of the computerization of civil and military information, cybernetic attacks are a frequent occurrence; the difference between simple cybernetic *transgression* and a cybernetic *attack* lays in the nature of the selected targets and information. In the case of *Epic Turla*, departmental servers and classified information were targeted, alongside civil sites and non-secret information. Authorized sources estimate that this cybernetic espionage campaign was the most sophisticated so far.

In 2011, another cyber espionage campaign,

originating from Russia, code named *Energetic Bear*, targeted information from the sphere of US and Canadian aviation and defense<sup>51</sup>; in 2013, *Energetic Bear* attacked energy production and delivery targets from the US, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Turkey, Romania and other states<sup>52</sup>.

Another cyber espionage campaign, again originating in Russia, called *Sandworm*, was identified in 2009, became active in December 2013 and has reached its maximum activity in 2014, according to the *Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign – Sandworm Team* report, published by the Washington Post<sup>53</sup>. Sandworm’s targets were mostly NATO and Ukrainian govern servers – especially during the period of the late 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. The Russians also attacked western governmental agencies, some Polish energy companies, some French telecommunication companies, and some North-American companies. During October 2014, the US White House was the target of a cyber espionage attempt originating from again from Russia and suspected of being ordered by the Kremlin<sup>54</sup>.

---

<sup>49</sup> Sofia este veriga slabă a NATO în războiul informațional cu Rusia Raport oficial: Bulgaria, invadată de propaganda rusă, cotidianul.ro, 27.08.2014, <http://www.cotidianul.ro/raport-oficial-bulgaria-invadata-de-propaganda-rusa-246042/>, accessed on 28.08.2014.

<sup>50</sup> Octavian Palade, *Cel mai mare atac informatic de spionaj lovește și România. Hackerii vin de pe filieră rusă. SRI confirmă incidentul*, 07.08.2014, [http://ad-evarul.ro/news/eveniment/sri-mai-multe-institutii-statului-vizate-atac-cibernetice-grupari-extremist-teroriste-1\\_53e3781e0d133766a81625da/index.html](http://ad-evarul.ro/news/eveniment/sri-mai-multe-institutii-statului-vizate-atac-cibernetice-grupari-extremist-teroriste-1_53e3781e0d133766a81625da/index.html), accessed on 26.08.2014.

<sup>51</sup> *Emerging Threat: Dragonfly / Energetic Bear – APT Group*, Cyber Security Group, 08.07.2014, <http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/emerging-threat-dragonfly-energetic-bear-apt-group>, accessed on 26.08.2014

<sup>52</sup> Pierluigi Paganini, *Kaspersky report on Energetic Bear – Crouching Yeti APT campaign*, 02.08.2014, <http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/27224/cyber-crime/kaspersky-report-energetic-bear.html>, accessed on 26.08.2014.

<sup>53</sup> *Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign – Sandworm Team Microsoft Windows Zero-day –Targeting NATO, EU, Telecom and Energy Sectors CVE –2014 -4114 An iSIGHT Partners Overview*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/10/14/National-Security/Graphics/briefing2.pdf>, in Ellen Nakashima, „Russian hackers use ‘zero-day’ to hack NATO, Ukraine in cyber-spy campaign”, The Washington Post, 13.10.2014, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-use-zero-day-to-hack-nato-ukraine-in-cyber-spy-campaign/2014/10/13/f2452976-52f9-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-use-zero-day-to-hack-nato-ukraine-in-cyber-spy-campaign/2014/10/13/f2452976-52f9-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c_story.html), accessed on 30.10.2014.

<sup>54</sup> Ellen Nakashima, *Hackers breach some White House computers*, The Washington Post, 28.10.2014, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa0-5ef7-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa0-5ef7-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251_story.html), accessed on 30.10.2014





On August 22, 2014, the former NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, directly accused the Russian Federation of direct and indirect military involvement in the confrontation in eastern Ukraine. The Summer 2014 entrance of a Russian humanitarian convoy<sup>55</sup> – suspected of delivering weapons to the rebels – on Ukrainian territory coincided with the intensification of Russian artillery barrages, fired from Russian soil, as well as from within Ukraine, with the transfer of heavy weaponry to the rebels and with a significant Russian land and air troop mobilization on the border<sup>56</sup>.

