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EDITOR'S NOTE

Dear collaborators and readers,

This year reunites two major anniversaries: 65 years since the signing of the Treaty of Washington and 10 years since Romania has officially become a NATO Member State, within the second wave of post-Cold War Alliance enlargement, together with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, demonstrating its firm engagement in the effort of transforming and adapting the Alliance to the evolution of the characteristics of the international security environment. Therefore, 2014 turns out to be a year of summing-ups, of analyses of the road made both by NATO and Romania as a Member State of the Alliance. It is a period when we can take advantage, at both levels, of enough expertise to be able to capitalize the learned lessons and to look with confidence towards the future.

In this context, the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) dedicated the already consecrated yearly international scientific seminar to the debate of the process of Romania's adaptation to the Alliance's structures and to the analysis of our country's contribution to its modernization. The 2014 CDSSS international seminar reunited military and civilian theoreticians and practitioners in order to address this topic under the title "Romania – 10 years of NATO membership. Adaptation and contributions to the Alliance's modernization".

The pages of the present edition of *Strategic Impact* academic quarterly host most of the articles resulted from the lectures and subsequent debates carried out under the aegis of this event, as well as other scientific materials, which we considered useful for underlying and developing the scientific analyses on the evolution of NATO and Romania as its Member State.

The importance of Romania's membership to the strongest security Alliance in history, as well as the added value brought in this framework are emphasized from the first article included in this edition, "The Relevance of Washington Treaty for Romania a Decade after NATO Accession", authored by Bogdan Aurescu, PhD, Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second article, signed by the Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff, Lieutenant-general Ştefan Dănilă, PhD, and by Colonel Avram-Florian Iancu, "Romanian Armed Forces a Decade after NATO Accession. An Institutional Perspective" lays an emphasis on the complex process of Romanian Armed Forces' adaptation to NATO standards, as well as on the Romanian militaries' merits within the Alliance. The paper, based on internal sources and on the authors' knowledge and experience in the areas in which they work, ends with the marking out of the

main trends identified at the Alliance level, as well as regarding Romania's role in this framework.

The necessity and coordinates for Romanian Armed Forces' transformation is argued by Major-general Gabriel Gabor, PhD, and Major Elena-Laura Ungureanu, PhD, in "Military Transformation. Trends and New Strategic Visions". In the end of the paper, the authors lay a special emphasis on the imperative of carrying forward the efforts directed to decreasing the gaps between Romania and the other NATO Member States.

Under the title "NATO Capabilities' Development Trends. Benefiting from Experience versus Continuous Adaptation", there can be found five brief studies offering a glimpse on the recent evolutions and trends in the area of NATO capabilities development: "Learning from Past Experiences", "Smart Defence, Smart Nations", "Transatlantic Teamwork: Enhancing the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Capability", "Capacity Building as a Tool for Comprehensive Security", "Warning: Information is Everywhere", signed by authors who have the experience of working with different structures of the Alliance. We considered the publication of these articles useful not only due to the character of novelty attached to the information they provide, but also due to the fact that they are authored by specialists, carrying out their daily professional activity within NATO institutions, having thus the potential to open new research directions.

The two following papers approach other aspects related to the evolution of the international security environment and to the solutions found at the Alliance's level in order to adapt to the new conditions. One of the article, signed by Colonel Neno Hristov, PhD, associated professor at "G.S. Rakovski" National Defence Academy, Bulgaria, subjects the challenges afferent to Smart Defence initiative to a close analysis. Colonel Valeri Velkov Ivanov, PhD, who works within the same institution, addressed within the article "Contemporary Security Dimensions in the Transition toward Multipolarity", the increased complexity of the international security environment, proposing, at the same time, possible solutions for managing this feature of security.

The range of articles included in the present edition closes with two analyses. The first one belongs to Lieutenant General (r) Virgil Bălăceanu, PhD, delivered within the framework of the first edition of the Workshop for young strategists "Romanian geopolitics and geostrategy – tradition and modernity" organized by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies on May, 29, 2014. The article "A new challenge regarding regional security. Romania – part of Visegrad Group and/or Craiova Group" emphasizes, on the one hand, the need for initiating and developing multiple new modalities of cooperation in the field of security, having in mind the Ukraine crisis context, which dramatically changes the security paradigm in Europe, especially in the Eastern areas of NATO and EU borders. On the other hand, it shows that Romania can play an important role where in the so called Craiova Group, where along Bulgaria and Serbia, it can promote its defense interests in an essential space in regard to the possible maneuvering of forces in order to assure the joint national defense. Within the second article, senior researcher Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD, investigates the significances, typologies, characteristics and stages of elaborating national security policies, strategies and objectives. We considered useful to publish these materials within the pages of a scientific journal dedicated to the celebration of 10 years of Romania's membership to NATO because they reveal the complexity of defining national security within an extremely volatile international security environment. Additionally, this article can be easily capitalized not only in understanding the directions guiding national security and defence decision-making process, but also in clarifying concepts frequently used in the area of security and defence.

Finally, within the pages of the present edition of *Strategic Impact*, you can also find information regarding the international scientific seminar dedicated to the celebration of a decade of Romania's membership to NATO, as well as CDSSS recent or future scientific activities.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is a publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from "Carol I" National Defence University and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to the National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by international indexing databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), but also by the presence in virtual catalogues of libraries in prestigious institutions abroad, such as NATO and universities with military profile in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

Strategic Impact journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in the main institutions involved in security and defence, scientific and academic environment in the country and abroad – in Europe, Asia, America.

In the end, I express my confidence that our readers will find extremely useful and relevant articles included in this edition.

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THE RELEVANCE OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY FOR ROMANIA A DECADE AFTER NATO ACCESSION

Bogdan AURESCU, PhD*

During the decade since it joined NATO, Romania contributed significantly to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, pursuing its national interest actively and coherently. The security evolutions in Ukraine reveal the need for reaffirming Allied solidarity and the indivisibility of security as a sine qua non *requirement for NATO's relevance in the 21st century. An Alliance promoting a security umbrella assumes a high level of deterrence against potential threats, both by focusing on new conflict areas in its vicinity, as well as by developing capabilities collectively and by every Ally. NATO's Missile Defense system and cyber security are two of the most recent Allied missions. Revealing a successful track record, NATO's partnership policy brings a strategic dimension to the comprehensive approach and must be continued, and so does the "open door" policy.*

Keywords: NATO, security threats, collective defense, missile defense, cyber security, NATO's partnership and enlargement policy, NATO's public diplomacy.

1. Romania's 10 years of experience as a Member State of the strongest security Alliance in history

The historic decision reached at NATO's Prague Summit in 2002, followed by full membership status of the North Atlantic Alliance reached in 2004, allowed Romania to achieve its highest level of security since its creation as a modern State. Once fully integrated within NATO, Romania obtained political, military and economic advantages, which generated in turn a higher level of development for our country. A defining moment in our country's post-communist evolution, the accession to NATO signaled the end of the transition period towards democracy, thus becoming strongly rooted in the family of Euro-Atlantic democracies.

The strong support from a vast majority of the population, as well as from the Romanian political establishment in favor of Allied membership demonstrates our desire to join an Alliance capable to combat efficiently both classical threats, as well as new challenges to our security. In hindsight, we see that Romania embarked on the road to accession convinced that the transatlantic partnership is and will remain the bedrock of European security, and with a desire to contribute to Allied actions designed to effectively oppose any security challenges.

During the decade since it joined NATO, Romania contributed significantly to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, pursuing its national interest actively and coherently. Romania's consistent contribution in theatres of operations revealed the profile of an Ally ready

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to defend national, as well as Allied security.

A revealing fact confirming Romania's substantial contribution within NATO is the gradual increase of Romanian personnel in Allied command structures, as well as an important contribution to NATO's parliamentary dimension. The decision to elect the head of Romania's Delegation to NATO Parliamentary Assembly as the vice president of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the appointment of the former Romanian Permanent Representative to NATO as Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, the appointments of deputy director of the Cabinet of the Secretary General and the director of the Multilateral Affairs Division of NATO's International Staff confirm the success of Romanian diplomats and recognize national expertise in Allied context.

2014 is an anniversary year, but also one of reflection on Romania's profile as part of the Alliance. We celebrate a decade since the most substantial wave of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, which included Romania alongside Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, twenty years since the creation of the Partnership for Peace, ten years since the launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 15 years since NATO's first wave of enlargement after the end of the Cold War and five years since the last wave of enlargement. For 65 years the Alliance has fulfilled its main task of collective defense, providing an indispensable link between North American and European security.

These moments of celebration coincide with dynamic evolutions both internationally and regionally. In this complex environment the Alliance is faced with difficult responsibilities, which require appropriate and flexible reactions, adaptability to multiple Allied security needs and the preservation of relevance, maturity and efficiency.

The present security environment, marked by the evolutions in Ukraine, indicates the fact that reaffirming Allied solidarity and the indivisibility of security is a *sine qua non* requirement for NATO's relevance in the 21ˢᵗ century. Russia's recent military actions against Ukraine and the decision to occupy the Ukrainian region of Crimea generated the most severe security crisis in the last decades, a massive challenge to global stability and to the paradigm of Euro-Atlantic security.

Geographic proximity doubled by the position of a border State on NATO's Eastern frontier forces Romania to evaluate with concern the regional situation and to insist on upholding international law and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Romania and its Allies are preoccupied in equal measure to consolidate collective defense and to adopt strong measures aiming at deterring military actions that could affect NATO security, and at reassuring the most exposed Allies.

Also, Romania wants the Alliance to be close to its citizens, fully aware of our country's security priorities as well as of our added value as a steadfast Ally. It is crucial that Romanian citizens are made aware of the benefits associated with membership to the Euro-Atlantic community of values, as security and stability are prerequisites of growth and the safety climate fostering the business environment and the economy in general.

The measures by which the Alliance ensures Member States' protection and defends peace, an essential source for maintaining stability in an unpredictable world, relate to the way in which it succeeds to address all security challenges and threats.

As such, the consolidation of NATO's public diplomacy and the intensified dialogue with the citizens from Allied Member States strengthen our Organization and ensure its public relevance. The Alliance should not limit itself solely to reaching out to Allied citizens on its contribution to the guarantee of their safety, but should fulfill the duty to inform and maintain their interest and commitment to the future of the Organization.

2. Security requires a bold and comprehensive vision in order to combat new categories of threats

An Alliance promoting a security umbrella assumes a high level of deterrence against potential threats, both by focusing on new conflict

areas in its vicinity, as well as by developing capabilities collectively and by every Ally.

In this context, we must acknowledge the development of NATO's Missile Defense system. It is arguably one of the most relevant projects for the future of the Alliance, from a strategic perspective, which implements the decisions reached at the recent NATO Summits and is based on the principles of indivisibility of security, solidarity and the defense of the entire Allied territory and population.

Romania actively supports the development of NATO's security architecture, both in Allied debates and, specifically, by hosting on its territory, at Deveselu, the *Aegis Ashore* missile defense facility as part of European component of the US Phased Adaptive Approach.

The bilateral project with the US represents a valuable contribution to the development of NATO's missile defense system and when the base at Deveselu will become fully operational, by 2015, it will extend the protection against ballistic missiles to all Allied European territory. The inauguration ceremony at Deveselu military base, which took place on 28 October 2013, revealed the strong Romanian and US commitment to the completion of this project.

As previously underlined[1], one should emphasize the exclusively defensive nature of the missile defense system and the conformity of its use with the United Nations Charter. The *Agreement between the United States of America and Romania on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania*, signed on 13 September 2011, reflects Romanian and US commitment to legitimate collective security of Allied states and, by extension, to the preservation of international peace and security.

The deterrence capability of the US missile defense system adds to the regional security. At the same time, the components of the system that would be placed in Romania, as well as the *European Phased Adaptive Approach* in general,

are specially designed to combat ballistic threats from outside of the Euro-Atlantic space and cannot alter the strategic equilibrium in Europe.

With regard to NATO's missile defense system, the strongest guarantees related to the purpose of its development were issued by the Alliance and are found in the *Declaration* of the Chicago Summit in 2012, as political guarantees: NATO's missile defense system ensures the defense of Allied territory, it is exclusively defensive and does not include offensive capabilities, it will not undermine strategic stability and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities[2]. NATO's ballistic missile defense system is an integral part of the collective defense obligations that unite all Allies.

At the same time, Romania acts in support of defining and consolidating NATO's role in combating new threats, such as cyber-attacks. As we are witnessing a stage of increasing number of more complex threats, NATO's efforts towards cyber defense have become ever more relevant. At the national level, cyber defense has become a component of national defense.

Following NATO's approach to cyber defense, the Alliance's Summit due this autumn could mark an ideal opportunity to update and consolidate the political and operational framework of Allied cyber defense. Additionally, Romania encouraged the natural development of a strategic dialogue between the Allies and expressed its support for a credible and efficient role for NATO in defending against cyber-attacks, in cooperation with partner states and, especially, in the development of a private-public partnership that can add real value in combating these threats.

3. Romania's vision on modernizing NATO

Romania's vision on modernizing NATO can be summed up as follows: robust Alliance, capable to assume collective defense against all

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1 See Bogdan AURESCU, "Article-by-Article Commentary of the text of the Agreement Between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania (Part I)", *Impact Strategic*, no. 3/2012, pp. 17-32.

2 Chicago Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593. htm?mode=pressrelease, accessed on 30 March 2014.

challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international community; solid transatlantic relationship; consolidated crisis management; continuation of *open door* policy and the promotion of partnerships; reaching out to its citizens.

Based on its prestige as the strongest security Alliance in history, Romania seeks to confirm NATO's essential role, especially in the current security context, aiming at consolidating NATO's main mission, i.e. to collectively protect all Member States.

As a distinctive regional voice, Romania has constantly spoken in favor of maintaining NATO's focus on the threats emanating from its vicinity, which is also NATO's vicinity, aiming for an inter-Allied dialogue that would deepen common understanding of these threats. Romania's actions are meant to concentrate NATO's attention to the Black Sea region – a strategically relevant region, a crossroads for strategic routes from Europe towards Central Asia and the Broader Middle East – and to rally NATO's support for the regional efforts aiming at assuring security and stability.

Romania has sought, since the first NATO Summit where it participated (Istanbul, in 2004), to anchor and secure the Black Sea region and to consolidate NATO's profile in maritime security.

At the same time, the significance of a strong transatlantic relation is unquestionable and it represents the foundation of the Alliance; the security of the Allies from both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. As such, the solidity of the transatlantic partnership must remain a priority for NATO's future, as it should be adequately reflected at the 2014 Summit in Great Britain.

The Allied forces from Europe and North America have fought alongside in many missions and campaigns and will continue to bring major contributions to international security. The success of these missions – in Afghanistan, Kosovo, in the Mediterranean and other places around the globe – would not have been possible without the high level of inter-operability among military forces, a level which should be maintained just as high in the future.

In Allied context, Romania promoted the consolidation of NATO's ability to manage crises. The response of the North Atlantic Alliance to the crisis in Ukraine would not have been possible in the absence of the format for political consultations, matched by action coordinated at the military level.

The continuous development of the Alliance's capacity to manage crises, especially by ensuring necessary infrastructure on Allied territory, is having a significant role in ensuring prompt responses, as well as increasing deterrence capability against potential threats.

The *open door* policy has been constantly supported by Romania, being viewed as more than just an opportunity to assess the readiness of new members, but also as a means to consolidate the Alliance by increasing its credibility and its overall security.

NATO's partnership policy brings a strategic dimension to comprehensive security and should be maintained. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the Mediterranean Dialogue must be consolidated as NATO strategic policies. To this end, it is essential to pursue amplified partnership programs in practical terms, moving beyond the level of operations. At the same time, we must acknowledge the efforts made by our partner States to support NATO's undertakings in addressing new threats (terrorism, piracy, cyber-attacks).

The level of excellence reached by Romania in consolidating partnerships is illustrated by the undertaking of responsibilities of Contact Point Embassy in Allied partner States. During 2005-2008 Romania undertook two NATO Contact Point missions in the Republic of Moldova, and in the current rotation system (2013-2014), our country is fulfilling two missions as Contact Point Embassy, a third consecutive mandate in Azerbaijan and a first one in Georgia. Romania's initiatives to assume the responsibilities associated with Contact Point Embassies, only a short time after its accession, confirm our country's interest in bringing partner States closer to the North-Atlantic Alliance and also in better acquainting the public opinion in the partner States with NATO.

Intensified cooperation between NATO and its Eastern partners, especially the Republic of Moldova, becomes a priority, especially in the actual security context. Alongside Georgia, the Republic of Moldova expressed its will to consolidate its relations with the Euro-Atlantic actors. Romania will continue to promote the need for NATO to keep close to its partners, especially the ones mostly exposed to pressure and the threat with the use of force.

Conclusion

Looking at the decade since joining NATO, I am convinced the Alliance will continue to represent the security umbrella necessary for Romania, promoting strong and effective reactions to the security challenges of the 21st century. In its turn, by associating to the Allied efforts, Romania will continue to contribute in a responsible, active and concrete manner to NATO's decision process and debates, as well as to Allied missions and operations.

The emergence of new threats with global implications supports the principle that collective efforts are required in order to ensure an adequate level of security. Following this line of thought, it becomes essential to correlate Allied actions with those undertaken by international organizations such as EU and OSCE, in order to achieve maximum results.

Ten years since it became a Member State mark an opportune moment to acknowledge that Romania is part of a strong and successful Alliance, capable to protect the liberties and the common legacy of the nations that are part of it, in the spirit and by the letter of the Treaty of Washington.

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ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES A DECADE AFTER NATO ACCESSION. AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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Avram-Florian IANCU**

On March 29, 2004, Romania became a full member of the North-Atlantic Alliance. This decade of Romania's membership to NATO has meant not only efforts made by Romanian Armed Forces, but also notable results achieved during the not an easy process of adapting to the Alliance norms and values.

The pre-accession, accession and, subsequently, the integration stages were possible through an appropriate conceptual and functional adaptation, directed to the legislative harmonization, the reform in the field of human resources, the dynamic of information exchange, the modernization of military logistics, as well as the ratification and implementation of the Allied standards in order to achieve the doctrinal and operational interoperability.

In addition, membership to the North Atlantic Alliance has been fully covered by a coherent and rigorous process of national defence capacities development and by an active and credible commitment to the collective effort.

Thus, the fulfilment of the commitments assumed in NATO's defence planning process, the endowment of national forces, their operationalisation and their affiliation to the Allied headquarters, the modernization of command, control and communications or the participation in multinational initiatives represent some facets of the efforts made for defence capabilities development.

The fact that, starting as early as 1991, Romania participated with over 40,000 troops in all NATO theatres of operations, in the assessment/certification or crisis management exercises, and the military representation at NATO Headquarters level and at the other strategic level headquarters give substance to Romanian contribution to the Alliance's efforts.

Keywords: NATO, capabilities, standardization, interoperability, transformation, NATO designated forces, operationalisation, operations.

Introduction

Ten years ago, on March 29, 2004, Romania became a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is considered one of the greatest successes achieved by Romanian policy since 1989.

Integration into the North Atlantic structure was a long process, which has been characterized by the constancy the wide support received from the Romanian people. NATO membership equals the guarantee of security and stability.

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Romania officially submitted its candidature to NATO in 1993 and a year later it was the first state to positively answer to the invitation launched by NATO to participate in the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a program designed for Euro-Atlantic cooperation in security matters, with a major role in the process of bringing new members into NATO.

Then, in April 1999, NATO launched its Membership Action Plan (MAP) dedicated to the accession of new members. Romania prepared its own MAP, establishing objectives, measures and deadlines for achieving the accession to the Alliance.

During the Prague Summit in November 2002, based on the assessment of the progress registered by the candidate countries, NATO Heads of States and Government decided to invite Romania and six other countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia) to start accession talks for the membership to the North-Atlantic Alliance.

NATO accession protocols were signed during a ceremony held in Brussels on March 26, 2003, and on March 29, 2004, Romania joined NATO by consigning the instruments of ratification to the U.S. State Department, the depository of the Treaty of the North-Atlantic Alliance.

