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EDITOR'S NOTE

Dear collaborators and readers,

The current edition – the third this year – subscribes to the usual thematic of the publication, also including some of the works presented at *The Workshop for Young Strategists “Romanian Geopolitics and Geostrategy. Tradition and Modernity”*, organised by CDSSS on May 29, 2014. Thus, at the section dedicated to this activity, we present you a first article which approaches the theme of geopolitics and geostrategy from the perspective of political-military topicality –“Geopolitics of the Wider Black Sea Area after Ukraine Crisis”, signed by Mr. Iulian Chfu PhD, while, in the next paper, Mr. Florin Diaconu PhD approaches the issue of geopolitics and geostrategy from a historical perspective, analysing “The History of Romanian Geopolitics and Geostrategy: some Really Important Episodes.”

Further, at the section *Political-military topicality*, the undersigned presents “Afghanistan National Security Coordinates within the Official Closing of the NATO ISAF Mission”, given the fact that this event is part of an extended series of changes that impose continuous adaptation of the Alliance to the dynamics of the terms in which international security is defined. There follows a paper which discusses the “New Terrorist Challenges in the Sinai Peninsula – Prominent Jihadist Organisations”, signed by two Hungarian academics, Mr. János Besenyő PhD and Mr. Zoltán Prantner PhD.

At the section: *security and military*, we propose a material which approaches from a theoretical perspective the major threat represented by the contemporary crisis for international peace and security, signed by Ms. Adriana Sauliuc, and another applied one which brings to the fore “Balochistan and its Geostrategic Potential in Southern Asia”, research realised by Mr. Demostene-Dorinel Gheorghe.

Within the section *Analyses, syntheses, evaluations*, the theme of terrorism is approached from another angle through the article of Mr. Anghel Andreescu PhD and Mr. Marius Cătălin Balaban, which propose a trans-disciplinary analysis of the suicidal terrorism. Further, Mr. Lucian Ștefan Cozma advocates for “The Importance of Organising a National Agency for Defence against Unconventional and Asymmetric Actions”.

Last, but not least is the analysis dedicated to the controversial aspect of strengthening EU integration, in the democratic European version, from the perspective of Ms. Mădălina Antonescu PhD.



STRATEGIC IMPACT

For this autumnal edition, Mr. Mihai Zodian PhD, advances, at the section: *Book review*, three books about The World War I: “1913”, by Charles Emmerson, “The Sleep Walkers”, signed by Christopher Clark and “Inventing the Schlieffen Plan”, by Terence Zuber. The reviews are grouped under the title “In the Shadow of the Past: World War I and the Contemporary World”.

As always, our colleague, Irina Tătaru, has realised the CDSSS Agenda, which makes a review of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies activities for the July-September 2014 period.

In closing of the edition, we present a series of conclusions resulted from the *scientific event* initially mentioned, the Workshop for Young Strategists with the theme “Romanian Geopolitics and Geostrategy. Tradition and Modernity”.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is a publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to The National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

For thirty years, the publication has been appearing in Romanian language and for nine years in English language and has been approaching a complex thematic – political-military actuality, strategy of security, military strategy, NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions, the issue of peace and the war of future, informational society, elements and aspects regarding the information community. The readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations at strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional, global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication’s scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), but also by the presence in virtual catalogues of libraries in prestigious institutions abroad, such as NATO and universities with military profile in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

Strategic Impact journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in the main institutions involved in security and defence, scientific and academic environment in the country and abroad – in Europe, Asia, America.

In the end, I express my confidence that our readers will find extremely useful and relevant articles included in this edition.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD.
Editor in Chief
Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

GEOPOLITICS OF THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA AFTER UKRAINE CRISIS

*Iulian CHIFU, PhD**

The crisis in Ukraine has created a new opportunity for the revision of the thoughts that we've once had on the future of the World Order. As Fukuyama revised his idea about the End of history¹, we are now confronted again with the situation of an end of the holiday that stability and peace offered at a large respect in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The "holiday" is over and we're back to the old power politics. In this context, there is a full revision of what continues to stand from the general theories and our ways of seeing the world, from globalization, post-modern soft power, influence and transformative power of the EU in the borderlands, the liberal approach of the security through interdependence, and the fall onto a new era of geopolitics and realpolitik.

The data was there, we just didn't want to accept that the retreat of the Russian Federation from the CFE Treaty in 2007, or the Russian Georgian War in 2008, or even the annexation of Crimea in February 2014 will through us in a new inter-war period once we took note of the speech of President Putin, 18th of March 2014, on the long term project that he is offering to the Russian people, but also to Russians, Russian speakers, "compatriots" in the neighboring independent states.

Back to square one, we've taken on our desks

¹ Francis FUKUYAMA, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, Free Press, 1992.

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the books of Geopolitics and Realism in International Relations and we are looking into the evolution to decide if we are moving towards a revisionism in international affairs – renegotiating security in Europe, a transformative system – keeping just the few rules that survived to the new type of post-Cold War Wars, an adaptative system of the existing rules, accepting that what happens in the post Soviet space is a "special case", to be considered under different type of glasses, respecting the exceptionalism and the interests of a once again strong Russian actor in Europe or should we stand in the orthodoxy of the International Law, meaning respecting rules, norms and principles that offered more or less peace in Europe and the World after WWII, 1948, the creation of the UN, 1975 and Helsinki Final Act, 1991 the Chart of Paris for a New Europe, 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Keywords: globalisation, post-modernism, soft power, security through interdependence, revisionism, future new world order.

Post Modern Order: Transformative Influence and EU Soft Power in the Borderlands

EU considered and developed its most important policy – the enlargement – in the last 20 years or so. First, it developed a tremendous attraction, in tandem with NATO, for the post-

socialist countries in Eastern Europe that had left the Soviet bloc with the will for their citizens to move towards liberty, democracy and prosperity in Western Style. Thus, a real soft power² was created and the support of the EU and NATO for this journey towards norms, rules and institutions in “Western style” succeeded in making the transformation from a centralised state planned economy with authoritarian if not dictatorships into a market economy, democratic states, with a development of the rule of law, subject to an intensive Security Sector Reform, civilian control of arm forces and intelligence institutions formed after the reform of the former political police of the socialist states.

This tremendous journey is not over yet since, on one side democracy developed and it is doing so in a continuous way to an irreversibility of the regime to grant peace and prosperity to the citizens and since parts of the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, fight against corruption and rules of incompatibility of business, interests and politics lay behind in this institutional development. Moreover, it has been proved that after good governance as part of a more perfected democracy, fight against corruption and clear rules for political activities are needed not only in Eastern Europe, in the new member states, but also in the core of Europe, in some founding countries of the original European Communities.

Enlargement and this transformative power of EU played an important role in Europe for the new member countries, but also for the borderlands. The countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy in the East of the continent, at the contiguous border, and then in the Eastern Partnership, were subject of this same attraction by the EU, but were not offered the perspective of integration. The original idea came from Barry Buzan’s approach that where there is a huge difference at the border, there are grounds for conflicts, and, *per a contrario*, if there are the same rules, norms, level of economic developments, no big differences, possibility to travel and trade, the space for conflicts is very low³. A

2 Robert KEOHANE, Joseph NYE, *Putere și interdependență*, Iași, Polirom Publishinghouse, 2009.

3 Barry BUZAN, *Poșoarele, statele și frica. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după*

post-modern approach for a post-modern actor, the EU, but also a liberal approach of the security through interdependence⁴.

Basically, the EU offered through ENP money and knowhow for the transformation of the normative system towards a democratic one and then selective access to the common market. Then, in the Eastern Partnership, the offer was far more concrete and targeted, special changes for the liberalisation of visas and access to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area of the EU, so more access to the common market, but under the rules of competition, and access to travel visa free if rules of security are observed and no excess for immigration appear.

The transformative power of the EU was even more important after the Ukrainian crisis. We’ve seen how corruption, vulnerabilities, real holes in the sustainability of the state that not only local oligarchs, but also foreign interests are using could turn apart a country. Ukraine proved to be a vulnerable state way beyond its capability or preparedness including in the security sector once politicization, corruption, influence altered its institutions. And the EU learned the hard way that those vulnerabilities experienced by Ukraine are easy to be identified in the Republic of Moldova or Georgia, the most advanced states in signing the Association Agreement, as some EU member states could also have such vulnerabilities. Basically, in the case of Ukraine, the oligarchs’ democracy proved to be a cancer for the Ukrainian state including in the security and defence sector.

So the post-modern model was also shaken with full strength by the reality. Moreover, after the economic crisis in Europe, and the emergence of a high number of eurosceptic, populist, xenophobic, anti-immigration anti-system parties with representation in the European Parliament, there’s a high possibility that the appetite of the

Războiul Rece, Chișinău, Cartier Publishinghouse, Ediția 2014.

4 Security through interdependence – a liberal approach, which states that security is higher when there’s a high number of common interests and a lot of mutual relations between two actors. If there are too many interests, it means that this prevents conflicts, because there is a lot to lose from this interdependence which is mutually profitable. See below note 23.

EU to move ahead with enlargement or interest in its neighbourhood to be much more reduced in the future, so it will be up to the Eastern Partnership states themselves to push for reforms, to ask for knowhow and technical support, then to prove that they did fulfil the needed changes and meet the criteria for moving closer to applying for EU membership. But the perspective should be there, as a guiding line for a possible future.

Russian Geopolitics: the New Realpolitik of Exceptionalism in Territorial Claims

Russian Geopolitics today is taking the shape of new old-forms of territorial control and the “near abroad”⁵ on behalf of “defending Russians, Russian speakers and compatriots”⁶ with an ideology of “Lebensraum”⁷ drawn from classic books of German geopolitics and geopolitical motivations dating back to Catherine the Great and lessons learned of the burning of Moscow by Tatar troops. Thus, because the area is a flat plain, with little geographic advantages to prevent the advance of an army to the capital, Russia has faced, throughout history, the inability to remove the army outside the city gates and combat

5 Notion introduced by Andrei KOZYREV, the Russian foreign minister, see Dr. Kaare Dahl MARTINSEN, *The Russian-Belarusian Union and the Near Abroad*, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, June 2002, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/martinsen.pdf>, accessed on 1 May 2014; Russia marks the alleged right to have a saying in the region see Robert KAGAN, “New Europe, Old Russia”, *The Washington Post*, February 6, 2008, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502879.html>, accessed on 1 May 2014; About Putin Doctrine in close proximity, Iulian CHIFU (editor) 2004. *Republic of Moldova – The antidemocratic Slipping of the Loud Governance*, București, Politeia-SNSPA Publishinghouse, 448 p.

6 David D. LAITIN, *Identity in Formation: Russian Speaking Population in the Near Abroad*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998. See also Iulian CHIFU, *The Post Space – In Search of Identity* (bilingual edition), Bucharest, Politeia –SNSPA Publishinghouse, 2005.

7 Lebensraum – or the theory of the “vital space”, the living “necessary” space policy promoted by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party who said that, after the Treaty of Versailles the country did not have not enough space to feed and host the large German nation, so that triggered expansionism in World War II. Detail in Stephen J. LEE, *Europe, 1890-1945*, London, Psychology Press, 2000, p. 237.

invading troops away from the bosom of power⁸. Therefore it needs space.

Today, new technologies render space almost useless, easily overcome in a matter of minutes by intercontinental missiles, supersonic aircrafts or airborne troops. It is true that there is still use for corridors, rights to fly or use of bases and military facilities – see the case of Incirlic⁹ in the war in Iraq when the refusal to use the US base in Turkey resulted in changing tactics and attacking from only one direction, or that of the Manas¹⁰ base in the war in Afghanistan. But Russia’s propensity to geopolitics, in particular, and realpolitik, in general, is of present interest. When you add the relapse into early 20th century nationalism, revisionism and complete ignorance of the rules of international law (or their disguise into the model of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, combined with the experiences of frozen conflicts) we deal with the current threat of re-discussing and redrawing the borders of Eastern Europe.

Current events in Ukraine bring us to a contemporary reality that we would not have otherwise guessed. It is true that there have always been objections to the thesis of defending “Russians, Russians speakers and compatriots”¹¹ because it exceeds by far defending their rights within the state in which they lived, with respect for borders and for the rules of international law. It went towards a claim of paternity in defending all Russian speakers and, in fact, “compatriots”, i.e. all former residents of the Soviet empire.

When defending them actually requires the use of armed force against another State, we are already outside of UN rules of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all the countries. The March 18th 2014 speech of President Putin reminds many post-socialist countries the claims of another era when the land where nationals and associated live is due to become part of the kin state or that there is

8 George Friedman, *Russian Geopolitics*, Stratfor, 2009.

9 U.S. base in Turkey for which the host State did not give its consent for use during the war in Iraq in 2003.

10 Manas Air Base, Alamudun, Kyrgyzstan, has been used by U.S. troops until its control was returned to local authorities in 2014, when the role was taken over transit centre airport MK, Constanța.

11 David D LAITIN, 1998, *op. cit.* See also Iulian CHIFU, 2005, *op. cit.*

an exception from the international rules that the power and military force are imposing. The return to the policies of force or to the exceptionalism in international affairs and especially in Europe is against the basic rules of the security and borders in Europe, and the Sudeten German model or that of “Austrian brothers” for the occupation of Czechoslovakia or the Austrian Anschluss memories are back, reading Putin’s statement, a real project for the “new Russia” where any state that does not respect the “right of observance” and the veto to its security and economic policies by Russia becomes subject to its military capabilities.

This is a vision and a long term project of Russia in its neighbourhood which comes back to the idea of Spheres of influence and the rational of geopolitics of Russia who needs space and nations/states with limited sovereignty in order to “defend its interests”. The only solutions that Putin’s Russia offers in the post-cold war era is, basically, a return to the Cold War and a nationalistic Russia that defends its co-citizens or “compatriots” in the former USSR wherever they are, using all the means including military ones and challenging the will of the people and states to choose their solution of security and their option for prosperity.

If we add to this the creation of the military doctrine¹² on the same basis and also mention that Russia announced it assumes the use of nuclear weapons in conventional regional wars that affect its “fundamental interests”, negative signals of revisionism have long been on the map.

Russia has orchestrated numerous “conflicts” in the Soviet period and that is how “frozen conflicts” appeared. Newly independent states gained strategic separatist areas – Transdnier, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia – with frozen conflicts in which Russia supplies at the same time the basis for separatism, the role of mediator as well as that of guarantor in order to resolve the conflict – which is never resolved –, but offers Moscow levers in all of these countries. Subsequently, the citizens of these regions have

acquired Russian citizenship en mass and have automatically become subjects of the future doctrine of defending Russians, Russian speakers and compatriots, thus creating a self-assumed right to military intervention by Russia.

In 2008, Russia attacked a neighbour for the first time after the Cold War, occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia, one step away from occupying Tbilisi and almost taking down the recalcitrant pro-European leader of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili. The two regions were unilaterally recognized as independent states, they were militarized and occupied by Russian troops in what constituted a first reply to the “threat to the fundamental interests”¹³ and to NATO’s closeness to the borders of the Russian Federation, as NATO was considered, in the same military doctrine, the main threat to Russia’s security.

Finally, today’s Ukrainian episode raises the threat that Russia brings to security and peace in the world to a higher level. Here too we can speak about the vocation for posterity that haunts a leader who said the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe for Russia in the last century – we are talking about Vladimir Putin and his integration projects for the post Soviet space – the Customs Union Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Union, both projects intrinsically dependent on Ukraine joining them.

The “pro-European” revolt in Ukraine was named so simply because its trigger was an opaque 180-degrees-turn – the decision of President Viktor Yanukovich and a majority made up of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party – before Vilnius, when the pro-European orientation turned into a “pause” in negotiations. Later, the constraint that the Ukrainian establishment had suffered became obvious, as did the road to the Eurasian Union and the strong comeback to the Russian orbit. Pro-European protests immediately added a strong Ukrainian nationalist footprint – which otherwise could become the largest Eurosceptic and anti-European basis, in other conditions.

12 Steven J. BLANCK, *Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defence Doctrine*, Institute for Strategic Studies, available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1050.pdf>, accessed on April 23 2014.

13 Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI, Oleksandr SUSHKO, *The Russian-Georgian War. A cognitive institutional approach of the crisis decision-making*, Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishinghouse, 2009.



We dealt with a popular uprising in Kiev with a deep nationalist base that embraced and supported the post-Vilnius pro-European wave in order to counter the neo-imperialism and neo-Russian expansionism. The uprising in Kiev is of the same type as the “Arab spring” in terms of countering an authoritarian regime; it is not a type of peaceful “colour revolution” the era of which has ended. The philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi’s peaceful uprising which was efficient during the colour revolutions could no longer work in a system that had already learned its lesson and that ignored democratic rules.

The nationalist component, as ideological support, and a violent expression as a means of fighting, created the pressure required to cause a change in Kiev and the Agreement of February 21. Without violence, combat capability and deterrence, the Maidan would have been shattered. Even like this, there still were officially 100 victims. The February 21 Agreement could not be maintained because it contained no taking of responsibility for the fires shot towards the demonstrators. The agreement was useless because of the pressure of the Maidan and because Yanukovych ran away.

Ukraine remains with two fundamental problems: hard economic situation and the division of the population into pro-Europeans, anti-Russian nationalists (the first two now allies) and pro-Russians. But in the context of subsequent events, the occupation of Crimea by Russian forces and the attempt to destabilize Eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian cohesion has become much stronger in the face of a common enemy than rivalries between groups: over 140 deputies of the Party of Regions – which brought support to 386 votes out of 450 in the current Verkhovna Rada – voted for the new Yatseniuk government and for the impeachment of the runaway president (also making it possible to take notice that the President left his position and to find his control of the Ukrainian state illegitimate). February 18 to 22 was an episode equivalent in magnitude to the fall of the Berlin Wall and it meant the breaking away of Ukraine from its Eurasian path.

In this context we witnessed the Russian military intervention. Russia interpreted these events from a geopolitical point of view, seeing the loss

of Ukraine from the new formula of Euro-Asian integration as a signal of failure of the Eurasian Union project which was supposed to be launched in early 2015. Russia acted to protect its “vital interests” and resorted to armed intervention to “defend Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine”, according to its own doctrine now elevated to the status of international norm, in what can be coined a fall into realpolitik and 20th century militarism which completely cancels international law, the inviolability of borders and almost all international documents which Russia is also part of.

The “civil” secessionist scenario in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has not worked – the Kharkov Congress¹⁴ has not taken the measure of declaring “Malorussia” or the Eastern Republic of Ukraine with Viktor Yanukovych as President. Subsequently the scenario of Taiwan was lost as well – with a President-elect a refugee in Sevastopol (he gave the decree to move the entire administrative powers in Crimea) and the creation of a new government. The main reason was the discrediting of Viktor Yanukovych due to the fact that he was abandoned by his Party of Regions, which voted for the Yatseniuk Government, and to his fleeing to Russia.

Russia has used the Transnistria scenario: a breakaway region with “self-defence forces”, protected by Russian troops (supplemented to the maximum, formally because of the agreement in Kiev in 1997 regarding the stationing of troops). It is not certain if we have overcome the war scenario and have come to the negotiating table: Putin has not achieved his objectives; the pressure on the Crimean military is high, a war can be triggered at any moment, even by chance or accident – at the time this article is being written negotiations and dialog for de-escalation

14 The Kharkiv Congress of deputies of all levels brought together representatives from the Eastern regions of Ukraine and Crimea and had to decide, on February 22, the creation of autonomous regions of Southeast Ukraine and a referendum on breaking away from Ukraine and joining Russia. Viktor Yanukovych was supposed to take part in the Congress. The resolution did not contain these provisions and the leaders of the rebellion, the chief of the Kharkiv region and the mayor of Harkiv fled to Russia. Later, on return, the originator of separatism, “popular governor” Donetsk region, Pavel Gubarev was arrested.

of conflict have not been accepted or are being postponed.

There are fundamental differences between the crisis in Crimea and frozen conflicts: not a shot has been fired, there are Ukrainian troops with equipment and weapons in Crimea and at sea (it is the only case of “frozen conflict” where the region is at an open sea) loyal to the government in Kiev, there is pro-Ukrainian anti-separatist Tatar minority (a minority that was deported by the Russians/Stalin in Uzbekistan in Stalinist times and returned to their hometowns in an independent Ukraine after 1991).

The side effects of military aggression against Ukraine in Crimea are that the Yatseniuk Government has become cohesive, representative and stronger and welded the relationship between the political opposition and new political figures given by the Maidan. Militarized anarchy has disappeared (paramilitary groups and militias with different agendas), as did the control over the Government and its policies by the Maidan. Events in Crimea led to efforts to unite all Ukrainians facing the crisis – the Maidan, the former political opposition / currently in power and the Party of Regions.

Additionally, Russia has definitively lost “Free Ukraine” – after the Crimea episode¹⁵, both oligarchs (some of them appointed governors in the East) and the Party of Regions rejected association with Russia in any form. Regaining it can only be achieved by military occupation or the imposition of new leaders and Viktor Yanukovich has completely lost legitimacy in Ukraine.

Maybe it is worth mentioning here why the Malorussia scenario or that of the Republic of South-Eastern Ukraine did not work. I think there are some elements to be decrypted here: the association of the pro-Russian project with Viktor Yanukovich was not good news, the president was not even loved in his own party because he had taken over it with the Family group at

the expense of old activists; second, because oligarchs were no longer following his lead or feared his habit of taking over their businesses or creating the business competition-monopoly that bankrupted them.

Against this background, there comes the second big assessment mistake made by Russia: that the Russian Ukrainians can hardly wait to live in Russia. It turned out that they embraced the adage “better be first in a village than second in Rome”; moreover, after the occupation of Crimea, groups of “Russian tourists”, agitators who attempted to takeover regions of Eastern Ukraine managed to involve only small groups of people; furthermore, there were confrontations with Russian Ukrainians outraged by the occupation of Crimea.

The scenario for Crimea is more radical than that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, i.e. the recognition as states and *de facto* occupation: in this case, Crimea proclaimed itself a state, it is joining Russia and Russia’s Parliament consented to this gesture of territorial change, a step that was to be recorded by law. That way, Crimea becomes part and subject of the Russian Federation.

But it didn’t stop there: Eastern Ukraine was back under assault and with Russian troops at the border, thousands of military trained groups well armed and well trained in Russia, thousands of mercenaries, paramilitaries and soldiers of fortune from Russia inserted in Eastern Ukraine, a real war has been forged on Ukrainian soil with a low possibility for a credible denial from Moscow in those actions on the ground. All came with the support of some 20% of the local population drawn first under the idea of more money and more power to the regions, then to autonomy, finally to independence and to joining Russia. But no public support was proved, with “referendums” where 32% participated in Donetsk and 24% in Lughansk (30% in Crimea with 50% of the “voters” for the independence, for being strictly clear on this matter) even though those “referendums” took part in an occupied militarised environment and under huge pressure.

15 Iulian CHIFU, “The New Old Russian Geopolitics, the temptation of nationalism and the search for a new identity”, in *Infosfera*, No. 1, Year VI, Spring Edition, Bucharest, Edited by General Directorate for Defense Intelligence, DGIA, 2014, pp. 9-22.

**Towards the Future New World Order:
Revisionism, Transformative System,
Adaptative System of the Existing Rules
or Orthodoxy of the International Law**

Now what's new for the international law, norms and rules, what is the future that such developments are offering? I don't know if we can talk about genuine revisionism, imperial dreams, ignoring the rules or if Russia is just playing for a renegotiation of its position in Europe or in the world, claiming this new revival and global ambition. But the basic instruments of international law and all the agreements in this area are put at stake, and the general perception is that Russia is no longer a strategic partner, but a strategic competitor, rival or even enemy. And this perception in Eastern Europe, at the borders of the EU and NATO is playing an important role that no politician, local or European, can ignore.

Another global harm is the challenge to an instrument of non-proliferation like the guarantees for territorial integrity of the states that give up nuclear weapons. The 1994 Budapest Agreement stated Ukraine joining the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and giving up its nuclear weapons, transferred to Russia, against a guarantee of security and territorial integrity. With its move in Crimea and Western Ukraine, as through its direct official statements, Russia blows up this instrument that could be used by the international community in the cases of Iran or North Korea. It's another fundamental harm to the security and arm control system of the world.

If this is the case, it would be complicated to explain to the public that we are able to have a spiritualised border between the Western European World and Russia. The idea that Russia is going to embrace European norms and rules failed during Medvedev's presidency, as "sovereign democracy" took over, but even this new system was not enough; it is not about an alternative to the democracy and Western world, not only about the perception of insecurity with NATO getting closer to Russia's borders, but about EU as well, about free trade areas that would attract post-soviet states in the "interest area" of Russia.

So the Russian annexation of Crimea and the

military aggression in Eastern Ukraine via proxies are creating the sense of the need for a new strong border, enforced border, containment border between East and West, a new line of division, wherever this line could run –the Eastern border of Ukraine, closer to Kiev or at the Eastern border of the EU and NATO. The sense of the enemy at the gates is very present in Eastern Europe and that's a fact of life nobody could reject.

Second, there's a sense of limits of the *security through interdependence*. Interdependence is a liberal approach¹⁶, which states that security is higher when there's a high number of common interests and a lot of mutual relations between two actors. If there are too many interests, it means that this prevents conflicts, because there is a lot to lose from this interdependence which is mutually profitable.

This first solution comes from the conjecture¹⁷ (meaning a rule that has never been proven, but neither the contrary, so it is accepted as true) that the interdependence and a higher number of relations between two countries is forging a situation where conflict is far less possible¹⁸. Conjecture also refers to the democratic paradigm¹⁹ that democratic countries are not

16 Scott BURCHILL, "Liberalismul", in Scott BURCHILL, Richard DEVETAK, Jacqui TRUE, *Teorii ale relațiilor internaționale*, translated by Ruxandra Ivan, Institutul European, Iași, 2008; Immanuel KANT, *Spre pacea eternă – un proiect filosofic*, București, All Publishinghouse, 2008; David BALDWIN, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics" în David BALDWIN (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, Columbia, 1993; Robert KEOHANE, Joseph NYE, *Putere și interdependență*, Iași, Polirom Publishinghouse, 2009.

17 A conjecture is a proposition that is unproven. Karl Popper pioneered the use of the term "conjecture" in scientific philosophy (see Karl POPPER *Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge*. London, Routledge, 2004). Conjecture is contrasted by hypothesis (hence *theory, axiom, principle*), which is a testable statement based on accepted grounds. In mathematics, a conjecture is an unproven proposition that appears correct. See SCHWARTZ JL, *Shuttling between the particular and the general: reflections on the role of conjecture and hypothesis in the generation of knowledge in science and mathematics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.

18 Mircea MALIȚA, *Zece mii de culturi, o singură civilizație spre geomodernitatea secolului XXI*, Bucharest, Nemira Publishinghouse, 1998.

19 Erik GARTZKE (1998), "Kant We All Just get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Demo-



fighting each other since they have other means to deal with their differences. Hence, the Liberal approach to the world states that interdependence is a solution for security²⁰, and we are all inclined to say that this is a reality.

The problem is if, at some point, one of the partners makes a surprise exit from observing the rules that stand at the basis of this interdependence. We never thought of a backdoor or a way out from interdependence, and when using another liberal tool, sanctions, economic and political sanctions, there is the sense that any sanctions against an interdependent partner are a sanction against ourselves. Fact is that the security through interdependence – the liberal approach –, has suffered a tremendous hit once the Ukrainian crisis erupted and sanctions have been discussed especially at the European level.

NATO is also under pressure, and has rediscovered its *raison d'être* after Afghanistan. The need to rebalance the positioning of some capabilities in the Eastern border, in order to reassure its allies is a first step, as the need to find solutions for the transfer of technology to those border states. It should find ways to cooperate with the countries in the borderlands – Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, why not, if they demand assistance.

NATO should also revise its national member states policies of selling technology and military capabilities in the neighbourhood and to third states that could become threats to some allies, beginning with Mistral, but not stopping to only one public and very visible capability. Military expenditures especially for the countries in Europe should come back to the 2% GDP convened, and that level would be used in developing territorial defence capabilities as well as expeditionary forces for NATO's missions.

It is true that here, too, there are differences of view between EU/NATO states, but Eastern European states are closer to that reality and a possible divide inside Europe is not a good step now. Moreover, there's an opportunity for a boost in European relevance at the global level if its

cratic Peace" in *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 42, No.1 (January).

²⁰ Robert KEOHANE, Joseph NYE, 2009, *op.cit.*

hard power can follow its economic power and improve once again its soft power.

NATO also has to deal with symbolic gestures, enshrined in the open door policy and enlargement. There is a need to state that this is an ongoing policy, that Russia does not have a veto inside NATO and that the Alliance policies should respond to the needs of the allies and not to the Russia's interest or Russia's will and veto.

And there's also a need for lessons learnt from the Ukrainian crisis. Here a lot has to be analysed, beginning with the vulnerabilities and fragility of the Ukrainian state and institutions, penetrated by foreign control and interests, and ending with the type of war developed in Eastern Ukraine on the ground, an insurgency war, a proxy war, an informational war, cyber war low intensity war in a charted and extremely well known environment. Lessons learnt are needed in order to avoid this type of fragility in the case of the other countries in the post-soviet space, first and foremost in countries at Russia's borders, but also in order to diminish these vulnerabilities in other countries, both in Eastern and in Western Europe.

So the solution goes more on the adaptative system rather than a transformative system, trying to preserve the existing rules and to learn the lessons of the last confrontation and challenge to the international system. It doesn't mean that we have to give up all interdependence with Russia – it's no longer feasible, and the costs are enormous, it is not realistic – and it's not about a type of new McCarthyism²¹ in Europe, chasing influences and vectors with strong relations to Russia. But the Ukrainian crisis, in a line of developments beginning with Russia's retreat from the CFE Treaty in 2007 and the Russian-

²¹ McCarthyism is the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, subversion, or treason without proper regard for evidence. It also means "the practice of making unfair allegations or using unfair investigative techniques, especially in order to restrict dissent or political criticism." The term has its origins in the period in the United States known as the Second Red Scare, lasting roughly from 1950 to 1956 and characterized by heightened political repression against communists, as well as a fear campaign spreading paranoia of their influence on American institutions and espionage by Soviet agents. Originally coined to criticize the anti-communist pursuits of U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, "McCarthyism" soon took on a broader meaning, describing the excesses of similar efforts.

Georgian war in August 2008, could not pass without consequences and adaptation of both the international system rules and European security, but also with important lessons learnt at the national level.

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THE HISTORY OF ROMANIAN GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGY: SOME REALLY IMPORTANT EPISODES

Florin DIACONU, PhD

The study explores, first of all, two different meanings of geopolitics and geostrategy: the traditional one, saying that we are speaking about a highly specialized science; and a second one, stating that there are, anytime and anywhere, not only geopolitically / geostrategically significant ideas, but also geopolitically significant activities (we call all these activities geopolitical praxis). Then, the study briefly lists the quite important number of major foreign influences which shaped, along Romania's entire history, the geopolitical praxis of the ruling elites of the states place on the territory of contemporary Romania. Then the study explores, with some details, three major episodes in the long history of geopolitical praxis on the territory of Romania. The first takes place in 292 before Christ; a second one is the astonishingly successful geostrategic activity of the Medieval prince Mircea the Elder, one of the most important Romanian princes in the Middle Ages; and the third one takes place in 1859, when Alexandru Ioan Cuza threatens, by mobilizing at Florești the armies of both Romanian principalities which had had been recently united, the strategic rear areas of the Austrian Empire, confronted at that very moment with a major war in northern Italy.

Keywords: geopolitics, geostrategy, geopolitical/geostrategic practice, threat (threatening rear areas of the enemy), strategic depth, strategic partnership, power.

Conceptual landmarks. One concept, two distinct meanings

Usually, geopolitics is defined as being *a science*: an intensely specialized domain of knowledge, which traditionally explores “the role of space and territory in international affairs”¹. For most of the contemporary authors, geopolitics is, mainly, a theoretical endeavor. In his *Introduction* to the volume called *The Geopolitical Reader*, Gearóid Ó. Tuathail says that geopolitics means “a concept” with its own history, a “part of Western imperial knowledge that dealt with the relationship between the physical earth and politics”, a word with an obvious “conceptual (comprehensive and total) sense”. Another meaning is that of “geopolitical thought”². Quite recent Romanian authors also state that geopolitics is “a theory”, or “a research trend or path”³. All these definitions do have a clear common denominator: geopolitics is to be regarded as being a set of ideas, and intellectual product which, when it is structured well,

1 Paul CLAVAL, *Geopolitică și geostrategie: Gândirea politică, spațiul și teritoriul în secolul al XX-lea*, Bucharest, Corint Publishinghouse, 2001, p. 10.

2 Gearóid Ó TUATHAIL, “Introduction: Thinking critically about geopolitics”, in Gearóid Ó TUATHAIL, Simon DALBY, Paul ROUTLEDGE, *The Geopolitics Reader*, London, New York, Routledge, 1998, 2003, pp. 1-2.

3 Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BÂRGĂOANU, *Geopolitica*, București, Facultatea de Comunicare și Relații Publice “David Ogilvy”, SNSPA, 2001, p. 9.

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becomes a fully developed theory.

But to consider geopolitics just an exclusively cognitive endeavor is an equally detrimental and impoverishing approach. This is due to the fact that, similar to other domains of human knowledge and action, geopolitics is not just a theory, but a practical activity (of course, not one that is at hand for everyone, but one that is within reach for the leading groups and/or individuals of a society, regardless of space and time. These groups and/or individuals have direct responsibilities regarding the relations between the state/community to which they belong and the exterior world, as well as responsibilities related to what is known today as security and defense). Furthermore, if we take geometry, for example, it is very clear that land parcels were very precisely measured (due to practical reasons: for calculating taxes and dues, as well as for the precise split of land property between heirs) long before the relatively late moment in the history of science when the Milesian School of thought emerged. In a similar way, it should be just as clear that, throughout universal history (as well as national history, regarded as a component of regional, continental and global one), there are numerous and interesting elements of geopolitics/geostrategy, with significant consequences. In the case of Romania, these elements precede (by many centuries) the moment in which a theoretical thinking based upon the relation between geography and politics emerged.

All these moments focus the attention to the way in which different political leaders understood and used major geopolitical realities: directions (axes of advance), distances (including the very length of supply lines), natural borders, threatening the enemy from at least two different directions, etc.

Romanian geopolitical praxis: multiplicity of influences, a significant feature

It is worth mentioning an obvious – and, we believe, a very important – characteristic of Romanian geopolitical practice (and, from a certain point, of geopolitics theory). The characteristic in case lies in the extremely consistent influence exerted by *numerous* and significant actors of the

global and continental stage in the geographical area in which Romania is found today. For centuries, these state actors have had – sometimes successively and other times in a concomitant manner – a consistent practical activity, which is also extremely relevant, from a geopolitical point of view. *This practical geopolitical activity of other state actors has generated consequences that have affected the geographical space in which Romania lies today.* Furthermore, we are talking about a practical geopolitical activity which, deformed or not, at a faster or slower rate, directly or through intermediates, has become known in the political climate populated by the actors which succeeded one another throughout time, over the territory of present day Romania.

What interests us in the case of Romania – which also applies in the case of other European states – is the consistent number of influences. Let us compare the case of Romania and that of certain states from South America, like Chile or Peru. In case of the latter, a long period of their history was dominated by local imperial structures, like the Inca Empire. Around these huge states, from a geographic and power potential point of view, there were only significantly smaller political actors; due to their lack of strength, they were able to generate influences and models of geopolitical practice only to a very small extent. When the Inca Empire crumbled to the Spanish conquest, the political tableau of the continent continued to be, roughly, a unipolar one: however, throughout Southern America (with the notable exceptions of the territories dominated by the other important Iberian state, Portugal), the Inca hegemony was simply replaced by the Spanish one. Thus, during the last two millennia, states like Chile and Peru are only subjected to two or three major geopolitical influences, which, in time, configure the local geopolitical practice: firstly, the influence of the local grand empires (the Inca and its immediate or more distant predecessors); second of all, the Spanish influence; and, much closer to the present, the geopolitical and geostrategic American influence (stated, in principle, starting with the Monroe Doctrine⁴, in 1823; gradually,

⁴ For the complete text of the document, see *Monroe Doctrine*; December 2, 1823, in the electronic collection of

the ideas outlined here continue to gain more and more substance and, especially starting with the inter-war period, as well as in the years of the Cold War, South America was in truth nothing more than the “backyard” of the USA and its geostrategic interests).

On the contrary, in the case of the political actors who, over time, succeeded one another on the territory of present day Romania, the pressures and influences of geopolitical praxis exerted by other states – influences which were either met with counter measures, or which became sources of inspiration or action models – were much more numerous.

