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EDITORIAL

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Senior researcher Petre DUȚU, Editor in chief
Director, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT[1]

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Complexity and dynamism of the current international context, marked by phenomena such as globalization, climate change, rapid population growth, world wide international migration, excessive urbanization, global economic and financial crisis have led to changes in concepts of crisis management and conflict around the world. Thus, the comprehensive approach in solving crises knowns a widespread distribution and application on the world stage, being used by countries such as USA, France, England, for example, and organizations such as the UN, NATO, the EU and the African Union.

Key-words: comprehensive approach; crisis; conflict; cooperation; international actor; USA; EU; UN.

1. Defining the "comprehensive approach" concept

The current international context marked by globalization and the effects of the recent economic and financial crisis has led to the strengthening of political and military decision-makers' vision related to efficient management of allocated resources in fullfiling the missions of crisis management and international conflicts. Persistent economic problems of the states and the fewer financial resources are required to find new ways to get better results with fewer resources. "Do more with less" has become a priority both nationally and within NATO, and it refers to the most efficient ratio between resources and results. In this respect, there were released rather complementary concepts, such as: the comprehensive approach in NATO and EU, smart defence within NATO or pooling and sharing within the EU.

Mainly, *comprehensive approach*, *multidimensional approach* and *integrated approach*[2], and in French *approche globale* are terms used in the early 2000s by different countries (USA, France, England, for example) and by international organizations (EU, NATO, UN, African Union and so on) to define the way of solving the crisis. In essence, these expressions are regrouping around the idea of greater harmonization and coordination of international and local actors, civil and military, during crises. Basically, it is the combined and concerted efforts of civilians and military personnel to better manage a situation which includes international and local actors.

The existence of a variety of terms[3] that define the concept of comprehensive approach makes it difficult to understand the situation, as each actor gives another meaning depending on the context and its history. In addition, some crisis management actors implement this comprehensive approach without naming it. "There is no single, coherent or commonly agreed CA model. Moreover, strategies and models can signify *de facto* a comprehensive

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approach without using the term. This complicates comparisons and creates terminological confusion. Besides, while most actors today acknowledge the necessity for better coordination and cooperation, their approaches diverge significantly regarding priorities, means and suggested end-states of crisis management."[4]

There is no universal concept of a holistic approach[5]. Cited source makes an analysis of the origins of this lexical group. Thus are mentioned: theoretical origins, historical origins, origins related to military doctrine (EBAO, global maneuver) and the origins of these political and technological concepts.

Therefore, in the literature, the concept of *comprehensive approach* has no clear definition, agreed by the entire international community. In its simplest meaning, comprehensive approach (CA) means a combination of civilian and military instruments and the enforcement of cooperation between government departments, not only for operations, but also more broadly, to meet the security challenges of the XXIst century, in particular terrorism, genocide and proliferation of hazardous materials and weaponry[6]. Therefore, cooperation between all involved actors is the only solution to new problems and challenges of modern crises and conflicts.

According to some authors, CA consists in generating and using security, governance and development, expertise services, structures and resources regardless of time and distance, in partnership with host nations, host regions, allied and partner governments and partner institutions, governmental and non-governmental[7]. Of course, it involves the whole range of measures, from the political-diplomatic, economic, financial, military and police, to the legal and humanitarian.

CA can occur between different groups of actors at different levels and in different stages, and its nature will vary depending on the actors involved. Level can be: government (collaboration and cooperation between different government agencies), intra-agency (collaboration and cooperation between departments within an agency) or inter-agency (collaboration and cooperation among different actors involved in the crisis). Therefore, CA has three main dimensions:

The first dimension, of international actors, refers to cooperation between international organizations, governments and the host country, such as: cooperation in political, economic and security between NATO and EU forces, international organizations, NGOs and host country. *The second dimension* of national actors concerns the interaction between responsible ministries such as the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and so on, and also the internal cooperation taking place within international organizations. *The third dimension* aims to develop consistent, stable and consistent growth of different

Cooperation / Level	between international actors *(1st dimension)*	between national actors *(2nd dimension)*	between local actors	Objective oriented *(3rd dimension)*
Political level	UN	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior	Local authorities	Rule of law, governance
Economical level	UN, international organizations NGOs, national governments	Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development		Development and reconstruction
Security level	NATO (ISAF), Enduring Freedom Operation	Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior	Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police	Stable and secure environment that does not allow the development of terrorist networks

Figure no. 1: Dimensions and levels of cooperation[8]

standards within the area of responsibility of the mission, especially in terms of reconstruction and development, security, governance and rule of law. In all three dimensions, the most important role is attributed to local actors[9].

As shown in Figure no. 1, the approach is both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal approach includes civilian and military parties and, where possible, allies, international organizations and local people. Vertical approach takes into account the different stages of the situation, from the initial phase of armed confrontation to reconstruction. CA seems to be the most comprehensive solution to all the problems of modern crisis management and conflict, involving the combined efforts of all military and civilian actors.

Essentially, CA is a new political-military vision which has completely changed the way of crisis management and conflicts resolution. The concept is closely related to "Effects-Based Approach to Operations", in the way that classic confrontation "force - force" is replaced with a modern type of clash "effect - force", a feature of future wars. Therefore, CA has become, in recent years, a basic concept in crisis management and conflict around the world.

2. Comprehensive approach in the US view

In the early 2000s, the United States was the first country that has shown interest and developed the concept of CA, especially in terms of inter-agency coordination. In the US view, the purpose of CA is mainly fighting terrorism and other emerging threats to national security. However, this approach quickly became a basic principle in other areas such as refugee protection, combating trafficking in persons, drugs, weapons, etc.

Regarding stability operations, the need for new rigorous approaches to these appeared in autumn 2003, due to obvious problems of American intervention in countries with a high risk or in conflict. Thus, based on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and on lessons learned, it was necessary to improve coordination between civilian organizations and military structures. The main objective was to achieve a greater impact in the management of complex situations of crisis, by implementing formalized processes of coordination between the following departments: State Department, Agency for International

Development and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Justice[10]. However, the administration in Washington seems more focused on objectives (the 3rd dimension in the table above), because the State Department is responsible for coordinating humanitarian actions, while the Department of Defence is responsible for military tasks.

In 2004, the US State Department decided to establish the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization[11], to develop civilian capacity for stability operations, to organize civilian efforts from US government and to coordinate with military in such complex operations. Creating Civilian Response Corps (CRC) was authorized in 2008, by "Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act"[12]. They are tasked to lead, coordinate and institutionalize US Government's civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in post-conflict, so that they can achieve the objectives of peace, democracy and market economy.

CRC is composed of people able to handle all the basic functions of government: police, lawyers, judges, economists, specialists in public administration, engineering etc. They should have good knowledge of the area and its respective language in order to adapt their functional needs to the country or region in crisis. CRC has an active component of 150-200 people that can be deployed within 2-3 days to respond to external crises. Another component of the CRC, consisting of 1,000-2,000 people in stand-by can be deployed in 1-2 months after the decision[13]. In 2010, CRC was deployed in about 28 locations, including nine in Africa, seven in Central and South Asia and three in the Middle East[14]. A good example of the development of the U.S. civilian expeditionary capacity is sending 40 experts to Afghanistan to help achieve a more rigorous civil-military planning in all Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) from the Regional Commands East and South and the Embassy in Kabul.

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has established a set of core principles – the host nation capacity and ownership, political supremacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, regional engagement –, in order to improve cooperation between US agencies, but also with internal and external partners. Based

on these principles, stabilization and reconstruction missions should achieve five major objectives[15]:

• *safe environment* – to enable people to live without fear of systematic or large scale violence;

• *rule of law* – to give people the opportunity to trust and have equal access to the justice system to protect their rights and ensure their safety and security;

• *stable governance* – to give people the opportunity to share, to have access or run for the power through non-violent political process and enjoy the benefits and services provided by the state;

• *sustainable economy* – to enable people to have opportunities to obtain livelihoods in an economic system governed by law;

• *social welfare* – to give people the opportunity to not depend on basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities to raise living standards.

Of course, the US is the main pillar in the development and implementation of a comprehensive approach within NATO in order to respond more effectively to international crises and conflicts.

3. Comprehensive approach in the NATO view

As argued by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in October 2010, "a comprehensive approach not only makes sense but is a must." [16] In essence, NATO is a military alliance and manifests itself as such, therefore it may participate in developing a comprehensive approach in a broader context. That is why NATO is concerned with developing their own crisis management instruments, in particular its ability to work with partner countries, international organizations, NGOs and local authorities.

To respond to the challenges in Afghanistan and other theaters of operations, NATO allies first stressed the need for CA civilian-military regarding security at the *Riga Summit* in November 2006. In paragraph 10 of the Final Declaration is stated: "**Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo** demonstrates that today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments..."[17]. This decision was reaffirmed at the NATO *Summit in Bucharest* in April 2008: "**Experiences in Afghanistan and**

the Balkans demonstrate that the international community needs to work more closely together and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non-Governmental Organisations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates..."[18]. In addition, an *Action Plan* was approved comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO's contribution to the CA, which mainly relate to the planning and conduct of operations, training and education and enhancing cooperation with external actors, including other international organizations and NGOs. The plan shows that the Alliance – headquarters, command structure, Member States – wishes to bring together all civil and military resources at its disposal to deal with the problems they are facing. Therefore, these proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels.

At the *Lisbon Summit* in November 2010, NATO Allies decided to strengthen its contribution to international community efforts to address the most comprehensive crisis management, as well as improve the Alliance's ability to provide stabilization and reconstruction effects. CA was clearly stated in the new NATO Strategic Concept, which at paragraph 21 states: "The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort."[19] Therefore, NATO will have to work with other actors, both inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, to contribute to the implementation of a CA which can effectively combine political, civilian and military tools of crisis management.

Given that military means, although essential, are not sufficient to meet the complex challenges to NATO and international security, NATO Allies decided to set up a civilian capacity adequate but modest, in order to interact more effectively with other actors and to achieve specific planning of crisis management situations. Also, the Alliance is concerned with developing closer partnerships with civilian actors who have experience and expertise in areas such as reconstruction and institution building, development, governance, justice and police.

Also, at the Lisbon Summit, NATO Allies tasked the North Atlantic Council to update the Action Plan agreed in April 2008 in Bucharest. CA Action Plan was updated in March 2012 when NATO officials agreed on a list of new tasks to be implemented by a civilian-military force special designed, involving all major states and NATO bodies[20].

Effective implementation of the Alliance's contribution to CA is a long-term effort that requires improvements in several key areas of activity[21], such as:

• *The planning and conduct of operations* – NATO promotes clearly defined strategies and objectives of all relevant actors before launching an operation, and also enhanced planning based on cooperation. As a general rule, stabilization and reconstruction problems must be undertaken by actors and organizations with relevant expertise, mandate and competence.

• *Lessons learned, training, education and exercises* – CA implementation means a change of mentality, which requires the joint training of military and civilian personnel, including sharing lessons learned. This creates better coordination and greater confidence between NATO partners and other local and international actors.

• *Developing cooperation with external actors* – the Alliance is constantly concerned to achieve closer links with relevant actors and organizations respecting the decisional autonomy of each organization.

• *Public message* – to be effective, CA must be completed by consistent and coherent public messages.

CA was an important topic on the agenda Summit in Chicago on 20-21 May 2012. Final Declaration reaffirms the importance of CA, as was established in the Lisbon Summit, notably in the case of Afghanistan where the transition from ISAF to Afghan National Security Forces should be completed by the end of 2014[22]. According to Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning Department of the Secretary General of NATO, CA of main institutions and civilian and military actors that cooperate is now official NATO doctrine for all actions non-Article 5. However, unlike previous concepts for NATO transformation, CA proved easier to formulate in theory than in practice, and in the case of Afghanistan seems to prove this statement[23]. Problems relate to the fact that, so far, there are significant discrepancies between military and civilian culture, which makes the whole theater coordination difficult. According to Shea, the experience of Afghanistan will make that, in time, the US and other allies to invest more in civilian expertise on reconstruction and civilian rapid response capability able to operate in hazardous areas for a long time.

In this context may also be formulated other potential obstacles in the progress of CA, such as those related to formal aspects of the relationship between actors: different organizations with conflicting mandates, lack of a Memorandum of Understanding which underpin cooperation or other legal or formal impediments that hinders collaboration. Also, other challenges may be related to:

- *bureaucratic rigidity*: it is possible that, despite good intentions, the organizational system of one of the actors does not allow flexibility to adjust plans and budgets to the needs of other actors;

- *security*: it is difficult for actors who are very concerned about the preservation of humanitarian space, which requires neutrality and impartiality, keep away from the other actors in the theater;

- *financing*: because many organizations competing for the same donor, funding can be reached in case of a zero-sum game, which hinders cooperation between them;

- *priorities*: different actors may share the same strategic vision to action, but may be in disagreement with the specific objectives of certain stages;

- *resources*: even if development is key to the success of an intervention, military resources receive more consistent;

- *leadership*: it is difficult to determine who runs when multiple actors are equally involved: an international organization, the most powerful actor (especially militarily) or main donor country;

- *authority*: for CA to be effective, it requires decentralization of authority in many existing organizations;

- *local ownership*: if the CA's goal is to achieve efficient and faster mission objectives, sustainability and local ownership issue becomes critical in terms of *when* and *to whom* to be given authority[24].

Considering these challenges, and the fact that CA refers mainly to awareness, dialogue and organizational flexibility as main models for collaboration, it is particularly important to provide a framework for discussion among all actors involved in preventing and managing crises and international conflicts.

4. Comprehensive approach of crisis management in the EU view

4.1. The EU's comprehensive approach

The EU is often presented as the actor committed to developing and implementing comprehensive approach to prevent / resolve crises. Indeed, the EU associates the military and civilian crisis management with the possibility of military intervention in crisis management at the European Council in Cologne in 1999[25], and the possibility of civilian crisis management missions (police, judiciary, civil administration and civil protection) adopted at the Feira Council in 2000[26].

Although there is no official EU definition for the concept of "comprehensive approach", there seems to be a consensus on the following explanation of it: "Comprehensive approach involves a methodology aimed at the implementation of shared principles and processes that increase long-term outcomes of collaboration perspective in political, diplomatic, security, economic, development, justice and human rights areas, and that, in achieving common objectives within and beyond the EU."[27] Basically, the EU, by applying the concept of comprehensive approach to crisis, base their action on defense, development and diplomacy. Central principles of EU Global Approach are: local capacity building in failed states, the importance of policy to ensure peace settlement, legitimacy in crisis intervention, unity of effort, security, crisis transformation and regional engagement.

If we study the texts promoted by the European Union, a broad reference to the comprehensive approach can be retained. Thus, the texts issued

by the European Council in March 2010, entitled *Towards a comprehensive approach - the operating implications*[28] and *Operating implications of a comprehensive approach*, reinforce the perception of comprehensive approach concept. On the other hand, it is noted that Lisbon Treaty strengthens the concept in question by the creation of the **European External Actions Service** and its *Crisis Management Planning Directorate* (CMPD), institutions that closely unite within them both civil and military components around the concept of "*Civil-military coordination*" (CMCO). The latter seems to be one of the most visible materialization of the will to develop a comprehensive approach within the European institutions.

In the EU context, reference is made to institutional efforts aimed at closer cooperation between civilian and military as the CMCO, for "civil-military coordination." The official definition is: "Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in the context of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to the crisis."[29] The objective was the implementation of necessary reforms in the EU to allow effective coordination between civilian and military actors. The document emphasizes the importance of co-ordination culture, having to create a new organizational routine of co-ordination. CMCO through its institutional and cultural impact was presented as a precondition for the implementation of a management crisis in Europe, under the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Indeed, the PSC is the one that may reflect when in a moment of crisis of all available European options (civil and military) in order to coordinate adequately. Through *crisis management concept* and then through PSC's common action is set the mission framework in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Besides CMCO concept, expression specific to the European institutional political context, can be found in texts from Brussels the term CIMIC, an expression that is currently in the military to qualify the relationship between civilians and the military on the ground[30].

CIMIC address operational and tactical support issues and CMCO the civil-military relations at the political and strategic level, ie within EU institutions with implications that it can have during crises. CMCO include civil-military cooperation

within the Common Security and Defence Policy, but similar links between Community instruments for crisis management and intergovernmental instruments, these links being strengthened with the implementation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) provided by the Treaty of Lisbon. The idea is to have a coordination of civil and military actors in all stages of crisis management and particularly strategic planning phase which defines the role of different instruments. The concept regards both Brussels and theater as the link between Brussels and theater.

In the Common Security and Defence Policy, the comprehensive approach is expressed in an *ad hoc* manner, even before the first texts of conceptualization. Basically, there are three types of cases in which a comprehensive approach was able to express in an *ad hoc* manner. The first comprehensive approach can be found in *ad hoc* European military operations in the *expanded Petersberg tasks*, which were validated by the Treaty of Lisbon. Originally tasks called Petersberg were defined by the WEU in June 1992 and then incorporated into the EU Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997[31] to include *peacemaking* and *peakeeping* tiers.

Secondly, a comprehensive approach is expressed *ad hoc* in civilian crisis management missions following the Feira Summit: this concerns above all rebuilding police, justice, administration and, in some rare cases, civil protection. Finally, there are civil-military operations, as in *Aceh Monitoring Mission*. There are three possibilities in the Feira Summit text which formalized the EU's comprehensive approach: "*Towards a comprehensive approach*". Indeed, it is noted that: "When it may be appropriate, the EU can conduct a civil mission with military support or a military operation with the participation and support of the civilian components. In a complex scenario, the EU may choose to conduct a civil and a military mission simultaneously, making available a wide range of tools, and this for an extended period."[32] By 2007, most civilian missions were planned by or with the military, like the one in Aceh, a very well planned military intervention.

Beyond the CMCO used in the Common Security and Defence Policy in the EEAS, is also comprehensive approach within the European Commission services. This has given rise to debate over the proper location of civilian dimension of

crisis management in the EU institutions, between the Council and the Commission[33]. Among European Commission instruments that can contribute to a comprehensive approach are: the Instrument for stability, humanitarian aid, Community civil protection mechanism, programs of reconstruction and development aid, economic support measures, and all that is within the order of reconstruction of institutions in function. Documents resulting from the comprehensive approach of the EU Military Committee include humanitarian and development aid issues managed by the European Commission in its actions.

4.2. Crisis comprehensive approach by the EU in co-ordination with other external actors

Comprehensive approach translates for the EU by the implementation of partnerships and agreements with other international actors. Moreover, the 2003 Security Strategy[34] emphasizes the importance of developing an effective and efficient multilateralism, including through better collaboration with the UN, NATO, the African Union, etc.

Regarding EU relations with the United Nations can be mentioned: "*Joint Declaration*" (2003 and 2007) and the implementation of "*UN - EU Steering Committee*". Moreover, the European Commission signed partnership agreements with UN agencies (UNDP, WHO, UNHCR, etc.). In addition, certain operations, such as the one in Kosovo, the EU was responsible for some aspects of UN integrated approach[35]. Finally, the European Commission finances many UN actors. Between 2001 and 2008, 37% of European aid dedicated to maintaining peace was transferred to UN programs[36]. In parallel, a third of European stability fund instruments are financing the UN actions. Through these various interactions, it seeks to establish a partnership institutionalization of EU - UN around civilian crisis management. It remains to be seen whether this could extend to partnerships that would include military issues in the global approach. Attempts took place, for example, with EUFOR in Chad. But it can be felt by talking to actors on the ground that the political opposition is strongest when soldiers are employed. This seems to make the EU - UN cooperation a more delicate one[37]. To this is added the fact that the UN can not lead coercion military operations. It seems that as the two institutions

are trying to formalize the partnership, the more it pose coordination problems[38]. Regarding EU-NATO coordination, it can be evoked the role of the Berlin Plus arrangements[39].

Also, institutionalizing partnership did not allowed to completely simplify interaction between the two institutions. Moreover, the political situation is blocked, which prevents the use of a real strategic global approach that would capitalize on the civilian component of the EU and UN's more developed military resources. Indeed, the conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey preclude the existence of a substantive strategic dialogue between the two organizations, Turkey refused the Republic of Cyprus to attend meetings of the PSC and the NAC (North Atlantic Council) and between respective military committees[40]. On the other hand, there is a strong competition between EU and NATO in crisis management[41]. However, NATO and the EU are in a context of asymmetric resources, especially on civilian crisis management resources[42].

Finally, there is also a partnership between African Union and EU. The latter supports Amis (African Union Mission in Sudan), Euro-RECAMP, African Peace Facility.

An example of the EU Global Approach is the Operation *Atalanta* (EUNAVFOR) *Somalia*, launched in December 2008, which contributed to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and robbery off the Somali coast[43]. This operation includes simultaneously military components, safeguards, humanitarian and political. Indeed, the EU deployed 1800 troops here. At the security level, the EU has put in place arrangements for the transfer of prisoners captured by military that can be delivered to justice authorities eg Kenya or the Seychelles. EU acts to implement justice sustainable solutions. At the development level, strategy document for Somalia that regarded period 2008-2013 provides an allocation of 215.8 million euros from 10 European development funds[44]. This support covers three main areas of cooperation: governance, education and rural development. Thus, the EU hopes to contribute to stabilizing the region in the long term. EU is politically involved in implementing a government to establish a democratically elected political institutions.

Atalanta is one of the first examples of using official EU global approach to an area of instability.

It is difficult to make an exhaustive review of this action due to the difficulties and obstacles encountered in field application[45]. For example, regional cooperation implemented especially at judiciary level remains weak. Some prisons, as in the Seychelles, are saturated with pirates. So it seems that a comprehensive approach creates some difficulties managing on the field in short-term between EU actors and local actors. In addition, there are quite a few EU communication about the intervention, making EU comprehensive approach less known by its citizens and less political visible. Also, coordination between civilian and military actors is still difficult[46]; among the mentioned difficulties are: low exchange of information between the Commission and the Council; the cultural differences between the military and the police on the ground; the complex implementation of local government.

Conclusions

Comprehensive approach of crisis management in the world is widely applied by a series of states of the world – the US, France, England, for example –, and by organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU, African Union, due to the advantages that it presents.

The main *advantages of implementing comprehensive approach[47]*, which influences planning, operations and evaluation in complex crisis situations are:

• *increasing organizational interaction* – CA is based on the assumption that the support of other organizations to achieve their objectives for the benefit of local actors helps to achieve their goals. CA influence can be exercised effectively for prevention of conflicts, not only in response to them. Therefore, CA is a way that allows local actors to produce results that improve life;

• *improving engagement in theater* – within the CA, multiple perspectives of different groups, especially local players who know much better the situation locally, generating a better understanding of engagement in theater regarding planning, operations and evaluation. CA provides the structure for accessing these perspectives, generating new ideas about what should be done to improve the situation with the means available;

• *developing a more effective partnership* – Combining mental models allow a better

understanding and organizational learning by all actors in theater. This combination enables in-depth view of environmental structure, of actors' nature and the effects of their activities. Therefore, the CA turns the multitude of actors from a problem into an opportunity to improve efficiency.

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ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE COMMENTARY OF THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN ROMANIA
PART I: PREAMBLE AND ARTICLES I-IV

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The article realizes an in-depth analysis – article by article – of the text of the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania, signed in Washington on the 13th of September 2011. Thus, in this first part of the article, the history and the context of the conclusion of the Agreement shall be presented, and the Preamble, as well as articles I-IV, shall be analyzed and commented.

The paper highlights the added value of the Agreement from the legal point of view and from the perspective of the national security of Romania (in accordance with the Agreement, by the establishment of the legal basis for the deployment in Romania of a facility of its missile defense system, the U.S. are firmly committed to protect the territory of Romania against missile defense attacks and related threats), and respectively as far as the relevance for the collective self-defense of NATO, as well as for the development of the NATO missile defense system; after the decision of the Chicago Summit to declare the interim capability of the NATO system, the next step towards the development of the Allied system shall be the site in Deveselu, operational starting with 2015, which shall constitute the initial capability of the Allied system. This strategic contribution shall award Romania a meaningful place in the decision-making process at Allied level in respect of this component of the NATO mix of capabilities.

Key-words: EPAA; collective self-defense; sovereign jurisdiction; interceptors; command and control; liability; claims; implementing arrangements.

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1. The History of Romania's participation to the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach for Ballistic Missile Defense[2]

The *Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania* was signed in Washington on the 13th of September 2011 and entered into force on 23 December 2011. The negotiation process of this agreement was a complex one, determined by its "interdisciplinary" nature. Thus, the negotiation effort has implied, on the one hand, the deep understanding of international law concerning the legality of the use of force and the mechanisms of collective self-defense, but also of certain elements of treaty law (the relation of the Agreement with the existing legal framework – in particular the existence of the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America regarding the activities of United States forces located on the territory of Romania, signed in Bucharest on the 5th of December 2005 (the "Defense Cooperation Agreement"), and of its 18 implementing arrangements). On the other hand, it involved the knowledge of complex aspects of a political-military and security nature, including issues of a technical character, related to the operation of the missile defense system, of the aspects pertaining to its command and control, of the establishment of the mechanism concerning the exchange of information between the parties, of environmental issues, but also of the very important issue of the identification of the optimal venue for the deployment of the system in Romania. This last issue was realized by a special joint Romanian-U.S. working group, under the coordination of the heads of the negotiation delegations, which has analyzed several potential locations by reference to over 120 technical parameters; following this complex process the Deveselu Base in Olt County was chosen.

In the following passages, I shall present the chronology of the most important moments of the involvement of Romania in the missile defense system project.

Thus, on the 17th of September 2009, the U.S. President Barack Obama made a statement[3] that can be deemed historical: the decision to develop the American missile defense system in a new

approach, phased adaptive *(EPAA – United States European Phased Adaptive Approach for Ballistic Missile Defense)*, in order to better protect the forces deployed in Europe and in operations' theaters, both American and Allied, as well as the populations and territories of the U.S. and of its Allies. The new approach replaced the concept elaborated and implemented by the preceding Republican administration, which did ensure only a partial cover for the Allied territory in Europe. Romania was only partially covered by this previous concept of the missile defense system, in the North-West of the national territory.

The next step, directly linked to Romania, was represented by the visit to Bucharest, on the 22nd of October 2009, of the American Vice-President Joseph Biden. During his talks with the President of Romania, the U.S. dignitary also discussed about the defense program concerning the missile defense system proposed by President Barack Obama. During the press conference organized following the talks with the President of Romania, Mr. Biden declared: "*I highly appreciate the fact that Romania adopted with open arms the new missile defense system that we want to introduce in Europe, which will replace with a much better architecture the initial version of the system that was intended to defend Europe's security. This new system physically protects Europe, as well as the United States.*"

Later, on the 16th of November 2009, the Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs in the Romanian MFA Bogdan Aurescu paid a working visit to Washington, during which he had meetings with American officials within the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon and the National Security Council. On this occasion the Romanian official expressed the availability of Romania to continue the bilateral talks on the perspectives on the new project of the missile defense system, proposed by President Obama, in the context of the current debates in the NATO framework, in accordance with the principle of the indivisibility of the security of Allied States.

Following the decision of September 2009 of the new Democratic Administration and a complex decisional process at the level of the American decision makers, on the 4th of February 2010, Mrs. Elen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security within the U.S. State Department, presented, during a meeting with

Mr. Traian Băsescu, the President of Romania, the proposal of the U.S. concerning the participation of Romania in the American project for the phased adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. On the same date, the Supreme Council of National Defense decided that Romania should reply positively to the American proposal.

For the implementation of this political principle agreement, the negotiations for the conclusion of the *Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania* (further referred to as "the Agreement") have started. The mandate of the Romanian delegation was approved by the Supreme Council of National Defense (being updated by the Report of the fifth round of talks, held in March 2011).

The Romanian delegation was led by Bogdan Aurescu, State Secretary within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and included representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Finances and other institutions from the national security system having competences in this field. For the preparation of the rounds took place, under the coordination of the head of the Romanian delegation, no less than 36 meetings in an inter-institutional format of the representatives of the Romanians agencies involved in the negotiation process. The negotiation team acted extremely homogenously and coherently, despite the large number of institutions and officials involved and emphasized the high level of coordination of the Romanian competent authorities.

The American delegation was led by Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. During some of the rounds the head of the delegation was Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance within the State Department, the U.S. delegation being composed of representatives of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Embassy to Bucharest.

In all, 8 round of talks of negotiations on the text of the Agreement took place, out of which seven were dedicated to talks on the text (held in Bucharest, on the 17th-18th of June 2010, the 26th-27th of July 2010, the 17th of September 2010, the

14th of December 2010, the 8th of March 2011, the 6th of April 2011, the 4th of May 2011). During the 7th round, of the 4th of May 2011, the text of the Agreement was agreed *ad referendum,* at the level of the negotiation delegations.

The round of the 4th of May 2011 was preceded by the public statement, on the 3rd of May 2011, made by the Romanian President, Mr. Traian Băsescu, concerning the location in which the American missile defense system in Romania shall be deployed – the Deveselu military base (Olt County) on the basis of the Supreme Council of National Defense decision to this effect of the 2nd of May 2011.

Moreover, on the 3rd of May 2011, Romanian and American officials, including the heads of the two negotiation teams, together with the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the leadership of the U.S. European Command and representatives of the U.S. Embassy, and the head of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, traveled to Olt County to discuss with the local authorities and the local community about the deployment in the Deveselu Base of elements of the missile defense system. On the 4th of May 2011, at the Parliament's Palace, took place the meeting of the heads of the two negotiation teams, together with the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the leadership of the U.S. European Command, representatives of the U.S. Embassy, other members of the negotiation delegations, with the members of the Commissions for Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, members of the Romanian-U.S. Friendship Group in the Romania's Parliament, the President and Vice-President of Romania's Senate, on which occasion details of a political-diplomatic nature linked to the participation of Romania to the American missile defense system were presented,

During the last meeting of the heads of the negotiation teams, which took place in Bucharest, on the 6th of June 2011, the text of the Agreement was checked from the perspective of the drafting in the Romanian and English languages, and the text was *initialled* by the heads of the negotiating delegations.

The talks took place, throughout the entire 8 rounds (which were preceded by two preliminary consultation rounds), in an atmosphere of genuine partnership, both delegations acting in order to agree a mutually advantageous text, which should

adequately respond to the security interests of the parties and to the necessity pledged by the NATO documents of the creation of a NATO missile defense system, on the basis of the U.S. contribution, to which Romania shall take part.

Following the finalization of the talks and the initialling of the text, the Agreement was signed, on the 13th of September 2011, in Washington, by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during the visit to U.S. of the Romanian President.

On the 23rd of September 2011, after the approval by the President of Romania, with the consent of the American side, in application of Article 39[4] of Law no. 590/2003 on treaties, in the interest of an information as correct and accurate as possible, the Agreement was made public by the head of the Romanian negotiation delegation during a press briefing held at the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 19 of Law no. 590/2003 on treaties provides that the treaties at State level, irrespective of their object, are subject to the ratification by the Parliament of Romania. Consequently, this Agreement, concluded at State level, was subjected for ratification to the Parliament. The ratification procedure was completed on the 6th of December 2011, with a very significant majority in the Chamber of Deputies and with unanimity in the Senate (the deciding Chamber). Law no. 290/2011 on the Agreement's ratification was published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 910 of the 21st of December 2011. Following the completion by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the notification procedure required by Law no. 590/2003 on treaties, the Agreement entered into force on the 23rd of December 2011.

I. Commentary of the text[5] of *Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania (Preamble, articles I-IV)*

Preamble

"Romania and the United States of America (hereafter referred to as the „Parties");"

Comment: The Agreement is concluded at State level, which indicates the importance of the field regulated by the Agreement for the two parties. Being concluded at this level, but also because of its object (military cooperation), the Agreement was subjected to the ratification of the Romania's Parliament, in accordance with Law no. 590/2003 on treaties.

"Having in mind the Romanian-United States Strategic Partnership and the further development thereof, and recognizing that a very important pillar of the Romanian – United States relationship is the solidarity embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Romania and the United States recognize the importance of enhancing their individual and collective national security by working within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter referred to as "NATO"), the United Nations, and other international organizations, consistent with the United Nations Charter and international law;"

Comment: The reference in this initial paragraph of the Preamble to the bilateral Strategic Partnership is very important, constituting a premiere at bilateral level. Thus, it is for the first time since its creation, in 1997, that the Romanian-American Strategic Partnership is enshrined in a legal bilateral document concluded between Bucharest and Washington. Furthermore, the preambulary provision is not limited to the recognition of the Strategic Partnership character of the Romanian-American relations, but recognizes also its evolutionary nature, stressing its continual development.

Equally, the preambulary text mentions the main purpose of the Agreement – the consolidation of the individual and collective security of Romania and the U.S. in accordance with the two fundamental benchmarks evoked, namely the solidarity principle – the basic principle of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – which operates at NATO level. The reference to this second benchmark is also essential, stressing the fact that the strengthening of Romania's security, a fundamental permanent purpose of the foreign and security policy of our State, can be done – also by bilateral Bucharest - Washington cooperation – mainly within the North Atlantic Alliance. The text confirms thus eloquently that the current level of Romania's security is the highest in its history. It is also acknowledged that the development of

the Strategic Partnership shall lead to an increase of the security of Romania and the U.S. but also of the other Member States of the NATO Alliance. The preambulary text also underlines the essential benchmark that circumscribes this cooperation, and respectively this purpose: conformity with international law, including the U.N. Charter.

"Reaffirming their strong will to work together towards contributing to, in accordance with the principle of the indivisibility of the security of NATO and with the principle of NATO solidarity, the NATO missile defense capability, as a key mission of the Alliance, with the aim of providing full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, as well as to shaping NATO's central role in missile defense in Europe;"

Comment*: The text enshrines the support of the parties for the NATO's missile defense capability, reflecting the role of Romania and U.S. as promoters of the missile defense project within the Alliance. The fundamental principles for which Romania has militated during the summits of Bucharest (2008) Strasbourg-Kehl (2009) and Lisbon (2010) are mentioned: the indivisibility of the security of the Alliance, the solidarity and respectively the defense of the entire Allied territory. The text anticipates at the same time the evolutions during the NATO Summit Chicago of May 2012, which has declared the interim capability of the NATO ballistic missile defense system. The reference to the "protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces" is due to the fact that, unlike the earlier missile defense project, the United States ballistic defense in Europe realized in a Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), currently promoted, ensures cover for the entire NATO territory, including the entire territory of Romania.

The text reflects the decision taken at NATO level to integrate the U.S. missile defense capabilities – to which, by this Agreement, Romania participates directly and substantially – within the architecture of the NATO missile defense system which shall be developed by NATO. Practically, after the NATO missile defense system shall become operational, the System – a component part of the EPAA – from Romania shall be placed under NATO control, and the Deveselu Base shall become a NATO base. The language

is adopted in a significant part from that agreed during the Lisbon Summit of November 2010 in the Final Declaration, but also in the new Strategic Concept. The term "key mission of the Alliance" (referring to NATO's missile defense capability) is a qualification supported by Romanian and the U.S. during the preliminary debates of the Lisbon Summit, being apt to underline the unmediated link between missile defense and the scope of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, the Chicago Summit decided the formal inclusion of missile defense in the NATO capability mix, beside the nuclear deterrent force and the conventional forces, as a complementary modality for these.

"Recognizing their shared vision of a broader and deeper Strategic Partnership between Romania and the United States, including the further development of enhanced mechanisms of political and military consultations on improving their mutual security, within the framework of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty;"

Comment*: The notion of a comprehensive and dynamic Partnership between Romania and the U.S. is developed. The provision completes the reference in the second paragraph of the Preamble: if in that paragraph the parties decide to further develop the Strategic Partnership, here the two partners envisage the extension of its domains and, respectively, its deepening. Thus, to this effect, the parties envisage the ways to develop this partnership, including by dialogue and consultations mechanisms which shall not be limited to missile defense and the military cooperation field, but shall cover the political field as well, in order to improve their security, in the broad sense.

Of relevance is, in this context, the reference to article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". Thus, the text constitutes a strong guarantee of joint action for Romania and the U.S., in the framework given by the NATO founding Treaty, to strengthen the military capabilities of Romania and, generally, of the security of our country.

"Recognizing the application of the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty done at Washington on April 4, 1949, the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, done at London on June 19, 1951 (hereafter referred to as the "NATO SOFA"); the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America regarding the status of United States forces in Romania, done at Washington on October 30, 2001 (hereafter referred to as the "Supplemental SOFA"); the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America regarding the activities of United States forces located on the territory of Romania, done at Bucharest on December 6, 2005 (hereafter referred to as the "Defense Cooperation Agreement"); the Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the United States of America concerning Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information, done at Washington on June 21, 1995 (hereafter referred to as the „Classified Military Information Agreement"); and the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information, done at Brussels on March 6, 1997 (hereafter referred to as the „NATO Security Agreement");"*

Comment: The multilateral and bilateral treaties in force between Romania and the U.S. which are relevant for the application of the provisions of the Agreement are indicated, governing the issues expressly regulated by this Agreement. First, two fundamental documents at NATO level are mentioned, respectively the Washington Treaty of 1949, by which NATO was constituted and the London Treaty which defines the norms applicable in case armed forces of a member state of the Alliance are deployed on the territory of another member State. Also two bilateral treaties between Romania and the U.S. are indicated, the Supplemental SOFA Agreement, which establishes, additionally to the London Treaty, several rules concerning the status of U.S. forces deployed in Romania, and the Defense Cooperation Agreement, which regulates in detail the way in which the cooperation between the Romanian authorities and the U.S. forces in Romania is conducted. Two agreements applicable in the field of protection of classified information which shall govern the management of classified information linked to the implementation of the Agreement are also mentioned.

"Recognizing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, including ballistic missiles, poses a grave and increasing threat to international peace and security, and to the populations, territory and forces of the Parties, their allies and partners;"*

Comment: The text presents the rationale for the development of the Missile Defense System, namely the intensification of risks related to a ballistic missile attack, generated by the proliferation of the technologies for short and medium range missiles and the access to such arms and their transport vectors, which requires the development of modalities to counteract this serious threat for the NATO allies, including Romania and the U.S. The security experts unanimously assess that the risks generated by the potential short and medium range missiles attacks are increasing, including in the European area to which Romania belongs, while, from a technological point of view, the ballistic systems become more flexible, mobile, and their action range increases[6]; in this context, the U.S. missile defense system and respectively, the NATO system constitutes an efficient countering instrument.

"Reconfirming the exclusively defensive nature of the United States *European Phased Adaptive Approach for Ballistic Missile Defense* and its consistency with the United Nations Charter;"*

Comment: It is a very important provision of the Agreement, strengthened by its dispositive (in article VI paragraph 2), by which the conformity with international law of the missile defense system, by its purely defensive character, is underlined, as it is designed exclusively to respond to a ballistic missiles armed attack against Romania, the U. S. or another NATO Member State, by their interception and destruction. Moreover, from a technical point of view, the SM 3 type interceptor which shall be deployed in the Deveselu Base, are designed only for defensive purposes, having no offensive capacity and no ability to be transformed in offensive attack capability. The use of the System is thus strictly circumscribed to the exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, which explains the reference to the U.N. Charter, which specifically provides this right in article 51.