1. Conceptual and functional adaptations

1.1. National legislation

The harmonization of the national legislation with NATO *acquis* was an important goal and it was meant to eliminate the impediments that could hinder the fulfilment of commitments assumed within the Alliance. Thus, for the purposes of constitutional consecration of Romania's accession to NATO and for providing a constitutional basis for the future changes of the national defence law, the Constitution of Romania, republished in 2003, provides that: *Romania's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty is done by law adopted in the joint meeting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with a majority of two thirds of the number of Deputies*

and senators[1]. This text was the basis for Law no. 22/2004 regarding Romania's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty

Further more, constitutional provisions amendment created the legal basis for the removal of conscription in peacetime and the shift to professional Armed Forces[2], for the defence planning within the Allied framework, for the participation to collective defence within military alliance systems and to the actions relating to the peacekeeping/peace-enforcement[3], and for the presence of foreign troops on Romania's territory[4].

1.2. Human resources reform

One of the objectives of the reform in this area consisted in developing a system for human resources management at the level of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence similar to the ones existing in other NATO Member States' Armed Forces.

Experience exchanges with other NATO Member States during the adhesion period gave

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1 Constitution of Romania, Published in the Official Monitor no. 767 of October 13th, 2003, art. 149, p. 29, available on-line at http://www.ucv.ro/pdf/site/constitutia_romaniei.pdf, accessed at 10 February 2014.
2 *Law no. 395/2005 on the remittance of the conscription in peacetime and the enacting of voluntary military service*, whose provisions have been in force since January 1st, 2007. We shall also mention that in times of war, during mobilization and martial law, military service becomes again compulsory. By *the Law no. 384/2006 regarding the status of soldiers and professional ranked soldiers*, with the subsequent amendments and additions, there was made a significant progress in the process of the creation and development of modern, light Armed Forces, with operational capacity of action and interoperable with other NATO Member States' Armed Forces.
3 *Law of National Defence no. 45/1999* (a normative act which was amended in this sense). According to the provision of *Law no. 473/2004 on defence planning*, there were elaborated and approved the documents on defence planning: National Defence Strategy, the Program of Governance, Defence White Paper, Military Strategy, the Directive on defence planning, major programs and operational plans of using Armed Forces. *Law no. 121/2011 on the participation of Romanian Armed Forces participation in missions and operations outside Romania' territory.*
4 *Law no. 291/2007 on the entrance, quartering, operations' performing, and transit of foreign Armed Forces on Romanian territory. Law no. 473/2004 on defence planning.*

rise to the need of adapting human resources regulatory framework[5]. National contribution with personnel for the employment in permanent positions within the headquarters of NATO Command Structure (NCS) and within the NATO Force Structure (NFS), as well as within NATO Agencies and Centers of Excellences (CoEs) has had, in the course of time, both a qualitative and quantitative evolution, in line with the dynamic of the Alliance's reform and transformation processes. Thus, if in 2004 there were 50 positions allocated to Romania, in present, 10 years after accession, Romania is allocated 145 positions in NCS headquarters and Agencies, 17 positions in NFS, and 18 positions within the CoEs.

As far as the level of these positions' visibility is concerned, although, in 2004, Romania was assigned a single General position within the Partnership Coordination Cell, nowadays, it is assigned 5 General positions[6]. Additionally, during the 10 years since the accession to NATO, approximately 400 troops have been rotated in international posts or within the Romanian military representations to NATO.

1.3. Military intelligence

The dynamic of information exchange is ensured by the consistent collaboration between national and NATO structures and by the annual contribution to the development of the Joint Assessment of Threats and of the products needed for NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

Romanian intelligence structures have been often congratulated by the Allies for the added value brought to NATO operations through the participation with staff and specific intelligence capabilities, for the contribution to the development of the documents in support to the deci-

5 *Law no. 80/1995 on the status of militaries and the Guideline for the Military Career* (approved by the Government's Decision no. 106/2011), the Order of National Defence Minister M. 30/2012 for the approval of the "*Guidelines for the recruitment, selection, professional training and the evolution in the military career in the Romanian Armed Forces*", the Order of the Minister of National Defence M. 30/2007 on the approval of "*M.R.U. 3/1, Guideline for the assessment of the militaries*" etc.
6 There are four general positions within NATO Command Structure and a Non Quota General position within the International Military Staff.

sions of the North Atlantic Council and Military Committee, to NATO Center in charge with the information corroboration, as well as for the support provided to all the developments that have taken place in NATO Centre of excellence for HUMINT, from Oradea.

It is worth noting that, during the period 2008-2012, Romania was among the top 5 contributors to the Intelligence Division of NATO International Military Staff, and, in 2013, was listed the first in terms of contributions to the support of the Intelligence Division.

1.4. Military logistics

In this area, a consistent process of transformation was initiated and is still ongoing. However, many relevant results have been obtained so far, mainly in the area of supporting the forces deployed in theatres of operations, in the area of movement and transportation, as well as in the area of Host Nation Support (HNS) and NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP).

The logistic support for Romanian troops participating in missions and operations outside the national territory was provided through the implementation of National Support Element. This support was complemented, when necessary, by bilateral agreements concluded with coalition/alliance partners or by multinational arrangements as part and within the framework of collective logistics concept.

In the movement and transportation area, the aim was to achieve interoperability with similar structures/bodies belonging to NATO and/or to other member or partner countries. Presently, Romania has a secured access to the means of air and sea transportation, has the necessary system for data exchange with NATO structures as the Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS) software is already implemented and its embark-debark operation units and movement control teams are certified and available to NATO. In addition, starting with 2010, Romania is a member of the Multinational Logistics Unit for Movement Control (MILU); in this context, Romania will ensure, through its national component, the operations of movement and transportation for NATO operation in Kosovo in the second quarter of 2014 and in the first and second

quarters of 2015.

Romania has also made substantial progresses in terms of host nation support (HNS). The first version of the HNS Capabilities Catalogue was drafted a year before its accession to NATO (at the beginning of 2003) and, subsequently, it continued the efforts for the completion of the legal framework in this domain[7].

In this context, it must be noted the vital support granted by Romania for the operations of resources transport to and from Afghanistan[8], a fact which is proof of the viability of Constanţa-Mihail Kogălniceanu multimodal transport node, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the air, sea and land transportation infrastructure in the area.

Until presently, Romania has been designated as implementing authority for 50 NSIP projects, which, sight out, among others, the following objectives: providing operational facilities, particularly in airfield infrastructure; ensuring and maintaining the capabilities included in NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS); and improving network communication systems of major interest at NATO level. The financial value of NSIP funding for these projects is over 100 million

euro, representing over 80% of the projects' total value, the difference being ensured through national contribution.

1.5. Standardization and interoperability

Within the Romanian Armed Forces, military standardization activity has been conducted continuously since 1998, six years before becoming a NATO member. Standardization is meant to gradually increase the interoperability between national armed forces and the armed forces of the other member countries of the international organizations of which Romania is a Member State, by accepting and implementing NATO standardization documents.

Achieving interoperability of the forces designated to NATO is a short-term priority within the timelines assumed through NATO Defence Planning Process. For the remaining national forces, achieving interoperability is a long-term strategic objective, interconnected with the time horizons set by the strategy for the transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces.

So far, out of a total of 1413 active NATO STANAGs[9], over 1200 standards have been analyzed seeking their ratification. For 586 of them, a national reply has already been sent to NATO, confirming their complete implementation (402) or the partial implementation (184).

Concrete results were achieved in all the specific areas of interoperability: communication, common procedures, action, as well as mutual support.

In the field of communication, there were implemented the procedures and the technical and material requirements in the domains of communication and computer science, military information and linguistic assistance.

With regard to the common procedures and joint actions, Romania put into practice the specific manuals and doctrines regarding targets' management, joint operations planning and management, intelligence and psychological support, as well as EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) force protection support, etc. These are either applicable to the joint level, or specific

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7 2003 – *The General Conception and Procedures regarding the conferring by Romania of the Host Nation Support in order to support the military actions of NATO Member and Partner States on the national territory*.

2004 – *The Order of the Minister of National Defence on the organization, training and functioning of the Liaison Teams in the embark/debark airports and maritime ports* and was elaborated Romania's HNS Data Basis, which allowed achieving interoperability in communicating data to the Allies.

2006 – *The Memorandum of Understanding between Romania, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) on HNS for NATO operations and exercises on Romania's territory*, facilitating the support provided to NATO-led operations and exercises on the national territory.

2009 – *The Order of the Minister of National Defence on the assets and services that can be put at the disposal to foreign Armed Forces, entering, quartering, carrying out operations or transiting Romania's territory*.

8 This action begun in 2011 and is still carried out, through the designation of Mihail Kogălniceanu-Constanţa International Airport and of Constanţa maritime port, as well as of the road and rail infrastructure of Constanţa area.

9 NATO STANdardization AGreement.

to the military services' level.

As far as the mutual support is concerned, it is worth mentioning the doctrines, procedures or technical-material requirements in the field of logistics, infrastructure, military topography, equipment and technique, as well as the documents for the implementation standards in financial domain.

The implementation of AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine, by developing a new edition of the Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine, formed the foundation for other documents of doctrinaire level and handbooks on different sub-domains for the categories of forces (Joint Doctrine for land operations, Air Forces operations Doctrine, Naval Forces Doctrine, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces) or for functional areas (intelligence, counterintelligence and security, electronic warfare, target management, joint operations planning and conducting, civil-military operations, support and EOD support and CBRN force protection, etc.). Thus, there were elaborated 32 doctrines, fully harmonized in terms of content.

Concerning technical interoperability, it should be noted that, based on NATO standards, there were developed national implementation documents that can be used in formulating technical specifications according to the needs of the missions and operational requirements for the technique and equipment which are in the process of being modernized or procured or which will be modernized or procured. Budgetary restrains allowed only the elaboration of the necessary documents for implementation, often leaving acquisition and the actual endowment at the level of a desideratum.

In the area of administration interoperability, it is noteworthy the implementation of NATO standardization documents, through the elaboration of national implementation documents (various glossaries of terms and definitions and guidelines for the standardization of specific administrative activities).

1.6. Strategy for the Transformation of Romania's Armed Forces

For the continuation of the reform process carried out in the period 1990-2007, the *Strategy for the Transformation of Romania's Armed Forces* (STRAF) was elaborated in 2007, in close connection with the similar process in the Alliance.

The goal of the transformation process consists in developing and maintaining a force structure able to fulfill both the tasks entrusted at the national level and the international commitments undertaken by Romania. The STRAF comprises three distinct phases, each of them with specific, achievable objectives, considering a constant and predictable financial support. Currently, the implementation of the STRAF is in the second stage, the *Operational Integration in NATO and the European Union* stage, which is planned to run over the period 2008-2015.

During this phase, it is planned the achievement of medium-term transformation objectives, among which, we shall mention the following: to continue forces' operationalisation; to continue the major procurement programs; to continue the military education reform, etc.

During the last stage of the transformation process, the full integration in NATO and the EU (2016-2025), it is envisaged to achieve the long-term objectives such as: concentrating all the efforts and resources for developing capabilities committed to EU and NATO; further modernization of new equipment procurement and interoperability; streamlining the systemic and structural assessment activities on the area of procurement and endowment with modern weapon systems and equipments.

2. Defence capabilities development

2.1. Forces designated to NATO – undertaking and fulfilling the commitments

With the accession into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2004, Romania became part of NATO Defence Planning Process, which is the next level after the one specific to the Partnership for Peace period (1994-2004), known as Planning and Review Process (PARP).

The role of defence planning is to ensure the forces, means and capabilities necessary for the defence of Allied states populations

and territories, through the concentration and strengthening of national efforts in the wide framework of collective security and defence.

Defence planning is meant to harmonize of defence-planning disciplines (armaments planning, force planning, logistical planning, resource planning, command and control planning, civil emergency planning, nuclear planning) in order to meet the collectively agreed requirements, to ensure the adequate coordination and harmonization of the other related activities (standardization, air defence, etc.) and to consolidate the connection between force planning and operational planning.

The integration in the allied defence planning has been realized by successive stages of adapting to this process, marked by the force packages (Force Goals) tailored to Romania as part of its contribution to the collective efforts: *Force Goals 2004*, *Force Goals 2006* and *Force Goals 2008*. Together with the Force Goals 2008, it was realized the synchronization with the other Allies within the framework of the process of defence planning.

In 2012 NATO completed the review of its Defence Planning Process and the former Force Goals became Capability Targets. For Romania, the current Capability Targets took over most of the requirements (87%) of the 2008 Force Goals that were under implementation within 2018 timeframe. There are also new requirements for forces and capabilities, determined by the lessons learned in conducting NATO operations over de last years. Among these, the most notable are the special operations forces and non-military capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction.

The timelines for implementing Capability Targets 2013 were agreed by multinational consultation between Romania, on the one hand, and the other Allies, on the other, considering the financial constrains.

2.2. Endowment with weapon systems and military equipment

The development and modernization of national forces and capabilities has been a constant concern of the Romanian Armed Forces during these 10 years, even though in recent years there have been significant constraints caused by the low level of budgetary allocations.

In this respect, Romania has launched an ample process of modernization and endowment with new weapon systems to ensure the interoperability with the armed forces of other NATO Member States and the substitution of Eastern origin equipment, which is consuming high amount of material and financial resources.

This complex and long term process was oriented and conducted following the guidelines set in the MoD's programmatic documents in this area (e.g. Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy, Endowment Strategy and Plan etc).

On the basis of the principle of "unique package of forces and capabilities", Romania, as any other Ally, has developed and maintains only one set of forces and capabilities, for participation in the full spectrum of both NATO- and EU-led operations.

In the period since NATO accession, various endowment programmes have been launched and some are still ongoing. Of these, the most relevant are: modernization of tanks and infantry armored vehicles, the acquisition of armored personnel carriers (APCs TBT 8x8), upgrading the Communication and Information System of the Romanian Armed Forces (SCIAR), the acquisition of T22 type frigates, acquisition and upgrading of naval helicopters, National Airspace Command Control System (SCCAN), integrated maritime border surveillance system (SCOMAR), short-medium haul aircraft and multirole aircraft.

In the context of financial crisis, it was considered the option of joining national efforts with those of other Nations for the development of joint capabilities, providing defence capacity and improving crisis management.

Participation in the development of NATO's multinational capabilities resulted in contributions for the purchase of specific products for some programs, such as those in the fields of Air Command and Control System (ACCS), Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALT-

BMD), Joint, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR), Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) and NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW).

2.3. Operationalisation and affiliation of forces

The operationalisation of forces began in 2005, with the initiation of the process of integration into NATO, conducted according to the *2004 Joint Force Command Naples' Accession and Integration Plan for Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia*.

Considering the plan's objectives fully achieved, on September 27, 2011 was signed the agreement to conclude the programme of support for the accession and integration with Joint Force Command Naples.

So far, 80 structures have been certified and affirmed: 56 belonging to Land Forces, 9 to Air Forces, 5 to Naval forces and 10 to the Joint Logistic Command. These units are now part of the *Capability Targets 2013* that Romania committed to NATO.

Being part of the obligations undertaken by Romania as a NATO member, the affiliation of forces constitute an evaluation criterion in the process of certification and affirmation of forces and contribute to the standardization of training process, as well as a concrete step toward the joint and multinational character of the allied military operations.

By the end of the year 2010, Romanian Armed Forces fulfilled the affiliation process for the forces with high readiness level. Thus, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade was affiliated to the NATO Rapid Reaction Corp Turkey (NRDC-TUR).

In 2012, bilateral talks between Greece and Romania were initiated in order to negotiate the legal framework for the affiliation of forces with lower readiness level. Currently, negotiations are ongoing for the affiliation of few such a units (e.g. ISTAR, PSYOPS, Special Operation Forces) to the Multinational Corp-North East Poland (MNC – NE).

2.4. Command, Control, Communications and Computer systems

Romania's accession NATO has accelerated the process of military communications systems' modernization, started in the 1990s. The evolution of the communications and information system (CIS) in the past decade is due in a large measure to the implementation at the conceptual, doctrinal, technical level of the applicable Allied standards.

Being a NATO member has allowed Romanian experts to operate together with their colleagues in the Alliance, and at the same time to have compatible equipments, to have compatible and interconnected systems and any specific CIS support for missions to be provided by human, technical and procedural cooperation, anywhere and anytime.

Thus, by the entry into service of NATO Point of Presence in Romania and also of NATO secret network CRONOS, there are provided such services as a secret data network, information exchange of NATO recognized air picture (RAP), a command, control and nuclear reporting system, an intelligence data network.

In order for CIS – a system necessary for leadership, cooperation and notification of the Romanian forces deployed to Afghanistan – to insure the real liaison needs between the beneficiary structures, the Communications and Information Technology Command developed, during the years of 2011, 2012 and 2013, sustained reconfiguration and maintenance activities, independent missions or missions in cooperation with specialized civilian operators.

By introducing into service of satellite communications systems from the systems for the safety of navigation (INMARSAT), up to complex systems of large capacity (SATCOM), including portable satellite terminals, and their ability to extend the fixed communications networks or computer, there has been granted access for fighting units to mission's networks and to the reporting and information networks.

A special place in the development of defence capabilities is taken by the Deployable Communications Module (DCM). This structure

was activated on September 1st and completed its operationalisation process at the end of 2011. The unit has been evaluated and fully integrated into NATO Communication Battalion. It is estimated that DCM will achieve its full operational capability (FOC) in 2015.

The establishment of DCM on the Romanian territory constitutes an important achievement by ensuring the formation of high level specialists in the field and a favorable framework for the development of interoperability between the Romanian Armed Forces and NATO structures.

Administrative support of the DCM (including the selection and the employment of the personnel as well as providing the necessary facilities and the training) is done by the Communications and Information Technology Command. The DCM is manned with Romanian soldiers, coming entirely from the Communications and Information Technology Command.

A NATO common funded project is ongoing in order to fulfil the requirements and standards for DCM (including those coming from the increase of peace establishment posts) and to procure new generation of CIS equipment (DRAGONFLY). In January 2014, NATO approved supplementary funds in the amount of EUR 290,000 for the execution of this programme.

2.5. Anti -Missile shield

According to the decisions taken at the NATO Summits (Bucharest 2008, Strasbourg-Kehl in 2009 and in Lisbon in 2010) Romania participates to the United States Phase Adaptive Approach for an anti-ballistic missile defence system, as a part of the NATO anti-missile defence system. This contribution is meant to ensure increased visibility and to strengthen the role of our country in the framework within the North-Atlantic Alliance.

The most important participation of Romania in the project is related to the second phase of the programme for development of anti-ballistic missile defence system and comprises the installation and the hosting of land based interceptors (SM-3 missiles) which is due to become operational by 2015.

Interceptors to be installed in Romania will not have nuclear charge; the ballistic missiles will be destroyed by the kinetic impact.

The General Staff coordinates the activities related to the implementation of the US Anti-missile Defence system including to make Base 99 Deveselu fully operational and to secure the transportation of the elements of the system to the base.

2.6. Participation in Allied initiatives

The development of national defence capabilities cannot be separated from the initiatives undertaken by the Alliance.

At the Chicago Summit, in 2012, the heads of States and Governments have adopted an ambitious defence package for NATO Forces suggestively titled *NATO Forces 2020* (a continuation and revitalization of the Lisbon critical capabilities). In this package the *Smart Defence* initiative takes a privileged place as it puts en emphasis on the multinational cooperation as the main means of achieving and maintaining the defence capabilities needed by the Alliance.

Prior to the emergence of the Smart Defence initiative, Romania was already participating in six multinational programs/projects: Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS); NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C); Air Command and Control System (ACCS); Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD); Deployable Communications Module (DCM E); Strategic Airlift Capability/(SAC).

In the framework of Smart Defence initiative, Romania is considering 46 from a total of 148 projects. Thus, Romania participates in 16 projects from tier 1 (draft a nation leader and that can be implemented), is interested in 22 projects from tier 2 (projects for which was manifested a desire moderate nations and participation has not been identified as a leading nation) and in 8 projects from level 3 (projects that can be developed for the time being due to insufficient resources and the low interest of Nations, but with a good potential for further development).

3. Active engagement, credible contribution

3.1. Operations and missions

The Romanian Armed Forces' missions within the Alliance represented a natural

continuation of the missions in which we took part within the PfP framework, and the benefits reside in the integration and achieving an increased interoperability as the accumulation of operational experience.

Engaging in missions and operations outside the national boundaries was done gradually since 1991 (with 13 years before carrot in NATO) and continues today, on three continents, under UN and OSCE mandates and under NATO command, EU, UN and OSCE.

It should be mentioned that the participation was permanent both before and after the Romania's accession into NATO, both in missions and combat training mission, covering the full range of challenges and responsibilities.

Thus, so far, Romania has participated in NATO missions in all theatres of operations with more than 40,000 troops (military observers, staff officers, liaisons officers, military police, combat units and hospitals campaign) getting a top position among contributing nations to operations.

