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CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES**



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## STRATEGIC IMPACT

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## **EDITOR'S NOTE**

### *Distinguished collaborators and readers,*

The current edition of the journal brings together analyses, synthesis, evaluations and points of view on issues related to security, military strategy, geopolitics and geostrategy authored by renowned academia members, researchers and experts from Romania as well as from the U.S.A., Slovak Republic and Serbia. The articles debate and analyse a complex variety of issues, from aspects related to supra-states for a such as NATO, EU and the relation between them in the context of transition towards multipolarity, the extent to which BRICS is a homogeneous group or its members are united just by some common interests, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, certain state actors' – Republic of China and Iran – interests, aspects related to military strategy – Defence Resources and Sustainable Development, post-conflict reconstruction, counter-insurgency strategies, theoretical aspects applicable in military sciences a conceptual model of the state security system using the modal experiment, possible threats to national security, network centric warfare, the issue of nuclear weapons and the impact of armed conflicts on the environment and human health.

You will also find in the journal some conclusions following the seminar “The correlation between technological development and the physiognomy of present day’s conflicts: content and tendencies in the current Revolution in Military Affairs”, organised within Expomil 2013 on September, 27 at Romexpo headquarters.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is a publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from “Carol I” National Defence University and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to the National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is published in Romanian for twelve years and in English for eight years and addresses a complex topic area – political-military topicality; security strategies, military strategy, NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; the issue of peace and of the future’s warfare, information society, elements and aspects related to information community. Readers will find in the journal analyses, synthesis and evaluations of strategic level, points of view in which is studied the impact of the actions taken at national, regional and global level.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication’s scientific quality is confirmed by international indexing databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), but also by the presence in virtual catalogues of libraries in prestigious institutions abroad, such as NATO and universities with military profile in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

*Strategic Impact* journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in the main institutions involved in security and defence, scientific and academic environment in the country and abroad – in Europe, Asia, America.

I express my confidence that our readers will find extremely useful and relevant articles included in this edition and I conclude with an incentive for our collaborators to explore the future, at the same time seeing in a critical manner the past events that have an impact on the present.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD.  
Editor in Chief  
Director of Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies



# IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSITION TOWARDS MULTIPOLARITY ON NATO-EU RELATION

*Cristina BOGZEANU\**

*International security environment passes through a period of ample changes determined by the economic and financial crisis. One of the most notable such changes can be found at the level of the international system's polarity, embodied in the multiplication of the number of centers of power. Nevertheless, although the emergence of new centers of power is a clear fact, until presently, none of them has equaled US power and influence. Actually, currently, the world is in a transit stage from unipolarity to multipolarity, international actors being in full process of reconsidering and readapting their foreign policies to the new trends characterizing the international security environment. Irrespectively of the actor one might take into consideration, the only possible conclusion is that we are witnessing a period of transformations, conversions, of finding a new optimal course for each and every actor.*

*NATO and EU are no exception from this common direction. Both of them are in search of objective strategic lines, according to the new international realities, which will define the security level in the Euro-Atlantic space.*

*The present paper represents an analysis of these transformations triggered by the mutations happened at international level, starting from the effects generated by the emergence of a multipolar international system on the US, an actor playing a major role in the preservation of the Euro-Atlantic security. This study premises that the Euro-Atlantic partnership remains of crucial importance for the actors on the two shores of the Atlantic, but it emphasizes, through recent events' analysis, the difficulties the two organizations have in adapting to a rapidly changing international context.*

**Keywords:** *multipolarity, NATO, EU, US, transatlantic partnership, transatlantic space, Asia-Pacific region.*

## **1. NATO-EU relations at a bird's eye view**

Enhanced in the context of the Soviet nuclear threat, Euro-Atlantic relations have become one of the most viable security communities of the international arena. At the same time, this security community benefits of the most developed institutional framework of the international arena. There is no other region or security community based on comparably diverse, complex and complementary institutions, covering the entire spectrum of common interest issues.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO became the main security guarantor of European security, the framework within which US have been able to offer security guarantees to European states. In 1990, the Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations was signed, an act by which signatory parts recognized the need to approach as much as possible their positions on the economic and political aspects of mutual interest, engaging in a close relationship<sup>1</sup>.

NATO-EU relations got an institutional dimension in 2001, when was established the practice of regular meetings between the representatives of the two organizations. Subsequently, in 2002, EU-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was issued, which confirmed EU's access to NATO's planning capabilities for EU-led operations and reiterated a series of political principles laying at the basis of this partnership, among which we shall

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mention the following: a) mutual consultations; b) equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO; c) respect for the interests of the member states of the European Union and NATO; d) respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; e) coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations<sup>2</sup>. Afterwards, “Berlin Plus” Agreements (2003) set the basis of NATO-EU cooperation in the area of crisis management. Actually, the principle laying at the basis of the efforts made to create an EU security and defence dimension consisted in the permanent complementarity with NATO regarding not only the vision on security, but also the military actions. This necessity originates in the fact that most NATO member states also have EU membership, which determined the imperative to avoid the situation in which efforts and the use of resources would have overlapped or doubled.

After 9/11, US and EU coalesced against a new threat, this time of asymmetric nature, international terrorism having become, in both actors’ visions, the gravest threat to their own security, as well as to the regional and international security.

At the same time, US reaction to 9/11 attacks – the military intervention in Iraq –, also marked one of the numerous turning points in the history of the transatlantic partnership, giving that not all EU member states supported and approved the initiation of US operation in the absence of UN Security Council’s approval. However, the reinforcement of the relations between US and EU was possible under the conditions in which both of them identified the same phenomenon as the main security threat.

After 9/11, another event influencing to a considerable extent the approach of US-EU relations was represented by the world economic and financial crisis, begun in 2007 in US and strongly felt on the both shores of the Atlantic in 2008.

### **2.From unipolarity to multipolarity – significations**

The economic and financial crisis marks, from the perspective of polarity, the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. But, unlike the previous change of polarity (from bipolarity to unipolarity after USSR implosion), this one is slower and takes the shape of a process. This is the reason for which, in our opinion, the current state of the international system from polarity’s perspective can be defined as

a transition one, as a period of shifting from an unipolar configuration to a multipolar one, giving the fact that none of the states considered emergent powers (China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey) have reached yet US level of power and acquired the necessary instruments for developing policies similar to the US. Nevertheless, it is sure that international systems evolves towards multipolarity, towards a configuration in which US will keep playing the role of a major world power, but not the one of the world’s sole super-power.

International system’s evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar configuration equals to mutations in the area of power resources’ distribution at international level, a multipolar configuration being characterized by the fact that various centers of power cumulate similar resources of power from quantitative and qualitative perspectives and which, together, reunite most of world’s resources of power. Simultaneously, the existence of various centers of power within a multipolar international system also supposes that none of them holds the necessary resources to become a dominant power.

This fact is also confirmed by economic studies. For instance, National Intelligence Council estimated that, in 2025, US will remain the main world power pole, but that the American domination will experience a decline<sup>3</sup>.

The idea is corroborated by the report published by the same institution at the end of 2012, *Global Trends 2030. Alternative Worlds*. According to this document, although the US have known a relative decline in relation to the emergent powers, its role on the international arena is still crucial from the perspective of its capacity to cooperate with the new partners and to redefine international system’s coordinates<sup>4</sup>. From this point of view, Washington will remain a “primus inter pares”.

Theories on polarity have considerably developed recently. Thus, theoretical argumentations on inter-polarity<sup>5</sup>, non-polarity<sup>6</sup> and apolarity<sup>7</sup> appeared. In our opinion, all these scientific approaches are the result of the efforts to understand the course of events happening at the level of the international security environment, to identify common, constant aspects in a stage characterized, firstly and fundamentally, by rapid changes, to find an explanation for the fact that international system goes, indeed, through a shift in polarity terms, but that there is still an actor – the US – keeping a status of “first among equals”. There are efforts to explain apparently paradoxical phenomena characterizing international security environment in present.



Transatlantic partnership developed within an unipolar context, being based on the reinforcement of cooperation between the two shores of the Atlantic in common interest areas, having at its core the security guarantees offered by NATO to the European actors. US has always plaid a fundamental role within this partnership, being the world's sole super-power, being able of offering security guarantees to its allies and also supporting at a large extent the costs of the Euro-Atlantic security.

Consequently, in our opinion, the key for understanding the effects of the mutation of international system's configuration on NATO-EU relation resides in the analysis of the transformations occurred at the level of the resources of power, interests and behavior of the actor placed at the center of this phenomenon – the United States of America.

### 3. Effects of the transition towards multipolarity

Most of the analyses on international system's dynamic after the economic and financial crisis have focused on the relative decline of US power as compared to the emergent powers, especially China. The decision to end the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was interpreted as a sign of the decrease of Washington's capacity to involve in other regions' security problems. However, the issue holding most of the attention of international community, of the academic and political environment was US decision to announce that its strategic interests have "pivoted" towards Asia-Pacific region. The subsequent questions focused on its capacity and willingness to continue its engagements assumed regarding Euro-Atlantic security, on the preservation of US interests unto this region, on the changes expected to happen at NATO's level and in the relation between NATO and EU and, finally, on EU future, strongly affected by the economic and financial crisis and yet incapable of unilaterally guaranteeing its own security or the security of the regions in its close proximity from the perspective of financial, military and organizational resources.

Overall, the changes occurred at the level of Washington's foreign policy consist, on the one hand, in actions of restraining its presence and investments in the security and stability of Middle East and Europe and, on the other, in actions of consolidating its presence and increasing the level of engagement in Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, the measures coming under the first mentioned category do not equal to the dissolution of US interests unto these actors. EU remains US main strategic partner

and Middle East still meets many conditions for Washington to consider it important for its own national security.

Actually, the existence of US strategic interests in Asia-Pacific is not as much a novelty as a rather accentuated trend in the context of international system's transition to a multipolar era. The maintenance of a balance of power in Asia-Pacific has been among US interests ever since Cold War and the emergence of China as a global power, under the conditions in which US capacity to allocate considerable resources to this area concomitantly with the ones already engaged in Europe and Middle East has substantially decreased recently, made this change of priorities necessary.

Under the same category of foreign policy measures materialized in reducing actions and resources also come some transformations occurred in the relation between US and Europe within North Atlantic Alliance. The year 2012 was marked by the launch of a new initiative in defence planning, known as "smart defence". "Smart defence" is about the necessity of making defence spending more efficient in the context of the world economic and financial crisis. In these conditions, US contribution to NATO budget needed to be revised, but without implying giving up the engagements assumed within the Alliance. The solution to this problem supposes that NATO member states will not be able to rely at such a great extent on US contribution regarding advanced and expensive capabilities.

The idea in itself is under no form a new one, as the principle of "burden sharing" is much similar to the recent "smart defence" and effectual ever since NATO's formation. A novelty character is attached only to the amplitude it has gained recently, in the context of the economic and financial crisis and of the recalculation of US strategic interests<sup>8</sup>. Behind this initiative, there is the need for the Europeans to assume a greater responsibility for their own security, given the fact that Washington's attention is to be mostly concentrated on Asia-Pacific region. It is not arbitrary the fact that EU also launched a similar initiative in this respect, known as "pooling and sharing".

The need for Europe to invest more in its own security does not have to be translated in the idea that the Americans intend to give up the Euro-Atlantic partnership. "Smart defence" is an economic solution for an economic problem. The EU remains the main US strategic partner both from the economic and security points of view. Europe is not only the main US economic partner, but also the most important partner in the fight against the





current security risks and threats such as the fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These actors' approach of Iran's nuclear program is one of the most relevant examples in this respect. Both US and EU imposed economic sanctions on Teheran, including an embargo on the oil import from this space. Moreover, European states host elements of US anti-missile shield, designed as a defensive measure in front of the possibility for Iran to develop nuclear armament. The continuation of US and NATO engagement as guarantors of European security can also be seen in the significances of the ballistic anti-missile shield – a proof of their involvement in maintaining Europe's security in the context in which there is an increase of the security risks and threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and organized crime.

At the same time, the EU and its member states are also allies in the fight against terrorism, launched after 9/11 attacks, as European space can be not only a potential target for such attacks (Madrid and London events are eloquent in this respect), but also a possible gateway for terrorists towards the US, as well as a possible recruitment base of new members for terrorist networks. Plus, having in view US military troops' withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations, Europe will play an even more important role in countering terrorist phenomenon.

The key role of the Euro-Atlantic partnership was constantly emphasized within programmatic documents issued at NATO's level. Thus, the Alliance's strategic concept (2010) mentioned that "the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible"<sup>9</sup>. The idea is also reiterated within Chicago Summit Declaration: "NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organizations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity"<sup>10</sup>.

A similar approach can be found at EU's level. Although, in our opinion, Brussels needs a new security strategy, in accordance with the new characteristics of the international security environment, the documents reflecting the Unions' strategic vision are still eloquent for the role plaid by

the Euro-Atlantic partnership in the context of European security. Thus, the European Security Strategy (2003) mentioned that "The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO"<sup>11</sup> and that "the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century"<sup>12</sup>. The need for preserving and reinforcing NATO-EU partnership is also underlined within the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008): "The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management"<sup>13</sup>.

Nevertheless, although these organizations' security tasks have remained constant and the positive impact of their cooperation is still an acknowledged fact, as well as the need for developing even more this partnership, the fact that NATO-EU relation evolves towards a new phase, under the influence of the general dynamic of the international security environment, is clear.

#### 4. New trends in NATO-EU relation

General trends described previously denote both the preservation of NATO-EU relations' importance and the imperative of these relations to be changed, adapted to a new international environment, under the conditions in which their relevance as non-state actors on the international arena is brought in question.

It is obvious that these organizations continue to play a significant role in the European and Euro-Atlantic security equation. Even if international affairs' center of gravity has shifted towards Asia-Pacific region, NATO and EU and, especially, the relations between them are focused on the security of this area. Moreover, the basis of this relation – the common set of values, principles and interests – has not ceased to exist once the emergence of new centers of power determined the "pivot" of US strategic interests towards Asia-Pacific region, although this phenomenon has undoubtedly affected them.

A first transformation of NATO-EU relations has already been illustrated previously in the area of defence planning, respectively, in the area of member states' financial contribution to European space defence. Another change can be found in the



area of responsibility, in the type of operations which are likely to be carried out by NATO and EU on short and medium term.

US strategic interests' pivot to Asia-Pacific simultaneously with the decision to balance the financial support of North-Atlantic Alliance also supposes the imperative for the Europeans to assume a higher degree of responsibility for their own security and for the security of their close vicinity. Actually, the US made it clear that they will involve in maintaining European security only on the strength of collective defence principle enshrined in article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. In this context, one shall take into consideration not only the instability hotbeds in EU's proximity – Western Balkans, Wider Black Sea Area, North Africa and Middle East – but also the re-emergence of the military power of Russian Federation. Departing from this observation, there can be identified another central point of NATO-EU relation evolution regarding their approach of Moscow. Relations with Russia have a central place both in Europeans' security interests and in US ones.

Our opinion, shared by other numerous members of the international scientific community, is that US strategic interests pivot to Asia-Pacific does not hide an “abandon” of Europe by the US, but the need to share in an equitable manner the responsibilities unto regional and international security. Most official speeches held by White House leaders, as well as the official declarations denote this trend. For instance, US strategic defence guide, *Sustaining US Global Partnership: Priorities for the 21st Century* (2012), clearly specifies that Europe is US main partner in promoting global and economic security and that it will keep this status in the foreseeable future<sup>14</sup>. The same document also refers to the continuation of US engagements unto European security, to the consolidation of North-Atlantic Alliance, as well as to the need for changing US position in Europe, in the context of a changing strategic environment<sup>15</sup>.

Actually, Europe's security remains an important aspect for White House foreign policy, but the role of European actors, respectively EU and its member states, is changing. They are put in the situation of assuming the role of security providers instead of security consumers. In other words, “from a Washington perspective, Europe has had over six decades to emerge from the ashes of World War II and to build a strong platform for shared sovereignty and new forms of international governance. Now is the time to share global responsibilities with the United States”<sup>16</sup>.

Additionally, at NATO's level, this reconsideration of transatlantic relations is translated in a return to the Alliance's basic function – collective defence. The end of Afghanistan and Iraq operations, the fact that NATO's mission in Libya was led by European states may reveal the tendency to give up non-article 5 missions for the article 5 related actions. At the same time, it is noteworthy that anti-ballistic missile shield has remained effectual and its construction is carried forward. All these, together with “smart defence” initiative may indicate the fact that Europe's main security guarantor will be the EU and its member states, the US playing just the role of “insurers' insurer”, “a last instance insurer”<sup>17</sup>.

In our opinion, this is the core of the main change happened in NATO-EU relation in the multipolar context – the greater involvement of European states in ensuring their own security, but this necessity is associated with a range of serious challenges.

Among these challenges, there is Europeans' financial and institutional capacity to play successfully this role on the European and international arena. EU has been not only strongly affected by the economic and financial crisis whose effects are still felt inclusively in the area of defence budgets, but it has also known relatively recently a reform of the institutions afferent to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Even more, EU also goes through a genuine political crisis, questioning its viability and chances of outlasting this period of ample changes happening at international strategic environment's level concomitantly with the exacerbation of its lack of internal coherence and cohesion.

As a matter of fact, many of the events happened in the last three years constituted demonstrations not only of the definition of this new role for European states in the equation of regional security, but also of their insufficient capacity to approach it in an efficient manner, making use of EU institutional framework and instruments. One of the most eloquent examples in this respect is the Libyan case (2011), where European states were the ones leading the operation Unified Protector, but under NATO aegis, the Union's intervention being considered, at most, marginal.

Another demonstration of EU's insufficient reaction capacity was given in the context of events happened in Mali in 2012, when authorities lost control on the northern part of the country. Malian government requested France's military intervention and, finally, the latter's troops put an end to the insurgency. The main problem in this case consisted



in the fact that as necessary and justified EU intervention might have been in this situation, equally evident was its lack of capacity to intervene decisively in resolving a crisis happening in a state characterized as “an important EU partner in Western Africa”<sup>18</sup>. EU’s reaction to this crisis is described even on the European External Action Service official web page as follows: “Ever since the begin of the crisis in Mali (the rebellion in the north of the country in 2012 and the coup d’état of March 2013), *the EU stood by this country, actively supporting regional organizations* (the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union) in their efforts to find a solution”<sup>19</sup>. However, on 18<sup>th</sup> of February 2013, the EU launched EU Training Mission (EUTM), meant to contribute to the training and organization of Malian military forces<sup>20</sup>.

The fact that the EU and its member states have not finished yet the development of the instruments and capacity to intervene in the crisis management in its proximity was also confirmed by the train of events in Syria. Begun as part of the wave of popular revolts happened in Northern Africa and Middle East in 2011, the revolt against Bashar al-Assad regime has escalated to a veritable civil war, culminating with the use of chemical weapons by the government against the rebels.

International community’s intervention, blocked until this event by the veto of China and Russia in UN Security Council, was recognized as being necessary. It is noteworthy that these events in Syria happen in the first years in which the White House set itself to focus its foreign policy mainly on Asia-Pacific region. According to US vision on its foreign policy, defined after the peak of the economic and financial crisis, Syria is not included in the region on which America’s strategic priorities are concentrated, but in one of the regions in which European partners are expected to make proof of their capacity to act as global actors alongside of Washington, sharing global security responsibilities.

As far as EU is concerned, Syria is included in the space regarded by the European Neighborhood Policy, an initiative meant to ensure a stable security space in the proximity of EU’s borders. Subsequently, a major EU involvement would have been more than justified. And this as more as Syrian turbulences seriously impact on another state with which Brussels set itself to develop the relations, a state whose own internal security is affected by protests of the population against its leaders – Turkey. As late as July 2013, in the context of a

violent reaction of Turkish authorities to protests, leaders in Brussels proposed an enhanced partnership with Turkey and the reinforcement of the process of its adhesion<sup>21</sup>. To all these, one could also add Turkey’s strategic relevance for the EU from several perspectives – energy security, the relations with the Russian Federation, the balance of power in the Wider Black Sea Area<sup>22</sup>.

As a consequence, a major EU intervention in the Syrian crisis would have been expected, at least at diplomatic and humanitarian level, instruments through which the EU asserted itself as a major actor on the international arena, constituting the very added value brought by the Europeans in crisis management domain.

The actual EU reaction in this respect consisted in an embargo imposed on the weapons and equipments which can be used for internal repression and punctual sanctions for the individuals involved in the repression, measures which, under the conditions of the “chemical weapons crisis” of August 2013, turned out to be insufficient to assess that the Union has had a real contribution to this crisis’ management, clearly affecting its credibility as a relevant regional and international actor.

A common action in this respect has not crystallized at NATO level either, as the Secretary General of the Alliance announced that the manner in which the intervention in Syria would develop is still its member states’ option and that NATO has not yet established a role in this context.

The attitude of Washington and Moscow towards this crisis denotes that they are verging towards multilateralism, a natural manner of approaching international relations in a multipolar context. But, in this case, the problem refers to the role plaid by the EU in the management of this crisis, especially in the context of the events happening in its vicinity.

Another aspect gaining increasingly more importance for NATO-EU relations in the context of international system’s transition to a multipolar configuration is represented by the place conferred to their relations with the actors in Asia-Pacific region. On the one hand, as mentioned previously, the shift of US strategic interest to Asia-Pacific equals to the increase of the necessity for the Europeans to involve at a greater extent in providing security for them and for the close neighborhood. Simultaneously, both at NATO and EU level, there can be seen a tendency to follow the US in its interest for Asia-Pacific region.

Change in the area of US foreign policy guidelines also determined mutations in the manner



in which North-Atlantic Organization approaches international security. Partnerships' development and reinforcement has always been one of the ways of ensuring international security in NATO's vision, but, after the economic and financial crisis, there can be seen an increased attention paid to these initiatives, especially to those regarding Asia-Pacific actors.

Thus, it is said that, nowadays, in NATO's case, one could speak about two organizations functioning under the same umbrella, about two NATOs in one<sup>23</sup> – one seen as the core of the alliance, functioning on collective defence principle, enshrined in article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, and another one having a global nature, comprising partner countries, open to engagement beyond Europe's borders, but without implying a compulsory participation of all its 28 member states.

At the same time, at EU's level, there is a debate on an "European pivot"<sup>24</sup>, not as much from a military perspective, but rather from economic, monetary, technological and "soft power"-related aspects, a tendency which begun a decade ago, according to the quoted source. EU's position unto Asia-Pacific might turn out to be a two-edged sword. EU's involvement in this area could be looked upon, on the one hand, as an adaptation of the Europeans to global trends, but, on the other, as a waste of energy, having in view not only their increased responsibilities regarding their own security, but also the irrelevance of the Union in Asia-Pacific from security point of view. Nevertheless, the development of economic and trade relations could constitute, even in our opinion, a positive aspect in EU's development as an international actor.

Concomitantly, an economic involvement of Europe in Asia-Pacific would be a sign of the assumed responsibility within the transatlantic partnership, especially if it would contribute to the mitigation of the economic and financial crisis' effects in the EU. In this respect, we consider relevant Hillary Clinton's speech (November 2012) within which she mentioned that the gravest threat to transatlantic security and partnership is a weak economic future on one or the both shores of the Atlantic.

Within the same discourse, it was emphasized not only US interest and intention to preserve the Euro-Atlantic partnership in a form adapted to the new international realities, but also the role of this partnership in pursuing the economic and strategic interests in Asia-Pacific region. "Our pivot to Asia is not a pivot away from Europe. On the contrary, we want Europe to engage more in Asia, along with us

to see the region not only as a market, but as a focus of common strategic engagement"<sup>25</sup>. However, in our opinion, EU's involvement in Asia-Pacific must be done after a realistic and pragmatic reorganization of Europe's strategic priorities.

### Conclusions

Euro-Atlantic partnership remains of crucial importance for the actors on the both shores of the Atlantic. The US-Europe relation is consolidated and based on a common set of values and interests which can ensure the foundation of a sustainable relation, in spite of any divergence of opinion that may occur. Anyone who might be tempted to underbid the importance of the common cultural, axiological and historical foundation in alliances' formation can only think about the type of difficulties attached to US-China or US-Russia relations.

As US' relative power decline does not mean a future of the international system without the US as global actor, neither does its policy on European partners denote an "abandon", but the clear imperative of sharing responsibilities, of balancing security tasks, clearly influencing NATO-EU relation.

The principle of balancing security tasks is reflected both in the strategic and economic domains. Despite of remaining under the sign of serious internal economic and political difficulties, the EU will have to assume an increased role in ensuring its own security and its neighborhood's stability. However, recent events denote the existence of clear vulnerabilities in this respect as, unfortunately, the EU showed, as far as the management of the crisis having happened recently in its close vicinity, inefficiency, difficulties in reacting or insufficient reactions, with a much too small impact to be able to make the difference between stability and instability, even from the perspective of the instruments which made the Union a relevant actor on the international arena (civil crisis management, diplomacy, humanitarian aid etc.).

It is also notable the fact that this shared responsibility does not mean that US and NATO are becoming irrelevant for the European space security, the relation with these actors being expected to function as an insurance for the European actors, US playing the role of "insurers' insurer", "a last instance insurer"<sup>26</sup>. Behind this process of reconsidering responsibilities' sharing, there can be found the idea that the Europeans have to act as equal partners for Washington.



### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> *Trans-Atlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations*, 1990, [http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans\\_declaration\\_90\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration_90_en.pdf), accessed at 12<sup>th</sup> December 2012.

<sup>2</sup> *The NATO-EU Strategic Partnership*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/006.pdf>, pp. 3-4, accessed at 16<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph S. Jr. NYE, "The Future of American Power. Dominance and Decline in Perspective", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, no. 6, November/December 2010, pp. 2-12.

<sup>4</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, December 2012, [www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends](http://www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends), accessed at 7<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>5</sup> Term defining a multipolar configuration of international system, emphasizing the need for cooperation between world's great and regional powers in the management of common issues, whose solution can be found only in this manner. "Inter-polarity is multipolarity in the era of interdependencies". For details, see Giovanni GREVI, *The Interpolar world: a new scenario*, Occasional Paper, no. 79, June 2009, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris.

<sup>6</sup> Non-polarity is not equal to a vacuum of power at international level, but to a world in which international affairs are not dominated by one or various powers, but by tens of such entities holding a significant power. In such a system, none of the significant centers of power dominates another and, thus, one could not speak about unipolarity. For details, see Richard N. HAASS, "The Age of Nonpolarity", in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 3, May/June 2008, pp. 44-56.

<sup>7</sup> The term defines a vacuum of power at international level, given the fact that none of the "candidate" powers to the status of great power fulfills all the conditions necessary for achieving such a status. This concept describes a "worst case scenario", making a reference to the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, it ignores states' capacity to follow their interests within international organizations and to cooperate for achieving common interests or for countering common security threats. For details, see Niall FERGUSSON, "A World Without Power", in *Foreign Policy*, 1 July 2004, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a\\_world\\_without\\_power?page=0,3](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power?page=0,3), accessed at 15<sup>th</sup> October 2011.

<sup>8</sup> For details, see Cristina BOGZEANU, "NATO-EU Relation from the Perspective of the Implications of Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing Concepts", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3[44]/2012, pp. 34-41.

<sup>9</sup> "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon. Active Engagement, Modern Defence", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 4 [37]/2010, pp. 5-11.

<sup>10</sup> *Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012*, Press Release (2012) 062, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease), accessed at 1<sup>st</sup> February 2013.

<sup>11</sup> *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, 12 December 2003, Brussels, p. 2, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed at 19<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>13</sup> *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World*, 11<sup>th</sup> December 2008, Brussels, p. 2, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf), accessed at 19<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>14</sup> United States of America Department of Defence, *Sustaining US Global Partnership: Priorities for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, January 2012, pp. 2-3, [http://www.defense.gov/news/defense\\_strategic\\_guidance.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf), accessed at 17<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Jackson JANES, "Sharing Global Responsibilities", in *IP Journal*, 1 May 2010, <https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/regions/sharing-global-responsibilities>, accessed at 11<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>17</sup> Author's translation from Jim THOMAS, "Asigurătorul Asigurătorilor", in *Foreign Policy Romania*, no. 25, November/December 2011, p. 46.

<sup>18</sup> *EU Relations with Mali*, <http://eeas.europa.eu/mali/>, accessed at 17<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>20</sup> Council of the European Union, *EU training mission in Mali launched*, Brussels, 18 February 2013, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/df/135524.pdf>, accessed at 17<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>21</sup> Stefan FÜLE, Speech – *EU - Turkey bound together*, June, 7<sup>th</sup>, 2013, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-13-517\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-517_en.htm).

<sup>22</sup> For details, see Cristina BOGZEANU, *Evoluția mediului de securitate din Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre și influența acesteia asupra configurării Forțelor Navale ale României pe termen mediu și lung*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 33-39.

<sup>23</sup> Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER, "Two NATOs in One", 5 June 2012, <http://we-nato.org/2012/06/05/two-natos-in-one/>, accessed at 12<sup>th</sup> July 2012.

<sup>24</sup> Nicola CASARINI, "The European pivot", [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Asia.pdf), March 2013, accessed at 15<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

<sup>25</sup> Hillary CLINTON, *US and Europe: A revitalized global partnership*, speech held at Brookings Institute on 29<sup>th</sup> November 2012, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/11/201223.htm>, accessed at 30<sup>th</sup> November 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Jim THOMAS, *op. cit.*



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- 7.\*\*\*, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World*, 11<sup>th</sup> December 2008, Brussels, p. 2, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf), accessed at 19<sup>th</sup> September 2013.
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# BRICS – A HOMOGENOUS GROUP OR JUST SOME COMMON INTERESTS?

*Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD.\**

*BRICS had received, even before South Africa's joining, an important role on the world stage: to transform the international system from a predominantly unipolar one dominated by the U.S., in a multipolar one. Analyzing the socio-economic and military characteristics of the BRICS countries, one might notice that the differences between them are obvious, and in this context, the author intends to study and clarify inconsistencies between the desire to set up a homogeneous group, with one strong voice, and the different, often conflicting, characteristics and interests of the Member States.*

**Keywords:** *unipolarity, multipolarity, homogeneity, common interests, security, national defence, BRICS.*

## Introduction

Over a decade ago, Jim O'Neill, a Goldman Sachs analyst, introduced the term BRIC in the analysis of investment opportunities in the developing economies. He predicted that, in ten years, the share of BRIC countries, especially China, in world GDP will increase, giving rise to new important aspects of the overall economic impact of fiscal and monetary policies of these countries<sup>1</sup>. In this regard, O'Neill recommends reorganizing the global decision-making fora, especially G7, to include representatives of BRIC. The acronym obviously refers to Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China; in 2011, South Africa joined this 2008 created forum (BRIC became BRICS) dedicated to debating issues related to the relevance of those countries as emerging major economic powers. This status is related to an equally important role: to transform the international system from a predominantly unipolar one, clearly dominated by the U.S., in a multipolar one.

Even if, in our opinion, this role is far too ambitious for most of the countries of this group, in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup>

Century can not be denied the existence of an upward trend in the BRICS economies, which sends the idea of their development as a great power, since economy is one of the most important components of a country's power. It is obvious that as one country develops its economic power, it tends to develop also the military component of power, so as to protect its own interests and expand its international influence. In this respect, the most frequently appealed examples are the ones of China and India, which illustrate, on the one hand, the so argued power transfer from the Western to the Eastern hemisphere and, on the other hand, the security aspirations of the Asian countries.

About four years ago, the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in Belgium edited the Report "A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe, and the Coming Order" making an obvious reference to the meaning of the word *brick*. The author of the report, Thomas Renard, demonstrates using a coherent scientific framework that behind the BRIC acronym is a more important story – that of China, which, due to the global economic crisis, has built an image of key global economic player that holds the ability to challenge the international status of U.S. in the next years. Regarding India, Renard believes that it follows the Chinese model, but at a more slowly and less spectacular pace, while Russia and Brazil are "the least emerging" powers<sup>2</sup>. The author brings into attention the possible affiliation of South Africa to the BRIC<sup>3</sup> (the report was published in 2009) by stating that the multipolar order involves the emergence of new poles of power, thus recognizing the role that this country plays globally.

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In the same period of time, in 2010, Indian experts Nandan Unnikrishnan and Samir Saran published the paper “BRIC in the New World Order – Perspectives of Brazil, China, India and Russia”<sup>4</sup> stating that “the BRIC countries are today an increasingly cohesive group of nations with a common vision and shared commitment to collaborate and shape a more equitable and prosperous world order”<sup>5</sup>. Therefore, the image of BRIC (BRICS) ranges from a group led actually by China, which aims to fulfil its own interests, to a homogeneous group dedicated to world peace and security. In our opinion, BRICS is, in fact, placed between the two extreme approaches, and in the following, we will analyze the economic and military dimensions of those countries in order to

clarify some inconsistencies between the simplistic image of a relatively homogeneous group and the visible differences between BRICS countries both in terms of socio-economic and military indicators and in terms of international status and role.

### 1. Is there a relatively homogeneous group when there are significant differences in terms of GDP, population and defence spending?

Currently, the GDP of the five BRICS countries represent about 38% of global GDP, comparable with the aggregate GDPs of the U.S., Germany, Great Britain and France (Figure no. 1) that are already holding the status of superpower (U.S.), respectively great powers (the other three countries).




Figure no. 1: Gross domestic product in the world and in the BRICS countries as 2012<sup>6</sup>

China emerges clearly from this group of countries, with a GDP of over 12 trillion USD for a population of over 1.3 billion inhabitants and an area of 9,596,961 km<sup>2</sup>. Although India's population number is comparable to the one of China (1.2 billion) but its area is about three times smaller, its GDP is three times smaller than the one of China. A greater difference in terms of GDP is between China and Russia, the latter having a GDP of about five times lower in a population of 142,500,482 inhabitants and an area of 17,098,242 km<sup>2</sup>. However, in terms of income per capita, Russia is highlighted with 17,000 USD/capita, followed by Brazil – 12,000 USD/capita, South Africa – 11,300

USD/capita, China – 9,100 USD/capita and India – 3,900 USD/capita. To a large extent, it is rather artificial to rank South Africa third in the BRICS group in terms of income per capita, since its population under the poverty line is estimated at 31.3% of the total, while for China, the statistics provide a rate of only 13.4%, comparable to that of Russia (12.7%) whose income per capita is about two times higher than Chinese one.<sup>7</sup>

The prospect of these countries for 2013 is no longer characterized by the same optimism that led Jim O'Neill to place BRIC (BRICS) at the international table of economic and financial decisions.






There is a slowdown in the economic growth that has propelled them over a decade ago in the group of emerging powers: at the beginning of 2013, China seems to have difficulties in reaching the official target of 7.5% growth and the growth rate of the Indian economy (about 5%), of the Brazilian (approximately 2.5%) and the Russian (about 2.5%) ones are not even half of that recorded during the economic boom<sup>8</sup>. Analysts note that the era of emerging markets ended and the potential growth of

these countries will be much slower, with a profound long term impact on the world economy<sup>9</sup>.

Beyond this situation caused by the persistence of the economic and financial crisis, but also beyond the image they have internationally, the statistical analysis shows that Russia and China could be considered as the main actors inside BRICS group of countries. In addition, the two countries stand out from the group in terms of defence spending, as can be seen in Fig. no. 2.




**Figure no. 2: Defence spending as a percentage of GDP in the BRICS countries as 2012<sup>10</sup>**

Even though, in terms of the amount allocated for defence, Russia is surpassed by India with 86 billion USD to 75 billion USD, the situation changes when

calculating the amount of spending for defence/capita, as can be seen from Figure no. 3.

Another indicator showing how these countries



**Figure no. 3: Defence spending per capita in BRICS countries as 2012<sup>11</sup>**

address the issue of national security and defence is the distribution of defence spending by category. The public statistics<sup>12</sup> identify four main categories:

procurement; research, development, test and evaluation; military personnel; operations and maintenance.




Figure no. 4. Main categories of defence spending in BRICS countries as 2012<sup>13</sup>

The large differences between the four countries (Figure no. 4) are the result of the fact that the percentage allocated to each category of spending varies from country to country, depending on several variables such as: the number of forces; defence budget; main activities and areas of interest of the institutions of the defence system; defence strategic vision, etc.

Therefore, it is obvious that one cannot talk about homogeneity in a group characterized by significant differences between its members that are revealed by the analysis of socio-economic and military indicators. Still, the differences do not impede the limited work of the group such as debates, the willingness to create a new development bank<sup>14</sup> and the joint military exercises. We could compare this situation with the cases of UN, NATO or the EU, where the differences in development between Member States are more visible, though, we must stress that the level of institutionalization of the BRICS – as a form of cooperation – is significantly lower than the one of the three international organizations.

## 2. BRICS approach on defence and security

BRICS has not developed its own military cooperation mechanisms, but the five countries' representatives meet in a multilateral framework to debate security issues, such as strategic stability, regional and international security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and solving regional conflicts. In addition, according to the official statements, the BRICS countries coordinate their efforts to strengthen the UN's role in combating international terrorism, implementing the Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism, the counter-terrorism conventions and the UN Security Council resolutions<sup>15</sup>. Other areas of cooperation between the five countries are information security and the fight

against piracy, the latter because each of the BRICS countries is or wants to be a maritime power<sup>16</sup>.

Beyond common statements relating to security, each of the countries in question has its own vision of national defence and security that is established by both the international statute and role each of them holds. The white papers of defence and security, alongside the Armed Forces branches and number, are a significant element of the analysis regarding the approach on national defence, along with the categories and dimension of the Armed Forces. The differences between BRICS countries in terms of Armed Forces branches and number are significant: even if, from an economic point of view, there are common characteristics, there is no military homogeneity in this group as we are going to see in the following.

### 2.1. Brazil

#### Key-elements of national defence:

- Military branches: Army; Navy (includes Naval Air and Marine Corps); Air Force<sup>17</sup>;
- Military personnel: active – 318,500; paramilitary – 395,000; reserve – 1,340,000<sup>18</sup>;
- Main papers: Brazil National Defence Policy (2005); Brazil National Strategy of Defence (2008); White Paper on National Defence (2012);
- Key-issues: guaranteeing sovereignty, territorial integrity and national heritage; defending Brazil's national interests, citizens, goods and resources; helping to preserve national cohesion and unity, regional stability and international peace and security; increased involvement in the international arena, especially in the decision-making process; maintaining modern, integrated, trained and balanced Armed Forces; increasing the level of forces professionalization; awareness of Brazilian society about the importance of national defence issues; development of the defence industry in order to obtain autonomy



regarding essential technologies; organizing the Armed Forces; structuring the Armed Forces based on capabilities, endowing them with personnel and equipment consistent with the strategic and operational planning; developing the potential of defence logistics and national mobilization<sup>19</sup>.

