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STRATEGIC IMPACT, 11 YEARS OF PUBLICATION

The beginning of 2012 brought for STRATEGIC IMPACT quarterly scientific magazine a series of changes concerning editorial aspects, as well as recognition and visibility on national and international level.

At the end of the last year, Mr. Constantin Moştoflei, senior researcher PhD, retired after a fruitful scientific activity as director of the Centre for eleven years. However, the magazine will continue to benefit from his experience as a member of the scientific board.

At present, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies undergoes its activity under the attentive guidance of Mr. Petre Duțu, Senior researcher PhD, who also became editor-in-chief. The Editorial Board enriched with a few experienced researchers and professors, from Romania and other countries. The Scientific Board has changed its constituency as well. There can also be seen changes as far as editors are concerned.

Regarding national recognition, up to this year, our publication was classified as a B+ magazine by the National University Research Council in Romania.

Starting with 2012, STRATEGIC IMPACT presents itself as a ***scientific magazine with acknowledged prestige in the field of Military Science, Information and Public Order*** according to National Council for Titles, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

Referring to international visibility, following endeavours, an agreement was signed in order to include the magazine in EBSCO international database (USA). Also, demarches were made to index STRATEGIC IMPACT in ProQuest database (USA). Concomitantly, the magazine will continue to be indexed in CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany) and Index Copernicus International (Poland). Starting with this year, our publication is also indexed in the list of publications of NATO Multimedia Library. International appreciation of the magazine's quality is also confirmed by its presence on the sites of other prestigious foreign publications, such as Defence & Strategy (Czech Republic).

STRATEGIC IMPACT scientific magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University, is a bilingual trimestrial publication which approaches a wide area of topics – political-military topicality; security and military strategy; policies, strategies and actions of NATO and EU; future peace and war; informational society. Our readers will find in it strategic analyses, syntheses and evaluations, points of view on the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

The magazine is edited in two separate editions, in Romanian since 2001 and in English since 2005. STRATEGIC IMPACT is disseminated, free of charge, in main institutions with security and defence attributions, in the scientific and academia environment in Romanian and abroad – in Europe, Asia, America. The publication can also be purchased by the ones interested in it.

STRATEGIC IMPACT collaborates with Romanian and foreign renowned experts from the scientific research environment and from civilian and military academia. National collaborations involve the Ministry of National Defence, General Staff, categories of forces' staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state organizations, NGOs, etc.

COMMON KNLOLEDGE AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN MILITARY SCIENCE

Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD*

Military science was formed and evolved from common, empirical knowledge and relying on scientific knowledge. There is a biunivocal relationship between the two types of human knowledge. Common knowledge provides the primary elements of scientific knowledge, and scientific knowledge, after their validation, uses them in the benefit of people.

Processual-organic theory as a means to approach the study of military science is of current interest, providing thus new openings towards the scientific knowledge of contemporary military phenomena and their development trends.

Key-words: common knowledge; empirical knowledge; scientific knowledge; military science; processual-organic theory.

1. Common Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge in the Evolution of Military Science

1.1. Common Knowledge, Empirical Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge

Specialized literature abounds in works about the types of human knowledge[1]. Thus, the cited source refers to spontaneous knowledge and voluntary knowledge, prescientific knowledge and scientific knowledge, observational knowledge, empirical and theoretical knowledge. Another author distinguishes two fundamental types of knowledge that interact[2]: ***common knowledge*** (Gr. *doxa*), based on observation and carried out spontaneously by people in everyday life, without using special methods. This type of knowledge does not have a critical stage; its results take the form of basic knowledge on reality, with a low level of generalization, knowledge expressed in natural language, without rigour. ***Scientific knowledge*** (Gr. *episteme*) aims for precise ends, is developed on the basis of rules, in an organized and systematic manner. This is a type of critical knowledge, it has a specific methodology and a conceptual language, it has a variety of forms (scientific observation, scientific experiment, scientific hypothesis and scientific theory), and among its methods, one can mention: axiomatization, formalization, modelling. Scientific knowledge is considered when investigating the nature, structure and development in time of knowledge activities and their products, while many methods used (logical-formal, psychological, sociological, historical, etc.) were developed and diversified in scientific disciplines. However, it must clearly be indicated that all sciences, including military science, turn to these methods and techniques of scientific research, adapting them, for investigating their field of study.

For reasons related to the approached theme, we are going to turn our attention towards *common knowledge* and *scientific knowledge*. And then, finally, to highlight their role in the formation and evolution of military science.

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Common knowledge is achieved by man made under its native-natural endowment, under no pressure and within the limits of ordinary life experience. This type of knowledge generalizes this experience and is not precisely delineated, not having its own, clearly defined objectives. It is spontaneous and impure, lacking systematization, precision and rigor, to the extent in which the means employed are mostly intuitive (empirical observation), employing little critical reflexivity and showing little interest in testing its results. Knowledge obtained in this way is a heterogeneous mix of essential and unessential, objective and subjective, intellectual and emotional, constructive and valuable, explanatory and pseudo-explanatory.

On the other hand, common knowledge is called banal knowledge or vulgar knowledge, spontaneous knowledge, empirical knowledge[3]. It is that knowledge which comes from direct contact of man with the surrounding reality, from its relations with other human beings. In essence, it serves to enable man to carry out his daily life and work without difficulty. Common knowledge is most often the product of spontaneous elaborations of reason, while scientific knowledge results from a reflected development, methodical, followed by a voluntary manner and sometimes laborious.

In common knowledge, sensations produced by the sense organs are developed unconsciously in perceptions, then in the mind, through memory, compared to each other, analyzed in this way, there can be observed certain repetitions of similar phenomena. Naturally, the mind expects them to reappear, and, to some extent, it becomes capable to foresee them. Thus, it makes empirical laws, such as the following: every man dies, fire cooks food.

The goal of common communication, structured and standardized by language, is to adapt to our environment, to enable us to defend ourselves against the dangers that threaten us, to buy our food, to adapt to our peers, to guess their intentions and to foresee to some extent their actions or behavior in one situation or another.

Empirical knowledge aims to order, systematize and explain disparate data provided by observational knowledge, which involves creating constant and repeatable relationships between facts, generating uniformity and regularity. It formulates - usually by means of incomplete induction and in the descriptive terms of natural language - the empirical correlations and laws on a particular class of objects. Such statements observe rather than explain, however, they allow some expectations and predictions about future conditions or events. Appeared on the basis of observations and experiments from a finite number of specific cases to an entire class of things, phenomena or processes, empirical laws have a relatively limited area of application, and in addition, are at risk of being overturned by new and special findings.

Scientific knowledge is the result of increasing specializations and the use of means, methods and research techniques aimed at discovering laws, structures and which controls various types of objects. This type of knowledge involves two relatively distinct levels, which interact however and mutually imply each other: *the empirical* and *the theoretical level*.

The *empirical level* consists of empirical facts and data belonging to science. Any scientific knowledge starts and is constantly supported by a large number of facts, which are records, specific “cut-outs” of individual objects and phenomena characteristics. By grouping and comparing the facts, it finds empirical regularities or empirical laws. These laws are still not theoretical, since they do not explain and do not foresee phenomena; they simply capture an observed repeatability. Empirical regularities appear often in the form of correlations. These are the raw material of science, which does not limit itself only to that. Instead, it constantly aspires to developing theories, essential, general explanations based on a deterministic conception, in which it seeks to discover the causes of these regularities.

The *theoretical level* is a higher level of deepening knowledge through abstract thinking, achieving an incursion into the essence of processes and phenomena, identifying internal links, causes and mechanisms of their existence, of the laws that govern them. Most often, this level is expressed through various scientific theories on one or another field of objective reality (social, economic, political, military, environmental, cultural, religious, identity, ethnic).

1.2. The relation between common knowledge and scientific knowledge

Despite its flaws and shortcomings, common knowledge is a safe approach to scientific knowledge, because it already carries a certain degree of generality. Indeed, it may state laws (not always rigorous) and somewhat subjective to some extent, that is, variable from one individual to another. It is highly influenced and regulated by society through language, whose words allow to classify quickly new sensations and with the help of syntax, to put them in relation to the previous ones.

Therefore, one can say that, ultimately, scientific knowledge goes beyond common knowledge. It is, in any case, an improvement, a progress. However, while perfecting common knowledge, scientific knowledge can deviate considerably from its ways of seeing things and to develop concepts which recall nothing of the immediate experience. Recent concepts of physics, for example, surprise and confuse common sense. Just as common knowledge, scientific knowledge is based on data of the senses. An accumulation of facts, observations and experiences are not yet a science. Indeed, reason seeks to unify and systematize in a rigorous way all knowledge acquired in a field. It pushes this coordination even further in science than in common knowledge. Systematization in science is made through laws and theories.

In conclusion, we shall affirm that between common and scientific knowledge, there is a difference of degree rather than of kind. Common knowledge is qualitative, while scientific knowledge seeks to introduce quantitative determinations in the wording of its laws, with the help of the measurements made with instruments appropriate to the nature of the assessed object. Everyone knows that, unsupported, bodies of a certain density fall, but science alone can show the way that they go through, depending on the moment in time.

Finally, scientific knowledge is more objective than common knowledge. Its contents, as it no longer varies from one individual to another, is independent from subjective character, desires and wizardries: it is a collective work, controlled and methodical. Scientific knowledge is based on carefully developed abstractions (speed, acceleration, work, power, etc.), that make this objectivity possible. No doubt, common knowledge also uses abstractions: tree, for example, is such an example, because the concept puts aside the features that differentiate between them a fir tree, an oak, etc., but scientific abstractions are much more technical and allow, as much as possible, the usage of computations. This is the high abstract degree of scientific knowledge that makes it easily communicable.

Common knowledge seems to have the feature to be commonly accepted, being shared by a group of people who do not put in question[4]. Such knowledge seems sure and true, because it is fairly supported by a community of people. It seems that it does not depend on subjectivity, always special, of a single individual and that it is "objective" (according to the object it designates). On the other hand, common knowledge is presented as permitted by the immediate and passive manner, without being questioned. Basically, it is used as it was assimilated by each individual through life experience.