Basically, our contribution to NATO-led operations and missions represents a presence for over six years in Iraq, from the19th of March, 2003 until the 23rd of July 2009, the date on which we successfully completed our mission.

The maximum number of troops deployed was 773. In the same period of time with a consistent contribution with combat units to the Coalition's mission IRAQI FREEDOM, we participated with trainers to the NATO training mission in IRAQ (NTM-I) (January 2005-November 2011).

Afghanistan has always been the biggest effort in a theatre of operations. At the peak of our participation we had deployed, for a period of several months, over 2,000 soldiers. Currently, we have approximately 1,100 troops deployed. A very important contribution was made by the Air Forces by taking over the command for the Kabul International Airport (KAIA), from April 2011 to April 2012, in two rotations every 6 months, with 75 soldiers/rotation.

For the next NATO mission in AFGHANISTAN post-2014, meaning the Resolute Support Mission, Romania will contribute with trainers and other forces, according to NATO's requirements and national policy decisions.

The Western Balkans is another area where we had forces participating in operations. Given that the security and stability in the area are of major importance for Romania, we participated in missions under NATO'S umbrella, in the province of KOSOVO, beginning with March 2000. Currently, Romania participates in KFOR mission with both staff personnel and intelligence elements (68-strong) as well as a manoeuvre company (128 conscripts) in the framework of the Strategic Reserve to SACEUR, which can be deployed at order (exclusively in the area of operations in KOSOVO).

With respect to specific missions, it should be recalled that since the date of accession, Air Forces have executed air force combat Air Police Service under NATO command as a result of the passage of the air defence command to the Allied authorities and integration of national air defence system in the NATO.

We participate in a wide range of NATO-led operations and missions. Thus, between august and October 2007, 4 MIG 21 LANCER planes participated to the NATO Air Policing Mission for the Baltic countries. Also, since 2005, for periods lasting between one and three months, depending on availability, "Regina Maria" frig-ate participated in operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, for three months in the year 2011, it has participated in NATO's Unified Protector of imposing the em-bargo against Libya.

3.2. Exercises

Romania's troops continuously participated in training exercises since the PfP membership. The scope and objectives of the exercises has been adjusted after the accession according to the Alliance's missions and operations.

A series of national-level joint exercises was dedicated to the evaluation with a view to affirmation of forces that have completed their operationalisation, such as *DEMEX 05, ROMEX 06, ROUEX 07, ROUEX 08* and *ROUEX 09*.

If DEMEX 05 constituted the event which was directed to the affirmation of the first five military structures made available to NATO, the year 2007 represented the apex of the operation readiness process. That is considering, on the one

hand, the number of structures affirmed and certified (35 units) and, on the other hand, the affirmation of Brigade headquarters (during ROUEX 07), a premier both for the Romanian Armed Forces and NATO evaluators.

All evaluation exercises carried out for affirmation, attended by teams of NATO evaluators, confirmed the high level of interoperability achieved valued structures, they will be able to act within the framework of multinational operations within NATO.

In this context, it is worth mentioning the participation in NATO exercises for crisis management, CMX a politico-military exercises aiming to test the concepts concerning the management of current and emerging crises. These exercises play an important role in maintaining and improving NATO's ability to manage crises and to consolidate lessons learned from real operations.

Romania participated for the first time in this type of exercise, in 1999 during its PfP partnership, and continues to participate in this form until the year 2003. Since 2004, Romania participates as a full member of the Alliance, contributing to both the preparation and the conducting stages of the exercise.

We also note the STEADFAST-type exercises, organized for the purpose of evaluation, certification and validation of units being part of NATO response force (NRF). This type of exercises started in 2006 as the STEADFAST JAGUAR, and over time, they wore many names JACKPOT, JOIST, JUNCTURE, JAZZ.

To the last exercise of this series, STEAD-FAST JAZZ 2013 which represented the first major joint exercise with troops on the ground (Major Joint NATO LIVEX) Romania participated with a total of 88 soldiers in different location in Poland, Norway, Latvia and Italy. Romania also participated with the Deployable Communication Module (DCM) (which provided the communication and information support during the exercise) and an infantry platoon equipped with type, technical, MLI 84 MARTEN, which was involved in all its stages.

As a final example, we underline the participation to the ABLE STAFF series NATO exercises. These are annual command exercises, at the level of experts in the field of nuclear consultation procedures. Since NATO accession, Romania participated with a national response structure aiming to train the staff responsible for the implementation of nuclear consultation procedures during a crisis with nuclear dimension.

3.3. Participation in the NATO decision-making process – military representation

An essential part of the participation in the Alliance's decision-making process is represented by the permanent military representative to NATO.

Romania's Military Representative to NATO and EU is the structure under the command of the General Staff, dedicated to maintain a permanent liaison with the NATO HQ and to represent the Romanian Chief of the General Staff (GS) in the NATO Military Committee and in the EU Military Committee (EU/MC).

The Military Representative (MilReps), by the authority vested in him by the Chief of the General Staff for NATO EUMC, is authorized to manage all military matters in relation with the NATO HQ and other national MilReps.

National Liaison Representative (NLR) to the Allied Command transformation (ACT) provides the direct and permanent contact, the necessary advice, and a continuous information exchange at the strategic level, between Romanian General Staff and ACT in specific areas for military transformation. The NLR Head acts as a military representative of the Chief of the General staff to ACT.

National Military Representative (NMR) to SHAPE provides the direct link, advice and the exchange of data and information at the strategic level, between General Staff and SHAPE. NMR plans and coordinates activities which ensure the promotion of Romanian Armed Forces interests in relation with SHAPE and with similar representatives of other NATO member and partner countries.

3.4. Hosting major events

We would like to emphasize that, over the past 10 years, Romania hosted and had a substantial contribution to preparing and conducting a series

of events of high visibility within NATO. Let us mention the informal Defence Ministers Meeting of NATO member countries, held in Poiana Braşov in 2004 and the 2008 NATO Summit held in Bucharest on 2-4 April 2008; this was the biggest political event of the year and the largest and most prominent event ever held in Romania.

The most recent NATO event hosted by Romania is the *NATO military Committee Conference* held in Sibiu in September 2012. The General Staff played an important role in preparing the event and the support from the local authorities and Central Administration was essential. Considering the location, the agenda of the meeting as well as the level and the number of participants, the conference was a successful event. The event was attended by the Chiefs of Defence from all NATO countries, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Operations, the Commandant of the NATO Defence College in Rome, commanders of the two strategic commands, as well as former EU Chief negotiator for the Western Balkans. The Conference included in the agenda information and analyses regarding current issues on NATO's agenda such as operations, operational and security situation in the Western Balkans and in the Middle East and North Africa, the implementation of the defence package, review the structure of the international military staff (IMS), etc.

Conclusions and prospects

Without any doubt, the above mentioned aspects give the measure of the demarches undertaken by the Romanian Armed Forces both before, and especially after NATO accession. The 10 years period from that moment was marked by both considerable efforts and notable results on the conceptual and functional adaptation, on the development of its own defence capabilities in line with Allied standards as well as with on the continuous and active engagement in NATO-led operations and missions. We appreciate that all of these have contributed to strengthening the Romania's profile as credible partner and as a real contributor to Euro-Atlantic security.

Unfortunately, things were not always as we would have wished. The world financial crisis strongly affected the defence sector and the budgetary allocations are very elloquent in this respect. Nevertheless, the intentions and even concrete steps for a gradual realignment by 2016 of the national defence budget to the "2% of GDP" benchmark agreed in NATO are already known. This quantitative growth must be matched by a qualitative component that implies an appropriate hierarchy of priorities as well as the efficiency and the effectiveness in spending funds as conditions for success.

The current security environment is deeply marked by the situation in Ukraine and its evolution. The North Atlantic Alliance has realized that the assumptions which form the basis for the current Security Concept have been if not dispelled, at least seriously contradicted by the reality. More than ever, the essence of the Washington Treaty proves to be of actuality. Collective defence needs to be adjusted in relation to other fundamental security tasks. Beyond the immediate measures already implemented of securing allies and strengthening the South-eastern flank, NATO should reassess the possible risks and threats and their potential to affect the NATO's security environment.

In this respect, the allied attempts towards NATO Summit in September 2014 and the decisions which the heads of State and Government will adopt on this occasion will give the outlines for the future Alliance's defence and deterrence posture.

Our country's geostrategic position at the Alliance's Eastern border, in the direct proximity of the events in Ukraine, determines Romania to have a major interest on this issue. In this respect, the Romanian President said on the occasion of the last visit of the NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in our country: "In anticipation of this year's NATO Summit, in September, our objective is to strengthen the security level on the eastern flank of the Alliance and to strongly reaffirm the implementation of article 5 of the Treaty, which guarantees the security of each of the members with the support of all Member States".

Against this background, we believe that

Romania's Armed Forces, as always, will find the best course of action to promote and defend permanently the national interests and to accomplish its missions.

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MILITARY TRANSFORMATION.
TRENDS AND NEW STRATEGIC VISIONS

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Transformation is a strategic imperative. At the level of the ministries of national defence of NATO Member States, modernization is influenced by the stringent conditions afferent to the competition in the information era. In this stage, power is determined by the distribution of information, the access to information and the capacity of making rapid decisions.

Transformation is a process that meets the need to adapt to the rapid changes occurring at the level of cooperation and collaboration, under the conditions of the simultaneous development of new concepts, new capabilities and new structural organizations that exploit the advantages with unto asymmetric threats and allow the pursuit of strategic interests.

Keywords: *structures, military transformation, modernization, military organizations.*

Introduction

The process of military structures transformation represents a continuous process of developing and integrating new concepts, strategies, doctrines, technologies and capabilities, with the purpose of improving the efficiency and interoperability of forces under the conditions of a permanently changing international security environment. NATO transformation and adaptation process to the changes occurred within the international security environment underlines the necessity of continuously reevaluating the military factor as the main source of credibility.

The engine of transformation is represented by the entirety of changes taking place in society and, especially, at the level of warfare characteristics, as well as at the level of threats such as terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

From the technological point of view, the answer to these challenges is focused on providing a high degree of information technology's availability, which will have as a consequence fundamental changes not only in the content of security, military and endowment strategies, but also in that of those strategies approaching risk and threat management.

Modernization of defence involves the simultaneous evolution of technology, concepts and organizations in order to provide a safe ground for military capabilities' development. The recent evolutions at the level of the international security environment have given birth to challenges requiring an adequate answer of the defence sector. This answer is materialized in new technological concepts that are expected to

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generate new capabilities, meant to support the competitive advantages in the battle space. Transformation as a goal in itself is unacceptable, as it needs to be based on a realistic argumentation of the fundamental advantages it can provide in the battlefield.

Technological transformation is just one of the elements of modernization, an equal importance being carried by changes of beliefs, attitudes and group values. The reason for this is the fact that war must be understood primarily as an expression of specific human behavior. In this context, technologies not only are the initiators of cultural changes, but they are also the result of the evolutions happening at the level of behavior and culture. Transformation is a complex and dynamic process, that has to be permanently monitored, at different levels, through a coherent and determined coordination, drown out from an efficient decision making process.

In order to preserve the role of the culture of change as a provider of competitive advantages in the information era, as a fosterer of leadership and education and as a stimulus for the individual and institutional development, as well as to acquire a balance, modernization process has to include two vital components: innovation and transformation.

From this perspective, the fundamental requirement of transformation is continuity which, at its turn, requires the anticipation of future, connecting the evolution of concepts, processes, organizations/structures and defence technologies. As a result, military transformation must be approached as a complex process, to which a set of interconnected meanings are subsumed. In this respect, the most notable meanings of the military transformation are the following:

• *a way of adaptation* – supposing the remodeling of all the components of armed forces, according to the new characteristics of the security environment;

• *reform of the defence area* – involves the continuous modernization of military infrastructure, the improvement of methods and practices of defence resources management and the reevaluation of the efficiency of financing,

programming and planning system, in the new context that includes the reduction of manpower and the change of the planning system, which shifted from the planning based on threats to the one based on capabilities;

• *effect of the revolution in military affairs* – involves the endorsement and implementation of technologies specific to the technical-military revolution, the restructuring of armed forces according to the requirements brought up by the information era (small size units, with a high level of independency and high power of action), flexibility of the command hierarchy, orientation towards network not to platform based operations, and interoperability of categories of forces.

In conclusion, *military transformation* implies changes at the level of doctrine, force structure and organization, capabilities, intelligence, training, education and procurement, human resource management and budgetary planning, which become in this way the main areas in which military modernization is put into practice.

Additionally, military transformation is a process taking place not only at national level, but also at the Alliance's one. NATO's credibility is and will be dependent on its military capabilities, on its capacity of fulfilling the missions assumed by the programmatic documents.

1. The extent of military organizations and Armed Forces transformation. Goal, domains, objectives

The general objective of military organizations' transformation is to create new military capabilities that would allow forces to conduct the full spectrum of operations during a conflict. *In the North-Atlantic Alliance's vision, the goal of transformation is to create military forces capable of ensuring*[1]:

• better capacity to act in joint multinational operations, through the implementation of new concepts and architectures to accomplish the objectives of interoperability;

1 According to the Concept of transformation issued by NATO ACT (Alliance Command Transformation).

• information superiority, which involves the exploitation of information advantages in the global evaluation, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as high capacity of assessment and dissemination;

• use of experimental concepts in the development process, which implies testing new operational battle concepts, new capabilities and structures through war games, efficient coordination of training through simulation and field exercises, targeted on crises situation management (civil emergencies);

• transformation of strategies at departmental level, by developing permanent capabilities adaptable to modernization requirements.

The strategies that define the transformation process approach three domains, respectively military culture, planning and capabilities transformation. The processes afferent to these strategies rely on enhancing joint operations, on information advantages exploitation, on the concept of development and experimentation and on the development of capabilities for transformation.

At the level of the defence management, transformation requires changes in the following four domains:

• *identifying the requirements* (as a result of an entrepreneurial perspective, based on superior concepts and on the judiciousness of decision making);

• *budgetary planning* (by shifting the balance, within the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System – PPBS –, from programs to a new systemic perspective in military budgeting);

• *procurements, equipment and logistics* (as a result of the need to significantly reduce the research-development-implementation cycles of new combat capabilities);

• *human resources management* (as a result of military professionalization).

Transformation has implications on:

• *modernization of technologies and armaments* (within the information and network systems, technologies and subcomponents, old/current weapons systems, new platforms and intelligent ammunition);

• *force structures* (battle and organizational structures; command structures, control and information systems; surveillance and reconnaissance systems; logistic and mobility support; infrastructure; out of border presence, etc.);

• *operations* (in order to connect within a network joint forces, drafting doctrines of military services, setting up headquarters with responsibilities in issuing operation and campaign plans and to realize interoperability with the Allied armed forces).

The objectives of the transformation process differentiated on a systemic basis consist in:

a) *Transformation in combat training* refers to reaching a level of training allowing the different structures of the armed forces to act as joint forces, a special role in this respect belonging to hi-tech modeling and simulation systems;

b) *Transformation in the area of endowment* refers to: the modernization of military capabilities, shortening decision making process in the development of armament systems and logistic support, increasing the adaptability of the programming and budgeting processes in this area, the development of evaluation and monitoring methods for the efficiency of equipment programs. Also, transformation in the area of endowment underlines the increased importance of the research and development processes and of the efficiency of using commercial technologies from information and telecommunication fields at the level of equipment policies.

2. NATO transformation

NATO vision on transformation does not change the force planning process, but the priorities get new meanings. Thus, the essential objective of force planning remains unchanged, consisting in the process of identifying the forces and assets needed by the Alliance and the coordination of the planning process at the national level has to support the overall interests of the Alliance.

Within NATO's philosophy regarding transformation, this is a key-element, a primary principle remaining the equitable distribution

of responsibilities and benefits among partners, within the processes in the Alliance. The monitoring and evaluation of actions taken by nations with regard to their actions to the overall requirements of the Alliance maintain their importance for identifying the domains which are not covered enough by the force planning process. Additionally, a special emphasis is laid on nations' capacity and willingness to answer the new requirements, in accordance with the evolutions of the international security environment. At the same time, NATO membership and the necessity of carrying out the process of military transformation in accordance with its standards imposes interoperability as a key-element of national force planning in order to achieve the common goals of the members of the Alliance.

These objectives are directly related to the main areas sought out by the transformation process at defence management level on which all the other members of the Alliance concentrate their efforts: identification of requirements, budgetary planning, procurement and human resource management.

At the same time, these NATO objectives are harmoniously related to the responsibilities of the Romanian Armed Forces in the defence matters, such as:

- promoting Romania national interests within the Alliance's military structures;
- readiness and interoperability of forces dedicated to NATO;
- active involvement in the whole spectrum of NATO missions as well as the fight against terrorism;
- active involvement in regional military cooperation initiatives.

Modernization is also a political imperative. The shift from classic threats – state interests against state interests – to the asymmetric ones (network structured) requires such an organization of actions. Political decision, through which has to be accomplished the defence, security, protection, declaration and even enforcement of national interests, especially the fundamental ones, must be connected to the new realities created by globalization, as well as to the new

vulnerabilities resulted from informational societies and the afferent threats.

In a security environment characterized by strategic partnerships between the great actors, by the diminishing of inter-state conflict risk, by the integration of a considerable number of states within EU, NATO and other international economic, political and cultural organizations, the political doctrines based on inter-state conflicts haven't enough legitimacy any more. The political foundations of the network centered warfare define the new type of engagement, its limits and rationale and represent a new way of thinking and operating, a selective, target oriented, limited and very precise engagement, in conditions of maximum security, regularly with the support of its coalition partners.

The transformation of the armed forces is determined by a series of threats, with direct consequences on:

- the decrease of the capacity to provide force protection, as a result of carrying out missions in distant geographical areas and of the new technologies making it possible for the opponents not to manifest this vulnerability;
- the increase of regional conflicts risk, due not only to the technological development of weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic missiles, but also to the support given by a part of the populations and state regimes in the Middle East and South-East Asia to terrorist organizations;
- the increase of the risk represented by the capacity of states with weak political regimes or of failed states to destabilize the security state;
- diffusion of power and military capabilities toward non-state actors and here, we refer, first of all, to governments sponsoring international terrorism;
- the considerable increase of sources of conflict and the difficulty in foreseeing the probable locations of future conflicts.

At the same time, modernization is a technological imperative. In the military field, the necessary technology evolves much faster than in the civilian one. The context created by the simultaneous manifestation of the technological

advancement, globalization, and scientific development has given rise to some significant trends in the area of strategy evolution and defence planning, among which we shall mention the following:

• technological advances in the field of sensors, information assessment and shooting accuracy;

• the increase of threats implying the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile as a result of the transfer of technologies, materials and experts to hostile countries and of ballistic missile technologies development in countries with hostile regimes, which are potential enemies;

• the increase of the possibility for a new military competition in space and cyber environment as a result of the fact that several states have developed capabilities for offensive information operations, which allow to attack both the military and civilian systems.

From a military perspective, all these are considered inseparable elements of defence policy's economic dimension ("defence economics"[2]). It has been ascertained that the most efficient economic structures are not the highly ranked big companies, but the so-called type "B" companies, able to adapt easier to the production and sale conditions. Moreover, the unprecedented development of the systems based on communication and information technology allows and, at the same time, requires the transition to the new type of network based organization in all the domains, not only in the economic ones.

Conclusions

Under the objective conditions of our country, we assume that, in order to diminish the gaps separating us, from a military perspective, from the other NATO Member States, it is of utmost importance to finance the scientific research in technology and hi-tech areas, which can give an impulse to the general progress of military knowledge and practice, of military skill in general and the improvement of military technology and systems performance, by the optimum and integral use of all human, financial, material, technological and informational resources.

The procedures, techniques, methods, structures and equipment have to be adapted so that they allow an increased speed in the deployment and the use of forces and, in case losses were unavoidable, they shall consist in "moderate damages", without determining blockages in vital areas such as the combat fire capacity, information and communications.

This is the reason for which, during armed forces modernization, the equipment component represents the dynamic phenomena and element involving human, technical, economic and financial resources with the purpose of putting into practice the research-development programs, starting from the necessity to maintain the high readiness according to NATO standards.

In the context created after Romania's accession to NATO, research and development have been focused on capabilities meant to improve the effect based approach. This, together with a program of experiments, will represent the validation test for the future concepts of modernization which are to be implemented. These concepts will be transposed in requirements and plans, through the defence planning process and, starting with 2007, they have been included in training programs based on the development of the effect based operations, at operational level, for the whole spectrum of the international engagements taken by Romania.