On the occasion of Ukraine's independence celebration, Donetsk hosted a "prisoners of war parade"<sup>57</sup>, which was reminiscent of those endless lines of German prisoners from the Second World War and was plentifully used by Russian propaganda to demonstrate the Red Army's invincibility. The message conveyed by this "parade" is identical, the desired psychological effect being the undermining of Ukrainian's belief in victory. In this regard we have to quote President Putin who said that if he wished Russian troops could be in Kiev in two weeks or, five other NATO states capitals within two days<sup>58</sup>.

---

<sup>55</sup> This convoy was followed by other similar "humanitarian" convoys that Ukrainian authorities accused of supplying weapons and war materials to the rebels.

<sup>56</sup> George Avram, *NATO: Artileria rusă a lansat obuze în Ucraina. Armata rusă este implicată în confruntările militare din estul Ucrainei. Trimiterea convoiului, o încălcare a angajamentelor internaționale*, 22.08.2014, <http://www.expresmagazin.ro/nato-artileria-rusa-a-lansat-obuze-in-ucraina-armata-rusa-este-implicata-in-confruntarile-militare-din-estul-ucrainei-trimiterea-convoiului-o-incalcarea-angajamentelor-internationale/>, accessed on 26.08.2014.

<sup>57</sup> Adriana Matcovschi, *Parada prizonierilor de război din Donețk "nu are nimic umilitor; consideră Lavrov*, AGERPRES, 25.08.2014, <http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2014/08/25/-parada-prizonierilor-de-razboi-din-donetc-nu-are-nimic-umilitor-considera-lavrov-galerie-foto--13-34-33>, accessed on 26.08.2014,

<sup>58</sup> Will Steward, *Moscow troops could be in five NATO capitals in two days, boasts Putin: Leader boasted to Ukrainian president about Russian power*, Daily Mail, 18.09.2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2761195/Moscow-troops-five-NATO-capitals-two-days-boasts-Putin-Leader-boasted-Ukrainian-president-Russian-power.html>, accessed on 20.10.2014.

From the data exposed, we observe a rich diversity of direct and indirect actions employing pro-Russian European political, economic and media networks that are used by the Kremlin in its attack on Ukraine. We refer to:

- Tactics specific to the irregular warfare – fomenting outbreaks of instability in Eastern Ukraine through the "coordination of the population" in civil insubordination and insurgency, followed by the using of the "little green men", Russian soldiers without national marks;

- Tactics specific to the conventional war – direct military intervention in the war in the Eastern Ukraine by shelling Ukrainian army positions, supply of weapons and logistics to the rebels through "humanitarian convoys" and an important mobilization of Russian terrestrial and air forces at the Ukrainian border;

- Tactics specific to psychological and image warfare – the Ukrainian prisoners of war parade on Ukraine national day in order to humiliate and undermine Ukrainian moral;

- Tactics specific to the economic warfare – leveraging Ukraine energy dependency on Russia;

- Tactics specific to the cyber warfare – cyber espionage campaigns that targeted Ukrainian government servers.

In the EU, Russia acted with *soft power*, targeting multiple sectors of the society:

- Political – the funding of the Euro Skeptical, revanchist, extremist political parties and movements, some of them represented in the European Parliament; stimulating the division of EU political opinions toward Russian Federation political behavior through pro-Russian political leaders; the use of historic animosities among East European countries to destabilize EU eastern border regions;

- Economical – the increase of European dependence on Russian gas by developing the gas pipelines network to Western Europe in parallel with undermining all alternative projects; investments in various key economic sectors of the banking and insurance system to networks of hotels, sports clubs or the IT industry;

- Media – investments in media companies in order to promote Moscow's political interests;



- Cybernetic – cyber espionage campaigns that targeted civil and military servers of EU and NATO states;

- Social – by funding of several NGOs, associations and research institutes, funding and promoting leaders who plead for Russian interests;

- Financial – by developing a transnational money laundry network that includes politicians, FSB officers, judges, banks and underworld people from EU and the former USSR.

The hybrid character of the war waged by Russia against Ukraine is certified by the following:

- *the Russian state is behind most, if not all, operations,*

- elements specific to conventional, symmetric military conflict are associated with those characteristic of guerilla warfare and insurgency,

- cyber warfare attacks have been launched against Ukraine, its allies and “*honest brokers*”,

- the Russians are conducting economic, psychological and imago-logical warfare, operations,

- Russian infiltration inside European politics and economy is designed to limit, split and distort European and American political decision maker’s response capacity.