1.3. The Role of Common Knowledge and of Scientific Knowledge in the Evolution of Military Science

We deem that in the evolution of military science, both common knowledge and scientific knowledge played a major role. First of all, *common knowledge is the starting point in shaping scientific knowledge* in any field, including military. In fact, common knowledge is rooted in everyday experience. It gives easy and practical answers to questions that individuals, families, groups or communities ask themselves. It is repeated and always asserts the same thing as 10 or 20 years ago. It rests on tradition and is monotonous. In addition, it gives final appreciations. In fact, common knowledge exists in all cultures and civilizations. Anyone uses in the beginning common knowledge in everyday life to communicate with other people in his entourage.

One can speak of knowledge as a phenomenon, as a process, but also as a product of human activity. A. Flew[5] shows that philosophical questions concerning the nature of knowledge belong to either epistemology or philosophy of mind and while the first group of questions focuses on the nature of knowledge, the second focuses on the nature of the knowledge subject and philosophers admit three main types of knowledge: factual knowledge, practical knowledge and knowledge through contact.

Along with the elements of the knowledge process (an object, a subject, a cognitive relationship between object and subject, knowledge and communication through which the latter is objectified and socialized) three levels of it have been identified: *the level of observational knowledge*, which starts from the objects, phenomena, different processes and in which are highlighted, with the help of external sense organs, the individual characteristics of the object; *the level of empirical knowledge*, which aims to analyze and describe the same class of identical objects, for data processing being used a number of logical operations, such as comparison, synthesis, abstraction, generalization; *the level of theoretical knowledge*, aiming to develop theoretical concepts and establish theoretic laws and in which the building capacity of the subject of knowledge plays an important role.

Basically, military science is founded, as a starting point, both the common general knowledge and empirical knowledge of the specific military environment. Thus, daily observations of military commanders at all levels of hierarchy are a first item of empirical knowledge in training troops, using them in battle, their commitment to military actions of different nature - peace, stability, peace enforcement, post-conflict reconstruction. Systematic observation, but using the empirical methods of various activities related to the military, from training of the workforce to strategy and arm doctrines development is an approach with scientific value, whose results will be validated or refuted by the military science research. Also, through scientific knowledge there can be checked the validity of commanders' findings in relation to workforce training, raising their morale, insuring the social cohesion of military crews, subunits and units. This is because scientific knowledge begins where we decide to no longer accept mere dictatorship our senses (sight, smell, hearing, touch) and to not rely on fragmentary impressions that they send us every day. Then we proceed on a voluntary basis to deepen scientific observation, for example, being more attentive to ordinary details or imagining new dimensions, looking for original aspects and unusual qualities, in short, going beyond appearances and eternal repetitions.

Scientific knowledge goes beyond known ways of common knowledge. As far as scientific knowledge is concerned, what is known is not eternal. Questions are always possible. Answers must be looked for by research. Things change, the way in which we see them evolve. Scientific knowledge is constantly seeking for evidence. It needs arguments and asks questions, without accepting anything as given. It also keeps open to debate what had priory been accepted. Thus, it always searches the reference field, in this case, the military, both in what is known and in what is unknown. Basically, it explores all the time, without taboos and without interdictions the field of study.

On the other hand, scientific knowledge is built. Contrary to common knowledge, that is always around us, spontaneously, scientific knowledge creates its own appropriate research tools to check the validity of its findings, of issued theories or hypotheses from which the scientific approach started. Therefore we consider that, in fact, scientific knowledge is intended to create, to imagine, to discover what is not yet known. Therefore, it does not rely only on tradition and rejects monotony. In addition, it manifests a critical attitude towards the investigation and the outcome reached. In fact, it draws away in terms of look, touch, feeling. In other words, although it uses perceptions given by the senses, it appeals to reason in their analysis. Thus, it supervises its own approach allowing it to analyze or to create, always using scientific methods and investigative techniques validated in the knowledge process.

At the same time, scientific knowledge, including the military, is based on known, concrete and objective elements. This knowledge is carried out in accordance with a set of principles, norms and rules of scientific research. Therefore, scientific knowledge is the one that has approved statements made; there is no place for personal opinions, tastes and imaginative speculation. Scientists' judgments need justifications coordinated in reasoning. The perfect form of scientific reasoning is demonstration. This is a clear and continuous argumentation, without gaps, without haste or cracks. Scientific demonstration can also be a laboratory experience, confirming a specific phenomenon and creating the link between cause and effect. Demonstration sets clear results and gives the possibility of generalization, i.e. possibilities to predict the evolution in time and space of a process or phenomenon. And military science uses scientific knowledge to the demonstration, the logical arguments, the experiences and sociological type experiments. Only in this way, claims made on some aspect related to the environment and military activity may be appreciated as valid, being possible to extrapolate them to situations similar to that of the demonstration, experience or experiment.

Moreover, knowledge in military science is based on facts or events subject to findings. It seeks to confront these facts with reality by experimental verification. It uses for this purpose rigorous methods, tools and instruments in order to gather evidence to verify the assumptions made, to formulate paradigms and theories.

In essence, both common knowledge and scientific knowledge have played, are playing and will play a different, but complementary role in the development of military science. Of course, scientific knowledge has a much larger role in the creating, founding and development of military science than common knowledge.

2. The Evolution of Military Science from Common Knowledge to Scientific Knowledge

The establishment of military science as a distinct science within the sciences system is connected both to common, empirical knowledge in the military field and to the common knowledge of other fields of human activity. To this type of knowledge is added, continuously, systematically and permanently, general scientific knowledge (from within other sciences) and military scientific knowledge. This is because the accumulation of data, information from other fields of human activity, transformed into knowledge through assimilation and learning influences scientific knowledge in the military field. Thus, scientific progress in a given time also contributes to the development of military science. In other words, discoveries in science, economy, politics, psychology, philosophy, history and technology positively influence military science. In turn, the remarkable achievements of military science are taken and adapted for civilian fields of activity. In this respect, a prime example is the military concept of strategy, which was taken over and adapted for civilian enterprises which produce goods or sell them. Thus, we find works that describe different strategies[6] commonly used in civilian areas of human activity.

In order to follow the development of military science in time and space, from antiquity to the present day, we are going to highlight the role of common, empirical knowledge, and by scientific knowledge in this process[7].

From the outset, we mention that common, empirical knowledge was the starting point of the foundation of scientific knowledge also in case of military science. Subsequently, various thinkers, first civil and then military, continued to research the military phenomenon in a systematic, voluntary, planned and increasingly rigorous manner.

Thus, ***in the Antiquity***, began to appear written documents with reference to the military aspects of that era[8]. In general, major battles are described by the thinkers of the time. Thus, we will find data and information about war in the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon. Information provided by them can be completed with the existing ones in some writers' works of the epoch. An example is the story of the battle from Salamina in Aeschylus' tragedy, "Persians". Of course, one should take such information with caution, especially when it comes to the number of combatants of the confronting armies.

Some Greek philosophers wrote about war as well. We can mention here Socrates (the art of war means applying the rules of tactics), Plato (evoking the qualities of a good strategist: perception and command); Dionysodoros (Sophist, used to give practical courses on tactics and issued diplomas attesting the ability to exercise command) and Xenophon (wrote about the practical experience of fighting).

In turn, historians have described armed conflicts emphasizing causes, operations, battles. But some of them went further. For example, Thucydides explained and criticized, when necessary, the parties involved in a battle.

Besides the authors mentioned above, there are several important authors in the field of military scientific knowledge: Sun Tzi (*The Art of War*), Kautilya (*Arthashastra*), Aeneas the Tactician (*How to Survive Under Siege)*, Julius Frontinus (*Stratagems*), Onasander (*The General*), Flavius Arrianus (*On Tactics*), Flavius Vegitius Renatus (*Military Art and Science*) and Mauritius (*Strategy*, later translated and published under the title "*Military Art*").

Classical Greeks and Romans wrote significantly on military campaigns. Among the most notable are the work of Julius Caesar on *Gallic Wars* and *Roman Civil War*, written about 500 years before Jesus Christ. Two major works on tactics come from the late Roman period: Aelianus Tacticus' *Taktike Theoria* and Vegetius' *De Re Militari* (On military issues). In *Taktike Theoria*, Greek methods were examined and they were the most influential battle in the Byzantine world during the golden age of Islam[9]. *De Re Militari* was the basis of European military tactics until the eighteenth century. Its essential saying was: "if you want peace, prepare for war".

In the field of military functions in the ***Middle Ages***, according to the quoted source[10], except for some new aspects at the level of military technique reached by Rome, there were no genuine novelties before the eleventh century. In the Middle Ages, military strategy, as a component of the general strategy, was complemented by other fields: diplomacy, money, marriage combinations.

In Western Europe, the military-inspired literature remains very poor for a long time. Practically, all authors (Joinville, Guillaume de Tyr, Ambroise, Villehardin etc.) limit themselves to campaign memories as former commanders, without making a critical analysis on the deep reasons of the fight results. The advantage of these narrations is that the reader finds out who, where, when and how participated in those fights.

During this period, Byzantium witnessed the emergence of some general, encyclopaedic works. Among these, we mention the following: the writings of Urbicus, as well as the ones of Anonymus Byzantinus, during the reign of Justinian (527-565), were characterized by the situation reflected in late Roman age; *The Manual* of Heron the Young, who admitted that he wrote it starting from the works of Apollodor, Biton, Filon, Aeneas, Heron the Old, etc.; an *Encyclopaedia* was elaborated by various authors at Constantine Porfyrongenete's order, also based on ancient works[11].

In the sixteenth century, among the most important authors who dealt with theoretical aspects of war was Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527). Two of his works are worthy to mention here, namely: *Art de la Guerre* (The art of War), published in 1521 and *Il Principe* (The Prince). We should also add here the fact that, in the same period, the Romanian voivode (prince) Neagoe Basarab wrote *Neagoe Basarab's teachings to his son, Theodosie* (in original, *Învăţăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul sau Theodosie*); this work is compared by many critics to Machiavelli's *Principe*, considering its structure, as well as the political, ethical and military thinking system. Thus, the Romanian ruler's book was a valuable European literary work for that time[12].