Initially, during the establishment of the first pre-states or proto-states, we are dealing with pressures and influences exerted, at the same time or successively, by the Persian and Greek worlds. Then, for a consistent historical interval, there are the pressures and influences exerted by the Macedonian state, during the period of Alexander the Great, son of Phillip II, and of his immediate successors. Afterwards, for centuries, there is the pressure – and influence – exerted by the Romans, both in the time of the Republic, and especially during the Empire. Among other things, *the interest for natural borders* is one of Rome’s legacies for the entire civilized world. Then we are speaking about the influence exerted by the geopolitical praxis of the Byzantines, of the Ottoman Empire, of the Hungarian and Polish Medieval kingdoms, later on of Austria (and, starting with 1866-1867, of Austria-Hungary), of Russia (the imperial, the communist and, more recently, the neo-imperial⁵ one). Starting with the 19th century, the part of Europe where Romania is placed is strongly impacted by the geopolitical/geostrategic influences of France, Great Britain, Germany and, mainly nowadays, of the USA.

Among all these influences and pressures, probably the most powerful – at least in the very long run – is that exerted by the geopolitical/

geostrategic praxis of Rome. Roman Empire left an *impressive legacy* to the rest of the Western world: *the obsession for natural borders*, potent natural defensive lines which, properly fortified, become even stronger. We see this important geopolitical and geostrategic concern put to practice on the Rhine; we see it put to practice in northern Britannia, through the notable military construction known as Hadrian’s Wall, a basically inexpugnable alignment which separates the Roman province from nowadays Scotland; we see it put to practice, for centuries, on the Danube. Let us not forget that here, on the Danube, the barbarian pressure on the Empire continuously grew since the third and fourth centuries. But we know that the Danube limes (fortified line) only fell in 602. That means five generations *after* Rome was conquered by barbarians, in 476, and a few decades *after* Justinian’s rule, a leader who – beyond the notable dysfunctions and oddness⁶ of his reign – is credited with repairing and consolidating many defensive structures on the northern frontier of the early Byzantine Empire. In other words, the Danube limes endured for *many years after* the fall of Rome, and decades *after* the last major “general overhaul” of the fortifications on the border.

The explanation is a simple one, and it has strong ties with geography, which was used with prowess by generals and political leaders. In many places, the southern bank of the Danube (which belongs to Bulgaria today) is considerably higher than the northern one (which nowadays belongs to Romania). At that time, on the ridges situated on the southern bank, there was a continuous line of fortifications – a wall a few meters tall, which was accompanied, in many cases, with a ditch at its base; as for the defensive capability, from place to place, the wall was consolidated with towers and forts, which held consistent garrisons. The barbarians who eventually dared cross the Danube had to face numerous risks and hardships. First of all, while they crossed the river, they were under continuous volleys from an array of Roman long distance weapons, of different types and calibers

primary sources “The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy”, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp.

⁵ For the *neoimperial* aspects of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy, see Janusz BUGAJSKI, *Pacea Rece: Nouă imperialism al Rusiei*, Bucharest, Casa Radio Publishing-house, 2005.

⁶ For the less ‘shiny’ features of Justinian’s era (and rule) see, for example, PROCOPIUS din Caesarea, *Istoria secretă*, Bucharest, RSR Academy Publishinghouse, 1972.

(for the contemporary leader, artillery would seem to be an inappropriate term; however, if we recall the initial scenes from Ridley Scott's *The Gladiator*, where the Germanics were overwhelmed by volleys from archers, ballistas and catapults, we realize that artillery is in fact the appropriate term). Once debarked on the southern bank of the river, the barbarians often had to climb an abrupt inclination, cross a deep ditch, and then, with improvised means, climb a wall which was at least five or six meters tall. Once atop the wall, the surviving barbarians, after great losses and serious efforts, were confronted with the best heavy infantry of Antiquity: soldiers with long-term military service, of over twenty years, equipped with efficient armor, and very high-performance cutting and piercing weapons. In these conditions, however precarious the resources destined to defend the Empire must have been in the age between the fall of Rome and the collapse of the Danube limes in 602, it is not at all surprising that the heavily fortified wall on the river bank functioned well for such a long period of time.

We can also speak about and *immediate impact* of the Roman geopolitical and geostrategic praxis in Dacia. Along the more than two centuries of the history of the Roman *province* established on the ruins of the former Dacian kingdom, the territory controlled by the Roman Empire was protected by several significant natural borders: "Tisa, the Danube, the Prut river and the northern Carpathians"⁷. The strategic protection offered by the major rivers and by mountains was a major positive asset, enabling the Empire to bring many colonists to Dacia, and also to diminish, without major risks, the total amount of troops deployed here. The Romanian historian Constantin C. Giurescu estimates that, when the province became stable, the military resources used by Rome to control and defend this territory sharply decreased, from roughly nine legions to only one complete legion (the *XIIIth Gemina*), plus auxiliary units.

7 Constantin C. GIURESCU, *Istoria Românilor, vol. I: Din cele mai vechi timpuri până la moartea lui Alexandru cel Bun (1432)*, Dinu C. Giurescu's editon, Bucharest, All Educational Publishinghouse, 2003, p. 104.

Only later on, when barbarian pressure increased, in the second half of the 2nd century, the Romans brought to Dacia another legion (the *Vth Macedonica*)⁸. We also mention that, in order to make Dacia more secure, the Romans have built several lines of strongholds along some rivers *inside* the province (on Olt, on Someș, along Mureș, and also along Târnave rivers)⁹.

Another important element of the Roman rule in Dacia was an *extensive system of strategic roads*¹⁰. In this Danubian province, exactly as anywhere within the Empire, *roads made distances significantly shorter* (both for heavily armed troops, and for trader, 30 miles along a fine road consumed less time than the same 30 miles across fields or along low-quality vicinal lanes, immediately transformed by any significant rain into deep seas of mud).

An episode of the distant past: Dromichaites versus Lysimachos

One of the earliest really significant and clearly successful episodes of geopolitical/geostrategic praxis on the territory of the present day Romania took place only a few years after the death of Alexander the Great. In the early states of his rule, young Alexander decided to pursue a set of quick and massive strategic raids to the north, both in order to pacify the barbarians in the Balkans, and in order to consolidate his political position, contested by some Macedonian nobles. Quickly advancing to the north, Alexander managed to get complete strategic surprise, attacking very early the Thracians in the mountains (the barbarians had had been not able to completely mobilize their forces). Then, Alexander crossed the Danube, with a limited amount of heavy cavalry and heavily armed infantrymen. But his quite small force was vastly superior in fighting quality and discipline, to the Getae living on the plains in the southern part of present day Romania. In such a situation, the Getae decided not to fight,

8 *Ibidem*, pp. 112-113.

9 For the Roman strongholds on Olt river and other rivers inside Dacia, see *ibidem*, pp. 114-115.

10 For more details about Roman roads in Dacia see *ibidem*, pp. 127-130.

and Alexander captured and destroyed one of their fortified towns¹¹. The impact of the quick and completely successful raid of the elite forces led by Alexander was so great, that for many years, both the Thracians and the Getae did not even attempt to attack the northern border of Macedonia. In 292 B.C., one of Alexander the Great's heirs, Lysimachos (who took control of the territories from the Balkan Peninsula) enters a direct conflict with Dromichaetes, leader of the Getae from the plains north of the Danube, and the first important Getae king, according to an important contemporary Romanian historian.

In Constantin C. Giurescu's opinion, the said conflict has its origins in the fact that Lysimachos wanted to expand his rule over certain territories from the south and south-east of nowadays Romania, while Dromichaetes also wanted to take control of the strongholds situated on the Dobruja side of the river.

A first confrontation took place around 300 B.C. Lysimachos's son, Agathocles, was taken prisoner, but was released by Dromichaetes, who sent him home, carrying expensive gifts. This behavior might have been interpreted as a sign of major weakness; furthermore, Lysimachos' expansionist interests were really great (let us not forget that in Antiquity, as well as for long periods of the Middle Ages, successful military performance was a very important source of power, and even a major source of political legitimacy).

In these given conditions, in 292 B.C., after he had significantly expanded his possessions in Asia, Lysimachos himself crosses the Danube, leading a vast army (which, according to some exaggerated ancient sources, was comprised of around 100,000 men). But Lysimachos commits an *important strategic and logistic error*: he doesn't have enough supplies, because he thought he can get more from his enemies (this had happened during the early stages of Alexander the Great's rule, when he undertook the already mentioned short and devastating raid in the Getic Plain).

11 For the raid of Alexander the Great, see Flavius ARRIANUS, *Expediția lui Alexandru cel Mare în Asia*, Bucharest, Editura Științifică, 1966, I, pp. 3-4.

Having learned a lot from the previous Macedonian expedition, Dromichaetes successfully applies the *scorched earth tactic*. As a consequence, the grand Macedonian army is soon confronted with thirst and hunger. Given the fact that the Getae had burned everything, Lysimachos' army is shortly confronted with a really critical situation. Finally, when the Macedonian troops became completely exhausted due to long marching and hunger, the Getae surrounded them and took them all as prisoners.

According to the Greek historian Pausanias, the conflict ended through an alliance treaty between Lysimachos and Dromichaetes; the Getae regained control of some of the strongholds that had been conquered by the Macedonians during the first stage of the campaign. Furthermore, Dromichaetes married Lysimachos's daughter¹². *This early episode* – in which we can identify and study the geopolitical and geostrategic value of distances and of directions (axes of advance) – *is one clearly indicating how strong and skilled was the ability of some political leader of the Getae, in the 3rd century b.C., of understanding and extensively using the political and strategic potential of geography.*

The exceptional geostrategic achievements of Mircea the Elder

Along the Middle Ages, the almost standard method used by Romanian princes (voievozi, in Romanian) to cope with foreign invasions was what we call today *scorched earth policy* (or *tactics*). This method forces the invader – and it does not matter who this invader might be – to march significantly more than initially planned; it also generated, by hunger and thirst, the almost complete and very intense exhaustion of the invading forces, crippled by a major crisis of their inadequate logistical support. When the invader was severely weakened by very long (and almost futile) marches, and by hunger and thirst, he was attacked (and usually defeated, and also forced to seek for shelter across the Danube, in present day Bulgaria). Acting this

12 For the short fragments quoted here, see Constantin C. GIURESCU, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61.

way inevitably generated some positive results in the benefit of the defenders: ability to mobilize all forces before the final confrontation, ability to freely choose where and when to fight (or not to fight), maintaining adequate level of supply, while the invading enemy became weaker and weaker. But the same scorched earth policy was based on a reality with *major negative consequences*, mainly in the long run, for the not so large Romanian principalities: its main element was the fact that, each five to ten years, the Romanians deliberately destroyed their own crops, killed their own cattle, burned their own villages and towns, poisoned their own sources of fresh water. Extensively and repeatedly used, this method led, almost automatically, to a significant decrease of the power of the state. It is quite easy to find out that a power decrease really happened along the Middle Ages and early Modern Times: in case of need, Stephen the Great could field an army 40 to 50 thousand men strong; a century later, Michael the Brave could usually mobilize not more than 16 to 20 thousand men; and, in the opening stages of the 18th century, Dimitrie Cantemir was able to deploy at Stăniilești not more than 8 to 10 thousand fighters of all sorts. But the fact that scorched earth policy, even if tactically sound and successful, could lead, in the long run, to weakening the state power was not at all something the Medieval princes could easily understand. Among the quite few Romanian princes who deeply understood the limits and risks associated with the scorched earth policy, Mircea the Elder played a major role. He was one of the earliest Romanian rulers able to understand that the invaders are to be kept, at all cost, far away from the territory of Wallachia (Țara Românească or Muntenia).

We feel the need to underline here something else, too. The general level of Romanian political and military effectiveness in the age of Mircea the Elder (and Alexander the Good) was so high, that it generated *a lot* of consistent echoes throughout the late Byzantine literature. For example, in Ioan Katakalon the Deacon's poem about the fall of Adrianople (Edirne) under Ottoman rule, there is a fragment according to which it wasn't the

Bulgarians, nor the Serbs, nor the Hungarians, and not even the "powerful Vlachs" who defeated the "unfaithful" Turks, but the tears and prayers. Related to this fragment, the contemporary historian Nicolae-Șerban Tanașoca backs up G. Popa-Lisseanu's opinion, according to which the lines speaking about the "powerful Vlachs" (or "Wallachians") is a clear acknowledgement of the "age of military brilliance"¹³ (and, in our opinion, of notable expertise in grand strategy, as well as in applied geopolitics/geopolitical praxis), portrayed in a *really exceptional* way by Mircea the Elder.

Today, we know well – and we can better understand than previous generations – that the Medieval rulers of the Romanian Principalities used a lot important elements of the Byzantine political, military and *geostrategic* tradition (the Byzantine influence – and pressure – has already been mention in the opening stages of this study). We are also better prepared than previous generations to understand that the Byzantine influence was *very* important in both Wallachia and Moldavia not only in the Middle Ages, but later on as well. According to an important contemporary Romanian historian, "Constantinople was the source of legitimacy which established the political foundations of the Basarabs and of the Mușatins, while the eastern Christian orthodoxy and the Byzantine political ideology, for which Wallachia and Moldavia opted, were the shield destined to defend the liberty and national identity of the Romanians"¹⁴. In the same study from which we quote here, the historian offers – making reference to the fact that Alexandru Ioan Cuza was anointed by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, just like the rulers from the apogee period of the Middle Ages – a convincing answer to the questions related to the exact period of time in which the

13 Nicolae-Șerban TANAȘOCA, "Viteazul neam al Vlăhilor". Români în poema lui Ioan Katakalon Diaconul despre căderea Arianopolului sub otomani", in Nicolae-Șerban TANAȘOCA, *Bizanțul și românii*, Bucharest, Pro Foundation Publishinghouse, 2003, p. 96.

14 Nicolae-Șerban TANAȘOCA, "Ultima ungere 'bizantină' de domn român", in Nicolae-Șerban TANAȘOCA, *Bizanțul și românii*, Bucharest, The Publishinghouse of Pro Foundation, 2003, pp. 124, 125-128.

Byzantine political tradition was fully functional in Wallachia and Moldavia. We specially emphasized the strength and the extreme duration of the Byzantine influence(s) on the (geo)political ideas and praxis in the Romanian principalities, in order to better understand that, most probably, the geostrategic thinking and praxis of Mircea the Elder was heavily influenced by the Byzantine model (a model which, mainly along the final centuries of the history of the empire, tried a lot to cope, using small – and even diminishing – financial, demographic and military resources, with the increasing pressure of the Muslim world (Arabs and, later on, Ottomans).

We also emphasize that, in the era of Mircea the Elder, the total area of Wallachia (together with the strategic depth of the principality) reached their maximal levels. During Mircea the Elder's rule, the Banat of Severin, for example, is an integral part of Wallachia (there are documents from 1390, 1398, 1407 and 1412 that certify this). Over the mountains, Mircea owns some important domains, like Amlaș (relatively close to Sibiu) and Făgăraș. Bran is another one of Mircea's possessions, at least between 1395 and 1412-1413. Towards east, Wallachia stretches until the heavily fortified Chilia and the border with the "lands of the Tartars" (the future Bessarabia). Dobrudja, respectively the part of "Podunavia" that stretches until "the Great Sea", is also a part of Wallachia¹⁵.

Mircea *quickly understood* that it would be extremely useful (from a strategic and economic perspective) to undertake efforts meant to stop the Turks from acting in force north of the Danube. Just a few years after the beginning of his reign, Mircea sends an important military contingent to help the Serbian prince Lazar, who was defeated – and killed – on June 15, 1389, at Kosovo Polje. To hold off the Turks south of the Danube – or at least hinder a massive invasion north of the river – with great financial efforts, Mircea builds a powerful stone stronghold at Giurgiu (half a century later, during his expedition on the Danube, Vlad Dracul, Mircea's son will tell the French knights that each block of stone from the

stronghold had cost his father an entire block of expensive salt) and further strengthens the Turnu stronghold (also known as Little Nicopolis, because face to face, on the other side of the Danube, in today's Bulgaria, lays Nicopolis). Subsequently – according to Turkish chronicles – on numerous occasions, Mircea launches attacks against Turkish positions and fortifications, south of the Danube. But, in 1393, Bulgaria is completely conquered by Bayazid. We would like to strongly emphasize, here, that *Bayazid was not at all an average or ordinary sultan*, but one of the most efficient rulers of the Ottoman Empire. For a better understanding of this evaluation, it is worth mentioning that this charismatic leader was able to simultaneously launch campaigns in Asia, in the extreme south of nowadays Greece, and on the Danube. He was the one that propelled the Ottoman Empire to the status of *hegemonic power* in south-east Europe (at the end of his rule, in 1402/1403, the territories controlled by the Turks were 40 times bigger than they had been in 1300, while Constantinople was completely surrounded by Ottoman territories¹⁶).

This exceptional Ottoman ruler decides – in an obviously predictable way – to launch a punitive expedition against Mircea, north of the Danube. Some historians claim that the battle of Rovine was fought in October 1394. What matters is that although victorious from a tactical perspective, Mircea – being numerically overwhelmed – is forced to retreat, after another battle takes place in the vicinity of the capital (Curtea de Argeș at that time) in his territories from across the mountains, in Transylvania. In 1395, with the aid of the Kingdom of Hungary, Mircea comes back to the Danube and recaptures Turnu stronghold. But in Wallachia, the problem of the throne is yet to be resolved; Mircea has to deal with the former nobleman Vlad, the new prince directly and clearly backed by the Ottomans. In 1396, a grand crusader army is crushed at Nicopolis, an episode which the historians call "disaster" or "great Christian catastrophe"¹⁷. In

¹⁶ Norman DAVIES, *Europe: A History*, London, Pimlico, 1997 (first published by Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 386.

¹⁷ See Constantin C. GIURESCU, *Istoria Românilor*,

¹⁵ For the maximal territorial expansion of Walachia, see Constantin C. GIURESCU, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-364.

1397 and in 1400, in Wallachia, Mircea manages to obtain two important victories against the Ottomans¹⁸ (but the price is high: shares of the territory of the principality are completely devastated by Bayazid's armies). *What interests us is the fact that after Bayezid was taken prisoner by Timur Lenk, in Ankara, in 1402, Mircea further elaborates his policy of keeping the Turks as far away as possible from Wallachia. Basically, Mircea successfully intervened, for quite many years, in the struggle for succession between Bayazid's sons.* Mircea offered financial aid to different pretenders, as well as military help, first backing up Musa and, after his death, Mustafa¹⁹. With direct military aid from Mircea, Musa actually manages to claim the throne, reigning over the Turks from 1411 to July 5, 1413. In 1417, the new sultan, Mehmed I is finally able to counter Mircea's continuous interference in the internal affairs of the Ottomans²⁰. We would also like to mention that Mircea's involvement in the struggle for the Ottoman throne is also presented in texts belonging to several important late Byzantine historians. Recent Romanian historians emphasize, in their turn, the significance of this grand strategy implemented by Mircea, calling him "sultan maker"²¹.

By means of seriously enlarging the territory he controlled and, above all, by designing and continuously implementing, along almost two decades, an active policy aiming to deny the Ottomans any chance to freely move along the strategic axis of advance leading from the Balkans to the north, across the Danube (a strategy which simply managed to keep the Turks far away from Wallachia, allowing uninterrupted positive

economic and demographic growth), Mircea the Elder proved himself to be an exceptionally gifted practitioner of geopolitics and geostrategy.

1859: The geostrategic meaning of the Florești military camp

According to the recently released treaty entitled *The History of the Romanians*²², published under aegis of the Romanian Academy, in 1859, the integration process of the recently united Principalities also had a strong military aspect, which went clearly beyond the Paris Convention stipulations. To be more precise, since the spring of 1859, multiple military units from Wallachia were sent to Moldavia and vice versa. Then, in the summer of 1859, the armies of the two Principalities were gathered in the Florești military camp, under the command of general Milicescu and having Carol Davila as their most senior medic.

The unification and integration process of the military structures also continued the following year, when instruction was homogenized, the logistic structures and military administrations were unified, and general Florescu was named Minister of War, being the first common minister of the two Principalities²³. As for the political and strategic meaning of the Florești camp, the same treaty mentions that the beginning of the Franco-Austrian-Sardinian war led to the complication of the international situation, which delayed the recognition of the double election by the Austrian and Ottoman empires. But, according to the same publication, although the full recognition was artificially delayed, the Romanians were determined to protect their conquests; furthermore, in May, *Cuza was also considering the eventuality of finishing the Union through a national action, concentrating the two armies in the Florești camp, near the city of Ploiești*²⁴.

vol. I: Din cele mai vechi timpuri până la moartea lui Alexandru cel Bun (1432), Dinu C. Giurescu's edition, All Educational Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 367, 369. Recent Western works use "disaster" (or "catastrophe") in order to describe the fate of Christian armies at Nicopolis – see, for example, Norman DAVIES, *Europe: A History*, London, Pimlico, 1997 (first published by Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 389, 391.

18 Constantin C. GIURESCU, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

19 *Ibidem*, p. 370.

20 *Ibidem*, p. 371.

21 Florin CONSTANTINIU, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român*, 4th Edition, Bucharest, Univers Enciclopedic Gold Publishinghouse, 2011, pp. 96-97.

22 Author's note: *Istoria Românilor*, in Romanian language.

23 Dan BERINDEI, "Cap. XIII. Constituirea României. Alexandru Ioan Cuza, domnul Unirii și al reformelor", in acad. Dan BERINDEI (coordonator), *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VII, tom I: Constituirea României moderne (1821-1878), Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 488.

24 *Ibidem*, p. 496.



Explicitly referring to the attitude of the authorities and of the public opinion from the United Principalities regarding Transylvania during the time of Cuza, the work from which we quote here mentions that although its liberation wasn't possible for the moment, the matter was still a not too distant historical duty²⁵.

We have *no* direct proof that in 1859, the United Principalities mobilize both armies at Florești to threaten the Austrian strategic rear, which had already sent most of its forces to the theatre of operations in northern Italy. But we know that, in repeated occasions, Napoleon III and Alexandru Ioan Cuza had a special relation (nowadays, we would probably call it an *intensely asymmetrical strategic partnership*); given the fact that at the end of 1863, the Polish issue created a very tense situation between the great European powers, this relation convinces Cuza to announce the French ruler that, in the event of a European war for the salvation of "miserable Poland", the United Principalities will be at France's disposal, alongside with their entire resources and army²⁶. We strongly believe that it is *very possible* for this to have *also* been the attitude in 1859.

The events of 1859 – which shortly lead to a new major war in Lombardy – are based upon the fact that *the strategic interests of Napoleon III's France and of the Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia had a very clear common denominator: both powers wanted to "eliminate Austria"²⁷ from northern Italy*. This leads to a situation in which Austria, confronted with the French-Sardinian alliance, is forced to declare war and – once again – just like in the time of Napoleon I, the north of the Italian Peninsula becomes a theatre of major and direct military confrontation between the French and Austrian imperial wills. Initially, at the moment of the Austrian ultimatum of April 20, on the Italian field of operations there were 60.000 Piedmontese soldiers commanded by

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 499.

²⁶ For the strategic relations of Cuza and Napoleon III in the context of the Polish crisis in 1863 see *Ibidem*, pp. 517-518.

²⁷ See "Italian War of Independence 1859-1861", in George CHILDS KOHN, *Dictionary of Wars* (revised edition), New York, Checkmark Books, 1999, p. 235.

general La Marmora, as well as about 90.000 Austrians under the command of general Gyulai. At the beginning of May, about 120.000 French soldiers reach Italy (significantly less than the 200.000 that Napoleon III had promised Cavour, in May 1858, at Plombières). The main clash of the campaign was the Battle of Solferino (a few kilometers away from Lake Garda) and took place in June. 138.000 French, Sardinian and Piedmontese soldiers, as well as 160.000 Austrians were involved. The losses have been very heavy on both sides: the encounter leads to 21.000 dead and wounded Austrians, 11.600 French and 4.300 Piedmontese.

With the exception of the initial moment of the campaign, these numbers indicate a clear and relatively stable balance between the resources which Napoleon III (together with his Italian ally) and the Austrians use in the competition for the control of northern Italy (region which dominates the rest of the Peninsula)²⁸. It is true that, in the end, the victories at Magenta and Solferino assured a massive success of the French and Sardinian strategic offensive against Austrian Italy²⁹, but we emphasize that this result was difficult to obtain, and a very costly one.

Given the fact that, for months, Cuza maintains the armies of both Principalities in the Florești camp, he exerts an indirect – but obviously consistent – form of strategic pressure over Austria. For Napoleon III's France, this pressure which threatens the strategic rear of the enemy is clearly useful. It is also useful for the Romanians: the Florești camp episode demonstrates that, in a strategic tandem with a great power, Romania has notable chances of more successfully promoting key elements of its national interest than it could accomplish with only its own power resources.

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²⁸ For all these figures, see William SERMAN, Jean-Paul BERTAUD, *Nouvelle histoire militaire de la France*, vol. I, 1789-1919, Paris, Librairie A. Fayard, 1998, pp. 356-372.

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AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATES WITHIN THE OFFICIAL CLOSING OF THE NATO ISAF MISSION

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The end of 2014 was the term established by NATO for fully taking over from ISAF the responsibility for Afghanistan's national security by the Afghan Security Forces. However, the security environment of Afghanistan still carries the mark of the three decades of conflicts; therefore the mission of the Afghan National Security Forces is an extremely difficult one, marked by numerous challenges.

Starting from the programmatic documents of the Afghanistan Islamic Republic (IR) and consulting the recent analyses on this state's security, the present paper represents a radiography of the Afghan security environment main characteristics. Therefore, the presented aspects are related to defining the national interests, but also to the current evolutions and trends regarding the security threats, either of internal or external nature, or against human security. The analysis reflects the urgent necessity of continuing the engagement of the international community, in a renewed formula, adapted to the new context, to contribute to the peace and stability of the state governed by Kabul.

Keywords: *national interests, national values, security threats, insurgency, organized crime, human security.*

Introduction

Placing the current situation of Afghanistan - a transition period of fully assume the

responsibility for the national security - within a context is extremely difficult, if we take into account the accelerated dynamic of the regional events which are linked to the extending influence of non-state actors and the inadequate response of the international community to the manifested threats in Northern Africa, Middle East and the Black Sea Basin.

Afghanistan takes a special place in the area of strategic concerns which aim to anticipate the events and actions that may affect this country level of security after the withdrawal of ISAF troops and the taking over the assistance and support duties by a new mission - *Resolute Support Mission*. Those aspects are complicated and belong more to the internal political volatility which takes place after the two presidential elections, which have not clarified the successor of the president in function. Moreover, President Karzai's refusal to sign The Bilateral Security Agreement – BSA - with the USA, naturally followed by signing the Status of Forces Agreement – SOFA - with NATO, despite the two presidential candidates' stating that they would sign the two documents, leaves room for interpretations - on one hand, related to the Afghan state's capacity of efficient governing at the horizon of the year 2015 and on the other hand, of assuring an internal security viable for all the Afghan citizens, regardless the ethnic group they belong to. The international financial support, which is presumed to decrease in volume during the year

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2015, must not be omitted from this equation; this aspect has direct effects on the Afghan security, economy and finance.

1. The geopolitical and security context Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Throughout history, because of the geopolitical and geostrategic position, Afghanistan had to cope with extended conflicts, competition with powerful countries and interferences with neighboring countries. From a historical perspective, Afghanistan has been invaded several times in comparison with other countries and was the subject of social and political interference of major external actors. Furthermore, because of its specific geopolitical and geostrategic position, some states, especially the neighboring ones, have been paying a special importance to this country in their major strategies. Some of those countries consider their active influences in Afghanistan a part of their national interest and want the continuation of the confrontation in different geographical areas of this country. However, one must not forget that this country, located at the crossroad of the major Asiatic trade routes, is seen as the Graveyard of Empires. The reason behind this name, but also its reputation, is seen precisely in the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of those powers which tried to influence, throughout history, the life and the civilization of this nation, in order to realize their political and strategic goals.

The 09/11/2001 attack was the reason behind the international community's decision to intervene in Afghanistan, to destroy the Al-Qaida bases and the terrorist phenomenon and to reconstruct this country. But war and other powers' interferences - of political, economical even military nature, are still ongoing in Afghanistan. The results of those interferences, with the presence of international community's security forces, the three decades of war, which generated massive losses of human lives and destruction of the infrastructure, have prevented the development projects and threatened the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, especially in the East, South and South-East areas.¹

¹ For details, see United Nations Development Programme,

In the present historical context, signing the strategic partnership agreement on long term with the United States of America² is one of the most important achievements of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government, in the past decade. Moreover, this cooperation environment does not offer only the foundation for good relations, but also the possibility of developing strategic long term relations between the two signatory states. The treaty has contributed to the increase of trust regarding the mass of Afghan population; it also delivers a clear message to the neighboring countries: that from now on Afghanistan has a strategic relation with The United States of America. It is considered that the Treaty is not in the best interest of some regional actors, like Pakistan or Iran, whose main goal is to prevent the negotiation process of security agreements between Afghanistan and the United States, valid after 2014. Thus, it is confirmed that the theory of strategic depth or the prevention of strategic encirclement does not constitute new elements in the political view of the neighboring countries, which aim to continue their efforts in this direction.

In the last decade, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government has been making efforts to ensure an optimal environment for exercising the national sovereignty, including by establishing a system of regional partnerships and agreements or even at a wider level, being considered that the development of friendly relations and good neighborly ones with neighboring countries contributes to regional stability³.

But the complexity of the political economical and military situations in this region, which is the result of various factors (geopolitical and ideological differences, political and economical

„Afghanistan. Millennium Development Goals: Progress at a Glance”, available at URL: <http://www.undp.org.af/MDGs/AfghanMDGs-ProgressataGlance.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2014.

² ***, *Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, May, 2nd, 2012, available at URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistansassignedtext.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2014.

³ See the strategic agreements portfolio of IR of Afghanistan available at URL: <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/strategic-agreements>, accessed on 13 July 2014.



structures which are less probable to survive, the extremism and the current flow of economical, military and cooperation actions in the region) has been a challenge whose roots lie in the regional level of trust and, not in few occasions, has placed in conflict the interests of states and regional powers. Therefore, gradually, the regional trust environment (good neighborly) has been changed by the contrasting politics.⁴

Therefore, in such a context and by comparison with the neighboring countries, the level of national power of Afghanistan is a low one, especially regarding the capacity of promoting the national interest. These features create a background for some of the neighboring states and regional powers to manifest their influence by intelligence actions designed to support the terrorism and the extremism, in order to affect the cultural, political, economical (trade and transit) life and the security of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; even those kind of situations offer the possibility of external military intervention.

Furthermore, Afghanistan is facing various challenges and threats, like terrorism, insurgent and extremist groups, organized crime syndicates and other elements related to the characteristics of failed states, which may create regional instability and represent a serious threat to the national security and to the Afghan national interests. The increased activity of Al-Qaida and Taliban, starting with 2004, made increasing the level of the Afghan government and international community attention to security necessary.

The assessments regarding the security environment evolution foresee an increase of the anti-governmental actions during this year⁵, especially taking into consideration maintaining the financial sources of support and the shelters for Al-Qaida and Taliban outside of Afghani-

stan's borders. The anti-governmental forces and activities have increased in terms of quantity and sophistication and the geographical area of their activities has also changed. However, because of the presence of the Coalition forces, of signing international agreements and of developing strategic partnerships, a conventional military attack is the less probable threat in Afghanistan.

Insurgence remains the main security threat in this state and is expected to remain of actuality in the near future. Taliban and other extremist elements have infiltrated in many areas of the country. The insurgents avoid, in general, the direct confrontations with the coalition forces and those of the Afghan security, often resorting to improvised explosive devices (IED), use of mines and guerrilla tactics (e.g.: kidnappings, assassinations, ambushes, serial murder targeting politicians and government, raids) against insufficiently protected or vulnerable targets or to suicidal attacks. Usually, the terrorist activities are organized in residential areas, the fight against them causing victims and discontent among the civilians towards the government, the insurgents managing to maintain an appreciable level of control over the local population by intimidation and constraint.⁶

Two sources of insurgent threats are considered to exist: indigenous (from the local community) or infiltrated agents (from external camps, especially, alongside the frontiers with Pakistan). In order to prevent the access of the last ones in Afghanistan, well-equipped police forces are required in the border areas and, also, a good cooperation is needed in order to support the border police in the special conditions of some fragile frontiers and of a hard accessible ground. The easiness in weapons, drugs and human trafficking in Afghanistan illustrates the fragile nature of its frontiers. The consequences of the continuous insurgence are reflected in the decrease of the central government authority, the disruption of reconstruction and development, loss of public confidence in democratic institutions,

4 For details, see: Kenneth KATZMAN, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and US Policy*, Congressional Research Service Report, May 29, 2014, available at URL: <http://fas.org/srgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf>, accessed on 29 July 2014.

5***, *Afghanistan's Insurgency after the Transition*, Asia Report No. 256, 12, May 2014, International Crisis Group, available at URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/256-afghanistan-s-insurgency-after-the-transition.aspx>, accessed on 13 July 2014.

6 Gilles DORRONSORO, *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, available at URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf, accessed on 10 July 2014.



the national unity fracture and a general state of instability and incertitude.

From the perspective of the year 2015, the instability caused by local Taliban, militant leaders, criminal organizations and illegal armed groups, probably enhanced by the rejection of the presidential election results, may lead to a state of anarchy. Insurgent and aggressive practices on the local population, fights between rival groups or tribes, clashes between governmental and anti-governmental groups and criminal activities can deplete the government resources and distract from the efforts to ensure internal stability and security and rebuild the country.

The militants' access to weapons, ammunition, explosives, unexploded ammunition and mines, either by means of weapon trafficking, robbery or by improper security of the stocks, allows anti-governmental forces to play havoc at the level of society. The possession and use of such weapons threatens law and public order enforcement, allows the continue poppy cultivation and trafficking of narcotics and undermines the counterinsurgency efforts, especially by using improvised explosive devices.

Taliban and the so-called "drug lords", which continue to crop, produce and traffic drugs, remain the most insidious threat, that can degenerate in the danger of transforming Afghanistan in a state of drugs. Narcotics market offers an enormous funding for insurgent and criminal organizations.⁷ Although the poppy is mainly being cropped in the South provinces - Helmand and Kandahar – the poppy crops can move fast to other provinces as well. Therefore, the narcotics traffic will probably remain a major threat on the long-term, requiring constant vigilance. Taliban, Al-Qaida, war lords and criminal actions are financed with hundreds of millions of dollars per year, which come from opium, heroin and cannabis dealing. Another equally important source is represented by "good Muslims" financings or donations, this being considered a moral but also religious duty:

⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy. 1387-1391 (2008-2013). A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*, p. 145, available at URL: http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2014.

to provide financial support for the Mujahedeen and the Jihad⁸.

Taliban infiltrated from Pakistan represent a particularly harmful challenge for the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, even though a tendency of cooperation from Pakistan with this country is observed, regarding the neutralization of militants training camps and related infrastructure in the mountainous border area; this aspect is confirmed by this summer Pakistani armed forces offensive in the Northern Waziristan area⁹.

Although these are no direct threats, the existence and manifestation of specific factors can contribute to the national and regional instability, among them being the tacit policy of some neighboring countries and other extremist organizations of supporting the activities of Al-Qaida and Taliban militias in the border areas or the political fights between internal and external actors, which undermine the efficiency of democratic institutions and the government's capacity of maintaining stability, those being associated with the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Afghanistan. The interference of neighboring countries, which is materialized in different types of actions, such as rocket and artillery attacks, has as effect the destabilization of some geographical areas, thus directly contributing to the illegal

⁸ See the interview with the Head of The Islamic Emirate's Financial Commission, available at URL: <http://shahamat-english.com/index.php/interviwe/45804-an-interview-with-the-head-of-%E2%80%98financial-commission%E2%80%99-of-the-islamic-emirate>, accessed on 12 April, 2014.

⁹ See JIBRAN și AHMAD, "Pakistan army begins ground offensive in North Waziristan capital", available at URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-pakistan-military-offensive-idUSKBN0F50RI20140630>, accessed on 30 July 2014 and Reza JAN, "What You Need to Know About Pakistan's North Waziristan Operation", available at URL: <http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/jan-what-you-need-to-know-north-waziristan-operation-june-19-2014>, accessed on 19 July 2014; "Pakistani Military Operation in North Waziristan: Knowing the Battlefield", available at URL: <http://www.criticalthreats.org/jan/pakistan-knowing-the-battlefield-military-operation-in-north-waziristan>, accessed on 30 July 2014; "Gauging the Success of Pakistan's North Waziristan Operation", available at URL: <http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/jan-gauging-success-nwa-operation-july-25-2014>, accessed on 28 July 2014.

transit and trans-border criminality flourishing. Such actions may induce discontent and anxiety among the population, undermine the national unity and the efforts of consolidating an Afghan national identity, acknowledged as such by all the constituting ethnic groups of the Afghan nation.