The extent and efficacy of the Russian political, economical, media and social networks within the EU reveals Moscow’s long term strategy to fracture European unity, and to create a gulf between Europe and the United States and, ultimately to increase Russian power in Europe and the world.

### Conclusions

Not far away from the eastern border of Romania, a major Hybrid War is raging. Russia is attacking Ukraine, using methods specific to insurgency and guerrilla operations, plus support from political parties, sympathetic media, business entities and “*little green man*” military units. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in late spring 2014 is the *de facto* and

*de jure* results of invading an independent and sovereign state, which is also United Nations (UN) member. Separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine represent the next step leading to the Russian goal of a collapse and fragmentation of Ukraine, should total annexation not be achievable. The complex ways attacks are prepared and are executed, together with the dual civilian plus military nature of these attacks clearly prove the hybridization of this armed conflict. A large and potent network of Russian interests of all sorts, built step by step along the past 20 years, strongly limits the latitude, resoluteness, and unity of the NATO reaction to all these threats, this Russian network directly endangers the Euro-Atlantic world by means of using several tools. Among these, an important role is played by financing and supporting extremist, xenophobic, racist and anti-European movements. They are the Fifth Column of yester year. The reactions of European leaders to Russian aggression is not coherent, some of them strongly resembling the so-called “*appeasers*” in the 1930s. In such a context, the NATO Summit in Wales was vital in harmonizing and reshaping the long-term NATO strategy.

Nathan Freier legitimately asked himself a few years ago: where is the exact point when Hybrid Conflict starts, and which are the situations that can legitimately be called traditional war? Or how can we find out what kind of war are we involved in? And how – and by using what means – can the US DoD decide whether to intervene when a non-military threat occurs, where other security institutions have jurisdiction<sup>59</sup>. Freier also stated that, if the US DoD continues considering Hybrid War as being less a military reality, and more (or even exclusively) a problem to be addressed by institutions with responsibilities in the counter-terrorism area, the DoD might be caught unprepared, should a new 9/11 occur.

Hybrid threats are created and logistically supported by an enemy state through state and non-state vectors. Therefore, in the field, military units can simultaneously act with militias, guerrillas, terrorist and anarchist organizations, clans and organized crime syndicates, as well

---

<sup>59</sup> Nathan Freier, (09.12.2009), *ibidem*.



as political parties, mass media institutions, companies and NGOs, financial institutions and intelligence services.

Hybrid operations cover a very diverse, very flexible, often random spectrum, perfectly adjusting to a target's vulnerabilities. The destabilizing impact is remarkable and the combined attacks rapidly deplete the target state's resources forcing it to counter multiple sorts of attacks.

How would NATO react, if a non-NATO power uses „the Crimean model” of preparing the population of a NATO state for the coming of „little green men”<sup>60</sup>? How would NATO react if a non-NATO state independently, or in cooperation with a NATO state, uses ethnic, religious or political tensions in order to destabilize another NATO state? Which article of the NATO compact would cover such cases? How would cyber-warfare and other potential forms of hybrid war be contextualized by NATO, such as geotectonic warfare, climatic warfare, biological warfare<sup>61</sup> or using other types of “dirty weapons?” In short, how can NATO react to the various forms of hybrid warfare when it is not included in NATO's Article Five?

There are voices saying that changing the current NATO Strategic Concept would mean a return to the Cold War paradigm. But, the reality happens to be different. Europe is confronting a very hot hybrid war, with hybrid threats targeting Eastern European countries where specific vulnerabilities facilitate internal destabilization and state disintegration. The EU construct is threatened from within by extremist, revisionist and xenophobic parties that are financially and logistically supported by an external power interested in destabilizing and fracturing the unity of the Alliance. These realities can not be obscured. British Prime Minister, David Cameron warned that soft Allied attitudes toward Russian aggression in Ukraine could allow Russia then to destabilize NATO countries, such as the Baltics

---

<sup>60</sup> NATO would respond militarily to Crimea-style infiltration: general, op.cit.

<sup>61</sup> For example inducing of zoonoses to destroy livestock, inducing an epizootic which destroy crops etc.

and Romania<sup>62</sup>. Quite clearly a new NATO Strategic Concept is necessary: and we are speaking about such a document to be properly adapted to the new strategic context, to the new hybrid threats present in the international arena. Activating Article 5 of the NATO Treaty in case of Hybrid War and Hybrid Aggression might be a method to deter, solve, or even prevent the intervention of hostile powers in the “domestic” problems and affairs of the Alliance. However, this would first require including the definition of hybrid warfare and hybrid threats in the Strategic Concept. Such a vision might be strongly supported by Romania, a country which has been directly threatened by President Putin.