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NATO CAPABILITIES' DEVELOPMENT TRENDS.
BENEFITING FROM EXPERIENCE
VERSUS CONTINUOUS ADAPTATION

Introduction

Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD*

With an over 65 year history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has demonstrated its capacity of adapting to the transformations occurring in the international security environment, a fact which allowed it to function as the main guarantor of the Euro-Atlantic security. It is this conceptual and institutional flexibility which has been the main factor making NATO one of the most important actors of the international arena. The world economic and financial crisis has been another impulse for NATO development, a stimulus determining the Alliance to enter in a new phase of its evolution.

International security environment has kept its changing nature, giving raise to new challenges not only in terms of security risks and threats, but also regarding the evolution of regional and international crises. The ''Arab spring'', the Ukraine crisis, and the events taking place since the end of 2013 and at the beginning of 2014 are relevant examples in this respect. In addition, other types of security risks and threats have had their own evolution, maintaining the topicality of the need to adapt the Alliance, its instruments and capabilities to these new challenges. Among them, we shall mention the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, international terrorism, cyber attacks and environmental issues.

Additionally, there are also aspects related to the dynamic of international relations, the most relevant being the conclusion of the operation in Afghanistan and the complete withdrawal of troops until the end of 2014, as well as US strategic pivot to Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, this stage of NATO's evolution is marked by the concern of developing partnerships and cooperation both within NATO and with third state and non-state actors.

All these are considered characteristics of the period after the economic and financial crisis which, by the severely disturbing Member States' economies, generated effects not only on the defence budgets, but also at the level of international relations.

During 2012 Summit in Chicago, NATO launched a new initiative in the area of capabilities' development, Smart Defence, a solution for preserving the Alliance's capacity to develop and acquire the necessary military equipments under the conditions of financial austerity. Although it is not a

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fundamentally new initiative as the idea of fostering cooperation between Member States in order to procure and develop military equipments has a rather consistent history at NATO's level, Smart Defence has certainly given a new impetus to this type of cooperation.

Consequently, in present, the Alliance's destiny is marked by the following major trends: a) preserving its capacity of fulfilling the missions assumed through the programmatic documents; b) developing capabilities within multinational cooperation projects; c) addressing the evolving security risks and threats (cyber attacks, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and of the assets for their transportation); d) impelling the cooperation not only between Member States, but also with NATO partner nations.

Within the following pages, you will find the analyses of NATO Allied Command Transformation officers and experts, who have the experience of working with various institutions of the Alliance. Thus, their authority doesn't necessarily derive from their academic status, as the readers of "Strategic Impact" might have gotten accustomed to, but especially from their professional status and their applied experience.

These short articles include information on the recent evolutions and the trends in the area of capability's development at NATO's level, aspects that will represent focal points in the discussions during the NATO Wales Summit, which will be held in September 2014. The relevance of the moment resides in the completion of NATO troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan, the need for setting new coordinates and strengthening the Partnership for Peace, as well as for reducing the capability gap between US and its European Allies.

Recently posted on NATO website, the articles were sent to our editorial office for an expanded dissemination in the national military audiences, so that the Summit discussions and outcomes to be better contextualized and understood. We considered the publication of these articles to be useful not only due to the freshness of the information they contain, but also because they authored by specialists, who carry out their professional activity day by day within NATO's organisms, having thus a high potential to open new directions for research.

At the same time, the following articles offer a glimpse on the major aspects and the manner of approaching them within.

LEARNING FROM PAST EXPERIENCES

Jose Raul GOMEZ BAS*

NATO takes a look at the good and the bad from past operations to improve the way ahead.

History shows us that experience is almost always the best teacher. One certainly learns from one's own experience, but this is a slow process and may come with great cost. Alternatively, one may quickly build vast amounts of experience at little costs just learning from others. This is the aim of the Lessons Learned process: to share experience and avoid the same mistakes as others made before.

After two decades of Operations, NATO has identified a multitude of lessons. Many of those lessons have either led or are leading to significant transformations in how NATO is structured and how it functions at all levels.


Figure no. 1: NATO Operations and Missions

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These operations indicate that, while significant improvement to some NATO capabilities have been achieved, further transformation could yield significant benefit to future NATO-led operations and preparation of forces.

What is a Lesson Learned?

A lesson learned is useful information gained through experience that an organisation should retain for future use and that might be relevant for others. So, to identify lessons you can ask yourself: *What is not working that can be improved?* or *What is working well and can be shared with others?*

Depending on the lesson, it could be a successful procedure or outcome that you wish to repeat or it could be a means to avoid an undesirable result you have experienced.

Innovation through Lessons Learned Process

It is not by chance that Lessons Learned is a major pillar of transformation. The added value of the work being completed within Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is the essence of innovation such as transforming NATO's training, capabilities and strategic thinking.

In today's changing security environment, the ability to identify and implement innovations quickly is of paramount importance to NATO's ability to undertake the full range of Alliance missions. Lessons Learned contribute to the successful reform and transformation of the Alliance, and is an essential component of any organisation committed to continuous improvement and development.

Accordingly with the above and focusing on the NATO Transformation Seminar and NATO Summit, the Nations and the Military Committee expect lessons from the last two decades to be mirrored in keystone doctrine and in this particular context, ACT will do an analysis and write a report to support the development of the Alliance future capabilities, noting NATO doctrine,

which has been identified as the DNA that runs through Smart Defence and CFI. NATO doctrine will subsequently be amended to serve as the repository for all Lessons Learned and to contribute to further improvement of training, exercises, education and force preparation for the Alliance to include preparation and conduct of Resolute Support Mission.

Expectations

The subject study aims to identify important NATO lessons and best practices from two decades of operations with special focus on Support to Kosovo Security Force (KFOR), the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, including Phase 3B Transition and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), as well as Operation Unified Protector (OUP).

The report is expected to cover the strategic themes and lessons from the past 20 years of NATO operations with focus on the strategic level, overarching lessons that can and should impact strategic and operational level and that therefore should consider the impact on all future capability development requirement within the spectrum of DOTMLPF-I (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability).

This way, the subsequent report, to be developed in close coordination with the International Military Staff (IMS) and Allied Command Operations (ACO), will be used for future capability development and to identify gaps (e.g. operational doctrine). In line with current priority themes within NATO, the report will address NDPP (NATO Defence Planning Process) and capabilities; Smart Defence; Connected Forces Initiative and interoperability; partnerships with Nations and entities; comprehensive approach, military capacity building; C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance); concepts and doctrine (AJP-3).

Applying the Findings

This study will greatly assist NATO to identify potential gaps and develop future capabilities and also preserve all the lessons learned and best practices in an easily accessible document.

Experience is indeed the best teacher, but it must be documented and shared throughout the lessons learned process to allow a community-wide understanding gaining years of knowledge.

NOTE: The article can be also found on NATO website, at http://www.act.nato.int/article-2014-1-15

SMART DEFENCE, SMART NATIONS

Richard PERKS*

Allies show that a multinational cooperation mind-set is increasingly at the heart of capability development.

NATO promotes Allies' working better together to efficiently build and maintain capabilities that increase effectiveness. It is one example of how NATO is addressing fiscal realities head-on, while simultaneously ensuring its ability to continue to field modern and relevant defence capabilities. Smart Defence (SD) is backed by a vision, action and leadership to foster a mind-set of multinational cooperation. From the outset, SD was built with and for Allies with commitment at the highest political levels. The idea is simple: help Allies identify and pursue multinational capability development opportunities that address both their national defence requirements and NATO's priorities through a phased continuous approach; building efforts across the short, medium and long term.

Intent Backed by Action

A SD portfolio of projects is under development and growing with new and innovative ideas from across the Alliance. The projects are multinational solutions to national capability requirements. By aligning the projects with NATO's Defence Planning requirements, the multinational solutions generated through SD can help fulfil NATO's capability requirements. This bottom-up approach is important to keep SD accessible to all Allies and solidify a SD mind-set. The portfolio currently has two completed logistics projects, Helicopter Maintenance and Demilitarisation, Dismantling and Disposal of deployed assets. Cooperation associated with Helicopter Maintenance saved an Ally millions of Euros, but more importantly significantly improved mission availability. There are 27 active projects and about 120 proposals under development at various levels of maturity.

NATO's Role

NATO's role is to help Allies identify practical areas for cooperation and facilitate and encourage progress. This function is accomplished within NATO's capability planning domains and is overseen by committees. Committees are best positioned to harmonise potential multinational solutions with NATO requirements. These committees are becoming 'marketplaces' to understand priorities, discuss ideas, and develop new multinational proposals. They are the primary forum to facilitate the development of project proposals through the identification of lead and participating Nations, conduct project workshops and to share lessons learned. NATO staffs have been proactive in helping Allies identify potential SD projects that can also help to fulfil

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NATO's pressing capability shortfalls. Sixty percent of SD projects and proposals can contribute directly to meeting NATO's shortfalls.

Capabilities that Increase NATO's Relevance

The 2014 NATO Summit is the opportunity Allies have to raise their ambition to use SD tools to show solidarity, resolve and to make progress in more challenging and politically visible capability areas. Focused efforts are in the Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability areas.

Under the JISR initiative launched at the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO is developing an architecture that will permit nations to "plug-in" national surveillance assets and share data. JISR emphasises the idea of essential connectivity. NATO continues to identify the 'connective tissue' frameworks and standards that help guide and focus Allies' JISR capability development. Considerable multinational progress is being made in shared training that will enable both the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability as well as address lessons learned from Operation Unified Protector (Libya). A long-range maritime surveillance capability being developed by a group of Allies may serve to highlight the overall efforts and essential connectivity of JISR.

Sensors and weapon systems contributed by Allies are the foundation of the interim NATO BMD capability declared in 2012. The permanent basing of four United States (US) multi-mission missile defence-capable AEGIS Destroyers in Rota, Spain is a fundamental building-block. Allies are gearing up to work together in the development of plans and operational concepts and to commit ships to combined deployments with these US ships. This essential first step of a phased and continuous SD approach enables all Allies, even those not BMD capable, to make a meaningful contribution to the mission. Short-term efforts like these could be important to medium and long-term multinational cooperation in other broader aspects of BMD outside of the maritime domain.

An Advocate of Multinational Cooperation

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) plays a key role in promoting the SD vision. ACT's current priorities include developing multinational efforts with Allies in JISR and BMD. These represent the broader and balanced efforts of ACT to promote and support cooperation and innovative ideas across the capability spectrum. Additionally, ACT looks longer-term by promoting efforts now that can enable future cooperation. As an example, requirements for long-term Theatre Air Mobility capabilities can benefit from discussions between defence planners and Allies to identify interest. Simple efforts now, to synchronise intent and eventually programme and budget requirements, is an essential first step to long-term cooperation on major capabilities. Finally, through Defence Planning activities and the management of the SD Database of projects, ACT helps to create a shared understanding of opportunities for cooperation and actively supports groups of Allies in their pursuit of multinational solutions.

NOTE: The article can be also found on NATO website, at http://www.act.nato.int/article-2014-1-06

TRANSATLANTIC TEAMWORK: ENHANCING THE NATO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE CAPABILITY

Willem VELDHOVEN*

Missile proliferation is a threat well-understood by the Alliance as numerous countries –some in close proximity to NATO's member nations –are developing sophisticated ballistic missiles of increasing range.

To date, over thirty countries have, or are acquiring, ballistic missile technology that could eventually be used to carry conventional warheads and weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of these capabilities does not necessarily mean that there is an immediate intent to attack NATO Nations, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to take this into account as part of its mission to protect its populations, territory, and deployed forces. In light of these emerging threats, the Alliance has sought to transform the focus toward building relationships with regional partners and developing critical capabilities with European Allies.

Referred to as the 'centrepiece' of the transatlantic defence partnership, the Alliance is considered the greatest peace movement in history[1]. As a collective security alliance, NATO maintains relevancy through modernization as it prepares to defend against 21st-century threats which may include ballistic missile attack.

Transatlantic Defence Capability

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) was established in September 2005 with the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme for the protection of deployed forces. As a result of the NATO Lisbon (2010) and Chicago (2012) Summits, the programme was expanded to include the protection of NATO European populations and territory. Notably, during the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO declared achievement of an 'Interim' BMD capability.

Two years later, on the road to the 2014 NATO Summit, the Alliance is moving towards achieving a full operational capability (FOC). Recently, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow acknowledged that a FOC system would mean 'full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces', iterating that the FOC system embodies the 'best of transatlantic teamwork' in terms of development and deployment.

A FOC system would be large enough to defend against limited attacks by states and non-state actors yet small enough to avoid fuelling regional arms races. The system is constituted - in terms of interceptor types, numbers and locations - to defend against principal threats to NATO European populations and territory. Existing within the system, are political, operational and technical strands of work which are complex,

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1 Robert TILFORD, " 'The Centerpiece of Our Transatlantic Defence Partnership Will Continue to be NATO', said Hagel", March 2014, http://groundreport.com/the-centerpiece-of-our-transatlantic-defense-partnership-will-continue-to-be-nato-said-hagel/.

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and require cooperation among Nations and stakeholders. As a result of the complexities, Allies are encouraged to partner and engage in a series of independent, yet mutually reinforcing activities that if combined would lead to an increase in available sensor and interceptor systems capabilities

Transatlantic Teamwork

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) aided in the facilitation of the 2012 Interim BMD Capability declaration by providing support to the NATO International Staff (IS) and Allied Command Operations (ACO). Today, HQ SACT continues to provide support to the NATO BMD programme through three lines of effort: *the NATO Theatre Missile Defence capability; BMD Battle Management Command Control Communication and Intelligence (BMD BMC3I); and the BMD Training and Education Plan.*

*N*ATO BMD activities extend throughout ACT. For example, the BMD Deliverable Team coordinates ACT's efforts in completing assigned BMD tasks and provides support to the BMD Programme Office, IS, ACO and other NATO organisations. Capability Development Directorate's BMD programme of work contributes to ACT's Strategic Campaign Plan objectives by leading NATO's military transformation and developing capabilities that address defence and security challenges, and improve NATO's ability to conduct current and future operations. Experimentation is an example of a reinforcing activity within ACT as experiments focus on BMD requirements development, refinement, and validation.

Research and Development adds to the effort with projects focussing on information fusion techniques and BMD operator screen enhancement. Further, within the Smart Defence initiative, related BMD multinational projects will aggregate into a focal point in 2014 to demonstrate this important capability on the road to the 2014 NATO Summit. Many interested Allies, even those not BMD capable, will work together in the maritime domain, with deployments in support of US AEGIS BMD platforms. It is noteworthy to recall the fact that Aegis BMD/SM-3 system is a keystone in the ballistic missile defence of Europe. Such an effort could take full advantage of lessons learnt by Allies in the Theatre Missile Defence Forum and promote connectivity with existing NATO systems.

Beyond the 2014 Summit

Together with other on-going BMD related ACT activities, the BMD programme of work will provide the Alliance with an operational BMD capability that offers protection to NATO European populations, territory and forces. Transatlantic teamwork is an essential component to collective security – and both support the development of an effective and efficient NATO BMC3I capability. Missile defence will undoubtedly be of increasing importance to the Alliance in the coming years, possessing the capability to strengthen regional stability. ACT will continue to be a part of that collective cooperation, - today and well beyond the 2014 Summit.

NOTE: The article can be also found on NATO website*, at http://www.act.nato.int/ article-2014-1-15*

CAPACITY BUILDING AS A TOOL
FOR COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

Keseah SILVERMAN*

"Partnerships" was a central theme in the 1990 London Summit. Member states will once again address the topic in this year's Wales Summit.

Capacity building is an essential contribution to the development of international order and stability. It is a part of NATO's responsibility to better offer defence and security capacity building support to Partners as was decided in the Berlin Partnership Policy, which is defined as making dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented.

NATO carefully considers how additional capacity building support could be offered to non-Partners. It is important for Alliance Nations and Partners alike to understand that support should be upon request, on a case-by-case basis, within the available resources as approved in NATO financial procedures, complimentary with other international organisations and open to contributions from Allies and Partners.

NATO's Capacity Building Activities

In addition to requiring topic-specific expertise, capacity building programmes are complex, require knowledge of the country and region, patience, and long-term commitment, including the occasional or enduring presence of NATO personnel on the ground and frequent travel, as well as careful follow-up and assessment. NATO has clear mandates, programmes, tools and experience to support defence capacity building. The Strategic Concept Core Tasks 2 (Crisis Management) and 3 (Cooperative Security) and the

Berlin Partnership Policy provide clear foundations. NATO's bilateral cooperation plans are significantly focused on defence capacity building. NATO's cooperation tools, including the Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM), the Professional Development Programme (PDP), the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), the Building Integrity Programme (BI), and the Resettlement Programme (RP) similarly focus on defence capacity building. NATO has additional experience in an operational context, in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in training and advisory roles in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and with the African Union.

The role of the NATO Command Structure's (NCS) in capacity building is to develop the skills, abilities, and processes in order to enable Partners to develop their defence capacity and to assist in achieving military capabilities. The 2014 Summit will focus on providing capacity building tools to non-NATO Partners which are not under the current NCS. The NCS and all its resources use the following tools, amongst others, to provide defence and related security capacity building for the Alliance and its Partners: expert team visits and mobile training teams; individual training and education courses; exercises, conferences, seminars, and consultations; and port visits and associated activities. The NCS also contributes to Defence Capacity Building in

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forms of operational advice assistance in defence policy; security sector reform (SSR); training and education of local forces (T&E); disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); Security Force Assistance (SFA); collection/storage/destruction of arms and ammunition; and human resource management and capacity building.

Benefits of Capacity Building

As NATO looks to a post-2014 future with a lower level of operational deployment there is an opportunity to improve the focus and effectiveness of NATO's support to defence capacity building. Capacity building takes time and resources but is less costly compared to involvement in operations and as result is imperative due to current global defence spending restraints.

Suggestions

Capacity Building should be demand-driven and concentrate on agreed priorities. Objectives should be clear, should focus on sustainment, and be based on solutions that have local buy-in, and also take into account potential lever-ages. NATO should adopt a comprehensive approach to capacity building whereby political, civilian, and military instruments are involved, as appropriate, during planning and implementation. Successful capacity building will be beyond multi-faceted and will extend beyond 'train and equip' programmes. NATO should engage, as required, with partner countries, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and local authorities to seek an optimum division of labour based upon mutual strengths, mandates and roles. Defence capacity building should take into account the links between the different elements of the wider security sector in the recipient country. A flexible approach should be adapted to local circumstances and to the contributions and ability of other actors and international and non-governmental organisations which will mean potentially working with Interior Ministries, police, as well as Ministries of Defence and armed forces.

NOTE: The article can be also found on NATO website, at http://www.act.nato.int/article-2014-1-09

WARNING: INFORMATION IS EVERYWHERE

Jim MAHER*

Cyber Defence is not a new topic, but one that continues to increase in relevance and importance. The attackers are often silent, but with an intelligently armed force within the Alliance, it is an attack that can be prepared for and won.

Wicked Threats Force Progress

Today, everyone is dependent upon information and its ease of access whether at home, at work, or in military operations. This message is true regardless what side of the Atlantic one calls home. However, the benefits of Internet access come with risks such as identity theft, cyber-crime, and cyber espionage. These threats are the same for individuals, organisations, and nations.

NATO is attuned to the severity of complex cyber challenges that have even been categorised as "wicked". It is the seriousness of cyber threats that has NATO making progress by evolving its approach to the topic.

Strength in Numbers: Planning and Preparation

There is no doubt that cyber-attacks will occur, it is how Allied Command Transformation (ACT) prepares the foundation, by starting at the lowest level possible, which will determine a successful outcome.

ACT is leading several activities that will assist in bringing Nations together for cyber defence. Preparing NATO to face the cyber challenges that will arise in the future is just the beginning.

Cyber awareness is the foundation of preparing NATO. By properly informing you, the user, the individual and the organisation, there will be no "weakest link", but instead a force stronger in numbers and information.

Dangers that the World Wide Web harvest are increasing: Malware (software used to disrupt computer operation, gather sensitive information, or gain access to private computer systems) is everywhere; Phishing (attempting to acquire personal information by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication) attacks are now able to specifically target you. Attackers know your name and email address and can become familiar with your personal interests. To better counter these risk areas ACT is conducting a Pilot Awareness Campaign throughout 2014. Once the pilot is complete, the programme will be adopted NATO-wide, arming users with the necessary information needed to defend themselves both at work and at home against cyber threats.