The ***seventeenth century***, so rich in conflicts, proves that great commanders do not take chances in writing theoretical works. For instance, Turenne and Vauban left a voluminous correspondence. But the letters addressed to the king or ministers were reports, requests and proposals of operations or works, which did not seek to rely on a general personal doctrine. Vauban left 12 volumes – *Mes Oysivetes*, which covered most of human activities, up to freedom of conscience, colonial expansion, or developing waterways. Still, except for some hints, *Mes Oysivetes* did not address military issues at all.

The ***Eighteenth century*** knew a certain number of inquisitive spirits who studied the military issue. Mainly, they were interested in the manner in which the available resources could be used more effectively, as once did Alexander the Great, Hannibal or Caesar.

A predecessor of great thinkers from the end of the century was knight de Folard. Among his works, we can mention: *Traite de la guerre des partisans* (1717) kept as a manuscript, *Nouvelles decouvertes sur la guerre* (1724), *Traite de la colonne et de l'ordre profound* (1727) – which will become the long foreword for *Commentaires sur l'histoire de Polybe* (1730).

At the end of the analyzed period, we could remember the knight du Teil and the count of Guibert as military authors. The former published a brochure in 1778: *De l'usage de l'artillerie nouvelle dans la guerre de campagne* (About the Use of New Artillery in the Campaign War), that preached the offensive spirit, even in defensive situations, and dealt with combining arms. He showed that the artillery must focus their fire to create a decisive effect on a point of the enemy line. Then, the infantry will exploit this effect. The latter, Charles Benoit, count of Guilbert (1743 – 1790), was an officer and military writer. He wrote for 21 years; among his works, we point out the following: *Essai général de tactique* (1770); *Mémoire adressé au public et à l'armée sur les opérations du Conseil de la Guerre* (1787); *De la force publique considérée par tous ses rapports* (1790).

In essence, count of Guilbert was an analyst and a restorer of tactics, he rose at the operational level and then at the strategic level, until he could foresee the nature of future conflicts. In this respect, he asserted that soldiers will be citizens and citizens will be soldiers, and the conflicts between sovereigns will become fights between peoples, and nations in their whole will take part at these conflicts. Moreover, he analyzed the capacities of European nations with a prophetic vision; he especially warned against the threat of gigantic Russia upon the small Europe.

The period between 1789 and 1815, scientifically speaking, was hallmarked by technical discoveries and by their implementation: the development of chemical industry, iron metallurgy, electric rasp, hydraulic jack, railway, electric telegraph and airscrew.

The military thinking of this period was made itself known as follows. In ***France***, where Marshall Gouvion – Saint-Cyr made an analysis of the campaigns undertaken during the Revolution and Empire period; Marshall Bugeaud demanded to go back to the definition of great principles, valid for the modern forms of war. He deduced the permanent abandonment of the profound order to the profit of gunners' chain, widely spread on the field. In general, the French military literature from this period consisted of war memoirs which were more interesting for historians than for ideologists. In ***Austria***, Archduke Carol had an interesting input: he stated that strategy prepares the battle and that tactics is the one which must win it. In ***Prussia*** – Carl von Clausewitz wrote his fundamental work *On war*, which has been studied to the present day. In turn, Anton Jomini, being of a military profession, published in 1803 and 1811 the work entitled *Treatise of Great Military Operations*.

The first modern wars period, from 1861 to 1914, define an era in which the industrial, technical, and scientific superiority tended more and more to constitute a factor at least as important as numerical superiority and the commander's military genius. This period can be qualified as a military "breakage" period as it was, at the respective moment, dissemination of the individual weapon and the cannon[13].

Meanwhile, all categories of armed forces experience new developments, as a result of scientific and technologic progress in almost all fields of human activity.

It can be said that the period between 1861 and 1918 was quite poor in terms of writers who approached military issues. As a general rule, the German authors from this period were at a higher level than the French authors. Under Clausewitz's influence, military thinking rose at the strategic level, to be more precise at a political-strategic level. Thus, it was stressed that preparing a war demands important efforts, especially financial, economical, industrial and human efforts. Its rapid implementation will involve important human sacrifices. Among the German authors, we note: Von des Goltz; von Bernardi; von Falkenhausen; von Bieberstein. All of them claimed that modern war is different from the chivalrous conflicts of old times, as it represents a means of acquiring political or economic advantages.

Regarding other nations, military thinking was stressed through a number of works, published especially in the USA, as memoirs of war. In them, the reader may find some views of tactical level, but nothing on the operational and strategic levels.

During 1918-1945, military science knew an interesting development[14]. Thus, J.F.C. Fuller published: *Tanks in the Great War* (1920), which is a critical review; *The reformation of War* (1923) in which he presented his concepts on the future armoured materials; *Foundations of the Science of War*, *On Future Warfare* (1929); *Regulation III*" (1930). Basil Liddell Hart published in 1923 *Tanks avec Fuller et quelques autres non-conformistes – Hobbart, Martell, etc*. Lt.col. de Gaulle published: *La France et son Armée* (1938); *Vers l'Armée de metier* (1934) in which he suggested the use of tanks in massive formations, the creation of a manoeuvre and shock, mechanical army, formed of elite personnel. Hans von Seckt published: *Geuselegende Gedanken fűr den Wiederaufban unsere Wehrmacht* (1921). Erwin Rommel published: *L'infanterie attaque* (1933); Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, military theorist, published in 1937 *Achtung! Panzer*.

The second world conflict, more than the first one, was marked by the respective industrial powers of the belligerent nations, but also by the strong involvement of force into battle, connected with the rapid transition from fundamental or applied research to operational use (radar, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapon).

The ***contemporary period*** was characterized by a mutual nuclear threat between the two military blocs, which confronted each other between 1945 and 1990 for dividing the areas of global influence. This played an important role in preventing a third world war that, had it happened, it would have led to destruction of life on earth. Despite the “nuclear peace”, people did not live in peace: there were conflicts between clients of two blocs, internal civil wars, between “second degree” nations (e.g. the war between Iran and Iraq), wars related to colonization. The antagonistic blocs have acquired numerous nuclear and classical war materials. This period was marked by fantastic progress in science and technology. Meanwhile, the industrial landscape has radically changed. If in 1945 the best indicator of a nation’s economic power was the steel production, today, this indicator has lost its value: economic power is measured by the production of military tools made with the best technologies (electro-informatics, space, nuclear energy etc.). As a piece of news, if for 45 years “army peace” has reigned in Europe, since the collapse of communism, minor conflicts have multiplied between small neighbouring nations, as well as civil wars for creating new states.

Currently, knowledge in the military field is greatly developed; some even talk about a ***revolution in military affairs*** (Revolution in Military Affairs - RMA), an activity that included all the armies in the world, institutions which are in a specific and vigorous process of transformation to keep up with the advancement of human society.

RMA is not a self-status process, but it is part of the much wider revolution in the information technology which, itself, is in the centre of the processes specific to globalisation. It is obvious that, as globalisation has allowed technology to develop quickly, and the human resource, trade and financial investments to transcend state borders, the revolution in military affairs was also influenced by this phenomenon. Moreover, RMA has not emerged in a “strategic vacuum”[15], and it is not a coincidence that its development has gained scope in the post-Cold War phase of globalization, the same way as the military consequences of the industrial revolution coincided with the boom of nationalism.

Today, the technological progress has revived the idea of RMA. Because of the emergence and improvement of technology, military analysts already implement improvements in the speed, capacity, and generally speaking, in the precision of weapons. Also, together with the rapid development of computers, the interconnection capacity of the armed forces will improve significantly. The progress of technology has conducted, in Michael O’Hanlon’s view, to military robots of unmanned artillery which foretell a future of virtual battlefield and of wars without human casualties[16]. More than that, if technology permits, a war in any part of the world can be waged from the national territory: guided munitions, combat aircraft and artillery could be deployed without taking a step on foreign soil. It is obvious that RMA technologically promotes the advanced countries, especially USA[17]. Military experts fear that the considerable technological gap will prevent states from participating in multinational operations and the inequality caused by the various technological capabilities of the states can build a source of tension between countries.

In the history of mankind, war has remained an essential aspect of existence. Some entities engaged in war by attacking, while others did it in order to defend themselves. Although war varies in terms of causes, components and magnitude, an aspect remains constant, and that is that war changes. The most notable changes can be observed in terms of war technology; thus, the idea that war will continue to exist as long as times and technology evolve.

RMA has not completely transformed either the art of war, or military science as a whole, but it allowed the development of new elements of strategic, operative art and military tactics. The processes, methods and rules of classic military art were reviewed and adapted both to the new stage, requirements and possibilities of the fight tools, and especially to the new types of risks, threats and military and non-military threats to security. Thus, in the contemporary period, military science will have to start from the premise that, in the near future, military actions will probably take place in a fluid, multidimensional battle space, characterized by asymmetry, mobility, decentralization, manageability and flexibility. Also, the armies, especially those of major developed countries passed to professional training and outsourcing of some functions. All these changes also translate in the theoretical field, where strategists, military analysts, researchers and theorists elaborate doctrines, concepts, strategies etc. for armies to use in conflict prevention and resolution. On the other hand, fight against international terrorism required a concerted and extensive research activity regarding the role of army in this fight.

At present, there are tendencies of developing military science in each country or at the level of military-political alliances, such as NATO. On the other hand, works belonging to military science were issued in all states of the world. Now, more than ever, military research is organized aiming at fundamental issues of war, as a complex and social phenomenon, on the one hand, and develops doctrines for each category of armed forces, various strategies targeting security and national defence, on the other hand. The dissemination of scientific knowledge, including military science, is significantly amplified by the strong progress in information and communication field, on the one hand, and the complex phenomenon of globalisation, on the other hand.

