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EDITORIAL

According to tradition, the second issue of STRATEGIC IMPACT is a thematic one. This year, its theme is *National Interests and Common Interests in the European Union*. It corresponds with the scientific seminar with international participation organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) in May this year. This edition partially gathers the papers delivered in the seminar by personalities with expertise in the approached theme, working in the field of research, civilian or military higher education, defence, European and external affairs. We are glad to benefit in this issue from the scientific contribution of experts from Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia and Turkey, as, in this way, the point of view of other EU Member States, candidate states or neighbour states can be emphasised.

STRATEGIC IMPACT, edited by the CDSSS within “Carol I” National Defence University, is a *scientific magazine with acknowledged prestige in the field of Military Science, Information and Public Order*, according to National Council for Titles, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The magazine is edited in two separate editions, in Romanian since 2001 and in English since 2005. It approaches a wide area of topics: political-military topicality; security and military strategies; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; future peace and war; informational society. Our readers will find in it strategic analyses, syntheses and evaluations, points of view on the strategic impact of the dynamic of actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

Referring to international visibility – strategic objective of the publication – the magazine is indexed in CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO international database (USA), Index Copernicus International (Poland) and is to be indexed in ProQuest database (USA) as well. The international recognition of the quality of our magazine is also confirmed by its being presented on the sites of prestigious foreign institutions and publications such as NATO Multimedia Library and the specialised scientific magazine “Obrana a strategie” (Defence & Strategy), edited by the University of Defence, Czech Republic.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is edited trimestrially, in March, June, September and December, in two distinct editions, Romanian and English and is disseminated, free of charge, in main security and defence institutions, in the scientific and academia environment in Romania and abroad – in Europe, Asia, America, but it can also be purchased (see our site for details).

In the end, we signal a few changes in the editorial board, as professor Marius Hanganu PhD, has ended his mandate as pro-rector for scientific research, professor Ion Roceanu, PhD, assuming this position. Also, the editorial board regrets to have lost professor Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, PhD, recently passed away.

Senior researcher Petre DUȚU, PhD,
Editor in chief / Director of CDSSS



MESSAGE OF THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF

**at the opening of the scientific seminar with
international participation, with the theme:
“National interests and common interests in
the European Union”,
May 17, 2012**

*Ştefan DĂNILĂ, PhD**

Generals, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

I am honored and extremely delighted to attend the opening of the seminar organized by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, from “Carol I” National Defence University, the most prestigious institution of the Romanian military education system.

I extend warm greetings to all guests and participants in the scientific seminar, which aims to tackle a topic so interesting and challenging, such as that raised here today.

It is well known that national interests have led to the European Union. Today, the EU functions as an integrated body, stating its own interests. They can sometimes affect a country's interests, interest of the Union prevailing. However, because the EU is based on solidarity, nations are making efforts to harmonize national efforts with those of the community. At the same time, within the decision-making forums, nations promote their national

interests with the stated purpose to convert them into common goals.

Thus, the Union's security is one of the common interests, but at the same time, encompasses many interests that converge to it. In concept, the defence starts to play an increasingly important role.

As a member of the European Union Military Committee, I participated at the debates concerning defence issues and I can say that the process is not simple.

As some Member States are also members of NATO or, conversely, because most NATO members are EU members, there were many discussions on the delimitation of their role. The solution reached, the complementarity of efforts, is not yet fully assumed by all States.

In hard times, in which the effects of economic and financial crisis are unpredictable, nations have similar problems regarding insufficient budget and the use of it. In this respect, the EU faces the challenge of maintaining the Euro area and tries to

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find solutions to end the crisis. Joint effort can be a savior in such a situation.

Under these circumstances, building the EU's military capabilities/defence is a new challenge. U.S. leadership's new strategic direction, focused on the Asia-Pacific area, involves a greater commitment of European countries to achieve their own defence and intervention capabilities for crisis management in areas of interest.

Construction of EU defence capabilities is possible by accepting the concept "Pooling and Sharing" and active involvement in the development of common capabilities. This process, coordinated by the European Defence Agency, is not easy, because economic and financial implications can not be neglected. Differences between economic and technological capacities of Member States are also difficult to negotiate, especially because sometimes questions the decisions of states to cede sovereignty in order to reach a joint decision.

I believe that Romania understood the importance of participation in joint projects, being involved in seven projects, such as investigating samples resulting from the use of improvised explosive devices, air transport and satellite services procurement. We also consider other

projects, according to the needs of national defence capability development.

Romania, as a EU Member State, brings an important role in maintaining stability, with direct implications on defence planning and strategies to promote national interests.

Romanian Army, as a basic tool in the implementation and promotion of national defence, will help increase confidence, stability and security at sub-regional, regional and European level, by promoting defence diplomacy and participating in arrangements and processes of cooperation in the military field.

I am convinced that the seminar will have an interactive character, given the theme's generosity under the auspices of which today's symposium will run, as well as the diversity of topics proposed for presentations and discussions, which will allow to crystallize the issues in the field of national interests and EU common interests, with the real possibility of applying fundamental elements in the educational curriculum of "Carol I" National Defence University, for the academic year 2012-2013.

I wish you a lot of success in the conduct of the seminar!



EUROPEAN UNION – A COMMUNITY BASED ON COMMON INTERESTS AND VALUES¹

*Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD**

The European Union (EU) is the result of a process that is complex, concerted, voluntary, dynamic, progressive and of a long duration. As a human community, the EU is based on a set of common values and interests unanimously shared by the Member States (MS) and their citizens. The EU defends and protects its values and interests both inside its borders and worldwide. From the sociological point of view, the process of EU development is based on several dimensions, namely economic, social, psychosocial, political, military and environment.

Key-words: European Union; process; values, interests; dimensions; actor.

1. Characteristics of the process of EU founding

The EU, as we know it today, is the result of a process that is *complex, concerted, voluntary, dynamic, progressive and of a long duration*. This process was based, since the beginning, on a community of values and interests in a continuous evolution.

Its **complexity** stands, on the one hand, in the need to harmonise national interests and values with European ones, which in their turn, are in a continuous evolution. Of course, at the beginning of the process, national interests and values were

dominant, as they corresponded to common objectives, recognised and accepted by all MS. Essentially, though, the EU is at the same time a political space in progress, an institutional frame and a dialogue structure in which, along with very technical debates, intellectuals throughout Europe develop reflections on the notion of “European social model” or on the nature of “European identity”².

On the other hand, the complexity of the EU development process is determined by a series of aspects³, such as:

a) *The context in which the EU founding process was begun and developed* – the difficult political, economic, social and military situation existent in Europe after World War II, when the idea of a united Europe was launched⁴. Simultaneously, the EU developed in a changing political, economic, social and military environment to which its institutional structures had to continuously adapt in order to attain the envisaged objectives.

b) *The diversity of the methods to promote and defend national interests* – each state is interested in promoting and defending its national interests, using, to this end, a wide span of methods, techniques and procedures.

c) *The influence of the globalization phenomena* on national and global economies – it is a well-known fact that globalisation has both positive and

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negative effects. States act, on the one hand, in order to take advantage of the benefits of globalisation, and on the other hand, in order to minimise the unwanted effects on their entire activity.

d) *The emergence of non-state actors on the international scene* – at present, a series of non-state actors have emerged and are manifesting globally. Among these, we mention transnational societies, organisations of international civil society, as well as international organisations as being the most active and, at the same time, the most important.

e) *The gradual development of responsibilities assumed by the EU in the economic, political, social, environment and military fields.* Along time, EU extended its fields of action, passing from its economic activity to the social, political, military and environment fields.

The **concerted character** of the analyzed process derives from the consistent efforts of the MS to achieve common and national objectives. In addition, it also describes the way in which European states stood up for the objectives and the responsibilities assumed regarding the EU present and future. In other words, all MS have actively and responsively involved themselves in fulfilling engagements assumed at the moment of adhesion, on the one hand, and those that intervened in the evolution of the organisation, on the other hand. The political will was, is and will be necessary in order to harmonise national interests and values with European ones. Both categories of values and interests are in a continuous evolution, which involves their redefining, their development on new dimensions and a continuous harmonisation. Harmonisation is absolutely necessary in order to bring together values and interests on which the EU is based.

The **voluntary character** is given by the political will of MS to achieve, together, a community based on unanimously recognized and shared values.

The **dynamic character** of the EU founding is mirrored, on the one hand, by the MS's efforts to achieve the settled objectives and on the other hand to formulate some new objectives which add to the old ones. The dynamic character is also reflected in the growth of the number of MS and in their increasing degree of involvement in the EU actions. Such an idea was that of Winston Churchill, who, in December 1946, founded, in UK, the United Europe Movement. In the same

period, Raoul Dautry created the French Council for a United Europe and Henri Brugmans was the president of the Union of European Federalists. At the beginning of 1947, there was a movement for the United Socialist States of Europe, led by Bob Edwards. Eventually, all these movements and associations, at the initiative of Richard de Candenhove-Kalergi, gave birth to European Parliamentary Union, whose first president was Georges Bohy.

The *progressive* character stands in the necessity to achieve the objectives of founding the European community in stages. The development process of the European Union, as a community based on values and interests, can be structured as follows:

- On May 9, 1950, the French minister of foreign affairs, Robert Schuman, declared: "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity."⁵ In this respect, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman formulated *Schuman Plan* in order to put together the resources of coal and steel of France and Germany in an organisation open to other European countries as well. Thus, on April 18, 1951 was signed the Treaty of Paris instituting the first European community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Six countries signed this treaty: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Schuman Plan represented a capital stage in the European construction, as it marked the Franco-German closeness.

- On March, 25 1957, the six states signed the Treaty of Rome. This treaty founded European Economic Community (EEC), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). EEC had the following objectives: *creating a large European common market* in which people and goods move freely in all MS (due to the creation of a customs union with progressive elimination of customs duties); *formulating common policies for all MS*, especially regarding agriculture; *developing in common and with a peaceful aim atomic energy in Europe*. With a view to achieve these objectives, new institutions were created at the beginning of 1958: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, a Parliamentary Assembly (the later European Parliament), the Court of Justice of the European Communities. On July 1, 1968, Customs

Union became reality and customs duties between MS were gone. The result was spectacular. Between 1957 and 1970, the community trade grew six times and the trade between EEC and the world grew three times⁶. The first EEC enlargement was in 1973 with the accession of UK, Ireland and Denmark. In 1981, Greece followed and in 1986 Spain and Portugal joined the Community. At that point, 12 states formed the EEC.

- In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed and it came into force July 1, 1987. This new treaty obliged the 12 MS to create by January 1, 1993 the Single European Market.

- The Treaty of Maastricht, signed on February 7, 1992, gave a new dimension to European construction. It establishes the European Union (EU) and adds to the community a political dimension. The “House of Europe” relies from this moment on three pillars⁷:

- the Community pillar (EEC, ECSC and EAEC). This pillar regards the domains subject to transfer of sovereignty (from Member States) to European institutions;

- the pillar relative to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), providing procedures for intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy matters (no transfer of sovereignty);

- the pillar of cooperation on justice and home affairs (JHA) providing procedures for intergovernmental cooperation in the immigration, asylum, the fight against organized crime (no transfer of sovereignty).

On January 1, 1993, the Single Market became a reality. Also, this year coincides with a new enlargement of the European Union, which enters a new phase. During the European Council in Copenhagen (June 1993), there are defined the criteria that any candidate for EU entry has to meet before accession. These criteria – also called Copenhagen criteria – essentially address the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, that after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 tried to approach the European Community. The criteria for membership fall in three categories – political, economic and the *acquis*⁸.

- On October 2, 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed. This new treaty improves the organization of intergovernmental cooperation between EU Member States. New areas are added to the Community: *police, justice and employment*. Social policy is integrated in the Treaty and all

states are thus obliged to comply with common agreed regulation. The Amsterdam Treaty created “an area of freedom, security and justice” within the European Union. Schengen Convention, signed by 13 MS, allows free movement of persons without border control and organises police cooperation between the signatory states.

- On February 20, 2001, the Treaty of Nice is signed by the 15 EU MS. It concerned the modification of institutional and EU decision-making system to allow enlargement to 25 members. On this basis, from May 1, 2004, the following states joined the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Then, on 1 January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU as well.

- On December 13, 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed; it entered into force on December 1, 2009.

The “long duration” attribute of the process of European construction is given by the time passed from the founding of the first European Community – the European Coal and Steel Community, on April 18, 1951, by the six countries (Treaty of Paris) – until today, when European Union is a stand-alone entity made up of 27 MS. In addition, there is the possibility to further enlarge the Union to include new members.

In our opinion, the building of Europe presents itself as an open system, which enables appropriate, consistent and systematic communication and adaptation to environmental realities around them. Moreover, from its origin, the European construction was guided by three logics, sometimes antagonist and other times complementary: states’ strategies, institutions’ dynamic and interests’ organizations⁹.

2. Common values and interests on which the EU is based

2.1. The relation between common values and interests in the EU

The EU is a community based on common values and interests unanimously recognized and shared by the states that form it.

Along time, *values* were compared and assimilated by some authors with beliefs, attitudes, needs, interests, personality traits or sometimes with social norms¹⁰. Also, other authors have de-



defined values as being “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of actions¹¹”.

On the other hand, regarding values as a kind of social achievements, there is often made a distinction between values, on the one hand, that are deep provisions, which are quasi-permanent, fundamental and sometimes unexplained, and on the other hand, attitudes, defined as conceptions or superficial and extremely changeable views¹².

The fundamental social role of values is to inspire and keep under control the behaviour of the members of the group. Two mechanisms are essential¹³. First, values are behaviouristic models that individuals internalise. Thus, they adopt a desirable social behaviour, which does not make unnecessary their permanent control by the community. Then, individuals invoke one value or another in order to prove that certain behaviour is adequate, in order to justify their exigencies towards the others and to create desirable behaviours. Either in a conscious manner or not, the agents of socialization seek to instil values that allow the survival and prosperity of the group.

Values are defined through the functions they fulfil in the community in which they are expressed. The first function of values is to maintain cultural systems, identified with a certain number of characteristics, common to values that take over their entire meaning, to the extent in which they express a specific social desideratum¹⁴. These characteristics refer to:

(a) *Values' particularities*. First, values imply the existence of modes, which allows for the distinction between positive and negative values.

(b) *The dimension of values' content*. Values have a dimension of their content. They can cover realities of different levels: an expressive reality, a cognitive reality, a moral reality.

(c) *Values' instrumental function*. Values can help individuals in order to achieve specific objectives. These are instrumental values, that have an operational incidence. They can, on the one hand, be observed as they are, by individuals or the society. These are values of objectives, called intrinsic values or ultimate values.

(d) *Values' more or less general character*. Values have a more or less specific or general character. Some values are specific to certain

situations, other are general, as they apply to a large variety of situations.

(e) *The intensity with which values impose on individuals*. The dimension of the intensity refers to the context surrounding the observance of certain values. There are seen as strong those values that imply the existence of a sanction system.

The scope of their being applied or not allows the appearance of various levels of intensity in observing these values. Thus, we can refer to:

- Categorical values, which imply, for a society, an absolute observance. In case of failure to observe them, severe penalties are envisaged.

- Preference values, whose observance is strongly recommended.

- Hypothetical values, which are the values for which compliance is often absent, but which manifest, however, their presence in one form or another. This includes traditional values.

- Central or peripheral values, according to their influence on individual and collective behaviour.

(f) *Their more or less explicit nature*. Values correspond to a reality more or less explicit. An explicit value is that which individuals can verbalize. The existence of implicit values is deduced from the recurrence of behaviours.

(g) *The extent of the scope of values*. According to their scope of application, values can be classified as being individual, group and community.

Among the concepts close to values are *interests*. Interest corresponds to a state of mind that takes part in what is found worthy of attention, what is appreciated as important. For Rokeach¹⁵, interest is one of the possible manifestations that a value may take. Interest shares certain attributes with values, because interest can guide the action. However, the interest covers a less broad reality than values, because the interest is not comparable to an idealized model of behaviour or to a final state of existence for an individual or a human community. In addition, the interests of individuals, groups or states do not have the universality character that values do. They are not structured into organized systems that allow individuals, groups or states to prevent or resolve conflicts. Thus, interests seem to resemble more social or individual attitudes, which are a favourable or unfavourable orientation towards certain objects or activities. Basically, the values promoted by a human community can be considered the foundation on which, on the one hand, its interests are formed, expressed

and realized, and on the other hand, those of its members.

Essentially, it can be stated that there is an interaction between values and common interests in a society, in the sense that values determine the nature and content of general and individual interests. The accomplishment of national and European interests is much in line with general values promoted by the European Union. Thus, interests contribute to the emergence of common values shared and acknowledged by MS citizens.

2.2. Common values and interests on which the EU is based, as an independent entity

The EU is the bearer of a message and a model to which its citizens adhere in their majority. Human rights, social solidarity, liberty of enterprise, equitable sharing of the results of economic growth, the right to a protected environment, the respect for cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, harmonised synthesis between tradition and progress are to the Europeans a true heritage of values. These common values are stated both in the founding treaties of the first European Communities which marked its ascending evolution in time and in the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU, proclaimed in Nice in December 2000. Thus, the Charter stipulates: "Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment."¹⁶

On the whole, these values constitute a patrimony individualizing Europeans, distinguishing them from the rest of the world. In short, the European Union is founded on the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, respect for human rights. They are common to

the Member States in a society characterized by pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non discrimination¹⁷.

These values are implemented by the European Union in and through a set of objectives such as promoting peace and its values, an area of freedom, security and justice for its citizens, a single market, where competition is free and undistorted. European Union, as a human community, is based on fundamental values inspiring and guiding its commitment: freedom, responsibility, solidarity.

Freedom is the essential value that allows everyone to imagine, act, create and express themselves. Freedom manifests at all levels of the European Union. Moreover, freedom should not make us forget the respect due to each citizen. It calls for *responsibility* and opens the gate for generosity. Being free means being responsible. Being responsible means being aware of rights and obligations on national and European community and of future generations as well.

Social cohesion is built through *solidarity*, allowing each to protect against risks such as illness, disability, addiction or unemployment. But solidarity also means respect for the individual, therefore, it should not turn the individual into an assisted. The sense of solidarity is to give everyone the possibility of new opportunities.

In its turn, Lisbon Treaty clearly defines the objectives and values of the EU; these are: peace, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, equality, rule of law and sustainable development.

This treaty guarantees that the EU will act in order: to give people an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders; offer a sustainable development of Europe based on economic growth, balance and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, tending to fully use labour force and social progress and a high level of environmental protection; to combat social exclusion and discrimination and promote justice and social protection, economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States; to remain attached to the Economic and Monetary Union, whose currency is Euro; to affirm and promote its values in the world and contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the world, solidarity and respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty; to help protect human rights, particularly those of children, and comply with the principles

and development of international law, especially the United Nations Charter.

In the current complex and dynamic global context, in which the influence of multiple actors is increasing, the EU must assume its role of a relevant power centre on the international arena. In this respect, it has no choice: if it wants to safeguard its interests, it must be a power and act in a strategic manner.

XXIst century Europe still faces security challenges. EU must ensure effective security of its states, for this being necessary the constructive engagement in regions that are situated on the borders with: Southern Mediterranean, Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East. The EU also needs to protect military and strategic interests through its alliances, particularly NATO, and through a genuine European policy on security and defence.

Internal and external security are two sides of the same problem, so that the fight against terrorism and organized crime requires close cooperation between the police services of the Member States. The establishment of a “space of freedom, security and justice” in the EU, where every citizen is protected by law and has the same access to justice, opens a new front, claiming increased coordination between governments’ actions. Bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, or European police system that promotes coordination between prosecutors, MS’ judges and police officers are also urged to strengthen the role and means of intervention.

3. Dimensions of the European construction

The EU is an ambitious project of the MS based on common interests and values, as previously stated. In our opinion, this project is defined through a sum of dimensions, namely: the *economic, social, psychosocial, political, military and environment* dimensions.

Economic dimension

On April 18, 1951 the Treaty of Paris was signed, constituting the first European community: European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This historical process of profound lining up of the European people and countries continued. It was translated in successive stages which, from the Customs Union to the common policies and Single currency marked the evolution and the deepening of the European Community. We can speak of pro-

moting in a harmonious and balanced manner economic activities and of a high level of the degree of employment and social protection.

Today, the EU is one of the major economic world actors. From the economic point of view, the EU represented 25.23% of the world GDP in 2011, that is 17.578 billion dollars, which made it the first economic power of the world in terms of nominal GDP and power of purchase¹⁸.

The economic model offered by the EU is that of a social market economy. In other words, we speak of an open, competitive and prosperous Europe, fully exploiting the potential of its internal market and the Euro, favouring the development of a state of the art industry and with a strong added value, facilitating the excellence of the service sector, encouraging agriculture and contributing to the creation of jobs for its citizens¹⁹. At the same time, EU invests in the future, that is in modern infrastructure, research and development, innovation and development of competencies.

EU is determined to escape from the current economic and financial crisis by opening a more rational growth, ecologic and sustainable, promoting economic and social cohesion, guaranteeing budget viability on a long term. Although it is against any economic protectionism, EU is firmly determined to protect and promote its interests worldwide. At the same time, the EU acts in order to insure an efficient regulation and monitoring of the financial markets, modelling globalisation in the spirit of its own values, respecting the ethical principles and advocating for adopting better social and environment regulations worldwide.

Social dimension

In addition to the major economic role that the EU has, it is also concerned with ensuring its citizens with a real social protection. The model of social development that the EU sustains and promotes focuses on the citizen and is based on values such as peace, liberty, justice and solidarity and it sets as a goal to advance the Europe of citizens²⁰. In the context created by the defence and promoting of the aforementioned values, the EU offers its citizens, first and foremost, rights, protection and opportunities on the market. Also, the EU allows the approach of peoples, the valorisation of cultural diversity in Europe to achieve a strong degree of communication. The principles of free movement and treating citizens



equally in the EU are seen and can be seen in the daily life of each European citizen.

Political dimension

The reason to be of the EU is insuring for its citizens the means of action and to defence their rights, to favour the social progress. In the context of globalisation, national governments are no longer able to cover these tasks. The EU is a real asset for Europeans when they make a real effort in order to build a better and safer future. In our opinion, sometimes, the EU institutions and Ms have failed in making clear that the European action translates in concrete advantages for its citizens, such as advantages from the Single Market, the opening of markets and regulating energy or telecommunication sectors, competition policy or structural funds.

All these benefits and rights that European citizens have can become a reality if and only if each citizen has access to them. To this end, all EU institutions and MS should define, explain and enforce those rights, giving them the necessary attention. Lisbon Treaty, by its provisions, as well as the institutions and MS, insure the delivery of the European objective, that the regular European citizen be at the centre of the EU project under construction, that is a community based on shared values and interests.

Psycho-social dimension

The EU is concerned with insuring *social cohesion, solidarity, social consensus, social conformity and full integration* of all MS and citizens in the European community. *Social cohesion* refers to the EU capacity, as a human community, to insure welfare for all its members, to minimise disparities and to avoid polarisations. Being cohesive, the EU is a *solidary* community, composed out of free individuals pursuing their common goals in democratic ways. Arriving to a *social consensus*, both among MS and European citizens is, practically, an ideal, aiming to create and manifest similar social attitudes of the MS and citizens towards general interest issues such as: sustainable and balanced development, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation between European citizens, respect for human dignity and recognising competencies etc. *Social conformity* implies that social and legal rules are accepted by all MS and their citizens freely, in a consented manner. *Social inte-*

gration in the EU has to be regarded both through the lens of individuals and through that of the MS. This implies that both European citizens and the Ms to accept first of all the belonging to this space of security, liberty and social justice and than to apprehend European norms of living in common, internalise them and act accordingly to putting them in practice as if they emanated from themselves. Social integration is real when the individual has the material and cultural resources insuring participation to national and European social life.

Military dimension

The crystallisation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been a long duration process, being determined, first and foremost, by the evolutions that have taken places in the international security environment and by the changes in world politics. Changes in the field of security and defence have manifested themselves as responses of the EU to the mutations appeared in these areas, which makes so that the CSDP be *a reactive process instead of a proactive one*, a process focused on compensating for past shortcomings and future-oriented²¹.

European Security and Defence policy has taken the outline that we know today through the evolution of European defence and security concept. Thus, key institutions in the security and defence decision making chain were set out (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Military Staff, Joint Situation Centre, Satellite Centre, ad hoc or regular meetings of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the Institute for Security Studies), methods of implementation, and the fact that the EU Council Secretary General also becomes the High Representative of CFSP²². Europeans have made some progress in the development of CSDP (for instance, Global Targets were set – 2003, 2008, 2010, expanding the Petersberg missions by Berlin + agreements, by adopting the European Security Strategy in 2003 and its revision in 2008.

Moreover, this reactive evolution trend of the EU military, the Security and Defence Policy, continued until today. Lisbon Treaty innovations in security and defence are a result of the fact that, in this regard, the EU needs more coherence and efficiency in action. Therefore, in terms of European security and defence innovations of the Reform Treaty, as the Lisbon Treaty is also known,

have been expressly designed to fill these gaps.

However, beyond these shortcomings identified by Europeans, efforts to reform CFSP / CSDP can be justified by the permanent debate on the necessity of EU structures and bodies authorized to act in defence and security, since the main guarantor of European security remains NATO.

Environmental dimension

The EU is likewise firmly engaged against climate changes, both at internal and at international level. It has integrated the control of emissions of greenhouse gases in its action domains in order to achieve desired objectives²³. Still, priorities set up in Lisbon – competitiveness, employment, economic growth – have stopped it from making a priority out of the fight against climate change.

Conclusions

The whole world is undergoing changes. So is Europe. In this context, the EU has to sustain and promote the social, economic and political development model. Thus, it will influence the development of the new world order, affirming at the same time its values and interests. At the moment, the EU has a fifty years experience of promoting, in an effective manner, in the conditions of globalisation, its values and interests – Europeans' rights, prosperity and solidarity.

The EU is a construction of values, being more than just a simple market, manifesting itself as a community of values based on human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity. Today, when the world is changing, these values are put in question both through the society's mutations and through the progress of science and technology. In this climate in continuous transformation, EU created the conditions for its citizens to live and work in liberty and security, a necessary fact for the full development of its citizens, who are safe from any discrimination. In addition, the EU respects diversity as a major asset and it watches for every human person to be treated with respect. Likewise, the EU is proud of its cultural and linguistic heritage, protecting and favouring diversity as the essence of European identity. Everything is done according to European values that the Union stands for and on which it relates with the rest of the world.

Going forward in the direction of fully achieving its project, the EU can promote its values and

interests not only in its immediate vicinity, but in the whole world. To this end, the EU has to become a partner in the initiatives that are appearing at global level. At multilateral level, it can act within UNO, with its partners in G 8 and G 20.

The EU can really become the champion of the cause of human rights and development worldwide. To achieve such objectives, the EU needs concerted political efforts of its competent institutions, especially the Parliament and the European Commission, and of the Member States.

Interdependence, both within Europe and worldwide, has never been more evident. In today's complex world, climate change, the adoption of sustainable energy policies, preparing our societies to face the demographic challenge, the reform of the global financial system and combating poverty are the objectives requiring concerted efforts of EU Member States. In other words, this requires the EU to assume a role that derives from its status as a major international player, using its institutions, the Member States, as well as the European and international civil society.

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7 These pillars are going to disappear with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. (A/N)

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THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY REVISED. THE ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE

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The Romanian debate concerning national interests within the EU is still prone to generalisation. The current security environment reveals major evolutions that the EU, as well as Member States, must take into account when formulating their strategic objectives. In this respect, a significant role must be assumed by the European Security Strategy which, in its turn, must be re-evaluated according to current realities and the conditions set forth by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.

Key-words: national interests; European interests; European Union; European Security Strategy; Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Albeit being a commonplace in Romania's public space, the debate concerning national interests within the EU is still prone to generalisation. In this regard, I would like to touch upon Romania's perspective concerning the necessity to revise the *European Security Strategy*, as well as the impact this exercise will have upon European Union's security, including on our country.

We are currently witnessing important conceptual evolutions, the most relevant from both theoretical, as well as practical perspective being the adoption of NATO's *Strategic Concept*, at the Allied Summit in Lisbon (November 2010)

and the new US strategy of military engagement. At the same time, there have been a series of significant evolutions, such as: the conflict in Georgia, in the summer of 2008; the European gas crises from the winter of 2006 and 2009; the global economic-financial crisis and its effects; the current, predictable US strategic shift towards Asia; the political transformations in the Union's vicinity / *the Arab uprising*; the accelerated emergence of new regional powers; the increase of global complexity and relevance for issues such as the competition for resources, climate change, migration etc.

The security environment presents major evolutions and EU's partners, be they states or regional and international organisations, have taken concrete steps to adapt to current transformations.

2013 signals the end of a decade since the adoption of the *European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World*. In 2008, there was a first revision of the Strategy, on that occasion a *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* was adopted.

In almost nine years since the adoption of the *European Security Strategy*, the EU was subject of relevant transformations. Twelve states have joined the Union, and Croatia is very close to becoming the twenty-eighth Member State. We have a new institutional framework, established by

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the Lisbon Treaty. As a result of the activation of the European External Action Service, the EU was endowed with an essential instrument, about to be consolidated, which is tasked, among others, with the promotion of a more efficient, more visible Union on the international arena.

All these key-moments mentioned above, along with the current global context, fully justify the need for an updated *European Security Strategy*, which would project a new strategic vision concerning EU's security interests, a vision to which Romania is willing to offer a substantial contribution. In our perspective, EU can no longer keep away from initiating the revision process of the *European Security Strategy*, otherwise the new institutional construct would lack an instrument for strategic action in tune with the current international context.

The *European Security Strategy*, in its next enunciation, shall endeavour to go beyond a simple adjustment, predictable by virtue of the ten-year interval since its launch. For Romania, a country that became an EU member approximately at the middle of this interval, the span and the ambition of the new *European Security Strategy* present an even greater relevance.

The debate concerning the current state of affairs, the objectives and the future orientation of the *European Security Strategy* must take into consideration its connection with other policy documents from various related domains – foremost the 2020 Strategy, the internal security strategy and energy security strategy, as well as other similar documents. At the same time, the revised version of the *European Security Strategy* will give structure and prioritise the various domains, by coordinating and integrating various policy initiatives, aiming at overcoming political and operational difficulties and ensuring greater coherence for EU's foreign and security action.