Countering threats includes preparing an informed network to help support the efforts. ACT is working with the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (COE) in Tallinn, Estonia and the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency to develop the Cyber Defence Education and Training courseware and curriculum that NATO needs to support its missions. This includes the cyber specialists in

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Mons, Belgium that work at the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Technical Centre (TC); military planners at SHAPE who need to consider cyber as part of their operational planning; and policy leaders who are making strategic decisions. The knowledge and comprehension of the effects that cyber plays at each of these levels is fundamental to ensure NATO is prepared to respond appropriately to future threats.

Transferring Knowledge to Operations

Planning, preparation, and cooperation provide the foundational knowledge and awareness which need to be translated into military operations (by doctrine) and tested (through exercises); an on-going and interactive process.

Technology has advanced war fighting so rapidly that NATO doctrine has failed to keep pace. Both Allied Command Operations (ACO) and ACT are addressing these issues through the Cyber Defence Action Plan and making steady progress. This progress will enable future exercises to be conducted and executed taking into account the myriad of cyber challenges that NATO Forces will face in a contested cyber environment. Furthering this idea, ACT is proposing nations endorse a "cyber range" capability that will enable the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) to support future cyber training, exercises, experimentation, and validation.

ACT is focusing on requirements and capabilities formulating the next generation of cyber defence capabilities. By encouraging Nations to participate in a variety of cyber-related Smart Defence initiatives, NATO can remain in stride with the advancement of technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities that have yet to be discovered and exploited.

Cyber Defence Transformation

In a holistic view, Cyber Defence within NATO is evolving as ACT plays a key role.

An enhanced cyber policy is being discussed at NATO Headquarters; NATO recently declared NCIRC Full Operational Capability (FOC) as providing centralised cyber protection over critical sites. ACT is delivering a comprehensive Cyber Defence Education, Training, and Exercise programme. The exercise and training mission where ACT is in the lead, are part of a wide-range of Cyber Defence deliverables for the NATO Summit in the fall of 2014.

This measurable progress puts roots down that can be followed to NATO employees who are embracing cyber awareness and taking ownership of their responsibility to safeguard and protect information. These roots also extend to NATO Nations who are developing and enhancing their own national cyber strategies to ensure they are prepared to operate in cyberspace with the same freedom as they operate on land, sea, and in the air.

ACT's cyber activities are the building blocks to ensuring its people are trained and prepared to effectively operate in this environment, and they will fully support NATO's role as a "facilitator" and "coordinator" in this area.

In the end, NATO Forces and their respective organisations will operate in the cyber domain and successfully execute future missions with the confidence and assuredness necessary – as a result of the foundation, planning, preparation, and cooperation led by ACT.

NOTE: The article can be also found on NATO website, at http://www.act.nato.int/article-2014-1-13

CHALLENGES
FOR SMART DEFENCE INITIATIVE

Neno HRISTOV, PhD*

The present paper addresses one of the most recent initiatives in defence planning, with a major impact in this respect at the level of NATO and its Member States. We depart from the premise that, in spite of passing almost two years since it has been officially launched, during 2012 Chicago Summit, Smart Defence is still a subject of high topicality, given the amplitude of its objectives, the evolution of the characteristics of the international security environment, as well as the challenges attached to this initiative's implementation.

As a result, we considered necessary to focus our attention mainly on the challenges which have to be overcome by the Alliance and its Member States in order to put into practice this initiative, looked upon as the main solution for developing the capabilities necessary for facing nowadays' security risks and threats. But, in order to reach to these challenges, we also found it necessary to emphasize the context in which Smart Defence was born, as well as to summarize its role and its main coordinates.

Keywords: *smart defence, economic and financial crisis, pooling and sharing, specialization, NATO core tasks, collective security.*

Introduction

Over the past decade, NATO Member States' defence budgets have been declining steadily. The current economic and financial crisis contributes to the aggravation of the situation and gives birth to further un-coordinated cuts. The situation of defence capabilities has seriously deteriorated after 2008, when the economic and financial crisis impacted seriously the economies of NATO Member States.

In order to respond to the market pressures and to secure their national budgets, most European governments have been forced to reduce their spending. This trend, visible in 2010 budgets, will continue and, perhaps, will even intensify in the coming years, especially for those countries included in the euro zone and with progressively high debt levels. In the coming decade, NATO on the whole and, especially, euro zone countries, will face high pressures on public finances and slow economic growth. Thus, in times of austerity, resorting to defence budget's cuts is very likely as it represents an easy way for the governments to reduce their expenditures with a low impact on their popularity[1].

The fact that NATO countries' armed

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1 Giovanni FALEG, Alessandro GIOVANNINI, "The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making a Virtue of Necessity", CEPS Special Reports, 19 May 2012, http://www.ceps.be/book/eu-between-pooling-sharing-and-smart-defence-making-virtue-necessity, accessed on 20 January 2014.

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forces experienced an unprecedented level of cooperation in the field hasn't yet translated in the development of common defence capabilities. A number of capability gaps continue to exist and to unravel, as illustrated by recent operations. At the same time, there is also overcapacity in certain areas at the NATO level, for which there is scope for rationalization[2].

Joint development and maintenance of effective defence capabilities is a huge challenge to the countries having achieved the Alliance membership during the last two extensions. All these countries have registered significant transformations in terms of organizational structures and partially replaced or modernized their armed forces' armament and equipment. But, in terms of financial constraints, the question of maintaining the achieved level of capabilities and the acquisition of new capabilities is becoming increasingly important.

In seeking to overcome this challenge, the EU announced various policy approaches, such as the "Pooling and Sharing" initiative. This approach is an EU concept which refers to Member States-led initiatives and projects to increase collaboration on military capabilities. The pooling of capabilities occurs when several Member States decide to use capabilities – either nationally owned or multi-nationally procured – on a collective basis. Sharing or, more precisely, role-sharing is when some Member States relinquish some capabilities with the assumption or the guarantee that other countries will make them available when necessary[3]. But these approaches are practically very slow when it comes to connecting with national defence industries.

Smart Defence initiative is a similar approach, announced by the Secretary General of NATO during 2012 Chicago Summit. The aim of this approach is to combine the political efforts of NATO Member States to identify opportunities and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Alliance, with limited resources. "Acting together, the nations can have access to capabilities which they could not afford individually, and achieve economies of scale. Cooperation may take different forms, such as a small group of nations led by another nation, or strategic sharing by those who are close in terms of geography, culture or common equipment"[4].

The question of NATO role in the implementation of Smart Defence initiative can be seen from different perspectives and, as a result, there can be obtained different images and expectations regarding the Alliance's role from this point of view.

1. Smart Defence – role and main coordinates

Lately, we ask ourselves more and more often how to achieve the current strategic objectives. In spite of the fact that the current global economic and financial crisis reduced the defence budgets and limited funding opportunities, it cannot be assumed that the challenges of the international security environment reduced. On the contrary, the current international context has increased the need for an effective transatlantic cooperation. In this line of thought, there can be identified two major challenges: firstly, the economic and financial crisis and the afferent financial austerity and, secondly, the maintenance and even development in terms of scope and intensity of security threats. As a consequence, it is essential to find an innovative solution for how to preserve and revalidate NATO role in international security, more precisely, for preserving its capacity of producing and delivering its specific product, namely "collective security".

Applying Smart Defence concept is one of the solutions for revitalizing NATO and will be subjected to the following framework:
- collective defence will remain one of

2 ***, European Defence Agency, "EDA's Pooling and Sharing", Fact sheet, 30 January 2013, p. 1, https://www. eda. europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/final-p-s_30012013_factsheet_cs5_gris, accessed on 20 January 2014.
3 *Ibidem*.

4 *Smart Defence*, http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-E402B602-BA05410F/natolive/topics_84268. htm?blnSublanguage= true&selectedLocale=en&submit= select, accesed on 21 January 2014.

the main core tasks of the Alliance, being aimed at deterring and defending against security risks, even though they occur beyond the borders of NATO Member States, as close as possible to the sources of risks in the widest (coalition) format;

• transatlantic relations are complex and NATO is just a very important starting point for them, as these relations also include social, political and economic dimensions, national interests and cooperation;

• the positive impact of applying best practices in the development of defence budgets and their distribution is obvious;

• the cost of defence supposes a high degree of uncertainty, but, nowadays it also supposes the reduction of the programs, elimination of duplicate programs, projects and expenses, abandoning the unnecessary programs, and pooling and sharing resources and capabilities;

• the need for maintaining the Alliance's ability to fulfill its core missions, as stipulated by the Strategic Concept (collective defence, crisis management, cooperation in security), by developing or acquiring the necessary key capabilities.

Within Smart Defence Initiative, NATO's role mainly consists in coordinating Member States' efforts in this respect, which creates the conditions for economies of scale and for developing NATO's capabilities through specialization. Thus, NATO Member States will have the proper conditions for acquiring the necessary capabilities, by identifying the resources in the interest of their building, while making the necessary savings of resources. This objective could be fulfilled only by coordination so as to ensure the building of the entire capability package necessary for collective security. NATO needs to develop clusters of capabilities in order to achieve a high degree of readiness and rapid reaction capacity. Those clusters could include framework nations, national headquarters, mission focus groups, or groups of allies providing niche capabilities, such as air transport, air refueling, precision-guided munitions, intelligence, reconnaissance and ground surveillance assets like drones,

suppression of enemy air defences, and all the other tangibles of modern war fighting[5].

Under these conditions, according to the quoted source, NATO must find ways to incentivize its members to form these clusters of capability and equitably distribute the costs of using them on operations to the broader NATO community. Of course, there are many open questions as:

- Where is the balance between common capabilities, solidarity, and the flexibility to allow groups of countries to go it alone?

- How can NATO persuade those allies wedded to national sovereignty to accept pooling and sharing vital capabilities with the assurance that they will be available when that ally needs to use them?

Creating political trust in the Alliance will be as important as solving the cost-sharing issues. The operation of each of these groups will require effective leadership and in general all groups will have a need of effective NATO or NATO agencies coordination. This will allow them to be closer to the groups, and thus more useful in the process of coordination.

In this context, but with other words, Member States may divide tasks among themselves, but without sharing a common responsibility for achieving the mission and goals related to collective defence. This will result in more efficient and full use of non-military (civilian) resources in the interest of the mission and tasks of security and defence.

The effective implementation of Smart Defence initiative requires a general understanding of the following issues:

• the impact of the economic and financial crisis on the level of defence spending is perceived by all as an objective factor, not as an expression of the subjective (individual) treatment of common security;

• the focus on defence spending is shifting from economy to efficiency, i.e. nowadays is not so important how much you spend but how we will spend less money on defence

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5 Jamie SHEA, "Keeping NATO Relevant", *Policy Outlook*, Carnegie Endowment, 19 April 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9, accessed on 10 February 2014.

and security;

- the necessity of finding ways for reducing defence spending and to increase capabilities through a qualitative change in management;

- the crisis should not be a reason for the weakening of ties between NATO and its Member States, but on the contrary, it should be seen as a challenge and a reason for strengthening and streamlining.

The implementation of Smart Defence initiative requires the introduction of common tools. Firstly, it could be useful to apply a pragmatic approach in determining the requirements for defence capabilities. The existence of dangerous gaps in the list of capabilities the Alliance is not acceptable. These gaps can be accentuated further reducing unreasonably the means of defence. Secondly, Smart Defence concept shall be put into practice by pooling and sharing Member States' capabilities. Last but not least, there shall be implemented a coordination of investment intentions and efforts of the Member States. In this approach, each party shall inform the other allies about its intention to make specific investment decisions in advance, not after having made these decisions and taken steps to implement them.

2. Potential difficulties, risks, challenges and solutions related to Smart Defence initiative

Based on the present analysis, there can be identified possible difficulties, risks, challenges and solutions relevant both for the development and the putting into practice of Smart Defence initiative.

Demand of maximum value from the implementation of Smart Defence initiative, taking into account the differences in the current and future status of the individual Member States, requires the use of an individual approach on possible cooperation.

Presently, regardless of the common security and defence policy, there is a division between Member States in terms of "can do it" and "want to do it" in aspects of pooling and sharing defence

capabilities. There are four categories NATO Member nations. Thus, the first category is "can do it" and "want to do it" countries, the second category is represented by "want to do it" but "do not have abilities to do it" countries, the third category consist in "can do it" but "do not want to do it" states and the fourth category includes "cannot do it" and "do not have abilities to do it" states. Here lies the need for NATO to play its role of being extremely creative in finding convincing and effective approach to individual Member States.

Another challenge is related to the integration and sharing of existing and future defence capabilities of Member States (pooling and sharing). The added value of this approach can be achieved if Member States think and act similarly in similar conditions. Possible conflict is based on one of the security laws, according to which in secure conditions international actors (Member States) act in a similar way, but in conditions of reduced security (insecurity) countries act differently.

This phenomenon also leaves open the question on the role of NATO. Under conditions of uncertainty, how it is supposed to convince Member States to think and act in a similar manner within Smart Defence initiative? The fulfillment of this role requires efforts from both sides. Thus, NATO has to identify and connect the Member States with similar needs and the Member of the Alliance have to establish and apply sufficiently effective mechanisms for sharing and the common use of capabilities.

The next challenge is to prioritize and, even more, to develop common priorities in the security of Member States. In practice, this process goes through the stages of identifying common priorities, defining the essential skills for their achievement, transformation (reduction) of the structures, reducing bureaucracy, etc. Possible conflict in this case is derived from the fundamental or primary tendency of the organization to keep the *statu-quo* and the need for a qualitative change of the *statu-quo* in the interest of implementing the concept of Smart Defence. It is to be understood that not each

organizational change would result in obtaining the desired results.

The development and use of the concept of Smart Defence is a challenge in terms of its innovative character. Smart Defence is an innovation, but not in terms of resources (tools) to build capacity in the interest of collective defence, but in terms of how to use the practice of the currently available resources (tools). Tools such as economies of scale, prioritization, specialization, focus, etc. have entered for a long time in the use of the full range of human activities, including in the field of security and defence. The added value brought by the Smart Defence concept can derive only through a qualitative change, i.e. by discovering new ways to apply the already known means (tools). This fact represents the main difficulty for the administration in implementing the concept of Smart Defence. This is not a technical process of adoption and implementation of one or another new resource, but a creative process that requires finding new ways of applying existing resources (tools) in order to achieve greater efficiency in the delivery of the product "collective defence". Possible conflict, in this case, is derived from the essential purpose of the administration to ensure the flow of pre-regulated and structured processes, failing, in this manner, to apply a creative approach to their development and quality improvement.

From the perspective of NATO Member States, Smart Defence is a different type of innovation, which also would raise certain barriers to its implementation. From the perspective of NATO, Smart Defence is a new way of building and providing capabilities for collective defence and could be defined as marketing, if analyzed from the point of view of the theoretical concepts enabling this innovation. From the perspective of NATO Member States, Smart Defence is more a process of innovation, reflected in the implementation of new or significantly improved processes for investment in defence and in the construction and use of defence capabilities. As each process innovation, Smart Defence is aimed at reducing the cost of product development – collective defence – and the quality of that product. In this case, NATO's role is that of a good writer who could create a scenario to effectively manage an innovation of a different nature and different features for both sides of the stage: the Alliance and the Member States[6].

Peculiarities of NATO's role in the implementation and use of the concept of Smart Defence can be searched more in the following directions:

• increase the coherence of the Alliance, in which the role of NATO is to provide total (large) picture of the needs of the common (shared) capability and to define strategic lines to identify possible areas for cooperation of member states, to distribute (share) good practices;

• growing, focusing and taking benefit from investing in research activities in the field of security;

• developing relations with partners outside NATO, with EU, the private sector and others.

Possible barriers to implementing Smart Defence as a more general approach to security issues would be related to:

• the need for harmonization of Member States' national legal systems, which would provide the basis for applying the general approach in sample areas: exchange of sensitive information, public-private partnership, including network management and meta-management, implementation of international projects;

• the increase of the administrative capacity of the specialized authorities, who are expected to implement the management of security issues as required in the following areas: training of administrative staff, development of administrative systems, etc.;

• the development of an integrated military-technical expertise towards sufficiently effective and full disclosure of current and future capabilities in terms of their use.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that the concept of Smart Defence offers the possibility

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6 Venelin GEORGIEV, "Innovative Nature of the Smart Defence Concept. Editorial", in *Defence Management*, No. 1/2012, available on-line at http://omicsgroup.org/journals/innovative-nature-of-the-smart-defense-concept-2167-0374.1000e106.pdf, accessed on 15 March 2014.

of obtaining the desired effects associated with achieving adequate security and adequate defence capabilities at a lower cost of defence, during the preservation of the spectrum and intensity of security threats. The achievement of this objective requires, above all, a proper understanding and accepting of its essential characteristics by which the added value is derived at the expense of a qualitatively new approach to the use of the already known fundamental theoretical concepts.

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CONTEMPORARY SECURITY DIMENSIONS IN THE TRANSITION TOWARD MULTIPOLARITY

Valeri Velkov IVANOV, PhD*

The present paper presents the original author's point of view on the new characteristics of the international security environment after the end of the unipolar world and some trends and challenges for the new security architectures. The article addresses the new characteristics and specific traits of the new model of the multipolar world, as well as its advantages and disadvantages with regard to its influence on national security systems.

Keywords*: national security system, security environment, risks and threats, unipolarity; multipolarity, security dimensions, security system's architectures, security making process, global security and stability, comprehensive approach.*

1. The Cold War legacy

There is no doubt that a bipolar world settled during the Cold war was stable and unchangeable for decades. Nowadays, many experts insist that it is time to say goodbye to the unipolar world which came after end of the Cold war and to build a new model for thinking global system and international relations. Maybe, these are good news, if we take in consideration the fact that the post Cold war period has been marked by terrible military conflicts and a huge number of social, political and religious tensions and bloodsheds all over the world. The global security model has been extremely unstable and cost several millions killed, injured and missing people, as well as destructions of industry, agriculture, infrastructure and thousands destroyed houses. There are many reasons and factors that provoked these processes and hostilities, but one of them comes to the fore as the most important and crucial, if we consider the architecture of global security system at the beginning of 21st century.

Unipolar world was an inevitable transitional stage, a result of the implosion of one of the great powers during the bipolarity era. From this point of view, it is easy to realize that it is extremely difficult, if not even practically impossible, for a sole state to be able to control post-Cold war world and its global security system. Needless to say this is a hard and ungracious work to manage global security policy and to constantly play the leading role in crisis management and conflict prevention global efforts.

Thus, at the end of the first decade of this century, the unipolar world has become inconvenient. In addition, many new global actors asserted and announced their ambitions to play more important roles within global security and stability making processes. Today, we are witnessing the beginning of a transitional and gradually accelerating process toward a multipolar world. That means that there will not be a single centre of power functioning as

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the main generator of global security, that there will be several poles of power controlling global and regional security and stability. And, finally, international relations will not be managed anymore by a single state that constantly occupies the position of a global leader. Undeniably, the unipolar world of Pax Americana went to the history and now we are in a period of transition toward a world driven by several centers of power.

The simple presumption is that a multipolar world is easier to be controlled and more stable from the perspective of global and regional security. Some authors insist that there is an only possible way to enhance global security model and to improve regional stability, namely by building geopolitical regional axes between states within the framework of the so-called "Great Spaces" – Eurasia, North America, West and Middle Europe, East Asia, Middle East etc.. It is a great challenge to describe some characteristics and specific traits of the new world order model which ought to be built with common efforts in the spirit of negotiation, mutual respect and considering all different interests. We are joining these efforts of addressing the challenge of studying the new characteristics of the international security environment and to present our point of view on some aspects and specific features of the transition toward a multipolar world, as well as to assess the advantages and disadvantages with regard their influence on the national security system.

2. Globalization effects and the dimensions of security

From the first, we suggest to accept axiomatically the statement that the model which presumably offers more opportunities for negotiations, mutual compromises and propose common decisions and actions is a better one, irrespectively of fact that this model might include several poles of the power, completely different in terms of ethnical, religious, economic and political system origin and nature. Nevertheless, in our opinion, all these are differences of opinion resulted from embracing distinct perceptions and divergent views. There is not any acute and deadly difference such as mortal enemies or persistent resistance.