The approach on defence is focused on the idea that Brazil is traditionally a supporting peace country. Regarding the principles that guide its foreign affairs, Brazil adopts a non-interventionist posture in defence of peace and peaceful resolution of conflict<sup>20</sup>.

The National Strategy of Defence is considered inseparable from the National Development Strategy, the latter leading to the first one, which, in turn, provides protection to implement the latter.

The strategy is three-pronged: the organization of Armed Forces in order to meet more efficient the constitutional mandate and missions in peacetime and war; the reorganization of the defence industry to meet the forces needs; the re-evaluation of the conscription in order to operate as a republican space in which the nation is above social stratification<sup>21</sup>.

The newest defence policy document, the White Paper on National Defence (July 2012), reaffirms the principle of non-intervention; Brazil's foreign policy is directed towards immediate geopolitical neighbourhood: South America, the South Atlantic Ocean and the West Coast of Africa. Security issues that concern the Euro-Atlantic actors for over a decade – drug trafficking, piracy, cyber threats, international terrorism, resource conflicts etc. – are considered “new issues” whose importance is not specified<sup>22</sup>.

In the regional context, Brazil is regarded as the most capable military power that continues to develop its Armed Forces and, in particular, power projection capability.

### **2.2. Russian Federation**

#### *Key-elements of national defence:*

- Military branches: Ground Forces; Navy; Air Forces; Airborne Troops; Strategic Rocket Troops; Aerospace Defence Troops<sup>23</sup>;

- Military personnel: active – 845,000; paramilitary – 519,000; reserve – 20,000,000<sup>24</sup>;

- Main papers: The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010); Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020 (2009);

- Key-issues: national defence, state and social security as main national security priorities; preventing global and regional wars and conflicts; strategic deterrence in the interest of Russia's military security; achieving national defence on the basis of principles of reasonable sufficiency and effectiveness, including means of non-military response, mechanisms of public diplomacy and peacekeeping, and international military cooperation; achieving military security by developing and improving the military organization and state's defensive potential<sup>25</sup>; neutralization of possible military threats using non-military means; maintaining strategic stability and nuclear deterrence potential at an appropriate level; maintaining the Armed Forces and other troops at the required level of combat readiness; strengthening the collective security system in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; participation in international peacekeeping activities; participation in the fight against international terrorism; reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD against Russia and its allies, but also in the case of an aggression against the Russian Federation involving conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state<sup>26</sup>.

Even if it is included in the debate on the distribution of power in the world alongside Brazil, India, China and South Africa, the Russian Federation remains, at least by the promoted image, the main international actor considered the counterpart to NATO, the EU and the U.S. Moreover, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010) identifies as the main external military threat the desire to give to the force potential of NATO a number of global functions that contravene international norms and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to Russian borders, including by the expansion of the block<sup>27</sup>.

Other threats to Federation's security are considered the following: the attempts to destabilize the states and regions situation and to undermine the strategic stability; the deployment (buildup) of troops contingents of foreign states or groups of states on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies and in adjacent waters; the creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems that undermine the global stability and violate the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere; the militarization of outerspace and the deployment of



strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems; territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and the interference in their internal affairs; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missiles technologies, and the increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons; the violation of international agreements by states and the non-compliance with arms limitation and reduction international treaties; the use of military force on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law; the presence or the emergence of some armed conflict hot spots and the escalation of such conflicts on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies; the spread of international terrorism; the emergence of interethnic and interfaith tensions hot spots, of the activity of international armed radical groups in the areas adjacent to the state borders of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies; the presence of territorial contradictions and the growth of separatism and violent extremism in some parts of the world<sup>28</sup>.

### 2.3. India

*Key-elements of national defence:*

- Military branches: Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard<sup>29</sup>;
- Military personnel: active - 1,325,000; paramilitary – 1,322,150; reserve – 1,155,000<sup>30</sup>;
- Main papers: Indian Army Doctrine (2004), the annual reports of the Ministry of Defence;
- Key-issues: preservation of national interests and safeguarding sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India against any external threats by deterrence or by waging war<sup>31</sup>; contribution to global and regional peace and stability; strengthening India's participation in multilateral institutions; deepening India's strategic partnerships with various countries; development of active and collaborative engagements with India's neighbours in order to promote mutual understanding and regional peace and stability; defending the country in front of external and internal threats<sup>32</sup>.

Unlike the other four countries, India does not have a strategic review process in the traditional sense, similar to Western one, but it does mean that its security and national defence objectives are not clearly delineated, and the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence is considered the main document program in this area. Some theoreticians, such as Raja Mohan<sup>33</sup>, argue the Indian Grand Strategy must be understood as three concentric

circles: immediate South Asian neighbourhood, the extended neighbourhood and the global level.

The Grand Strategy aims in particular the last two levels where India wants to extend its sphere of influence through trade and economic integration, the projection of soft power, balancing the increasingly numerous alliances and complex and increasing role in shaping the international system. Mohan argues that the first circle of immediate vicinity might be best described as a mix of different doctrines on military power, nuclear liability and relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan<sup>34</sup>.

India's immediate vicinity is a widely debated topic of the international community, especially through the so-called *Cold Start* military doctrine – the existence of which is denied by India – that envisages a possible war with Pakistan.

Regarding the nuclear issue, India states that it plans to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent and commits itself not to use nuclear weapons first.

### 2.4. China

*Key-elements of national defence:*

- Military branches: People's Liberation Army (Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery Corps); People's Armed Forces; People's Liberation Army Reserve Force<sup>35</sup>;
- Military personnel: active – 2,285,000; paramilitary – 660,000; reserve – 510,000<sup>36</sup>;
- Main papers: The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces (2013); National Defence White Paper (2011);
- Key-issues: national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; support the peaceful development of the country; obtaining victory in local wars under conditions of informatization, expansion and intensification of military training; self-adapting the Armed Forces to new security threats (formulating comprehensive security concept); efficient management of operations other than war; expanding cooperation in support of security and international obligations as an initiator, facilitator and participant in various forms of international cooperation<sup>37</sup>.

China's national defence policy is, as authorities say, purely defensive and for its modernization is being implemented a three-step development strategy involving: the informatization of national defence and Armed Forces; the overall planning of economic development and national defence; intensification of national defence and Armed Forces reform in order to develop, until 2020, a complete set of scientific models of organization,



institutions and ways of cooperation specific to China, but also in accordance with the laws governing the construction of modern armed forces.<sup>38</sup>

At the same time, at the level of military strategy, China promotes an active defence based on a set of recommendations, taking into account both the evolution of modern warfare and the main threats that could arise and face the Republic.

Main coordinates of the recommendations set concern one again the victory in local wars under conditions of informatization, but also the deterrence of crises and wars, improving capabilities of the Armed Forces to counter various security threats and carrying out a variety of military missions.

At the same time, it is still retained the strategic concept of People's War, but with changes in content and form to aim at public participation in the war and support for the front, and the development of new informatization strategies and tactics. Regarding the nuclear weapons, China declares that remains consistent to the principle of not using nuclear weapons first, applying a nuclear strategy of self-defence and not entering the arms race with any other country.<sup>39</sup>

### **2.5. South Africa**

*Key-elements of national defence:*

- Military branches: National Defence Force (Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Operations Command, Military Intelligence, Military Health Services)<sup>40</sup>;

- Military personnel: active – 62,100; reserve – 15,050<sup>41</sup>;

- Main papers: South African Defence Review 2012-2013 (2013); Strategic Plan 2010/11-2012/13 (2012); Overarching Annual Strategic Statement (2012);

- Key-issues: state's sovereignty and territorial integrity; state's independence in the decision-making process on main prerogatives and international relations; providing internal and external security of fundamental resources such as minerals, energy and water; defusing any tense situations before giving rise to a dispute or conflict; resolution of disputes and conflicts by means of diplomacy, mediation or negotiation; developing and strengthening systems and means of regional and continental cooperation, including alliances and pacts, to reduce potential tensions and conflicts and increase the potential for peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts, etc.<sup>42</sup>

South Africa is considered the most important military power in sub-Saharan Africa. Strategic and operational concepts and doctrines are circumscribed to the principle of use of diplomatic means to resolve the crisis in a regional or multilateral context.

If military action is necessary, the operations will be conducted with balanced forces that are tailored to each mission with specific objectives and short duration. South Africa prefers a multinational approach in dealing international security issues, but if needed, there are also supported the autonomous operations.<sup>43</sup>

### **2.6. BRICS and Peace Operations**

In terms of actual contribution to peace missions, in 2012, each BRICS country was contributing to UN operations or other type of operations, as follows:

- *Brazilia:* Western Sahara (UN), Liberia (UN), South Sudan (UN), Côte d'Ivoire (UN), Sudan (UN), Haiti (UN), East Timor (UN), Cyprus (UN), Lebanon (UN);

- *Russian Federation:* Armenia (Russian Federation), Belarus (Russian Federation), Côte d'Ivoire (UN), D. R.Congo (UN), Georgia (Russian Federation), Gulf of Aden (Russian Federation), Kazakhstan (Russian Federation), Kyrgyzstan (Russian Federation), Liberia (UN), Middle East (UN), Moldova/Transdnistria (Russian Federation), South Sudan (UN), Sudan (UN), Syria (Russian Federation), Tajikistan (Russian Federation), Ukraine (Russian Federation), Western Sahara (UN);

- *India:* Afghanistan (India), Côte d'Ivoire (UN), D.R. Congo (UN), Gulf of Aden (India), Lebanon (UN), South Sudan (UN), Sudan (UN), Syria/Israel (UN);

- *China:* Côte d'Ivoire (UN), Cyprus (UN), D.R. Congo (UN), Gulf of Aden (China), Lebanon (UN), Liberia (UN), Middle East (UN), South Sudan (UN), Sudan (UN), East Timor (UN), Western Sahara (UN);

- *South Africa:* D. R. Congo (UN), Mozambique (South Africa), Sudan (UN).<sup>44</sup>

The analysis of the five countries involvement in peace operations reveals that they can be considered, simultaneously, both actors wishing to preserve the existing status in intervention areas and critical actors acting by their local, regional or global interests and by specific rules, ideological preferences, historical experiences related to war, peace and development<sup>45</sup>.



However, despite political, economic, social and military differences between the five countries, they share a similar vision of a multipolar international system. Also, these countries are involved in UN peace operations; in 2011 their contribution was around 15% of all civilian and military personnel involved in these operations: China is one of the ten largest financial contributors and 15<sup>th</sup> human resource provider; Russia is the 11<sup>th</sup> financial contributor and India is the world's third participant with troops to UN operations.<sup>46</sup>

Given the above parts, one can argue that, in terms of national defence, the five BRICS countries do not form a homogeneous group. The three giants – Russia, China and India – detach clearly from the other two countries from the viewpoint of military personnel due mostly to the increased population number and therefore larger military personnel selection based.

Also, even if one considers that military power is a result of economic power, and that these countries have similar growth in economic terms, China and India clearly stands out in terms of modernization rate of the Armed Forces<sup>47</sup>.

### Conclusions

The main conclusion that arises from the analysis above is that Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa constitute a group of multilateral cooperation for the formation of which the forecasts on their economic potential played a crucial role. At a closer look at the detail on the socio-economic and military characteristics of BRICS countries, the differences between them are obvious. Russian Federation, India and China are net highlights from Brazil and, especially, South Africa, both economically and militarily.

Moreover, there is disagreement between them on issues such as UN reform (Russia and China are permanent members of the Security Council, while India, Brazil and South Africa aspires to that status) and historical disputes (China - India and China - Russia).

Although BRICS is actually a heterogeneous group, there can be identified some common interests that are circumscribed to the power game aimed at strengthening international multipolarity along with the transfer of power from the Western to the Eastern hemisphere. Currently, there are many views on the current International System that is defined as multipolar or as polycentric, nonpolar or even uni-multipolar, while keeping heated the debate on whether to stop using the term superpower.

In all these debates, especially the ones regarding multipolarity and uni-multipolarity, BRICS – as separate states, but united by a number of common interests – is central, despite the fact that differences between the five countries are obvious and, moreover, are accompanied by disagreements between some of them that seem to be irreconcilable.

In this context, BRICS as a forum will continue to operate at a formal level, but as long as at least three of the five members have independent aspirations in terms of great power status, the group will fail to achieve any degree of homogeneity or consistency in their actions with visible results as stated in BRICS summits so far.

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# IRANIAN INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR CONTRADICTIONARY CHARACTER

*Eubomír ČECH, PhD.\**

*The long common history of Iran and Afghanistan is linked with their cultural vicinity and interconnection. Afghanistan and Iran are partially connected, due to the similarity of languages and Shia religion. Furthermore, both countries are linked also due to a large number of Afghan refugees that emigrated to Iran after 1979, when the war started. Furthermore, there are also Iranian political, ideological, economic and security interests in their eastern neighbouring country, which Iran demonstrates in various ways. One can notice a certain contradiction. On one hand, they fuel with weapons the Sunni Taliban, on the other hand, they belong to the group of countries that spend enormous investment for the recovery of Afghanistan, especially to its western part. This contradictory tactic of Iran gives the impression that they are not clear about their strategic interests in Afghanistan. Iranian engagement in Afghanistan does not have the same stimulus as their activities in neighbouring Iraq. Iran fears the collapsing state in their neighbourhood and the effect it may have on Iran's domestic policy. Based on the historical background of the relations, the article reflects the nature of Iranian "whip and sugar" policy towards their eastern neighbour. A policy which can hardly be considered balanced.*

**Keywords:** national interests, bilateral relations, common historical heritage, unequal status, unstable neighbouring state, infiltration, Talib.

## Introduction

Persia (as the predecessor of Iran, after 1935) has boasted in the past several times with its powerful

status. In the modern history, it acts rather as a country that has to deal with multiple threats towards its stability and security. At present, Iran (officially Islamic Republic of Iran – *Džomhúri-je eslámi-je Írán*) claims its status of regional power, while its policy is orientated in four directions: Turkey and Southern Caucasus, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Central Asia – Afghanistan, South Asia (Pakistan and India).

This study particularly focuses on the third direction, which has acquired significance especially after the end of Cold War and when it was necessary to deal with the question of defining the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and their neighbouring countries in the north and east. However, their relations with Afghanistan are rather peculiar, as will be shown throughout the paper.

The presence of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first ten years of the new millennium was perceived in Tehran with a certain amount of nervousness. It has been interpreted as a threat towards the Islamic Republic of Iran<sup>1</sup>, which, in my opinion, can, in certain situations, result in a military conflict. The United States have not been hiding that Iran is in the centre of their foreign policy interests. Iran neighbours upon Pakistan and Afghanistan, i.e. according to the USA, with states forming the main front of the so-called „war on terrorism”.

In general, it is not a secret that Tehran educates, supplies and trains Shia fighters for actions in Iraq. We suppose they have lately been using the same tactic also in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A strange situation of seemingly contradictory activities has occurred: on one hand, they were *supplying arms channels* directed to the Sunni Taliban<sup>2</sup> (tying

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American forces in Afghanistan), on the other hand, the Iranians contribute with large investments into economic development and reconstruction of Afghanistan<sup>3</sup>, particularly in its western part, which they border upon.

The seemingly contradictory policy of Iran makes us think that it has not so obvious important strategic interests in Afghanistan. However, Iranian engagement in Afghanistan and their activities in Iraq do not have a common stimulus. If Iranian strategy towards Iraq is motivated by the efforts to complicate the plans of the USA and the West, then Iran is worried because of the collapsing Afghanistan and the effect of the impact on Iran's domestic policy. Iran's neighbourhood policy can be summed up by the words of the Russian academician Leonid Šerbašin: "Iranians are pragmatics... used to cheat on their partners. They care about their own interests rather than about the interests of the international society or the suffering humankind."<sup>4</sup>

Based on the historical background of the relations, the aim of this study is to present the reader Iranian activities in Afghanistan, define their goals and show the nature of Iranian "whip and sugar" policy towards their eastern neighbour.

### **1. Historical Background of Relations**

Iranian interests in Afghanistan are more than 2000 years old. They result not just from the centuries during which today's Afghanistan was under the dominion of Persia (with an emphasis on the strategic location of the town of Herat in western Afghanistan), but also from the continuous identifying of present-day Iranians with the achieved power and influence of the ancient Persian empire<sup>5</sup>.

During the reign of Cyrus the Great in Persia (Achaemenian dynasty, 559 – 530 B.C.), many Iranian tribes were united along with neighbouring countries<sup>6</sup>. The large empire spread from Greece and Egypt to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its fame faded away in 331 B.C., when it was defeated by the forces of Alexander the Great within his huge eastern campaign.

During the next centuries, in the Persian territory various state structures arose and fell – some of them including the territory of today's Afghanistan. Parthian empire, as well as Sassanid rule included parts of Near East (from Mediterranean Sea) to Central Asia and today's India. The Persian dominion in the region lasted until the Arab raid. Until 644 A.D., Arab forces conquered major part of

Iran and Islam gradually gained in the region dominant position.

Further on, both domestic and foreign dynasties reigned in Persia. Iranians began to gain influence in the country during the Abbasid caliphate in the 8th century A.D. From the 9th to 10th centuries, the Samanid dynasty ruled in Afghanistan and brought Persian rule to the Afghan territory. In the 11th century, a Turkish dynasty took over the rule and two centuries later, the Mongols from the east came. In the 15th century, the town of Herat was the capital city of Jahan Shah – ruler of the Turkish dynasty Quara Qojunlu. At the beginning of the 16th century, Ismail I. – the founder of the Safavid dynasty – became the Shah. He converted Persians to shiitism. After his death, Tahmasp I. took over the rule at the age of just 10 years.

In spite of the fact that Persians had lost several eastern territories due to Uzbek raids, Tahmasp managed to repel the aggressor and gain control over Herat for some time. Later, between the 16th and 17th centuries, Shah Abbas reformed Persian army and continued in the war against Uzbeks with the aim to extend the reign of Safavids to the whole West Afghanistan. At the beginning of the 18th century, the reign of the Safavid dynasty declined. Influential Ghilzai and Abdali tribes in Afghanistan rebelled against Persian power.

The takeover by Qajar dynasty at the turn of the 18th and 19th century is connected with the rise of Iranian nationalism. When Iran started building institutions and structure typical for a national state, Shah Muhammad more and more claimed Herat. This was a completely different strategic situation in Central Asia, where particularly European colonial powers have for a longer time been struggling for their influence. British rulers of India were afraid of Russian imperial interests in India as well as the possible Iranian – Russian alliance in Afghanistan. As a result of British pressure, Shah Muhammad retreated from Afghan territory.

However, Qajar dynasty members did not give up their interest in Herat, which had strategic importance for them. The ruling dynasty was convinced that the acquirement of the town and its surrounding would grant them the advantage of the Massif, which would make it easier to protect Chorasani (an important agricultural area), holy town of Mashhad as well as surrounding centres from more and more destructive raids of Turkmen tribes. In October 1856, Iranian forces of Naser al-Din Shah conquered Herat. British reaction was immediate: 6000 British soldiers disembarked in



Iranian port Bushehr. The surprised Iranians agreed with the conditions of Parisian pact from 1857 and retreated from the Afghan territory.

Iran still claims Herat, considering it to be part of its historical and cultural heritage. The interconnection of Iran with their eastern neighbour is not just of historical character. Most Afghan people are connected with Persians both by blood and ethnolinguistic point of view, too. The biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan are Pashtuns (cca 45%) – sometimes incorrectly considered the only genuine Afghans. But there are also other ethnic groups having bloodlines with Iranian Persians. The biggest are Tadjiks (cca 38%) and Hazaras (cca 10%). There are also some smaller groups such as Baloch people and Nuristanis. Approximately 50% of all Afghan people speak Dari – Afghan Persian language, which is one of the two official languages in Afghanistan (the other one being Pashto).

Since the unfortunate British – Iranian war at the middle of XIX<sup>th</sup> century, there were no more attempts of Teheran to gain control over the western Afghan territory. Until the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, both countries had similar interests, allowing them to cooperate.

### 2. Situation after Iranian Islamic Revolution

More significant engagement of present-day Iranian regime in Afghanistan can be noticed at the beginning of the 80s, when the Islamic Republic of Iran supported the anti-Taliban revolt and religious and ethnically close minorities against Sunni radicalism. The tension between the two states escalated in 1998, when Taliban after conquering the town of Mazar i-Sharif in the north of Afghanistan murdered several Iranian diplomats. Iranian reaction to this event was a large military exercise with almost 300 000 soldiers participating and this situation almost resulted in war<sup>7</sup>.

After the 9/11 events in the USA and the consequent allied invasion in 2001, Iran maintained its contacts with a number of armed groups and even started supporting other groups that began to occur. This strategy served Iran to maintain their influence in Afghanistan, and at the same time, it was a tool of activities against the United States. Iran's worries about the American military presence in the West (Iraq) and in the East (Afghanistan) gave rise, in my opinion, to considerable frustration. Because of the fear that pro-American Afghanistan could offer Americans important military and strategic

opportunities, Teheran applied the strategy of supporting practically all significant anti-American armed groups in Afghanistan. Even though the ethnic and religious factor plays an important role in Iranian support, it turned out not the most important one. According to the American report on terrorism, Iran is willing to supply guns, ammunition and other military equipment to Sunni radical Pashtuns and to Taliban, who were former enemies regarding ideologic aspects<sup>8</sup>.

The most important way of supporting the anti-American rebels are primarily gun supplies and financial support. Since the 90s, in international politics, Iran is considered a pragmatic state, willing to sponsor any military or political structure who could serve their regional interest, especially regarding the limitation of external influence, primarily American, at their frontiers.

This is particularly the case of Taliban and Pashtun groups connected to them. Paradoxically, US allies – Saudi Arabia<sup>9</sup> and Pakistan – are among their supporters. Pakistan, with their secret service ISI, in the mid 90s, helped train Taliban in the Pakistani refugee camps<sup>10</sup>. Iranian activities are thus some form of compensation for the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani force within the competition for regional leadership.

At the beginning, not much has been known about the origin of guns that emerged in Afghanistan. However, it was obvious that the guns got there via Iran. Those were handguns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and plastic explosives. The reactions and commentaries of American military representatives were at the beginning very careful – the comments implied that “the guns might have been manufactured in Iran“. Later, the comments referred to the Taliban leaders who reportedly admitted these gun supplies, including heavy guns. Some information on Iranian gun supplies was later confirmed due to the serial numbers of guns and their parts. In spite of that, the gun supplies for Taliban are not as huge as the supplies for other groups (ethnically and religiously closer). It is largely affected also by logistic problems that occur when it is necessary to transport goods through the whole territory of Afghanistan to areas controlled by Taliban. The far more convenient route for Taliban supplies leads right from Pakistan, which is easier, due to the strong mutual ties and ethnic identity of Pashtuns on both sides of the border<sup>11</sup>. Iran is cautious about supplying Taliban, which is partially influenced by



the fact that Iran does not want Taliban become the strongest and best equipped group in Afghanistan again. From Iran's point of view, it seems best to maintain power of Taliban just to allow them to effectively weaken American position in country. It is definitely not for Iran's sake to reestablish Taliban regime<sup>12</sup>. According to this idea, we can assume that as soon as western forces retreat from Afghanistan, Iranian support for Sunni Pashtuns will be interrupted and this support will be even more focused on other preferred powers in the country.

There is a similar case of supporting Galbuddin Hekmatyar<sup>13</sup>, who has had good relations with Iran. In 1997, Hekmatyar fled from Taliban to the neighbouring country – Iran, where in Teheran he found a safe refuge. Iranian government has since then considered him a “useful Pashtun”, who returned to Afghanistan in 2002 and joined the active fight against the United States<sup>10</sup>. His group is an important receiver of Iranian support, but Hekmatyar, as well as Taliban, is a pragmatic player, more Pakistan-oriented and acting far from Iranian – Afghan border. His position and activities are far more dependent on grants from the Pakistani side than from Iranian side. In this case, we can likewise assume that after the retreat of coalition forces from Afghanistan, his cooperation with Iran will significantly decline. Hekmatyar has been cooperating with Iran on guns supplies, ammunition and other military equipment, but unlike other Afghan warlords, he has not been participating in the active drug dealing<sup>14</sup>.

Iran has been supporting also other groups, networks and individuals in Afghanistan. These are especially Tadjik and Hazar community, due to their religious and ethnic closeness. Iran has had the biggest influence in the long term in Herat province, but we should not underestimate its influence also in the centre in Kabul. Iranians have been building loyalty and cooperation with high government officials, particularly by means of financial stimuli. For example, officials from the Afghan president's Office receive, according to Iranian sources, 2 million euro per year. It is obvious that this financial stimulus affects (directly or indirectly) the president himself in his decision-making process and approach<sup>15</sup>.

Another means of Iranian influence in Afghanistan was also one of the Iranian allies, Burhanuddin Rabbani, ethnic Tadjik, former Afghan president, fighter against Taliban and a frequent visitor to Iran. He had strong ties to Iranian regime and his Office in the centre of Teheran was paid and even protected by Iranian government. His murder in 2011 caused a big fuss there and meant

a significant loss for the power of Iran in Afghanistan. In this context, there were many speculations that Rabbani's death could have been a product of Iranian – Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan.

A more significant penetration of Iran in Afghanistan occurred after the fall of Taliban, however, since then Iran has been cooperating with several organizations: with the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan – an organization fighting against Taliban, with Shiite guerrillas *Harakt-i-Islami* (Islamic movement), *Hezb-i-Wahdat*, *Hezb-i-Wahdat-e Islami*, *Shura-e-Itehad* (Union of Islamic Front), *Sazman-e Nasr* (Victory Organization) and *Sepah-i-Pasdaran* (Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution), with *Jumbesh-i-Melli Islami* (National Islamic Movement) representing Uzbek and Turkmeni minority, but also with Sunni guerrillas from Pakistan *Hezb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party).

Influential receivers of Iranian financial support and important allies in Afghan policy of Teheran are Ismail Khan, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Sayed Hussain Anwari, Daud Saba or Muhammad Asif Muhsini. Ismail Khan is, at present, probably the most important ally of Iran in Afghanistan. This ethnic Tajik and former commander of anti-taliban Northern alliance has been taking Iranian support for a longer time. He is the head warlord in the Herat Province and Minister of Water and Energy of the Kabul central government at the same time. He is often nicknamed Iranian president in relation to his strong orientation towards his western neighbour<sup>16</sup>. In our opinion, is more than probable that Khan himself is going to be the most important man in Afghanistan after the retreat of coalition forces from the country.

Another mentioned ally is Mohammad Mohaqiq, currently a Member of Parliament, the founder and chairman of the People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan. He is the unofficial leader of the Hazara people. When he held the post of Vice-president, he significantly represented Iran's interests, which was one of the reasons of the tension between him and president Karzai.

Sayed Hussain Anwari is Shi'ite Hazara, currently a Member of Parliament and former governor of Herat province. His ties to Iran rose in the course of the civil war, when he was the commander of the Northern Alliance. As the governor of Herat in the years 2005 to 2008<sup>17</sup> he became an important tool of Iranian activities in the province, as well as in the rest of the country. He



allowed many Iranian companies to make business and invest in Herat. The same applies for Daud Saba, Anwari's follower on the post of the governor of Herat. He is, in my opinion, an important ally of Tehran, with which cooperates closely, also trading with Iranian companies.

In the religious field, Asif Muhsini has been an important Iranian tool in Afghanistan. Muhammad Asif Muhsini, Tajik shi'a marja, Ayattollah, who, despite his arguments with the Ayattollah Khomeini in the 80s, was the key pro-Iranian religious authority. Religion plays an important role in Afghanistan, in which Iran strengthens their power. The main Iranian religious organization acting in Afghanistan is the Imam Khomeini Emdad Committee (or Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation), which supports financially Shia advocates all over the world, providing they are willing to be loyal to Teheran. The Committee has its own sources to finance cultural and religious activities in Afghanistan – support for celebration of the Day of Assura<sup>18</sup>, building Shia mosques, religious schools and culture centres, teaching Farsi (Afghan Persian – second official language in the country) and Arabic or the printing and distribution of Quran. While Afghan religious representatives teach in these mosques and schools, they themselves have been educated in Iranian centres of Shia Islam in Qom or Mashad. Thus, they embody the will of Iranian religious representatives in Afghanistan<sup>19</sup>.

### 3. Iranian Economic Support for Afghanistan

Iran has participated in reconstruction of Afghanistan and enhanced the economic and cultural diversity within the investments in their Eastern neighbour. The investments flew into Afghan public administration, infrastructure, power engineering, agriculture, healthcare and communication.<sup>20</sup> According to the American Congressional Research Service, the government in Tehran offered Afghanistan in 2001 humanitarian aid also in form of fuel and transport totalling 500 million dollars.<sup>21</sup>

In 2009, Iran was the fourth biggest source of direct foreign investments in Afghanistan. Iran belongs to the main business partners of the country (along with the USA, Pakistan, India, Russia and Germany)<sup>22</sup>. The value of the official Iranian – Afghan trade exchange has been persistently growing. In 2001, it was just 10 million USD, while in 2006 up to 500 million USD.<sup>23</sup> Sales of goods grow largely due to 90% reduction of import duty, which was suggested by the government in Tehran. The activities of Tehran within the reconstruction of

one of the poorest countries in the world is supposed to prevent the collapse of Afghanistan as a state. A neighbour like that would for Iran (coping with their own economic and social problems) be the source of even bigger wave of refugees and threat in form of organized crime and drugs.

It is worth mentioning that most of the Iranian investments in Afghanistan is in three border provinces – Herat, Farah and Nimroz and includes infrastructural projects, roads and bridges construction, education, power engineering and telecommunication. Iran has been building 176km section of railway to Herat, modernizing custom-houses, interconnection of Iranian docks Chabahr with Kandahar and Kabul<sup>24</sup>. The biggest Iranian car factory *Iran Khodro* has announced investments up to 20 million for the construction of car factory in Herat. Moreover, Iran has opened Chamber of Commerce for faster and easier business contacts. A new branch of Firdausi University of Mashhad will soon be opened in Herat<sup>25</sup>.

Tehran's goal is not just the reconstruction, but also integration of border provinces of Afghanistan into the infrastructure and trade of Iran. When the planned projects in Herat, Farah and Nimroz provinces are finished, this Afghan territory will be more integrated with the Western neighbour than the rest of Afghanistan<sup>26</sup>.

Economic development of these border areas of Iran is also supposed to enhance the security situation in this area. First, there is supposed to be a new buffer zone to divide Iran from unstable Afghan provinces. Thus, the protection of borders with Afghanistan is strengthened and, due to the war on drugs, a concrete wall along the 936 km long border with Afghanistan is being built. Finally, development assistance and investments are perfect coverage for Iranian secret service activities in the area which the strategic enemy of Iran – the United States of America – are interested in.

### 4. Herat Province in the Centre of Attention

As stated above, the biggest Iranian interest in Afghanistan is geographically focused on provinces bordering with Iran. Particular attention is paid to Herat province, which is closely connected to Iran (historically, ethnically, linguistically and religiously) and many Iranians even today consider it a part of Iran, which was annexed to Afghanistan only because of historical circumstances. Citizens of Herat speak modern Persian – *Farsi*, the form of which is almost



identical with common everyday language anywhere in Iran. They differ this way from the rest of Afghanistan, since *Dari* is, in many ways, different from Persian. The closeness of Herat province with Iranian province Khorasan is affected also by hundreds of years of migration, settling down and trade between both areas. People from Herat often work in Iran, study, trade, start families in the Iranian Mashad and send the earned money to their relatives in Afghanistan. Herat is, in general, considered one of the most democratic, most liberal and most suitable provinces for life in the whole Afghanistan. Iran has a big influence here due to money transfer and direct or indirect investments. They influence construction of schools, mosques, hospitals and administrative buildings. Finances are supplied from Tehran and projects are completed by Afghan engineers, who studied at Iranian technical universities.

Iran invests into the transport infrastructure of the province, too. They build road network, e.g. the route from Eslam Qal'eh at the Iranian border to the town of Herat, or they build roads heading to the South to an important Iranian port Chabahar. Recently, they have also built roads heading to the North and providing connection between Iran and Turkmenistan and especially with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan via Afghan territory. Large investments are spent in the development of railroads, while rail between Afghanistan and Iran represents a thoroughfare reaching as far as Persian Gulf and also the connection to European, Russian and Middle Asian railroad system. It is necessary to emphasize that everything is under control of Tehran<sup>27</sup>.

Except direct investments in infrastructure and constructions, Iran exports to Afghanistan large amounts of building material. In Herat province, they are the exclusive supplier of asphalt. Thanks to this, they participate not only in development of infrastructure, but they also have significant control over planning and execution.

Concerning Iran, it is a general fact that export of any kind of goods is very important. Without Iran, Herat and other areas would lack consumables, energy, machines and grocery. On a large scale, Iran supplies vehicles (such as the production of the car factory Iran Khodro and SAIPA), petrol, oil, grocery and medicines. Thanks to these supplies, Iran is very popular in Herat. They especially enjoy the favor of local governments, mayors, local elders, whom they regularly "reward" with a respective amount of money and thus gain their loyalty and goodwill, as well as the space for their own investments in the country. Another Iranian tool in the country are consulates. Their main official mission is to issue

visas to common Afghan people and businessmen. However, regarding the combination of two factors – big fluctuation of people from one state to another and permeability of borders – it is not a very popular service. Official issuance of visas lags behind the unofficial issuance or simple crossing the borders without any official permission. A far more important role of Iranian consulates in Afghanistan (especially in border provinces Herat and Nimroz) is what all consulates and embassies do – gaining information.

Similarly to other Muslim countries, another Iranian source of influence in Afghanistan are foundations (*wakf*). The two largest ones – *Bonyad-e Shahid* and *Bonyade-e Mostazafan*<sup>28</sup> directly or indirectly participate in investments in infrastructure, building material supplies and energy. They are linked to many businessmen who create new companies with names and ownership structure independent from Iranian foundations, i.e. it is very difficult to prove their interconnection or participation of Iranian funds in the trade. This is how hundreds of companies act in Herat and other provinces. They participate in government (Afghan and Iranian) contracts, which are, in fact, run by Iranian foundations.<sup>29</sup>

### 5. Afghan Refugees Issue

Afghan refugees and seasonal workers present a problem which influences the relations between Tehran and Kabul in a negative way. The estimated number is 2.500.000 people<sup>30</sup>. Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Iran sees the main cause for this in the security and economic situation of Afghanistan<sup>31</sup>. Migration is made easier due to similar languages (*Dari* – Afghan Persian language) and common religion (*Shiism*), which is practised by groups of Afghan citizens.

In the past, especially in the 60s and 70s, migration was officially controlled. During the following two decades there were masses of Afghan war refugees running to Iran. However, since they did not have the official status of a refugee, any movement across the border was, at that time, considered a flow of illegal workers.

After the fall of Taliban in 2001, the phase of repatriation started. Yet, there were many burdens. From April to July 2007 approximately 130 000 Afghans were expelled from Iran. Because of international criticism, Iranian officials later reduced the speed of forced expulsions and in July 2007 they finally stopped<sup>32</sup>.



It is obvious that deportation policy regarding Afghan refugees was abused for propaganda and justifying homeland issues. The negative attitude of Iranian society towards Afghan refugees can still be seen in Tehran. The populist government of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad blamed the unstable neighbour for the economic crisis in Iran. The big noise about the issue of mass deportations of Afghan refugees was supposed to distract the public from the homeland economic problems<sup>33</sup>.

The policy of Afghan refugees deportations predominantly serves to create pressure on Afghan government, since Iran is well aware of the fact, that Afghanistan is not able to accept 2.5 million people. Accepting a bigger number of refugees would destabilize the situation of the Eastern neighbour of Iran. Tehran thus indicates that the key to security in the Western part of Afghanistan is in hands of Iran and not Washington. The tough policy towards refugees was supposed to get public support for the administration of Ahmadinejad. Criteria for Afghan refugees were therefore toughened, too. For example, their right of residence in several Iranian provinces and towns has been taken away<sup>34</sup>.

Negotiations and diplomatic manoeuvres may bring some results in the following years. Tehran alleviated the speed and course of the forced deportations. In spite of that, there was some information about deportations at the beginning of 2009 again. According to this information, there were 9000 deported Afghans in January and about 13 000 in April. In 2010, about 7500 Afghans returned from Iran. The next year, it was more than 15 000 people, while the main provinces where people returned to were Kabul (26%), Nangahar (14%), Herat (8%), Kandahar, Laghman, Balkh, Baghlan and Paktya (each 4%)<sup>35</sup>.

### 6. "Security Concerns"

The tension in the relations between Iran and the West has grown during the last 33 years. The overthrown Shah Pahlavi (ally of the USA) was replaced by the theocratic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was called by the United States "The Great Satan". The Americans reacted later on by including Iran among the states called "The Axis of Evil". The situation has got complicated after Iran agreed to follow their nuclear programme. But from the current Iranian government point of view, the roots of distrust towards the Western countries are still in the year 1953, when the Prime Minister of

Iran Mohammad Mosadegh was overthrown in a coup d'état orchestrated by the Great Britain and with the help of the USA. The pro-American Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was appointed head of government, against Iranian nationalists.

Thus, it is quite a logic explanation that the Iranian support for Afghan rebels is supposed to thwart the American plans of stabilizing the region. The presence of American and coalition forces near Iranian borders is in Tehran considered as an immediate threat of their national security. Providing training and equipment for rebels thwarts military forces and means of coalition. When we consider the fact that a similar tactics of support was chosen by Tehran also against Iranian rebels, the only conclusion is the Iranian strategy is to divert the military endeavour of coalition into a larger area. Instability in Iraq was beneficial also for Iran's economic goals. It caused the decline of Iraqi oil production, which consequently decreased its price on the world markets and Iran achieved superior profit.

Such explanation of Iranian strategy and attitude towards Afghanistan is not complete. Firstly, it does not consider the diversity of Iranian engagement in Afghan affairs that we tackled in the previous parts of this article. If Iran was interested just in distracting and weakening American and coalition forces, why would they search for such financial means to restore Afghanistan? Secondly, disregardless which government is in power in Tehran, it will have to deal with the same economic, ethnic, religious and social problems and challenges. Thus, to understand the Iranian interests in Afghanistan as a collapsing neighbouring country is more important<sup>36</sup>.