Given the current crisis, it has become even more relevant to combine in a better way the national resources, policies and instruments with the European ones, an objective already assumed by the current *European Security Strategy*.

NATO has undergone a similar review process of its *Strategic Concept* during 2009 and 2010, also a decade after the adoption of the former policy document. At that time, the strategic debate entailed an important gain for NATO's profile, as a result of promoting an efficient public diplomacy

strategy. This is a lesson the EU should learn in order to take advantage of the debate on the *European Security Strategy*, in order to promote the image of a *more active-more capable-more coherent* Union.

Romania is an active participant to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with a substantial contribution both on the political dimension, as well as the operational one. Taking into consideration the added need to develop NATO-EU cooperation in a formal and structured framework, Romania wishes to actively engage in the review process of the *European Security Strategy*, even more so since at the time of its adoption we were not a Member State. It will be a premiere for Romania, after participating, also for the first time to the revision process of NATO's Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon.

EU's civilian-military operational capacities will need to answer to a set of missions with a foreseeable increased complexity, be it the case of conflict management, humanitarian crises or disaster management, stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction – in a global context in which these attributes are more and more inter-twined, and the rapid reaction, assembling capabilities and their deployment become essential.

These requirements touch upon the means and framework of cooperation with institutional partners – NATO foremost, but also UN or OSCE.

Of specific interest for Romania remains the need to highlight the relevance of the trans-Atlantic relation – especially in the present context of increased uncertainties and in a strategic moment in which the US is more aware of evolutions outside of the Euro-Atlantic area.

More efforts and strategic ambition are required to attain trans-Atlantic cohesion and coordination, both in principle and practice, at all levels: political; aligning US and EU security strategies; consolidating NATO-EU political and operational capabilities for common action; shared areas of concern on the regional and global security agendas – European energy security, neighbourhood policies, relations with Russia, further enlargement, OSCE files, frozen conflicts.

A very important subject for Romania concerns the engagement with the Eastern Neighbourhood, a region with strategic value for Romania, as a Member State situated on the border of both NATO and the EU, by harmonising policies, values and



standards, by expanding economic exchanges and promoting political liberties, by expanding energy and infrastructure connections. We aim to engage our partners as much as possible in this kind of agenda, based on reciprocal commitment and without fundamental compromises.

A balanced approach towards the neighbourhood, on both the Eastern and Southern dimensions will confer more credibility to EU's foreign and security action. Romania is interested that the new *European Security Strategy* should reflect more elements concerning the Eastern neighbourhood and the Wider Black Sea Region – an extremely important region connecting both the Southern and the Eastern dimensions.

Romania is adamant about the need for increased solidarity among EU Member States in the area of security, especially with respect to energy or cyber security. Over the last decade, the energy file has become a crucial element for European security, taking into consideration the increased dependence on external sources.

The energy file migrated from the economic sphere to the political and strategic one, considering the implications of a lapse in the flow of energy resources, especially for prolonged intervals. These interruptions may be the result of either political decisions or security incidents. As such, the EU must assume a comprehensive approach with respect to energy security.

The increased dependence on cyber space lead to the rise of new threats and risks and it is only fair to assume that they will increase in the absence of concrete counter-measures. The cyber space is mostly managed by private entities and it constitutes a medium for promoting economic and social developments, as well as highly elusive cyber attacks. Furthermore, critical national infrastructure (communication systems, energy distribution networks) has become a battlefield where hostile actors can inflict massive damage with reduced costs. Finally, classic deterrence methods do not apply to these new categories of threats.

Romania promotes an ambitious EU approach with respect to foreign and security action. From our point of view, the Union must look further than its immediate neighbourhood and must define its own global strategic outlook. The risks and threats to European security can originate anywhere on the planet, and can take the shape of ballistic

missiles, cyber attacks or the competition for vital resources.

In order to manage successfully the current security environment, the EU needs an increased level of cooperation with its partners, both at State level, as well as at the organisation's level. Multilateral action and cooperation with international partners, especially NATO, but also the UN or OSCE brings efficiency and enhance European efforts. Coordination and the distribution of responsibilities are essential in order to avoid duplications and maintain efficiency, especially in the context of NATO-EU cooperation.

Finally, I want to underline the fact that any strategy is a prescription for action. As such, in the revision process of the *European Security Strategy* we must find the optimum balance between the level of ambition in formulating the objectives and the mechanisms and instruments through which these objectives could be achieved. The institutional framework set in place by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty offers the EU a set of innovative instruments. From this perspective, the European External Action Service is not just one of the key actors of the revision process of the Strategy, but also one of its beneficiaries.

A fair number of the Member States already support the necessity of initiating the review process of this policy document, in order to provide the EU with an instrument for evaluation and strategic action in tone with the current international setting. This subject has been already discussed with our strategic partners and it is a topic on our agenda for discussions with the European capitals. At the same time, we intend to make use of our experience from participating in the Allied debate on the revision of the *Strategic Concept*, also by organising a session of debates with academic and non-governmental participation. Romania endeavours to take active part in the future revision process of the *European Security Strategy*. I hope that our own efforts and the efforts of our partners will be successful and will increase EU's security, both as a regional, and as a global actor.

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PROMOTING NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AT EUROPEAN UNION LEVEL

*Răzvan-Horațiu RADU**

The European problematic is defined by complexity and interdisciplinarity. Romania's fundamental and strong participation in the decisional process of the European Union fully serves our national interests. That is why there is the need to combine the efforts of all national institutions involved in solving this problematic in an appropriate and efficient manner with a view to comply with Romania's interests.

Key-words: European problematic; national interests; decisional process; coordination system; institutional actors; cooperation; priorities.

Introductory considerations

The particularly complex issue of the process of promoting Romania's national interest at EU's decision-making level needs to be approached by clarifying essential elements such as the concept and functioning of the European affairs coordination system and the Parliament's control on the Government, determined by the need for constant political dialogue in European affairs between the two powers. We believe, as well, that there is an interest for a quick overview of the main files currently under debate, for which the course of action to be taken by the Romanian State has already been established, as well as of the

tendencies taking shape at European level which require a deepened analysis on the national level.

In this respect, it must be noted that the national system for coordination of the European Affairs in Romania comprises several institutional actors involved in the internal decision-making process. The role of this system is to identify the fields of interest for the Romanian State and to promote a uniform and consistent stance at EU level.

The coordination system was conceived and developed on the basis of the experience gained during the EU accession negotiation process (2000-2004), and also during the period when Romania had the statute of active observer at the European institutions, after the signing of the Accession Treaty (16 April 2005 – 01 January 2007).

Starting from 1 January 2007, Romania is a full Member of the European Union and one of the main objectives of the Romanian administration is to actively take part in the European decision-making process.

After joining the EU, the national coordination system was built on new institutional bases, with the European Affairs being managed jointly by the Department for European Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Starting from October 2011, the Department for European Affairs was integrated, together with the Authority for Coordination of

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the Structural Instruments, into the Ministry of European Affairs¹.

1. The European Affairs Coordination System

1.1 Institutional actors

The Ministry of European Affairs (MEA)

After joining the EU, as it is known, the European affairs become internal affairs (obviously, through the profound impacts they have on all fields of the Romanian society), so that in Romania, as in other new Member States, the model of *hard* coordination was opted for, that is the one achieved at the executive level, by setting up the Department for European Affairs (DEA) as a specialised structure of the central administration, initially placed under the direct coordination of the Prime Minister. The model is maintained and strengthened by the setting up of MEA as it has, over the time, proved its viability.

Therefore, MEA currently coordinates the drawing up of the national stances in the field of European affairs, as well as of the horizontal strategic documents of national concern (e.g., The National Reform Plan). MEA ensures the unity and consistency of the national stances which will be presented at all levels within the EU institutions. To this end, it has mediation tasks between the national institutions with a view to adopting a uniform stance.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is involved in the coordination process endorsing along with MEA the mandates of the Romanian representatives to the EU in relation to certain topics. Moreover, MFA manages the information flow between Bucharest and Brussels and draws up along with MEA the file of the Romanian delegation to the European Council.

The Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union (PR) is the institution which ensures the communication between the European institutions and the Romanian authorities. Romania's Ambassador to the EU, the leader of the PR represents the Romanian State at the COREPER 2 meetings and his deputy at the COREPER 1. If experts or officials from Bucharest cannot attend the meetings, Romania is represented by PR in accordance with the instructions sent from Bucharest. PR ensures the automatic distribution of the unclassified EU documents to the Romanian institutions.

The Parliament of Romania is informed and consulted in the European affairs issues. The Minister of European Affairs participates in informative meetings with the members of the Commission for European Affairs from the Parliament of Romania. The line ministries are invited to participate in these meetings according to the topics from the European agenda.

1.2 Internal coordination

The legal framework for the coordination process of the European affairs in Romania is represented by the Government Decision No 115/2008.

At technical level, a specific coordination mechanism was set up, the Committee of Coordination of European Affairs, made up of representatives of MEA, MFA and of ministries and/or of other institutions of the central public administration involved.

The coordination meetings take place weekly and they are jointly presided by MEA and MFA and are intended for:

- approval of mandates for stances that the representatives of Romanian authorities will present at the European Union Council meetings, COREPER and working groups. The mandates are drawn up by the institutions which will take part to the meetings, endorsed by the MEA and MFA, as appropriate, and sent to PR by MFA;
- approval of the general mandates (according to the general policy orientations) which will be presented by the ministers at the European Union Council meetings;
- discussing the European agenda;
- establishing the responsibilities of ministries in the preparation, decision and implementation of the specific European files;
- establishing and monitoring the internal working groups on several subjects from the European agenda (e.g., the working group on pesticides, data protection).

At *internal level*, the relevant ministries theoretically have directorates/departments/units specialised in European affairs, although there are situations where they should be consolidated or even re-established. By orders of the ministers, special work groups are constituted in order to prepare and participate to the activities of the EU Council and the European Commission, at political and technical level.

The structures responsible for European affairs within the ministries and the other central authorities were functional since the beginning of the accession negotiations, between 2000 and 2001. Meanwhile, their attributions were adapted to the new requirements imposed by the evolution of the statute of Romania (candidate state, acceding state and member state).

At *governmental level*, the same regulatory framework governs the Council for European Affairs (CEA), structure subordinated to the Prime Minister, with the role to ensure the convergence of political decisions in European Affairs matters. Its meetings are chaired by the Prime Minister, with the participation of the highest rank officials: the ministers of European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Public Finance, Romania's Permanent Representative to the EU, as well as the ministers in charge, according to the work agenda.

CEA's main responsibilities (according to the Government Decision 115/2008 on the establishment of the national system for the coordination of European affairs):

- establishes Romania's priorities as EU Member State;
- analyses the topics from the European agenda, the priorities of the EU Council Presidency and their relevance for Romania;
- identifies the objectives and political priorities of Romania in relation with the directions adopted by the European Council;
- ensures the coherence of national stances regarding European policies and mediates any divergences between institutions at the meetings of the Committee of Coordination of European Affairs;
- approves the list of general mandates to be drawn up.

However, at present, the issue of European affairs is approached in a much more pragmatic manner: directly during the government meetings, involving the participation of all ministers. Thus, on a weekly basis, the Prime Minister and the Government members are informed exhaustively by the Minister of European Affairs on the main topics from the European agenda, on the elements of great relevance for Romania, as well as on the direction of action that will have to be taken by the Romanian relevant authorities. It can be said that, in practice, CEA's responsibilities/works are taken over by the entire Executive and the reason for this

fact is the complex and, mostly, interdisciplinary character of the European matters, reflected in the sensitivity of the decisions to be adopted.

1.3 European representation

The responsibility for participation to the work groups of the Council belongs to the ministries and the other institutions involved, with the obligation to have prior consultations with MEA and MFA. As a general direction, the Member States attempt to intervene from the base level of the decision-making process – that of experts – in order to negotiate and influence the legislative act proposition of the EU.

The instructions for the COREPER meetings are discussed at the weekly coordination meetings and are sent to the Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union by MEA and MFA.

At the Council of the European Union meetings, Romania is represented by the ministers or, in their absence, by state secretaries, according to the mandates approved by the Government.

The European Council is usually attended by the President of Romania, who may or may not be accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Minister for European Affairs.

As known, this is the highest level of representation, the place where the main political orientations of the EU are decided.

2. Cooperation between Parliament and Government in European Affairs matters

In this context, we consider it is essential for Romania to ensure, while maintaining the constitutional balance between the two powers, a constructive dialogue in the field of European affairs between the Government and the Parliament. MEA continued certain prior initiatives for a draft law to this end, which was approved by the Executive in January 2012 and was forwarded to the Parliament for adoption.

The project aims at creating a flexible and efficient mechanism for cooperation between the Executive and the Legislative, which would meet the requirements generated by a substantiated and strong participation of Romania to the decision-making process at the level of the European Union in the specific conditions of this process

marked by a dynamic succession of stages, by an immense information content and by the necessity to harmonise the interests of Member States. The project is substantiated, thus, on two key principles, namely the good-will principle and the one of raising the awareness of the political decision-makers, in serving the national interest.

The general concept of the project was, initially, at the moment of its promotion by the Executive, that the Parliament's opinion expressed within the framework of democratic control on the Government in relation to the content of the stances drawn up in order to be presented in the framework of the decision-making process in the European Union, is not mandatory for the Government and it can diverge from what is stated in its text provided that its representative subsequently explains at the request of the Legislative, in writing or verbally, as appropriate, the reasons which substantiate the promotion of the diverging position².

This concept is based on the principle that the Executive acts in good-will and always takes into account, at the completion of mandates, the opinion of the Parliament expressed as a result of the parliamentary examination, which can, moreover, bring a significant added value and (democratic) legitimacy to the action of the former in the context of European Affairs. In outlining this regulation, the immense responsibility of the executive as concerns the effects its stances are likely to have on the national interest cannot be overlooked and neither can the expertise it contributes with to the whole process. Moreover, the cooperation mechanisms between the two powers reside in the internal law-making competence of Member States which define them in accordance with the constitutional regulations and the traditions of their systems. Thus, according to the draft law, the parliamentary control is exercised mainly in relation with the mandates of the executive on draft legislative acts drawn up at European Union level.

It was considered that a rigid and strict mandate under the current circumstances of Romania's administrative capacity might affect its capacity to react in a substantiated manner and in due time, might limit the freedom of negotiation and action of the Government and might lead, in certain situations, to its marginalizing on an unwanted minority position.

However, during the debates of the legislative forum on the draft law, a series of amendments

modifying the consultative character of the Parliament's opinion was introduced. This becomes mandatory mandate for the Executive, according to the model (however, currently in minority) of other Member States³.

The project focuses on regulating the parliamentary control by circumscribing it, mainly, to elements which are essential for the European decision-making process: stances on EU draft legislative acts. However, the project is not limited to these stances, yet it also regulates a specific procedure of analysis by the Parliament of the European acts without legislative character. This category covers any type of acts, including those of strategic nature, which are important precisely because they anticipate EU's direction of action in certain domains and the Government must inform the Parliament thoroughly on these acts as well.

The general concept of this project meets the necessity to ensure the concrete political control of the legislative on the way in which the executive participates in the decision-making process at the level of the EU, however without overcharging the former's agenda and without elements which surpass the latter's capacity, starting from the assumption that the draft legislative acts are the expression of the concrete modality in which policies become mandatory for the Member States and their concrete content must not be missed by the legislatures as they have binding character, if approved.

At this moment, the project must go through a few more stages of the legislative process in the Parliament and will probably undergo some other changes, after the approval of the amendments. Nevertheless, a certain regulation is absolutely necessary, especially since, after more than five years since the accession to the European Union; Romania still does not have a mechanism established by law⁴, which can ensure cooperation/ the systematic dialogue between the two powers in a complex field, with undisputed and profound effects on all the components of Romanian society.

3. Romania's priorities in the negotiations related to the EU decision-making process

As it can be noted from the presentation of the national coordination system, the process of elaborating and supporting Romania's national



position at European level is a complex one, involving a large number of actors – central public administration authorities.

The fundamental purpose of the entire process is two-fold: on the one hand, defining national interests in all files, with major focus on the priority ones, and, on the other hand, ensuring the capacity and ability of the Romanian administration to promote them at European level, taking into account the potentially diverging positions of the other 26 Member States.

In this context, it should be emphasised that the promotion of national interests supported by Member States in the context of the European decision-making process must take into account two aspects:

- on the one hand – the interests/stances supported by the other Member States: it is crucial to identify the states having similar stances, with which alliances can be formed, or states with divergent stances, regarding which lobbying strategies can be adopted;

- on the other hand, special attention must be paid to the developments at European level in various regulatory fields – lately, we noticed, especially in the context of the economic and financial crisis that affected all Member States (and other states), a tendency to regulate, at European level, certain fields which, at present, fall under the competence of Member States (e.g. fiscal policy coordination etc.).

Among the most important files for Romania, at the moment, we can mention for example: negotiations for the next EU Multi-annual Financial Framework for the period 2013-2020, aspects regarding the economic governance, which has a central role in the measures taken to strengthen European economy in the post-crisis period, the Single Market, transportation, which will be briefly presented below.

Regarding the *post-2013 EU Multi-annual Financial Framework*, it should be mentioned that negotiations related to this file represent one of the major priorities of Romania, its general objective being to improve its position of beneficiary in the financial relations with the European Union compared to the one in the current perspective, by the appropriate funding of European policies, especially the ones which are of great interest for Romania, since they have the potential to reduce the gaps, namely the Cohesion Policy and the Common

Agricultural Policy. Moreover, in the context in which the European budgetary framework has proved to be viable until now, Romania will seek to maintain budgetary discipline at European level.

Regarding the *Cohesion Policy*, we intend for it to remain, by the end of the negotiations, a key-element for the European construction, with an important weight in the EU budget. We also wish that this policy continues to address mainly the states and regions which are the least developed, so that development disparities within the European Union can be reduced. Romania considers that proposals for regulations on the future of this policy are a good basis for discussions, but appreciates that they also involve delicate issues, such as: conditionalities (especially the macro-economic ones) and suspending payments, limiting to 2,5% of GDP the allocations to the Cohesion policy, transitional regions and the way they affect the allocations to less developed regions, simplifying the process of implementing structural instruments, the transfer of 10 billion Euro from the Cohesion Fund to the Connecting Europe Facility.

Romania supports the signing of an agreement on the legislative pack by the end of 2012 in order to create the premises for an appropriate preparation of strategic documents for the next period of financial scheduling/planning.

As regards the *Common Agricultural Policy*, it is important for Romania that final decisions should contribute to reducing the administrative burden for farmers and the administration and ensure a balanced development of rural areas. Romania considers that the CAP Reform is essential for the achievement of all the objectives of Europe 2020 Strategy, acting in a manner integrated with other EU policies, through the contribution made by employing labour force in agriculture and in related sectors, contributing thus to achieving the objectives of social inclusion. The role it can play together with other policies (environmental, cohesion, innovation and research and development, social) and the effort to attain competitiveness goals on the global market, as well as solving environmental issues, including the ones related to the new challenges concerning climate change, are equally important. In order to actually achieve the objectives of the future reform of European agriculture, it is necessary to continue ensuring a consistent budget for CAP, providing a stable, decent and fair income

for farmers, avoiding the abandonment of rural areas, agricultural activities and lands, as well as paying the supply of public goods. That is why it is important for Romania to maintain in real terms the value of the support granted for agriculture within the configuration of the two complementary pillars, so that it enables the capitalisation of the development potential in the agro-industrial field of the new Member States and contributes to the achievement of the convergence objectives.

As for the *European economic governance*, it emerged as a consequence of the prolonged economic and financial crisis, which led to the adoption by the European Union of an impressive series of instruments for economic governance, which can be applied either to all Member States, or just to the Euro Zone Member States.

The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, one of the main measures taken in this context, seeks to complete the European legislative framework on budgetary surveillance and imbalances, in order to extend the coordination in the field of economic policies and to improve governance in the euro area.

Romania permanently envisaged to be a part of the European evolution related to economic governance, actively joining in all initiatives taken to this end. We pursued this goal in order to be able to promote our points of view and to contribute to the strengthening of the European Union. By adhering to the provisions of the Treaty, Romania wishes to build a Union of responsibility and economic growth, based on macro-economic discipline and the promotion of competitiveness.

Romania is aware that the Single Market is one of the greatest accomplishments of the European Union and a central element in the process of European integration. Nevertheless, the Single Market must be adapted and developed continuously in order to obtain additional benefits, to reduce its fragmentation and address the new developments of the market, such as the emergence of digital economy and the new globalisation challenges.

To this end, Romania pays special attention to “The Single Market Act”, which was approved at the highest level last year and which will mark 20 years from the creation of the Single Market. The act includes 12 key legislative initiatives⁵ that should be adopted in the EU decision-making process by

the end of 2012. Romania will participate actively in the negotiations and will support the presidencies in order to reach an agreement on these initiatives according to the established objective.

Labour mobility within the European Union is a fundamental principle set by the EU Treaties.

Ensuring the full application of the principle of free movement of Romanian workers throughout the European Union is a priority for Romania.

Romania’s objective is that the Member States which still impose restrictions⁶ on the access of Romanian workers on national markets eliminate them before the deadline established in the Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, namely 1 January 2014⁷.

Romania is also given support through the European Commission Report⁸ on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements on Free Movement of Workers in Bulgaria and Romania, which shows that the labour migration did not create disturbances in the Member States’ markets and, on the contrary, contributed to their economic growth.

In the field of *transportation*, one of the important negotiation files for this year is the Connecting Europe Facility. Romania supports the initiative of the European Commission, yet appreciates that some aspects related to this regulation should be reassessed. Thus, as regards the list of projects benefiting from financing, Romania does not approve of the criteria used by the Commission in order to define the corridors and proposes the following alternatives: removing the list from the regulation proposal and introducing clear criteria for calls for projects, or setting up a list of projects only after consulting the Member States, in order to identify the real development needs for each country.

Thus, Romania considers that the development of road infrastructure continues to be a priority and that focusing only on the development of the other means of transportation creates a disadvantage at national level.

4. Current tendencies at European Union level

The European Union is going through a period of revising and redefining its foundations. Either if we talk about the amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in order

to make the stabilisation mechanism for the euro area permanent or about the completion of the vast processes of reforming the main European policies – cohesion, agriculture or budget – the economic and financial crisis has marked and continues to mark the direction in which the European Union is going from now on.

The need for all these changes is based on two aspects: on the one hand, Europe and the entire world are evolving, are confronted with these new challenges for which individual efforts stopped being sufficient long ago. On the other hand, the European Union, as a whole, showed that, without concerted and especially coordinated efforts, the foundations of the economic and political union – that remains a project at the moment – could not be achieved.

The Communication on reinforcing economic policy coordination in the European Union, launched by the European Commission in 2010, represented the first step in the efforts that Europe was going to channel in this direction. It seems to have been only a step from the initial moment of reservation towards the proposals of the European Commission – expressed mainly in the states which were more affected by the crisis – to the Franco-German initiative in the European Council of 4 February 2011. In fact, backstage negotiations hide ample processes of revising the stances of the Member States, of redefining and resizing, rethinking and compromises.

There seems to be a tendency to achieve a certain transfer of competencies and responsibilities from national level to European level. Each of these proposals comprises a component of transfer of sovereignty: the legislative pack on economic governance implies the elaboration of the national budget not only based on what governments will consider to be priorities of action, but also depending on the assessments of the European Commission and of the Council (implicitly of the other Member States), the stabilisation mechanism involves resorting to European support when internal support is no longer enough (or there are no resources left) in exchange of accepting certain conditionalities imposed in order to return to the normal path. Last but not least, the Euro Plus Pact involves the agreement, by euro zone and non-euro zone countries, by optional criteria, with certain common objectives and standards, in order to increase EU competitiveness, bringing in the

foreground of proposals including fields which fall under the competence of Member States.

In this context, promoting national interests gains new dimensions. Member States (therefore, Romania too) must develop and/or improve their capacity to adapt to a continuously changing environment.

Conclusions

Taking into account all these elements, it is more than obvious that Romania, as Member State of the European Union, has shaped a coherent institutional mechanism, with solid foundations, which can ensure the identification and promotion of its interests/values in the European context; but, at the same time, it must be permanently improved, in order to ensure its adequacy to the current and future challenges (especially concerning the creation of the detailed legal framework for the systematic dialogue between the legislative and the executive powers) in this field.

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NOTES:

1 Through the *Government Emergency Ordinance* No 78/2011 78/2011 on establishing organisational measures in European affairs and the Government Decision No 967/2011 regarding the organisation and the functioning of the Ministry of European Affairs.

2 This latter element can be considered as derived from the way relations between Parliament and Government are regulated in the Constitution: at the former's request, there is a political obligation for the latter to present the information and documents requested by the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the Parliamentary Commissions by their chairmen and, if their presence is requested, the participation of the member of Government is mandatory, according to

Article 111 et seq. of the Constitution.

3 E.g., Denmark.

4 At the moment, cooperation is based exclusively on constitutional provisions related to parliamentary control and on the Government Decision No 115/2008.

5 Creating European venture capital funds, Revising the Professional Qualifications Directive, Setting up a unitary patent and a unified patent litigation system, The Alternative Dispute Resolution in the field of consumption, Revising the standardisation system, Connecting Europe Facility, E-identification and E-authentication (May 2012), Creating European funds for social entrepreneurship, Revising the Energy Taxation Directive, A better implementation of the Directive on the posting of workers and social rights (February 2012), Simplifying the accounting directives (the Fourth and Seventh Directives), Revising public procurement directives.

6 At present, 10 Member States apply different types of transitional measures: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Great Britain, Netherlands and Spain.

7 According to the Treaty of Accession, maintaining restrictions on the labour market for Romanian citizens in the last transitional period (2012-2013) is justified only if serious disturbances in the labour market of the countries that imposed those restrictions arise or if there is a risk that they arise.

8 COM(2011) 729 final, Brussels, 11.11.2011.



THE ROMANIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSDP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EU INTERESTS' PROJECTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

*Viorel ANGELESCU**

Defining a general European interest has become a must for the European Union, starting in this way the reflection process on building a common belonging feeling, and on the political agreement that would be capable to unify citizens and European institutions as well. The recent history showed an undeniable liaison between the evolution of international security crisis and the European cooperation in the defense field (the Balkan crisis in the '90s or the Georgian crisis in 2008). Nevertheless, the absence or the incomplete character of the EU definitions of strategic and security interests may have some noxious effects upon the manner in which the Union would like to be perceived on the international scene. The practice of defining the interests on a case by case basis or through opportunity speeches founded on the promotion of European values, does not help the European Union to impose its role as a major actor on the international security scene. Moreover, EU displays its role under a form which is extremely complex and seldom perfectly comprehensible, from a unitary perspective.

Key-words: national interest; European interest; European union (EU); Romania; Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

1. National Interest vs EU Interest

In the current security environment, the risks and threats are more and more interdependent, transnational and complex. No state can ensure its security solely by its own means, therefore cooperation with other states is becoming not only a solution, but a necessity. Under these circumstances, the need of defining and promoting the common or general European interest, as well as the conceptual innovations in the security and defense field, justify the Romanian contribution along with the efforts of the other EU Member States to enhance and develop the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Considering that Member States keep their sovereign prerogatives in the fields of diplomacy and defense and each state has to a certain extent its own vision on EU as an actor on the international scene, the approach of the national interest in the context of the European Union also leads to the definition of the community interest. Moreover, the revival of the Common Security and Defense Policy would also involve a paradigm shift, and not in favor of projecting the national interests at the level of EU institutions with a decisional role in

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the field of security and defense. Thus, in order for the EU to be perceived as a global actor with global interest, the transformation of the general interests' morphology is required, with the aim of defining some „so-called” common interests reflecting the common identity and level of ambition of the nations.

1.1. The Necessity to Define European Interests

The preservation of the Member States' sovereignty in the foreign policy field and its development through the inter-governmental cooperation requires the establishing of the manner in which a certain unity or at least coherence of the national and European policies as a whole could be created. As long as the foreign policy will continue to be perceived as a way of promoting national interests, their synchronization at European level will prove difficult to achieve. Therefore, it is important to clarify to what extent the evolution of the European foreign security policy is the result of a compromise among national interests or, on the contrary, of a superior common interest.

Taking into account the relative new character of the CSDP, the definition of a common European interest can start only with the explanation of the manner in which national and security interest are perceived. Nevertheless, one cannot neglect the fact that the interests are not the only elements defining and guiding the foreign policies of the EU Member States. This part is also played by the democratic principles and values that are commonly shared at European level.

The Romanian 2010 National Defense Strategy refers to both notions of national and security interests, considering that “**national interests, values and objectives** play a central part in defining the national defense strategy and offer it legitimacy”. If national interests are defined as “**those needs and aspirations essential for the affirmation of national identity and values, the state existence and the preservation of its fundamental functions**”, the security interests can no longer be defined only from a perspective reduced to the state framework. Security interest must relate to the reality of the international environment marked by the interdependence of its actors. Consequently, “in order to defense and promote the national interests, values and security objectives, Romania respects the principles of the international law, develops the

dialogue and cooperation with the interested states and the international organizations responsible for the regional and global stability and security”¹.

There are two fundamental trends in the field of the international relations theory that mark the evolution of the national interest perception. On the one hand, the realist school² defines the national interest in terms of power and presents it as the conductor of political leaders' behavior, in a world defined by the conflict of interests. From this perspective, the national interest is bounded to the political sphere. From the realist perspective, the political leader represents the state interest and not the general interest which reflects the public wellness and the homogenous interests of all citizens. The conclusion resulted from this rationality is that “**the foreign policy guided by moral abstractions, without consideration to the national interest, is meant to fail**”³. The existence of an actor superior to the state is difficult to conceive. This idea cannot, obviously, be favorable to the development of a coherent foreign policy in the context of the European construction.

Nevertheless, the promotion of neo-realism is followed by a conceptual mutation, due to the questioning of the national interest as a fundamentally explanatory concept of international relations. Thus, power is considered to be only a tool for the political action and not the purpose of politics⁴. Hence, from this renewed perspective, the foreign policy is guided by projects, perspectives of the world and ideals. Considering that the national interest is defined pending on a project and a political horizon, the opportunity to conceive the European interest in realist terms arises.

In addition, the constructivist theory allows the development of the European construction analysis. According to constructivism, national interests are conceived as products of the interaction among states, where each state will define its interests taking into account the interests of the other states and the manner in which those ones perceive their specific interests⁵. The constructivist approach of the national interest notion favors its perception as a social construction, a decisive element in the framework of the decision-making process and an important element of the political speech in negotiations. Plus, the conception of the national interest starts with a common belonging feeling and encourages the adoption of an identity based perspective.