Of course, at NATO level, there are clear protocols established and included in what is called “*A Comprehensive Approach*”, though the hybrid threats are not yet officially included and defined. But we must not forget that protocol implementation is local and their effectiveness depends exclusively by the institutions that operate at the local level. Romania should not forget that NATO is mutual “*security umbrella*” that depends equally on Romanian fulfilment of her promises to her fellow members and requires her to fully develop her own defense and capabilities.

Because of the basic fact that problems directly associated with hybrid threats are vastly complex, coping with such threats demands a special type of approach: effective, flexible, unitary, coherent, fully operational, based on adequate resources (human and financial), based on procuring adequate “hardware” of all types for the civilian-military complex, and on creating unitary (and joint) command and control structures. These C&C structures, vital in any scenarios dealing with hybrid threats are to be fully and quickly adaptable to different types of operational situations generated by the very

---

<sup>62</sup> Mihai Drăghici, *Cameron: Rusia ar putea destabiliza țări precum România în lipsa unei atitudini ferme a UE și SUA*, MEDIAFAX.ro, 30.07.2014, <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/cameron-rusia-ar-putea-destabiliza-tari-precum-romania-in-lipsa-unei-atitudini-ferme-a-ue-si-sua-13006125>, accessed on 26.08.2014.





hybrid nature of the threats faced<sup>63</sup>.

Our final conclusion is this: different combat situations, starting with conventional/ traditional conflicts and including the non-conventional ones (waged by means of using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or disruptive hi-tech, or counter-insurgency, or terrorism) clearly require careful strategic planning, well-defined procedures interconnecting different state institutions, and specific preparations. And, above all, an effective reaction to combat situations, including those within Hybrid War, is based mainly on a sound and comprehensive strategic vision, adapted and revised to reflect the contemporary and quickly evolving regional and global security environment.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ARON, Raymond, *The Century of Total War*, Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1954.
2. Von CLAUSEWITZ, Carl Phillip Gotlieb, *Despre Război*, Editura Antet, București, 2001.
3. EWING, Jack, Alison Smale, In Reversal, Germany Cools to Russian Investment, *The New York Times*, 28.12.2014, [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/business/international/in-reversal-germany-cools-to-russian-investment.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/business/international/in-reversal-germany-cools-to-russian-investment.html?_r=0)
4. FREIER, Nathan, „Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe... Don't Define”, *Small Wars Journal*, 09.12.2009, [www.smallwarsjournal.com](http://www.smallwarsjournal.com)
5. HOFFMAN, Frank G., Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)*, Issue 52, First Quarter 2009.
6. A. FLOURNOY, Michele, „Rebalancing the Force: Major Issues for QDR 2010”, *Federal News Service*, April 27, 2009, remarks delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://policy.defense.gov/sections/>

---

<sup>63</sup> The August 2014 case of suspected infection with Ebola virus showed how unprepared for Romania is such situations, the suspect being transported by an common ambulance from Ploiești to Bucharest, where there is a Centre for Diagnosis and Treatment of Tropical Diseases without special facilities in case of infection with the highly pathogenic vector Hymera or classic type.

[public\\_statements/speeches/usdp/flournoy/2009/April\\_27\\_2009.pdf](http://public_statements/speeches/usdp/flournoy/2009/April_27_2009.pdf), 2009.

7. NAKASHIMA, Ellen, *Hackers breach some White House computers*, 28.10.2014, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa0-5ef7-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa0-5ef7-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251_story.html).

8. NAKASHIMA, Ellen, *Russian hackers use 'zero-day' to hack NATO, Ukraine in cyber-spy campaign*, 13.10.2014, *The Washington Post*, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-use-zero-day-to-hack-nato-ukraine-in-cyber-spy-campaign/2014/10/13/f2452976-52f9-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-use-zero-day-to-hack-nato-ukraine-in-cyber-spy-campaign/2014/10/13/f2452976-52f9-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c_story.html).

9. PAGANINI, Pierluigi, *Kaspersky report on Energetic Bear – Crouching Yeti APT campaign*, 02.08.2014, <http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/27224/cyber-crime/kaspersky-report-energetic-bear.html>

10. PANYSHKIN, Valerij; ZYGAR, Mikhail, *Gazprom - Noua armă a Rusiei*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2008.