The new model of global security system is still in course of formation, but, along this process, there can be observed and identified a considerable number of characteristics and trends of the international security environment. Perhaps, the most important and well-known global trend at the beginning of 21st century is globalization. Many pessimists and opponents of globalization had the unpleasant surprise to get to the simple truth that contemporary world globalizes not only in the areas of economy, technology, energy resources, financial systems, ecology, culture etc. Nowadays, global, regional and national security and stability are strongly connected and are all in a state of mutual interdependencies. Presently, every aspect or branch of our life is considered critical for the common state of stability and national prosperity. At this point, all aspects and scopes of human being could be defined as different dimensions of the national or global security systems. In addition, each of them is appreciated as extremely important for national and international security and stability. As a result, areas or dimensions like social, energy and cyber security, ethnic, religious, economic and financial stability, ecology and natural resources are becoming more important than military security, missile defense and war against terrorism.

Globalization's impact on all security dimensions and, of course, on every level of security systems is a result of many factors and changes in the security environment. Consequently, now it is easier to realize that each dimension could be used as a unit of measurement to calculate a level of common stability, and to figure out how much is the real or desired security level, comparing every dimension with the preliminarily settled or adopted standards. In this manner, we can assess which dimension presents more problems, challenges or real threats, and to decide how to balance the system as a whole or to undertake additional measures to compensate gaps or discrepancies. In sum, considering security from the perspective of its multiple dimensions, it becomes easier to make analyses and undertake consequent measures in order to achieve the

desired level of security, as losses or unconformities can be immediately observed, allowing restoring of the balance, through the use of appropriate means.

At the same time, this could be considered a normal situation when referring to the completely new connections and dependencies within the complex security environment in the multipolar world. Additionally, we have to reconsider that the process of security globalization also means the globalization of the all challenges, risks and threats, requiring adequate reactions and new approaches to prevent them. Such a new and adequate manner of addressing all the challenges raised by the contemporary international security environment is the comprehensive approach which is already widely spread as a basic concept and universal tool in operational planning process and doctrines of NATO and of its Member States. That does not equal to the fact that we have to stop using other basic approaches and methods such as holistic, architecture, systemic approaches etc..

Another clearly distinguished consequence of these tendencies of the security environment is the sharply increasing dependencies between global, regional and national level of security. Connections and mutual influence were also a reality in the past and this is probably a normal situation due to the impact of many factors, forces and circumstances. But the directions and dependencies in the past and those we can notice in present are completely different. During the Cold war, in the stage of bipolar world, influence and flows of power were directed from top to the bottom, from the global level to the subordinate regional and national one. In this way, the chain of command and control was very clear and all responsibilities and obligations about global, regional and national security and stability were shared among the two main centers of power. A similar situation can be identified during the short period of unipolarity.

3. Security systems and the multipolar world

The emerging multipolar world is hypothetically empty of centers of power and is that very absence that offers a variety of directions and dependencies through the different levels of security systems. It is logical to consider that this situation demands a new model and more complicated security system architectures. The most important characteristic of the new model is that the global security system now is in a stage of increasing dependency on the lowest level, the level of national security and stability. The directions of impulses stimulating stability or instability processes and factors are now mostly bottom-up, meaning that national and regional stability are becoming key factors for achieving better global security. From this point of view, the main factors and pillars vital for the maintenance of the global stability are rooted in certain countries' internal stability. This is a completely different situation, requiring the development of a new strategic thinking and appropriate approaches so as to ensure the evolution of the new security concepts, distinctively from the former ones.

It is high time to stop thinking in the manner specific to unipolarity or bipolarity, as these models suppose that global stability is, primarily, a result of efforts carried out by one or two centers of power at the global level. In this line of thought, these centers are the ones having most of the obligations and commitments regarding the maintenance of regional stability, by building military or political alliances, economic and trade agreements. Within these models, the leading center/centers of power has/have not only a considerable influence, but also engagements in the regional and national security of all partners and allies. The regional and national security systems are their subordinate system echelons and architecture levels.

But fortunately today this model becomes unsuitable because the security architecture of the multipolar world is completely different.

This architecture has as a basic requirement of perfect national security systems, with capabilities to prevent a wide specter of threats and challenges and the capability to solve all problems and contradictions inside the communities. Having in mind the fact that every country or region has a specific distinctiveness from the perspective of historical, cultural and religious characteristics, the new model of national security system should be versatile. Practically, this vast number of traits supposes a great diversity of national security models, all of them requiring special capabilities to deter or prevent the entire range of security risks and threats and, implicitly, considerable financial resources.

A major disadvantage is represented by the fact that this model opens the possibility for a new global chaos or world confusion. But the most important and valuable advantage is that, in this manner, the necessary degree of stability is granted at the lowest, basic level, namely, at national level, increasing gradually at regional or allied level, and, thus, the world is expected to become more secure and stable.

In fact, it is easy to understand how effective and steady is this new model of the multipolar world because hypothetically all tensions and conflicts should be solved at the first level – in the scope of the national security systems – and that fact automatically supposes the lowest level of intensity. This new approach will have priority in securing the national stability and, as a result, will enhance global security and stability, opening the possibility for all potential conflicts to be blocked at the first stage, using a small amount of resources and causing limited damages. With this approach, regional stability is the second level of the security system that has to be brought under control. That means any tensions and contradictions within the close neighborhood should be thrown and replaced with common efforts between all countries. This is the second level of conflict prevention system and, if there are economic integration organizations, trade agreements or political alliances, it will be practically impossible for frozen conflicts to break out into civil wars or military conflicts. Certainly, this new approach offers some automatic restraining impulses and, as a result, it makes the security systems more stable and less vulnerable at all their levels.

Another aspect of the contemporary security dimensions is that obviously not only their number is constantly increasing but also the role and importance of each of them are changing continuously. The weight of some of them, such as the military dimension, has the tendency to erode, while the weight of other security dimensions such as the social, political, information and financial ones becomes increasingly high, turning into real warranties for national stability and prosperity. The future probably will show that the most stable security system is not that which has more tanks, airplanes or ballistic missiles, but the one which gives more opportunities to their inhabitants for a better quality of life and gradually increasing prosperity. Also, the security system should allow undertaking better actions and synchronized efforts between different agencies and structures in reference to the national security in case of emergencies, and to also having a flexible and reliable mechanism to compensate immediately any gaps or shortages of capabilities. Of course, the last statement is very important, because, for example, in a stage of decrease in terms of defense resources and military budgets, military capabilities gaps must be overcame by developing new technologies, weapon systems and advanced battle platforms.

It is a generally shared view that the nature of contemporary security is now a function of multiple factors and we can state that security has an increasingly fluid nature, by constantly diversifying its dimensions. Nowadays, national security and stability are inherently variable and become a desired end state which can be only a result of a vast number of efforts of ministries, agencies, organizations, national business and citizens. Security level could be calculated only through an equation, implying numerous unknown agencies. Consequently, the level of security acquires contents and characteristics of

a specific product in which quality and quantity ought to be an outcome of a public agreement. Undoubtedly, security making process now converts into a special contract between society and high level managers who assume their specific task to run the national security system in a manner that guarantees to produce enough security capacity. But, in this context, raises a key question, namely which is the modality to manage the security system's components and its capabilities in order to be able to react effectively and adequately in all cases of emergency or crisis situations.

4. Smart security system – how does it work?

The most important task is to find out the needed balance between the security components or dimensions, as well as to maintain this balance in complex situations and circumstances. Achieving a perfect harmony between security dimensions is a great challenge which needs supreme efforts from all structures, components and executives at every echelons of the security system. That means that none institution could either play the dominant role, or could be in the supreme position in the security system. There are no private spaces or dimensions, no threats or challenges still belonging to a specific agency or organization. No more leading roles, no more special appointed tools or particular means used by a certain actor in the field of security. Security is a public benefit and is in the use of each one of us; consequently, there is no agency, organization or particular person to stand apart from this job.

Contemporary security dimensions are fully interrelated and their contribution to the common efforts for achieving certain degree of stability is not just a simple sum of particular capabilities. Not only the common level of stability is variable, but also all the dimensions are changing constantly due to the influence of a variety of factors. In case of lack of stability in certain sector or dimension, another dimension should be capable to compensate immediately for this gap in order to keep the total level of security. There are many cases showing ultimately that hard military power[1] is not enough to achieve the desired political goals even if this resource of power is given a very important role.

Many authors support the idea that the 21st century is an era of soft power and, during the next decades, smart power[2] will dominate the international relations. Smart power is based on a very skillful mixture between different kind of tools and means, among which we shall mention politics, diplomacy, economy, culture, social system, finances etc. The key for success is to implement the right combination and portions of different resources of power. Indeed, hard power and, especially, military power, will continue to play a crucial role in the area of security and stability, but will be continuously changing its shape, dimension and characteristic. That means that security dimensions are in the same state of dependency and the executives have to keep in mind that fact during the security building process.

There is no universal rule or gaining strategy to figure out this combination, to manage the security system and to constantly obtain good results. It depends on the certain situation, national peculiarities, traditions, culture etc. But, the desired synergy effect is possible if there are smart, well educated and qualified managers, trained to run national security system in a right, smart manner. Capabilities like these are very important due to the new trends in the security environment, characterized by the increasing number and importance of non-state actors, ultimately becoming the main security challengers instead, replacing the traditional ones. This situation requires the very flexible approaches and variable, interchangeable methods of managing the security systems. But it is practically proved that if an actor is in a state of high readiness on all the security dimensions, security system as a whole is in a good shape and capable to secure national stability and prosperity.

1 Joseph S. NYE, Jr., *The Future of Power*, Perseus Books Group, New York, 2011, pp. 19-42.
2 *Ibidem*, pp. 229-258.

Such conditions and trends are smoothly, but inevitably becoming typical in a stage of transition toward multipolarity. Therefore, it is very important to understand that we need a new model of security system management.

That means new approaches, a new strategic thinking, smart decisions as well as perfect security managers. They have to have special knowledge of contemporary security dimensions, to be familiar with security system's architectures, as well as to build a considerable amount of significant professional skills. From this point of view, maybe only the human dimension could be considered as a secret factor or moving force which could make any security system efficient and effective.

Of course, all these thoughts about new trends within the strategic environment, security dimensions and circumstances connected with security sector building processes should not be accepted like a secret formula that will resolve all problems or as a guarantee for achieving stability long-term goals. Instead, they should be used as an adequate approach, laying down the basis for the security systems in the era of multipolarity.

Finally, to be crystal clear – this is not just a single act of decision making or several accidental security activities. The approach should be adopted as continuous activities among all the complicated actions related to the security making process. In addition, comprehensive approach will give the executives an opportunity to simulate the situations fully, to design scenarios with highly probable conditions and circumstances, and finally to shape in appropriate manner the model of decision making and security system management processes.

Parallel with this, another very important task should be achieved by using the philosophy of this new approach. A national security policy and capabilities building strategy must be worked out having in mind all the new characteristics of the security environment and of contemporary security dimensions. They must describe a completely new model of security system at the national, regional and global levels, which are adequate to

the conditions of multipolarity. In this manner, security systems will be fully adequate and relevant to the current challenges and threats.

Concluding remarks.
After the multipolar world

Global trends analyses indicate increasing instability and growing opportunity for confrontation and conflict[3]. There is no doubt globalization has accelerated the pace of changes at the level of the characteristics of future conflicts and common security. Access to resources (energy, food, water, etc.) will drive states' security interests and will direct their efforts to control these resources through the global commons. Extremist non-state actors, particularly, organizations like al-Qaeda and its associates, are likely to remain a significant threat to global stability and national security. That is maybe a "dark side" of the future. But there is another one, if we fully accepted the idea of Joseph Nye Jr. who argues that, during the 21st century, power will pass trough two stages – transition and dispersion[4], meaning that by the middle of this century the world would become nonpolar. In this line of thought, from our point of view, the decline of traditional states is unavoidable and, as a consequence, we will witness an increase of a process of horizontal and vertical fragmentation and dispersion of the power. On this occasion, we will have to expect a quite strange situation – the world will lose slowly and continuously its centers of power and leading states, the relations between modern communities will change and, at the door of the so called 'Third Wave', the world would have become one without any polarity or pillar. Traditional states' dominant role will decrease and the world of nations will be replaced by new global model, based on a network of international political, economic, social and security institutions and organizations.

The truth is that what comes after multipolarity

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3 George FRIEDMAN, *The Next 100 Years. A Forecast for the 21st Century*, Doubleday Publishing Group, New York, 2009, pp. 153-155.
4 Joseph S. NYE, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 133-134.

is very ambiguous. That situation will demand diverse models of security systems and its architectures will require taking into account security dimensions completely different from those mentioned previously. But this topic should be a subject matter of another paper.

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A NEW CHALLENGE REGARDING REGIONAL SECURITY.
ROMANIA – PART OF VISEGRAD GROUP AND/OR CRAIOVA GROUP

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The Ukraine crisis dramatically changes the security paradigm in Europe, especially in the areas of NATO and EU borders. The current state of affairs is an unfortunate one from a regional and European security and stability point of view and it contemporizes once again not only aspects related to the highly destructive conflicts of the past century, but also reveals the necessity of developing and initiating multiple new modalities of cooperation in the field of security. The importance of defense itself gains new understanding, following a period of time when these aspects were regarded as not being that important, especially from a political point of view.

The regional defense cooperation forms that are in full effect at the moment will definitely be consolidated with a larger concentration of cooperation domains in the essential directions, like arms cooperation, joint training and strategic and operation cooperation, as well as the ones generating the force.

The lessons learned from the northern states' regional cooperation will be applied in other areas, as we will be seeing a rapid development of the ways and measures of the military cooperation of the Visegrad Group, as Poland becomes a worthwhile player in regard to national defense, but also in regard to the way it represents its security interests, especially in its area of influence.

Until now, the military cooperation in south-eastern Europe depended on outdated and lacking in substance forms. This is where the important role that Romania can play could come into effect, in organizing and maintaining the so called Craiova Group, where along Bulgaria and Serbia it can promote its defense interests in an essential space in regard to the possible maneuvering of forces in order to assure the joint national defense.

Keywords: *regional initiatives, defense cooperation, areas of cooperation, Visegrad Group, south-eastern Europe, The Balkans, The Craiova Group, freedom of movement and maneuvering.*

1. Introductory framework

One of the recurrent themes of the 1990's, the regional initiative, became at the start of the new millennium and throughout the first decade of our century a constant concern, even more so as we are seeing a strong institutionalization of international organizations under the influence of globalization.

After all, developing these initiatives expresses a necessity and an answer for certain

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problems that are confined to a well determined geographical area, where state interests relate to particular aspects in the specific area, beyond the continental factors or those determined by heavily internationalized hegemonies.

Things are not new, as history, at least for the past two centuries, acknowledges the balance of power supported by a regional basis. The present days however are far more complex than the solutions found at a historical scale in its modern configuration.

We also need to underline the fact that understanding the regional agreements from a small and middle sized country's perspective requires a different approach, as history cycles cannot confirm, for the most part, their solidity and effectiveness.

In a way, alliances between the world's major powers have been around since the inter-war period. However, their solidity and sturdiness in times of crisis do not represent an example of defense and a representation of small and middle-sized countries' interests.

For Romania the Balkan Pact and the Little Etente speak volumes about the fragility of these alliances under the strong influence of major powers.

Usually, behind the regional structures lay hidden interests of a third party, a major power. In the above example, although France promotes and actively supports the two alliances, its indecision and its decline lead to them eventually failing, crumbling under the weight of well known real-politik domino game.

Preoccupied more with the Balkans, I have tried approaching ideas regarding not only this area's troubled past, as they say that the Balkans have more history than geography, but also its near and far future.

Unavoidably, there is a tendency to analyze the south through the values and performances of the north, in the same way we are trying to separate ourselves from the eastern patterns through the western models.

Such a tendency, an objective one, psychologically speaking, requires the analysis of an achievement that seems to be, from a strategically point of view, the most important and significant one in relation to the regional cooperation for defense and security.

2. A dilemma or a certainty – Romania between Visegrad Group and Craiova Group. Lessons of the Northern cooperation

The cooperation of Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) is by far a successful one, without reaching its performance and efficiency limits. This is why the context and perspectives of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) find their substance in the accumulation stages of previous initiatives such as Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), Nordic Armament Cooperation (NORDAC) and Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP).

At the present time, the five areas of northern cooperation – capability, human resources and education, exercises and training, operations and, not least, armaments, prove not only the diverse character of this cooperation, but also its pragmatism.[1]

During the complex and extremely challenging NATO pre-adherence period, central European states respond to Poland's initiative and create the so-called Visegrad Group, where three states – Czechoslovakia back then, Poland and Hungary combined their efforts in order to create favorable circumstances for joining the North Atlantic alliance.

Interestingly enough, despite its initial objective, thanks to the Czech president at the time, Vaclav Havel, this cooperation is not affected by the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech president acted cautiously in regard to the possible consequences of creating a successful regional initiative, as this success would have considerably decreased the whole purpose of allowing the said states to join NATO.

Romania's efforts to join the Visegrad Group had no results, the member states pointing out

1 See www.nordefco.org/ The cooperation areas , accessed on 14.04.2014.

the social insecurity and the fragile Romanian democracy, in a period of time marked by the miners' revolt and the events in Târgu Mureş.

But why Visegrad? Its meaning goes back to the year 1335, when the Visegrad Castle, placed in present day Hungary, on the Danube, 40 km north of Budapest, witnessed an economic and military agreement between Joan of Bohemia, Kazimir the Third Of Poland and the leader of the Kingdom of Hungary, well known to the lands south of the Carpathian Mountains, Carol Robert de Anjou. In those times Visegrad was the capital of the Kingdom of Hungary.[2]

The Group cooperated in various areas such as V4 cooperation, NATO cooperation, EU cooperation and other international types of cooperation.

One important point was energy cooperation, especially regarding transportation and security of the energy transportation networks, trans-border cooperation and defence cooperation. Regarding the latter, Visegrad Group intends to have, by 2016, an operational Battle Group ready for EU to use. This is regarded as one of the corner stones of the military cooperation.[3]

The regional cooperation of Scandinavian countries and central European countries stimulated and enhanced cooperation in the Baltic, beyond the rough edges caused by national pride in the small Baltic states.

In these cases we find military cooperation in the form of the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Newtwork (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).

At the beginning of the 1990's, the situation deteriorated in south Eastern Europe, as a result a lot of regional initiatives failing to achieve their purpose of reforming and developing the said area. We are going to approach the military initiatives, SEDM (South Eastern Defence Ministerial) being the main one. The creation of the South Eastern Europe Brigade Multinational Peace Force (SEEBRIG), along with the naval

cooperation through Blackseaforce and Black Sea Harmony represent important elements improving the good neighborly relations in the military field. In reality, things can be seen form a different perspective. Because although SEEBRIG, as well as the Romanian-Hungarian mixed battalion or the Tisa Relief Battalion score high points with the public image, they do not bring any new elements as to cooperation on a strategic and operational level.

We could say this type of cooperation was needed by a stage that is now well in the past, and this is why we need to initiate new superior plans for the defence collaboration accordingly.

One good example worth considering is the possibility of creating an EU EUBG (battle group) on the structure of the Romanian-Hungarian mixed battalion. This battalion never saw deployment during its existence, and both countries have serious doubts regarding its future.

As previously stated, Romania looked for an approach to the Visegrad group but a certain elite tendency prevented this from happening, as the member states are concerned with the aforementioned battle group. This being said, it is very unlikely that we will see a miraculous change of the already drawn options. More likely, considering the complicated situation in Ukraine, we might see it being invited to join the group or even requesting to join the forces structure of the Battle Group.

Faced with this reality, Romania needs to reorganize its regional efforts, to reconsider the role and place it could have in the Balkans where, without a question, it represents an important player. From a military perspective, Romania is a key player if we take into consideration its available military force in comparison to other NATO and UE states, of course, looking well beyond its precarious defensive capability.

Statistics reveal that the northern active forces total a number of 77.000 military, this being the joined capability of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Romania has a number of 75.000 available military.[4] Of course, Visegrad Group

2 For details, see www.visegradgroup.eu/history, accessed on 14.04.2014.

3 According to www.visegradgroup.eu/cooperation, accessed on 14.04.2014.

4 See www.globalfirepower.com/ Scandinavian countries, accessed on 15.04.2014

has a hefty 175.000 military, of which 120.000 come from Poland. Romania is the second contributor to NATO forces from the Baltic to the Black Sea, after Poland. This is without taking into consideration the extended Black Sea area, where Turkey holds an absolute supremacy.[5]

3. Establishing Craiova Group and its implications

In this context, a political event from this spring appears as a very important one. This is the Romanian and Bulgarian chiefs of government meeting, in Ruse, with the Serbian prime minister being present. During this meeting, Romania launched the idea of a multidimensional cooperation in the area, with the creation of a so called Craiova group, as Craiova is situated at an equally distant point from all three countries' capitals.[6]

This Group would have as main mission cooperation in various fields, including defence, establishing the basis for a new defence cooperation paradigm in the Balkans. One major element is the 135.000 strong military force that needs to be managed, keeping in mind the de facto character of such a group.[7] The military determinations need to be conjoined with the historical and cultural determinations, according to the economic and social development levels and to the interests of major powers in this area. This common cultural and historical space is described by the influences that civilizations had one over the other, by the similar cultural model, from the common Thracian genetic substructure to the Ottoman dominance period and the common patterns in the formation of the modern national states in the XIX century.