3. The Up-to-dateness of the Processual-Organic Theory in Military Science

Military science experiences a continuous exchange of data, information and knowledge with other sciences. In fact, the relationship is biunivocal. Military science takes information, data, paradigms or theories from other sciences, which it adapts to the specific object of study but it also provides data, knowledge, theories, concepts, paradigms to other sciences. This exchange is continuous, for the benefit of each science and of scientific human knowledge in general. In this context, we appreciate that the processual-organic theory is currently of interest for the military science. In support of this assertion, we can bring the essence of this theory and the open character, dynamism and complexity of military science.

The essence of the processual-organic theory can be highlighted by the main theses and paradigms that it supports and which find applicability in terms of scientific knowledge of military phenomena and processes in general, of the subject of study of military science.

The processual-organic theory supports a lot of theses and paradigms, but we consider that essential are the following four: 1) ***The processual-organic conception about existence***[18]. Briefly, it states that *social existence*, in itself, *is processuality. Social existence is an information-energy existence*, containing information processors; these are the ones which maintain the state of disequilibrium of social organizations. *People*, through interactions that make in order to satisfy their needs, *are at the origin of organizing processes*, of the establishment, maintenance and changing of social organizations. *In a first stage, there can be only simple, disparate social organizations*, but the evolutions produced by the flows that develop organising consequences produce new ways of social organisation and connections networks which, in the context in which the incorporating bio-organization is finite and is in states close to equilibrium, generates social existence of people; as long as it forms itself, it exerts conflicting influences on social organisations that it includes, which maintain it. *People are the ones able to keep running social organisations* through interactions they make in order to fulfil some needs. 2) ***The processual-organic interpretation of human being***[19]. The paradigm opened by the processual-organic query establishes as a plausible reference not the "human", but people in social processuality. Within the processual-organic paradigm, a human being is the product and expression of connections between bio-processors of information that maintain the body and the homo-interpreters that are in the neocortex. Two explanations need to be made: through bio-processors, the human is embedded in bio-organization and through homo-interpreters, he is inevitably embedded in specific social organisation which, in turn, maintain social processuality. The processual-organic query aims to model in a unified manner each mega-existence. Such modelling supposes a priority focus on emergences, on the organising consequences of information-energy processes, the connections between organising and disorganising processes within the social processuality and socio-organizations. Thus, two differences are possible and necessary: the renunciation to studies that investigate separately energetic processes (such as sciences based on physical, biotic or social existents); awareness that products of queries made with systemic or deterministic-causal methods provide little support points. It becomes clear that making modelling in ways that introduce distortionate simplifications and which may relate only to specific energy characteristics of study objects can not be explanations of the processes that maintain a mega-existence. The mentioned limits mainly come from ignoring the information-energy nature of the existence from the inability to model mega-existences as products and expressions of complex information-energy processes; 3) ***The processual-organic query of social existence.*** Through the ontological query of man, people's potential to shape in the social processuality is modelled in any possible way. In this case, reference is made to the fundamental domain that we deem appropriate to examine human issues. The explanation is taken from the model of social processuality and it is insisted upon people possibilities in main sequences that can occur from the discontinuities which the becoming of social information processors can produce in social processuality. Thus methodical references to applicative investigations become possible. 4) ***Information processing in organisations.*** The processual-organic approach, based on theoretical guidelines, investigates the ways in which the organisation can increase its performance and the solution found is a single one: *"the investigation of man-in-social and social organisations are considered consequences of the ways in which people can interact in order to satisfy their needs.*[20]*"*

In our view, processual-organic theory has a positive effect on military science. We can bring in favour the following arguments. ***It enriches the specific methodology of this science*** with a new approach to events, phenomena, processes, actions and activities related to its object of study. The processual-organic query, having as objective to model in a unified way each mega-existence, it supposes a focus on emergencies, on the organizing consequences of information-energy processes, on the connections between organizing and disorganizing processes within social processuality and social organizations. ***It redefines the status and role of human role in the military organisation with a holistic vision of human beings***. People are active components of social organisations. Processing of social organisation can not relate but through people and are particularized by their information-energy capacities. As people characteristics are different in specific functional capabilities, integrating organisations will also differ. ***It also improves its own epistemology by taking some of the characteristics of processual-organic epistemology.*** The processual-organic conception enables the unitary query of the existence interpreted as processuality, as mega-processuality that integrates all possible processes, not just processes successively updated until now and available to some types of queries in certain interpretative horizons[21]. ***It facilitates the realistic interpretation scientifically rigorous of the impact of globalisation on national, regional, international and human security***. It becomes increasingly obvious that the issues of people social security require investigation not only at the level of nations or states. Between the situation of people, nations, continents and humanity, there are woven more and more numerous connections. They are consequences derived from diversification of interactions, which is possible by the fructification of new possibilities offered by theoretical research and in their extension, of new technologies, of changes that especially information technology, telecommunications, microbiology and microphysics in more and more areas of social existence[22]. Thus, accepting globalisation as a *social processuality*, decision makers can be aware and accept that social processes derived from decisions' application are estimated in ways that prove unsatisfactory as long as we do not have the correct interpretation of this processuality. Another argument is that ***it allows the development of profoundly pertinent political decisions in security and defence***. In the context of globalising processes (pressures), the main way to increase human security comes from scientisation of public decision-making activities. *Provided, of course, that policy makers accept that whatever the problems that require solving, solutions are acceptable only if they do not produce "perverse" consequences, harmful to humanity*. Such a condition brings about the issue of human socialisation, of their training as citizens, *of connections between 'freedom' and 'responsibilities' of people, contributing to the development of viable security strategies*, much in line with the real needs of people, states and other players of the global stage. Such interventions to improve the human condition, starting from the 'genetic heritage' of mankind, can be considered central objectives in strategies that will be really security strategies. In the strategies we refer to, people should not be only objects whose functional capabilities are improving; they should become subjects of saving actions. Therefore, we consider useful that the involutions endangering people's social existence to be known by people; they must receive sufficient information to be aware, because, without a minimum social culture, people do not include the quality of their lives, the future of humanity and life on the planet among their concerns. Such motivation, specific to people that were able to overcome individualistic interests, characteristic of people who live spontaneously, involves socializing processes conducted by educators who understand the connections between people's lives, the functional possibilities of social organizations and state of the planet. Training of such educators and organizing socializing processes can become important objectives of the strategies that we advocate[23].

Conclusions

Military Science was formed based on common, empirical knowledge and remains confined to the scientific knowledge that it enriches continuously. There is a biunivocal relationship between common, empirical knowledge and scientific knowledge during the development of military science. The latter was, is and will continue to be a fruitful exchange of information, data, concepts, paradigms and theories with other sciences.

Processual-organic theory, through the specific manner of approach to social existence, of interpreting human being and not only has a significant impact on military science, maximising it with rigorous investigation of the subject of study. By taking over the processual-organic conception on social existence, on human phenomena and complex processes of reality, military science proves its openness, ability to adapt in a flexible manner, effectively and appropriately to new as well as the ability to continue the continuous upward development.

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OFFSHORE BALANCING IN THE USA MILITARY REFORM

*Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, PhD**

President Barack Obama has recently operated major changes in the US security strategy, which entails, inter alia, the fact that Europe must enhance its military capabilities and rethink its military investment policy. With a new USA Defence Strategy, Washington will not take sole responsibility to maintain international stability, and it will not stop at involving other state players, but will have the opportunity to opt for non-intervention, without being criticized and lose the strategic position of great power. The strategy requires a force that is agile, technological and capable of confronting global terrorists, maintaining at the same time the power to deter Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions and to counter China's growth in the Western Pacific.

Key-words: strategy; security; reform; military; defence.

Introduction

On Thursday, 5th of January, 2012, President Barack Obama presented a restructured defence strategy at the Pentagon, outlining a plan for a smaller army, which can defeat any adversary, although it will face severe cuts in expenditures for the next decade. The new defence strategy redefines the interventionism in the logic of shared responsibilities. Obama Administration takes election risks by supporting a strategy that requires drastic cuts, but they are not specifically defined. The hegemonic role of the US shifts to integrate the alliance in the power balance of the international system.

In addition, the most important perennial element of the US strategy in the last decades, the goal of fighting and defeating in two and a half wars, is changed and transformed in the ability of fighting in two wars simultaneously, to conquer in one of them and to block the opponent in achieving its purposes in the second.

This is a massive and fundamental change of doctrine, with major costs. But since military disengagement in Europe and the shift of attention towards Asia are facts, maintaining the US engagement within alliances, especially NATO, is the only good news for Europeans. Europe must move quickly to prepare and equip with important capabilities, redesigning their military contributions and important investments in the military dimension.

1. The Background

The Pentagon is facing a number of issues: the budget crisis, the war in Afghanistan, post-conflict period in Iraq, Iran's nuclear ambitions, the issue of Israel, the relations between the US and Pakistan,

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military rise of China and the biggest challenge of all – the Congress. The presidential campaign is approaching and a chorus of Republican candidates, as Mitt Romney has already done, will tackle issues such as defence policies of Obama Administration and the level of expenditures.

While the economy will be the main subject of the debate of the campaign, defence will be a second subject. US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta, suggested that, if there is a need for further cuts, the Pentagon is allowed to choose where to make these reductions and not to apply them in general. He must also establish how many militaries he will lay off, which smaller weapons programs will be diminished or closed, how much should be spent on future and how much money must be spent, in the future, on research and development.

Sometime this year it must be decided how the withdrawal from Afghanistan will be organized and what arrangements can be made to maintain US forces in this country after 2014, if military trainers are sent back to Iraq and what the response will be if the Congress authorizes sending special forces in Nigeria to help in the fight against terrorist group Boko Haram, the way it sent US troops to help the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa.

Also, there are military problems with electoral implications: the personnel coming home from Iraq and Afghanistan to get enough support; what is done to reduce military suicides; commissions are required to determine which officers and troops should be withdrawn since the overall number decreases; how one can monitor the end of an era of *"do not ask, do not say"* and the new legislation on sexual abuse and rape in the military and who will be part of the promised Commission which will take into consideration changes in the retirement military system and, probably, the Pentagon's health system.