### 7. Afghan Factor as a Tool to Solve Iranian Problems

Generally speaking, any unstable state with a weak leadership and administration and permeable borders in the imminence is a problem. Such state can cause complications on the regional, and in some situations, also global scale. It can be the reason for conflicts, civil wars, refugee waves and consequent humanitarian crises needing to be solved by the forces of international society.

Experts argue about how to characterize the situation of Afghan state at present. The annual review by the organization Fund for Peace – by means of The Failed States Index – places



Afghanistan in 2013 on the 7th place in the ranking (out of 178 evaluated states) regarding the riskness and the possible unstable course of progress<sup>37</sup>. From this point of view, the Iranian concerns about their unstable neighbour are justified.

Iran uses their Afghan activities handily for their own inner political intentions. In the years 2001-2005, when the rise of oil prices allowed Iran to offer significant sources for the restoration of the country, there were better circumstances for economic consolidation and, therefore, also good conditions for refugees to return to Afghanistan. However, the rise of national income from the oil sale covered also deeper economic problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Oil and gas form approximately 80% of Iranian export and more than two thirds of national income. Energy sector did not stimulate the rise and creation of jobs of the whole society.

There are other export commodities, such as carpets and pistachios, nevertheless, those are not of big importance.

In relation to the situation in Afghanistan in the years 2003 – 2006, when Taliban began to obtain their lost positions again, the position of Iran, the neighbour of the biggest opium producer in the world, has also worsened. Iran is one of the countries most struck by the dramatic rise of opium production in Afghanistan after the year 2001. In the world ranking of drug addiction Iran takes the highest places.

In October 2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) research showed that there were at least 2 million people drug addicted in Iran. Iran receives 15% of world opium production and published data show that this number is still growing. Iranian borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan are very busy routes regarding drug smuggling. 60% of opium transported from Afghanistan crosses Iran<sup>38</sup>.

Teheran fights the violent groups of smugglers who move along the borders. They are often interconnected with armed groups from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The line between organized crime and extremist religious militants is getting thinner and thinner<sup>39</sup>. Hundreds of Iranian security agents were killed by smugglers.

In 2008, Iranians confiscated 1000 tons of drugs and spend 500 million USD every year on fighting the smuggling. Most of it is spent on building infrastructure around the borders and the training of customs officers. Lack of organs in Kabul to supervise the production and trade with opium and

unwillingness to cooperate and fight these phenomena complicate the normal neighbourhood relations between Iran and Afghanistan.

When Ahmadinejad took the Office and the situation in Afghanistan got less and less stable there was a significant turn in Iranian policy. The president used higher income from the energy sector to enhance the welfare of the poorest people. However, he did not do the most important thing; he did not take measures to eliminate unemployment<sup>40</sup>.

In 2007, Iranian administration realized that their economy needs radical reforms. There was an uncontrolled rise of contraband rise. Due to public expenditure rise, Tehran had a difficult task of reducing grants.

Also, because of an extreme rise of prices of common rice, the grant system for bakery products was supposed to be reformed so that it would work just for the poor and not for all citizens. Finally, this intention was not implemented. But there was a back-up plan in form of rationing of subsidized petrol.

While Ahmadinejad was the president, Iranian policy towards Afghanistan was influenced by several inner political factors. Afghanistan became a political scapegoat, which has been considered the cause of economic problems in Iran. At the same time, Iran's approach focused less on development and reconstruction of Afghanistan, but more on securing the border with the aim to stop drug trade.

Considering the Iranian worries about Afghan drugs, we may ask why does Iran supply guns to the same group that does not allow consumption of drugs in their own territory, but unscrupulously uses the incomes from growing and exporting drugs for their own goals.

Let us not forget that guns do not travel to border provinces Herat, Farah and Nimroz, but to the South to Kandahar and Helmand. By investing in the three provinces, Iran creates a buffer zone towards other Afghan provinces. This can definitely have effect on destabilization of the whole Afghanistan<sup>41</sup>.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is seriously interested in becoming the regional leader. Iranians are proud of their historical fame of Persian empires. Afghanistan as an unstable state can stir its ambitions.

Thus, Iran stands in front of a difficult task – find a compromise between a strong Afghanistan not threatening them with drugs and refugee waves and a reasonably weak Afghanistan to remain in a subordinate position towards Tehran.





### **8. Developmental Tendencies of the Situation**

Recent events in the political, economic and military field have doubted the ability and ideas of Iran regarding their policy towards Afghanistan. It was caused especially by the reduction in oil prices. In the recent years, this has caused more than 50% reduction of national income and has had a negative effect on unemployment (cca 17%) and inflation (cca 25%). Another factor Iran had to deal with was the pressure of international community in form of sanctions due to their nuclear programme. Last, but not least, it was the distrust in presidential election results, which finally drove the country in a dangerous turbulent position. Although things calmed down after the mass demonstrations, we cannot say that the situation was solved. It is just a question of time until the young frustrated society turns against their government again because of the worsening economic situation.

Another aspect of the support for Afghanistan remains questionable. Political promises will hardly be fulfilled if Iran does not have adequate economic potential. Economic crisis used up foreign currency reserves and the country will have to try harder to focus on their inner problems. President Ahmadinejad has fought for voters' trust by means of a stronger policy of subventions and grants. Afghan issue served him as one of the factors for justifying the homeland problems.

Hassan Rouhani won the presidential elections in June 2013. He is being presented as a moderate cleric who is tightly connected to the present day regime and also to the "father founder" of Islamic Republic of Iran – Ayatollah Khomeini, whose assistant he was. Hassan Rouhani represents rather hope than certainty of real significant change of Iranian policy. In spite of strong public mandate, he is not in the position of directly elected presidents of western political systems. Regarding the foreign affairs, including Iranian policy towards Afghanistan, this change could bring less populism and more pragmatism that is so necessary for solving bilateral relations, as well as regional problems, which are the subject of interest of both countries. During the inauguration of the new minister of foreign affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, Rouhani announced he was in favour of rhetoric change, which should be less confrontational. "Foreign policy is not pursued by repeating slogans," he stated about the harsh rhetoric of his predecessor Mahmud Ahmadinejad that led Iran into

isolation. Rouhani emphasized that foreign policy shall be used to gain recognition, which is necessary for Iran at present. He pointed out that "It does not mean that we give up our principles, we just change the method"; Iran will still advocate their interests, but "in an adequate and rational way"<sup>42</sup>.

Theoretically, it is possible that Iran agrees on negotiations with the USA and European countries. In this case, Iran could become the mediator in solving the Afghan issue and the main activator of Afghanistan's reconstruction. The USA and its allies could be able to perform the so-called trade strategy. Iranian offer would, therefore, occur along with the claim for consent for their nuclear programme.

### **Conclusions**

Iran's approach to their eastern neighbour has several aspects, which have one thing in common: following Iran's own national interests. The security aspect tries to undermine the American (and coalition) force in the country, since Iran considers them a significant security threat. Thus, on one hand, they agreed on a limited support for Sunii radicals from within Taliban, i.e. their religions and ideological enemies. On the other hand, they markedly support ethnically and religiously similar communities in Afghanistan, with whom they plan to cooperate after the retreat of American armed forces.

From the geographical point of view, Iranian influence focuses on the area of provinces close to Afghan border, while the biggest support is devoted to Herat province. However, Iranian influence is notable also on central level in Kabul. Investment and trade play an important role in enforcing Iranian influence in Afghanistan<sup>43</sup>.

It is not just the geographically and ethnically close border provinces where Iran dominates and stimulates economic, intellectual and spiritual growth of the citizens. This way, Iran obliges the citizens and strengthens their loyalty towards it at the expense of the more distant and ineffective centre in Kabul.

Afghanistan is important to Iran from economic and political perspectives because of the access to the states of Central Asia. In this context, an old situation is mentioned from the times of "The Great Game" – who controls Afghanistan, controls Central Asia. In the long term, Afghan territory may serve for Iran for the transport of energy to China, which is an



important purchaser of Iranian natural gas and oil.

Success of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the economic and political influence expansion to the East is yet more and more affected by the course of situation inside the country. Present-day political leaders of Iran apply the “whip and sugar” policy towards their neighbour for several reasons. Firstly, they care about stabilization and securing their own border. Afghan refugees distract the society from the inner economic problems. Secondly, with the policy of including border provinces under their influence, they try to weaken the power of central Kabul government. Although this attitude is far from friendly, it tries to distract people from their own problems.

In general, Iran contributes to the economic development and political stability in the region, however, Iranian activities play a rather minor role in the economic development of Afghanistan and its northern neighbours. This is caused, partially, by their own insufficient economy and partially by lack of experience of Iranian companies with investments in foreign projects.

For the citizens of Western provinces of Afghanistan, Iranian engagement definitely brings along a number of benefits which the central government in Kabul is not able to provide. On the other side, this also presents a negative factor for the stability of Afghanistan as a whole, because their central government is evidently weakened by foreign engagement, which on one hand provides financial aid, and, on the other hand, focuses on specific regions and pursues their own pragmatic strategic goals.

When we consider the Iranian engagement in support for anti-American and anti-Kabul militants, Iran undoubtedly represents at least a controversial element in building the Afghan state.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> The name of the Islamic Republic of Iran is connected to the revolution in 1979 (author's note).

<sup>2</sup> K. Jha LALIT, “Concern in US over increasing Iranian activity in Afghanistan”, in *Pajhwok Afghan News*, March 16, 2011, available at <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/03/16/concern-us-over-increasing-iranian-activity-afghanistan>; A. AIRAN, “Iran accused of supporting Afghan insurgents. Cultural and economic influence weighs heavily in country's control over militants”, Central Asia online, June 7, 2010, available at [http://centralasiaonline.com/en\\_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2010/06/07/feature-03](http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2010/06/07/feature-03)

<sup>3</sup> A. DZISIÓW-SZUSZCZYKIEWICZ, “Analiza nt. polityki Iranu wobec Afganistanu”, in *Biuro bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Departament Analiz Strategicznych*, p. 6, Warszawa, December 23, 2010, available at [www.bbn.gov.pl/.../AnalizaBBNntpolitykiIranuwob...](http://www.bbn.gov.pl/.../AnalizaBBNntpolitykiIranuwob...)

<sup>4</sup> K. MÓZOVÁ, “Teherán spája ideológiu a pragmatizmus”, in *Despite Borders – Central Eastern European Watch*, January 1, 2008, available at [http://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/mozova\\_iran\\_extremizmus-SK.pdf](http://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/mozova_iran_extremizmus-SK.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> M. AXWORTHY, *Dějiny Íránu. Říše ducha – od Zarathuštry po současnost*, Praha, Nakladatelství lidové noviny, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 17-22.

<sup>7</sup> “Iran army forces parade near Afghan border”, in *CNN World*, November 1, 1998, available at [http://articles.cnn.com/1998-1101/world/9811\\_01\\_iran.Wargames\\_1\\_afghan-border-official-iranian-news-agency-afghan-taliban?\\_s=PM:WORLD](http://articles.cnn.com/1998-1101/world/9811_01_iran.Wargames_1_afghan-border-official-iranian-news-agency-afghan-taliban?_s=PM:WORLD)

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<sup>12</sup> L. ČECH, *Regionálne aspekty a súvislosti medzinárodnopolitického vývoja Afganistanu*, Ekonom, Bratislava, 2011, pp. 80-88; 131.

<sup>13</sup> Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is ethnic Pashtun, who founded and lead the military organization and political party Hezb-e Islami, he was engaged in the war against the Soviet Union. In the course of the civil war, he strengthened his positions by violence and terror and when Taliban came to power, he emigrated to come back to the country again after the allied invasion and to lead war against the United States and the regime in Kabul, M. TAHIR, "Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Return to the Afghan Insurgency", in *Terrorism Monitor Volume*, 29.5.2008, roč. 6, č. 11, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/bprograms/gta/single/?tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=4951&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=167&no\\_ache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/bprograms/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4951&tx_ttnews[backPid]=167&no_ache=1), accessed at 2013-04-06.

<sup>14</sup> J. KRAUS, "Íránské aktivity v Afghánistánu: Konstruktivní nebo destruktivní přístup?", in *Defence & Strategy* online, 15.12.2012, vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 45-52, available at <http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2012/volna-tribuna/iranske-aktivity-v-afghanistanu.html>

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, pp. 46-50.

<sup>16</sup> T. JOHNSON, "Ismail Khan, Herat, and Iranian Influence" in *Strategic Insights*, July 2004, III, No. 7, available at [http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/34033/ichaptersection\\_singledocument/40df6437-bda6-40bb-9d07-0fc5cb4a2161/en/johnsonJul04.pdf](http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/34033/ichaptersection_singledocument/40df6437-bda6-40bb-9d07-0fc5cb4a2161/en/johnsonJul04.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Who is Who in Afghanistan, Afghan Biographies, Hussein Sayed Anwari, 23.7.2012, available at [http://www.afghanbios.info/index.php?option=com\\_afghanbios&id=186&task=...](http://www.afghanbios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=186&task=...), accessed at 2013-04-05

<sup>18</sup> Day of Assura is the most important celebration for Shi'as, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at the Battle of Karbala.

<sup>19</sup> A. MAJIDYAR, A. ALFONEH, "Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Imam Khomeini Relief Committee" in *Middle Eastern Outlook*, 2010, No. 4, available at <http://www.aei.org/files/2010/07/27/No-4-Middle-Eastern-Outlook-g.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> \*\*\*, "Iran Pledges Cooperation in Education Sector", *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 01-03-2007, available at [www.pajhwok.com](http://www.pajhwok.com)

<sup>21</sup> Council on Foreign Relation, March 30, 2009, available at [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org)

<sup>22</sup> M. MILANI, "Iran and Afghanistan", *The Iran Primer*, 2010, available at [www.iranprimer.usip.org](http://www.iranprimer.usip.org)

<sup>23</sup> B. MISZTAL, "Upadające państwo jako sąsiad", in *Sprawy polityczne*, no. 1 (I) jesień 2009, pp. 38-59.

<sup>24</sup> This route will make the distance from the area of Persian Gulf to Afghanistan 700km shorter and it will significantly reduce the importance of Karachi – Kandahar route, which is the traditional route from

Afghanistan to the international waters. For more information, see M. Milani.

<sup>25</sup> A. J. TELLIS, A. MUKHARJI (ed.), "Is a Regional Strategy Viable for Afghanistan?", 11-05-2010, available at [www.carnegieendowment.org](http://www.carnegieendowment.org)

<sup>26</sup> B. MISZTAL, "Upadające państwo jako sąsiad", in *Sprawy polityczne*, no. 1 (I) jesień 2009, pp. 43-44.

<sup>27</sup> A. MALEKI, "Iran", in Frederick STARR (ed.), *The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia*, Washington D.C., Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2007, pp. 185-189.

<sup>28</sup> Full name Bonyad-e Shahid (Foundation of the Martyrs) and Bonyad-e Janbazan va Mostaz'afan (Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled).

<sup>29</sup> R. MAKARIUSOVÁ, Počátek působení islamských nevládních organizací s radikálním podtextem, *Mezinárodní politika č.11*, 2008, roč. XXXII. S. 19; J. BENTHALL, J. BELLION-JOURDAN, *The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World*. London, I. B. Tauris, 2003.

<sup>30</sup> *Amar-e Eszteghal-e Atba'e Afghan Dar Iran* (Statystyki dotyczące zatrudnienia Afgańczyków w Iranie), in *Alef News Agency*, December 19, 2009, available at [www.alef.ir](http://www.alef.ir)

<sup>31</sup> A. MAJIDYAR, A. ALFONEH, *Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Refugees as Political Instruments*, Listopad, 2010, available at [www.aei.org](http://www.aei.org)

<sup>32</sup> The situation in 2007 led to political crisis in Kabul. Afghan parliament asked for resignation of minister for refugees and minister for foreign affairs. After Karzai's interpellation the deportations were stopped, see A. MAJIDYAR, A. ALFONEH, 2010.

<sup>33</sup> There are about 1.5 mil seasonal afghan workers in Iran, most of them illegal. They can be found mostly in Iranian provinces near the borders with Afghanistan – Sistan, Baluchestan, South Khorasan and Razavi Khorasan.

<sup>34</sup> A. DZISIÓW-SZUSZCZYKIEWICZ, Analiza nt. polityki Iranu wobec Afganistanu, *Biuro bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Departament Analiz Strategicznych*, p. 11, Warszawa, December 23, 2010, available at [www.bbn.gov.pl/.../AnalizaBBNntpolitykiIranuwob...](http://www.bbn.gov.pl/.../AnalizaBBNntpolitykiIranuwob...)

<sup>35</sup> *Stosunki dwustronne Iran-Afganistan*, 2012-08-09, available at [http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/kraj,Iran,stosunki\\_dwustronne,Afganistan](http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/kraj,Iran,stosunki_dwustronne,Afganistan)

<sup>36</sup> F. BEZHAN, *Tensions Simmer Between Tehran, Kabul* in RFE/RL, May 15, 2012, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/iran\\_afghanistan\\_tensions\\_rise/24581508.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/iran_afghanistan_tensions_rise/24581508.html)

<sup>37</sup> The Failed States Index 2013, available at <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable>

<sup>38</sup> World Drug Report 2006, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; L. BEEHNER, Afghanistan's Role in Iran's Drug Problem, September 14, 2006, [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org)

<sup>39</sup> C. ZAMBELIS, *Is Iran Supporting the Insurgency in Afghanistan?*, November 6, 2009, [www.jamestown.org](http://www.jamestown.org)

<sup>40</sup> B. MISZTAL, Upadające państwo jako sąsiad: Strategia Iranu wobec Afganistanu, in *Sprawy polityczne*, No. 1 (39), 2009, pp. 43-44.



<sup>41</sup> R. DREYFUSS, "Iran Hedges its Bets in Afghanistan" in *The Diplomat*, August 07, 2012, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/07/iran-hedges-its-bets-in-afghanistan/2/>, accessed on May 6, 2013.

<sup>42</sup> "Nový prezident Rauháni chce zmeniť zahraničnú politiku Iránu" in *spravy.pravda.sk*, August 17, 2013, available at <http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/290223-iran-novy-prezident-chce-zmenu-zahranicnej-politiky-aby-nebola-velmi-konfrontacna/>, accessed on September 9, 2013; "Jaký bude nový iránský prezident?" in *IHNED.cz.*, June 17, 2013, available at <http://dialog.ihned.cz/c1-60082430-jaky-bude-novy-iransky-prezident>, accessed on September 9, 2013.

<sup>43</sup> F.W. KAGAN, K. KAGAN, D. PLETKA, "Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq and Afghanistan" in *A Report of the American Enterprise Institute*, 2008, pp. 37-57, available at [http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080215\\_IranianInfluence.pdf](http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080215_IranianInfluence.pdf); B. MISZTAL, "Upadajace panstwo jako sasiad: Strategia Iranu wobec Afganistanu", in *Sprawy polityczne* No. 1 (39), 2009. pp. 43-44; A. LEITHEAD, "Iranian Influence in Afghanistan", in *BBC News*, June 11, 2007, available at <http://www.afghannewscenter.com/news/2007/june/jun112007.html#3>

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# ASPECTS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: RISKS, OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW DOCTRINAL TRENDS

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*This paper analyses the changes in the Chinese Communist Party's doctrine, by stressing the main findings of the 18th Congress of the Party held between the 7th and 14th of November, 2012. It is an attempt to explore the fundamentals of China's unique and genuine model of development and the Chinese liberal-type vision concentrated in concepts such as "harmonious society", "peaceful development", "social justice and equity" and "ethical governance".*

*Also, the Paper stresses the current challenges to China's national sovereignty, based on its relations with Japan, North Korea, and on the evolutions of the unsolved dossier of Taiwan. Concerning China's foreign policy agenda in the years ahead, Beijing will be charged with the task of balancing its traditionally low foreign policy profile with its increasing assertive day-to-day actual foreign policy behavior.*

**Keywords:** *geopolitics, immediate neighborhood, sovereignty, harmonious society, peaceful development, socialism with Chinese characteristics.*

## Introduction

In a world of international relations in which nation states are still dominant players, the political and legal model of territorial control exercised by states over almost the entire surface of the globe prevails. The "Westphalian" legacy refers to the territorial aspect of power and the control exercised by "sovereigns" (kings, emperors, and then republics) over their territories and populations. If in what we call generic the West, the international relations have gradually structured as a network of

sovereign states that recognize themselves equal in international law being in fact separated by the rank of power, in an international system characterized by hegemonic cycles (rise and decline of great powers, followed by others), in the case of China, things are quite different.

The ancient and medieval China, but also China until the early of the twentieth century was an empire, one considered itself as "the center of the world" as shown by its name *Chung Kuo*. Theoretically, Chinese emperors were sovereigns of the whole world, while the other kings and emperors were considered subordinates. In this regard, the Chinese have not developed a Westphalian theory of sovereignty, but an imperial and sinocentric one, based on hierarchy and inequality and not on equality and symmetry.

The republican China, in its nationalist and then communist version had to suddenly accommodate itself with the logic of the Westphalian international system, represented at the institutional level by the UN. There was a swift from a conception of the state as universal entity without territorial limits generated by the presence of other state entities, and maintaining relations with other dependent states<sup>1</sup>, to a conception that matches international reality, whereas China as a young republic was a state with low power and prestige rank. Subsequently, China has faced the challenges of a neighboring state, also communist, namely the USSR, and the existence of and the U.S. as great power representing the capitalist West. Losing Taiwan, that the U.S. have tried to protect from a forced conscription in the Chinese mainland territory, and the location between the U.S. and the USSR, both considered hostile

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powers, have generated a sense of vulnerability and the will to better protect the country against the military and non-military risks.

Communist China in the post-Cold War era found itself in an international system under the U.S. hegemony, which although has not directly interfered in China's internal affairs, it has exercised an extended control in its neighborhood. Also, as we know, the globalization has American features, a reality that China seems to have partially settled, given its spectacular economic development in the last decade.

As a rising great power and main challenger to the US hegemony, People's Republic of China has developed an emerging philosophy of creating a safe space in its immediate neighborhood, considered as a primary tool to defend its state sovereignty and exert increasing global influence. Today, even if Beijing is still obsessed with its so-called "core interests" relevant to the regime survival and economic growth, it seems ready to assume massive global responsibilities besides those attached to the future development of the country.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay stressed that "The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic, the ocean of the present, and the Pacific, the ocean of the future."<sup>2</sup> Since the '70s, this statement has begun to materialize itself, primarily through the Asian miracle.

English geographer and academic Halford J. Mackinder used to speak of a Eurasian pivot (*Heartland*)<sup>3</sup> that designates a group of huge forces and resources in terms of power and potential, and the establishment of some infrastructure to enable such a potential to dominate the world. Therefore, in Mackinder's vision, but also in that of another politician – this time an American, Nicholas J. Spykman –, the main concern of the maritime powers faraway from the continental scene of the competition for supremacy was containment of the continental power, particularly by dominating the coastal areas and denying the access to the Planet Ocean. These visions were not simple theories since they materialized themselves in a huge and continuing confrontation, by which these maritime powers apparently won. We are still under the impact of the Cold War tributary geopolitical thinking, which had a containment dimension of this space of geopolitical transition from *heartland* to *rimland*, but the dominance of the great maritime powers, notably the U.S., is quite relative, since the containment of the Asian powers and the increase of

economic disparities were partly done. China remains an emerging power with a huge human potential, an ancient culture and an accelerated growth rate.

Even if the Chinese people think that they are at the heart of the world – and, to some extent, so it is – their philosophy of life and action is not conquering, but defensive and very subtle, in the spirit once described by the *Book of Changes (I-ching)*<sup>4</sup> and famous philosophers like Confucius, Lao Tzu and Sun Tzu. The East-West dialectic can be formulated through Clausewitz – Sun Tzu doctrinal opposition, Carl von Clausewitz's philosophy focused on winning the war contrasting sharply with that of the great Chinese philosopher who was preoccupied with the preventive diplomacy of avoiding the military conflicts.<sup>5</sup> This does not mean that the Chinese people are extremely generous, acting selflessly for the entire world. They are not interested in conquering the world, but only in the unity and stability of their national territory, the feeding of the 1.35 billion people<sup>6</sup>, and good neighborhood.

### 1. Partnerships versus territorial disputes in the neighborhoods

China's territory is a taboo territory: "We must cherish every square inch of the national territory", highlighted the former President Hu Jintao, on the occasion of the 18th Chinese Communist Party's Congress. China's sovereignty over its territory is unwavering, and its philosophy to create a safe space in its immediate neighborhood is emerging. For the Chinese people, every meter of land or water is of vital interest to their country. In this spirit, they gained Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999. Besides the Chinese population from Taiwan, who wishes their independence, other nations of the world do not consider useful to challenge in any way the Chinese territorial borders and even the U.S. recognizes that there is one China only (even if the U.S. administration supports the regime in Taipei)<sup>7</sup>.

China is a realistic and dynamic country. It is not a passive entity situated in a *rimland*, i.e. an edge, as Nicholas Spykman defined this area (or part of it)<sup>8</sup> – concept at the core of the American policy and strategy *containment of communism*. It is always at the center of the world, both by its impressive culture, its history of millennia, and a very high economic growth rate, targeting good neighborhood, partnerships and peaceful resolution of the existing problems in the area.





China has 20 percent of the world population, and the question of the natural resources and their distribution is extremely stringent. China is rich in natural resources, particularly in coal. A barrier to the uniform development of the industry, however, is the uneven distribution of resources and the insufficient development of the transport infrastructure. China is dependent on oil and gas imports, in particular from the Middle East and North Africa, and therefore MENA geopolitical region is of great importance to Beijing. China's attitude towards this region is special, specifically Chinese, meaning careful, cautious, adaptable to certain circumstances and perseverant.

Also, China attaches great importance to its strategic partnerships made primarily with Russia and the European Union. The bilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation in the field of energy has advanced and their strategic political partnership has been also deepened, allowing the signing of some agreements in the military field. The two countries, which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, show a growing solidarity in many bilateral cases on the situation in the Middle East, non-proliferation or the UN and the international financial institutions' reforms. On the other hand, China's involvement in Europe is complex. It is all about a set of infrastructure investments, loans with low interest rates and massive financial investments. In an optimistic approach, Sino-European relations should be seen as an opportunity, and not as a zero sum game (especially on the background of the euro crisis), by promoting symmetrical trade relations.

Over time, China has gone through geopolitical trauma that marked its collective identity. After mid nineteenth century, the Chinese empire was very weak and the Russian expeditions on the Amur River led to the Aigun Treaty (1858) by which Russia was entitled to control the left bank of the river until its flows into the sea. It was the first Russian-Chinese "unequal treaty", followed in 1860 by the Convention of Peking by which Russia obtained Vladivostok region from a China recently defeated by France and England. The unequal treaties have remained permanently etched in the memory of the Chinese leaders, communists and also nationalists, so that the former leader Mao Zedong called the USSR in the 60s to return the Chinese territory taken by force by the Russian Empire. In fact, there were even incidents at the borders in 1969, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Only on 2 June 2005, an agreement with Russia on

the common border which measures 4300 km was signed in Vladivostok. After signing this agreement, for the first time in the history of the Russian-Chinese relations, the territorial boundaries were clearly stated.

On 11 April 2005, China signed an agreement with India to resolve the border disputes dating from 1962. China claims a territory of 20,000 km<sup>2</sup> in north-east India – Arunachal Pradesh –, while India claims Aksai Chin in Kashmir area, of 38,000 km<sup>2</sup>. Kashmir, located between China, India and Pakistan, is a significant conflictual area of the world, since all three countries that dispute in one form or another parts of this territory are nuclear powers. These three countries, which together account for over one third of the global population and 13,688,490 km<sup>2</sup> have never had excellent relations. The two great cultures – Chinese and Indian – hardly communicate with each other. The Chinese and Indian territories have been conquered and mastered by others, and this humiliation significantly marked the populations of these countries. Therefore, the sovereignty over their territories, especially China's sovereignty, is firm, even excessive.<sup>9</sup>

If China's southern neighborhood is one that involves the risk of nuclear conflict and / or territorial claims (see the case of India, Pakistan and the Russian Federation), regarding Beijing's eastern neighborhood, this faces challenges posed by North Korea, although this country is not a regional power. Pyongyang has repeatedly stated that has such weapons, and the possibility that the communist regime unites accidentally with South Korea in the future under the auspices of the American domination, is an unacceptable scenario for China. China is concerned about Kim Jong-un's bellicose rhetoric, maybe due to the fear of not controlling anymore this unpredictable client state, this without abandoning necessarily its support to the regime that it wants to maintain as a buffer state on its borders. This concern seems to be underestimated by the North Korean leader, who seems willing to ignore Beijing's enormous influence on his country's economy. Recently, China and the United States agreed to make a joint effort and try to achieve peacefully denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On the 13th of April 2013, US secretary of state John Kerry and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, the highest representative of China's foreign policy, stressed in Beijing that both parties sustain the idea of denuclearization for regional stability, being in favour of thawing the relations between



Seoul and Phenyong in a critical moment of the crisis. Therefore, China's position on North Korea began to change, the recent speech delivered by President Xi Jinping being more than eloquent in this regard. He said that no nation "should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain"<sup>10</sup>, without making explicit reference to North Korea.

Also, a major source of concern for China is Iran, a state which tends to follow the path of nuclear arms, as well as the conflictual relations between Iran, Israel and some Arab states from Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Concerning the bilateral relations between China and Japan, these are tensed because the territorial disputes. This situation might be the most serious crisis between the two countries in the last 40 years. In September 2012, China has taken the right to take "additional measures" in its dispute with Japan, challenging the nationalization of Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands, which are disputed by the two countries. Liang Guanglie's declaration, announced by an interpreter was launched during a press conference held together with his American counterpart, Leon Panetta.<sup>11</sup>

In the eyes of the West, China and Japan appear to act in a disproportionate way, judging upon the importance of the Senkaku islands, many political analysts calling attention to the possible historical accidents with devastating implications on humankind.<sup>12</sup> In the events in the East China Sea, the parties in dispute cannot allow themselves the luxury to act according to some nationalistic feelings, being forced to manage with responsibility their territorial problems, in order to avoid a precedent similar to that of 1914.<sup>13</sup>

According to U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, the current territorial disputes in Asia could trigger a war, if the involved governments continue their "challenges".<sup>14</sup> The subject of the mentioned dispute on Senkaku archipelago, which would hide significant hydrocarbon deposits, is also claimed by Taiwan.

China wants to end the separate political existence of Taiwan, under conditions similar to Hong Kong. China's messages about its intentions on Taiwan are quite clear. For example, recently enough, the new Pope was asked to end Vatican's diplomatic relations with Taiwan, recognize the People's Republic of China's government as the sole legal government representing China and also recognize Taiwan as part of China.<sup>15</sup>

U.S. position in this unsolved dossier of China is of particular relevance, some Americans even willing to rethink the support for Taiwan and saying that if the United States would abandon Taiwan all the parties take benefits.<sup>16</sup> But even if US give up its support to Taiwan, a harmonious relation between Washington and Beijing would not be possible, because the competition for getting the access to the East Asians Seas – that Beijing regards as its own sphere of influence – will continue. In addition, its allies in Japan, South Korea and other countries with multiple stakes in the area would not see with indulgence the abandonment of Taiwan.

In November 2012, the works of the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party were concluded successfully in Beijing. The report of this Congress is the political manifesto and the Chinese Communist Party's program of action, which guides the Chinese people towards the socialism with Chinese characteristics and the fight consecrated to the integral building of the decent welfare society. In order to achieve these goals, China needs a peaceful environment in its neighborhoods, stable and of mutually beneficial cooperation. Therefore, in the future, China will consistently promote a policy of friendship and partnership with its neighboring countries, enhance good understanding and neighborly relations and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with them. It will need to respect the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region and the reality of interdependence, following the path of regional cooperation based on consensus through consultation and gradual progress. Let us not forget that the in the context of the global economic crisis, China has had several consecutive years a contribution of more than 50% to the rise of the Asian economies, driving continuously forward the mechanisms for enhancing political mutual trust and cooperation with other countries in Asia. China will embrace with consistency the road of *peaceful development* and apply the policy of good neighborhood, according to which the neighbors should be treated as friends and partners, and act to resolve peacefully its disputes. New doctrinal guidelines fully reveal this optimistic outlook.

### **2. Outcome of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (7 – 14 November 2012)**

The doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party is focused on eliminating hegemony, power and block politics and the arms race.



Fair and amicable bilateral relations, sustainable economic development and reducing tensions of any kind have always been the main objectives of the party politics of a particular flexible nature.

The results of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in November 2012, are of great importance not only for China but also for the rest of the world, its major principles demonstrating that People's Republic of China does not only focus on its future development, but seems willing to massively take global responsibilities: "We will take an active part in the global economic governance, we will promote and facilitate free trade and investments and strongly oppose protectionism in any form."<sup>17</sup> In the XXI century, when all countries are facing major economic challenges, China is trying to prove the valences of its own unique and original model of development. It remains to be seen whether the liberal reforming ideas of western inspiration will prevail over the classic communist doctrine.

The Report of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party – the programmatic document that contains the results of this great political event - was distributed shortly after the event within the Romanian military academic environment by H.E. Huo Yuzhen, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Bucharest. Its cover captures our attention by two exhortations which are the very essence of the Chinese nation and Communist regime's survival: "To move forward resolutely on the path of the socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "To strive for decent welfare society". The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics implies: the firm observance of the four basic principles – independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries; reform and opening to the outside world; development of the productive forces; building socialist market economy; democracy and advanced socialist culture; harmonious socialist society; and socialist civilization that respects the environment. Its theoretical foundation is clearly stated in the report: "the scientific system based on Deng Xiaoping's theory, the ideas of the three representations<sup>18</sup> and the concept of scientific development, as a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought."

So, the Chinese liberal vision is based on the concept of "harmonious society" or "decent welfare society" – *Datong /Da-yitong* is the term used for

great harmony, also interpreted in terms of a global society based on collective welfare and collective property<sup>19</sup> -, an essential attribute of the Chinese political and doctrinal identity, besides "peaceful development", "social equity and justice" or "ethical governance". Moreover, in recent years, China has encouraged the spread of Confucian ideas, especially the order, respect, moral behavior and social harmony.

The wish to comprehensively achieve a decent welfare society requires new imperatives such as: sustainable development of the economy (doubling GDP and income per capita, compared with 2010, is one of the major assumed goals); expanding popular democracy; increased culture and living standards of the population; and building an environmentally-friendly society by saving natural resources. A separate chapter of the report (Chapter VIII) is dedicated to the environmental progress. Here, China appears to move away from the traditional Western methods, by promoting a new way focused on preventive measures, compared with the developed countries that firstly polluted the environment and then resorted to "greening" measures. Preventing and combating pollution, anticipating serious environmental problems through joint efforts with international community and the consideration of shared responsibilities, these are prerequisites for moving toward "a new era of socialist ecological progress".<sup>20</sup>

Chapters IX-XI are most relevant to our analysis on Chinese sovereignty: *to accelerate the modernization of national defense and armed forces; to enrich the practice of "one country, two systems" and to promote the reunification of the motherland; to continue the promotion of the noble cause of peace and development of humankind.* The modernization of national defense, made in the spirit of the military thinking promoted by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, endorse, inter alia, full mechanization of the army and major advances in the field of the informatization until 2020. It is stressed that the Chinese people have, by definition, a defensive national defense policy, the current efforts to strengthen the capacity of national defense having as main objectives the protection of sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of China and the assurance of its peaceful development. It is suggested, somehow, that China's civilizational superiority led to the pacification of the region as such, China's armed forces being described as "reliable power to maintain peace in the



world, that will continue to enhance cooperation and cultivate relationships based on mutual trust with the armed forces of other countries, participate in regional and international security projects and play an active role in international politics and international security”.<sup>21</sup>

The principle “peaceful reunification, one country, two systems” is the famous leitmotif of the party leadership, the leaders in Beijing reiterating their strong opposition to any separatist attempt that concerns Taiwan’s independence. As concerns the road of peaceful development, China has a consistent position in terms of protecting its sovereignty and rejecting any external pressures, declaring itself as a promoter of peace agreements in international disputes and vehemently opposing the use of military force, hegemony, expansionism and force policies.

Finally, the last chapter of the report, dedicated to raising the scientific level of the party establishment, the Chinese national leadership presents a number of tasks to be performed in the near future. Among them are the fight against corruption for an honest government, the active promotion of party democracy and increasing transparency of the political process.

### Conclusions

China’s world in the XXI century is a mixture of continuity and change. There is certain logic of sovereignty and a security dilemma accompanying China’s foreign policy, which must be understood in light of the traditional theories based on the perception of uniqueness of action, expansion by “cultural osmosis, not missionary zeal”<sup>22</sup>, and their adaptation to the current challenges. In reality, China’s political alliances and options between war and compromise have remained the same over the millennia. As Henry Kissinger argues, “any attempt to understand China’s diplomacy in the twentieth century and its global role in the XXI century must start - even at the cost of possible simplifications - from a basic understanding of the traditional context”.<sup>23</sup>

The recent changes in the Chinese political scene and those which are expected at the economic level have encouraged the political analysts to make some predictions about the future of China. If China maintains its economic growth and remains faithful to the current economic pattern, the United States will remain a competitor in the shade. U.S. is concerned about the Chinese economic growth (up to

8.2% in 2013, according to the current predictions) and the growth of China’s military, while China is worried about the American “strategic pivot” in Asia, which includes a missile defense system. American weapons transactions to Taiwan, the blockage by China of the US efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria and the way the Iran’s nuclear file is to be solved, these are sensitive issues that will print China-US relationship a winding road in the near future.

If the U.S. triggers a containment policy against China through alliances with Japan, South Korea, India, the Philippines and Australia, most likely China will adopt innovative balancing strategies. In this context, we believe that the Chinese power will still try hard to avoid war, which is useless in their view (“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”<sup>24</sup> is an aphorism that remains strongly anchored in the Chinese collective mentality) and wait cautiously for better times for strategic response by further developing stronger relationships with their strategic partners – EU and Russia – as a method of *soft balancing* against the United States.

The project of a Pacific Community – region to include U.S. and China, among other countries in the area – is the most optimistic scenario, by which both countries’ fears could be alleviated. After the success of the concept of Atlantic Community, which laid the foundations of the world order at the end of the Second World War, a similar concept to eliminate potential tensions between China and the U.S. would come to meet China’s aspirations toward a global role. For now, we can speak of co-evolution rather than partnership, when describing Sino-American relations.