"Recognizing also the need to combine and enhance their efforts for purposes of individual and collective self-defense, to maintain international peace and security, and to further enhance their capabilities for an appropriate response to threats and attacks, including those of a terrorist nature;"

Comment: Further to the provision in the preceding paragraph, by express reference to the right of individual and collective self-defense, the text presents the general fundamental purpose to the fulfillment of which the deployment of the System in Romania shall contribute, namely the keeping of international peace and security, by its deterrent capacity, respectively that of protection, contributing thus to the counteracting of the threat posed by ballistic missiles. The text constitutes the basis for the bilateral cooperation for further developing the capabilities of Romania (and the U.S.) to respond to threats and attacks, including terrorist attacks, a joint objective of the two States, for which they conduct a continuous cooperation.

"Reaffirming that deployment of ballistic missile defense interceptors in the territory of Romania represents an important contribution by Romania to the building and further enhancement of the United States missile defense system as well as to the NATO missile defense capability;"

Comment: The text highlights the substantial role of Romania's contribution, by its participation, to the construction of the U.S., and respectively NATO missile defense system. The significance that the System has for the U.S. defense capability, but also for the future NATO missile defense, is stressed. The text represents a recognition of the fact that, by its geostrategic position, but also by its firm support for the System, Romania is able to contribute decisively to the security of NATO members. Practically, by the deployment of the system in Romania, the level of security of NATO, generally, and especially of the region, increases.

"Recognizing that cooperation with NATO allies and partners, in defense against the threat of ballistic missiles is important, and that deployment of United States ballistic missile defense interceptors in the territory of Romania enhances the existing security relationship between

Romania and the United States and contributes to international peace and security and to the security of Romania, the United States, and NATO;"

Comment: The text underlines the place that the bilateral Romania - U.S. cooperation in the missile defense field has in the ensemble of the military cooperation with the U.S., being able to strengthen the security relationship existing between the two States. The intention of cooperation with the other NATO member States by developing the missile defense System is reiterated; the value of the Romania's contribution, by agreeing to host the U.S. System, for international security and peace, is reaffirmed.

"Bearing in mind their common defense interests and recognizing that cooperation in the field of ballistic missile defense constitutes one of the elements of broader bilateral security cooperation, which should contribute to the strengthening of the security of the Parties;"

Comment: The text confirms the fact that between Romania and the U. S. there is a community of interests in the security and defense field and that the partnership established between Romania and the U.S. in this field is not restricted to missile defense cooperation.

"Recognizing their strong, successful and longstanding cooperation under the Defense Cooperation Agreement

Acknowledging the intent of the Parties to assess the effective implementation of the Supplemental SOFA and of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and, if mutually agreed, update those agreements;"

Comment: The two paragraphs include the common assessment of the parties of the legal bilateral context in which shall be inserted the new cooperation field – missile defense. Thus, the existence of an already consolidated, long and successful cooperation is recognized, structured by the two agreements indicated in the text.

While the contribution of these legal instruments to the success of bilateral cooperation is acknowledged, it is provided that the parties shall assess their application and, on the basis

of the existing cooperation practice (lessons learned from the actual implementation of the two agreements) and of the joint appraisal of the parties, shall make possible improvements (modifications/adjustments).

"Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Purpose and Scope

1. This Agreement establishes the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the deployment of a United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in the territory of Romania on the *Deveselu* base."

Comment: The paragraph enunciates the purpose of the Agreement, namely the establishment of the bilateral legal instrument which shall allow for the deployment of the System in Romania in order to regulate the legal regime applicable to the entire range of issues pertaining to the deployment and functioning of the System. It is mentioned that the location where the system shall be deployed shall be the airbase of the Ministry of National Defense at Deveselu, identified following a selection and analysis process conducted in coordination with the American side. This selection process was done by a joint working group, made up from Romanian and American military experts and technicians, which has analyzed a number of location in the territory of Romania by reference to over 120 different technical criteria; following this analysis, the former Romanian airbase at Deveselu, the Olt County was chosen.

"2. Each and every provision of the Supplemental SOFA and the Defense Cooperation Agreement shall apply to this Agreement, unless this Agreement provides otherwise. For matters not covered by this Agreement or the Supplemental SOFA or the Defense Cooperation Agreement, to the extent such matters are covered by the NATO SOFA, the NATO SOFA shall apply."

Comment: As a development to the Preamble provisions, the applicability of the Supplemental SOFA Agreement, of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and of the NATO SOFA Agreement, for issues which are not specifically regulated by this Agreement, is confirmed. These specifications

of the paragraph, which confirm a legal reality determined by the application of the existing bilateral framework, proceed from the premises that this Agreement on missile defense is a *lex specialis* in relation to the Defense Cooperation Agreement, representing the definition and specific regulation of an activity generically covered by the 2005 Agreement.

"Article II
Definitions

For the purposes of this Agreement, the following terms are hereunder defined:"

Comment: By this article, the most important terms used in the Article were defined. Other terms having a specific meaning which are used in the text have been defined by the Defense Cooperation Agreement (e.g., "United States forces", "members of the force") respectively in the other agreements applicable in accordance with the previous article (e.g., "civilian component", "family members").

"1. "United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania" includes non-nuclear interceptors, as well as those components needed for the operation of such interceptors, identified in Article V paragraph 1, and associated mission and mission support equipment and infrastructure for defense against ballistic missile attack."

Comment: The definition has the purpose to indicate exactly which are the components of the System which shall be deployed in Romania, clarifying – a very important aspect – that the interceptors which are part of the System shall not carry nuclear charges. In accordance with the technical specification, these SM3 type interceptors which shall be used by the system Romania shall have no dangerous charge whatsoever, the destruction of the enemy missile being done exclusively by kinetic impact force.

"2. "Base" means the military area in the locality of *Deveselu*, used by United States forces pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement and for the duration thereof, for the purpose of deployment and operation of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania, in accordance with Article I paragraph 5 of the Defense Cooperation

Agreement and consistent with Article I paragraph 2 of this Agreement."

Comment: The location which shall be made available by the Romanian side for the U.S. for the deployment of the System is identified, the applicability of norms concerning facility and zones made available for the U.S. of the Defense Cooperation Agreement being reconfirmed. As it results from article IV "The Base", this location is and remains under Romanian jurisdiction, as a Romanian military base, under the command of a Romanian officer as Commander of the Base.

"3. "Facility" means the area located within the Base where the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania and supporting infrastructure are located and with respect to which the United States controls access, in accordance with Article I paragraph 5 of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and consistent with Article I paragraph 2 of this Agreement."

Comment: The term used to precisely designate the zone within the Base where the System shall be effectively deployed is defined; this provision, corroborated with article V "The Facility", clearly indicates the legal regime of the facility which is only a functional zone located within the Base, without constituting an American military base.

"4. "Restricted Airspace" is a designated area subject to certain restrictions, due to the existence of hazards to aircraft and taking into account the need for operational security in the vicinity of the Romanian Base."

Comment: A notion used in article IV "The Base", which refers to the establishment of restrictions concerning the airspace, necessary both for the safe operation of the System and for the protection of civilian aircraft which overfly the aerial space in the proximity of the Base, is defined. After the entry into force of the Agreement (the 23rd of December 2011), an Implementing Arrangement concerning the use of airspace over and surrounding the Base was negotiated and signed on the 29th of June 2012, by the co-chairs of the Joint Committee created by the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2005.[7]

"Article III
NATO and the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System

1. The Parties shall support close coordination within NATO, and shall work together in the development of the NATO missile defense capabilities.

2. The United States fully intends for the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System to be interoperable with and a contribution to the evolving NATO missile defense capability.

3. In addition to continued Romanian and United States participation in NATO programs, the Parties intend to further develop bilateral security cooperation, including through fulfillment of the principles and objectives of this Agreement."

Comment (for paragraphs 1-3): The Article consolidates the provisions of the Preamble on the same matter by several operative provisions on the commitment of the Parties to cooperate for the implementation of the NATO missile defense System. The Article has the role to underline the link between the contribution of Romania to the U.S. missile defense System, through the site in Romania, and the NATO missile defense System; the commitment of Romania and the U.S. to closely cooperate for the development of the NATO System is enshrined.

"4. Within the context of, and consistent with the North Atlantic Treaty and the Romanian-United States Strategic Partnership, the United States is firmly committed to the security of Romania; and within NATO's commitment in this sense, to defend Romania, along with the NATO European populations, territory, and forces, by means of its ballistic missile defense system, against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and against a potential ballistic missile attack."

Comment: This paragraph is one of the most important provisions of the Agreement. It has the role to legally enshrine the guaranteeing by the American strategic partner of the security of Romania – in the framework and with the instruments and mechanisms offered by the North

Atlantic Treaty – by expressly stipulating the *firm* commitment of the U.S. to protect the security of Romania and the territory of our country, through the missile defense system, both against the risks of attack (determined by the proliferation of ballistic missiles) and against an actual attack.

Equally remarkable is the fact that the text includes a new confirmation of the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the U.S., as a premise of this firm commitment of the U.S. for the security and protection of Romania, which eloquently highlights the value of this Partnership for our State. Likewise, the provision indicates the importance of this partnership with Romania for the United States. It is noticeable that the syntagm used ("the *firm* commitment of the U.S") is present only in this Agreement, unlike the similar Agreements concluded by the U.S. with Poland[8] (and the Czech Republic[9]) in 2008.

"Article IV
The Base

1. The Base is under Romanian sovereign jurisdiction and the property of Romania. Romania shall retain ownership of, and title to, the Base in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Defense Cooperation Agreement. The United States forces shall be authorized access to and use of the Base with full respect for Romanian law in accordance with applicable provisions of the Defense Cooperation Agreement, and may use the Base to host the Facility."

Comment: Out of the text, it unequivocally results that the hosting of the assets of the system does not affect in any way the sovereignty and the exercise of Romania's jurisdiction in respect of the Base. This conclusion is strengthened by the reference to the Defense Cooperation Agreement (which provides that the use by the U.S. Forces of facilities and areas on the territory of Romania shall be done with full respect for the Romanian legislation). Romania shall continue to exercise all the attributes of sovereignty over the Base, which is and remains a Romanian Base, both form the point of view of the exercise of jurisdiction and from the point of view of the ownership title. Furthermore, the text constitutes the legal permission awarded by Romania, as sovereign over the territory, for

the use by the U.S. of the Base in order to deploy the missile defense facility.

"2. Consistent with Article IV of the Defense Cooperation Agreement, all buildings, including those constructed, used, altered or improved by United States forces, are the property of Romania, while movable objects and fixtures remain the property of United States forces or United States contractors as appropriate."

Comment: Article IV of the Defense Cooperation Agreement confirms that Romania shall maintain all rights over the facilities and areas made available to the U.S. forces. In the application of this principle, the immovable property located on the territory of Romania is the property of Romania. The rule applies even to buildings constructed, used, modified or improved by the U.S., over which Romania shall exercise property rights.

"3 The laws applicable on the territory of Romania apply in the area of the Base, as set forth in this Agreement. It is the duty of the United States force and its civilian component and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the laws of Romania, and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement.

4. The United States forces shall use the Base without prejudice to the sovereignty and laws of Romania.

5. Operations on the Base shall be conducted with due regard for public health and safety."

Comment (on paragraphs 3-5): This set of provisions substantiates and details the principle previously enunciated of maintenance of Romania's jurisdiction over the Base. Thus, the application of the Romanian legislation in respect to the Base is confirmed, and the members of the United States forces, of the civilian component and their dependents have the duty to respect Romanian legislation. The norm in paragraph 4, in accordance to which any activity undertaken in the process of use of the Base shall be done with respect for the sovereignty and for Romanian laws, without prejudice to them, is important. It is an

additional guarantee able to confer solidity to the cooperation provided by the Agreement. Moreover, the U.S., in the conduct of any activities, must take the preventive measures necessary to ensure that public health and safety are not affected, a provision which guarantees that the activities and assets in the Base are harmless for the population of the area.

"6. Romania and the United States shall coordinate and cooperate regarding transportation security for United States ballistic missile defense assets during transportation within the territory of Romania outside the Base. Romania recognizes the right of the United States to protect these assets. The applicable procedure shall be addressed in an implementing arrangement."

Comment: Given that for the deployment of the System it is necessary to transport the components on the territory of Romania, the text provides the obligation of operative coordination between the Romanian and American authorities in order to ensure the security of transport, the details of this cooperation being clarified by an implementing arrangement. Following the entry into force of the Agreement (the 23rd of December 2011) it was negotiated and agreed an amendment to the Implementing Arrangement on security of the 20th of July 2007 to the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2005 by which the procedure necessary to ensure the security of transport on the territory of Romania of the assets of the missile defense system was regulated. The amendment to the arrangement was signed by the co-chairs of the Joint Committee created by the Defense Cooperation Agreement on the 29th of June 2012.[10]

"7. Romania shall ensure, according to the Romanian legislation in force, that use of the land areas surrounding the Base is consistent with the operation of the Facility and the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania. The United States shall furnish relevant information to Romania to regulate the use of land areas surrounding the Base. The specific parameters and limitations on land use shall be established in an implementing arrangement."

Comment: The emplacement of constructions or other structures in the immediate proximity of the Base could affect, from the technical point of view, the proper operation of the missile defense System. In order to avoid such a situation, the Romanian authorities – in application of the internal legislation in force – shall take the necessary measures for the use of surrounding land areas to be consistent with the operational requirements of the System. This provision of the Agreement corresponds to the legislation in Romania, which stipulates the necessity of obtaining the permit of the General Staff for the authorization of any works in the vicinity of military facilities (such as the Base at Deveselu). Following the entry into force of the Agreement (on the 23rd of December 2011) it was negotiated and agreed an Implementing Arrangement concerning the use of land areas surrounding the Base, which was signed by the co-chairs of the Joint Committee created by the Defense Cooperation Agreement on the 29th of June 2012.[11]

"8. Romania shall establish Restricted Airspace over and around the Base. Romania shall develop air traffic restrictions. Detailed parameters for the aforesaid zones, as well as the principles of their establishment and operation, and of cooperation between relevant Romanian and United States authorities regarding use of Romanian airspace, shall be set forth in an implementing arrangement. The United States shall furnish relevant information to Romania to regulate the airspace over and around the Base."

Comment: In order to allow for the functioning of the System, but also to avoid endangering the aircraft in transit trough the airspace in the immediate vicinity of the Base, the establishment of restrictions of air traffic shall be necessary. This task shall be the duty of the competent Romanian authorities, the U.S. providing the relevant information. Following the entry into force of the Agreement (on the 23rd of December 2011) it was negotiated and agreed an Implementing Arrangement concerning the use of airspace over and around the Base, which was signed on the 29th of June 2012 by the co-chairs of the Joint Committee created by the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2005.[12]

"9. The number of members of the United States force and civilian component deployed at the Base

after construction is completed and operations begin shall not exceed 500. The routine number of members of the United States force deployed to the Base will be approximately 150 persons."

Comment: It is an important text of the Agreement by which a *numerical ceiling* (500 persons, both for the members of the U.S forces and for the civilian component) is ensured, so as the personnel shall not exceed the necessary number for the operation of the System.

This paragraph ensures thus the natural control of the Romanian side over this element that pertains to the sovereignty of Romania, but also the degree of public transparency necessary for the public opinion in Romania and for the external partners. The paragraph reflects the fact that, in fact, the ceiling of 500 persons shall be necessary in particular during the period of preparation of the location in order to become operational or in cases which require the increase of the personnel, during the operational period, and includes, for predictability purposes, a statement to the effect that the total number of the members of the U.S. forces shall routinely be of about 150 persons.

"10. The United States may, after obtaining the necessary authorization, as set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12, undertake construction activities on, and make major alterations and improvements to, and maintain, sustain, and operate ballistic missile defense structures and infrastructure on the Base. In the course of such activities, the United States may:

(a) use, alter, or demolish existing structures and infrastructure on the Facility;

(b) clear existing vegetation; and

(c) excavate soil on the Facility with due consideration for the Romanian legislation in the field of protection of archeological sites."

Comment: For the effective deployment of the System there is a need to build constructions which shall host the equipment and personnel using it, being necessary to allow the American forces to undertake the required activities for construction or adjustment of the existing infrastructure, respecting the Romanian legislation.

"11. Prior to beginning a construction activity related to the Base, the United States shall provide Romania with a construction schedule. The United States will also submit all the relevant construction documentation in advance of seeking the Romanian authorization. Romania shall respond to the United States request for the authorization within thirty days of the formal submission of the relevant documents. In case of construction inside the Base, if Romania does not issue the authorization within thirty days, the United States may proceed with the scheduled construction activities.

12. Romania shall obtain the necessary authorization for the construction in accordance with the Romanian law and the provisions of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and applicable implementing arrangements. In the case of construction inside the Base, this authorization will allow the United States to begin construction after thirty-five percent of the design is submitted to Romania, while in the case of construction outside the Base and related to it, this authorization will allow the United States to begin construction after one hundred percent of the design is submitted to Romania."

Comment (for paragraphs. 11-12): The two paragraphs establish a functional mechanism to authorize the constructions that shall be realized by the American side in the Base or in relation to the Base. It is a balanced and flexible regime, and it takes into account the legislations of both countries, as well as the operational requirements, so as to avoid delays in the process of deployment of the missile System in the Deveselu Base, delays which would be detrimental to both countries (and implicitly to the schedule for the future NATO system). Thus, it was taken into account that the procedures applicable for the American forces allow for the start of the works after the completion of thirty-five percent of the design. In these conditions it was provided that, for constructions inside the Base, the United States may begin the construction after thirty-five percent of the design is submitted to Romania, while in case of constructions outside the Base, it shall be allowed for the United States to begin construction after one hundred percent of the design is submitted to Romania. It is a functional regulation, which allows for the efficient and on time completion of the preparations necessary for the System to become operational in the envisaged time (during the year 2015). Following the

entry into force of the Agreement (on the 23rd of December 2011) it was negotiated and agreed an amendment to the Implementing Arrangement of the 31st of October 2007, concluded in accordance with the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2005, which concerns the real estate operations and real property management (the management of the constructions and structures inventory in the areas and facilities where the presence of U.S. Forces is allowed), which was signed on the 29th of June 2012 by the co-chairs of the Joint Committee created by the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2005.[13]

"13. United States forces shall utilize local physical persons and legal entities as suppliers of articles and services to the extent feasible for the performance of a contract when the bids of such suppliers are competitive and constitute the best value.

14. To the extent permissible, United States forces shall accord to contractors who are citizens of Romania and are registered legal entities in the territory of Romania treatment no less favorable than that accorded to contractors who are not citizens of Romania and legal entities not registered in Romania."

Comment *(for paragraphs 13-14)*: By the inclusion of these provisions, the Romanian side obtained a more favorable treatment for the local goods and services providers, which shall have the opportunity to conclude contracts with the U.S. forces. Moreover, on the 13th and the 14th of June 2012, the American military authorities have organized in Bucharest and Caracal two conferences dedicated to the presentation of business opportunities linked to the preparation of the Base, the possibility to conclude contracts for up to 350 millions dollars being mentioned.[14]

"15. The Base, and the Romanian military and civilian personnel staying on the Base, shall be under Romanian command exercised by a representative of the Romanian Armed Forces (hereafter referred to as the „Romanian Commander").

16. The Romanian Commander shall be identified within thirty days of the entry into force of this Agreement. The Romanian Commander or

his or her designees shall be the Romanian point of contact regarding activities related to Base operations. The Romanian point of contact shall have an office on the Base.

17. The Romanian Commander shall, *inter alia*:

(a) advise regarding relations with Romanian governmental and local institutions and facilitate contacts with such institutions;

(b) participate in coordinating mutual logistics support for the military and civilian personnel deployed on the Base;

(c) participate in coordinating the provision of security on the grounds of the Base;

(d) participate in coordinating joint training on the grounds of the Base; and

(e) advise the United States Senior Representative regarding Romanian law relevant to Base operation."

Comment *(for paragraphs 15-17)*: The provisions have an important role, which practically confirm the control of Romania over the Base and which flow from its regime of location under the sovereign jurisdiction of Romania. Thus, the person who exercises the command over the Base (the Romanian Commander) shall be a representative of the Romanian Armed Forces, which shall have the role of point of contact for realizing the coordination with the American forces in respect of all activities on the Base and the provision of the entire necessary support. These paragraphs, completed by the subsequent ones, establish the designation procedure and describe his or her attributions.

"18. The Romanian Commander shall notify the United States Senior Representative of actions by United States forces, dependents, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees on the Base that appear to be inconsistent with Romanian law. The Romanian Commander and the United States Senior Representative shall cooperate to prevent and address such situations."

Comment: The U.S. forces have the duty to respect Romanian legislation, one of the attributions of the Romanian Commander being to signal to his American counterpart possible breaches committed by the American personnel and to cooperate with him or her to avoid and manage such situations.

"19. The Romanian Commander and his or her authorized representatives shall have access to the entire area of the Base, as provided in Article V, paragraph 6."

Comment: In application of the provisions concerning the preservation of the authority and prerogatives of the Romanian side over the entire area of the Base – including the Facility where the system shall be deployed – the unimpeded access of the Romanian Commander in the Facility is confirmed.

"20. The Romanian Commander shall, with the concurrence of the United States Senior Representative, establish the procedures for access to the Base, including appropriate safety and security measures to be applied for entering the Base, and shall issue appropriate passes to the Base.

21. Romania shall be responsible for providing security and protection for the Base outside the perimeter of the Facility.

22. Applying the Defense Cooperation Agreement, the Supplemental SOFA and their relevant implementing arrangements, the Parties, including the Romanian Commander and the corresponding United States Senior Representative shall exchange information concerning the security and protection of the Base, and Romania shall coordinate with the United States on the planning for such security and protection, both prior to and after the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania achieves operational status."

Comment (for paragraphs 20-22): These paragraphs concern the way to ensure security within the Base. The responsibilities are divided in a natural way: as the Base is a location of the Ministry of National Defense of Romania, under Romanian jurisdiction, the protection of the security of the Base is the responsibility of the Romanian side. The access in the Base and the related regime is decided by the Romanian Commander, who establishes the required security procedures and issues the necessary authorizations, consulting the American counterpart. In the context of the duty to ensure the direct security in the Base, the

exchange of information is very important and, to this end, paragraph 22 establishes the necessary procedures.

"23. In the event that security and protection are to be provided by contractors, such entities shall comply with all relevant requirements of Romanian law.

24. In the event either the Romanian Commander or the United States Senior Representative becomes aware of a crisis situation on the Base that may affect the safety of the population inhabiting the region, that Commander or Senior Representative shall promptly notify his/her counterpart.

25. The Parties undertake to cooperate, as appropriate, with respect to intelligence sharing on all threats to the Base or related to the operation of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania.

26. The Parties shall carry out this cooperation with regard to the Base and the Facility and ensure procedures for timely exchange of intelligence and counter-intelligence through appropriate institutions or organizations, according to mechanisms to be stipulated in an implementing arrangement."

Comment (for paragraphs 23-26): These paragraphs complete the preceding ones in respect of the way to ensure the security in the Base. If U.S. forces use contractors for guarding, they shall have to respect Romanian legislation. The two parties undertake to actively cooperate to ensure the exchanges of information and the mutual notification of emergency situations. It is important in such context the reference in paragraph 24 to the local population safety, which is a permanent concern of the parties during the activities in the Base. The previous provisions on cooperation in respect of the exchange of information are completed by these paragraphs which extend the sphere of this cooperation, not only to ensuring the security of the perimeter of the Base, in a narrow sense, but also to threats against the Base which are related to the operation of the System. In this respect, it is extremely important to establish, in accordance with paragraph 26, the procedures and mechanisms for timely exchange of intelligence

and counterintelligence through the competent institutions or organizations.

"27. The boundaries of the Base and the Facility shall be represented, for illustrative purposes, on the appended map. Technical details of that map may be updated by an implementing arrangement."

Comment: For purely illustrative reasons, in order to ensure the correct public information and the necessary transparency, the parties have agreed to include in the Agreement an annex with a map on which the limits of the Base and of the Facility placed within its perimeter are represented. In case that, for purely technical reasons, certain modifications of the perimeter of the Deveselu Base or of the Facility are necessary, the possibility to update the map by the conclusion of an implementing arrangement is provided.

NOTES:

1 During 2010-2011, Bogdan AURESCU was the chief negotiator of the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania, signed in Washington on the 13th of September 2011, and respectively of the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century between the United States of America and Romania, adopted on the same date. The author thanks Mr. Liviu Dumitru for his precious help with the English version of this paper.

2 Questions and answers concerning Romania's participation to the U.S. Missile Defense System, official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *In focus* Section, http://www.mae.ro/node/1523 (accessed June 30, 2012).

3 The White House, *President Obama Speaks on Missile Defense in Europe*, September 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-Speaks-on-Missile-Defense-in-Europe#transcript (accessed June 30, 2012).

4 Article 39 of the Law on treaties provides in paragraph 2 that "After the signature, pending publication in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, the text of bilateral treaties shall be made public with the express consent of the other party (…) a) in case of treaties at State level, upon approval by the President of Romania (…)".

5 The text of the Agreement, in the Romanian language (scanned after the Romanian original which was initialed on the 6th of June 2011 and signed on the 13th of September 2011) can be consulted on the official

site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/tratate/2011.09_scut_ro.pdf (accessed on the 30th of June 2012) as well as in the Official Gazette of no. 910 of the 21st of December 2011, Part I, in which Law no. 290/2011 on the ratification of the Agreement is published. For the text in the English language, see US Department of State, *The Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania,* http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/172915.htm (accessed June 30, 2012).

6 Questions and answers concerning Romania's participation to the U.S. Missile Defense System, official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *In focus* Section, http://www.mae.ro/node/1523 (accessed June 30, 2012).

7 MFA's Press Release "State Secretary Bogdan Aurescu's participation in the Romanian-US Joint Committee meeting on implementation of the Romanian-US Agreement concerning activities of US forces stationed in Romania", official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/node/14242 (accessed June 30, 2012).

8 *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Deployment of Ground-based Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland*, signed in Warsaw on the 20th of August 2008, amended by an additional Protocol (in order to be adapted to the new American missile defense formula - EPAA), entered into force on the 15th of September 2011.

9 *Agreement between the Czech Republic and the United States of America on Establishing a United States Ballistic Missile Defense Radar Site in the Czech Republic*, signed in Prague, on the 8th of July 2008, it has not entered into force.

10 MFA's Press Release "State Secretary Bogdan Aurescu's participation in the Romanian-US Joint Committee meeting on implementation of the Romanian-US Agreement concerning activities of US forces stationed in Romania", official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/node/14242 (accessed June 30, 2012).

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12 MFA's Press Release "State Secretary Bogdan Aurescu's participation in the Romanian-US Joint Committee meeting on implementation of the Romanian-US Agreement concerning activities of US forces stationed in Romania", official site of the Ministry of

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13 MFA's Press Release "State Secretary Bogdan Aurescu's participation in the Romanian-US Joint Committee meeting on implementation of the Romanian-US Agreement concerning activities of US forces stationed in Romania", official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/node/14242 (accessed June 30, 2012).

14 MFA's Press Release "Industry Days conference attended by State Secretary Bogdan Aurescu", official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/node/13905 (accessed June 30, 2012).

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4. *The Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania*, official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/tratate/2011.09_scut_ro.pdf.

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NATO-EU RELATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF "SMART DEFENCE" AND "POOLING AND SHARING" CONCEPTS

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The concepts of "pooling and sharing", developed at EU's level, and "smart defence", developed by NATO, refer to an intelligent manner to invest in defence, to pool resources in order to create or procure capabilities which are to be used in common by the participant states. Although these concepts are presented as novelties, as innovative solutions for the current issues which European actors, US, NATO, and EU are facing in terms of investments in defence, the general definition of these concepts recalls of aspects related to "common security", "permanent structured cooperation", "European Defence Agency's missions", "burden sharing", etc. The core idea of this article consists in the fact that, although the problem of making defence investments more efficient is in no circumstances of recent date, the current period offers the ideal context for its development, which will bring a series of advantages in terms of defence planning, if the afferent difficulties will be managed adequately.

Key-words: "pooling and sharing"; "smart defence"; military capabilities; world economic and financial crisis; Europe; cooperation; specialization; challenges; advantages.

Introduction

Recently, at NATO's and EU's level, the concepts of "smart defence" and "pooling and sharing" have imprinted the manner in which the two organization relate to the issues afferent to security and defence. Broadly speaking, the two notions imply efforts to cooperate, to share the capabilities of Member States, to invest together in developing the necessary capabilities in order to use them in common subsequently. Actually, smart defence and pooling and sharing refer to making defence expenses more efficient in the context created by the world economic and financial crisis.

The crisis begun in 2007 generated a series of transformations at international level, with a consistent impact on the characteristics of the international security environment. Thus, on the one hand, there are still notable security risks and threats impossible to be ignored by any state or non-state actor of the international arena. International terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, inter-ethnic conflicts, energy and cyber threats have never ceased to compel the attention of international community. But, on the

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other hand, as the economic and financial crisis' effects manifested and disseminated, the context in which the above mentioned risks and threats are approached has become more complicated. Firstly, the crisis revealed international actors' strengths and weaknesses, demonstrating that, on the international stage, there are new centers of power beginning their increasingly visible and acute emergence, especially from an economic point of view; these centers are generally known under the acronym BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and their emergence offers tokens on the fact that US power and influence on the international arena has been declining. Moreover, US resented the effects of the economic and financial crisis much more acutely than other actors, China being a relevant example in this respect.

Thus, for the main contributor to NATO, US, whose contribution amounted for 75% of the Alliance's budget, it became necessary to revise its defence expenses, including its share to NATO's budget. At the same time, the emergence of the new centers of power together with the stability characterizing the European space from a military point of view and the relatively close perspective of ending Iraq war and of withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan caused a reconsideration of US strategic interest areas, its interest being mostly drawn by Asia-Pacific. A region comprising a great part of economic, demographic and energy resources of the world, Asia-Pacific needs a higher level of US implication so as to create an architecture which would allow America to preserve its leadership in the predictable future[1].

In this context, the necessity of a new approach on defence planning took shape so that NATO, overall, as well as EU and the European states would benefit of the same security guarantees. The solution was identified in the practice of pooling resources and sharing the capabilities obtained in this manner, within initiatives coordinated at NATO and EU level – smart defence and pooling and sharing.

1. Smart defence – between tradition and innovation

Pooling and sharing resources for defence suppose a component related to tradition and another one related to innovation, flexibility, and adaptation to a new context. The traditional dimension of smart defence may be approached from two perspectives. Firstly, it is about the fact that the idea *per se* is not a new one, invented in the current international context, but one with a relatively consistent history. Concerning the EU, the idea to pool defence resources with a view to achieve economic and security advantages is inherent to the conception of the first European Communities. For instance, the European Coal and Steel Community, created in 1951, supposed that France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands would share the resources of coal and steel (the raw material for armament production) in order to support their economic growth in the post-war period, but also to achieve a higher degree of security, by increasing the mutual trust between the comprising states[2].

Even more, in our opinion, this manner to approach security, especially its component of procuring and using capabilities has been preserved in the course of time. Thus, in 2004, was created the European Defence Agency (EDA), with the aim of "developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base (DTIB) and creating a competitive European defence equipment market"[3]. Actually, when "pooling and sharing" idea has begun to take shape officially, EU already had the institution necessary for its implementation, EDA's mission being to improve EU's defence capabilities and coordinating Member States' efforts in this respect.

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) also offers means and instruments similar to "pooling and sharing" capabilities. Beyond the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon also contains the legal basis for EDA's functioning, it introduces the possibility of permanent structured cooperation which is meant to develop Member States' military capabilities. This type of cooperation doesn't have to be confounded with the procedure of enhanced cooperation, which excludes military-related issues or with pooling and sharing concept. Permanent structured cooperation comes under the idea of "multiple speed Europe" and allows a certain group of states to realize an increased degree of integration, supposing that the others will catch up with them later, when they would have developed the necessary capabilities; pooling and sharing, on

the other hand, has an European extent, supposing that all EU's Member States benefit of the capabilities resulted after this initiative, all states participating at its implementation in accordance with the capabilities they already posses, with their capacity to take part in this type of European projects and with the interests defined at national and European levels.

Additionally, regarding the long history of pooling and sharing notion at European level, the idea of "common defence" is also relevant. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Common Security and Defence Policy also implies "the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy"[4]. Researches[5] on this notion reveal the fact that common defence implies a range of characteristics which, in our opinion, may be attached in present to pooling and sharing concept. According to the cited reference, common defence implies forming (with the contribution and by the will of participant states) the instruments – institutions, human, material, financial, intelligence resources, juridical normative acts – meant to protect their fundamental interests, to defend their territories, integrity and sovereignty[6]. The similarity between this definition and the implications of pooling and sharing idea are obvious as both of them suppose the contribution of various states with a view to create the necessary instruments for increasing the security degree; but, the newly launched concept is narrower, more specific and applicable only to certain capabilities, this being the reason for which pooling and sharing may be looked upon as a step, a stage towards reaching the European desideratum of creating a common defence policy.

At NATO's level, the principle of sharing the defence burden may be noticed ever since the Alliance's creation[7], the problem having consisted since always in the proportion between US contribution and the input of European states to their' security and defence. In this respect, it was only the historical context, the conditions of the international security environment that have known modifications in the course of time.

The novelty related to smart defence concept consists, both at NATO and EU level, in the amplitude it gains in the context created by the world economic and financial crisis, in the attention given to it in the European space, in the fact that it acquires a more and more clearly defined institutional dimension and that it materializes

in projects thought, elaborated and implemented after a competent and relevant analysis. Thus, even if, as far as EU is concerned, pooling and sharing is an inherent idea, included in EDA's conception, NATO experiences a development of its institutional apparatus so as to smart defence would become the main attribution of a specialized organism. As a consequence, on 6th of July 2012, the NATO Procurement Organization took birth and it is expected to become fully operational until 2014.

Another issue attached to these concepts is related to the sense in which the ideational contagion is realized within NATO-EU relation. EU's security and defence dimension has a shorter history and NATO's, a political-military organization, with clearly established attributions in security and defence matters; consequently, many of the evolutions and initiatives for the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy were, in fact, adaptations of NATO's vision, starting from the premise that the approaches of the two organizations shall not overlap, but complete each other. Nevertheless, concerning pooling and sharing and smart defence, the contagion was made conversely, from EU to NATO, as the concept was developed firstly within EDA.

This phenomenon has two implications. Firstly, smart defence principle, no matter if it is approached at NATO or EU level, is intrinsically connected to European states. Concerning the EU, one can speak about the necessity to develop the military capabilities necessary to support the political ambitions of the Union, in general, as well as of each Member State in part; as far as NATO is concerned, the efforts to identify a smart solution to develop and procure military equipment were determined by the decrease of European states' contributions to NATO's budget concomitantly with US necessity to reduce its financial input and with the transfer of Washington's attention on a new area of strategic interest.

Secondly, one may note an overlap of this novelty issue (the sense of the ideational contagion) with another one which comes under the traditional line of developing EU's security and defence dimension and the reason for this is the fact that modifications in this area have always manifested as EU answers to the mutations occurred in the international security environment and international policy which makes the development

of the Common Security and Defence Policy a reactive process and not a proactive one, a process concentrated on correcting the lacks in the past and not oriented towards the future[8]. Pooling and sharing or, at least, the amplitude it has gained recently, comes under the same European reactive tradition of developing EU's security and defence dimension. The motivation laying at the basis of our affirmation can be found in the reaction of US, of European states, of NATO and EU to the escalation of the crisis in Libya (2011). Northern Africa comes under the area of interest not only of the EU (as this region is included in European Neighborhood Policy), but also of some of its Member States (France, for instance)[9]. Naturally, the military coalition that intervened in Libya was led, in the first instance, by European states and not by US, under NATO's aegis, the US intervention being subsequent to this fist stage. This situation may be interpreted as a withdrawal of US from the foreground of the management of those international crises occurring at a large distance from their national borders, causing Europeans' efforts to increase their capacity of defence within EU's framework. Also, under the same line of thought comes the shift of US strategic interest towards Asia-Pacific which supposes the concentration of defence resources preponderantly in this region. Even more, under the conditions of the economic and financial crisis' impact on military budgets, US engagement in the process of guaranteeing the security of a region which is militarily stable (Europe) or of other regions for whose security there are other actors which assumed their responsibility (the Mediterranean space, already taken into account by the European Neighborhood Policy and EUROMED Partnership) knows an obvious process of diminution. In our opinion, it is possible for this state of facts to have been contributed to the increase, at European level, of the awareness degree regarding the necessity to give a new incentive to the development of security and defence policy in order to enable the European states to ensure their own security and the one of the region from the close vicinity.

2. Smart defence – a solution to make defence expenses more efficient

Smart defence concept is defined at NATO's level as a "new way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities the Alliance needs for the coming decade and beyond"[10]. Smart defence implies the idea that the Alliance's Member States will not be able any more to rely preponderantly on US contribution regarding the advanced and expensive capabilities, the proof for this being the intervention of international community in Libya.

Pooling and sharing is translated into practice by the decision of various states to contribute materially, financially to the construction or procurement of certain military equipments (pooling) which, afterwards, are to be used by more states (sharing). The designation of this type of practice is a merely economic one and, at EU's level, it has existed ever since the first stages of EDA's creation (2004), the institution by whose intercession are coordinated the two stages of the described process.

Implemented at NATO's level as well from merely economic reasons, the concept is developed and is given the name of smart defence, defined as the action to pool and share capabilities, establish priorities and a better coordination of efforts[11]. Subsequently, smart defence is very similar to pooling and sharing concept, but there is not a full equivalence between the two ideas as NATO implements a more developed, refined version of the concept which took birth at EU's level. In this respect, even the definition given to smart defence concept is relevant – "pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better"[12], pooling and sharing constituting only a part of the definition given by NATO to smart defence.

The mention regarding setting priorities is very relevant from our perspective as, at NATO's level, the areas in which smart defence will be implemented are clearly defined, namely those capabilities which have a critical importance for NATO and which were established during the Lisbon Summit (2010) – ballistic missile defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maintenance of readiness, training and force preparation, effective engagement and force protection.

The two organizations are already coordinating projects elaborated on the strength of the two principles. Thus, within NATO, the efforts to implement smart defence focused on developing those capabilities which are expensive and necessary for preserving the Alliance's capacity

to carry out the assumed missions. It is about systems of land, maritime and air surveillance; airborne early warning and control systems, countering improvised explosive devices, command and control systems etc. Simultaneously, EDA coordinates other projects of developing military capabilities which are distinct from the ones approached by NATO so as to their efforts would be complementary. Helicopter Training Programme, Maritime Surveillance Networks, European Satellite Communication Procurement Cell, Medical Field Hospitals, Air to Air Refueling, Future Military Satellite Communications, Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance, Pilot Training, European Transport Hubs, Smart Munitions, Naval Logistics and Training[13] represent the actual initiatives developed in virtue of pooling and sharing principle. It is also remarkable the fact that the two organizations focus on those capabilities which are necessary to carry out the established missions, as well as on those in which there is already a certain degree of expertise.

As a consequence, smart defence and pooling and sharing represent an intelligent way to invest in the capabilities necessary to guarantee security and defence and its development was propelled by the economic and financial crisis' effects on EU and NATO Member States' military budgets; but, at the same time, the concepts under discussion are also completely adapted to the specificities of international security environment which is still under the influence of globalization forces, characterized both by integration and interdependency concerning the relations between the main international actors, but also mined by trans-border risks and threats. Intelligent investment in security and defence is an idea whose roots can be found in the early stages of the development of security and defence dimension of the two organizations, whose utility has been understood and accepted for a long time, but for which NATO and EU Member States are willing to make real efforts only under the current conditions of the economic and financial crisis.