On the other hand, although frequently used in political speeches, the European interest notion does not come with a clear definition. One of the difficulties resulting from the attempt to define it consists in the automatic reference to the classical notion of national interest, widely approached in the past in the international relations theory papers. Having as a starting point the European interest, the analysis of the national interest restrains the reflection to certain concepts which are already outdated due to the very nature of the European construction and to the level of ambition established within the common security and defense policy.

Therefore, it is important to establish to what extent the common European interest can be limited to a compromise of the national interests as negotiated among member states or if there are authentic European interests as a result of the general interest, namely of a political project comprising the adhesion of all citizens and surpassing the framework of private interests. In reality, the community interest frequently represents the results of negotiations and debates within various institutions and at various decision-making levels.

Moreover, one should not neglect the fact that the European interests are defined taking also into account a common identity and certain common interests, due to the external perception of the Union as a community of interests. Or, although the European Union is not based on linguistic or religious similarities, the existence of a common cultural patrimony resulted from a tumultuous history undoubtedly represents the source of a unifying identity. Furthermore, leaving aside the identity aspects, the European interest needs the definition of a common political project capable to reflect the Member States' commitment.

1.2. Institutionalizing the Community Interest under the CSDP

Despite the difficulty to define the foreign and security policy of the EU, one must take into consideration that this policy does not resume to the actions of the European institutions with responsibilities in the field, but it also includes a process of "Europeanization" of the national policies, comprehending the sum of EU and Member States actions in the realm of international affairs⁶. Developing an efficient collective security

requires the promotion of common interests through a real common policy. That is why the cohesion degree of European security policies continues to represent a debate topic even though a certain dilution of national interests was recognized.

Institutionalizing the cooperation in the EU framework inevitably led to a reevaluation of the Member States' perception of their national interests. Nevertheless, states continue to promote within the European institutions the policies that best reflect their national interests defined in the capitals. Still, the result consists in an act that proves the consensus of all involved actors and reflects the interest they commonly assumed.

For instance, even if only certain states identified a specific interest of political, economic nature or simply due to a cultural and historical background regarding the opportunity of an military or civilian intervention in an area marked by conflicts and instability, the other members will join this initiative in the spirit of a more large, common interest, namely securing the area and promoting the European democratic values. Romania makes no exception to the case. The involvement of our country in missions that EU deploys in different theatres with no apparent strategic interest for Romania shows our commitment to the objective of a global security. This commitment comes from the association to a common interest and to the efficiency developed from the process of institutionalizing the European interest.

To that effect, the European Commission is probably the institution with the best developed capacity to promote the general interest which comprehends and overcomes the national interests' dimension. The Commission competencies in the field of the promotion of propositions and initiatives, as well as the part it plays in the implementation of the policies previously promoted show the originality of this organism. There is no other international organization to have at its disposal an institution capable to define and promote general interest. Nevertheless, not even the Commission can elude its own source of legitimacy and act independently of the states' will, hence being obliged to take into consideration their interests. Consequently, institutionalizing the European common interest implies a certain depoliticization by creating a public servants body capable to find the ways and promote a deliberately homogenous vision of the European interest.



In spite of the difficulty to create a European body that would be able to conceive and efficiently manage the community interest, without neglecting the voice of the citizens, the general interest notion is institutionalized by its definitions in the European Union fundamental treaties. Numerous references to the European interest notion are comprised in the Maastricht Treaty, during the process of defining the common defense policy. Thus, among the objectives of the common defense policy one could count “the preservation of common values, fundamental interest and the independence of the Union” aiming at promoting the EU’s identity on the international scene. Another objective here defined consists in the enhanced protection of the rights and interests of the EU Member States’ citizens by implementing a citizenship of the Union. From this perspective, the European interest is defined in accordance with the collective interest. There is an interest defined and promoted by the European citizens and not by the European institution. The Maastricht Treaty mentions both the notions of common and general interest of the Union.

All these notions are later on resumed in the Lisbon Treaty. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the Union affirms and promotes its values and interests and contributes to the protection of its citizens in relation to the rest of the world. The role of the European Union is described in relation with the other international actors, defining its interests depending on the evolution of this relation. Moreover, the Commission is presented as the body promoting the general interest of the Union and which has the ability to take initiative to that scope. All the same, the treaty frequently evokes in its text the expression “questions of common interest”. As a result, the Lisbon Treaty enhances the perception of the existence of a community interest which is superior to national interests.

2. The Common Interest Reflected in the CSDP Development

The development of the Common Security Defense Policy reflects the unanimous reconnaissance of the necessity to reaffirm the European common interest in this domain. A step forward in the field of conceptual evolution of the European Security Defense Policy and of the European interest is made by the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on the 1st of December 2009. The

treaty brings a series of innovations in the foreign policy field of the European Union emphasizing the reinforced cooperation between Member States (MS) with regard to the common security. We therefore assist to the creation of a European Common Security and Defense Policy consolidated by clauses as the solidarity and mutual assistance in case of military aggression ones, competing in formulation with the well known article 5 of the fundamental Treaty of the North Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty innovations present some deficiency regarding the guaranty of the solidarity here invoked. The political will in the case of the security foreign policy of the EU remains the main decisive element in the adoption of concrete measures by getting actively involved on the international arena.

Consequently, each Member State contribution to the development of the CSDP remains essential. The affirmation of some common values and principles as a shared burden sustained by their promotion denotes the process of definition of a common interest voluntary sustained by the European nations. Romania makes no exception, regardless the financial difficulties and her previously assumed security engagements before the EU integration. Our country’s contribution brings in added value to the missions and operations led by the Union in various areas of the world.

2.1. Lisbon Treaty Innovations and the CSDP Reform

The Lisbon Treaty comes along with a series of important innovations in the CFSP / CSDP field, in order to reinforce the security dimension of the European Union. The planned reforms regard the promotion of CSDP in a sustained manner with the aim of establishing an efficient EU common defense. According to the Treaty provisions, the development of EU common defense sector should evolve in line with the engagements of some EU MS to NATO. With the Lisbon Treaty, we assist to a rise of the Union level of ambition by introducing new clauses and initiatives. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty laid down the conceptual foundations of the gradual transformation of the European Union in an actor with major role in the management of international security issues. Nevertheless, reaching a consensus is still necessary in matters touching a series of aspects and also with



regard to measures to be adopted and implemented to achieve a proficient level of EU security and defense operability.

Among the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, in the CFSP and CSDP domain, it is worth mentioning the following: the role of the president of the European Council, the establishment of the institution of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (FASP), the establishing of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the widening of the spectrum of the Petersberg missions, the introduction of the clause of mutual assistance in the case of a military aggression and that of solidarity, the creation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the affirming of the European Defense Agency role and the diversifying of its responsibilities.

Regarding the role of president of the European Council, the Treaty conveys, in the ESDP domain, the responsibility to represent the Union in the previously mentioned area without touching any prerogatives of the EU H.R. for FASP. The H.R. corresponds to a foreign affairs minister proposed also in the draft of the Constitutional Treaty, integrating the position of the Commission foreign affairs commissioner. The position of H.R. is of major importance in the development of CSDP taking into consideration that he presides the Foreign Affairs Council and is also the vice-president of the Commission. In his activity he is assisted by a diplomatic staff, composed of civil servants transferred from relevant structures of the General Secretary of the Council and the Commission, or by MS seconded diplomats.

The European External Action Service plays an essential role in the definition of EU as a security global actor. In compliance with the Article 27 of the Lisbon Treaty, “the High Representative in the accomplishment of his mandate is assisted by a European external action service. This service works in cooperation with the MS diplomatic services and is composed by civil servants of appropriate services from General Secretary of the Council and the Commission, as well as by seconded diplomats. The organization and the functioning of the European External Action service are set down by the Council decision. The Council decides upon the nomination of the H.R., after the consultation of the European Parliament and the approval of the Commission”. The structure became operational starting with the 1st of December

2010, and the transfer of staff from Council relevant structures has been initiated beginning with the 1st of January 2011.

Taking into account the necessity to enhance the CSDP contribution, the Lisbon Treaty extends the panel of the Petersberg tasks adding “military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilization” and specifying that “all these missions can contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting the third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”.⁷ Moreover, the insertion of the mutual assistance clause in case of an armed aggression against a Member State, inspired by article 51 of the United Nations Chart regarding one’s right to defend itself, responds to the needs derived from the process of absorption of UEO functions by the EU. It is worth mentioning that this provision must not get in contradiction with the commitments already assumed by some Member States in the framework of NATO. In such cases the Alliance remains the main forum for the collective defense. In addition, the solidarity clause stipulates that when one of the Member States is coping with a terrorist attack or a natural catastrophe, the Union must act in a unitary manner, out of solidarity. Hence, according to the solidarity clause, the Union will mobilize all means at its disposal, including the military resources offered by Member States, in order to prevent the terrorist threat on their territories, to protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population against any terrorist attack.

Another innovation of the Lisbon Treaty creating opportunities in the CSDP field is the Permanent Structured Cooperation. According the provisions regarding the Permanent Structured Cooperation, Member States with an advanced capacity to develop in the military capabilities field, may unify their efforts in order to create among themselves an enhanced structured cooperation. The Permanent Structured Cooperation was conceived as an efficient way to manage the common resources in order to promote faster the process of developing the states’ defense capacities.

All those innovations advance the idea of a conjugation and sometimes even of a harmonization of the national interest in view of advancing a superior European interest that is promoted in a commonly agreed manner and supported by the collective effort of all Member States. Nevertheless, the sometimes vague formulation

and the absence of some clear definitions leave place to confusions and can be used as an argument when sticking to a national interest. For example, the Permanent Structured Cooperation is not yet uniformly perceived by all Member States. Consequently, there is no unanimous perspective on this cooperation tool. All the same, regarding the solidarity clause stipulated in the article 222, Member States have the sovereignty to decide on the manner in which they will act in the name of the invoked solidarity. Therefore, although the common interest seems clearly defined from the point of view of guaranteeing one state's security by the contribution offered by all the other states, the absence of the definition of the concrete modalities to do so and of the details concerning the situations that may favor an intervention in fractioning the external perception of the Union as a strong and homogenous international actor by the very nature of its objectives and actions.

As for the role of the High Representative as a promoter of the community interest, its double affiliation both to the Council and the Commission may generate a beneficial perspective to the management of a general interest due to the convergence of EU actions and to the strengthening of the coherence of external policies. Still, on the other hand, this double role can lead to the emergence of some contradictory positions regarding the promotion of the European interest taking into account the difficulty of the task to conciliate the role of the Council representative and therefore of the potentially divergent interests of Member States with the role of vice-president of the Commission who independently promotes the general interest of the Union away from the national influences. In the end, it depends on the way in which the High Representative assumes and manages its responsibilities while creating and interface between the states' interests and the general community interest.

2.2. The Romanian Contribution to the CSDP Development

The innovations of the Lisbon Treaty allow not only the strengthening of the cooperation among Member States, but also the enhancement of the feeling of belonging to a homogenous organizational structure while sharing the interest to promote the same values and principles. Furthermore,

the gradual definition of a community interest is based on the national constant effort to act in a unitary manner in order to project the role of the European Union as a security provider on the international scene. Therefore, the Member States' contributions to the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy remain essential as they reflect the established ambition level.

In the CSDP framework, Romania assumed an active role as a contributor and joins the other states' efforts to promote the foreign policy of the Union through concrete actions in the form of civilian missions and military operations. At present, Romania participates to several CSDP missions, having a military presence in EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia Herzegovina, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA in the Horn of Africa, EUSEC RD Congo and EUMM Georgia. Romania's contribution to the process of defining and projecting the European interest is even more obvious as our involvement is in areas with no apparent geostrategic or economic interest for our country.

For instance, the Horn of Africa represents a complex geostrategic area and a challenge from the perspective of the deficiencies in the security situation. Precisely for that reason, considering the proximity of the European continent, the European Union which plays an important part in the field of security on the international scene, cannot elude its implication in the attempt to contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the region. Consequently, the European Union is strongly engaged in the area and focuses on five major activity fields: the partnership development, the political dialogue, the response to crisis, the crisis management and commercial relations. Moreover, in 2007, the EU launched the Initiative for the Horn of Africa⁸ in order to stimulate the regional cooperation while supporting the seven states⁹ in the area in order to surpass the challenges of a durable development, challenges that often become sources of conflict.

Romania decided to shift its contribution from the North-Atlantic Alliance maritime operation by sending a frigate to EUNAVFOR ATALANTA. In this way, we wish to balance our participation to NATO and EU operations, in accordance with the commitments assumed by our country in the framework of EU. Romania's contribution to this operation will certainly lead to a consolidation of the country profile while proving our commitment to the Common Security and Defense Policy.



To the same effect, one should mention as well the Romanian contribution with military personnel to the Advice and assistance mission in the field of the security reform sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RDC). The results of this mission will be obvious in the long run and we hope to have a significant impact on the security situation of the Congolese state and on the entire central-African area.

On the other hand, the participation to the missions and operations in the Balkans and South Caucasus strengthens the role of European Union in the neighborhood of Romania and justifies the common effort to the benefit of a more broadly defined community interest. EU's military operation in Bosnia Herzegovina and civilian monitoring mission in Georgia are supported by a consistent Romanian participation that contributes both to the creation of a safe and stable security environment in the proximity of our country and to the Union reflection as a dynamic actor playing a major part on the international scene. It should be mention that these engagements are also a living proof of the efficiency of the actions undertaken under the impulse of the community interest.

Conclusions

All this developments, may they be in the conceptual plan or projected in the form of policies and actions carried out by the European Union in the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy, irreversibly contribute to the definition and promotion of the community interest. Establishing a high level of ambition regarding the CSDP dynamics shows the unitary political will of Member States and their capacity to synchronize their priorities and objectives with the scope of reaching a common denominator which consists in assuming the community interest. Nevertheless, as one can ascertain after this short analysis, the process of recognition and promotion of the general European interest does not evolve without knocking against certain difficulties. Yet, the political will shown at all European echelons remains essential in order to keep going on this path and to support the perception of the European Union as an harmonious organism with an advanced capacity to impose itself in the role of promoter of security and stability in any area.

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2 Hans J. MORGENTHAU, *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, ed. Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 5.

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THE COMMUNITY RELATION BETWEEN WESTERN BALKANS AND EU. REALITIES AND PROSPECTS OF THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA

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Europe is engaged in a project to change the physiognomy and to transform the Balkans. If, until yesterday, this region was primarily a place of war of all against all, today Balkans are very close to becoming a security community, where war is almost unimaginable. European effort to redevelop the Balkans can not be justified only in ethnic plan as it is not only pure Wilsonian idealism, but it is a necessary and pragmatic response, derived from a security imperative. For over a decade one could see community Europe actively involved in this region, not only at military level but also at civilian level in building government structures and institutions that provide state functionality, and in expanding the rule of law and a state governed by the law. The recipe is to export stability not to import instability. This is a formula that aims to create well-governed states in an area of divided societies and institutional fragility. European Union's role becomes almost that of a creator of

order; through the process of naturalization of fundamental values and European institutions: the rule of law and multi-ethnic democracy.

Key-words: Western Balkans; Kosovo; Serbia; Macedonia; Montenegro; regional initiatives.

1. State and Nation, National Identities in European Context

The spectacular developments of the international relations for the last decades, along with the violent conflict in the Western Balkans, at the end of the last century, led to the accumulation of numerous information which has not undergone substantive forecasts. Later on, however, theoretical developments on the role, place, and especially the future of the nation-states of Westphalian origin were particularly prolific. It has to be noted that, most frequently the above-mentioned concept is approached from a local perspective, so in the

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economy of our approach is important to note the specific area of our analysis – the Western Balkans area.

From this perspective, common sense assign the nation as a form of human community created over a common history, with a unit of language, territory and economic life, based on national culture and answering a conscience and a common destiny. The nation is clearly a social organization that stands against any form identified in the social dimension of life. In the context of a regional approach of the Western Balkans issues, where ethnic conflicts have sometimes reached climax, we take into consideration Anthony D. Smith views¹ that analyses the basic ethnic components and emphasizes the importance of the name as a distinctive feature of collective personality and as a delineation means against the other. Also the name, when speaking about ethnic groups, may arouse controversy and prevents fundamental approach and mutual trust. Finally, a name may seem ridiculous when is invoked to refuse recognition of commonalities of language, culture and history, as in other circumstances, can cause undeserved suffering to a people rejected from the accession to some Euro-Atlantic organizations. Both the disputed aspects of Macedonism, Moldovenism or Serbian and Croatian led nationalism to paroxysm and undermined community space characteristics, which once existed in the reference area.

The second element highlighted by Smith, significant for what the Balkans have been, what they currently are, and especially for what they could be, is the common historical heritage, the essential foundation for the future prospects of the economic security and why not cultural community in the Southeastern Europe. It is often said that the Balkans have more history than geography, and balkanization, at the very unfairly way, got a negative connotation of chaos both at inter-and intra-state level. Thus, if there is broad consensus on Balkan history under Roman rule, the topic is complicated when discussing the history of the Byzantine Empire, of the Bulgarian or Serbian territories. Often it is forgotten the fact that during the history of these three empires the existing community foundations of today were created and, meaning the religion – Orthodoxy is the dominant religion, seconded by Islamism and Catholicism in variable proportions, and the common economic space – as boundaries were almost nonexistent.

These should be added to the obvious merit of creating institutions and feudal states which would have been the foundation of national states created in the nineteenth century, or in early twentieth century, that was called historically the Great Family of the Balkans.

The third element identified by Smith is related to the common history and inevitably follows from the second element. Ethno-history of the community has an outstanding value, and generates in most cases, an exacerbation of the latent conflict situations and a perception of permanent violent reactions as a fateful size of a damned region. And yet, paradoxically, the construction of common history, as outlined previously, is the element which gives the greater consistency of an outstanding space in terms of community traditions, the economic community or language community. For example, the traditions community can be observed both in cooking and at folk events or those involving lifestyle. Thus, the Balkan economic community shows that generally there is no discrepancy of a standard development, while the language community provides an example approach, sometimes to the identity of the languages such as Romanian and so-called Moldovan language or at the same register, the approach between Serbian and Croatian languages or Bulgarian and Macedonian languages. It is obvious that these facts define a true area of a shared culture, if we take into account the latest results of anthropological research, which shows a genetic link between Romanian, Bulgarian and Greek peoples. Related to the penultimate element underlined by Smith, that of the specific territory, we believe, that to the people of the Balkans actual possession of land is not crucial, but the shared sense of belonging. When addressing the discussion about the Balkan community space, one must identify the necessary levels for such a construction, and the mere enumeration of them can be very eloquent, if we refer to the ethno-religious Christian aspects, to that of ethno-spiritual bounds, to the ethno-social aspects, and last but not least to the ethno-political issues. They must be thought together in theory, in order to be recovered in practice.

Yet, the Balkans, especially the West part, stays with the burden of the historical area with the greatest crisis potential in Europe, at least for the last decade of past century. The Yugoslav



crisis, to which we make more often and consistent reference becomes extremely challenging in terms of legitimacy crisis – both political and authority – but rather from a special perspective, the Community space crisis. This crisis is reflected mainly by the phenomenon of dissolution and disintegration of a community building, namely the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, for the Balkans area, the size of restructuring process gains a double meaning, one based on history and other related to the need for designing a concrete perspective.

The best example to illustrate the real force of restructuring process in the reconfiguration of collective identity is offered by the European Union formation. As it will be developed later, policies and actions implemented by joint European programs, in fact a combination of principles and pragmatism, generate a cohesion which clearly tends toward a new identity, to a true Community space in the Balkans.

However, we have to underline that, currently, the national feelings in the Balkans having priority to the European sentiment, as well as distinct geopolitical and economic interests, create many difficulties in developing a true identity and European communities, as well. The way the Balkans will fold on this restructuring force is very important. In the new Europe, and especially in the Balkans, the principle of exclusion persists. At the same time, creating local, national, regional and continental identities represents a power source of creativity, and not least, for the inclusion in the new context defined both by limitations of national power and a deepening sense of community.

2. A Geostrategic Perspective

More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, the problem of understanding the recent history² of the Western Balkans³ is facing the difficulty to synthesize the lessons learned. Some are hard to accept, simply because they have left historical traces impossible to forget, and they tend to revive under apparently new forms even today. Thus, at geopolitical level, one speaks more often of shaping a “new nationalism” able to reform the map of Europe. According to most observers of contemporary history, the awareness of this issue was different in Western Europe compared to Eastern Europe, where problems are still hot. According to this thesis, nationalism, with its

emotional charge, is an auxiliary phenomenon of modernization, through which any society passes on its way to modernity⁴.

In this context, the close proximity of Romania namely the South-Eastern Europe, offered one of the toughest lessons of history. The war in Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 and subsequently in March 1999, when NATO forces involved⁵ in the conflict between Serbia and its breakaway province of Kosovo, have proved all Europe how dangerous may be a superficial application of a nationalist template. Currently, when trying to understand the recent history at the end of 20th century, we have to accept a painful and incredible truth, as a consequence of that pattern: the tragedy of ethnic cleansing. But in the early 90s the whole Europe, overwhelmed by the bloody nature of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, was trying to put an end to a war that had spread already too much. Consequently, by means of peace agreements in Dayton/USA and Paris, the major international actors have become, indirectly executors for the new borders created by force of arms. “*Geopolitical peace... built on the ethnic separation*”⁶ have had heavy and long-term consequences. While Eastern Europe was confronted with the exodus of population phenomenon, Western Europe has recorded everyday reality events as of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.

So, it became obvious that stabilizing all Europe could take place only through a redefinition of the geopolitical concepts. For the Western Balkans area, implementation of these concepts required a customization process, especially for states derived from the former Yugoslavia, a process that had to take into account the conflicts and differences between the cultures and religions of the region. The most powerful catalyst for this process in these countries was the European and Euro-Atlantic integration a process redefined many times. The complexity of the process imposed a specific for the levels of integration, based on political, economic and geostrategic integration⁷. “Stabilizing through reconciliation” followed the specific conditions of the area, and became the leitmotif of the entire process. In this respect, NATO relied on two of its main instruments, namely the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO Membership Action Plan, and the process is underway.

At EU level, the vision framework is provided by the Stabilization and Association Process. The

framing of the states in the region as candidate countries or potential candidates offers them certainty about the concreteness of the EU enlargement process, and especially on the clear advantages related to the process. One by one, each of the Balkan states have benefited from signing and ratifying the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), which is the promoter of EU membership for a state aspiring to this status. The Agreement establishes Community rules in various fields and allows deepening the relation between the state and EU. In this context, the Agreement provides a framework for developing economic relations with the EU, and the next step is to open accession negotiations chapters. This process, which can extend over several years, involves all political, social and economic aspects, as well as foreign relations area, and everything is structured on negotiation chapters. Completing each chapter or closing it requires that each state has demonstrated a meaningful integration commitment of the political leaders, both on regional issues and the international obligations arising from it. Thus, each state had to resolve its disputes with neighboring countries, to sign agreements governing good neighborly relations, to establish bilateral relations with regional states, to adopt and implement those laws aimed at strengthening the rule of law, to create a sound framework for business life, to implement the reform of police structures and public administration, and to align national law to EU regulations as a whole.

Given her experience in the field, Romania understands the complexity of this approach that targets the entire Western Balkan area. At the same time, lessons learned, along with geopolitical trends in the region, lead to configure Romania's own interests, in accordance with the specific of the region and the community one as well. Mainly, the strategic importance of the Western Balkans could be summarized for Romania in three propositions, namely (1) the consequences in the close vicinity, (2) the imperative to be surrounded by reliable partners, and (3) the need to deal with common threats and new security challenges.

Speaking of the close vicinity, Romania has consistently taken an active role in the region, promoting the dialogue and deepening regional cooperation as essential means of action. At the same time, one can not ignore the competition we are witnessing in the Western Balkans in terms of

promoting EU interests, the US interests and those of the Russian Federation. Currently, the game has two stakes: one economic and one political. If the economic stake is a challenge that concerns the Western Balkans in terms of markets and possibly as a corridor for transporting raw materials from Asia, the political stake is taking into account the stability of the entire region, with benefits to all stakeholders with interests in the area, but mainly to all Europe. In our opinion, this approach, namely to address regional instability at any cost, could make a real contribution to the abolition of the association of the term "Balkan" with notions of violence, chaos and turbulence. Unfortunately, the two decades to which we referred at the beginning of this paper have brought into attention the specific of the "powder keg" and the endless rivalries between ethnic groups in the region, especially at the religious level. From here to the naturalization of the terms like "Balkan mentality" or "balkanization"⁸ having the most unpleasant implications for the people of the area was only a short distance. One must noticed, however, the efforts of historians and analysts in demonstrating that, historically, the Balkan nations are not more unstable and more difficult to govern as compared to the Western nations on the continent at the time when these nations were established. Thus, the meaning of the term "balkanization" as unnecessary fragmentation into small countries is not justified anymore, but rather counterproductive, by its sensitive denigrating nature. In this context, supporters of linguistic political correctness are drawing attention on over-bidding the term "European", which tends to get an exaggerated valuable meaning in the context of public discourse.

Going back to the implications of the phrase "immediate vicinity", we consider that Romania's concerns are justified, given that, as EU member state since 2007, Romania wants to be surrounded by stable states, with which to cooperate. It is obvious that "Romania needs to better identify and exploit existing opportunities and resources, both in terms of international relations and in the national security"⁹. To this end, we need to be surrounded by trusted partners, oriented towards the same ideals, as isolated efforts are doomed to failure in international affairs. That is why, Romania seeks to position as a leader in regional initiatives and aims to create bridges of dialogue and international cooperation in the region. Along



with political diplomacy mechanisms specific to organizations such as NATO or the EU, Romania believes that economic and cultural diplomacy can be used to support re-launching of traditional partnerships¹⁰. In this regard, we support the need for understanding and compliance with local specificity principle in making any decisions, especially by enhancing the value of experienced players with direct interests in the Balkans, and Romania is corresponding fully to such a profile.

Another aspect of the strategic importance to Romania of the Western Balkans, that is the need to deal with common threats and new challenges, is in our opinion related directly to national security issues. A lesson learned from recent history, and not only, is that poor recovery of geostrategic position could have unexpected consequences. Again coming back to the last two decades, it is clear that the unprecedented proliferation of asymmetric risks is closely related to the specific of Romania as transit country for the networks of organized crime and illegal migration. Also, Western Balkans area is facing currently a number of common problems of the utmost importance. Criminal activities with trans-border extension, human trafficking, arms and drugs trafficking, nationalist rhetoric with secessionist emphasis, border disputes, widespread corruption are only some of the aspects, and their simple enumeration give us the actual size of the phenomenon.

In our opinion, addressing these issues can be made more successfully using the formats of cooperation offered by EU to the Western Balkans countries, focusing on Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Also, by using consistently EU formats, namely the Eastern Partnership¹¹ and the Danube Strategy¹², one can get a better positioning of Romania as a regional initiatives leader. The accession process stages forced out of isolation the ex-Yugoslav countries. They had to reconsider their preconceived image in relation with close proximity countries, and to join actively in regional cooperation formats, especially with countries that were in a position to share some lessons learned resulting in their own accession process. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that too many conditioning and delays that could not be avoided in a process as complex as that of the accession and integration, creates an imminent danger, namely the revival of nationalism and its return to power. Even if this scenario is less credible the

last decades experience shows beyond doubt that disappointment and lack of clear perspective on economic and social sectors are likely to encourage nationalist rhetoric and to inspire its revenge.

In this context, we could say that only if there is a serious and concerted effort to bring all the Balkan countries within the EU, the current ethno-national states, resulting from dissolution of former Yugoslavia, will ascertain their position towards a civic posture and multicultural functional states. Another lesson learned tells us that the effort should include not only general commitments on political support, but also a significant financial assistance, since the spectrum of Euroscepticism is very real. Under these conditions, a clear and reasonable timetable for EU accession would provide an incentive to complete the relevant institutional reforms, especially those who aim to develop consolidated ethnic and civic democracy. Rigor and accuracy required by the accession process and pace of reforms and duration, can lead us to think that those who knock on doors of the EU will make use of a pragmatic attitude to achieve mainly economic benefits of membership. However, multi-cultural and religious diversity can be an obstacle to assimilate European cultural and political pattern¹³ and will bring only a moderate opening towards Western values. In turn, the EU as a structure becoming more and more complex and bureaucratic, should not ignore the possibility that the “Arab spring” to generate a pressure wave on migration sector towards Europe having economic, cultural, but mostly humanitarian consequences. Obviously, the Euroscepticism values will oscillate significantly, depending on how this potential crisis is solved in the near future.

3. Regional military interests in the Balkans and Southeast Europe

In the mid '90s, the specificity of the Balkan crisis called for new forms of political-military cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral military relations were at an early stage of development, armies in the region having few high-level contacts and few joint projects. After 1990, regional defense cooperation in Central and Southeastern Europe intensified, as part of the answer found to compensate for “security vacuum” that emerged after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War.



In that context, both NATO and EU have promoted regional military cooperation formats, as means to exercise negotiation, cooperation and mutual knowledge skills of participants, aiming at leading to increased confidence and to reinforce security.

At that time, participation in regional cooperation was seen as an indispensable step in preparation for integration, not as a substitute for it. This was the context in which some regional military initiatives were developed. Since then, considerable progress has been made. We managed to find a common language, a common set of principles and a common agreement that supported the basis for the development of a specific framework of political and military cooperation. All these achievements were evidence of professionalism and dedication of those involved, and in our opinion one can say that a pragmatic long term relationship was established based on common security interests.

Interaction between countries in the region has developed and improved. A good military training was obtained in various areas such as communications, command and control, combat support training, medical and public information.

Member States Armies have established important channels of communication. Joint exercises were dominated by a real spirit of comradeship and professional dedication, fulfilling their objective - to demonstrate that the forces in the region are prepared to fulfill their mission and are fully interoperable.

Facts demonstrate that the geographical positioning does not guarantee protection against the challenges of XXI century. Globalization affects more and more the unstable world we live in, and instability could not be limited to areas of origin. The phenomenon affects us all, wherever we live. Indeed, global events that have occurred in recent years have shown that to meet these challenges we must develop a complete range of military missions. Regional initiatives in South-East Europe and the Balkans are now an inseparable part of the fight against terrorism and global terrorist threats, against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and extremism, and ethnic conflicts as well.