However, no matter if the rise of China occurs based on the *peaceful rising* scenario (recently called *peaceful development*, as not to alert its neighbors) or, if necessary, through anti-hegemonic alliances and the arms race, Beijing will always consider the necessity to protect the national sovereignty as a must of its security policy, according to the vision of a global power that dominates the South and East Asian rimlands, including an important region of the Pacific Ocean.<sup>25</sup>

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Yaqing QIN, “Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?”, in Amitav Acharya, B. Buzan (eds), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*, Routledge, 2010., p. 26-46.



<sup>2</sup> John Hay, 1889.

<sup>3</sup> Halford J. MACKINDER, "The Geographical Pivot of History", *Geographical Journal*, XXIII, April 1904.

<sup>4</sup> *I-ching (Book of Changes)* is part of the five canonical books that represent the fundamentals of the Chinese culture and tradition. Moreover, *I-ching* is the oldest among them.

<sup>5</sup> See the political objective of war in Carl Clausewitz's vision, in his book titled *Despre război*, Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 1982.

<sup>6</sup> The Report of the National Bureau of Statistics of China published on 20 January 2012; [http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20120120\\_402780233.htm](http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20120120_402780233.htm).

<sup>7</sup> Until 1971, Taiwan represented China in the UN Security Council and the USSR constantly protested against the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from this structure. In 1971, with the U.S. consent, a "castling" was made: Taiwan was expelled from the UN and the People's Republic of China occupied this place.

<sup>8</sup> Spykman thought Rimland, the strip of coastal land that encircles Eurasia, is more important than the central Asian zone (the so-called Heartland) for the control of the Eurasian continent. His thesis is exposed in the book titled *The Geography of the Peace*, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1944.

<sup>9</sup> Gheorghe VĂDUVA, „China dinapoia unui zid cu geometrie fluidă”, *Geopolitica*, no. 21 (1), 2007, p. 25-30.

<sup>10</sup> David IGNATIUS, "Kim Jong Un plays a dangerous game with the threat of warfare", *The Oregonian*, 11 aprilie 2013. Available online: [http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/04/kim\\_jong\\_uns\\_dangerous\\_game\\_da.html](http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/04/kim_jong_uns_dangerous_game_da.html) (accessed on 20 April 2013).

<sup>11</sup> Declaration available on the site of the US Department of Defense: <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5116>.

<sup>12</sup> For instance, it is considered that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, by the Serbian extremist Gavrilo Princip would have caused World War I, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declaring war on Serbia afterwards.

<sup>13</sup> James HOLMES, "Will Japan and China go to war?", 11 February 2013. Available online: <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/02/11/will-japan-and-china-go-to-war/?iref=obinsite> (accessed on 15 April 2013). See also Stephen HARNER's article titled "Japan and U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis". In: *Forbes*, 20 February 2013; <http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharnner/2013/02/20/japan-and-u-s-ignored-chinese-signals-and-history-blundering-into-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis/> (accessed on 15 April 2013).

<sup>14</sup> See in this context Ambrose EVANS-PRITCHARD, "The dangerous drift towards world war in Asia", *The Telegraph*, 15 April 2013. Available on-line: [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans\\_pritchard/9950791/The-dangerous-drift-towards-world-war-in-Asia.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/9950791/The-dangerous-drift-towards-world-war-in-Asia.html) (accessed on 20 April 2013).

<sup>14</sup> Ben BLANCHARD, Michael MARTINA, *China urges Vatican to drop Taiwan ties day after pope elected*,

Reuters, 14 March 2013 (accessed on 25 August 2013).

<sup>16</sup> A prominent voice for this view is that of former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski who said for *Foreign Affairs*: "It is doubtful that Taiwan can indefinitely avoid a more formal connection with China". See, in this context, William Lowther, „Brzezinski mulls Taiwan's future”, *Taipei Times*, 17 December 2011. Available online: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/12/17/2003520967> (accessed on 15 April 2013).

<sup>17</sup> Report of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 72.

<sup>18</sup> The official statement of the *Three Represents* ideology stipulates that the Communist Party of China should be representative to advanced social productive forces, advanced culture, and the interests of the overwhelming majority. See Jiang ZEMIN's speech at the 16th CCP Congress (November 2002) that founded this socio-political ideology.

<sup>19</sup> Șerban F. CIOCULESCU, "Fața nevăzută a Chinei: paradigme, autori și evoluții instituționale în domeniul cercetării relațiilor internaționale", *Monitor Strategic*, No. 1-2/2012, p. 44-45.

<sup>20</sup> Report of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 62.

<sup>21</sup> Report of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 64.

<sup>22</sup> Henry KISSINGER, *Despre China*, Comunicare.ro, București, 2012, p. 433.

<sup>23</sup> Henry KISSINGER, *Despre China*, Comunicare.ro, București, 2012, p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Sun TZU, *Arta Războiului*, Antet, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> David C. KANG, *China Rising. Peace, Power and Order in East Asia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, p. 16.

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# REFLECTIONS CONCERNING POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

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*The controversial status of post-conflict reconstruction operations is a tempting invitation for international relations theorists to propose concepts and theories that explain, justify and even interpret very dramatic situations according to the interests the actors involved in the reconstruction want to promote. Hence the diversity of approaches and divergent finalities they propose.*

*Based on an idealized vision of human security, but unfortunately with no chance to materialize in the short and even medium term, the present study is an analysis of the most representative perspectives on post-conflict reconstruction of the main schools of thought in international relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism.*

*The beauty of international relations theories is due not only to the creativity in presenting arguments but also to the originality of the syllogisms and paradigms that are hiding well-defined interests.*

*Even if not directly reflected in the international law, polemics between different theoretical currents in international relations can be considered worthwhile, at least for the fact that it presents facets and aspects of the international environment from new and fresh perspectives.*

**Keywords:** *post-conflict reconstruction, human security, realism, liberalism, constructivism.*

## **Introduction**

On June 5<sup>th</sup>, 1947, at Harvard, General Marshall<sup>1</sup> spoke about the program that was to make history

and bear his name. "(...) Europe is exposed to a very serious economic, social and political dislocation (...) without any important additional support. (...)

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring peoples' confidence in the economic future of their own countries throughout Europe. (...) The United States is committed to bring aid and establish a European program, but the initiative must come from Europe"<sup>2</sup>

The Convention for European economic cooperation of April 16<sup>th</sup>, 1948 and the Global Program for Europe Reconstruction defined Europeans' vision on development and economic cooperation.

The benefits of national programs and Marshall Plan allowed Western Europe to overcome, in 1949, the average level of development existing before the war. In fact, it meant that reconstruction was completed<sup>3</sup>.

Despite all the hopes and changes triggered in 1989, a new Marshall Plan wasn't resumed; currently, post-Cold War theorists propose several new, exciting and original perspectives on post-conflict reconstruction.

## **1. The concept of human security and multinational interventions**

"Human security" concept was developed within the holistic paradigm concerning human development, issued within the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)<sup>4</sup> to which several theorists contributed<sup>5</sup>.

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The “Human Development Report” (1994) was the first major international document that enunciated human security in conceptual terms and launched proposals for establishing a policy and outlining courses of action in this respect.

The issue had been previously raised at a roundtable known as “The Economics of Peace”, held in Costa Rica, in January 1990.

Discussions carried out at this event led to the conclusion that post-Cold War world needed a “new security concept” and redirecting defense and foreign policy objectives to a shift from almost exclusively military security concerns towards broader aspects related to individual security such as: social violence, economic decline and environmental degradation, all these requiring “attention to the causes of individuals’ insecurity and to the possible obstacles to achieving their full potential”.

The report placed these challenges in post-Cold War context, in conjunction with the need to reduce military expenses and create a peace fund, meant to ensure human development and to level away economic and environmental imbalances<sup>6</sup>.

The Human Development Report (1994) pointed out that security concept “has been interpreted too narrowly for too long, either as security of territory against external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security against a nuclear holocaust, being related rather to nation states than to peoples”<sup>7</sup>.

Human security concept involves several dimensions. United Nations Development Program proposes seven individual components of security: food, economic, health, personal, environmental, community and politics security<sup>8</sup>. Moreover, other international security organizations have addressed this issue<sup>9</sup>. European policies and practices in the field seem to be closer to the person-centered approach, at least at conceptual level, as demonstrated by “Solana Strategy”<sup>10</sup> launched in 2003.

As it generally happens with most phenomena in international relations, we are witnessing a debate on post-conflict realities occurring either within schools or between different schools of thought. The stake originated in these realities’ definition, as well as in the way they relate to, frame and detail the specificities of post-conflict reconstruction.

It should be noted that international conventions specific to armed conflict or referring to the state of belligerence and military occupation remain valid<sup>11</sup>. What is of interest in this study is the radiography of the invoked arguments and constructed syllogisms

may they have a finality or not, molded into international law documents.

### **2. A realistic perspective: failing states and post-conflict reconstruction**

In order to emphasize the importance of states’ post-conflict reconstruction, Karl Deutsch, a representative of political realism, proposed the functional reinforcement of state institutions and considers “failing states” phenomenon<sup>12</sup> may be eradicated. Another type of post-conflict reconstruction, in the view of political realism, is the creation of “fortress state”<sup>13</sup>. But, in our opinion, the creation of such a state is not a long term solution, but a rather self-preservation reaction in an existent or recurrent conflict situation. Throughout history, it was the force of prosperous countries’ models with open borders that created emulation among weaker states. Moreover, such a policy would contradict the very logic of many post-conflict humanitarian programs launched under the aegis of UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and EU.

At present, during post-conflict reconstruction, state institutions are reinvented and revived and the main objective is to bring the failing state into the community of democratic states. Being functional is no longer sufficient as state is also supposed to be democratic. What is of interest is the fact that, at a first sight, there is a unique model seeming to become the standard for a functional state. However, it is known that differences and divergences are usually generated by details. In this respect, it is necessary to report to the provisions of Copenhagen and Geneva Conventions<sup>14</sup>, regarding the need to enforce democracy, especially in states where religion is a key factor.

Dan Duță asserts that a strong and functional state (without the obligation of democratization), possibly with less permissive borders<sup>15</sup>, represents a viable possibility to determine development. The thesis seems more adapted to the internal crisis the U.S. (considered, however, the most powerful democracy in the world) are going through rather than to a project launched to be adopted by the UN humanitarian agencies, OSCE, the Council of Europe, and EU.

Some analysts explain failing states existence through failure to connect to global economy, which places them outside the beneficial effects of globalization<sup>16</sup>. Taking into consideration the fact that one of state’s essential functions is to ensure its citizens’ security, we consider that, as far as





failing states are concerned, one could speak about states' failure in exercising this particular function. In this case, post-conflict reconstruction means, first of all, restoring confidence in state institutions<sup>17</sup>. According to the same author, most cases of failed states were determined rather by internal causes and intrastate conflicts than by interstate wars. According to Human Development Report (1994), the official terminology is "enduring peace".

Around this concept, international organizations' documents, strategies, as well as military documents and specialty literature use a range of phrases allowing different interpretations, according to their own interests, such as: "post-conflict reconstruction", "nation-building"<sup>18</sup>, "peacekeeping"<sup>19</sup>, "peace building"<sup>20</sup>, "post-conflict operations"<sup>21</sup>, "post-conflict rehabilitation"<sup>22</sup> etc. US specialized literature, especially the military one, uses the term "post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization"<sup>23</sup>.

Specialized literature considers failing states or conflict-affected states to be the object of the above-mentioned operations<sup>24</sup>.

The contemporary challenge lies in finding exactly that particular state policy that would be best adapted to the new challenges.

The broad range of concepts originates in the multitude of sources: there are numerous documents of international law, political and military doctrines and strategies and authors dealing with this topic. Very often, misunderstandings arise precisely from the diversity of theoretical concepts and interpretations<sup>25</sup>.

It has become obvious that the "Agenda for Peace" of Boutros Ghali, as well as all the definitions relating to it are no longer relevant for the realities of interstate conflicts.

There can no longer be any conceptual distinction between "peacekeeping" and "peace building" and completing the mandate with the provisions relating to Chapter VII of the UN Charter is avoided.

This fact is reflected in a decreasing number of UN missions and military participants in these operations.

Repeated failure in the attempt to reform the Brahimi Report<sup>26</sup> and replace the "Agenda for Peace" (1992, completed in 1995) with another UN documents makes it necessary to consider, especially when reporting to "peace-building" concept's variations, the types of operations mentioned previously, tributary to the provisions related to "military occupation" in the law of armed conflicts.

The types of operations undertaken by the UN or another international organization under the mandate of the UN Security Council have the following objectives: conflict prevention; peaceful resolution of the conflict, preferably through diplomatic actions (peacemaking); peaceful resolution of the conflict through military action coupled with diplomatic efforts on the basis of an agreement between the parties involved (peace keeping); ending conflicts and crimes against humanity by undertaking military actions (peace enforcement); building sustainable peace (peace building); and the mitigation of the effects triggered by conflicts on local population or humanitarian law violations (humanitarian aid)<sup>27</sup>.

### 3. A liberal perspective: *pater familias* and post-conflict reconstruction

We could advance a parallel with the relationships within a family, respectively the relations with *pater familias*, that is the head of the family. When he can no longer manage the problems, family members take life on their own, and sometimes turn against the head of the family. Regarding relationships between state actors and citizens, events happened in a similar manner. It comes to the use of intrastate violence in a citizens' attempt to solve problems through their own forces, even if this means resorting to violence against the state.

In such situations, state – as the one that has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence – will use violence against its own citizens, even if its original function is to protect them. Individuals react violently when their fundamental rights and freedoms are violated, although sometimes they give up to some of them in exchange for security. When the security of citizens and of the entire community is threatened or lost, one could speak about a state's failure in fulfilling its basic function. In this case, citizens take back their lost freedoms – by themselves or with foreign aid – and take responsibility of the protection function, given initially to the state.

The analysis of reconstruction projects' basis indicates that the restoration of both public and state security can be justified through reasons related either to a certain judgment of reality or to certain national interests that may or may not be supported by the United Nations.

According to the quoted source<sup>28</sup>, there can be also taken in consideration citizens' call addressed to



foreign forces for a new state construction. Of course, from the point of view of international law's instruments, such a perspective is very questionable<sup>29</sup>.

P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen give priority to ensuring individual security against violent threats, this being considered a pragmatic alternative to the definitions and procedures proposed in UN documents<sup>30</sup>.

From the perspective of US National Security Strategy (2006), in order to make the object of state reconstruction, a state does not have to fall under the category of failed states or to be affected by conflict. It is enough the respective state was considered a threat either to US national interests or to democratic states' community<sup>31</sup>.

If before the crisis, the state was the only guarantor of security, in the post-crisis stage there are also external actors that intervene in order to restore security (other states or organizations, international institutions).

Traditionally, it is considered that individual gives up some freedoms in order to have his security ensured. It is however difficult to identify to what extent giving up certain freedoms is, in fact, an attempt to obtain certain "privileges" that are, in reality, guaranteed rights of the individual<sup>32</sup>.

The right to security is guaranteed by constitutions of democratic states, but in times of crisis, individual and community rights are considered exceptions and require sacrifice.

As far as the processuality of "security" concept is concerned, Robert Cooper considers that there are used double standards: on the one hand, the relationship between the post-modern states and, on the other, the relationship with pre-modern and modern states<sup>33</sup>.

In 2004, the European Union launched "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe"<sup>34</sup>, which focuses on protecting citizens through law enforcement, humanitarian assistance and occasional use of force. The report proposes inclusively the creation of a humanitarian force to be used if necessary.

Academic communities in Latin America and South Africa use "citizen security" concept<sup>35</sup>. In 2004, the Community of South American Nations<sup>36</sup> launched a series of joint statements developed around "citizen security" concept in conjunction with other key concepts, such as national security, rule of law, democracy, and freedom<sup>37</sup>.

It is provisioned that at the basis of this concept lie ideas such as "peaceful coexistence" of South

American Nations and human dignity respect and the democratic system<sup>38</sup>.

Citizens must participate in the community life, ideally in an environment without risks to its security. Civil society is considered an essential factor, along with the police forces in ensuring citizens' security.

Public safety remains a state attribute, but in cooperation with "social energies". Social inequity is considered a major factor in the societies in the concerned region, while citizen's security is a "shared responsibility between state and community"<sup>39</sup>.

The actual extent of commitments at interstate level took the form of a joint program for the implementation of citizen security.

In 2002, a comprehensive research project formulates and analyzes a series of indicators specific to each stage of post-conflict reconstruction<sup>40</sup>. The report provides a list of necessary steps, namely only what should be done, and not how or by whom.

Conceptually, the proposed model for the reconstruction process is divided into three stages (initial response; transformation and strengthening state's self-sustainability) developed on four pillars (security; justice-reconciliation; social and economic welfare; and governance – participation in the act of governance)<sup>41</sup>.

In 2003, World Bank initiated the project named "Community Driven Reconstruction", as a tool in the transition from war to peace<sup>42</sup>.

The paper analyzes the role local community can play in reconstruction and development projects. The increased involvement of local community is presented as an alternative to the projects developed exclusively through foreign involvement.

In the view of World Bank analysts, post-conflict programs are divided traditionally in the "initial, humanitarian or conflict" phase and a "transitional or developmental" phase. World Bank usually intervenes in the final stage of conflict and at the beginning of the transition one<sup>43</sup>.

Both national and international documents, as well as the specialized literature provide a set of definitions for "post-conflict reconstruction" concept.

Among the proposed definitions of "post-conflict reconstruction" concept, according to a synthetic definition for such operations carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan, reconstruction is "the process that addresses the causes of violence and instability in a society simultaneously with building the state and



local capacity to support peace, making it possible to reduce external intervention and maintain assistance at sustainable levels”<sup>44</sup>.

#### **4. A constructivist perspective: Western models and post-conflict reconstruction**

According to Gaston Bachelard<sup>45</sup>, all scientific knowledge is determined by answering questions. “If there were no questions, there would be no scientific knowledge. Nothing exists by itself. Nothing is given beforehand. Nothing comes naturally. Everything is built”<sup>46</sup>.

An opinion<sup>47</sup> tributary to the constructivist school argues in favor of mainstreaming human (in)security (at individual, institutional and structural-cultural levels) in peace-building processes (alternative concept for the post-conflict reconstruction) and shifting the main focus from state security (security and integrity of state institutions) to citizens’ security, to the understanding of citizens’ communities. Reconstruction processes have greater chances of success when understanding local realities (inclusively understanding groups marginalized in pre-conflict stage) and eliminating any sources of human insecurity<sup>48</sup>.

Starting from the classical theory, namely that it is all about humans’ representation, perceptions and imagination, one should wonder what post-conflict reconstruction really is? On the one hand, there can be found a tendency to impose Western democracy standards and, on the other, a tendency to impose religious fanaticism. Such a discrepancy is not beneficial to anyone. Should Western democracy be imposed at all costs and even where religious traditions are very difficult to overcome on a short term?

Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents structure their identity according to the manner they perceive themselves within local societies (having as key indicator religious exclusion). Being inconsistent with the values of the local society (due to self-perception), their identity motivates the need for changing local realities, inclusively by violent means.

Religious exclusion makes constructivist theory incompatible with post-conflict reconstruction projects. Obviously, in Afghanistan or Iraq, there is a clash between two different perceptions: on the one hand, there is Taliban’ perception and, on the other, of the perception of the other actors, state or multinational entities (UN, NATO, and EU).

But the threat to national interests has led to direct and violent intervention and, implicitly, to the post-conflict reconstruction phase. However, the strongly controversial modality of intervention in Iraq makes the constructivist approach questionable even from its starting point.

In Afghanistan, the situation is more complex. According to the quoted authors<sup>49</sup>, identity crises originate in the colonial era, in the relations not only with great powers but also with neighboring states. Constructivist literature argues that it is the behavior that can be changed rather than the actors’ identity and interests<sup>50</sup>.

Social constructivism<sup>51</sup> argues that the optimal learning process (knowledge of reality) occurs under a dynamic interaction between instructors, “students” and objective tasks. Culture (traditions) and context are of great significance.

Finally, due to these interactions, each student produces its own version of the truth. In our view, an important dimension of post-conflict reconstruction is the teacher-student interaction.

But what happens to the teachers who transmit only their version of the truth and try to impose this version to the students through subtle methods or are they themselves influenced by students’ truth? Although we accept the usefulness of knowledge transfer, and thus, of changing the way local actors perceive the new realities of their country, we still want to draw attention on the unrealistic and artificial character of this process in some projects.

Therefore, there can be raised the question of the extent to which Iraqi Constitution is applicable, as long as, in everyday activities, local population refers to Shari a and not to the civil Constitution (which they perceive as an adaptation of the models used in Western culture). How credible would an international force be if it is simultaneously supporting the legal regime and conducting negotiations with the outlawed opponents?

Cultural constructivism<sup>52</sup> further complicates the problem, emphasizing the differences produced by the cultural context, focusing on objects or events in the construction of reality.

For instance, Western forces’ presence in Afghanistan or Iraq could not be perceived by locals as a positive event either at micro or macro level, given the daily attacks directed not only against the military but also against the diplomatic and civil component.

According to Hutchinson, a theorist of radical constructivism, knowledge is a self-organized



cognitive process of human brain that starts from the ability to represent past experiences, including the personal one through the use of certain explanatory patterns for objects, events and situations<sup>53</sup>. Hutchinson also adds that different perceptions (influenced by different needs) can partially serve as an explanation for the failure of most reconstruction projects carried out so far, either by states or organizations<sup>54</sup>.

### Conclusions

Conducted for 5 years, the Marshall Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), enabled the strengthening of the economic and liberal policies promoted by Western governments, so that, in 1953, Europe was back on its feet. If based only on political documents and specialized literature and not reported to the provisions of armed conflicts law, the analysis of post-conflict reconstruction would have been incomplete, even if the sinuous practice of the Security Council and a range of operations carried out after 1989 are considered precedents with legal value by some authors, their nature remains controversial. Post-conflict reconstruction can and should also take into consideration the legal requirements regarding “military occupation”, armed conflict law, as an institution, as well as a type of operations conducted under the UN mandate.

The current various theoretical perspectives on international relations must start from the provisions of international law documents, particularly the law of armed conflicts. Most international community’s attempts to substantiate, justify, and propose the adoption of new international legal instruments are a creative and laborious process, which need to be accepted at the academic level.

Discussions and debates on “human security” concept have not moved beyond the status of a desideratum as building an international order on the basis of this generous and altruist phrase will take a very long time. The immediate consequence is that international relations theories built around the pedestal of the “individual” remain attractive but have questionable applicability.

The disappearance of “failing states” as a solution of political realism for the post-conflict reconstruction projects is only a possibility, not a probability and definitely not a perspective for international law rules if it is imposed by external factors. The liberal understanding of post-conflict reconstruction operations through the algorithm

“relationships within a family orbiting around *pater familias*” is a vision getting to Oriental despots, to the recent “Arab Spring”, as well as to the provisions of international conventions regarding military occupation.

Constructivist authors’ attempt to highlight the risks of post-conflict reconstruction projects is salutary, in the sense that it might seem reasonable to design state reconstruction models for the regions affected by crisis according to Western standards, but local population might not be willing to accept them.

Modern anthropology has to face, in fact, the same problems it has encountered since its inception – the cultural nature and values specific to each nation, mixed and aligned to standards after the end of the conflict. Instead of having the conflict consequences erased, new tensions are triggered and can escalate into another conflict.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> His speech, held at Harvard University on 5<sup>th</sup> of June 1947, advanced the common plan for the reconstruction of Europe, later known as the Marshall Plan. As he later declared in a press conference, the plan was designed for all European countries, including the Soviet Union. For details, see \*\*\*, *Le Plan Marshall et le relèvement économique de l’Europe*. Colloque les 21, 22, 23 mars 1991 sous la direction de René Girault et Maurice Lévy-Leboyer. Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, Paris, 1993, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> \*\*\*, *Ibidem*, p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> Michael J. HOGAN, *The Marshall Plan. America-Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, Cambridge, London, 1987.

<sup>4</sup> Mahbub UL HAQ was the author of the *Report on Human Development*, first presented in 1990; For details, see Mahbub UL HAQ, *Reflections on Human Development*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 3 and <http://www.mhhdc.org/reports/khadija-haq/6-LUMS%20speech%20on%20Mahbub%20ul%20Haq%202011.pdf>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>5</sup> See also, R. JOLLY, *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004, p. 21 and [http://www.unhistory.org/reviews/FDS\\_Jolly.pdf](http://www.unhistory.org/reviews/FDS_Jolly.pdf), accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>6</sup> North-South Roundtable, 1990. The positive reactions to human security analysis presented in the first Human Development Report presented four years later, in 1994, are due to the high level of participation in this round table. See also, R. JOLLY, *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, United Nations, New York,



2004, <http://www.un.org/secureworld/>, accessed at 26<sup>th</sup> August 2013; Report of the Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All*, 2005, <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/> accessed on 26 August 2013; See also, *Human Development Report 1994*, UNO, p. 24; *Reports of UN Institute for Disarmament Research*, <http://www.unidp.org/htmywi/humM>, accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>8</sup> See also, *Human Development Report 1994*, <http://hdr.undp.org>, accessed on 26 August 2013; See also, *An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, (A/48/935), 6 May 1994. See also, Barry BUZAN, "People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations", in *International Journal*, Vol. 40, no. 4, *Managing Conflict*, Autumn, 1985, pp. 756-758; S. TADJBAKHSI, "Human Security: The Seven Challenges of Operationalizing the Concept", Paris, UNESCO Conference Human Security: 60 minutes to Convince, 13 September, 2005, p. 25, [http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/unesco\\_13-09-05.pdf](http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/unesco_13-09-05.pdf), accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>9</sup> See also, Paul DUȚĂ, "Human security and the phrase „Partnership for security” for NATO’s Strategic Concept”, *Strategic Impact*, Issue: 4/2009, pp. 55-64. [http://impactstrategic.unap.ro/reviste/cup\\_33.html](http://impactstrategic.unap.ro/reviste/cup_33.html), accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>10</sup> See also, Javier SOLANA, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf>, accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>11</sup> See also, Ionel CLOȘCĂ et alii, *Dreptul Internațional Umanitar la începutul secolului XXI*, Romanian Association of Humanitarian Law, Bucharest, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> See also, Francis FUKUYAMA, *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2004, p. 134.

<sup>13</sup> Proposed by Francis FUKUYAMA and Emmanuel TODD. For details, see F. FUKUYAMA, op. cit., p. 135; E. TODD, *Après la démocratie*, Gallimard Publishinghouse, Paris, 2008, p. 41, [http://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/apres-la-democratie-par-emmanuel-todd\\_fr\\_art\\_809\\_41561.html](http://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/apres-la-democratie-par-emmanuel-todd_fr_art_809_41561.html), accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>14</sup> See also, Document ST/SGB/1999/13, "Observance by U.N. forces of international humanitarian law" [Respectarea regulilor dreptului internațional umanitar de către forțele Națiunilor Unite], in *Revista Română de Drept Umanitar*, no.5-6(29-30), pp. 29-32.

<sup>15</sup> See also, Francis FUKUYAMA, "Bring back the state", *The Guardian*, 2004, July, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/04/globalisation.comment>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>16</sup> See also, Thomas P. M. BARNETT, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Putnam Publishing Group, April 2004, p. 24, <http://thomaspmbarnett.com/the-pentagons-new-map/>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>17</sup> See also, Bernard SHAPIRO, "Israelis failed security policy", *The Maccabean Online*, Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, July 2, 2006, <http://www.freeman.org/>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>18</sup> See also, James DOBBINS, "Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower", RAND Review, Summer 2003, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/summer2003/nation1.html>, accessed at 26 August 2013; Karl DEUTSCH, "Nation-Building and National Development. Some Issues for Political Research", in Karl DEUTSCH, William FOLTZ, eds., *Nationbuilding*, New York, Atherton, 2003, pp. 7-8, [http://www.researchgate.net/publication/32158530\\_Deutsch\\_Karl\\_W\\_and\\_Foltz\\_William\\_J\(ed.\)\\_Nation-Building\\_Atherton\\_Press\\_New\\_York\\_1963pp.xiii167](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/32158530_Deutsch_Karl_W_and_Foltz_William_J(ed.)_Nation-Building_Atherton_Press_New_York_1963pp.xiii167), accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>19</sup> See also, Virginia Page FORTNA, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War", in *International Studies Quarterly*, 2004, pp. 269-292, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unl.org/pbps/library/Peace%20operations%20final%20literature%20review.pdf>, accessed at 26 August 2013; Marrack GOULDING, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", in *International Affairs*, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 451-464, <http://www.Scribd.com/doc/90749795/Evolution-of-Un-Peacekeeping>, accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>20</sup> See also, Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Document A/47/277 - S/241111, 17 June 1992, New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1992, [http://www.un.org/ar/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2029\\_Agenda%20for%20peace.pdf](http://www.un.org/ar/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2029_Agenda%20for%20peace.pdf), accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>21</sup> See also, Michael PUGH, *Post-conflict Rehabilitation: social and civil dimensions*, December 1998, [http://scholar.google.ro/scholar?q=Michael+PUGH,+Post-conflict+Rehabilitation:+social+and+civil+dimensions&hl=ro&as\\_sdt=0&as\\_vis=1&oi=scholar&sa=X&ei=dbMYUrgzsefhBNHegTg&ved=0CCoQgQMwAA](http://scholar.google.ro/scholar?q=Michael+PUGH,+Post-conflict+Rehabilitation:+social+and+civil+dimensions&hl=ro&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholar&sa=X&ei=dbMYUrgzsefhBNHegTg&ved=0CCoQgQMwAA), accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>22</sup> See also, Michael PUGH, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> See also, SEDRA, Mark; MIDDLEBROOK, Peter, "Afghanistan’s problematic path to peace: Lessons in state building in the post-September 11 era", in *Foreign Policy in Focus* (FPFIF), June 12, 2004, [http://fpif.org/afghanistans\\_problematic\\_path\\_to\\_peace\\_1\\_essons\\_in\\_state\\_building\\_in\\_the\\_post-september\\_11\\_era/](http://fpif.org/afghanistans_problematic_path_to_peace_1_essons_in_state_building_in_the_post-september_11_era/), accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Francis FUKUYAMA, *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2004, p. 34.

<sup>25</sup> *Protocoalele adiționale la Convențiile de la Geneva din 12 august 1949 cu privire la protecția victimelor de război (The Additional Protocols to the Geneva*



*Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Conflict*), Military Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 1992.

<sup>26</sup> Letter signed by Lakhdar Brahimi on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 2000, [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/), accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>27</sup> See also, Paul Dănuș DUȚĂ, "Instituții de securitate. Partea generală", Colecția Politică și Apărare Națională, no.18, Tehno Media Publishinghouse, Sibiu, 2007, p. 21.

<sup>28</sup> See also, *Human Development Report 1994*, UNO; Reports of UN Institute for Disarmament Research, <http://www.unidp.org/htmywi/humM/>, accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>30</sup> Governments can choose a pragmatic option. See also, P. H. Liotta, Taylor Owen, "Sense and symbolism: Europe takes on human security", in *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Seton Hali University, Winter/Spring, 2006, pp. 85-93, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/06autumn/liotta.pdf>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

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<sup>32</sup> Douglas MacLEAN (co-editor), *Liberalism Reconsidered*, Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, N.J., 1983, p. 5.

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<sup>34</sup> The doctrine is related to *The European Union Security Strategy*, considering the emphasis on direct threats: terrorism, organized crime, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failing states. For details, *The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*, Barcelona, 15 September 2004, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40209/>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 12-18.

<sup>42</sup> Coordinated by the World Bank, the document can be considered a guide for local communities' officials with responsibilities in the field. The lessons outlined in the document mainly come from the experience of reconstruction in East Timor and Rwanda, where the World Bank developed programs of reconstruction in the '90s. For details, see Sarah CLIFFE, Scott GUGGENHEIM, Markus COSTNER, *Community Reconstruction as an instrument in War to Peace transitions*, CPR Working Papers, Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, Paper no. 7, August 2003, pp. 1-6, <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35122/WP7final.pdf>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 9.

<sup>44</sup> Craig COHEN, "Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction", in *US Institute of Peace, Stabilization and Reconstruction Series*, no. 1, Mars 2006, p. 4, <http://www.usip.org/publications/measuring-progress-in-stabilization-and-reconstruction>, accessed at 26 August 2013.

<sup>45</sup> Gaston BACHELARD, *La formation de l'esprit scientifique*, Paris, Librairie philosophique J. VRIN, 5<sup>e</sup> édition, 1967, pp. 13-20. More or less advanced and complicated explanations were also given by other constructivists (Antonio Machado, Norbert Wiener, Jean Piaget, von Glaserfeld etc.), but without reaching a unified constructivist theory.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 34.

<sup>47</sup> Earl CONTEH-MORGAN, "Peacebuilding and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective", in *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2005, pp. 70-82, [http://www.gmu.edu/acadeim/Vijjs/vol10\\_1/Conteh-Morgan\\_1011JPS.pdf](http://www.gmu.edu/acadeim/Vijjs/vol10_1/Conteh-Morgan_1011JPS.pdf), accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 84.

<sup>49</sup> Paul DUȚĂ, Constantin STANCIU, „Avatarurile imperiilor și expedițiilor în Asia Centrală”, in *Policy Paper no. 1*, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Bucharest, 2012, p. 3, <http://www.idr.ro/publicatii/Policy%20Paper%201.pdf>, accessed on 26 August 2013.

<sup>50</sup> History shows that constructivist theories have been implemented since antiquity, but without being conceptualized. Recently, actors have the tendency to believe to have won the war, instead of seeing that it was only battle in which they achieved victory, which determines, for example, some US officials to believe that the reconstruction of Iraq is already a success. See also, Alexander WENDT, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics" in *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, p. 2, [http://labmundo.org/disciplinas/WENDT\\_anarchy\\_is\\_what\\_states\\_make\\_of\\_it.pdf](http://labmundo.org/disciplinas/WENDT_anarchy_is_what_states_make_of_it.pdf), accessed on 26 August 2013.

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# A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE STATE SECURITY SYSTEM USING THE MODAL EXPERIMENT

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*The development of cybernetics resulted in the birth of modeling method as a general scientific method, and made unity of theory and practice become, by far, more qualitative than, until then, governing statistical method. In the field of social science, the method has appeared as the modal experiment. Using these fundamental experiences, in this work, the authors firstly explain the concept, structure and types of modeling, and then the concept and types of experiments, that is, the basic model in modal experiment. In the end, the authors elaborate a possible conceptual model of security system of the Republic of Serbia and modal experiment variables. In this model, it is possible to vary and change the quality, intensity, dynamics and quantity factors. With the help of this model, it is possible to determine the power of accomplishment and tendencies. To achieve this simulation the research prognostic technique has been applied. Conceptual model has been seen from the doctrinal, legal and organizational perspectives, having been in compliance with security movements in the world, needs and objective possibilities of the Republic of Serbia.*

**Keywords:** *conceptual model, modal experiment, security system.*

## **Introduction**

In the process of realization of fundamental, applicable and developing research, the modeling

method, experiments and modal experiments have been gaining larger significance.

Also, their application is important when it comes to verifying and heuristic research when performing a scientific classification, description, explanation, forecasting and detection of phenomena, all of which requires their close study and getting the clearer picture of their application in all the spheres of human operations, especially in the sphere of security.

Modeling, as a general scientific method, has been the consequence of cybernetic development. Its basic characteristic is “the unity of theory and practice”, which permits it to be at a higher qualitative level than statistical method, thus allowing it to be applied in certain fields where the very existence of the unity of theory and practice is of crucial importance, first of all in political science and practice of political security. It appears as a general theory of social and political relations, a system of programmed, political, lawful and other normatives, and also as a certain degree of fulfillment in practice – as a model experiment<sup>1</sup>.

There are two important facts which have decisive influence on application of modeling method in all empirical research in political science, and they are: *firstly*, scientific research is based on already existing scientific knowledge or knowledge based on experience, and *secondly*, it is necessary That the project of empiric research contain certain theoretical model of research object as well<sup>2</sup>.

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The modal experiment application, based on existing scientific knowledge and knowledge based on experience, enables a complete insight into the security system of a state and new conceptual models creation.

### **1. Modeling, Concept and Types of Models, Experiments and Basic Model in Modal Experiment**

Modeling does not mean only “presentation through senses and physical copying, but every psychological presentation as well, even imagining an object or phenomenon”<sup>3</sup>.

If we start from the point where modeling is a constituent part of every process of human thinking, this term can be seen as “rational, systematic, complex action of presenting adequately important points of the process or phenomenon that is social reality or their thoughts as particular units”<sup>4</sup>. In that meaning, the creation of new terms is accomplished by using already existing ones.

A modeling process consists of noticing conceptual and physical presentation of important factors of the phenomenon which is being researched.

While modeling certain social phenomena, it is necessary to abide by the following principles: universality of the modeling object principle, which shows that each and every research object can be modeled; variety of the modeling principle, which means that every object or system can be modeled in different ways, and principle of prototype and example<sup>5</sup>.

Determination of the modeling concept preconditions determination of its structure, which consists of four elements: “modeling object, which is any phenomenon which can be researched by the modeling method; subjective factor – an individual or a group of researchers who work on some object model and through that object they do a research on some phenomenon or process; means which are used in creating the model and from which the model is created (physical, technical, cognitive and linguistic) and conditions under which the model is built”<sup>6</sup>.

Based on what previously stated, one can conclude that the process of modeling consists of the following phases: defining needs and necessity to build the model, choosing modeling object, choosing type and kind of model, choosing modeling means, choosing associates in creating the model, projecting and creating the model, testing the model and

finishing touches to it, if necessary, and presenting and using the model.

In contemporary methodology of social sciences, generally accepted meaning of the concept of model does not exist.

Generally speaking, “model is every theoretical – conceptual or real, or practically realistic, system analogue to the research object ( $S_1$ ) used to research on certain basic object or system ( $S_0$ )”. Having this in mind, modeling is “ $S_1$  system constructing that is modeling system according to original system  $S_0$  which is researched on  $S_1$  model”<sup>7</sup>.

Also, model is “a simplified and idealized picture of reality”, which “enables us to face with the real world (system) in the simplified way, avoiding its complexity and irreversibility, as well as all dangers (in the broadest sense) which could result from the experiment if it is done on that real system”; also, it can be “imitation, prototype or projection of a subject – part of existing, past or possible future social reality”<sup>8</sup>.

Theoretically seen, having in mindgnoseological nature of a model, the following main types of models could be distinguished: theoretical, practical, real, ideal, simple, complex, structural, functional, partial, global, analytical, typological, network, deterministic, stochastic and statistical. Apart from these, mixed or combined models, such as, for example, the theoretical – practical, structural – functional and complex are often used<sup>9</sup>.