3. The other side of the picture – obstacles, difficulties, vulnerabilities

As we demonstrated previously, smart defence and pooling and sharing represent solutions known for a long time at the level of NATO and EU which

imply undoubtedly a series of economic and military advantages. Nevertheless, the necessity to smartly spend the resources, to invest efficiently so as to reach an ideal proportion between investments and results, respectively between the security related expenses and the level of security, is not characteristic only to the current period of austerity. Therefore, smart defence could have been an advantage in any stage, in any historical period we might consider. In our opinion, the delay of this concept's implementation until the economic crisis period, when it seems to have become the only viable solution to preserve and develop the necessary capabilities to promote and defend national interests and common interests defined within NATO and EU, may be justified by a range of difficulties it implies, by certain obstacles to be overcome and by the possibility to generate, at least on the short term, negative repercussions on national level.

One of the main causes of the fact that smart defence and its European corollary have gained an unprecedented popularity in the austerity period we are passing through, although its would have brought advantages in any post-Cold War period, can be found in European states' style to approach international relations and, especially, the relations between them. The inter-governmental character of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the slow progresses which are generally registered under the influence of an external stimulus are clear indications that European states have maintained a Westphalian style of regarding international security, being strongly attached to the sovereignty idea. Actually, as far as EU is concerned, defence domain has never benefited of a high degree of support and trust on behalf of its Member States, as they usually preferred to act within NATO, a framework within which most of the financial contribution was provided by US and where membership has always supposed a lower impact on national sovereignty. Overcoming this "historical inheritance" of the European states which would allow them to develop an increased mutual trust and the certitude that they can rely on each other in guaranteeing their security represents one of the challenges of smart defence, no matter if we considered NATO or the EU.

Another challenge to this concept's implementation consists in putting into practice the full cooperation and coordination of the efforts

made within NATO and EU as smart defence and pooling and sharing are similar concepts, implying the financial participation and the input of resources of Member States in order to obtain military capabilities. Cooperation and coordination are even more important to be achieved as the two organizations have 21 common Member States, thus there being an increased risk for the resources to be cast away. The advantage in managing this challenge is represented by the fact that NATO-EU cooperation practices already exist, that they have experience not only in avoiding their efforts and actions to overlap, but also to make them complementary. "Berlin +" Agreements as well as the actual experience in cooperating in crisis and emergency situations management constitute important fundaments on which they can rely in overcoming this obstacle.

At the same time, smart defence and pooling and sharing suppose the existence of some organisms developed at the level of each organization, specialized organisms, capable of giving their attention completely to coordinating this type of initiatives. At EU's level, as we have previously mentioned, the necessary institutional profile was already in place when pooling and sharing turned out to be a necessity for the future of European defence. But, for NATO, the responsibility was taken by the Allied Command Transformation, the institution meant to be in charge exclusively of coordinating smart defence projects (The NATO Procurement Organization) being still in the first stages of its development and is to become operational in 2014. Thus, the new conception on defence planning also reflects in the institutional profile of international organizations.

Plus, making defence planning more efficient supposes a range of changes at national level too. Beyond all the economic, military and security advantages implied by smart defence and pooling and sharing, there is also another side of the medal. Thus, according to NATO's official web page, in order to be able to speak about smart defence, it is necessary for the efforts to comprise three types of activities: *prioritization* (ranging up national capability priorities with NATO's ones); *specialization* (concentrating investments only in certain areas of defence industry, being expected that the eventual necessary, but inexistent capabilities to be provided by the states specialized in the respective area); *cooperation*. All these

components could turn into genuine challenges, each one of them implying specific difficulties, but specialization defines itself by far as the most demanding aspect of smart defence due to the fact that its impact on defence planning is maximal. Actually, specialization supposes the fact that states will cease to invest in certain areas of defence industry so as to be able to concentrate on other ones, where there is more expertise or which are more necessary for guaranteeing national security. Thus, a state whose border is represented mostly by the ocean's shore will focus preponderantly on navy industry, for instance, leaving the construction of aircrafts under other states' responsibility. This supposes not only that the organization of forces' structure at national level will be modified, but also possible negative effects on the economic plan, by the disappearance of certain branches of defence industry.

At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the fact that international or regional organizations with competencies in security and defence matters have to maintain their capacity to act, to respect the missions assumed by their fundamental treaties. Intelligent investments should be made and coordinated so as to Member States would be able to provide together the necessary capabilities for the respective organization, irrespective of its composition, to achieve its purposes. Consequently, cooperation and coordination of the projects carried out by NATO and EU must consider the fact that each one of them has to remain capable of acting independently of the other.

Conclusions

Pooling and sharing and smart defence delineate as economic solutions to manage the economic and financial crisis' effects on military budgets, but their success, the publicity and the attention they have been paid are the result of a cumulus of factors related not only to features having characterized international security environment before 2007, but also to the repercussions of the crisis we are passing through in present. The idea to make defence spending more efficient is under no circumstances of recent date, the novelty consisting, generally, in the energy given to the projects of developing capabilities in common and in the acceptance of the concepts under discussion

as viable solutions for maintaining the capacity to manage security issues.

In our opinion, not only pooling and sharing, but also smart defence approach, in essence, a European issue; in this respect, we consider eloquent the context in which the rhythm of their development knew an exponential acceleration – the intervention in managing the crisis in Libya, intervention which was led by European states, with a minimal US participation, the shift of US strategic interest to Asia-Pacific region, Washington's decision that it is necessary to re-balance the financial share of NATO's Member States to the Alliance's budget concomitantly with the tendency of European military budgets to decrease.

Moreover, besides the fact that pooling and sharing and smart defence are presented in an extremely favorable light, their implementation also supposes overcoming some difficulties of technical nature (the negative effects on defence industry, institutional adjustments, the effective coordination of the efforts undertaken at the level of each organization). We consider that a special relevance regarding the existence of these obstacles to be overcome, of some vulnerabilities to be managed has the fact that the implications of pooling and sharing and smart defence idea are not new; irrespective of the moment when it had been implemented, it would have brought obvious economic and military benefits. In conclusion, as far as this solution to make defence spending more efficient is concerned, there is another side of the picture. At the same time, pooling and sharing and smart defence may be looked upon as proofs of the fact that a crisis situation doesn't always imply negative results. When managed adequately, the crisis and/ or the challenge may represent opportunities to improve old forms, to evolve, inclusively in the defence area. Therefore, the economic and financial crisis, by creating the favorable conditions for the implementation of pooling and sharing and smart defence concepts, may constitute one of the occasions to fathom European integration and cohesion in security and defence matters and to impulse its development.

NOTES:

1 Hillary CLINTON, *Secolul Pacific al Americi*i, in Foreign Policy Romania, no. 25, November/ December 2011, p. 27.

2 *Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and Annexes I-III*, 18 April 1951, Paris, http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/historic%20documents/Paris/TRAITES_1951_CECA.pdf, accessed on 30th August 2012.

3 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:245:0017:0028:EN:PDF, accessed on 10th September 2012.

4 European Union, Consolidated Treaties. Charter of Fundamental Rights, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, Title V. General Provisions on the Union's External Actions and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Chapter 2. Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Section 2. Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Article 42 (2), p. 38.

5 Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, Petre DUȚU, *Apărarea colectivă și apărarea națională în contextul integrării României în NATO și aderării la Uniunea Europeană*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2005, p. 14.

6 Ibidem, p. 14.

7 Charles A. COOPER, Benjamin ZYCHER, *Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing*, The RAND Corporation, June 1989, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2009/R3750.pdf, accessed on 3rd September 2012.

8 Examples in this respect can be found ever since the firsts stages of the crystallization of European Security and Defence Policy to present-day. For details, see Petre DUȚU, Cristina BOGZEANU, *Reforma instituțională a UE din perspectiva Politicii de Securitate și Apărare Comune*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 36-42.

9 For details, see Mihai-Ștefan DINU, *Evoluții geopolitice actuale – consolidări și aspirații*, în *Echilibrul de putere și mediul de securitate*, A XI-a Sesiune Anuală de Comunicări Științifice cu Participare Internațională, 17-18 noiembrie 2011, Vol. I, Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 84-87.

10 *Smart Defence*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm?, accessed on 5th September 2012.

11 Ibidem.

12 Ibidem.

13 European Defence Agency, *EDA's Pooling and Sharing*, 24 November 2011, www.eda.europa.eu, accessed on 5th of Septembrie 2012.

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12. European Defence Agency, www.eda.europa.eu.

13. *Smart Defence*, http://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm?.

EXERCISE OF FUTURISTIC PROJECTION REGARDING THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE HIERARCHY OF GLOBAL PRIMACY

Cristin ALĂZĂROAIE*

Anticipation of evolution projections for the hierarchy of global society creates premises of coordination and control, but also for a possible influence of manifestation vectors with social effects.

The accuracy of an objective analysis, based on multiple perspectives, involving quantifiable representative parameters for the evolutionary current and anticipated process augments the relevance of the incursion into the future of global society.

It is imperative that on the global society level to be created mechanisms which will ensure the stability of the overall security environment as an ensemble of plurality of quasi-total conditions that cause the functioning of modern society, where political, economic and cultural nature includes and determines approaches of social security, which tends to expand state barriers to regional level.

A primary necessity represents identifying vulnerabilities, risks and major social threats that can unhinge the balance and stability of the global security environment, in the context of the contemporary world, where confrontations are played in all possible environments.

1. Stance boundaries of the contemporary world perspective

The metamorphosis of the world architecture might seem obsolete from an identity outlook, assessed from the perspective of hierarchy design of civilizations, cultures and nations, which is experiencing an unpredictable dynamic on long-term prognosis, and a firm projection of the role, position and influence of an actor or another, while the coefficient of force is currently imposed by an unstable balance of power inside the states or alliances of states.

The multitude variables that contribute to the evolution of an actor's force on the global arena is placed in a direct relation of influence with economic power, energy independence, scale of exploitation of the opportunities offered by space, but also from a cumulative efficiency based on individual and social conscience, implemented by civil society mentors or by political leaders,

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through the targets achieved in act of attributes on internal or external side, at the international level.

In this context, the *security environment* is a reality composed of all political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental, information, domestic and international conditions, processes and phenomena, which determine the level of protection for individuals, community, state, area, region or world, while promoting their own interests[1].

The sine qua non dependence of the development by protection provided throughout stability of domestic and regional environmental security, and from the perspective of great actors by the international strategic environment, can be seen by comparing the development of some emerging countries, from which the most noticeable example is China, with the decline of Russia, from the ideological worldwide pole position, on an inferior place due to fault of erroneous management and territorial fragmentation events. The comparing of these two giant countries has burden, as they are members of the same type of social organization system, the Marxist category, which proved over time, with the sacrifice of several generations and with the reluctance of notable dictators in history, the erroneousness of applying utopian theories of evolution at unsuitable times of human ethology. Religion of neighbor love was spread by the sword, in the name of freedom and democracy of peoples has been subjected to military dictatorships, and for the emancipation of the workers class was necessary to set up the dictatorship of the Communist Party (Conradt, 1973, p 101)[2]. The elimination of communism by itself as a governmental form perfected up to imposing, by means of social control and repressive measures to suppress any bulk opposition, has confirmed victory and endlessness of peoples ethos. Recent researches conclude that domination essentially based on violence is in diverge with human nature, conducting every time to counter violence, (...) but of course there were tyrants who ruled with the help of bloody terror, (...) but no domination can be maintained through terror, as proven by history.[3]

The stage of current human evolution in all its grandeur, emphasized by interdependence caused within the globalization phenomena, requires acceptance of human dyads, as applicable principle of social organization and religious parties, currently manifested in the war conducted by radical Islamists against Western civilization, majority Christian dogma representative. The longing which will ensure the interpersonal tolerance at the civilizations and peoples stratum, which are in a constant preeminence interaction, imperatively requires in the present nuclear era, which will have in the near future need for innovative approaches to human security system against nuclear weapons owners.

There are considerations that invoke a decline trajectory of U.S., which still undoubtedly represent states with the most globally impact because of "authoritarianism manifested in any part of the world since the time of aggressive foreign policy applied by the Bush administration, which led to what Fareed Zakaria has called post-American world"[4].

The profile of U.S. preeminence in the international arena, after its exercised significant contribution to Allied victory in the World War II, was established by launching a new strategy for domination, which has prevailed learnt lessons of history and built a bridge of modern geopolitics, towards the abolition of territorial imperialism, by building economic and financial colonialism.

The illustration of communist system evolution, centered on a cult of personality of a ubiquitous profile, that creates a circular repressive and privileged apparatus which will promote its own interests and will suppress the true values, does not recommend the pragmatism of centralized structures based on utopian theories. Preserving U.S. national unity, a union of states that proved the power of federal union as the only form of achievement primacy of social structures in this historical period, was made with government policies focused on the fundamental freedoms of human being, as a guarantee of promoting veritable value.

The futurist anticipation developed by Alvin Toffler, inside the book named "The Third Wave", suggests a possible systemic restructuring and redistribution of global power, which will completely redesign the current arrangements. In a such scenario, *on short-term*, there are quietly designing a continuation of regional security policies and further significant advance of the EU policy towards the anticipatory definition of relations with third parties, in a projection which will protect the geopolitical, economic and financial interests of the Union, with forces

gathered in stable or incidental partnerships, and even potential adversaries, actors with instability effect. The evolution within Europe has varying perceptions, „... the notion of European field of power is differently approached by some sociologists who believe that it replaced the power of nation-states (Georgakakis) or as a struggle for the dominant principle of domination (Anton Cohen) which will persist as a long process that does not exclude the field of national power but is deeply rooted on it."[5]

The internal disputes of EU display a stage of normality for this phase of the fusion, and the levelling of tax policies to protect the community economic strength, but also to promote the interests of all members, represents a desideratum that will have to be speeded up, including in order to mitigate the effects of international financial crisis, to which the Union still contributes. The stability of Union is emerging as a global priority, and identifying sustainable solutions to rebalance the European financial and economic system, on circumstances regarding existence of a legislative flaw and heterogeneous views, reliant on domestic and culpable grounds of internal policies of state members, represents the nub of concerns of domestic policy makers and also of international community.

On the *medium terms*, it is possible to generate some reorganization within the structures set, or in close proximity to them, therefore as a tendency for some partners to readjust priorities toward new alliances, or even to design emergence of atypical pacts that now generate an apparently incompatible picture under different aspects of political, cultural, or religious identity.

On the *long-terms*, the close regional centers of power, presumptively constituted, may perhaps reassess not only the neighborhood policy, but also will have to concentrate their power, in every bit of its aspects, to face more fierce global competition, amplified by domestic, regional, global, and environmental distortion factors of social instability.

The global status forecast in the context of relentless, unpredictable, ubiquitous and inexorable globalization is uncertain, but common synergistic direction for promoting a common set of values unanimously accepted by the nations and civilizations, continues the determinant process of chronological current stage.

2. The coercive variables of the world balance forecast

The technological explosion has accelerated global integration process, concisely defined by the word "*globalization*", facile communication, social and cultural interactions, economic interdependence and disagreement of actors to deal with the most important challenges of the planet or its people, which at present show a shock impact to the society systems, cultures and environments of the current world.

The contemporary crisis has deepened rethinking process of the global building under economic, political and strategic aspects, and future projections doubtlessly indicate that the existing parameters for defining the world will no longer work after the same entropy. The delay of a profound structural systemic rectification, controlled and softened, can only produce a collapse of current hierarchy, which proves its obsolete and rigid design of functional forecast, generating a state of social fatigue, marked by stagnation of the evolutionary process, which will be followed most likely by a regression ceiling process.

The retrospective historical analysis provides lessons learned regarding revolving and collapse of great empires, and circumvention of the potential recovery under pressure of mainly internal factors, blinded by autocratic systems, only temporarily delayed the inevitable. The meta-paradigm of current society, assisted by greater possibilities of projection of possible scenarios, due to the high-tech level, represents also the most complicated illustration of humanity systemic picture, and an international reorganization by the rules and regulations which prioritize a lucid hierarchy is hindered by the complexity of political, economic and social interactions. The concept that globalization, understood in terms of technological determinism and the generalization of economic policy measures (regardless of circumstances) solves humanity's problems, simplifies and underestimates the reality[6].

The global security environment estimated for the relative near future will be characterized by accelerating of current essential features and coming out of any possible changes on the international set system. "The widely trend, invoked in unison, correlates the security environment dependence

upon the accelerated globalization process (with its ambivalence, beneficial and harmful effects), continued emergence of China and India on the global stage, rapid development of technology innovation, accelerating the proliferation of mass destruction technologies, augmenting of the capacitive power of non-state actors against nation-states, the persistence of an extended regional conflicts developed on ethnic and religious foundations, and increasing the scarcity of resources due to environmental degradation"[7]. The dispute triggered for effortless access to a large-scale of resources created major changes regarding the facet of threats and means to respond to them. Today, old enemies are seen to face the same problems that affect all of them and therefore they are forced to take joint decisions and moreover, to find ways and general solutions to some sorts of threats that become more difficult to combat. The motivations are easy to predict due to damage of their own interests, and cooperation based on exchange of information, suitable tools or resources will facilitate common security, but also individual safety in the context of reducing costs problem.

"The dark side of globalization, which includes terrorism and organized crime will continue to increase regional and transnational tensions, to encroach on U.S. security and other advanced democracies integrated into the global economy and provide competition and instability in the international system"[8].

The manifestation of systemic fouling forces of globalization speculates the nature of technological opportunities created on the high-tech producer states' competition and states willing to possess this kind of technology for the only reason of serving the purposes of cultural or ethnic opponency or primordiality. The opportunities of organized crime groups to take possession of technologies and weapons with great destructive possibilities and trends of the tactics practiced by transnational and international terrorism represent a threat with a high rank estimated risk.

"In the reconfiguration point of global distribution plan of power, projections of relative certainty assessed with authorized probable impact scenarios, indicate the crystallization of a multipolar global system under currently development, mainly defined by the rise of China and India, but also with particular extension

on BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) member states"[9]. Expanding the power of BRICS states will feasible generate a mitigation of U.S. global political weight, which will have to forsake some of the currently privileges within international institutions, regardless of the field – world level, military, economic or political. Simultaneously, the relative power of non-state actors covering different types of corporations and organizations, economic, cultural, religious or even organized crime networks, extends the process of dimensions growth and geographical scale dissipation, situation which augments the configuration of unpredictable future parameters and concerning actors which are performing the global balance of power, with the main effects on the security environmental level.

"By 2025, the collocation "international community" with the current denotation, involving its composition of nation-states will no longer exist. The power will be more dispersed and the ascendancy of power will be given to new players that set new rules of the game while risks will increase, simultaneously with the weakening of the Western traditional power alliances"[10]. The emulation of the Western paradigm, omnipresent today on the political and economic development, will experience a competitive alternative development, towards China's paradigm, which is an example of economic pragmatism, achieved by a socialist-liberal structured management.

The specialized assessments of future levers of power indicate a high probability for achieving a transfer of economic power and a high level of living standards, with unprecedented impact parameters of volume and mass from Western civilization to Eastern emerging countries, situation which may cause increasing feelings of nationalism in the countries and civilizations concerned. The manifestation of nationalism feeling within the Arabic civilization in terms of pan-Arabism augmentation and in conjunction with high demographic index and relatively high share of ownership of fossils natural resources could create imbalances of weight in the global society due to the absence of applying compensatory measures.

The near future geopolitical stability will be to ensured only through effective contribution of all major actors on the international arena, and the arguments of emerging states in the relation of diffusion and exercising of power through

diplomacy within international structures will become stronger as those states will be able to display a higher degree of economic prosperity, after the infusion of development incentives.

The case of Russia's policy, based on the opposition inertia to any political and especially military action of U.S. on the internationally level can be relevant by galloping economic recovery, achieved mainly due to the abundance of energy resources, which places the country in a favourable position that would be substantially improved by grounding an economy based on industry and competitive export.

The projection of power equation which emphasizes its profile as the force capabilities of the BRICS states are raising – without excluding other emerging countries whose shape and influence are manifested at regional levels – is marked by the unanimously recognized preeminence of the U.S. as economic and military power, whose decline displays an inverse rapport with other players' developments. "Mitigation of the impact of global economic and military capabilities may oblige the U.S. to access a set of difficult compromises that must force them to choose between national priorities and foreign policy"[11].

The numerous competing factors at geopolitical stage are in various stages of appearance of the priority on the evolving global society agenda. "Therefore, continued global economic growth, combined with a population growth of 1.2 billion people by 2025"[12] will generate a comparative "pressure on energy, food and water resources needs"[13]. The race to meet domestic resources, where the state role remains crucial on linking costs paid in a tough competitive market and achieving energy independence as economic ideal of nation-state, or creating dependencies of other states by perennial market products to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for sustainable development, will represent the economic survival conditions for the world states. The pace of technological innovation will be essential to maintain the balance in terms of exponential growth of energy needs, concomitant with world population, but currently all owned technologies seem insufficient and inadequate for the total replacement of traditional energy architecture on the scale required. Guidelines and current research concerns will be concentrated on innovation in the energy field, which requires rapid development of technologies able to implement a large-scale use of alternative energy sources, based solely on non-fossil, eco-style fuel, made at a relatively low production and exploitation cost, which could be provided on long term operating reserves. Developing such a system could alleviate the geostrategy policies applied by the great powers over areas such as Middle East, Caspian Basin or Latin America, and geopolitical influences would radically restructure current power objectives that might focus the interest on other areas of attention, which could be for instance the space, that offers endless possibilities for research, exploitation and resources.

3. Demography and strategic security environment

The asymmetrical evolution of populations within the great civilizations comprise a factor with major implications in terms of global stability and strategic international security environment, due to economic, demography (migration, geographical distribution, age distribution of force employment by region, etc.), ecological and humanitarian characteristics. National Intelligence Council issued an evaluation on the medium term showing that the number of states with young people from "the arc of instability"[14] will decrease, but the population of some states in this category will continue to grow.

"The number of fragile states, failing states or failed states could increase on short – medium term, as a result of domestic economic collapse, of diminishing resources, inefficient governance, repressive governance or failure of segmentation of social infrastructure. Thus, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and many other countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and Central Asia will face tensions raised by internal pressures"[15]. In the near future, it is considered that the lack of working and living conditions within some disadvantaged countries such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria and Pakistan will lead to instability and governance deficiencies, the syntagm *failed states* representing the indicator regarding the high level of the potential of conflict with regional implications.

The social instability due to some intermediate stages that several countries cross in order to avoid collapse is estimated to grow with a high rank of vulnerability for Islamic civilization, because of

economic factors or high adhesion capacity of extremist ideology, on the setting of impoverishment population that can deepen the degree of ethnicity intolerance among or within civilizations.

Following relatively rapid changes evolved in several parts of the Greater Middle East, exacerbated by widespread and facile outsourcing of access to destructive capabilities, through expansion and broad accessibility to the latest technology, for which have not objectively been evaluated the risks due to a fragile border between security / democracy or due to prioritization of profit at the depletion of safety, have increased the risk of attacks which can be subject of using mass destructive weapons. For the next future, it has been assessed a growing need of states to amplify their efforts to mediate regional divergences in the Middle East, and non-state organizations contribution can not be raised without the involvement of nations, which will probably have to show more significant action than at present.

The opportunities to execute major terrorist attacks, with possibility of using chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons will increase, as large-scale spread of technological innovation and hence the users of nuclear energy, condition which augments the possibilities and ability of radical groups to adapt those kind of nuclear equipment as weapons. Physical and psychological consequences of such attacks, with an increasing likelihood of happening, will have a minimal regional and global impact, and the effects could threaten ecosystems and global economic stability which is interdependent within a world, intensified in a gradually generalized world due to globalization. Terrorism will continue to be perceived as a major threat, but the impact could be reduced on the long term, if economic growth will continue in the Middle East, concomitantly with reducing unemployment, especially among young people, radical indoctrinated due to shortages and lack of options regarding education, family and future. But we must have in mind the fact of increasing nationalism inside a failed state, which may amplify the degree of social instability, and therefore increase incidence of the risk vectors of social security.

Conclusions

The arguments exposed on the base of screening courses of vision for the future transformation of world primacy indicate the likely possibility of assisting the crystallization of new poles of world power, which will reduce the impact and force of nowadays known alliances, representative in relation with share of global influence.

The transition process of power from traditional alliances to other coalitions, or transfer of burden of decision within current alliances will be achieved, while diminishing the role and capacity to exercise influence at the expense of certain social systems, with appearing of some negative effects on the social credit plan of organization, but also regarding the degree of ensuring stability of security societies within the world.

The manifestation of low rate of entropy for the global society, complicated by hybrid threats in an unpredictable, unstable and uncertain environment represents the social current characteristic coordinates, influenced by recurrent induction of globalization process.

Global security environment' stability represents the primordial condition of world society development, which will have to act proactively, opportunely and flexibly for mitigation of effects produced by intrusive, unpredictable, hybrid and harmful factors for institutions and social entities positioned on international or regional level or inside large civilizations.

NOTES:

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2 Irenäus EIBL-EIBESFELDT, *Agresivitatea umană*, ed. a 2-a, Editura Trei, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 188.

3 *Ibidem*, p. 135.

4 http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Scenarios_to_2025.pdf, accesed on March 7, 2012.

5 International Political Sociology, volume 5, issue 3, September 2011, Published for the Internationale Studies Association by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. p. 224.

6 Gh. POSTELNICU, *Globalizarea economiei*, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 255.

7 Stephen J. FLANAGAN, James A. SCHEAR, *Strategic challenges*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, Copublished in the US by National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, Inc., first edition, 2008, p. 1.

8 *Ibidem* p. 3.

9 http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_

Trends_Final_Report.pdf.

10 *Ibidem*.

11 *Ibidem*.

12 UN issued the prognosis regarding population growth by 2050, which estimates that will increase with 2,5 billions, up to 9,1 billions people.

13 According to American specialists, if all plants growing on Earth would be used as food for people, there will be enough food only for 15 billions human beings. This is about the concept of carrying capacity which defines the total number of people who can live at the same time on Earth. The maximum value of this number presumes that all Earth's resources will be spent for a singular goal to ensure the live of people (that means all parks and natural reservation will disappear and all food resources will have the purpose of human being consumption).

14 States with structured populations as a relatively reduced age characterized by a rapid growing are described as *arc of instability* which extends from the Andine region to Latin America through Africa Sub-Saharan, Middle East and Caucasus, up to the Northern of South Asia.

15 Stephen J. FLANAGAN, James A. SCHEAR, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

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GEOPOLITICS OF "BLUE GOLD" – CONFLICT SOURCE IN THE ARAB WORLD

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Recently, with all the climate changes happening all around the world and the global warming talks, water became a worrying issue at global level. This indispensable and irreplaceable resource is, however, unevenly distributed, and on the world's resources map, North Africa and the Middle East appear to be threatened the most by the water scarcity. In addition, the rapid growth of the Arab population makes water become more valuable than oil and, if decades ago, countries were concerned about obtaining an oil rich territory to instantly secure their wellbeing, now, the Arab countries are becoming more preoccupied with the way they would be able to supply water to their population, in addition to the industry and the agriculture. For the Arab world, this problem proves to be particularly difficult, as the resource is diminishing, the demand is increasing, and thus the deficit could easily lead to internal conflicts that might trigger regional and global consequences.

Key-words: Arab world; water; Israeli - Palestinian conflict.

Introduction

According to international rules, drought is when a person in a certain area has access to less than 1,000 cubic meters of water a year[1]. Presently, 1.2 billion people live in areas of water scarcity and, by 2030, 47 per cent of the world's population will be living in areas of high water stress, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; it is considered that future wars will be fought over blue gold, as thirsty people, opportunistic politicians and powerful corporations are going to fight for dwindling resources.

Of all the water on earth, 97 per cent is salt water and the remaining three per cent is fresh, with less than one per cent of the planet's drinkable water readily accessible for direct human uses[2].

The planet's total volume of freshwater has stayed the same for millennia. Two factors have changed the problem though: the growth of the population and the global warming, which affect the rainfall balance, the seasons, etc.

Thus, while some regions have considerable water surpluses, others suffer from a growing shortage of rainfall.

In 1995, the World Bank estimated that 80 countries, representing 40% of world's population were already facing water shortages. Currently, one third of the world's population is deprived of drinking water. In some countries, less than 40% of the population has access to drinking water; see

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the case of Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Afghanistan and Oman.[3]

Nine "water giants" countries share around 60% of the freshwater renewable natural resources of the world, and per year, their richness is calculated in thousands of billions of m³ per year or in km³ of water. This is the case of Brazil (5 418 billion m³/year), Russian Federation (4 312), Indonesia (2 838), China (2 812), Canada (2 740), USA (2 460), Colombia (2 133), Peru (1 746) and India (1 260).[4]

By contrast, a specific number of countries have much fewer resources, almost none, whose levels are expressed only in million of m³ per year: Kuwait, Bahrain (near zero renewable resources), Gaza (46), UAE (200), Jordan (700), Libya (800)[5]. Taking these information into consideration one can clearly discern the great handicap of the Middle East.

These vulnerable regions, often on a developing path, have a very high population growth rate, which leads to increased demand for fresh water; also the case of the Arab countries. Scientific projections show that in 2025, they will use more than 40% of their total freshwater reserves. However, the groundwater supplies water for only 20% the arid and semi-arid regions' need, leading to a shift of population towards cities, where groundwaters are overexploited, and have a questionable quality, favouring the permeation of various pollutants due to lack of sanitation facilities (the most obvious example is Cairo)[6]. According to IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), each increased degree in temperature on the medium term will bring insufficient access to water for another one billion people, with serious consequences for the health of the youngest and poorest.[7]

Having these assumptions as starting point, we want to bring further to the fore how the water resource is distributed in the Arab world and how this resource's scarcity influences the delay in solving old conflicts (Israel-Palestine, Israel-Syria on the Golan Heights, where the Jordan River sources) and leads to new ones (the food crisis as a catalyst for the "Arab Spring" being seen as an effect of the limited water resources to support the agriculture from the North African countries), or the ones from the future.

1. Water resources in the Arab world

UN studies predict that 30 nations will be water scarce in 2025, in comparison with 20 in 1990. Eighteen of them are in the Middle East and North Africa, including Egypt, Israel, Somalia, Libya and Yemen[8].

The most important resource in the Middle East may be water, not oil, because almost all countries depend on river water that flows into their territory from another country, or on ground water that they are using faster than it is being recharged and moreover, 67% of the Arab world depends on water from non-Arab states. These two facts make the Arab countries, long-term as well as short-term, some of the most politically dangerous in the world, especially as the hostilities are fanned by religious fanaticism. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali (former Secretary-General of the United Nations), warned, the next war in the Middle East will be fought on water[9].

Water resources have, thus, a major role in the Arab world's geopolitics and in influencing its regime, because the Arab region, with a population of over 315 million people, has a total area of about 14 million square kilometres, of which more than 87% is desert, with super aridity and poor vegetation cover dominating the region[10]. Water usage in Africa and Middle East is not sustainable and thereof, its lack determines the instability – that is if the involved governments will not take solving measures for the crisis.

The 22 Arab countries have very different climatic and geographical features.

Maghreb has green coastal and mountain areas, from Morocco to Tunisia. The Libyan coast, a dry area with a growing population, is subject to important and costly facilities regarding the water supply, namely "the great artificial river". In Egypt, the Nile Delta and its valley is the only habitable area along with the Fayoum region.

Machreq – or the Middle East – has indeed a coastline, along with its green and forested Syrian-Libyan mountain. However, the first settlements were placed along the Tigris and Euphrates, otherwise a rich cultural area.

In Lebanon, Syria, the water tower, set on the Golan Heights and the Jordan River is collected and controlled by the State of Israel.

Most of the Arab area consists of desert, naming the Sahara, Egypt, Sinai and Arabia, or semi-desert

steppes. Yemen has fertile valleys arranged in terraces on a small portion of its territory.

Morocco is in a water induced stressful situation – people have from 1,000 to 1,700 m³ per person per year – and all other Arab states are already in shortage (people have less than 1000 m³ per person per year) of fresh water.[11]

Regarding weather conditions, the Machrecq and Maghreb's atmospheric circulation is characterized by two elements:

- the latitude position: the region is between parallel 36 North to the Syrian-Turkish border, and 12 south to the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula;

- the presence of the Mediterranean, vast marine space that deeply penetrates to the East towards the Euro-African continental mass and the west valleys.

Thus, this assembly of 14 million km² is exposed not only to a single climatic regime, but it is a transition area between two zones:

- a tropical and subtropical zone that is characterized by the constant or near constant presence of very stable dynamic pressures;

- the Mediterranean zone that joins the temperate climate and is characterized by a West-East movement of cyclonic currents;

- the polar front limits the two tropical and temperate climates and moves during the year, with oscillations at high altitude. In the summer it rises in latitude and in the winter comes down to northern Africa, allowing the passage of cyclonic currents.[12]

One single region is beyond this regime: the southern Arabian Peninsula, especially Yemen that receives summer monsoon rains.

Underground water, phreatic and groundwater were constantly used in the Arab area. The highest pressure exploitation was exerted on groundwater located in the adjacent piedmont deposits, fed by the more consistent rainfall from these higher areas. Close to the piedmont area connecting the Atlas Mountains and the Sahara desert, the first Arab-Berber formations from Maghreb were born in the early Middle Ages and then different local emirates, based on the water resources exploited from the higher piedmont areas, drained through the feed pipe systems along which have developed the cores of local communities. Also, a number of local formations in the Sahara and Arabia have coagulated around oases where the phreatic appears.

In the last three-four decades the water resources from ***underground water sources*** began to be exploited in Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, countries that have made significant investments in projects and exploitation and feed pipe infrastructures. The river network is unevenly distributed though, as a consequence of physical and geographical conditions. Three major river systems cross the Arab language-speaking area, two in Asia and one in Africa, namely the Euphrates, Tigris and Nile, whose water flows make a competitive regional stake.[13]

The strenuous aridity makes water be a rare product of these places, and under these conditions, the two rivers, Tigris and Euphrates gain special strategic meanings in the region, not only by the amount of water itself, but even by the geometry and the hydraulics of river bed. Even the common short fluvial sector Shatti al-Arab has strategic-territorial outstanding stakes, as is the joint Iraqi-Iranian border in an area with a complex morpho- dynamic of the hydro morphological processes from the river bed, which generates the reconfiguration of the seas and require periodic redrawing of the border, which was also the reason for the Iraqi-Iranian war from 1980, yet unresolved dispute until now. But the great stake of Egypt is the Nile. Despite the huge size of the desert, the Egyptian state is considered a fluvial state by providing food to its growing population from the river valley, secures the hydropower and water needs due to the construction of lake Nasser and the hydropower from and Asswan, although these projects have some negative environmental impacts. The middle and upper Nile, as a penetration vector, has geopolitical meanings for the Egyptian State, which considers such spaces (located in the Sudanese space) part of its natural hinterland of evolution, which causes local tensions and border disputes between Egypt and Sudan.[14]

2. Water – a conflict source in the Arab world

Water resources have gained the valences of a strategic pressure lever in the physical and geographical conditions of aridity. In recent decades, we can talk about the practice of a real water geopolitics in the Arab space – a certain *aqua politics*, where the water supply became a matter of geopolitics from an economic one. Often, the projects where water was a strategic stake

complementary overlapped with other pressure vectors from the geopolitical field, increasing the conflicting effects from the ongoing space. Depending on the entities involved in the strategic water games, this category of geo-economics and geopolitical relations was and is held and conducted on three relational levels: the Arab-border relations, inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli.

*Sharing water resources between the Arab states and the non-Arab bordering state*s is a sensitive issue in the geopolitical water equation of the arid or semi-arid regions. Senegal and Mauritania have had a war since 1989 on the rights of the Senegal River. [15] Eloquent in this regard is the competitive use of Euphrates river's water by Turkey, Syria and Iraq (Syria and Iraq fought in minor collision over the Euphrates[16]), the old river, thus revealing its enormous geo-economic and geopolitical stakes that flow on its river bed and which are the substrate for the strained relations between the three riverside states. Euphrates has its source in Anatolia, which gives the Turkish state the position for controlling its flow through the retention lakes Firat (on Euphrates) and Keban (on Murat – the main tributary of the Euphrates), accumulations that are strategic Turkish "taps" of Euphrates water. Therefore, the flow remains insufficient, especially during the summer, for meeting the downstream water needs, specifically for Syria and Iraq, and especially for water supplying Lake Assad's dam, built by Syria on the river. This further reduces the amount of water reaching Iraq, a country almost totally dependent on the river. If Egypt is the gift of the Nile, we can say of the Mesopotamian Plain that is the gift of Tiger and Euphrates, due to the fact that civilizations developed in the Mesopotamian basin benefited from similar conditions that Nile gave Egypt, and the polarizing centre of Baghdad on the Tigris enjoyed similar meanings as Cairo on the Nile valley.[17]

Sharing water resources between neighbouring Arab states is behind the escalation of many inter-Arab tensions. In this context, we have the permanent disputes between Iraq and Syria, triggered by the insufficient water volume reaching Iraq, as a result of the Euphrates water retention in the Assad Lake in Syria. This aspect had amplified the already existing political-ideological differences between the two countries during Saddam Hussein regime.

Sharing water resources between Israel and its Arab neighbours has been a constant cause of Arab-Israeli tensions, which has been added to the classical bilateral conflicts. The area of ongoing dispute and the interest stake is the water from the Jordan River basin, wanted in large proportions by the five riverside actors: Israel, Jordan, West Bank, Syria and Lebanon[18]. In fact, some analysts believe that Israel continues to occupy the Golan Heights, taken from Syria in 1967, because of the Jordan's water control problem, while others believe that the occupation relates only to the possession of the highest land in the event of future conflicts.[19]

At the Sea of Galilee's outlet, Jordan has a volume of 500 billion cubic meters/year and after receiving the tributaries (including Yarmuk – 500 billion cubic meters/year), flowing into the Dead Sea is totalling 1,850 billion cubic meters/year of which 1/4 comes from Israel and three quarters from the neighbouring Arab states, parties that share the hydrological heritage of Jordan in varying degrees, and for which there is a constant state of tension and competition. This continuous "water war" between Israel and its neighbours could not be fully ever resolved, especially following the rejection by the Arab League Council in 1955 of the Johnston Plan, which stated the Jordan's water sharing between the riverside states as: Jordan - 52 %, Israel - 36%, Syria - 9%, Lebanon - 3%; and so these weights were generally met, however silent and customary.[20] So far, no other regional partition agreement was adopted, each of the riverside entities developing their own exploitation projects of aquifers resources and their relationships with neighbours on this issue.

The most complex relationship is the Israeli-Jordanian one for sharing the river resources, where the water volume provided by Jordan is twice the volume of other Israeli available water and triple the other water sources available in Jordan. In this way, it conditions life not only in Israel, but in Jordan and West Bank also, an aspect that shows the amplitude of the dispute and competition between the Arabs and the Israelis regarding the preemptive use of Jordanian water. In the context of the pressing conflicts with Israel in the '50s and '60s, the Hashemite Kingdom built on the Jordan Valley, since 1957, the Ghor channel with a 110 km length, parallel to the river, supplied with water by its tributary, the Yarmuk through a separating point toward the channel located a few kilometres

upstream from the limit of the Israeli possession in the Golan Heights. The Jordanian state managed by this inspired hydro-technical work to obtain a capitalization advance of a part of Yarmuk flow at the expense of Israeli side. In response, Israel has built its own water exploitation system, under the National Water Carrier started in 1964, which takes between 400-500 billion water cubic meters / year from Tiberias Lake supplying throughout a pipeline network Israel to Negef desert. This is a response solution to the Jordanian project, through which Israel extracts a massive volume of water that no longer reaches the Jordan's perimeter.[21]

After occupying the Golan Heights in 1967, Israel blocked the Arab project to build a link by which the water of higher Jordan (upstream of Lake Kinneret) would be directed to the Yarmuk, with the purpose of depleting the lake from which the Jewish state extracted the above specified volume of water and would also secure an exclusive supply for Ghor channel from the Jordan. Also after the 1967 war Israel gained the monopoly of exploiting the rich groundwater from the West Bank – 475 billion cubic meters / year which provides a quarter of Israel's necessary water consumption.