2. The 2012 US Defence Strategy

The new US Defence Strategy focuses on creating a force that is agile, technological and capable of facing global terrorists, while maintaining power to discourage the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and counter China's growth in the Western Pacific.

"We need a smart, strategic set of priorities. The new focus that the Department of Defence launches does just that", said the President of The United States[1]. "As we look beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – and end of a long-term process of nation building through large military footprints - we'll be able to ensure our security with smaller conventional ground forces. We will continue to get rid of outdated systems belonging to the Cold War era, so we can invest in the skills we need for the future, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, anti-terrorism, combating weapons of mass destruction and the ability to operate in environments where adversaries seek to deny us access"[22], said President Obama while meeting with Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff), General Martin Dempsey, and the commanders of the four military services.

Pentagon's new strategy is to make terrorism a top priority for US forces, while moving their attention from major ground operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, towards the naval and air from the Pacific. It emphasizes the cooperation with NATO allies in Europe and low-cost options such as common exercises and counselling missions in Latin America and Africa, where budget cut is able to reduce the US presence.

It also requires reducing the rate of increase in personnel costs, a major factor of expenditure raise of Pentagon in the past, although officials have promised that no change will affect current employees.

The strategy is the product of several meetings in the fall 2011, between Obama and military leaders and it enjoys the public support of Pentagon's elite. The President is facing a complex balancing act, since he seeks re-election in November this year, to show that he is dedicated to reducing costs and maintaining and strengthen national security.

The strategy does not specify what will be cut, although Pentagon officials said that this will create a smaller Army and infantry and make new investments in Navy and Air Force capabilities to meet the challenges of Chinese power growth in the Pacific Ocean. Detailed proposals for expenditure will come with the release of government budget in the coming weeks, which will be based on the reduction of 450 billion dollars in planned expenditure from the agreement on debt issued last year[33].

President's tax plan will not include the additional 500 billion dollars[44] that will come into force in January 2013, and which were triggered by the Super-commission's failure to reach an agreement. Pentagon Secretary, Leon Panetta, has made a strong lobby against further cuts, on which he said that "*it will force them to reduce tasks, commitments and capabilities that are deemed necessary to protect key national interests of security, generating a dispirited and shallow force*".

Publication, on Thursday, 5th of January, of the eight-page document may ease criticism from the GOP (*Grand Old Party – The Republicans*)[55] Members and presidential candidates that Obama has put budget figures before Defence Strategy, but not complaints that the President endangers national security by cutting too deep Pentagon's expenditure. Although Obama has made clear that, within the budget that he intends to launch, military expenditure will continue to grow, Republicans argue that this increase is not sufficient to maintain a force capable of doing what the president said on Thursday. "This is a strategy for managing, from the back, of an America that has remained behind. The Chairman included our withdrawal from the world in a new strategy to mask the deprivation of our military and national defence", said the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Howard "Buck" McKeon (R. California), following the President's statement. "A fair and valid strategy for national defence can not be based on the premise that we must do more with less, or even less with little", he further said on the same occasion.

One of the key arguments is related to whether the strategy will continue to require the US forces enough to contend with more than one opponent at the same time. Pentagon officials have suggested that it would not be the case for this issue, although many analysts have questioned themselves whether the armed forces are able to do so even at present. While considering this subject, General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then stressed that the US strategy has always been the country ability to respond to global events wherever and whenever are happening, and this will not change.

Meanwhile, GOP candidates linking defence expenditure decline to the main issue of the campaign last fall - jobs - will probably receive a boost after Boeing announced on 4th of January that they will close a plant in Wichita, Kansas, that currently produces military tanks, which will lay off more than 2160 workers. In a statement, the company said that it has sufficient sustainable businesses on the horizon to create a structure at reasonable costs to maintain and win new business.

3. Evolving Trends and Views

In early November 2011, Tom Friedman, columnist of "The Times", stated in his article that the strategic interests in Central Asia are too expensive and that a withdrawal of troops from Iraq will exacerbate the relations between Iran and Iraq and will improve the US strategic position in the area and withdrawing from operational theatres in Asia will replay the United States freedom of manoeuvre necessary to have more strategic options.

If the US will take a few steps back, there will be several options open to them. They let the competing regional powers to act against each other and then to tip the balance of power. This logic can be applied to states such as India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China and Afghanistan.

This strategy will give America the option to choose, without having the responsibility to intervene anywhere, anytime. Also, the US geographical position is desirable for such a strategy, since it is far away, geographically speaking, from most "hot" areas in the world, but also from other centres of power.

Such a policy of returning to isolationism is an option discussed, but marginal, in the US. Questions like the reason why US should use such a strategy when the power is not offset by any other state or international organisation and/or why they will not continue to be hegemonic if they have the power to do it are also legitimate.

According to the new policy, the US should behave like any other state of the current international system and act only where is in their best interest to do so. Thus, it will not have the sole responsibility to maintain international stability, other state players will be involved, and beyond, it will be able to opt for non-intervention, without being criticised and not lose its strategic position of great power, will not have the same huge costs, and will be able to focus on internal development and on its primary interests. The US could, therefore, intervene selectively.

The resulted strategy, so called of "offshore balancing", should not be confused with isolationism as long as the US will continue to be involved at the diplomatic level in some areas and even at the interventionist level in other areas where the balance of power fails. So, a situation where the US President would order the withdrawal of all American troops stationed on foreign land and would focus his attention exclusively on the American continent will not be reached. Such a scenario is not only unlikely, but impossible, given the current global interdependent system.

The strategy, which the President of the United States, Barack Obama, adopted by announcing the withdrawal of troops from Iraq could be interpreted in this sense, but it should not be forgotten that this is still mainly an interventionist strategy.

What is new in the offshore balancing policy?

First, the US will not use many ground troops, instead they will focus on unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles. Then, the US continues to intervene in areas of low strategic interest, like Pakistan or Yemen. And, finally, offshore balancing strategy, as it is proposed by theorists of realism, involves alliances with other states, whether democratic or non-democratic, to achieve a balance of power in key regions.

Alliances with other democratic states are certainly preferable, yet no state can afford, no matter how powerful it is, to reject any alliance with an undemocratic state. The argument is obvious: partners are chosen depending of the area that the respective state would like to work, influence, intervene, and in this context the choice is limited. This option is often criticised and avoided from the perspective of the current administration at the White House.

Also, it should not be overlooked the fact that the adoption of offshore balancing strategy came against a backdrop of global financial crisis, so this could be interpreted as a necessary adjustment of the US policy imposed by costs and not as a choice. However, if this strategy would have been adopted in 1992, perhaps the US would not have gone through the events of September 11, 2001 and certainly would not have been involved in costly wars such as Iraq or Afghanistan.

Therefore, the policy proposed by President Obama is not currently an offshore balancing strategy, but it is certainly a step in its favour. Too fast a change could lead to a high degree of instability in the world especially in "hot" areas, where regional actors expect the US to intervene, thereby assuming the responsibility of hegemony. Precisely because there is such a player, these states have begun to rely too much on the US intervention, so a rapid change of responsibility towards these regional actors would generate a lack of response from them, simply because they do not have yet developed such a policy. Offshore balancing strategy would be the desirable book for any time, crisis or financial boom for the US, because it allows not to take unnecessary or undesirable responsibilities; it does not create or emphasize antagonisms between states, in a system where the US is the strongest, thus minimizing the fear that might be caused by this power. Considering that it requires a clear hierarchy of priorities and areas of interest but also it underscores the fact that the US will rely on its regional allies the strategy will determine the avoidance of certain situations in which the state will be drawn into conflicts that are not necessary and will cause others to act and not just to help the US. As mentioned before, the geographical location is an advantage that the US must seize, especially since it determines the regional powers be more focused on themselves and their neighbours than on the US. Perhaps the most important aspect is that offshore balancing is not a passive strategy. Rather, it is a cost-benefit analysis, which does not exclude the involvement of all available resources of US to promote and protect the states' vital interests.

So, the strategy adopted in January this year by President Barack Obama is not fully subject to the rules of offshore balancing strategy, but it clearly comes closest to it. Yet, the message is clear: regional powers must be more active in the future if they wish to maintain their status. Mere helping the US is not enough anymore.

The Chinese state has quickly reacted after the announcement of the new US military strategy, which provides increased staff in Asia. In an editorial published by the news agency Xinhua, the Chinese warned the US to stop "flexing their muscles". They argue that a large American presence in Asia could mean stability and prosperity, but it could also endanger peace. Chinese journalists also said that if the US will militarize the Asia-Pacific region, this would endanger peace instead of increase stability in the region. Pentagon officials are reluctant to speak openly about a possible conflict with China. During a visit to China of US Deputy Secretary on defence issues, Michele Fluornoy, she said to a Chinese military top general that "the US is not trying to counter China" and that "China is not seen as an adversary". However, the US military officials often talk about preparations for a conflict in the Pacific, without mentioning who they will fight against.

Conclusions

The Obama strategy introduced some change and is reshaping the US military far from major expeditionary land wars and towards standoff capabilities (drones, naval/air strikes) and other different forms of war, such as cyber.

Therefore, the US strategy on defence presented by President Barack Obama will create a profound change for the US Armed Forces. As a result, after a decade of fighting the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US troops are to withdraw by the end of 2014, the number of troops will be reduced, as will especially affect the land forces (US Army) and Navy.

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2 *Ibidem*.

3 *Ibidem*.

4 *Ibidem*.

5 The Republican Party was founded by anti-slavery expansion activists in 1854 and is one of the two major contemporary political parties in the United States, along with the Democratic Party. The party's platform generally reflects American conservatism in the US political spectrum and is considered center-right, in contrast to the center-left Democratic Party. In the 112th Congress, elected in 2010, the Republican Party holds a majority of seats in the House of Representatives, and a minority of seats in the Senate. The party holds the majority of governorships, as well as the majority of state legislatures, and control of one chamber in five states. For more details, see "Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopaedia" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Party_(United_States).