The insufficient progress in terms of reform of the security sector, the slow development of the security forces' action capacity and of the necessary effective fight against threats capabilities able to respond to the security challenges and to maintain stability, may have a negative influence on the governmental efforts regarding the reconstruction, economic growth and long-term development of the country.

2. The regional context of the IR of Afghanistan

Currently, analysts are estimating that Afghanistan does not face any threat regarding a military attack from another state. However, Afghanistan is located in an area where security is affected by numerous interconnected external factors, such as international terrorism, the extremism and organized crime groups. In this respect, we estimate that the following factors may be considered main challenges:

a) *armed opposition groups, both internal and external ones*, such as Al-Qaida, Taliban / Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), Haqqani Network, Hikmatyar Faction - Hizb Islami Gulbuddin's (HIG), the Pakistani Taliban Movement (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan – TTP)¹⁰ and other terrorist organizations in the region such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and local leaders, so called “war lords”;

b) *The foreign extremist ideology having as vehicle of spreading the religious schools that promote and cultivate an ideology of violence;*

c) *The external financing of insurgency and terrorism;*

d) *The external economic interest.* The great

economic actors of the world can contribute to the state of security or to the lack of it by the interests they promote, which can be in contradiction with the national Afghan interests, through the economic domination in exploitation of mineral resources, the Afghan state not benefiting fully of its own natural resources;

e) *Organized crime groups.* Regional organized crime groups use Afghanistan especially for narcotics, weapons, gems and human trafficking. This type of activities constitutes a serious national security threat, contributing to the increasing number of manifestation possibilities of corruption and violence. The insufficient border control and the lack of security forces in some areas of the country contribute to the development of organized crime groups operations opportunities to conduct illicit activities.

The external strategic interests and their influence in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is, without doubt, in the attention of regional powers and the ones outside it. Their interests are extremely diverse, ranking from supporting the insurgency to stabilizing the country and preventing the situation in which this country becomes a base for the transnational terrorists. Also, in the region, the ambivalence and tension regarding the long-term presence of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan can be identified, on the one hand, and the desire to benefit from economic perspective of the stability in Afghanistan, on the other hand.

Pakistan. Pakistan is not considered to represent a military security threat for Afghanistan, despite the extended disagreement over the so-called Durand Line. However, the economic and strategic interests of Pakistan regarding Afghanistan and also the socio-economic and security concerns and imperatives (difficulties in maintaining the security in the border areas, the free access to the water of Kabul river, the prolonged geostrategic tensions and the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan) will have serious repercussions and implications for Afghanistan during the next years.

Iran is a very important neighboring state and a profoundly interested one when it comes to the situation in Afghanistan. Iran's interests in Afghanistan have a cultural, linguistic and religious

¹⁰ See „Country Information and Guidance Report: Security, Afghanistan”, August 2014, Home Office, UK, pp. 15-18, available at URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/343042/AFGHANISTAN_-_CIG_-_SECURITY_2014_v_1.0.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2014.

background, but originate from geopolitical rivalry with other regional and global powers, powers which are currently present in Afghanistan. Although, the scenario of a possible threat from its behalf it is less probable, Iran offers material and non-material support to some groups of opposition in Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are states with whom Afghanistan has strong economical and social connections and which are dealing with similar economical challenges. Moreover, there are common security interests and concerns.

China's interests in Afghanistan are focused on the economic development of the country, assuring the access of the Chinese companies to mineral resources, supporting the Afghan government in maintaining an internal stability in order to allow, in conditions of stability, the mineral resources exploitation and development of mutual economic relations; from political perspective, The Treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between the IR of Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China (PRC)¹¹ represents the keystone of this cooperation.

The relationship between Afghanistan and *India* has improved after the fall of the Taliban regime, the last one increasing its investments¹² and implication in Afghanistan, but also offering opportunities regarding the training, equipping and improving the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), obvious aspects which arise from the provisions of the 2011 Strategic Partnership between the two countries.¹³ India, by means of its position within

its relations with the IR Afghan aims, on one hand, to extend its economic influence at regional level and on the other hand, to secure an easy access the Central Asia's energetic resources through the Afghan corridor. One must not neglect, within this reasoning, the strategic calculation related to Pakistan. An independent Afghanistan, sovereign, stable, with an acceptable level of security and outside of the power factors influence or Pakistani influence, is for India a support in the geopolitical conflict with Pakistan, depriving the last one of its strategic depth, necessary geographical space in order to successfully engage its perpetual enemy.

Russia has also major interests in Afghanistan, the most relevant one being the prevention of spreading the fundamentalist ideology among the Muslim Russian population from Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia has interests of economic nature in Afghanistan as well, being at the same time concerned for the permanent presence of NATO forces in its southern flank. However, overall, Moscow's interest is that Afghanistan does not slip on the path of violence even further, thus becoming a "secure paradise" for the separatist and armed groups from Central Asia. Also, the common security interests of Russia and Afghanistan include the threats induced by the drug trafficking.

3. The internal security context of Islamic Republic of Afghan

Afghanistan needs stability and security in order to develop a state of law as it is held in Afghanistan's IR Constitution, but this goal is threatened by its internal security level, which is affected by a number of interrelated factors. Although terrorism and armed opposition constitute primary factors, poverty, poor health of the population and limited access to public health services¹⁴, narcotics trafficking, organized crime,

Between%20The%20Islamic%20Republic%20of%20Afghanistan%20and%20Republic%20of%20India.pdf, accessed on 15 July 2014.

14 For more details, see World Health Organization, "Afghanistan Health Profile 2012", available at

URL: <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/afg.pdf>, accessed on 15 July 2014 and World Health Organization, Country Cooperation Strategic Agenda (2009 -2013), available at

11 Treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between the IR of Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China, 19 June 2006, available at URL: <http://mfa.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan-China%20Friendship%20accord.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2014.

12 In the last decade, India totaled over 2 mild USD in investments, mainly directed to road infrastructure, hospitals, schools and electrification of rural areas, according to Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report 3rd Quarter 2014, London, UK, p.10, available at URL: <http://country.eiu.com/afghanistan>, accessed on 10 September 2014.

13 Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Republic of India, 4 October 2011, available at URL: <http://mfa.gov.af/Content/files/Agreement%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership%20>



poor governance are also important factors¹⁵.

The national interests of Afghanistan reflect the beliefs, priorities and values of the Afghan citizens, placing value on human prosperity, territorial integrity, state of law and governmental stability. The national interests are influenced by the internal and external security environment, which requires its permanent assessment and adjustment, due to the fact those situations tend to change. In order to ensure its security, The Afghanistan IR has a strategic approach towards pursuing national interests including national security, of Afghan citizens, Afghan allies and partners, creating conditions for a strong, innovative and emerging economy within an open international economic system, which promotes the prosperity, respect for national and universal values at national and outside the national borders level, and never the less, the regional stability and international order. Regarding the national interest related to regional stability and international order, Afghanistan aims establishing, extending and cultivating good international relations, based on mutual respect, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and also on Afghanistan's image as a positive and productive member of UN. Afghanistan supports an international order that promotes peace and security through a stronger cooperation in order to respond the current global challenges.¹⁶ Also, it is considered that the acceleration of society democratization will create the necessary conditions for economic and social progress and development.

The inadvertences present in the social system and the reduced capacity of response, to include natural disasters, continues to leave Afghanistan in a vulnerable position regarding the internal

URL: http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_afg_en.pdf, accessed on 15 July 2014.

15 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy. 1387-1391 (2008-2013). A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*, pp. 53-55, available at URL: http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2014.

16 *Ibidem*, pp. 59-60. For more details, also see the National Interest chapter of Afghan National Police Strategy, available at URL: <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5076>, accessed on 15 July 2014.

and external threats. The insufficient opportunities of formal education and the high rate of illiteracy represent the premises for a continuous internal security threat for Afghanistan.¹⁷ Also, if the economy stagnates and the rate of unemployment maintains at a high level, the people will remain vulnerable to extremist elements that claim to offer a better alternative. The establishment of the state of law depends on the capacity of deterring and reducing corruption, and also on the capacity of detect, pursuit and sanction the corruption.¹⁸ The existence of the corruption in the governmental organizations (bribery, power abuse, the employment based on ethnic or tribal affiliation, nepotism) diminish popular support for the government. Besides, corruption and ethnical partisanship diminish the government's counterinsurgency effort and alters the business environment and the overall economy.

Another threat that affects, in general, Afghanistan and the whole region is the prevalence of extremist cultures in the neighboring countries, directly or indirectly related to terrorist activities in Afghanistan.¹⁹

It is estimated that, in the years to come, the biggest national security threat for Afghanistan will come from within and it is represented by the presence of a ruthless insurgency, without respect for human life and property. As with respect to the internal threats, these include a wide range of phenomena, actions and processes and organizations²⁰ that, combined, can generate conditions for a conflict manifestation proper to civil war.

Within these, the Armed Opposition Groups come forth; these aim the removal of foreign

17 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy. 1387-1391 (2008-2013). A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*, pp. 113-119, available at URL: http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2014.

18 *Ibidem*, p. 146.

19 See the chapter: *Assessment of the Internal Security Threat* within *Afghan National Police Strategy*, available at URL: <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5076>, accessed on 15 July 2014.

20 Kenneth KATZMAN, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, July 11, 2014, pp. 10-18, available at URL: <http://fas.org/spp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf>, accessed on 11 July 2014.

troops from Afghan territory, weakening or even removing Afghanistan IR's government and establishing a fundamentalist Islamic state in Afghanistan (it is known that, in the relation with the legitimate Republic's government, Taliban are the ambassadors of Islamic Afghan Emirate). *The Taliban councils (Shura)* constitute organization forms of the Taliban leadership (they include some command centers - Quetta, Rahbari, Peshawar, Miran Shah), which share the same objectives²¹. They focus on the fight against the Western troops, on restricting the civil population's support offered by multinational forces by means of intimidations and violence towards those who are suspected of working with international forces or the government, clerks, auxiliary personnel of international forces, international troops, schools, etc.. One must not underestimate the support offered by other terrorist and extremist groups in the region, which have common objectives to the armed opposition groups from Afghanistan. Therefore, the possibility of *a short – term armed opposition increase*, as a reaction to the Afghan government forces increase, and from the perspective of international coalition forces' withdrawal, can not be excluded at the horizon and beyond the 2015 year. Al-Qaida, as an organization that constitutes the ideological opposition, is a threat not only for Afghanistan, but also for the regional area²², because it supports and protects the Taliban fighters and other armed opposition groups, promotes in an active manner - and benefits from - the drug trafficking; its ideology encourages generating local fighters

21 Guido STEINBERG, Christian WAGNER, Nils WÖRMER, „Pakistan against the Taliban”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments 8, March 2010 p. 4; it is considered that the most important one is Quetta Shura Taliban, which represents a group of Taliban insurgence leaders, having the base in Quetta city, in the South of Pakistan, province Baluchistan. The leader of this group is Mullah Mohammed Omar; Shura Peshawar is the coordinator group of Pakistani Taliban; Miran Shah operates in North Waziristan and Rahbari Shura controls the operations in Gerdi Jangal. For more details, also see available at URL:<http://www.afghanwarnews.info/insurgency/quettashurataliban.htm>, accessed on 30 July 2014.

22 See the recent announcement regarding its operations expansion beyond the Afghan borders, on the Indian sub-continent and the emergence of an armed Al Qaida cell in India.

and rebellions against the government.

The violence, propaganda and intimidation carried out by the opposition armed groups undermine and obstruct the evolution towards peace and progress at the level of the entire Afghan society. This situation causes frustrations and fear among citizens and reduces their chances of leading a normal life, causing some segments of local population to be tempted to join the Taliban, especially, of engaging in their fight against the coalition forces, contributing to the manifestation of the so-called *local opposition based on population's discontent*.

Organized crime. There are links between the Taliban and organized crime; this is mainly based on narcotics smuggling in order to finance their operations, which create even more instability in the country.²³ Besides, the prolonged war has generated the emergence of a underground economy, which has weakened even more the state's capacity to regulate the economic activities and to extend its taxation base. In this regard, there are estimates that underline the fact that the corrupt administration, especially the one from the Southern area of the country, is directly involved in drug trafficking and benefits from this type of activity even more than the insurgents do.²⁴

The psychological effects of criminal activities on society. The illicit activities (kidnapping, for example) induce fear among the population and lack of trust regarding the state's capacity to protect its citizens; it affects in a negative manner the economic development and reduce the possibility to invest in legal economic activities. Also, these types of actions can reduce the availability of international organizations to invest in Afghanistan or can generate a social rupture (in ethnical terms), which can be used by the opposition armed groups in order to portray the state institutions as incompetent and ineffective or to place in positions of conflict the constituting ethnic groups of the Afghan nation. Poor functioning of public institutions clearly indicates the existence of *institutional vulnerabilities*, of a le-

23 Gretchen PETERS, *How Opium Profits the Taliban*, United States Institute of Peace, 2009, pp. 4-6.

24 David MANSFIELD, *A Report for the Afghan Drugs*, Inter Departmental Unit of the UK Government, July 2008, p. 41.

gal and regulatory vacuum within distinct areas of society, which undermine population's trust in state institutions and of which organized crime groups benefit.

In the areas with reduced or inefficient presence of ANSF conditions are created by illicit armed groups for exercising the freedom of action, and *the inefficient control at the border* allows the development of smuggling activities and other illicit trans-border activities.

Corruption in administration strikes good governance and also the compliance to fundamental human rights, encourages obtaining illicit incomes and maintaining in functions or positions which allow the access to resources and power instruments and administrative decision, used for personal or group interests.

Regarding *prosperity and economic development*, in the programmatic documents of Afghan government some actions are indicated as necessary, such as²⁵:

a) focusing on national economic development and preventing the budgetary waste at all administrative levels;

b) increasing the power of citizens regarding social development so that they can approach national prosperity and protect national values;

c) reconstructing, developing and activating political, economic, security, social and administrative agencies for exercising a good governance so that the state can be effective in managing the country's affairs;

d) providing support for the creation of a favorable environment for investments and consolidation in a comprehensive manner of the foreign trade;

e) continuing the development of the government's capacities to respond to natural disasters and emergency situations;

f) managing, maintaining and properly and effectively using natural resources.

Regarding the maintaining and promoting some national values, based on various ethnic

²⁵ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy. 1387-1391 (2008-2013). A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*, available at URL: http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2014.

groups identities and traditions, the following aspects are being aimed:

a) implementing a global strategy of fighting against corruption, which can only be the result of a total transparency of the governmental structures of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at all levels;

b) protecting natural resources and maintaining a favorable life environment for a smooth development of the nation;

c) maintaining the cultural heritage and promoting national values in order to enrich and emphasize, in a more conspicuous manner, the Afghan national identity and common aspects of various ethnical groups that represent the Afghan nation.

From an economic and social perspective, it is considered that economic development will remain the central concern of the Afghan authorities, though still relying on the support offered by the international community. The economic and financial forecasts of the international organisms for 2015-2018 are optimistic ones, even though some analyses indicate a decrease in international financial contributions, being considered that the focus area of the external support will be providing primer services, such as electricity and education. The increase of fiscal incomes constitutes a priority as well, taking into account that in 2013 the governmental expenses represented the equivalent of approximate 20% of the GDP and that international donors are susceptible to reduce budgetary financial support in the years to come.

4. Human security threats

The security environment evolutions, Afghanistan's recent history features have generated conditions for the development and proliferation of a wide range of human security threats. A close look at those aspects can reveal the complex relation between them and the internal and external threats. The notable human security threats can be detected from *The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), 1387-1391 (2008-2013) – A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*.²⁶

²⁶ *Idem*.



Poor implementation of the law

The three decades of clashes have weakened the state's capacity to impose and enforce the law. A key factor in restoring the state of law is a strong and independent judicial system. Population's perception of law being applied inconsistently creates disturbances among the communities and reduces their support of the government.

The access to natural resources

It is possible to emerge disputes over some resources such as water, pastures, forests, mines and agricultural land, even when the property rights are clearly defined in the Constitution. Even though this aspect does not yet rise a significant threat, it is possible to generate amplified use of force, careful management of property and access rights being necessary, so that economic development and decrease of disputes and tensions among communities is allowed. The uneven access to resources threatens the tribal and regional relations as well; it reduces cooperation with the government and can create conditions for the upraise of discontented groups of population, which are likely to be recruited by the armed opposition groups.

Poverty and hunger

Despite the GDP doubling during the past eight years, there still exists a significant number of population which is dealing with the effects of poverty, 36% of population being unable to ensure its basic needs. Poverty and hunger amplify the discontent of population and create opportunities for the armed opposition groups to gain popular support.

Unemployment

The unemployment rate in Afghanistan is estimated to be between 40% and 53%. In this case, the high rate of unemployed in young population rises their possibility to be recruited by armed opposition groups, especially by those with access to international support and founding from activities of illicit or extremist and religious fundamentalist nature.

The reduced access to basic health services

Similar to poverty, impossibility to access basic health services has the potential to generate short circuits in internal security by means of social discontent, on short term, and on long term

by means of its impact on constructing state's capabilities. Afghanistan's health services are dealing with a lack of qualified personnel and lack of medical supplies and their high costs and uneven distribution result in high infant mortality rates and low life expectancy rates (58 years for men and 60 years for women)²⁷. Also, inadequate health infrastructure, lack of sewage systems and the fact the large portions of Afghan population do not have water access constitute a significant risk in terms of diseases that could be prevented.

Abuse of narcotics and lack of social protection

Conflict, population movements, in both forms (refugees and internally displaced), economic challenges and free available drugs have contributed to the development of abuse and addiction, which adds to the spectrum of threats the population from Afghanistan is dealing with.

Environmental deterioration

This aspect has been determined, in the last thirty years of war, by population movements and negligence regarding the environment. The effects include desertification, urban pollution, uncontrolled use of chemicals in agriculture, deforestation, reduced wildlife populations, decreasing production capacity of the agricultural land, soil erosion and pollution (from the use of mines and other military devices), air and water pollution. Environmental deterioration rises a severe security threat, on the medium and long term, especially from the perspective of economic sustainability and livelihood of population.

Low economic development

The economic situation of the country directly contributes to creating favorable conditions for the actions of armed opposition groups and simultaneously influences the dynamic relation between the external and internal national security threats of Afghanistan. There were increases in the private sector, but those are dealing with challenges regarding inefficient implementation of economic and social policies, poor law enforcement, corruption, lack of access to energy, poor development of the bank financial sector, etc.

²⁷ World Health Organization, *Afghanistan Health Profile 2012*, available at URL: <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/afg.pdf>, accessed on 15 July 2015.



Final considerations

With a history in which clashes, mostly military ones, were almost continuous, situated in a space characterized primarily by overlapping various interests of the regional and international actors, but also the limited, difficult to govern character of its resources, Afghanistan is, at present, in the in the early stages of a new historical period, but also of a specific conflict one. It is also expected that the transition and stabilization process this state currently is going through is the source of lessons, generating awareness regarding the need to deepen the theoretical level, but also the practical one, methods to encourage states towards effective self-supporting and self-governing.

Certainly, along with the complete withdrawal of NATO forces, we will witness a change in terms of addressing the Afghanistan matter. One year after the killing of bin Laden, Hamid Karzai and Barack Obama signed an Agreement: Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America (enforced on July 4, 2012), which established the framework for conducting the relations between Kabul and Washington after the complete withdrawal of the troops. Basically, military operation is thus replaced by a strategic partnership between the USA and Afghanistan. In January 2013, the leaders of the two states had another meeting in which the agreed commitments from the agreement signed in 2012 were reaffirmed and in which the strategic vision regarding Afghanistan's security, stability and prosperity was also addressed.

However, the IR of Afghanistan does not enjoy an acceptable level of security and stability yet, given the fact that, since the Soviet invasion (1979-1989), Kabul has allocate resources more in the fight direction than in the one of country development. Therefore, given the multiple political, social and economical challenges, Afghanistan remains an underdeveloped state, with a level of security and stability that ranks it at the very top of the Failed States Index (6th place in 2012, 7th place in 2013)²⁸.

28 The Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index 2013*, available at <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi>, accessed on 1 July 2014.

At the dawn of 2015, the political stability in Afghanistan is likely to remain weak, in the condition of an ongoing insurgence campaign, developed especially by the Taliban. The transfer of responsibility for security of the country to the national Afghan forces will end with the withdrawal of the majority of international forces by the end of this year. The uncertainty generated by the withdrawal of most of the international forces in 2014, which added to a high rate of political instability, can also indicate a probability of state fragmentation and conflict continuation.

The current dispute regarding the fraud of the presidential election from June 2014 is still far from being over and will delay the establishment of a successor for President Hamid Karzai, leading to erosion of trust, both internally and externally, in political system's capability to manage a transfer of power according to democratic rules.

This country's level of security is still a poor one, dealing both with external risks and threats and especially with hard to overcome difficulties, their limitation requiring sustained efforts on the long run, as well as full commitment from the behalf of national authorities. This all the more, as one of the most serious security threats of this state - which amplifies other phenomena as well, which contribute to the destabilization of the country and its economic and social stagnation - is related to a domestic phenomenon - insurgency. In this regard, the general tendency is one of escalating violence and insurgence attacks. Therefore, these severe security challenges are difficult to overcome, especially in the absence of a significant and sustainable international support in terms of security and also at economical and political level.

Taking into consideration the complexity of factors to be accounted within the analysis of the Afghanistan conflict and of its level of national security, we can certainly assert that this state's future depends, firstly, on the success rate of the government's commitment to respect the state of law and to fight against corruption and, secondly, on the willingness and ability of the international community to continue its efforts for establishing peace and security. Those efforts should not be



followed now, at the withdrawal of military presence, by apathetic attitudes, but by a renewed commitment.

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NEW TERRORIST CHALLENGES IN THE SINAI PENINSULA – PROMINENT JIHADIST ORGANISATIONS

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After the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, public order effectively collapsed in the Sinai Peninsula. Many condemned Jihadist operatives have been freed from prisons. New terror-organisations were formed with the cooperation of escaped Jihadist operatives (e.g. Ansar al-Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, Muhammad Jamal Network or Ajnad Misr). These groups are similar in that they are in a loose or close relationship with the al-Qaeda's global organisation, deny the Egyptian government's authority, which they consider corrupt, fight jihad for the establishment of an Islamic State and their targets are mainly personals of the Egyptian security forces as well as the Egyptian–Israeli gas-pipeline. Many of the inhabitants, who are living below the subsistence level and under discriminative measures, are receptive to their extreme ideology and they are about to establish their own Islamist emirate, propagating by the extremist. Currently, the Egyptian government sees the solution to build up closer cooperation with neighbouring Arab and African countries in the fight against terrorism. It is imperative for Cairo to solve the problem, because a long-continued conflict deters foreign investment and inhibits the restoration of the critical economic situation.

Keywords: *terrorist, salafi, jihad, Egypt, Sinai Peninsula, Israel, The Ansar al-Jihad, Al-Qaeda.*

Introduction

Near the Libyan border, 22 soldiers died in an armed clash between the Egyptian military border guards and smugglers on July 19, 2014. The smugglers' aim was to transport weapons to the Sinai Peninsula where public order effectively collapsed after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. A security vacuum emerged in the region after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak that was transformed into an organised insurgency. Many condemned Jihadist operatives have been freed from prisons due to the disturbances and then fled to the peninsula. New terror-organisations were formed with their cooperation (e.g. Ansar al-Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, Muhammad Jamal Network or Ajnad Misr). These groups are similar in that they are in a loose or close relationship with the al-Qaeda's global organisation, deny the Egyptian government's authority, which they consider corrupt, fight jihad for the establishment of an Islamic State and their targets of the near-daily attacks are mainly personals of the Egyptian

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security forces, as well as the Egyptian-Israeli oil and gas-pipeline.

The violence increased notable since President Muhammad Morsi was removed from power in July 2013. This unprecedented wave of violence poses a major threat to Egypt, because the terrorist attacks of these Sinai based armed groups became a common occurrence in the heartland of the country, particularly in Cairo. Moreover, this situation also affected the country's economy: according to several accounts, Egypt's foreign currency reserves have fallen by nearly 50 percent despite foreign aids during the last 42 months, the food and fuel reserves of the inhabitants became equivocal and the natural gas shortage is growing¹. The instability of the peninsula poses a serious danger to the wider region too. The Suez Canal and the Western interests in the area could be potential targets of these activists. Due to the attacks of the militants and the inconsiderable effectiveness of the Egyptian army's campaign strained relations with Israel and the United States. This means that continued Salafijihadist activity could undermine the stability of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, which is the cornerstone of Middle East policy of the Western countries.

1. The Ansar al-Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula and the Al-Qaeda groups in the Sinai Peninsula

The Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula is one of the Salafist Jihadists groups, which has been formed recently. Its exact headquarters is unknown, but it is supposed to be somewhere in the Sinai Peninsula. Its size and composition is also the subject of debates, as well as its relations with internal al-Qaeda network. The Ansar al-Jihad, thought to be the organisation's military wing, has announced its formation on December 20, 2011. It has vowed to fulfil the oath of the killed Osama bin Laden and promised a determined fight against the 'corrupt regime'

¹ Eric TRAGER, "Sisi's Fearful Egypt", in *The Washington Institute Improving the Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy*, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/isis-fearful-egypt>, June 11, 2014.

and its 'henchmen' – the Jews, the Americans and those around them. It blamed Israel and the United States for the Egyptian people's suffering on the overthrown of President Hosni Mubarak and his government, as well as his allies.² The Ansar al-Jihad swore allegiance to al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman Zawahiri in January 2012.³

The organization is led by the Egyptian Ramzi Mahmoud al-Mowafi, who travelled to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the 1990s. He volunteered to al-Qaeda during this journey, made his best and eventually became bin Laden's personal doctor. Later, he set up an explosives laboratory in Tora Bora caves, where he controlled the terror-organisation's chemical-weapons production. That is why he became known as "the Chemist". Egyptian officials managed to arrest him and the court sentenced him for life-imprisonment. During the 2011 disturbances, he escaped from his maximum security prison on 30 January and he was seen in Sinai Peninsula in August same year. According to the Egyptian Intelligence reports, he made contacts with terrorists from Takfir wal-Hijra and Army of Islam.⁴ Moreover, according to witnesses, meantime he had been training about 40 volunteers with ages between 15 and 40. During the training, the operatives were guarded by vehicles which carried anti-aircraft missiles and by 15 armed men, equipped with automatic weapons and military binoculars.⁵

The terror-organisation claimed responsibility for attacking on Egyptian soil only once. The mentioned terror-act happened on July 29, 2011,

² Bill ROGGIO, "Ansar al Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula announces formation" in *The Long War Journal*, December 22, 2011.

³ In their statement, the terror organisation subordinated itself to Zawahiri's power and swore to continue the fight until the establishment of a state preferred by the Islam. See Bill ROGGIO, "Ansar al Jihad swears allegiance to al Qaeda's emir" in *The Long War Journal*, January 24, 2012.

⁴ Mohamed Fadel FAHMY, "Osama bin Laden's doctor resurfaces", *CNN*, August 17, 2011.

⁵ "Local sources say Bin Laden's doctor trains Sinai militants, while security official denies this" in *Al Arabiya News*, August 25, 2011; David BARNETT, "Former bin Laden doctor reportedly heads al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula" in *The Long War Journal*, July 17, 2013.



when unidentified people attacked a police station in el-Arish. The assault was followed by another overnight attack and gunmen shot the Sinai gas-pipeline with rocket-propelled grenades.⁶ The action, which was coupling with the Army of Islam, according to Egyptian officials, wanted to emphasize the rising announcement in el-Arish on the same day for establishing an Islamic emirate in the Sinai Peninsula.

In the wake of the attacks, the Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula issued its proclamation on pamphlets. Like the Army of Islam, the terror-organization called for creating an Islamic emirate based on Sharia. It also demanded the abolition of Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the intervention of the Egyptian military forces on behalf of the Hamas in Gaza Strip, as well as the cessation of government's discriminative policy against local Bedouins. The experts emphasize mainly the importance of the last point, which suggests that the terror-organisation wanted to enlarge the number of its supporters with local Bedouins, where some groups have been radicalized by al-Qaeda activists or at least have become sympathizers of al-Qaeda's objectives.⁷ The attack against the police station led them to conclude that the presence of al-Qaeda has emerged in the Peninsula. They have begun to establish training facilities and take control of certain towns, according to the American considerations.⁸ Later, the Ansar al-Jihad caused

damages to the pipeline several times, which was attacked 14 occasions between the end of January 2011 and the end of July 2012, according to own reports.⁹

2. The Muhammad Jamal Network

The Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN) particularly operates in the Northern part of Sinai Peninsula and it set up training camps in Egypt as well as in Libya. The organisation is a part of international al-Qaeda network and it is controlled by Muhammad Jamal Abd-Al Rahim Ahmad Al-Kashif (known by the *nom de guerre* Abu Ahmad al-Masri), who was described as "ultra-radical" by former Jihadists. He trained volunteers in Afghanistan how to make and use bombs in late 1980s. After his return to Egypt, he became the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad's operational wing. He was jailed in 2002, but he was released, like his many fellows did, during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and established his own network.¹⁰ Soon, he made close cooperation with al-Qaeda, due to his acquaintance to Ayman Zawahiri. Besides this, he established a single group, named Nasr City Cell, with his former comrade, Sheikh Adel Shehato. According to charges, the group plotted several attacks in Egypt.¹¹

6 About 100 masked gunmen arrived at the place with motorcycles and 4x4 all-terrain vehicles carrying flags with Islamic slogans, where they tried to storm the police station by surprise. The defenders made a stand against them with Egyptian Army's help and the aggressors were forced to retreat after several hour clashes. One policeman, one military officer, three civilians and one of the attackers were killed. The number of the casualties was more than 20. The attack against the disused pipeline caused no casualties. The Security Forces arrested 15 persons on the following day, who were suspected of taking part in the assault. Two thirds of the prisoners were Palestinian, which proved the network's wide relations and its popularity in the circle of peoples, who were living under poverty line. See Amro HASSAN, "EGYPT: Six dead in assault on Sinai police station" in *Los Angeles Times*, July 30, 2011.

7 Bruce RIEDEL, "Al Qaeda's New Sinai Front" in *The Daily Beast*, August 21, 2011.

8 Robin SIMCOX, "An Emerging Threat: al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula" in *Henry Jackson Society*, August 30, 2011, available at <http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=2395>, accessed on July 14, 2014.

9 The terror-organization claimed responsibility for surprise attacks occurred in three stages on Highway 12, near Eliat on August 18, 2011. The assassins were armed with suicide bomb vests, grenades, RPGs and machine guns. Eight Israeli citizens died and 40 injured in the series of attacks. The Israeli forces killed eight militants, the Egyptians liquidate another two, and one of the perpetrators blew up himself by his own device. During armed clashed Israelis also killed five Egyptian soldiers by accident, which triggered a serious diplomatic row between the two countries. Later the American intelligence agencies also linked Popular Resistance Committees and Army of Islam to the events. (Gabe FISHER, "Sinai terror group claims responsibility for gas pipeline blasts" in *The Times of Israel*, July 25, 2012; Eli LAKE, "Al Qaeda linked to Israeli bus ambush. U.S. investigates faction in Sinai" in *The Washington Times*, August 22, 2011.)

10 Mohamed Fadel FAHMY, Tim LISTER, Paul CRUICKSHANK, "Militants at large since Arab Spring complicate anti-terrorism efforts" in *CNN*, October 4, 2012.

11 Thomas JOSCELYN, "New photos of Nasr City cell members published" in *Threat Matrix*, February 20, 2014. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/02/new_photos_of_nasr_city_cell_m.php#) accessed on July 13, 2014.



The organisation was financed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula due to Jamal's personal relations and it provided considerable help in smuggling volunteers into Muhammad Jamal Network's training camp. Previously, many prominent members of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (among them the group's emir, Nasir al-Wuhayshi) were trained in Jamal's camp according to the letters found on his confiscated computer after his re-arrest in 2012. Jamal reported that he established training camps in East-Libya and in the Sinai Peninsula, where he formed an armed group, too. Beyond these, he urged training suicide bombers and transporting heavy weapons, like mortars and missiles, as many as possible.¹² Ayman Zawahiri supported his imagination and gave his blessing to attack Egyptian and Libyan targets. According to reports, it seems that Jamal kept his promise to Zawahiri. Some of the attackers who took part in the September 11, 2012 bombing on United States diplomatic outposts in Benghazi, killing the ambassador and three other Americans, were trained at some Jamal's Libyan camp for the action based on intelligence reports.¹³ Later, Jamal confessed to his interrogators that he had trained the former military officer, Walid Badr, who tried to kill the Egyptian interior minister, Mohamed Ibrahim with a suicide car-bomb.¹⁴

When Jamal was rearrested in November 2012, his organisation did not disable, though it had lost its leader. Currently, the network is still operating and it has strong ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as part of the international al-Qaeda network.¹⁵ The U.S. State Department also drew

12 Thomas JOSCELYN, "Communications with Ayman al Zawahiri highlighted in 'Nasr City cell' case" in *The Long War Journal*, February 10, 2013.

13 Siobhan GORMAN – Matt BRADLEY, "Militant Link to Libya Attack. U.S. Tracks Egyptian Operative Freed From Prison in Wake of Arab Spring" in *The Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 2012.

14 **Later the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis claimed responsibility** for the action. (Zack GOLD, "Security in the Sinai: Present and Future" *ICCT Research Paper*, March 2014. p. 9, <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gold-Security-In-The-Sinai-March-2014.pdf>, accessed on July 13, 2014.

15 "Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entries to its Sanctions List" in *Department of Public Information News and Media Division New York*, October 21, 2013. (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/>

attention to several links with different European Jihadist groups.¹⁶

Beyond the global networks, it is seeking the opportunity for cooperation with the other Egyptian Jihadist cells, formed after 2011, to commit common terror-acts. According to Egyptian officials' suspicion, it is linked to those al-Qaeda plans, which were prepared against Western embassies and interests in Cairo in 2013.¹⁷ The United States named the Muhammad Jamal Network and its founder specially designated global terrorists on October 7, 2013. The UN Security Council Committee followed the example two weeks later.¹⁸

It is important to emphasize that the network has not claimed responsibility for any attacks in Egypt. It could be curious, because the network has procured a significant amount of arms in the Sinai Peninsula, according to Jamal-Zawahiri letters, quoted by officials.¹⁹

3. The Ajnad Misr

The Ajnad Misr (Egypt's Soldiers) is the most newly-formed Egyptian terror-organisation that was set up after the Islamist Mohamed Morsi's

sc11154.doc.htm) accessed on July 13, 2014.

16 Arshad MOHAMMED, "U.S. brands Egyptian Muhammad Jamal as 'global terrorist'", in *Reuters*, October 7, 2013.

17 According to Mohamed Ibrahim's announcement on May 11, 2013, the Egyptian officials arrested an al-Qaeda cell, which consisted of three members. The prisoners plotted to attack a Western embassy. He said that the Egyptian police found 10 kg of explosive material and instructions on how to build bombs and rockets during the custody. The interior minister also said the terrorists had previously taken direction from the Nasr City Cell. (Thomas JOSCELYN, "Egyptian interior minister: Al Qaeda cell plotted suicide attack against Western embassy", in *The Long War Journal*, May 11, 2013.)

18 Arshad MOHAMMED, "U.S. brands Egyptian Muhammad Jamal as 'global terrorist'", in *Reuters*, October 7, 2013. "Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Two Entries to its Sanctions List", in *Department of Public Information News and Media Division New York*, October 21, 2013, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11154.doc.htm>, accessed on July 13, 2014.

19 Thomas JOSCELYN, "Al Qaeda's Expansion in Egypt: Implications for U.S. Homeland Security" in *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, Washington D.C., February 11, 2014, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20140211/101734/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-JoscelynT-20140211.pdf>, accessed on July 14, 2014.



overthrown. It has issued its establishment in a statement on January 23, 2014. The terror-organisation said that it would fight against the “regime’s criminal organs”, which had humiliated the Egyptian people and prevented them from performing religious duties.²⁰ Later, it made clear for everyone in its declarations and acts that the term of “criminal organs” alluded mainly to security forces, which continued arrest-campaign against woman and girls. Also, they launched the attacks every Friday, killing and abusing innocent people without punishment according to the view of the terror-organisation.²¹ It promised mercy only for those ones, who defected and repented. The organisation said that it wanted to continue the fight until “justice prevails and a state accepted by God is established”.²² The more than a dozen attacks in Cairo and nearby show exactly its grim determination. The Afnad Misr was listed as terrorist organisation by the Cairo Urgent Matters Court on May 22, 2014.