Specificities of political science subject of research also demand slightly different classification of models: simple – complex; static – dynamic; closed – open; rigid – flexible; retrospective – prognostic; evaluative (normative) – actual (realistic); derived – projected and internal – external.<sup>10</sup>

When approaching scientific experiment, as the basic and the most important form of gaining scientific knowledge, it is seen as “planned, organized and methodic producing and performing, or just changing the emergent process, in order to discover unknown facts, properties and relations between phenomena, and to check the hypothesis on these facts and their properties”<sup>11</sup>. From methodological point of view and technical aspects, the experiment is viewed as “planned observation of phenomena artificially induced in determined favorable conditions, in order to study the relationships between factors of the phenomena”<sup>12</sup>.



Also, experiment is a way of collecting data by direct sensual perception, with the use of auxiliary technical means or without them<sup>13</sup>.

There are different criteria for the classification of an experiment. According to the criterion of the place of executing, there are the following types of experiments: experiment in natural conditions, experiment in laboratory conditions, natural experiment, experiment *ex post facto* and simulation experiment<sup>14</sup>.

Experiment, as a research method, is usually based on using two equal groups – experimental and control groups, which are, at the beginning of the experiment, made equal according to determined property which the experimentator is interested in. In this, the experimental group is, according to the plan, exposed to the activity of the determined factor or influence, while the control group conducts its acting in accustomed conditions.

After a single or repeated exposure to the activities of a determined factor, the experimenter again conducts measuring in both groups, and a possible (significant) difference in measuring values of a certain property between experimental and control group is attributed to the effect of experimental factor. When it comes to social and political sciences, experiments are divided into two groups – real and quasi-experiments. The first group consists of laboratory experiment and experiment in natural conditions, and the other group – natural, *ex post facto* experiment and simulation, e.g. modal experiment<sup>15</sup>.

Laboratory experiment has the rarest use in political science and it is the hardest one for conducting. Experiments in natural conditions can be performed by using the two groups – experimental and control. The possibilities for conducting the natural experiment are far greater, but it can not be claimed that it is more economic than the previous type of experiment.

*Ex post facto* experiment represents a reconstruction of a social phenomenon on the basis of available data and using statistical method. However, these researches by their probability and reliability have very limited value. Simulation method can be applied as a form of *ex post facto* experiment or prognostic experiment. This experiment is conducted by using known data or scientifically based assessments about properties of certain phenomenon, often by means of computer in presumed functions of the goal for the formation of notions of possible situations and behaviors. As for the simulation experiment, it should be pointed out

that its result is “a set of points, i.e. values of dependent variables for certain values of independent variables (time)”. Independent variables or variables of models have random character, and as a result of the experiment different values of dependent variables for the same value of independent variables are obtained.

When it comes to modal experiment, it can have double meaning, that is, it can be empirical and practical, on one hand, and theoretical and cognitive, on the other hand. The term “cognitive experiment” contains a contradiction, which is reflected in the fact that the experiment is primarily empirical method and that the important characteristics of the experiment are connected exactly to “practical behavior in producing determined result”<sup>16</sup>. However, this contradiction could be explained: first, conceived and verbally presented model is checked by practical experiment; second, the model is only outlined, so the model is build and developed by using the experiment and quaziexperiment and third, there is a cognitive model which is based on theory and applied in practice<sup>17</sup>.

Modal experiment is an experiment that is conducted on already built model. It is the higher form and a special type of artificial experiment, which is characterized by higher level of creativity. The *main characteristics of modal experiment* are as follows:

- 1) is conducted on a model, in which, to some extent, the theory relying on hypothesis, which, in turn, are being tested using modal experiment, is realized and practically presented;
- 2) it enables researching of certain phenomena in strictly determined conditions, which could be, not only varied, but also controled by the experimenter;
- 3) it enables, not only varying of the conditions for conducting experiment, but also combining these conditions, and that enables conducting of new experiments;
- 4) enables practical researches of certain phenomena in so called pure form, after their separation from complex phenomena;
- 5) very broad area of application<sup>18</sup>.

The *structure of modal experiment* consists of the following factors:

- conditions in which the phenomenon occurs and exists,
- subjects who evaluate the conditions and who have certain characteristics and relationship with conditions,
- connection between the subject and the conditions in whose base are motives, interests,



desires, intentions, aspirations because of which certain activities develop,

- activity, behavior, action of subjects in these or changed conditions, in order to achieve the objectives, relations and connections,

- methods and means, which are used and which are clearly and efficiently being built into a possible system.

Therefore, starting from the constructed model, modal experiment comes to new model as a result of the process of thinking. In doing so, the complete process of thinking includes the following elements: perception, representation and knowledge. Also, each modal experiment is also the process of: a) selection; b) variation and c) evaluation. In fact, every modal experiment is a developed procedure of proving and disproving, which usually has the following three phases:

- the first phase includes a thesis or a basic (initial) idea;

- the first phase includes a thesis or a basic (initial) idea;

- in the second phase, positive and negative arguments are presented, and they include selection, variation and evaluation:

- the third phase includes the establishment of a valid system model.

## 2. Conceptual Model of the Republic of Serbia Security System and Variables of the Modal Experiment

By the analysis of the existing security system of the Republic of Serbia, an appropriate model can be developed, in which it is possible to apply the modal experiment.

The National Security Council, whose main function would be internal and external relations of the whole security system with public.

The model (security system of the Republic of Serbia) is considered from the strategic-doctrinal, legal-normative, organizational and functional aspects.




Figure no. 1 Conceptual model of the national security system structure



The area of internal policy defines different strategies, such as: Strategic Defense Review, The Defense White Paper, Counterterrorism Strategy, Strategy for fighting organized crime and other similar strategies. From these strategic documents are derived the systematic documents for the forces of security and defence systems, thus for the Army and for the rest of the system elements (documents consistent with their functions and responsibilities in security system of the Republic of Serbia).

There are several approaches to foreign policy development, which influence on security system structuring: membership in Partnership for Peace Program, military neutrality, joining NATO, and other.

These approaches, defined by holders of legal and executive power, determine conducting of the foreign policy to a broad extent. It is important to point out; the security system is also shaped by the orientation for EU membership, developing cooperation with neighboring states, as well as regional cooperation strengthening.

The structure of national security system of the Republic of Serbia consists of governmental and executive parts. Governmental part includes: National Assembly, the President and the Government, while the executive part includes particular ministries.

The security system structure in this model consists of the management subjects, through the legal, executive and judicial institutions, because of realization of the most favorable security conditions. The functions of the system management are: planning, organizing, ordering, coordination and control and they are realized consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, law and the other regulations<sup>19</sup>. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia realizes the managing influence on all parts of security system by executing constitutional and legal activities. It decides on war and peace, conducts control over the work of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the other subjects responsible to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in accordance with the Constitution and national laws. The President manages the Army of Serbia as a commander, in compliance with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Serbia. The Government of the Republic of Serbia manages ministries and the institutions in the area of national security. It proposes and implements a policy of national security, directs and controls the functioning of the system, provides material resources, manages the activities of state bodies, organizations, institutions, individuals and

corporations in the area of national security and ensures the implementation of international treaties and agreements in the area of national security.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Finance, the Director of Security Information Agency (Bezbednosno-informativna agencija - BIA) and the Minister of Emergency Situations submit reports to the National Assembly and the Government about state of security from the scope of their responsibilities. The other ministries, at the request of the Government and the National Assembly, or whenever necessary, submit reports from the scope of their responsibilities relating to security issues. In this way, subjects of security are: the Army, the Police, security services, private security agencies (Fizičko-tehničko obezbeđenje - FTO) and civil security services: social and health protection, pension insurance (Penzijsko i invalidsko osiguranje - PIO), custom, education. In order to implement the oversight of the security system, there is the Committee for Defense and Security in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. The National Assembly may establish committee of inquiry on certain phenomena and events.

For guiding activities and coordination of all security issues in the Republic of Serbia, the National Security Council is established, and it is composed of the President, Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defense, as well as the directors of the security services (Security Information Agency -BIA), Military Intelligence Agency (Vojnoobaveštajna agencija – VOA) and Military Security Agency (Vojnobezbednosna agencija – VBA). Within the National Security Council, there is a Bureau for the Coordination of the National Security Council.

Also, in its composition, establishment of the National Agency for the Protection of Classified Information and the Central Registry is anticipated, since they are necessary preconditions for cooperation with states members of Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. By establishing of this Agency and Registry and by adopting of the Law on protection of classified information of the Republic of Serbia, the ability would be gained for protecting, storing and exchanging of classified security information. Agency for Public Relations would become a part of the Bureau for the Coordination of The model anticipates the existence of three security services, namely: BIA, VOA, and VBA. In the model, BIA is responsible for non-military challenges and threats, while VOA and VBA for military challenges and threats. For the management of the activities of these services, the Bureau for the Coordination is established. According to the conceptual model, there is the Ministry for Emergency Situations




within the Government of the Republic of Serbia, with the task of integral planning and engagement in emergency situations – protection and rescue at the national and provincial level and in local self government, with establishment of working units of volunteers in case of accidents, as well as functioning of the system in emergency situations. Safety and security of the citizens, their rights and obligations, as well as media and NGOs, affect the overall efficiency and awareness of the security system.

The developed model of the security system is dynamic, compatible with contemporary solutions and our experience and practice and provides the opportunity for development and testing of theoretical model by experimental risk simulation, engaging the security system elements and taking other actions in the structuring of system security, for the purpose of preventive, effective actions directed towards the elimination of potential threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia.

The algorithm, as shown in Figure no. 2 shows experimental variables by blocks representing control and dependent variables, by which it is possible to experiment on the model in order to obtain appropriate results.

The algorithm assumed the existence of threat to security of the Republic of Serbia (block no. 1), which causes making the decision on engagement of the forces of the Republic of Serbia security system (block no. 3) by responsible state organs (National Assembly, Government, President) (block no. 2), for the efficient elimination of the security threat. Simultaneously, diplomatic activities are increased (block no. 4) for the purpose of positive attitude of the international community and international security forces. International Security Forces (block no. 5) can have negative, neutral, positive or allied attitude towards engaging of the security forces of the Republic of Serbia, and this significantly affects the structuring of the security forces model. Media



*Figure no. 2 Algorithm of experimental variables of the security system conceptual model*



(block no. 6) and NGOs (block no. 7) also have an impact on the modeling of elements of security system. Modeled forces (block no. 8) respond to security threat in order to eliminate it.

Having in mind the above mentioned the central issue in resolving the algorithm is efficient structuring of the security system forces in relation to the various threats.

The algorithm was developed by blocks which include these structures, from block no. 1 to block no. 8. The structure of blocks represents the possible relations between variables in the model: block no. 1: forms of security threats to the Republic of Serbia; block no. 2: National Assembly, Government and President; block no. 3: forces of the security system (military, police, security services, other state armed organizations (Ostale državne oružane organizacije – ODOO), civil protection, private security agencies – FTO, the customs authorities, local self government and citizens); block no. 4: diplomacy; block no. 5: international security forces; block no. 6: media; block no. 7: NGOs; block no. 8: modeling of forces, reaction of forces to security threat (block no. 1) and the new political decision (block no. 2).

For political decision makers, of crucial importance is the adequate modeling of the effective security system structures, by using appropriate scientific methods and techniques in accordance with an assessment of security threats.

Solving this problem, by experimenting on the model, whose experimental variables are operationalized, is possible by using various mathematical disciplines and methods of decision theory with the application of appropriate software support.

However, for adequate treating of certain phenomenon in reality, it is necessary first to develop a model, which will, considering characteristics important for the realization of the research, imitate objective reality to which the model refers. Only under these conditions, the application of mathematical and informatics tools in the model will provide necessary, scientifically valid results.

During the realization of research and search for possible responses to the security system model based on potentially different forms of security threats for the Republic of Serbia, there has been

noted a particular problem of measurement of security breaches, as well as possibility of opposing subsystem to the security system.

The system model is structured as organizational, partially determined, having in mind the fact that it behaves and reacts in connection to the surrounding and environmental actions (in this case friendly, allied, partner, but also hostile) and it is man manageable, which determines its functioning.

The security system model is also a system which reflects the existence of complex social phenomena and its behavior is not possible to be valued by direct quantitative measuring results.

While researching the problem of reaction and measurement of the response security system on potential breaches of the Republic of Serbia, the start point was the postulate which refers to measurement of social phenomena, which is best defined by the attitude that *measurement is revealing and noting the quantity of certain quality through particular procedures and adequate measuring devices*. To put it simple, one can measure something, but one cannot measure anything.

The measurement of response reaction of the security system<sup>20</sup> in this case falls into the domain of research of *social reality* which consists of past, present and future. Having in mind that the security system model of the Republic of Serbia represents the thought – the concept of the restructured organizational system, the system facing future security threats and it basically refers to the management of social and security interests, as well as their accomplishment–, it is very important to understand that these measurements are foreseeing and that they are based on estimation and evaluation, terms which are important for quantification of the results of social phenomena actions.

According to its meaning in practical usage, the basic meaning of the term “evaluation” is adding or justified added value (quantity of values) to some real manifestation. Therefore, evaluation is turned to both present and past.

Estimation is also based on existing knowledge, standards and instrumental usage, while being turned towards the perspective or possible, probable quantities which can be numerically stated (mentioned terms get their concept solely through realization of intuitive measurements)<sup>21</sup>.

The subsystem of the system model is a man or group of people of any size. Each man or group of people has an instinct to survive, identify itself with the environment and manage the orientation system of values.





The system model factors can also be modeled in relation to security risks and threats, which are also most frequently orchestrated by a man with his or her mental and physical capabilities. In any case, the goals of threat function and security system are diametrically opposed; while the threat is directed towards destruction of certain social or any other value in the country, the security system is directed towards neutralization of the threat and maintaining the value in question.

From that aspect, the security system actions and threat function systems are in constant fight, and the outcome depends on many factors, including the human one. Under such conditions, the result of security system actions, as well as the result of their inter-dependant subsystems, cannot be fully quantified.

That result (under experimental – simulation conditions) is first of all estimation of the response, and not its evaluation; that result represents certain probability of the scenario, which can, but does not have to happen in real situation.

Having in mind that phenomena, processes and events, which represent the concrete forms of existence of objective reality in the security system, are qualitative and social, and they are expressed by attitudes whose cognitive value, depending on different values of determined conditions, can vary between 0 and 1, their measurement depends on estimation and not evaluation and it is clear that their realistic recognition is possible through the application of fuzzy logic.

Fuzzy logic has been created as the consequence of the polyvalent logic development, which has unlimited number of consequences, depending on the change of values of its causes (including the minimal ones). Polyvalent logic and fuzzy logic do not rule out all result values between 0 and 1, as divalent, traditional logic does.

Fuzzy logic, under experimental conditions, provides frame values for the security system employment results, as the organizational system, in which man has an important role, but also as the system which works in the hostile environment. It provides the assessment of the response results, which should be approximately the same as in real situation.

Having in mind the complexity of the security system as organizational system, as well as complexity or its functioning conditions and full definition of the conflict situation role play (the participants being the security system, the security

threat and other conflict situation factors), human factor, it is without any doubt that fuzzy logic, as a scientific method, allows security system quality research from the aspect of necessity of its enhancement on all levels of its organizational system in order to optimize its functioning, depending on all the factors determining this system.

### Conclusions

From the scientific point of view, this model is a simplified picture of realistic system based on which the scientific acknowledgement can be reached by application of other scientific methods.

Application of modal experiment in research of the potential security system is permanently actual. It is scientifically evident and obvious in practice that the security system, like any other social system, contains subsystems and interrelated elements on the level of general, special and individual. It is the differences within the general framework which demand respect of uniqueness and specific traits in research of certain elements of the potential security system of the state.

This is logical – methodological and theoretical paradigm that is emphatically present in consideration of the possible security system of the Republic of Serbia, by using modal experiment as a necessary research method and technique, which allows the unity of theory and practice at a higher level, that is, allows that axiomatic, general, theoretical methods find their practical application and testing in a natural, scientific and social dimension. Therefore, application of the modal experiment as a scientific method is necessary and extremely important in reaching rational, economic and effective decisions.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, *Istraživanje političkih pojava*, Institut za političke studije, Centar za omladinu i pionire Palilule, Beograd, 1980, pp. 241 - 242.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 242.

<sup>3</sup> Bogdan ŠEŠIĆ, *Opšta metodologija*, Naučna knjiga, Beograd, 1974, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, Ivan RADOSAVLJEVIĆ, *Osnovi metodologije političkih nauka*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, p. 265.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Bogdan ŠEŠIĆ, *Opšta metodologija*, Naučna knjiga, Beograd, 1974, str. 18. Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ and Ivan RADOSAVLJEVIĆ also distinguish four



fundamental factors of modeling: the situation or the conditions of modeling; the modeler; object of modeling and modeling resources. Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, Ivan RADOSAVLJEVIĆ, , *aforementioned piece*, p. 271.

<sup>7</sup> Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, Ivan RADOSAVLJEVIĆ, *aforementioned piece*, p. 21.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 265

<sup>9</sup> Božidar RADENKOVIĆ, *Interaktivni simulacioni sistem za diskretnu stohastičku simulaciju organizacionih sistema i njegova realizacija na mini i mikro računarima*, PhD thesis, Univerzitet u Beogradu, FON, Beograd, 1989, p. 23.

<sup>10</sup> Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, *aforementioned piece*, pp. 244-248. Starting from the definition of the model as "imitation, prototype or projection" of some object, Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ and Ivan RADOSAVLJEVIĆ distinguish three basic types of the models: imitation, prototype and projection models. The first types are models that represent realms of social reality, material or other nature.

<sup>11</sup> Bogdan ŠEŠIĆ, *Osnovi metodologije društvenih nauka*, Beograd, 1984, p. 243.

<sup>12</sup> Predrag KOZIĆ, *Metodologija naučnoistraživačkog rada*, Beograd, 1994, p. 36.

<sup>13</sup> Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, Ivan RADOSAVLJEVIĆ, *aforementioned piece*, p. 540.

<sup>14</sup> Dobrivoje MIHAILOVIĆ, *Metodologija naučnih istraživanja*, Fakultet organizacionih nauka, Beograd, 1999, p. 162.

<sup>15</sup> Slavomir MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, Ivan RADOSAVLJEVIĆ, *aforementioned piece*, p. 542-543.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 271.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 272.

<sup>18</sup> Bogdan ŠEŠIĆ, *Opšta metodologija*, Naučna knjiga, Beograd, 1974, p. 25.

<sup>19</sup> Miodrag GORDIĆ, *Modalni ekperiment u istraživanju potencijalnog sistema bezbednosti države*, Medija centar Odbrana, Beograd, 2011.

<sup>20</sup> In response to security threats through military operations and their modeling see: Miroslav TALIJAN, JELIĆ Mile, Rade SLAVKOVIĆ, *Projektni menadžment i modelovanje vojnih operacija*, Vojno delo, zima 2012, Beograd, pp. 43-56 and Rade SLAVKOVIĆ, Miroslav TALIJAN, Mile JELIĆ, *Projektovanje vojnih operacija*, Vojno delo, zima 2012,

Beograd, pp. 129-139.

<sup>21</sup> Of monitoring and evaluation as a function of the security management, see: Momčilo TALIJAN, M. Miroslav TALIJAN, *Opšti i bezbednosni menadžment*, VŠUP, Banja Luka, 2012.

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# DEFENSE RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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*The contemporary world is very complex, dynamic and challenging. All aspects of our lives are shaped by political, economical, financial, social, cultural, environmental actions performed in various degrees by individuals, groups, nations, alliances, and/ or global organizations. The latest developments of the economical and financial events have shown us the weaknesses of the modern society arrangements, one of them being represented by the following paradox: most of the time, we are shortsighted and concerned only about present days and not about the sustainability of our current systems. This is true not only about civilian areas of the economy but also in respect to defense resources.*

*This paper intends to emphasize the correlation between the sustainable development of a country and the defense sector based on relevant concepts, key indicators, management strategies and reasonable ways optimize the national efforts and harmonize the international efforts for development.*

**Keywords:** *sustainable development, national resources, natural resources, defense resources, sustainability, indicators, strategic domains.*

## Introduction

The year 2008 marks the onset of the most serious and complex economic crisis since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a crisis with major implications of both geopolitical and strategic nature, which threatens both the power hierarchies and the states' capacity to undertake international responsibilities. Moreover, the ever-increasing

global economic competition reduces, on one hand, the interest for contributing to the international management of new problems arising from this crisis, and on the other hand, generates an increase of the political nationalism. The world states – especially the medium and small ones, with frail and dependent economies – consider themselves vulnerable as open societies. The modern age and the unavoidable connections established within the “global village” lead to the situation in which the effects of the economic crisis are felt both by the aforementioned states and by their competitors. Furthermore, the innovations resulting from the technological and information revolution are equally accessible to all states.

In this sense, we are all addicted to the proper functioning of all kinds of mega-networks, as they shape our life in general, and especially the economy – through internet or transcontinental flights, for instance. We depend on the access to vital resources and especially energy, as we depend on maintaining freedom of trade, as well as free access to information. Besides sovereignty and territorial integrity, many of these elements are also vital to our security and prosperity.

In such a tense and complex context, a country' security and the security of the international community as a whole, is based not only on the responsiveness and adaptation, but rather on the ability to anticipate and take pro-active action, targeting primarily – among others – the sustainable management of the planet's resources. The availability of natural resources has caused related

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problems, which exert a major influence on the foreign policy of states, as the availability of natural resources remains a source of tension and potential conflict. This is demonstrated, besides the many arguments in the literature, by the more recent contemporary international issues, problems and concerns: the Iraqi crisis, the Russian gas crisis, the Iranian nuclear negotiations crisis, the Arab Spring and, more recently, the Syrian crisis, which has already raised the price of an oil barrel.

### **1. Sustainable development – necessity of the Present for the Future**

The onset of the new century requires the reformulation of the foreign policies of all the world countries, with major focus on the specific problems of providing and managing resources, especially natural ones. The main motivations of this strategic reorientation of foreign policy relates to the increased dependency of the national economies on resources, especially on energy, but also on the reality of the phenomenon of the accelerated depletion of these resources. The specialized economic and political literature makes broad references to the issues of the Earth's resources with emphasis on the energy resources. Resources have been, over time, the epicenter of deliberations and negotiations regarding the new coordinates of global geopolitics, and the last decade of the last century witnessed dramatic upheavals in global politics.

This is the general context in which the possession, availability and effective use of resources becomes a source of tensions, crises and even conflicts. For these reasons, the resources have become the subject of extensive international debates, aimed at solving the problems of their availability, on the one hand, and on the other hand, of their division among nations.

In response to the emergence of natural resources crisis, coupled with the unanimous worldwide recognition of the contribution made by destructive human activities to the damage the environment, has emerged the process of sustainable development, *which meets current needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*. In other words, development is sustainable when all of the following three defining elements are simultaneously met, each with its specific characteristics: the economy (efficiency, growth, stability), the society (standard of living, equity, social dialogue and delegation of responsibilities, protection of culture/heritage) and ecology

(conservation and protection of natural resources, biodiversity, diminished pollution).<sup>1</sup> The most important resources are food and water, energy – indispensable element to most human activities – and raw materials, and their issue remains a major concern in the current international circumstances, given the unprecedented scale of the demand of these resources. More so because, on one hand, all developed economies depend on energy sources around the globe, and their limited nature and the spectrum of their depletion becomes more obvious. On the other hand, the increasing interdependence of countries on the use of these resources generates new and complex issues related to the need for all states to access resources to support their economic development. In the opinion of most analysts and specialists, the access or loss of access to these resources can have unpredictable consequences.

Under these conditions, sustainable development has become one of the fundamental objectives of both the European Union and NATO, aimed at continuously raising the quality of life, for the welfare of present and future generations. The reconfiguration of NATO and EU interests soon led to highlighting the common interests in security and defense, not by duplicating them, but through their complementarities, cooperation, and dialogue and transparency measures. Proof of this behavior is the agreement between the two organizations with global vision, on EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, determined by financial constraints and scarcity of resources.<sup>2</sup> Despite all efforts at institutional level, in essence, the achievement of the objectives related to sustainable development can be done only through a radical change of the people's mentality in the two bodies' member states, in order for them to become able to use the resources rationally and efficiently and to ensure the economic potential necessary for the prosperity of the people, environment protection and social cohesion.

### **2. The concept of sustainable development – key objectives**

The *sustainable development* concept has been circulated and debated for decades, remaining a challenge for politicians, economists, scientists, philosophers, participating to various non-governmental organizations or private citizens.

The processes that occur at an increasingly intense pace at national and international level are represented through debates and concrete actions of different scopes, deriving from the recognition of the



limits the finite quantities of natural resources impose on national economies. Moreover, in the recent years it has become obvious that the human activities generate a series of negative externalities (pollution, depletion of natural resources etc), with visible influences on the living standards and on the long term economic development.

In this context, the concept *sustainable development* “is built on the premise that human civilization is a subsystem of the ecosphere, heavily dependent on the flows of matter and energy within it, on the stability and capacity for self-adjustment”<sup>3</sup>.

Numerous states, among which Romania, have focused on the development of a guiding framework in the area of sustainable development, through the development of strategies, both at national level and at the level of international organizations, such as the European Union.

The Romanian document pertaining to this issue is called *The National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania – Horizons 2013-2020-2030*.

This document contains four key objectives pertaining to sustainable development, as follows<sup>4</sup>: environment protection; equity and social cohesion; economic prosperity; achieving EU international responsibilities.

Regarding the defense sector, its sustainability is often characterized by the concept *economy of defense*, which highlights the human, financial, material and information efforts of a country in support of its military activities. The main element that highlights this effort is the percentage of the defense budget from the national budget.

Each country regulates its own vision regarding the national budget and the allocation of financial resources to key areas such as health, education, environment, infrastructure, social assistance, security and defense, etc.

It is obvious that each area requiring budgetary resources enters into competition with the other areas and that financial requests can be handled in a huge range of ways, according to government priorities.

For this reason, the clarification and understanding of the concepts of sustainable development and sustainability of the defense sector is crucial. We consider that it is possible to achieve defense sustainability at the same time with the implementation of sustainable development, even though it entails a series of efforts, both from the civilian society and from the defense sector.

### 3. Indicators for quantifying sustainable development and defense sector sustainability

Measuring the performance of a domain has always generated heated discussion and debates. This performance is determined also for the two aforementioned concepts, through the development of a set of indicators used to provide a more precise image on how to carry out and complete an activity. In the case of the concept of sustainable development, a highlight should be placed upon the set of indicators developed by Eurostat<sup>5</sup>, taking into account the proper systematization, consistency and objectivity to other structures belonging to different non-EU countries and other international organizations. This EU model associates to each of the 10 strategic dimensions an indicator (Level 1), a set of 11 indicators for the subordinated operational objectives (Level 2) and over one hundred descriptive indicators for areas of intervention on associated policies (Level 3).

In the case of Romania, the document *National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania – Horizons 2013-2020-2030* includes:

- national indicators of sustainable development, updated continuously, focused on key priorities expressed in quantifiable targets which also allow the comparison of the national performance with that of the international partners and against the renewed objectives of the Reviewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy;

- indicators of progress of the National Strategy for Sustainable Development, covering the full range of policies it generates, including those not included in the EU Strategy. In this way, all policies are subject to monitoring, aiming at increasing the responsibility of political decision makers and allowing the public opinion to assess the success of the actions undertaken.<sup>6</sup>

In regard to the sustainability of the defense sector, the relevant indicator is the allocated budget, which can be correlated with the activities in this area, through the monetary expression of the resources allocated in order to achieve each objective. Still, the defense sector is characterized by a certain lack of transparency regarding specific objectives and measures that are applied to achieve these objectives. For this reason, the whole structure performance indicators is rather weakly correlated with the real activity, due to the classified nature of many of the activities undertaken. In this context, it



is important to underline the close correlation between sustainable development, expressed by the Eurostat indicators structure, and the sustainability of the defense sector, as expressed through the defense budget, but also through other types of resources needed and which can not be expressed in monetary value.

Thus, the first strategic dimension concerns the economic and social development, using the indicator *Real GDP / capita*, expressed also as the *Rate of Growth*, and as *absolute values*. It is clear that, without this economic development, it is not realistic to request further resources for any activity, the military sector included. Events in recent years show that, due to financial crisis, the world economies had lower growth rates, even negative growth rates in some countries. All areas of socio-economic activity were affected (investments, regional economic development, economies, labor productivity, research and development, consumption, employment, etc.). All these have a direct impact on the sustainability of the defense sector, through the fluctuating level of resources allocated, the uncertainty regarding the level of these resources in the future, the allocation of resources below the needs, but also because the necessary human resources do not have the same quality and availability. Military equipment is also deficient, due to the fact that a number of economic activities at local or regional level disappear or become inaccessible due to unsustainable costs (defense producers and service providers are faced with economic difficulties).

A second strategic dimension is the sustainable production and consumption, with the indicator *Resource Productivity*. The current picture is a mixed one: the consumption of material and mineral resources continued its exponential growth, the waste management has been improved and allows recycling on large scale, there is a slight decrease in air emissions and less energy consumption at global level (due to global economic slowdown), there are more vehicles in circulation, the number of organizations and activities with eco license in the environmental management system is increasing and there is a decrease of intensive agricultural activity. These trends directly influence the sustainability of the defense sector, through the fact that the energy required for various forms of military activities is becoming increasingly expensive and sometimes generates strange situations in the desire to become "green". Moreover, the cost of developing various weapons systems and military facilities is increasing

significantly, due to higher prices of mineral and material resources.

A third strategic dimension is the social integration, with the indicator *People at Risk of Poverty and Social Exclusion*. The current trends are the following: an increase in the number of poor and people at risk of social exclusion, an increase of the gap between rich and poor, rising unemployment and an increased number of those who work for low wages, stagnating life expectancy, an increase in the number of children giving up school early. All this affects the human resource related to the defense sector, leading to an increased number of potential recruits with low education level, criminal history or who are sole parents, a high rate of entering / exiting the system for disciplinary reasons, etc.

The fourth strategic dimension is represented by the demographics, with the indicator *Employment Rate of Older Workers*. It is clear that during a crisis, many workplaces are lost, there is a tendency to retain more experienced staff (usually older), the rate of active population decreases, with negative impact on public finances, pensions decrease, affecting the elderly population and people who lose their job have difficulties finding employment elsewhere. Regarding the defense sector, inputs to the system are reduced, due to the limited number of positions in military education institutions, the reduction of the overall number of jobs available in the military, the lack of qualification for certain military activities of the personnel coming from civilian life. These phenomena lead to the same trend of keeping the existing staff in employment for longer time, sometimes with negative effects on the goals to be achieved.

The fifth strategic dimension regards the public health, with the indicators *Healthy Life Years and Life Expectancy at Birth*, by sex. At EU level there is a slight increase in the life expectancy and a narrowing of the gap between men and women in this regard, but there is also a growing number of people who are not eating healthy food, the environmental pollution is not decreasing, the access to healthcare is becoming more expensive and less accessible for those with low incomes. For the defense area, these elements generate increased challenges in terms of human resources which are already in the system and / or which enter the system. Ensuring optimal living conditions and personal health care becomes more expensive and sometimes outsourcing solutions have to be found, with impact on the sustainability of the activity.



The sixth strategic dimension is related to energy and climate change, with indicators of *Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Share of Renewable in Gross Final Energy Consumption, Primary Energy Consumption*. Efforts are being made to achieve the targets set through international commitments, there is a trend of increasing the contribution of renewable energy in the overall energy consumption, a lowering of the overall energy consumption, lower emissions from industrial processes and increased emissions from transport, an increase in the general prices of the energy produced. The sustainability defense sector is strongly affected by increasing energy costs (fuel, electricity, etc.) and any increase of prices or limitation of the access to energy resources may negatively affect the activities in the field.

The seventh strategic dimension is the sustainable transport, with the indicator *Transport Energy Consumption Relative to GDP*. In this sense, the energy consumed for transport is increasing, the price for land transport services grew faster than that for air transport, and there is a particular concern for reducing harmful emissions by replacing vehicle fleets that use old technology and by an optimized transportation management. The sustainability of the defense sector depends heavily on transportation infrastructure, on the price paid for mobility (air, land, water transport), on the ability to limit the impact of toxic emissions during the military activities.

The eighth strategic dimension is related to the strategic natural resources, with various indicators *related to protected species*. In this regard, there are increasingly more protected areas of relatively small dimensions, but deforestation is quite common in countries that do not have or do not apply the legislation in this field, human areas are expanding at the expense of wildlife, water quality is generally approaching the limits of sustainability. For the defense sector, this field is sensitive in the sense that the need to preserve the natural environment and certain human activities may have a negative impact on the defense area, in the sense of the reduction of the spaces available for military applications, exercises, maneuvers etc.

The ninth strategic dimension refers to the *Global partnership*, using as main indicator the official support for development as percentage of the gross national income, accompanied by a series of contextual indicators, as follows: population with incomes under 1 dollar per day, official support for

development per person, population with access to sustainable water sources. In this context, we may identify a series of general trends: an increase in the raw materials imports in the developing countries and an increase of highly processed products exports, an increase of financing for development in those countries, although the final impact of these investments is reduced by the financial crisis, the diminishing difference between the pollution level for EU citizens and for other developing countries citizens. The defense sector should take into consideration all these trends in establishing its objectives. The defense acquisitions are also closely linked with international transactions, with the observance of the myriad of treaties, agreements, contracts etc existing at national level, NATO level or at the level of other international bodies and organizations.

The tenth strategic dimension is related to good governance, making reference to the *Consistency and Effectiveness of Policies, Openness and Participation, and Economic Instruments*. Present trends show a pronounced decrease of public confidence in government (especially during deep crises), manifested by an increased absenteeism from voting and demonstrations, an increase of the availability and use of e-governance tools, an increase and diversification of environmental taxes, with debatable impact on the use of collected funds. The sustainability of the defense sector is directly influenced by the evolution of national governments, but also by NATO and EU actions. Their impact can be predicted to some extent and may cause delays in taking military decisions, or even a lack of response due to momentary or long term un-sustainability of military activity because of reduced budget funds.

#### **4. Defense resources within sustainable development – vital element of the defense sector sustainability**

As an absolute value and at a first glance, the relation between defense resources and sustainable development may seem a contradiction in terms. *How is it possible for a military organization - whose actions, due to their own nature, have eminently destructive results, through a high consumption of resources in a short time, in conjunction with the destructive effects on resources in general – to enter the competition for ensuring sustainable development?* It is a question that seems to generate mostly negative answers, but which, at a



closer look, may also reveal shows that there may be a positive feedback.

The promotion and defense of the security interests of a state is directly proportional with the power exerted by the state at external level, as its power is supported mainly by the creation, the appropriate support and the diplomatic promotion of adequate defense capabilities. Power generation and support are inextricably linked to resources. Thus, the resource component of the military resources makes reference mainly to human, informational, financial and logistical resources, in a state of readiness, available or potentially available at a specific time. Specifically, this component takes into account absolutely all resources that can be made available to military structures for the effective performance of their missions. Therefore, military power is inextricably linked to the national economic and financial power, to the investments in human resources, in research and in the acquisition of the latest technology.

However, resources available for defense are generally limited and insufficient in comparison to the requests from military strategists. Hence the stringent need for a proper defense planning, as a vital attribute of national defense policy. Defense resource planning needs to take into account all resources –human, financial, logistics and information – which need to be provided annually for the generation and sustainability of the military capabilities essential for the fulfillment of military missions, deriving from political objectives in the national defense strategy, in conjunction with the responsibilities undertaken within alliances with international vocation, such as NATO and the EU, or within international coalitions. Therefore, national defense can not be made without a detailed and judicious planning of defense resources, linked to the assigned missions and to the projected results. In this context, planning must ensure a timely and sufficient resource allocation, of the appropriate quality. Also, resources must be carefully chosen so that they correspond entirely to the needs of the military, to ensure interoperability with Allied forces, and they must ensure sustainability.

As a result, defense resource management must ensure sufficient financial allocations in order to fulfill specific missions. In regard to human resources, it must create the mechanisms for selecting, training, retraining and promoting personnel, in order to ensure the continuity and effectiveness of defense professionals. In terms of

logistics, there is the need for the development of the appropriate, efficient, reliable and effective infrastructure, consistent with that of the allies, able to support enhanced features and capabilities. The information resource is required to establish a process of knowledge, direction, influence and action that should provide the system the ability to easily and quickly determine the directions of effort and the effective planning of activities.

Taking into account the above, we can easily identify the connection between national resources and defense resources and indissoluble link between them. It is more than obvious that the military is equally vital to any nation. Ensuring national security depends directly on the economic development and international integration of the country. Therefore, the access and management of vital resources for the national economy determines the quality and quantity of defense resources, so that sustainable development invariably expands upon the defense sector. In this context, there is a basic need for the development and maintenance of defense resources at a sufficient level to meet national and regional sustainable development requests, presently and especially on long term. The Euro-Atlantic defense requires the defense sector to become a more sustainable segment, with a high technology level, interoperable and globally competitive, and this goal can only be achieved through convergence and cohesion of the related policies.

In Chapter 7 of the National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania – 2013-2020-2030, there are mentioned the success criteria for measuring the viability of general objectives and the actual performance of Romania's external action, objectives and priority actions to create a predictable and stable security environment for Romania according to the national interest, the contribution to Romania's sustainable development, ways to enhance Romania's contribution to the adaptation of the international security system to the requirements of globalization, ways of active involvement in the crystallization of EU common positions on foreign policy, defense and security and promotion in this framework of the Romania national interests, strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the active participation to the promotion of democracy, stability, security and prosperity around Romania, the promotion and defense of Romanian values in the world.

All these objectives and actions must be multidimensional, integrating; they should be based





on a continuous, clear, consistent, unambiguous and appropriate communication between the different areas of society and between the institutions representing the state.

### Conclusions

Present projects regarding sustainable development have the potential to create a new pathway, to provide a new approach to how the world states choose to act in order to ensure sustainable development.

The current global crisis, like any crisis, can be also an opportunity. In the current economic austerity conditions, it is of utmost importance that, in addition to the message sent to the humanity, namely that our environment is an asset that must be preserved, protected and exploited with caution, it is now necessary to build an awareness of the present lessons. Beyond the aim of mere survival, we have to ensure a careful planning and thorough and active preparation of the future.

The accelerated depletion of the Earth's natural resources following the current intensive and extensive production processes, added to the increased pollution of the planet's environment through the uncontrolled production of waste and to the potentially disastrous consequences of a negative inheritance for the future generations – an inhabitable planet – make extremely necessary the urgent implementation of the sustainable development concept in all aspects of a nation's life.