With the occupation of the Golan Heights, Israel started to control two of the Jordan's emissaries, namely the rivers Dan and Banias, and, after occupying Lebanon's southern strip in 1978, gained the total control over the Jordan's sources by holding the third emissary, too – the River Hasbani in southern Lebanon. In this context, the Israeli authorities have even tried to increase the water volume flowing on Jordan, from Lebanon, by attempting to build a hydraulic pipe to drain the Lebanese Litani river toward the Hasbani tributary, but the project was unfinished till the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000. Among the 1967's war consequences could be mentioned Syria's deprivation of two important waters, respectively the phreatic aquifer in the area of the Golan Heights and Lake Tiberias.

Also, there are lacustrine perimeters which retain their protective limes' character amid political and territorial disputes: according to the territorial waters principle, the Dead Sea is divided between Jordan (50% of the aquatic), West Bank territory (about 1/3) and Israel (15%), and the eastern shore of lake Kinneret is a segment of the official border between Israel and Syria; however, in reality, it separates Israel from the Golan territory, which

was occupied by Israel in 1967[22].

The fact is that, taking into account the increased climatic drying of the last years, the growing of water scarcity is an obvious phenomenon in the near future, which will enhance the hydro-political differences between Israel and its Arab neighbours, given that Israel already needs 800 billion cubic meters water/year supplementation, and Jordan 500, which will lead to an increasing geopolitical water resources importance in the Arab world and will also be a vulnerability to its security, involving managing this risk as not to lead to other conflicts.[23]

The current lack of water resources as a catalyst for crises and conflicts

In 2011, in the context of "Arab Spring", poverty, repression, decades of injustice and mass unemployment have all been cited as main causes of political convulsions in the Middle East and North Africa. But a less recognized cause of riots in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen and Jordan has been the rising food prices, directly linked to a growing water crisis.

The various states of the Arab world, stretching from the Atlantic coast to Iraq, have some of the world's largest oil reserves, but this hides the fact that they occupy the most hyper-arid areas; rivers are few, water demand is increasing as populations grow, underground reserves are declining and almost all depend on imported food which is now trading at record prices. [24]

For a region whose populations will double to nearly 600 million over the next 40 years [25], and where the climate change will trigger temperatures' increases, these structural problems are political dynamite and are already destabilizing countries, as shown by the World Bank, United Nations and other independent studies.

In the future, the main geopolitical resource in the Middle East will be water rather than oil. Water is a fundamental part of the social contract in the Middle Eastern countries. Together with subsidized food and fuel, governments provide cheap or even free water to ensure the consent of the governed, but when subsidized foods have been cut, instability has followed soon.

The role of water has been underestimated by the international actors, but will be reviewed, as the problems will get worse as the Arab countries depend on other countries for their food security.

In 2008-2009, the Arab countries' food imports cost 30 billion dollars[26]. Then rising prices caused waves of rioting and left millions of unemployed and impoverished in Arab countries. The paradox of Arab economies is that they depend on oil prices, while increased energy prices make their food more expensive.

The region's most insecure country in terms of water and food is Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, which receives less than 200 cubic meters of water per person a year – well below the international water poverty line of 1,000 m³ – and must import 80-90% of its food.[27] Two internal conflicts have broken out in Yemen and the capital was rocked by riots. There is thus a clear link between the high food price and tensions. Drought, population and water scarcity are aggravating factors. The pressure on natural resources and land is becoming greater.

Jordan is not faring much better, experts believing that water demand will double in the next 20 years and will suffer water shortages because of population growth and the long-lasting dispute with Israel. Water consumption per capita will decline from 200 m³ per person to 91m³ in the next 30 years.[28]

Palestine and Israel fiercely dispute their fragile water resources. In 1919, the Zionist delegation went at the Paris Peace Conference stating that the Golan Heights, the Jordan valley, what is now known as the West Bank, as well as Lebanon's Litani river were "essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have the control of its rivers and their source waters". In the 1967 war, Israel gained exclusive control of the waters of the West Bank and the Sea of Galilee, although not the Litani. Those resources – the West Bank's mountain aquifer and the Sea of Galilee – give Israel about 60% of its fresh water, a billion cubic metres per year. Heated arguments rage about the rights to the mountain aquifer. Israel and Israeli settlements take about 80% of the aquifer's flow, leaving the Palestinians with 20%.[29] Palestinians say they are prevented from using their own water resources by a belligerent military power, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to buy water from their occupiers at inflated prices. Moreover, Israel allocates to its citizens, including those living in settlements in the West Bank deemed illegal under international law, between three and five times more water than the Palestinians. This, Palestinians say, is crippling to their agricultural economy. Not surprisingly, during the era of Arab-Israeli peacemaking in the 1990s, water rights became one of the trickiest areas of discussion[30] and will be a major issue in the future projects that will aim at achieving peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Algeria and Tunisia, along with the seven emirates in the UAE, Morocco, Iraq and Iran are all in "water deficit" – using far more than they receive in rain or snowfall. Libya has spent $20bn pumping unreplenishable water from deep wells in the desert, but has no idea how long the resource will last; the Saudi Arabian water demand has increased by 500% in 25 years and is expected to double again in 20 years. But only UAE has started to build the world's largest underground reservoir, with 26,000,000m³ of desalinated water, which will store enough water for 90 days when completed.[31]

Conclusions

In conclusion, we can say that when considering the geopolitics of the current Arab world and particularly in the Middle East, water has become an important element of the governments' strategies of the local regimes.

Water conflicts are present all over in the Arab world: the rivalries for groundwater use, the Jordan waters and tributaries, whose basin is shared by four countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, as well as the Litani River water use – all represent a challenge to their national security. As an economic problem, water is a matter of national or international policy, and like oil, water could become a reason for peace or war, and, more than any other peace process that would address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it must mainly take into account the settlement of the water issue. Thus, it can be considered that water resources play an important role for ensuring security and stability to a country and solutions should be found for managing potential water crisis, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, whereas the lack of these resources overlapped onto other crises triggering factors may lead to the inflammation of a regional complex that could have repercussions throughout the world.

In these circumstances, we can consider that the blue gold can lead to tensions, as it did in the

past, or even to lead to future wars, which may not necessarily have a strictly military sense if counteracting strategies will be built for possible water crisis.

Thus, as water needs are growing, the international community should focus on finding joint solutions, because water requirements are interdependent and it seems that these cross even the political boundaries, in this regard being necessary to impose an improved conservation and recycling of resources and investment in desalination plants and other advanced techniques. On the other hand, it is necessary to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, because improving the general political atmosphere will create a cooperation climate between neighbouring countries on the water problem and so the old enemies can become partners and thus will ensure a stable environment in the area.

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WHAT HAS NOT BEEN SAID
AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN CHICAGO

Iulian ALISTAR, PhD*

NATO summit in Chicago has fixed EU's role in the context of NATO - EU strategic partnership and opened a process of reflection on cooperation with new global powers that emerge in the geopolitical complex equation configuring in the Asia-Pacific region.

The shifting attention of the US to Asia-Pacific will implicitly involve NATO, US having no interest to act unilaterally, but in cooperation and supported by NATO's credibility and prestige and the politico-military capital of its Member States, especially when it has to confront two emergent global powers such as China and India.

The raise of new economic powers in Asia foment the US and NATO's (its Member States') attention and the fact that states from the region tend to play an important role in the future global politics is an argument strong enough to start develop bilateral relations with them, including through the NATO partnership policy. NATO interest for the region matches the current imperative to stabilize Afghanistan and protect against terrorism, drug trafficking and religious extremism (previously generated form criminal elements accommodated in this state), but also to the intention of cooperation with countries in a region characterized by emerging states that may have a major contribution in preventing and diminishing the new security and global threats (terrorism, illegal migration, human traffic and corruption, economic crisis, climate change, proliferation...etc.). In this context, NATO relations with Australia, New Zeeland, South Koreea, Japan, China or India has also a direct effect in preserving and building security.

Key-words: geopolitics; geostrategic; cooperative security; partnership.

1. The transatlantic partnership in the light of the NATO Chicago Summit

The NATO Summit in Chicago (20 – 21 May 2012) has strengthened the Euro-Atlantic partnership and confirmed the imperative need for cooperation among Allies in order to face the new security threats of the 2020 horizon and beyond.

The transatlantic relation has been consolidated in Chicago, where Allied nations reaffirmed their commitment to continue and sustain the NATO transformation process and develop organization's efficiency in a globalized world. Under this strategic end state, NATO members stressed the need for coordination and complementarities of their political and military actions and put forward an ambitious plan as basis for their future and practical cooperation[1].

Firstly, the NATO Chicago Summit revealed the political will of member states to unify their efforts and work together in order to surpass the present economical crisis that reflects on military aspects

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as well and, secondly, it pointed out the lines of further joint actions. In this respect, the Allies have agreed to develop and materialize the various multinational initiatives previously proposed and activated under the "Smart defense"[2] (SD) concept, and to implement the Defense Package[3], namely a series of military measures aimed to boost the Alliance defense capacity and reach the "NATO Force 2020"[4] objective by which NATO looks to be better equipped (technologically) and trained for the next decade. In Chicago the Allies also emphasized their determination to make operational the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Europe[5].

While this political commitment was necessary to strengthen, determine and orient on a long range the military cooperation among the allied states, by analyzing the NATO - EU relation, in Chicago has been projected another layer of desired synergy in order to tighten the transatlantic link. Accordingly, it has been underscored the unique and special nature of the NATO - EU partnership that, beyond reciprocal political support of the two organizations, should become relevant on military dimension as well. NATO and EU should put together resources, the Alliance should be involved and cooperate closer with the European Defense Agency and projects within SD and those from EU similar "*pooling and sharing*"[6] initiative should complement each other and develop jointly, when feasible, in order to boost the NATO/EU military industrial sector.

NATO - EU enhanced military cooperation is seen as an important vector to sustain a durable transatlantic bond and a way to foster cohesiveness between the two organizations, based on common security interests. One strategic objective in this respect is planning and harmonization of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) complementarily with NATO as to avoid redundant effects of projects and/or initiatives developed separately, independently, outside of this strategic partnership. It should be understood on this matter that NATO commitment to support Afghanistan post-2014 and the operationalization of the BMD project in Europe, two major projects and US/NATO's top priorities, cannot be achieved without political support from EU and its member states.

We appreciate that the Chicago Summit has fixed the coordinates for the NATO - EU political and military cooperation and communicated

NATO's expectations to this important and strategic partner, emphasizing on the necessity that EU should develop and consolidate its own military capabilities.

The summit declaration underlined EU should have the capacity to manage more efficiently the crisis situations in Europe and its proximity and asserted the importance of the fact that NATO states which are non-EU members, should be involved as to enhance EU defense capacity and foster success of its security initiatives[7]. The usage of this language has political implications and might suggest EU should be more opened, for example, towards Turkey, a state of great value for NATO, who may offer a comparable contribution within CSDP context, if accepted as EU member. In parallel, on the occasion of the Atlantic Council Conference (May 14) it has been suggested that a representative of Turkey[8] should take over from the current NATO Secretary General, thus recognizing the increased role of this state in contemporary international management of crisis and conflicts, especially when actions are required in proximity of EU (Mediterranean and Middle East areas).

It seems that the US considers the enhancement of EU military capacity a necessary instrument to reduce NATO effort in Europe and to facilitate a focus on global issues and on the region of strategic interest: ASIA-PACIFIC. Having said that, it is possible that we will soon witness a revitalization of discussions in respect to the establishment of one permanent EU Operational Headquarters[9], new dynamics in regard to the British - French military partnership, with Italy as new potential partner, and further debates looking to develop cooperation between different military regional initiatives in Europe, for example the Visegrad and Weimar groups. These are normal things to follow and necessary in order to boost the EU capacity for crisis management as to be able to share the burden of NATO/US security responsibility over Europe.

Although after Chicago Summit still persists a series of problems and tensions between Allies, derived from postponing the decision with respect to reduction of the US nuclear arsenal in Europe[10], lack of clarification on what will be a proportional participation to the Alliance common budget and operations or in regard to member states' access to the military capabilities developed and financed in cooperation[11], it was clearly articulated that the

US and NATO remain the main guarantors for European security.

NATO Chicago Summit has also stressed on the importance of diplomacy and dialogue conducted internally, inside the Alliance, and externally, with other partners, states and/or international organizations. Diplomacy and political dialogue are part of the same strategy (to maintain cohesion and NATO relevance) and represents viable instruments to prevent various security threats and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and outside of it, as presently NATO is accepting its role as "a modern, flexible and Global Security Alliance"[12].

2. Global NATO and its projections into Asia-Pacific

With its presence in Afghanistan[13], the recent mission in Iraq[14] and military operation in Libya[15], with support given to African Union[16] and deployment of one maritime Task Force against pirates from Somalia[17], NATO reveal itself as one credible and important actor in support of the international management of crisis and conflict, expanding its role by acting globally.

NATO maintains its focus on the Euro-Atlantic region, reaffirming and reassuring Member States in respect to the security guarantees it provides under the provisions of art. 5 from the North Atlantic Treaty, but will extend its area of operation/interest as is developing like a global security Alliance. In the context of hybrid character of the conflicts in contemporary and asymmetric threats (terrorism, piracy, non-proliferation, cyber attacks…etc) NATO is an Alliance in transformation who's missions is no longer limited to its territorial defense and has the opportunity to remain geopolitical relevant only if is going to act as part of an extended security net, a global one. There are opinions which suggest NATO should not become a "global policeman"[18] but should be active and capable to react and defend global peace and security. NATO should be able to intervene in order to defend its strategic interests and international stability. Italy considers that future NATO, in the 10 years from now, should become more involved and responsive in front of unpredictable and uncertain international context getting beyond the limits of comfortable but restrictive conception "of defense, waiting to be attacked" as this approach

means more an involution and return to the Cold War period.[19]

NATO decided in Lisbon (2010) to embrace and implement the so call cooperative security[20] as one of its core tasks, and is acting today in cooperation with UN and other international organizations in order to maintain regional peace and stability in Europe[21] but also to prevent risks and deter threats to the international peace and security and foster stabilization in other regions which are not into its traditional area of responsibility, but constitutes priorities of security interests. Within the modern paradigm of comprehensive approach, proposed on the occasion of Bucharest summit (2008), subsequently viewed as an important objective at Lisbon (2010)[22] and reinforced at Chicago (2012)[23], NATO is acting today globally through a series of partnerships and bilateral agreements developed with various states and international organizations. This partnership net supports NATO's geopolitics both concerning the consolidation of transatlantic bonds and the projection of its interests in relation with states from other regions (currently and in the future of strategic interest being Asia-Pacific).

The US shifting interest to the Pacific will have consequences and, in fact, we may see a pivot of the US/NATO towards this new area of strategic importance. The US is very unlikely to act unilaterally in this respect but in cooperation and supported by the influence, credibility and politico-diplomatic strengths of NATO (and its Member States) especially when confronting with rising global powers such as China and India.

The emerging states in Asia-Pacific have drew the US attention, as well as that of other NATO Member States and the fact that some tend to become important actors within global politics is one strong enough motive trying to develop relations, including through the perspective of the Alliance's partnership policy and actions.

NATO initiatives in Asia-Pacific:
➢   initiation of cooperation with China (in 2012) [24];
➢   projecting cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and India[25];
➢   developing cooperation with Japan, South Korea and New Zeeland[26];
➢   developing a strategic partnership with Australia. In order to underline the importance of its strategic partnership with NATO, Australia has established, in 2012, the position of Australian

ambassador at NATO HQ in Brussels[27], and, on the occasion of Chicago Summit, Australia and NATO have issued a Joint Political Declaration aiming to increase cooperation within an Individual Partnership Cooperation Program.

NATO accepted the idea that only through an extended partnership[28] will be able to answer efficiently in front of multiple challenges of the future, where security risks becomes hybrid and are going to rise not only from evolutions into military domain, but also from evolutions within economic, environment or social dimensions.

NATO's interest for Asia – Pacific match the current imperative to stabilize Afghanistan and protect as such against terrorism, drug trafficking and religious extremist phenomena previously generated by criminal elements accommodated in this state, but also with the intention of cooperation in a region characterized by emergence of states that may have major contribution in worldwide efforts to prevent and diminish new risks and global threats to security (terrorism, climate change, illegal trafficking, economic crisis, proliferation…etc).

Close relations between NATO and states such as Australia, New Zeeland, South Korea, Japan or China and India, that are considered to be able to significantly influence the global politics in the future, has implicit effects on preserving security.

New security risks will require a more diplomatic approach and less military, in which respect, presently, the Alliance actions in order to be present in the complex equation that is configuring in Asia-Pacific, based on security, economic and geopolitical interests of its member states.

3. Challenges for Romania

The internally oriented policies and concerns in regard to the necessity to continue to enhance state's progress and prosperity must be paralleled by at least an equal effort and concern related to the projection of national foreign policy and foreign affairs, that can and should produce prosperity as well. By the capacity and ability of our strategists to plan, project and follow national interests abroad depends the future of our state in a world where fight for resources and influence has winners and privileged populations and, by consequence, losers and underprivileged populations.

In the above mentioned context, Romania should identify opportunities to fulfill its national objectives understanding the dynamics of international relations. Developing bilateral cooperation with states from Asia-Pacific, including through military cooperation, being prepared to contribute and actively support the promotion of NATO's interests in that region concurrently with keeping the US/NATO's interest on its proximity and extended region of the Black Sea are equally important for Romania.

From military perspective, one challenge is to identify "niche capabilities" which should complete and/or complement NATO's needs within complex operational environment of today and future and to identify a possible niche for military cooperation with states in Asia-Pacific, either in the area of training of security forces and/or provision of military equipment.

Developing the military intelligence domain and military diplomacy covering Asia-Pacific area is also important and, at the same time, could be a futile instrument serving the national interest and NATO's as well.

And last but not least, it is of paramount importance to plan and sustain economically any national strategy/interest related to Asia-Pacific and further to project national economic interest in the region.

Conclusions

NATO Summit in Chicago was not focused on the enlargement process, but it consolidated the NATO - EU relation and dismayed any suspicions over the possible erosion of the transatlantic link, especially between the US and its European allies. This impression of erosion has been fostered based on the critiques done by the US administration's officials[29], who emphasized the reality that US is contributing disproportionately to the NATO common budget and NATO missions[30]. To this point, the multinational projects developed under the "Smart defense" initiative come to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic cooperation and represents a direct effect of the above mentioned critiques aiming as such to solve the problem of NATO's critical military capability gaps and reduce Alliance's dependence from the US, especially in regard to ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) assets.

At Chicago there has been emphasized the NATO and EU special partnership and expressed some guidance in respect to what EU should do

within this partnership. If EU enhances its military and becomes more independent and efficient in handling alone over stability and security issues in Europe and its proximity, this would give US the possibility to follow its strategic interests in Asia-Pacific, where is seen the growing importance of China and India. In this future geopolitical confrontation, the US understood that they should not act in isolation, but together with two major allies, NATO and EU. Under this strategic partnership, it is possible the US will sway NATO to continue to display a military global projection (see in conjunction *Operation Active Endeavour* in the Mediterranean See and *Operation Ocean Shield* in the Indian Ocean) and expand its area of operation to the Pacific. In this context, Australia is one major ally which supports NATO cooperation with Member States of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on subjects of common interest, such as humanitarian assistance, fighting against terrorism, non-proliferation, maritime security, cyber security and so on. This potential of an extended cooperation in Asia-Pacific, stabilization of Afghanistan and building a bridgehead in the Central Asia, initiation of partnership with Mongolia[31] and NATO relations with states from the region confirms the Alliance's interest to enable this geostrategy. This interest is swayed more or less by the US and equally related to the more often asserted idea that NATO is a security organization that should act globally.

So far, the involvement in Afghanistan, in Libya and, to a lesser extant, the BMD project in Europe, show that NATO strongly supports international peace and security efforts, but the strategic interests of the US as well.

On the other hand, at Chicago, NATO was asking EU to act efficiently in order to maintain security and stability in Europe and its proximity as this indirectly will permit the US to focus differently and shift its politico-military effort. We appreciate that NATO summit in Chicago has fixed the EU role within NATO partnership and opened a process of reflection on the way ahead and the need of cooperation with new global emergent powers following the strategic interest of the US in Asia-Pacific.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the US interest is convergent with the EU`s interest, especially one developed by the strong economies of Germany, France or United Kingdom, which may identify new market places in an economically growing region.

The US interest in Asia-Pacific strengthen indirectly the Euro-Atlantic relation, the US - NATO partnership and US partnership with EU, this being beneficial to the US who, including through the third parties (NATO/EU) and military diplomacy exercised by NATO, can follow its interests into the region. Just because of this, the US should tightly cooperate with NATO and EU and their Member States in order to counterbalance the increasing influence of arising regional and global powers.

In the background of Russia's geopolitical come-back, we also appreciate the US will continue to give special attention to NATO, as this alliance is still relevant and is seen as a buffer zone against Moscow's influence in Europe.

In the last and recent NATO operations, some smaller allies (Denmark, Norway or the Netherlands) had a substantial contribution in Afghanistan or Libya and this enhanced their prestige and influence within NATO. In the context of the US pivotal interest to Asia-Pacific, it is expected that some allies support and participate along, exploiting any strategic opportunities. By doing this, the respective states will be able to negotiate their interests in a region that reportedly will be a hub for the global commerce, in bilateral relation they have with the US and inside NATO.

The rhythm of NATO orientation to the Pacific region is slow and presently hampered by the economic crisis in Europe, the events from the Middle East which retain Alliance's attention for the time being, and by the institutional capacity and expertise NATO should develop as to efficiently approach, interact and cooperate with states from the region.

NOTES:

1 In reference to the NATO *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, Press Release (2012) 064, 20 May 2012.

2 Concept launched by NATO Secretary general on the occasion of Security Conference in Munchen (2011).

3 See *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, op. cit., art.12.

4 See *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, op. cit.

5 NATO *Chicago Summit Declaration*, Press Release (2012) 062, 20 May 2012, art. 60.

6 See http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/

docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129161.pdf.

7 NATO Chicago *Summit Declaration*, op. cit., art. 20.

8 On www.acus.org/exent/anchoring-alliance-report-launch.

9 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html.

10 Albeit the NATO Deterrence and Defence Review reaffirms that NATO will remain a "nuclear Alliance", a decision must be taken in the next decade in regard to the deployment of the 180 nuclear sub-strategic warheads of US currently hosted in Europe as some states are reluctant to host them in the future (Germany, Netherlands). See George Perkovich, Malcolm Chalmers, Steven Pifer, Paul Schulte, Jaclyn Tandler, *Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit. Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO*, The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2012.

11 There are opinions that regard *Smart defence* as an initiative without many practical results. See http://174.122.28.120/event/atlantic-councilforeign-policy-survey-future-nato and http://174.122.28.120/event/nato-chicago-summit-outcomes-and-way-ahead.

12 *NATO: a modern, flexible and Global Security Alliance*, International Conference, May 07, Madrid, Spain, 2012, available on www.youtube.com/watch?v=g/AB/BgTV57I.

13 In reference to ISAF operation.

14 In reference to NATO Training Mission in Iraq (closed in December 2011).

15 In reference to NATO operation "Unified Protector".

16 In reference to NATO support for the African mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

17 In reference to NATO mission "Ocean Shield".

18 See http://www.acus.org/files/fpsurveyimg/3_.jpg.

19 Giampaolo Di PAOLA, *NATO SMART DEFENCE AGENDA. The challenge of implementation*, Rome, Italy, April 26, 2012. (See on http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&contentid=756). See also www.174.122.28.120/event/atlantic-councilforeign-policy-survey-future-nato.

20 See NATO *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,* Lisbon, 2010, art. 4.

21 See KFOR mission in Kosovo.

22 See NATO *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, 20 Nov. 2010, art. 2.

23 In reference to the cooperative security that basically put into practice the comprehensive approach concept. See *CHICAGO Summit Declaration*, op. cit., art. 2.

24 On 13-15.02.2012 has been conducted the first NATO visit in China. (See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_84305.htm.

25 On the official NATO web page, these states are identified as possible partners for dialogue and cooperation.

26 NATO develops with every each of them bilateral relations and cooperate on specific issues including on issues related to their participation on ISAF mission in Afghanistan. These states were also invited and participated at NATO Chicago summit. On the official NATO web site those states are nominated as "partners across the globe".

27 Previously, Australia had appointed a special representative at NATO.

28 This is reflected both in the new NATO Strategic concept and the *Chicago Summit Declaration*.

29 In reference to the critiques of the former US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, addressed to NATO, see http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/10/world/la-fg-gates-nato-20110611.

30 The US provides approximately 77% from the NATO budget and, during the NATO operation in Lybia has been illustrated the Allies dependency on the US logistics and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.

31 NATO *Chicago Summit Declaration,* op.cit., art. 22.

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING SOVEREIGNTY CONCEPT IN THE CURRENT EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Mihai-Ştefan DINU, PhD*

The new international context became increasingly complex, on the background of the 2008 financial crisis. European states must face more complex situations which – in addition with the limitations imposed by the austerity budget – revealed, more than ever, the existent differences of opinion amidst European Union states. Most of these differences are based on the reason of sovereignty as it is perceived by every Member State.

Key-words: European Union; sovereignty; state; sovereignty; transfer; cultural identity, religion; security.

1. Sovereignty – foundation of state's action on the international stage

States are the main actors on the international stage. This is one of the most stated opinions – with differences related to grammar and topics – in the analyses and studies issued in political science domain. There are frequently analyzed issues related to domestic, foreign or regional policy, to political and military organizations and alliances, and less frequently the characteristics that allowed statal entities to be the main actor of international relations. In order to approach the issue proposed in the main title of this article, the sovereignty concept in the present-day European context, our analysis will be a multidisciplinary one, covering historical, cultural, religious or legal issues, as well as security and defence issues.

1.1. The emergence and evolution of sovereignty concept

Historically, the sovereignty concept first appears in Jean Bodin writings[1]. Obviously, Bodin's approach reflected his time reality, in his attempt to establish legal basis for the King of France, to support his royal power. The subject of Bodin's legal argumentation is era specific, but its content survived history until nowadays based on the fact that it succeeded to legitimize the King's actions by the rule of law in his tense internal relations with the feudal hierarchy, on the one hand, and externally with the papal authority. Under these circumstances, Jean Bodin demonstrates that the monarch sovereignty presents a dual feature: internally (sovereignty within state territory) and externally (state sovereignty). Published under the „Les six livres de la république", in France, 1576, Bodin's writings seemed to have a strong impact on the realities of an era characterized by frequent religious wars. Our affirmation is based

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on the fact that almost a century later, Westphalia Treaties (Osnabruck and Munster Treaties) are signed, ending a war with a pregnant religious nature, a war also known as *The Thirty Years War*. Beside ending a war the mentioned treaties have a double significance: they stated political and religious independence of the monarch from papal authority, which had immediate effect on the existent political order at that time, and on the other hand, the sovereignty and equality of states were promoted as central principles that guide the states interactions in international relations, their use adding new regulations on inter-states relations, namely the recognition of sovereign power of the state on its territory and its independence from any external force.

The nation-state as we all know it today succeeded to become, on the European continent, the main political institution, only after the French Revolution. As a consequence of the decline of multinational and colonial empires after the two World Wars, the nation-state became the normative model in international relations, dominating the political world scene. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and especially from the French Revolution (1789), the emergence of nation-states and their rise as main actors in international relations was a manifestation of their sovereignty, the establishment of the modern nation-states being supported by the claim of being sovereign, and according to this claim in relations they developed each other no state obeys to a higher power.

The beginning of the XXth century brings along with it the premises for the first transformations of the norms that regulated states' relations. Thus, after the end of The First World War, it is founded the League of Nations, a first attempt on establishing an international organization which major objective, was to maintain peace at a global level. The formation of this organization represented the emergence of a new type of actor on the international scene, namely an actor that tried to regulate the quality of inter-state relations with the declared aim to maintain world peace and security. After The Second World War, League of Nations is transformed in United Nations Organization. During the period after the Second World War, a series of politic, economic and military organizations emerged on the international scene. Their presence lead to new regulations regarding the international relations,

the regulations that attempted to settle down the previous strong rivalries relations between free and sovereign states being transformed in order to act for every state interest by promoting collaboration in the framework of internationally or regionally organized communities of states.

1.2. Current reality

Thus, the reality of the XXIst century imposed on the European scene two major organizations: European Community, the today's European Union (EU), organization which primary objectives were in the economic cooperation domain, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), political-military organization which objectives continued to be placed in the security and defence domain.

The events occurring these last few decades, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War, have triggered significant interactions on the international stage.

At the European level, new states emerged, either by the dismantling of federal states such as Yugoslavia, or by the unification of other states, such as Germany.

In this context, favoured by the changes occurring on Europe's political map, new alliance systems have emerged too, as well as new political and ideological options which the newly-emerged states or – as was the case of the ex-communist states of South-East Europe – those exiting the sphere of influence of one of the two former Cold War combatants, have found expression in order to strengthen their national security.

Being concerned with increasing their level of national and regional security, most of the European states have thus chosen membership to some supra-state organizations, NATO- or EU-type organizations. Obviously, the reasons for adherence to each of the two organizations matched different interests, depending on each state's security needs. There have been states which chose to become members of both organizations, states which chose NATO membership to strengthen the military dimension of their security, and states which chose EU membership to contain their economic vulnerabilities and automatically to increase their economic security level.

In time, the increased complexity of the security environment, as well as the emergence of new non-state actors, have led to new political phenomena, movements of ethnic or religious groups to occur,

which has further caused the need for the supra-state alliances and organizations – to which most of the European states adhered – to adapt.

The need to adjust to the complexities of the new security environment has caused the international relations structure to undergo changes, in the sense that a supra-state alliance or organization member status has come to presuppose to a certain extent, at least in the EU Member States' case, what most of the experts in political sciences and international relations have called decision-making power transfer/sovereignty transfer from the state, national level to the supra-state, EU communitarian level.

If we take into account the fact that to carry out some important tasks of the modern state – e.g. maintaining the currency stability, the external trade balance, the correction of economic cycles, tax collection for public activities funding, obedience of national laws, public security – is almost impossible under certain circumstances which the state cannot control (i.e., stock exchange crash, ecological disasters, terrorist acts, weapons of mass destruction, arm, illegal drug and human trafficking), the tendency to unify the force of states seems fully justified in order to attempt to stop or at least slow down these negative circumstances by means of joint actions. The effects of globalization have caused to use some sovereign joint competences until not long ago used exclusively by the state; this has further led to reconsideration of the concept of state sovereignty itself, and of the state's duties, functions and objectives.

Where the states were once the market masters, it is now the markets which, in many core matters, lead the national governments. The progressive integration of the world economy, through international production, has shifted the balance of power from the states to the international markets. The decrease of the states' authority is reflected by an increasing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, to regional organisms, as well as to an increasing asymmetry between the larger and the smaller countries.

Faced with this sovereignty transfer, the EU member countries reacted differently, depending either on internal mechanisms of European legislation adoption, or on reasons which might be interpreted as nationalist or protectionist; this is, in fact, one of the premises of the present project, motivated by the perception that the stability and

coordination of the EU integration and operation presupposes, by the decision-making power transfer to the super-state level, to harm the main feature of any state – namely to limit its sovereignty. The latest series of events inside the EU, related to strengthening the economic stability at EU level, have revealed (more than intended) this type of reactions, the signing of the fiscal stability treaty being a meaningful example. Another meaningful example is Great Britain's behaviour, upon the December 2011 EU Summit. Based on its strongly asserted identity in the defence area, considering itself NATO's leading European member, and one of the leading actors in the European foreign policy area, through the voice of Prime Minister David Cameron, the British state isolates itself from the European economic system stating[2]: We are not, though, in the single currency area, and we do not want to be, either; we are not in the free circulation Schengen area, which makes me glad, for we do not want to use our borders to protect ourselves from illegal immigration, arms and illegal drugs. Upon the same occasion, Hungary's initial reaction is noteworthy, voiced by its Prime Minister Viktor Orban, in which the latter considers he is "not mandated to give up the sovereignty of the country"[33].

We believe these reactions were possible because, traditionally, one of the state's essential attributes is its inalienable right to freely apply its laws without any interference from another state (the organization and operation of the political system, the relationships between the society-state-citizen, the personal and patrimonial relationships among the individuals, etc., by means of the legal norms), and tradition is at least at the level of European states, an issue belonging to the national historical memory, memory that resides within the national values core, that core being the source of national identity.

2. Hypotheses on the attitudes regarding sovereignty transfer from state level to supra-state level

There is how reality provides us with arguments that could prove the existence of a certain resistance at the national level when it comes in discussion the sovereignty transfer from state level to supra-state level. Which is the nature of justification

Figure no. 1. Influence of religion on the sovereignty transfer process[55]

behind this resistance attitude? In order to answer this question, we will attend to enounce some hypotheses.

First in line is the economic motivation, that could constitute a very sensitive issue, especially when some of the states with superior GDP could expect a down grade of their income following the reallocation of resources towards states with a low level of GDP. Through cooperation and political will, this sensitive issue can be eliminated by establishing economic and financial instruments adequately regulated by the European legislative forum.

We also believe that, from legally point of view, there are no major contradictions between the national process of sovereignty transfer from popular level – through vote or referendum – towards the elected representatives of the public authorities (Presidency, Parliament etc.) i.e. towards state's institutions. Similarly, at the European level, every nation is represented at the legislative level in the European Parliament and at the executive level also, the European Commission being consisted of one representative of each Member State.

Despite this level of representation, the needed political and social level of cohesion, in order to exceed the current critical moments, is not yet fulfilled. The desideratum of European leaders regarding the European citizen proud of his country

and also of European values, delays its fulfilment although if we analyze it through the lens of values, a solution may rise to the horizon.

As we previously noted, every EU Member State is represented both in legislative and executive structures of European Union. Consequently, every European state contributes equally to the European decisional process, through their elected representatives. The mentality of each of those representatives is the product of national culture they represent. Hence, we introduce by our hypothesis the cultural identity variable element.

The identification with a particular culture could create a strong sense of belonging, providing a sense of security. The identity is important for the perception of self, meantime constituting for individuals[44], a source of understanding and experience regarding the perception of the world around. There is how could mould the way an individual interact with other individuals or groups. Considering the tumultuous European history and the context sovereign concept emerged in, we think that it is significant to write down the role of religion as being the factor with strongest influence on the reticent attitude with which the process of sovereignty transfer is faced.

In order to support and clarify our hypothesis, we presented in a plotting chart (Figure no. 1) on

Figure no. 2. Distribution spaces of the three major Christian confessions across European continent.

how religion reaches to influence the process of sovereignty transfer towards a supra-state political entity.

Based on this hypothesis, the current tensions between political and economic requirements of European integration, on the one hand, and the conservative and normative force of national values, on the other hand, is to be reconsidered from the perspective of the influence exercised by the major religious doctrines spread across the territories of different Member States of European Union.

Conclusions

Various models of state-religion relationship existing across EU Member States covers a large series of variants, from total separation of religion and state, as it is the case of France or Netherlands, to the existence of national churches, in UK, Finland and Greece, each of those sharing a particular core values. That is why our opinion states that future European approaches on integration must start considering this particular core values. An additional argument to this opinion could be constituted by the graphic representation (Figure no. 2) on the map of the main Christian confessions: catholic, protestant and orthodox. Three major areas are identifiable on this map, each of them corresponding to influence areas of the already mentioned three main Christian confessions existent at European level, the state grouping within this areas as follows:

• Catholic Europe – South-Western Europe[6] states: Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Germany (partially);

• Protestant Europe[7] – Northern and central European states;

• Orthodox Europe – Eastern and South Eastern European states: Romania, Bulgaria, Greece.

We believe that the hypothesis related to sovereignty presented in this article could constitute a starting point towards the understanding of unity through diversity due to the fact that religion corresponds to an identity form that has a strong impact not only within particular groups or communities, but in the political live of a state or region.

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3 Bianca TOMA, *De ce a refuzat Ungaria reforma tratatului UE pentru salvarea euro? Orban: "Nu am mandat să cedez suveranitatea ţării",* Adevărul, 09.12.2011, la www.adevarul.ro.

4 Manuel CASTELLS, *The Power of Identity*, vol.2, Blackwell, Oxford, 1997, 2004, p. 6.

5 Concept and design by the author.

6 To be noticed that in this group alongside France and Germany – considered till the beginning of the financial crisis the engine of the EU – are three of the

states that were included in the PIGS states group, the forth one, Greece being placed in the orthodox area.

7 This group includes states that have either been invited to adhere to the EU, not wanted to adopt or kept reticence about the euro currency. (Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden).

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ASPECTS ON JAPAN'S SECURITY AT THE BEGINNING OF XXI CENTURY

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Japanese were always interested in who they were, who they are and where they came from. It wouldn't be a mistake to search to understand Japan – the country called "The land of the rising sun" – and its people from the regard of some security studies, by presenting some aspects related to this country security at the beginning of XXI century. In this respect, I appreciate there are needed some explanations over the history, economy, science and technology, education and culture of Japan.

Key-words: security; economic dimension; security policy; security strategy; cooperation.

1. Japan – a country unique in the world

Japan lays in Eastern Asia and reveals its uniqueness by its geographic position: it is a country situated into an archipelago formed by about 6,800 isles in the Pacific Ocean and Japanese Sea, East from the Korean peninsula. Honshu Isle from the centre of the archipelago forms with Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokkaido isles what Japanese call *Hondo,* meaning "the core land". It cannot be omitted in this presentation that Japan is situated on the "Pacific Ring of Fire" (that homes 10% of the active volcanoes in the world) and on the intersection of three tectonic plates that overlap: the Eurasian plate in West and North, Philippines' plate in south and the great plate of Pacific in East. By its geographic location perhaps comes also the

official name of Japan, *Nipponkoku*, meaning "The land of the sun's origin" or "The land of the rising sun".

Other aspects I consider bring uniqueness to this country are the legend, the modality of Japanese people formation and the succession of historical epoch: pre-historical epoch, proto-historical epoch and historical epoch.

The legend says Japan was created by gods who threw a sword in the ocean and when it was pulled out, four drops were formed and afterwards they became main isles and a multitude of small isles.

The Japanese are the result of a mixture between Ainu people of unknown origin (recent studies of genetics suggests relations of Ainu people with the Tungusic, Altaic and Uralic from Siberia), with different Malaysian population came from the Southern Pacific, and also mongoloid races came from the Asian continent, from Korea, China or Mongolia[1].