The group’s headquarter could not be precisely localized till now. Some localise it in the Sinai Peninsula, others look for it in the Egyptian hinterland. In April 2014, Mohamed Ibrahim, interior minister, described Afnad Misr as an offshoot from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and stated that a prominent Muslim Brotherhood member, Osama Yassin was behind it. He said the group was composed mainly of Brotherhood-linked students from Students against the Coup movement.²³ The Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis could confirm this announcement, when references were made several times to Afnad Misr as brothers.²⁴

20 “New militant Jihadi group formed in Egypt claims responsibility for attacks on police”, in *Associated Press*, February 1, 2014.

21 “New Egyptian militant group claims responsibility for Giza bombing”, in *Associated Press*, February 8, 2014; Staff Writer “Jihadist group Afnad Misr claims Cairo bombings” in *Al Arabiya*, April 2, 2014.

22 “New Egyptian militant group claims responsibility for Giza bombing”, in *Associated Press*, February 8, 2014.

23 al-Masry AL-YOUM, “Interior Ministry: Soldiers of Egypt formed by MB leader”, in *Egypt Independent*, April 19, 2014.

24 David BARNETT, “Afnad Misr claims 3 more attacks in Cairo area” in *Threat Matrix*, April 18, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/04/ajnad_misr_claims_three_more_a.php#, accessed on July 15, 2014.

4. The “Retribution for Life” campaign

It seems Afnad Misr had committed terror-acts, mainly against official people, even before its actual establishment, according to investigations and the statements of the group. The Egypt’s Soldiers made their first attack on November 20, 2013 when they hurled an explosive device on a police checkpoint in Cairo.²⁵

They committed no less than eight other attempts with primitive explosive bombs till April 2, 2014.²⁶ The common element in these actions was that they targeted mainly the infrastructure and vehicles of the Egyptian police (the Al-Azhar bombing was the sole exception on March 29, 2014), they used generally two bombs near their target, and surprisingly not a person was killed (altogether there were 12 injured persons). However, the April 2 bombing proved the radicalization as well as the improvement of methods and equipment of the Egypt’s Soldiers. On this occasion, they exploded three homemade bombs near the Faculty of Engineering belonging to Cairo University, which killed a police Brigadier General, and injured five of his inferiors.²⁷ This

25 Four police officers injured and a kiosk was destroyed in the attack. On the same day, a car bomb killed 11 soldiers and wounded 34 others in the Sinai Peninsula. See “Cairo bomb attack wounds 4 police security” in *AFP*, November 20, 2013.

26 A roadside bomb, which was planted in a bush, injured two police officers on November 25. An ambush, executed by grenade and gunfire, hurt another official on January 7, 2014. Two explosives, planted on a main highway, wounded another officer on January 31, 2014. Six police officers wounded in a bomb attack near a checkpoint in Giza on February 07, 2014. No one hurt in the attack against Talbiya police station in Cairo on January 24, in the case of police car that was damaged on a bridge on February 07, in the bombing nearby the Israeli embassy on March 11 as well as in the explosion that happened near the fence of Al-Azhar University on March 29. (“**Blast at Cairo checkpoint wounds two police**” in *AFP*, November 25, 2013; “Bomb thrown in drive-by attack on Cairo police” in *Reuters*, January 7, 2014; “New militant Jihadi group formed in Egypt, claims responsibility for attacks on police” in *Associated Press*, February 1, 2014; “New Egyptian militant group claims responsibility for Giza bombing” in *Associated Press*, February 8, 2014; “Bomb explodes near Israeli embassy in Cairo, no one hurt” in *Reuters*, March 11, 2014; “Bomb explodes close to Al-Azhar” in *Mada Masr*, March 29, 2014.)

27 Two of the explosive devices exploded in quick succession and killed immediately Brigadier General Tarek al-Mergawi, chief of police in Giza province. The third,

assassination proved for everyone that the high-ranking leaders of the security forces could not feel safe. The perpetrators' aim was knowingly to kill them, not only hurt. Later, they contented with injuring the senior ranking targets and in the first half of April they activated only one-one primitive bombs in the two other attempts.²⁸ We have to underline the fact that we can consider the April 15 bombing as a turning-point, because here was a civil casualty along with two police employees, although Afnad Misr emphasized several times in its statements that it wanted to avoid hurting civilian people.²⁹

On April 17, Afnad Misr released its first video message. It was dedicated to the mothers who have been killed, injured or detained by the security forces. In the about 23 minute-long film, they condemned again the government's policy which they kept calling anti-Islamic and they claimed responsibility for eight previous actions.³⁰

much smaller detonation occurred less than two later, when police and journalists gathered at the scene. Among the casualties was Major General Abdel-Raouf El-Sirafy, deputy of the killed al-Mergawi. (Staff Writer „Jihadist group Afnad Misr claims Cairo bombings” in *Al Arabiya*, April 2, 2014.)

28 The April 10 attack, carried out by a primitive bomb placed under the car, injured a captain of the traffic police only in his leg. (“Bomb Wounds Egyptian Policeman in Cairo Suburb” in *Ma'an News Agency*, April 11, 2014.)

29 According to the terror-organisation, it has aborted many operations, because it did not intend to harm any innocent passerby by flying splitters in the blast. However, it is not clear why they bombed one of the crowded crossroads of the al-Galaa Square on April 15, 2014. (“Bomb Attack in Cairo Wounds 2 Police, Civilian” in *Ma'an News Agency*, April 7, 2014; David BARNETT, “Afnad Misr claims 3 more attacks in Cairo area” in *Threat Matrix*, April 18, 2014 – http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/04/ajnad_misr_claims_three_more_a.php#, accessed on July 15, 2014.; Staff Writer “Jihadist group Afnad Misr claims Cairo bombings” in *Al Arabiya*, April 2, 2014.)

30 In the first half of the video, members of the security forces could be seen attacking protesters and assaulting detainees. The second half of the video shows the aftermaths of Afnad Misr actions. The video closes with a message saying to take revenge for the female captives and threaten those who hurt them. (David BARNETT, “Afnad Misr releases first video of attacks” in *Threat Matrix*, April 17, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/04/ajnad_misr_releases_first_vid.php#, accessed on July 15, 2014.)

The following day, at around 10 p.m., they exploded another bomb in the illustrious MohandessindistrictandkilledMajorMohammed Gamal Eddin as well as injured a high-ranking officer and two other people.³¹ Five days later, another attempt occurred and a Brigadier General died, and two conscript policemen were injured.³² On June 27, Afnad Misr announced that it had planted earlier several bombs around the presidential palace. It urged passersby to be careful toward avoiding civil casualties. Three days later, two low ranking police officers died and ten others were injured in the blast outside the Ittihadiya palace, President Abdel-Fattal el-Sissi's residence. The attack was a useful example again and proved that the most secure locations could not give safe shelter against bombs, which were meanwhile perfected by the terrorists.³³

Conclusion

After the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, several new Jihadist organisations have been formed. They are in a loose or close relationship with the

31 The explosive device detonated around 10. p.m. Cairo times next to a traffic post in busy Lebanon Square. The reports of the witnesses were antinomic in connection with planting of the bomb. According to someone, it was hid inside the traffic post earlier. Others said that the bomb was hurled from a bridge over the traffic post by unidentified perpetrators. See David BARNETT, “Afnad Misr claims 3 more attacks in Cairo area” in *Threat Matrix*, April 18, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/04/ajnad_misr_claims_three_more_a.php#, accessed on July 15, 2014; Maggie MICHAEL, “Blast in busy Cairo square kills 1 police officer” in *Associated Press*, April 18, 2014.

32 Brigadier General Ahmed Zaki was torn asunder by the bomb that was placed under his car outside his home. This action confirmed the statement of Afnad Misr according that their attacks could not be considered as randomize raids. They planned their operation accurately and sized up correctly the daily routine and route as well as the attendants of their targets. See Tom PERRY, “Two policemen, militant killed in Egypt”, *Reuters*, April 23, 2014.

33 Allegedly the experts of the Afnad Misr studied for months how the police defuse the bombs. By experiences, it seems that they could construct such a new explosive devices, which cannot be detected by ordinary equipment. The case of two dead policemen is the evidence, which were killing during the bomb-disposal. See Maggie FICK, “Two police officers killed in bomb blasts near Cairo palace”, *Reuters*, June 30, 2014.; Sayed REHAB, “Afnad Misr claims palace blasts that killed two”, *Z News*, July 02, 2014.

al-Qaeda's global organisation. Their positions and operations are facilitated by the fact that a potential danger zone developed in the Sinai Peninsula during the last years. Many of the inhabitants, who live below the subsistence level and under discriminative measures, are receptive to their extreme ideology and they are about to establish their own Islamist emirate, propagating by the extremist. The situation is very serious because public order collapsed after 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the weapon-reinforcement coming continuously from Libya.

The terror-organisations improve the opportunity to weaken the Egyptian government's authority and they led dozens attacks against the security forces during the last years. Now the Egyptian government, which measures were criticized several times by political figures, sees the solution to build up closer cooperation with neighbouring Arab and African countries in the fight against terrorism. Fortunately the terror-organisations receive marginal support in urban, densely populated areas.

We consider that the Ajnad Misr is the most dangerous terrorist group from the above mentioned ones. There is no information about the leadership and the size of the organisation. Now it is operating in Egypt's hinterland, mainly in the capital. Like the Ansar al-Jihad and the al-Qaeda groups, the most common type of its attacks is bombing against security person.

However, there is an essential difference between these organisations, that Ansar al-Jihad operating particularly in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula and targeting mainly economical interests, like pipelines.

We think that the least perilous organisation is the Muhammad Jamal Network. We don't know any kind of attack attributed to this group. Moreover, the structure of the terror-organisation weakened after Muhammad Jamal was re-arrested in November 2012. At the same time, we would like to emphasize that this group is active nowadays and gives considerable help for foreign militants in the training camps. In this case, the solution of the problem could be exploring and destroying these bases not only

in Egypt, but in Libya and the Gaza Strip for a short period as well. Of course, this aim needs wider international collaboration in the area with Western moral, political and material support.

Moreover, it is imperative for Cairo to solve the problem, because a long-continued conflict deters foreign investment. The tourism, which is one of the main revenue of the country, abated also due to "anti-coup" demonstrations, bombings and Jihadist insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. The avails are sorely needed for the restoration of critical economic situation.

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CONTEMPORARY CRISES – A MAJOR THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

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With the fall of communism and the disappearance of the principal enemy of the free world – the USSR, both the United States and its allies had hoped that the society will tailor the way to an era in which international peace and security will replace the tensions, crises and confrontations of the Cold War. But the way that the '90s started determined a reorientation of the position of the states, and they understood that the disappearance of the danger that was represented by the Soviet Union and all the implications that its ambitions had on the international security didn't make the situation easier.

This is because the period in which we live is just as rich in tensions and conflicts, even if the crises situations and confrontations are not in the intensity of those in Cold War, when the danger of triggering a nuclear attack led humanity into a dramatic situation.

Keywords: *international security, crises, conflicts, peace, risks, threats.*

Introduction

Without doubt, the Cold War was one of the most interesting periods of humanity's history, in the first place because of the way it was fought. If the period before was marked by

wars of conventional type, worn following the clausewitzian logic, except for the Second World War, when atomic weapons were used for the first time (and last, up to this day), the period of confrontation between the "Big Two" was going to bring to the foreground the new way to a war: indirect, by subversive activities, through middlemen actors, while tensions between the two super-powers – the United States of America and the Soviet Union rivalised, but by avoiding a direct confrontations, which would have put the humankind in front of a major danger.

In other words, the Cold War represented a tense episode of history, being characterised by an extremely prolific period for crisis situations, which represents a step in the history of reference when we talk about crises. Subsequently, its ending, as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the implosion of the Soviet Union, has generated extensive mutations on the stage of international relations, mutations which have led to changes in the evolution of the security concept on all its characteristic bearings. Also, the ending of the Cold War brought hope in the international community level regarding the fact that, once the Soviet Union has disappeared from the fight for world leadership, cooperation would replace the confrontation in the relationship

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between states, the world having the chance to become more peaceful. The fact that that's not what happened is proven by the high number of crises and conflicts that were born and consumed in the post-Cold War period. Even if these crises and conflicts have not been as dangerous as those from the previous period, when the imminence of a nuclear war between the two superpowers propagated fear and horror on international level, they were sufficiently complex to raise problems from the point of view of safety.

The pass of about 25 years of the fall of the Iron Curtain, an event that made important mutations both at regional level – on the old continent –, and at international level, USA winning the battle for mondial supremacy in front of the Soviet state, didn't get to settle the things in a way in which the world would become that desired peaceful place, without wars and confrontations of any kind. This makes the period that we cross, as a result of the plurivalence of the factors that underlay the triggering of some tense situations, to which are added the interests of the international actors that are almost always divergent, to be one rich in tensions and conflictual manifestations on different levels of intensity, but always regarded with concern from the international community and by the states directly or indirectly affected by them.

1. Brief presentation of crisis situations

Crisis represents an extremely rare event that, by the changes that it can make in a very short amount of time, has the capacity to bring important harm to the affected international actor; in the case of states, we can speak of events that threaten their fundamental values. Starting from the effects that a crisis may have, such a situation requires an immediate answer, based on a coordination in the distribution of the resources, facilities and efforts needed in such a context, beyond those available in normal circumstances. Moreover, the fact that a poorly managed crisis may entail the occurrence of another crisis or a shift of the existing crisis towards a more dangerous stage makes the one who manages this kind of

situations to treat them with utmost seriousness.

Given the fact that a state of crisis can be triggered by a variety of factors, with different typologies, but also the multiple ways in which they may occur, crisis may have many definitions, given by specialists and analysts in the fields in which crises may occur, by explanatory or speciality dictionaries, and also by documents drawn up by relevant international organizations. Thus, the Romanian Explanatory Dictionary (DEX) explains crisis as a „manifestation of difficulties (economic, social, political etc); period of tension, of disturbance, of attempts (often decisive) occurring in society; acute lack (of goods, time, labor force)”¹. Another lexicon, Human Science Dictionary, defines crisis as “a period of disturbance or imbalance”, talking about theories that conceive the history development as a succession of crises and stability.²

Because of the large number of crisis situations manifested in international relations and in associated fields, definitions of the crisis are found also in speciality dictionaries. Thus, the Diplomatic Dictionary defines crisis as “a critical moment that occurs in the evolution of international life, in the relations between the states, in a system, regime or government. Such moments, whether it is about the internal or international life of a state, are characterised by the sharpening of contradictions, occurrence of tensions, changes in the ratio of forces”³. The Dictionary of International Relations considers crisis as “a moment of turning-point in the relations between actors or between the environment and the actors”, cases that can be associated with this kind of situations are multiple, many relevant examples existing during the Cold War: the two crises of Berlin (1948 and 1961), the crisis of Suez (1956), the missile crisis in Cuba (1962) etc.

1 *** *Dicționar explicativ al limbii române (DEX - Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language)*, second edition, Univers Enciclopedic Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 1998, p. 241.

2 François GRESLE, Michel PANOFF, Michel PERRIN, Pierre TRIPIER, *Dicționar de științe umane (Dictionary of Human Science)*, Nemira Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2000, p.75.

3 *** *Dicționar Diplomatic (Diplomatic Dictionary)*, Political Publisher, Bucharest, 1979, p. 315.

The diversity of factors underlying a crisis triggering require that these kind of situations to be “studied, analyzed, monitored and settled”⁴, and in order to find a solution to the problems which have arisen as a result of crisis we need to understand the causes, generated circumstances and effects that they may have. The analysis of how the crises are formed, as well as the multi-faceted factors that trigger them offers the possibility of splitting them according to several criteria of classification, among which: *the field of manifestation* (political, diplomatic, economic, military, social crises, etc.); *the origin and triggering causes* (progressive and sudden, voluntary and forced crisis); *the space of manifestation* (local, national, bilateral, regional, continental and international); *the resources involved* (crisis of human resources, demographic crisis, of raw materials, financial, bank etc.); *the mode of manifestation in intensity* (violent crises, latent); *the complexity degree* (simple, complex, combined); *the quality and characteristics of the entities engaged*: inter-ethnic, religious, inter or intra-civilizational, inter-social categories, professional crises⁵; also, there are other types of crises: of authority, of education, industry, health, petrol, gas, certain products, etc.⁶

The criteria that divide the crises depending on their mode of manifestation, the actors involved, the field in which they occur provide a general overview of them, but it has to be noted that a crisis is not limited strictly to the area in which it manifests. In other words, this kind of situation doesn't need to belong to one of the classifications referred to above. There are plenty of examples of crises that, as a result of the complexity of factors underlying their triggering, the development and the stages covered on the interval between the triggering of the crisis and its ending, can be included in more than one typology. Thus, an internal crisis which arises in

4 Gheorghe VĂDUVA, Mihai-Ştefan DINU, *Politico-military crises of the beginning of the millenium, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2005, p. 7.*

5 Gheorghe VĂDUVA, Mihai-Ştefan DINU, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

6 Dorel BUŞE, *Crisis and regional conflicts management*, Fundația România de Măine Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 48-62.

the perimeter boundaries of a state, may exceed them during its evolution, extending its effects in its geographical proximity, at regional or even international level. And the best recent example in this respect is the Sirian crisis, which on more than four years from the trigger moment was turned into an internal crisis – generated by the desire of one part of the Syrians to remove the power from Bashar al-Assad – in a regional crisis, which affects powerful states around Syria (refugees issue, security risks caused by opening of the borders, etc.), but with strong reverberations at international level.

2. Introduction into international security

The initiative of setting up an international organization in the security field right after World War I was based on the desire of those who have supported it to create an opportune environment to establish a lasting peace at international level. The League of Nations failed lamentably in the exercise of the duties that have been assigned to it, and the most eloquent evidence in this respect is itself the triggering of the second world conflagration in the autumn of 1939.

Afterwards, the Cold War has left deep traces in the relations between international states and non-states actors, significantly helping to create a climate of distrust on the international stage. The vast range of crises and conflicts that have marked human history, to which are added those manifested currently, have generated fears regarding the possibility of wars to occur. That caused, at international level, in particular relevant actors, to become more aware of the fact that this type of events in the relations between states must be, if not avoided – unlikely situation –, at least kept to a level where the danger generated does not lead to a deterioration of the security, on all the levels which this occurs (individual, national, regional, international).

The fact that the international states or nonstates actors that play a role in the security field are aware of the necessity to adress risks and threats faced by security in a pragmatic manner, the main objective being to reduce the

consequences of situations that have negative effects on the stability on regional and international level, represents a step forward, while the efforts made in this respect are more than welcome. In many cases, however, their initiatives encounter difficulties in the realities in the field, while the complexity of the causes underlying the triggering of the crises and conflicts makes a general model for resolving and managing these situations impossible to be found.

But despite the efforts submitted at international level over time, totally avoiding the crisis situations or conflicts has been impossible to accomplish, which is an obvious fact if we take into account the motivations underlying the international actors' actions. Thus, on the background of old disputes remained unsolved (territorial claims, religious reasons, etc.) or some elements recently emerged (e.g.: the discovery of important reserves of energy resources in a space claimed by more than one state, as happened in the case of the resources discovered in the Mediterranean Sea⁷), the number of the contemporary crisis and conflicts that mark the beginning of the III millennium is a worrying matter. And the prospects are less reassuring: we have a region spread over two continents, where the level of instability has reached alarming proportions, as it is the case of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a geographical area deeply marked by tensions and violent actions of some actors who have acquired a significant power in the detriment of the state authorities in whose territory they are acting. The most relevant examples in this respect are the militias that act within the borders of Libya, the Islamic State which occupied a part of the Iraqi and Syrian territories, its desire of laying the foundation for a Sunni califat in the Levant region, transforming it in a regional actor who raises big security issues to the states in the area, who are directly threatened by the expansionary ambitions of the Islamic State.

An interesting aspect is related to the expansion of dangerous crisis and conflicts in regions

less prone to such events, the crisis in Ukraine triggered by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and the future developments showing that the geographical position at a certain distance of the "traditional" outbreaks of tension, specifics for example for Middle East and the North of Africa, are no longer a guarantee of security, on the contrary, may contain a major risk in a situation in which in the geographical proximity is a powerful state, dominated by revansarde desires.

3. Ways of crisis management and peace establishment

Currently, the international community is faced with a series of situations that put its ability of managing simultaneously a series of problematic episodes to test, including the crises and conflicts from the MENA region, as well as the tensions from the Eastern boarder of Euro-Atlantic area. We live in a complex world, in which globalization, in addition to the positive effects on the economy or on people's lives, generates extensive negative consequences in the security field.

In addition to this, there is another component of the present – interdependence, that makes states unable to watch passively from the sidelines of events, even if the ones who make the moves on the big chessboard understood as international arena are the big international actors. This is because the distance of a given area marked by tensions and violence stopped representing a component that ensures a satisfactory level of stability for the states long time ago, high consumers of regional security representing factors of instability on international level. In other words, no country of any area in the world is totally safe with the matters which security is facing, even if, from a geographical point of view, doesn't have any connection to any grounds marked by tension and conflict. This is because globalization and interdependence, as well as the member of organizations statute, leaves no room for a different kind of cohabitation than together, in a common space in which the positive effects of mondialisation are assimilated by the

⁷ Felicity ARBUTHNOT, *Israel: Gas, Oil and Trouble in the Levant*, Global Research, December 30, 2013. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/israel-gas-oil-and-trouble-in-the-levant/5362955>, visited 09.07.2014.

international actors, depending on the capacity of each country of protecting itself, the dangers that threaten their security and stability.

Considering the costs (material, lives, image) that the state might have to pay if it takes part to a crisis or conflict, it is much more efficient to avoid triggering such episodes than to manage them. But the history and the present showed us that not always such a situation is possible, in many cases crises and conflicts, due to unavailability of the parties to a peaceful understanding, cannot be avoided.

In such a context, international actors involved in finding sustainable long-term solutions to the existing problems have to make considerable efforts to determine a return to the status quo ante, where such a situation is favorable or to influence its evolution to a point where tensions and/or violence to be reduced. For them to be effective, it is required the implementation of some sustained measures, aimed to prevent the escalation of the situation and avoid its transformation into a dangerous one for the international actors involved and the region to which they belong. In this regard, the actions that lead to achieving peace involve identifying long-term solutions to situations that fit in the patterns of some interest conflicts between two or more parties, and this is done through negotiations.

Thus, peace can be achieved through the following actions: the imposition of a solution (case in which the violence is used or obtaining novelty through a position of force), solutioning the situation with the help of juridic or political-diplomatic ways.

Imposing a solution can be achieved by:

a) Applying some sanctions that don't involve the use of force, understood as actions meant to answer acts committed by a state and considered inappropriate or illegal, as in the case of:

- reprisals (consisting in seizing of properties belonging to nationals of that state; cutting off the trade relations, telegraphic, mailboxes; expulsion of state citizens; refusing to apply/respect certain treaties);

- penalizing measures, which can mean breaking the diplomatic relations, stopping the trade, reducing imports; not recognising the acts of that state;

- applying embargo, in this measure can enter from the trading ships of the "unfriendly" state, to the assets of any kind;

- boycott, which may take the form of interruptions of trade relations and communications in a number of areas;

- peaceful maritime blockade, measure by which it is intended to prevent a state's access to the ports and coastal areas of another state without using force.

b) sanctions that require the use of force, but are accepted by the international community only if their implementation is done according to international laws.⁸

The use of violence as a way of solving a situation is a special case in the sense of its sensitivity, thus sanctions stipulating the use of force cannot be imposed without complying with international law. The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in order to protect the next generations from the scourge of wars, is composed of a Preamble and 19 Chapters, all totalling 111 items). The Charter regulates recourse to force, that "becomes legitimate when is used in the defense or impose of the human rights and democratic values", being considered "illegitimate, when it will not fit in these patterns."⁹ Current world order respected and accepted by the UN Charter is built on the Clausewitzian premise, that war is the act of using the army to impose will, that is the hardest form of power relations.¹⁰

The concepts can be understood differently, because the Charter of the United Nations does not define all the terms that it is using, from the text even missing the definition of the term "people". In this respect, it is possible to apply arbitration in the relations between states, meaning that the use of war is not the last solution, but depending on the interests that the warring parties or a third party would have, because "removing war from

8 Ioan CRĂCIUN, *Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management*, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 94-96.

9 Mircea MUREȘAN, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *The war of the future, the future of war*, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, 2004, p. 61.

10 Nicolae DOLGHIN, *Security and Defence Studies*, vol. IV, *Space and future of the war*, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, 2007, p. 63 (author's translation).

the sphere of interest means removing it from the political sphere, which is a nonsense”.¹¹

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations – “Action in case of threats to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression” refers to international peace and security. After 1990, it includes the human side, societal of security, taking into account issues such as: the spread of a disease by the flow of refugees, large number of refugees etc.

The chapter emphasizes the power of the Security Council, component of the United Nations which has as main responsibility maintaining peace and security, being able to decide actions and measures of constraint for this purpose. The UN Security Council “accredited with the fundamental responsibility of maintaining peace and international security”¹², has the most important role, so that no court in the world will have jurisdiction over it as regards international peace and security. This fact is attested by Article 25 of Chapter 5, which provides that anything that is decided within the framework of the Council, UN members are obliged to accept and execute.

Art. 39 of the Charter is one of the most important items and it specifies that the Security Council considers as an assault any security threat : „The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threats to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”¹³

Art. 40 refers to the fact that, in order to prevent the deterioration of the situation, before making recommendations or making decisions on the measures that have to be made in accordance with art. 39, the Council may request the parties to submit interim measures.

11 Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Principles of war and armed struggle. Facts and Trends*, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, 2003, p. 11.

12 Bogdan SGĂRCITU, *Post Cold War security strategies*, Strategic Monitor, no.3-4/2006, Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, Bucharest, 2006, p. 132.

13 ****Charter of the United Nations*, http://www.dadalos.org/uno_rom/un-charta.htm#7.

In addition to this, art. 41 provides the possibility for the Security Council to decide what measures can be taken that do not involve armed force. It may include the interruption, either complete or partial of economic relations and communications by rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, but also cutting off diplomatic relations.

Art. 42 cannot be applied before application of art. 41 and it provides that the UN can require any action (with air, naval or land forces) which it considered necessary to maintain or restore peace and international security. The phrase “any action which it considers necessary”, is used to avoid expressions such as „military action”, “military force”, an action of war is accepted only in case of Art. 51, which relates to self-defense. The action may include demonstrations, blockade measures and other airline, land or sea operations of the United Nations member states.

Art. 43 refers to the forces provided by the member states of the organization, for the UN. The article becomes operable only in case of peacekeeping operations, with the specification that all troops who will take part in actions offer to participate in United Nations missions, the organization is not allowed to ask for troops to its missions. That’s where art. 44/Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which refers to the fact that at the time when the Security Council has decided to use force, the United Nations organization knows what members it can count on.

Articles 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 provide military measures concerning the quotas which will participate to the UN mission, to the creation of a Staff Committee, which has the task to advise and assist the Security Council in connection with military operations and other measures which are provided by the decision taken in connection with the task which will take place.

Art. 50 comes to help the states that would be affected by the preventive or coercive measures that the UN Security Council can take against an aggressor state. Thus, any other state – whether or not is a member of the United Nations – that encounters economic difficulties as a result of the measures decided by the Council, has the right

to consult it in order to resolve the difficulties. Last article in Chapter VII refers to the right to self-defense, which the UN members have, no provision of the Charter touching it.

Thus, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations attests the power of the UN Security Council to authorize diplomatic, economic or military sanctions, as well as its competence to decide the use of armed force regarding settling conflicts and maintaining peace and international security.

Crisis settlement with the help of the justice is done by means of:

a) international arbitration, which “consists in solving a dispute between states by a person – arbitrator or an organ by the parties, which make up the arbitrary court through a decision which, according to the prior agreement, has mandatory value”.¹⁴

b) International justice, meaning the addressing to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, as a main component of the UN.

With respect to the prevention or settlement of crisis situation on the political-diplomatic way, it is about how to use specific methods of such an approach, and these are:

a) Negotiations – one of the most important ways of preventing and resolving crises and conflicts; they are seen as opportunities for identification and construction of a solution to a problem clearly defined: fixing a conflict situation, preferably before it enters into the violent phase.

b) Good offices – represent the involvement of a third state both on its own initiative, as well as at the request of the international actors involved in the dispute. Their main role is to ensure the communication lines between the parties, the establishment of some contacts that have informative and explorer role, and in some cases the actor who offers/accepts to make good offices provides and hosts the talks between the parties who have a dispute.

c) Mediation is understood as a form of intervention of a third party in the conflict, the purpose of such action being bringing the conflict to

an acceptable solution for the involved parties in the conflict, but which should be consistent with the interests of the mediator.

d) International investigation is an preliminary action for the settlement of a conflict and consists in an attempt to establish objectively the development of the facts and events which underlie the contradictions between the involved parties.

e) International conciliation is made, like in cases of good offices and mediation, by third parties international actors and can be considered an extension of the investigation. It provides the existence of a commission whose members are appointed to resolve a dispute which could not be resolved by direct negotiation between the international actors involved in the dispute.

f) Arbitration is one of the most ancient forms of dispute settlement and is also made by a third party. Even though it has all the attributes of a judicial method used by the International Court of Justice, in this case, the parties choose arbitration judges themselves.¹⁵

Crisis management is rooted in studies made in the United States since the triggering of Cuba missile crisis (1962), an episode of history both exciting and dangerous, which raised awareness of the complexity of these situations and their effects on the security and stability of the regions where they occur, but also at extended level, globally.

The need for understanding their mode of manifestation with the hope that lessons learned will be able to lead if not to avoid triggering other similar situation, at least to a much easier way to identify the mode in which they should be addressed and solved, has led to the emergence of what is called *crisis management*.

In the speciality literature, this is understood as “a set of measures and actions intended to stop at last moment the evolution of the conflict to a violent course or to stop extending the violence to war”.¹⁶

A realistic identification of those measures that would best answer the crises situation, by

14 Aurel Preda – MĂTĂSARU, *Treaty of public international law*, Lumina Lex Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2002; p. 241.

15 Teodor FRUNZETI, *Solving international crises. Military and non-military means*, European Institute Publishinghouse, Iasi, 2006, pp. 162-173.

16 Ioan CRĂCIUN, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

preventing its escalation is linked to the way in which the crisis itself is perceived and understood. And here intervenes what is known as crisis management, referring to “investigating, analyzing, studying, knowing and understanding the mechanism of a crisis, of the systems and processes of triggering and evolutions, as well as the ways of preparation of some institutions, communities, organizations, business, entities to handle both the action causes, as well as their consequences, i.e. effects”.¹⁷ The more the crisis situations are closely monitored and understood, the more their approach may be more effective. The complexity of these situations imposed the need of analyzing them by the typology they fit in, so that for every type of crisis there have been identified appropriate measures. Based on the definitions and characteristics mentioned above in this paper, we note that:

a) Political crisis management can be understood as the process accepted of establishing a complex of negotiations, commitments and procedures to control the crisis, as well as shaping it for the agreed purpose. It is taken in consideration, in the first place, identifying the crisis, planning for an answer, implementation of actions to solve the crisis.

b) Managing social crises is a complex and multi-level process, due to many effects that they produce, through specific methods through which the crisis can be controlled and prevented. The management of social crises involves identifying the risks and social vulnerabilities, as well as searching for a strategy of prevention and its implementation.

c) The management of economic and financial crisis gained, in the last period, a particular relevance, firstly because of the globalization, but also because of the crisis' effects in this field that affected all world states, regardless of the size or location on the globe. Just like the previous case, it is considered the identification by the competent authorities of those measures which will give the possibility of controlling a crisis in

the economic and financial field, avoiding in the same time potentially disastrous effect on the financial system or on the economy.¹⁸

d) Political-military crisis management has been given an increased attention since the Cold War ended, when NATO adopted a series of new measures, adapted to present times, in an attempt to respond as effectively as possible to the risks and threats that the security environment encounters. The political management of the Alliance is based on three stages which support each other: dialogue, cooperation with other states and maintenance of NATO's collective defense capacity. Each element of the three was intended to streamline preventing or solving crisis situations in a peaceful way, thereby avoiding a response involving the use of force.¹⁹

Conclusions

This article started from the idea of treating the topic of crisis, given the fact that the period we are going through is a problematic one from this point of view and followed the logical shift of the concept through the theoretical part, and then there are shown the ways in which a crisis can be avoided or managed.

The classification and the definition of the main typology of crises found in this Article was meant to explain theoretical issues which are related to the evolution of this sensitive sphere, pointing out the way in which crises emerge, are consumed and ended, on the sensitive points “speculated or operated” by them, as well as the manner in which they may affect the status quo of the period in which they are occurring.

If starting from the characteristic elements, a classification of crises can be made on multiple criteria, achieving a hierarchy based on the danger their existence generates can be difficult, partly because each crisis affects in a more or less large share the environment in which it occurs, and may have the most serious consequences.

The complexity of how crises arise and the difficulty with which they are exceeded in many

17 Mureșan MIRCEA, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, Eugen BOAMBA (editors), *Crisis, conflict and war*, vol. III, National University of Defense „Carol I”, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 12-13.

18 *Ibidem*, pp. 25 – 42.

19 Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, *Politico-military crisis management*, TopForm Publishing, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 190 – 191.

cases resulted in the need to develop their management studies, understood as action to prevent and solve them. Internationally, there are a number of mechanisms by which the states that are considered responsible for the triggering of certain crisis or conflicts can be determined to change their behaviour and position, both through peaceful means and the use of force. Their purpose is to transform tensions and violence in a peaceful climate, as well as decreasing the ambitions of some states.

If the theoretical part is covered in the specialized literature as deep as possible, there are ample studies that deal with crises in the smallest details, from the definition to classification, ways of managing them, etc., all the elements that are found also in this article, it is interesting to note how effective they are in real cases on the ground and not in the classroom or in the literature.

Looking at the crisis in Libya, for example, we can say that the actions of the international community to impose peace have worked, but only through the application of specific measures and not through soft power. However, there are current developments which may prove sufficiently problematic for state and non-state international actors, crises generated by the events taking place in Syria, Eastern Europe (Crimea), or the Islamic State actions representing many examples of cases in which the international community mechanisms were proved non-efficient, at least up to this time.

From here, we conclude that crisis situations are highly complex episodes, which are based on various factors, and the fact that for some of them the mechanisms with which the international community functions work, and for others they don't, is a proof of the fact that they have to be adapted according to the type, depending on the involved parties and the stake they have.

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BALUCHISTAN AND ITS GEOSTRATEGIC POTENTIAL IN SOUTHERN ASIA

*Demostene-Dorinel GHEORGHE**

The importance of this province derives mainly from its geographical position and mineral resources. In addition to providing access to Central Asia and the Caspian resources for the United States, China, Europe and the Indo-Pacific countries, its rich reserves of iron, copper, gold, uranium and other energy reserves have always kept up the interest of the world's key players, from the 19th century "Great Game" – the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia up to the current conflict between the United States and China over the same region of Central Asia. In addition to these stimulating factors, Baluchistan has also a fairly long coastline which includes Gwadar – a small port on the coast, strategically located between the three major regions of the world: the oil-rich Middle East, the densely populated South Asia and the mineral resources rich Central Asia.

Keywords: *Baluchistan, South Asia, Gwadar, Pakistan, mineral resources, China-Pakistan.*

1. Context and history of the conflict

The controversies involving Baluchistan¹ started after 1893, when the establishment of

¹ The tribe and the province are usually written either Baluch and Baluchistan or Baloch and Baluchistan, but the latter spelling appears to be currently winning writings on the subject and, therefore, I will use it in this material.

the *Durand Line* separated the Pashtun and Baloch tribes living in Afghanistan from the tribes currently living in Afghanistan, India, Iran and Pakistan (see Fig. 1²). In the early 30s, some Balochi leaders have anticipated a possible withdrawal of the British from the region. Consequently, demands for independence³ began to rise and be promoted by the Balochi ethnic groups and supported by the Khan of Kalat⁴ himself, with reference to Nepal and Kalat which, in his opinion, ought to have the same status⁵.

² "The spread of ethnic Baloch in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India", available at: http://baluchistanhcr.blogspot.com/2011/07/01_archive.html, accessed 5/20/2014.

³ Alok, BANSAL, *The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan*, Strategic Analysis Paper, April-June 2005, http://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_abansal_0306.pdf, accessed at 5/20/2014, p.3, apud Owen Bennett JONES, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2002, p. 132.