At the same time, we need to look at the conflicts and wars that place the three countries on the same side or on opposite sides. This could mean overcoming prejudice and old animosities that are part of a troubled past.

These challenges can also change the perspective on how ethnically diverse people can be situated on a different level of civilization.

The economic potential reflects the fact that Romania leads as far as the GDP goes but slow reforms and inconsistent economic performances appear to be more or less on the same level as with the other two states.

From a geo-strategical point of view, if Romania represents the key of stability in a troubled space, connecting directly to the central and eastern-European area, Serbia is the key for peace and stability in the West Balkans, and Bulgaria represents o bridge to the Aegean states.

Without a doubt, the security is insured by the major powers' interest in the area, the USA having interests that exceed those of the EU, a fact that could change over the years, but that is a certitude at the present time, one that has to be taken into account when planning international support.

The analysis of the current state of affairs reveals other aspects that need our attention, aspects that help us differentiate the US interests and the Western states interests, from the Northern to the Southern point of the alliance. From the historical, political, economic and military conditioning, we see a concentrated effort of the Northern defence, a constant that is difficult to counter. However, through a reconfiguration of alliances and regional efforts in the Southern NATO flank, we could establish a certain balance.

Craiova Group would be one of the solutions that could lead to the strengthening of the Southern flank and could have a major impact on Romania. First of all, Romania would take on a leading role in the group, which would mean becoming one of the nations that play a huge part in the area. Of course, this would mean a bigger resource allocation, but also a better prioritization of the objectives in various fields, especially those concerning trans-border activities.

Romania would become important for Serbia for at least two reasons. One is the need to keep Serbia in the EU sphere of interest and avoiding

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5 *Idem*/Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary.
6 See www.agerpres.ro/externe/2014/03/07, accessed on 15.04.2014.
7 See www.globalfirepower.com/Bulgaria, Serbia, accessed on 15.04.2014.

its subordination to the de jure Moscow politics. The second one has Romania more involved in the long term aspirations of the Balkan countries towards the EU and NATO.

Operationally speaking, Romania needs to protect its back and its land, air and water communication lines.

It is very important to overcome old mentalities regarding the NATO Smart Defence Cooperation or the EU Pooling and Sharing with Bulgaria, in order to have better results. One look at the deployment of the closest NATO Army Corps Commandments, Thessaloniki and Istanbul, reveals the part that Bulgaria plays as a transit country and even as a Host Nation, a very important one for Romania. Furthermore, the Black Sea cooperation of the naval forces and surveillance and early warning systems is absolutely necessary, taking into account the coastal continuity and maritime border.

The Danube and its whole way through Central Europe represents another common control and action target, the need of cooperation of the three states being obvious in order to insure free maneuvering along the Danube.

Craiova Group could represent a valuable initiative for Turkey and Greece also, seeing as the two countries have their own interests in the Balkans, along with their unsettled disputes.

The official and amplified support for Serbia to join the European structures and extending the cooperation with the euro-Atlantic ones would create the historical basis for strengthening our relations with the southern neighbor. We could also plan involving the group in the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia, in hopes of finding some middle ground.

It would be interesting to see the way that Washington and the European chancellors will appreciate and support the group's consolidation, as the American policy in the area would mean an institutionalized cooperation, but only if the precautions concerning Serbia's possible dual policy will be eliminated. Western Europe will have a positive reaction as far as the group's objectives implement the EU's policy in South-Eastern Europe and the group will decisively contribute to EU projects regarding the West Balkans and Serbia in particular.

Last but not least, Hungary's interests in the Balkans and its relations with Romania and Serbia could be influenced by the Craiova Group, insuring an active and efficient dialogue with the Visegrad Group, leading to a Baltic-Pontic cooperation, the so-called V4 and C3 cooperation.

The near future will let us know if the Craiova group will be just an idea and not a reality. However, if this idea will not be put into effect it could mean a new failure to take advantage of a very favorable historical moment, one that could put Romania in a more deserving position.

Conclusions

Europe wakes up after a bad dream, one that was unacceptable not a long time ago, a nightmare of its agitated history that brought so much destruction and suffering – war.

It was all happening fast and unexpectedly, as the reactivation of the old hegemonic and expansionist Russian spirit made its presence felt not in some geopolitical analysis, but somewhere in the Crimean Peninsula and the Donbas region, in a familiar way, characteristic to other times, that of direct or indirect military invasion.

This is a wakeup call for the definition of real politik, a strategic surprise of large proportion that is forcing NATO and EU to look for ways of countering it, an endeavor that so far lacks results.

Is NATO facing the impossibility of respecting a very important fight principle, avoiding surprise? The question tends to be a rhetorical one.

Many look forward to the NATO summit in hopes of a more hands on approach from the perspective of a permanent NATO involvement through bases in the northern and southern flanks. This challenge will reveal if the efforts will be biased, if the northern flank will receive a more concentrated reinforcement as opposed to the southern one.

Romania needs to increase its defense budget and also to address the problem in a more

pragmatic and efficient way, In order to diminish its known deficits through defense multiplication factors.

As a general line, the efforts that Romania made in the pre-adhering period of time (supporting SEEBRIG in Afghanistan) are appreciated, along with its substantial contribution to the NATO ISAF mission, as opposed to other NATO countries with similar military potential.

There is a good precedent, no doubt about it, but the new faces of the regional security environment request a different approach.

The good neighborly relations need to be reevaluated, in order to find the best ways to increase its reaction capability when facing a military and non military threat, as these types of threats affect not only its national integrity, but also a larger geographical region.

It is understood that, beside the important role that Romania has in NATO, the regional cooperation becomes a pressing necessity that demands wise solutions.

This is why developing the Craiova Group could be, for starters, the way in which Romania embraces its role as a geostrategic key player in South-Eastern Europe, assuming a leading role that could make the military cooperation in the Balkan a more dynamic and efficient one, beyond the well-known disparities.

We are talking not only about a political message, but also about founding and enforcing a historical message with positive consequences in the long run. In this way, the trust that our country has gained through the sacrifice of tenths of soldiers, wounded or killed in operation theatres, will extend on the Balkans.

Such a challenge will forever remain in the Balkans' troubled history and will make Romania a known voice in Centre and Northern Europe.

Insuring not only stability, but also military cooperation on the Southern border, by granting freedom of movement in all areas, land, air or water will allow Romania and its allies to have a wider maneuvering space and to enforce the flanks, as the back of this displacement is safe from any threats and generating and relocating forces will be closely related to such an operational space.

We are not only talking about military advantages, but also joint economic projects, in the fields of energy and transportation networks, border safety and cultural exchange, as well as problems regarding nationalities and ethnicities.

One must not forget that Romania and Bulgaria are both facing the same challenges in the EU, challenges that require a joint effort and a joint vision in overcoming them.

In the Visegrad Group, Romania would have had a secondary, blurred role, that would not have been very notable, while Craiova Group could mean a whole new perspective for our country, with many opportunities in the long run, even if the short term efforts would be substantial.

Nothing can work better than a long term strategic investment, which we think Romania can sustain.

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ANTE ACTIO: GRAND STRATEGY, POLICY, STRATEGIES, AND OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD*

Before the Second World War, the Grand Strategy and national security policy had mainly a military component, and foreign policy was an area almost different from the latter. Subsequently, the development of the characteristics of national and international security environment towards more unpredictability and interdependence both between different areas of the world, and between various social phenomena caused the conceptual reassessment of grand strategies and the correlation of national security policy with external policy. The entire process of formulating Grand Strategy, policies, strategies and objectives in the area of national security was supplemented with new variables, reflecting, on the one hand, the complexity of defining national security through its two components, physical and psychological, and, on the other hand, illustrating the volatile nature of the security environment. In this perspective, this paper presents a theoretical approach on the lines that guide decision-making in the sphere of national security, preceding the actual action.

Keywords: security environment, national security, Grand Strategy, policy, strategies, objectives, theoretical models.

1. Preliminary considerations

The need to analyze the theories on the relations between security policy, strategies and objectives derives from the fact that the use of these concepts is not always in the sense and the context developed by experts. In this respect, there is a tendency consisting in the prevalence of common knowledge, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in States' proneness to pay more attention to certain areas to the detriment of others in significant cases. The framework for this assertion is centered on Charles R. Miller statement (professor of International Relations at West Point), who argues that States of the world, especially electoral democracies, are facing with the problem of clearly defining the strategy and its application in their foreign policy[1]. This statement becomes dramatic when correlated with the number of countries classified by Freedom House as electoral democracies: 122 out of 195 countries of the world[2]. In his argument, Miller

1 Charles R. MILLER, "Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation", in *Public Administration and Management*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2005, pp. 85-129, EBSCO Host Connection.
2 According to Freedom House, *Freedom in the World –Electoral Democracies*, 2014, http://www.freedom-house.org/sites/default/files/Electoral%20Democracy%20Numbers%2C%20FIW%201989-2014.pdf, ac.12.03.2014.

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appeals to the wide range of areas that Grand Strategy is intended to summarize in order to achieve the fundamental interests and objectives of that State: diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, etc. The policies for each mentioned area are subordinated to Grand Strategy, and when there is a single enemy (whatever its nature) against which these policies could be coagulated, it is difficult to orient them towards the same purpose. It is obvious that the problem issued by Miller is identifiable especially in national security because, according to Liddell Hart, Grand Strategy is specific to a security community[3]. For the latter, Grand Strategy is inseparable from war and represents the policy that guides the carrying of the war. Thus, Strategy was reconceptualized and defined as the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or, in modern terms, information and diplomacy interact with military power in order to determine certain outcomes in a world where other countries also have Grand Strategies[4]. Edward N. Luttwak, American military strategist, believes that all States have a Great Strategy, whether or not they call it like that. Luttwak argues that there is consistency and efficiency only when persuasion and force are guided by accurate information and then are synergistically combined to generate the maximum power with the available resources. However, there is inconsistency and inefficiency when persuasion is altered by the reckless use of force or when the results hardly won by means of force are spoiled by clumsy diplomacy, which antagonizes the neutral States, encourages enemies and discourages allies[5]. Therefore, Grand Strategy defines a country's or other international actor strategic posture, and sets the level of ambition and the action capacity depending on several factors, such as permanent and accidental characteristics of the international environment,

geographical location, resources of that actor, security vulnerabilities and opportunities that it has[6].

From here, we can identify an important issue that is specific to the contemporary world, namely the relationship between policies, strategies and objectives or, more precisely formulated, how to get from an area policy, in case of national security, to the actual achievement of the proposed purpose.

2. Policies and strategies

Broadly, the policy is the process by which a group of people with initially different views and interests reach collective decisions and choices that impose to the group and symbolizes its overall approach[7].

Policies can be defined as labels of some activity fields – they describe areas of activity and of government involvement (economic policy, social policy, etc.); as an expression of the general purpose or desired end state (in a document of a political party or of the government, the term "policy" is used to indicate the general aim or purpose of government activities in general or in a particular area); as specific proposals for certain types of actions that political organizations would like to see accomplished; as official approval (the government policy regarding a problem whose support is related to a law passed in parliament or a government decision to allow or require the conduct of an activity); or as programs (a governmental policy expressed by the creation or implementation of a specific program involving the existence, in a sphere of a defined and relatively specific governmental activity, of a package of measures including regulations, organization and resources). Furthermore, policies are defined, at the same time, as products and results. In the first case, policies are what the government provides, unlike what it promised or authorized by law,

3 Timothy Andrew SAYLE, "Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy", in *The Telegram*, Vol. 4, January 2011, Foreign Policy Institute, Temple University, URL: http://www.fpri. org/articles/2011/01/defining-and-teaching-grand-strategy, accessed at 26.02.2014.
4 Edward N. LUTTWAK, *The Grand Strategy of Byzantine Empire*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 409.
5 *Ibidem*.

6 Iulian CHIFU, *Gândirea strategică*, Editura Institutului de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale, Bucharest, 2013, p. 19.
7 Nicolae LOTREANU, "Politică", in Cătălin ZAMFIR and Lazăr VLĂSCEANU (coord.), *Dicţionar de sociologie*, Ed. Babel, Bucharest, 1998, pp. 430-431.

and, in the second case, policies are defined by the results they produce and reflect its purpose in those results. Moreover, policies can be defined as processes, expressing the whole transforming process of an area[8].

Summarizing, we can argue that *a policy is a network of interrelated decisions regarding the choice of objectives, means and resources allocated to achieve them in specific situations*[9].

Policymaking process is complex, especially in the sphere of national security, as both the domestic and international security environment is characterized by complexity and continuous change. The most illustrative model is considered the input-output one, whose origins are found in systems theory applied in political science[10]. This model (Figure no. 1), used mainly in American decision-making system has three main components – the international political system, national political system and national security system – that provide inputs to and receive them from other systems[11]. National security system is central to this model accounting for the following tasks: obtaining resources from the other two systems, the allocation of these resources, planning and establishing national policy, organizing and guiding actors to implement these policies and motivating, evaluating, modifying and changing actors and policies as policies are implemented and the feedback is processed.

It is necessary to emphasize that decision making is influenced not only by national and international rules, but also by contextual factors, national interests and, last but not least, by the feedback from the implementation of the system outputs. Depending on the approach to interactions in the national security system, these influences vary in intensity and presence

(Figure no. 1). Thus, the rational perspective asserts that decisions are based on the desire to promote a clearly identified national interest and that the benefits and costs of the various options are carefully weighed in order to make a choice. From the perspective of organizational behavior, different organizations within the government exert influence over decision-making in order to promote their own interests and, as a consequence, decisions are often made to protect the interests of that organization, not the national interests. When dealing with the approach that promotes the role of government policies, it is not the organizations having the most important role in influencing the decision-making process, but the councilors of the decision-makers. Finally, the fourth perspective, the cognitive one, argues that decision-makers' values, beliefs, experiences and personal emotions are much more powerful influences in decision making than suggested by the other perspectives[12].

Considering the definition of policy, there can be made reference to another related concept – *strategy*. Although its origins are to be identified in the military life, specifically in Ancient Greece, nominating forms and methods used by the military commander in his management tasks[13], currently, strategy is one of the basic elements of the government and non-governmental programs, business etc. Strategy can be broadly defined as a mean of achieving goals that are themselves targets of the organization to which the reference is made[14]. Strategy is also defined by correlation with all the domains of social life as a science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological and military forces of a nation or a group of nations in order to achieve the maximum support for the policies adopted in peacetime or war[15]. Also, making use of the

8 Marius Constantin PROFIROIU and Elena IORGA, *Manual de politici publice*, Ed. Economică, Bucharest, 2009, pp. 15-16.
9 Adrian MIROIU, *Analiza politicilor publice. Curs*, 2008, p. 12, URL: http://adrianmiroiu.files.wordpress.com/2008/05/capitolul-1.pdf, accessed at 26.02.2014.
10 According to Richard J. NORTON, *Understanding the Policy-Making Process: A Guide to Case Analysis*, in "Case Studies in Policy Making. 12th Edition", Eds: Hayat ALVI and Nikolas K. GVOSDEV, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, 2010, pp. 5-12, p. 6.
11 *Ibidem*.

12 *Idem*, p. 9.
13 Milan N. VEGO, *Joint Operational Warfare. Theory and Practice*, Naval War College Press, Newport, 2009, p. I-36, Google Books extract.
14 Constantin BRĂTIANU, *Management strategic*, f. Ed., Bucharest, 2000, p. 54, URL: http://www.lefo.ro/carmensylva/Carmensylva/ppap/2000/an2/sem1/bratianuman-strat.pdf, accessed at 28.02.2014.
15 „Strategy" in *Merriam-Webster. An Encyclopedia* Britannica Company, URL: http://www.merriam-webster.

Figure no. 1: The input-output model of the policy making process which is based on decision making model of David Easton

SOURCE**:** Richard J. NORTON, "Understanding the Policy-Making Process: A Guide to Case Analysis", in Case Studies in Policy Making. 12th Edition", Eds: Hayat ALVI and Nikolas K. GVOSDEV, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, 2010, pp. 5-12, p. 6.

complex systems theory, strategy can be defined as "a plan to impose a predetermined outcome to a complex system"[16], with a holistic (supposing the resolution of a wide range of issues) and durable character and not subjected to failure if conditions change during its implementation.

One of the most consistent models for drafting the national security strategy is the one proposed by the U.S. Army War College (Figure no. 2); it reflects the complexity of the strategy and the implementation of this model increases the consistency, continuity and consensus of the process of designing, developing and implementing national security and military strategies. Assuming that strategy is an art, but that, at the same time, includes a stronger scientific component[17], the authors of the model

com/dictionary/strategy, accessed at 28.02.2014.
16 Leon S. FUERTH, "Grand Strategy", in *Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path through a Complex Future*, Sheila R. RONIS (Ed.), United States Army War College Press, Carlisle, 2013, pp. 9-18.
17 J. Boone BARTHOLOMEES Jr. (ed.), *U.S. Army War*

place the national purpose in the starting point of the process of formulating a national strategy; the national purpose determines the national interests which shape Grand Strategy, methods and means to achieve them. Hence, based on decisions related to Grand Strategy, decision-makers formulate the national policy, which is the first step in developing a national strategy. Overall, the strategy formulation process – whether it is about national security, defence, military, or theater strategy – will include: the identification of the interests of the respective country; the level of intensity for each interest; the evaluation of various issues; the trends and challenges regarding those interests; the identification of the objectives; the identification of alternative concepts using available or necessary resources to achieve those objectives; the assertion of the feasibility, acceptability and appropriateness

College Guide to National Security Issues. Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 5th Edition, U.S.AWC, 2012, p. 413.

Figure no. 2: The United States Army War College model for strategy formulation

SOURCE: J. Boone BARTHOLOMEES Jr. (editor), *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues. Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th Edition, U.S.AWC, 2012, p. 413

of policy options; the implementation of risk analysis and, finally, the recommendations on that policy. It is noted that this process takes into account both the national and international forces and trends in the security environment.

This model, published in the latest edition, the 5th, of the *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, is a reprint of the one published in first edition of the series by the College in 2004, but with some changes. Changes have been made since the Guide's 2nd edition in 2006, and they have been maintained until present day. The 2004 version of the model (Figure no. 3) introduces Grand Strategy after the step of identifying the interests, objectives,

concepts and national power, which is called "the grand strategic appraisal"[18], and before "the national strategic appraisal"[19], which is focused on evaluating the elements of national power, the formulation of appropriate policy and on risk analysis, but it doesn't include the step of determining the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of strategic options.

Analyzing the evolution of these models, we can see that they have evolved in correlation with the changes of the characteristics of the interna-

18 J. Boone BARTHOLOMEES Jr. (ed.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, 1st Edition, U.S.AWC, 2004, p. 279.
19 *Ibidem.*

Figure no. 3: U.S. Army War College Model for the formulation of the national security strategy

SOURCE: J. Boone BARTHOLOMEES Jr. (ed.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, 1st Edition, U.S.AWC, 2004, p. 279.

tional security environment. Interestingly, the model proposed by the War College in 2004 is different from that proposed by the same type of guide published by the same institution in 2001 (Figure no. 4), preceding the series edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Professor of Military History at the Department of National Security and Strategy of the U.S. Army War College).

Although both the 2001 and 2004 Guides start from the definition of strategy as "an art, and a highly creative one"[20] and although the first mod-

el refers to military strategy, and the one of 2004 to national security strategy, the entire process of developing these strategies is much improved in the latest edition; there is a shift from a model whose horizons do not cross national boundaries to a model that looks beyond internal environment. New elements are brought into the discussion, such as the global and national environments' influence on strategy formulation, one of the causes laying at the basis of the review being, in our opinion, the change in the vision on the characteristics of the international security environment caused by the terrorist attacks in the fall of 2001. This was the time when many security

20 Joseph R. CERAMI & James F. HOLCOMB, Jr. (eds.), *op.cit.*, 2001, p. 221 and J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. (ed.), *op.cit.*, 2004, p. 279.