ISAF AFTER 10 YEARS, BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY

*Petre DUȚU, PhD**

Nowadays, international, regional and national security environment is defined by complexity and dynamism. During the latest two decades, international community has shown a tendency to involve directly in the management of crises and armed conflicts, sometimes resorting to the military instrument to resolute them. Thus, various international military coalitions under UN mandate have formed and acted in the theaters of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.

In Afghanistan, there is a war between UN international military coalition and the Afghan security forces, on the one hand, and the Taliban and insurgent forces, on the other.

Key-words: military coalition; international community; crisis; armed conflict; insurgents; the Taliban; ISAF; NATO; UN.

1. International Community's Attitude to Crises and Armed Conflicts Management

After 1990, once the bipolar era reached to an end, many political and military analysts, as well as the majority of world population, have expected to witness the diminishing or even the disappearance of world crises and armed conflicts. But the reality was different from these expectations and completely opposed to them. Thus, crises and armed conflicts with a diverse nature (political, ethnic, religious, economic, and identity-related) have increasingly gathered way in the whole world, but especially in Europe, where a series of states disappeared from the world map, transforming either peacefully (Czechoslovakia divided in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) or by civil war (Yugoslavia, a federal state, disintegrated in a range of independent and sovereign states).

International, regional and national security environment's complexity and dynamism have got international community's attitude to the adequate and expeditious management of political, identity, ethnic and economic crises and of armed conflicts to substantially change. Nowadays, various organizations with competencies in security, stability and peace decide to intervene directly and as promptly as possible in solving crises and armed conflicts representing a risks or a threat to regional and global peace and security. In this context, we witnessed the direct intervention on international community in the war between Serbia and Kosovo (ex-Yugoslavia, 1999), in Iraq (1991, 2003), Afghanistan (2001), Libya (2011). In the last three exposed, the action was made through international military coalitions under

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UN mandate, mainly employing the military instrument to manage the armed conflict. EU and NATO, as important actors of the global scene, by their capabilities, have been playing a significant role in the theaters of operations of Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, for instance.

Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the fact that one could speak about two types of motivations for the international community's intervention in the management of crises and conflicts from different areas of the world. Thus, there may be distinguished between *declared reasons*[1], related to the defence of the fundamental human's rights which are violated in different countries, and *motives which are less declared officially, but they are implicit* and refer to the economic, political and military strategic interests of international state actors which are consistently involved in the management of the crisis or conflict taking place in a certain region of the world[2]. Even more, it is known that human action, both individually and in group (state, international community, political-military organization or of other nature), is supported by a wide range of needs, tendencies, intentions, wishes, motives, interests, aspirations and beliefs. Some states' strategic interests are the ones mobilizing human energies in the direction of active, responsible, voluntary and direct involvement of certain state and non-state actors in the management of crises and armed conflicts in certain areas of the world. It seems that international community's active attitude to solving crises which are diverse in their nature of Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya is based on the response to some vital interests of certain states which contributed with consistent military troops to constitute the international military coalition. As a matter of fact, achieving the access to the energy resources in this area or its maintenance may be considered as arguments for the major interest shown by some states involved in solving the crises in the region[3].

In order to illustrate the significations, perspectives and implications of some event from the theaters of operations, we will focus only on the ones in Afghanistan. In our opinion, they are the most representative for illustrating the efforts of the international community, of the North-Atlantic Alliance and of certain inter-governmental organizations in the area to manage adequately this crisis and armed conflict with a significant impact on international and regional security.

2. ISAF – Objectives, Tasks, Mandate and Evolution

ISAF was launched in 2001, by resolution no. 1386[4] of the UN Security Council, after having overthrown the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Initially, ISAF was a UN multinational force which was meant to ensure the security of Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, and its surroundings. Actually ISAF begun on 20th of December 2001, with the UK as the leading nation, cooperating with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a political mission composed of civilians, created on 28th of March 2002 by resolution no. 1401 of the UN Security Council[5].

On 11th of August 2003, NATO assumed ISAF command, coordination and planning on the strength of resolution no. 1510 of October 2003 issued by UN Security Council. This resolution, by virtue of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations extends ISAF action to the entire territory of the country. In 2005, NATO enacts an operational plan in accordance with the development of the mission started at the beginning of 2004. Thus, ISAF's regionalization process covers the Northern and the Western parts of Afghanistan. The extension to South and East was made in October 2006. Plus, the parliamentary elections organized on 18th of September 2005 marked the return to a normalized political life in this country which has known many years of war.

With the end of Berlin Agreements of 5th of December 2001[6] and the beginning of the Afghan National Assembly's functioning on 19th of September 2005, it is announced a "Pact for Afghanistan" on 31st of January 2006[7]. It constitutes the road map for consolidating pace in the country for five years. The pact referred to three domains of activities: security, governance – includes human rights and the rule of law – and the economic and social development – also comprises the fight against drugs.

Nevertheless, the climate in the country is not the expected one. Frequently, ISAF forces have to deal with violence acts affecting especially the Southern and Eastern areas. Numerous militaries die during operations, attacks or assaults. On 12th of September 2006, Security Council extended ISAF mandate with a year starting from 13th of October 2006, by resolution no. 1707. At the same time, UN Security Council calls ISAF participant states to bring in more people and means. The answer to this call was a very little incentive one. This is the reason for which, on 22nd of September 2007, Security Council extends with one more year ISAF mandate by resolution no. 1776, although it expresses its concern about "the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade"[8] in Afghanistan. The mission's forces began, in the autumn of 2007, the transfer of the control of some strategic bases to the Afghan security forces. These actions are part of the process of withdrawing the foreign forces from Afghanistan.

As far as ISAF is concerned, numerous participant states, such as US, Canada and UK, request some changes related to the strategies from the military and humanitarian areas, to the increase of the number of political advisors, to appointing a super-emissary charged with the coordination of the international assistance and with the reinforcement of the effectives.

By resolution no. 1806 of 20th of March 2008, Security Council decides to extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, emphasizing the necessity to enhance the cooperation with ISAF in civil-military coordination, intelligence sharing and actions' coherence in order to continue implementing the Pact for Afghanistan.

It is worth mentioning that NATO plays a key role in international community's engagement in Afghanistan, where this organization supports the Afghan authorities in installing security and stability in order to open the way of reconstruction and of the efficient management of the state's affairs. In this respect, NATO is engaged on three lines: 1) it leads, under UN mandate, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); 2) a high civil representative, charged with progressing at the level of the Alliance's political and military engagement in this country; 3) an important program of cooperation with Afghanistan focused on defence reform, the establishment of the defence institutions and the military aspects of the reform in the defence area.

As a matter of fact, in Afghanistan, NATO assumed the main role in supporting the Afghan government in exerting its authority and influence on the entire territory of the country in order to create the favorable conditions for reconstruction and efficient governance. To this respect, NATO uses the International Assistance Force in Afghanistan, under UN mandate. Plus, within NATO Summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, it was made a reference to the fact that ISAF, led by NATO under UN mandate in Afghanistan, remains the main priority of the Alliance[9].

3. Expectations Related to ISAF of the Actors Involved in the Conflict in Afghanistan

In our opinion, the expectations related to ISAF of the actors involved in the conflict in Afghanistan have to be approached differently, beginning from the set objectives – the support given to Afghan authorities in ensuring security and stability in the view to create the propitious conditions for reconstruction and development –, and the assumed tasks – security, reconstruction and development, governance and the fight against narcotics trade[10].

Thus, ***international community*** is represented, first of all, by the UN which issued a series of resolutions of the Security Council by which it regularized ISAF activity in the course of the ten years of existence and action. As a consequence, UN expected the assumed objectives and tasks to lead to the installation of stability, of a climate of peace, of development, to the extension of the Afghan government's authority on the entire national territory and to a successful fight against drugs. Generally, international community expects all Security Council's resolutions on Afghanistan to be implemented and observed by Afghanistan's population and government, by the states which are part of ISAF and UNAMA and by Afghanistan's neighboring countries. For instance, by UN resolution no. 1453 issued by the Security Council on 24th of December 2002 on a nonaggression agreement between Afghanistan and six of its neighbors (China, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), all these states are expected to observe the pact and support the implementation of its provisions.

The same expectations are nourished by the international community from the observance of all the resolutions issued by the Security Council regarding the situation in Afghanistan and the manner in which the coherence and convergence of all the activities related to its implementation have to be ensured.

Participant countries, especially US, UK, Canada, but not only, expected ISAF objectives to be reached as soon as possible so as to ensure security in all the regions of the country, the post-conflict reconstruction and development to begin and continue systematically, the population to know a good governance by those elected freely and democratically and the fight against narcotics to obtain the approval from all the citizens. At the same time, these states expected their efforts on the line of country's stability, security, reconstruction and development of the fight against narcotics to be supported by all the Afghan citizens and by Afghanistan's local and central authorities. Additionally, the involved states want to see that their efforts to create a climate of trust and propitious for life are accepted and assumed by the new institutions of the Afghans and understood correctly by the state's population.

At the same time, the states which are part of the international military coalition also act in the line of forming Afghan armed forces and police[11] so as to make them able that, when the foreign military forces from Afghanistan would have been withdrawn, they could assume the tasks carried out by the coalition in the area of human and national security.

NATO, as an essential ISAF actor, has great expectations regarding the fulfillment of this mission's objectives on the three directions mentioned previously. Alliance's Member States which are involved in the process of managing the armed conflict in Afghanistan aim consequently, systematically and perseveringly at implementing all the established measures to create a security environment, to realize this state's reconstruction and development on democratic principles, to mitigate and, then, to eradicate the opium production and trade. NATO expects its human and material efforts to prove efficient in matters of security, stability and democratic development in Afghanistan.

The governing elected freely and democratically hope their authority will be recognized and accepted by all the citizens and on the entire state's territory. At the same time, they want to remain in power after the withdrawal of the international military coalition's forces.