⁴ Khan al Kalat or Khan-e-Qalat - is the title held by the former heads of State of the State of Kalat. Baluchistan Kalat State and is now part of Pakistan. Leaders of Kalat were legally subordinate to political authority of a larger state each for different time periods: the Mughal Emperor Akbar beginning in Delhi, then after 1839 the British, and finally the government of Pakistan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_of_Kalat).

⁵ Alok, BANSAL, *The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan*, Strategic Analysis Paper, April-June 2005, http://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_abansal_0306.pdf, accessed 5/20/2014, p. 3, apud Veena KUKREJA, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2003, p. 131.

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Figure no. 1: The spread of ethnic Baloch in Afghanistan, India, Iran and Pakistan

After the British departure, the territories under their control were joined to Pakistan and Quetta municipality, “a legislative body dominated by the non-Balochi, ratified this annexation. Later, the Khan was forced to sign the document of annexation, which led to the outbreak of the armed insurgency of 1948, led by the Khan’s brother⁶.

Pakistan gained its state independence in 1947, when India and Pakistan were granted the privilege of becoming two sovereign countries. Currently, Pakistan consists of four provinces: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh, a state capital – Islamabad, and a Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)⁷, which includes seven distinct tribal agencies, administered directly by the Federal Government of Pakistan through a special set of laws. Each of the four provinces of Pakistan is associated to

an ethno-linguistic group: Punjab with Punjabis, Balochistan with Balochi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with Urdu (as national language) or Pashto (as majority language) and Sindh with Sindhi. Supported by cultural roots, these ethnic and linguistic groups often promote themselves as “peoples” or even “nations”⁸. This is the case of Balochistan. With an area of over 347,192 km², approximately 43.6% of the total area of Pakistan, Balochistan is the largest but also the “poorest” and least populated province of the four provinces and territories of Pakistan.

The province of Balochistan is strategically located in the south-west of Afghanistan and is bordered by Iran to the west, the Punjab and Sindh provinces to the east, the Pakhtunkhwa Province to the north-east and the Arabian Sea to the south. It comprises 30 districts, and the most important city of the province, Quetta, which is located near the border with Afghanistan and is also the Capital Province, an important commercial

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): semi-autonomous tribal region in northwest Pakistan, bordering the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan and Balochistan to the east and south, and the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika and Khost in Afghanistan, west and north.

⁸ Alexander, ATARODI, *Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance*, Report no. FOI-R-3110-SE, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2011, p. 16.



and communication center, a strategic military location for the Pakistan Armed Forces and the main hub of the ISAF land supply line for the coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The population of Balochistan province is estimated at about eight million people (about 5% of the Pakistan's population), with a very low density of approximately 22.5 inhabitants per km². This is largely due to the predominantly mountainous relief, the water scarcity and the deserted land. Baloch and Pashtun are the two major ethnic groups in the province, with common aspirations and ideals: free and independent Balochistan and Pashtunistan states.

The province is very rich in natural gas reserves, about 40% of Pakistan's total production of gas originates from this region; Balochistan has also one of the largest reserves of copper and gold in the world. Although earnings from the export of natural gas annually reach 1.4 billion euro per year, only 8% of this revenue goes back into the province. For this reason, the Balochi nationalists and supporters of secession feel neglected, abused and robbed by the central government. The lack of infrastructure has a big impact on the population's education, as the literacy rate is below 31% of the total population. The province is also the main center and supplier of weapons on the black market in the south and southwest of the neighboring country, Afghanistan.

The main effect of the province loss would be that Pakistan would lose much of its natural resources, which would make it more dependent on the energy supplies from the Middle East. The fact that these natural resources are not exploited to their full capacity, and that almost only non-Baloch provinces, especially the Punjab province, benefit from them, fuels the separatist beliefs of the Baloch nationalists, who think that these natural resources could contribute significantly to the economic development of an autonomous Balochistan; on the other hand, an independent Balochistan would restrict Islamabad's access to the Gwadar Port and the resulting benefits. And the losses that Pakistan might suffer in case of a possible secession are not limited to the economic field. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is another key

aspect which attracts international attention. Without an arid and depopulated area, as most of the Balochistan is, the government in Islamabad would have to identify new areas for testing missile and nuclear arsenal, but they would be too close to populated areas. This is an additional argument allowing the Baloch nationalists a game of international sensibilities, supported by declarations of acceptance of any nuclear demilitarization programs of the Balochistan Province in exchange for state independence⁹.

2. Nationalism, insurgency and self-determination

Balochistan, the largest province of Pakistan, is also an area troubled by an increased armed insurgency, fighting for both the right to manage their own natural resources and for cultural and territorial autonomy, which has always been impaired by the games of the big powers in the region.

A statistics for the year 2013 compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the United States of America¹⁰ reveals that Pakistan ranks second in the top ten of countries where terrorist attacks are common in the everyday life, with an average of 1.21 deaths and 2.6 injuries/attack. According to the same report, more than half of the total number of attacks (57%) and deaths (66%) and almost three quarters of all injuries recorded following the attacks (73%) occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given that two of these three countries are currently undergoing civil unrest or armed conflict with international involvement, this statistic becomes alarming for Pakistan.

Baloch nationalist and self-determination feelings date back to the 12th century. Recently,

9 Frederic, GRARE, *Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism*, Carnegie Papers, No. 65, January 2006, p.11.

10 Annex of Statistical Information, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013*, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence, Based at the University of Maryland, April 2014, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224831.htm>, accessed on 5/20/2014.



if we consider the 60 years that passed since the creation of Pakistan, the Balochistan Province is undergoing a continuous period of secession; the “deaf” fight for independence of this province, during the last decades of the British Empire presence in the region resulted in its annexation to Pakistan in 1947, which was the beginning of a period of subjugation and attempt to transform the Baloch identity into a Pakistani identity based on Islam. Much of this strategy involved the destruction of the tribal power of the local leaders and the concentration of authority in the hands of the central government – a strategy that largely continues to this day. The armed riots launched by the Baloch ethnics and repressed by the government from Islamabad took place, chronologically, in 1948, 1958 and 1973¹¹. The reaction of the Pakistani central authorities to the Baloch secessionist movements has always been one as decisive and important as it should be a state’s territorial unity. For example, in 1948, 24 hours after the creation of the Republic of Pakistan, the Balochistan region declares its independence, which makes the new state of Pakistan’s reaction extremely fast and forceful – the Army of the Islamic Republic (Pakistani army) invades Balochistan on April 1st and crushes the first attempt of secession of the province.

According to the Pakistani government sources, there are currently five militant groups operating in Balochistan. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is the most prominent, requiring the separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. Besides this, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), the Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Baloch Jhalawan Tigers emerged to challenge the government in Islamabad. Over the time, these groups were responsible for many attacks on gas pipelines, electric transmission lines, security checkpoints, railroad tracks, oil tankers, government offices, attacks against everything that is administered by the federal government of Pakistan, and even against pro-Pakistani government tribal members or civilians.

The Balochistan Liberation Army, the most prominent of the five clandestine militant groups,

11 Frederic, GRARE, 2006, *op. cit.*

although formed in the early 1980s, gained international recognition in 2000, after a series of attacks in densely populated areas. This group planned attacks aimed mainly at reducing the benefits that the government in Islamabad has due to its presence in the province. As a result, natural gas pipelines, oil fields, Pakistani security forces, civilians employed in the government sectors in Quetta and journalists have constantly been the targets of attacks. The Balochistan Liberation Army has always taken responsibility for the systematic “ethnic genocide” against Punjabi civilians, residents and employees living in the province of Balochistan, in response, they say, to the punishments that the Pakistani Army, led by the government in Islamabad, has applied on the Balochistan nationalist population.

The same government classified the Balochistan Liberation Army as a terrorist organization in 2006; later the same year, the British government declared that the Balochistan Liberation Army was an illegal group and banned the access of its members in the UK. Soon after, the actions of this group were classified as terrorist by the State Department of the United States, the group being included also by this State on the blacklist of worldwide terrorist organizations.

The Balochistan National Party, a political party that promotes the provincial rights and supports the provincial autonomy through peaceful means, as well as the politicians who are members of the party are also victims of the conflict between the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Government of Pakistan. Many leaders of the party, especially its senior members have fallen victims to this political conflict. Thus: Habib Jalib Baloch¹², general secretary of the party, was killed in Quetta on July 14, 2010, Jumma Khan Raisani and Abdul Salem, were killed on September 28 and July 22, 2011, both in the city of Khuzdar; the press at the time blamed the Pakistani security forces for these “government executions” and the way it combats

12 *Habib Jalib Baloch*: Baloch nationalist politician who served as a member of the Senate of Pakistan and as Secretary General of Balochistan National Party; was shot dead by unknown assailants in Quetta on July 14, 2010. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habib_Jalib_Baloch).



the Balochistan provincial opposition.

Lashkar-e-Balochistan, a separatist militant group, better known as the Balochistan Army, is located in Balochistan and was founded in 2009, but became known in 2012, after they claimed responsibility for several attacks in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, resulting in several deaths and injuries. The group is believed to hold more training camps, in Balochistan and Afghanistan.

An independent Balochistan seems not to be in the interest of any regional or international power. However, the presence of Balochi militants in Afghanistan has brought an important and valued contribution to the relationship between Pakistan and its neighbors. Balochi leaders have actively sought the support of the USA and India for free movement of their co-ethnics and even had a positive feedback when, in 2012, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher introduced a resolution in the United States' House of Representatives, requiring Pakistan to recognize Balochistan's right to self-determination. According to his plea to the members of Congress, the "riots" of 1958, 1973 and 2005 of the Balochi ethnics "indicate the long-lasting popular discontent with the regime of Islamabad and with the plundering of its vast natural resources, while the province remains the poorest in country"¹³. However, both the United States and India on the one hand, and the international community on the other, are reluctant to openly support the separatist movement in Balochistan, given the danger of the international precedent.

3. The strategic interest and natural resources

Ever since the British domination in India, the territories of Balochistan have generated a real interest, due to their geostrategic position. Having in mind the geo-economical and geopolitical importance of this region, the British administration in India has been waiting long time for a favorable moment to intervene in the northwest end of the continent. It was thought

¹³ Huma IMTIAY, "US congressman tables bill for Baloch right to independence", in *The Express Tribune*, February 18th, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/338079/us-congressman-tables-resolution-calling-for-independence-of-baloch/>, accessed 5/26/2014.

that the existence of some buffer states between the colonial territories and the Soviet Empire would protect the British interests in the region. Soviet invasion in India through Afghanistan, the Khyber Pass¹⁴ and Bolan Pass¹⁵, has always been perceived as a potential threat to British India; for this reason, the Indian Government launches a series of research-exploring expeditions in the territories led by Captain Grant (1809), Colonel Henry Pottinger¹⁶ (1810) and finally by Mounstuart Elphinstone¹⁷ (1812), who collected information on the geographical and political situation prevailing in the vast regions of the northwest. The geopolitical importance of Balochistan was the main factor in the foreign policy pursued by the British government in India, who focused on protecting the line of communication with Afghanistan, which transits the province.

The policy pursued by the *United States* in South Asia has always aimed at maintaining the military balance between India and Pakistan, two countries with nuclear potential, unstable political regimes, and last but not least, two countries that are important partners. A certain difference

¹⁴ Khybers Pass: located at an altitude of 1070 m, is a mountain pass that the north-east of Spin Ghar mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan such links; part of the ancient Silk Road, is one of the oldest known mountain passes in the world, throughout history has been a major trade route between Central Asia and South Asia and a strategic military location (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khyber_Pass).

¹⁵ Bolan Pass, important crossing at Balochistan's border, connecting Jacobabad and Sibi with Quetta city, which has always occupied an important place in the history of British military campaigns in Afghanistan, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolan_Pass).

¹⁶ Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pottinger, (October 3/1789 - 18 March 1856), Anglo-Irish military and colonial administrator who became the first Governor of Hong Kong. In 1806, he joined the British campaign in eastern India and in 1809 as a lieutenant fighting Mahratta war; is promoted to the rank of colonel after expedition Nushki, Balochistan in 1810, an expedition financed by the East Indian Company for research and the realization of maps unstudied regions of Balochistan and Persia, of the concerns about the possible invasion of India by the forces French, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Pottinger).

¹⁷ Mounstuart Elphinstone (October 6, 1779 - November 20, 1859), historian and politician Scottish nearest British government in India.



tends to be made by the United States, and it is in favor of India, which is in full economic and military growth and seems more capable of providing regional stability on the one hand, and of combating China's influence in the region on the other hand. Based on these considerations, the United States concluded a series of treaties with India, such as the Strategic Partnership Initiative in 2004 on the development of cooperation in the civil nuclear fields, the civil space programs and high-tech fields, which resulted in signing the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2008.

Supporting the policy of balance necessary between India and Pakistan, the United States sought the cooperation with Pakistan in order to combat the threats of Islamic extremism, especially after September 2001, offering Pakistan security assistance in amount of 16 billion dollars¹⁸ during the past thirteen years and the status of a very important non-NATO partner in the war against terrorism, which started in the United States in 2001.

It is known that the Allied military presence in Afghanistan will be significantly reduced after 2014. Military analysts expect that the "support" offered by Pakistan to the United States, in the form of a logistic transit point or a so-called "effort to mitigate" the extremist attacks against the American troops will decrease considerably. At the same time, in order to ensure long-term strategic benefits in the region, the United States will seek a stronger partnership with India¹⁹, as mentioned above.

This form of mutual cooperation between the United States and Pakistan could be endangered by the Baloch nationalism and its supporters in the province, as this fight for independence could complicate the US-led war against Islamic terrorism in the region. Moreover, a "quiet" Balochistan pleases both the partners in the coalition operating in Afghanistan, and especially the United States who benefit from the facilities derived from the operation and control of the

18 Larry HANAUER, Peter CHALK, *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan. Implications for the United States and the Region*, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Occasional paper, 2012, p.10.

19 *Ibidem*, p. 11.

Shamsi Airport, rented since 2001 for logistics activities and surveillance missions by the Air Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.²⁰

China's interests in Balochistan derive both from the fifty years of political and military relations, period during which China considered Pakistan its main partner in South Asia, and in the context of the good economic relations that Beijing has steadily developed with Islamabad. Economically, Balochistan became China's physical link to its investments in the exploitation of Iranian gas and oil in the Middle East. At the same time, Chinese investments in Pakistan have become significant: China operates gold and copper mines in Saindak, near the borders with Afghanistan and Iran, and after the construction of the Gwadar port, it has become one of the most important investors in the province.

Built in the south-west of Pakistan, Gwadar has come to be considered the main Chinese naval outpost in the Indian Ocean, designed to protect Beijing's supply lines in the Middle East, while counteracting the growing presence of the United States in the region²¹. The Chinese investment in the Gwadar Port proves to be very important for the Chinese economy, contributing to the development of the South-western region of the Xinjiang province, providing a real economic opportunity for the Uighur population²² and hence the development of relations between the Muslims in the two neighbor regions, as well as a military development. Located at about 460 km west of Karachi, the Gwadar port strategically and militarily offers the possibility to observe the American naval activity in the Persian Gulf and the Indian naval activity from the naval bases in

20 Jason HEEG, *Insurgency in Balochistan*, Kansas State University, available at: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/universities/Balochistan_final.pdf, p. 7, accessed on 27.05.2014, p. 7.

21 Alexander, ATARODI, *Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance*, Raport No. FOI-R-3110 -SE, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2011, p.28.

22 *Uighur*: ethnic Turkish population living in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, mainly in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, where they are officially recognized as one of the 56 ethnic minorities.



Gujarat and Mumbai²³. To this end, on January 30, 2013, the Government of Pakistan signed a concession agreement in order to lease the Gwadar port to the Chinese authorities, withdrawing the operation right from the Port Authority of Singapore, which had held this right during the past five years. Although it was assumed that Singapore would continue to have this right for another forty-five years. Pakistan has given to China²⁴ the operational control of the port, creating thus serious economic problems with an immediate impact on the region, especially on India. The greatest effect, however, is the fact that China gets an oil supply port on land, a trade that can not be controlled by the superior American naval power. Moreover, Gwadar is a major cog in the planned Pakistani-Chinese energy corridor, an old plan of China abandoned in 2009 because of the volatile situation in Balochistan – the construction of a refinery in Gwadar, with a capacity of approximately 20 million tons per year. This new refinery would be connected to Kashgar of eastern China, avoiding thus the Malacca Strait and the dangerous sea routes through the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea. Also, both China and India are major importers of fossil fuel and use the Strait of Hormuz as main route, which is just 250 miles from Gwadar; the Chinese presence in Gwadar, in addition to restricting the influence of India in the region, becomes a serious threat to the Indian marine transport in the event of armed hostilities²⁵.

The extremely big distance between the eastern ports of China and Kashgar, of about 3500 kilometers, compared to only the approximately 1500 km between Kashgar and Gwadar, turns the latter into the point of transit and access to northwest China of the imports of crude oil

23 Hasan Zaser MALYK, “Strategic Carnage of Balochistan”, *IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science* (IOSR-JHSS), Volume 8, Issue 4 (Mar. - Apr. 2013), pp. 4-77, p. 4.

24 Syed Irfan RAZA - *China given contract to operate Gwadar port*, <http://www.dawn.com/news/786992>, accessed on 5/20/2014.

25 Jason R. MURTHA - *The Strategic Importance of Balochistan*, Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2011, p. 41.

from Iran, the Persian Gulf and Africa. Through the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”, the Gwadar port will be connected to the city of Kashgar, the Xinjiang region of northwestern China through a network of highways, railways and pipelines for the transportation of oil and natural gas; the secretariat of this project has already been launched in Islamabad on August 27, 2013 (see Fig. 2)²⁶.

The corridor also provides for the construction of 200 km of tunnel at Gilgit Baltistan, which will give China access to the Strait of Hormuz, the strait via which is transported a third of the global oil production. Moreover, from a military point of view, Gwadar will give China the ability to maneuver and have a naval presence in the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, although China is not a naval power in this region²⁷. Derived from the same need for energy security and due to a higher Western influence in Burma/Myanmar²⁸, China’s interest to open a path for the electricity supply is crucial and closely related to Gilgit-Baltistan - in the north, and Balochistan - in the south, two regions rich in mineral resources, valuable for Chinese companies²⁹.

For *Afghanistan*, the third country with a strong Baloch ethnic minority, the idea of an independent Balochistan will only fuel the feelings of Pashtun ethnic groups, present on both sides of the Durand Line, which strongly desire self-determination both in Afghanistan and in the Federal Administered Tribal Territories of Pakistan. Afghanistan’s interest in Balochistan is mainly economical, stemming from the development of deep-sea port facilities in the Gwadar Port. For

26 Adapted from an image presented by Mr. Aasim Siddiqui, Ex-Chairman, All Pakistan Shipping Association (APSA) & Managing Director - Marine Group of Companies, available at: http://www.intermodal-asia.com/files/aasim_siddiqui_apsa.pdf, accessed 5/20/2014.

27 port be a game changer?, *FIRSTPOST.INDIA* (India), 04.02.2013, <http://www.firstpost.com/india/will-chinas-takeover-of-paks-gwadar-port-be-a-game-changer-612682.html>, accessed 5/20/2014.

28 *Burma, officially the Republic of the Union of Myanmar*, usually abbreviated Myanmar is a sovereign state in South Asia that is bordered by Laos, Thailand, China, Bangladesh, and India.

29 Vikas KUMAR - *Pakistan’s Fragile Periphery*, Future Directions Associate Paper, 27 March 2014, p. 6.




Figure no. 2: Route project “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”

a country with the largest lithium deposit in the world and real prospects of economic growth, but lacking maritime facilities, Gwadar offers Afghanistan a quick and cost-effective possible access to the Indian Ocean and opportunities arising from this exit to commercial sea roads. Moreover, given the current situation and the effort that the United States put in Afghanistan, this Afghan interest for Gwadar pleases Washington who would prefer Pakistan instead of Iran, as a transit territory for the Afghan trade. Of course, it should be noted that the strong cultural and religious ties offered by the Pashtun ethnic group from the two neighboring countries have also a contribution to this³⁰.

Wishing to meet its energy needs and its obvious interest in Central Asia and Iran, India has to analyze which situation best represent its interests: a stable Balochistan within a strong Pakistan or an independent Balochistan and moderate Pakistan³¹. In one possible scenario,

30 Hasan Yaser MALYK, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

31 Suba D. CHANDRAN, *Akbar Bugti and after: Implications for Balochistan & Pakistan*, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies issue brief, no 38, New Delhi, India, p. 4.

India may be tempted by an anti-Pakistani alliance through an insurrection in Balochistan, generating pressures in Islamabad that could end the conflict over Kashmir³².

In the effort to get access to the Indian Ocean, **Russia** has been courting Balochistan since the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 - February 1989. A certain tacit agreement seems to have been developed between the two parties at that time: the Soviets provided economic and military support, and in return, the Baloch party offered assistance for the insurgency in southern Afghanistan and access to the facilities of the the Gwadar Port. Although the years of the Cold War are long ended, military analysts consider that there are still residual feelings of distrust between Moscow and Washington in terms of the presence in the region. If China’s interests are added to the mix, a smoldering tension haunts the international stage³³.

32 Frederic GRARE, *Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism*, Carnegie Papers, No. 65, January 2006, p. 12.

33 Jason R. MURTHA, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 67.



Russia's interests in Balochistan can be interpreted in the following ways:

- the old issue of natural resources is equally applicable to Russia;
- a great world power and at the same time a great consumer, Russia can not give up the temptation to control also the oil in the Gulf, estimated at about 60% of the known global reserves; thus both natural resources from the Indian Ocean and Antarctica may come under Soviet control and management;
- fish catches transport – about one third of the total global fish – from the Indian Ocean, especially the Arabian Sea to the countries of Central Asia could become much faster and more efficient³⁴;
- Russia may be the beneficiary of the shortest way to transport natural resources from and to Antarctica, known as the largest pool of untapped mineral resources in the world³⁵.

The Gulf strategic military aspect and access to the Indian Ocean should not be neglected either, as they offer Russia further proximity to a more or less declared partner, China.

For *Iran*, Balochistan is the only land route to the future gas pipeline that will link one of the largest natural gas operation fields, located in Pars in Iran, the main point of distribution of natural gas from Shaheed Benazirabad (ex Nawabshah), Pakistan; nearly 1200 km of the total gas pipeline of approximately 1881 km will transit the territory in Balochistan.

As regards the deep water port of Gwadar, its advantages are clear, and in the absence of a matching competitor, Balochistan can only benefit from such advantages. Iran, however, is developing what is called today the “Chabahar Free Trading Zone”, a free trade area of the port of Chabahar, located just 110 miles away and a worthy competitor to be reckoned by the Chinese investors in Gwadar. Funded mainly by Indian companies, the Chabadar port is in direct competition with Gwadar for access to the same markets;

34 Ahmad, Lt. Col. Syed Iqbal, *Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance*, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1992, p. 256.

35 Cheema G. SHABBIR, *Intra-State Conflicts and Development Strategies: The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan*, available at <http://pbrc.soka.edu/files/documents/working-papers/cheema.pdf>, p. 7.

this competition has become a major concern for Pakistani officials who declared that the success of the Chabahar port would cause a huge financial setback to Pakistan³⁶. For Iran instead, this initiative is part of a larger plan of rehabilitation of the Sistan-Baluchistan region in southeastern Iran, one of the poorest and least developed regions of Iran, a Baloch-majority region.

As an important partner at the global discussions, *Europe*, through its economically stronger member states, participates actively to the game that seems to take place in the region. Thus, after the mutual agreement of cooperation between the EU and Pakistan³⁷ signed in 2004, the two parties increasingly used this forum in order to facilitate as many aids as possible for Pakistan on the one hand, and to open the European market for products from Pakistan, on the other hand. Thus, between 2009 and 2013 the European Union donated humanitarian aids, grants, including grants provided by the European Investment Bank amounting to approximately € 485 million support for Pakistan, including contributions from the Member States amounting to about 423 million €³⁸.

The Member States did not hesitate too much, trade flourished between Pakistan and Sweden, who has become a leading investor in the labor market in Pakistan; economic relations further tightened, as Sweden became the early warning air system supplier for the Pakistani army³⁹

36 Haider ZIAD “Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port”, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 2005, p. 101.

37 Bilateral cooperation agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad signed on 24.11.2004, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=368>, accessed on 12.06.2014.

38 Shada ISLAM, *Moving EU-Pakistan Relations Beyond Words*, http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Islam_Moving_Aug11_final.pdf, accessed on 5/15/2014.

39 In early 2006, the Pakistan Air Force ordered six Saab 2000 aircraft equipped with the Erieye AEW equipped Saab 2000 from Sweden worth about \$ 1 billion; In December 2006, the Pakistani Navy commissioned a number three aircraft equipped with Hawkeye 2000 AEW, the total cost of the program is the \$ 855 million, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/sweden-finalizes-saab-2000-aewc->

and the *Netherlands* became the fifth largest destination for exports from Pakistan.

Given the international interest in this region, Pakistan's stability is vital for the great global powers such as the United States of America or China, but also for Europe. All other individual national interests merge into the international common interest, further contributing to the internal development of Pakistan⁴⁰.

Given the current energy crisis, it should be no surprise that the energy security in Pakistan is a top national priority. Pakistan's economy is one of the world's most dependent on natural gas, which represents about 50 percent of the total energy consumption in Pakistan, the main source of energy in the country. Two thirds of the existing reserves of natural gas are in Baluchistan; while the province provides about 40% of the total natural gas production in Pakistan, it consumes only a modest 17% of it.

Besides these considerable reserves of coal and natural gas, there are indications that it would also have large reserves of oil; the geological reports show a quantity of 19 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 6 trillion barrels of oil, as untapped natural resources in the province Balochistan⁴¹.

Conclusions

The attempt of the international community to convince the government of Pakistan to involve politically the nationalist opposition of Baluchistan is not a solution easy to implement, but, at least in theory, it might be successful in tempering the hostilities in the province. The development of a stable security environment in the future of Pakistan and Balochistan, allegedly two sovereign states, is inevitably closely linked to

the progress of radical Islamic terrorism in the region. To minimize the concerns about India's influence in Afghanistan, and particularly in Balochistan, after the military forces of the United States and NATO Alliance will leave the country, the Islamabad regime will try to strengthen the relations and support for the Taliban, fact that was officially denied and which is reflected in the intensity of the current insurgent activities in Afghanistan. Consequently, Balochistan is and will remain an important segment of the Pakistani strategic thinking⁴².

The internal security of Pakistan is, as I mentioned above, a source of concern for the European countries. From their point of view, the collapse of Pakistan would induce long-term negative consequences for the political development of Afghanistan. Pakistan's ability to control its nuclear capabilities and to minimize the risk of proliferation of the arsenal, where it fails as a state, is also analyzed. At the same time, an independent but unstable Balochistan would attract militant organizations that will probably use the advantage provided by the lack of power in the province in order to achieve political ideals and a safe heaven for terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, a base for regrouping, recruiting and planning future terrorist attacks which could be targeted, why not, even against the European territory.

A nuclear-armed state, such as Pakistan, is a target that must be monitored, especially since the internal challenges pull the country in different directions and the domestic developments have significant implications for the region and Western countries, part of the coalition in Afghanistan⁴³.

There is also a consensus that a division of Pakistan could induce serious security challenges in the region, raising the concerns of both politicians and scientists, who fear that the Baloch insurgency could have a drastic impact on the neighboring countries that are also home

contract-with-pakistan-02377/, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20061211/C4ISR01/612110301/Pakistan-seeks-P-3s-with-Hawkeye-radar>, accessed on 6/13/2014.

40 Alexander ATARODI, *Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance*, Report No. FOI-R-3110-SE, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2011, p. 25.

41 Adley PRIYASHREE, *Balochistan A Background*, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, Issue 32, October 2006, New Delhi, India, p. 7.

42 A. SIDDIQUE, "Unrest in Balochistan Contributes to Regional Tensions", *Radio Free Europe*, 20 July 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Unrest_In_Balochistan_Contributes_To_Regional_Tensions/2104498.html, accessed on 5/15/2014, p. 34.

43 Alexander ATARODI, 2011, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

to large communities of Baloch ethnics. None of these countries would agree with the movement for territorial autonomy of these minorities⁴⁴.

It is known that the natural and energy resources represent one of the main reasons for potential conflicts worldwide, and this only makes Balochistan a piece worthy of notice on the chessboard of the great world powers. Until the alternative energy resources will be widely produced and distributed, the gas fields and the oil and mineral riches that are still available globally will be sought for exploitation purposes by all the major global players and the Balochistan province, one of the numerous regions renowned only due to its potential energy is unlikely to decline in importance in the near future.

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⁴⁴ Alok BANSAL, "Baluchistan: Continuing Violence and Its Implications", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 30, No. 1., 2012, http://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_abansal_0306.pdf, accessed 5/15/2014, p. 6.

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A TRANS-DISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF SUICIDAL TERRORISM

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Suicidal terrorism is a worrying phenomenon, especially after the 11th of September 2001 attacks, when the necessity of understanding it gave rise to various approaches. A trans-disciplinary analysis starting from the hypothesis according to which the element which sets off and fuels this phenomenon is a mass movement, may outline a perspective and even a forecast of it. Analysing the evolution of the phenomenon, keeping in mind the key of mass movements and in accordance with the main events of the last three decades which establish it, additional conclusions are generated which can offer the logic of some terrorist actions, as well as the real, undeclared purposes of these.

Keywords: *suicidal terrorism, mass movements, the ideology of terror, Al Qaeda, trans-disciplinary method, Middle East.*

Introduction

Suicidal terrorism represents, in our times, a phenomenon hard to accept and understand at the level of modern civilisation based on stable democratic systems. It exists, and the analyses on this phenomenon show that, in the last three decades, it has gained ground, being practiced all over the world. Specialists from nearly all

scientific fields have tried to explain, each in their own right, the resurgence of this phenomenon, the causes and favouring circumstances, the structure and psychosocial profile of the individual predisposed towards martyrdom.

We believe that a trans-disciplinary analysis based on disciplines like sociology, psychology, history, philosophy, religion, military sciences, political sciences and international relations can lead to an understanding which might offer a perspective, a context and even a forecast.

If we approached the study of the phenomenon as being a form of terrorist action and an individual act, referring to martyrdom itself, we could not identify the impulse, the energy that fuels it and sets it off. We consider that this phenomenon cannot be set off only by the attacker's decision because, in this situation, it could only represent the particularities of a psychopathological suicidal act.

For this, we launch the hypothesis that the energy source of suicidal terrorism is represented by a mass of people, a psychological community in full-blown movement, of the type of revolts or revolutions, a mass movement which pursues a radical change of the present at a collective level. From within these masses and animated by ideas, ideals and ideologies the adept comes forth, dis-

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posed towards self-sacrifice and violent acts, both in the criminal dimension as well as in the heroic one. It is true that not any adept of a movement is capable of self-sacrifice, but all support it and worship it, because mental contagion and mimesis work at this level. Predisposition in this sense depends on the personal circumstances of the individual but, compulsorily, the suicidal terrorist belongs or is convinced he belongs to a mass movement and has the same identity with it.

1. Mass movements

A characteristic of the mass movement encountered also in the case of the fanatic is the attitude towards the present, considered as unacceptable, deplorable and the belief according to which the future will fundamentally change everything that exists in the present. Practically, we can talk about a feeling of frustration, in the sense that the individual that suffers several failures and cannot find grounding points in the present is willing to detach from it and from himself, even if the present gives him great freedom. For him, freedom is a burden.

In the classification of Eric Hoffer¹, fanatical adepts can be “newly poor” (people recently impoverished), the poor freed from a regime of absolute egalitarianism, the unadapted, the super-selfish, the ambitious with unlimited opportunities, the minoritarian, the bored and the sinners (those who consider that they can purify themselves through martyrdom).

By adhering to a mass movement, the frustrated one considers that s/he has been liberated of all responsibilities, obligations, decisions that s/he must shoulder within a free society, including self-liberation, by transferring them to the mass movement.

In this context, frustration is not necessarily a native personal characteristic of an individual², but may be a social product, usually of a free, unstable society or with an administrative system incapable of responding to social needs, which

maintains big social inequities, but also of a society or civilisation undergoing modernisation or liberalisation, as well as of those devoid of progress (in the case of the bored).

For the mass movement adept, time only represents the past and the future, a future which transforms into eternity. He condemns everything that is present, replacing, for example, pleasures with abstinence.

At the opposite pole, the individualist, who lives in the present, content with himself, with his personal achievements and who has a complete social status, enjoys the system he is part of and, many times, is oriented towards a mass society, consumerism, hedonism. This one does not conceive his existence except in the present and for him suicidal terrorism constitutes a horrible action, hard not only to perform, but even to conceive. He has this same attitude towards heroism.

Most times, the character of a mass movement has, alongside a nationalist or socialist component, an ideological religious component as well, which must ensure eternal existence and life after death. Gustave Le Bon observes that “masses need a religion (...) social and political convictions, faith in a divinity do not take hold in their ranks except clothed in religious forms, which shelter them from any doubt. If the masses were determined to accept atheism, it (...) would become a cult”³.

In his own right, Eric Hoffer noticed the fact that “rarely it happens that a mass movement has a unique character. (...) sometimes it represents two or three movements into one”⁴.

The general traits of mass movements are intolerance and fanaticism, these being inevitable, but they manifest with different intensity, depending on the cultural, religious factor and the influence of leaders. These traits differentiate an amorphous mass from a mass movement. After identifying the common enemy, which may be determined persons, masses or peoples or all of these at once, the unifying vector of the move-

1 Eric HOFFER, *Adeptii fanatici*, Bucharest, Polirom Publishinghouse, 2013.

2 A/N – for example unrealistic aspirations, beyond possibilities, is the characteristic of unadaptedor misfit people.

3 Gustave LE BON, *Psihologia multumilor*, Antet Publishinghouse, 2012, p. 37.

4 Eric HOFFER, *Adeptii fanatici*, Polirom Publishinghouse, 2013, p. 30.

ment is hatred, which, in on the background of intolerance and fanaticism, develops the criminal dimension.

2. Ideology and religion

Isaiah Berlin, referring to the revolutionary European ideologies and defining the essence of romanticism, which is the basis of ideologies like anarchy, extreme nationalism, fascism, communism etc., observed: “to be free does not mean anything – to be free is Heaven. Sacrifice for a cause is important, not the validity of the cause itself, because the sacrifice made for it is what sanctifies the cause, not some intrinsic property of it”⁵. This leads to the idea that everything represents movement, dynamic, between all and nothing, but the tendency is towards nothing, towards destroying the present.

Radical thought systems, romantic in Isaiah Berlin’s perspective, approach the concept of “truth”, as that being created and not discovered, protecting it against any debates or doubts, because it is unique, something that, until it was created, did not exist. Truth discovered existed before its discovery. Debate or doubt regarding truths which create or maintain the mass movement lead, inevitably, to its disappearance.

Thus, we find at the root of the ideas of a mass movement’s created truths, reinterpreted and ideologised variants of the great religions. Whether we talk about Judaism, Christianity or Islam, they have been ideologised to serve one purpose or another, from the moderate, modernist forms favouring liberalism up to the fundamentalist, puritanical and radical ones. Each extreme is the answer from the same level of the other extreme. For example, the colonialist period in the Middle East, which constituted an import of civilisation to the Arabic countries and which led to an economic and social modernisation, meaning a liberalisation, would determine an answer by the return to puritanical, fundamentalist practices of Islam, as they are consecrated in the Qur’an and in the life of the Prophet Mohammed. The answer was materialized in the Wahhabi

⁵ Isaiah BERLIN, *Puterea ideilor*, Humanitas Publishing-house, 2012, p. 276.

movement, at the end of the XVIIIth century, initiated by Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab, in the Arabic Peninsula and transformed into the Salafi movement, which in the XXth century spread into several Arabic countries.

Karen Armstrong defined fundamentalist movements as being “crenellated forms of spirituality, which appeared as a response to a perceived crisis” – the fear that modernity would erode or even eradicate faith and morality, but the fear does not belong to any religion. In this context, we can clarify if religion is ideology or not. In our opinion, religion, Islam in the present example, is not an ideology. Wahhabism or Salafism may be an ideology of a religious type, which represents an ensemble of ideas by which religion is reinterpreted and presented to the masses with a view towards mobilisation and orientation towards certain behaviour, combating and condemning other interpretations and behaviours or even the religion itself. Even if the religious ideology pushes for a return to religion or its modernisation, it is not religion, rather it is the religious ideology which comes as a response to a perceived crisis or to the desire for modernity, to the desire for power or its legitimization, to the justification of some actions or to the condemnation of others.