11. THOM, Françoise, *La naissance de l'énergocratie russe*, *European Security&Defence*, [http://www.european-security.com/n\\_index.php?id=5667](http://www.european-security.com/n_index.php?id=5667).

12. Site-ul Center for European Policy Analysis, <http://www.cepa.org/>.

13. Site-ul Center for Strategic & International Studies, <http://csis.org/expert/nathan-freier>.

14. Site-ul EODE – Eurasian Observatory for Democracy & Elections, <http://www.eode.org/contact/>.

15. Site-ul Foreign Policy Research Institute, <http://www.fpri.org/taxonomy/term/413/0>.

16. \*\*\*, „Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign” – Sandworm Team Microsoft Windows Zero-day – Targeting NATO, EU, Telecom and Energy Sectors CVE – 2014 – 4114, An iSIGHT Partners Overview, *The Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/10/14/National-Security/Graphics/briefing2.pdf>.

17. \*\*\*, *Emerging Threat: Dragonfly / Energetic Bear – APT Group*, *Cyber Security Group*, 08.07.2014, <http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/emerging-threat-dragonfly-energetic-bear-apt-group>.





18. \*\*\*, *Eurasianismul – o ideologie rusească cu vechi rădăcini*, Radio Europa Liberă, <http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/25299115.html>.

19. \*\*\*, Investigație marca RISE Project: „Un văr al lui Putin, implicat într-o uriașă operațiune de spălare de bani”, *Cotidianul*, 22.08.2014, <http://www.cotidianul.ro/un-var-al-lui-putin-implicat-intr-o-uriasa-operatiune-de-spalare-de-bani-245742/>.

20. \*\*\*, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*, March 2005, <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>.

21. \*\*\*, *The Russian Banks and Putin's Cousin*, OCCRP, 22.08.2014, <https://reportingproject.net/the-russian-laundromat/the-russian-banks-and-putins-cousin.php>.

#### **Acknowledgement:**

This work was made possible by the financial support of the Sector Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “*Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation program for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”*”.

## THE LAST MISSION

*Daniela RĂPAN\**



The book I chose to bring to our readers' attention in this issue is *Ultima misiune* (Last Mission) of Commodore (Ret.) Ion Dumitrașcu, PhD, printed in 2014 by Luxlibris Publishinghouse in Brașov.

Under this title of impact, the author makes a record of the years (2009-2013) spent under Allied flag in a relevant position at SHAPE<sup>1</sup>, that of Deputy head of Military Cooperation Division<sup>2</sup>.

Without being a scholarly paper or a handbook on how NATO works, the volume presents, in

304 pages, a polyptych of the nearly 1500 days and nights, mornings and afternoons<sup>3</sup> spent in the Shapian community<sup>4</sup> – “a modern Babylon that ends up being intelligible”.

The book is a novelty from several points of view. On the one hand, Mr Dumitrașcu is the first Romanian of the few with top assignments in the NATO hierarchy who decided to write about and publish the experience acquired during the mission. On the other hand, the originality of the paper resides in the style in which it is written, blending in a very pleasant and attractive manner the military and the literary components. The book brings together elements connected to NATO mechanisms and functioning, elements of geopolitics, episodes of lived history, lessons of intercultural communication and reflections on life that are filled with sensitivity, wisdom and emotion, triggered by various happenings.

The tome is structured in ten chapters, with short titles, formulated in a simple manner, that make one think we are dealing with a fiction novel: *The Beginning; On the Beauty of Wandering; On Pride and other Feelings; On Wars; On Power and Unhappy Events; NATO, on the Inside; Wandering on the Globe; Life, Seen Differently; Almost Miraculous Meetings; The End*. The subtitles represent metaphors full of meaning. Among them, I mention: *Strangled holidays; Transatlantic Epaulets; Convalescent Wounds; Homeland of the Name or the Name of Homeland; On Operational Baptisms; Defence, Common Menu; Through the*

<sup>1</sup> Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

<sup>2</sup> NATO Cooperation with non-Member States.

<sup>3</sup> As the author writes, Ion Dumitrașcu, *Ultima misiune*, Editura Luxlibris, Brașov, 2014, p. 301.

<sup>4</sup> Term forged from the SHAPE acronym.