Launching the military cooperation initiatives in the region was from the very beginning both a political process and a program of cooperation, efforts being made over the time to strengthen both

dimensions. Political consultation has increased significantly in recent years and brought upon real benefits to all involved. This trend should be continued and developed to maintain regular contact on matters of common interest, to avoid any misunderstanding caused by the new policy directions, and to provide meaning and substance to the cooperation process.

Once the background was created, there was a growing interest on the development of new mechanisms and models of cooperation. Thus, arising from the need to develop a compact network of security cooperation in Southeast Europe, an impressive number of formats of regional cooperation was launched, including military ones to which Romania is participating in, namely:

- South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process (SEDM);
- Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR);
- Turkish naval operation "Black Sea Harmony" (OBSH);
- Multinational Engineering Battalion – "TISA";
- Romanian-Hungarian Joint Peacekeeping Battalion (RO-HU BAT);
- Political directors/Defense Ministries working group - Defense Advisory Group (DAG).

All these forms of regional cooperation have been created with the common goal of contributing to peace, and to foster good neighborly relations, trust, security and cooperation among nations in the region.

In recent years, there is a certain "fatigue" in the some of the initiatives of cooperation, despite the fact that the Western countries has promoted and promotes strongly the principle of "regional and local ownership". Overall, one can see some kind of "release" in how countries are approaching the issue regarding political and military regional cooperation. This approach comes amid the growing number of peace support operations and participation of the countries in the international campaign against terrorism, but it can be also a consequence of the different status of the Balkan countries (vis-à-vis the cooperation in South- Eastern Europe), regarding the level of the Euro-Atlantic integration process (NATO and EU candidate states, aspiring states to start accession negotiations, etc.).

Balkans and Southeastern Europe is now the cradle of a variety of initiatives. This may be a



surprise, given that for a long time the region was known as “trouble making of Europe”. Fortunately, today the related events the area are not occupying the front page news. Although, the region is not completely free of concerns about its own security, the South-East has made remarkable progress in this regard. Today, Southeast Europe is perceived as having good prospects for a real stabilization even if it is facing tensions and violence at a low scale.

Countries in South-East are not identical, each confronting a variety and a multitude of challenges. The large number of mechanisms and initiatives under the aegis of international organizations, both European and Euro-Atlantic, especially NATO and the EU, have brought not only financial assistance but also ideas, thinking and new cooperation models.

Therefore, from a political point of view, the South-Eastern Europe is, as a whole, more stable than expected after 20 years of dramatic changes. As has been pointed before, organized crime is spreading its tentacles, infesting markets and society, and helping the growth and development of illegal activities. All this led to a sense of serious concern to the countries in the region. Spectrum of security risks exists, unfortunately, in most European countries. Sometimes insufficient measures to foster security have paved the way for dangerous developments to emergence. Too often, security challenges concerns turn to crises finally.

There is a serious stance about the fact that sometimes the absence of a maximum level of violence in the Balkans could lead the political factors to the conclusion or restricting the activity of some organizations or cooperation formats for providing regional security. Recent developments across Europe that raised real concern are clear evidence that they must continue their presence in the region.

We do believe that, overall, Romania’s specific interests in the Western Balkans are becoming more complex as social problems in the vicinity of the southwest are recording a revival. In our opinion, regardless of their nature, dialogue, mutual interest and economic cooperation should be based on political ideas of the European integration process. It should be noted that just and lasting solutions could not be found without an analysis of the context, with its Balkan and extra-Balkan characteristics, and without taking into account

all the interests involved. This refers equally to solving the problem of Macedonia’s constitutional name, to the status of Kosovo, to the functioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina as multi-ethnic state or to discouraging the nationalist discourse in Serbia, and helping its pro-European orientation. And the approach could be only visionary, creative and pragmatic at the same time, given the complexity and specificity of the Western Balkans, and its relevance to stability throughout Europe.

Conclusions

Security analysis of the period of time between the end of the Cold War and the present time has revealed us the existence of multiple and profound developments that are related with the state of affairs and changes occurring at the level of global international relations system and security environment adjacent to them. It remains to be seen whether the Balkan states have understood the lesson of developments in the region in recent decades, if they have assumed the past, and if they have the ability to manage the present and design the future. It all depends now, as far as possible, on their action, decision and willingness. As a conclusion, from a military point of view, the principle of cooperation based on common interests of South-Eastern Europe should continue to apply at regional level in the context of a joint Europe. Also, it is necessary for this approach to include both the security dimension and economic growth principle. Therefore, European and Euro-Atlantic integration seem to be the only answer to the issue, as it is very clear that all Balkan countries may submit to the common goal only if they move along together.

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2 Tony JUDT, *Reappraisals. Reflections on the forgotten twentieth century*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2011.

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4 Urs ALTERMATT, *Sarajevo Forecasts: Etno-nationalism in Europe*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2000.

5 On March 24, 1999, NATO had launched a series of air raids on towns in Serbia, which targeted President Slobodan Milosevic refusal to accept a peace agreement with Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. According to Serbian authorities, NATO raids have killed 2,500 civilians, including 89 children.

6 Urs ALTERMATT, *Sarajevo is not an accident*, in *Sarajevo Forecasts: Etno-nationalism in Europe*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2000.

7 Stelian TEODORESCU, *West Balkans – Perspectives for European and Euro-atlantic integration*, „Infosfera” Magazine, no. 3/2011.

8 The word *Balkanization* defines the disintegration process of the multinational states in smaller national states, most often rival states. The concept lasts from the '20 and matches the disintegration phenomenon of the former empires (Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman empires) and the formation of new states, of smaller size.

9 From the conclusions of “The Young Romania” Forum on the theme “*Future Vision for Romania - 2030*”, international relations and national security panel, hosted in August 2011 by the Romanian Banking Institute, with the support of the National Bank of Romania.

10 Idem.

11 Eastern Partnership - an initiative of Poland and Sweden, launched in May 2009 in Prague, covering EU cooperation with six former Soviet countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

12 EU Danube Strategy - an initiative launched in December 2010 aimed at regional cooperation with 11 countries bordering the Danube.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN “THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE” AND “EUROPEAN UNION INC.”

*Silviu NEGUȚ, PhD**

Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, PhD

This study was born in response to the different phrases that tried “prophesising” the future of the “European project”. Thus, we put face to face two idioms and at the same time two stances in which the European Union might find itself in a possible future, respectively “The United States of Europe” (an idea older than the European Union itself) or “European Union Inc.”. The first represents a unitary block with political value, while the second was used by American analysts in a more derogatory way to illustrate this struggle of “Europe” between “a sort of greater Switzerland” from a political point of view and “a transnational corporation” from an economic standpoint. This interrogation, which is both philosophical and systemic, - what is the European Union or what does it desire to be? -, was especially complicated by the international economic crisis that seems to have shed light again on identity fanaticism of any kind and extremist discourse, none of which are too distant in Europe’s history. Taking all of the above into consideration, European Union’s future remains uncertain.

Key-words: European Union; “The United States of Europe”; “European Union Inc.”; Euroscepticism.

Preamble

In 1992 – just an year after the implosion of the greatest geopolitical construct of the 20th century, the USSR, or in the nostalgic words of President Vladimir Putin, “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” – when American sociologist and political analyst Francis Fukuyama wrote the “End of History”¹, announcing a liberal-democratic peace built on the basis of a capitalist economy, nothing seemed to threaten the world’s peace and the “European project” was being shaped like a pleasant dream.

Today, after the international crisis – at first financial and then economic – engulfed the planet, reluctance is greater, euroscepticism is rising and ideas that not so long ago were presented as “European values” are now considered failed concepts.

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How are the two beginnings of centuries, 20th and 21st, different?

Both begin with a major systemic crisis, that makes itself felt on a mostly economic level (1929 and 2008); both crises are doubled by social unbearableness, followed by a spin of power towards the extremes of the political spectrum: extremist discourse and exacerbated nationalism (as harmful as the fanatic speech in regard with minorities of any kind) have seized the socio-political sphere and propelled to power parties and personalities that scarred the entire international order (both Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini got in power by posing as viable alternatives for a crisis whose effects no one could bear any longer) while in the Europe of the 21st century, in France, Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Hungary and even in the “neutral” Switzerland, the extreme right, ultranationalist has significant and increasing weight, covering the public space with increasingly extremist speeches; what comes next is “finding the guilty”: Jews in the previous century, emigrants now.

The almost identical evolution of the two beginnings of centuries, the 20th and 21st, in spite of the civilisational experiences lived in the first half of the previous century, proves the idea that any imbalance in the tandem economy – identity (cultural, national) leads to the system’s “malfunction”: economic crises bring back into focus the degradation of the identity speech. Or, today, these cleavages of political discourses are an almost general trend at Europe’s level.

Here are some examples:

France, during the last days of the ex-president’s – Nicholas Sarkozy – term, took into consideration suspending its participation in the Schengen Agreement, reintroducing internal border controls for 30 days and a selectively open market for emigrants; interesting to mention is the fact that, as a candidate to the 2012 presidential elections (which he otherwise lost), he was supported by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, while a similar position was also being taken by the American president Barack Obama; how “scared” of ultranationalist diversions were these world leaders, if they were showing their support for a presidential candidate in an important European Union country, a candidate who, in his previous term, became well known as a European “player” and internationalist?;

The **Netherlands** blames the economic immigrants that originated from new member states for its increased criminality. In the same context, in the discourse of **Belgian** parties one can find more often than not the phrase “social fraud”, and in **Finland**, there are certain opinions that simply remind of the Nazi period of the 1940s: foreigners to wear bands and/or be tagged with microchips.

Not even in the “2004 stage” of the countries that joined the Union as “new members” the situation is not different, although euro optimism was the keyword several years back. For example, **Hungary**, under the motto “we’re not a Western colony”, has adopted a Constitution in an “authoritative and nationalist” spirit that has forced journalists to consider Premier Viktor Orban as a “mixture of Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chavez”. Some of the people in the **newly joined countries** (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary etc.) are exhausted, tired of democracy, euroscepticism, and the aversion towards the Western world is rising. These examples were presented in an attempt to summarise the current “state of mind” within the European society.

1. The idea of the “United States of Europe”

The idea of European construction is not as new as one would have you believe. We won’t retrace its history, we’ll only remind the fact that the person who used this name (*the United States of Europe*) for the first time was a French geographer, Albert Demangeon (1872-1940), who, even though didn’t consider himself a geopolitician – he even violently opposed the idea of geopolitics (which he considered to be a purely German concept) –, expressed, in reality, a geopolitical concept. He is the one who, in the paper *Le déclin de l’Europe* (“Europe’s Decline”), published in 1920, immediately after the end of the First World War, uses the phrase *Les Etats Unis de l’Europe* (“The United States of Europe”), a phrase often used as of late, however without anyone mentioning the original “source” from almost ... one hundred years ago!

The European Union is, by far, the most highly integrated regional block: obviously, primarily, from the economic point of view; partially, political and it is also trying to achieve diplomatic integration; for the future, defence integration.

After the European Union became the most important economic player on the world scene

(surpassing at the start of the new millennium, in total GDP, the United States of America, that held the supremacy for over half a century) and after the big 2004 enlargement stage it would have seemed that nothing could stop the European Union's both economical and territorial expansion.

2. The Main Visions for the European Union

Although, apparently, there are several options regarding the future of the European Union, practically, the common perception is that there really are only two options, sort of different, of the great European block's nucleus, France and Germany, that form – which is no longer a secret for anyone – “Europe's tough core” (*Framania*). Even though they have multiple convergences, the two European (and still Global) powers have different visions regarding the European Union's future. These visions can be summarised, maybe somewhat radically, to two future projects:

The German vision (publicly presented by a former German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oskar Fischer), which entails a federal type of construct, otherwise functional, such as Germany (16 lands), the United States of America (50 states), plus other regional powers such as Brazil, Mexico, India and others; **The French vision** (obviously, with several acolytes), which focuses on a “republican” type of construct, in which the players' rights/obligations are limited and, practically, subordinated to the regional block's “suprastructure”. This model is very clearly presented in the study of a French geographer, and at the same time geopolitician, from the French sphere of analysis and decision structures, Michel Foucher. This, in a study published in 2000 (*La République européenne*) – also translated in Romanian (*Republica Europeană*, Mirton Press, Timișoara, 2002) –, emphasises that “the idea of republic is opposed to the Empire, the other state configuration that Europe has known”². And continues by stating that “the founding countries of the European Community in the 1950s could agree on a common project only after choosing to give up their imperial and colonial past. The European Union is built on *exercising in common and consensually the national attributes of sovereignty* (our emphasis), in a positive sum game”³.

As it is known, the three European powers have different visions: France is animated by the idea of

a Europe capable of competing with the Americans for supremacy, while for Germany the European Union represents a vital market for its products. Great Britain is the adept of the *balance of power*. Its European strategy remains loyal to Lord Palmerston's historic assertion in his speech in front of the British Parliament, in 1848, in which he stipulated that Great Britain has neither permanent friends, nor permanent enemies, only permanent interests. It is reserved in terms of any continental initiative, especially of a Franco-German nature: did not adhere to the Euro zone, did not adopt the common currency and was, initially, the first and only to oppose the fiscal treaty, which it has not signed, soon followed by the Czech Republic.

Obviously, a question arises: where is the idea of sovereignty clearer and stronger (?): in a *republic* (*res publica*, respectively *common good*), in which, it practically exists a sole entity (as in the case of an “empire”), not several or in a *federation*, in which the idea of sovereignty is, indeed, limited (only certain power prerogatives are maintained), but it still exists?

The economic crisis – which began in 2008 and still hasn't ended – questions both constructs, as everyone can feel, from the most competent analyst to the simple citizen.

3. European Union Inc.

The definition of a *corporation* is well known: a company whose joint stock is spread in shares and the social bonds are guaranteed with social shares; the shareholders are only liable to the value of the money they invested.

We remind this definition because in a study published in 2000, entitled *Living with a New Europe*⁴ (being about the United States of America and the European Union), the renowned American political analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski makes a not that flattering comparison, with derogatory nuances, for the European block, namely that “it will be less than the «United States of Europe», but only slightly more than «European Union Inc. »”.

Reverting to this idea in a later study of his⁵ he states that the “European Union” project resembles no more and no less than a transnational corporation (TNC), from an economic point of view and a confederate Switzerland, from a political standpoint. Political fulfillment as “the United States” (of Europe) cannot be achieved, in



the famous American political scientist's vision, because of aspects such as:

- The lack of ideological passion, a passion that spirited the "founding fathers" of the post-colonial American project;

- The lack of European civic loyalty, the highly publicised idiom of "European values" failing to fully replace the lack of genetic identity: the European peoples' roots are too deep and different, roots that are incredibly different from a cultural point of view in comparison with the short perspective of several continental "colonists" that shaped the so called "American dream"; in this respect, the USA has also seen a rather steep evolution: the "founding" nucleus of "WASP"⁶ is gradually smaller (demographic aging) in favour of Hispanic, Asian and other communities (that bring a birth oriented model specific to their countries of origin); for example, in all of the Southern USA, from California to Florida, people rather speak Spanish than American English, and during the presidential elections in 2008 (Barack Obama vs. John McCain), ballots were trilingual: English, Spanish, Chinese; in the same spirit, another renown American publicist, Samuel Huntington, was asking himself, expressing the title of one of his studies⁷, who are we (text that attracted numerous critics and even accusations of racism)?, differentiating between the first "colonists" that founded "America", united, regardless of their rather diverse ethnic origin, by the enthusiasm of creating a new nation, and today's "immigrants" that acquiesce to the "American dream" from the position of minorities that no longer feel the need to integrate, instead they even generate segregation, social fragmentation, exacerbating the cult of preserving their own cultural identity;

- The lack of emotional engagement, considering the previous statements and also reminding that the European project was initially an economic one that involved, most of all, moving away from exacerbated nationalism (in this case German and French) through economic development, in a "win-win" type of game: France (Luxembourg)-iron ore, Germany-coal, Netherlands-the gate towards the North Sea (Rotterdam harbour, that will become the world's largest harbour, and hold the position for half a century, being surpassed in the 2000s by the Asian harbours of Shanghai, Singapore, Hong Kong), together as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951 (the

future European Union from 1992), with the well set goal of sharing the steel and coal production, thus preventing the forming of a monopoly in the metallurgic industry and the rearmament of that country; in other words, "the European project" is more a convenience rather than a belief;

- Nationalisms, instead of European nationalism; explainable, we could say, if we take into account the millennial history of the European peoples, some of them being, through their civilisational evolution since ancient times, the foundation of what we call today the "Western world" (western values, western way of life, western economy, western political system etc.), while others being born out of the terribly troubled osmosis of cohabitation of sedentary and nomadic peoples; however, a pronounced genetic and ethnic diversity and a history that, most of the time, is not common; on the other hand, when the economy prospers and society's fundamental social needs are taken care of, "nationalisms" are only found in the pages of history books (see the successful examples of "soft" solutions in: Belgium, Switzerland, where several ethnic groups cohabit under the jurisdiction of a single state); yet, every time the economic balance is destroyed, nationalisms are exacerbated, nationalist political discourses are taken to extreme: as was and is the case of the Balkan peoples of the ex-Yugoslavia or as the current global economic crisis has deepened the state of countries that, until not so long ago, were successful "models" of multiethnic states (Belgium's case, that couldn't form a government since almost 2007);

- The horizontal, not vertical, expansion that has shaped a Europe with "variable geometry and different speeds"; integration is essentially a bureaucratic process and is not the same with unification, noted the above mentioned American analyst, adding that the European Union's expansion was, inevitably, in conflict with intensifying integration.

We could say that, to a certain degree, the current global economic crisis has highlighted elements that can be interpreted through Brzezinski's statement: there was no consensus in decision making and those that posed as main leaders were, we must admit, *the main shareholders*, Germany and France.

Twelve years ago, when enthusiasm regarding the European construct was at a historical maximum, such an assessment as the "European Un-

ion Inc.” would have upset many Europeans: from those in the “tough core” of the Union (France and Germany, that were already forming *Framania*) to those just “integrated” in the «first wave» and those that anxiously awaited for the «second wave» (among others, us the Romanians). It seemed then, in 2000, more of a thrill of pride from a prestigious analyst that wanted to appear objective but whom, in his mind, believed in American hegemony on a slightly longer term, in comparison with those that were already performing the funeral rights for the USA.

Today, though, especially in the conditions of the ongoing economic crisis, we could look at the issue a bit differently, highlighting Brzezinski’s reasonable assessments that we could interpret thus (and we believe, mostly, correct):

- A “united” Europe would, potentially, be a rival for the USA; this would be the fear of American leaders and they would no longer encourage the European integrationist process;

- The current European Union, in spite of its economic power and the relatively high degree of integration (including the Economic and Monetary Union) is *de facto* under American “military protectorate”;

- The European Union lacks – at least in order to be a federal type of construct – “an emotional and ideological engagement that was at the origins of the creation of the United States of America⁸⁸”;

- A “European political entity” built on the pursuit of advantages will be very different from a political entity built on beliefs; in this case Brzezinski refers to the countries in Central Europe, ex-communist, that wished to integrate in the European Union not out of belief – like the Americans, we have to understand –, but for the advantages, considering that they have lots to win in terms of security, prosperity, liberty;

- Uniting more peoples (countries) does not intervene, usually, if there is no external danger, in the case of Europe first there was the Soviet Union (1989-1991) and then its successor, Russia;

- “Europe will grow, but mostly horizontally, not vertically, because, in practice, it cannot simultaneously advance in both dimensions”, also stated Brzezinski.

In this respect it is useful to remind that even some senior officials of the European Commission ruled in the same spirit. For example even Jacques Delors, ex-president of the European Commission

(1985-1994) declared, in the beginning of the 2000s that the “rhythm of expansion is incontestably too fast and that it risks to dilute the political union project as it was defined by Europe’s founding fathers”.

Greekisation: simplifies or complicates the future of the European Union?

The situation in Greece – derogatory identifiable with the idiom *greekisation* –, subsequently extended as a phenomenon, at another scale, to other European countries, generically grouped under PIGS, demonstrated again the “different speeds” with which, from not only an economic point of view, the European Union moves forward.

The phenomenon determined interrogations at a systemic level, that culminated with the initiation of the fiscal treaty at the summit on the 1st-2nd of March 2012 which rather shown the vulnerability of European countries in times of crisis, instead of European solidarity – the flagship phrase of discourses – which originated, in the context of helping Greece, from the necessity of recovering British investments from Greek territory (similar to Germany’s investments in Ireland) – not adding the “shopping list” (to be read French armament) that Greece had to honour from the borrowed money –. At the same time, the way the Greek situation evolved has once again shown Great Britain’s rather pro-American spirit (with massive investments overseas), than the European continental feeling.

Conclusions

The analysis of the mix between the two possibilities, towards which the European Union can move in the near future – (also) political integration (*the United States of Europe*) vs. (only) economical integration (*the European Union Inc.*) –, in the context of the current economic crisis, leads to several conclusions:

European unity, not European identity. The end of the Cold War put Europe face to face with a historical opportunity: the possibility to integrate territorially, ideologically etc. However, the maybe slightly exaggerated and unfounded in reality euro-optimism from the beginning of the 21st century held only as long as the economic prosperity or, better yet, consumerism’s economic

philosophy held (citizenship didn't matter as long as you bought, consumed). The global economic crisis reactivated old enmities and, at least from our point of view, certified several issues: the European countries are only of European "class" otherwise they're too different, rooted too deep in the past, with different histories and cultures, some of them too unprepared for democracy and European integration, while others too close to Russia. The "key" shouldn't be finding by any means necessary a European identity, quantified by the heralded homonymous "values", but unity.

Different interests, different views of the European project. The European Union's major players, also called the "tough core" – France and Germany –, have somewhat divergent positions in regards to a possible European political unity: the first embraces the idea of a non-imperial, sort of "republic" construct, while the other tends towards a federal structure.

The disintegration of the European construct is in no way a solution. If the European Union wants to play an important part in what is becoming a multipolar world, in which it would have to deal with economic giants, like the emergent ones – China, India, Brazil, for example –, then it must keep its structural cohesion.

One last idea: the European Union's future, from our topic's dilemma – "The United States of Europe" or "European Union Inc." – remains uncertain.

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- 3 *Ibidem*.

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- 6 White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant (a phrase that defines the cultural standpoint of the typical American, respectively Anglo-Saxon, of white colour, well individualised by Protestant conservatism).

- 7 Samuel HUNTINGTON, *Cine suntem? Provocările la adresa identității americane*, Antet Press, Filipeștii de Târg, 2005.

- 8 Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *op.cit*.



INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS WITH EUROPEAN INTERESTS¹

*Viorel BUȚA, PhD**
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In essence, national interests are the foundation of European construction as is known today the European Union. Thus, EU membership entails interdependence of national states interests with European interests.

For mutual support it is needed that European interests should converge and be compatible with national interests, which are the engine of ascending evolution of the European Union.

Key-words: national interests; European interests; European integration; European Union; European identity; European citizenship.

1. European Union - unique organization with special international status

European Union is an entity resulting of voluntary association of European states, in economic and political areas, with the aim of maintaining peace in Europe and to promote economic and social progress. Currently, EU has 27 members, among them, since January 1, 2007, Romania as well.

Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed on February 7, 1992 at Maastricht and entered into force on November 1, 1993 recorded the creation of this complex entity. Until the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 13, 2007 and entered into force only two years later, in December 2009, the EU encompassed three pillars, namely: the community pillar, consisting of three communities – the European Coal and Steel Community, European Community and European Atomic Energy Community or Euratom; the second pillar on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third pillar, constituted by police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

Lisbon Treaty suppressed this pillar structure, replacing the European Community by EU. The term *community* thus disappears from the Treaty establishing the European Community, which was its foundation, and the treaty is renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. EU Treaty and Treaty on the Functioning of the EU are the EU's governing documents. Despite this simplification, many areas of EU intervention procedures remain

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subject to intergovernmental specific decisions (e.g. CFSP requires unanimous agreement of Member States).

EU is a unique organization. It is neither a federation nor a confederation of states, but is recognized as an international organization. It is an independent legal entity of the states composing it and it has competencies of its own (exclusive competencies) (common agricultural policy, fishery, trade policy, etc.), as well as competencies shared with the Member States. However, it is endowed with legal personality by Lisbon Treaty (Article 47 TEU), which allows concluding treaties or acceding to conventions. Finally, the EU has strong institutions which Member States have transferred some of their powers. This means that here we deal with a close connection between what is national interest and European interest, based on a voluntary act by the Member States.

EU status is a significant world power from the economic point of view. EU is considered to be an economic giant². This is because it is the world's first commercial power, although it has only 7.3% of the world population. Without taking into account commercial inter-exchange, the EU ranks first in world trade. EU is a services exporter, before the US, which is not at all negligible in a world where the tertiary sector occupies a prominent place. Moreover, the EU was in 2010 the first world economic power, with 25.85% of the world GDP, its agricultural output was the first (first leading importer and exporter with the US), the first tertiary world power and the first industrial power in the world³. The triad EU, US, Japan is 57.7% of world GDP in 2010, according to the same source.

So, in economic terms, the EU is an entity with a high status, at regional and global level. Politically, it can not be made the same claim. Basically, in this area the prominence and assumed roles have some of the EU Member States. Above all, we refer to France, United Kingdom, Germany. This is explained by differences in approach between Member States, between the atlanticists and others favoring a true emerging Europe on the world stage. In addition, a foreign policy must be based on a defence capability which EU is missing. Armed forces of most Member States are integrated in NATO, while others are neutral and want to maintain this status. These are Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Malta.

In addition, two countries have a nuclear striking force – France and the UK – which makes it difficult to harmonize military strategies. Basically, here is the prevalence of national interests to community interests. On the other hand, Europeans have not yet found a common language in foreign policy. In fact, there are national interests in priority to the EU.

The possibility for Europe to make its voice heard in the world today lies undoubtedly in a multilateral approach to international relations and the willingness to make international law be respected. EU external relations, as a whole, are a kind of European diplomacy. In addition, it suggests an example to third countries, that of regional integration, which in other parts of the world may try to reproduce (e.g., Mercosur in Latin America).

However, its ability to intervene is limited. EU can more easily manage the civil operations conflicts than to send troops. It doesn't have its own army, but its Member States armed forces. Moreover, Europe's energy dependence makes it vulnerable and pushes each member country to promote its own national interests with priority. In this context, the relationship with NATO and the US remains crucial. In some way, we can say that all these are within a soft power.

Treaty of Lisbon⁴ determinates EU values, namely: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, respect for human rights, including rights of minorities. They are common to the Member States in a society based on pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men (Article 2, TEU).

Defining these values and principles is the fruit of development. Indeed, European integration since its inception stood only in economic terms. But gradually, different texts and treaties have defined common values to the Member States. Today, these values and principles endorsed by all EU Member States make it to exist and function, pursuing goals, for both common interests and national interests.

2. Ways of defining national interest and European interest

European Union, as a complex entity, is an area crossed by a set of interests that interact and influence each other, including: national interests;



European interests; state interests; general interests; community interests; strategic interests; economic interests; security interests.

In our opinion, of priority are the national interests of EU Member States. This is at least due to the following reasons: the European Union was created by desire to achieve faster and more securely national interests of Member States; national interests are the functioning engine of the Union; national interests, by their alert dynamic, ensure and guarantee the evolution of the European Union; national interests give EU political value.

On the other hand, the European Union, as an entity, has its own interests it supports and promotes. Therefore, before analyzing the different concepts of European interest, it is essential to define the notion of national interest, which most often serves as a starting point in the European construction.

However, in defining European interest should be considered EU's specificity as a social, economic and political entity. Therefore, to define European interest, we will start from the concept of national interest and what is the European construction. Also, in defining European interest must be considered actor's role that it promotes. European interest is often the fruit of negotiations, debates and political reflections, it is essential to identify the participating actors in defining it. The goal is to understand the articulation between different concepts of European interests. In this respect, are considered institutional actors – representatives of the states, European Commission, national and European Parliament – on the one hand, and private actors – interest groups, reflection circles, civil society organizations, social movements – on the other. Finally, the inclusion of European interest in the strategy is another step in defining European interest. To this end, are identified the obstacles and ways of promoting the European interest, including that in the security matter.

In general, defining the national interest was within the frame of international relations theory. In this respect, there are two main theories that focused on international relations and within them the concept of national interest. It is *realist theory* and *constructivist theory*.

Thus, national interest is central in the *realistic thinking* that makes it key to understand international relations. Basically, the national interest is “defined in terms of power” and guides policymakers' behavior⁵.

Rationalized, national interest of realists is an intelligible continuum that exceeds mere references or the sequence of reasons more or less coherent⁶. If the policy which allowed power varies depending on the circumstances, the idea of national interest is invariable⁷.

For Morgenthau, the national interest comes under the political sphere. Being a superior principle, the national interest is beyond discussion. The idea that competing interests can co-exist within the same state is rejected by the founder of realism that protects the autonomy of the political sphere by reference to economy or moral⁸. For a realistic, power is a superior principle which cannot be subordinated to economic, legal or moral imperatives. This autonomy of power generates autonomy of the decision maker in relation with the society.

In realistic perspective, promoting the national interest is only a theoretical law born of empirical observation of international relations: it is a political requirement and a criterion for assessing a state's foreign policy. Realist theory would be so normative as a proof of case studies' depth conducted by realist writers applied to demonstrate that such a foreign policy is or is not consistent with national interest.

On the other hand, international relations are perceived as a power play, states shouldn't pursue only one interest: to preserve or increase their power. National interest of realists is therefore essential conservative because it makes by obedience of the laws claimed universal a requirement of political ethics. Therefore, European interest could not be the sum of national interests, not even their convergence⁹. First, this is because the national interest is the result of discussions and arbitrations between different policy options. It did not emerge from a simple observation of reality claimed objective. So the national interest is defined in relation to a project and a political horizon. National interest is defined not only by what it is (the desire for power)¹⁰ but from what could be: common political horizon of a heterogeneous political unit. The national interest is not only defending or preserving the state, it also promotes society's project that the nation defines. In its theoretical and practical indeterminacy¹¹, the national interest opens the way of possible: an interesting opportunity to think of the European interest.