Afghanistan's population expect the stability, good governance, their feeling of security about the future both from an economic and security point of view to become a reality in all the areas of the country. State's reconstruction and development on all accounts – social, economic, political, cultural, religious, environmental – are expected as results of which all the Afghan citizens will have, irrespective of their social-economic condition, religion, sex or tribal belonging.

The Taliban and the persons affected by ISAF objectives and tasks want their terrorist actions – attacks with improvised explosive devices, ambushes, trap cars – or actions of the insurgents against the Afghan security forces aimed at creating a climate of fear, incertitude and insecurity among the population. Additionally, by all their acts, they have in view to maintain their control on certain areas of the country, especially, where drug production and traffic is developed. On the other hand, they also fight against the legal and legitimate government of the country and wish to regain their privileged positions which they had in Afghanistan before the war against international terrorism begun.

4. The Real State of the Implementation of ISAF Objectives and Tasks

In our opinion, the objectives and tasks assumed by ISAF haven't been realized at the extent they were expected by all the actors involved in the process of restoring peace, stability and economic, political and social development of Afghanistan.

International community represented by the UN has seen its expectations becoming reality only partially. The fact that it had to extend the mandates of ISAF and UNAMA[12] year after year stands as a proof that UN hasn't seen its expectations on the resolution of Afghanistan conflict becoming true. At the same time, its repeated calls for the participant states to increase the personnel and means sent in the Afghanistan theatre of operations, calls which didn't receive the expected answer, enhance the conviction that international community's expectations regarding the resolution of the conflict in this country and its real development haven't been brought into being. In our opinion, the extension itself of the war for more than ten years proves that international community's expectations are far from being fulfilled at the extent estimated initially. On then other hand, although there is an agreement between Afghanistan and six of its neighbors, not all of the latter support UN objectives. For instance, Pakistan has an ambivalent behavior in the area of the fight against terrorism. At the same time, it was also hoped that, by removing the Taliban from power, the provision bases, the training camps and fields of Al-Qaeda would be disbanded. The continuation of the Taliban attack on the coalition's military forces and the Afghan security forces invalidates this expectation.

Participant countries, especially those with the highest contribution in personnel and means terms, have to see the following issues:

- The mission's extension to a large period of time on what was initially estimated, at the moment of the beginning of the operation of fight against terrorism;
- The losses in human and material terms are enormous in report to the successes achieved in reaching ISAF objectives. In this respect, it was expected that by removing the Taliban from the governance of the country and its replacement with a democratic regime, resulted from free and democratic elections, Afghanistan would know a decisive transition to reconstruction and development. Thus, despite the fact that there were invested more than 130.000 people and billions of dollars in this country's reconstruction, the international coalition hasn't always succeeded in ensuring Afghanistan's peace and security[13]. It still has to face continuous attacks of the Taliban, the reforming of the seniors of war, the burst of opium production and traffic.
- Actually, international missions of assistance and support for the populations have become more and more actual fight missions. Military and civilian losses have increased in the both sides. In this sense, a report published in March 2011 by the UN Mission of Assistance in Afghanistan (UNAMA) mentioned that, in 2010, 75% from the 2,777 civilian victims if the Afghan conflict were made by the insurgents, equaling to a 29% raise by comparison with the previous year[14]. Another document mentions that, in the war in Afghanistan, until present, there have been more than 75,000 deaths as far as the Afghan security forces are concerned, 200 deaths within NATO troops and more than 38,000 deaths within the Taliban and insurgents[15].
- The reconstruction advances slowly and the consistency of the power of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzaï, is based more on the alliances agreed with the seniors of war than on observing the democratic rules.

Although its actions are directed on three lines in ISAF framework, ***NATO*** has to see that its human and material efforts haven't yet proved their efficiency regarding the re-establishment of peace, security, the country's reconstruction and development while opium production and traffic continues. The Taliban, insurgents and seniors of war attack systematically the international coalition's forces, inclusively in the bases in which they are disposed, not only in the different routes on which there are performed various missions on the field.

Afghanistan's government hasn't seen its authority extended to the entire territory of the country but only in the areas where there are the coalition's military forces. At its turn, Afghan population has to see that after ten years of war, its condition hasn't changed in a good sense, but, on the contrary, it becomes worse day after day. Nobody and, especially the Western leaders, ignore the fact that the security state worsens with every day that passes. Thus, in the summer of 2011, the attacks became more intense, the losses in terms of western military and civil lives increased, the insurgents are present on the entire territory of the country and the Afghan security apparatus (armed forces and police) have under control only Kabul region[16]. Therefore, Afghan government authority has not extended to the entire territory of the country, but only on the localities and regions where the coalition's forces are present.

The Taliban and insurgents expect that once the international coalition's forces would have been withdrawn, they will become the absolute "lords" of the country, creating themselves a life style in accordance with Sharia (the set of laws, imposed by Allah and revealed to the prophets, which rule the human life from birth to death).

5. Possible Lessons from the Management of the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan

The ten year long war in Afghanistan urges to a deep reflection on the manner to approach its management[17].

First of all, it seems that resolving a conflict by means of violence, even if it is legitimate, is inefficient. This happens because violence brings forth more violence. The evolution of the conflict in Afghanistan proves this to the full. Maybe, the peaceful way of dialogue between the actors involved decisively in the armed conflict and reaching to compromises may turn out to be more efficient than armed confrontation and to trigger results which will resist in time.

Secondly, any process of crisis or armed conflict management has to begin with the thorough knowledge of the culture, civilization, traditions, customs, common laws, religion, and life style of the population in the area in which the intervention is made. Thus, we reckon that international military coalition, respectively, the mission and its members, will be accepted and supported in their undertakings by the population of the country in which they intervene. Presently, not all the population of Afghanistan agrees to ISAF mission, a fact proved by the support offered, in present, by some Afghans to the Taliban and insurgents.

Thirdly, it seems that any military intervention meant to manage an armed conflict in a certain country of the world exceeding six months is perceived by the respective state's population as a military occupation. From this perception to revolt against the occupants is just a little step to be taken, a step which some citizens really take. Probably, this is the explanation for the actions of Afghanistan Taliban and insurgents against the international coalition's forces, on the one hand, and the Afghan security forces, on the other.

Fourthly, the technological superiority in terms of manpower, resources and armament doesn't always ensure the success in an armed confrontation with a technologically inferior adversary in terms of manpower, resources, armament, which adopts means of fight which are specific to asymmetric warfare. Thus, the Taliban and insurgents in Afghanistan, in spite the fact they don't have the technical equipment, the resources and the manpower of the international coalition, are not definitively defeated. In fact, they have two advantages on the international coalition's forces, namely *the support of a part of population* from which they also originate and *the thorough knowledge of the relief of the area in which they execute their attacks*.

Fifthly, trying to impose a lifestyle completely different from the one of the country in which there are performed missions of crisis or armed conflict management seems to be doomed to failure. The results achieved in Afghanistan, by ISAF, in terms of state reconstruction and democratic development, seem to indicate this observation. Moreover, the central and local authorities that won the elections organized in this country[18] on 20th of August 2009 aren't totally recognized by the entire population of Afghanistan. Terrorist-type action of the Taliban and the attacks of insurgents on international coalition forces, on Afghan security forces and on central and local authorities stand as proof for this observation.

Finally, the process of state reconstruction should be accomplished by the concentration of international community's efforts with the ones of the Afghan population, with the ones of the citizens, of the elected authorities of the country and of the national organizations. We reckon that attracting all the local resources for the complex process of state reconstruction and development would be a proof of the acceptance by Afghan population's majority of the support received from the international community and, especially, of its agreement on the new pattern of social and political organization.

Conclusions

Nowadays, international community's responsible, active and direct involvement in the management of crises and armed conflicts worldwide is a reality. There are two kinds of reasons laying at the basis of this type of approach: *official*, declared, referring to human fundamental rights and rule of law and, *implicit*, regarding the fulfillment of the strategic interests of one or more actors involved in the process of the management of the crisis or armed conflict.

Afghanistan war has been running for more than a decade. The objectives established by the international community regarding this country's security, stability, reconstruction and development are noble. But their fulfillment is only partial and it is possible that, after the withdrawal of the international coalition's forces from Afghanistan, even this partial fulfillment would disappear under the aggression of the Taliban and insurgents. The latter will try to reestablish the country's social organization according to the traditions, common laws, religion, culture and national civilization.

ISAF success is strongly connected to the acceptance by the Afghan population of the country's social organization pattern proposed by the international community. Nonetheless, the western social organization pattern seems to not be fully compatible with the traditions, culture, civilization, religion and customs of the Afghan population. This is the reason why a large part of this population manifests resistance to their country's reconstruction and development.

The solution for the war in Afghanistan seems to be a compromise between the involved actors, reached through negotiations. Using violence, military force, will not lead soon to a definitive cease of war. It is possible that, after the international coalition's forces would have been withdrawn, namely after ISAF mission ceases, Afghanistan would return ***either to a traditional political regime, or to the continuation of war*** of the Taliban and insurgents against the central and local authorities which won the latest elections organized by this country.

Population's support contributes significantly to the winning of war[19]. And this is also valid in the case of Afghanistan. If we consider the way in which the Taliban and insurgents act, by military force, one could see that not all the population of Afghanistan supports the fulfillment of ISAF objectives and tasks.

NOTES:

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THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION

Gheorghe TOMA, PhD*

Cultural globalization refers to the growth in the exchange of cultural practices between nations and peoples. Although this is a process that has undoubtedly occurred for thousands of years, economic and political globalization has enhanced the process enormously in recent decades. In addition, many analysts point to the way new technologies and their exploitation such as commercial air travel, satellite television, mass telecommunications and the internet have created a world where billions of people consume identical cultural products – such as pop music, soap opera and sporting events – and employ cultural practices they would never otherwise have encountered – such as foreign food preparations and foreign words and phrases.

At the heart of much of the rise of cultural globalization has been the massive expansion of the entertainment and communications industry fuelled, in particular, by the spread of television. Television has become the key to the development of pop music, news services, advertising, sport and light entertainment with an appeal and enormous money-making potential across the whole world.