Each three epochs marked the historical evolution of the Nippon state. The pre-historical epoch comprised four periods: Sindai-Jidai and Sendoki Jidai in Palaeolithic, Jomon in-between 7,000 B.C. and 300 B.C. and Yayoi, in-between 300 B.C. and 300 A.D.. The proto-historical epoch, called Yamato or Kofun, lasted 293 years, in-between 300-593 A.D. The historical epoch has many periods of time (Asuka, 593-710; Nara, 710-794; Heian, 794-1192; Kamakura, 1192-1338;

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Muromachi, 1338-1573; Azuchi-Momoyama, 1573-1603; Tokugawa, 1603-1868) and eras (Meiji or the Lightened Leadership, 1868-1912; Taisho or the Great Justice, 1912-1926; Showa or the Lightened Peace, 1926-1989 and Heisei, 1989 - present)[2]. The period comprises the time when ruled more emperors, and it comprises only the ruling of a single emperor.

Speaking about Japan's uniqueness, I cannot omit few aspects related to its current internal organization. Japan's form of government is constitutional monarchy greatly grounded on the British system and the influence of other states from Europe as Germania and France. In conformity with the Constitution, the highest power body in the state is the bicameral Parliament assigned by the Diet, being composed from Representatives Chamber (The Inferior Chamber or Shugi-in) and The Counsellors Chamber (Superior Chamber). The cabinet is composed of a prime-minister and ministries of state being subordinated directly to the Diet. The prime-minister has the power to assign and relieve the ministers, which are compulsorily elected by civilians. A reduced number of parties participates in the Japanese political life: the Japanese Democratic Party, the Japanese Communist Party, Komeito, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party. The Constitution stipulates the sovereignty is in the hands of Japanese people.

The Imperial House lead by the Emperor (Japan is the only country in the world with an Emperor), has as main residence the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. Japan's Constitution defines the emperor as the "symbol of state and people's unity", this executing the ceremonial duties without having any real power either in emergency situations. Japanese peoples worship their emperor and everything connected to him, and their national day gets specific valences that coincide with the emperor's birthday, the past and present of Japan closely being entwined with one of the imperial institution[3].

To that, I add other aspects that sustain, in my regard, the affirmation that Japan is a unique country in the world: national cohesion and national symbols. This country's national cohesion is shown by its administrative organization (8 regions constituted by 47 prefectures), by its ethnical homogeneity (95% of the Japanese live in Japan and the existent minorities do not get

over 1%) and its unity of language. Japanese language is an ancient one, closed to the dialect from Ryukyu (Okinawa) isles, with which forms the community of Japanese languages but it is not part of any known linguistic families. Studying the "Land of rising sun", John Nathan understood the Japanese' insistence over the impenetrability of their language represented an affirmation of their uniqueness.

National Nippon symbols strengthen national cohesion and give a uniqueness note in the world: the national flag, Hi-no-Maru (the flag of the Sun) or Nishoki (the Sun Rising flag) that represents a red circle symbolizing the Sun on a white background; the national hymn (Kimigayo); the chrysanthemum (imperial emblem); the flower of bird cherry (sakura); the celebration festivals and traditions that gain a specific charm; haiku (the Japanese traditional poetry); ikebana or Fuji-san, the sacred mountain of Japan.

Also, the way of behaving of the Japanese people bring a unique note. Its essential characteristics, its ingenious character, its inventive opened spirit avid of science, pragmatic and also sentimental, cheer, always polite, prepared by an assiduous education, by an elegance of expression, fancy, and behaviour[4] determined them no to be a people reticent to the extern immixture which took over, analyzed an assimilated in own manner. Tradition emphasizes this country's uniqueness and occupies a special place in the Japanese society, imposing in all the activity fields, starting with literature, art, religion, way of living and in all other manifestation form of the material and spiritual life. This aspect can be expressed as: to be Japanese means to be a Japanese citizen, born in Japan, living there and speaking the language[5].

Along the years, Japan became one of the most fascinating countries, with a unique culture, faithful to its traditions and with an impressing and inspiring economic development. For many people it is a special country, wherein the advanced forms of machined and electronic civilization ingeniously intertwine with the old, traditional structures.

2. The economic dimension of Japan's security

Japan was aware the economic dimension is a determinant element to provide its national security and a support for all types of security (economic, financial, individual, collective, of institutions,

of state, etc.). Although it is a relatively a small country, 90% mountainous and geographically situated in one of the most active volcanic areas of Pacific, a country without natural wealth or energetic resources and touched by the devastating effects of the atomic bomb, Japan became an economic surprise for the entire world.

In-between 1955-1972, there were registered record economic growths (even about 10% yearly), and in-between 1970-1985, the increase of the industrial production was about 162%, following the agriculture surpassing by the industry.

The exceptional economic fulfilments (complex and highly efficient economy, adaptation to the energetic crises, gain of global market segments and getting in the world's capital markets, etc.) lead to the Japan situation, more then 4 decades, as the second great economic power of the world, after the United States of America.

The complex, refined, advanced and modern Nippon economy by its obtained accomplishments and bold projects initiated is an example, a permanent challenge for a sustainable development, the whole universe well-being and progress, inoculating optimism and trust in the unstoppable power of human. Their own management style, efficient and adaptable to new, rooted after 1970 when Japan proved to the entire world it is the country of performances and high tech.[6]

Japan has a prosperous economy in all main branches (navy industry, electronic industry, energy industry, atomic and geo-thermal energy production, iron and steel industry, etc.) providing 1/5 of industrial production of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. Maybe many persons question, just like me, *which were the secrets standing on the basis of these accomplishments?*

It seems incredible, but the explanation is simple: the human factor (samurai spirit), dynamic of group and the respect of hierarchy and authority, obedience, devotion, modesty and equality, the attachment to the enterprise. These were and remain the ingredients of Japanese economic development.

"The Japanese miracle" owed to the knowledge on quality transmitted by American savants William Edwards Deming and Joseph M. Juran and applied in Japan's program of economic boom after World War II by the accent on high quality of products and the adaptation of American principles of management to the Japanese specific.

The combination of formal and informal managerial elements and also the application of a centralised management from the strategic-tactical regard and strongly decentralized on the operational plan at the economic agents' level brought the contribution to the economic development of Japan.

The economic dynamism also owed to the special attention on scientific research oriented to the growth of the national economy and the commercial expansion on the external markets. Large part of the funds for research and development (about 70%) come from private companies, the other 30% representing allocations of the public budgets (government or different local administrative bodies). The particular attention granted to the scientific research and medical fields and to the technological field transformed Japan in a global leader[7].

Aspects of Japanese system of economic development were copied by other countries; for example, South Korea used the Japanese model of the 1960s and got incredible results in economic growth and competitiveness in certain fields (navy constructions, electronics) but also had similar problems as the Japanese in 1997 meanwhile the financial crisis from Asia[8].

The particular importance given to the economic dimension in providing and maintaining security was not diminished by China surpassing Japan, as the second economic power of the world (in 2010, China's GDP was 7% bigger then of Japan)[9]. In regard to the estimations and forecasts presented on diverse sources of Internet, Japan will occupy for many time, even in 2020, the third place in the economic field, after the United States of America and China.

The human resource, the key of Japan's economic development, became a problem at the beginning of the XXI century, manifested by the decrease of birth rate conjugated with a longer life of inhabitants that trains a rapid aging of population. In compliance to a Nippon Government report publicized in January 2012, Japan's population will decrease with 32,3% between 2010 and 2060 under the circumstances of births decrease, and people aged over 65 years will represent almost 40% from the total, a worrying perspective for this country and its regime of social protection.[10]

The dependence and the access to the energetic resources are reality without possibility to be

ignored in Japan, for the exercitation of influence in the region, and also for the projection of the economic-military power.

The energetic resources of Japan are insufficient, therefore their majority are imported. One of the countries importing oil and gases is Russia, which, in 2011, proposed to Japan to sign in some long lasting contracts on the deliverance of oil and gases by the Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean system and from „Sahalin-1" and „Sahalin-2", and the gas, from the Ceaiandinski and Kovâktinski.

As an alternative to replace the energetic resources, Japan, similar to other states (Israel, Australia, Italia, France), uses solar energy to heat the dwellings and ménage water.

Since 2000, it is seen the rhythm of economic development in Japan slowed down, as consequence of many causes: the aged population and expensive force of labour determined the Japanese companies to orient to more accessible labour markets in Malaysia, Thailand, or Korea; the population following the negative dynamic of prizes became more attentive with the expenses; Japan's Bank did not offer support to the population by decreasing the rate of interest. These causes, to which adds the need for energetic resources, are permanently in the awareness of the Nippon government.

3. The multidimensional approach of Japan's security at the beginning of XXI century

From political and military regards, in the Eastern Asia are seen some aspects: the United States of America have special relations with Japan and South Korea; China is member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); North Korea and Mongolia are observers at SCO; Taiwan, independent since 1949, is the main commercial partner and the privileged destination of Chinese investments; China's president appealed for the reunification of China and Taiwan, on October 10, 2011, when the centenary of revolution in China was celebrated.

At the beginning of XXI century, the main threats against this region's security are considered to be the following:

- North Korea's nuclear arsenal;
- The Sino-Taiwan-Japanese over the divergences Senkaku isles situated to the Southern extremity of the Ryukyu Japanese isles;
- The historical divergences between China - Japan and North Korea - Japan;

- Taiwan issue;
- Energetic security;
- The new non-conventional threats as: terrorism, piracy, ecological and natural disasters, epidemics, etc.

In the present security environment, Japan approaches the multidimensional concept of security considering peace, security and independency can be maintained by efforts of national defence, collaborations with the neighbour countries and regional and international collaborations. It is not a new approach, but this way it sincerely aspires to an international peace grounded on justice and order, the Japanese people renounce forever to the idea of war as sovereign right of nation and to threat with force in solving international disputes[11].

The perennial renounce to the idea of war as sovereign right of the nation and to the threat with force in solving the international disputes is an aspect clearly specified in Japan's Constitution entered into force after the World War II, on 3 May 1947 and written in English language by the American lawyers of the forces of occupation.

In order to maintain its own security, Japan adopted, in November 1995, a Program of national defence wherein is specified as main mission of Forces for Self-Defence the country's defence. The Program also included firm engagements with USA and the stipulation that Japan must be prepared also for the prevention and combating of the natural disasters.

The Japan of Today newspaper wrote in 1996, Japan is aware its security and prosperity cannot be provided singularly and they depend on a global collaboration.

At the end of the XX century and beginning of XXI century, the Nippon state considered to be engaged in the following objectives:

- peaceful resolution of regional conflicts;
- resolution of global issues, cooperation with the developing and transitional countries;
- continuous promotion of armaments reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
- provision of a sustainable development of the global economy;
- cooperation with the developing and transitional countries;
- resolution of the global issues[12].

Japan's defence policy is grounded on the maintenance of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation

and Security with the United States of America signed for the first time in 1960s, which stipulates USA to participate to the Japan's defence if it is attacked. The relations between Japan and USA were strengthened also by the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security in 1997 by the Nippon Prime-Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and the American President Bill Clinton.

At the beginning of the XXI century, the relation between Japan and USA is similar to their relations after the World War II, but it must be taken into account that now Japan is able to define its own economic interests at global level and is a superpower allied on formal quasi-parity with USA.

Japan's defence capacities are of defensive nature and designed to prevent an aggression against the country. Japan does not have nuclear weapons (its Constitution forbids the possession of nuclear weapons or other offensive forms outside the legitimate defence) based on security arrangements signed with US to reject an eventual nuclear threat.

At the beginning of the XXI century, Japan released a serious arming program. Consequently, its military force includes: 250,000 persons (voluntaries), 5 land operative groups, 1,000 tanks, 40 destroyers, and 25 aviation escadrilles[13]. Also, the Self-Defence Force is organized under the control of the Ministry of Defence with the role to deter very rapidly and efficiently any type of aggression against the country.

The dynamic concept of defence standing on the basis of this force creation regards the following aspects: response to the cyber-attacks and to the attacks with ballistic missile; adequate response for the unpredictable situations and against the attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances; response against guerrilla and special operations of the enemy forces; preservation of the maritime and air space of Japan.

The multi-dimensionality of Japan's security is revealed not only by the internal plan measures from diverse activity fields, but also by the promotion on external plan of the cooperation relations to provide peace by activities into some organizations framework as: UN, ASEAN or G-8.

Since 1992, Japan participated to peace maintenance operations and humanitarian actions in Cambodgia, Angola, Mozambique, Salvador, Zaire, Rwanda and Middle East.

I must not neglect in the approach of Japan's multi-dimensional security, the collaboration with NATO that became more accentuated following September 2001. Since 2001, Japan sent in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea naval means to support the occidental military marines; since 2003, Tokyo brought an important contribution to the disarming, demobilization and reintegration do armed groups from Afghanistan, closely co-working with the NATO forces and engaging to provide humanitarian aid and support for NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The collaboration between Japan and forces of some NATO Member State materialized in peace maintenance operations undergone by UN in the region of Golan Heights to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq at United States request and also in missions of salvation and removal of disaster consequences, following the Pakistan earthquake[14].

Japan intends to use the collaboration with the North-Atlantic Alliance as a supplementary mean to increase the awareness at international, and especially European, level of Eastern Asia security. In this regard, the declarations of the North-Atlantic Council condemning the launch of the North-Korean missiles in July 2006 and the nuclear test from October 2006 were appreciated by the Nippon government. Despite very aggressive speech of Pyongyang, the Japanese relations with the North-Korean authorities remain a diplomatic game wherein the solidarity on the international level counts very much[15].

By *Japan's White Paper on Defence* adopted by the Security Council and the Nippon Cabinet on 17 December 2010, there are settled a series of objectives of security policy, as:

- provisioning of country and population peace and security by preventing and eliminating any internal and external threats;

- strengthening the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region;

- strengthening peace and stability at global level by the active participation in missions of peace maintenance, humanitarian aid, response to crises generated by natural disasters, support to the international community in the fight against international terrorism.[16]

As regards the contemporary security environment, Japan's White Paper on Defence appreciates the following:

- the probability of a war between the main countries of the world is low due to the interdependencies among them;

- increasing the role of China, India and Russia in the security environment and therefore the power relations are reconfigured on international plan;

- USA remain the country with the most important role in provisioning the global peace and stability and in the strengthening of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region;

- The cyber-space and the climate changes became a great challenge for security;

- The regional conflicts and the countries which governance weakened, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic missiles, the increase of terrorist organizations number and piracy remain perennial challenges against the international community security;

- North-Korea is considered to be the destabilising element of Asian regional security.

As regards the maintenance of own security, the main worry of Japan is the North-Korean nuclear arsenal. The North-Korea withdrawal by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a major important risk factor for Nippon security. In their declarations, Japan, China and South-Korea's leaders participating to the Summit undergone in May 2012 reference were not made to the nuclear ambitions of North-Korea – the main issue in the region, but the need to prevent challenges came from Pyongyang and not to allow many North-Korean nuclear tests were underlined [17].

Another worry for Japan's security is China. China's economic power and its alliances with Pakistan and North-Korea, or a possible alliance with Russia (in the case Japan is seen as a threat) are appreciated by the Nippon government as major issues against the country's security.

As concerns Russia, Japan did not have close relationships on security owed to a territorial misunderstanding dating since the end of the World War II appeared over the Kurile Isles, occupied by Russia in 1945. Therefore, no peace treaty was signed between the two countries, which, formally, even today, are in a state of war. But the increased influence of Russia as regards security in Europe, Central Asia and Asia-Pacific region was extremely important for Japan to deepen the Russian-Nippon relations. Recently, on January 2012, both countries expressed their will to unite their forces to maintain the regional security, on the ground of China's military presence increase in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusions

Japan, country which gave, at the end of X century - beginning of XI century, the first novel of the world, *The Tale of Genji (Genji Monogatari)* written by a court lady, Lady Murasaki Shikibu, is a unique and fascinating country. Japanese are proud of their well-organised society and their ancient culture, but, most of all, they are proud of being Japanese.

In Japan, people make history on a relatively small terrestrial territory with almost no natural resources and submitted to natural disasters. The dynamism and continuous work of these people made from this country one of the most developed one from the economic perspective.

Pacifism, economic security and prestige are strong aspects of security policy of Japan. The maintenance of its own security is for Japan a priority. But Japan's security cannot be provisioned outside the mechanisms of collective defence. Keeping in mind Japan's contributions to the international peace and stability, it would be necessary for it to obtain the statute of permanent member of UN Security Council (as other states – Germany, Brazil and India, with which Japan forms the G4 also wish).

In order to preserve its security, Japan appreciates the arming escalation in the region should be by all means avoided, by assuming mutual guarantees of security with the ASEAN member states and South-Korea and by intensifying collaborations with all countries of the world. Participation to the mutual cooperation mechanisms from Asia is a major concern for Japan's foreign policy, proved by closed connections with ASEAN (the ASEAN+1 Summit; the process of ASEAN+3) and by its quality of OSCE cooperation partner.

Japan's security policy is pro-American; US remain its single perennial credible allied to guarantee its borders, with which it develops since 1998 an anti-missile shield.

In regard to some annalists' opinions, the improvement of the military activity of Japan represents a sign of its militarist and nuclear ambitions, while other annalists' opinions are interested in the regional involvements of more active and almost unrestricted participation in the

international security. Japan is a US and Occident strategic ally but promotes a distinctive policy of cooperation with China and the South-Eastern Asia and Oceania countries.

At present, its main preoccupation is constituted by the fulfilment of an educational system able to make first class international citizens. Therefore, in regard to the predictions of the Japanese sociologist Hayashi Kenjiro, in the twenty first century, Japan will export culture and information in the rest of the world; in that moment, the internationalization process of Japan will be closed and the country will accomplish all the conditions to become the leader of the international community.[18]

In my opinion, Japan's security is indispensable for Eastern Asia security and widely for the security of the entire humankind. As promoter of security in its non-military dimensions, Japan is able to become a major constructive force in the regional and global stability and peace. The future is going to prove this.

NOTES:

1 Emilian M. DOBRESCU, (coordonator general), *Puterea economică şi spirituală a Japoniei*, Editura Renaissance, Bucureşti, 2010, p. 11.

2 Ibidem , pp. 15-44.

3 Ibidem, p. 13.

4 F. VASILIU, *Japonia. Pagini de istorie, civilizaţie şi cultură*, Editura Corint, Bucureşti, 2001, p.13, apud. Emilian M. Dobrescu, coordonator general, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

5 Vlad CONSTANTIN, *Japonia. Introducere în istorie, cultură, civilizaţie*, Editura Fundaţiei România de Mâine, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 19.

6 Emilian M. DOBRESCU, *op. cit.*, pp.75-76.

7 Emilian M. DOBRESCU, *op. cit*, p.131 şi p.149.

8 *Lumea* magazine, no.4 / 2011, p. 39.

9 Ibidem, p. 38.

10 Sursa: http://www.gandul.info/international/populatia-japoniei-ar-putea-scadea-cu-o-treime-pana-in-2060-9189947, accesat la 14 iulie 2012.

11 Richard TAMES, *Japonia. Istorie. Civilizaţie. Tradiţii*, Editura Lider, Bucureşti, p.241, apud. Prof. univ. dr. Emilian M. DOBRESCU (coordonator general), *op. cit.*, p. 42.

12 *The Japan of Today*, 1996, p. 24., apud. Emilian M. DOBRESCU, coordonator general, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

13 Teodor Frunzeti, Vladimir Zodian (coordonatori), *Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică şi militară (Studii strategice şi de securitate)*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 496.

14 http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/romanian/art4.html, accessed on May 16, 2012.

15 http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/Asia/nato_partner_asia/RO/index.htm, accessed on May 14, 2012.

16 Alexandru STOICA, *Rolul marilor actori statali în arhitectura de securitate* contemporană, teză de doctorat, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2011, p. 301.

17 http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/n-korea-reference-absent-from-japan-china-s-korea-summit-declaration, accessed on May 16, 2012.

18 Richard TAMES, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

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IRREGULAR FORCES – TODAY'S ADVERSARY OF ARMED FORCES

Ryszard BARTNIK, PhD*

In the majority of cases, modern wars are not waged exclusively by states. Groups identifying themselves by ethnicity, nationality or religion can also act as parties to a conflict. In such circumstances a classic division into soldiers and civilians loses its bearing, as every member of the society is a soldier – realistically or potentially. This, in turn, undermines the meaning of uniforms as indicators of the identity of persons who participate in combat. The civilian-soldiers who are members of irregular forces prefer warfare that is conditioned by the aspects of time, space, authority legitimization and social support. The main weapons of irregular forces in this type of warfare are personal arms capable of destroying even technologically advanced armament. The warfare philosophy adopted by irregular forces would be unsuccessful without a strict observance of the established rules.

Key-words: irregular forces; partisan; terrorist.

Introduction

Paradoxically, the international community believed that the end of the Cold War, culminating a period of severe confrontation of two ideological systems created after World War Two, would eliminate all conflicts that were resolved by referring to violence. The great powers were using their position not only to reach egoistic goals, but also to stabilize the situation within other states. This wave of post-cold war euphoria had an effect on Francis Fukuyama, who announced "the end of history, meaning the end of all armed conflicts"[2], and Martin Creveld, who claimed that "alternatives to military activities developed by humans will lead them to a peaceful means of resolving disputes and conflicts"[3]. In fact, the "enthusiasm" of Fukuyama, Creveld, and those who subscribed to their opinions, did not last too long, as it was shattered by the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001. In retaliation for that attack, the former US President, George W. Bush, declared United States' participation in the "war on terror". In the beginning, the phrase was seen as a typical platitude similar to "war on poverty", or "war on drugs" – that did not entail any particular actions. The status of the war changed with the armed invasion of the countries suspected of supporting terrorists. As a result of the interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the political systems were changed. Such state of affairs caused dissatisfaction of the

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supporters of the "old" system, who immediately started fighting the "new" governments and countries that supported them.

The present knowledge on the battles waged by states with the use of armed forces against the forces of non-state entities, dissatisfied with the present status-quo, produced various analyses. While reading these analyses, I found it befitting to share my thoughts on who the modern irregular forces are and how they fight.

1. Irregular forces – an attempt at identification

While classic wars involve countries at dispute, in irregular wars[4], the control over organised violence is dispersed among many entities. In classic wars, it is the armed forces of states that fight on both sides of the conflict – highly formalised, hierarchical structures with a very specialised function; the "corps" of irregular wars, on the other hand, are formed by national armies, multinational armed forces – in no way native to the territory where a given war is waged – as well as a mosaic of guerrilla troops, terrorist groups, and forces centred around clans and families, foreign mercenaries, organized crime groups. It seems that from the above mosaic it is guerrillas and terrorists who are the most dangerous to states that send armed forces to fight them.

Much of the confusion with descriptions of partisans and terrorists follows from the present discourse that is charged with evaluative and emotional expressions. While the word "partisan" is commonly regarded as a flattering term that entails positive connotations, "terrorist" induces fear, and brings to mind deceitful violence and terror. No modern terrorist would refer to themselves using this term, because of the strongly pejorative meaning – thus, they prefer to call themselves warriors, rebels or simply soldiers. Yasser Arafat, former Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization once said that "whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders (…) cannot possibly be called terrorist"[5]. Such verbal manipulation can also be witnessed nowadays in the media, where Iraqis who attack the coalition army are called terrorists, while Chechens who behave in the same way towards Russians are almost always referred to as warriors – in an attempt to present them as rather noble.

Treating both terms, i.e. "partisan" and "terrorist", as synonyms would be a vast oversimplification, but using one term to refer to both groups – "irregular forces" – seems to be quite practical. The equivalence of meaning achieved in this way can have an influence on the simplification and standardization of the military language. I am in favour of this approach and would like to propose the following understanding of *"irregular forces"*: *any paramilitary organization having a precise goal and using other than regular methods of combat*.

Due to their social background, the majority of members of irregular forces display rather low military qualifications and loose organization. Their skills are limited largely to the operation of simple armament[6]. Thus, they are unable to conduct regular operations (most often they do not need or intend to). That is why, within irregular forces it is the leader who plays the key role, controls the whole formation, and manages it. The charisma and determination of the leader are hence the most important factors conditioning the efficiency and continuity of the organization. On the one hand, the leader oversees the use of methods of coercion, fulfils the needs and goals of the members of the organization, and on the other hand becomes – together with the organization he or she heads – the only guarantor of "safety" for the people who inhabit a given territory, gaining in this way considerable support from the community. This in turn can make the leader not only an important political leader in the region of his or her activity, but also a prospective "architect" of the new – or be that a "refurbished" – state organism[7].

The core of irregular forces' staff comprises of uneducated individuals aged between 25-35, originating from lower classes, deprived of any prospects of advancement (this is much more relevant to the privates, much less so to the leaders), but at the same time strongly believing in their ethnic, religious, national, or racial superiority. Demobilized soldiers of regular armies who failed to integrate into the society are valuable additions to the human resources of irregular militaries. Oftentimes they are the only members who are well trained and able to utilize their art of war skills. It is not uncommon for students and university graduates to be "invited" to join the structures of irregular forces. Higher education institutions all over the world have thus become the places where new members are recruited.

It is common for the ranks of irregular forces to include youth, and even children, who are accustomed to violence, which makes them especially attractive from the leaders' perspective, even if only for their physical fitness or costs of living. To the uneducated youth "to be a soldier" is the best option of social participation that guarantees a far greater chance for survival in the society paralysed with fear. Youths taken from the streets are sent to Koranic schools, where they undergo ideological training, and once armed become ammunition carriers, sentries or privates[8]. The very fact that children are able to take part in warfare is strictly connected with the technical evolution of armament. It is worth noting that it is their relatively low awareness of risk and rather simple needs that make them an especially cheap, and at the same time, effective instrument of violence.

Irregular forces are also cynically utilizing women who chose to become suicide-assassins in an attempt to take revenge for their husbands, brothers and fathers. The "Black Widows", as this is how they are most often referred to, are using the so called "shahid" belts, filled with explosives, nails, and equipped with a detonator[9]. Leaders of irregular forces are choosing women (men dressed as women) because attacks perpetrated by women are far less often thwarted by security forces.

When trying to find what type of personalities are typical for the members of irregular forces, Maciej Szaszkiewicz came to the conclusion that certainly they are not psychopaths. "From a psychological point of view, mental functions – efficiency of thinking, associating facts – of partisans or terrorists, are exactly the same as ours. They are driven by similar emotions; still, many of their undertakings remain incomprehensible to us"[10]. Islamic fundamentalists can be used as an example as their actions are motivated by religious reasons. Their main goal is to destroy Western political systems and cultural models. The very act of violence is for them tantamount to fulfilling a religious obligation and a way to protect themselves from the secularization that comes from the Western world[11].

When trying to identify irregular forces, it is useful to use a criterion that indicates the formal or informal character of a given organization[12]. In the first case, the differentiating factor are legal acts (act of law, regulation, statute, rules) conditioning the creation and functioning of the organization in question, while in the latter case it is the relations existing between its members, and ensuring an organizational coherence. Although irregular forces are created without prescriptive legal acts, as is the case in the context of military forces, the members of irregular groups are observing their own legal, ethical and religious norms. This is why irregular forces can be treated as informal organizations, possessing some hallmarks of a formal organization. Another criterion is differentiating organizations with reference to the territorial range of their activities. Irregular forces are not only organizations of national outreach – located within the administrative boundaries of one country and acquiring their resources from the country – but also international organizations – located in one country, acquiring their resources from other countries; increasingly, they are also becoming global organizations – not attached to one mother country, obtaining resources from many countries.

2. Philosophy of warfare according to irregular forces

Analysing the warfare of irregular forces in retrospect, it becomes evident that the span of their activities involves years rather than months, and their potential victory may come as a result of gradually gaining advantage over time, territory, legitimization of authority and social support[13]. The struggle of irregular forces rarely takes place in one of the enumerated aspects, and success in any of the spheres does not cause neglecting other aspects. Without significant support from the country or abroad, irregular forces would not be able to succeed, irrespective of the time or space won. The relative value ascribed to the above aspects varies, and is most often shaped with regard to the specific conditions.

For irregular forces, *time* is the condition that allows them to organize themselves, crush the resolve of the government, and gather the potential to take control over the state. It seems that Ho Chi Minh understood the importance of time very well when he claimed that "the basic strategic assumption of our resistance must be the prolongation of war. Protracting war is a key to victory"[14]. This poses the following question: why should war be prolonged? This is Ho Chi Minh's

answer: "if we compare our army with the army of the enemy, it becomes clear that the enemy is strong and we are weak. If we send all our troops to a few battles in order to achieve an outcome, we will surely be defeated and our enemy will win. On the other hand, if we manage to keep our army during combat, and then to develop them, train them, and learn the tactics, at the same time exhausting our enemy's army, wearing them out and discouraging them, the enemy, despite their strength, will become weak, and suffer defeat instead of winning"[15]. Carlos Marighella disagreed with Ho Chi Minh's theory. In his opinion, "time does not favour systematic uprising; it is the state that grows in strength with every month, leaving the partisans in a deadlock"[16]. However, the most recent developments in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to confirm Ho Chi Minh's theory, as the struggle with the local irregular forces has been going on for years now. The time the irregular forces have managed to "buy" has enabled them to, for instance, become better organized and close the gaps in their training.

The aspect of time is harmonized with *space*. Control over space gives irregular forces the necessary leeway, at the same time convincing the local inhabitants, that the authority of the irregular forces has better legitimization, which in turn entails internal and external support. Social support for irregular forces translates into increasingly braver operations. With unavoidable losses the irregular forces suffer what they expected from the very onset. Obviously, irregular forces are analysing their operations and draw conclusions from them, such, for instance as the one proposed by Martin Creveld: "for the stronger party, every soldier, policeman or civilian killed becomes yet one more reason for ending the struggle; while for the weaker party they are one more reason to carry on until victory"[17].

Having space under disposal, the irregular forces are able to choose where and when they want to attack. If the state strikes with prevalent forces, the space enables irregular forces to retract and possibly assume fight when the conditions are more favourable. A difficult terrain limits the freedom of manoeuvres of the armed forces, but for the lightly armed irregular forces it is a great chance to balance the unfavourable differences in technology, organization and numbers. The irregular forces often manage to gain tactical advantage in difficult terrain, especially if the armed forces are not equipped to manage in such environments as mountains, jungle, desert and urban areas. Any terrain with limited access is also a natural refuge and ideal space for irregular forces – where they can setup bases and start further fight.

The forces to space ratio influences not only the course of struggle, but also the time it lasts. Simultaneous activity of irregular forces in many locations induces the armed forces to protect only the most important zones, leaving considerable portions of the area without control. This is strictly connected with the insufficiency of forces to dominate the entire territory of the country. The above relationship was noticed by Thomas Edward Lawrence, who artfully utilised the advantage of the Arabs, in terms of forces to space ratio, during their war against Turkey (1916-1918). Knowing the area at war, he estimated that "the Turks would need six hundred thousand men to quench the insurgent spirit in the whole of Transjordan. It is: ten times more than they could"[18]. A similar problem must be confronted by the armed forces of third countries who, assisted by the newly created security forces, are trying to take control over the entire territory of Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is practically impossible for the potentially weaker party, i.e. for the irregular forces, to win without a substantial internal and external support. The equipment produced or pillaged by the irregular forces is very often insufficient to meet their needs. The latter statement is not true with respect to the war in Iraq however, because the irregular forces had taken the full advantage of the fact that ammunition and explosives' magazines of the Hussein army were not appropriately secured by coalition forces, and thus acquired considerable amounts of weapons, which has enabled them to continue the fight for many years[19]. Apart from armament, irregular forces must face the problem of treating and caring for the wounded and constant replenishment of resources. They must keep the information on the position and plans of the armed forces updated, and train new recruits. Without this type of support, they would be quickly defeated by the armed forces. The question of external support was also highlighted by one of the spiritual leaders of al-Qaeda – Ayman al-Zawahiri, who suggested avoiding "all operations that are not understood or accepted by the masses. The words of the Prophet can be used as guidance: You cannot cause people to

say that Muhammad is killing his companions"[20].

On the other hand, acquiring external support requires legitimization of authority – that is why the irregular forces are fighting for it so vehemently. Violence that is not backed by a comprehensible political goal or moral grounds cannot expect wide approval of the general public. Leaders of irregular forces are therefore striving to achieve legitimization for using violence, by showing their moral superiority over the members of the "new" government they object, in an attempt to take over functions of the state on a local level. Legitimization attained in this way is transformed into significant external support for their cause. The support depends to a large extent on the geographical environment of the country, and political relationships nurtured by members of irregular forces; it can be material (supply of necessary resources, or organised refuge) or moral (political approval, lobbing).

The legitimization of irregular forces is further strengthened by the incommensurately fierce reactions of the government towards citizens suspected of helping the irregular forces. Any form of brutality originating from the government allows the irregular forces to act as defenders of the people, which deepens the mutual relationship between both groups. A nobler way of dealing with the local people than the one displayed by the government is naturally applicable only to those groups of citizens who actively support the activities of irregular forces. Partisans, and especially terrorists, can never expect total backing from the people – enthusiasts will always be counterbalanced by opponents, while the majority will remain hesitant anyhow.

3. Forms of activity of the irregular forces

Generally, the warfare of irregular forces as such is not considered to be a means to bring political change, but rather a trigger of a particular reaction. This reaction is related to bringing about a permanent threat, terror, social psychosis and uncertainty of fate for the people and institutions that are targeted directly and indirectly. Such strategy proves to be successful, since the attacked individuals often do what irregular forces expect of them, and the terrorized institutions function in accordance with their will. To achieve this state of affairs, irregular forces do not affect the resources of the state directly, as is the case in a classical war, but destroy the citizens' will to act by escalating the overpowering fear.

When analysing activities of irregular forces in the last decades, it can be stated that material and "human" targets have become the objects of their attacks. The material objects are structures and facilities created by man, and include: hotel and administration buildings, shopping malls and tourist centres, restaurants, theatres, schools, public transport, airports, railway stations, as well as military equipment and installations, etc. The "human" targets – according to the division proposed by Jan Borkowski – embrace "a wide range of individuals: anonymous, i.e. persons who were unfortunate enough to find themselves in the given place and time; personalised, that is individuals having unique social status, performing important public roles, impersonating (according to irregular forces) evil and misfortune; socially categorized, that is community structures that can be differentiated by an important feature. In the last case, those can be members of specific ethnic groups or religious adversaries"[21].

The following activities should be regarded as most typical for the modern irregular forces: raids (sudden attacks on strongly protected targets or facilities that are not easily accessible, as well as brake-ins involving access to a given building, followed by a rapid abandoning of the premises), ambushes (attacks on moving targets), as well as attacks (often suicidal).

Raids perpetrated by irregular forces cause much damage and force the state to maintain the state of high combat readiness of the armed forces. An important benefit following from this type of activity is the freedom to choose the time of attack, which can be carried out practically at any time of day or night. In the majority of cases attacks on selected civilian and military targets are carried out during the night, in order to take advantage of limited visibility, and in effect, restricted possibility to support the army fighting with irregular forces from the air. The forces selected to perpetrate the attack are divided and located in a few positions to improve camouflage and security. The positions are chosen with a view to achieve a sufficient degree of fire concentration at the selected target. During raids, apart from artillery attacks, gunfire is also used (from passing vehicles), and the barriers of military bases are forced – with the use of cars

filled with explosives. Soon after seizing fire at the target the irregular forces retreat to safer regions.

Irregular forces concentrate much of their efforts on ambushes that involve secretly moving into shooting positions and carrying out a surprise attack. Ambushes are setup based on reliable and detailed information, regarding not only the target of attack, but also any troops that could be used in pursuit. The choice of location for an ambush is very important for the effective concealment of the irregular forces. Unlike raids, where the location of an attack is determined by the position of the target, ambushes offer much freedom of choice. Unconstrained range of options concerning the battleground allows irregular forces to place themselves in a more favourable position relative to the attacked target. Deciding on the appropriate location for the ambush is always done with a view to achieve the greatest possible level of surprise and to open fire from a very close range. The location for the ambush must offer excellent conditions for concealing and camouflaging the irregular forces and guarantee effective execution of the operation, and not the other way around. The most important quality of this type of activity, utilized by irregular forces, is inflicting serious losses on the other party, with a relatively low effort on the part of the perpetrator. Ambushes are very often setup with improvised explosives devices, planted on the route of a patrol or convoy, travelling along communication routes. The devices are placed on utility poles, buried beneath the surface of the ground, covered with rocks, or under a pile of rubbish, and even in the carcasses of dead animals. Often, in order to maximise the effectiveness of the improvised explosives, fake bombs that are clearly visible from the road are used, which force the patrol or convoy to stop within the range of the proper explosives, in the so called "killing zone". If the defensive support of the convoy or patrol discovers the ambush and commences fire, the irregular forces retreat immediately, thus minimizing possible losses.

The last of the most typical forms of activity employed by irregular forces are terrorist attacks, considered by many experts to be their "strategic weapon". This form of activity gives irregular forces the chance to transfer their operations to the territories of other countries (most often supporting the government that is at war with the irregular forces). Terrorist attacks involve the killing of government officials (politicians, soldiers and policemen). Victims can also include casual civilians killed in the streets, markets, or in front of mosques, which further destabilizes the situation in the country. The goal, apart from fatalities, is to maintain the state of psychosis and a permanent life threat to the citizens. The attacks are executed by suicide-bombers or with the use of car bombs.

In order to significantly increase their chances to prepare and execute an operation, irregular forces make extensive use of the World Wide Web, satellite communication and portable computers. Universally available sites such as Google Earth, supply irregular forces with topographical data that, not so long ago, were available only to world powers. Even basic laptops facilitate the preparation and secret distribution of propaganda materials through websites, portals and blogs. The internet is extensively used by irregular forces to recruit new members, acquire training and propaganda materials, exchange information and coordinate operations, without the danger of being caught by security forces[22].

4. Rules of irregular forces' combat

Combat, being an organized activity, is carried out according to a specific set of rules. The fact that irregular forces are referring to rules in their struggle is quite understandable. From the wealth of rules, they are selecting those that ensure their existence on the one hand, and at the same time enable them to execute their operations despite enemy's advantage. Most often these are: initiative, dispersal of troops and concentration of effort, surprise, mobility of elements and flexibility of operations, careful preparation of operations, avoiding engagement in combat, covertness of activity.

Initiative in the struggle of irregular forces – just as in warfare executed in accordance to classical rules – involves imposing one's will on the opponent. Achieving this is not difficult if the opponent is weaker. Maintaining initiative by irregular forces, the potentially weaker party, is possible, provided that they remain active and effective in taking advantage of all the favourable conditions. It is paramount for the operations to be sudden and brief – not allowing the armed forces to counteract, and especially engage the party who initiated the operation in combat. It is also necessary

to simultaneously conduct operations in many locations (over an extensive area), following the principle that the smallest of activities performed by small groups are of little importance, "but once combined, pose a significant threat"[23].

The most dangerous situation for the potentially weaker irregular forces is stagnation – because initiative can then be taken over by the armed forces that have technological and shooting advantage – which can lead to their defeat. In order to prevent this happening, irregular forces avoid undertaking defensive operations that are imposed on them and submitting to the will of the opposing party, even for short periods of time. Avoidance of combat by irregular forces is not considered as flight. It should rather be perceived as retreat from the battlefield in order to move the forces away from the attack, and to maintain their potential ability to resume operations. Thus, it can be said that irregular forces retreat from combat in order to maintain initiative.

Ensuring the appropriate conditions for irregular forces to maintain initiative requires an effective reconnaissance system that facilitates foreseeing potential changes in the plans of armed forces and taking advantage of all the situations emerging during the operation. Moreover, an effective reconnaissance system of the irregular forces guarantees avoiding unfavourable situations that cannot be resolved without suffering losses.