This process has to be accelerated and adapted in order to eliminate or at least diminish the fatal risks and consequences to which Earth and the entire humanity security are exposed. The concrete and effective modality of satisfying this wish is the undertaking, in a conscious and realistic way, by all decision makers, both at national and international level, of the common interests, including those in the areas of security and defense. From this context, defense resources can not be excluded, as they are part of a nation's general resources.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> The Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992, [http://www.anpm.ro/Mediu/dezvoltare\\_durabila-18](http://www.anpm.ro/Mediu/dezvoltare_durabila-18), accessed at 11 September 2013.

<sup>2</sup> The *Berlin plus* Agreement, 2002, [http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opocefact\\_sheets/info/data/relations/cfsp/article\\_7\\_233\\_ro.htm](http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opocefact_sheets/info/data/relations/cfsp/article_7_233_ro.htm), accessed in 9.11.2013

<sup>3</sup> *The National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania – Horizons 2013-2020-2030*, [http://www.stpse.ro/atasamente/066\\_Strategia%20nationala%20pentru%20dezvoltare%20durabila%20a%20Romaniei%202013-2030.pdf](http://www.stpse.ro/atasamente/066_Strategia%20nationala%20pentru%20dezvoltare%20durabila%20a%20Romaniei%202013-2030.pdf), accessed at 25.08.2013

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>5</sup> The Sustainable Development Indicators (SDIs), <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/sdi/indicators>, accessed in 25.09.2013

<sup>6</sup> *The National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania – Horizons 2013-2020-2030*, [http://www.stpse.ro/atasamente/066\\_Strategia%20nationala%20pentru%20dezvoltare%20durabila%20a%20Romaniei%202013-2030.pdf](http://www.stpse.ro/atasamente/066_Strategia%20nationala%20pentru%20dezvoltare%20durabila%20a%20Romaniei%202013-2030.pdf), accessed at 25.08.2013, p. 15.

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# COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGIES – TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVEL

*Marius Valeriu PĂUNESCU\**

*The current study aims to present possible approaches and perspectives about the feasible strategies applied during the planning, preparation, development and execution of a military counter-insurgent campaign. Due to the fact that the power instruments applied to the operational environment in counter-insurgency remain the same with those applied in the operational environments that are specific to the continuous conflict peace-war-peace (diplomatic, economic, military and informational instruments of power – DIME), the manner in which these are used is the only one able to assure new perspectives about the development of adequate strategies during counter-insurgency. Knowing the fact that in counter-insurgency the population represents cause, means and aim, this study discusses why the use of more strategies specific to indirect actions is better than those specific to direct actions.*

**Keywords:** *strategy, tactics, insurgency, counter-insurgency, operational environment, NATO.*

## **1. Preliminaries**

Counter-insurgency (COIN), integrated at the level of a doctrinaire concept into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a distinct campaign scheme in the continuous spectrum of the conflict peace-war-peace, together with the operations that support peace (*Peace Support Operations – PSO*), created countless debates about the role that military structures within NATO member states had in the

field of preventing, controlling and solving insurgent conflicts. The experiences accumulated at the level of the organization, as a result of the actions developed by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) meant to stabilize Afghanistan, created new opportunities to understand the strategies that may be used in order to fight against insurgency.

Through the publishing of Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation<sup>1</sup>, in which insurgency and counter-insurgency are included in the chapter about counter irregular activities, NATO created the context requested in order to elaborate and to ratify NATO's doctrine towards counter-insurgency<sup>2</sup>.

Due to the fact that NATO's doctrine (AJP-3.4(A) and AJP-3.4.4<sup>3</sup>) defines COIN<sup>4</sup> through a set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil, and psychological activities that aim to defeat<sup>5</sup> insurgency and to solve the real reasons of discontentment, this study aims to discuss several strategies that may be used at any military level, in order to fulfil the goals of this particular form of military campaign.

## **2. Counter-insurgency. Particularities of the operational environment**

If for those who are preoccupied by the study of so-called classic wars (First World War, Second World War), Clausewitz remained known through the quote: “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means”<sup>6</sup>, so, for those preoccupied by the

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study of non-classic, irregular<sup>7</sup> wars, as COIN, David Galula is considered a top thinker through the quote: “politics becomes an active instrument of operation”<sup>8</sup>.

Therefore, one understands that war, as well as insurgency and counter-insurgency, although represents continuations of politics in forms specific to the diplomatic, economic, military and informational instruments of power, due to the ever-changing nature of conflict, they apply differently, according to the functional particularities of the operational environment. Therefore, in the operational environment specific for insurgency and counter-insurgency, the four components of power<sup>9</sup> could be understood and applied to concrete situations that appear in the operational field through the perspective of the following functions and characteristics:

- *the political component* represents the main function, because it assures the requested context for creating and developing the governmental administration, that is the center around which the other actions in insurgency and counter-insurgency appear (generally speaking, the quality of the political action determines the efficiency of the strategy in counter-insurgency);

- *the economic component* supports the fulfillment of the basic needs that a human, who is in the middle of the conflict, has (food, water, shelter) and supports the long-term development of the necessary economic capacities for the governmental authorities in order to ensure a peaceful environment, that allows cohabitation and social development (for example, the existence of sufficient jobs offers favorable conditions for satisfying the basic needs of the population and, by this, it contributes, indirectly, to ensure the stability and the security in the operational area);

- *the security component* includes not only the development of military, police and civilian structures form the security and defence field, that are able to ensure the security of the citizens, but it also includes the assurance of favorable conditions that allows the creation and the proper working of the juridical system (the rule of law) in the operation area;

- *the informational component* refers to the totality of the information and the products of intelligence used by the militaries who are working in the specific activities of counter-insurgency, in order to develop the actions that are supposed to influence the goals and to thwart the enemy's propaganda.

In this context, talking about the possible strategies that may be applied in the operational environment specific to insurgency and counter-insurgency, David Kilcullen said: “There is no constant set of operational techniques in counterinsurgency; rather, this is a form of counter-warfare that applies all elements of national power against insurrection. As insurrection changes, so does counterinsurgency.”<sup>10</sup>

Even if every insurgent – counter-insurgent action is characterized by its own unicity, during the creation of the strategies in counter-insurgency, some specific elements may be taken into consideration.

The first element that particularizes the operational environment in insurgency/counter-insurgency is the fact that the fight between the two parts (on one hand, the enemy – the red forces, on the other hand, the friendly troops – the blue and the green forces) is no longer a direct one, through the symmetric, asymmetric, hybrid use of power instruments, but an indirect one, through the population and its product – public opinion.

In this type of fight, the population becomes the cause, the means and the goal. The population is the cause because respecting the liberty and human rights are considered to be a fundamental principle in international humanitarian right.

It is also a means because the population represents the main “field” of confrontation for the two parts in order to gain the population's support and in order to accomplish the desired final goal – the use of the benefits of its action vector (a population that actively supports one of the two parts that are fighting creates innumerable occasions for success for those who are supported).

Population is, at the same time, the goal, because its satisfaction degree relating to the effects of the parties' actions determines the criteria for measuring the success of the two parties.

The meaning of the term “population”, for the present study, is not the exclusive referring to the citizens that live in the conflict zone, but it takes into consideration a larger spectrum, that is specific to the studies about the current international security environment.

For example, when we discuss about the central role of the population in Afghanistan, we are not referring only to the citizens of this country or to those who are living in the operational area, but also



to the citizens of the states that are, one way or another, involved in applying UN resolutions.

Therefore, through this extrapolation of the meaning, the term “population”, seen as “an actor” in counter-insurgency, gains global aspect that may be extremely hard to master by military means in order to obtain the desired political effects.

As an answer for this state of things, military structures became more and more preoccupied – during the planning, the preparation, the leading and the execution of the operations in counter-insurgency, to take into consideration specific indicators, as the following ones<sup>11</sup>:

- population: demography, language, ethnical affiliation, social categories, territorial repartition (cities, villages), health state, culture and religion;

- political, economic and social environment of the operational area: the type of government and its legitimacy at the national and international level, the economic relations (internal and external), the threatens of civilian society (criminal organizations, terrorism, e.g.);

- the law system that ensures the working and the respecting the law in the society (in both these meanings: national and international law);

- mass-media: the access at national and international mass-media; its impact at the level of public opinion.

The second element that particularizes counter-insurgency is the enemy. Due to the fact that it is hard to define (the most general term considers an enemy<sup>12</sup> to be the people/organizations/forces that opposes to the actions made by a govern elected in a democratic way), the enemy is also hard to identify (insurgents do not wear uniforms, they do not comply with international rules and regulations on conflicts and war), at the same time being hard to hit and to neutralize (because it is impossible to make the distinction between civilians and insurgents and the targeting process is a difficult and full of errors).

Thanks to this, using deadly methods for neutralizing and killing the insurgents does not always lead to fulfil the desired effects. The motivation is that, in most of the cases, insurgents and civilians in operational zones are mixed together, are connected to one another, often, they are even related.

The example offered by the general Stanley A. McChrystal, a retired officer of U.S. Armed Forces and the commander office of ISAF in Afganistan, is very cogent in his directive “*Eight Imperatives for*

*COIN*” about the inefficiency of lethal actions in counter-insurgency.

The well known formula of the American general McChrystal,  $10 \text{ insurgents} - 2 \text{ insurgents} = 20 \text{ insurgents (not 8)}$ <sup>13</sup> actually represents the translation of the reality from the fighting fields in Afganistan in an abstract concept.

The reason for a different result in this simple equation from the logical, mathematical one is linked to the fact that the enemy is part of the population, living and fighting *with* it and *for* it.

For example, an uninvolved person who loses a friend or a relative that was an insurgent, may become an insurgent too, urged by countless reasons, of which he is more or less aware (the yearning of revenge, justice, liberation, etc.) and after that, he may also be capable to make others become insurgents as well.

Things are even more complicated when relations are more tied together, when we talk about a family. What can a father, who loses his (insurgent) son, do? Even if that insurgent is a killer, proved by legal means, the mentality about him, in his own family, is, surely, a different one.

The third specific element in counter-insurgency is the support of the Host Nation (HN). The allied operations of counter-insurgency are driven for the benefice of the central and local governmental authorities and with their support.

These authorities have the national and international legal power to control the territories from the conflict zone. Their strength or weakness directly proportionally influence the manner of development and the efficiency of the actions made by the international communities involved in counter-insurgency.

### 3. Strategies and tactics in counter-insurgency

If at the beginning, the term “strategy” was used in order to define a component part of the military art, which used to deal with the preparation, the planning and the developing of the war, nowadays, the terms “strategy” and “strategies” can be found in the vocabulary of each actor, without taking into consideration his field of activity (political, social, economic, financial, cultural, educational, etc.). As a consequence of this context, the term “strategy” gained a lot of meanings, some of them of an abstract nature (general meanings), some of them of a concrete nature (specific meanings, peculiar to certain fields).



Analysing the strategy regarding the relations developed in itself between the abstract and the concrete zone, Sun Tzu considers that strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory, and that tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat<sup>14</sup>.

Therefore, on one hand, a successful strategy must offer the possibility of the material success of the desired effects through the available means and by applying the most adequate procedures (the tactics), and on the other hand, the tactics that are applied must not uselessly consume the human and material resources without having a very clear and established vision, one that would be capable of creating the courses of action able to support the premises of obtaining the desired victory.

General A. Beaufre understood strategy and its value by measuring how much it facilitated the action, the strategy being seen as a way of thinking that allows the classification and the hierarchy of the events [...] that appear simultaneously in all fields – political, economic, diplomatic and military.<sup>15</sup>

Nowadays, the application of a successful strategy for a certain situation means the integrated use of different politics, concepts, doctrines and ways of thinking for obtaining the desired ends, ways, and means.<sup>16</sup>

- *ends* are the objective points; they are usually established by the politics; they describe what must be and what must not be done;

- *ways* are alternatives about how the goal may be accomplished or how the politics may be established;

- *means* are the available instruments in order to accomplish the objective points; they are what politics created, what it made available.

Studying various thinkers who took counter-insurgency into consideration (Charles E. Callwell, Roger Trinquier, David Galula, Frank Kitson, David Kilcullen and others) we may identify and analyse various strategic models that were applied in different conflicts that are specific to the insurgency/counter-insurgency environment.

Due to the fact that the operational environment in counter-insurgency is different from the classic one (the fight friendly forces–enemy) through the implementation of an indirect confrontation similar to the type friendly forces – population – enemy (in which the population represents the “field” of action as cause, mean and effect) the desired final states, at the moment in which every strategy in counter-insurgency is created, are defeating the will to fight

of the insurgents and, at the same time, the gaining of the population’s support.

At a conceptual level, the strategies in counter-insurgency followed the common direction of approaching as those for the classic wars, being shaped as a direct action’s strategy (the nucleus: the enemy; this approach is based on the conviction that once the defeating of the enemy is accomplished, the other concentric effects of supporting the final victory will join it without any effort.

The used tactics will have as a goal the neutralization / killing of the enemy (the insurgents and their actions), using both soft and hard, violent and non-violent means) and being shaped as an indirect action’s strategy (the nucleus: the population; this approach is based on the conviction that through protecting and supporting the population in order to accomplish the personal security objective points, the conditions to obtain the final victory are being created; the used tactics rely on the maximum limitation of the armed fight component and on the maximization, as much as possible, of the non-violent means of action).

According to David Galula, strategies in counter-insurgency must be supported by certain general principles<sup>17</sup> that derive from the following fundamental laws: the first law – the population’s support is equally necessary for the counter-insurgent as it is for the insurgent; the second law – the support of the population is obtained through an active minority (in any situation, no matter the discussed problem, there will be an active pro-cause minority, a neutral majority and an against-cause minority); the third law – according to the side that the population is going to support, the strategy and the tactics in counter-insurgency can be developed; the fourth law – the intensity of the efforts and the diversity of the means are the decisive factors in counter-insurgency.

In base of these laws, Galula proposes to guide the actions in counter-insurgency according to the principle of force and means economy, of coordinating the effort, of irreversibility, of keeping the initiative, of simplicity, of ruling through the force of control in order to apply the following strategy<sup>18</sup>:

- to concentrate sufficient military, capable of destroying or expelling the armed insurgents;

- to bring enough troops, in order to be able to defeat the forced coming-back of the armed



insurgents; to locate the troops where population lives: villages, cities;

- to establish relations with the natives, to survey their movements in order to prevent the creation of any type of connection between them and the insurgents;

- to dissolve the local political organizations of the insurgents;

- to support the creation of the local temporary authority, by using the democratic mean of the elections;

- to verify the professional capabilities of those elected in the local authorities` structures; replacing the unqualified and incompetent people; to give the full support to the competent and pro-active leader ;

- to group and educate the leaders using a political program of a national and local nature;

- to gain the support of those who are still sympathizers with the insurgents or to isolate their action.

David Kilcullen, starting from the ideas about the counter-insurgency, which appeared during the ages and taking into account his vast experience, created through years of PhD`s studies and concrete practice in the fighting fields in Afghanistan and Iraq, proposes a strategy that must take into consideration the following characteristics<sup>19</sup>:

- politics is primacy;

- the created strategy must ease the actions of the local governmental authorities;

- to assure the safety of the local population is the most important thing in a military action;

- to legitimate the local security forces;

- to make the partnership with the local governmental authorities more effective;

- to hierarchy the actions in the following order: first, to build the fundamental institutions of a nation and then the counter-insurgency;

As a result, if we were to analyse what kind of strategy one should use in counter-insurgency, we may notice that the strategy of direct actions (solving the conflict on the battlefield by armed confrontations), may find a useful point in this kind of battle, but the strategy of indirect actions ensures more opportunities of success about the long term acceptance of peace propositions.

Strategies in counter-insurgency represent those actions that apply tactics mended to influence the behaviour of the population in order to accomplish the objectives the campaign

established, objectives that are not only on short term, but especially on long term.

To activate the strategies and the tactics in counter-insurgency, one must take into consideration what Lawrence of Arabia (T. E. Lawrence) said about the effects produced in the military areas: “the permanent damage must be reduced as much as possible, because today’s enemy will be tomorrow our client and the day after tomorrow our ally.”<sup>20</sup>

### Conclusions

Trying to identify several approaches and perspectives regarding the strategies and the tactics applied during the planning, the preparation and the development of the military actions in the operational environment of insurgency/counter-insurgency, I brought some arguments in support of the fact that counter-insurgency represents a complex effort of integration of all diplomatic, economic, military and informational answers, that are mainly guided to support and secure the population in crisis.

This perspective must not imply the idea that, in counter-insurgency, the level of violence is always a more diminished one compared with the classic war and, therefore, the military activities imply a lower level of violence because, theoretically speaking, the force must be equal as effort regardless the kind of campaign which appears in the continuous spectrum of the conflict peace-war-new peace. If in order to obtain the victory, in regular operations, the use of military forces is a binomial one (personal forces – the enemy), the goal being the neutralization and/or the killing of the enemy, in counter-insurgency operations, the military force is a trinomial one (personal force - population - enemy), the goal is to gain the population’s support for the friendly forces.

In order to help gaining this aim, the procedures of military planning must take into account the specific conditions for using military actions (the geographical, political, demographic, cultural space in the battlefield), the reason for their use (history, culture, motivation, interests, personal goals), and the other internal/external factors` appreciation from the battlefield which can influence, one way or another, the accomplishment of the missions peculiar to counter-insurgency.



Defeating the insurgents' will to fight simultaneously with the gaining of the support from the population who lives in a difficult situation are critical political objectives that urges the military forces which develop the counterattack actions to use more and more the strategy of indirect actions – to minimize the use of military actions that imply the attack and to maximize the military actions which deal with stabilization, reconstruction and development.

If politics means the capacity to influence the others' behaviour<sup>21</sup> “then the counter-insurgency, due to its particularities, represents those strategic, operational and tactical actions that are put in motion in order to influence the behaviour of the unhappy groups in order to create a new equilibrium in the security's system of the afflicted space.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, AJP-3.4(A), October 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) – AJP-3.4.4, February 2011.

<sup>3</sup> AJP- 3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), February 2011, p. 62.

<sup>4</sup> AJP-3.4(A). Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, NATO Unclassified, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), October 2010, p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> According to AJP-3.4(A), the term *defeat*, in COIN context, means “To diminish the effectiveness of an individual, group, or organization to the extent that it is either unable or unwilling to continue its activities or at least cannot fulfill its intentions.”

<sup>6</sup> Carl von CLAUSEWITZ, *On War*, New Jersey, Editura Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 87.

<sup>7</sup> Irregular Warfare – a type of war conducted partially and / or completely outside the rule /rules that are generally accepted at the international security environment level and its institutions. If the (so called) classic wars are also described by the concept of “conventional war” (in terms of the types of weapons used, that are in compliance with international conventions), the wars as insurgency and counter-insurgency can not be described through the concept of “unconventional warfare” because this term refers primarily to the nuclear weapons of mass destruction (weapons that have an unaccepted status in accordance with the international conventions).

<sup>8</sup> David GALULA, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice*, University Place New York, 1964, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> US Counterinsurgency Guide, United States Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Guidance, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> David KILCULLEN, *Counterinsurgency Redux*, 2007, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication 5-00 (Second Edition), Campaign Planning, UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham SWINDON, 2008, pp. 1-6, 1-7.

<sup>12</sup> *Wining the Battle, Building Peace*, Land Forces in Present and Future Conflict, Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces, Paris, 2007, pp. 2- 37.

<sup>13</sup> COIN Leaders Course, COMISAF Conference, COIN Academy, Kabul, 2009, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/gen.-mcchrysal-8-imperatives-of-coin-2.html>

<sup>14</sup> Sun TZU, *Arta Războiului*, Editura Militară, București, 1976, p. 21.

<sup>15</sup> Author's translation from A. BEAUFRE, *Introducere în strategie. Strategia acțiunii*, Editura Militară, București, 1974, pp. 5-13.

<sup>16</sup> Army Doctrine Publication – Operations, UK Ministry of Defence, Shrivenham, DCDC, 2010, pp. 2-4, 2-5.

<sup>17</sup> David GALULA, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-58.

<sup>18</sup> David GALULA, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>19</sup> David KILCULLEN, *The Accidental Guerrilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 110.

<sup>20</sup> B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte*, Editura Militară, București, 1973, p. 364.

<sup>21</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, Fourth Edition, Ministry of Defence, November 2011, pp. 1-4.

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# UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

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*The potential acquisition and use of chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) materials and weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors pose a significant threat to international peace and security and to militaries worldwide. NATO's Strategic Concept emphasized that "the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity.*

*During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the most volatile regions". Military forces actively prepare to defeat an adversary threatening to use WMDs and mitigate the consequences of a CBRN WMD attack. Also, the military has a significant role to play in implementing the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in order to prevent and dissuade the proliferation of WMDs, related materials and associated expertise and technology by non-State actors. The military forces of many countries are executing interdiction operations designed to stop the proliferation of WMDs, delivery systems, associated and dual-use technologies, materials, and expertise from transiting between States of concern and between State and non-State actors, whether in a lead role or in support of civilian authorities. This article provides a primer on the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) from the military perspective.*

**Keywords:** resolution 1540, weapons of mass destruction, CBRN, non-State actors.

## Introduction

A report of the US National Intelligence Council called "*Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*"<sup>1</sup> foresees that by 2025 "terrorism, proliferation, and conflict" will remain key global concerns. Opportunities are also foreseen for mass-casualty terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, or less likely, nuclear weapons as the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world's most dangerous capabilities within terrorists' reach.

The report also warns that "a successful nuclear weapon test or use of a nuclear weapon by a state to deter or halt a conventional attack might, on the other hand, enhance the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons in defending territorial sovereignty and increase pressures for proliferation in countries that do not possess a strong conventional military or security guarantees"<sup>2</sup>.

This continued proliferation of WMDs combined with the advancement of weapons capabilities such as long-range precision weapons (which may fall into the hand of terrorists) and the employment of new forms of warfare such as cyber and space warfare are providing State militaries and non-State groups the means to escalate and expand future conflicts beyond the traditional battlefield thus creating more complex defense challenges.

On the other hand, the *Global Strategic Trends – out to 2040* report of the UK Ministry of Defence<sup>3</sup> also predicts that the proliferation of modern weapons' technologies, to include Weapons of Mass

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Destruction (WMD), will generate instability and shift the military balance of power in various regions.

The present volatile international security environment gives enough reasons to worry about presumable acquisition and use of WMD in various circumstances, as is proved by the recent events in civil conflict from Syria and raise the question of what is to be done.

In efforts to curtail the proliferation of these materials and delivery means and reduce the possibility for different actors, both state and non-state, to use CBRN weapons-usable materials, the effective implementation of UNSC 1540 represents a valid instrument in reducing the risk of using such weapons during a conflict. Of note, in the UNSCR 2118 which was adopted unanimously on 27 September 2013, in regards to the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons during the Syrian civil war, the Security Council recalled inter alia UNSCR resolution 1540 and asked the UN Member States to “inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore”.<sup>4</sup>

While the reports discussed above describe a dim future yet to come, the present reveals the willingness of non-State actors to engage in trafficking WMD materials and using such materials to cause harm if not deterred. For example, incidents reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)<sup>5</sup> (2331 incidents as of 31 December 2012) show that illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials is still an acute problem, with 16 incidents since 1993 involving unauthorized possession of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium with attempts to sell or move these materials across international borders. During 2012, 160 incidents were confirmed to the ITDB. Of these, 17 involved possession and related criminal activities, 24 involved theft or loss and 119 involved other unauthorized activities.

Two incidents in the period involved HEU in non-criminal but unauthorized activities. While the materials used were obtained domestically, the anthrax attacks of 2011 and ricin letters of 2013 in the US underscore the risk posed by unsecured WMD materials and the willingness of non-State actors to use them to cause harm when readily available.

Having a nationally integrated legal and enforcement framework to provide for the accountability and physical protection of WMD materials as well as for an effective border and export/transshipment control system will thus enable combating illicit trafficking and denying unauthorized access to non-State actors. While the military may de facto be involved in these areas as a “capacity-builder”, either domestically or internationally, awareness of the overlap of these areas with the obligations set by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) will enable the national military and/or politico-military organizations such as NATO<sup>6</sup> to effectively contribute to the resolution implementation and reporting to the 1540 Committee. From this perspective NATO “is lending its support to non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by playing its role in contributing to the implementation by nations of UNSCR 1540.”<sup>7</sup>

### **1. UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Response to International Peace and Security Threats**

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540<sup>8</sup> was unanimously adopted on 28 April 2004 by the UN Security Council to address the risk that terrorists and illicit networks would acquire WMDs. The Security Council adopted this resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitute a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council adopted three related additional resolutions [UNSCR 1674 (2005), UNSCR 1810 (2008) and UNSCR 1977 (2011)] re-emphasizing the importance the UNSCR 1540 and the need to implement it effectively by all States.

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter establishes the UN Security Council's powers to maintain peace. It allows the Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security”.

Chapter VII also gives the Military Staff Committee (made up of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Council) responsibility for strategic coordination of forces placed at the disposal of the UN Security Council.

UNSCR 1540 established for the first time legally binding obligations on all UN Member States



(regardless of their membership status in a treaty or convention) to develop and to enforce effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological WMDs, their means of delivery, and related materials. For the purpose of UNSCR 1540, “related materials” refer to materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

The main obligations under UNSCR 1540 are contained in operative paragraphs (OP) 1 to 3. OP1 prohibits States to provide “any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”. OP2 requires States to adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws to prohibit such activities under their national legislation in order to prevent any non-state actor from engaging in these activities.

For the purpose of UNSCR 1540, a “*non-state actor*” is any individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution. OP3 prescribes that States implement and enforce a comprehensive system of domestic controls on WMDs, related materials, and means of delivery.

For the purpose of UNSCR 1540, “*means of delivery*” refer to missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that are specially designed for such use. Overall, OP1-3 address (a) accountability; (b) physical protection; (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts; and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such exports and trans-shipments of WMDs, related materials, and means of delivery. While the UNSCR 1540 identifies specific obligations, States decide how to implement these obligations.

Compliance with the UNSCR 1540 requires that States implement such measures “*without delay*” after entry-into-force and report them to the 1540 Committee<sup>9</sup> (a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council established per UNSCR 1540 to monitor States’ implementation of the resolution and report back to the Security Council).

UNSCR 1977 (2011) extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee until April 25, 2021. The 1540 Committee is aided by a Group of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1977 (2011) and expanded per UNSCR 2055 (2012) “to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate...”.

Of note, the 1540 Committee is NOT a sanctions committee. It facilitates UNSCR 1540 implementation through cooperation, dialogue, and as a clearinghouse for assistance. It remains to be seen whether in light of resolution 2118 (2013) on Syria, the 1540 Committee mandate may be considered for revision.

The 1540 committee and its experts monitor national implementation (Figure 1) by reviewing States’ national reports and updates; maintaining a list of States’ national points of contact formally reported to the committee; reviewing States’ voluntary national implementation action plans and assisting States as appropriate in drafting such plans; conducting visits to States and participating in country-specific activities and dialogue at States’ invitation; and compiling State-specific information on compliance with UNSCR 1540 in “1540 matrices”.

A “1540 matrix” covers national activities related to the 1540 operative paragraphs and State-specific information comes from national reports submitted to the 1540 Committee, to other international organizations (if publicly available) or information posted on the governmental websites, as compiled by the 1540 committee experts.

The national matrices are prepared and used by the 1540 Committee but national authorities may also utilize the template to identify gaps and areas that need improvement. National matrices are used as a reference tool for facilitating technical assistance and the Committee’s constructive dialogue with States on their implementation of UNSCR 1540. The UN Security Council recognized that some States may require assistance in implementing UNSCR 1540 and invited those in a position to do so to offer assistance.

The 1540 Committee itself does not provide assistance but it has a matchmaking role to facilitate assistance by other States or international, regional or sub-regional organizations (IROs) for implementation of the resolution.

The 1540 committee also cooperates with other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council [such as the Counterterrorism Committee and the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee – established pursuant to UNSCRs 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999)/ 1989 (2011), respectively] and the Security Council is briefed



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biannually on the continuing cooperation among the three committees and their expert groups.

In addition to the joint reporting of the three committees to the Security Council, the 1540

Committee also submits to the Security Council an annual review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and the committee's annual Program of Work (now in its 12<sup>th</sup> iteration)<sup>10</sup>.




Figure no. 1: The 1540 Committee Process<sup>11</sup>

In addition to monitoring national implementation, facilitating assistance, promoting cooperation, and reporting to the Security Council, transparency and outreach are also areas of main interest in the work of the 1540 committee and its experts.

The 1540 Committee website<sup>12</sup> serves as the main repository of inter alia States reports and updates, presentations made by the committee members and experts' at outreach events, and reports to the Security Council. In addition, the 1540 committee members and experts submit articles for publications in the 1540 Compass journal which is published by the Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia, US, and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

At a recent outreach event<sup>13</sup>, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, noted that "the 1540

Committee has a key role to play in ensuring that the world is a safe place and in allowing people in every country to pursue their lives free of fear of catastrophic attack by non-State actors". It is however, the contribution of each and every State to combating WMD proliferation and terrorism as well as our national efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to CBRN incidents that allow us to address such critical and pervasive threats to human security.

### 2. Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in Romania and the Role of "Carol I" National Defense University

Romania promotes regional and international initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, in particular



against possible risks of diversion of strategic goods to terrorists and other non-State actors. It participates in international cooperation programs for Customs, Border Control, combating organized crime and illicit trafficking, including WMD proliferation and terrorism, in the framework of the SECI Center for Combating Organized Crime and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). At the PSI high-level meeting earlier this year<sup>14</sup> State Secretary for Strategic Affairs Bogdan Aurescu re-emphasized Romania's commitment to the PSI principles and its actions to enhance the capacity of intercepting, inspecting and seizing transports suspected of containing WMD, WMD delivery systems, related materials or dual-use goods.

Romania is a State Party to the following treaties and agreements that provide synergy and convergence with the UNSCR 1540 obligations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, IAEA Safeguards Agreement, IAEA Additional Protocol, Nuclear Safety Convention, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005), Geneva Protocol, Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Romania is also a member of the Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Agreement.

Romania is also party to 14 out of the 16 Universal Anti-terrorism Instruments – UATI (United Nations Conventions, their Amendments and Protocols) currently in force. UATI and the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions constitute the international legal framework for the fight against terrorism.

Romania also participates in a number of other international and regional legal instruments related to combating terrorism or cooperation in criminal matters against terrorism.

Romania submitted four reports to the 1540 Committee on its national implementation of UNSCR 1540 (in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2011)<sup>15</sup>. Its first report to the committee notes that “Romania's policy on non-proliferation and export control is an important part of its foreign and security policy and has as its main goal the preservation of peace and security and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of

delivery. As a State Party to the international non-proliferation regimes, Romania remains committed to contributing to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and responsibility in transfers of armaments and dual-use goods and technologies”<sup>16</sup>.

The report also notes that the export control legislation is complementary to the legislation enacted to implement the international treaties on non-proliferation (such as NPT, BWC, and CWC), and that the Inter-Ministerial Council for Export Control of Dual Use Goods and Technologies, the Inter-Departmental Group for Non-proliferation and the Inter-ministerial Council for Counter-terrorism are responsible for actions related to Romania's non-proliferation activities, both at policy and technical levels, ensuring the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Of note, Ambassador Mihnea Ioan Motoc of Romania was the first chairman of the 1540 Committee at the time it was established and is also worth mentioning that Romania was within the six states that co-sponsored the draft resolution.<sup>17</sup>

As a member of the European Union, Romania is also intrinsic part of the EU collective efforts for preventing the risks of WMD proliferation.<sup>18</sup>

Romania's armed forces are part of the national security system together with the police and the intelligence agencies, and contribute to the national anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism and consequence management as well as crisis management capabilities to include nuclear, chemical and bacteriological security and control of use. Specialized government departments and agencies, undertake intelligence work to trace terrorist interest in obtaining CBRN materials, assessing the possible effects and purpose, and, if required, to contain such threats.

The armed forces provide support with intelligence, operational, combat and combat support actions, as required, via specialized units such as CBRN defence units, medical support units or by using, if considering terrorist threats, the Romanian Intelligence Service Antiterrorist Brigade<sup>19</sup>, Rapid Intervention Detachment (DIR) and the Special Operation Forces (SOF), in the Ministry of Defense General Directorate for Defense Intelligence and others such as the Special Operations Force Naval Group (GNFOS) and the Marines Infantry Battalion<sup>20</sup>.

Within this framework there are also different specialized agencies of the ministries, such as the



Department of Public Health and Control in Public Health, National Institute for Research and Development in Microbiology and Immunology “Ion Cantacuzino”, CBRN Research Center, Medical Research Centers, Mobile Emergency Service for Resuscitation and Extrication (SMURD) etc. which have well established procedures to implement at “tactical” levels precautionary measures and initiate actions of response to threats and attacks or manage the consequences.

The national security forces in Romania have outreach programs to raise awareness of the civilian decision makers (executive and legislative members), civil society (NGOs, media, think tanks, and academia), and public in general on the threats and challenges posed by terrorism to Romania’s security. These outreach programs led to increased citizens’ vigilance and willingness to report potential threats to authorities.

Romania is also actively committed to participate in different activities of awareness training, at national and regional level, such as the *Trilateral (US-Romania-Moldova) Civilian-Military Forum on Outbreak Response and Bioterrorism Investigation (ORBIT Forum)*, which was held in Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, in October 2010.

The overall aim of this initiative was to strengthen the core capacities required by the WHO International Health Regulations and existing national measures consistent with obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention and the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to deter, prevent, and respond to biological incidents or threats.<sup>21</sup>

“Carol I” National Defense University, as the Romanian leading institution in professional military education, has also a significant role to play in the country’s non-proliferation efforts by training leaders and experts (military and civilian) in the field of national defense and security.

Through its educational programs, including its courses on crisis management, as well as various seminars and workshops or research projects, the university enhances the awareness of the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat and the international non-proliferation regimes as it relates to defense and national and international security policies and programs.

### Conclusions

Effective implementation of UNSCR 1540 by all UN Member States would ensure that CBRN

materials will be out of terrorists’ reach and thus decrease the risk of a mass-casualty terrorist attack using these materials.

Whether conducting counter-proliferation of the WMD or consequence management operations or training, the responsible authorities from the national security system of Romania contribute to implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to prevent and dissuade the proliferation of WMDs, related materials and associated expertise and technology by non-State actors. On the other hand, while UNSCR 1540 signatories countries’ militaries contribute to national non-proliferation efforts or as part of bilateral or multi-lateral capacity building assistance activities, NATO could effectively formalize its role as a potential assistance provider in the non-proliferation area by providing the 1540 Committee with a point of contact for assistance as the Security Council urged relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations to do so pursuant to UNSCR 1977 (2011)<sup>22</sup>.

### Disclaimer:

*The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and may not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, ROU Army, the U.S. or Romanian Government, or the United Nations.*

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, US National Intelligence Council, November 2008, p. ix, available at [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025\\_Global\\_Trends\\_Final\\_Report.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Strategic Trends Programme, Global Strategic Trends – out to 2040, UK Ministry of Defence, Jan 2010, p. 12, available at [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/33717/GST4\\_v9\\_Feb10.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33717/GST4_v9_Feb10.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> UN Security Council, Resolution 2118 (2013), available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118(2013))

<sup>5</sup> IAEA Division of Public Information IAEA Bulletin 54-2-June 2013, available at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull542/5420201222.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> NATO Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, available at [http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport\\_Terrorism/Docs%202012/1st%20Ctee%20-%20IO%20replies%20-%202012/NATO%20-%20English.pdf](http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/Docs%202012/1st%20Ctee%20-%20IO%20replies%20-%202012/NATO%20-%20English.pdf)



<sup>7</sup> Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008.

<sup>8</sup> UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning weapons of massive destruction*, 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004), available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/411366744.html>, accessed 24 September 2013.

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# THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PARADOXES OF USING NUCLEAR LOAD FOR BALLISTIC AND ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

*Ion PURICEL, PhD.\**

*The international environment, as the sum of international actors and their relationships, is ever-changing, while constant is only the interest in promoting and protecting own interests. Military power is far from having exhausted its possibility to shape international security, and the nuclear weapons, from its inception, in conjunction with a secure vector of the missile (target) are one of its essential components.*

*Why should we approach the problem of nuclear armament at about 68 years from the “life demonstration” from Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 22 years since the end of the Cold War?*

*The answer could reside only in the fact that the general security issue of possessing nuclear armament has been and still is indisputably modern as most of the post Cold War conflicts have been directly motivated by the accusation of having weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the cause of potential conflicts on short and medium term identifies mainly the same problem.*

*Keywords: nuclear weapons, nuclear test, international security, ballistic missile, anti-ballistic missile, meteorites, anti-ballistic shield.*

## **Introduction**

Lately, over a relatively short period of time (one week) two separate events have taken place with comparable impact on international security: North-Korean nuclear test (the third), and the fall/disintegration of a meteorite in an area at the south of the Ural Mountains, around on the Siberian town of Celeabinsk.

The connection between the two events is made not only by the fact that they represent direct threats to the security of an important part of mankind, but also by the necessity and possibility to protect against such threats coming on Earth from space and even from the aero-cosmic space.

Moreover, the group of arms systems that can make possible the successful defense against these threats has as active element – the anti-ballistic missile with different types of charges, even if the possession of these arms may have immediate consequences on international security (in terms of the theory of International Relations), such as: the status-quo, imbalance of power, security dilemma, etc.

Further, we will analyze the contradictory aspects of using nuclear ballistic and anti-ballistic nuclear loads.

## **1. Threats to international security**

### ***1.1. The Korean nuclear test and the logic of the nuclear-ballistic security complex***

On 12th of February, North Korea, after announcing that „the country will cross soon a historical moment”, and regardless of the international sanctions and protests, experiments a nuclear explosion 6-7 kT, that triggers in the Peninsula an earthquake measuring 5.1 on the Richter scale<sup>1</sup>.

Beyond the international denunciation of the nuclear test, at the level of international security based on *new realpolitik*, this event has marked an increase in the specific weigh/status of the

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communist state and moreover, it has underlined the multiplication of difficulties that the major international actors will have when negotiating/imposing sanctions to the Pyongyang regime.

Pyongyang's privileged military position is rooted, on the one hand, in the success of atomic tests and the official declaration regarding the membership into the small club of states that possess nuclear weapons (declaration which cannot be ignored by any responsible state actor), and on the other hand, by the performances registered by the other component of its research and weapons program meaning the successful launching of a space shuttle and placing its own satellite on the orbit (technological advancement that involves elements that are essential to building a long-range ballistic rocket).