Contrary to realistic vision that states are forced to pursue their interests and to increase their power due to the anarchy of the international system, **constructivist theory**, by A. Wendt, developed the idea that anarchy is, above all, what states are doing. Thus, this theory allows more to consider European construction. Its advocates argue that national interests are the product of interactions between states¹², each state defining its interests taking into account the interests of other states and in a manner that the latter perceive those interests first. Under this theory it would mean that the EU defines its interests in contact with its partners during international negotiations with the WTO, UN, or high-level bilateral meetings between the Union and third countries: US, Russia, China, India.

After numerous criticisms made on the analytical dimension to the concept of national interest the constructivist approach is trying to give it back a theoretical content considering it both as a decisive element of foreign policy decision making and as an element of political discourse that allows to justify choices achieving consensus. The analysis of perceptions and interpretations is in the centre of constructivist approach. Reality is not an objective data but a source of interpretation. Political decisions being taken only based on a perception of the world influenced by cultural representations, the definition of national interest results from the social constructions and involves common references: domestic context, society, its values, its representations influence on the perception of crisis and international relations.

Another definition of national and European interest arises from the role of **national and European identity**. Given the central role of identity in defining national interest does not belong entirely to constructivists. Indeed, studying the realist concepts on national interest showed that its defence is related to the protection of political identity: nature of the regime, functioning of institutions, for example. The national interest is accepted that it guarantees the survival of the political unity, it targets the preservation of its identity: to allow the political unity to remain what it is. What constructivists change, is the concept of identity that is not an essential, fixed and immutable data, but a social construct¹³. The process of constructing the national interest detailed by J. Weldes shows that common representations may

evolve and drive to evolution the identity of an actor. Identities being the fruit of inter-subjective interactions, national interests could not be defined selfishly without taking into account the external perspectives. International system and its values affect the definition of national interest. The progress of humanitarian law with its notions of interference law or responsibility to protect, and promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts, for example, constrain the action of states¹⁴. Regarding European interest, these reflections incite about whether a European identity is likely to determine the Union's interests. Shared sense of community being weak among European citizens, it should be thinking about what can compensate for this lack of common references. Although it plays an important role in defining interests, the role of identity should not be overestimated. Therefore, the error committed by realists in defining national interest in terms of power may not be corrected by replacing power with identity, and this, for many reasons. First, the identity of a political unit is always a vague concept if is taken into account that the difficulty of defining a European identity in a manner generally accepted. So it is with the definition of national identity¹⁵. In addition, identity is often more like a search or a construction than an essential data and an immutable legacy of the past. It is also essential to distinguish (not necessarily opposed to) the identity of cultural heritage. Finally, it should be noted that identity itself is not homogeneous. It is sometimes inconsistent and may therefore be a source of conflicting interests. Citizen embodies this heterogeneity of identity and interest. Employee, taxpayer, consumer, user of public services, social assistance, a citizen may have conflicting interests. Everyone wants in general to consume and possess more but paying less and showing their commitment to durable social and environmental development.

Identity is not the alpha and omega of defining interest. However, the myth of identity was fundamental in shaping national sentiment, and construction of nation-states. In this regard, the importance of the enemy notion in formation of common membership feeling should be underlined. Considering the premise of defining the European interests only starting from identity issues, under the circumstances that this European identity can be born only when confronting an enemy or stigmatizing anything that is not European, we



risk to create an image on European interest which rather perverts European identity than being its own expression. It is therefore essential to consider a European interest to be more based on a joint project than on the roots or a common identity.

Most identity derivatives often originate in the weakness of the social contract or the project that connects citizens as ethnic conflicts in delinquent states prove. Where no joint project is shared, mobilizing ethnic or religious identities allow recreating the connection, but similarly, the cleavage where the political opposition or debate of ideas has disappeared. Then the ethnicity is manifested as a sense of common affiliation. Since that moment, defining European interests can not develop unless avoiding nationalist retreats by promoting an European citizenship based on values and principles such as those defined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Recognizing national and cultures identities it evokes a European citizenship (chapter V) characterized by the desire to share a peaceful future based on common values. More than a common patrimonial inheritance, European interest can build on a common project – which is not otherwise prohibited to recognize or to discuss what it makes this European heritage. Thus, there is a distinction made above between an interest aiming more conservation and protection, and an interest that favors the development, the conquest and the fruition of the heritage. Therefore, European interest is not uniquely about the protection of territory, of citizens and Union's institutions, but it covers also its development: deepening European political integration and European citizenship development.

Another way of defining the national interest is in terms of its role in European construction.

Several theories have attempted to analyze the relationship between national interest and European integration. We mention, among others, functionalist theory, institutionalist theory, neofunctionalist theory. Thus, functionalist theory developed by Mitrany¹⁶ does not directly concern the European construction. Mitrany seems reluctant to regional construction idea which would only shift the competition between states to the opposition between larger regional or continental entities. However, principles and functionalist theory's articulation are useful to understand European integration. They were resumed to explain how ad-hoc cooperation in

specific areas – energy, raw materials, economics, security, defence – can strengthen interdependence among states and improve relations between them. Study of the European Coal and Steel made by E. Haas takes this idea and joins J. Monnet's project to create a political entity based on a strong economic integration¹⁷. But initial functionalism tends to distinguish itself from the constitutional approach according to which states integration and convergence of interests involves a global political structure, it's about a league or a federation. Indeed, in a purely functionalist perspective, the European Union may well continue to strengthen its integration by new cooperation and ad-hoc agencies, without this leading to the adoption of a European constitution and the creation of a European federal state. For Mitrany, the stake is not to change borders by new treaties, but to make these borders insignificant due to increased functional cooperation. From functionalist point of view, it must be based on common interests to form a truly effective transnational society. But if common interests are behind this functional cooperation, one may wonder up to what point the increase of exchanges, alleviating international borders and the creation of specialized agencies are required to form a common political entity; especially when states lose their legitimacy and power to initiate, decide, act and control over the delegation or sharing power with the Union. Particularly, it is what neofunctionalists are stating that adopt vision of Europe in general close to federalism.

Neofunctionalists mobilize the *spillover* concept to explain the transition from economic integration to political integration. The idea is that any cooperation, increasing interdependence, requires a strengthening of cooperation in new areas and thus up to the establishment of a political entity¹⁸. The stakes are therefore to define whether neofunctionalists are thinking, interdependence of societies necessarily lead to the formation of a political community. In theory, the idea is seductive. It is indeed hard to imagine how common interests making room to common activities and cooperation or transnational exchanges may not involve common rules and therefore a public authority – as admitted even by Mitrany by the importance given to specialized agencies. But intergovernmental agencies not necessarily allow the emergence of a common public space institutionalized around

the state. This is especially what shows the works of some federalists like A. Sbragia¹⁹ who distinguishes functional interests and territorial interests. It may be here a functional gap between functional deterritorialized policies and threatened with community level and interests that remain solidly anchored in the territories, national or infra-national²⁰. This gap is concretely observed in the European Union where an increased integration supporters are advancing pragmatic and rational arguments to develop functional policies at Community level and intended to be more effective than national policies (using a certain manner of the principle of subsidiarity), when European citizens often remain very attached in national framework and are apprehensive about the new transfer of sovereignty. One of the gaps of the neofunctionalism is to think that a political structure can be forged by the will of the citizens that a European political entity can give birth to enhanced technical cooperation without arousing political consciousness of citizens. Building Europe *for* citizens and not *by* citizens is probably doomed to failure. It could not be thought of a European interest which is not *for* and *by* European citizens around collective interests.

3. Unity and diversity of interests in the European Union

Understanding the formation of European interest in the fundamental areas of the state, including security and defence depends on what all those involved will understand in foreign and security policy at the EU level. For many authors, it is important not to be limited only to actions taken by European institutions, but to include the Europeanisation of national policies²¹. Thus, the Union's foreign policy would include joint initiatives and national policies, it would be the result of what the EU and Member States do in international relations. Others evoke a system of interactions between Community policies, CFSP and national diplomacy²². All national diplomacy is not so Europeanized and the number of institutions in which national political actors are manifesting in diplomacy and / or defence is large enough. In this respect, we can mention: Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, PSC (Political and Security Committee), under COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives), at

which it can be added all CFSP and CSDP organs.

On the other hand, there are authors who say that there is not a genuine European foreign policy²³. This criticism of foreign and security policy incoherence Union must nevertheless be relativized, as far as it was already noted the lack of coherence that could sometimes rule between ministries or agencies even within a state, because of their divergent interests. It should be noted that there are common interests of European states: the defence of territory, institutions, fundamental freedoms, for example, who did not allowed a transfer of sovereignty.

Definition of *convergent interests* is not enough to adopt consistent common policies. The division of responsibility between states and EU institutions involves a renewal approach of sovereignty, especially in security. It is essential to distinguish between state interest and national interest, and not between state sovereignty and national sovereignty. Once again, this reflection on European interest makes necessary to consider *the notion of citizenship*. Before considering the manner in which different actors conceive European interest, it is useful to briefly summarize the conceptual contributions will be used to think the European interest. The national interest and European interest require to be defined not only based on one criterion, be it power or identity. If national interest normative theories have tried to give objective content is more relevant to consider the definition process than its content. Therefore, the original ambition to think the European starting from what it is and what could be and not from what it should be retains all its relevance. The content of European interest depends on the political project of the Union, and then reveals more of politics' work than the researcher's.

European interest, as national interest is above all a research subject, it is useful to identify *the actors helping its development* and to reflect on their legitimacy. Insisting on the distinction between national interest and state interest and emphasized the importance of a common public space in the formation of consensus, defining European interests can not be confined to international actors. It will be considered the role of civil society trying to define European interest in terms of European citizenship, as it seems difficult, even dangerous, to build European interest on cultural or identity criteria.

If the *sense of common affiliation* remains weak in Europe, rapid study of theories of European integration made it possible to update the particular role of institutionalization of security and defence policies in deepening integration. So, it is necessary, at EU level, to make efforts defining a particular interest in European security; this security interest is understood broadly because it is not limited to preserve an economic, cultural, political heritage, but to maintain a balance in a dynamic manner. Union's security and its citizens thus go through the vitality of its institutions and their reform rather than conserve them in marble.

4. National interest, engine of the European construction

The concept of national interest is fundamental for foreign policy orientation. It is the main guide to all external activities conducted by a state²⁴. National interest is defined by several parameters: the first is the degree of its generality – not any narrow interest falls within the national interest, but only those that have the widest coverage; the second parameter is the degree of perennality – because it is not about conjectural interests, but about the truly sustainable ones, not altered by time; finally, we consider the ability of such interests to be translated into political practice, because, without it, they remain only at the stage of unattainable aspirations.

Specifically, the interests that fall under the national interest are expressed by values, which then translate into tangible objectives, the actor must meet. Once the objective is set, it must be chosen means of achieving it, and, within them, the concrete ways to proceed. This is valid when the actor is the one who launches a foreign policy initiative; but when it must respond to an initiative launched by another actor, so an external stimulus, it must identify the response (following the same sequence: objective – way – means) which ensures meeting, in the highest degree, its own national interest. In this respect, the National Defence Strategy²⁵ defines national interests as follows: *National interests are those essential needs and aspirations of asserting national identity and values, existence of the state and insurance of its basic functions. National interests are the national character of state, sovereignty and independence, its unity and indivisibility... republican form of*

government, independent of the judiciary, political pluralism and the official language, Romanian.

The notion of national interest has generated debates over time. Starting from the assumption that nation-state is the main actor in international relations have been formulated many definitions of national interest. Thus, national interest has been devised as: general and continued finality for which each nation acts; needs and wishes of a sovereign state perceived in relations with other states that constitute the external environment; the sum of political purposes regarded as special concerns of a nation; needs and vital aspirations and decisive motives that guide and animate nation and state's action in international affairs.

These essential characteristics of national interest remain unchanged for all Member States, with their integration into the European Union.

In our opinion, full, timely and systematic satisfaction of national interests is the foundation of the idea of European integration. In fact, the initiators of the European Community, later the European Union, have set off animated by the desire to overcome together social, economic and political difficulties generated during the years of World War II. Throughout construction, with the finding of particular economic advantages, the idea of European integration amplified. The establishment of the European Union, Member States hope to increase their internal security and stability, to enhance well-being of their citizens, in fact, to fulfill the objectives that materialize achievement of national interests.

In our opinion, some provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon highlight the superiority and priority of national interests in relation with the European ones. Thus, the cited document mentions that “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member”²⁶. Also, Article 50 of TEU, paragraph (1), by its content, highlights the possibility for any Member State to “decide to withdraw from the Union, in accordance with its own constitutional rules”. In our opinion, such a decision can

be determined only by incompatibility between national interests of the State concerned and European interests promoted by the European Union.

Conclusions

The analysis of national interest and European integration theories, as well as the study of political concepts of European interest permit some relevant conclusions about what the European interest is meant to be.

First, a *European interest wanting to exceed the national interest* can be found. Defining the European interest can not be objectively made in terms of power by an actor claimed unique or homogeneous, the State. First, European interest is the result of research, it is invented, it did not exist beforehand. On the other hand, European identity is not the essence of European interest, for it is not yet precisely concretely defined or formed. In addition, European interest can not be considered the sum of national interests of Member States. The study of EU treaties, immigration and asylum policy of the Union frequently differ from the Member States.

Then, the attempt to *define European interest appealing to European citizenship* is obvious. As state interest differs from national interest, Union's interest is not limited to institutions' interest and includes the interest of citizens, especially since the EU has established European citizenship. It is about devising the European interest in terms of general interest. Overcoming national and private interests' plurality has nothing obvious to the extent that the public interest can not be based only on converging or compatible common interests. The idea of common interest implies the convergence or compatibility of national and private interests and infers a possible harmony, while concerning general interest, it may require overcoming of national and private interests and sometimes opposing them, threatening to undermine the sovereignty of States. At the same time, citizen's participation to the stability of institutions and in European's public life vitality becomes important. In other words, European citizens must be actively involved, responsible, legally safe and voluntary in Union's daily life. Thus, it builds and develops citizens' sense of common affiliation to the EU. In this context, promoting the idea of a European social contract seems to become necessary.

Finally, there is a concern *to define the general European interest by appealing to a European social contract*. Defining a general European interest involves a real European social contract as defined by J.J. Rousseau²⁷. Such a conception of European interest implies a common public space free, open and pluralistic, an increased politicization of the EU.

The general interest being the fruit of research that allows not only reconciliation but also overcoming special interests for the common good and a closer union, and the latter can not be done without adherence to a common political project. Defining a social contract and a general interest passes, also, by investing local, regional, national and European public actors, on the one hand, and mobilizing various mediators that can serve as an interface between citizens and politics.

In defining European interest, more than power or identity, a significant role has *citizenship*, meaning sharing common values and adherence to a social contract. Beyond simply the absence of risk or threat, a more secure Europe in a better world involves an autonomous international projection in terms of strategy, planning and management capacity of the operation, but also in terms of world view.

National interests of the Member States play a significant role in establishing and asserting European interests, which, in our opinion, must be a result of the former. Member States regardless of the degree of integration within the Union will remain fundamental actors in promoting national interests and, obviously, the European ones. The necessary and sufficient condition to achieve simultaneity of defence and promoting the two categories of interests is if and only if they are converging and compatible with each other.

Member States' conduct during the current financial and economic crisis proves the superiority of national interests in relation with European interests.

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THE RETURN TO THE BEGINNINGS OF TOMORROW¹

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Is or isn't the full and definitive unity of the European continent possible? Is this unity the result of an objective process of human society's becoming or is it imposed by matters of competitiveness, and also, by political, economic, societal and military power and security matters? Which are the mechanisms used to fulfil (or not fulfil) this full unity? Which are or could be the horizons of waiting for a complete, firm and sustainable European construction? What are the states or the citizens going to loose and gain by such equally communitarian and unitary architecture? Are the states prepared to bear the success (or failure) of trans-nationalization and communization of power? Are the national and communitarian issues harmonized or in conflict on the road of primary European construction? How much from this becoming is internal determination of system and process and how much is external, meaning extra-European, determination? Even the answers to these questions – and many others -, are responded since 1815, some more sophisticated as others, the reality shows that they were not, are not and will not be satisfactory for much time ahead. Even the European frontiers seem to be some lines of a puzzle; the continent's unity and thoroughness are still very far from a perfect normal shape. But, a return to the initial beginnings is not possible

anymore because all these beginnings shifted to tomorrow.

Key-words: union; values; interests; national; communitarian; regional; transfrontalier; unitary; fragmentary.

1. Frontier's process

Today, the international system – as we accept such system exists as the systems are defined -, is based on the sovereign states, although it contains a contradiction in terms. The sovereignty is, at the same time, the defining feature of this system, its basic principle and the sufficiently clear term imposing the respect of frontiers, of national values and also of national interests, peculiarly the vital ones, therefore, the identity and the difference. The international system is one of international relations, meaning the reports between the sovereign states, therefore, of their common and different parts, of community and nations, of communities of nations and communitarian nations, of identity values, common values, but also of interests which still separate, redefine, identify, re-identify, oppose and sometimes unite.

Since the humankind appeared on the Earth, peoples are harmonised in values, but basically different, opposed and even in conflict when it

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comes to interests. The values identify and unify from the perspective of qualitative accumulations of culture, civilization and patrimony. The interests rebuild these identities from the perspective of efficient actions, power, and of political, economic and other nature goals, presuming strategic objectives, positions, statuses, ideals, often settled on the support of moving sands of surviving, prosperity and related to those, of security environment.

Survival, prosperity and security are the three essential dimensions of human existence and human action from all the times and in all types of society. Always, these defined and redefined the knowledge and action horizons, but they never identified and, moreover, fully solved them. This is because the survival, the prosperity and the security are not universal, but particular: they are not mechanic, but dynamic, they are not programmatic, but hazardous, they are not something natural, but a construct, they are not just a cause, but also an effect, they are not absolute, but relative, they are not definitive, but temporary. They are built and than rebuilt everyday, but not in a quite, ideal and perfectly mouldable space, but into a randomized, unpredictable, very hard mouldable and, moreover, essentially conflicted space.

Under these circumstances, the European community – as we see it today –, regarded, at its beginnings, the survival after the effects of war, the prosperity and security of the occidental countries which reunited immediately after the war when the world separated into West and East, in traditional Capitalism and dangerous and utopia expansive Communism. Two totally different systems, irreconcilable as form and content (at least, in those times formula), incompatible in their essence and mutually unacceptable, were doomed to coexist. This was about two swords unable to fit simultaneously in the same scabbard. From economic and financial regards, the Western Europe massively helped by the Marshall Plan and the American pragmatism and essentially furthered from its previous colonialist and expansive philosophy, but also frustrated and scared by the both World Wars mainly undergone on the European territory and by the Cold War pressures, rapidly reached to prosperity and, as security matters, they contented with a bipolar strategic balance imposed by the American concept to restrict the communism, by the soviet of expansion, by the

German complex of guilt and fascinated in certain measure by the Japanese renaissance.

In its traditional sense, the nationalism of the Western Europe countries kept silence under the pressures and tensions of the World War II effects, but did not cease a moment to exist and manifest into a very peculiar and strictly conditioned way in the new communitarian framework managed by the Americans, by British and French and already succumbed in the occupied, fragmented and drastically controlled Germany. The Germans, with American help, but especially with own colossal Prussian effort as form and very wealthy and nuanced as content, specific for this strong, disciplined and determined nation, need to reconstruct their country, molecule by molecule, into a strictly conditioned environment. In the following years after the war, all day, the Germans worked with dourness and responsibility of the peoples who caused a disaster they didn't seen yet, but which had fallen down almost entirely over their heads.

In a certain manner, this extremely hard reality helped this engine-nation of Europe to reborn. The nowadays German miracle is just a meticulous and sustainable German construction as all the machineries done by the Germans are. Of course, all these were done with a substantial American support.

The dominant frontier from the Cold War times was between East and West, between Communism and Capitalism, between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, between two political poles of the planet, between two ideologies. This dominant essential frontier yet wasn't the only one. For a while, the communist frontier (in those times form) was in expansion in Africa, in Asia and even in the Latin America. In response to this offensive frontier answered the restraining frontier practised by the United States of America. The Berlin crisis, the missiles crisis from the Caribbean Sea, in 1962, constitute some of the examples of confrontation between the two types of frontier which brought the humankind very close to a new disaster, this time a nuclear disaster. But also the splitting of Germany into Western Germany and Eastern Germany, as Korea's into South Korea and North Korea, and Vietnam's (that generated the Vietnam War) etc., are examples of the battle among the two essential political frontiers of the Cold War period. The other borders – of the law states – besides the

above and some other ones, including Romania, remained almost untouched.

Of course, World War II and the Cold War affected the frontier process but sovereignty process wasn't infringed but only rebuilt in regard to the peace and war prevention requests and also in regard to the new architecture of the international relations.

All things done until now – from the triggering and ending of the war to the creation of some international organizations and bodies – didn't affect or doubt the sovereignty principle, but some theories that develop high education or even today argue round and round on the subject.

2. The labyrinth of theories involved into a possible regeneration of beginnings

And still, the principle of sovereignty – essential for the political and civilization architecture of world – didn't remain in the same coordinates as a century ago, but also it bore the effects of becoming, of the complexity and unprecedented dynamic of the international relations.

Morgenthau, for example, shows the states' wish for power, while Waltz sustains, in his theory, the states wish only to survive and therefore their tendency is to maximize their security. But, as it can easily be deduced from the humankind multi-millenary experience, there isn't security where there isn't power and wisdom and neither power or wisdom where security doesn't exist. And, in both cases, the states give much attention to their security problematic; this is real, of course, for the states being aware about their living environment reality, about the pressures, challenges, dangers and real threats concerning them, about their vulnerabilities and consequently about their assumed or ignored risks.

The states' attitude can be offensive or defensive, but even the defensive one is active and constructive. There also could be added the expectative type attitude, but this doesn't count very much in the international relations because it can't last, because, anytime, the conflict is still possible and then the states should opt for offensiveness, defensiveness or neutrality. Or, the neutrality is a knife with two blades or with both blades blunted. The natural state of humankind seems to be war, not peace. Consequently, if we are to sum the years of peace and war from the second

world conflagration, we reach to the conclusion that in 60 years of peace (1945-2006) there took place crises, armed conflicts and wars totalizing 747 years². Namely, in every year of peace, there were 12 years of crises, conflicts and wars. Other data shows that in the last 3500 years, there were only 230 years of peace in the civilized world.

The most of the realist concepts (but also constructivism or institutionalism) have very pessimistic ideas. From here come the five hypotheses of realism over the international system:

1. The anarchic character of the international system, not in the chaotic or disordered sense, but because states are independent, sovereign and their behaviour isn't and can't be ordered or directed, but self-organized in concern to the report of forces and analysis of chances.

2. The states have certain military offensive capacity offering the needed means to attack and even to mutually destroy themselves.

3. The states can't be sure of the other states intentions (not a state can guarantee that another one won't use its military offensive capacity against another state when the offensive state will consider it necessary).

4. The survival is the basic reason of states behaviour and in this regard the states must be sovereign and maintain their sovereignty.

5. The states' strategically reason over means to survive in the international system but, many times, they can deceive over the potential adversaries because, usually, the states dissimulate their offensive behaviour.

In regard to realists' vision, from these hypotheses result three basic patterns of behaviour:

1. The states from the international system fear one another and the level of fear among them, no matter how many agreements and collaboration treaties would conclude, can't ever be insignificant. The political competition between the states is more than dangerous than the market competitiveness because it can lead to war, even if all international documents and UN Charter forbid the aggression war and in its absence (because is forbidden), the war of defence won't have any sense.

2. Every state of the international system tries to provide its own survival or its own prosperity. The other states, in the realism logic, can be and are considered a danger in certain conditions and even a threat because there isn't a supreme authority to control and impose them a certain type of



behaviour. And even such authority would exist; practically, it can't have any word to speak in the present conditions without the guarantee of the great powers and of the other states or international organizations. The European Union and NATO aren't sovereignties, but organizations of sovereign states mutually guaranteed by constitutional treaties, by strategic policies and concepts, their security and defence. Still, every state behaves in regard to its interests, even if it assumes the participation to crisis and conflicts management, to common security and collective defence.

3. The states from the international system try to maximize their position of power against other states (although never tell it directly) the military power being the safest mean to provide the survival into a dangerous world. Theories as the ones of over-saturation with military means, mutual destruction, and weapons development in such a way that the war becomes practically impossible don't resist to a realist analysis. Neither one state ever renounced its military power, or the systems of alliances and coalitions in order to enhance this power and to shelter it, or its national vital interests.

Actually, the European Union tries to do the same thing in regard to the principle *Non multa, sed multum*. Each Member State, by itself, is helpless in front of economic, technological, demographic, political and even military offensive of the great entities – The United States, Russia, China, India – without mentioning the recent forum – Brasilia, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) – counting over 40 % of planet's population. This association seems strange because the BRICS forum states do not have almost anything in common but the present international financial system, the pressures shaping more aggressively and also the new possible reconfigurations of the centres of power assert such associations. For example, one of BRICS targets is to create a bank to counterbalance the discretionary and chaotic power of the present occidental financial system generating crises and conflicts.

In the realistic vision, cooperation is promoted and, consequently, restricted by two stimulator and consequently inhibitor factors, the relative benefit and the preoccupation over the deceit.

What are and can be the frontiers under these new circumstances? But what can be the sovereignty?

The European Union constitutes a possible shaping answer to such questions. It isn't the only one, nor the first.

Three basic institutionalized theories exist in Europe and in the world: the liberal institutionalism; the collective security; the critical theory.

The liberal institutionalism is the least ambitious theory³. In regard to this theory, a better economic collaboration between the states will reduce the world conflict situation and also the danger of war. The institutions have the goal to avert the deceit and mistrust between the states but not anyway but by the creation and imposition of some rules to take out the states from the international chaos and to constraint them to accept a set of norms absolutely necessary for survival. From here, it doesn't result that certain rules and norms, which can be welcomed, affect states sovereignty, but only the fact that in the relations between them some norms previously accepted by every of them to reduce the tensions and to prevent the conflict and even the war should be respected. It is about some necessary rules (norms) without which, in the present conditions, they cannot survive.

The collective security shows that force is, in fact, the one that still plays a very important role in the global policy – even such policy shouldn't be based on force or the threat with force –, and the states should protect against eventual aggressors, as also results from Article 51 of UN Charter. But even Article 51 gives the right to the Security Council, particularly to the five permanent members – China, France, UK, Russia and the US (five plus one, today also Germany) – “to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”⁷⁴. In regard to collective security theory, the conflict threat can be diminished if: the states reject the idea to use the force to change the statu quo; the states don't behave in regard to their narrow interest to confront the states infringing the norm and threatening with war or even launching it; they trust the other states will renounce the use of force.

As is seen, these norms have a substantial degree of utopia because is hard to presume the states, especially the great powers will ever renounce the forces they dispose of and the vital or very important interests for the sake to maintain peace at any prize. For now, these norms are some kind available in the relations between the

great powers and not for the rest of the world and particularly not when applying Article 51 to solve a conflict that doesn't regard them directly but can threaten the security of one region or of an important strategic area (to see the case of Iraq war in 1991, continued in 2003, the case of NATO intervention in Yugoslavia and more recently in Libya). The European Union as important entity in geostrategic plan regards the creation of a common voice to matter in the geopolitical and geostrategic reconfiguration of the world and also in the international security environment management in all its components.

The critical theory regards the institution of an omnipotent cooperation and of an authentic peace. Hence, it would result that the manner we think and speak about the international policy would represent a real *modus vivendi* in the international relations system. The critical theory categorically rejects the realists' affirmation that states' behaviour would be conditioned by the exterior world. This theory's adepts, as well as some autochthonous utopists, still believe ideas are decisively shaping the world. The mean to revolute the international policy consists in the radical change of the manner of thinking and speaking of individuals about the world policy. The critical theory, although a utopia, seems realistic in its criticism, but it doesn't have effective solutions. It is only critical. Its merit is of sensing the rigidity, the unproductive categorical affirmations, the system almost closed of apodictic (necessary) judgements, but that don't come out from the sphere of some analyses that considers the states as certain particles chaotically moving in the international environment, this being, otherwise, one of the traditional realism limits.

3. Premature hurry

States operate with absolute gains; namely, every state is concerned with how its opponent's strategy will affect its own gains, but not how much benefits one of the parties compared to the other. The liberal institutionalism promoters affirm their theory is available in the economic field and not in the military, but the military force significantly matters in the economic relations as the economic field significantly matters in the creation and maintenance of military power. Therefore, the relative gains are important for the economic field and also for the military field. There also exist

theories concerned about the relative gains issue. For example, the strategic trade theory offers an economic argumentation as the states should sustain their enterprises in order to gain an advantage in the competition with the rival countries, this being the best way to provide the national economic prosperity. In return, the liberal institutionalism promoters argue that if the states don't cheat in the economic relations, then it has no sense to refer to the relative gains. Even if the deceit would be eliminated, states will still be concerned about the relative gains because the differences of profit can be translated in military advantages used for deterrence, coercion and even aggression. Also, the relative gains shouldn't have relevance for the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or for the occidental countries, the relative gains counted enough in the relations among them. These relative gains generate duplicity or stratagem policies.

In this regard, there are three important studies. Stephen Krasner studied the efforts of cooperation from different sectors of international industry of communications. The states weren't concerned anyhow by cheating, but they were very worried about the relative gains. This ascertainment led him to the conclusion that "the liberal institutionalism isn't relevant for the global communications". Grieco studied the American and European Commission efforts to implement, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) auspices, the agreements over the non-tariff barriers the trade confronts it. He had seen that not the concern over the deceit brought the success but the interest over the gains distributions. Michael Mastanduno reveals the problem of relative gains was an important factor in USA policy shaping in regard to Japan over the FSX fighter, the satellites and high resolution television.⁵

The collective security theory includes two major errors belonging to the important component of trust. The collective security theory does not offer an acceptable explanation over how states overlap their ancestral fears and reach to trust one another. It is, of course, the situation of some today European states that didn't succeeded to get out from history phantasms.⁶ This isn't a purely objective matter, as they do not want to go out, but an extremely objective matter because it transforms the beginnings in effects and the effect into a new beginning.