Maintaining initiative is possible for the irregular forces only if they remain dispersed. On the one hand, dispersal of forces facilitates camouflaging and hiding, and simplifies supply of resources, thus reducing threats and making existence easier. On the other hand however, it prevents the armed forces from successfully using their advantage and compels them to disperse their forces as well. The dispersal of irregular forces is not their weakness, but conversely – it is their strength.

Irregular forces act predominantly in small groups, but the need to conduct larger-scale activities cannot be ruled out altogether. This is when the forces become concentrated for the attack. In principle, irregular forces use other methods than regular forces – concentration at exit positions – as it would pose a threat of immediate destruction of the forces once they are discovered. Since concentration is not a typical approach for irregular forces, they disperse immediately after the attack. The rate of dispersal of irregular forces over a given terrain depends on the topographical features. The worse the conditions for hiding and camouflage in the given area, the larger the dispersal. If an operation requires using a larger number of irregular militaries in one zone, most often the operation is executed without previous concentration, where the forces engaged in the operation gather in different zones and strike from various directions. If avoiding concentration of forces is impossible because of the conditions, irregulars strive to make it as short as possible.

It is common knowledge that is impossible to be strong "everywhere" during combat. That is why irregular forces ensure efficiency of the individual operations by applicable concentration of efforts, allowing them to gain advantage in the given place and time. The main method used by irregular forces to achieve superiority over armed forces is not by quantitative concentration, but by skilful deployment of conditions, facilitated by a detailed knowledge of the terrain, and cooperation with local population. Their numerical disadvantage is usually compensated by surprise operations, which are possible thanks to a detailed reconnaissance of the armed forces and targets to be attacked.

It does not seem to be an overstatement to say that without the element of surprise, an operation conducted by irregular forces cannot be successful. This works both ways: achieving surprise in the right moment can balance other shortcomings. The element of surprise is thus considered to be one of the decisive rules, within the activities undertaken by irregular forces, without which no struggle between a weaker and stronger party would be possible. Due to the fact that surprise is never a permanent condition and that its effect fades rapidly, irregular forces consequently aim to make use of it while it lasts. Achieving the state of surprise again would require planning and executing the operation in a different way. Irregular forces strive to avoid the error of using the same plan twice. That is why, in the majority of cases, the warfare of irregular forces is marked with ingenuity, slyness and deception. Accomplishing surprise is influenced by the ability to efficiently use the time of day and prevailing weather conditions, as well as – for operations executed in the cities – high traffic congestion.

Mobility and flexibility of irregular forces gain particular importance in the case of operations conducted by them in residential areas. Both

tactics are necessary for maintaining the initiative and concentration of efforts of the dispersed forces, and are the basic condition for achieving surprise. Mobility and flexibility seem to be understood particularly well nowadays, as it is quite impossible for the irregular forces to be everywhere. The mobility of irregular forces is their ability to quickly change their whereabouts, while activity flexibility refers to prompt switching from one activity to another. The combat of irregular forces brings best effects when both tactics are combined. It is particularly visible when their position relative to the armed forces enables them to achieve surprise and build situational advantage, facilitating optimal utilization of the resources under disposal. Irregular forces achieve mobility and flexibility mainly through detailed knowledge of the terrain, small size of their groups, light armament and relatively minor load of supplies, and thanks to the freedom of activity, supported by local population. All the above characteristics enable them to approach a target rather quickly and secretly – even with limited means of transport – carry out a surprise attack, and disperse before the armed forces commence combat. At the same time, these features facilitate the redirection of the attack to another (auxiliary) target, if circumstances prevent the execution of the original plan.

Careful preparation of an activity is the rule employed by irregular forces in order to minimise the risk of a failure. A plan of the operation concentrates on the way the target should be approached, how to perpetrate the attack, and how to retreat. Stealth of approach is achieved by an extensive use of the features of the terrain (e.g. existing structures), time of day and year, and the prevailing weather. There are also attempts to distract the attention of the armed forces from the target. Prolonged contact between irregular forces and armed forces hardly ever occurs, as it is always detrimental to the former party. Otherwise, it would give the armed forces a chance to make effective use of their advantage, and to increase it by introducing more troops to combat. Engagement in sustained combat deprives irregular forces of the chance to act efficiently. Consequently, avoiding engagement in combat with armed forces is a fundamental rule of irregular forces' warfare. When faced with a stronger opponent, irregular forces strive to stop the combat as soon as possible, and retreat, i.e. they immediately dodge in order to move away

from the field of fire. This tactic is observed in the case of prolonged or unsuccessful operations of irregular forces, or an unplanned contact with armed forces. Stopping an operation is considered to be better than endangering the participating forces, because preserving operational ability of the forces increases the chance to execute future operations.

The concept of defence is alien to irregular forces – in the sense of "holding on" to the chosen positions and fighting back the attacks of the armed forces. This is why, whenever defensive activities are inescapable, irregular forces use their mobility and knowledge of the terrain – to temporarily defend themselves with a view to create the conditions that will allow them to separate themselves from the armed forces. Irregular forces try to avoid being surrounded at all cost. If they find themselves in a difficult situation, they disperse and "melt" with the crowd. Avoiding engagement in combat sets especially high requirements on irregular forces in terms of constant and active reconnaissance, aimed at gaining data on the intentions of the opposing party and any ensuing dangers. Past experiences of irregular forces from combat indicate that failing to observe this rule most often results in many casualties. One of the methods to overcome this weakness is operational stealth. Militant irregular forces emerge only during operations, remaining in hiding before and after (becoming anonymous). All activities are performed with the use of camouflage, usually in poor visibility conditions, therefore monitoring the situation from the air (by the armed forces) is difficult. Approach to the zone where the operation is to be executed is done secretly, in order to reinforce the element of surprise. Likewise, withdrawal after completing the operation should be misleading to the armed forces in terms of direction of exit. The stealth of irregular forces' combat manifests itself in acting in a way that facilitates remaining secret, through shunning observation from land and air.

Conclusions

Irregular forces remain a powerful actor in a full spectrum of conflicts. Although objectives and weapons of irregular forces have changed over centuries, the overall philosophy of operations and organization remain relatively unchanged. Typically, irregular forces make significant efforts to control

their respective populations and try to exploit their state adversary's weaknesses, such as aversion to human casualties, mounting costs of operations or prolonged involvement in strategically insignificant military operations. Although Western militaries wind down their operations against irregular adversaries in Afghanistan, it seems premature to shift focus toward conventional warfare again. Irregular forces will likely remain one of the most challenging adversaries on the future battlefield. Nowadays, technological superiority of potential enemies encourages even some state actors and their militaries to adopt irregular forces' philosophy of operations and tactics. Such an approach will complicate future operations and limit freedom of action for state and international armed forces involved in fighting irregular forces.

Lessons learned by Western militaries during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to support such observations. It is surprising that, despite their good training and equipment, armed forces of the developed countries (supporting legal governments of third countries) are not able to find a way to defeat forces that are organized and act in an irregular way. Examples of such failures abound. Especially disturbing is the case of the American armed forces in Iraq. It is enough to mention that twenty years ago, Iraq lost two thirds of its armed forces. The remaining troops, as it soon became apparent, comprised ill trained, conscripts that were unwilling to fight, and had a meagre number of obsolete tanks at their disposal. Soon after the completion of "major combat operations" – to quote the Mission Accomplished speech delivered by president George W. Bush – it became clear that American armed forces, despite managing to capture a vast country and its capital city in only three weeks, are not able to deal with a few thousands of "rebels". The conflict in Afghanistan that ensued after the overturn of the Talib government, does not herald a prompt solution. On one of the sides of the symbolic barricade there were the local militaries and police forces, backed up by the technologically advanced coalition army, comprising mainly NATO countries, while on the other side there were the Taliban and members of al-Qaeda that do not use such technologically advanced equipment. Despite the differences, the opponents are not an easy target for the well trained and equipped armed forces; one of the reasons for such state of affairs is the form of combat adopted by irregular forces which noticeably eliminates the advantage of the stronger party.

Judging from geostrategic trends, it is fair to assess that standing, state and international armed forces will face the challenge of irregular adversaries well into the future. No single military will enjoy situation when it may focus entirely on conventional warfare against a well defined state and its military fighting conventional war. That is why fighting effectively irregular forces should remain one of priorities for doctrine development, training and equipping armed forces. To be more effective at countering irregular forces, conventional armed forces need to adopt some irregular approaches and learn from their irregular adversaries. Winning hearts and minds of the local population, providing it with security and humanitarian assistance are nowadays recognized as basic elements of effective military operations against irregular forces. To remain effective in the future, a purely military approach may not be sufficient. A coherent economic, social and cultural influence may be necessary to complement military operations of conventional armed forces to make irregular adversaries less effective. If armed forces are going to win, they have to be more agile and adapt better then their irregular adversaries.

NOTES:

1. Martin CREVELD, *Zmienne oblicze wojny*, Rebis Dom Wydawniczy, 2008, p. 279.

2. Dariusz KONDRAKIEWICZ, *Systemy równowagi sił w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Uniwersytet Marii Curie Skłodowskiej, 1999, p. 51.

3. Martin CREVELD, *On Future War*, Brassey's, 1991, pp. 190-191.

4. Irregular war – activities engaging two opposing parties possessing incomparable potentials and using different methods, where the weaker party strives to benefit from or take effective advantage of the weaknesses of the enemy, if it is possible to do so. *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2009, pp. 161-162.

5. Bruce HOFFMAN, *Oblicza terroryzmu*, Bertelsmann Media, 2001, p. 27.

6. Robert D. KAPLAN, *The Word of Achilles: Ancient Soldiers, Modern Warriors*, in *The National Interest,* winter 2001/2002, p. 39, available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-world-of-achilles-ancient-soldiers-modern-warriors-733?page=2.

7. Anna SIMONS, *The Death of conquest*, in *The National Interest*, spring 2003, pp. 45-46, available at

http://faculty.nps.edu/asimons/docs/Death_of_Conquest.pdf.

8. Ahmed RASHID, *Talibowie. Wojujący islam, ropa naftowa i fundamentalizm w środkowej Azji*, trans. Dominika CHYLIŃSKA, Adam LIPSZYC, Jadwiga PIĄTKOWSKA, Wydawnictwo ZNAK; 2002, pp. 182-183.

9. Jessica DAVIS, *Women and Terrorism in Radical Islam: Planners, perpetrators, patrons?*, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. available at http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/gradsymp06/Davis.pdf.

10. Maciej SZASZKIEWICZ, *Kim są ci ludzie?*, p. 44, available at http://www.archiwum.wiz.pl.

11. Jan SIEŃKO, Bogusław SZLACHCIC, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa w dobie walki z terroryzmem*, Zespół Redakcyjno-Wydawniczy MW, 2005, p. 34.

12. Marcin STRUŻYCKI, *Podstawy zarządzania*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, 2008, p. 25.

13. James D. KIRAS, *Wojna nieregularna: terroryzm i działania partyzanckie*, in *Strategia we współczesnym świecie*, ed. John BAYLIS, et al., Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2009, p. 178.

14. Martin CREVELD, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

18. Thomas E. LAWRENCE, *The evolution of the Revolution*, p. 8, available at http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/lawrence.pdf.

19. Janusz OGRODNIK, *Działania partyzanckie sił antykoalicyjnych w Republice Iraku w latach 2003-2006*, in *Działania wojenne, pokojowe i stabilizacyjne prowadzone w warunkach szczególnych w XX i XXI wieku*, ed. Dariusz S. KOZERAWSKI, Wydawnictwo adam marszałek, 2007, p. 256.

20. James D. KIRAS, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

21. Jan BORKOWSKI, *Cele terroryzmu i terroru*, in *Bellona*, Issue no. 3/2007, pp. 36-37.

22. James D. KIRAS, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

23. Daniel KUBAJEWSKI, Andrzej PAZDOR, *Podstawowe właściwości działań partyzanckich*, Akademia Sztabu Generalnego WP, 1988, p. 28.

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THE MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Cristian-Eduard ŞTEFAN, PhD*

Accomplishing and assuring national security by the competent authorities' implies, most of the times, gathering and obtaining information from different locations, environments or areas of interest. Throughout the article, there are analyzed general aspects regarding the management of intelligence activity for national security, in terms of components of the informational process - gathering, analyzing and verifying information.

Key-words: management; information; intelligence; intelligence activity; national security; strategic analysis; tactical analysis.

1. General aspects regarding the intelligence activity for national security

Etymologically speaking, the word "information" comes from the Latin word "informeo", "informare"; its initial acceptance was of instructing, conceiving, planning, imagining an idea. The information represents the written or verbal formula able to bring new knowledge and can be viewed as a measure of order[1].

Intelligence activity represents all operations and activities carried out by specialized structures that are legally, systematically, uniformly, offensively and secretly established in accordance with a plan, by using specific means and methods for searching, collecting, verifying, processing and exploiting information about risk factors, threats, dangers for national security and for controlling their trends and developments in order to prevent, counteract, or remove them or to appropriately apply the law[2].

The activity of gathering information has a long history. For hundreds of years, there have been conducted intelligence activities by judicial and military authorities on persons suspected to represent a threat for the state security or civic safety because of their illicit activities (involvement in the commission of crimes, acts of disturbance or serious threats for national security or public order, etc.)[3].

The most efficient weapon against terrorism and serious crime is the information regarding the activity of organized criminal groups. The activity of gathering, processing and exploiting information must take place within the limits of the law and must be at all times under the strict supervision of authorized institutions. A high priority should be granted to information that sets the grounds for special repressive operations and for identifying the sources to obtain evidence or means of evidence[4].

Products of the "intelligence"[5] activity, national security intelligence is new data in relation to the already existing data regarding situations, phenomena, facts or states of facts that threaten or

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can become threats or sources of risk for national security[6].

2. The management of intelligence activity for national security

Intelligence management consist of searching, collecting, verifying, evaluating and valuing intelligence in order to prevent and combat the risks and threats for national security.

The first objective of the intelligence activity is anticipation – strategically preventing the national authorities about the possibility of terrorist actions or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts or outbreaks of transnational organized crime on national territory or warning them about the existence of such threats for national security. State's authorities decide on the type of preliminary or preventive action that must be held[7].

2.1. Gathering of information is a process deriving from the planning of the search operations which consists of certain activities, data collection materials from different sources[8]: open, public, official, semiofficial or secret[9].

In our country intelligence activities which regard national security, being conducted by the bodies of National Intelligence Community[10], are based on a series of principles.

• the principle of legality, stating that the search, collection and use of information are executed according to specific legal powers only in relation to the facts, circumstances or situations which are potentially threatening for national security and are mentioned by the law;

• the principle of objectivity, stating that each body must provide impartial, equidistant and independent from any political involvement information in accordance with the truth establishing criteria;

• the principle of neutrality and equidistance, stating that the professional behavior of the National Intelligence Community's personnel must not be influenced by external interference that can favor or discriminate persons or organizations when exercising their legal rights;

• the principle of opportunity of information, stating that the informing of the bodies mentioned by the law that need intelligence to base their decisions regarding national security or appliance of the law, is based on accurate, correct information, submitted in time, to allow adaptation measures to prevent, counter or remove the states of danger or threat;

• the principle of planning, anticipation and prediction, stating that informational resources are planned, created and managed to ensure avoidance of strategic surprise against any internal or external threats;

• the principle of cooperation and collaboration, stating that the bodies of the National Intelligence Community initiate and develop protocols, programs and operations to coordinate informative efforts – national or in cooperation with allied states – and to promote a culture of cooperational safety in partnership with public authorities or institutions or private organizations.

• the principle of transparency, stating that in connection with the activities of the National Intelligence Community, any authority or person consents on the need for secrecy regarding intelligence sources, operations, methods and means; regarding the identity of the operational staff and the intelligence held; regarding any references related to intelligence, from obtaining, evaluating to valuing it as confidential by their governments or foreign service;

• the principle of protection of the sources and means, stating that the bodies of the National Intelligence Community guarantee each other full protection of intelligence sources and the secrecy of held operations.

As mentioned in the literature[11], conventional methods of obtaining information are:

a) Direct observation – it is the most ancient and most available method of obtaining information about a person, an act, a circumstance, an event of interest, etc., if the circumstances permit;

b) The interpellation of observers – in the context of the specific activity of the investigator, the interlocutor is a person who has information of interest for solving the case or are presumed to have such information;

c) Exploiting specifically designed systems to obtain the information.

Information gathering may require the services with national security responsibilities to be authorized with exceptional or special *prerogatives* of restricting human rights, especially those

relating to privacy. In this respect, we distinguish the following types of tasks[12]:

• running activities of supervision, registration and tracking of intelligence;

• running investigative actions in spaces (premises) or closed objectives;

• opening mail or other packages without the consent of the sender or recipient;

• use of false or stolen identities, keys, special software or optical devices to corrupt, copy or clandestinely penetrate databases;

• interception, recording, receiving and monitoring conversations, telecommunications or other data transfers and transportation within the country or abroad;

• requesting service providers and public telecommunications networks to provide intelligence concerning the identity of customers and existing traffic;

• access to all places, environments or areas of interest to national security to install technical surveillance equipment.

Methods, techniques and tools used to gather, verify, assess and use information are in constant improvement and adaptation depending on the evolution and dynamic of the risks and threats for national security.

2.2. Analysis of intelligence

The intelligence gathered may be of a large volume. If it is unclear, firstly, its veridicity is verified, afterwards being submitted to the responsible factors. The analysis of the intelligence is done, mainly to select it in regard to its importance for national security. The interpretation of the intelligence results in issuing valuable judgments.

The analysis of intelligence permits a classification: simple and complex information. Simple intelligence is a unique event, which refers to the state of a system. Usually, for a piece of intelligence to be considered truthful, therefore significant for the intended purpose, it is verified from at least 3 sources. If it is truthful and it concerns national security, than it is significant and it is submitted to decisional factors.

The analysis of intelligence is most often compared to a puzzle, where some pieces are missing and others belong, in fact, to another puzzle game. This analogy has its limits, because the puzzle of intelligence analysis includes problems,

actors and dynamic actions and is constantly subjected to change[13].

Analysis, the central activity of any structure of "intelligence" is a complex process of evaluating and transforming raw data and intelligence obtained from specific and complementary sources into products for beneficiaries. This process involves making judgments, issuing assumptions, reasoning and prognosis based on interpreting the available intelligence that the analyst has[14].

The "intelligence" information is the one collected, analyzed and disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent or monitor risks and threats to national security intelligence[15].

The "intelligence" activity implies special skills, intrinsic motivation, professional training and a lot of work. To become a truly professional worker in this field one must go through many challenges and limit situations. Along all these efforts a multisource analysis system contributes substantially and it is continuously improving. It must be kept in mind that when practicing informative-operational work, high professionalism is formed in a long time, up to 10 years one could say without exaggerating[16].

The cycle of classic "intelligence" includes the following stages: planning, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of "intelligence" products.

There are two basic categories of analysis: strategic analysis, which is more important and has a long-term perspective and tactical analysis, which focuses on immediate operational problems[17].

Strategic analysis will provide for superior decision makers intelligence aiming for early warning of threats and help them prioritize the preparation for effective risk management and national security threats.

Therefore, strategic analysis of processed information will organize all the intelligence and will provide insight into the operational situation (phenomena of interest and decisional factors).

Tactical analysis focuses on approaching issues and developments on certain areas (economical, financial, social, military, terrorist and organized crime, etc.) that may affect national security interests. The analytical process is carried out by evaluating the data and intelligence about the involved actors, the targeted objectives, the spatial and temporal coordinates and the concrete forms of manifestation of risk-bearing situation[18].

2.3. The analysis of intelligence designates the step of emphasizing the objectivity and accuracy of the intelligence. The value and credibility of intelligence is determined by several factors, most important to remember – the verifiability. Assessments made in haste or superficially have often compromised structures with national security ***prerogatives***[19].

Experience has shown that very important intelligence at a given time becomes totally unnecessary if known but unused in good time. In the context of the activity of specific structures with responsibilities in national security proper use of obtained intelligence is essential.

An important aspect of investigating crimes against national security is the constant exploitation of collected, stored and processed information by bodies dealing with intelligence in their databases and especially streamlining and orienting intelligence data flow to supply investigative activities undertaken by the judiciary authorities for crimes against national security to streamline the investigative approach generally and specifically for criminal cases[20] in particular.

In terms of users/beneficiaries of the information obtained by the national security services by applying special investigative techniques, they are decision makers established by law, which, according to legal competence, require to be informed[21] about the existence of any dysfunction, vulnerability, risk factors and danger states for national security. They make decisions consistent with the social value of information and level of imminent danger signaled, ensuring protection of sources and resources involved in obtaining and processing data and transmitting intelligence.

Thus, in Romania, the beneficiaries of intelligence obtained by the services with national security responsibilities are represented by:

a) the Senate's President, Chamber of Deputies' President, the Standing Committee for defense and public order of the two Houses of Parliament, the ministers and heads of departments in ministries, (when the intelligence concerns issues related to areas of activity that they coordinate or are responsible for);

b) the prefects, the General Mayor of Bucharest, the heads of county councils, respectively of Bucharest, for issues related to the competence of the respective bodies;

c) the criminal investigation body, when the intelligence concerns the commission of a felony.

To guide providers of information and, hence, engage a more efficient dialogue with the security structures, beneficiaries make requests on intelligence and also give feedback on informative documents addressed to them.

Conclusions

The activity of information gathering is one of the crucial factors for national security. A complex investigation can become functional and can be completed with positive results only if it is based on the continuous conjunction of specialized efforts when collecting, analyzing and processing information in the qualified investigation of cases that represent national security threats.

A significant role in the cognition of security risks, threats and dangers is played by the components of National Intelligence Community. Each of these, through the nature of the activity they conduct in the information gathering field, must promptly inform the decisional factors about the risks, threats and dangers to national security, in order to take preventive measures. Simultaneously, it is important that the activity of intelligence documentation and investigation regarding the risks, threats and dangers to security to be achieved through the conjunction and cooperation of the specialized structures by pooling all available resources.

NOTES :

1 Florin MATEAŞ, *Sistemele complexe în managementul integrat al Poliției de Frontieră* in Criminality Investigation Magazine, no. 2/2008, pp. 353-373.

2 *http://web.archive.org/web/20040821134521/http://www.sri.ro/Anexa3.pdf*

3 *Criminal Intelligence. Concepts and Issues Paper*, IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, Washington, 2003.

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5 A first difficulty in trying to understand the role of analysis derives from the fact that there is no generally accepted definition of the term ''intelligence''. The term ''intelligence'' is not always well defined. It is generally used synonymously with information, reflecting the

importance of material obtained from open sources and suggesting a positive analogy between information obtained and quality journalism.

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7 Gheorghe OȘVAT, *Investigarea criminalității transfrontaliere (teză de doctorat)*, Academia de Poliție "A.I. Cuza", București, 2011, p. 183.

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THE IMPACT OF CRISIS SITUATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, PhD*

Romania was not spared the consequences of the recent global financial and economic crisis. Its economic and social consequences strongly disrupted the normal functioning of state and society, although the contagion effect on our country was originally limited. In this context, the crises that affect or could affect Romania are specific to the five dimensions of security or combinations thereof. Currently, economic crisis and social crisis generate the greatest difficulties, with direct effects to the security of the individual, community and Romanian state.

Key-words: crisis; crisis situation; society; economy; national security.

1. Theoretical aspects of crisis

Crisis is a constant in the contemporary world, which usually occurs as a result of economic, political, social difficulties. It is a period of tension, disorder, tests, often decisive, which is manifested in society[1]. The meaning of a state of crisis can be simplified to the *need for change*, i.e. disorganization to a new organization.

Crisis can be understood as a moment of rupture within an organized system[2]. In this case, it knows a transition threshold from normality to abnormality, a transition threshold from abnormality to pre-crisis and a transition threshold (rupture) from pre-crisis to crisis. Critical threshold is when a crisis transforms into war (violent conflict). This moment of rupture – the transition from pre-crisis to crisis – requires decision makers to define a position either to preserve or to transform the system in anticipation of his return to normality, at steady state.

In most cases, crisis appears when those responsible actors loose control of the most levers of political and diplomatic, financial and economic, socio-cultural, military activities and processes, leading to dysfunctions in the organization and functioning of the system. Exiting the crisis is done either by structural change of the system, or by major adaptive changes of its structure[3]. Therefore, returning to normality of the system can be achieved only in conditions of adaptation or modification of its form, content and structure.

Also, other two concepts are important for our analysis: *state of crisis* and *crisis situation*[4]. The concept of state can be defined as a specific position, identified in a continuum or series of a process. This means that not any deviation or dysfunction could be crisis. Here comes the perception of others and community on events and possible consequences. The crisis situation is the result of a combination of circumstances at a given time. Identifying and monitoring the progress of these

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Year / Indicator	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012 (estimate)
GDP (billion dollars)	204.34	164.34	164.44	189.78	186.42
GDP percent change	7.35	-6.58	-1.65	2.45	1.46

Figure no. 1: Romania's GDP in 2008-2012[5]

circumstances make possible projecting the nature of responses, establishing favourable moments to end the crisis, maintaining the crisis in a balance to allow future defusing.

The types of crisis can cover any of the areas of activity and human action: political, diplomatic, economic, financial, social, cultural, military, informational, environmental, etc. Usually, crises from a system move to other systems and even systems of systems. The maintaining of a situation of generalized crisis or permanent crisis by moving from one crisis to another, from the economic crisis to the social one, from the social crisis to the political one, has as an inevitable finality the creation of favourable conditions for either failure/collapse of that state or armed aggression.

The interconnection model of different crisis types to an armed conflict could be: *financial crisis – economic crisis – social crisis – political crisis – military crisis* and finally *armed aggression*. This model is a theoretical one, in practice can not be easily identified such "cascade" effect given that progress of the events is quite rapid and stages (crises) often overlap, resulting in a generalized crisis in the society.

In theory, the crises phenomenology and their management has been studied in detail and there have been developed all sorts of policies, strategies, models, mechanisms, tools for prevention, mitigation and resolution. However, their application in practice often reveals a new element that was not taken into account and the desired result is not always the envisaged one.

In the next chapters, we will analyze the different types of crises that occur/may occur at the national level and how they affect/may affect the state, its institutions and, last but not least, Romania's citizens, society and security.

2. Crises that affect national security

Romanian economy has become an important part of the European and international system as a result of globalization process and the country's accession to the European Union. The degree of interdependence increased so that the risks and the positive/negative results of EU and global economy have an impact on the national and vice versa. This transfer could be observed as well in recent years.

In 2008-2009, the financial crisis has spread rapidly and triggered the entry of the EU economy in difficulty. Aggressive monetary policy measures and cash infusions taken by developed European countries were not sufficient to avoid the crisis worsening, which gradually turned into recession. Therefore, the *economic crisis* is the most serious crisis that affects Romania's security.

Since 1990, Romania has gradually moved from an economy based on agriculture and cheap labour to one driven by investment. National economy has made visible progress and the growth during 2002-2008 was mainly fueled by the boom in real estate, credit expansion and the increase of domestic consumption. In late 2008, the Romanian economy has been affected by the effects of the crisis that swept the EU economy and showed the first signs of weakness: growth slowed down, the current account deficit has widened, foreign investment has decreased and unemployment has increased.

Romania experienced a recession in 2009-2010, with decreases in all sectors of economy. After record growth in 2008 (7.35%), the national economy contracted sharply in the next years, with -6.58% in 2009 and -1.65% in 2010. The leading sectors during growth were the ones which pulled the economy even further down. Thus, the gross value added of the construction sector (-13.6% in 2009 and -10.7% in 2010[6]) and the services (-6.8% in 2009 and -2.8% in 2010[7]) have been a negative contribution to national economic growth.

Inflationary pressures have increased due to evolution of international price of goods. Higher prices, excise duty and VAT or sectoral rigidities maintained Romania to the top of EU countries

with high inflation[8]. The inflation rate was 5.59% in 2009 and 6.09% in 2010[9], levels that has exceeded the 4.5% target set by the National Bank of Romania (NBR). Although real demand suffered severe contractions, consumer prices increased in 2010, particularly in manufactured goods (e.g. tobacco, cigarettes, fuel and heat), than in 2009, when prices in the services sector experienced the higher growth.

All these difficulties were reflected in income and living standards of the population. Moreover, the dismissal of more than 100,000 people in the public sector over two years resulted in increased unemployment rate from 6.3% in 2009 and 6.87% in 2010, compared to about 4% in the pre-crisis time[10]. Also, reducing wages and new hiring in the public sector and limiting employee expenses has contributed to this situation. Since June 2008, the number of unemployed began to rise sharply from 403,441 people at the end of 2008 to 709,383 persons at the end of 2009. Over the next year the situation improved, only 626,960 people were registered as unemployed.

The monetary policy interest rate has been adjusted downward during the past two years by NBR. From 10% in February 2009, the reference rate reached a historic low of 6.25% in May 2010[11] in order to maintain prices and financial stability on medium term. By the end of 2010, the rate remained unchanged despite inflationary pressures arising from VAT 5 percent increase. Moreover, short-term external debt totalled 18.746 billion euros at end of 2010, an increase of nearly 21.6% compared to 2009, while in the same period the medium and long term external debt advanced with 9.5% counting 72.019 billion euros[12]. Strong increase in Romania's debt was mainly given by the 19.95 billion euros stand-by arrangement with the IMF, EU, WB and EBRD.

After a time when Romania was one of the few countries that did not succeed to overcome the crisis, the economy has recovery in 2011 (2.45%). Increased investment, industrial orders, domestic and external demand have given a new stimulus to national economy. However, the Euro Zone sovereign debt crisis (Greece, Italy, etc.) and the situation increasingly difficult to manage by the authorities in Brussels are likely to return the EU economy in crisis. The second wave of the economic crisis will hit probably even stronger our Romanian economy, which in addition have to cope with and maturity debt committed in recent years.

The economic crisis coupled with less effective policy decisions and inconsistent legal framework produces *social crisis*, i.e. a state of instability or imbalance characterized by a large number of changes in the normal functioning of society. A social crisis is not desirable because it reduces the welfare of that society, but has a positive result as the society develops to a higher level than the pre-crisis situation.

Since 2009, Romania's population has felt the full effects of the crisis and recession in the national economy. Social crisis settled gradually as more and more social categories were affected by government decisions. Amid the difficulty of the economic and financial situation and the need to rebalance the state budget, Romanian authorities were required to decrease spending as a solution with short term effects.

Under these conditions, social problems such as poverty or unemployment have worsened and affected the most vulnerable social groups. The most difficult period for the population was July-August 2010, when the public sector wages were reduced by 25% and the most social benefits by 15%, while the VAT rate was increased from 19% to 24%. Also, those with pension of more than 740 lei were required to pay 5.5% contributions to social health insurance fund. Austerity measures have led to a relative economic stability, but increased social discontent reflected in a sharp drop in consumption and living standards. Purchasing power of the population has declined and many people were not able to pay their debts and interest rates on committed loans.

The economic crisis, like any time of crisis, has favoured some pressure to change the existing way of organization and functioning of the state. Reform consisted in reorganizing certain segments of social life, from education, labour market and public pension system to public administration and justice. Starting the last months of 2008, the number of governmental personnel declined steadily due to dismissals, retirements and vacancies freezing. In 2008-2010, the public sector employees fell by 132,207 people, from about 1.398 to 1.266 million[13]. The most affected sectors were local authorities, pre-university education and health.

In these circumstances, the cohesion of the Romanian society was severely impaired. The

Figure no. 2: Governance Indicators Score for Romania[15]

population morale and social solidarity gradually deteriorated and discontent and distrust in state institutions and its measures increased. The negative effects of the crisis reflected in the financial situation of the population rose the degree of pessimism towards improving the national economy state.

3. Crises that could affect national security

The *political crisis* in Romanian society may arise as a result of structural contradictions manifested through economic and social crises after 2008.

On the one hand, the legislative process obstruction is one of the most serious consequences of a potential internal political crisis. A nonfunctional Parliament (both chambers) or absence of a government with parliamentary legitimate make impossible the debate and adoption of laws and reforms critical to Romania's economic and social development and fulfilment of its international obligations.

On the other hand, financial and socio-economic context imposed by the economic crisis constrain the state to shift to a new type of policies. However, any major changes to be made in the manner of organization and functioning of the state in order to be more efficient encounter, as expected, the opposition of citizens. The rupture between the political class and the population occurs when politicians' agenda does not coincide with that of the population and the achieving of political and economic objectives leads to major impoverishment of several social categories. That brings up the question of governance.

According to World Bank's experts, governance is defined as traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised[14]. This include: the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social integration among them.

The World Bank analysis methodology makes it possible to evaluate the quality of a country's governance over time and in comparison with other countries.

According to Figure no. 2, Romania recorded negative scores in 2008-2010 in terms of "Government Effectiveness" and "Control of Corruption". The "Regulatory Quality" and "Rule of Law" indicators have seen some improvement. The "Political stability" was much better in 2009 than in 2008, but in 2010 it deteriorated again and "Voice & Accountability" fell steadily.

It seems that the difficult economic situation at European and international level and the need to modernize the state led to a decline in public confidence in the ability of leaders to solve their current problems. Elections remain the most effective option by which voters may punish the governance team, although there is an obvious decrease in population's desire to exercise their right to vote, either disinterest or lack of alternatives to meet their aspirations and expectations. Improvements of the entire Romanian political system is also a fundamental condition for its opening to citizens and complement the representative democracy with participatory democracy virtues (full exercise

of democratic rights and liberties, political stability, civic spirit development and active participation of civil society to the governance).

Romania is exposed to certain types of natural and technological hazards/disasters. The *ecological crisis* could occur in our country as a result of the vulnerabilities increased by the following human activities:

- deforestation of large areas in order to expand the agricultural land;

- deforestation of secondary watershed that generate large amounts of silt that moves in the main rivers and leads to artificial lakes clogging;

- use of slopes as arable land or performing work that leading to a change in morphodynamic equilibrium;

- exploitation of raw materials (salt, lignite, petroleum, etc.) caused degradation and pollution of large areas, including settlements;

- industrial activities that cause environmental pollution[16].

In conclusion, Romania is exposed to a variety of hazards resulting from the interaction of all those factors, including the demographic and social ones.

The most common hazards/disasters that Romania may face are floods and outrushes, which have a major effects on settlements, traffic routes and land along the 4,000 rivers on national territory. Romania also has high seismic risk with a considerable impact on the population. That risk is exacerbated by the large number of high and ancient buildings, most in Bucharest and large cities, and the economic inability of owners to take quick action to fortify them.

Analyzing some specialized data[17] in correlation with vulnerabilities described above, it appears that approximately 60% of Romanian national territory is vulnerable to natural hazards. The worldwide geo-climatic changes over the last decades have led to the emergence of risk factors in our country that have evolved to disasters. The situation is even more serious as some phenomena increased the society's vulnerability to natural disasters, such as: population growth, poverty, excessive urbanization (forced), environmental degradation and lack of local structures specialized in natural hazards/disasters management.

Romania is vulnerable to certain types of *technological hazards/disasters*. The most likely

hazards may occur in our country are those related to: radioactive substances; chemical industry; mining sector; soil, surface water and groundwater pollution by oil and other hazardous substances; damage or collapse of engineering works; air, rail, sea or road accidents[18]. Therefore, technological hazards in Romania are closely related to the equipment level of companies, wear rate of facilities and technology and training level of employees. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that almost every county in our country are establishments that are under the EU Seveso II Directive[19].

Romania is unlikely to face a *military crisis*, given the absence of threats to the interests and fundamental values of our country. As advocated in the National Defence Strategy[20], Romania does not perceive a direct military threat in the coming years, meaning a threat involving the use of military force against our country.

However, the indirect risks and threats against Romania, as a member of NATO/EU and actively participant in international crisis management and conflicts resolution missions, could trigger a military crisis. Thus, the expansion in international terrorism, transnational organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and development of ballistic missile systems are potential problems that Romania should be prepared to deal with. Also, the frozen crises and conflicts in the Black Sea region or instability in North Africa and the Middle East are threats that not directly address our country, but that could affect national security.

Counteracting these risks and threats (or a direct military threat against Romania) can be done either by employing its own resources (human, financial, material and information) or through cooperation with international allies and partners. In both cases, the aim is the development of security and defence capabilities in order to deter any potential aggressor to use or threaten to use military force against our country.

Some conclusions

The complex crisis that has disrupted the entire global economic and financial system is still an important source of vulnerability and insecurity at national level. Its severity and expansion were unprecedented with destabilizing effects that were felt in all structures/areas and at all levels

of security. In this context, state's vulnerabilities, whether political, economic, social, environmental or military, have increased, while its capacity to respond and act decreased.

Romania has been and still is subject to a double pressure: on the one hand, internal pressure to meet the basic needs of its citizens and institutions, to prevent, reduce and counteract the crisis effects on the national level and resume economic growth and, on the other hand, external pressure to cope with the changes taking place on international level. Given the fact that economic power determines the power of the state, the internal stability and cohesion, the structure of external interests, the perspectives of regional and global integration, the government should focus both on reducing the effects of the crisis on households and communities and measures for economic recovery. Economy may be a strong factor that sustains the prevention, containment and resolution of crisis situations.

Romanian authorities can counteract the negative effects of socio-economic crisis and other types of crises which can appear through the implementation of new policies in order to strength the rule of law, increase the social security, promote the education, fight against corruption, combat marginalization and bolster those elements that help to develop a political and security culture, build up relations with neighbouring countries, etc. The existing social and economic issues should be also solved by the authorities through increased efficiency – both the outcomes of governance processes and institutions and the natural resource using and environmental protection – and increased accountability and transparency of governance – decisions making and their implementation is consistent with existing regulations.

Finally, given the complexity and impact of various types of crises on people, property, material assets, cultural values, and environment, we believe that it requires closer cooperation between central and local authorities to ensure national security and normality of economic, social, political, environmental and military systems.

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AMERICA'S NEW GRAND STRATEGY – AN INHERITED STEP BACK?

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Cristiana MARIA***
Alina MOGOŞ****

The international system is currently undergoing a period of transition as the hegemon of the unipolar order, United States of America, seems to step back, permitting thus the emergence of a multipolar or non-polar system. This new behaviour might suggest that Washington is pursuing a new Grand Strategy, the so-called "offshore balancing strategy". Through a comparative analysis of three security strategies of USA from the mandates of President R. Nixon, G.W. Bush and B. Obama, the present article aims to identify similarities and differences between them. The purpose of this academic endeavour is to observe the inherited elements from the past of the new strategy and to identify the main changes and the reason for applying them.

Key-words: Grand Strategy; offshore balancing; hegemon; unilateralism; Realism; R. Nixon; G.W. Bush; B. Obama.

Introduction

In the last years, the world witnessed events which made it clear that international stage is changing; the unipolar world is being replaced by the game of '*great powers*' – multipolarity[1]. Many argue that the world is facing *the decline of America's global power*, that the capacity and long-term ability of the U.S. to continue as a unilateral superpower is over, this being mainly caused by growing financial deficits and military overextension, but also challenged by the rising of China and Russia.[2] As the United States of America have played over more than 65 years a leading role in transforming and shaping the international system[3], the whole world is eager to find out how U.S. will respond to all these changes. Confronted with all these facts, Obama administration had to reconsider America's national security policy.