The analysis of the Korean nuclear test show that the nuclear load was plutonium<sup>2</sup>, a fissionable material with greater possibilities for miniaturization than uranium, so that the production of the nuclear war load for long-range ballistic rocket, if does not exist already, will be made in a relatively shorter period of time. Lately, other news from the Korean peninsula has come to fuel the general unrest about this "hotspot" on the world's map: new economic sanctions against the Pyongyang regime, provocative military maneuver at the border between the two Koreas, war rhetoric and breaking the armistice from the '50s – the American secretary of defense stating that the situation in the area is extremely disturbing, and the North-Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, considering it "unpredictable"<sup>3</sup>.

It is unanimously accepted that the nuclear weapon, associated with a secure transportation vector, is a super-weapon which changes the Clausewitzian logic of war meaning the continuation of politics with other (violent) means in the sense that this will inevitably lead to modifying the policy of a nuclear state at international level.

As a result, the combination between ballistic missile and nuclear load will inevitably become an instrument of power in the IR, whose specific weight is direct proportionate to the range of the ballistic missile and the destruction power of the war load, which justifies, once again, the rush for the production and purchase of weapons.

Besides scientific and technological glory, special consequences have been immediately identified at the level of international security so that starting with the Manhattan Project and until

recently, no state that has nuclear weapons is willing to share with others the success/benefits of this activity, producing the nuclear bomb being surrounded by extraordinary security measures, initiated for obvious reasons (to limit Germans' access to nuclear research) by one of the pioneer atomist scientists before the beginning of the war – Leó Szilárd<sup>4</sup>.

Nuclear weapons states have tried at the same time to discourage or even prevent the others from getting the same weapons through other means, from non-proliferation treaties/limitation of advancements in the nuclear field to threatening measures or even destruction of nuclear installations of the potential enemy (Iraq – 1979; Syria - 2007).

In the same time, states whose security interests justified the possession of nuclear weapons, starting with the Great Powers – permanent members of the Security Council, excepting the United States that had already acquired it – immediately started to produce this exceptional instrument of security, trying to produce and improve it in different ways such as own research in great secrecy, espionage, eluding treaties /postponing their signing until they joined the nuclear club or reached a level of technological expertise that suited their ambitions.

Justifiably, international attention is focused on the Korean nuclear tests, but we should not forget that before these events from the Korean peninsula, regardless of international protests, France continued the tests in the Mururoa Atoll until they obtained the desired technological expertise (1996); this objective was met prior to this by the other nuclear competitors, the whole number of official nuclear tests being unfortunately over 2000<sup>5</sup>: the USA – 1050, the USSR – 750, Great Britain - 50, China – 50, France – 210, India and Pakistan 6 each; it is important to recall the fact that the hydrogen bomb (fusion/thermonuclear), tested for the first time in the USA on 1<sup>st</sup> of November, 1952 (*Ivy Mike*, 10 Mt<sup>6</sup>), is more powerful than the classical nuclear bomb (hundreds or thousands of times), the maximal thermonuclear Soviet test from 1961 having an enormous force estimated between 50 and 57 Mt (*Tsar Bomba*<sup>7</sup>).

Regarding the nuclear competitors and the debates on the health of our Planet, we need to highlight the privileged place held by their permanent concern for the environment against their interests for security.



Many have written and commented upon the bombings from Hiroshima and Nagasaki: from the official version, related to the need to shorten the war in the Pacific and avoid the large number of human casualties, to the American demonstration of force meant to discourage the “momentum” of the Red Army which would not have stopped at Berlin, but at the Atlantic Ocean.

The historical approach regarding the advancement of the Red Army towards the Atlantic Ocean was based on Stalin’s<sup>8</sup> assumed wishes identified on the basis of that military reality and on his political philosophy as a man of stated dedicated to the communist ideal, regarding the foundation of a new order in the European and Asian space and, further, on his just judgment to implement worldwide communism starting from the situation of only one powerful communist state which, under an attractive ideology, should take a genuine *realpolitik* action: the interest related to imposing the new order having as support the relations of power at the moment, the military (conventional) power being favorable to the Soviet Union.

The period that followed the Second World War founded more important international relationships such as:

- existence of two superpowers – the USA and the Soviet Union, the representatives of two antagonistic systems engaged in a multidimensional competition (capitalism and communism/socialism) – and the confrontation between them with the use of third parties: Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Israel and neighboring Arab countries;
- existence of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty;
- American policy of “containment”;
- disappearance of the colonial system and decline of Great Britain and France from the position of global powers certified by the Suez Crisis (1957);
- powerful non-aligned movement having as main sponsor the Soviet Union, etc.

From the military point of view, this period has marked an extraordinary competition between the two superpowers, beginning with 1945, both regarding traditional and nuclear weapons – the year when the USSR experimented its first atomic bomb (fission) – and, especially, nuclear missiles, both states reaching hard to imagine levels of mutual destruction: thousands of nuclear loads, destructive powers bigger than those used against Japan (Hiroshima – *Little Boy*, Uranium-235, 12-15 kT, Nagasaki – *Fat Man*, Plutonium, 22 kT)<sup>9</sup>.

In addition, the general suspicion fueled by own ideologies made irrelevant the efforts to regulate the nuclear arms race through limitation treaties (Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty - SALT) and reduction of nuclear arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - START), as well as those to increase mutual trust thorough the antiballistic missile limitation treaties (Antiballistic Missile Treaty - ABM), in the general framework of mutual destruction, both states keeping equal shares of thousands of nuclear and thermonuclear loads.

Moreover, we should stress that, paradoxically, the understanding of the scope of destruction potential made the Cold War a period of peace between Great Powers, better said, a period in which they, as owners of the majority of nuclear weapons, would not confront directly, but test their systems of arms and influence through their clients – the above-mentioned actor-clients (the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the direct confrontation was avoided at the last moment, was a singular case).

The situation after the Cold War forces us to state that, currently, military power, even if it is considered by some annalists of the international environment to be obsolete, still has more to say as most of the international actors often resort to this instrument of power as an a deterrent in time of peace and a promoter of fundamental interests (defending the territory, population, access to resources, etc.), as well as a last resort solution (nuclear arms) in terms of war.

As we have already highlighted, the benefits of possessing nuclear arms were and are evident at the level of international security; they are mainly connected with deterring exterior attacks, and to military-offensive purposes, to hit enemy targets in order to win the war or facilitate own offensive on certain directions when enemy defense is too powerful (an good example of the doctrinary vision of the USSR to use the nuclear loads with tactical and operative value in the Cold War e, SS-21 *Scarab*)<sup>10</sup>.

What can then be said about the use of the nuclear weapons for defensive purpose and how current is this option?

The use of nuclear arms for defensive purpose is not new, it being used at the conceptual level both in the past and in present. So, in the view of Cold War NATO, the nuclear arms were meant to be used for defensive purpose, as a last measure before stopping the advancement of the Soviet heavy armored units to the centre of Europe, a missile for this purpose being the nuclear missile *Pershing II*<sup>11</sup>.



Nowadays, the Russian Military Doctrine, both the one promoted by Vladimir Putin in 2000, and the one promoted by Dimitri Medvedev in 2010 and supported by Putin in his new mandate, abandons the traditional Soviet position of “no first use” and, the same as NATO a while ago, stipulates clearly that “The Russian Federation will use nuclear weapons also in the case of an aggression against it with conventional weapons if the existence of the state is in danger”<sup>12</sup>.

In other words, Russia will use first the nuclear weapons in case of aggression even with traditional weapons if the results of the confrontation are not favorable.

Both mentined cases, relevant to the military and defensive purpose, appeal to the nuclear weapons as a last resort measure, showing that implicitly the political actors that harbored this defensive nuclear doctrine declared to some extent their inferiority in arms and conventional forces at the moment, the nuclear weapons being meant to stress this conventional asymmetry.

### ***1.2. A meteorite’s penetration of the Earth airspace and international security challenges***

Regarding the event that followed the Korean nuclear test – the fall/disintegration at 15<sup>th</sup> February of 2013 of a meteorite over the area of the Celeabinsk town –, relevant commentators state that this is the biggest space object that has hit the Earth since the event in *Tunguska*, in 1908<sup>13</sup>.

The lack of detection of the meteorite is also explained by the post-factum approximations related to some characteristics of the flight and the meteorite itself: diameter - app. 15 m; mass - 7 t; energy release - between 300 and 500 kT; number of wounded persons – app. 1200; damaged buildings - over 3.000; velocity of meteorite when entering the atmosphere - 18 km/s (65.000 km/h)<sup>14</sup>.

This rare event, but with highly destructive potential, has brought again to public, scientific, and political/military attention the problem of vulnerability of humankind to hazard and threat of human or non-human nature coming from outer space. In the post-event discussions, it was clearly stated that, surprisingly for the public opinion and world-wide decision-makers, the monitoring stations of space objects that come close to the Earth do not track usually objects with a diameter over 100m, the problem being more concerning as it was declared that “until now, it hasn’t been

taken into account the protection against space object with smaller diameter ...”<sup>15</sup>.

### **2. Now and then counteraction and response solutions**

Therefore, we have clear evidence that the threat from Earth via space or coming from space to Earth is extremely real and frightening. In this case, should we ask the question regarding the counteraction solutions that are taken into account?

In our opinion, both threats require coherent and global answers since the population of any state of the international community and even all regions of the planet can be affected by these. The first threat proves that the idea of the anti-missile shield, symbolic or not, but functional, is a solution beyond the unfavorable attitudes of certain relevant international actors interested in the balance of global powers as in the case of Russia even if the shield is not a real threat to it.

As we have already mentioned, the basics of counteracting the racket/ballistic charge in both variants of the anti-missile shield – the one built around the ground base interceptor (GBI) and the one around standard missile (SM) – is given by “the projectile meeting the target” at high speeds (4 – 6 Km/s) and the destruction of the target through kinetic impact (“hit-to-kill”), action which is considered efficient for the destruction of ballistic missiles and their nuclear load.

In the case of the second threat – the meteorite –, taking into account its rough structure and the large dimensions, there is currently only one solution, which is quite controversial and consists in the use of American long-range antiballistic missiles with nuclear load, and moreover, with thermonuclear load (based on nuclear fusion), as being more powerful than the classical nuclear load (based on nuclear fission).

The idea of using nuclear load for counteracting threats coming from space – ballistic rackets with a load of mass destruction – is not completely new, it was made operational within the antiballistic missile system for the defense of Moscow, consequence of *ABM Treaty* signed in 1972 and the *Additional Protocol* to this treaty signed in 1974.

The antiballistic missile system for the defense of Moscow had as an active element a number of 100 antiballistic interceptors (within the limits of the *ABM Treaty*) with two types of thermonuclear loads: missile SH-11 *Galosh* (modernized) with



long-range between 300 and 400 km and warhead of Mt and antiballistic missiles, SH-08 *Gazelle*, with a range of 100 km and less powerful nuclear warhead, with probably tens of kT<sup>16</sup>.

The principle of counteraction was based on the interception of ballistic missile by the antiballistic one (anti-aerial with antiballistic possibilities) and the detonation of the own nuclear warhead at a certain height at a point on the trajectory of the missile/ ballistic load and the destruction of the ballistic load through the explosion of the antiballistic missile in the atmosphere, at a height of over 30 km<sup>17</sup>.

The use of nuclear load was dropped in the '90s, but the idea of its use is being reconsidered now, having the same vector – the anti-aerial/ antiballistic missile with nuclear load, as an acceptable solution for counteracting threats coming from outer space (meteorites). Therefore, this is how a weapons system meant for antiballistic defense specific to the Cold War is still valuable and adapts to combating the space objects that enter the atmosphere around the Earth.

### Conclusions

In my opinion, until another viable counteracting solution is found, the moral problem raised by the use of nuclear (thermonuclear) atmospheric explosion has to be addressed only considering the consequences, which means choosing one of two bad options: *a thermonuclear explosion at tens of kilometers in the atmosphere with medium and long-term consequences, and a nuclear super-explosion on or above the ground, with immediate catastrophic results.*

Moreover, the threat posed by meteorites is more than the one of a nuclear ballistic missile and has regional or planetary consequences comparable to a chain of powerful nuclear explosions so, taking coordinated actions is a must to all states that have the counteracting ability suitable for this threat.

A normal question would be: will humankind – so divided by own proud and interests – unite their efforts in order to take coherent and effective action?

Even if, unfortunately, short and medium term estimations are not optimistic, we have to consider the important decisions that have to be taken at the level of major international actors with operational capabilities in the aerial and space field – the USA, Russia, France, and China – together with other international actors that have relevant technologies

in this field – Japan, India, Great Britain, and Brazil; in addition, concrete and urgent measures at regional and global level are also necessary because beyond the statistical calculations and the mistrust existing between great international actors (sometimes within the same alliance), the stake is huge – the survival of humans or of an important part of them on Planet Earth.

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# NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

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*Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a keystone of the constant revolution in military affairs that continues apace within the defense establishment. Expanding the idea of what is traditionally understood as NCW, focusing more heavily on “network” vs. “warfare”, this paper seeks to expand the consideration of NCW concepts. Treating NCW as encompassing not merely insight into intelligence/battlefield management, but overall combat support and service, the piece attempts to stimulate thought on NCW. A balanced examination tempers the indisputable advantages created by NCW’s enhanced information, speed, and control with cautionary warnings on vulnerabilities, threats, support tail expansion, and most critically, the long-term risk of leadership atrophy and technology overdependence.*

*NCW facilitates information sharing/collaboration, enhancing information quality and expanding shared situational awareness across all levels of war. It enables collaboration and self-synchronization, while enhancing sustainability and speed of command.*

*Technological innovations and their uses come with both advantages and disadvantages. Implementation of new concepts in warfare can create new weaknesses or vulnerabilities an enemy can seek to exploit. NCW is not immune; thus, a few of its inherent and/or derivative advantages and disadvantages are offered, with a brief consideration of each.*

**Keywords:** *Network Centric Warfare, situational awareness, common operational picture, decision-making, battle space, information operations environment.*

## Introduction

For a number of years, a lot of ink and many millions of dollars have been consumed in pursuit of a real-time, integrated, simultaneous picture of a fused infosphere and battle space. This idea is known within the United States Department of Defense (DoD) as Network-centric Warfare (NCW), and has been an on-going transformation initiative. The goal of which is to provide a shared awareness and a common operating picture for the integrated force (US, allied, coalition, and other government agencies) on the battlefield or in a battlespace, conducting full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century. NCW focuses on technology solutions, and how solutions affect individual and collective behavior. It is the nearly simultaneous harnessing of emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures interconnected in such a way as to create a decisive war-fighting advantage in the operational environment.

Involving all areas of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, NCW allows technology to mass power through “information, access, and speed.”<sup>1</sup> The stated aim is to integrate information and systems in such a way to enable decentralized decision-making across the spectrum of decision points – from the tactical level of the individual soldier throughout the command and control structure to the strategic level.

The assumption: combat power is enhanced by sharing awareness.

NCW is based on adopting new ways of thinking in the military<sup>2</sup> and harnesses the power of information to expedite the decision cycle and gain a significant

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advantage in the operational environment.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, NCW is a mechanism for gathering information from all available sources, and providing combatant commanders with a single, integrated sight picture for ease of review, decision, and dissemination. The network allows, or, more accurately, provides the capability, for this information to also be available across commands, services, and allies.

As with most things, technological innovations and their uses come with both advantages and disadvantages. Often, what some people see as advantage, others might perceive as disadvantage. Additionally, implementation of new concepts in warfare can create new weaknesses or vulnerabilities an enemy can seek to exploit. NCW is not immune to discussions regarding its value.

### **1. The Advantages of the Network Centric Warfare**

Perhaps the single most significant advantage of NCW is an opportunity to gain improved situational awareness at every level of the command structure. When effectively implemented, this improvement gives commanders a true, real-time common operating picture and allows forces to self-synchronize<sup>4</sup> and collaborate horizontally.<sup>5</sup> It also provides commanders at all levels the ability to target the enemy with the most effective and lethal mix of weapons.

If viewed from the perspective of Boyd's OODA Loop<sup>6</sup>, NCW enables seamless iterative flows through the observe, orient, decide, and act cycle. Networks and new technology have allowed for unprecedented amounts of data collection, the processing of this data into meaningful information instantly relevant to commanders, and decision support systems that enhance the ability to analyze and share more completely and faster than ever before.

Computing speed and integrated networks, processing thousands of relevant inputs, can flatten the fusion and control mechanism, delivering push and pull information capability and cueing technology to the war-fighter and associated equipment. Fielding increasingly sophisticated technology and advanced platforms can provide the ability to increase effectiveness.

Combat power is derived/multiplied through the efficient gathering, sharing, and, most critically, the

exploiting of information. Network-centric operations seek to maximize all resources to ensure not only rapid data acquisition, but increasingly fast data mining and information processing to provide situationally relevant products to commanders at all levels of war. Knowledge is power. More people can now collaborate on an issue, strategize, and problem solve. The result of all this is better final informational output, in order to keep not only the combatant commander informed, but key actors at all levels of mission execution.

Through improved situational awareness, the speed of execution is increased, as decision-making data based on a broad and deep information stream is available even to the "smallest tactical unit."<sup>7</sup> In fact, tactical units – as well as tangentially interested parties – can follow the development of the decision-making calculus in real time. This supply of information might serve to simply inform, allow added time to prepare, or serve to allow unique input from parties not solicited for input, but nonetheless in possession of facts critical to the decision process and ultimate execution/outcome. Thus, producing enhanced war fighting insight via integrated tactical "ground-truth" with strategic considerations, with simultaneous analyses from people at all levels.

In addition to increasing the lethality of combat forces, improved situational awareness can reduce both incidences of fratricide and collateral damage to noncombatants. Moreover, NCW can increase a commander's span of control, providing economy of force (small and more agile units) across the battle space, while effectively orchestrating all elements at his or her disposal.<sup>8</sup> This advantage becomes a significant force multiplier, and allows the commander to continually track and shape the battle space.

Stepping away from the purely operational advantages that NCW can provide, support and combat functions can better align supply and demand based on a truly common operational picture. Taken to the logical extreme (within the limitations on combat support reach), it could effectively turn combat logistics systems into a real-time, data-fed, just-in-time, materiel delivery system in the model of the most efficient modern manufacturing systems. The F-35 Lightning II is working to implement just this type of support system under the guise of an "autonomic logistics information system" whereby the jet itself has a rudimentary intelligence designed to monitor key systems' performance, and effectively notify aircraft



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support systems when a part is failing or reaching end-of-life. This sort of NCW system data-feed could be as simple as providing a report with a red-flag based on low supply levels, all the way to a system that could use predictive models to autonomously direct suppliers to prepare for future orders based on usage patterns and future projected operations.

NCW provides an efficient means of integrating single service, joint, allied, and coalition forces into a single homogeneous information operations environment. The near real time information fed from strategic intelligence assets to the tactical level, and from the tactical to the strategic decision-maker, allows for rapid actions on the objective. This shared common picture leverages intellectual capital across a geographically dispersed force. NCW allows the expansion of human capital economies of scale beyond previous boundaries that triggered diseconomies.

### **2. The Disadvantages of the Network Centric Warfare**

A primary disadvantage of NCW is that it is highly resource intensive. Procuring necessary hardware and software is not only expensive, but is an ongoing cost with no ceiling, as both hardware and software systems reach obsolescence at ever increasing speed. Maintaining said wares, as technology evolves, will be even more costly. The overdependence by DoD on commercial information technology providers with conflicting goals (maximizing shareholder value vs. providing national security) has the potential of compromising national security by constructing a system on a platform over which you have no direct control. While this risk can be mitigated somewhat by organic development on open-source platforms, there is a very limited existing capacity to do this at the present time, not to mention, no known inclination to do so.

Further costs arise with the steps necessary to ensure interoperable platforms. One need only look at the current inability of U.S. forces to communicate among themselves or with allied/coalition forces. Aside from the difficulty of service-specific stove-piped data systems, existing treaties and agreements, and limitations on data sharing among any given collection of varying coalition partners in one or another operation can create special problems. In the ever shifting modern security environment, the protection of sources and

methods and effectiveness and operation of unique NCW capabilities will drive the need for systems that provide flexible information output to coalition partners transparently based on security limits; and this requirement drives an additional order of magnitude of complexity. Of special concern is the uncertainty surrounding the long-term viability and, as yet unrealized, full effectiveness of NCW.

Resource expenditures will not only be felt in terms of finances. Research and development can take years. That amounts to an uncertain opportunity cost equation as valuable time and attention is spent on NCW and not on other concerns, missions, or allied interoperability. Additionally, the risk of obsolescence during such processes is almost guaranteed as so many NCW-like systems are built on a foundation of Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and software that advances based on commercial demand versus military need. The complexity inherent in developing systems with highly fused data requirements can take more than five years to reach the field; while computer hardware typically refreshes every 18 months and commercial operating systems on a 12-14 month cycle, driving either obsolescence or increased cost as the government has to pay suppliers for diminishing manufacturing sources or delayed software end-of-life agreements.

Beyond resource consumption, security is almost impossibly difficult. An integrated network-centric configuration is only as secure as the most vulnerable platforms, operating systems, interfaces, and users. As the Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden cases have recently made plain, insider attacks are a significant risk with highly networked systems full of sensitive data. A single individual with elevated access and an axe to grind can completely undermine the entire network, all the information it contains, and the security/capability it projects.

Physical security of NCW system nodes are an especially troubling vulnerability. Satellites are an obvious example, and have become increasingly COTS-like and less hardened than the military systems of the recent past or Cold War era. As a result, they are highly vulnerable to kinetic attack, electronic interference, or other means of rendering them ineffective. Natural forces, like sunspots, can also add uncertainly to operations. Additionally, defending network relays is difficult with the vulnerability of ground nodes, many of which are provided by commercial vendors outside of secure locations. Another major security concern is data





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integrity as meaningful information requires continuously maintaining information trust, structure, and credibility. Finally, pure information volume strains fusion and control mechanisms, and either human or machine issues could exacerbate a problem and lead to mission failure.

Moreover, it is altogether possible that potential adversaries with no acquisition loop may be able to rush ahead of and exploit our NCW capability, via other commercially available or simplistically asymmetric means.<sup>9</sup> As recently evidenced when members claiming to be affiliated with the Syrian Electronic Army were able to seriously degrade the online presence of technology behemoths Twitter and the New York Times, the ability to disrupt network operations is a very real threat. These threats can range from state actors to cyber-terrorist groups like “Anonymous” down to individual “script kiddies” using widely available open source and commercial attack tools to cause mayhem on connected systems. Ultimately, it is important to recognize that possibilities exist for increasing the efficiency of existing systems and processes without the massive investment in large, complex, networked systems.

Considering the depth of required technology distribution, security/encryption issues, bandwidth requirements, and Moore’s Law, etc., the more reliant the military becomes on NCW, the more susceptible it becomes to both technical factors in addition to the real threat of an information technology sophisticated enemy.

All these factors are exacerbated by the types of environments the United States and her allies typically engage in military operations. Bandwidth, power, access, and nodes are scarce in harsh, isolated environs. The sensitivity of modern high-technology systems to heat, dust and moisture, as well as the large standing army of personnel to manage and support such systems in the field create a significant support tail.

From clean facilities to generators, from air conditioning units to spare parts, from physical security to technical support and management, NCW systems need key requirements that could limit their effectiveness on the battlefield. This potential drain could lead to adverse effects on both the deployment logistics footprint to other important pieces of defense budgets; does the DoD spend its time and space on bullets, butter or CPUs? Transformational adjustments to capitalize on NCW’s potentialities may not be forthcoming or may be unrealizable in contested settings. Another looming, but less

considered disadvantage is the required revisions to doctrine and force structure (organization) to take full advantage of NCW.<sup>10</sup> Merely appending technology to existing hierarchical command and control constructs will not result in significant improvements.<sup>11</sup> In fact, evidence exists that indicates NCW capabilities allow and encourage senior leaders meddling in actions well below their level. This micromanagement tendency thwarts the autonomy of tactical decision-makers, frustrates actions, and marginalizes authority down the chain of command.

Worse still, it could be argued that NCW might produce a long term negative impact on the military, as young leaders never get to really lead because superiors maintain control from the operations center or further back in rear echelons. While the intent is well-meaning – adhering to the grand strategy, not having subordinates make superiors look bad, hedging against mistakes – the result is crippling to the development of young leaders.

The nature of the small wars we have been engaged in while NCW capabilities have rapidly matured do not need the multiple, overlapping bureaucratic layers that are populated by superfluous leaders, all of whom have tactical visibility and communication ability. Daily video teleconferences undermine the necessity of some leadership autonomy. Further, very restrictive rules of engagement that require call backs to superiors in the rear before actions are taken in the battle space and on the battle field limit the growth and maturity of both junior officers and senior enlisted alike. [Admittedly, mistakes are unwanted; but it must be remembered and realized that leaders are forged, not trained via PowerPoint.] Many would contend that “meddling” by leaders has long-term effects that are already manifesting, as every level of leadership is looking over their shoulders because the next level is watching and directing in a very real way.

Modern militaries have technology overdependence, impacting both the strategical and operational arts. Technology can aid the conduct of war, which is inherently a human endeavor; the volume of information processing through the network can cause information overload for the humans engaging in war.

Advanced technologies are outpacing our allies to the point that forces cannot interoperate, producing a stifling of initiative resulting in failed missions. Collection and transmittal of information from diverse sources is primarily designed to speed targeting processes between the sensor and the



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shooter, rather than focusing on military objectives and tasks.

It fails to address the personnel, cultural, and leadership lessons we have learned over the past decade in Iraq, Afghanistan, and across the continent of Africa. This ultimately leads to the largest risk associated with NCW, the increased vulnerability it creates for U.S., allied, and coalition forces.

The previous paragraph noted that modern militaries – especially the United States military – often suffer from a technological overdependence. This overdependence was brought to the broad attention of the American public during the most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the fight against improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defense Organization brought forth over \$21B in funding to combat cheap and widely-available explosive devices built on simple technology platforms such as cordless phones, infrared remote control sensors and basic pressure plates.<sup>12</sup> This challenge to coalition forces and the subsequent response highlight that NCW will create a dangerous center of gravity for any military force that becomes too dependent upon it.

The idea of a center of gravity is generally credited to Clausewitz, who introduced it in the seminal classic *On War*, where he stated: “Out of the characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.

That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.”<sup>13</sup> When an entire military infrastructure, from doctrine, to training, to equipping a force is dependent upon the advantage that NCW provides, disrupting NCW can cause the entire house of cards to collapse. One of the most obvious examples the military has sought to prepare for is the disruption of the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal, upon which virtually all “smart weapons” depend for targeting guidance.

If you create an entire military command, control, communications and information system dependent upon NCW principles like everywhere access, trusted communication, and high-speed data, you give an enemy a detailed map of how to defeat you. As a result, systems have to be not only robust, but your doctrine and training has to be tolerant of working without NCW available, and that least-common-denominator or worst-case-scenario undermines all the effort and work spent on an NCW system. While cliché, the old saw “The enemy gets a vote” is all too true, and depending entirely and inflexibly upon a single concept of any sort is a sure step on the road to defeat.

### Conclusions

The speed of decisions is meant to translate into speed of tactics and targeting. There are concerns that NCW will become a panacea, and the human factor of military operations will be diminished. An additional concern is the limitations of the human animal in dealing with extraordinarily large and complex data sets.

Without intelligent, highly fused data systems that can translate raw data into information usable at the appropriate command level of war, all the effort and resources spent on NCW is for naught. This human factor can lead down multiple branches, two of which will virtually guarantee mission failure. The most common branch considered in NCW discussion is data saturation, leading to paralysis.

The concept of data saturation concerns the widely varied and overwhelming amount of raw data points available using current systems alone. From data available in generally available commercial systems like Google Earth, to unclassified military systems to classified data ranging from sensitive to Top Secret, the platoon commander in the modern military has data that would have seemed truly fanciful to even a combatant commander as recently as the Gulf War in 1991.

This sheer volume of available data can be simply overwhelming, as a military leader works to reach a decision that is both militarily advantageous and defensible to civilian leadership and the media, and can result in paralysis.

This paralysis can take the form of data overload, to the point that the leader is unable to sort through the vast amount of data points available to him, or the inability to act because he is waiting for that one last bit of data to make that decision completely obvious and immune to second-guessing, after the fact.

As dangerous as this is, however, NCW data overload can lead to an even more perilous condition, that of oversimplification.

This oversimplification in the face of virtually unlimited data has resulted in the “PowerPoint-ization” of modern warfare, wherein the most complex concepts are driven to the most basic level based on the tool available instead of the information requirement for presentation.

This can lead to a complete loss of the underlying message in the data as the staff works to refine and simplify it for presentation at the colonel and general/flag officer level. However, as Brigadier General H.R. McMaster noted in a telephone



interview with the New York Times in 2010, “Some problems in the world are not bullet-izable.”<sup>14</sup>

Too little information is far more dangerous than too much, and therefore, NCW systems must be respectful of and responsive to the human element.

Ultimately, the human factor cannot be eliminated from war; overreliance on systems or a particular tool can produce uninformed, rather than informed, decisions – absent much “ground truth.”

While NCW can, in theory, reduce the possibility of this, too many system design concepts force information into a standard format instead of letting the information define the appropriate means of presentation to be an effective decision support tool.

Avoiding the unintended manifestation of disadvantages and creating decisive war-fighting advantages is the challenge of NCW, as the capability continues to be extended into operational environments.

This focus on technological solutions must include allied and coalition information sources, subsequent sharing, and concurrent dissemination. Provision of a common battle space picture in real-time remains a worthy goal, the pursuit of which will consume scarce resources and spark continued debate.

### **Disclaimer**

*The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government, the Department of Defense, or the United States Air Force.*

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### **NOTES:**

<sup>1</sup> *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*, Washington, DC, Office of Force Transformation, 2005, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Jeffrey L. GROH, *Network-Centric Warfare: Leveraging the Power of Information*, J. Boone BARTHOLOMEES Jr., ed. US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd edition, 2008, p. 324.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 323.

<sup>4</sup> David S. ALBERTS; John J. GARSTKA; Richard E. HAYES; and David A. SIGNORI, *Understanding Information Age Warfare*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 2001, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Donald RUMSFELD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 59. See also GROH, *op. cit.*, p. 327 and Thomas L. FRIEDMAN, *The World is Flat*, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005, p. 207.

<sup>6</sup> The OODA Loop model was developed by Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret). The concept involves four actions: observe; orient; decide; and act. Originally, this looping concept referred to the ability possessed by fighter pilots that allowed them to succeed in combat. The concept is now used by varied organizations to assist with competitive business decisions. The premise of the model is that decision-making is the result of rational behavior in which problems are viewed as a cycle of observation, orientation (situational awareness), decisions, and action. Moving through the loop quicker than an opponent, or “getting inside” their decision cycle, is a means to advantage.

<sup>7</sup> Donald RUMSFELD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 59. See also GROH, *op. cit.*, p. 327 and Thomas L. FRIEDMAN, *The World is Flat*, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005, p. 207.

<sup>8</sup> *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*, Washington, DC, Office of Force Transformation, 2005, p. 14; and Clay WILSON, *Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress*, June 2, 2004, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas X. HAMMES, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, Saint Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2006, p. 195.

<sup>10</sup> True transformation requires a combination of technology, doctrine, and organization changes that come together or are fused to produce a new approach. Great leaders are typically those that see and seize the opportunity presented by technology to revise doctrine and alter organizational structure – think Napoleon.

<sup>11</sup> HAMMES, *op. cit.*, 195.

<sup>12</sup> Peter CARY, Nancy YOUSEF, *JEDDO: the Mahattem Project that bombed*, The Center for Public Integrity, <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/03/27/3799/jjeddo-manhattan-project-bombed>

<sup>13</sup> Carl VON CLAUSEWITZ, *On War*, trans. and eds. Michael HOWARD and Peter PARET (Indiana: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 595-96.

<sup>14</sup> Elisabeth BUMILLER, “We Have Met the Enemy and



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He Is PowerPoint”, *The New York Times*, April 26, 2010, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html?_r=0)

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# POTENTIAL THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

*Petre DUȚU, PhD.\**

*National security is a public good that must be provided equally to all citizens of a state. Constant and sometimes concerted pressure is exerted on it, from a multitude of threats different in nature and intensity. Threats are of several kinds: symmetric, asymmetric, conventional, unconventional and hybrid. States act permanently, constantly, continuously and often concertedly to limit the effects of security threats on the lives and activities of their citizens.*

**Keywords:** *national security, security threat, globalization, regional integration, economic crisis, political crisis, climate changes.*

## 1. Preliminary considerations

National security defines all the conditions conducive to life and work of many people in shelter from threats that may cause physical or mental detriment of individuals, groups and communities of people, or even society as a whole<sup>1</sup>.

Of course, the effects of security threats can not be removed completely, but can be limited only if we adopt coherent, concerted, systematic and permanent preventive measures on all components of existence and manifestation of national security.

According to the Copenhagen School<sup>2</sup>, security has the following components: social, economic, political, military and environmental. Different security threats, from the conventional to the hybrid ones exercise their influence on these components, disturbing people's life and activity. Also, most specialists in the field of national, regional or international security consider that the most frequent security threats are: international terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fragility of the international financial system, regional conflicts and state failure<sup>3</sup>.

However, in my opinion, to these threats we should add the following phenomena and processes, human acts and activities: privatization of strategically important national enterprises; globalization; climate changes and crises of all types (from the economic to the social ones) occurring nationally, regionally and internationally.

*The above phenomena and processes* must be considered threats to national security for the following reasons:

- frequently, they affect national security and all its components through the negative effects they generate;

- they always serve systematically and constantly the strategic interests of state and non state actors which support them through all legal and sometimes illegal methods, techniques and instruments and not national interests;

- they amplify and facilitate the effects of security threats (conventional, non conventional, symmetrical, asymmetrical, hybrid<sup>4</sup>) national states are constantly faced with;

- they affect human security directly and indirectly, through the negative effects they generate at the level of human groups and communities forming a national state;

- they possess all the characteristics defining a security threat.

In fact, a security threat is a fact, an event, a phenomenon or a process, an act or an activity affecting the normal life and activity of a human group, community or society and also the relationships between them. In fact, the security threat leads to the emergence and manifestation of malfunctions in human society with a negative effect on the physical and psychological integrity of its members.

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### 2. Globalization – a potential threat to security

According to widespread belief, globalization corresponds to the generalization of geographical interconnections between products, businesses, markets and factors of production (labor, capital, information), of which an increasing share is created or available in an increasing number of countries and especially more and more in the developing countries. This perception, in a way, gives a plausible explanation of the development of international trade, training a large equity market and increase the number and weight of transnational firms in the global economy.

“Globalization means a multitude of social and economic transformations made by mankind nowadays, generated by the impact of transcontinental monetary and financial flows on the characteristics of social interactions. Globalization refers to the transmutation in the structure and organization of human societies which resulted in extensive dissociation and polarization of nation-states, or at least what's left of them today, at the beginning of the third millennium”<sup>5</sup>. In a world becoming increasingly interdependent, economic, political and military events overseas have an immediate impact “at home” and, in parallel, the disturbance of the internal environment of the nation-state generates effects territories situated thousands of miles away. In fact, globalization means an intermingling of national, regional and global events so that the remote impact is amplified, while most local events can have significant planetary consequences. From these aspects derives people's fear of globalization's effects.

Globalization, as a complex phenomenon, multidimensional and relatively ubiquitous, produces a variety of effects, with a diverse content and nature. Thus, there are positive effects, such as better economic, cultural, political, military, environmental cooperation between states; relatively rapid development of economic sectors in some geographical areas, the employment of non-state actors in the fight against poverty in the world, creating conditions for sustainable development of mankind. On the other hand, globalization generates negative or adverse effects, such as: maintaining inequalities between North and South, between income inequality and the working capital, amplifying the differences between high-skilled and unskilled labor, significantly affecting the role of nation-state, the emergence of new conflicts and threats (revival of nationalist movements,

international mafia networks, massive migration from poor countries to the developed ones)<sup>6</sup>. On the other hand, globalization, by relocating the intensive industry from a country to states where skilled and cheap labour is present, and by deregulation, significantly affects sustainable economic development, especially in developing states.

Both by the negative effects it generates and the relocation of important enterprises and deregulation, globalization affects national security directly and indirectly. Therefore, it can be said that globalization, by its negative effects, especially in developing states, is a possible threat to national security.

### 3. Climate changes and national security

Today, more and more experts accept the fact that the Earth is experiencing a poignant climate change, a phenomenon that has many different consequences for national security. These changes include sea level rise, changes in rainfall and drought pattern and increased frequency as well as intensity of extreme weather events. In the latter case, we speak about torrential rain and/or snowfall in short time and on relatively large surfaces, the appearance and manifestation of storms and cyclones in regions where once weather events did not occur, prolonged droughts, desertification<sup>7</sup>.

The climate varies greatly from one place to another, from one year to another or from one parameter to another. Among the manifestations of climate changes considered likely or very likely for our century, are the following: increased maximum temperature and augmenting of the number of warm days for most of the land areas, increased minimum temperatures and reduced number of cold days for most land areas, increased drought risk for most land areas, increased number of episodes of intense rain and snow for most land areas, increased intensity of tropical cyclones in some regions and the average and maximum rainfall intensity that accompanies them<sup>8</sup>.

The climate changes have a significant, strong and direct impact on national security by the effects they produce on social, political, economic, military and environmental levels.

The risks of climate changes are real and their effects are already being felt. That is why the international community has responded adequately to these risks. The UN estimates that all emergency calls since 2007 have been related to climate. That same year, the UN Security Council held its first



debate on climate changes and their implications for international security. In turn, the European Council drew attention to the consequences of climate changes for international security and, in June 2007, invited the High Representative and the European Commission to submit a joint report to the meeting in the spring of 2008<sup>9</sup>.

Currently, the effects of climate changes are felt more strongly: temperatures are rising, ice caps are melting, extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and gaining in intensity. All this generates national security consequences. In the following pages, we are going to analyse some of them.

### ***Resource conflicts***

We can already see in many places of the world the diminution of arable land, water shortages, reductions in food and fish stocks, multiplying floods and droughts extension. The climate changes will have as effect changing rainfall patterns and reducing available freshwater reserves in an amount that could reach 20-30% in some regions<sup>10</sup>.