*\* Expert within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: rapan.daniela@unap.ro*



---

## BOOK REVIEW

---

*Powder Keg of the Balkans; Moving Friendships.*

The volume includes the three components of life: the one related to work, leisure time and the mental plan/reflections.

As far as the professional plan – office work and representation activities – the stories that we are told encompass a lot of meaning, being some lessons learned by the author that can be of use to the reader as well. The author, modest and honest, shares not only the successful experiences, but also his more or less minor failures.

Throughout the lecture, we are introduced in the caste of NATO analysts and decision-makers, in the decisional and bureaucratic labyrinth, in the Alliance jargon, chapter by chapter discovering aspects related to the way in which were taken part of the decisions that to some extent also affected us Romanians<sup>5</sup>. Taking into account the strategic level of the mission, we notice the balance that the author manages to keep between what can and what cannot be told, but also the ability to induce implied meaning<sup>6</sup>. Thus, we find out elements of Allied protocol as well as backstage decisional aspects. We also take part in socio-cultural events from the Shapian life, we witness the author's meetings with civilian or military highrank officials from within NATO, the Member States or from Partner States, including royalties. At the same, the officials are also depicted at informal social events such as sport competitions, cosmopolite parties such as *Open House*, Universal Children's Day<sup>7</sup>, Belgian Carnival in March and many more.

The reflection passages have, in turn, different inflexions: some are melancholic, expressing the longing for home, others are veracities or lessons for life. While reading the book – which, unfortunately, is not accessible in a large number of printed copies, but can be lectured on-line on virtual libraries, I marked such memorable passages. Among these, I quote only one:

*I learned that not all truths are told by generals, that humiliation does not underrate epaulets' size, that friendship goes beyond ranks or age. I learned from those around me and especially from own mistakes that life is too short to be wasted by being unhappy, that today is unique, that tomorrow is already too late<sup>8</sup>.*

The end of the book brings a nostalgic, somehow self-critique wave, from the perspective of an author with a daring spirit, involved and wishing to overcome obstacles that hinder the optimal and rapid solution<sup>9</sup>.

If I were to put a label on this book in terms of its genre, I would describe it as a *bildungsroman* for officers, but also a kaleidoscope book, whose lecture is not just useful, but also extremely pleasant, by the end, the reader being happy and grateful for having met this good Romanian and Military and feeling richer in spirit. Thus, the book is not only recommended to future diplomats, but to anyone acting in the military field.

All these being said, I invite you to accompany, in your turn, Commodore Dumitrașcu in this truly unique Mission.

---

<sup>5</sup> See the brief presentation of the book on the site of The General Staff of Naval Forces, <http://m.navy.ro/texte/03071401.html>

<sup>6</sup> As Maj.Gen. (Ret.) Iordache Olaru writes in the Introduction of the book.

<sup>7</sup> Established by the UN on November, 20, <http://www.un.org/en/events/childrenday/>

---

<sup>8</sup> Ion Dumitrașcu, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>9</sup> Ion Dumitrașcu, *op.cit.*, p. 11.



# STRATEGIES XXI INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

**- The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment -  
25-26 November 2014**

## **The importance of conference and the goals pursued**

The series of international scientific conference STRATEGIES XXI is a tradition not only for the National Defence University academic life, but for the whole Romanian academic community. The interest for security and defence issues is, for a long time, more than a concern of the military education system; one can notice an ever stronger orientation from the civilian university on these matters, like the ones pursued by the University of Bucharest, “Alma Mater” University from Sibiu, Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, the National School for Political Studies and Public Administration, “Spiru Haret” University, “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, Craiova University, but also the Base University, for example.

Also, at the conference took part representatives from the Romanian Presidency, the Government, Romanian Academy, National Anti-Drug Agency, Emergency Inspectorate, Romanian Intelligence Service, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Police Academy, “Mihai Viteazu” National Intelligence Academy, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Institute for Political Defense Studies and Military History, Morgenthau Center, Association of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, the Bar of Bucharest etc.

The 2014 edition of the Conference on “The Complexity and dynamism of the security environment” is the 12<sup>th</sup> organized by the Center for Defense and Security Strategic Studies. The main goal of this event is to bring at the same table of debates military and civilian experts to analyze with objectivity and in an interdisciplinary manner the newest events and tendencies of the international security environment.

Beyond this interdisciplinary nature of the conference, we wish to underline its international trait. At this edition, we were honored by the presence of our partners from Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Republic of Moldova, with whom we have a long and beneficial cooperative relationship.