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┌─────────────────────────┐
│     National Values     │
└─────────────────────────┘
            │
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│    National Interests   │
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│   Strategic Appraisal   │
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│     National Policy     │
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│     Risk Assessment     │
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Figure no. 4: U.S. Army War College Model for the formulation of the strategy

SOURCE: Joseph R. CERAMI & James F. HOLCOMB, Jr. (eds.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, U.S.AWC, 2001, p. 221.

and defense policy makers realized that not only security has globalized, but also and especially insecurity and that the international environment is extremely volatile. In the changing security environment, one of the few constants is represented by the national values that must underpin any strategy, representing the moral, philosophical and legal basis for the continued existence of the nation and the explanatory factors of the social actors' actions. National interests deriving from the national values are an active expression of the perceived needs and aspirations of the nation relative to the external environment. This last feature of the national interest, namely its definition in relationship with the external environment, provides nations the opportunity to involve in actions and activities abroad, which is linked to the national security objectives.

John M. Collins, researcher at the U.S. National Defense University and former head of the Strategic Research Group of the National War College (U.S.), stresses that no nation can prosper on long term in a competitive environment without determining ways to promote and protect the interests of both its core interests and assumptions arising from them[21]. This statement is completed by the fact that the international security environment is in constant change and it is almost constantly subjected to pressures that, paradoxically, come from within. In this context, the need to develop and implement effective and clear strategies, from the national to area levels (military, in this case) is obvious. Collins provides a ranking of these strategies and identifies the main elements specific to each strategy in the design and implementation process (Figure no. 5). Creating and planning policies to achieve national interests is a six-step process that starts from the specification of these interests as a first step, the resistance evaluation – the second step, the focus on political and military objectives aimed at safeguarding national interests despite the resistance that can be met – the third step, the design strategies necessary to achieve those objectives in relation to the guidelines of the policy – the fourth step, allocating the necessary resources – the fifth step and, finally, assessment of the extent to which the allocated resources are sufficient to support the selected concepts and, if not, to identify alternatives – the sixth step[22]. This process, argues Collins, is not linear and steps can be reversed, especially the one of resource allocation with the one of the strategies' design.

National strategies developed by government officials and approved by the President are designed to achieve national objectives and include elements from all areas of social life. *The national security strategies* – developed by political-military experts at the highest level and, as described above, approved by the Head of State – refer to the application of appropriate forms of national power in times of peace and war, in

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21 John M. COLLINS, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*, Potomac Books, Inc., Washington D.C., 2002, p. 3.
22 *Idem*, p. 5.

	Primary Focus	**Primary Participants**	**Primary Policies**	**Primary Input**	**Primary Output**
National Strategies	National Objectives	Chief of State, Governmental Advisers	National Policies	National Power	National Plans
National Security Strategies	National Security Objectives	Chief of State, Security Advisers	National Security Policies	Suitable National Power	National Security Plans
National Military Strategies	National Military Objectives	Chief of State, Military Advisers	National Military Policies	Military Power	National Military Plans
Regional Strategies	Regional Objectives	Foreign Ministers, Ambassadors	Foreign Policies	Diplomacy, Economic Levers	International Accords
Theater Military Strategies	Regional Military Missions	Defence Ministers, Regional Commanders	Unilateral or Coalition Policies	Unilateral or Coalition Forces	Unilateral or Coalition Plans and Ops
Operational Art and Tactics	Subordinate Military Missions	Subordinate Military Commanders	Joint or Uniservice Policies	Joint or Uniservice Forces	Joint or Uniservice Plans and Ops

Figure no. 5: Strategic and tactical hierarchy according to John M. Collins

SOURCE: John M. COLLINS, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*, Potomac Books, Inc., Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 3-4.

order to achieve the national security objectives, despite any existing internal or external threats, employing diplomatic, economic, psychological, cyber, technological and other type of means. *National military strategies* are drafted by Defense ministers and senior officers, committing Armed Forces to achieve national military objectives, based on guidelines set by the subsequent approval by the Head of State; in other words, they are consisting in establishing military objectives, formulating strategic military concepts needed for the achievement of military objectives and to implement those concepts[23]. *Regional strategies*

are implemented by Foreign ministers and ambassadors appointed by the President, by various means, primarily diplomatic and economic ones, aiming to promote national interests, provide support to friendly actors, favorably influencing the neutral ones and undermining the actors perceived as enemies. *Theater military strategies* are developed by Defense ministers, regional commanders and allies in order to carry out military missions that underlie regional objectives during

23 This approach is promoted by Arthur F. Lykke, one of the most famous American military strategists and professor at the U.S. Army War College, and transposes the general definition of strategy (goals + means + resources) in the military field, that is applicable at all levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. In this model, Lykke introduces the risk by which he explains the discrepancy be-

tween what should be done and the concepts and resources needed in order to achieve the objective. Risk is inevitable because, in any case, the necessary resources can not be covered completely or any concept can not include all the complexity of the problem; but the risk can be significantly reduced by balancing the three elements put forward by the author. See Arthur F. LYKKE, Jr., „Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy", in Joseph R. CERAMI & James F. HOLCOMB, Jr. (eds.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, U.S.AWC, 2001, pp. 179-185.

an armed conflict or in circumstances other than war (in case of troops not involved overseas, the national military strategies coincide with military strategies in the theater). *Operational art and tactics* aim at implementing military strategies in theater at the level of campaign, battles and missions[24].

3. Objectives and some typologies

National interests/objectives are the basis for these strategies, and from them result the national security interests/objectives. The latter constitute the basis for developing valid national objectives that define the goals of a country; they are the pervasive expression of the wishes and needs of a nation, especially in terms of protecting people, values, institutions, territory and lifestyle[25]. It is obvious that the amplitude of these interests vary from State to State depending on the status and the role plaid in the international system. Thus, if the interests of a superpower can cover the entire planet, countries with low international power focus on regional or local interests. A different approach to security interests is belongs the European Council on Foreign Relations experts, Olivier de France and Nick Witney, who had analyzed security strategies of 27 European countries and extracted six categories of countries depending on the consistency of their strategic vision:

• the grand strategists – countries with the most coherent and up-to-date security strategies: France and United Kingdom;

• the strategists – countries with coherent security strategies: Finland, Czech Republic, and Sweden;

• the globalists – countries whose security strategies are focused on changing the balance of power and on the general policy objectives, but without an analysis of the operational consequences involved: Germany, Netherlands,

Spain, Slovenia, Hungary;

• the localists – States interested in the security of their own territory and in the operational means to preserve the territorial integrity: Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia;

• the abstentionists – States that appear to have largely forgone strategic thinking out of conviction: Austria, Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg;

• the drifters – States that, due to certain circumstances, have old documents (published before the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis in 2007) or have abandoned the security strategic thinking: Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal[26].

The typology of national security interests differ in democracy from the one in dictatorship, from the permanent ones to the temporary ones depending on the level of the importance that the respective country attaches to, but still there are national universally valid interests. Collins summarizes them by primarily referring to the sphere of security:

• universally important interests: survival, homeland defence, domestic tranquility, military power, national credibility, freedom of action;

• variably important interests: peace, stability, prosperity, ideology, geostrategic position, morality[27].

Based on security interests, Collins identifies security objectives and, further, the main military aims. According to him, to each of the national security objective correspond some basic military aims that are designed to complement and support national policy objectives. This category of objectives is characterized by the following features: lack of ambiguity, consistency, capacity of being achieved with the available armed forces, and flexibility. In his paper on strategy, Collins selects the following six security objectives and related military aims:

24 *Idem*, pp. 3-5.
25 See *"National security interests"* in U.S. Department of Defence, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 08 November 2010 (15 January 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ dod_dictionary/, accessed at 28.02.2014 and John M. COLLINS, *op.cit.,* 2002, p. 13.

26 Olivier de FRANCE, Nick WITNEY, *Europe's Strategic Cacophony*, Policy Brief no. 77, European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2013, URL: ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR77_SECURITY_BRIEF_AW.pdf, accessed at 28.02.2014.
27 John M. COLLINS, *op.cit.*, 2002, p. 14.

- deter aggressors: avoid challenges, deploy superior power, instill fear of reprisal, deceive opponents, demoralize opponents;
- defeat aggressors: destroy enemy armed forces, confine collateral damage, occupy enemy territory, pacify insurgents, eradicate terrorist sanctuaries;
- ensure force sufficiency: improve land force mobility, improve littoral warfare posture, perpetuate superior air power, improve missile defence capabilities, improve the defence against chemical and biological warfare, strengthen information dominance;
- create strong coalitions: promote compatible doctrines, improve joint/combined training, promote interoperable material, strengthen security assistance, obtain or retain base rights abroad;
- foster technological progress: improve requirement forecasting, improve program management, shorten acquisition times, improve cross-service applicability, decrease costs;
- improve the recovery capacity: strengthen reserve components, improve mobilization procedures, improve mass casualty care, invigorate civil defence, and tighten military-industrial ties[28].

The order of priority of these security objectives and main military aims differ from one country to another, but a coherent strategy, regardless of the level to which it refers, should include them all. In this regard, it is particularly important for both civilian and the military leadership to understand that there is a close relationship of mutual determination between the aims of national power, with reference to the strategic ones, on the one hand, and, on the other, the tools for achieving them.

In this context, the work of Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare. Theory and Practice*[29], is an important element of the theoretical framework on politics, policies and strategies. Starting with the classics of strategy as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke Sr. and B.H. Liddell Hart, Vego explores the relationship between politics and strategy based on the premise that the boundary between them

is often blurred. In Clausewitz's work, is obvious that strategy depends on politics because war is not considered a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of politics by other means[30]. In Moltke Sr. view, politics can be considered separately from strategy, strategy is closely linked to the requirements and conditions of the politics, but operations can be conducted without taking into account politics. Vego points out, taking over the writings of the Marshall, that strategy should be independent from politics to the possible extent, and politics should not interfere with operations, making a clear distinction between political and military leaders: politicians are responsible for strategy for peace, and soldiers for military actions in war[31]. The third main approach to the relationship between politics and strategy on which Vego focuses is that of Liddell Hart: military objectives must be subordinated to politics and strategy and not vice versa, because too often, the military objective was regarded as an end in itself, not as a mean to achieve a goal, case in which the results are disastrous[32].

Analyzing these theories, Vego notes that it is necessary that the politics should prevail on strategy, but without entering into conflict with each other and without leading this subordination to extreme (he appeals here to the case of Nazi Germany). Political and military leaders depend on each other, and strategy is the issue belonging to both political and military leadership. However, in practice, there are indicators of a permanent tension between these two types of leaders, especially in the debate on the ways by which to achieve a certain strategic objective[33]. To illustrate the dependence relationship between the politics and military, Vego proposes the following model:

Vego's model identifies several strategic objectives based on areas of social life, but there are experts who believe that all strategic objectives are political in their nature[34]. Vego

28 *Idem,* p. 37.
29 Milan N. VEGO, *op.cit.*, 2009, p. I-41.
30 Carl von CLAUSEWITZ, *On War*, Oxford World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 28-29.
31 Milan N. VEGO, *op.cit.*, 2009, p. I-42.
32 *Ibidem.*
33 *Idem,* pp. I-42–I-43.
34 Michael D. KAMPFE, *The Fallacy of the Military Strategic Objective*, Naval War College, 2011, p. 4, www.

Figure no. 6: The desired strategic end state and strategic objective by Milan N. Vego

argues that strategic military objectives differ considerably from the political ones because the latter determine the ultimate purpose of the whole effort, while the military ones identify the role the military instrument of power can play in achieving the ultimate goal of politics and strategy. Therefore, the military strategic objective is governed by the political one, provided that politics does not aim at an objective militarily impossible to attain. Consequently, Vego takes over a part of Liddell Hart's theory and states that in case of war, the political objective and the strategic military one must be consistent with each other, without allowing the political reasons to dictate operational and tactical objectives[35].

Conclusions

The need to return to the concept of Grand Strategy may be a conclusion to this paper. Grand Strategy encompasses all the above analyzed elements – national interests and values, policies, strategies, objectives – although it can be said that it is an ambiguous concept that receives relatively different meanings depending on the source of definition (from the academic to the political or military environment). However, a common feature of all approaches is that Grand Strategy is both a vision for the future and a plan for achieving this vision in terms of security and peace. Grand Strategy includes all the elements of national power related, not cumulated, so that is possible to achieve national security in an environment that is not insulated from external influences. An example of an event that could trigger the transformation of Grand Strategy is the previously cited one, namely September 11, 2001: the terrorist attacks that took by surprise mankind and stressed the need to create a new kind of strategy, a more flexible strategy, based on national resources accurately assessed and more strongly linked to the international security environment, both for the country directly affected by the terrorist threat and its partner countries. Some understood this need (U.S., U.K., France) and revised their Grand Strategies, while others were either satisfied only to include transnational terrorism on the list of threats or not making changes at all in their national strategies (those States included by the experts of the European Council on Foreign Relations in the category of

dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA546261.
35 Milan N. VEGO, *op.cit.*, 2009, p. I-47.

abstentionists and drifters).

However, the main problem arising here is not necessarily the existence of Grand Strategy, but its coherence and flexibility, and State's capacity to implement it. The importance of these issues derives from the fact that although the concept of Grand Strategy has overtones of belligerence and conflictuality, the developments of international security environment characteristics prove that the enemy against whom the Grand Strategy was designed (in the classical sense) can not be only a rational actor (State) or a group led by certain interests, but also a social problem or a social phenomenon. Grand Strategy brings together many areas (military, political, economic, and diplomatic) in order to perform a valid long-term national goal; it is more than a policy document, it is a compelling process adapted to the dynamic contemporary world.

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INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC SEMINAR

**"Romania – 10 Years of NATO Membership.
Adapting and Contributing to Alliance's Development"
March 27, 2014**

Within the framework of the range of deferential events, celebrating 10 years of NATO membership, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) from "Carol I" National Defence University organized the International Scientific Seminar "Romania – 10 years of NATO Membership. Adapting and Contributing to Alliance's Development", on March 27, 2014.

By this already well-known scientific event, CDSSS set itself to bring its contribution to the development of the public debates regarding both Romania's stage of integration within the Euro-Atlantic structures and its role in the context of NATO modernization.

One of the Seminar's objectives was to reunite around the same table specialists and practitioners from security and defence area, whose expertise is essential for understanding NATO's evolution, as well as Romania's merits and limits in adapting to the Alliance's transformation processes and in contributing to NATO modernization.

This scientific event included debates on the extremely valuable and pertinent lectures of the notables in security and defence area – Lieutenant general Ştefan Dănilă, PhD, Head of Romanian Major Staff; Liviu Mureşan, PhD, President of EURISC Foundation; Adrian Davidoiu, CEO, the Department for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Iulian Fota, PhD, Presidential Counselor, Presidential Administration; Răzvan Buzatu, PhD, fellow professor, National Defence College; Brigadier general Tomiţă-Cătălin Tomescu, PhD, Commander of 1st Infantry Division "Dacica".

The event gathered 65 specialists from the entire country, who carry out their professional activity within the Ministry of National Defence, Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Romanian Intelligence Service, Protection and Guard Service, as well as within civil universities. At the same time, the Seminar "Romania – 10 years of NATO Membership. Adapting and Contributing to Alliance's Development" attracted the interest of the military scientific community from Bulgaria. Colonel Neno Hristov, PhD, and Colonel Valeri Ivanov, PhD, both of them associated professors within "G. S. Rakovski", Bulgaria, participated with materials, which can be consulted within the content of the present issue of *Strategic Impact* scientific journal.

The debates focused not only on Romanian Armed Forces' transformation process in the sense of its full integration in NATO – Horizon 2025, but also on fulfilling Romania's responsibilities derived from the North-Atlantic Alliance membership. It was also realized a detailed analysis of the regional security environment and of the role Romania could play in guaranteeing security, especially in the Black Sea area.

Iulian Fota, Presidential Counselor, emphasized that "due to the new international context, it is very clear that there will be new roles. Romania remains a factor of stability in a rather turbulent area, marked by uncertainties, an area which, from a geopolitical point of view, finds itself in a completely new situation, especially in the light of the recent events".

Colonel Avram Iancu, the Representative of the Head of the Romanian Major Staff, mentioned that "Romania's willingness to engage in NATO operations has maintained the permanent connection between headquarters and military units, on the one hand, and, on the other, the strategic military evolutions from certain areas of the world, which raised the interest for studying, analyzing, preparing and conceiving applications and trainings at major staff level from this perspective".

In this context, CDSSS Director, Colonel Stan Anton, PhD, pointed out that the Alliance itself goes through a period of analysis of the past experience and of prospecting the future directions of action and that the rapid pace of the changes happening in security areas and the frequency of the strategic shocks we are witnessing reveal a security transformation trend.

A considerable part of the lectures and the debates they generated represented for many of the participants in the Seminar starting points for the articles hosted by the pages of the present number of *Strategic Impact* scientific journal.

Overall, the event was held with participants of a high status and specialization, and the institutions represented called for a proper perception of the implications of adapting Romania's political-military structures to the Euro-Atlantic framework, as well as of the responsibilities emerging in the context of a complex and, sometimes, contradictory present and, especially, of a future primarily characterized by uncertainty.

Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD.

ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTER FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies organized, on May, 29, 2014, the first edition of the Workshop for young strategists "Romanian geopolitics and geostrategy – tradition and modernity".

The workshop series opened this year is a way by which CDSSS research team set itself to consolidate the results achieved during a decade of experience. Thus, starting 2014, CDSSS will hold two workshops every year. The first one we have already mentioned and the second one is dedicated to geo-economy, will address the post-crisis geo-economic trends and it will take place on September 25.

This year, 36 participants subscribed to the workshop – young professors, researchers, PhD, MA and BA candidates from "Carol I" NDU, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, "Lumina" University of South-East Europe, the Center for Conflict

Prevention and Early Warning, the Institute for Public Order Studies, the Faculty of Political Sciences from the University of Bucharest.

All of them benefited from the lectures of 7 military and civilian personalities, with empirical and theoretical expertise in the area of geopolicy and geostrategy – Presidential Counselor and associate professor Iulian Chifu, PhD; General (ret.) and associate professor Constantin Degeratu, PhD; Lieutenant-general (ret.) Virgil

Bălăceanu, PhD; Brigadier general (ret.) and senior researcher Gheorghe Văduva, PhD; Brigadier general (ret.) and professor Constantin-Gheorghe Balaban, PhD; associate professor Florin Diaconu, PhD; and Răzvan Buzatu, PhD.

This year, CDSSS most important scientific event, the International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI "The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment", which has reached to the 14th edition, will take place on November, 25-26. Those who are interested in participating can already register. More information is available on the conference website, at http://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/ro/conferinte-strategii-xxi/centrul-de-studii-strategice-de-aparare-si-securitate.

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GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual academic journal *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

ARTICLE LENGTH may vary between 6-12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 11, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE

- Title (centred, capital, bold characters).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD. title or PhD. candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
- A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters).
- 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters).
- Introduction / preliminary considerations.
- 2 - 4 chapters, subchapters if needed.
- Conclusions.
- Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format as well. Below will be mentioned "Table no. 1, title" / "Figure no. 1 title"; the source, if applicable, shall be mentioned in a footnote.
- REFERENCES shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of footnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: Joshua S. GOLDSTEIN; Jon C. PEVEHOUSE, *International Relations*, Longman Publishing House, 2010, pp. 356-382.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year).

Example of article: John N. NIELSEN, "Strategic Shock in North Africa", in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at http://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/, accessed on 10.03.2014.

- BIBLIOGRAPHY shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations,* Longman Publishing House, 2010.

Example of article: FRUNZETI, Teodor; HANGANU, Marius, "New Paradigms of Armed Combat and their Influence on Military Forces' Training", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 4/2011.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents.

SELECTION CRITERIA are the following: the theme of the article must be in line with the

subjects dealt by the journal: up-to-date topics related to political-military aspects, security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence; the quality of the scientific content; originality of the paper; novelty character – it should not have been priorly published; a relevant bibliography comprising recent and prestigious specialized works; English language has to correspond to academic standards; adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the journal. Editors reserve the right to request authors or to make any changes considered necessary.

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DEADLINES: authors will send their articles in English to the editor's e-mail address, **impactstrategic@unap.ro**, **cssas@unap.ro**, according to the following time schedule: 15 December (no. 1); 15 March (no. 2); 15 June (no. 3) and 15 September (no. 4). If the article is accepted for publication, an integral translation of the article for the Romanian edition of the journal will be provided by the editor.

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