The past unsolved problems are reprogrammed in the future. The realism sustains the international structure is still anarchical with numerous unpredictable and even chaotic evolutions. This nonlinear and, therefore, unpredictable evolution of the relations between states – even between the states of the European Union – creates new terms and from here new factors generator of insecurity. The present economic-financial crisis confirms these fears. We don't know anything precise over tomorrow's security (particularly economic-financial, but also military) environment evolution and this emphasizes the uncertainty and frustration. The states can't return to the frontiers closing – this isn't possible anymore – but the illegal migration toward the Occidental Europe countries, the demographic explosion in the Muslim families from Europe (8.1 children per family) and the demographic disaster of autochthonous peoples (1.5 children per family), where we add the environmental problems, the energetic uncertainties, the labour places issue, the austerity regime imposed by the crisis or the issue of sustainable development stopped by some “swelled heads” as Nicolae Iorga would say if he were alive, generates discrepancies and huge fears able to baffle the fulfilment of Lisbon Treaty provisions and the unification “de facto” and “de jure” of the European continent.

We consider the unification is almost irreversible. Without the unification, Europe will disappear from the map of centres of world power and without this power and the needed resources, our continent doesn't matter. Consequently, the nations composing will not matter because the national force generator of security won't exist in the relations with the new power centres that rapidly reconfigure, but only the force able to accumulate in time into the new entity framework, namely the European Union. Moreover, Europe doesn't massively benefit by the United States support because they now have other interests in the strategic partnership with Russia, with India, with part of the Latin America countries, especially for the Pacific area and for the Arctic Ocean area.

Turkey and the Middle East develop a series of policies and strategies which, for now, aren't very precisely shaped but many of the slogans that many years mixed up and dominated these areas start to fall down. The tensions grow; the explosion is very close to the imminent second. The hurry

becomes obvious and Israel impatience to hit the nuclear installations of Iran and the events from Syria seem to bring near this fatidic second.

Neither a state can be completely safe of the others' intention, no matter how many guarantees of security would grant to it and therefore, the national dimensions or at least the intern determinations under the effect of impossibility of a complete knowledge of pressures and extern dangers evolutions, but also of internal dangers, will experience significant evolutions in our opinion even if those won't manifest at world's sight. This, not necessarily because some of the states are aggressive and others aren't, but because in a international structure of sovereign states every state has policies and strategies related to their interests, wherein the evolutions of the relations between them have very complex determinations, the attitudes varies in relation to reality dynamic, to the system of pressures, challenges, dangers and threats, to vulnerabilities to those and consequently to the level of risk. One or many states could reject the collective security theory behaving aggressively. The common security and collective defence realism have a very pronounced dissuasive effect.

There still exists a reason for which the states can't fully trust a system of collective security. Claude shows the collective security requests the accomplishment of at least two extraordinary complex conditions as follows:⁷

1. The states must clearly distinguish between the aggressor and the victim in order to function or this is very hard because, peculiarly in crisis times, this identification is difficult (for example, neither until now it isn't known exactly which of the great powers is guilty for the starting of World War I and, perhaps, neither over the triggering of World War II the things aren't as clear as seem to be in this moment);

2. The theory states any aggression is a bad thing but at least from a certain regard, it shows the aggression doesn't seem such a bad thing (the predominant offensive states have a lot of examples and arguments to support aggression as positive fact which call preventive or newly preemptive, coming from Article 51 of UN Charter because the pre-emption means defence, not attack);

3. There are states having friendly relations from historical and ideological reasons. It is hard to presume, for example, that the US will ever use



force against the UK or Israel, even if these states would be considered aggressors. On the contrary, the US supported the UK in the Falkland War and the disproportioned riposte of Israel in the Gaza Strip against the Palestinian population didn't produce any reaction of condemnation or rejection from the US;

4. There are traditional animosities between some states, complicating the efforts regarding the collective security;

5. Even if states agree to collectively resist some aggression, it is difficult to settle "ab initio" everybody's contribution (inclusively into an alliance). There are still serious discussions among the United States and Europe over the contribution to the Alliance's effort and to the implementation of NATO Strategic Concept;

6. The provision of a rapid reaction to aggression in the collective security framework is difficult. It can't be exactly provisioned which will be the groups of states and coalitions in situation of conflict. The United States needed over six months to form the coalition that freed Kuwait from Saddam Hussein occupation. NATO Response Force and European Rapid Reaction Force have different destinations different from providing the trust among the states;

7. There are appreciations that, probably, states will hesitate to join an effort of collective security because the system transforms every local conflict in an international conflict. The solution is represented by the area's isolation as was done in the wars from the former Yugoslavia area, Iraq and Afghanistan. Or, collective defence involves the enlargement even if it aims the area's isolation and the conflict's resolution.

8. The idea that the states should automatically respond to aggression damages states' sovereignty and, therefore, will be hardly to be accepted. At present, states effectively participating with forces to the crises and conflicts management acts and reacts differently in accepting the solutions proposed by the international commandments. The decisions taken into the framework of the international bodies or of the institutions responsible with conflict management must have the approval of national parliaments and this procedure hardens a lot the action itself.

9. There exist enough contradictions over the states positions over issues concerning the use of force, inclusively as regards the European attitude

or the extension of NATO competencies beyond its area.

As we notice, all the nine conditions are formulated in categorical terms, although they raise problems keeping from a very large flexibility of action and reaction related to the conditions.

Thus, a major conflict is created between the national and international dimension which, as the European Constitution project proved, it can't pass over the national dimension. Therefore, the project was rejected. From here results that the European Union - even if it will become the United States of Europe, as was visualized since 1815 or a simple country, as the Integrated Europe, the European Union or no matter how will be called (if somebody will find a better name than the present one and a proper logo), this can't be but a country of countries wherein maybe for a long time the states won't loose their sovereignty, but only will rebuild it as the new conditions will request. This will happen because it is hard to presume that in the following years, despite the already existent numerous components of European Union institutions, the UK, France, Spain, Italy and many other countries will give up the sovereignty, identity, personality and specificity of concept that for now has got only an agitated and controversial recent history, characterized also by euro-optimism and euro-pessimism. Or, European Union without sovereignty can hardly be something else but a forum or a club of discussions and harmonization of national policies. The solution for the future can't be other then the perfect imaginable, sovereign and powerful European Union and not an empire of new type or a Union as the soviet one with another logo on its frontispiece.

But, as some components from Brussels behave and as some projects are undergone, it is hard to presume the objective and compulsory phenomenon of the continent's unification will be analyzed and known in realistic manner by those authorities. For example, the Romanian territory division in eight euro-regions has not serious economic support, it isn't grounded on a thorough study and the studies done bears the print of an embarrassing bureaucracy. For example, one of the commissions from Brussels reached the conclusion that over 95% of Romanians instantaneous speak the Moldavian language - the official language of Moldavian Republic -, and from here the scientific research team, or whatever kind of team did the



study, results that Romanians own very special qualities in learning foreign languages ... Or, if the European projects in their majority will be granted by such “competencies”, it is easy to understand what will come from the millenary nations of our old continent ... A bunch of measures at least strange, even hilarious, not to call them otherwise, as of the lethal injection to sacrifice pigs for Christmas, of the bells fitted to scythe to warn the animals sheltering in the hay (in order to beware them from being surprised or involuntarily hurt by the haymaker), of the rules imposed to manufacture traditional booze etc. – transform the integration concept into a terrorization concept or, worse, to take out with the forceps from traditionalism and to wander in the beautiful European places. Or, we aren't very sure if the nations from Europe really want this. Meantime, for example, the Romanian scientific research receives less than 18% from Romania's contribution to the European fund for scientific research – resulting that the European Union does not finance Romania's research, but rather Romania finances the research from the European Union space, and the reasons for which our country is returned only a little part of its own contribution are put on the Romanian bureaucracy, on our incapacity to write viable projects and on the government helplessness to attract European funds, on corruption, etc.

The present economic-financial crisis showed most of the countries with problems of economic development aren't helped in anyway (besides the system of subjugator loans granted or rather imposed by IMF), but are also forced to widely bear a significant part of expenses to pass over the crisis.

The vital national interest does not matter because the systems of monitoring and assessment used by the Union aren't consonant with the national interests and the populations are often put in front of accomplished fact. When population is called to opinion by referendum, it is happening something similar to the rejection of European Constitution project.

The solutions from Brussels aren't always in the advantage of the national interest but also this is almost never identified and formulated as needed. Sometimes, Brussels isn't thinking for us, but the IMF, who admits it has done an (disastrous and unjustified, in our regard) experiment in Romania as it has done some years ago in Argentina and in

other countries. But Romania isn't Argentina, it is a Member State of the European Union and the Union should care about Romania's situation but not from the bailiff position or an emperor chancellery, but from the position of the elder brother with the same blood and same life as us and with the entire community of our old and beaten continent. Heretofore, the EU is a union of 27 countries, 23 official languages and over 60 indigenous regional or minority languages⁸, 27 cultures and 27 vital interests needed to be harmonized and make sound as one. The *E pluribus unum* precept is generous, but *unum* isn't possible without *pluribus*.

Everything is very important in this complicated process of the European construction, in this communitarian dimension of the European space. The national culture of each state matters very much, its level of sustainable economic development, how the European concepts are translated in the national plan and how the national concepts resonate with the European ones, states' position in issues related to international relations, the effective participation to crisis and conflicts management, the full integration in the European Union and NATO, in international or regional organizations etc. For some of these positions, it is possible to be inflexible, based on national interests carved from the sphere of the other realities and interests, without taking into account the dynamic of the other states' interests, inclusively the common ones coming from the geographical environment, environmental protection, resources capitalization, behaviour to calamities and disasters, characteristics of the international security environment, human rights, life protection, etc. Still, it might be that the European interest, as is formulated by the officials from Brussels to be more rigid, be unrealistic and even devastating for some of nations or states.

All theories, inclusive the constructivist one, share the reality of states and the relations among them, submit to some analyses that bring to very interesting conclusions over the sovereignty concept and others. Samuel Barkin, for example, examining the constructivist epistemology and the classical realist theory, shows that in reality these are compatible even some of constructivists consider⁹ their method or goal consists in the social construction of the international policy. Both constructivist epistemologies, admitting the empirical fact (a reality able to be studied empirically, other that considers that it doesn't exist

a true reality discovered by empirical study) are known as “neoclassical” constructivism and “post-modern” constructivism.

But, all these theories we recalled are sometimes too simple to explain the effects of the European connections and inter-connections in the integration process and some other times too complicated for those pragmatic peoples from Brussels who elaborate directives or projects and put the states in front of the accomplished fact or in very difficult postures.

The realities are very complex, the problems are many, and the solutions very few. They can't always come from Brussels and even if it is the capital of the Union, it can't know and understand *ab initio* the entire problematic of the greatest geopolitical and geostrategic construction of the history, as is the European construction.

A single thing is sure. The national can't melt into European, it can't disappear and the solutions can't be only global, but especially particularized, oriented, meaning specific, for every state and for every problem. They don't all come from Brussels because Brussels is not a demiurge of solutions, but from the national parliaments in connection to the European Parliament, from the national institutions in connection with the European ones, as the procedure always is when systems and process are assembled. They can not be assembled by destruction, but by methods to lead every of them to the stage to be able to be interconnected and assembled.

The Brussels bureaucracy should not be a meta-bureaucracy, neither a bureaucracy of bureaucracies, but just an integrator system generator of policies and strategies of sustainable European construction by assembling national systems and processes making all and each to be ready for assembling, for performance. From here, it results that the whole and the parts of it have clear identities and very precise roles.

Seldom, in the elaboration of directives, reports and other documents absolutely needed for the European construction, the creativity and descriptivism, the voluntarism and subjectivism were stronger than the pragmatism and even stronger than the values of patrimony and vital interests of the nations, as the realities and their projection in the future, equally, from the national perspective and also from the perspective of the beautiful and generous European horizons.

Conclusions

Joining these perspectives is as hard, but also as important and needed as the assessment, knowledge and joining of national and European realities, chances and ideas. We don't believe a Europe without nations is possible, neither a sustainable development of nations without a European integrator, realist, objective, enthusiastic and enduring concept. Unfortunately, the beginnings of the European Union aren't in the past, but in the future, even if the great beginnings of the big continent come from history. Only the continuity and normal and intelligent metamorphosis of the nations on European geopolitical and geostrategic support can, in a healthy and sustainable manner, generate the tomorrow beginnings of our wonderful and unique, unitary and prosperous continent.

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS' DEEPENING

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All countries, regardless of size, economic and military power, political system, define, promote and defend their national interests. The Republic of Moldova is not an exception to this reality. As a state, the Republic of Moldova defines its national interests and promotes them by all possible legal means. Such a means is the EU accession. Although, since 2003, European integration has been proclaimed as the highest priority of Moldovan foreign policy, its effectiveness can be observed depending on the internal policies that a state is determined to implement. Steps taken by the government of the country had different contents, intensities and achievements.

Key-words: national interest; European integration; Republic of Moldova; European Union; program; neighborhood.

1. Meanings of the national interest

Starting with the independence proclamation, in August 1991, an extremely complex process of building the statehood of Moldova began. One of the key elements of this process was the formulation of the young state's *national interests* abroad. So, basically, like most former socialist countries, the Republic of Moldova declared as a priority policy

its adhesion to the European integration process, although it was hard to take a decision on its orientation. In this context, appears the determined opportunity in defining the *national interest* of the Republic, approached as a determinant factor of the state development and ensures the society cohesion, taking the basic interconnection and interdependence between domestic and foreign policy. This aspect of approaching the concept of national interest emphasizes not only the multi-vector nature of the Republic of Moldova foreign policy, but also the controversial nature of issues of national interest.

In general terms, the formulation of the *national interest* presents itself a dynamic and complex process, as this category reflects certain social realities, including all common needs and aspirations to all members of socio-cultural entities, and their satisfaction and support is an indispensable prerequisite for its existence and identity as a subject of history. National interest highlights the aspirations of a people to occupy a position in the global community which corresponds as much as possible to its historical, cultural and spiritual traditions, ensuring full realization of its potential. The main political institution empowered to define the national interest, its expression and support

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is the state, which by achievement of social and cultural community aspirations ensures its power legitimacy.¹

A. Schlesinger jr. considers that the state that does not give proper attention to its *national interest* as the driving force of his policies can not survive. In the academic frame, R. Keohane insisted on the opportunity to develop a theory of interest, but without, according to D. Sanders, an explicit reference to the *national interest*, expressing the view that the failure to formulate it makes impossible any theory of international relationships.² In the same vein, V. Beniuc emphasizes that “the national interest is the most complex project that can be achieved by a country's development and the debate is a very necessary and responsible act that has not only a perfect conceptual crystallization but also social mobilization for universal implementation of this project. The nation, the state community that does not clearly realize its interests, can not rely on a sustainable existence and development”.³ According to S. Burchill and A. Linklater, national interest “is in preserving political and cultural identity of a nation and involves ensuring national independence, territorial integrity, public order and internal balance”⁴ and in the opinion of Iu. Pinteau, national interests are based “on the values and national heritage, moral and intellectual potential of the society, being made / provided by future work in the economic, political and military, social, demographic, information, ecological fields etc.”⁵.

Actually, the concept of *national interest* may be charged at its fair value only when it is approached as a whole, taking into account its entire complexity: the need for conscious self-preservation in the nation in its security;⁶ the vital needs of the state and society focused to ensure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the human rights and freedoms⁷, the advantage of society and the state in economic development and reforms, an instrument of foreign policy to national security⁸. At the same time we note that the concept of national interest can be found – and is often found – in the definition of national security. Theoretically, the link is explained by logical necessity of a complex and complementary approach of these two terms. From a practical perspective, the link between national security and national interest finds its explanation in the new

European traditions⁹. May we remind you that in the Soviet period the concepts of security and national interest were not recognized or were replaced with a pretended higher aim, such as Workers Union of the world or the victory of the worldwide socialist revolution. The profound changes on the European continent after the ‘90s onwards forced to the forefront looking for new models of behavior and coexistence of European nations, being mainly concerned about international and regional security in conjunction with its national interests. Also, the national interest is the factor underlying the national consensus, social cohesion and public obedience. That is why, when it comes to national interest, all citizens or most of them agree to put supported efforts to achieve strategic objectives, to be united and work together in the same direction, to obey consciously the measures adopted by the government to ensure the sustainable development and security of the country. Therefore, today, we find in the concepts of the states security, formulations with respect to their national interests and strategies to protect them. Therefore, both concepts involve some effort of the nation, not without dangers and risks though.

Meanwhile, national interest appears as the ultimate argument used by the government when switching to adoption of unpopular measures, to reduction or restriction of human rights in general. For example, joining the European Union required for some countries, price increases for natural gas, electricity and heat and it was done not for economic reasons, but to harmonize the domestic prices in the EU. Also, for security, within the fight against international terrorism, measures are taken which limit and restricts a series of human rights, such as freedom of movement from one country to another, guard enforcement and control at airports, railway stations and bus stations, increasing the rights of the intervention forces.

Based on the significance of national interest, we find different realities of its manifestation. Thus, in the developed countries, with high capacity for action and influence, the national interest fully meets its national sui generis qualities of existence, in fact meets all functional attributes. Conversely, an emerging national interest, with many obstacles and deviations in the accumulation the necessity of manifestation, as that of the Republic of Moldova is, has relatively low capacity to be achieved. It evolves slowly, through the turbulent

motions, the rise and decline.¹⁰ But whatever the conditions, favorable or unfavorable, the interest in question needs to be examined and debated through two prisms – internal and external. Internal and external policies complement one another, ultimately ensuring the achievement of common tasks – maintaining and strengthening the existing relations in the country by simultaneous achievement of the national interest. European integration is one of the most fundamental problems of internal politics in the Republic of Moldova, but its complexity requires a massive foreign presence and thus they became a strategic priority of foreign policy, the issue that deserves attention.

2. National interests of the Republic of Moldova

2.1. Dilemmas of defining national interests of the Republic of Moldova

The proclamation of the Independence of the Moldovan state involved an express formulation of the national interests, defining the strategic development priorities and asking the political and social mobilization efforts to achieve them. However, the Republic of Moldova currently “only forms its national interests, the elite being in the initial process and unfortunately quite lagged in determining and realizing it”¹¹ or “national interest building in Moldova is overflowing, knowing the successes, failures and even slips back “based on more declarative than real content and should develop” “general national ideas” of its achievement, the idea that “would unite everyone around it”¹².

Currently, official documents, such as Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova of February 8, 1995 and the National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova May 22, 2008, do not expressly and unequivocally define the *national interest*, but only contain references, without saying the words “major national interest”, “Moldova's interests”, etc.. National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova addressing the connection between national interests and national security, implying that the “defense and their achievement” will ensure the integration and participation in international cooperation processes, while reducing the risk of involvement in conflicts.¹³ Thus, in the second document is highlighted the idea that Moldova's national interests are mainly

associated with European integration, and the other components of social-economic or institutional character, are going to be exploited by connecting to the requirements of the community *acquis*, but we must emphasize that only in conditions when this procedure will be triggered.

In the specialised literature we find several local authors' views on the definition of national interest of the Republic of Moldova. Saca V. argues that the general idea that national mobilizing factor to achieve the national interest could include two components, reintegration and European integration, which, moreover, met consensus between government and opposition in 2005, when V. Beniuc focuses on non-political dimensions, proposing building a soft power system that provides increased economic potential and launch educational programs, promoting cultural values and establishment of good relations between people, etc.. In order to implement policies of state consolidation and national identity formation, exercising the foreign policy and institutionalization of a true diplomacy, geared towards the contemporary international partnership development activities. These two visions, in fact, characterize the complexity of the interconnection between domestic politics and foreign policy, in the formulation of national interests of the Republic of Moldova in the context of European integration.

2.2. Steps of the Republic of Moldova for European integration

Analyzing the process of European integration of Moldova, we notice two stages at the political-legal level, related to the entry into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) on July 1, 1998. In turn, the first stage is divided into two periods, divided by the signing of the CPA on 28 November 1994, which established the foundations for governing the relation between the signatories.

The period 1991-1994 was mainly a search to specify and identify the legal position to initiate political dialogue between the parties. But starting the negotiations regarding the signing of an agreement of partnership and cooperation was expected for too long until the beginning of 1994, the initiative to start the dialogue belonging to the Moldovan side, that through the official letters signed by M. Snegur found that Moldova remains the only country in Central-European relations

with the EU which had exceeded even the early stage of creating political and legal framework.¹⁴ However, once initiated, the political dialogue did not get promotion and sequence, the main causes being:

1. The Republic of Moldova did not manage to position itself to be included in the strategic priorities of the European Union because of the lack of effective and consistent political forces that would have been identified with European integration and would have promoted that process of gradual approach and accession through concrete activities of awareness of the West, democratic reforming and strengthening of state power institutions, building a functioning market economy, etc..

2. The uncertainty of the political path promoted by the Republic of Moldova both home and abroad, reflected by the quality of reforms and strategic priorities of political alternation external -pro-CIS/ pro European, turns that inspire confidence.

3. Even if the European Union announced a differentiated approach to the CIS states, taking as basis the geographical location and capabilities of each of them, however the European Union increases interest especially to countries that have officially announced intention to join NATO.¹⁵

Further, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed on November 28, 1994, institutionalized the relationships between the parties raising their level of partnership and basing them on democratic values and an advanced legal framework, made the Republic of Moldova a direct European Union partner and provided the legal framework necessary for hiring a genuine dialogue on multiple levels, including political dimension printing processes to identify new means of cooperation and permanent dialogue. It should be noted however, that despite its importance, PCA does not contain a clear political purpose in the sense of gradual integration; Moldova is a confined space to which the EU is not prepared to address an integrationist strategy, the membership to the ex-Soviet geopolitical area being thus confirmed.

In fact, the Republic of Moldova has tried several times to distance itself from the former Soviet Union, hoping for another treatment, preferential, the European Union, the most successful attempts were when it was accepted in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in 2001 and in the Cooperation Process in South-East

in 2006, not to mention the other structures and sub-regional tools such as the Central European Initiative (1996), Free Trade Agreement in Central Europe (2007) etc. But with the launch of the EU'S Eastern Partnership on May 7, 2009, the Republic of Moldova is placed back in the ex-Soviet concept and thereby reducing the chances of signing an association agreement, even if the first request to start negotiations on drafting such a document were undertaken by P. Lucinschi in 1996 -1997, and Voronin said in 2003 that "European integration has become a state policy priority both internal and external and the external orientation is not only a process of return to European culture and civilization, but also of connection to the European political-economic standards and rules"¹⁶.

Accordingly, the aim of PCA is to establish partnerships horizontally, this document institutionalizes them and outlines the areas of cooperation, but not containing a clearly defined purpose and to determine the prospects of "gradual integration into the European Union". However, the "European Integration" department was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only in January 1998 and the first truly pro-European government program, even if it was characterized by serious shortcomings, could be the one proposed by the I. Sturza Cabinet in March 1999.

The decisive step in the process of European integration, as well as the largest deception, are related to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, considered, with some exaggeration, an important mechanism for the preparation of potential candidates for EU membership, assumption based on Article 20 of the Pact –the European Union makes the region closer to the prospect of full integration of these countries into its structures and for those who have concluded association, this is done through a new kind of contractual relationship. No doubt, for the Republic of Moldova, accepted in the Pact on 8 June 2001, it was very important to receive stabilization funds, 21 areas of priority interest being identified, but much more fundamental proved to be an attempt to include other space, geopolitical and conceptual located closer to the European Union. Paradoxically, this event coincided in time with the establishment of the Communist Party government in Moldova, with an obvious Pro CIS program.

The Republic of Moldova could not fully capitalize the emerging opportunities, challenges



being of both internal character (unstable democratic institutions, failure of communication between branches of state power, poor management of human resources, lack of a functioning market economy, hostile environment for foreign investors, unfair competition, low quality of life, serious shortcomings in Chapters adjustment of the legal and media freedom, protection of human rights, the absence of a clear-cut pro-European orientation, fully agreed and supported by concrete action, at least until 2005, although we can not overlook the institutionalization of some structures other than the three provided by APC, such as the National Commission for European Integration, The Committee for European Integration of Moldova, etc.), but also of foreign origin, conceptual (the Republic of Moldova did not get into the initial calculations of the Pact authors), geopolitical (CIS membership, placing the sphere of influence and interests of the Russian Federation) and institutional (the subdivision of the “General Directorate 1A of the European Commission that manages the relations with the Republic of Moldova, is responsible at the same time for relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”¹⁷). Major recorded failure is that by participating in this project Moldova failed to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union¹⁸.

European integration perspectives were diminished to some extent by the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy, accomplished through bilateral action plans that establish short-term reform agenda and the environment: neighbor countries, being subjected to “Europeanization”, have the opportunity to approach European Union, but without access to its fundamental institutions and get the right to be a Member State in the near future. Signed on February 22, 2005, the Action Plan EU-Moldova is a political document designed to supplement the PCA, which remained valid basis for cooperation, outlines 80 objectives and 294 actions / steps to follow in seven key areas,¹⁹ most of them the object of Moldovan authorities responsibility. At the same time, the plan contributes to more operational, visible and participatory engagement of the European Union in Moldova: the appointment of Special Representative for Moldova (March 2005), opening the European Commission Delegation in Moldova (October 2005), establishing the Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (November 2005), open-

ing the Common Application Centre in Hungary Embassy in Moldova (April 2007) which currently provides service to eight European Union member states, approving the Regulation on the introduction of Asymmetrical Trade Preferences (October 2007), which the access to the Community market is offered to over ten thousand items of goods from Moldova until 31 December 2012, but excluding exports of wine, sugar and vegetables and dairy foods, which are subject to quota and connected to European requirements etc.

Therefore, this document updated and expanded the dialogue between the parties and expended the opportunities for cooperation, places the Republic of Moldova in a geopolitical perspective focused on the concepts of neighborhood and European proximity, supporting the participation to the European Cooperation Process of South East (Republic of Moldova signed on October 10, 2006 the Charter of good neighborliness, stability, security and cooperation in South East becoming a full member of this forum).

The launch of the Eastern Partnership aims to identify new capabilities to deepen cooperation between the parties by extending on the bilateral dimension as well as on a multilateral level, made under the “principles of joint involvement, differentiation and conditionality”²⁰. The main areas of cooperation are structured on four platforms: democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration and convergence with EU policies, energy security and human contacts. It should be noted, however, that this mechanism of funding and assistance from the European Union has two key drawbacks: circumscribe the Republic of Moldova in post-Soviet space and does not foresees a definite political purpose, even if the assumptions, concerning differentiated approach depending on progress made by the State are not expressed and therefore could approach the event of signing an association agreement resulted from bilateral cooperation.

Thus, the relations between Moldova and the European Union under APC regulation, have evolved slowly and are characterized by a relatively low intensity and consistency. As O. Serebrian rightly remarked, the great unhappiness of the Republic of Moldova is that it realized too late the need and feasibility, especially European integration,²¹ and most of the measures envisaged, according to A. Thatham and E. Osmochescu,



proved to be declarative and therefore it can be just a first step of cooperation; progress is rather slow because of the lack of clear guidelines²², in terms that the progress in the implementation of agreements was uneven and on different areas of the reform process²³. At the same time, it should be stressed that European integration cannot be achieved by the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is proved to be a tool to promote “regional integration outside the EU borders”²⁴, and therefore a new contractual relationship is required by signing an association agreement. The process of negotiations on an Association Agreement started in Chisinau in early 2010. This supposes political association and economic integration of Moldova into the European Union. Currently, the republic of Moldova and the EU agreed on the bulk of articles of the Association Agreement, but no one knows when this process will be completed. Moldova could become an associate member of the Union, but it must obtain in advance a liberalized visa regime and free trade treaty.

Moldova's European integration is a two-dimensional process, involving efforts and willingness of both partners. Certainly, by 2014, we can only talk about Moldova approach to the European Union, the causes being of *financial nature* (the current EU budget set for 2007-2013 period, provides no source for accession / absorption of the Republic of Moldova), *conceptual-geopolitics* (circumscribing the Republic of Moldova through the Eastern Partnership in the former Soviet area and the hesitations to make a difference between the CIS states), and also the *institutional and legal*. As the previous enlargements of the EU show, EU accession is a long and complicated adjustment of all internal areas of the candidate states' principles, values and EU standards. But the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 will affect Brussels foreign policy, especially the Eastern dimension, since the Treaty of Lisbon creates substantial changes in the EU decision²⁵, the qualified majority voting becoming the general rule in the Council²⁶.

Measures to be implemented by the Republic of Moldova are much more varied and extensive, including the opportunity to elaborate two urgent documents of a major importance: *National Strategy for European Integration and Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova*. The Strategy is to be concluded based on the

Copenhagen/ Madrid criteria and the community *acquis*, to ground the European integration as an ideology to strengthen social cohesion, the cardinal objectives being the confidence of expectations and welfare, insuring and guaranteeing the human rights and freedoms, the individual and national security, which implies indispensability of this document support at a national level by the government authorities, the major political parties and elements of civil society.

The *External Policy's* mission is to update and adjust to the conditions and new options the priorities and main directions of foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova, specifically requiring the strategic course of European integration and giving up the declarative nature multivectoral (of the foreign policy), materialized through the idea of “connection node”, because it does not have sufficient potential to perform such a role, and in the globalization conditions the relations are established mainly directly and horizontally.

No doubt, a serious obstacle to European integration of the Republic of Moldova is the mentality, being amplified by the geo-economic factor, invoking unreasonably that adhering to the European Union means to abandon the traditional markets of the CIS in terms of future lack of appreciation. A. Burian rightly emphasizes that the autochthonous products “were designed almost exclusively for the USSR market”, and currently at its quality and standards can only be sold on the markets of CIS countries “and now Moldova is obliged to maintain its position on the CIS market, and don't allow to be removed from there despite the fierce competition”²⁷. But it is also true that CIS unfair competition caused major restrictions, Russian Federation widely applying economic methods for punitive purposes of political nature, while achieving European integration, the Republic of Moldova will benefit from another kind of treatment and Moldovan goods connected to the European Community requirements will consolidate their quality and by diversification on the Russian market. In general, the argument in favor of traditional markets is temporary, because the market economy with imminent will eliminate weak competitors and the friendly insurance to remedy the situation will help. In the same reference system of the multi-vector nature of foreign policy, the idea proposed by S. Nazaria is highlighted, which claims that Moldova's strategic course is Europe

integration by approaching all European countries, but the strategic partner in achieving this process is Russia²⁸. This way of perceiving the Moldovan foreign policy is determined by the fact that the Republic of Moldova was not able to formulate clear objectives, preferring the so-called multi-vector policy to balance between East and West, it failed to formulate a clear vision of anchoring the national interest in a system of benchmarks and values that would have allowed them to quickly and efficiently overcome the difficult transition by creating beneficial external conditions for reforming successfully the country²⁹. Referring to the quality of Moldovan diplomacy, I. Munteanu invokes a critical opinion, not without reason, its failure and “visible deficit of ideas and action, able to redefine, using modern terms, the country's national interest³⁰”.