Thus, our hope for achieving the goals of this scientific event are subordinated to the necessity of coopting in the research efforts of the experts and practitioners in the security and defence, considering that the issued approached in the conference are essential for understanding the phenomena of contemporary security.

The novelty of this edition, has two aspects. First, it is about the subjects discussed – latest events and some of the most innovative theoretical approaches.





Second, but not the least, it is about the integration of these series of conference in a top priority program for our university, called “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of *Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security* – Continuous formation program for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”, undertaken by the National Defence University in partnership with the Police Academy “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, The Association of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning and the Royal Strategic Studies Institute – CRISMART from Sweden, and cofinanced by the Operational Sectorial Program for the Development of Human Resources 2007-2013. From this point of view, at the conference took part PhD and postdoctoral researchers from the National Defence University and its partners.

### **Conclusions following the debates**

We notice the youth`s growing interest in this domains, but not only this, also their highest level of expertise.

The approaches brought by our external partners from the Czech Republic and Hungary regarding their behavior inside NATO reflected specific transformative processed, but also common elements which can be identified in the Romanian case.

Very new issues, like the situation in Ukraine, the influence of non-state actors on the international security environment, like ISIS, provoked live debates and very different approaches.

The scientific exploration of issues like hybrid warfare, the right of intervention or humanitarian intervention was also approached in the debates.

In this context, the dialogue and the exchanges occasioned by the conference were contributing, without doubt, to the efforts undertaken for knowing, understanding and communicating constructive ideas and opinions. One could notice logical but also polemical arguments, specific to a scientific debate, which brought a touch of originality, being seen as attempts to suggest food for future thought.

*CDSSS team*  
*Translation in English by Mihai Zodian*

## THE CDSSS AGENDA

OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2014

During this period, within the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, a series of studies were published: “Advantages and disadvantages of NATO and EU policies on the Pooling and Sharing of military capabilities assigned for deployment and support of the armed forces and their implications on regional and global security” (Mirela Atanasiu PhD, Mihai Zodian PhD, Florin Cîrciumaru PhD); “Comparative analysis on the military strategic objectives of NATO and CIS/CSTO member states (Alexandra Sarcinschi PhD); “Terrorism - the shadowy evil of the century beginning” (Mirela Atanasiu PhD, Lucian Stăncilă PhD) and “Possible consequences of restricting access to resources in the European area (Cristian Băhnăreanu PhD, Alexandra Sarcinschi PhD).



We also want to announce our readers that, starting this scholarly year, CDSSS is organizing monthly lectures at the National Military Center. At these activities, the Center’s researchers will present papers on various interesting and actual themes, followed by a Q&A session. They are meant to stimulate interactivity, debating and opinion’s exchange between anyone interested in security, defense and international relations domains.

The first two lectures took place, during this period, on the following issues: “Terrorist action’s asymmetry”, by Mirela Atanasiu PhD and “Crimeea 2014 – between strategic shock and strategic surprise” by the Center for Defence and



Security Strategic Studies director, Stan Anton PhD.

The traditional International Scientific Conference, STRATEGIE XXI with the theme *The Complexity and the dynamic nature of the security environment* took place in 25-26 November. During this activity, lectures were presented by representatives of “Carol I” National Defence University leadership, Presidential Administration, the Ministry of National Defence, of the Center for Security Studies and Military Strategies from the National Defense University in Brno (Czech Republic), from the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies in Budapest (Hungary) and “Alexandru cel Bun” Military Academy in Chişinău (Republic of Moldova).

At the conference were presented communications by representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Romanian Intelligence Service and of various civil research institutes and universities from Romania.

More details can be found in the “Scientific event” heading. The lectures main points were the ones regarding the role played by non-state actors in the power relations configurations at the beginning of the XXI century, security transformation, the strategic theory and practice, the military organization’s modernization and the cybernetic conflicts. Also, there were debated issues like new elements in the international security environment’s evolution, the power equilibrium in the context of international relations changes, potential risks and threats for the security environment or perspectives for multinational cooperation in the defence sector. The lectures stimulated intense discussions, which made a contribution to the efforts for understanding, explaining and for the dissemination of some constructive ideas and opinions.