### ***Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure***

According to estimates, a global unchanged policy regarding climate changes could cost the global economy up to 20% of global GDP per year<sup>11</sup> and this proportion will increase even more in the years to come. Major cities and their supporting infrastructure such as port facilities and oil refineries are often constructed on shore or river deltas. The raised sea water level and increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters are a serious threat to these regions and their economic prospects. Thus, the Eastern coast of China and India, the Caribbean and Central America would be particularly affected. The increasing number of natural disasters and humanitarian crises will exert considerable pressure on donor resources, including capabilities that allow carrying emergency relief operations.

### ***Loss of territory and border disputes***

Scientists predict major changes to the shores of seas and oceans during the twenty-first century. The coast kickback and submersion of large areas could lead to loss of territories and disappearance of all countries, for instance small island states. The disputes concerning land and maritime borders and other territorial rights are likely to multiply. Rules of international law, in particular the Law of the Sea, in the regulation of territorial and border disputes will have review. The competition for access to energy resources could also take the form of conflict for resources located in the polar regions, whose likely

exploitation will lead to greater warming. In turn, the desertification could be at the origin of a vicious circle that binds environmental degradation, migration as well as border and territorial conflicts that are going to threaten political stability at national and regional level.

### ***Migration due to environmental factors***

Those who are already exposed to poor sanitary conditions, unemployment or social exclusion are more vulnerable to the consequences of climate changes, which could cause migration between countries and within them, or increase the existing ones. According to the UN, by 2020, there will be millions of "ambient" migrants, this phenomenon being explained essentially by climate changes. Some countries particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon already require that migrations due to environmental factors are recognized internationally. Basically, these migrations could translate into an increase in the number of conflicts in transit and destination regions. In this respect, Europe must expect a substantial increase of migration pressures.

### ***Situations of fragility and radicalization***

The climate changes could exacerbate instability in failed states, requiring in excess the already limited ability of governments to effectively cope with the challenges that are faced with. The inability of government to meet the overall needs of its population or to protect the difficulties caused by climate change could lead to frustrations, tensions between different ethnic and religious groups in the country and a political radicalization. Thus, states, even whole regions could be destabilized.

### ***Tensions over energy supplies***

One of the main potential conflicts for resources is linked to an increased competition for access to energy resources and their control, which, as manifested, is a cause of instability. However, given that much of the world's oil reserves are in regions vulnerable to the consequences of climate changes and that many oil and gas-producing states already have to deal with important socio-economic and demographic problems, the instability tends to increase. This development, in turn, can lead to greater insecurity of energy supply and an increased competition for access to resources.

### ***Pressures over international governance***

If the international community is failing to deal with the threats above, multilateralism will be doomed to failure. The consequences of climate changes will cause resentment among culprits of this phenomenon and the most affected persons. These



are just implications of policies aimed at mitigating climate changes (or failure of these policies), which will determine the political tensions nationally and globally.

The potential fracture is not just a North-South division, but will be one of South-South type, particularly the increased intake in global emissions of China and India. The international security architecture, already subjected to tensions, will be subject to increasing pressure in the coming years.

Reducing the negative effects of climate change is the responsibility of each country, regional and international organizations that must unite. Only in this way it is possible to ensure the stability and security at national, regional and international levels.

#### **4. The impact of various crises on national security**

Currently, there are local, regional and global crises in all fields, from the economic one to the ones regarding drinking water. All have a significant negative impact on national security on all components. The economic crisis lowers GDP, leads to fewer jobs and higher unemployment, reduced production of goods and services and lowers exports etc.

These effects directly act on social security as part of national security, and social and political instability can be reached. In turn, the food crisis could seriously affect social, political and military stability of a society, which is reflected in a significant reduction of national security and an increased social and political insecurity of the country's citizens. Similarly, the energy crisis has consequences in terms of safety, by reducing resources allocated to defense and national security, as well as by taking measures to reduce the consumption of petroleum products in all sectors.

The mitigation of the effects of this crisis on national security can be achieved by massive, concerted and continuous investments in human capital. Raising the awareness of citizens through their schooling judiciously managed, oriented towards the needs of the present and especially the future of the company, allows employment during the crisis and prepare them to overcome the economic crisis.

On the other hand, the human capital is less perishable than the financial one and relatively easy to manage. In addition, a high degree of citizens' training, fully in line with the requirements of socio-economic development, facilitates the transition to

the knowledge society which undoubtedly will have a beneficial impact on national security.

The demographic crisis manifested by reduced growth on the one hand and the population aging, on the other hand, will be reflected in the national security.

In this regard, we will see a significant decrease in citizens fit for military service and economically active, which will create difficulties in ensuring human, financial and material resources necessary to support adequate security. In addition, the demographic crisis may be exacerbated by the emigration of Romanian citizens in other EU countries in the hope of finding better living and working conditions.

On national security level, a negative impact can have the increase of non European immigrants coming to Romania in search of living and working conditions superior to those in their countries of origin. Their adaptation and integration is possible in time, which can create difficulties in national security field through a different behavior from that of the natives.

#### **Conclusions**

National security as a whole of favorable conditions of life and human activity is a dynamic reality and a conscious, voluntary, concerted and constant construct of state institutions, of the country's citizens and of civil society organizations with security vocation. It is influenced by many different threats (symmetric, asymmetric, conventional, unconventional, hybrid), and the following phenomena and processes: globalization, various crises (financial and economic crisis, energy crisis, water crisis, energy crisis, demographic crisis); climate changes. The latter, through their effects, are considered threats to national security.

Mitigating those threats can be achieved through the concerted efforts of all stakeholders with expertise in national security. Thus, at the national level, economic and social measures, attractive to nationals, can be adopted, so that they do not want to leave their homeland to emigrate in search of a better life and work. Also, economic, social, political, legal measures to encourage immigration or to stop it may be adopted.

Since the security threats effects are cumulative, the national measures for their reduction are required to be concerted, constant, continuous and systematic, on one hand and correlated with regional and international ones, on the other hand.





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<sup>2</sup> Barry BUZAN, *Popoarele, statele și teama*, pp. 124-152, Editura Cartier, 2000. Nicoleta LAȘAN, „Securitatea: concepte în societatea contemporană”, *Revista de Administrație Publică și Politici Sociale* An II, Nr. 4(5)/ decembrie 2010, [http://www.uvvg.ro/revad/files/nr5/Nicoleta %20LASAN-Securitatea %20concepte %20in%20 societatea%20contemporana .pdf](http://www.uvvg.ro/revad/files/nr5/Nicoleta%20LASAN-Securitatea%20concepte%20in%20societatea%20contemporana.pdf), pp. 46-48.

<sup>3</sup> Strategia Națională de Apărare a României, <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf>, p. 13, Strategia europeană de securitate - o Europă sigură într-o lume mai bună, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ROC.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ROC.pdf), pp.31-35.

<sup>4</sup> Petre DUȚU, *Asymmetric threats or hybrid threats: conceptual delimitations for the substiation of national security and defence*, „Carol I” National Defence University Press, Bucharest, 2013, chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>5</sup> Florin, ERHAN, *Globalization. In search of balance*, Bucharest, Economic Press, 2003, p. 9

<sup>6</sup> Petre DUȚU, *The security environment in the context of globalization and regional integration*, Bucharest, „Carol I” NDU Press, 2007, pp. 164-165.

<sup>7</sup> Petre DUȚU, *Various phenomena affecting the local, regional and international stability and security*, Bucharest, „Carol I” NDU Press, 2012, p. 25.

<sup>8</sup> Robert McLEMAN, Barry SMIT, *Archive: Commentaire N° 86: Changement climatique, migration et sécurité*, <https://www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm86-fra.asp>, p. 6, apud Petre DUȚU, *Fenomene diverse cu impact asupra stabilității și securității locale, regionale și internaționale*, București, Editura UNAp „Carol I”, 2012, p. 26.

<sup>9</sup> *Changements climatiques et sécurité internationale*, Document établi par le Haut Représentant et la Commission européenne à l'attention du Conseil européen, 14 mars 2008, <http://world-waterforum-2012-europa.eu/IMG/pdf/99389.pdf>, accessed on August 12, 2013, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 4.

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# THE NECESSITY TO INCREASE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS' SECURITY

*Eugen SITEANU, PhD.\**

*This paper presents some theoretical and practical aspects regarding the necessity to increase the security of nuclear, military and civilian systems, although they continuously improve their security systems. The analysis of nuclear systems' security requires thorough and scientific research of all factors, conditions and arguments, of the dangerousness posed by the uncertainty of these systems and the consequences for global peace and security. In this context, it is also necessary to approach the issue of starting a nuclear war as a result of accidents or nuclear disasters, although the current surveillance systems and nuclear parities between the two major nuclear players reduced the probability of triggering a nuclear war.*

**Keywords:** *security, reliability, nuclear systems, nuclear war, safety.*

## 1. Introduction

Humanity can use nuclear energy either for peaceful purposes, as inexhaustible source of energy in the field of transport, medicine, electricity, heating, etc.) or for mass destruction (eg. WMD). The progress in science and technology can be used for sustainable development or for self-destruction, according to the choices that people make.

One can talk about a paradox which is that human thinking finds acceptable spending a large part of humankind resources in order to create nuclear weapons for mass destruction, and this should be considered a basis for peace. It is obvious that founding peace on a basis that involves the threat of humankind destruction has a wrong and highly dangerous character, in total contrast with the sustainable humankind development.

The concepts of "limited" usage of nuclear weapons or of "conducting" a war and "winning" it are also dangerous. Some nuclear powers still consider that

they may be involved in the major wars that will use nuclear weapons. Russia, China and North Korea have underground tunnels in the mountains to protect the nuclear weapons systems, which means that they are prepared for a nuclear war.<sup>1</sup>

Continuous accumulation of nuclear weapons, after the nuclear arms race, represents one of the greatest threats to humanity, and their use in a possible nuclear war could destroy life on the Blue Planet.

The idea of a possible nuclear war, that would have catastrophic consequences on life on planet Earth, is also dangerous. Some researchers ask themselves if we could be drawn into another hot or cold war because of some similarities between our times and the 1930s.<sup>2</sup> We believe that this possibility exists and it might give a serious thought to the governments which possess nuclear weapons in order to take the most appropriate measures for avoiding a nuclear catastrophe.

Henry D. SOKOLSKI<sup>3</sup> goes back half a century ago, when the U.S. had 24,000 operational nuclear weapons, USSR - 2500, and the United Kingdom and France – a maximum of 50. Currently, the United States have 1980, Russia has 4537- 6537, China - between 200 and 1000, and India, Pakistan, United Kingdom, France and Israel have each between 1 and 400 operational nuclear weapons. It follows that the ratio of the number of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. and Russia compared with other nuclear powers declined by more than 100 times and will continue to decline. After more than five decades, only the U.S. and Russia had intercontinental ballistic missiles, but now over 20 countries can produce them and their number is growing. If Russia and Pakistan had planned to use the nuclear weapons first in order to hit enemy conventional forces, who knows how many other states which possess WMD will adopt in the future the same doctrine?

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## POINTS OF VIEW

We consider aberrant any doctrine or concept which implies that triggering a nuclear war could be rational. Many scientists, specialists in nuclear physics and other fields, argue convincingly that some consequences of nuclear accumulation are obviously serious because the threats hanging over humanity are real and they can culminate with a nuclear catastrophe because of a scientific, technological or human error, or of a terrorist action.

Therefore, this requires further research and actions that would lead to decreasing the danger of a nuclear war (a nuclear conflict) triggered by error. Thus, some U.S. military political analysts<sup>4</sup> have concluded that there is a possibility that some nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of unauthorized persons during political crises.

### 2. A theoretical approach to nuclear systems

In the category of nuclear systems are the military and civilian nuclear systems (nuclear power plants, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste storage centers, (atomic) nuclear complexes, nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel plants, particle accelerators, etc.). It may be admitted that the political factor is one of extreme responsibility because it must balance the technical problems with the economic, political, social, military, environmental implications etc.

The key of correct decisions is the ability of decision-makers to understand the fundamental principles of large systems security and then apply them to concrete conditions. Complex technical

systems, such as the nuclear ones, are part of these large systems. In the latter category also fall large units, states armies and coalition / alliance armed forces.

Civil nuclear systems (CNS) and nuclear weapons systems differ from the “small” or simple technical systems<sup>5</sup> both quantitatively (number of components) and qualitatively, through a higher level of organization and complex reciprocal connections between the component elements.

By the complexity of the structures and of the functions performed by the systems, they are classified as: simple systems, complex systems and large systems (ultra-complex).

Large systems (the nuclear ones are also a part of them) meet complex functions, contain a huge number of elements connected by a huge number of connections and have a functioning mode which is influenced by a large number of random factors (external and internal) which are hard to predict.

Among the reasons for this determination we may include the following: the decision is taken under incomplete information, the set of possible states of these systems do not allow the analysis and description of all states, which makes the design to take into account only the most probable situations; it is difficult to determine accurately and completely all connections between the different functions of the components sub-systems.

Figure no. 1 shows the general functioning scheme of a CNS and / or of nuclear weapons system, scheme which is valid for the functioning of any large system.




Figure no. 1: The general scheme of operation of a civilian or military nuclear system<sup>1</sup>



This scheme contains an ordered process, a logical leading equipment and a measure and control equipment.

From this figure it appears that the operation of ballistic missiles or of other nuclear weapons is coordinated by the command subsystem (A), which includes several elements (subsystems): information network, information content processing subsystem and man-technique subsystem.<sup>6</sup>

Therefore, block of command A also includes the human being and human errors.

CNS or nuclear weapons systems safe functioning has an enormous significance, failure of some elements being able to trigger accidents or nuclear disasters.

Lack of safety with regard to optimum operation of such systems can lead to their failures. Faults occur under the influence of a combination of factors.

They depend on the operators' actions, such as breach of the system's exploitation or maintenance rules of internal characteristics of nuclear weapons (wrong choice of system's structure, key schemes, functioning regimes and so on), or the influence of external factors (geo-climatic, hydraulic, mechanical, of radiation, etc.), specifying that all these factors are in a complex interdependence, which is difficult to quantify.

The greater the complexity level is, the more difficult it is to assess the security of operating systems. For a fair assessment of operational safety of the CNS or nuclear weapons systems, it is essential to know the consequences caused by the failure of some components or sub-components, issues which are going to be presented in the following pages.

Since the leadership has a great significance in using the CNS or nuclear weapons systems, some tests and studies are needed in order to establish some objective criteria for estimating the quality of senior leadership, finally reaching the top of the politico-military system, because each system is part of a superior system.

But, unfortunately, assessing the quality of leadership is a problem insufficiently studied.<sup>7</sup>

The quality of the functioning of a CNS or of a nuclear system can be judged in accordance with a number of factors related to the conception, design, manufacturing (construction), operation and maintenance of the systems. Nowadays, the systems with a "very high quality for a long period of time"<sup>8</sup> can not be achieved without the substantial expense. Therefore, it is necessary to

carry out permanent checks (verifications) regarding the technical and maintenance condition of the systems for preventing any errors.

The functioning of nuclear weapons and the CNS is influenced by many random factors, and therefore, these systems are stochastic, their analysis requiring discussions on probability spaces; they are also ergodic systems, meaning man-technique systems.

Therefore, the complex issues related to biotech-systems operator environment must study.

These issues are studied by a new discipline, ergadics, which analyzes the quality, reliability and effectiveness of biotechnical systems, assessing the quality of human-technique cooperation and ensuring the compatibility between the elements of the operator-machine-environment system in all aspects (information, biophysical, economic, political).

Diversity of random factors of some particularly complex situations taking place in large spaces and at high intensities are elements that impose at least the following main requirements to nuclear weapons systems: continuity of leadership, confidentiality of the actions, unity of information, flexibility of functioning and of adjustments (Figure no. 2).

These four requirements require the usage of highly reliable subsystems, techniques and special measures to cope with the effects of high-risk activities (explosions, decays, jams etc.), which determine the behavior of nuclear systems tolerant to distort and destructive and strong actions, depending on the level of the assumed risk and beared cost price.<sup>9</sup>


There is a certain gap between the requirements that are necessary in the design and development phase of a system, and the results obtained during its usage/ exploit. The greater the difference between the time of design and the results, the bigger this gap is.

This distance, caused by cognoscibility, technology and time, determines dangerous behaviors of the system upon the action of some disturbance factors, which can cause explosions, radiation and so on, resulting in disastrous consequences on people who are in the risk zone.

Therefore, the security of these CNS or nuclear weapons systems should be treated with special attention, based both on the reliability and durability of modern techniques and on the new methods consistent with the integronic nature of these security systems.<sup>10</sup>



## POINTS OF VIEW



**Figure no. 2 Nuclear weapons system requirements<sup>11</sup>**


The security of CNS systems and of nuclear weapons is a social problem and then a functional one, because the damage these uncertainty systems can cause to the society (humanity), which shows that the security problem of these systems is essential. Systems can not be separated from the environment and they must be assessed in close conjunction with their functional parameters and their specificity in terms of reliability, sustainability and security.<sup>12</sup> Reliability (R) is expressed as a function of time (t) and it has two components:

functional safety (S) and maintenance (M) and, symbolically, this relationship can be expressed as:

$$R(t) = S + M.$$

For the nuclear weapons system or CNS, the dynamics of reliability can be represented as in Figure no. 3. It follows that the optimal level of reliability is determined by the minimum cost (MinC).

This means that the level of reliability can not be higher than optimal reliability because of the costs that cannot be beared by the defence budget.



Cem – Costs of exploitation and maintenance;  
 Cap – Costs of acquisition/production;  
 TC – Total Costs  
 OR – Optimal Reliability

**Figure no. 3. Dynamics of reliability – R(t)<sup>13</sup>**

If viability (V) of a system is its ability to preserve the characteristics of reliability and efficiency, when the variations of the input quantities and disturbances (external and internal) cause major changes in the conditions for which it was designed and built, then these changes can be interpreted as some exceptional conditions, resulting exceptions, functional errors or interruptions (defects/ damage)<sup>14</sup>.

Knowing the possibilities of rehabilitation/reconfiguration (R) and reliability reserve (Mf), the viability (V) can be expressed as:

$$V = R + Mf$$

Then, the security (Sec) of CNS or nuclear weapons systems can have three components:<sup>15</sup> conservation / remodeling (C), functional rehabilitation (Ra) and operational safety (S):


$$Sec = C + R + S$$



An infringement<sup>16</sup>, exception or error of a subsystem which contributes to the security of the system can produce a nuclear weapons or CNS system failure.<sup>17</sup>

Similarly to the reliability and sustainability, security depends on costs and has an optimum value if it meets the criteria that represent a correlation, a relationship between cost and risk.

Based on Bayes' theorem, we calculate the parameters of system security, the probability (p) of fatality to produce the infraction which destabilizes the nuclear weapons system or CNS and the optimal value of "p", noted by "p\*", which correspond to the minimum cost of system security .



**Figure no. 4 Security Dynamics (S)<sup>1</sup>**

If we know the level of security (S) depending on the assumed risk (r), then it may be represented the security level of nuclear weapons system or CNS,  $S(r)$ , depending on the cost (c) and the resulting minimum cost (Cmin) and optimal security ( $S_0$ ).<sup>18</sup>

Securing the nuclear weapons system or CNS depends on the provisions and security mechanisms that are perishable, and their compromising is only a matter of analysis, time and money from the enemy. Accordingly, any "frozen" security mechanism of the nuclear weapons system or of CNS is certainly compromised.

Security is distinguished from the reliability and viability by the energetic-informational<sup>19</sup> report of the nuclear weapon systems or CNS, report which must be considered as an expression of dynamism and mutation from energy to information.<sup>20</sup> Based on the analysis of the energetic and informational report of the nuclear systems security are defined: security operation, physical of personnel protection and information protection.

We appreciate that the nuclear weapon systems security, the information protection should be given a priority role; the informational fraud is difficult to detect and counteract, as well as the computer viruses. Protection of information means the

information component of energetic-informational report, along with personal protection.

### **3. Nuclear weapons systems insecurity - a practical approach**

There are increasingly more cases in which serious dangers arising from the continuing nuclear arms race in the information age are convicted.

Nuclear war can be triggered both by policymakers and by accident or catastrophe. Analysis of this possibility has been in the past, the subject of several works, being the subject of the supreme court of the United Nations discussion. The possibility of starting a nuclear war as a result of an accident or a disaster that could be the prelude of a planetary nuclear destruction is minimized by the representatives of states. The arguments are technocratic, at odds with the realities and fail to provide viable and sufficient guarantees to be able to talk about a satisfactory level of safety in this regard.

Democratic governments try to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and make efforts to stop the nuclear weapon race and promote the cooperation and trust necessary to create a favorable climate for the nuclear arsenals reduction.

According to the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), those states were obliged to take all measures for a sustainable development and research and promote the technologies which are favourable for the environment protection that minimize the adverse effects, including the impact on the social, environmental and economic factors.

Therefore, it is necessary to assess the nuclear technology compared to other technologies, regarding their impact on climate, security and sustainable development changes. However, it requires the implementation of national and regional programs that lead to minimizing the climate change and the negative impact on environment and security; these programs may relate, among other things, to manage nuclear waste and other resources, and also to adapt the nuclear technologies to sustainable development.

However, in accordance with the protocol mentioned before, it is necessary for the world states to cooperate for sustainable development, including the transfer and access to nuclear technology, which is efficient from the point of view of the environment and the formulation of some programs for the effective transfer of efficient environmental technologies; the document defines a clean



development mechanism to assist the states in their effort to achieve sustainable development and to minimize the effects of climate change. For the sustainable development, the nuclear technologies should be evaluated in terms of the environmental, economic, social, political, military and cultural effects. In this context, the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency should bring an increasingly more efficient and effective contribution.

The provisions of the Treaty regarding the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), adopted by the UN General Assembly (at 12 June 1968), take into account the devastating consequences of a nuclear war to the entire humanity, the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear technology and the need for nuclear disarmament and banning nuclear experiments, it promotes the strengthening of trust between states in order to terminate the production of nuclear weapons and existing inventory liquidation by a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

Making missiles with multiple warheads reduced by more than 100 the nuclear warheads number of Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) needed to hit 100 silos, the result being therefore in favor of the one that would act first the nuclear button. Consequently, manufacturing MIRV missiles is one of the most dangerous nuclear arms race actions. In this way, it substantially increased the risk of triggering an unintended nuclear war because it was produced a new way of obtaining some strategic advantages.

In a study for nuclear weapons by the United Nations, it is shown that once with the improvement of MIRV sites, it increased the threat that a fraction of a party ICBM<sup>21</sup> (own or enemy forces) can destroy, in a first blow, the enemy ICBM sites in silos. This is, therefore, considered potentially unstable, because during a conflict / crisis, each party could choose its rockets rather than risk their destruction by the enemy<sup>22</sup>.

Therefore, we can say that any technological improvement of strategic nuclear weapons, any modernization of them increases the risks of starting a nuclear war by accident (error).

In the seventh decade of the twentieth century, there began the construction of submarines (powered by nuclear reactors) equipped with ballistic missiles (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile – SLBM). Vulnerability of these resources is now becoming greater. Consequently, SLBM's, although they were intended for tactical use, turned into a weapon

capable of being used for a first nuclear strike. Knowing this risk by the opponent may have a dangerous effect, on the formula, “either you use them or they’ll be destroyed.”<sup>23</sup>

It is noteworthy, however, that the system of communication between the central command and the submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles do not provide sufficient certainty to ensure that the order of attack can succeed.<sup>24</sup> “All these conditions, combined, print a destabilizing SLBM character, which emphasizes the tendency to transform them from a force response in one of the first strike.”<sup>25</sup> Intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from submarines has therefore common features with those of the means discussed above, being likely to trigger a nuclear war by accident, as a result of their vulnerability.

Next, I consider a few relevant examples of accidents and incidents of nuclear submarines, some of them very serious and being able to cause nuclear accidents.

According to the findings of some specialists, “regarding the nuclear submarines, there are some specific aspects of vulnerability, mostly related to stress, to which it may be subjected commanders and crew members.”<sup>26</sup> If U.S. Navy regulations provide, for instance, such a complicated procedure, involving the participation of several trigger factors in the process of the “key” to start the nuclear attack, in fact, there are a number of elements in the sequence or their completion which could cause the onset of a nuclear war, despite the strictness of these regulations.

There are today in the world – says Barnaby – over 100 strategic nuclear submarines of which at least 40 are, in every moment, on the seas and oceans of the world. The thought that a radio operator and captain on some of these submarines could conspire together to trigger a chain of events that could lead to the destruction of the planet's northern hemisphere is certainly not a comforting thought. Strategic bombers equipped with nuclear weapons also contain elements of vulnerability such as those mentioned above. Defects or accidents, on such behavior means to target nuclear weapons, could easily cause very serious injuries.<sup>27</sup>

In 1966, an American bomber B-52 type, with four nuclear bombs aboard with a capacity of destruction of 25 megatons TNT collided with a KC-135 tanker aircraft during air fuel supply above the village Palomares in Spain. The power of the atomic bomb on board was equal to that of 5,000 bombs of



the type dropped on Hiroshima.<sup>28</sup> One of the four bombs remained intact, another one fell into the sea, where it was later recovered and the other two were damaged when they hit the ground and plutonium dust spread over a very large area.

Public opinion reacted strongly, the French magazine *L' Express* wrote, "24,000 years of radioactivity – these is the risk for Palomares residents. This is how long could last the radioactive effects of the plutonium-239 which was released along with the uranium-235." A layer of soil of approximately 2 acres was collected and transported to the U.S., loaded into containers, to be "buried" in a radioactive waste repository. On the other 224 ha were undertaken decontamination measures.<sup>29</sup>

But the accident to which I referred is not the only accident of this kind. In 1956, a U.S. B-47 nuclear bomber, with missiles on board, disappeared in the the Mediterranean Sea; in the same year, a B-52 bomber accidentally released a nuclear bomb near the Kirkland base in New Mexico, and a bomber B-47 crashed at Lankenhater in South-East of England. In this context, the frequently asked questions about humankind security are fully justified.

In April 2013, the Norwegian foreign minister, Espen Barth Eide, moderated in Oslo, an international conference related to the impact of the use of nuclear weapons. There took part representatives of 127 countries and also of UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and civil society, who have discussed the global humanitarian consequences of nuclear explosions.<sup>30</sup>

Representatives of humanitarian organizations present at the conference said they would push for re-discussion of the prohibition of nuclear weapons worldwide. But the Member States of the Permanent UN Security Council, all nuclear powers, did not send any representative to this event.

Conclusions of the conference emphasized that the effects of a nuclear explosion will be so catastrophic that will exceed the abilities of any country to deal with them. Practically, no state and no organization can successfully manage properly the humanitarian emergency caused by the detonation of a nuclear weapon or to provide assistance to those affected.

The nuclear destructive potential persists and the effects of a nuclear detonation, for whatever reason, would have a transnational character, endangering

people's lives and states security in the regional or global level.

As a result of budget cuts, which are automatically starting on March 1, 2013, the U.S.A. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, ordered a review of the fundamentals of defense strategy approved by President Barack Obama in 2012.

The current defense strategy was developed for the redefinition of U.S.A. interests in the military field after 2012, by moving them in the Asia-Pacific area and strengthening the missile defense capabilities against the cyber attacks.

The review could affect the maintenance of major nuclear systems that will have to be made in the next years as a result of decreasing the budgetary allocations. Recently, "the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of General Staff, General Martin Dempsey, said that reducing the U.S. budget deficit is a national security imperative, adding also that the current approach of automatic spending reduction is the most irresponsible way of managing the country's defense."<sup>31</sup>

Insecurity of nuclear systems will increase proportionally with the funds decrease for their maintenance and security.

#### **4. Insecurity of civil nuclear systems**

Security of nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons is one of the central concerns in terms of ensuring the regional and international security, their vulnerabilities being a well-founded and justified cause for concern not only for the policy makers but also for the public in general. Therefore, we can notice a tendency of the public to want to know the facts – which are often of classified nature – under the right of information, including the nuclear sources of instability and insecurity.

The interest is manifested even in the technical aspects, targeting mechanisms of nuclear accidents; another important topic for the public is the role of bureaucratic relations in these accidents, of scientific and technical errors leading to such disasters.

Thus, it is justified the public opinion desire to obtain information about the hierarchical and political pressures made to prevent such errors. More than that, most of the times, in case of such accidents or nuclear disaster, the human factor is involved, regardless of social and political hierarchy envisaged.

Therefore, the causes and consequences of the nuclear disaster continue to attract a large extent the





public interest. Therefore, strategic decisions on nuclear energy production should be carried out with the participation of as many representatives of the citizens, since such activities can generate instability of national, regional and global security.

This is not a recent idea, its necessity being argued shortly after the Chernobyl nuclear tragedy. Thus, three years after this catastrophe, Andrei Sakharov expressed his opinion that the nuclear reactors should not be built at the ground surface, but only in the underground, regardless of the costs. Sakharov also mentioned that these issues should be resolved by the citizens, and not just by specialists, whose method is a purely technical one, without, necessarily having the consciousness of responsibility for the effects of their actions on the security plan.

Thus, the relevance of the events at Chernobyl still preserves and currently resides in drawing attention to the risks associated with operations in the production of nuclear energy, especially at the level of public opinion. In addition, they have been also a stimulus for the concerns to enhance the safety of the nuclear systems functioning; in other words, Chernobyl has demonstrated the need for a balance between the benefits resulting from the production of nuclear energy and adopting all the necessary measures for the operation of this industry in as secure as possible terms. The words of the current Prime Minister of Russia, following the tragedy of Chernobyl are eloquent in this respect: "Personally, I am convinced that the nuclear energy is necessary to mankind and that we must develop it, but in the conditions of an absolute security, which requires effectively the underground reactors location"<sup>32</sup>.

Until May 1986, the nuclear power and the idea of "peaceful atom" were presented as a high of security, ecological purity, safety in operation and reliability. Many scientists strongly argue that the nuclear power plants (NPP) are absolutely safe, and the debris from these plants are compact and can be kept safely in locations isolated from the external environment.

But, after the Chernobyl explosion, the nuclear fuel was stored right next to the destroyed reactor, and the consequences of this fact are well known. After the Chernobyl accident, the issue of preventing the groundwater pollution of the Dnieper and Pripet rivers was put at stake.

The 1986 accident was not the first one; there are data about a number of accidents and cases of

previous irradiations. Out of the 46 reactors which operated in the USSR in 1985, 15 are of RBMK type (high power reactor with boiling water). These reactors provided 40% of the electronuclear energy and about 5% of the total electricity production of the Soviet Union. They were and they still are intended both to produce electricity and plutonium which has a military purpose.

These types of reactors are still functioning on submarines or surface ships with nuclear propulsion. They have, however, two major problems, namely: loss of fission products in the cooling water flowing through the reactor core (unlike them, the Western plants have a second circuit of uncontaminated water, heated by the primary circuit); the lack of a second protective enclosures (outside the concrete formwork) to isolate the reactor assembly from the circuits in direct contact with its core.

In the nuclear accident from Chernobyl, the security conditions of the nuclear power plant, with unexperienced staff, in addition to the fact that the materials used in the construction did not have the quality prescribed in the project – using cheaper and lower quality materials being used. Unlike this case, at Fukushima, the causes were totally different.

On March 11<sup>th</sup> 2011, there was a big accident at the electro-nuclear power plant at Fukushima Daiichi, which has four nuclear reactors.

The event began with an earthquake in north-eastern of Japan, which triggered a tsunami whose huge waves have hit the cooling tower of the nuclear plant. This power plant (Fukushima I) started to use the reserve electric batteries (of rather low capacity). Three days later, there was made a public announcement that the cooling system of reactor 2 is no longer working either.

Due to abnormal cooling of the reactor, the core reactor overheated at a temperature of 2000°C, which was very close to its melting point and the risk of an explosion. The next day, it was announced that there occurred an explosion at the second reactor that damaged its shell, causing the increase in radioactivity environment. The Tokyo Government announced that radioactivity values are "dramatic". Once reactor 2 exploded, there was a strong fire at reactor number 4 (which was in the revision before the earthquake), which caused a great increase in radioactivity.

In the case of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, in its design stage, there was used a statistics of the height of the waves produced by the Tsunami and there was not applied a safety coefficient (for



example, 2 or even 3), used in engineering calculations in order to multiply the maximum wave height to determine the height at which the cooling tower was built. Because of this, the cooling tower, being at a too low height, was hit by the Tsunami and caused that nuclear catastrophe with devastating consequences.

### Conclusions

It has been demonstrated that in the world there have been very many nuclear accidents, which proves that the civil and military nuclear systems are not safe in operation.

At the same time, any maintenance operations (maintenance and repair) do not provide perfect security of the personnel carrying out the work concerned. It was observed that the workers who carry out operations with “nuclear danger” – loading and manipulating nuclear submarines and fuel in CNE – have a higher rate of cancer two times larger than the workers who do not carry out such operations.

In the world, there are over 440 nuclear power plants distributed in 35 countries around the globe. This nuclear issue is particularly important for Romania because the Romanian Government should take account of nuclear accidents presented in this paper and take the most appropriate and safe measures for putting into service the other units of the nuclear power plant of the nuclear power station at Cernavoda.

### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Henry D. SOKOLSKI, *The next arms race, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center*, and Strategic Studies Institute, 2012, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Henry D. SOKOLSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Henry D. SOKOLSKI, Bruno TERTRAIS, *Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach?*, Strategic Studies Institute and U. S. Army War College Press, 2012.

<sup>5</sup> A “little” or simple technical system, as opposed to another, is neither integrated nor cybernetic and it cannot be perfected continuously by expanding databases and improving some running algorithms; at the same time, it cannot perform automatic testing and neither preparation of the crews through simulation. Also, it cannot automatically process the information and carry out adjustments (automatically) etc.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 36.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 39.

<sup>9</sup> Eugen SITEANU, Naianu BEDROS, Gheorghe ILIE, *Fiabilitatea produselor tehnice*, Editura AISTEDA, București, 2000, pp. 128-129.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 127.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 134.

<sup>16</sup> Infringements – events which, by their consequences, can become dangerous for the safe exploitation (utilisation) of the systems (actions of some external destructive factors or which cause structural, technological, organizational or functional changes, attacks on the warning the systems of alarm, security, fire fighting and protection of information, penetration of cryptographic systems and introducing some dissimulating information, alteration of the capabilities of rehabilitation, reconfiguration, maintainability and general resilience). Also, infringement can be defined both as an external action for the destruction or annihilation/neutralization of the system or any of its duties, and as an effect of certain exceptions or functional errors that can bring about a state of insecurity.

<sup>17</sup> Mircea MUREȘAN, Ilie GHEORGHE, Tudor NICULESCU, Alexandru MIHALCEA, *op.cit.* p. 135.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 137.

<sup>19</sup> For the explanation of the energetico-informational report of the systems security, we shall define the safe functioning, physical and personnel protection, and also the protection of your information. *The safe functioning* is dependent on energy, involving privacy of actions, safe functioning of systems and combat technical facilities as well as the ability of resistance to the enemy action, by adapting and reshaping their own subsystems. It is obvious that by privacy, they protects all the material, informational and human resources, engaged in actions or in preparation, and that any system must have a good reliability. Also, the energetic support of the action in security cannot be separated from the informational one, because in the security field action cannot be taken without the adequate protection of the information; the reciprocal is obviously valid.

*Physical protection (an energetical dependence)* refers particularly to security (against criminals but also of fires and disasters) and has a significant informational component, which is why, in its dynamics it is always geared towards the informational field, beginning with supervision (with interconnected sensors and robots), continuing with surveillance (with radiation means and robots integrated) and ending with direct action (security robots).

*Personnel protection (informational component)* is dependent on the semantics and usage of information, complex preparation of the human resources employed, the conditions for logistical activities development.



*Protection of information* is the decisive informational component in ensuring the leadership and execution of actions in secret; it also has a human and material support (registered users and specialists, and racks of processing). Therefore, although, as a support, military technical systems security components can be aggregated in a different manner to the energetical or informational units, as actions and goals, their interpenetration is total and hard to separate, making it difficult to treat them separately, but allowing their energetical-informational dissociation.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 137.

<sup>21</sup> ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).

<sup>22</sup> See *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons*, UN A/35/392, 1980, p. 14, paragraph 20, [https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/3b43778d45f5a2d28525757d004e4f7f/f7d6a7efcc6fb1dd8525762100554201/\\$FILE/A-35-392.pdf](https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/3b43778d45f5a2d28525757d004e4f7f/f7d6a7efcc6fb1dd8525762100554201/$FILE/A-35-392.pdf)

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 449.

<sup>24</sup> SIPRI, Yearbook, 1979, p. 389.

<sup>25</sup> A. BOLINTINEANU, V. DUCULESCU, G. MONAFU, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

<sup>26</sup> A. BOLINTINEANU, V. DUCULESCU, G. MONAFU, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 132.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 132.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 133.

<sup>30</sup> "Considerente privind exploziile nucleare", *Observatorul militar*, year XXII, nr. 14 (1201), 10-16 April 2013, p. 15.

<sup>31</sup> „Revizuirea strategiei de apărare a statelor unite”, *Observatorul militar*, year XXII, nr. 13 (1200), 3-9 April 2013, p. 15.

<sup>32</sup> Grigori MEDVEDEV, *Adevărul despre Cernobâl*, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 1992, p. 6.

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
10.\*\*\*, Accidentul nuclear de la Fukushima-Daiichi, [http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentul\\_nuclear\\_de\\_la\\_Fukushima-Daiichi](http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentul_nuclear_de_la_Fukushima-Daiichi).



## ***ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES***

JULY-SEPTEMBER 2013

The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) organized, in the framework of Expomil 2013, the seminar “The correlation between technological development and the physiognomy of present day’s conflicts: content and tendencies in the current Revolution in Military Affairs”, on September, 27 at Romexpo headquarters. At the seminar were delivered presentations by representatives of “Carol I” National Defence University leadership, Armament Department, C.N. ROMTEHNICA S.A. and C.N. ROMARM S. A. companies. In the activity participated as well representatives of Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Romanian Intelligence Service, Prime Minister’s Chancellery, National Administration of State Reserves and Special Issues.



There were debated issues concerning the content and dynamics of the current Revolution in Military Affairs, the correlation between doctrinaire and technological development, trends in the field of military research in the current security environment context, advanced technologies for an effective training, perspectives and challenges regarding the usage of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The presentations generated debates among participants which contributed to the effort of understanding, knowledge as well as to disseminating constructive ideas and opinions.

On the CDSSS Agenda of the upcoming period is the International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI with the theme *The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment*, to take place in November 21-22, 2013. Those who are interested to participate are invited to access the conference website, <http://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/ro/conferinte-strategii-xxi/centrul-de-studii-strategie-de-aparare-si-securitate> or CDSSS website, <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

***Irina TĂTARU***



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