In the same context of diplomatic efforts, but the political will and goodwill being also indispensable, include the opportunity of normalization of bilateral relations with Romania not only because it is a neighbour country, but also with the aim of capitalizing provision from the Concept of foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova: cooperation with Romania will ensure integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European community.³¹

Finally, we pay attention to the Program of activity “European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, and Welfare”, approved by the governing Liberal Democratic Party for 2009 – 2013, which has a special significance in the evolution of the national interest of the Republic. In the Government report regarding the implementation of this program after a year of government a series of achievements of internal and external nature is ascertained³², which has contributed to strengthening the country's *national interest* in terms of increased credibility for the Republic of Moldova in the EU countries. Thus, taking into consideration the EU enlargement, no significant differences between the structural elements of the *national interest* are noticed, as it was until recently. However, the national interest of our country, regarded as a factor itself, does not have enough consensual substance. The regarded interest may not be naturally associated with the consensus because of strained relations between government and opposition. There are also divisive elements within the ruling elite, between the leaders of the Alliance for the European Integration.

Conclusions

Taking into account all previous arguments, the option of the bulk of Moldovan citizens of joining the EU (according to surveys conducted by IPP Moldova), the timeliness of the subject regarding European integration in political circles in Chişinău and the modest actions taken to achieve this goal, make us believe that the Republic of Moldova, after a period of uncertainty, will opt for *European integration* as a primary *national interest*. Defining its national interests is for the Republic of Moldova an opportunity to demonstrate that committed to follow the democratic values, it is open to dialogue and to bilateral and multilateral cooperation, it tends to become a security generator and a reliable partner, giving them more credibility. Once some clear priorities for the strategic development of the Republic of Moldova are set, their achievement, taking into consideration the quality of small country of the Republic of Moldova, will be possible only because of their diplomatic actions framed in a very active and coherent foreign policy.

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CYPRUS AND BEYOND: SHIFTING INTERESTS OF THE EU

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This article provides a theoretical background to the interest definition of the EU in dealing with the Cyprus issue that has implications for regional and global security. The shifting interest definitions of the EU are analysed through neorealist and social constructivist schools of International Relations. It is argued that the European approach to Cyprus is based on strategic priorities, taking into account the geopolitical position of the island in the Eastern Mediterranean context. Since this region faces a turbulent period, EU's relations with its neighbourhood are to be reformed under new conditions. In this regard, the Cyprus issue constitutes a case for understanding the interest identification upon which EU foreign policy is based on. This paper states that while the Eastern Mediterranean region imposes strategic visions over integrative ones, EU foreign policy's efficiency and cohesion is strongly linked to its soft power capacities defined in terms of constructive and cooperative attitudes.

Key-words: neorealism; social constructivism; Cyprus; European Union; Eastern Mediterranean; Turkish Cypriots; Greek Cypriots.

Introduction

The changes that flew from 1980s ended up with the decline of the Soviet bloc and the rise of

the USA as a superpower. The new international system that presents an uncertain and complex structure brought with it new interest conceptions that the classical schools of International Relations could not have conceived. In this respect, some new approaches, taking into account social and economic factors in the definition process of interests, have emerged in order to tackle global challenges that could not be understood through classical approaches. Therefore, neorealism, based on logical deduction and social constructivism, based on the inductive thinking which constitute the theoretical perspective of this article, are to be elaborated as a “harmony of contradictions.”¹

The change in the nature of international system has also transformed the tools that the international actors mobilize in order to face regional and global challenges. Therefore, it was imperative to add new tools to the classical ones in order to become a significant actor in the international arena. The way in which actors deal with international challenges, as a result of their interest conception varies between rigid and imperious methods conducted by states and/or state oriented mechanisms and flexible, specific, and comprehensive attitudes stipulated by a multiplicity of actors. The EU presents the right framework for approaching old problems in new ways from a *soft power* perspective. The EU, mobilizing political, economic and socio-

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cultural tools rather than military and strategic instruments, assumes a role of *soft power* in the international scene. In this sense, Cyprus' EU membership since 2004 constituted a turning point for the history of the whole island, because the EU could present a framework for cooperation and integration for sustainable peace on the island with its repercussions on Southern Europe, Middle East and Caucasus through its enlargement policy and *soft security* capacities.

The way in which the EU tackles the Cyprus issue is related to its interest definitions. The first one is based on the classical interest definition in search for relative gains by maintaining conflictual positions and thus the *status quo*. The second one is about to bring a perspective change in order to contribute to the transformation of the conflict through a constructive point of view. The choice that the EU is to make is not only dependent on its aspirations, but also on the *realpolitik* of the regional and global challenges.

The argument of this article is meant to fathom EU's interest definitions while dealing with the Cyprus conflict in a broader regional context with a theoretical explanation. This article considers the concept of "interest" from a perspective of International Relations with its classical and new explanations. The first part of this paper analyses from a theoretical point of view the concept mentioned above, relying on the paradigms of neorealist and social constructivist schools of International Relations. The second section is devoted to the development of EU's relations with Cyprus. This study ends with an evaluation of the Cyprus issue in the Eastern Mediterranean context in terms of security anxieties, geopolitical and geostrategic concerns and regional dominance.

1. Theoretical Analysis and Interest Definitions

Neorealist paradigm, derived from classical realism, is based on a systemic approach of international relations that privileges structural elements over agents' behaviours and strategies. It argues that the international system depends on state-centric security relationships and materialistic views. The main principle of the international system is considered *anarchy*, which presents a decentralized structure without any formal central authority. It is composed of sovereign and rational states which have the capacity of making

politics and acting unilaterally. Every single unit, i.e. sovereign states, whose functions are not differentiated from each other, are positioned equally in the international system. According to K. Waltz, state activities are shaped under the pressure that originates from international competition that restricts and eliminates choices. On another note, states are largely concerned with relative gains rather than absolute ones; and the main goal of states is to prevent the others from increasing their relative capacities.²

From the neorealist perspective, the primary concern of states is to ensure their own survival and security prior to a consideration for economic and/or social factors. This is a prerequisite for states before following other goals like prosperity and/or technology. This approach actually explains the *self-help* principle, according to which every state seeks its own interest and does not bow to others' interests. This structure, which generates uncertainties, is based on distrust and insecurity between states. Since states prioritize their own security and cooperation possibilities are limited, military instruments are needed in order to prevent offensive action and eliminate potential dangers as defined amongst perils to survival. To this end, every state would increase its relative power defined in terms of military capabilities. As states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, they seek to accumulate power in order to face future threats. This trend which constitutes a response to international concerns, and implies the maximization of relative power without any communicative relationship between the units of the system is called the *security dilemma*. In other words, this is an escalation of relative powers prompted by states choices based on individual perceptions.

Thus, neorealism has an interest definition based on sovereignty, power, relative capabilities, survival and national security. The notion of interest constitutes the essence of this approach which is described in terms of *hard security*. Since neorealism has its roots in traditionalist military-dominant perspective, states pursue their national interests rationally and incessantly. Sovereign states have conflicting interests and they try to impose their own priorities on the others concerning their interest definitions. The national interest could be interpreted by two different perspectives based on the acquisition of power. The first one is based on



the maximization of power in an offensive manner and the second is on the maximization of security with a defensive aspect. According to the offensive view, since there is always a possible threat to security, states will never feel safe in the *status quo* and will tend to increase their relative power.³ However, the defensive agent will be seeking to maintain the balance of power in order to avoid a conflict or war, which means that states will try to retain their power.⁴ In this case, the security concern of a state becomes a source of fear for another state. Even though a state accumulates military instruments just for defensive purposes, it is considered by the others as a threat warranting a response. The states' choices as regards to reducing the security of the others and increasing its own security appear as a function of the balance between offensive and defensive approaches.⁵ While the defensive balance is intended to protect its own security, the offensive balance means the attempt to assure its own security upon other actors by increasing insecurity.

During the Cold War, interest definitions were widely based upon power definitions. The struggle between the blocs for domination based on ideological, political, economic and social differentiation was supported by military capacities including nuclear deterrence. However, the dynamic nature of socio-economic structures and the permanent transformation of aspirations in the societies were not taken into account.⁶ The end of the bi-polar system indicated that the military issues constituted only a part of the international relations and states were no more the only actors of the international system. Hence, it is no longer possible to understand the international system through the egoistic behaviours of states, which in turn has implications over interest definitions.

The state-privileged approach of the Cold War has reassessed social priorities with the erosion of state role. Social constructivism, which offers a new understanding of international relations by taking into account historical, political, economic, social and geographical factors, deals with the relationship between power and the role of norms and values like human rights or economic welfare in international socialization and the diffusion of administrative cultures. In that respect, the foreign policy of a state is formed by shared collective norms, values and cultures in the framework of a socially 'constructed' process through the mecha-

nisms of social learning and interaction. As such, the unification of individual perceptions at the social level would generate the transformation of state relations and consequently that of the international system. Since A. Wendt considers the social construction process from a historical perspective, the goal is to examine state perceptions, roles and identities through the network of state relations.

Social constructivism emphasizes the importance of normative structures, the role of identities and the mutual formation of structures and agents in the construction process of behaviours and interests. In this framework, the culture appears as a structural and structuring factor which constitutes and reforms states over identities and interests.⁷ E. Adler defines constructivism as "the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world".⁸

Soft security concepts such as norms, values and identities are admitted as the independent variables of social constructivist foreign policy understanding. In conformity with this view, interests are proceed from social practices and defined upon inter subjectivity based on shared ideas which help shape state interests. In the words of A. Wendt, "interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is."⁹ So, the states act according to their interests defined through their perceptions.¹⁰ S. Walt states that constructivists consider the interests and identities as the flexible outcome of historical processes.¹¹ Since the identities are in a constant process of being formed and reformed, the interests are also produced and reproduced as a response to the transformation of identities. In that sense, the reformation of identities in the social environment shapes the interest definitions which appear as a function of identities and works as a guide in the international scene. Thus, interests transcending national structures and reaching the transnational level are the outcome of the interaction between states as result of perpetually transformed norms, values, ideas and expectations.

It was therefore impossible to understand the EU which emerges as a non-state actor through classical state definitions, taking into consideration the decline of the unique and exclusive role of the state and the blurring of the distinction between domestic and external politics. The EU enjoys a



shared form of sovereignty that is different from a classical state. Identities and thus interests are performed from an integration perspective which relies on the constitutive processes rather than a fixed, immutable and stable sovereignty approach. This European approach emphasizes the democratization and demilitarization processes by using political, economic, normative and socio-cultural instruments. In that sense, EU's foreign policy tools encouraging consultation and desecuritization mechanisms could have a functional effect in preventing the unilateralist approaches of the member and candidate states.

EU's positive contributions are stated by C. Hill in that the EU represents a settled bloc of constitutional relations and a zone of peace in the international system; a model for other regional organizations; the hopes of many for some kind of political counter-balance to the United States; a reference point inside other international organizations that fulfils the actualization of certain principles of conduct in foreign policy and finally a reference to the idea of "civilian power"¹² stressing the utility of *milieu goals*¹³ such as the environment or new forms of governance for a turbulent world, promotion of human rights, transnational processes of justice and criminal investigation.¹⁴

The role of the EU in the international arena is considered more broadly within the conception of a long-term perspective and augmentation of security frameworks, so that the EU can play an effective and influential role in non-crisis situations.¹⁵ This view refers not just to a response to crisis, also the pre-crisis situations and the stages before military intervention. The EU seems to be an effective actor especially in the field of conflict prevention by using its soft power tools. The overall international role of the EU is summarised as "emphasizing diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, the centrality of mediation in conflict-resolution, the importance of long-term economic solutions to political problems and the need for indigenous peoples to determine their own fate – all of these in contradistinction to the norms of superpower politics."¹⁶ The role of the EU in the international arena has been subject to many approaches underlying in different ways the capability-expectations gap.¹⁷ The civilian power Europe introduced by F. Duchêne in 1970's reflects the context of the Cold War and refers to diplomacy, negotiation, multilateralism, economic instruments of foreign policy as trade and foreign

aid for development, legal and judicial tools and peacekeeping. In the words of S. Wood, a civilian power is an actor that employs non-military means to pursue its interests and to try to solve international problems. The concept admits that the EU has a moral superiority over some actors in international politics.¹⁸

The EU's goal to be a 'force for good' in the world was treated, alongside the civilian power Europe by another concept: the normative power Europe. This concept prioritises constitutive approach rather than empirical one for designating ideational impact of the EU's international role. According to I. Manners, "the most important factor shaping the role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is."¹⁹ In that respect, normative power refers to a system of values as democracy, human rights, rule of law and civil freedoms within and beyond its borders. The instruments for the implementation of these values can be cited as international institutions, international law, international legitimacy, negotiation and dialogue by excluding non-military connotations. It's obvious that the capacity of persuasion and conviction of the EU to transform others preferences appears as an important factor. Serving as the institutional repository of member states' shared second-order normative concern, the EU is regarded as a 'force for good' in the world, championing values and principles that have universal applicability and reflect cosmopolitan norms.²⁰ The growing strategic role and importance of the EU in the international arena positioned the EU as a global actor possessing both civilian and normative power as well as social and material instruments. This is about to play an international role beyond civilian and normative power conceptions by using ethics. The concept ethical power Europe takes into account the pursuit of peace and prosperity; the diffusion of norms as democracy, multilateralism, rule of law, good governance and human rights and the promotion of negotiation, dialogue and interactivity. However, these elements are supported universally and indirectly by the EU. The notion of ethical power Europe does not refer to empirical reality but to a new concept that opens up new lines of critical reflection.²¹

The European Security Strategy (2003)²² and the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004)²³ define EU as a force for good in the world. It's



argued that the EU became a global power capable of influencing regional and global parameters. The European Security Strategy and the European Neighbourhood Policy consider the EU as a positive role model assuming the responsibility of acting on global scale. The promotion of stability, security and well-being for all via its carrot policy and the adoption of new tasks in the areas of crisis management, conflict resolution, peace-keeping, state-building and reconstructing failing states are stated in the framework of improving its own utility by improving cyclically others utility.

In the same way, general provisions on the Union's external action is cited in the article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty as "The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law."²⁴ Taking into account the values, principles and objectives defined in the Lisbon Treaty which strengthened the role of the EU as an international actor, I. Manners argues that the constitutionalisation of normative principles in the Treaty marks the crystallization and culmination of norms and practices which have been evolving over the past 15 years and the efforts of the EU for a more just and cosmopolitical world.²⁵

The *soft power* of the EU arises from its problem solving and conflict resolution capacity regarding its neighbourhood and also around the world. In other words, efficiency of the EU is strongly linked to its abilities of being an intervener on the grounds of objective, credible and sustainable perspectives in order to transform the established order and bring a securitization aspect to the problems via constructive and integrative tools. Besides local conflicts as Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Balkan conflicts, the Cyprus case offers an opportunity for evaluating the problem solving capacity of the EU and also the way in which the EU defines its interests regarding foreign policy.

2. European Union – Cyprus Relations

The Zurich and London Treaties of 1959 which ended the civil war on the island were signed

between Greece, Turkey and Britain as 'guarantor powers'. In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was declared as an independent state for the first time in its history on the basis of Treaty of Foundation, Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance, being a single, ethnically-mixed and bi-communal state based on an equal representation between Turkish and Greek communities. However the constitutional system did not have a lasting order due to the inter-ethnic clashes, which intensified after 1960. Since the Turkish Cypriots claimed they were ousted from the government in 1963, the island was divided into two political entities, of which the southern part *de jure* represents the whole of the island internationally. Turkish Cypriots declared unilaterally independence in 1983 as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) recognized only by Turkey.

Following the membership of the UK in 1973, the relations with Cyprus became a current issue in the framework of association but not membership, and negotiations were carried out with Greek Cypriots on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus. An Association Agreement regarding the establishment of a customs union between the EU and Cyprus came into effect in 1973, calling for the elimination of all tariffs and quotas within five years and the creation of a customs union in two stages. The agreement also prohibited discrimination against the Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots by their EU trading partners.²⁶ Cyprus has always maintained close relations with the EU in economic, social and political terms, but these relations have been from the start essentially exclusionary of Turkish Cypriots, as in the 1973 agreement.

Greek Cypriots, representing the whole island, submitted their application for full membership to the EU on July 4, 1990. In 1993, the Commission noted in its Opinion that "the Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership and that as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession."²⁷ Until 1994, the EU called for a settlement in the Cyprus issue before the membership and linked an eventual solution of the conflict to the membership. The aim was to bring together the two sides and reach a solution on the basis of European values. Hence, the European approach has somewhat changed at the European Council at Corfu of 24-25 June 1994. The Presidency Conclusions of the Summit



stated that the next phase of the enlargement would involve Cyprus and Malta.²⁸ This decision made clear that the resolution of the Cyprus conflict was not a precondition for full membership of the island. It needs to be underlined that the EU expected that it could play the role of catalyst in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict.²⁹

This change in the attitude of the EU can be explained with several reasons. First, as the EU has deepened economic integration and reached the status of a great economic power, it wanted to improve its common foreign and security policy further and Cyprus was chosen as a test case in that regard. Second, EU's possible help in solving the Cyprus issue would help it to go ahead with plans of becoming a global power. Third, as being located at the triangle of Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus, Cyprus is of strategic importance to take the EU to a new geography, making it neighbour to the Middle East. Fourth, the convergence of Greek and EU foreign policies with each other broke mutual cautious policies up and the EU was not forced to pursue a neutral attitude on the issue.³⁰ On 6 March 1995, the Council of Ministers Conclusion confirmed Cyprus' suitability for membership and took the decision that accession negotiations with Cyprus would start six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. In the words of C. Brewin, the Presidency's hopes that this would mark a historic turning point in EU relations with Turkey and that the accession process would bring the Turkish Cypriots to agree to an economically beneficial solution within the EU context have both been dashed.³¹

In this framework, French, German, Dutch and Italian governments expressed their concerns about the full membership perspective of Cyprus without a political solution to the division of the island taking into consideration the whole enlargement process of the EU and EU-Turkey relations.³² "In retrospect, the 1995 decision seems to have been a miscalculation – it has become part of a chain of events with dangerous implications for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as for transatlantic strategic interests more generally."³³ The 1995 decision marks the starting process of Europeanization of the Cyprus issue and hereafter, the EU became a party involved in the Cyprus conflict.

"Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union", presented on 16 July 1997 by the

European Commission, considered the future of Cyprus in the EU and recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus even if no solution was reached on the island's longstanding conflict. The Commission also stated that the *status quo*, which is at odds with international law, threatens the stability of the island, the region and has implications for European security. This point of view regarding Cyprus makes it clear that Cyprus cannot be thought without any geostrategic and geopolitical connotations. The Luxembourg Summit of 1997 included Cyprus within the first rank of countries of admission and confirmed that the accession negotiations with Cyprus would start by the end of March 1998. Although the general assumption was that the negotiation process would produce a catalytic effect for a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus issue, EU's decision has had the opposite effect and has actually made reintegration less likely.³⁴ The Council's decision has further complicated prospects for a settlement and the EU gave up any pretence that accession negotiations would produce a 'catalytic effect' resolving the Cyprus dispute.³⁵

In early 2000's, Turkish Cypriots had some efforts for participating in the Europeanization process of the island and has started a campaign in support of a solution. In 2002, an EU information centre has been opened on the premises of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and in 2003 Turkish Cypriot leadership decided to open up crossing points on the Green Line. In the same period, Greek Cypriots ended the negotiations on 13 December 2002 and signed the accession agreement on 16 April 2003 which recognized that the *acquis communautaire* is suspended in the areas of the country which are not under the effective control of the Government of Cyprus.³⁶ It is considered that the authority of the Republic does not in practice extend to the north and its legitimacy is rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.

The final version of the UN proposed plan to end the division of the island, the so called Annan Plan was submitted for approval at separate simultaneous referenda in both the northern and the southern parts of the island on 24 April 2004. The plan was accepted in the north with 65% and rejected in the south with 76%, and hence an opportunity for cooperation, reconciliation and peace on the island and in a larger sense, on the Eastern Mediterranean region was missed. The



EU considered liable for solving the conundrum of how to avoid castigating the side that sought reconciliation by shutting it out of its enlargement round and rewarding the side that rejected this reconciliation with accession.³⁷

Following the accession of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May 2004 as a *de facto* divided island, the Commission proposed a package of aid and trade intending to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community which is a member *de jure*, but not *de facto*. However, the Green Line Regulation approved in 2004 and Aid Regulation approved in 2006 met many problems regarding the implementation and the Direct Trade Regulation remains with the Council for consideration. EU policies towards Cyprus after 2004 are focused on softening the Green Line. The goals of current policies and practices are to fully integrate Cyprus into the EU's internal stable functioning market economy which will benefit all the people of Cyprus; to cooperate with Cyprus in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe and the wider world and in finding effective responses to common challenges facing the continent; to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community of northern Cyprus.³⁸ This attitude did not produce any resolution or rapprochement with a bizonal, bicomunal and federal framework in sight. With the accession of Cyprus, the EU became a primary party bringing within its own jurisdiction a protracted ethnic conflict characterized by historical memory, regional hostilities, major-power interference in internal affairs, and reluctance to change the *status quo* and one driven originally by extreme nationalist rhetoric, intolerance of cultural differences, abuse of minorities, and use of violence to subvert the political process.³⁹

The EU enlargement process is designed to bring stability, peace, prosperity and security as an instrument of integration. In this manner, EU's membership accession process has a potential transformative effect which could present a proper framework for the solution of conflicts. The integration of new members into the western European system through a set of norms and rules in different political, economic, commercial and social spheres makes the Union a force for peace *via* its sticks and carrots policy. Likewise, the EU

could have created a catalytic effect in the Cyprus conflict but remained unsuccessful to be "the new hope" for the future of the island and the whole region. "Interestingly, the EU seems to be the only international organization with the capacity –through a stick/carrot policy- to impact a political settlement in Cyprus."⁴⁰ In the stick and carrot framework, the EU is constructed as an actor standing outside the conflict but helping to bring about a solution.⁴¹ As soon as the outside actor became a part of the conflict, its problem-solving capacity has vanished. The EU has failed in two important respects, according to N. Tocci. The first is not having driven away the Greek Cypriots' self reliance over unconditional accession including their misplaced reliance on *acquis communautaire* and the second, not to be able to present itself as an alternative security framework at both regional and international levels.⁴² "If the EU was to make a positive contribution, it would have to more actively support inter-communal grassroots activities, combined with a renewed approach towards the Northern part, withdrawing the grounds on which politicians perform securitizations and thus continuously reify identities"⁴³

Domestic and international factors have created incentives for both Turkish and Greek Cypriots to follow a non-cooperative strategy aimed at unilateral victory rather than a compromise.⁴⁴ However, the European project that stands on the shared sovereignty and multiple identities could help overcome the Cyprus conflict which is often conceptualized as a zero-sum game.⁴⁵ If the EU is to become a catalyst in Cyprus, it is not because EU membership will automatically solve the problems on the ground, but because the institutional and discursive framework that the EU provides allows for the re-articulation and re-presentation of identities.⁴⁶ The EU could change the interest perception on the island by the expansion of the civil society which was also envisioned to enable the formation of interest groups that would be able to form trans-cultural links on the island and transnational ones outside it, within the context of the EU and beyond.⁴⁷

However, the "constructive" impact based on shared values and interaction, like democracy, European identity, pluralism, rights through the broadening of civil society that the EU could have on the existing conflict has not taken place because of the interest definition adopted by the



EU. Although the steps taken by the EU could have been classified within *soft* measures, it has contributed to the *status quo* on the island due to its state-centric concerns regarding the Eastern Mediterranean. This inherent involvement of the EU in the conflict tends to undermine attempts of desecuritization, since whatever moves the EU or representatives of its Member States make, it will easily be securitized in turn.⁴⁸ Similar to this view, the catalytic effect which was anticipated to emanate the securitized environment turned to be in contrast, a desecuritization factor. The membership of Greek Cypriots led to further securitization in the region as defined by classical approaches. The EU did reinforce, rather than ameliorate the situation on the island by placing itself on the side of Greek Cypriots. Whereas the transformation process itself is much more important than the outcome, the membership brought an end to this process. In the words of E. Prodromou, the membership of Cyprus was conceived within the context of stability in NATO's and Europe's southern region and the EU decision on Cyprus signalled that transatlantic policy-makers view peace within the Eastern Mediterranean triangle of Greece-Cyprus-Turkey as critical to a multi-regional strategic calculus incorporating South-eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus.⁴⁹

The Eastern Mediterranean faces great challenges which have consequences on global security. This region in turbulence suffers from geostrategic and geopolitical priorities which dominate social and civil aspects by impeding integrative, constructive and inclusive interests and promoting unilateral, egoist and introversive interests. By accepting EU membership of Cyprus, EU took into account *hard security* concerns rather than *soft security* aspects.

3. Cyprus and the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean Context

The Cyprus issue cannot be treated without taking into account the parameters of the Eastern Mediterranean region. In this respect, T. Diez evaluates that securitizations on Cyprus are intertwined with securitizations in the Eastern Mediterranean in general, making the search for desecuritization ever more difficult.⁵⁰ The Middle East and the Mediterranean have always been a source of instability in terms of strategic and

political visions. The security concerns historically prevailed in the region over cooperation initiatives. The Eastern Mediterranean especially since the end of the Cold War faced threat-focused attitudes emphasizing uncertainty and unpredictability. Because of this troubled structure, NATO and the EU have focused on the enhancement of the western influence through enlargement processes. However, factors such as Iran-Israel tensions, Sunni-Shiite geopolitics, and hectic militarization in the region make the region a source of conflict on a global scale. In addition, this area is contingent to serious political and economic problems after the process so-called "Arab Spring" which remains an instability factor. Therefore this region in turmoil resonates with geostrategic and military ambitions and national interest anxieties and that is why a strong need for cooperation is required in order to maintain regional and global stability.

The Eastern Mediterranean is defined as the West's outer limit.⁵¹ The borders of this region, which constitutes a distinction line between the west and the East go through Greece, Turkey, Israel and Cyprus. This group called the "Western quartet" by E. Inbar and S. Sandler needs to be achieving a better coordination of its foreign policies and their interactions has to be institutionalized at various levels. This region, shaped by materialistic and military priorities, impose the pursuit of conflicting, unilateral and nationalist interests on the actors concerned. In that sense, geographic and geostrategic rhetoric taking its source from neorealist view has a strong background in the region.

The Cyprus conflict which occupies a central place in the multidimensional strategic and regional balances of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and southern Europe, ranks high on the foreign policy agenda of the governments of Turkey, Greece, the USA and Russia and has implications for stability in NATO and policy-making in the European Union.⁵² The Cyprus issue, which seems to be an inter-ethnic conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, is also related with the strategic plans and/or concerns of various actors. A peaceful solution of the conflict has been blocked by political and military perspectives of diverse actors. This is the reason why the reconciliation between two communities is necessary but not sufficient because of strategic formulations over this region regarding strategic objectives and priorities.⁵³



The balance around the Eastern Mediterranean and the security of NATO's area in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus conflict is crucial because the *status quo* further complicates security concerns in the region. "A timely and viable resolution of the Cyprus problem is a strategic imperative for NATO. Eastern Mediterranean is located at the centre of a volatile regional triangle comprising South-eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Given that stability in the Eastern Mediterranean is impossible without a viable Cyprus solution, NATO's broad strategic interests are linked to a sustainable peace in Cyprus."⁵⁴ During the Cold War, the US was the key actor with regard to Cyprus; Europe played a marginal role. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Europe's influence on the Cyprus issue has increased significantly.⁵⁵ In that context, the shifted relative influence of the US and Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean appears as an advantage for the EU in order to extend EU's influence in the region and increase European commitment to security there over the recent years.

The main actor which could have a transformative effect on this region appears to be the EU with its *soft security* aspects. After the Cold War, the EU became a global political entity through its soft security role in the international system. One of the main objectives of the EU is to build and follow a structured and effective foreign policy with respect to emerging and ongoing conflicts, within both its own region and its periphery. The European approach based on human elements with sociological dimension presents a supranational framework for reinforcing the economic and political benefits generated by power-sharing system in the Eastern Mediterranean. "European interests are in creating peace in the Eastern Mediterranean and in taking seriously its new self-definition as a multicultural and security actor protecting minorities and human rights."⁵⁶ Since the *hard security* elements are dominant in this region, the important threshold for the EU is to be able to change the rules of the game. This attitude could pave the way to a democratic and peaceful neighbourhood in conformity with EU's aspirations and expectations in terms of regional and global challenges.

The Cyprus issue, alimanted by classically national interest concerns offers a test case for the implementation of EU's soft security policies which means actually a perspective change for the

whole region. In that sense, whether the EU, as an international actor that spreads democratic and civilian principles has been engaged to the Cyprus issue in the context of Eastern Mediterranean challenges, it could have a positive effect on EU's foreign policy. But currently, this integration mentality is not valuable and viable in the region. Israelites and Greek Cypriots are working together in political, economic, energy and military domains; French and Germans are deepening with Greek Cypriots political dialogue and military cooperation.⁵⁷ These entire cooperation frameworks encourage unilateral approaches but this segmentary structure does not generate any cooperation network and integration. Indeed, these unilateral cooperation schemes damage EU foreign policy's cohesion and effectiveness and also the constructive effect that the EU is to produce for the whole region. Firstly, the EU cannot assume a conflict resolving role as in the case of Cyprus, the EU became a part of the conflict but not the catalyst of the resolution. And secondly, the EU cannot act as a global power having a weight on the international system. Factors such as economic gravity shifting from West to East or declining demography make already difficult for the EU to be a global actor.⁵⁸ In this case, the EU has two choices regarding its positioning on the international scene according to J. Howorth. It will either improve its capacity for adapting to the new world order or experiment an eventual unravelled process.⁵⁹ The EU's civilian, normative and ethical role that follows from its *soft power* capacities has a crucial meaning regarding the adaptation of EU's foreign policy to the new international system especially through its conflict resolution and problem solving competences with a social dimension.