3. The rebirth of suicidal terrorism

The rebirth of suicidal terrorism is considered, by the majority of analysts, to be the suicide truck-bomb attack committed by a Hezbollah adept against a military base in Beirut on the 23rd of October 1983, which resulted in 241 dead and over 100 wounded. In the months that followed, attacks of this kind were repeated, determining the U.S.A. and France to pull-out all of its military personnel from Lebanon. In this case, we can classify the attack as a terrorist one, due to the fact that it was attributed to a terrorist organization, otherwise it could have been qualified as a tactical military action on an enemy military base, situated in a theatre of operations.

Still, the first suicide attack was committed on the day of 11th November 1982, when a young

man entered with a Mercedes vehicle, loaded with explosives, in the general headquarters at Tyr of the Israeli army, destroying an eight storey building and killing 141 persons. It was the first human bomb since the rebirth of suicidal terrorism, and the suicide was part of a Hezbollah formation un-officialised at that date.

The above-mentioned suicide terrorist attacks later inspired terrorist groups from around the world and culminated with the terrorist attacks committed by the 19 terrorists led by Mohamed Atta, on 11th of September 2001, a moment from which onwards the establishing of the psychosocial profile of the suicidal terrorist would entail a different approach. These were to be the first terrorist attacks which used airplanes as weapons. Until presently, the plane had been used as a weapon in a single isolated case.

The first thing that came to the fore following the investigation of these attacks was the attackers' high level of training. Thus, most of them had higher education degrees, of which seven held pilot's licenses. The standard of living and the social status of these individuals was different from the classic one, namely one of them was a diplomat's son, the other a lawyer's, and all of them knew very well the Western urban life and spoke fluently at least two foreign languages. But of all the relevant matters, the most difficult one to explain by the investigators was the determination with which they carried out the attacks, despite the fact that they had been away for a long time from the environment which had indoctrinated them, some for months, others even years.

Although being far from the environment which had shaped them to become "martyrs of faith", they were capable to perform a nearly perfect operation, as regards the planning, training and coordination, thus demonstrating a detailed knowledge of the security systems of American airports, but also patience and motivation, which was out of the ordinary until that date.

Still, a few elements from Mohamed Atta's past could be relevant. After graduating from the University of Cairo with a Bachelor in Architecture, he got a job at the Centre for Urban Development from the same city, within

an architectural planning and building design department. Here he was concerned about the modern development and high rise buildings, which he considered as big, impersonal and ugly, and for which old neighbourhoods had been destroyed, affecting people's private lives and dignity. Even his family moved to such a block of flats in 1990, naming it "a poor symbol of Egypt's attempt to modernize and to embrace the West's indecency"⁶.

In July 1992, Mohamed Atta got to Germany to complete his post-graduate studies at the Technical University of Hamburg. The first host, who after 6 months demanded that he move, described him as "a frustrated individual, with no horizon and with an introverted personality"⁷. Starting with the year 1993, he moved to the university's campus, where he shared an apartment with two friends until 1998. They described him as being "almost aggressive and completely insulting"⁸.

Another relevant insight comes from the year 1994, when Atta's professor, Dittmar Machule, invited him to Alep, with the aim of an archaeological visit. Atta stayed for several weeks in Alep, where in the month of August 1994 he met Amal, a young Palestinian, who worked in the urbanism office. Volker Hauth, who travelled with Atta, described Amal as being "attractive and self-confident"⁹, observing in her the Muslim chastity, although she was emancipated and provocative. Both seemed to be attracted to one another, but Atta explained to Hauth, regretfully, that she had a pretty different orientation and that her lady-like emancipation did not fit. This was the closest moment to love for Atta.

6 Thomas EVAN, "The day that changed America", published in *Newsweek*, available at <http://www.newsweek.com/day-changed-america-148319>, accessed 10.08.2014.

7 John HOOPER, "The shy, caring, deadly fanatic", published in *The Guardian (London)*, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/23/september11.education>, accessed 19.08.2014.

8 Terry McDERMOTT, "A perfect soldier", published in *Los Angeles Times*, available at <http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/27/news/mn-25005>, p. 6, accessed 19.08.2014.

9 John HOOPER, "The shy, caring, deadly fanatic", published in *The Guardian (London)*, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/23/september11.education>, last accessed at 19.08.2014.

These elements from Mohamed Atta's past lead, indubitably, towards the pattern of the fanatic adept built by Eric Hoffer. It is widely accepted that a fanatic militant does not first become a militant and then a fanatic, rather he is first a fanatic, then becoming a fanatic militant. The fanatic adept cannot manifest in the militant form except within the framework of a mass movement, the individual version being the object of psychopathology.

Of these attacks, some analysts have considered that they targeted the civilian population, but applying the first rule of a trans-disciplinary analysis, namely the existence of several realities due to the fact that there are different levels of perception, we could issue a different opinion. Thus, we can observe that the 19 suicidal terrorists, as well as the mass movement to which they had dedicated themselves had the conception, as it was inoculated to them by cultivating the feeling of hate, that first of all they will punish the Western civilian population, considered as being pagan, sinful and decadent. The unifying agent of a radical mass movement, as shown, is hate. Eric Hoffer signals the importance of this unifying agent, noting as well its pragmatic character at the disposal of mass movement leaders, considering it as the most accessible and encompassing of all the unifying agents. So, in their perception, the target was, first of all, the civilian population. Meanwhile, Osama Bin Laden had a completely different view, namely his positioning in the equation of international political power, from which it derives that he had a political target.

However, in the hypothesis according to which the phenomenon of suicidal terrorism of the last three decades is the effect of mass movements, it is necessary to analyse the evolution of events that have to do with these.

Two major events in the Middle East would mark future evolutions: The Islamic Revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by soviet troops.

In the 60s, in Iran the *white revolution* takes place through modernisation policies initiated by the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, leading to an unprecedented liberalisation in the Islamic world

of the social and economic life. This movement, supported by an uncanny coalition between liberals¹⁰, communists, nationalists and religious forces, would generate several popular revolts which were successively repressed by the Shah's army, but which paved the way for a revolution, *the Islamic Revolution*.

On the 11th of February 1979, the Islamic Revolution would cast aside from power the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and transform Iran from a monarchy into an Islamic republic, based on a nationalist and religious ideology of a messianic type - Shiism. In Iran, 89% of the population is Shiite. Regarding the effects of the revolution, Carmen Bin Laden writes: "in the months that followed, the revolution against the Shah of Iran would release a shockwave in the whole region, energising the traditionalists who opposed any attempt of the Middle East to step forth into the modern world. Islam would gain a new dimension and would change the face of the entire world"¹¹. Radical religious ideologies immediately took hold of Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that this is a primarily Sunni country, but they activated the traditionalist wing, which imposed the return to the old traditions, by using the religious police – *mutawa* – as a repressive instrument, it being endowed with discretionary powers and manifesting a total intolerance and an exacerbated fanaticism. Carmen Bin Laden, a sister-in-law of Osama Bin Laden and an adept of modernism, as opposed to all the members of the family, noticed: "the young people scared me the most. They were the ones who should have taken the country out of the Middle Eve and into the modern world. And yet I saw them every day going backwards, towards long-gone centuries. I saw the gloves of the young women, their black stockings and their angry faces and I was hearing them asking for even more restrictions"¹².

The Iranian Islamic Revolution reverberated in Lebanon as well, an Arab state which shared in the 60s the same economic and social evolu-

10 A/N – immediately after the Revolution, the liberals would be cut off from power.

11 Carmen BIN LADEN, *Înăuntru regatului*, Pandora Publishinghouse, 2011, p. 149.

12 *Ibidem*, p. 154.

tion as Iran. The forced liberalism of the market economy would create the newly rich and the newly poor and accentuate the discrepancies that existed between them on the background of the traditional distribution of governmental power and of responsibilities on denominational criteria. Thus, in the 60s and the beginning of the 70s, the Shiite had a limited representation in the political scene, holding the title of President of the Muslim Parliament, while the titles of President of the Republic and that of Prime-Minister went to the Christian Maronites and the Sunni. Because the accentuated demographic rise in the Shiite rank did not lead to a redistribution of governmental power, they became the most numerous part of the militants and the leaders of the Lebanese Communist Party and of the Syrian National Socialist Party. At the end of the 70s, Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, a charismatic Muslim cleric, began to compete with the left-oriented parties, winning the sympathy of the Shiite youth. Al-Sadr gave them the alternative: *The Movement of the Disinherited*. A militia stemming forth from this movement, Amal, was founded at the beginning of the Lebanese civil war, in 1975.

In 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran catapulted to the political scene of Lebanon a new Shiite mass movement, which broke relations with the two left-oriented parties and took over the new model of Shiite Muslims the world over, having a new vision on an alternative world to the Western liberal capitalism, different than that glorified by the left-oriented parties.

Starting with 1982, several of the important members of the Amal movement left this organisation, forming several armed groups composed of young people organised in the name of Islam, in the south of Lebanon, in the Bekka Valley and in the peripheries of Beirut. The basic military formation and the equipment of Shiite militias was supplied by Iran and, as a result of their fusion, the political organisation *Hezbollah* was founded and its armed wing, *The Islamic Resistance*, but which was not announced officially until the 16th of February 1985. As a result of exacerbated radicalism, Hezbollah initiates martyr formations called *Al-Amaliya Al-Istishhadaya*. These worship and protect the practice of mar-

tyrdom and the use of human bombs, which constitute their main means of combat.

The ideology of the Hezbollah organisation was based on the doctrines of Khomeini, which have as their main objective the founding of a pan-Islamic republic led by religious clerics, partaking in the fascist type of nationalism and religious messianism. Their ideals are justice and equality. Freedom was not part of their ideals, they were coming from freedom and this had proved to be a burden.

The expansion of the Islamic Revolution in other Arab states would preserve up to the present the character of a mass movement and permanently ensure immediate objectives and a public enemy, because lacking these, the mass movement would have been extinguished along with the founding of the Islamic Republic, meaning that the Revolution would have ended, by achieving its objectives. For that matter, religious messianism is a perennial source of immediate objectives, and also perpetual ones: the preparation for the return of the Hidden Imam, the return of Mahdi and the taking of political power by religious clerics to ensure his return, constitute inexhaustible energy sources.

And yet, messianism also contains a predisposition which prevents action and the mass movement – quietism, which recommends the achievement of spiritual calm and the adoption of a passive, contemplative attitude towards the world in the wait for Mahdi. Khomeini managed to repel this predisposition using the Shiite teachings, using his abilities for political manipulation of the popular Shiite messianic beliefs. Thus, manipulating the concepts of injustice and suffering, but also of the unending battle of Shiite faithful against the liberal, worldly tyranny and oppression, Khomeini created the best instrument for revolutionary mobilisation, exploiting especially what was, at that given moment, one of the most unequal and poor societies in the Arab world.

24th of December 1979 is the date of the second event that confused the Middle East, namely the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. The emotion provoked by this event is very expressively described by Carmen Bin Laden:



“The aggressive and atheist communist monolith had attacked a country of poor and God-fearing Muslims”¹³. In a bi-polar world, in which the Middle East had succeeded to enter into an opposition to the capitalist west, the consequence of the invasion of Afghanistan was that the Arab elites realised that they are not sheltered from any of the poles. They were outside of the bi-polar world, but they were not neutral, rather they were in a conflict with both poles. Saudi Arabia and the royal family reacted, trying to activate Arab solidarity and financing the resistance in Afghanistan. The Saudi government offered financial support to volunteers which directly participated in the afghan cause.

The Afghan cause represented for Saudi Arabia an alternative to the mass movements that were developing on its own territory, as a result of the Islamic Revolution. Its pointing towards the afghan cause would bring back the glow of Sunni Islam and temper the local radical tendencies.

This moment surprised Osama Bin Laden immediately after completing his higher education, when he joined, decisively, the afghan cause. Of the Bin Laden family, Osama was the most religious of the brothers. At the beginning of his volunteer phase, he ensured the transport of help for the afghan resistance towards Pakistan, where he contributed to the building of hospitals and some training bases for the combatants, later on moving to Afghanistan, where his contribution ensured him a Saudi hero status in the fight against the soviet monolith. Here is where he meets Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian, who was member of the Muslim Brothers who, in disagreement with the P.L.O.’s¹⁴ approach to the fight for freeing Palestine, reattached himself to the afghan cause.

The disagreement with the P.L.O. consisted of the fact that it should have mobilised the entire Arab world, so as to unleash Jihad against Israel. But, following the Jihadist spirit, Abdallah Azzam attached himself to the afghan cause, publishing the main *fatwa* that called to battle the entire Arab world, becoming later on the mentor of Osama Bin Laden and the ideologue of the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 158

¹⁴ A/N – Palestine Liberation Organization.

Two other events lay their mark decisively on mass movements: the end of the soviet retreat from Afghanistan and the fall of the Iron Curtain.

The Afghan resistance, after nearly 10 years of fighting, seemed to become a mass without movement, a sustained, armed and trained mass for so many years seemed to be discharged. Nothing more false, the adepts of a mass movement with a past like that of those from the afghan resistance always have the predisposition to reattach to another movement. Osama Bin Laden experienced and felt this predisposition and built an alternative for the masses of Mujahideens in which he cast himself in the main role.

Following the Geneva Accord regarding the political regulation of the situation in Afghanistan, on the 14th of April 1988, between the Ministers for External Affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union as guarantors, the withdrawal of the soviet troops in the interval 15th of May - 15th of February 1989 was decided. Within this accord, Pakistan and the U.S.A. pledged to stop giving help to the Mujahideens.

Following this accord, Osama Bin Laden founds the Al Qaeda organisation in the same year, and the stoppage of support from the U.S.A. he qualifies as betrayal with a view to present a new enemy to the masses, this being an essential element in the spurring of the mass movement and of Al Qaeda. The ideal of the new organisation, which was formed by fighters for the afghan cause, had to fit in the coordinates of this cause, in order to ensure the transition¹⁵: the liberation of Muslim territories occupied by foreign invaders. In this way, he shares the ideas of Abdallah Azzam, which redefined the cause of Jihad, turning it from the fight against tyrannical and corrupt leaders of Arab states, into the fight for liberation of Muslim territories from foreign occupation and this in the context of the fall of the Iron Curtain, which modified the international power relations. The soviet monolith

¹⁵ A/N - Naeem Gul Mohammed, Director of the sole Afghan Centre in Sankt-Petersburg, observed: “We must not forget the traditions, mentality and culture of the Afghan people. The warrior Pushtu tribes obeyed no one. The presence of foreign troops was never tolerated. The local population revolted against the soviet troops”.

had disappeared from the sphere of international power, and the only pole of power was the United States of America. The Ideal of the Shiite Islamic Revolution of creating a pan-Islamic state in the Middle East was complementary to that of Al Qaeda.

The direct approach of a hostile attitude of the Al Qaeda organisation towards the U.S.A., at the beginning of the 90s, would create in the ranks of Muslims an image of force and an alternative at least on a regional level, to the American power, generating a new mass movement. The desire to be involved in the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation and of rejecting U.S. involvement in this cause, a desire refused by the king Fahd of Saudi Arabia and which led to the breaking of ties with him, represents another attempt at positioning in the power zone of the Middle East, but also to fuel the mass movement left at that moment without a cause, which refused to be discharged. This is also the moment in which Osama Bin Laden chooses the path of international terrorism.

The plan of the New World Order was supported by Al Qaeda, by recreating the bipolarity between a state actor and a non-state actor (which wanted to identify itself), but for this it needed sacrifices (*offerings to sanctify its cause*), immediate objectives which to preserve the mass movement, deep tactical actions, hard to combat and which could create a permanent fear – suicidal terrorism.

4. Suicidal terrorism before and after 9/11

Suicidal terrorism, since its rebirth in 11th of November 1982 and up to the attacks of 9/11, had certain constancy and did not represent a worrying phenomenon, totalizing 202 suicidal terrorist attacks of over 60.000, namely 0.34% of the total of terrorist attacks. The number of persons declared deceased in the 19 years of suicidal terrorism reached 2810, with only a small part civilians, but the attacks of 11th of September 2001 resulted in 2973 civilian deaths in only a few hours, shocking the international community. The period which followed would bring suicidal terrorism as an on-going manifestation of

terrorist organisations. Thus, after September 11th attacks, in only 13 years, as opposed to 19 years, the number grew approximately 40 times, representing 6.3% of the total and the number of deceased persons grew 11 times reaching 34.481.

The information taken from the CPOST database of the University of Chicago and presented graphically in Picture no.1, confirms the tendencies to use suicidal terrorism after September 11th, 2001.

It is hard to believe that, overnight, the number of fanatical adepts inclined to self-sacrifice grew without it being determined by a major event like the terrorist attacks of 11th of September 2001. But how could this happen, the following of such an event? We can find the answer in the logic of mass movements or in the *law of mental unity of masses*, as defined by Gustave Le Bon and, in this context, we can refer to the following characteristics of mass movements.

Thus, the capacity for suggestion and credulity of the masses is excessive, it being contagious, and the rapid orientation of its feelings towards a determined direction is easily done. Mass movements, in the context of events with a significant emotional impact, not only respond to any suggestions, but more than that, they ardently wait for any suggestion or so-called truth that tries them emotionally, these being excluded from any critique or debate. Any sentiment spread rapidly and especially, provoked by major events, generates its exaggeration. In the perception of militants in terrorist organisations of a Jihadist type, the September 11 attacks represented a revolution. On the basis of an excessive sensibility of masses, in the case of revolutions, this is amplified, determining the development of aggressiveness and making it so that between the criminal component and the heroic component differences cease to exist.

The 9/11 events were carriers of different emotional messages in relation to the target groups. Thus, for the Western Civilization they were messages of outrage, fear, uncertainty, solidarity and even revolt against those who produced them. For the civilization in the Middle




Figure no. 1: The evolution of the suicidal terrorist attacks before and after 9/11
Source: This diagram was drafted based on CPOST database of University of Chicago, available at http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php, accessed at 18.08.2014.

East, it was a message of power of the Al Qaeda organisation, of a beginning of an Islamic Revolution at an international scale and without precedent, of weakness of the only existing world power. In the context of this latter message, we believe that the leaders of the Al Qaeda organisation performed an intense campaign of suggestion towards the masses, the fact being widely known that mass movements never turn against leaders of governments which manifest power, but will always turn against those who are weak or manifest weakness.

The exponential growth of the number of suicidal terrorist attacks after September 11th attacks could only be fuelled by the existence of mass movements with ideological and doctrinarian views compatible with those of the Al Qaeda organisation.

Conclusions

The trans-disciplinary analysis of suicidal terrorism within mass movements applied to the Al Qaeda organisation reveals additional conclusions to the ones that we expected.

The phenomenon of suicidal terrorism is the effect of a complex mass movement which combines radical ideologies with religious ones. Between the suicidal terrorism and the mass movement there is a two-way relationship.

The 9/11 attacks, organised by using the 19 suicidal terrorists, capitalized within the mass movement and the Al Qaeda organisation not only the loss of human lives amongst innocent civilians (towards which hate was promoted as a unifying vector) and the destruction of symbols, but also the suicidal act of the attackers itself, which would *sanctify the cause* and distract

attention, sheltering it from a potential analysis.

Most definitely, Al Qaeda needed the September 11th attacks, first of all in order to maintain, coagulate and even amplify the mass movement without which it could not exist and secondly, in order to position itself visibly in relation to the U.S.A., believing, probably, in the illusion of rebuilding a bi-polarity of which it could be part of.

This positioning would however confer to the Al Qaeda organisation, as a non-state actor, the statute of an emerging regional power in the Middle East in relation to the other Arab states and which, in the context of globalization in the Arab version could have ensured its position as leader.

Regardless, after 11 years in which Osama Bin Laden's image of the Saudi hero in the fight with the soviet monolith was given to oblivion, and in this period, the ideology that he promoted and his failed attempts to get involved in so-called Arab cases did not bring him too many followers, the 9/11 attacks would bring him back in the centre stage. We consider this not to be a collateral result of the attacks rather that it is the first and possibly only objective pursued by Osama Bin Laden.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZING A NATIONAL AGENCY FOR DEFENSE AGAINST UNCONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC ACTIONS

*Lucian Ștefan COZMA**

The increasingly numerous and sometimes unpredictable challenges, which characterize the contemporary security environment, came partially due to the rapid evolution of technology and also because of the expansion of the theater of conflict in other dimensions than the physical dimension – all that causes made it very difficult to ensure the needs of security and defense of states and communities/alliances of states, and will continue to create that effect in the nearest or remote future. Among these new and severe current challenges are the hybrid military actions or the unconventional and asymmetric actions. Most often, the traditional security and defense systems are not capable enough to respond effectively to such challenges, or in some cases are even incapable of giving any reply, however small. Therefore it becomes imperative to look for new ways to meet these challenges, also covering the needs for security and making compatible the defense system for the new forms of conflict in a multidimensional environment.

Keywords: *security, unconventional, asymmetrical, geophysical aggression.*

Introduction

As already repeatedly demonstrated us the experience of the first decade of the third millennium, the propensity to conflicts has grown

worldwide and the battle modes have become more and more complex and less common in terms of traditional modes of warfare and generally, the modes of manifestation of a confrontation that includes military components or components with high degree of violence. The reasons for conflict worsened, especially amid the global rearrangement of the political and military scene and especially the changes of the balance of power. Against this background, of the general reconfiguration of international relations and the emergence of new actors, most often atypical actors which have not any precedent in the known history, it revives some old concepts which catch new forms and seeks to become the new challenges of the present or near future.

Among others, there is the case of “total war” concept. But this time, the above mentioned concept tends to take new forms, unconventional and atypical. However, in order to finally lead to the same result and the same effects. It should therefore be taken as a type of war that seeks to impose not only a political will, but seeks the complete destruction of the enemy, in that order being able to use any means. As demonstrated with the end of the last world war, NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) weapons allow the total and indiscriminately destruction of large areas, including not only military targets but also political, economic, administrative targets etc.

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Thus, they destroy not only the combat capability or the potential of recovery the combat capability, but the full destruction of the economic and human potential.

1. Modes for making the hybrid or unconventional and asymmetric actions

For example, we can mention that the asymmetric and unconventional military actions, including the hybrid actions, currently allow the achieving of decisive effects by: hitting the enemy targets which are located in the strategic depth, the infiltration of research and diversion groups, which despite their low staff, have the capacity to produce significant effects, especially when acting on the main directions of effort or even precisely on the center of gravity of enemy forces; the warfare using unconventional weapons other than NBC (non-NBC) acting with latent or difficult to detect sources (such as the means that emit and focus the infrasound, microwaves etc.); means and/or methods of warfare that cause serious effects on the population, but without being easily detected and countered; for example, by altering the quality of air and water, also the quality of food, or produce electromagnetic emissions of low or high frequency, with harmful effects on living creatures; means and/or methods particularly designed for the destruction of the enemy infrastructure; attacking and destroying those specific resources for defense system; the natural disasters caused or facilitated by the use of known anthropogenic factors or by the use of some special weapons; the hitting of the critical military permanent infrastructure components, and disorganization of the enemy defense system before the start of the armed confrontation, using atypical means/methods.

These new challenges, particularly caused by the fast development and progress of the XXIst century, are becoming increasingly apparent, so we can make the following observations from the perspective of evolutionary trends of the military confrontation in the near future: the increasing use of effective low staff groups which no longer comply with the general rules set by the “laws of war” (uniform with insignia, weapons sight etc.) acting even in the center of the enemy territory,

mainly in urban areas and aiming especially the targets on infrastructure, particularly the military and civilian critical infrastructure; the use of concealed forms of aggression, generally acting indirectly on people and rather aiming the direct alteration of the infrastructure and strategic resources; the identification and exploitation of infrastructure’s vulnerabilities, to achieve or facilitate the aggression which aims the destruction of specific infrastructure elements and arousing feedback¹ processes, to make the functional incapacity of systems; the causing of social disorder and economic dysfunctions, which are very difficult countered by the opponent and relatively quickly lead to its complete incapacity; the use of aggression under various “masks” (like a natural disaster, strike or rebellion, industrial accidents or other interethnic or interconfessional disorders, “revolutions” etc.) most often in combined/hybrid forms.

Such military actions (which often do not actually take an obvious military form...) are often difficult to identify and even more difficult to combat. Usually, the victimized state identifies an aggression after the act, not before or during the subversive activities, but only after finding the effects they produce.

2. Some legal aspects regarding the unconventional weapons and actions

In the armed combat, there are used different categories and types of weapons which generally act directly on the opponent or on the combat technique, sometimes targeting the enemy state population or the civilian targets that are important. The peculiarity of the asymmetric and unconventional weapons (non-NBC) is that the action is directed towards elements like infrastructure, environmental factors, population, the mental state of the people, and indirectly, it affects the military forces or the combat technique.

The Convention adopted in Geneva on May 18, 1977 forbade any changes in environmental factors (especially climate) for military purposes,

¹ The *Feed-back* means a great amplification of a small initial disturbance, through the domino effect or different forms of relations (correlations).

which would produce damages of any kind. Subsequently, the Convention on Biodiversity (2010) additionally prohibited certain forms of intervention on climate factors or the geo-engineering activities (major changes in environmental factors) without, however, express prohibitions regarding the genetic engineering activities which create various hybrid species of creatures that can harm the natural balance of the biosphere.

We started from the observation that the combat means by which are made the unconventional military actions, especially those regarding the infrastructure and the environmental factors have, in terms of Public International Law, unconventional character, but without talking about the weapons that were until 1977 classified as unconventional: NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical). In this situation, we have considered it appropriate to introduce the phrase “unconventional weapons other than NBC” or “non-NBC”. In certain circumstances, the (non-NBC) weapons used in unconventional and asymmetric actions may also be considered “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) because: they can have destructive effects of very high intensity and scale; affect the population and civilian objectives; can have a major negative impact on the ambient, causing harmful and remanent secondary effects; their action is non-discriminatory.

Currently, by law, the categories/types of weapons are predominantly determined by their technology and their purpose. To obtain a more complete classification, it is therefore necessary to introduce other criteria of differentiation: their mode of use, the specific effects and their legal regime.

To determine the mode of use, it is necessary to analyze the purpose and/or the mode of action of the weapon. An example is the use of aerosols in warfare: they can be used to amplify the explosive-incendiary reactions, but at the same time to cause fog, rain, hail, as well as for masking operations in the battlefield or poisoning the combat troops and the infection of field. Therefore, aerosol weapons can be simultaneously assigned to different categorical systems or typologies based on the mode of use them.

Regarding their legal regime, it is clear that

weapons are, before applying other criteria, divided into conventional and unconventional. Some papers² state that by unconventional weapons we understand unconventional means of fighting capable of causing massive damage and widespread destruction, without being able to distinguish between the belligerents and non-belligerents and also, their use and/or experimentation is prohibited by international conventions/treaties. At the same time, it states that weapons of mass destruction are means of combat capable of achieving great destruction and/or of being used in such a way as to produce a large number of human losses. We notice that to a large extent, by its content, the definition of weapons of mass destruction overlaps with the definition of unconventional weapons.

Considering the above definitions from the official lexicon published by the Ministry of Defense, we might add that there are other types of weapons (non-NBC, as might be the combat means specialized in intervention on the environmental factors, that we might call “the geophysical weapons”) which are also part of the WMD (weapons of mass destruction) category and thus, of the category of unconventional weapons (according to the Geneva Convention of 1977). The above-cited work³ mentioned the case of plasma weapon, considering it as “a system that is based on energy directed by the components located on the ground of actual weapons (microwave or laser generators, antennas and other systems) focused (concentrated) to a predetermined flight path in the atmosphere, in front of the flying target (missile, aircraft) with the role to ionize the region around the target and disrupt its aerodynamics, the target being destroyed by the enormous aerodynamic pressure”. The mention of this weapon which is unclear or confused described, appears in other papers⁴ without mentioning anything

2 Group of authors, *Collection of terms, concepts and notions of reference in the fields of military policy, national security and military defense*, Bucharest, Ministry of Defense Publishinghouse, 2000.

3 *Ibidem*, p. 42

4 Mircea MUREȘAN, Costică ȚENU, Lucian STĂNCILĂ, *Correlation of the military art with the contemporary military phenomenon - military art lecture*, Bucharest, National Defense University Publishinghouse, 2005, pp. 12-13.

clearly enough about the nature or the operation mode of that weapon.

In fact⁵, the “plasma weapon” is one of the most important (regarding the scale and the intensity of its effects) types of “geophysical weapons”⁶ based on the collection, polarized movement, focus, transport and discharge of electrical charges at the target. This device can be placed in the general definition of “weapon” and in categorial terms, is a specialized weapon, fundamentally based on the use of environmental factors energy and also, the alteration in some form or another of that factors.

The military action that used this specialized weapon to produce effects that directly interest the combat missions, in the author’s opinion, is itself a specialized combat action: “the geophysical warfare”⁷. In a general sense, military action is considered⁸ a human action which takes place using the weapons or regarding their use, engaging a complex structure comprising military elements and possibly other (including elements of political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, technical and scientific etc.).

Also, it means the ensemble of measures (all measures and activities) designed, planned and carried out by military structures for carrying out the tasks entrusted to them, and actually presented in the form of armed combat, military operations other than war or other forms associated with them. As special military operations, there are mentioned *the subversive combat actions*, defined as actions made with illegal means and forms of combat, aimed at destabilizing the political system, disrupting of the state and society, in order to impose conditions that violate their security more easily. These actions can be a combination of terrorist means and methods with the particular means/methods of political combat, economical, psychological or otherwise, and usually that actions precede the military aggression.

5 Details could be found in the patents RO04595, US1309031, US2703882, US3404403 etc.

6 Lucian Ștefan COZMA, *Modalities to use of the environmental factors in the modern warfare*, Research Report during the PhD research activity, Bucharest, National Defense University Library, 2013.

7 This concept is proposed by the author, because currently it cannot be found in the specialized terminology

8 Group of authors, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

Also, *the terrorist* and *terrorist-diversionary actions* are considered those illegal internal aggressions which are unpredictable, extremely violent, made on targets belonging to combat forces operating in the theater of warfare, and also on the political, strategical, territorial, demographic, ethnic, diplomatic objectives, all that actions being supported by the opponent through combat forces and/or material and financial resources. Because the classical typology does not distinguish other weapons of mass destruction than the NBC, it is evident that there was no question about the non-NBC means of combat able to have specific effects comparable to those formal recognized as “mass destruction”. In this situation, in our view, the ensemble of measures (all the measures and activities) undertaken to use or regarding the use of specialized weapons (weapons by their nature designed to a particular purpose) or just adapted (other weapons, but modified or used in a way that serve a different purpose) for intervention on the environment factors for military purposes, represent the “geophysical military action”.

Through its specificity, the “geophysical military action” can be classified as indirect type of military fast actions, intended to achieve a *fait accompli* resulted in changes of the environmental factors, such as to surprise the enemy (regardless of level, even at the level of strategic surprise) in such a manner that the enemy cannot realize what is going on (by concealing combat actions under the guise of natural or human hazards) and cannot have the ability to react effectively.

Going down the same logical line, the confrontation (sequences of confrontations) conducted in a specific environment with specialized or adapted weapons, and intended to use in any form the environmental factors to achieve any specific purposes of armed combat, can be called *geophysical military action* or *geophysical warfare*. This particular form of combat practically corresponds to the confrontation in which are used the specialized/adapted weapons, exclusively for intervention on the environment factors for military purposes. According to this judgment, the author proposes the notion of *geophysical weapon* as representing that system, facility or device in the category of unconventional and

atypical weapons, designed to achieve the attack and intended for use in quickly and asymmetric type of military actions, whose action is aimed to cause altered state (altered structure) and damaged cycles of the geosystem, at a certain time on a specified area. In this manner, the enemy is surprised and incapacitated by creating a *fait accompli* that can be an environmental crisis, an important damage caused by the environmental factors, also the distraction of enemy attention and effort. In the situation that the interventions on the environment are non-discriminatory and of high intensity/scale, the extent/persistence of the effects in space and time is uncontrollable.

3. Aspects that contribute to the need to set up a special organization for defense against unconventional and asymmetric actions

The structure and functioning of national defense issues are closely related to the specific elements of the phenomenon of war, like the physiognomy, content and tendencies of the modern warfare. From the analysis of these elements results, in the author's opinion, the need to set up an organization for the defense against unconventional and asymmetric actions, especially against those means/actions that are based on the intervention on the environment, particularly aiming the alteration of the infrastructure.

The first criterion for the analysis of the phenomenon of war and its dynamics is represented by its physiognomy and how it can evolve depending on certain specific factors. In a general sense, physiognomy⁹ is defined as a distinctive or particular appearance. It was stated that¹⁰ the physiognomy of military conflicts represents the distinctive character of a war between states or coalitions of states, in which the belligerents intend to achieve their political, social, economic

9 According to the *Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language*, 1998 edition, but equally defined as a specific structure or a characteristic appearance, according to the *Dictionary of neologisms*, 1986 edition, or considered as a particular aspect that distinguishes one thing or another, according to the *Great Dictionary neologisms*, 2000 edition.

10 Paul VASILE, *The war of the Third Millenium*, Bucharest, DBH Publishinghouse, 2001, pp. 34-35.

and psychological objectives, which can be relatively limited or decisive, that objectives being reached by using weapons and violence at small scale or by using mainly conventional means of combat or the use of modern technology and all categories of existing armaments.

We must underline that there are many factors that influence or have a decisive role on the physiognomy of war: the political situation; the purposes and the general conception of the conflict; the combat forces and means involved; the specific environment where the conflict takes place; the modes of action; the technological level; the degree of endowment; the use of means of combat etc. Regarding the content of the modern warfare, the phenomenon of war, regardless of the definition accepted, mainly involves in one way or another, the armed combat, being compulsory a part of the contents of War and representing an element whose form and acting method permanently influence the physiognomy of war. Properly, the armed combat has in its content a number of factors such as: purpose, method, means, maneuver. On the other hand, the armed combat, according the definition¹¹ would be "the violent engaging of organized armed forces, endowed with weapons and military equipment, on the basis of some principles, rules and regulations of the military art, also the execution of operations, major battles and different scale fights, and all their consequences" in order to finally achieve the impose of their will on the enemy (according to Carl von Clausewitz), by causing human and material losses on the enemy or even capturing it. The phenomenon of war generally contains the aspects on which is made the classification of categories/types of war: political-military purposes, combat means, duration, form/character of actions, belligerents. The unconventional military action type non-NBC and especially the geophysical actions modify all these elements by introducing in the general scheme of confrontation some new purposes and objectives that are nonspecific to the classic war, also the use of some atypical and unconventional means of combat, the significant shortening of the duration

11 Constantin ONIȘOR, *The theory of military strategy*, Bucharest, Military Acedemy Publishinghouse, 1999, p. 27.

of military actions and the amplification of their effects.

Analyzing the current development tendencies, we can say that in the near future, the new type of war, according to its new components, will be defined by the following aspects¹² that change entirely its physiognomy: the transfer of the confrontation from the physical (proper) combat environment to some new environments that allow the confrontation disguised in various forms, sometimes discrete forms; the war hiding behind some “masks”, such as the so-called “military operations other than war”¹³, but actually they have in their content the classic warfare disguised under some pretexts, which makes the state of war to exist unofficial during the peacetime; the partial or total renunciation at the classic means of combat, based on violent actions, for the use of new means of combat, unconventional and atypical, generating the asymmetric action and the surprise; paradoxically, the share of violence will increase as it will renounce at the conventional violence and means of combat; the new means and forms of combat and violence will have much higher intensity and effects, both physically and psychologically; the space of conflict will be generalized, reaching the level when it become impossible to be strictly located in time and space.

In these confrontations of the near future, we have a number of content elements of war, substantially different from the traditional ones: new forms of belligerents, which often act non-military or from a great distance from the actual battlefield; new means of combat, appropriate to some unconventional and atypical technologies; such as, for example, geophysical weapons; the development and use of some pathogens which have a selective action, made by genetic manipulation in order to achieve plagues with differential action on criteria such as gender, ethnicity, race; powerful generators of infrasound and electromagnetic waves of extra low frequency for subliminal intervention

¹² Paul VASILE, *The war of the Third Millenium*, Bucharest, DBH Publishinghouse, 2001, pp. 30-33.

¹³ This phrase is used less and less, in recent years new expressions appearing within NATO, but with the same general meaning.

and altering the function of internal organs; new purposes/objectives that may not be necessarily subscribed to political purposes, there occurring thereby a gap between the official policy of the aggressor state and its proper military actions which is done discreetly, disguised in various forms. Under these conditions, the maneuver in combat become useless, where new means/methods of warfare are such that they act not necessarily in the physical environment, but also in other dimensions of the geosystem, thus reducing the unnecessary maneuver of forces and means, except the maneuver of fire, even if the execution of “fire” will mean practically another thing than the classical sense.