Within this context, the following study aims at establishing the main elements that constitute the cornerstone of the new Obama approach of security and of the international system trying to identify if his Grand Strategy envisions elements of continuity with other grand strategies of the U.S. More specifically, we assess that the Obama strategy is based on the legacy of the strategies that Nixon and Bush adopted during their mandates.

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Although these strategies were thought to be adapted to different national interests, threats, international orders and proposed different and opposing visions, they constitute two of the choices that rested at Obama's disposal for the new US Grand Strategy. We claim that elements of these both concurrent strategies are to be found at the basis of the new American strategy.

In order to reach this paper's goal, the authors are going to underline in short separate analysis the main characteristics of Nixon, Bush and Obama's strategy and in the last part of the paper we will engage in a comparative analysis of the three visions.

As each of these strategies can constitute by itself the subject of a vast study, our analysis will focus on several key aspects that each grand strategy of U.S. should encompass. The elements that we aim to discuss were first defined by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross in their article "Competing visions for U.S. Grand Strategy". They argue that each alternative for US Grand Strategy is constructed taking into account: a certain analytical anchor, the major problems of the international politics, the preferred world order, the nuclear dynamic, the definition of the national interests, the regional priorities, the approach of nuclear proliferation, the approach regarding NATO, regional conflicts and humanitarian intervention and the appeal to the use of force.[4] In addition, we introduce other two elements to be taken into account when discussing U.S. grand strategies: the presence and interpretation of the American 'exceptionalism' and 'manifest destiny'. These two concepts have been defining to many American Grand Strategies and have influenced each presidential administration. These concepts affected the discourses of US political personalities and the path of the American foreign policy. Thus, before discussing how the actions and decisions of the American political leaders gave meaning to these concepts, a brief analysis of their understanding is compulsory.

1. 'American exceptionalism' and 'Manifest destiny': defining the United States Grand Strategy

As Stephen Walt mentions, the United States are described as being: "an empire of liberty", "a shining city on a hill", "the last best hope of Earth", "the leader of the free world" or "the indispensable nation". The common belief is that the international system cannot be imagined without the presence of US. This is what defines the "American exceptionalism". Several historical events led the Americans to the conclusion that their values, their political system and their "know-how" represent a role-model for all the other nations in the world, which entitles US to play a special role on the world stage.[5] The "American exceptionalism" has been used on different occasions to "legitimize both the idealistic and pragmatic, domestic as well as foreign policies" by emphasizing the fact that "the United States has a moral superiority and a uniqueness of its origins political system, social organization, values, cultural and religious characteristics"[6].

"Manifest destiny" is another concept that defines the features of the American foreign policy. The concept expresses the belief that the United States has to expand across the American continent[7] to spread the democratic values to other people, due to the superiority of the "chosen land". The two elements are linked and together emphasize the "missionary" role the US has in the world, rather as a legacy, that is the duty that the Americans have towards other nations. Looking back to the American history and institutions, it seems that the general belief is that US is not only "exceptional", but "exemplary" too, in terms of political decisions, of balance between economic and social life, leadership.[8] Woodrow Wilson, who believed in America's millennialism, mentioned that the US could not spread the message only through the power of an example, that it was necessary to "come down from the hill", and lead the nations through democracy by bringing them together in international institutions such as the League of Nations.[9]

2. Nixon's Detente Grand Strategy – restoring US image on the international arena through triangular diplomacy

Richard Nixon held the Presidential office for two mandates and was the only American President to resign. He presided during the Vietnam War period, the first war that America as a whole generally admitted to having lost and that caused a huge American image deficit.[10]

Nixon inherited an uneasy context: America's global role and leadership were questioned, "The

US nuclear superiority was eroding, its economic supremacy was being challenged, the society was frustrated"[11], in short being affected by what became known as the "Vietnam syndrome"[12].

Pressured by the challenges of the bipolar system and the Cold War logic, convinced that US could neither abdicate its responsibilities, Nixon had to design a strategy that could secure a leader position for his country, without resorting to the military force.[13] Therefore, he preached for detente in relation to USSR and a closer approach towards China thus, installing a three-way relation. He chose to partially withdraw US from world politics in terms of offering less American support and to transfer responsibility of solving disputes to the concerned regional powers.

Nixon saw the "Sino-Soviet split" as an opportunity to improve relations with both countries[14], more precisely to attach China to its goal of containing USSR and thus seek a settlement to the Vietnam War honourable for the Americans. On an individual scale, Nixon regarded winning this war as a dream pursue, namely history granting him the title of peacemaker[15].

As a response to domestic resentment, Nixon administration shaped its policies to support and alleviate power transfer from Washington to the states, regardless of their ideological differences. One could argue that this resembles modern isolationism, but this would be a narrow, rather traditional understanding of national interest concept.[16]

Aside from domestic conduct of politics, his advisor, Kissinger, clearly stated that, aiming at preserving its leading role in maintaining international stability, USA will cease to "sustain the freewheeling interventionism [...] without a strategy for victory."[17] Therefore, selective engagement represented more than the middle way between isolationism and interventionism[18], but also the practical end of Nixon's cost-efficient foreign policy. According to the "Nixon doctrine", states were expected to be handling their own security issues and gain more responsibility in their neighbouring areas.[19]

The balance of power that Nixon favoured was meant to both pinpoint USA as standing by its commitments and bring financial relief, while aiming at a global equilibrium. To reach and maintain such equilibrium, a shift of perspective upon USSR was necessary and, by introducing detente in their relations, competition was replaced with cooperation. A vivid example of the latter is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties.

Redefining the Soviet Union and pushing forward a relaxation in their liaisons, while nevertheless trying to contain its adversary's expansion, Nixon practised something similar to what Walt came to name 50 years later as "offshore balancing".[20] This also implies a switch of focus from Americans to more regional matters. On the one hand, one ought not to oversee Nixon's entanglement with Iran which took the shape of numerous weapons sent to its government[21], only to support America's policy of USSR containment. On the other hand, US troops were not to be deployed, thus staying offshore. The twofold argument of "offshore balancing" – the financial aspect and the public opinion – gave Nixon enough ground to apply triangular diplomacy.

The Soviet Union still being its nuclear archenemy during the high time of Cold War, Nixon stated in his doctrine what American involvement would trigger:[22] USA was staying loyal to their commitments, especially towards the allied nations considered vital to national security.

In order to achieve his main electoral objective, the ending of the Vietnam War, referring to a "honourable withdrawal" of the US that would not affect the confidence of the American people and of the entire world during the US's leadership, Nixon adopted a policy called "Vietnamization", so that it could withdraw from Vietnam without being regarded as the defeated part, while keeping the honour of the American nation intact. The policy consisted in the gradual reduction of the American forces in Vietnam, while helping the South Vietnam assume a complete role in the war. [23]

While sticking to this strategy, Nixon argued in its favour, by saying that "North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that". Many thought that this end to the Vietnam War would coincide to the end of the American exceptionalism and it had a great impact upon the American public confidence. The matter is that Nixon, seen as the one to restore to the Americans the faith in themselves, but he weakened it through the policies he adopted. More than being just a stain on the American history, the Vietnam War easily turned into a "syndrome", a reference point for the evolution of the American exceptionalism.

Although, promoting the realist approach, assuming that all states act rationally and are alike – which obviously comes in contradiction the thesis of American exceptionalism, Nixon used the Wilsonian rhetoric of the American exceptionalism and the manifest destiny of USA: "we do have a destiny to give something more to the world than an example which other nations in the past have been able to give... an example of spiritual leadership and idealism." He shared Wilson's belief in America's indispensability and "preferred to invoke Wilsonian rhetoric to explain his goals while appealing to national interest to sustain his tactics."[24]

3. Bush Doctrine – unilateralism as means to proclaim U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world

George W. Bush presidency has defined a US strategy bearing one of the most offensive and unilateralist visions in the US history, in a unipolar era of peace among great powers. It is also a proof of how the US strategies are influenced by the definition of interests and threats and how easily a president can change drastically its vision as an event favours the redefinition of interests and threats.

Bush began his mandate without having any relevant experience in foreign policy, without having faith in the idea that the US is a superior nation with a special role on the international arena. In his first year of presidency, he took measures that were antithetical to the idea of "manifest destiny" or "American exceptionalism". Regarding the approach of the "manifest destiny" concept, in one of the debates with Al Gore, Bush expressed his feeling that it is not US's role to spread the democratic values across borders the way it used to: "I'm not sure the role of the United States is to go around the world and say «This is the way it's got to be. We can help....» I think one way for us to end up being viewed as the ugly American is for us to go around the world saying «We do it this way, so should you »."[25]

The 9/11 events made Bush drop his selective engagement doctrine and embrace a more activist global perspective.[26] These events gave to the neoconservatives the pretext to make their strategy of military primacy the next US Grand Strategy.

Maria Ryan considers that the touchstone of the neoconservatives' foreign policy was preserving what Charles Krauthammer refer to as "America's unipolar moment", the US' position as the single pole of the world power that was able to be the decisive player in any conflict it chose to be.[27] In one important document of the neocons think-thank "Project for the New American Century", they emphasize the fact that US "is the world's only superpower and faces no global rival. America's strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible." To their minds the beginning of the XXI century presented a strategic situation in which US should try to preserve its power in order to enhance the "pax Americana", thus the need to maintain the pre-eminence of military forces. [28]

These ideas are to be found also in the "codification of the Bush Doctrine"[29]- the National Security Strategy of US from 2002. Within this document it can be observed the same neoconservative rhetoric about the "unique position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence", "the moment of opportunity"[30] that US should maintain. Also it is assessing that US power must be ready to take action at any time if it is to have an impact and the military power should be used to maintain unilateral global dominance and hegemony.[31]

The events of 9/11 questioned the efficiency of deterrence, containment or ex post facto responses when dealing with terrorists and rogue regimes, hence the need for a preventive approach.[32] The National Security Strategy from 2002 acknowledged that during the Cold War deterrence was "an effective defence", but the traditional concept of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose targets are innocents.[33]

The second assumption of the Bush Doctrine is that America has to free itself from the multilateral constraints as its power needs to be free to pursue and guarantee its national interests.[34] The neocons argue that in reality UN and other international institutions on most urgent and deadly problems are mostly incapable of acting or inadequate to the task, failures in Bosnia and Rwanda stand proof for the argument.[35] Thus, US must be prepared to act unilaterally: "will not hesitate to act alone if necessary".[36] The Iraq war is a resilient example of Bush's unilateralism.

A third element of this doctrine is related to the fact that facing a new borderless threat, US claims the right to intervene anywhere in the world to anticipate such challenges.[37]

A special significance within the strategy is the objective of establishing an American hegemony or primacy.[38] According to the Neoconservative vision, preserving peace and securing US interests can be ensured only by a preponderance of US power. In fact, the main objective of primacy is not to merely preserve peace among the great powers, "but to preserve US supremacy by politically, economically and militarily outstanding any global challenger." Therefore, one of the major concerns of a primacy policy is to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Posen and Barry identify the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with a huge threat to US interests, as it undermines US freedom of action by increasing the costs and risks of advantage.[39] Related to this argument, one can observe the preoccupation of the doctrine and Bush's administration for increasing non-proliferation efforts and actively punishing those who do not conform to U.S.'s will – such as Iraq for example. It is argued that terrorism has provided Bush with the opportunity to press for US's primacy.[40] But there are also arguments that tend to emphasize that the hegemonic doctrine of Bush was mainly favoured by the unipolar system. The tendency to favour a unilateral hegemonic approach can be explained by using Thucydides' hypothesis that "states expand in the absence of a countervailing power, unbalanced power will act without moderation and states not subject to external restraint tend to observe few limits on their behaviour, imbalanced power creates the possibilities for aggressive behaviour."[41] It can be also considered that the same unipolarity created the permissive environment for the aggressive promotion of democracy around the world, because of the increasing relative power states tend to define their interests broadly and seek to more influence abroad. In this manner, the deep desire of Bush to spread liberty and democracy around the world as related to the security of U.S can be explained. The idea of promoting democratic values can be traced back to the manifest destiny that Wilson envisioned for U.S., but while Wilson wanted "to make the world safe for democracy", Bush "wanted the world to be democratic so the US could be safe."[42]

In order to obtain full support at home for the two wars from Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush based his speeches on the American exceptionalism, justifying the attacks by the fact that only a superior nation, "the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world" could represent a threat for those who are enemies of the democratic principles. To sum up, Bush thought that the very fact of the US being an exceptional nation made of it an easy target for Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Furthermore, the war on terror has been carried under the auspices of the American exceptionalism, influenced also by the legacy of the Vietnam War and Nixon's policy that did not lose its impact upon the foreign policy. The Americans were to engage in "the freedom's fight" so that they can avoid strengthening the "Vietnam syndrome".[43] The turnover is controversial as Bush did not seem to spread the democracy and protect freedom by the forms of arms, but this was "a sort of neoimperial effort to assert American global rule in which democracy promotion is decidedly less important" and more like a geopolitical ambition[44].

4. Obama Doctrine – maintaining US preponderance and leading role through offshore balancing

Given the structural change, President Barrack Obama had to face with several challenges all over the world: "unfinished and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, stalled peace talks in the Middle East hostile states acquiring nuclear capabilities and a deteriorating non-proliferation regime, a global financial crisis and deep economic recession, looming climate and environmental dangers, mounting public debt and strained budgets, and growing "multipolar" worries brought on by a rising China and an estranged Russia".[45]

Considering this inherited background, the American exceptionalism did not seem enough. From the beginning of its mandate, Obama seemed to have rejected the "old conservative idea of American exceptionalism" that Bush spread throughout his mandate, but not the entire concept. Far from discrediting it, Barack Obama conferred the notion another meaning. In his discourses, he often spoke about US' "greatness" or "true genius"[46]. But US were too much entangled in conflicts worldwide and its capacity to choose was jeopardized. It chose to act as a leader, but once it was there, US was obliged by its role to act, it was its responsibility, and therefore it was involved in unnecessary conflicts[47].

A new strategic approach was needed. In January 2012 a new strategic defence guidance came into force. As the title is suggesting it, Obama's administration objective is to sustain "U.S. Global Leadership", hence it would still intervene and would assume the responsibility of being a leader.[48] This is not very different from Bush's unilateral strategy analyzed above. But, as we go further, the unilateralism is replaced by what Stephen Walt calls "offshore balancing". Following this strategy, US would intervene discriminately only when its vital national interests are threatened or when the costs are not too large (in the case of humanitarian intervention). US would sustain regional powers in order to create a balance of power that prevents the emergence of threatening powers. It will intervene discriminately and would focus its resources in areas of strategic importance. Also, it will restrain its interests.[49]

Walt considers that this strategy is effective due to the fact that the American power would not generate anymore a state of fear among other states and non-state actors, therefore the American power will not be perceived as a threat.[50] Christopher Layne[51] considers that the strategy of offshore balancing is different from isolationism because in the case of the last one the balance of power in Eurasia or in the Middle East or Europe is irrelevant for the security of US. None of the actors could threat US. Regardless the fact that these two strategies are two different paths with different resources and results, they can seem alike. Both assume that US would succeed in containing the regional powers from going to war and it would not use force in order to preserve the economic openness of the Eurasian region. But maybe the most striking difference between the two is represented by the capabilities in the region from which it is most likely to emerge a hegemon. And that is the case of China in the South-East Asia.

Acting as an offshore balancer, US would concentrate its attention and its military presence in South-East Asia, fact that is already mentioned in Obama's defence strategy.[52] Regarding the creation of a regional balance of power in strategic regions for US in order to encumber the emergence of what Walt names "a peer competitor"[53] (in this case China in the Pacific), Obama already ensured America's military presence in the Pacific, through its agreement with Australia.[54]

Additionally, the strategy is pursuing an increased level of cooperation with India, which will serve as a "regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region". Through these actions, the regional powers would have more responsibilities in maintaining the stability of the region, fact that, firstly, allows US to choose where to act and secondly makes other states to focus more on their neighbours and less on US.[55] Therefore, US will deter other emerging powers by creating and sustaining regional alliances that will establish a regional balance of power. If deterrence is not productive, US is ready to defeat that threatening state. The present defence strategy is very clear in this regard, especially in the case of deterring or defeating North Korea[56].

The statement of the Secretary of Defence regarding the size and the role of the Joint Force of America is another important aspect. This force should continue to be the most developed in the world and must be prepared to intervene in missions that are threatening the 'core national interests' of US (defend the homeland, defeat aggressions coming from al Qaeda, deter or defeat aggressions, countering nuclear proliferation, maintaining the deterrence coming from the nuclear capacity etc).[57]

This leadership strategy has been reflected during Bush administration in extended operations like the ones in Iraq or Afghanistan. They were made in order to maintain its hegemonic position. But in neo-realist terms of costs and benefits the numerous operations in which the US has been dragged into, during Bush mandate, had increased significantly the costs over the benefits.[58] The Defence Strategic Guidance explains the need to reduce these costs "we draw back from these two operations [Iraq and Afghanistan], take steps to protect our nation's economic vitality, and protect our interests".[59] Given the fact that countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic missiles is still defined as a core interest of US, Washington will maintain its military presence in the Middle East. The fact that "U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations" is another point in which Obama's defence strategy comes very close to the objectives of an offshore balance strategy, because, in this way, US will be able to develop a low-cost, innovative and small-footprints approach.

As regards US nuclear arsenal, it will continue to be a nuclear deterrent, fact that falls again under the offshore strategy umbrella, because "as an offshore balancer, the United States would seek simultaneously to maximize its comparative military-technological advantages and its strategic flexibility".[60]

But, as Walt is underlying, the new defence strategy, although has many characteristics of an offshore balancing one, is still interventionist. According to the Defence Guidance, US will continue to fight against terrorist threats, by an active approach on countering it. This can be translated into "drone strikes, night raids, and various forms of covert action".[61] According to the strategy, US must remain the leader of the international arena, but it should also rely more on its regional allies from that area and intervene only when the regional balance of power is unproductive.[62]

The Obama strategy, although it tends to narrow the area of direct US intervention in order to prevent entanglement in other costly wars if the vital interests of US are not at stake, does not assume that US gives up on their role of leaders on the international realm. It is rather, a matter of perceptions. For example, the US assume that their role in Asia represents "a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security", but it is possible that China, North Korea or Pakistan not to have the same opinion upon the American intervention, as the American intervention in that area can make them feel less secure. Fact is that even according to the new strategic defence guidance, the US "will continue to promote a rules-based international order"[63], which means that it would not give up to its missionary role, but only limit its actions to those areas of strategic interest.

Table no. 1 offers a clear image of the main characteristics of each strategy, making it easier to observe the similarities and differences between them. As it can be seen in the table that Obama's doctrine is similar with Nixon's doctrine in what it regards the analytical anchor, mainly the realism, the wish to avoid entanglements, the preference for the balance of power as provider for world stability, the support for status quo regarding the nuclear dynamic and the idea of discriminate use of force and humanitarian interventions, the narrow definition of the national interest, the predilection for seeing Asia as a regional priority. It also retains from Bush the idea of maintaining

leadership, the indiscriminate prevention of the weapons of mass-destruction, the wish to contain the regional conflicts. It can be observed that although promoting different types of intervention in the regional priority areas, all three presidents remain merely interested in the Asian continent.

Unlike Bush's "unipolar moment of great opportunity", Nixon and Obama had to design strategies that tackled with the need for reassuring US leadership in uneasy international and domestic environments. Despite the fact that they were leaving in different international system realms, Nixon in a bipolar one, Obama in unipolar one, same had to deal in drawing their visions with similar challenges: a society reluctant to any future military entanglement, inherited from unpopular and costly wars – Vietnam in case of Nixon, Afghanistan and Iraq in case of USA, they faced nuclear and economic difficulties and were both concerned about how to tackle with China and Russia.

Bush doctrine differs in many aspects from Nixon's – first because Bush doctrine assess that the stability of the world system lies in preserving the preponderance of its power, while for Nixon the stability can be achieved only through the balance of power. While Nixon was promoting through his detente strategy and triangular diplomacy something more similar to selective engagement that retain neo-isolationist elements, imposed by the difficulties of his time, Bush promoted a hegemonic system, an offensive military approach, based on preventive action. Moreover the neocons, tend to criticise the detente strategy and accuse Nixon of showing small ambitions giving birth to the idea that there were limits to US power.[65] The same argument stands also for the offshore balancing elements encompassed in the Obama doctrine, they are seen by the neocons as proving to the world American weakness that could destabilize the system favouring the emergence of a competitor to the role of leading power. The so-called moral democratic realism that is from Kaufman point of view the theoretical anchor of the Bush doctrine asserts that regimes do not behave alike as they adopt different ideologies and regime types. This comes also in contradiction with the Nixon's perception that in an anarchic system all states will have a similar, predictable conduct, that "all countries should be judged on the basis of their actions not on the basis of their domestic ideology."[66]

	Nixon GS	Bush GS	Obama GS
Analytical anchor	Realism	Unilateralism/primacy/moral democratic realism	Defensive realism
Major Pb of the int'l politics	Peace among the major powers Avoid any entanglement similar to Vietnam War	Avoiding the rise of a peer competitor Global War against Terrorism	Maintaining leadership but in the same time avoiding entanglement
Preferred World Order	From 2, to 5 great powers – balance of power	Hegemonic	U.S. leadership through regional balance of power
Nuclear dynamic	Support status quo	Supports aggression	Support the status-quo
National interest	Restricted	Broad	Restricted
Regional priorities	Eurasia	Asia & home of any potential peer competitor	South-East Asia and Middle East
Nuclear proliferation	Discriminate prevention	Indiscriminate prevention	Indiscriminate prevention
NATO	Maintain	Expand and Bolster	Bolster
Regional conflict	Discriminate intervention	Contain, discriminate intervention	Contain, Discriminate intervention
Humanitarian intervention	Discriminate intervention	Discriminate intervention	Discriminate intervention
Use of force	Discriminate	At will, frequent – preventive war	Discriminate, not the first resort
American Exceptionalism	Rhetorical usage, belief Wilsonian principles and in America's indispensability Used it to withdraw from Vietnam	Reinterprets Wilson's exceptionalism US has the duty to promote democracy for its safety – different from Wilson's wish of a world safe for democracy Used to justify the US interventions in Iraq.	Apparently indifferent to it – doesn't reject but neither actively applies it.
Manifest destiny	Rhetorical usage	It applies a reinterpreted form like justification for military interventions US mission to eradicate the evil	U.S promotion of democracy by the power of example

Table no. 1 – Nixon, Bush and Obama Grand Strategies[64]

It has been argued that the need for a change in the approach of national security strategy was inherited by Obama because of the unilateral, hegemonic doctrine of Bush. Fukuyama identified four key mistakes made by the Bush administration that were perilous to the US future[67]: the broad definition of the doctrine of pre-emption that did not take into account that the costs of such a purely military approach were high to be realistic even for a superpower like the United States, the failure to anticipate the global reaction to US exercise of its hegemonic power (this increased the anti-Americanism rhetoric around the world), the overestimation of the effectiveness of conventional military power in dealing with weak states and transnational terrorist networks and the lack of a compelling strategy.

Conclusions

The above comparative analysis revealed that the new American doctrine can be seen as a legacy of the Nixon doctrine and Bush doctrine, retaining elements from both of them. While sharing many similarities with a vision that influenced America's security policy in the Cold War period, it maintains few elements from the previous doctrine. The comparison of the Bush doctrine to Obama's tend to emphasize more why the need to change the vision.

The elements of offshore balancing that the Obama strategy assumes are similar to the detente strategy of Nixon's as both try to avoid US entanglement in wars that are not vital for the American interests and both submit a regional balance of power on the Asian continent. The presence of some corresponding elements of the two strategies can be explained on the one hand by the similar context, in particular the tense economic situation and the involvement in a costly war that brought a decrease of the international prestige of US. But, on the other hand, it can be also used as an argument the similar transitions of the international system given by the change of distribution of power. Twenty years of unipolarism and interventionism changed very much the logic of the international order, and a total retreat inward is not a viable alternative for a state seen for such a long period of time as an uncontested leader.

Robert Lieber identified four factors that can stand as proof for the need to readdress one's security strategy as they rise concerns related to the over-extension and the fact that the cost of maintaining its foreign commitments increasingly exceeds its resources. These factors are: possibilities of military risks, entanglement in a foreign quagmire, erosion of domestic support and economic decline.[68] As it has already been discussed when analyzing Obama's doctrine, it can be observed that Bush left an American country that indicated the need for a change if we consider the above factors: the military spending put lot of pressure over the US financial system and together with the economic recession, forced some cuts in the defence spending in the new strategy. Obama renounced to Bush's idea of favouring preventive action to deterrence as well as to the idea of using force at will and emphasizing the unilateral actions, but it retained from Bush doctrine the idea of developing the military force.

Although no "David or group of Davids stepped forward to confront the US Goliath"[69], thus giving credit to the neocons that bandwagoning is more prone to occur in relation to the US hegemony than balancing, the hegemonic strategy seemed not to be anymore the best choice to promote and secure US interests. The lack of preference for a hegemonic power of US but the maintenance of the will to continue to assess the leadership of the world, by proposing more a multilateral and regional tackling of problems than a unilateral aggressive one, can be explained by referring to what it is called the tension between the role of a state as a hegemon and its role as a great power (defined in terms of material capabilities).

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TSUNAMI AND INTELLIGENCE - THE NEED FOR SMART RESILIENCE

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*The increasingly rapid and unpredictible developments of the security environment – given the emergence of an era of globalization, uncertainty and multiple tsunamis (real and also alegorical, including informational ones) – **are forcing security institutions to plan for and create foresight and early warning standing capabilities.** However, analyzing the series of events which could not have been predicted for the last 10 years – **from 9/11 to the tsunami which hit Japan in 2011 – we cannot rule out the harsh reality: not only we cannot predict such kind of events, but their impact is increasingly higher.***

Key-words: tsunami; uncertainty; intelligence; intelligence analysis; prognosis; foresight; resilience; smart resilience; strategy.

Introduction

The current paper will present a series of findings regarding the intelligence role within an uncertainty environment, including by studying the use of foresight methods for reducing uncertainty, but it will also emphasize the current harsh reality: we can no longer predict everything. As such, given the absolutely unpredictable developments, the state, the society and even the individual have to adapt, including by implementing what we can generally define as 'resilience'. Taking into consideration the fact that the implementation of a policy is difficult to define by resilience per se, the current paper is focused on the concept of smart resilience, as a set of future-oriented unitary policies implying the use a minimum amount of resources for a maximum output for the society and the individual.

1. 'Tsunami' as a metaphor for the uncertainty within the current security environment

Tsunami usually describes a meteorological phenomenon. Given the increasing dynamics of the international security environment, the concept gained new meanings (technological[1], economic[2], informational[3], political or social[4] tsunami). However, these new meanings are the results of the main features of the phenomenon: unpredictability and overwhelming impact.

If we are to study the predictability degree, there are three concepts largely used by the nowadays analysts and perceived as relevant in relation to the security environment developments – strategic uncertainty, strategic shock and strategic discontinuity. These concepts are conveyed within the most of the risk maps operating by different organizations by the features of the threat, with a view to their impact, likelihood and the available knowledge regarding the threat.

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The strategic uncertainty might be described using Donald Rumsfeld's famous wordplay focused on the *unknown unknowns* and extended to a diagram envisioning:

• two types of uncertainty – (un)certainty of first degree (we know or do not know certain things) and (un)certainty of second degree (we know or do not know that we know certain things) – and,

• four quadrants of different dimensions: *known knowns* (things we know and we are aware of – or at least we think we are aware of – that we know), *known unknowns* (things we know that we do not know), *unknown knowns* (things we know, but we are not aware we know) and *unknown unknowns* (things we do not know and we are not even aware that we do not know).[5]

Strategic shock might be defined as "a major event that punctuates the evolution of a trend", accelerating its pace and significantly changing its trajectory, and even more important, changing "the way we think about defence and national security".[6]

Even though some analysts see strategic shock as having the same meaning with strategic discontinuity, we need to take into account the fact that the latter concept describes a more extended after-shock state of affairs[7]: while a strategic shock modifies the current equilibrium, the strategic discontinuity envisages the after-shock identification of the new trends which may define a pattern for the new equilibrium.

As such, the strategic discontinuity is emphasizing the need to define a third axis for threat analysis. Even though most of the assessments / security strategies are highlighting the importance of knowledge for a correct perception of the environment, they are conducting the threat analysis using two dimensions – impact and likelihood.

The third axis might be the available knowledge regarding the threat, specifically referring to the second-order uncertainty from the above-mentioned wordplay described by Donald Rumsfeld. Therefore, the events where knowledge seems to lack are either unpredictable events, or the events which cannot be analysed by using a pattern (atypical).

The interconnection of the characteristics of the above-mentioned concepts is outlining two "spaces" of the future strategic security environment: a strategic continuity "cube", surrounded by a limitless strategic discontinuity space, as seen in Figure no. 1.

While the strategic continuity "cube" includes mainly military threats, originating from the Cold War, the strategic discontinuity space comprises an entire class of new threats, difficult to be tackled by using "classical" thinking.

The beginning of the current millennium is thus described by a series of unique events associated to the strategic discontinuity: the 9/11 terrorist attacks (by their effects, not only because of the generated surprise), swine flu pandemic (the first pandemic procedurally declared by the World Health Organization), revolts in the Middle East and North Africa / MENA (the first wide social unrest impacting almost the entire Arab world), Japanese nuclear crisis (the first significant crisis of this type after Chernobyl, but with much more extended effects, both technologically and geopolitically), Katrina hurricane (natural disaster disrupting the crisis management of the most developed state in the world, according to the current standards), the tsunami affecting Indonesia in 2004 (with major impact, taking into account the victims number and the physical destruction) or the activation of the Iceland volcanos (leading to the blockage of the air traffic, fortunately for a short period). At the same time, the world economic crisis reached an unprecedented level, and the Mumbay attacks upheld the efficacy of using guerrilla tactics in performing terrorist attacks, having also the potential to initiate an unmatched conflict in the India-Pakistan tensions history. And the list can go on. We all forgot the threat perceived as the most important one at the beginning of the new millennium: the Y2K. At that moment, the problem was easily solved by creating a simple software application.

Moreover, not just the events themselves are hard to predict, but also the consequences of certain events (meaning that some known phenomena or developments that seem to be linear produce what sociologist call "pervert effects"). Thus, often, an isolated event produces unexpected effects on the other side of the earth (butterfly effect). Such example is the nuclear energy "crisis" caused by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, which, for the moment, has had effects only on Germany. At the same time, there are noteworthy the effects of the disaster over Japan – its withdrawal from the foreign financial-banking markets, its focus on

Figure no. 1. The security environment, in terms of threats' main characteristics (likelihood, impact and available knowledge)

domestic spending and investments – which will mean massive acquisitions of resources, implicitly a rise in their price.

Furthermore, we do not have to forget the effects of the information technology tsunami. Who foresaw the emergence of Wikileaks? What about the boom of the social networks? The boom of Facebook or Twitter and their use not only for socializing (but with implications in politics – see the "Facebook effect" on the youth in MENA or "the Twitter revolution" in the Republic of Moldova) will lead to the readjustment of the theories related to the social field. Who had ever thought that such forms of associations that were spontaneous and non-structured, virtual and with no obvious political drives, with no headquarters, no leaders or coherent platforms could become important non-state actors within the sociological or international relations theories?

The influence of an idea, of an objective launched on Facebook can be more powerful than that promoted by a state institution. The Internet tends to replace the written media, soon even the audio-video media. If so far we knew who the stakeholders and managers of a newspaper were, we were familiar with their editorial policy, what do we know about the opinion leaders on the internet (notably those who choose to hide their identity)?

What is more, the strategic discontinuity has revealed certain paradoxes, such as the fact that the anti-terrorism causes terrorism. The world war against the terrorism has generated reactions such as more terrorist attacks (not just in the war fields Afghanistan and Iraq, but also inside the states taking part / militarily involved). Had not we had "international war against terrorism" we would not have experienced the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London!

Thus, the risks related to the space of the strategic discontinuity will be more and more diffuse, hard to acknowledge, foresee or monitor. Faced with so many tsunamis, what solutions do we have?

In principle, we have two choices for the future: to "scan" it (to prepare ourselves for what is coming next) and to influence it (to avoid negative developments and to strengthen positive ones). Where we cannot know or influence we have to prepare the institutions, the society and the individual to accept it and to coherently react, in order to attenuate the possible shocks and to restore the social, political or economic life to the previous levels, as soon as possible. Therefore: prognosis and resilience.

2. Intelligence as a structured system of meaning in an interconnected world

An analogy of intelligence with a system of meaning which follows the triadic pattern of Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistics[8] – signified (the intelligence product), signifier (the events/analyzed developments), sign (the meaning related

to the analyzed event) – although seems to be far-fetched, would highlight the role of the intelligence services, in particular the intelligence analysis, in an approach to provide the political decision makers with a structured outlook on the security environment.

"While the intelligence work has as purpose, generally speaking, to decrease the inherent uncertainty for consumers – meaning consumers' natural insecurity associated to the complex national security problems as well as their induced uncertainty (by manipulation and disinformation operations) – the analysis process is mainly focusing on transforming the results of the intelligence work into a tangible contribution to state and citizens' security."[9]

In order to limit the effects caused by the fast and often unpredictable developments of the security environment which it has to regularly assess, the intelligence activity must envisage to improve itself by adjusting every time the processes, so that the final product is obtained as soon as possible, at high quality and in terms of efficiency (the ratio cost-benefit)[10].

In order to confront tsunamis, the readjusting of intelligence could entail:

• approaching trans-disciplinarily issues/phenomena related to security and making multi-source analytical products;

• developing capabilities needed for making predictive/anticipating intelligence products that could enable the identification of the vulnerabilities and countering the risks, before turning into threats to the national security;

• creating different early-warning mechanisms, which could help showing from the early beginning the developments prone to take unfavorable turns against the security interests and applying lessons learned mechanisms, which could help gather and share (since the training stage) the factors that can influence the intelligence activity;

• assessing different types of configuring the producer-consumer relation and providing feedback, allowing further adjustments in intelligence collection and analysis, given the extremely important role of the consumer role for an efficient intelligence work in support of national security.[11]

The trans-disciplinary approach is residing in the fact that "national security has a multi-faceted nature, requesting an integrated and cross-disciplinary approach, possible of being implemented only in the case of existing proper institutional cooperation mechanisms".[12]

As for standardizating the intelligence work, an assessment is given by Rob Johnston[13], which – right after the 9/11 attacks – concluded that the US intelligence agencies did not use any analytic methods for performing their daily activities. Moreover, the author noted that: "the most common practice is to organize a limited brainstorming based on previous assessments, generating in that way a propensity for confronting previous opinions. No agency knows to many things about the other agencies analytic techniques. Overall, the accent goes more toward the writing and communication skills than toward using analytic techniques. Most of the training is on the job."[14]

So you canot help wondering if there is any connection between the fact that there were information on what was going to become the biggest tragedy of the US and the fact that 11 September 2001 events could not be prevented, respectively that the most powerful intelligence agencies in the world employed at that time only empirical methods of analysis.

Within the analytical methodology an important role is played by boosting the use of the intuitive-predictive methods (analysis of opportunities, assessment of the reduced probabilities, the scenario method, the analysis of the concurring hypothesis, analysis of the conflicting decisions, brainstorming, red team etc. – related to the strategic intelligence) in order to meet the customers' requirements or needs, focused on the assessment of the effects and on the highlighting of the uncertainties.[15]

If we refer to a scale determined by more types of future – probable, plausible and possible (see Figure no. 2[16]) – we could demonstrate the need to switch from using already "classical" forecasting[17] methods to applying foresight.[18]

The current analysis shows that institutionalizing the process of drafting/using the prospective studies could represent a premise for managing the challenges of the future, including by the security sector, by drafting new policies (Australia, Finland), modifying the structures (Singapore) or developing new capabilities (Netherlands)[19].

This process should be thoroughly structured in clearly defined stages, but, in the same time, should include a mechanism of "measuring" the efficiency and of adjusting the activity in order

Figure no. 2. Futures Cone (after Voros)

to be at any time adaptable to the developments of the security environment – which both the governmental approach and the private one have stressed out.

Regarding the connection of the prospective studies with the security field, we could refer to two approaches which are familiar to specialists: the reports *Global Trends*, drafted by National Intelligence Council and *Multiple Futures Project (MFP)*, a project initiated within NATO, with the purpose to encourage the debates on the Strategic Concept adopted in 2010.

What is noteworthy regarding the MFP is that, while identifying the trends/possible developments of the security environment for the horizon 2030, it was also made a future projection of the organization, having as reference points the degree of involvement/the dominant position of the USA and EU within NATO, and the perception on the threats along the both shores of the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, the MPF project has brought into attention the double utility of the prospective studies: anticipating the dynamics of the security environment allow some projections of the organization in the future and, implicitly, helps it to adjust both conceptually and structurally.

If the prospective studies can stand for the basis of the readjusting of the early warning mechanisms, the activity of the organizations from the field of national security should be (re)organized, so that it enables the continuous adjustment, to be able to deal with the new risks and threats.

Thus, the analysis of the cases of failure of the intelligence activity to foresee a "surprise" (such as the 11 September 2001 attack) shows the importance that must be attached both to the estimates based on strategic presuppositions and the analyses based on technical drives, as the occurrence of some signals at tactical level that thwart with the strategic presuppositions can indicate a possible "surprise".[20]

The strategies of change in the intelligence field must take into account the need to adjust the analytical outputs both to the intelligence consumers' priorities and objectives and to the particularities of their personality.

Methods such as the neuro-linguistic programming, profiling or the personality study can prove extremely useful to adjust the message to the customer's style and personality. The fact is that the intelligence services must be empathic when relating to the decision-makers.

The dissemination toward the customers has many forms, but the most frequent used delivering support is the paper, despite the technological developments. However, in order to reduce the latency generated by the use of paper, there are intelligence agencies (especially in the Anglo-Saxon system) which have implemented the direct relationship of the producer with the customer (briefer to the decision maker)[21].

Beyond the concrete forms of this relationship, it is important to build a real partnership, based on mutual trust, between the producer and the consumer, which could allow an exact and rapid knowledge of the consumers' needs and the collecting of relevant reactions, useful for planning of the intelligence activities and for a better understanding of their strengths and limitations.[22]

At internal level, intelligence agencies have

modernized their IT platforms, in order to increase the interaction among analysts or between the collecting areas and the analysis ones (notably in the case of working groups), to increase rapidity in processing the information and in completing the analytical projects. However, we believe that this is not enough. Certainly, this can be only an issue of the security culture, but the consumers should be part of the intelligence cycle.

Thus, in the future, it can prove vital to build bidirectional communication networks between producers and intelligence consumers and, why not, to extend this kind of networks within the academic, research and innovation fields.

The final goal of the (re)building of the intelligence field could be to develop a security culture within the national intelligence community, that can enable taking measures that can add value to the analysis processes and products.[23]

3. Smart resilience or from a resilient infrastructure toward a resilient society

While the intelligence agencies could play a significant role in the development of anticipating the future security tsunamis, especially by using foresight products, a coherent national crisis management process needs a set of prerequisites beyond the intelligence domain, but built around the concept of resilience.

We may use the term of resilience with the meaning offered by the US homeland security endeavors – contain the threat[24], absorb the shock (consequence management) and recover[25] (getting back to the initial functions).

Given the fact that the resilience per se is not enough for managing the security tsunamis, there is a need for using a smart version of the concept.