On the CDSSS 2015 agenda, one can find two workshops: one in 26 March, dedicated to young strategists, with the theme “Nonproliferation and disarmament” and the other, on 8 October, on “Romanian Army’s Modernization. Capabilities, tactics, strategy”. For December 2015, the Center plans a symposium on “Atypical conflicts of the XXI Century”.

The most important scientific manifestation, the international scientific conference STRATEGIES XXI with the theme *The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment*, will take place on 11-12 June 2015. Anyone interested can register to this activity. Detailed information can be found on Conference site <http://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/ro/conferinte-strategii-xxi/centrul-de-studii-strategie-de-aparare-si-securitate> or on the CDSS web address <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

**Irina TĂTARU**  
**English translation by Mihai Zodian**

*\*Irina TĂTARU is expert with the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania E-mail: [tataru.irina@unap.ro](mailto:tataru.irina@unap.ro)*



## GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual academic journal *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

**ARTICLE LENGTH** may vary between 6-12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

### ARTICLE STRUCTURE

- Title (centred, capital, bold characters).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD. title or PhD. candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
  - A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters)
  - 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters)
  - Introduction / preliminary considerations
  - 2 - 4 chapters (subchapters if applicable)
  - Conclusions.
  - Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format as well. Below there will be mentioned "Table no. 1, title" / "Figure no. 1 title" and the source, if applicable.
  - REFERENCES shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of footnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

*Example of book:* Joshua S. Goldstein; Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010, pp. 356-382.

*Example of article:* Gheorghe Calopăreanu, "Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union" in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University.

*Electronic sources* shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year). *Example of article:* John N. NIELSEN, "Strategic Shock in North Africa", in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at <http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/>, accessed on 10.03.2014.

- BIBLIOGRAPHY shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

*Example of book:* GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010.

*Example of article:* CALOPĂREANU, Gheorghe, "Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union" in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University.

*Electronic sources* shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents.





**SELECTION CRITERIA** are the following: the theme of the article must be in line with the subjects dealt by the journal: up-to-date topics related to political-military aspects, security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence; the quality of the scientific content; originality of the paper; novelty character – it should not have been previously published; a relevant bibliography comprising recent and prestigious specialized works; English language has to correspond to academic standards; adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the journal. Editors reserve the right to request authors or to make any changes considered necessary.

**SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION PROCESS** is developed according to the principle *double blind peer review*, by university teaching staff and scientific researchers with expertise in the field of the article. The author's identity is not known by evaluators and the name of the evaluators is not made known to authors. Authors are informed of the conclusions of the evaluation report, which represent the argument for accepting/rejecting an article. Consequently to the evaluation, there are three possibilities: a) the article is accepted for publication as such or with minor changes; b) the article may be published if the author makes recommended improvements (of content or of linguistic nature); c) the article is rejected. Previous to scientific evaluation, articles are subject to an *antiplagiarism analysis*.

**DEADLINES:** authors will send their articles in English to the editor's e-mail address, [impactstrategic@unap.ro](mailto:impactstrategic@unap.ro), according to the following time schedule: 15 December (no. 1); 15 March (no. 2); 15 June (no. 3) and 15 September (no. 4). If the article is accepted for publication, an integral translation of the article for the Romanian edition of the journal will be provided by the editor.

**NOTA BENE:** Articles shall not contain classified information.

Authors are fully responsible for their articles' content, according to the provisions of *Law no. 206/2004 regarding good conduct in scientific research, technological development and innovation*.

Published articles are subject to the Copyright Law. All rights are reserved to "Carol I" National Defence University, irrespective if the whole material is taken into consideration or just a part of it, especially the rights regarding translation, re-printing, re-use of illustrations, quotes, dissemination by mass-media, reproduction on microfilms or in any other way and stocking in international data bases. Any reproduction is authorized without any afferent fee, provided that the source is mentioned.

***Failing to comply with these rules shall trigger article's rejection. Sending an article to the editor implies the author's agreement on all aspects mentioned above.***

For more details on our publication, you can access our site, <http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm> or contact the editors at [impactstrategic@unap.ro](mailto:impactstrategic@unap.ro).

**“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING HOUSE**

Director: Colonel Alexandru STOICA, PhD Lecturer

Layout: Liliana ILIE

The publication consists of 142 pages.

***“Carol I” National Defence University Printing House***

Panduri Street, no. 68-72, sector 5, București

e-mail [editura@unap.ro](mailto:editura@unap.ro)

Tel: 021/319.40.80/453

Fax: 021/319.59.69