Therefore, we can observe the significant changes brought by the geophysical military action on the components of the armed combat and war. More recently, the contents of the armed combat and beyond it, but fully correlated, the content of modern war, will be defined by the multiplicity and diversity (heterogeneity) of purposes/objectives, forces, means and methods of combat, acting in very different environments.

One aspect that significantly contributes to our conclusion on the need for a special organization of defense against unconventional and asymmetric actions using weapons other than NBC (non-NBC) is represented by the modern war tendencies, and we refer here only at some aspects such as: the changes in space-time-combat correlation; the preponderance of military actions in depth (much easier for the unconventional and asymmetric actions), the fluid battlefield, the accentuation of the decisive character of actions; the generalization of asymmetry; the growing influence of the technological development (the so-called revolution in military affairs) in which is part the field of the author mainly research, under the title proposed as “geophysical weapon and military action”, but also the influence of the unconventional (non-NBC) and asymmetric actions on the dynamics of the modern war, especially the influence of the “geophysical military action”. Regarding the space-time-armed combat correlation, beginning from the evolution of the military phenomenon in the last century, we can see that in the field of physiognomy of armed confronta-

tion, corresponding to all its levels, there are new forms¹⁴ of correlation between space, time and armed combat. We can also find some new specific characteristics emphasizing the phenomenon of war, such as: the dissemination of the specific war actions under the guise of humanitarian, ecological, international justice (eg., use of public international law concerning the manufacture, trafficking the raw materials and/or use of NBC, to justify military aggression and the outbreak of war, otherwise prohibited by the international law) actions; using means and methods (forms of combat) unconventional and atypical; the generalization of asymmetry in the field of the means and methods of combat; planning and acting in a synchronized and integrative (joint) manner; the amplification of the decisive character of the confrontation; the dissemination of the battlefield (space of combat) in other dimensions than the physical one; increasing tendencies for use of the components and energy of the natural system for the optimization of military actions and the use of the environmental factors for military purposes; the amplification of the importance and role of the psychological component of the confrontation; the diversification of methods and means of action.

Furthermore, analyzing the relationship between space, time and armed combat, we can find that the environment (geophysical system) will exercise certain determinations/ specific conditionings on military actions, and their influence does not occur as an isolated case, but in a close and permanent interdependence. The physical (3D space) dimension is considered¹⁵ that “a size that defines the spatial scale of military actions”, including the types of space contained in this physical dimension, like the electromagnetic field and the proper geophysical space. Moreover, the general evolution of the modern armed combat physiognomy is precisely in the purpose of establishing new relationships between the main correlated elements: space, time and armed combat.

The influence of the environment (the geophys-

14 Lucian STĂNCILĂ, “Tendencies in the development of modern armed combat physiognomy” in the *Romanian Military Thinking Journal*, nr. 5/1999, pp. 14-20.

15 Gheorghe DEACONU, *The influence of time and space in achieving the success in the modern military actions*, Bucharest, Moroşan Publishinghouse, 2008, pp. 50-51.

ical system) on the relation between space, time and the armed combat makes the geophysical military action (the intervention on the environmental factors for military purposes) to lead to the optimization of fast actions conducted over long distances, so the actions that can effect throughout the strategic depth. The tendencies in the preponderance of depth actions and of the fluid battlefield, are related among others with the American specialists views, according to which the depth corresponds to one of the five principles of military action: to achieve the actions in depth, to gain and maintain the initiative, the speed (of the action and maneuver) synchronization and flexibility. Therefore, it is an engagement of the confrontation with the enemy, practically on the whole depth of the battlefield and simultaneously for all categories of forces. That also implies a better anticipation of the enemy reaction, engaging and blocking its reserves and incapacitating its forces in depth. Such conditions can be achieved at great cost by the means of conventional combat, but could be achieved more efficiently/effectively by using the influence of the environmental factors. A correct correlation between space, time and armed combat will grant the latter fluidity, namely: mobility, speed, maneuver, anticipation, simultaneous activity at least on 2-3 different environments, a high rhythm of action, the good functioning of command/control system. Space and time are the main determinants of the geophysical system and the environmental factors act at their level. Therefore, using the environmental factors for military purposes will optimize the correlation between space, time and military action, by the influence of these factors on the physical components (spatially determined) of the environment of confrontation, and also delay the enemy actions.

A problem that now leads to limiting the application of geophysical military actions is the uncontrollable nature (in space and time) of its effects. The amplification of the decisive character is a key aspect with the participation very much of the technological surprise, actually represented by the intervention in the equation of the conflict, of some news in the matter of combat means, command and management (ensuring the actions).

Besides the technological surprise, other fac-

tors that participate in achieving the surprise are the unpredictable changing of the environmental conditions under artificial interventions, the rapidity of action, the effective research, deceiving the enemy (the diversion), the unexpected strikes, to ensure the actions, the frequently changing of forms and procedures of action. The actions achieved in depth of the confrontation space are practically correlated with the decisive action principle because they intend to significantly reducing the enemy firepower, to disrupt its command/control system and its cooperation and to ban or delay the maneuver of reserve forces, to disorganize/disable of the logistic system, to decrease the morale, to de-structure the enemy action system.

The choice of the methods of action is mainly influenced by the factors related to mission, enemy, own troops, field, the weather and time resource. Thereof, it is clear that if one of the combat forces would be able to have an important influence on the field condition, the weather conditions and resource of time, it could impose to the enemy the adoption of certain procedures for fighting, and also it could choose and eventually change rapidly the procedures for own forces, according to the opportunities.

The generalization of asymmetry is an aspect evidenced by American scholars since 1999, when they tried to set out an official definition¹⁶ for the asymmetry: “the asymmetric approaches are attempts to deceive, thwart or undermine the power/force of USA and to exploit its weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the methods of achieving operations expected by the United States. The asymmetric approaches generally aim to produce a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion, that affect the opponent’s initiative, its freedom of action and its will. The asymmetric methods require an appreciation/evaluation of the opponent vulnerabilities. The asymmetric approaches often use new tactics, non-traditional, different weapons or technologies, and can be applied at all levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical level, as well as in the full spectrum of military operations”. The tendencies of evolution

towards a fluid battlefield make that the military action systems can no longer be placed in rigid structures, whether linear or circular, thus becoming asymmetric. The quasi-static models of armed combat that take place through the linear structures of fighting positions are no longer actual and even less of future.

The fight tends to be conducted in the multidimensional space corresponding to the entire geophysical system, in which it will be achieved new types of asymmetric actions compared to what is the “traditional” asymmetry. Such (asymmetric) actions can be characterized by: mobility, dispersibility, decentralization, maneuverability, flexibility, the using of an ensemble of actions which are conducted simultaneously at all levels, continuously, and at a very fast rhythm, in order to strike the center of gravity or the enemy decisive points, by using various combat means through the apply of an integrative and correlated manner of use the cosmic, ground, marine, aerial, electronic weapons, also, the information, the psychological and atypical/ unconventional combat means. The asymmetric and atypical warfare (which includes the “geophysical military action”) are characterized by: their unusual form and therefore unpredictable; the absence of any equivalent traditional means/methods and thus the enemy inability to come up with an immediate and effective response; their indiscriminate action and effects, directed both on military and civilian targets; the specific psychological effect that they cause.

In the classical theory, terrorism and guerrilla warfare are particularly regarded as forms of asymmetrical military action, in which atypical means and methods are used. But in our opinion, the best example of the use of atypical and unconventional means/methods in the asymmetric warfare is given by the geophysical military action. Not only because of the special effects that such action may cause, but also in terms of the low effectiveness of any countermeasures and the great difficulty to develop an asymmetric and integrative strategy regarding the multidimensional elements by which confrontation is done. This is valid in the situation in which the modern confrontation tends to integrate the most different methods applied in the most different areas: informational and infor-

¹⁶ Paul VASILE, *The strategic asymmetry*, DBH Publishinghouse. Bucharest, 2001, p. 19

matics, geophysical, psychological, media etc.

Among the aspects that tend to be characteristic of the asymmetry in the modern warfare, we can mention: the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and of military systems; the integration of environmental factors in the conflict with the tendency to generalize the “battlefield” (the combat space) on all the components of the geophysical system, which makes that the conventional military forces to become virtually incapable (conceptual, in action etc.) to give a reply to these asymmetric warfare actions (also conventional and atypical); the occurrence of non-discriminatory effects with a hard impact on the infrastructure (of any kind) and population, with important psychological effects. We note also the direct link that exists between the asymmetry, the atypical forms and the effect of surprise. The optimization of asymmetric action is made through the use of atypical means/ methods, and one of their main effect is that of achieving the surprise. In our opinion, the geophysical military action fits well in these circumstances.

As described in the literature¹⁷, the scientific and technological progress is a complex process that includes some changes virtually unprecedented in the known history of mankind, to this process corresponding a complex of mainly qualitative changes. From the military perspective, the most important aspect is the relationship between technology (and its evolution) and the military power. At present, literature talks about the existence of a military technological revolution (according to the American acceptance) or the so-called “revolution in military affairs”. The research on the content of this technological revolution leads us to delimitate the following characteristics: it comprised the whole military domain; it has a rapid rhythm; it has enabled the multidimensional extension of the military domain; it comprises a plurality of human, economic, financial, scientific resources from all the fields, not just the military. Among other things, it has meant the emergence of the weapons/geophysical warfare. These developments in technology will lead, in our opinion, to an evolution of

weapons according to the following tendencies: the increase of destructive effects and thus the maximization of the violence, but also the tendency to hide the effects of weapons under the guise of natural or artificial hazards; to use combat means which can have a multidimensional action (in space, ether, cyberspace etc.) with fast effect and long range; to use the electronic means (especially the equipment which generates pulses and emissions of ultra high frequency) and laser techniques for interventions on the environmental factors and the guided transport of focused electronic beams at long range; the special improvement of the autonomy of smart weapons and of their combat capacity; to improve the non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons and increase their destructive effects; the inclusion in the panoply of geophysical weapons, of all combat means designed to act on the biosystem and the integration of their action, using the biotechnology, in the action of other types of weapons.

The unconventional/atypical weapon and military action is able to modify the content of the modern warfare by changing the belligerents, the means/methods of combat, the general concept of warfare, bringing the advantage of the covert warfare, eliminating through the conventional scheme a part of the classic military actions that were specific to the state of conflict. The change of these content elements will lead, as a consequence, to a change of the war physiognomy, mainly in the following aspects: the ability to cover the warfare under the guise of natural hazards, leading to avoidance of conflict and also to avoidance of the classic declaration of war. Therefore, it leads to the possibility to avoiding the classic armed confrontation, by generating environmental crises (apparently natural disaster) inside the enemy territory that will attract and consume the resources, attention and efforts of the opponent, making it unable to wage a war and also very vulnerable. Also, the unconventional/atypical weapons and warfare can influence the correlation between space, time and armed combat; they contribute at the preponderance of the military actions in depth; they also contribute to the creation of the fluid combat theater. Through their effects of large scale and high intensity, they lead to an increased

¹⁷ Ion BĂLĂCEANU, *The contemporary technological revolution and its impact on the military potential*, Bucharest, Military Academy Publishinghouse, 2001, pp. 22-23.

decisive character of the combat action; they also participate in the generalization of asymmetry in the military action, the geophysical military action being a quick action, atypical and asymmetric, such that it leads to surprise the opponent (at all levels: tactical, operational, strategic) and generates its incapacity of combat.

The role of these unconventional/atypical military actions in the modern conflict could be that they:

- intermediate the hit of targets by producing indirect effects, and thus open the possibility to circumvent the restrictive legislation;
- affect the foundations of the state power (the power factor) and not so much the armed forces (which are the main target of attacks in the classical variant, but they can regenerate in a state which preserves its power factors) and thus offer the possibility of confrontation between states with asymmetric armed forces, and the victory is no longer strictly according to the armed forces, thus establishing new schemes for the structure and dynamics of the global power;
- divert the attention and the effort of the opponent to the problems created by effects (environmental problems, the social problems related to the protection of victims of “natural” disaster, the reconstruction efforts etc.) and thus offers the possibility of imposing the political will and to minimize or completely avoid the classic armed confrontations, therefore changing the settlement modes for serious disputes between states and international groups of interests;
- provide opportunities for surprising the opponent, creating and maintaining its state of confusion, regardless of its power and reconfiguring the map of regional or international balance of power, without producing any war in its classic form;
- lead to structural and functional profound changes of the geosystem on long term and produce effects on the climate balance and a harmful impact on the economic, social, demographic and political issues;
- force the authorities to change the fundamental conceptions regarding the models of defense system, and generally lead to the change of the security system, introducing in the scheme some new challenges for the security, for

which the old models can not provide effective solutions, thus requiring the establishment of new models and new modeling techniques, adapted to the new conditions;

- in time, they will lead to the restructuring of national defense and the emergence of new organizations and state structures, that virtually have no precedent;
- will lead to the formation of new branches and new fields in the military science, and with these, the emergence of new professions and new positions in the military and civil professional hierarchy, that have no precedent.

All these specific issues could cause the exact role in the modern conflict, dissimulated action (to keep the appearance of legality) with decisive effect on the enemy, but without involving the expensive resources (and costs) specific of any type of classic confrontation; another important role will be to change the concepts and modes of action on defense.

Conclusions

The defense systems need to be reviewed and adapted to these fundamental challenges. Therefore, we appreciate that the new concepts regarding the achievement of national defense will be more largely related to the specific aspects of modern conflictuality: an increasing tendency as the hostile actions/acts of aggression take place hidden in various forms that give the appearance of legality and also, the multidimensional character of the modern confrontation. At the same time, notice the tendency to increase the importance of the environmental security and correspondingly, we can see the increasing importance of the natural resources security.

It is expected that the general tendency will be that of conceiving integrative defense systems based on the organization type “network”, composed of military and civilian components able to act together, but with different modalities applied in different environments, however based on an unitary conception and command system, which would be able to achieve the level of strategic agility.

Also, the tendency to create more and more active defense systems, even during peacetime,

which would ensure the permanent preventive actions and able to integrate in an unitary system, the military defense and the defense (including the NBC disasters) against natural disasters, according the prepared in advance, general model of defense.

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STRENGTHENING THE EU INTEGRATION DIMENSION, IN THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC VERSION

*Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU, PhD**

This paper seeks to analyse a few possible trends in the EU's institutional evolution, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with emphasis on the key relation between the EU Parliament and the national Parliaments of the EU Member States (in our opinion, fundamental for strengthening the parliamentary democratic type of European legitimacy and reducing the EU's current democratic deficit). This scenario is based on the idea of developing the „new co-decision” procedure (between the EU Parliament and the national Parliaments of the EU Member States), as a means to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union as a whole, in the post-Lisbon phase.

Keywords: *the European Union, European citizen, EU institutions, national Parliaments, the Lisbon Treaty, the post-Lisbon phase.*

Introduction

In our opinion, the development of the institutional framework of the European Union, which is based on the need to strengthen the integration dimension of this multifaceted entity called the EU, could shift its focus implicitly on boosting the development of the democratic foundation of the Union. In this respect, we

intend to analyse (in parallel with a limitation of the intergovernmentalist dimension, achieved through the loss of the predominant positions held by the “the Councils” within the hierarchy of EU institutions) elements such as: strengthening the role of the European Parliament; enshrining the role of the CJEU¹ in promoting a democratic Union; the Commission's concern to propose legal acts for the promotion of human rights and European citizens' rights and to supervise compliance with these rights by the Member States and the other EU institutions; strengthening the cooperation between the European Parliament and national Parliaments; increasing the involvement of EU citizens in the European decision-making process and other similar elements.

1. The central political role of the European Parliament in the new “post-Lisbon” institutional framework

If the EU's evolution (in the “Lisbon phase”² and beyond, during subsequent stages) is dominated by the tendency to strengthen and extend the political position of the European Parliament

1 The Court of Justice of the European Union

2 A phase in the evolution of the European construction which has begun with the signing and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

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in relation to the other EU institutions, this will mean, on the one hand, a recognition of the EU's democratic legitimacy³ and, on the other, a correct identification of the source of the EU's democratic deficit⁴, accompanied by an attempt to remedy this major deficiency of the European construction.

The first method of reducing the Union's democratic deficit would be, in our opinion, a progressive tendency to extend the "co-decision role" of the European Parliament beyond the scope of the Union's Community pillar⁵ (for

3 One of the "sources of legitimacy" of the Union are EU citizens, whose rights are considered to be guaranteed and strengthened by the EU treaties in force, with the inclusion of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the text of the Lisbon Treaty and the development of EU's democratic life (legitimacy expressed mainly through the European Parliament), according to François PRIOLLAUD, David SIRITZKY, *La Constitution européenne. Texte et commentaires*; La Documentation Française; Paris, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

4 Certain authors (J.H.H. Weiler; J. Habermas) note that the EU is currently facing "an acute crisis of legitimacy, affecting its supranational nature", the democratic deficit resulting "from a structural contradiction between the normative supranationality – expressed by the process of constitutionalisation of the Community treaties; the doctrine of direct applicability and precedence of Community law over the national law; the principle of EU's exclusive competence; the CJEC's function generating supranationality – and, on the other hand, supranationality of decision-making, expressed through the independence of intergovernmental institutions; the extension of majority voting". According to Habermas, the source of democratic deficit lies in "the asymmetry between the high level of formal and informal integration of techno-administrative and economic systems and the national character of democratic control". According to Mario TELÓ, *Démocratie internationale et démocratie supranationale en Europe*, in Mario Teló (ed), *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Ed. de l'Université de Bruxelles, Etudes Européennes. Collection dirigée par l'Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1995, p. 5.

5 The Treaty of Lisbon/2009 transforms the EU's architecture – we can no longer speak about "Community pillars", as Article 1(3)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that "the Union shall replace and succeed the European Community"; moreover, the EU gains express legal personality (Article 46 A/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon). The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) remains in force, (Article 9 F/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon) but it preserves only one of the three original European Communities. By Article 1a/TFEU (former TEC), as amended by

instance, by means of a new international treaty laying the foundation of a profound democratic institutional reform and not simply reiterating "the need" to impose a new intergovernmental political project). In other words, it is time to "democratise predominantly intergovernmental policies", to subject these fields which have been governed exclusively by the will of national executives [CFSP; PJCC (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters)⁶] to the intervention of the European Parliament (possibly, in cooperation with national Parliaments, under the „new co-decision" procedure)⁷.

In parallel with strengthening the legislative role of the European Parliament, the new international treaty (in the "post-Lisbon" period) should progressively reduce, in our opinion, the legislative role of the Council (as a political institution composed of national executives,

the Treaty of Lisbon, the foundation of the EU's legitimacy becomes a double-conventional one (two fundamental treaties and not the will of European citizens or peoples).

6 According to the version of the EU's architecture established in the Amsterdam and Nice phases. The entire architecture of EU's pillars is changed by the Treaty of Lisbon/2009, the treaties founding the new EU (TEU and TFEU) reordering, according to its own style, all areas of competence of the EU and its Member States, as well as the Union's policies. It introduces the concept of "the Union policies", pursued either on its own or jointly with the Member States, which means a clear evolution from the notion "Community policies", compared to the Nice phase.

7 Certain authors propose (advancing the hypothesis of strengthening democratic representation within the EU and creating a "Community public space") would compensate for the democratic deficit "by organising public authorities with a view to strengthen the European Parliament and to extend beyond the state scheme" This way, the institutional bases of representative democracy would be extended, through an activation of national and regional parliamentary powers, rather than increasing European parliamentary powers at the top. This way, a decentralised European parliamentary system would be created, in which the political dialogue between parliaments would function horizontally and vertically, in both directions; in which the European Parliament would be the supranational/transnational level of "this strengthened European parliamentary power". According to Jean-Marc FERRY, *Souveraineté et représentation*, in Mario Teló (ed), *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Ed. de l'Université de Bruxelles, Etudes Européennes. Collection dirigée par l'Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1995, pp. 94-95.

representing these executives at the level of European political governance, institution that also has executive powers)⁸, in favour of a new European political institution, for instance called “the Congress” (made up of representatives of national Parliaments of the EU Member States), which would become the “second Chamber” of the European Parliament⁹.

Thus, from an institutional perspective, the Union would enter a new phase of evolution, by identifying and combating this major source of its democratic deficit¹⁰, an authentic democratic evolution, consisting in the progressive elimination of the legislative role of the Council (by gradually reducing the fields in which it can issue European legislative acts¹¹, either on its own or by co-decision with the European Parliament), as well as the introduction of parliamentary bicameralism at European level, enabling the representation of EU citizens both through national Parliaments and through the European Parliament (double *democratic* legitimacy of the Union).

Secondly, we believe that the Council, in the post-Lisbon phase, should be reduced to an executive political institution such as the Commission (by a series of international treaties which would take over the supranational reformist tendency and reinforce it), the European Parliament, with its bicameral structure, remaining the only authentic European legislator, Parliament

that can also involve national Parliaments in the European legislative process, under various consultation and cooperation procedures.

Another means to reinforce the political role of the European Parliament in the “post-Nice phase” is to confer the right of legislative initiative¹² (currently monopolised by the Commission) upon it. At present, during the complicated European legislative procedures, the Parliament acts only to validate or reject a process which remains essentially intergovernmental (process which *de facto* transforms the Parliament into “a genuine Chamber for recording the drafts of the Commission and the Council”, which can oppose its veto only in the event of a major disagreement with the draft laws)¹³.

Moreover, it would be necessary that the future European institutional reform should give the European Parliament the full exercise of the budgetary function (which is currently shared by the European Parliament and the Council¹⁴).

In our opinion, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) should be elected by a single European referendum, according to a single electoral procedure¹⁵ and the candidates on the lists of the European political parties should be elected according to their contribution to the evolution of the European construction, their political beliefs concerning the Union, as well as their political programme proposing the resolution of European civic and political issues. These requirements would prevent the European Parliament from being transformed into a “Chamber”

8 J.H.H. WEILER, *The Constitution of Europe. Do the new clothes Have an Emperor? And Other Essays on European Integration*; Cambridge University Press, UK, 2000, p. 266.

9 Paul ALLIÈS, *Une Constitution contre la démocratie? Portrait d'une Europe dépolitisée*; Climats; Castelnau-le-Lez, 2005, pp. 92-93.

10 Most authors of the literature in the field note that the deficit of political “legitimacy” tends to increase, as EU’s policies continue to be drawn up “through a certain form of cooperation between the EC bureaucracy and national bureaucracies and put into practice according to the procedures institutionalised by the two Councils. According to Thomas MEYER, *European Public Sphere and Societal Politics*, in Mario TELO (coord.), *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, Etudes Européennes. Collection dirigée par l’Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1995, p. 123.

11 Called “Union legislative acts” in Article 9 D (2)/TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty.

12 Article 9 D (2)/TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, expressly grants the monopoly of legislative proposals exclusively to the Commission (with a few exceptions provided for in the Treaties). But, a right granted to the European Parliament in this regard could not be “exceptional”, but a normal right for a parliament (if the EU’s evolution towards strengthening the European parliamentary democracy would be sought).

13 Jacques GÉNEREUX, *Manuel critique du parfait européen. Les bonnes raisons de dire „non” à la Constitution*; Seuil; Paris, 2005, p. 98.

14 Article 9 C (1)/TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, on the joint exercise by the European Parliament and the Council of the legislative and budgetary functions.

15 Walter OSWALT, *Constitution Européenne, Non; Pour une alternative radicale*; Paragon/Vs, translated by Eva Zum Winkel, Annabelle Turkis, 2005 p. 22.

politically subordinate to national governments (through the Council, which establishes, by decision, the internal structure of the Parliament¹⁶).

The mechanisms for political control of the European Parliament should also be strengthened: by passing a motion of censure against the Commission, but also against the Council, which would remain, under this assumption, a mere “executive” at European level; by calling on the Commission, but also on the Council, to answer the questions and issues raised by MEPs; by setting up committees of inquiry to investigate the manner in which decision-making and executive duties of the Commission and the Council are carried out, as well as the way in which this exercise respects the Union’s democratic values; by ordering the Commission and the Council to submit annual reports on the general state of the Union and other reports on certain issues of European interest, whenever necessary.

Likewise, the President of the European Council should be invited to be heard¹⁷ by the European Parliament (and not the other way around¹⁸, as the European Parliament is an institution with direct democratic European legitimacy, which must not be answerable to intergovernmental institutions such as “the Council”).

Moreover, the subsidiary bodies of the “Councils” (the General Secretariat of the Council, COREPER¹⁹, referred to in Article

16 Article 9 A (2)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

17 Article 9 B /TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, does not provide for such a prerogative of the European Parliament in relation to the President of the European Council, but only for the latter’s obligation to present a report to the European Parliament after each meeting of the European Council, which we believe is insufficient to remedy the EU’s democratic deficit.

18 According to Article 201 a/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, which provides that the President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard by the European Council (provision which relativises the direct democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament in respect of the European Council, whose President’s hearing by the European Parliament is not provided for). Hence one of the sources of the EU’s democratic deficit in the Lisbon phase.

19 Although certain authors classify COREPER in the category of auxiliary bodies of the Council (according to

207(1) and (2)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon) should be subject to political control by the European Parliament, through committees of inquiry, hearings and other levers of political control, in as much as they participate effectively in the drawing up of European decision-making acts²⁰.

Regarding the conclusion of international agreements between the Union and third countries or international organisations, the European Parliament should be the one to enjoy exclusive decision-making powers in the field of association agreements²¹, as well as co-decision powers in the field of economic, trade, common foreign and security policy agreements²². The Council

the criterion concerning the method of setting up the EU institution, by means of a legal act), the decision-making role played in practice by this body (representing even “a permanent core of the Council”) entitles us to consider it to be a “special political body” which should be politically controlled by the European Parliament, similarly to the institution having created it (the Council). Also see Augustin FUREA, *Instituțiile Uniunii Europene (Institutions of the European Union)*, Universul Juridic, București, 2002, p. 63.

20 In a context where COREPER (Permanent Representatives Committee) plays a very important practical role in preparing and establishing the Council’s agenda, being responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the latter (Article 207/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon).

21 Currently, there is a co-decision power between the European Parliament and the Council concerning these agreements (Article 188 N/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon).

22 Article 188 N/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon – except where agreements relate exclusively to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Council shall adopt the decision concluding the agreement after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases: association agreements; agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures; agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required. Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon enhances the role played by the European Parliament in the field of EU’s conclusion of international agreements, introducing a genuine co-decision procedure. In other cases in this field (international agreements), only a consultation of the European Parliament (advisory opinion, without which the Council would be able to decide without waiting for the EP’s opinion) is required.

could maintain its power to authorise the opening of negotiations, but the nomination of the negotiator²³ will have to obtain the consent of the European Parliament. Any restrictive measure (aiming to interrupt or reduce, in part or completely, economic and financial relations with one or more third countries) would be adopted exclusively by a European law²⁴ issued by the European Parliament (compared to Article 188 K (1)/TFEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, which provides only for its information by the Council, the one making the decisions in this respect and adopting the necessary measures).

The new international treaty (in the “post-Lisbon” phase), intended to identify and eliminate the sources of the Union’s democratic deficit, by giving a central political role to the European Parliament, could provide for essential decision-making powers for the Parliament also in the field of common commercial policy (conclusion of international agreements in this field), thus eliminating the Council’s decision-making monopoly²⁵.

The President of the Commission (in that capacity and not together with the entire Commission as “collegiate body”), but also the President of the European Council, according to this version of development of the European institutional

23 Currently [Article 188 N (3)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon] the negotiator is nominated exclusively by the Council and the EP does not have any power of prior approval.

24 In the post-Lisbon phase, in a version strengthening the European legislative role of the EP, which could issue “European laws”. According to the version adopted in Lisbon, EU “institutions shall adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions” [Article 249(1)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon]. The designation “European laws” is not expressly used, but it is provided that “legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts.” [Article 249 A (3)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon].

25 Article 188 C (2)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that “the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures defining the framework for implementing the common commercial policy.” Therefore, currently we can talk about a co-decision competence in this field, but not a decision-making monopoly of the EP, as it would be desirable in the version strengthening the parliamentary democratic nature of the EP.

framework, will be held politically accountable to the European Parliament (similarly to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, but in this capacity, as minister²⁶), which would strengthen the levers of political control of EU citizens, through the European Parliament, over supranational institutions (the Commission) or intergovernmental institutions (the European Council), playing an important role in laying down the model of the EU political organisation.

The European Parliament would approve the appointment by the European Council of the President of this intergovernmental institution²⁷, as well as the appointment of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (also being able to end his term of office, against the will of the European Council²⁸).

Regarding the procedure for appointing the Commission’s President, the European Parliament will be able to propose its own candidate for this office²⁹ (which will implicitly involve a loss of the Council’s political control over the Commission); thus, the candidate shall be elected by the Parliament (genuine democratic legiti-

26 In the Treaty of Lisbon, called “the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (Article 9 D/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon).

27 Article 9 B (5)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (EP has no role in the appointment or ending of the term of office of the President of the European Council).

28 As regards the current situation (the Lisbon phase), the appointment of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [Article 9 E (1)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon] requires the prior approval of the Commission, not of the EP. Hence another source of democratic deficit, by excluding the EP’s control in the procedure of appointing and ending the term of office of this real supranational minister for foreign affairs.

29 Currently, under the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP cannot do this. Article 9 D (7)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that “taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who *shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure.*”

macy³⁰). The Commission, once elected by the Parliament, as “a collegiate body” (by a vote of consent³¹), will no longer have to be appointed, subsequently, by the European Council³², as it enjoys democratic legitimacy through the European Parliament’s vote. The European Parliament will also be able to approve the appointment³³ (by the governments of the Member States) of Judges and Advocates-General of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The European Central Bank will be managed by “decision-making bodies” that will have to be subject to the political control exercised by the Parliament (their status of “total independence³⁴” in relation to any EU institution and to the national level, in the post-Lisbon phase, would be limited by a legislative act issued by the European Parliament concerning this supranational banking institution). This political control could be exercised by the European Parliament as follows: by inviting the directors of the ECB to answer the questions of the MEPs; through committees of inquiry; by hearing the President of the ECB, vice-presidents and members of the Executive Board in the European Parliament. Moreover, the Parliament will approve the appointment of the ECB’s Executive Board by the European Council, failing which the European Council will have to appoint other members.

The central role of the European Parliament, according to a new international treaty in “the post-Lisbon phase”, should clearly result also concerning the “membership of the Union” (accession, withdrawal, suspension of certain rights). Thus, in case of accession of a new state

to the Union, the Parliament should be the one deciding on that state’s application for membership (application addressed to the Council, which simply notifies it for information to the European Parliament and to national Parliaments, under Article 49/TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, which enshrines the Council’s central role in the decision-making process in this field – it is the Council, and not the Parliament, which shall act unanimously).

Secondly, regarding the decision on the suspension of certain rights deriving from the membership of the EU, the main power (to establish that a Member State committed a serious and persistent breach of the democratic values of the EU; to suspend certain rights deriving from the application of the new treaty, including voting rights within the Council; to amend or repeal such a decision) should be conferred on the European Parliament and not the European Council, which acts by unanimity (as laid down in the new Article 7/TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty). A state could withdraw from the Union after notifying the Parliament of its intention, in order for it to approve this withdrawal³⁵.

According to this version of development and strengthening of the integration dimension of the EU (or supranational, from the perspective of the European Parliament, as an institution representing European citizens directly), the new international treaty would identify and eliminate the new causes of the Union’s democratic deficit, brought by the Lisbon Treaty.

Thus, a real institutional and political reform of the Union would be implemented, opposed to the political project of “intergovernmental Union” (focusing on the Council and on “the confusion of powers”, in favour of the latter), a reform benefiting the project of “a democratic Union”, whose core element would be a strong and supranational European Parliament, but with democratic legitimacy (and not an “intergovernmental” one, as in the Councils’ case).

30 According to the formula proposed by the Treaty of Lisbon, the candidate for President of the Commission shall be proposed by the European Council and shall be elected by the EP only in this formula (he is a candidate of an essentially intergovernmental institution and not of an institution with direct European legitimacy, such as the EP). [Article 9 D (7)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon].

31 Article 9 D (7)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (referring to the EP’s vote of consent granted to the Commission as a whole).

32 Article 9 D (7)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

33 Article 9 F (2)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, procedure in which EP does not play any role.

34 According to Article 245a (3)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

35 Under Article 49 A (2)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, withdrawal shall be notified to the European Council and an agreement setting out the arrangements for the withdrawal from the EU “shall be concluded on behalf of the Union, by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament”.

2. From “the enhanced cooperation” between national Parliaments and the European Parliament to “the new co-decision” procedure

Strengthening the integration dimension of the European Union in the “post-Lisbon phase” can be achieved including by enhancing the cooperation between the national parliamentary level and the supra-national parliamentary level, starting with a consultation of national Parliaments³⁶ concerning various issues of European interest (conclusion of association agreements between certain states and the EU, Common Foreign and Security Policy; immigration and asylum; the election of the President of the European Commission; imposing restrictive measures to third states or non-state groups; revision of the international treaty on the new “European Union”; the appointment of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs; drawing up the list of the Union’s competences and the competences of Member States, etc.) and continuing with a genuine institutionalised cooperation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament (the so-called “new co-decision”).

This trend in the evolution of the Union in the post-Lisbon phase is necessary in order to eliminate the Union’s democratic deficit also resulting from the insufficient involvement of national Parliaments³⁷ at the level of European political governance (unlike the executives of Member States, playing a key role in the European construction) and from the lack of appropriate legal and political instruments for an enhanced and diversified cooperation between them and the European Parliament³⁸.

36 For example, Article 8 C/ TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, concerning the power of national parliaments to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is respected by EU institutions.

37 Paul ALLIÈS, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

38 The Constitutional Treaty (subsequently, provision included in the Treaty of Lisbon) mentioned the obligation of the Councils and the Court of Auditors to inform national Parliaments on the acts and positions adopted in certain fields. It is expressly provided that “Commission consultation documents shall be forwarded directly by the Commission to national Parliaments upon publication. The Commission shall also forward the annual legislative programme, as well as any other instrument of legislative planning or policy to national Parliaments, at the same time as to the European Parliament and the Council”. There are

Article 8 C/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, confines itself to granting national Parliaments a rather modest role, in our opinion (they are merely “informed by the institutions of the Union”, which does not give them precise and powerful prerogatives of active involvement in the democratic game and in the European legislative process), which cannot represent a real legal and political counterweight to the Council’s prerogative to adopt measures to extend the EU’s competences which were not provided for in the treaty, “to achieve one of the objectives laid down in the treaties³⁹”. Normally, in such a case (in our opinion, the Union has exceeded its competences) either a revision of the treaty or granting the central decision-making role to the European Parliament⁴⁰ and national Parliaments would have been required). That is because national executives (through the Council of Ministers) must not have the key decision-making role, as the issue of extending the competences falls within the organic law (at national level), therefore involving an exclusive competence of the Parliament, not of the executive.

methods of cooperation between the EP and national Parliaments (including through COSAC) such as: meetings of the standing parliamentary committees of the EP and of national Parliaments; visits by Presidents and rapporteurs; contacts between political groups; administrative cooperation, including through traineeships and exchange of civil servants. According to Mihai-Constantin EREMIA, Violeta ȘTEFĂNESCU, *Procedura codeciziei și cooperarea strânsă cu parlamentele naționale – modalități eficiente de combatere a deficitului democratic comunitar (The co-decision procedure and the close cooperation with national Parliaments – efficient methods to fight against the Community’s democratic deficit)*, in AUB Drept, III, Ed. All Beck, 2005, pp. 84-85. Many of these methods are informal, do not have an institutionalised form, enshrined by an EU treaty, which leads to the extension of the period of EU’s democratic crisis, due to the insufficient participation of national Parliaments in the European decision-making process.

39 Article 308(1)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

40 Under Article 308(1)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, *the prior consent of the EP* is required, but this is not a decisive, major, essential involvement of the EP in relation to this key power conferred on an institution without direct democratic legitimacy, such as the Council. In our opinion, this provision is a major source of EU’s democratic deficit in the Lisbon phase.