As such, smart resilience might consolidate the ability of a foresight-oriented intelligence (leading to certain knowledge / influence on the future) while, in the case of the lack of / weak intelligence signals the smart resilience might provide for an after-event coherent reaction (shock absorbtion and recovery).

The idea of smart versions of different concept was also used in some other situations where there was a desire for emphasizing the need to update different security theories, such as smart power or smart defence. While 'smart power', coined by Joseph Nye since 2006 and defined as "the

ability to combine soft and hard power resources by a winning strategy"[26], 'smart defense', recently promoted by NATO's Secretary General, is envisioning "the common use of capabilities, the settlement of certain priorities and a better coordination of efforts"[27].

The necessary prerequisites for a coherent national crisis management process would envision the following:

- promoting a *new alphabetization* for security (starting from a 3D – Development, Diplomacy and Defence – and resilience mix);
- developing a *network-type mechanism* whole-of-society / WhoS (analogy with whole-of-government idea, but targeting more than the governmental area) with a significant early-warning dimension (see Figure no. 3);
- fostering a *real anticipatory dimension* for the national security strategy, as well as for the departmental strategies (defence, public order) – including by improving the development of such documents (the difference between strategic planning and strategic thinking) – correlated with the delineation / implementation of resilience up to the small communities / individuals levels.

Unlike 'smart power' (combination of *soft* and *hard*) and 'smart defence' (prioritization, specialization and cooperation), the *smart* character of the new version of resilience would be defined by three landmarks: re-alphabetization, multiple or cross-dimension connection (WhoS), anticipatory / early warning capacity.

Even though the debate over an extended meaning for security is relatively old, its implementation in the extended understanding is still facing difficulties in the Eastern Europe, given the reservation of the "dedicated" institutions in including other dimensions in the national security management.

Within the above-mentioned model, as part of the 3D approach, the development envisioning "the build-up of an economic, social and political basis for a state and the settlement of communities / societies", the diplomacy including "the communication or negotiation for conflict management, using official or unofficial channels for this purpose", and defence consisting of "a wide array of actions mostly of military nature", ranging from humanitarian aid to warfighting[28]. However, the concept of defence from the 3D model is related to a larger extent to the broader

Figure no. 3. 3D + WhoS + R

idea of security than to the military actions per se.

The WhoS-type mechanism would envision connecting the governmental area, the civil society and the business community for a coherent approach of different work domains at state level (health, energy, etc.). As for the early warning, it could be built on already existing structures / constructions, such as the NATO Intelligence Warning System, and adapted to a potential national crisis management system[29].

The connection between the above-mentioned concepts (3D + WhoS + R) would track the following algorithm: the connection of all the actors (government, civil society, business) in order to reach the established objectives (including the national security ones) according to the 3D domains, and finally to ensure the resilience of the entire system. The actions of the actors will gain coherence and consistency only in the case of a coherent vision regarding the future (and implicitly the objectives), which can be built using foresight.

The anticipation can be inserted in the security strategies – generally speaking – by defining flexible objectives / architectures / processes. In order to illustrate this orientation for planning, one could use the Netherlands (process) and Singapore (objectives and architecture) security strategies.

A comparative analysis of the two strategies (as seen in Figure no. 4) – even though they have a slightly different orientation, Netherland's strategy

focuses on a flexible process (without particular details regarding the institutional architecture for its planning and execution) while Singapore's document centers on flexible objectives (offering details also on the architecture[30]) – is emphasizing three common features, specific for an anticipatory approach:

- *the significance of foresight*, in order to identify the emerging trends and to take them into consideration as part of the planning process;

- *the importance of inter-connection* at different levels (global, cross-institutional, etc.) and the creation of networks – including by the involvement of every citizen – according to the responsibility areas, which have to interact both formally and informally;

- *the relevance of the capability-oriented planning*, where capability – used with multiple meanings, both as mean, as well as ability to act – is about "the ability to produce a certain (military) effect"[31], with specific lines of development[32].

A coherent projection of the future (emerging trends, but also point scenarios / wild cards), associated to a high degree of inter-connection (for the purpose of information or good practices sharing) and to a holistic approach, in terms of multiple use capabilities (abilities) will lead to a flexible crisis management framework (as an effect of inserting anticipation into the security strategies).

THE NETHERLANDS (process-oriented)　　SINGAPORE (objective-oriented)

Figure no. 4. The frameworks defined by security strategies of Netherlands (2007-2008) and Singapore (2005)

As regards the current posibilities for using foresight in the national security area, in the case of Romania we might take into account the possibility to connect to the current national (including using the expertise transfer from the public sphere) and international foresight flows, as well as to explore the instruments available on the market and to identify the methods / techniques proper for a governmental approach.

Internationally, we can explore the NATO (Multiple Futures), US (Global Trends) or EU projects (European Foresight Monitoring Network). At national level, the foresight exercise for the purpose of creating the 2007-2013 Research, Development and Innovation Strategy[33], as well as the ongoing one regarding the higher education[34] (including the experts involved in these projects) are tremendous resources of knowledge in this domain.

For the instruments, in addition to using web search engines, one could mention two consistent resources: the online platform dedicated to foresight experts – FORWIKI (www.forwiki.ro), launched as part of the Romanian higher education initiative and offering free access, as well as the book Futures Research Methodology, written and promoted by Millennium Project.

In the meantime, the process of writing / using foresight products might be facilitated by the know-how and good practices transfer, while building networks / communities of interests at (non)governmental, national and international levels.

A good example for illustrating the importance of inter-connection at different levels is Singapore, where for the purpose of improving the relationship on the foresight dimension within the government – especially with high level decision makers – the authorities built the Strategic Futures Network, comprising the deputies of the state secretaries leading different governmental agencies which usually meet each two months. The Singaporean authorities envision also the connection of the governmental network (special structures from different agencies) both to a national (including the Singaporean think tanks, the business area, etc.), as well as to a global one (connected especially to the Anglo-Saxon sphere) on this matter.

Another element supporting the insertion of anticipation in the security strategies – part of the debate since 1994 – is focused on the difference between the strategic planning and the strategic thinking and it is emphasized by the fact that *the visions are the succesful strategies, not the plans*. This difference is given by the construction of these concepts:

• planning always had as central element the analysis, the transformation of an objective in

lines of action, its formalization in order for the objectives to be automatically implemented, and the articulation of the anticipated consequences / results in the implementation of each lines of action;

• strategic thinking was built on the synthesis of the knowledge acquired by the manager from all sources (both from his / its employees experiences, as well as from the data obtained by market analysis / research), implying the intuition and the creativity.[35]

The potential fallacies in designing strategies[36] (including the security ones), generated by the tension between the strategic planning and the strategic thinking have emphasized the need for a balance in using these two concepts.

Smart resilience in Romania

Is there a need for developing foresight-oriented intelligence or smart resilience in Romania as of 2012? We think there is such a need for building, at least mentally the 2030 version of Romania.

• On the intelligence dimension, the Romanian agencies are implicitly assessing the risks and if they have resources (money, people etc.), they will manage including the less probable risks. In order to assess the risks all the agencies are using planning instruments, such as risk maps and assessment grids (ussualy having two axes - probability and impact on national security) and they are implicitly focusing on the most serious risks.

A solution which might provide for a foresight-oriented intelligence work might be the addition of a new assessment axis: the ability to act (on the one hand for prevention, on the other for containing the adverse effects). As such, a third axis would presume, on the one hand the use of foresight and other preparatory measures for dealing with the possible futures (including by cooperating with other foreign intelligence agencies, by using what we may call intelligence diplomacy), and on the other hand the development of clear procedures and measures, cooperation and intervention protocols, legislative endeavors, exercises, simulations etc. in order to cover also the high impact and less probable risks, whose significance might increase for the security environment.

• At the same time, at a larger scale, one might notice that *within the political programs*

in Romania from 1990 up to now there was not any idea of future. There was not any thought or concern for the future. In the rare concerns about the future, many times the purposes were taken as means. For example, the idea of joining NATO was presented as a fundamental objective, even though it is a mean for increasing the security of Romania. Moreover, the Romanian authorities used, during the last years, a lot of resources for creating working groups on multiple topics, most of them external, or for developing strategies and updating them, or for designing feasibility studies (but the country's infrastructure is bad). Despite all these endeavors, while we are crossing a full economic crisis – the most significant one from the last century, bearing the sign of strategic discontinuity – we do not have an inter-departmental innovative and cross-disciplinary working group which might seek for problems, causes etc. and articulate solutions (such as Finland's Committee for the Future[37] or the Singaporean Strategic Futures Network). The above-mentioned group might also continuously monitor what is happening in the world, to assess the impact (not necessarily a current impact, but a future possible one) of the measures adopted by external entities related to our country on Romania. Alternatively (because we have to accept also the alternative methods) this group might ask futurologists, scriptwriters, SF writers, but also military, financial, academic or other types of experts for support.

• It is obvious that the security environment developments are a set of unpredictable events or processes, havind unwanted and unexpected effects (perverse, collateral etc.). *We also have to accept the current reality that not all significant events could be foreseen.*

And at that point we are talking about resilience. We deem necessary to implement the concept of resilience at a national level and to include it in the public policies, security strategies etc. While some of world states already implements clear policies for resilience (US, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Singapore etc.), the term 'resilience' is largely unknown in Romania and, as such, much more difficult to implement (for example within the National Defence Strategy) and afterward put into practice.

The difference we propose for the smart resilience – compared to the initial Western concept of resilience (specific to significant actors)

– is related to the purpose and the instruments. Precisely, we are talking about getting maximum of benefits with low costs.

To this end, there is a need for a high impact, but low probability risks inventory. We did not even take stock of the black swans our country has already faced, even though we are always saying that we should learn from history.

We do not have intervention standards and procedures in the case of a large scale earthquake, because we have a lot of institutions having overlapping responsibilities and it is unclear who and what everyone does in the first seconds after disaster. We do not prepare the society for such events and we are not pursuing computer-assisted simulations. The analytic simulation scenarios are used at federal level in the US, as well as in the private sector.

After the 2005 flooding in Romania, we built or consolidated dams (emergency breakdown solution), but we did not solve the basic case (the systematization of river flows). Moreover, preparing for the flood, we did not think what we are going to do with the 2011 drought. 'Hidroelectrica' functioned at 50% capacity and 'Cernavodă' nuclear plant was about to stop a reactor. Do we have alternative strategies in case of decreasing energy resources? Smart resilience would imply a previous preparation for the worst scenarios. For example, to have agreements with the neighboring countries in order to be supplied with what we need, to invest in the thermal power plants (coal, gas etc.) in order to cover the energy deficit, to invest, very early, in the alternative energies (wind for example), and shortly *to have coherent strategies for longer than four years, which must not be changed at every elections.*

Conclusions

As mentioned before, we think that *facing the future implies two endeavors: to study it* (in order to get prepared for the future) *and / or influence it* (to avoid the damage and to stimulate the beneficial developments). *In the cases where we can neither scan, nor influence the future, we are implementing the smart resilience* (meaning we are preparing the institutions, the state and the individual to accept the future and to clearly react to it in a certain way in order for them to easily recover after the shock and the social, political and economic life to regain its previous functionality as faster as possible).

Smart resilience means to prepare for unlikely futures, which implies the preparation for worst, but less likely scenarios. It also means to invest in research. The technological, scientific etc. progress will lead to a better preparation for the future. It might help us to become a competitive nation. A competitive nation is the one producing more than consuming, future-oriented, modern and inter-connected, linked to the major thinking flows, extremely prepared (valuable education system) and healthy (a good national health system).

At the same time, smart resilience implies overcoming self-sufficient approaches ("by ourselves") and the intelligent use of other mechanisms for ensuirng citizens' security. It also means to transform the current society into a knowledge society, centered on building feasible futures. It means a unitary approach within the state – society – individual triangle, as to everyone is acing as a single force, especially in the case of unpredictable catastrophic events.

Last, but not least, for a small and medium developed country, the smart resilience means the association with the powerful and the rich which might provide for us security and prosperity, while we are preparing for the discontinuities or crises, where our "associates" cannot offer any guarantees for our present or future.

The uncertainty and the unpredictability are about to overwhelm the security environment, but they cannot function as an excuse for ignorance or lack of action, and smart resilience might be a relatively easy to implement option for facing the significant growth of black swans.

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13 Rob JOHNSTON, *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community. An Ethnographic Study*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2005.

14 *Ibidem*, p. 3.

15 Ionel NIȚU, *op.cit.*, p. 88.

16 After Joseph VOROS, *A Primer on Futures Studies, Foresight and Use of Scenario*, www. thinkingfutures.net, as of 11 July 2012.

17 Projecting a likely to happen future, this kind of products being based on extrapolating the trends highlighted by statistical data.

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ROMANIA FIVE YEARS AFTER THE EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION. EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES[1]

Petre DUȚU, PhD*

Romania's accession to the European Union was long prepared and awaited by the country's population, political class and governors. Five years after the accession, a brief summing-up of the expectances' fulfilment can emphasize the reality of its benefits for all Romanian citizens.

The reality of Romania's integration is essentially different from the population, political class and governors' expectances over the benefits of the EU Member State quality. There is a significant deviation between the expectations and the reality of social, economic, political, demographic and environmental results of the Romania's integration in the European Union.

Key-words: accession; European Union; Romania; expectations; realities; European citizen; values; national interests.

1. Preliminary considerations

Initially, the European construction debuted as an economic organization, constituted to surpass the consequences of the World War II. Therefore, in 1951, the Economic Coal and Steel Community was created[2]. But, progressively, the diverse texts or treaties defined common values for the Member States. Thus, the Treaty of Rome (1959) stipulated safeguarding peace and liberty. In the European Single Act (1986), states declared determined to commonly promote democracy based on fundamental rights. Pursuantly, EU evolved in time in such a manner that today it is a voluntarily association of European states in economic and political fields to provide the peace maintenance in Europe and to favour the economic and social progress[3].

Nowadays, the European Union is a unique body, by its organization, functioning, competencies, international statute and assumed roles on internal and global plan. Yet, the European Union is neither federation, nor an international organization. Still, it has juridical personality pursuant to Lisbon Treaty (Art. 47 TEU) and this allows it to conclude treaties or to adhere to conventions. The European Union has strong institutions to which the Member States transferred a part of their competencies.

Lisbon Treaty[4] settled the values the Union is grounded on, that is the respect of human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, state of law, respect of human rights, inclusively the minorities' rights. The states which desire to adhere to EU must compulsory respect these values to become candidates (Art. 49 TEU) and to accomplish a series of criteria[5] to gain the statute of Member State. In this respect, all candidate states must accept the communitarian acquis. The EU empowered institutions monitor the candidate states and the recent members of the Union.

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The European Union promotes the European citizenship[6]. Each person having the nationality of a Member State is a Union citizen. The Union citizenship complements, but does not replace the national citizenship instituted by Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and completed by Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. It is a connection between the citizens and EU designed to favour the identification of Union's citizens and the development of a public opinion and of a European identity. European citizenship is reserved for the citizens of the EU Member States.

The person that has European citizen quality holds the following rights Art. 20-25 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)[7]:

- the right of all active and inactive citizens (students, pensioners, etc.) to move and locate, to work and study on the territory of other Member States;

- the civic and political rights: veto right and the right to be elected to the municipal elections and to the elections for the European Parliament in the Member State where is resident, right to appeal to the European Parliament;

- the right for legislative initiative created by the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 11, TEU);

- certain juridical guaranties: the diplomatic and consular protection by a Member State of the territory of a third non-member EU country; if their country is not represented, the right to address the European Ombudsman a complaint against an act of faulty administration committed by an European institution.

Still, we have to point out the exercitation of these rights is accompanied by certain limitations and conditionings. Thus:

- EU citizens can be elected municipal counsellors, but not mayors or deputy mayors;

- they can work in their residence state, but only in jobs which do not put at stake that state's sovereignty;

- they must prove they owe enough resources to locate in other EU Member State.

2. Expectations of Romanian citizens, political class and governors in regard to the EU Member State quality

Since January 1, 2007 Romania became EU Member State. This status attainment was the result of a long process of preparation, known as pre-accession, wherein Romania took knowledge of principles, values, norms and criteria governing life and activity of this organization increasingly assimilating those aiming its integration. Actually, integration is a process mush spoken about, that started in 1993 with the European Agreement signing, undergone until the accession, and that continues after it as well[8]. The accession moment was just a phase on the integration path. Practically, the accession does not signify the end of this process, but can be the start of this complex process that is going to develop on economic, social, political, military and environmental dimensions[9]. In the latest years, the EU accession generated a huge wave of expectation in Romania for an amelioration of life in different fields[10]. We refer to expectations of the Romanian citizens, political class and governors from Romania. Also, we appreciate there were and perhaps still are expectations of the other Member States and of EU, as entity, over the Romania's status of EU Member State.

2.1. Expectations of Romanian citizens in regard to EU accession

Romania's accession to the European Union was accompanied by multiple expectations of the country's population. These were emphasized in different sociological studies among which is also the investigation fulfilled by the Pro Democratia Association in the project undergone in-between 1 and 31 January 2008, with the financial support of European Commission Representation in Romania[11].

These expectations are more or less defined or diffuse. They are precise when are formulated as answers to questions as: "What does the European Union mean for you personally?" (peace, prosperity, democracy, liberty to travel, cultural diversity, etc.); what actions should EU priory accomplish? Does the European Union play a positive or a negative role over fighting criminality, public transportation, education, pensions, etc.? There are also diffuse expectations expressed in answers related to the trust in Union. What we call "trust" is nothing else but a positive expectation over the behaviour of a social actor in uncertain conditions[12].

Among the Romanians expectations concerning the country's accession to EU there are:

• *The great hope to freely move in the European Union countries.* Up to 1989, Romanians

movement over the borders was significantly restricted, but after 1990, when the frontier barriers were opened, the migration reached the culminant rate in Romania. This involves severe consequences at different levels: economic, social and demographic[13]. It is crucial to underline that statistical data over migration include not only the usual emigrants that change their permanent residence. The labour force migration is hard to quantify, although in the recent years it became the biggest component of Romanian migration. On the other hand, Romania's accession to EU, in January 2007, opened wide possibilities to Romanians to move in their quality as European citizens on the whole area of the European Union.

The amplification of democracy in Romania[14]. Romania's accession to EU, also of the other Eastern and Central European states, raised the issue of their adaptation to a different type of union than the Soviet one. This process is proved to be sensitive enough and the measures to be adopted quite controversial. However, the European Union does not proclaim to have a perfect form of leadership, but continuously tries, through its regulations, to optimize the leadership forms in the Member States because it should equally act as a defender of democratic rights and procedures from all the Member States; although there still are many things to do for this desiderate, the efforts made in this direction cannot remain unappreciated.

• *The fulfilment of a better governing and the implementation of EU values in the Romanian society's life*[15]. Since the pre-accession period, Romania put in significant efforts to harmonize state's institutions' organization and functioning in consensus with the exigencies asserted by the principles and values promoted by the European Union. Romania's citizens, members in the big European family, have the same rights and obligations as the citizens of the other European Union Member States, have the same benefits provided by Union's policies and share values which stand on its basis: the respect of human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, state of law and human rights. These values implementation is awaited by all Romania's citizens as an expression of country's good governance.

• *The increased possibility to find a better paid job than in Romania, in any EU country.* In the pre-accession period and immediately afterwards, although Romania had a positive rhythm of economic development, it was below the level of Western countries[16]. Thus, in 2006, Romania managed to equalize (at dollars parity) the GDP per inhabitant of 1988. If we compare the European average of Gross Domestic Product per inhabitant in 2007, about 26,208 US dollars, and the global one, about 8,191 US dollars, Romania had an average rate about 7,523 US dollars, almost 3.5 times lower then the European level and situated under the global average level[17]. Consequently, in our country were jobs and the unemployment rate was relatively low. For example, in 2007, in Romania, the unemployment rate was about 7.1 %[18]. Still, the individuals' aspirations for better living, made many persons to leave the country in order to find another job in a EU Member State.

• *The possibility to create new job opportunities in different sectors of activity in Romania following the support received from the European Union*[19]. Both in the pre-accession period, and also afterwards, EU financially supported Romania by different funds, for Romania to develop socially and economically to the level of the other Member States. These are: **pre-accession funds** for Romania – PHARE Programme (Poland Hungary Aid for Reconstruction of the Economy); ISPA Programme (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession); SAPARD Programme (Special Pre-Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) and **post-accession funds:** ERDF, European Regional Development Fund; OPRD, Operational Programme 'Regional Development'; ESF, European Social Fund; SOP-HRD, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development; OP-ACD, Operational Programme 'Administrative Capacity Development'; EAGF, European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, for financing marketing measures; EAFRD, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, for financing the rural development programs; CF, Cohesion Fund; EFF, European Fisheries Fund.

• *A direct financial support granted to Romania by the European Union for the social and human development*[20]. In this regard, there appears the need for a more proactive attitude of the European institutions to help Romania in accessing different European funds, and the implementation of the European legislation. Otherwise, the mentioned investigation emphasizes is the European Union institutions duty to offer guidance correlated with the assertion of certain standards[21].

In our regard, all these expectations of Romanian citizens related to country's accession in the European Union expresses their aspiration for a living standard at the level of the other Member States.

2.2. The expectations of Romania's governors related to the EU accession

Member States' and candidate states' are presented the expectations related to EU accession are presented in a report made at the request of the European Commission[22]. Among these, there are:

• *Expectations raised by the weakening or insufficiency of national public powers*. They are especially expressed by the Member States from the Southern Europe in social matters, in the fields of consumers' protection, health, educational system, public services. Also, the accessing countries have the same expectations, with a stress on the economic development and living standard.

• *Expectations for the sustenance of economic and social development*. We refer to cohesion policies. In the Member States already benefiting by this support, there are expectations for its continuation and in the candidate states, the economic and social development are seen as manifestation of Union solidarity with those.

• *The need to approach at EU level the cross-border related issues*. Here we speak of the environment's preservation, public health protection and consumer protection.

• *The need to strengthen the EU status on the global scene*. Here is regarded the defence of European and national economic, political, social, military, cultural, technological and environment interests against the rivalry and competitiveness generated by globalization, climate changes, demographic phenomena, global economic-financial crisis.

• *Expectations for a fair economic treatment*. We have in mind a veritable loyalty of competitiveness which many doubt, particularly the less developed Member States from the economic point of view.

• *Expectations over the mobility and exchanges*. We refer to the real mobility of workers, the mutual harmonization and recognition of studies diplomas, educative and cultural exchanges, or support in defending the patrimony.

The political class and governors of Romania had, in their turn, expectations when our country accessed the European Union. In our regard, along with the expectations above emphasised, there are also hopes/aspirations which took different shapes of manifestation and mainly consisted in:

• *Granting concrete institutional, organizational, material and financial support to Romania in order to accomplish its social, economic, political, juridical, administrative and environmental reforms*. In order to reach to the EU member States level – in all the dimensions and components of human life and activity – had and really has need for concrete, effective, opportune and continuous support from the European institutions and distinctly from the more developed Member States.

• *Real, concrete aid and different as form of manifestation granted to the Romania government in the implementation of European principles, values and norms*. The governance experience in our country, in our regard, is relatively reduced on the democratic dimension, population's involvement to the debate, adoption and creation of main political, economic, social and not only decisions. From here, the need for a real, concrete and adapted support for each field of activity.

• *Real support to fulfil the national interests in and to the fulfilment of the European interests*. Romania, as all the states accessing EU in time made this decisive step for its democratic, economic and human evolution aiming to reach its national interests[23].

• *Adequate support in preservation of national patrimony, promotion of national culture values and products*. EU runs support programmes for some cultural industries, encouraging them to grasp opportunities offered by the integrated EU market and digital technologies. It also strives to create a dynamic environment for these industries by: cutting red tape, providing easier access to funding, helping with research projects, encouraging cooperation with partners inside and outside the EU[24].

• *Provisioning to Romania a high international status*. Our country, as part of NATO and EU, has the premises to assume a wide range of roles in the European and global area and on this ground, to get an international statute highly recognized by the other regional and global state and nonstate actors.

2.3 EU and the its Member States' expectations related to Romania's accession

The European Union and its Member States have expectations on Romania after its adhesion to this organization. Among those we consider to be:

• *A positive and proactive behaviour related to the directives emitted by EU institutions and the opinions of the economic and social developed Member States.* We speak about the obligation to harmonize the national legislation with the European legislation on all plans of human life and activity. The developed Member States insist that newly-joined countries totally comply with European values.

• *Accepting the principles and values promoted by the European Union and the other Member States.* Of course, each Member State has national values, traditions, and habits they want to perpetuate and disseminate in the European Union as a form of preserving their own national identity. It is important to achieve a harmonized cohabitation, a fructuous and healthy interaction for everybody.

• *Organizing the social, economic, political, cultural (and not only) life and activity from Romania in consensus to the principles and values of the European Union.* Obviously, here we speak about a compilation of national and European characteristics without altering national or European identity.

• *Conceding a part of national sovereignty to EU, respectively to its competent institutions.* In our regard, this is an extremely sensitive field emphasised once more when it was attempted to adopt the European Constitution[25].

• *Romania's relative constant engagement in the actions and activities promoted by the European Union to reach for the general European interests on internal and external plan.* In this regard, Romania was actively involved in humanitarian and other nature operations initiated by the EU in different areas of the world. Thus, our country has participated in missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo etc.

• *To increase the level of civilization and social, economic and human development of Romania and its inhabitants*, considered to be inferior to the occidental living standards. From here, it raises the negative and relatively superior attitude of some chiefs of states and governments from some occidental countries related to Romania, whom they sometimes treat not as an EU Member State, but as a failed country[26].

3. Realities of Romania's accession to the European Union

In order to emphasize the reality on Romanian citizens and governors expectations over the country's accession in EU, we will go over each expectation, as it was described at point 2.

3.1. The reality over Romanians' expectations related to the country's EU accession

We appreciate that *the hope of free movement for the Romanian citizens in the European states* was partially accomplished. This is because, currently, Romanians can travel without visas in the EU Member States, only with their identity card. Practically, still, although, by Romania's accession to EU, Romanians are European citizens, there are restrictions concerning them over their movement and especially location in some European states. For example, Norway, Ireland, Belgium or Italy renounced the restrictions on the labour market asserted to Romanians only in 2012[27]. Simultaneously, each EU Member State has it own legislation over asylum and migration[28].

Democracy in Romania is consolidating but, in our regard, there are still many things to do on internal plan by the concerted efforts of the whole Romanian society, including here the political class, state's institutions and civil society. We appreciate that the EU, in fact its institutions' support often seems to be a mixture in Romania's internal affairs[29].

The accomplishment of a better governance and the EU values implementation in the Romanian society life; we appreciate it is being done, but not in the form and content wanted by Romanian citizens. Frequently, "indications" from EU come, from various officials of the Union's institutions that go beyond the legal framework accepted by a sovereign state[30].

The increased possibility to find a better paid job in another EU country rather than in Romania. Presently, there are appreciations that over two million Romanians fled the country after 1990[31]. Romanians are the most numerous group of immigrants in EU[32]. In our opinion, the citizens

of an EU Member State cannot be considered as immigrants, since they have the quality of European citizens'. At the most, in this case, we can speak about an internal migration in the European Union space. The immigrant status of the Romanian citizens is improper and undignified, as long as they are European citizens.

The possibility to create new opportunities for the occupation of the labour forces in different sectors of activity in Romania is partially facilitated by the European funds offered by the EU. Still, we appreciate that, owed to the autochthonous and EU bureaucracy, and also to the corruption, European funds are accessed with great difficulties, the absorption rate being of nearly 7%[33]. The conditions and criteria to access the funds are quite restrictive and difficult to apply in Romania, wherein it seems few people know how to draft feasible projects.

A direct financial support granted to Romania by the European Union for the social and human development. The financial support was more accessible for our country in the EU pre-accession period then at present. From here comes the need for more proactive attitude of the European institutions to help Romania access the diverse European funds and also to implement the European legislation[34]. By all means, European Union's institutions duty is to offer guidance over the accession of various European funds.

Altogether, Romanians' expectation related to the country's EU adhesion to bring wellbeing, social peace, economic and human development was accomplished only partially.

3.2. The reality over Romanian governors' expectancies related to the country's accession in EU

We appreciate the general expectations of the Member States and candidate states over the accession in the European Union at Romania's level were reached almost integrally.

As regards the expectations specific for Romanian governors' vis-à-vis country's accession in EU, we appreciate the situation is as follows:

• *Granting concrete institutional, organizational, material and financial support to Romania in order to fulfil its social, economic, political, juridical, administrative and environmental reforms.* Romania, in order to reach the level of the developed EU Member States – on all the dimensions and components of human

activity and living – had and has the political conditioned support of EU. In this regard, there must be analysed the reactions of the European institutions' representatives over the political crisis in Romania from July-August 2012, for example, against the constitutional measure to suspend the president of the country.

• *Real, concrete support granted to the Romanian government in implementing the European principles, values and norms.* Also in this case, the support offered to Romania was conditioned by the accomplishment of some requests from some EU institutions which, according to some opinions, infringe national sovereignty[35].

• *Real sustenance to fulfil the national interests in and by the fulfilling European interests.* Romania, as the other states that accessed the EU, made this decisive step for its democratic, economic and human evolvement aiming to reach its national interests. Still, if we analyze the manner the European firms involved in the privatization of some Romanian enterprises, we can see the satisfaction of some group and national interests of some other Member States was aimed to the expense of Romania's harmonized economic development. In this concern, we can give as example the privatization of the public limited company PETROM that did not bring the expected benefices for Romania[36].

• *Adequate support in the preservation of the national patrimony, the promotion of national cultures' values and products.* The European institutions support is present, but because of EU and autochthonous bureaucracy, it is materialized with many difficulties.

• *Provision of a high international statute for Romania.* Our country, by its active, responsible and concrete involvement in diverse EU activities and actions is strengthening its regional and international status. In this concern, Romania's quality as EU member plays a significant role.

3.3. The reality over the EU and its Member States expectations related to Romania's accession

In our regard, EU and its Member States expectations related to Romania's accession are very much fulfilled. Here intervened the governors and political class representatives from Romania trend to manifest full obedience to the

foreign parties in almost all situations. Generally, the obedient behaviour related to any directive or indication from Brussels or an EU official is quasi-general when comes to the Romanian state representatives, Romanian officials and other categories of population. Under these circumstances, the acceptance of the values promoted by the EU is permanent and constant. Also, the organization of human life and activity in Romania took almost entirely the European model. Consequently, Romania, with little exceptions[37], is involved in all EU activities to prevent and solve crises on the continent and in the world. In this way, our country supported the fulfilment of European general interests.

The sort of generalized opinion, to some extent negative in the occidental countries over the level of civilization and social, economic and human development in Romania can hardly change in a couple of years from the accession to EU[38]. From here comes the sometimes discriminatory treatment of EU, in fact of its institutions, against Romania. Thus, although our country accomplished the criteria of accession to the Schengen space, still, it was not accepted, different arguments being invoked, without connection with the norms settled for such situations[39].

Conclusions

Romania's accession to the European Union was a significant event accompanied by multiple expectations of Romanian country's population, governors and its political class. These expectations essentially regarded the economic prosperity, social and human development, real implementation of EU values and Romania to be treated as an equal partner, in all directions by the European institutions and officials and by the other Member States.

A brief analysis of these expectations' accomplishment reveals that many remained at stage of wishes, dreams or aspirations. This happened by reasons keen on Romanian society, national traditions, habits, values and interests, but also the manner how EU institutions and their clerks perceive or represent themselves Romania and its citizens.

The quality of European citizens of the Romanian population, by its content, does not carry all its rights, remaining rather an honorific title.

The attenuation of the distance between Romanian citizens' expectations related to the country's EU accession and the social, economic, political, cultural (and not only) realities can be done by concerted efforts of Romanian representatives to Brussels, Romanian governors and autochthonous mass-media to represent Romanian society's life, civilization and culture with more national rigour, patriotism and dignity, at one hand, and the change of EU, its institutions and officials' attitude and behaviour over our country by treating it equally to the other Member States and not in a discriminatory manner[40].

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
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THE SECURITY COMPLEX "WIDER BLACK SEA AREA"

GHEORGHE CALOPĂREANU

COMPLEXUL DE SECURITATE "ZONA EXTINSĂ A MĂRII NEGRE"

EDITURA UNIVERSITĂȚII NAȚIONALE DE APĂRARE „CAROL I"
- BUCUREȘTI, 2012 -

Among the new editorial releases under the aegis of "Carol I" National Defence University (NDU) Publighinghouse, we signal *Complexul de securitate „Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre" (The Security Complex "Wider Black Sea Area")*, whose author is colonel Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, PhD associate professor, deputy commandant of NDU.

The book is structured in three chapters, the first going through a series of *historical and geostrategic landmarks*, including security risks in the envisaged area (threats and challenges of cross-border nature in fields such as migration, prevention of criminality, infrastructure or pollution), the second chapter analysing, in an objective and equidistant manner, *the politics of state, regional and nonregional actors of the pontic scene*, and the third approaching the *security component of cooperation* in the Wider Black Sea Area.

The author emphasizes the multiple remarkable geopolitical, social, cultural and political valences

of the region within the context of geopolitical transformations of the past two decades, which occurred after the communist break-up and NATO and EU expansion towards East – platform for launching military force in Asia and Middle East, buffer zone for asymmetrical threats, key-zone for testing the capacity of democracy and security outside Europe and, last but not least, zone for oil and natural gas refining, transiting and transportation.

Its position of linking bridge between Europe, Central Asia, South-East of Mediterranean Sea and Middle East and, in addition, the valorisation of economic and commercial potential of the Black Sea have turned the region in an important geostrategic stake in such a way that – it is highlighted in the book – to the riparian states, were added other important actors, such as NATO, EU, USA, Japan, the Arab countries, the Caspian countries, interested to play an important role in this area.

Thus, there emerges the idea that the Black Sea Area has come, in time, to be in the centre of strategic interests in a geographical area in which, under the aspect of regional cooperation, tends to play the main role. This type of local relation could not have a positive impact on the states involved without any democratic consolidation efforts, without taking advantage of globalization process and the community acquis for the Central Europe and South-Eastern countries and without the latters' attractiveness for the North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

The book highlights at the same time that the management of this area is a challenge that will maintain a ferocious economic competition and will permanently imply a harmonization of the efforts in order to develop and implement projects of cooperation and consolidation of security. According to the author's opinion, multilateral cooperation has to be regarded as a chance to maintain stability in the region, having in mind

that certain bilateral unsolved problems have impeded the elaboration of concrete and realistic regional plans. The current work brings solid arguments to the idea that the conversion of the Black Sea Region in a pole of political stability and economic development, together with the extension of the peace and security climate must represent a priority for the future activity, both for the states in the wider Black Sea Area and for the Euro-Atlantic organizations with responsibilities in the regional security field. It is considered necessary the development of active and efficient institutional monitoring mechanisms in territories that can easily turn into conflict areas. Likewise, Romania's perspective on the region is brought forward, namely the necessity of an initiative with a high regional profile and well coordinated in the area, translated by launching the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF) in 2006 in Bucharest and through the Forum on Cooperation in the field of Politics at the Black Sea, held in November 2011 in Bucharest.

The central axis of the paper is represented by the analysis of the way in which a holistic strategic approach for this area can be drafted and applied, the actor expected to do that being EU, two of which Member States are riparian states, the Black Sea being vital to EU security and its external policy ambitions.

One of the main conclusions of the book requests the need of a Euro-Atlantic strategy to conjugate the international efforts of solving frozen conflicts with the transfer of democratic culture which, in the end, should bring more trust, stability and prosperity.

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ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2012

Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies organises on 22-23 November, the international conference "STRATEGIES XXI" with the theme *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, XIIth edition.

The topics approached this year are focused on new aspects in the evolution of the international security environment; balance of power in the light of International Relations' evolutions; potential risks and threats to the security environment; emerging states' impact on regional and international centers of power; the role of non-state actors in the evolution of the security environment.

In the activity will attend Romanian and foreign representatives of national defence and public order structures, military and civilian researchers, university teaching staff, PhD and MA candidates and students. People interested to participate can register according to information on our site, http://cssas.unap.ro/en/events. htm

According to tradition sanctified by the twelve years of high level scientific research, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) renews the series of publications in *Security and Defence Studies* collection, proposing a new format and opening the perspectives of accessibility of its research studies not only at national level, but – by publishing it exclusively in English – at international level. Thus, the visibility degree will increase; additionally, the subjects are going to be dealt according to the field of expertise of each CDSSS researcher.

The first volume of the new collection is entitled *Common and national interests within EU framework* and was coordinated by Cristian BĂHNĂREANU and Mihai-Ştefan DINU, two well-known CDSSS researchers. Through the cumulated effort of our team and the dedicated support of the CDSSS coordinating director, Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD professor, the coordinators of the volume have succeeded in bringing forward – through an objective, critical and realistic approach – contemporary issues, sometimes controversial, but extremely important, related to the complex process of European integration. Each chapter of the book deals with issues that are within the scope of expertise of the authors, most often in an inter-disciplinary manner, needed for an accurate X-ray of the process of European integration at the moment.

Not wishing to deplete the natural curiosity of traditional readers of CDSSS work, but at the same time meeting the natural need of communication and information, we reveal that the aforementioned volume will come out in print by mid October, while a critical review of it will appear in the next issue of Strategic Impact.

Irina TĂTARU

GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual scientific magazine *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE

- Title (centred, capital, bold characters).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD title or PhD candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
- A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters).
- 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters).
- Introduction / preliminary considerations.
- 2 - 4 chapters, subchapters if needed.
- Conclusions.
- Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format as well. Below will be mentioned "Table no. 1, title" / "Figure no. 1 title"; (italic characters) the source, if applicable, shall be mentioned in a footnote.
- References shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of endnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: Joshua S. GOLDSTEIN; Jon C. PEVEHOUSE, *International Relations*, Longman Publishing House, 2010, pp. 356-382.

Example of article: Teodor FRUNZETI; Marius HANGANU, *New Paradigms of Armed Combat and their Influence on Military Forces' Training*, in Strategic Impact, no. 4/2011, pp. 5-15.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year).

- Bibliography shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations*, Longman Publishing House, 2010.

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Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents.

ARTICLE LENGTH may vary between 6 -12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 paper. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 11, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

SELECTION CRITERIA are the following: the theme of the article must be in line with the subjects dealt by the magazine: up-to-date topics related to political-military aspects, security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence; the quality of the scientific content; originality of the paper; novelty character – it should not have been priorly published; a relevant

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 SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION PROCESS is developed according to the principle *double blind peer review*, by university teaching staff and scientific researchers with expertise in the field of the article. The author's identity is not known by evaluators and the name of the evaluators is not made known to authors. Authors are informed of the conclusions of the evaluation report, which represent the argument for accepting / rejecting an article. Consequently to the evaluation, there are three possibilities: a) the article is accepted for publication as such or with minor changes; b) the article may be published if the author makes recommended improvements (of content or of linguistic nature); c) the article is rejected. Previous to scientific evaluation, articles are subject to an *antiplagiarism analysis* (for details, see www.strikeplagiarism.com).

 DEADLINES: authors will send their articles in English to the editor's e-mail address, **cssas@ unap.ro**, according to the following time schedule: 15 December (no. 1); 15 March (no. 2); 15 June (no. 3) and 15 September (no. 4). If the article is accepted for publication, an integral translation of the article for the Romanian edition of the magazine will be provided by the editor.

Failing to comply with these rules shall trigger article's rejection.

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