In the context of the Cyprus conflict, the EU faces many struggles to deal with Turkey and to regulate EU – NATO institutional relationship. Given the geostrategic importance of the island, membership without Turkey's agreement meant, in the words of Neil Nugent, 'to act unilaterally to what Turkey regards as one of its core interests.'⁶⁰ The entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU reversed the cooperation initiatives between Turkey and Greece developed in late 1990, increased the tensions on the island and deteriorated the EU-Turkey relations as expected by H. J. Barkey and P. H. Gordon.⁶¹ The membership of Cyprus resulted in the alienation of Turkey by the EU and bilateral

relations have been seriously damaged. In 2006, eight chapters related to the customs union agreement were suspended on trade and transportation related domains. Also, six chapters met Greek Cyprus blockage in 2009. Finally, the upcoming rotating presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012 constitutes another source of problem between Turkey and the EU. Since Turkey does not recognize Greek Cypriots as the representative of the whole island, it refuses to participate to the meetings presided by Greek Cypriots. In addition, the drilling activities of Cyprus to exploit energy resources in the exclusive economic zone in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute another source of tension threatening the regional stability. The Cyprus conflict also presents an obstacle to institutional relations between NATO and the EU. Turkey is using its veto right in order to prevent the participation of Cyprus to NATO-EU meetings, while Cyprus likewise is blocking Turkey's participation in the European Defence Agency and obstructs any moves towards Turkey signing a security agreement with the EU.⁶²

The Arab spring, a process started in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, etc. covers a wide area including North Africa and the Middle East. Even though the domestic dynamics in each state are different, the main demand of the peoples consists of freedom and prosperity. This transformation process contains many uncertainties and complexities for the region and bears several risks to the global order. It could also foster conflictual, military and nationalist tendencies in the region. But an integrative and constructive effect is needed to overcome the difficulties that the region faces and to promote stability and security for the wider region. In this era of a plethora of changes, it is even more important for the EU to redefine its neighbourhood policy in an effective and coherent way.⁶³

Conclusions

During the Cold War, Cyprus was the instrument for preserving the conflictual relationships in the framework of bipolar *status quo*. In the aftermath of the Cold War, this 'role' of Cyprus has not changed and Cyprus has continued to be a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean with its strategic location at the crossroads of Euro-Asia. The Cyprus issue, referring to a long-lasting

and protracted dispute between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots has wider connotations that go beyond the inter-ethnic problems, and the problematical situation on the island gets more complicated as regards to geopolitical and geostrategic position of the island.

The EU defined its interests regarding Cyprus by taking into account Cyprus' geopolitical and geostrategic importance for the Eastern Mediterranean region. In this manner, the way in which the EU deals with the Cyprus question is far away of being constructive and integrative. The EU did not adopt an integrative approach and thus, did not have a constructive impact on the problem and in a more general manner, on the reshaping of its neighbourhood but preferred to conduct a strategic policy aiming at protecting its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. This policy is stuck between European *soft security* aspirations on the international scene and the *realpolitik* of the region in the international system.

This state of affairs has five fundamental implications for EU foreign policy. The first one is that the credibility, efficiency and cohesion of EU foreign policy and thus the European capacity for challenging established orders is seriously damaged in the international scene. Secondly, since the EU could not turn into a constructive actor able to bring a change for the whole region, the intervention of the national governments seems to be inevitable.

This conflictual perspective does not promote the resolution of the Cyprus conflict and stability quest over the Eastern Mediterranean but military and strategic priorities. Thirdly, the instability in and around Cyprus makes the island part of unilateralist partnerships and the conflict of interest is pursued upon Cyprus' problematical structure. Fourthly, EU-Turkey relations but also the cooperation schemes that could be initiated in the Eastern Mediterranean have deteriorated. Finally, EU's ability to transform the region and the way of approaching the region from a strategic perspective to a socially constructive one is crucial during the Arab spring that is conducted by societal demands for reform.

Consequently, the EU's failure to take into consideration soft power factors, as well as its shifting interests of the EU over the Cyprus problem and beyond pushes the EU for a struggle for power.



NOTES:

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THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRITY IN DANGER: THE CASE OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

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The current period of deep economic and financial crisis of the Euro-zone entails a comprehensive and wide-ranging crisis of legitimacy of the European Union, which, to a large extent, affects not only its activities towards Member States, but in particular its role as a responsible and relevant international actor. In the forthcoming period, it will be particularly crucial for the European Union to make a decision on its future existence and functioning. In this paper, we will therefore focus our attention to the current crisis of the European Union legitimacy, as well as to actually discuss ways of its future direction, outlining briefly advantages and disadvantages of each mode and drawing a picture of the complexity and the extent of impacts of each variation.

Key-words: crisis of Euro-zone; legitimacy of the European Union; future direction.

Introduction

The issue of various forms of the European Union legitimacy in the current period of economic and financial crisis of the Euro-zone goes forefront much more than ever. Today, not only the specific measures and procedures are being questioned, but

also the overall importance of the existence of the European Union as a whole. This fact is leading the European Union to the most important cross-roads in its development. The European Union is getting closer to the moment when it will be necessary for it to decide about its dissolution / survival, about the form of the future systematic and structural functioning, and also about the legitimacy of its activities.

The aim of this article is therefore to outline the current status of the legitimacy of the European Union as well as to present the upcoming possibilities of its further development, including advantages and disadvantages of each these presumptions.

On the basis of these projections of European Union future development, it will be possible to assess, to some extent, their own sustainability of implementation. It means that they will allow us to realize their own impact on the further deepening of the economic crisis, worsening of already declining international status and power of the European Union and, last but not least, to create a picture of the complexity and scope of the impact of each presented presuppositions.

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1. Legitimacy of the European Union

The question of legitimacy of the European Union is a matter that accompanies the process of European integration from the very beginning. Despite the long-term examination of its nature and the ways which can most efficiently turn it into existence and operation of the European Union, it is still a highly controversial topic of the various discussions connected with the different systematic and procedural changes of the EU functioning.

The birth of the initiative of this integration formation has already been questioned, which according to the authors Banchoff and Smith was historically managed rather by the elite groups than by the voice of people. Naturally, the legitimacy of integration process as a whole has been questioned and lacked any support from the side of people.¹ From the development point of view, the significant decrease in overall power of the European Union is caused by especially so-called democratic, social and cultural deficit.

The democratic deficit concerns special activities of institutions of the European Union, the complexity of their decision-making procedures, and transparency of political processes, which are for citizens of the Member States unintelligible and this fact makes interest of the further knowledge disappearing and at the same time are getting more and more distanced. The result, in this case, was and still is a need for continuous approximation of the Union institutions to its citizens.

In the case of social deficits with the same result there is a crucial need for effective international discussion about important social issues, among which there are: social, health and pension insurance, the existence of real European political parties, a common fiscal policy and the like.

In connection with the cultural legitimacy of the European Union is due to the fact that in the case of citizens of Member States of the European Union “there is no subjective identification (sharing a common identity and loyalty), or an objective identification (based on ethno-cultural criteria) in relation to the European Union”², the need for creation of space for people's general identification with the European Union and all that belongs to it, is getting to the forefront.

The current situation of financial and economic crisis, ending with a deep and prolonged economic recession of the euro-zone, is for the future and

legitimacy of the European Union serious key factor. With that crisis is no longer just a general criticism of multilateral activities of the European Union, but there is also a comprehensive and wide-ranging crisis of legitimacy of its existence, in which loses attractiveness, credibility and support from all social groups. It is therefore a moment when the European Union must decide about the future direction and where it should find a source of legitimacy of its activities so as to be able to solve problems quickly and efficiently and overcome the most difficult crises and protect its citizens.

2. Economic vs. Political Crisis

Here it is necessary to realize that the financial and economic crisis of recent years has created a stalemate in which economic necessity and political impossibility of implementing necessary measures results from inability of the European Union to react flexibly and this impossibility of implementing necessary measures stands against economic necessity for this measures.³

In this situation, citizens are just fearfully watching the adoption of a large number of different measures of uncertain outcome and very quickly lose faith in any other action taken by the European Union. As a result of introduced loss of faith in the activities of the European Union the aspect of democracy in the European Union processes is also quickly disappearing. In general this democratic crisis of the European Union amended by the economic crisis is **thereafter called** “Political crisis”.

An excellent example of this stalemate may be a current requirement for creation of a fiscal union as a supplement of the economic and political union, in which the most problematic aspects are considered to be the following:⁴

1. creating a sort of European Union Finance Ministry, whose mission should be to enforce compliance with tax laws;
2. opportunity to raise one's own sources;
3. existence of bank regulation and insurance;
4. joint representation in international institutions;
5. creating a mechanism of ensuring the democratic legitimacy of above mentioned processes.

In this context, however, the question arises: how, when and where to take money to implement

these measures? Will they have desired long-term effects? Can they solve the immediate serious crisis of the Euro-zone and protect citizens against worsening living conditions without further worsening the already declining power of the general European Union? Are they applicable to the current structure and system functioning of the EU?

These are the most frequently asked questions regarding the further development of the European Union, which very accurately reflects the inability to reach political consensus focused on the implementation and fulfillment of economic plans.

3. Controlled Transformation

Most researchers, economists and politicians shared a consensus on the necessity to create the fiscal Union, which would centrally “gather financial resources to be used as a response to any shocks in periods of economic growth”.⁵ But is there, in this situation, a specific procedure for creating a fiscal union? According to Mark Leonard, a director of the first pan-European think-tank called the European Council for Foreign Affairs, there are several solutions. Each of them involves a large number of positive and negative aspects. Among the most basic solutions of the current crisis of the Euro-zone, based on different procedures and procedural efforts, while taking into account the endeavor not to worsen the decline of power of the European Union, there are following four options:⁶

Asymmetric integration is the continuation of the current setup, in which the central elements of the European Union consist of the possibility to check public finances of Member States, financial instruments such as the European Instrument for financial stability or the European financial stability mechanism providing financial assistance of the European Union countries with economic problems and the International Monetary Fund designed to manage saving measures.⁷

Among the most significant issues of this version, Leonard advises that, due to the fact that these tools work outside the founding treaty, it allows countries to avoid “no aid clause” already defined in the Maastricht Treaty, and at the same time, this asymmetric integration makes taking decisions difficult, in the sense that any allocation

sources of individual tools must be approved by national governments and decisions must go through the ratification of national parliaments.

This will, among other things, result in the division of Europe into two blocks, debtors vs. creditors, and the European Union itself could move from a rules-based management to the management based on power.⁸

The second option, called the **Smaller Euro zone (“two-speed Europe”)** was originally the idea of the leader of German Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria, Wolfgang Schäuble and his colleague Karl Lamers, who in 1994 promoted the idea of creating a “Europe Core” with its own currency to avoid the creation of economically weak and unstable community.⁹

Due to the malfunctioning of the Euro zone, European Union is turning back to this structure of smaller or “two-speed” Europe. For the time being, the price needed to pay for such transformation would be relatively high without regard to whether the departing country is strong or weak.

Researchers of the Swiss global financial services company, UBS¹⁰, agree that this scenario would probably be the worst way from the financial point of view. Decrease in production of Euro-zone countries would range from approximately 20 to 40% of GDP and would be accompanied by a general bankruptcy and financial turmoil.¹¹ Moreover, if the European Union survived this fall, its international influence, in any form, would be in ruins, as well as the destroyed economy of the Euro-zone. It is still really hard to imagine that the actor, unable to solve internal problems, would be internationally accepted and perceived as an equal partner whom one can trust implicitly.

The Political Union through treaty change has become the third hypothetical projection for future development of the European Union. This presupposition has the most numerous scope of development possibilities. As mentioned above, the current requirement of a fiscal union supplemented by economic and political union has got a lot of unclear points and, also, there is no proper detailed plan dealing with the implementation of this projection which would answer many questions, such as: How far do we need to go in such integration? Is it sufficient to create only a fiscal union or is it required to be supported by the political union? How to set the rights, duties and responsibilities of each institution? What should

the new contract include and what should it not? Should there also be the possibility to exclude a state from the Euro-zone? In this case, it is really impossible to predict the outcome and all the accompanying effects. Within this option and with the Lisbon Treaty experience, we can expect more of approval and ratification obstructions of each Union country, which may have just the opposite effect – disintegration.

The last option is the so-called **Federation without the Federalists**, which should be based on the generally binding intergovernmental agreement signed by the Member States outside the founding treaties of the European Union, which would create a fiscal federation outside the impact of the Union institutions.

This would essentially apply the federal approach in the partial area. Most theorists are concerned that as with “smaller area”, this projection could lead to the division of the European Union into two parts (euro-countries with the rapidly improving integration and the other countries with the slow integrating process), or this could even lead the European Union directly on the edge of the spotlight.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that the future of the Union is at risk, regardless of whether we look at it from the point of the threat of disintegration of the Euro-zone or of the democratic, cultural and social deficit. Real integration involving a fiscal union supported by the political union is therefore the irreversible future of the European Union. However, an unanswered question remains: which of these ways will be taken or will we find another, more appropriate, modification? The answer lies in the hands of leaders of individual Member States, whose essential role in this regard is to reach consensus on questions such as how the European Union and the Euro-zone will exist and operate in the future.

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10 UBS was originally an abbreviation for the Union Bank of Switzerland; however, UBS ceased to be considered a representational abbreviation after its 1998 merger with Swiss Bank Corporation. It is still officially used but without itemization.

11 DEO, S.; DONOVAN, P.; HATHEWAY, L.; *Eurozone: Where next?*, UBS Investment Research, 26 September 2011, available on: <http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/UBS%20fin%20de%20l'euro.pdf>, accessed on 08.01.2012.



MAKING THE EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY FOR THE DANUBE REGION MATTER: CHANCES AND CHALLENGES FROM ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE (AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW)¹

Adam VARGA*

This article aims at highlighting the chances and challenges faced by Romania during the implementation of the Danube Strategy. In our opinion, – if successful – the Strategy can not only bring economic and infrastructural development, but it will also further the integration of Romania to the EU. Furthermore, ever since becoming a member of the European Union, Romania strove for being an important contributor to EU neighbourhood and regional policies, strengthening the EU's presence in the Black Sea area. The European Union Strategy for Danube Region presents a new opportunity to further Romania's role as the main contributor to the Neighbourhood Policy in the Black Sea Region.

Key-words: European Union Strategy for Danube Region; economic development; Neighbourhood Policy; Black Sea Region; Romania; contributor.

1. The European Union Strategy for Danube Region

The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (hereinafter referred to as the **Danube**

Strategy, or **EUSDR**) is second in the line of macro-regional strategies elaborated and accepted by Member States, stakeholders and various European bodies – the first being the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (hereinafter referred to as the **Baltic Strategy**, or the **EUSBSR**). And, seemingly, it's not the last one, either, since a “macro-regional fever” has swept through Europe with now 1 – 2 possible strategies under elaboration. This progress of spatial strategy-making started in the 1950's (became official European policy with the SEA in 1986) and has continuously evolved ever since.

Though the early approaches to and history of the EU macro-regions and macro-regional strategies is not part of the present article, there are a few questions that are worth highlighting even here.

First, attention should be drawn to the fact that there is no strict definition for macro-regions (and that the term macro-region can cover various territorial units, e.g. from the point of political/economic geography, the EU itself is a macro-region, or in the EU terminology, INTERREG IIC and IIIB are corresponding to macro-regions and the whole Community was divided into them, for

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instance North-Western Metropolitan Area, North Sea Region, CADSES, etc.

The EUSBSR defined the macro-region as “*an area covering a number of administrative regions but with sufficient issues in common to justify a single strategic approach (...) the extent depends on the topic: for example on economic issues it would involve all the countries in the region, on water quality issues it would involve the whole catchment area, etc...*”.

The Danube Strategy gives also only a vague definition by stating that “*the Danube Region is a functional area defined by its river basin. (...) Geographically, it concerns primarily, but not exclusively Germany (Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria), Austria, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria within the EU, and Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (the regions along the Danube) outside. The Strategy remains open to other partners in the Region.*”²²

What’s common in the two definitions is that a macro-region is a flexible complex formed by numerous countries or parts of them (and not necessarily Member States), where cooperation is based on territorial proximity and/or common challenges and that the principle of “variable geometry” applies to it meaning that its borders vary in a case and policy specific way. This, of course, implies that with time – and in case further macro-regional strategies get accepted – overlapping macro-regions can develop in the EU.

Macro-regional strategies are represented as integrated frameworks to identify needs and allocate available resources to address the various regional issues in a more efficient way, by making „*best use of what is available, by aligning efforts, specifically policies and funding*”²³ - thus the „three no”-s principle of no new legislation, no new institutions and no new funding. All participants hope that cooperation within these frameworks can help to build synergies, avoid duplications and to better coordinate sectoral policies. Stocchiero⁴ emphasizes the multi-level and multi-actor nature of these strategies, and the fact that macro-regional strategies contribute to “Europeanization”, since every institutional level takes part in a positive-sum game.

The EUSBSR was vague and general concerning the structure and implementation of the strat-

egy. The drafters of the Danube Strategy, learning from the previous experience and accepting the request of the European Parliament⁵ created a more elaborate framework for coordination – in which a High Level Group (consisting of Member States, and – on invitation – non-members), the Commission and National Contact Points will also have a role. Furthermore, each Priority Area is coordinated by Member States.

2. Challenges in the implementation of the Danube Strategy

Salines⁶ argues that effective macro-regional cooperation requires four factors: common perception of interests, a common identity, a well-balanced cooperation method and the involvement of the EU. In Schymik’s⁷ view, the success of macro-regional strategies depends on choosing the right policy priorities and on the sound diagnosis of regional challenges. Given the relatively short period of time that elapsed since the creation of the two strategies, there is little experience on how they meet the expectations.

But, besides Salines, various authors drew attention to the many possible shortcomings of such complex cooperation schemes, just to mention a few of them⁸:

- Ensuring consistency with EU legislation and policies, e.g. TENT, TEN-E, Digital Agenda, Europe 2020, Integrated Maritime Policy, European Territorial Cooperation Objective, European Neighbourhood Policy – so they need to be implemented and analyzed in the context of existing cooperation initiatives, which renders these macro-regional strategies to a mostly complementary role, with possible new projects developed in the shipping, transport and energy sectors.

- “Efficiency challenge”: too high number of priorities can lead to weak focus and the constant need to seek consensus of stakeholders of completely different, sometimes even contradicting interests.

- The “governance challenge”: striking the right balance between a solid institutional framework and a dynamic involvement of stakeholders. Thus, while trying to avoid over-bureaucratization and supporting grass roots initiatives and bottom-up approach to ensure that the Strategy is not “elite-driven”, too widespread stakeholder involvement



also entails the risk of fragmentation. So, adequate coordination is a must, but on the other hand a rather difficult task: the Commission has no resources to fulfil this role, while macro-regional strategies connect to the tasks of most of the DG-s.

- Solidarity challenge: the “no new funding” approach also requires the solidarity of all Member States, not just of those taking part of the given strategy; whereas the territorial cohesion is “a political principle founded on solidarity between the different territorial scales”, thus the macro-regional dimension can “provide only a partial response in delivering it.”⁹

- Lack of regional centre(s): traditionally, regions tend to have a certain spatial organization/hierarchy: one (or a few) regional centre functioning as a point of gravity, with the rest of the region strongly linked and interconnected to it. Macro-regions, on the other hand, do not have such centres, on the contrary, priority areas and pilot projects are coordinated by various Member States. This can make cooperation and especially evaluation more difficult, since Member States are required to coordinate actions across the macro-regions and across multiple DG-s.

- The “external” challenge: since there is no instruction on exactly how to work with non-Member States, it raises further questions concerning financing, analysis and the enforcement of decisions.

- To achieve added-value: many authors (and even the Commission) drew attention to the fact that macro-regional strategies should not merely create an extra bureaucratic layer but bring real added-value to the already existing cooperation initiatives.

- Problems with identity: traditionally, the definition of a region also requires the existence of a certain level of regional identity for a successful regional cooperation, which is not always the case regarding the macro-regions.

These challenges are general, thus not only applicable to the participants of the Danube Strategy, but to every member of every macro-regional strategy to come.

This being stated, it also has to be emphasized that – as it was the case with the EUSBSR – the Danube Strategy is not starting with a “white Paper”: in fact, it is a complex region with more regional cooperation initiatives, institutions, NGOs, etc. (e.g. Danube Commission, Danube Region

Working Group, International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, V4, Regional Partnership, Central European Initiative, South-East European Cooperation Process, GUAM).

So, regional cooperation is not without precedents, even if the region itself is rather heterogeneous and its history is marked with conflicts, wars and territorial disputes. Not to mention economic differences: “*the Danube region comprises the highest developed and most productive regions of the EU with the highest creation of value and highest wealth as well as the regions with the least development and productivity and the lowest available income at the same time*”¹⁰

The same applies to differences in agricultural output, demographic problems, civil participation, infrastructure and transport connections, culture and religion. Cooperation within such a diverse framework can easily reinforce the East-West, centre-periphery division, reaching exactly the opposite of its goals if the agenda of the macro-regional cooperation is carried by a small number of powerful actors instead of the collective effort of all stakeholders.

From the above, civil participation deserves special attention since it is the stakeholders’ participation in the implementation of the Danube Strategy that can give true meaning and added value to the intergovernmental cooperation already in place. Given the relative short period that has elapsed since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, civil society (NGO’s, interest groups, foundations) has just begun to control politics and bureaucracy and its influence is not comparable to that of Western civil societies.

As the Danube Basin NGO Network Project emphasized in its report, that civil society “*in the Danube basin is ... heterogeneous, civil society organizations (CSO) often are still in the process of formation and learning to articulate and upload their agenda into the process within the respective national frameworks and the EU. The national states and societies often have not developed a culture of dialogue with CSO that is comparable to CSO - state dialogue in Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany and others, or the dialogue between EU-Commission and CSOs*”¹¹. There is also insufficient expertise in applying for EU funds. Török and Ders¹² also draw attention to the fact that “*looking at the organizational landscape of the region, (...)*

can identify several pragmatic differences between “established” and “transitional” societies, which – as symptoms – are challenging macro-regional cooperation in development”. Thus, in the latter societies, any strategic development process requires strong investment in the horizontal alliances of civil society organizations.

As Teodor Baconschi, the then foreign-minister of Romania emphasized to (possible) stakeholders and entrepreneurs: “I can almost say that we have completed our work: we wanted the Strategy, we studied it and we established it. The difficult part has just begun, as the moment when we can see how the strategy can contribute to the development of our countries is now in progress.”¹³ It is up to the various stakeholders now, to outline concrete projects, which, given the relative weakness of civil sector, can prove to be a challenge.

Though various EU organs can contribute to the development of the civil sector in Central and Eastern Europe in general, and in Romania in particular, it is up to the local governments and politicians to strengthen the role and influence of civil society, by promoting decentralization. As long as such decentralization does not take place, it is likely that these organizational differences limit inter-organizational relations mainly to the national level.

For Romania (and, in fact, for many countries in the Danube Region), an extra challenge is presented by the lack of qualified staff and experts. Coordinating a Priority Area with several Member – and non-Member States, dozens of stakeholders, the European Commission and its DG’s is a task that requires great expertise in handling EU matters, uniting public and private sector initiatives at a multilevel governance sphere while at the same time maintaining the necessary political cohesion. The fact that previous cooperation (its efficiency, maturity, web of existing contacts and organizations) is different in each Priority Area also presents an extra burden, not to mention the extra costs presented for the local administration. (For this reason, during the evaluation of the first year of the functioning of the EUSBSR, there have been calls for specific technical assistance funding to cover these costs.)

From Romanian perspective, recruiting able staff can be challenging – as it was proved in connection with the absorption of EU funds. Though not in direct connection with the

Danube Strategy, the conclusions of the study the Directorate-General for Internal Policies¹⁴ can easily be applied to it: “effective, continuous and sustainable development of administrative capacity requires **stability in the civil service and good human resource management.** (...) Current Commission Services’ feedback notes that Bulgaria and Romania still have difficulties, as Member States, in implementing EU regulations **as they lack capacity to develop national procedures.**” Furthermore, the study emphasized that human resources problems, like high staff turnover and lack of adequately experienced staff in key pre-accession funds management structures were a chronic problem for many years for these countries. There’s a need to change administration and management culture in the public sector.

3. Chances for Romania

Besides the chances/opportunities created for the whole region in the fields of communication, transport, environmental protection, capacity building, etc. (see the 4 pillars), the Danube Strategy can contribute to the integration of Romania, and South-Eastern Europe as a whole.

With Romania and Bulgaria being Member States of the European Union, the Black Sea became an EU sea and (as it has been said before in the chapter regarding the challenges presented by the Danube Strategy) “since the Danube flows into the Black Sea, it [the Danube Strategy] should be coherent with Black Sea perspectives”¹⁵. On the other hand, in light of the previous chapters, it is also necessary to separate the Danube Strategy from the other regional programs – so to avoid its overstretching and losing its proper identity¹⁶ – , while at the same time ensuring their smooth co-existence.

Being already an active participant and in some cases even initiator of the various regional cooperation-initiatives (e.g. Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy) in the Black Sea Region, it’s obvious that Romania can play an important role in coordinating the overlapping questions, having sufficient knowledge about the challenges for both regions. A scientific research network and a centre of excellence for Danube and the Black Sea, as the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed¹⁷, can for example contribute to this work. Former Romanian Minister of Environment, László Bor-



bély already emphasized that the implementation of the Danube Strategy can contribute to an increased connection between the Danube River and the Black Sea.¹⁸

If the implementation of the Danube Strategy is a success story, it can strengthen and enhance cooperation within the EU and with the non-Member States. It also helps to develop the economy by increasing the absorption capacity, thereby strengthening the country's position in the Black Sea area, for example by making it the main gate towards the goods traffic between Asia and Western Europe by offering access from the Black Sea to the North Sea via the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway on European Corridor VII.

Another possible chance to enhance Romania's position is the opening of the Danube Strategy to the countries of the West Balkan, which was a necessary step since its implementation cannot be effective without close cooperation with them. In the last decade the EU has been less and less able to act as a magnet for the West Balkan countries by failing to provide the proper attraction and mobilization in their pre-accession process for implementing the conditions.

This situation can be fundamentally changed by the Danube Strategy as a genuine "European perspective" for the West Balkan countries to reorganize their societies based on EU values and regulations.¹⁹ As a relatively new member of the EU, Romania, and Romanian civil society organizations can share their knowledge and experiences with their West Balkan counterparts.

As it is in the case towards the Black Sea region, Romania can actively participate in cross-border cooperation programs, by linking territorial cooperation initiatives carries out by European sub-state authorities and the various relevant instruments of existing policies with those of the Danube Strategy. The countries of the West Balkan now clearly lack "European identity" – comprehensive dialogue with them can have great transformative potential if it is integrated in the socio-cultural exchange within the Danube Region, thus bringing new and clear vision about polity, economy and society²⁰.

On the other hand, Romania itself can benefit from the Danube Strategy: having to work together with Member States and stakeholders more experienced in applying for and managing of EU funds, Romanian companies and NGO's

can learn, adapt and prosper, so in the long run, the absorption capacity of the country as a whole can improve significantly. Close cooperation on various levels (both on stakeholder and on political) helps the participants to develop a higher degree of understanding of the others' priorities, readiness to negotiations and so on, thus "working together can become a habit and a skill", as the DG Regional Policy concluded.

Working together also helps confidence-building. As the history of foreign politics and diplomacy has shown, close cooperation is the best way to enhance confidence building – therefore, the Danube Strategy which combines various levels and policy areas, provides an excellent opportunity for that. If Romania can show real commitment and preparedness to cooperate within this framework, it might help to disperse Western fears concerning the capacities of the country to properly handle European questions, e.g. those fears that still render Romania's Schengen accession to a halt.

Final thoughts

Co-operations like the EUSDR could provide a "new tool" to further the integration of the new Member States into the EU. New members have to find the way to develop

- their absorption capacity,
- cooperation among each other,
- their capacities to apply EU's project development methods.

The Danube Strategy is a good example that "thinking together" can help to the members to find and outline common interests. The EUSDR, as a loose cooperation framework is a great tool to develop this kind of common thinking. I'm sure that common thinking and formulated common interests could be the basis of a real strategic partnership that could bring economic-cultural changes for all of us.

The EUSDR is a good opportunity for new members to show their preparedness and maturity for the membership, but at the same time it is a huge responsibility, too. If new members can prove that they can implement the strategy that was built up according their interests, with success, that would be an excellent proof of their capabilities. The journey towards finalizing these programs is a long and difficult one, during which all participants can and will learn a lot.



The main aim of the Danube Strategy is to provide a positive-sum game for every participant by creating a chance for a planned trans-border cooperation within one region. The Danube region's development alongside uniform principles can bring a real development on the levels of economy, politics and society. We can say that the EUSDR is a "second integration process", because it could integrate or at least bring closer our divided region. The EU and EUSDR are frameworks within which nation states have a chance to create an appropriate sub-structure which, later, can serve as the basis of their self-evolution.

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1 The content of the article illustrates a personal point of view and is not to be considered the official position of the Hungarian Government.

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ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

APRIL - JUNE 2012



The event that marked CDSSS' agenda in this period was the XIIth edition of the scientific seminar with international participation, held on 17 May 2012 in the Senate Hall of "Carol I" National Defence University. This year's theme was *National Interests and Common Interests in the European Union*.

The seminar brought together, in a scientific event, national and international personalities from various fields – foreign policy, defence, public order, national security, European affairs, scientific research, military and civilian higher education – which made the exchange of information and opinions remarkable and gave the potential for their dissemination in the political, economic, military and scientific environments.

Participation of experts from three countries – Republic of Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine – that have close working relations with the EU and have accession wishes, represented for Romanian specialists, on the one hand, an opportunity to share their experience of our country's accession and EU integration, and, on the other hand, the possibility to know their views, aspirations and expectations. Materials submitted by participants at the seminar are included in the current issue of our magazine.

The next scientific activity that CDSSS is organizing is the annual scientific session with international participation, with the theme *The Complexity and Dynamic of the Security Environment*, which will take place in November, for which we encourage you to prepare papers. Information on this activity will be posted on center's website, at <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

Regarding the latest scientific publications, we mention the study *Various Phenomena with Impact on Local, Regional and International Stability and Security*, authored by senior researcher Petre Duțu, PhD.

Irina TĂȚARU



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- Title (centred, capital, bold characters).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (in capital letters, to avoid confusion), e-mail address, main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, the field of PhD title or PhD candidate (if applicable), city and country of residence.
 - A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters).
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 - 2 - 4 chapters, subchapters if needed.
 - Conclusions.
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