Under Article 8 C (b)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, as regards the procedure of involving national Parliaments in the control of the principle of subsidiarity, their role of supervising the compliance with this principle is acknowledged. According to the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Articles 4-7), as well as the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union (Articles 2-8), protocols attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, the role played by national Parliaments is modest, consisting mainly of a passive dimension (of being informed on the draft legislative acts elaborated by the EU competent institutions⁴¹), together with a dimension of active involvement (issuing a reasoned opinion on the compliance of a draft legislative law with the principle of subsidiarity). The legal value of the reasoned opinion, issued in this case by national Parliaments, is consultative, similar to a recommendation (EU institutions “take account of” these opinions, but they may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft legislative acts, according to Article 7/Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). Thus, there is no imperative legal value designed to force EU institutions to amend or withdraw the draft legislative act considered by national Parliaments as being inconsistent with these legal principles. Therefore, these two protocols attached to the Treaty of Lisbon afford to national Parliaments merely a symbolic, marginal political role as regards the legislative process, but also the European decision-making process (processes in which the EU institutions representing national executives, such as the “Councils”, hold a prominent political position).

Secondly, these two protocols do not provide for (and neither does the Treaty of Lisbon, in our opinion) a concrete mechanism to counterbalance the prominent political position held by national executives, within the EU institutional framework, a powerful counterbalancing mechanism, which should be exercised by the European Parliament⁴².

41 Article 8 C (a)/TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

42 For example, methods of political control over “the

Thirdly, we believe that neither the above-mentioned protocols, nor the Treaty of Lisbon, set out forms of “enhanced institutional cooperation” between the European Parliament and national Parliaments (in the sense of a permanent cooperation, institutionalised at EU level, possibly by creating a new political institution, such as “the Congress”, as the second “Chamber” of a reformed European Parliament, or by involving national Parliaments as such in the European legislative and decision-making process, together with the European Parliament). According to this version of EU’s development, national Parliaments should be consulted by the European Parliament (as supranational parliament, which would hold, according to the version strengthening the integration dimension of the EU, a central role in the EU institutional framework, as well as the position of “single European legislator”, thus ending the “height period” of national executives within the Union, through the Council).

Moreover, in “the post-Lisbon phase”, also in the framework of much simpler ordinary and extraordinary legislative procedures (elimination of the “Council” from these procedures, following the withdrawal of its exercise of the European legislative function, by the new reformed international treaty), the European Parliament could involve national Parliaments directly, not simply through the procedure of their consultation, but also by the assent procedure. This way, national Parliaments could give their assent in fields such as: accession of new states to the EU; association agreements and other agreements concluded with third countries; appointment of the Commission’s President and of European Commissioners; amendment of the Statute of ESCB; assigning additional powers and objectives to the ECB (procedures which, in “the Nice period”, apply as regards the political and legal relation between the European Parliament and the Council)⁴³.

Councils”, put into practice by: hearing of their Presidents by national Parliaments; questions; setting up inquiry committees; including a motion of censure filed by a minimum number of national Parliaments against the Councils, concerning their decisions regarding the EU’s general development.

43 The “assent” procedure, introduced by the Single Euro-

The cooperation procedure⁴⁴ could also be applied in “the post-Lisbon phase”, but as regards the new political relation between the European Parliament (as “genuine European legislator”) and national Parliaments, possibly in fields of the EU’s exclusive competence, but involving the dimension of strengthening the EU’s democratic legitimacy, by enhancing the role of parliaments in the European decision-making process in this areas)⁴⁵.

The consultation procedure (here, between the reformed European Parliament and national Parliaments included in the European decision-making and legislative process, by the new international treaty, in the post-Lisbon period) would apply in situations in which the other types of mechanisms of cooperation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament are not incidental. According to this version, the Commission would be the political institution maintaining its right of legislative initiative (by its competence to address legislative proposals directly to the European Parliament, and not to the Council, reduced to the position of “executive”). Under this assumption, the consultation phase would require that, before exercising its decision-making powers, the European Parliament consult other EU institutions, but also national Parliaments (as a priority). Thus, the consultation of national Parliaments should be compulsory (and should concern all political decisions which are important for the Union and its Member States), failing which the proposal may be challenged before the CJEU. This way, according to this version, the opinion of national Parliaments should necessarily be requested by the European Parliament in fields such as:

pean Act (SEA)/1986, does not enable the EP to act directly (it cannot propose or impose amendments, but it can only accept or reject the acts proposed by the Council), which is atypical for a deliberative institution such as a parliament. According to Augustin FUERA – *op. cit.*, p. 195.

44 Introduced by the Single European Act/1986, procedure under which the decision-making power belongs entirely to the Council, while the Parliament can only influence its decision, by issuing an opinion to the Council.

45 For example, Article 2 B (1) (c)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (EU’s exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro).

liberalisation of public services; fight against discrimination; taxation; competition; social protection; environment; extending the external commercial policy to industrial property services and rights; setting up transitional periods for visas, asylum, immigration; establishing the general framework for the employment policy).

In our opinion, the consultation of national Parliaments could be followed by a “decision-making phase” (according to what we would call “the new consultation procedure”), under which the Commission would submit again its legislative proposal to the European Parliament (with a possible amendment, according to the political positions expressed by national Parliaments). Thus, a political and legislative role which is key for this procedure would no longer be assigned to a technical body, auxiliary to the Council (namely, COREPER), which is not democratically elected, but in practice carries out a decision-making activity in the field of European legislation (by means of the prerogative to select the type of “legal acts prepared for adoption” and to include them in “procedure A” or “procedure B”).

Lastly, the Union’s institutional reform in “the post-Lisbon phase”, according to the version of the Union’s evolution which grants to the European Parliament the central role of “a genuine European legislator”, would be complete, in our opinion, after the introduction of “the new co-decision”.

The legal phrase “the new co-decision” refers to a type of enhanced participation (on an equal footing) of national Parliaments (having become “associates of the European Parliament”) in the drawing up of European legal acts, in certain fields. In our opinion, “the new co-decision” would be intended to enshrine the democratic institutional reform of the Union in “the post-Lisbon period”, orienting the European legislative process towards the priority political and legal relation between the European Parliament and national Parliaments. Thus, “the old co-decision” procedure in “the Nice period” and the Lisbon period (based on the political and legal relation between the Council and the European Parliament, where the “genuine European legislator” is the

Council⁴⁶, as the European Parliament is granted only an atypical role, of “associate” of the Council in the European legislative process⁴⁷ is no longer used.

In addition to the distinctive character of the new institutional reform of the Union in “the post-Lisbon period” (aiming to grant to national Parliaments a right of legislative initiative at European level)⁴⁸, the institutional reform, which should be initiated after the 2005 failure of the Constitutional Treaty and after “the Lisbon phase”, should be based on a “new co-decision”, which would enable the adoption of legal acts by the European Parliament only based on the consent of national Parliaments (expressed directly or through a new “EU institution”, namely the “Congress”) or based on the absence of their opposition to the adoption of the act by the European Parliament. Thus, legal acts would

46 See the progress and limits of “the European parliamentary democracy” (phrase used by Olivier DUHAMEL, *Pour l'Europe. La Constitution Européenne expliquée et commentée*, Seuil, 2005, Paris, p. 112). Although the EP becomes co-legislator, the Council is the one holding exclusive lawmaking powers in the following areas: social security and protection; taking steps concerning the internal market; extending the rights deriving from European citizenship; consular protection; family law with cross-border effects, etc. The Council establishes regulations on its own in the field of mass influx of refugees; establishes rules for advisory bodies; adopts decisions on its own in the field of CFSP or common defence.

47 Gilles FERRÉOL (editor), *Dictionarul Uniunii Europene (Dictionnaire de l'Union européenne)*; translated by Iuliana-Cristina DOBOȘ, Polirom, Iași, 2001, p. 125.

48 Certain authors believe that “strengthening the Union’s parliamentary dimension” (as regards the EU’s decision-making process) must be based on two pillars: the EP and national Parliaments, having regard to the fact that both types of parliaments “suffer from a serious imbalance between the powers conferred on the Commission and the Council, on the one hand, and their own possibilities of participation and control concerning the processes of drawing up legislative acts and political guidelines of the EU, on the other hand”. According to Jean-Luc SAURON, *La recherche d'institutions démocratiques et le gouvernement européen*, in *L'Union Européenne entre réforme et élargissement – comparaison entre l'approche d'un Etat membre et la vision d'un Etat candidat*; Actes du Colloque des 11-12 Septembre 2003, Bucarest, Collège juridique franco-roumain d'études européennes, Ed. All Beck, București, 2003, p. 70-71.

appear to be adopted jointly by the European Parliament and national Parliaments, being signed, under this assumption, by the Presidents of all parliaments (which would implicitly mean to exclude the Council from exercising the European legislative function).

The progressive extension of “the new co-decision”, by a series of international treaties enshrining this version of the EU’s evolution in “the post-Lisbon period”, would mean the elimination of the EU’s democratic deficit, both by acknowledging the role of “genuine European legislator” played by the European Parliament and by granting to national Parliaments real legislative competences at European level.

This way, the Commission’s proposal should be presented both to the European Parliament and to national Parliaments and, subsequently, under this assumption, the European Parliament would discuss the Commission’s proposal and send its opinion to national Parliaments.

If national Parliaments (possibly represented by a distinct institution, “the Congress”) accepted all the amendments proposed by the Parliament, then the European Parliament could decide, according to this version of institutional evolution of the Union, to adopt the European legislative act in question. Otherwise, it would be open the second phase of the “new co-decision”, according to which, based on the Commission’s amended proposal, also taking into account the amendments made by national Parliaments, the European Parliament would adopt the European legislative act in question. If the European Parliament rejected entirely the Commission’s proposal, the legislative procedure would not be closed, since national Parliaments and the European Parliament could agree, through joint parliamentary committees, to draw up a new legislative proposal which would be adopted by the European Parliament.

If the European Parliament admitted partially the proposal made by the Commission, bringing certain amendments to it, these would have to be adopted by national Parliaments (through the “Congress” or directly, within two weeks from the receipt of the European Parliament’s

position). If national Parliaments rejected the amendments made by the European Parliament, a Joint Parliamentary Committee (made up of an equal number of MEPs and members of national Parliaments) could be convened in order to draw up a joint European draft legislative act, which would be adopted by the European Parliament and each national Parliament, within six weeks from its receipt. The legislative act adopted this way would be called “European legislative act issued by the European Parliament and the Congress/national Parliaments”.

The failure to adopt the joint draft of the Joint Parliamentary Committee would result in the closure of the legislative procedure (as the European Parliament does not have the power to impose a European law bypassing national Parliaments, which have the same direct democratic legitimacy).

These versions of legal procedures intended to confer on national Parliaments and the European Parliament a real involvement and a genuine political control on the European legislative and decision-making process⁴⁹ are, at the same time, legal instruments which should be provided for by a new EU international treaty in “the post-Lisbon phase”, with the express purpose to eliminate the Union’s democratic deficit⁵⁰ and not to achieve

49 Starting from the EU’s dilemma (the impossibility to have parliamentary accountability without the creation of the federal state), which persists after Maastricht, certain authors believe the EU could compensate for “the lack of parliamentary legitimacy” by using the connection with the electorate, created by national Parliaments, and by their control on the national representatives of the Council of Ministers. According to Kjell A. ELIASSEN, *Legitimacy, Effectivity and the Europeification of National Policy-Making*, in Mario TELO (coord.), *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, Etudes Européennes. Collection dirigée par l’Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1995, p. 188. Nevertheless, due to a lack of authentic political control by the EP on the Council, this method does not offer a solution for the complete elimination of EU’s democratic deficit, considered from this perspective.

50 It is impossible to imagine an elimination of EU’s democratic deficit, unless the peoples of the Member States are the ones conferring legitimacy, through national Parliaments, to the actions of EU’s institutions; on the other hand, at EU level, there is no direct relation of accountability between EU’s citizens and the Council, “the main decision-making body of the EU”; See Kjell A. ELIASSEN – op. cit., pp. 187-189.

merely “an appearance” of institutional reform (which enables national executives to maintain their prominent role, to the detriment of the political institutions which represent citizens directly)⁵¹.

3. Introducing, in a new international treaty, legal mechanisms of a genuine European participatory democracy

Currently there are certain legal mechanisms intended to provide citizens with a degree of involvement in the European political governance (but to say that they “participate” in the European legislative and decision-making process is an overstatement)⁵². The Maastricht Treaty/1993 introduced in the Treaty establishing the European Community (Part Two, “Citizenship of the Union”) certain political rights acknowledged to the citizens of the EU Member States, under their legal and political capacity of “European citizens”⁵³, including the right to address petitions

51 To ensure democracy within the EU means to move beyond the need to guarantee an effective participation in the decision-making and executive processes of those who want it; at the same time, this goes beyond the type of vertical and horizontal inter-institutionalised relations, based on an “open governance” and “effective communication”. This objective must be based on the development of a “participatory political culture” and a “sense of belonging and contributing to a common destiny”, a sense of “stability within institutional structures”. See Juliet LODGDE, *Democracy in the EU: the Inter-relationship between Supranational, National and Subnational Levels of Government*, in Mario TELO (coord.), *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, Etudes Européennes. Collection dirigée par l’Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1995, p. 249.

52 Certain authors identify “several degrees” of democracy in a society, believing at the same time that, currently, as regards the involvement of citizens in the European decision-making processes, we can talk about a “zero degree of democracy”. See Jacques GÉNÈREUX – op. cit., p. 96-97.

53 “European citizenship” (including citizens’ rights and human rights) defines “the first fundamental level of homogeneity of the forms of state organisation compatible with the EU”; it appears as “an explicitly supranational dimension”, as “the most distinctive conquest and the foundation of the original power” (according to B. de GIOVANNI, *Pourquoi une constitution européenne?*, in Mario TELO (coord.), *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, Etudes Européennes. Collec-

to the European Parliament, individually or in groups, on issues under the jurisdiction of the European Union (the first paragraph of Article 8d/TEC, which became the new Article 21, under the Treaty of Amsterdam). This way, starting with the Maastricht phase, every citizen of the Union, *as well as any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State*, is entitled to write and file a petition to the European Parliament, in one of the EU official languages⁵⁴.

According to a new trend in the political and institutional evolution of the Union in the “post-Lisbon phase”, based on “the new co-decision” (involvement of national Parliaments on an equal footing with the European Parliament in the European legislative process), EU citizens and residents of the EU Member States should be able to address petitions also on issues of European interest and concerning them directly, to the national Parliament of the EU state of nationality or residence. This dimension can put into practice and extend the legal mechanisms of the European participatory democracy also to national level, by the direct involvement of national Parliaments in the exercise by citizens and residents of extended political rights, initially granted by the Treaty of Maastricht/1993, taken over in the Treaty of Lisbon, rights derived from the legal and political capacity of “European citizen”. Thus, the political cooperation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament would not be exercised exclusively in the field of European legislation (through “the new co-decision”), but also through new types of joint procedures or shared competences, in dealing with the petitions of European citizens.

Another European political right which, in our opinion, cannot be excluded from the concrete methods used to exercise the European participatory democracy, is the one initially

enshrined by the second paragraph of Article 8d of TEC and Article 138e of TEC⁵⁵. This way, every citizen of the Union, any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in one of the EU Member States may apply to the European Ombudsman⁵⁶. This European political institution, elected by the European Parliament⁵⁷, is competent to receive complaints concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of EU institutions, bodies or agencies⁵⁸ (with the exception of CJEU, acting in its judicial role).

In a future European institutional reform, EU citizens and residents of the EU Member States should be offered the legal possibility (by a new EU treaty) to also address directly to national ombudsmen (from the EU country of nationality or of residence) on legal issues concerning them directly, relating to a direct legal relation between an EU institution (EU agency/body) and the residents/citizens of the Union. In our opinion, this would result in the extension and strengthening of the participatory democracy exercised *across the EU's political system*, both at national level (concerning issues of European interest affecting the political and legal rights of EU citizens and residents, acknowledged under the EU treaties in force), and at European level (through the cooperation between the European Ombudsman and national ombudsmen).

Finally, another European political right is (in our opinion) the one initially enshrined by Article 8b/TEC, introduced by the Maastricht

55 Article 195/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, also provided for the appointment of a European Ombudsman.

56 Gilles FERREOL (coord.), *Dictionarul Uniunii Europene (Dictionnaire de l'Union européenne)*; translated by Iuliana -Cristina DOBOȘ, Iași, Polirom, 2001, p. 110.

57 Article 195(1)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

58 The institution of the “European Ombudsman” is also mentioned, in addition to other measures to address the “democratic legitimacy gap of the Community system” (the principle of subsidiarity; increasing the EP's powers; establishing the Committee of the Regions; the right to petition). See Jacques VANDAMME, *Vers un modèle néo-fédéral?*, in Mario TELO (coord.), *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Ed. de l'Université de Bruxelles, Etudes Européennes. Collection dirigée par l'Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1995, p. 347.

tion dirigée par l'Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1995, p. 342.

54 Under Article 17 of TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, citizens of the Union shall enjoy “the right to petition to the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union, in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language”.

Treaty, under which any EU citizen residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that state⁵⁹ (the National Treatment principle)⁶⁰. Nevertheless, this political right should be extended, in the post-Lisbon period, also to legal residents of the EU Member States who are non-EU citizens, precisely in order to avoid the exclusion from the European political life of a large category of people from the EU countries.

Moreover, it is also worth mentioning the political right enshrined by Article 8b(2)/TEC, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, conferring upon every EU citizen residing in a Member State of which he is not a national the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State⁶¹ (another application of the National Treatment principle). Therefore, we are not dealing with a guarantee by the state of residence of this European political right under more favourable conditions than those recognised to its nationals (which would have resulted in a breach of the principle of non-discrimination between the EU citizens, concerning the exercise of political rights deriving from the European citizenship).

In the declaration made by the European Council (29 October 1993), on the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (on 1 November 1993), national executives recognised the need to create a Union based on “more democracy, in all its forms and at all levels, whether concerning the domestic institu-

tional game or the relations between the Union, the Member States and its citizens”. This way, it was implicitly admitted, in our opinion, that it is necessary to also introduce forms of European participatory democracy (in the broad sense of the phrase) exercised both by European citizens and by legal residents of the EU Member States, across the EU political system (at local, regional, national and European levels).

Secondly, the Union would be based, according to this version described by the European Council, on an innovative combination between different ways of exercising participatory democracy⁶² and representative democracy (in our opinion, these legal methods must rely on the pair “national Parliaments – the European Parliament”). The objectives of the Union (transparency, openness, decentralisation in the context of European procedures) concerning the fight against the Union’s democratic deficit, are directly related to the need to extend the legal and political mechanisms used to exercise participatory democracy⁶³.

The Treaty of Amsterdam achieved a certain degree of strengthening the direct political relation between EU citizens and the Union’s institutions: a new paragraph was added to Article 8d/TEC,

62 According to certain authors, the EU remains a political system “lacking many of the features anyone would expect to find in a fully developed democratic political system”, ensuring a governance for the people, but not being a governance by the people, since it is based (according to Fritz Scharpf; 1999) on “an outward-oriented legitimacy, lacking an inward-oriented legitimacy”. This way, “in the absence of a political control and a strong sense of collective political identity, the legitimacy of European decisions depends on their effectiveness in achieving consensual objectives”. According to William WALLACE, Helen WALLACE, *Procesul politic în Uniunea Europeană (Policy-Making in the European Union)*; Ed. ARC, translated by Genoveva BOLEA, Chișinău, 2004, p. 543.

63 Within the EU, the European Parliament has had (and continues to have) a special responsibility in controlling “the EU institutions with executive powers (inter alia)” – the Commission and the Council; but, while the Commission is subject to parliamentary control, the Council circumvented parliamentary supervision, monitoring and control at national and European level. In this context, certain authors believe that the thesis of “the duality of EU’s legitimacy” is an “illusion”, since, in fact, national Parliaments do not manage to exercise a political control over national ministers as regards the roles undertaken by them in the Council. According to Juliet LODGE – *op. cit.*, p. 247.

59 Article 17(2)(b)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

60 Roxana MUNTEANU, *Drept european. Evoluție, instituții, ordine juridică (European Law. Evolution, institutions, legal order)*, Bucharest, Oscar Print Publishing-house, 1996, pp. 138-139.

61 Article 17(2)(b)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, acknowledges only to citizens of the Union “the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State”.

according to which every EU citizen may write to any of the institutions or bodies of the Union, in one of the EU official languages, and have an answer in the same language⁶⁴. In our opinion, this right does not reflect sufficiently clear the objective of the EU's institutional transparency, compared to the need of a public debate on all European legislative drafts within the Council (when it adopts European legal acts on its own, but also when it uses the procedure of co-decision with the European Parliament)⁶⁵.

Moreover, Article 16 B (1)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (which, in fact, takes over Article 213b/TEC, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam) concerns everyone's right to the protection of personal data (the power of control by certain independent authorities, responsible for monitoring the application of European legal acts regarding this type of legal protection, is provided for only in the Lisbon phase and in rather vague terms). Thus, the exercise by EU citizens of derived political rights which have a direct incidence on the transparency and democratic functioning of EU institutions in "the Nice period" (the right of EU citizens to the protection of personal data and the free movement of such data) can be subject to restrictions through the legal limits imposed by the Council (therefore, by national executives), instead of legally granting to the European Parliament⁶⁶ a specific power to this end.

Conclusions

The Treaty of Lisbon preserves certain aspects concerning the direct legal and political relation between EU citizens and the Union's institutions, making some improvements, but, gen-

erally speaking, we appreciate that it is still far from effectively enshrining an authentic participatory democracy at European legal level. Thus, neither legal instruments for a political control exercised directly by EU citizens on EU institutions, nor specific ways for the participation of citizens in the European legislative process ("the citizens' initiative" enshrined by the Treaty of Lisbon, as amended by Article 8b(4)/TEU, being only an apparent, superficial method, which does not really involve EU citizens in the political act of European governance)⁶⁷ are laid down.

This way, in "the post-Lisbon phase", by means of a new international treaty (if this legal form is preferred), the European citizens should be offered more opportunities to exercise the right to vote concerning EU institutions or their Presidents, which would bring the Union closer to an authentic democracy and would create a "European public space".

Through European referendums, organised whenever a major issue of European interest must be debated⁶⁸ (accession of a state to the Union; withdrawal of a state from the Union; conclusion of a major international treaty, which would deeply influence the Union's evolution as a whole; revision of the framework treaty, etc.), European citizens could participate actively in the Union's political life, thus influencing the European decision-making process.

This should become a real trend in the European Union's political evolution in the post-Lisbon phase, as the only way to ensure credibility and a genuine democratic character to EU institutions and to the decision-making process. We believe that the mere information of citizens on this process (from which they are excluded), monopolised by EU institutions (currently, by the Council) or their access to the documents of these political institutions, under the conditions established by them or by the Council, are not real legal mechanisms of participatory democracy, but simply elements designed to mask the defective nature (as regards the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions)⁶⁹ against which, currently, there

64 Article 17(2)(d)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

65 Only after the Seville European Council held in 2002 was it decided that the adoption of European legislative acts by co-decision procedure must also require the Council to hold a debate on these acts in public sittings (according to *Augustin FUERA, Instituțiile Uniunii Europene, op. cit.*, p. 55.

66 Until the Lisbon phase. The Treaty of Lisbon introduces a power of co-decision between the Council and the EP, in drawing up rules in this field. Article 16 B (1)/TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.

67 Jacques GÉNÈREUX, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

68 Walter OSWALT, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

69 Paul ALLIÈS – *op. cit.*, p. 94.

is no effective and powerful legal, political or institutional counterweight⁷⁰.

Disclaimer: *This paper reflects exclusively the author's personal opinion and does not involve any other natural and legal person.*

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⁷⁰ Also see Aurore WANLIN, *European Democracy: Where now?*, Open Democracy, 2 June 2005; www.cer.org.uk

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UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE PAST: WORLD WAR ONE AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

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Charles Emmerson, *1913: In Search of the World before the Great War*, PublicAffairs, Falkirk, 2013;

Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*, Penguin Books, 2012;

Terence Zuber, *Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914*, Oxford University Press, 2002.

One of the many questions characterizing social sciences comes from the difficulties involved by the interpretation of past. This year, we commemorate one century since the beginning of the First World War, and the controversies regarding the causes and the evolution of this very important conflict are still raging on. How much that world resembles ours? Was it an unavoidable war, or the decision-makers could have chosen a different course of action? Was there even a Schlieffen Plan, or this was just a reconstruction due to legitimizing reasons? A new wave of research regarding this phenomenon has grown in the last years, influenced not only by the academic interest in the subject, but also by the fascination of the public opinion.

Charles Emmerson tries to answer the first question, developing a wide sketch of the societies from the last year of peace. He points out some of the similarities to our age like a tendency towards globalization, multiple contacts, exchanges of ideas, to argue in favor of indeterminacy¹, contrary to a classic, Barbara Tuchman's

¹ Charles EMMERSON, *1913: In Search of the World before the Great War*, PublicAffairs, Falkirk, 1913, p. xiii.

*The Proud Tower*². Emmerson's message is that, despite some resemblances, like the rivalries between the great powers, the developing of linkages between societies, the presence of transnational threats, the future is open, we are not condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past.

In 1913, Europe was still considered the symbol of rationality, people could travel almost everywhere, if they could afford the expenses; telegraph and railroads unified at least the prosperous regions of the world, but not only; science and technology were promising a continuous progress, even though some critics were present. Emmerson offers us a fascinating journey across some of the biggest cities of that world; from London and Paris to Istanbul, Tokyo and Detroit. Even though his message is mostly an optimistic one, he does not idealize the age: alienation and atomization in the richest societies³, social tensions, political conflict and xenophobia could be found at that time. After reading this work, almost unavoidable one has to ask, from where did the First World War came about, in that era defined by partial openness and dynamism?

Contrary to Charles Emmerson, Christopher Clark has a more pessimistic approach⁴. Maybe the First World War was not unavoidable in theory, but the decision-makers acted without much ability to foresee the results, taking steps after steps toward a conflict whose dimensions

² Barbara W. TUCHMAN, *Trufaşa citadelă: O frescă a lumii dinaintea Primului Război Mondial*, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1977.

³ Charles EMMERSON, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

⁴ Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*, Penguin Books, 2012, Epub edition.

and length went beyond most expectations. His work draws attention on the importance of policies and of crisis management, being focused on the consequences of the Sarajevo assassinations from 28 June 1914 and on how the great powers but also the smallest ones reacted.

Clark studies the policies and regime of small powers and transnational terrorist organizations as important causes of the 1914 crisis and of world war⁵. He does not see Serbia's foreign policy, for example, just as a reflection of Russia's interests. Some of the tendencies identified by the author also resembles our age: captive states, international radical organizations, terrorism and grey areas of conflict.

Responsible of the leftovers from the system of Congress which managed the European affairs, the leaders of that age are not very well seen by the author. The Austrians went for the military way, despite the doubts from Budapest, without thinking about the risk of a general and devastating war⁶; the Russians thought that Vienna's reasons were mere pretexts and gave support to Serbia⁷; Berlin supported the Habsburg crown, underestimating Moscow's determination⁸; France stood by her eastern ally⁹, while Britain was drawn into the conflict more by the desire to keep the Entente together, than by the breach of Belgium's neutrality, which was not exactly a surprise¹⁰. For Clark, this "sleepwalking" was alike the result of a risky poker game, in the context of a rapidly changing multipolarity, defined by arm races, distrust and weak international institutions¹¹.

Terence Zuber's work, a little bit older, but probably the most controversial of all, is not very well known in Romania, even after Andrei Miroiu's detailed review¹². Major in the US army, Zuber argued that the Schlieffen Plan, based on envelopment maneuver on the Vest of Paris, was

an invention, used to justify the failure from the battle of Marne. He points out to several ideal: the lack of a direct proof, of a plan as such, since the military archives were partially destroyed; that the whole theory is based on a memorandum from 1906, which contains operations pursued by inexistent divisions, and underestimated the Eastern front; that the staff has prepared multiple scenarios and that the real plan involved a series of frontier battles¹³.

Zuber work provokes us to think about the fragility of the knowledge regarding the past, and how uncertain can sometimes be the beliefs which are influencing the decisions and behaviors¹⁴. The fear of a surprise attack justified much of nuclear strategy, while the distrust on rigid plans supported arms control diplomacy¹⁵. One can grasp how hard it is to deduce intentions from actions, when everything is depending on interpretation, or can simply be the product of circumstances.

It is difficult to see who is right on this issue, Zuber or his critics¹⁶, since neither side has come with a decisive proof, like the plan of 1914 as such. Unfortunately, the loss of documents will probably allow the dispute to continue, regarding both the Schlieffen Plan and the origins of World War One. Even so, it is recommended to have a critical attitude towards things taken as granted and to be aware that even the most certain knowledge is sometimes open to doubts.

The books discussed in this review show us that even a phenomenon considered well studied like WWI, part of the popular culture, can be problematic. Either we see it through the perspectives of his era, as an accident caused by blindness, or as a case which still awaits the verdict, World War One still manages to draw attention. The parallels which can be drawn with our era are making it more interesting and add value for contemporary researchers, especially since we are dealing with a conflict with strong influences on Romania's history.

5 *Ibidem*, p. 365.

6 *Ibidem*, p. 387.

7 *Ibidem*, p. 402.

8 *Ibidem*, pp. 409-410.

9 *Ibidem*, pp. 437-438.

10 *Ibidem*, pp. 486-488.

11 *Ibidem*, pp. 545-550.

12 Andrei MIROIU, "Was there a Schlieffen Plan?", <http://www.cseea.ro/publicatii/view/brief-analysis/was-there-ever-a-schlieffen-plan> (accessed August 2014).

13 Terence ZUBER, *Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914*, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1-36.

14 Andrei MIROIU, *op. cit.*

15 Lawrence FREEDMAN, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, St. Martin Press, New York, 1981, pp. 121-154.

16 For a short description of the debate, see Miroiu, *op. cit.*



WORKSHOP FOR YOUNG STRATEGISTS

“Romanian Geopolicy and Geostrategy – Tradition and Modernity”

May 29, 2014

The Center for Security and Defence Strategic Studies (CDSSS), from “Carol I” National Defence University (NDU), organized on May 29, 2014, the first edition of the Workshop for Young Strategists “Romanian Geopolicy and Geostrategy – Tradition and Modernity”. This type of events adds to CDSSS scientific events portfolio, where are already included an international seminar and an international conference, well known by the ones with academic preoccupations in the area of security and defence.

The workshop series, opened Thursday, May 29, at NDU headquarters, is a way by which CDSSS research team set itself to consolidate the results achieved during a decade of experience. Thus, starting 2014, CDSSS will hold two workshops every year. The first one we have already mentioned and the second one, dedicated to geo-economy, addressed the post-crisis geo-economic trends and it will take place on September 25.

Both the workshop for young strategists and the one dedicated to analyses of geo-economic aspects were designed so as to serve the need for a wider opening towards the civilian academic and scientific environment, continuing, at the same time, the traditional cooperation with security and defence institutions.

Therefore, these workshops are meant to represent real debate forums, reuniting civilian and military specialists, with the aim of providing for the young with preoccupations in these areas a framework for guidance and changes of opinions with the already consecrated experts.

This year, 36 participants subscribed to the workshop – young professors, researchers, PhD, MA and BA candidates from “Carol I” NDU, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, “Lumina” University of South-East Europe, the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, the Institute for Public Order Studies, the Faculty of Political Sciences from the University of Bucharest.

All of them benefited from the lectures of 7 military and civilian personalities, with empirical and theoretical expertise in the area of geopolicy and geostrategy – Presidential Counselor and associate professor Iulian Chifu, PhD; General (ret.) and associate professor Constantin Degeratu, PhD; Lieutenant-General (ret.) Virgil Bălăceanu, PhD; Brigadier General (ret.) and senior researcher Gheorghe Văduva, PhD; Brigadier General (ret.) and professor Constantin-Gheorghe Balaban, PhD; associate professor and senior researcher Florin Diaconu, PhD; and Răzvan Buzatu, PhD.

Wider Black Sea Area geopolicy after the Ukrainian crisis constituted one of the major subjects



approached by the distinguished lecturers invited to this workshop. The topic was opened by Iulian Chifu, Presidential Counselor, underlining not only the aspects related to Moscow-Kiev relation, but also 2014 Ukrainian crisis' impact on EU and NATO foreign policies. The debate was continued by General (ret.) Constantin Degeratu, his lecture being focused on NATO-Russia relation, departing from post-Cold War evolutions until present day. An interesting intervention in this respect belonged to Brigadier General (ret.) Constantin-Gheorghe Balaban, who approached the Ukrainian crisis from the perspective of the strategic interests of several great actors, such as US, EU, NATO and Russia.

Also, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Virgil Bălăceanu presented one of the most recent geopolitical events, in which Romania plays a key-role – Craiova Group. The topic was addressed in parallel with Romania's membership to Visegrád Group, the lecturer emphasising both advantages and disadvantages of Romania's participation in these cooperation initiatives.

Although the relevance and the major impact of the events having been happening since the beginning of this year in Ukraine made this subject actually impossible to be by-passed or ignored by all the lecturers, the high topicality geopolitical and geostrategic analyses entwined with the historical approaches. Thus, the evolutions and the constant aspects in Romanian geostrategic practice were addressed within associate professor Florin Diaconu's speech, as well as in the one held by Brigadier-General (ret.) Gheorghe Văduva.

An equally valuable intervention belonged to Răzvan Buzatu who, turning to account a wide experience in international affairs, presented his vision on global system's nature and functioning way.

Each one of these lectures was followed by questions raised by the young participants in this event, the workshop having a clearly marked interactive character, forming into a veritable forum of debates.

The pages of this *Strategic Impact* edition host the lectures of the personalities taking part at this event so that their extremely pertinent and well-documented analyses, a result of both their theoretical and empirical knowledge, could be consulted by as many specialists and future specialists in this area as possible.

Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD

ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2014

On September 25, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University organised the second workshop of this year, the theme being “Post-Crisis Goeconomic Trends”. This kind of activities, initiated in 2014, are a good way of disseminating scientific research results, but also of accumulating knowledge, the lectures being held by experts in the above-mentioned field.

Workshop briefers are exponents of the academic environment: Mr. Silviu Neaguț, PhD. professor and Mr. Marius Cristian Neacșu, PhD. associate professor



from Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Mr. Gheorghe Văduva, PhD senior researcher with “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University and Mr. Florin Diaconu, PhD associate professor within the University of Bucharest and also senior researcher at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute.

During the briefings, there were debated issues like the recently emerged goeconomic and geopolitical reconfigurations on the world stage, sustained by case studies, the goeconomical effects of hybrid war, but also goeconomic trends in the military field – arming programs, regional competition cases, military expenses, international agreements. The lectures will be published in the following edition of *Strategic Impact* (No. 4/2014).



CDSSS AGENDA

At the workshop debates there were over 50 participants – researchers, academics, doctoral and post doctoral students within “Carol I” National Defence University, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, National School of Political and Administrative Studies and University of Bucharest – Faculty of Political Sciences. Some of these participants, including CDSSS members, are participating both as scholarship doctoral and post-doctoral students and as experts within the two ongoing projects at “Carol I” National Defence University: “Transnational Network of Integrated Management of Intelligent Doctoral and Postdoctoral Research in the “Military Sciences”, “Security and Information” and “Public Order and National Safety” Domains - a Professional Training of Elite Researchers Programme - “SmartSPODAS”.” and, respectively, “Horizon 2020 – Doctoral and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence, Competitiveness and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied Scientific Research”.

Currently, we are making preparatives to organise the International Scientific Conference Strategies 21 with the theme: “The Complexity and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment”, which reached this year its 15th edition, to take place between 25-26 November. Details can be found on the official website of the conference, available at <http://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/en/>.

*Irina TĂTARU**

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Translation from Romanian by Cătălina TODOR, volunteer with the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania.

GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual academic journal *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

ARTICLE LENGTH may vary between 6-12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE

- Title (centred, capital, bold characters).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD. title or PhD. candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
 - A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters).
 - 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters).
 - Introduction / preliminary considerations.
 - 2 - 4 chapters, subchapters if needed.
 - Conclusions.
 - Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png / .tiff. format as well. Below will be mentioned "Table no. 1, title" / "Figure no. 1 title"; the source, if applicable, shall be mentioned in a footnote.
- REFERENCES shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of footnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: Joshua S. GOLDSTEIN; Jon C. PEVEHOUSE, *International Relations*, Longman Publishing House, 2010, pp. 356-382.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year).

Example of article: John N. NIELSEN, "Strategic Shock in North Africa", in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at <http://geopoliticraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/>, accessed on 10.03.2014.

- BIBLIOGRAPHY shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations*, Longman Publishing House, 2010.

Example of article: FRUNZETI, Teodor; HANGANU, Marius, "New Paradigms of Armed Combat and their Influence on Military Forces' Training", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 4/2011.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents.

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geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence; the quality of the scientific content; originality of the paper; novelty character – it should not have been previously published; a relevant bibliography comprising recent and prestigious specialized works; English language has to correspond to academic standards; adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the journal. Editors reserve the right to request authors or to make any changes considered necessary.

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