*Key-words***:** *globalization; culture; civilization; nationalism; Westernization.*

Introduction

Few expressions of globalization are as visible, widespread and pervasive as the world-wide proliferation of internationally traded consumer brands, the global ascendancy of popular cultural icons and artifacts, and the simultaneous communication of events by satellite broadcasts to hundreds of millions of people on all continents.

"The most public symbols of globalization consist of Coca - Cola, Madonna and the CNN news. Whatever the causal and practical significance of these phenomena, there can be little doubt that one of the most directly perceived and experienced forms of globalization is the cultural form"[1].

Despite the complexity of cultural interactions between societies over the last three millennia, the intensifying movement of images and symbols and the extraordinary stretch of modes of thought and of communications are unique and unparalleled features of the late twentieth and the new millennium.

We have moved from "a world dominated by cultural isolation in a world where intercultural factors dominate, from an era characterized by cultural autonomy of traditional isolated groups to an era of generalized interrelations and communication"[2].

Our time has the great historical privilege of moving from a world of isolated civilizations, based to some extent on different spaces and times, to a single world, which is characterized by the same space (world market) and the same time (synchronicity of all events), birth of a communication and of a world community.

The community has always taken precedence over communication; the latter being first developed inside the group: individuals speaking the same language, sharing the same religion, the same values, the same history, the same traditions and the same memory. At present, we notice a shift

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from a planet of closed civilizations to a world open to all people through travel and media.

1. Cultural Development

We can state there is a close connection between globalization, history and culture. In this respect, D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, in their book "*Global transformations: politics, economics and culture*", make a detailed presentation of the historical forms of cultural globalization. Thus, the author analyzes pre-modern and modern globalization.

Before the Modern Age, "*world religions and empires offered the most important cultural and institutional complexes that made the cultural interaction and long distance communication possible and through which strong and extended cultural interacting relations might prevail. Trade was a key-vehicle for this spreading of ideas and of artifacts on long distances*".[3]

Because of logistic limitations of the leadership based exclusively on military force, the empire capitals attempted to build lasting alliances among the elites, beyond ethnic and geographical divisions.

Even where the strategy failed from the perspective of building up the empire, there was the possibility that it might leave behind a distinctive cultural heritage. For example, the ephemeral Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great had been the essence for the spreading of Greek language, science, philosophy and Greek literature in the Middle East. The Roman Empire offered the institutional framework through which first the Hellenistic culture and then Christianity could infiltrate in Northern Africa and Western and Northern Europe.

Even though cultures had relations with other cultures, and religions with other religions, the contacts had not always been fruitful. The regional feature of world religions reflects border lines and discrepancies between them and the empires they encountered. Even more, hardly did most of the people understand those great cultural interactions – the identities, the beliefs and rituals were mostly local. Between the village and the great empires, there were very few cultural exchanges".

The Han Empire in China provided a similar framework for the spread of Chinese writing, literature, science and technology. Although these cultures communicated with other cultures, and religions with other religions, the meetings were not always fertile. The regional character of world religions reflected the cleavages and divisions among them and the empires with which they intertwined. Furthermore, most people have often caught just a glimpse of these great cultural interactions – as identities, habits and faiths were mostly local. Between the stat and the great empires there are very few cultural forms[4].

After the fall of Rome and of the Han Dynasty in China and after the first wave of Islamic expansion, empires continued to rise and fall. Nevertheless, up to the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Western imperial adventures began, there are no historical events comparable to the military and cultural expansion of Islam. The great emperors were nomad warriors from the Eurasian steppes. But their cultural innovations did not overcome their military talent. Their campaigns and their conquests led to the reconsidering of the old cultural models and not their transformation. European empires will have finally become efficient instruments of the cultural power abroad, but only starting with the 18th century, after the birth of nationalism and of nation-states in Europe and in both Americas. Inside this area, there had been gradually redefined complex models of cultural streams between aristocrats, as well as the distinctive area of the local folk features.

States were searching for united nations in order to rule them and nationalists were searching for auto-determination through states. Consequently, although the process was uneven and contested, more and more cultural institutions and cultural flows began to fix themselves within the frontiers of the developing nation-states. More and more cultural institutions and cultural streams got to set their place between the borders of the forming nation-states.

Language, school, means of transportation and communication, liturgical ritual and identity, all had been defined more and more from the perspective of the nations territorially bordered. External or foreign influences were rejected or treated in a suspicious and hostile manner. But, in the Occident, the cosmopolitanism and the internationalism continued to exist, as well as the trans-national cultural practices and institutions.

Indeed, from the heart of the European system of the nation-states "ideologies and secular strong discourses had arisen – liberalism, Marxism and modern science – whose rationalism from Enlightenment suggested, entitled or not, the attraction and the universal applicability. Still, generally, nationalism was the one that became the most powerful cultural force, partly because it was systematically and financial supported and displayed by the modern states. According to this interpretation, the climax of cultural globalization is placed in the past, while the most powerful and significant cultural streams and relations developed between the borders of the modern nation-states"[5].

2. Cultural Dimension

Globalization changes the way in which we conceptualize culture, because culture has been localized for a very long time in a certain space. Does global modernism promise to offer us a global culture? In a certain way it might be said that such a culture already exists. As Ulf Hannerz writes, "today there is a world culture, but it advisable to understand what it means. The total homogeneity of the expressional and signifying systems has not taken place yet and there is no probability to be seen very soon. But the world has become a net of social relations and, between its various regions, there is a movement of meanings similar to the movement of people and goods."[6].

What U. Hannerz wants to say is that nowadays we have a globalization of culture in the sense of complex interconnection.

The integration context of the cultural practices and experiences into the web, world wide, may be seen as a global culture. This meaning must be separated from the one according to which global culture is understood as a unique and homogenized signifying system. Global culture "is like the birth of a single culture, gathering all the people in the world and replacing the diversity of cultural systems used before."

Obviously, such a culture has not appeared yet.

Of course, the idea of a global culture has not become possible only in the days of global modernism. The great cultural statements and texts could overpass the linguistic, political, civil and cultural borders provided that they should be translated into the languages of the interested cultural communities. But, along centuries, the process has been delayed by the geographic distances, by the slowness of travelling or by technical difficulties.

Along with the development of globalization, made possible by media and the contemporary means of transportation, the movements of the texts (religious, political, literary, scientific ideas) has speeded up. Political, cultural and religious powers proved themselves incapable of stopping people to travel or the development of communications (parabolic TV antennas, video tapes, Internet), so the circulation of ideas and opinions. We enter the age of the generalized mixture of cultures and civilizations, of discourses and passions.

Cultural globalization "stands not only for empirical human contacts between civilizations (the revolution of the means of transportation), and also for the intellectual instruments of mediation between groups put together in more or less brutal manner".

We should call humanistic sciences those intellectual instruments, giving them a sufficiently extended meaning: History, Philology, Linguistics, Archaeology, Sociology, Philosophy etc.

In the attempt of creating a global culture, speaking some world wide spread languages has an important role. Undoubtedly, in the top of the hierarchy is English language, used in the whole world, in all its forms: written, spoken, formal, informal, and also in its functional styles: economic, legal, technical, journalistic etc. It has become the *lingua franca* by excellence and continues to strengthen this domination through a process of self-consolidation. It became the central language of international communication in the business, political, administrative, scientific and academic area, at the same time being the dominant language used in global advertising and popular culture.

The main language used in IT is English, being the written code for Windows and Internet protocols. "More than two thirds of the scientists in the world write in English, three quarters of the international mail are written in English and 80% of the information of the recovering systems of world electronic data are stocked in English"[7].

Another aspect regarding the domination of the English language is represented by book translations. Thus, an overwhelming amount of all translations in foreign languages are based originals written in English. In a certain sense, this domination is not at all surprising. "As the destiny of the other languages shows, the use of a language is tightly connected to the rhythms of power. English is the mother language of the two hegemonic superpowers of the modern world, Great Britain and USA. Even more, this power is used in all the fields of human life: economic, political, military and last, but not least, cultural" [8].

As a consequence of the development of information technology, we are also the witnesses of an avalanche of scientific and technical concepts, which are employed in most languages in their English form. Concepts such as: *businessman, barter, broker, dealer, computer, marketing, management, manager, dumping, know-how, trend* – are used nowadays without a translation. This invasion of English and American concepts can be called a "vocabulary globalization". The problem of the domination of one language and the threat upon the linguistic diversity is connected to another more general problem, that of the cultural imperialism: the idea that a culture may be a hegemonic one.

This pessimistic construction of the idea of global culture was very popular at the end of 20th century. Indeed, the theory of the cultural imperialism may be considered one of the earliest theories of cultural globalization.

3. Culture Globalization

As Jonathan Friedman wrote, the discourse of cultural imperialism from around the late 1960s tended to set the scene for the initial critical reception of globalization in the cultural sphere, casting the process as "an aspect of the hierarchical nature of imperialism that is the increasing hegemony of particular central cultures, the diffusion of American values, consumer goods and lifestyles"[9].

This concept of global culture is perceived today as the spread of the American values, goods and lifestyle. Actually the most visible sign of globalization appears to be the spread of American hamburgers and Coca Cola in almost every country on the globe.

In his book "The Lexus and the Olive Tree", Thomas Friedman wrote "globalization wears Mickey Mouse ears, it drinks Pepsi and Coke, eats Big Macs, does its computing on an IBM laptop ... in most societies people cannot distinguish anymore between American power, American exports, American cultural assaults, American cultural exports and plain vanilla globalization"[10].

The best proof to support this affirmation is the convergence and the standardization obvious in the cultural products in the whole world. "Take any catalogue, from clothes to music, to film and television, and to architecture and you could not ignore the fact that some styles, brands, tastes and practices now have global circulation and can be found almost anywhere in this world"[11].

Certain brands and symbols of global mass culture have already become clichés: Coca Cola, McDonald, Calvin Klein, Microsoft, Levis, IBM, Nike, CNN, MTV – some even becoming synonymous with Western cultural hegemony: McWorld, Coca-Colonization, McDonaldization and even McDisneyization.

But what does this homogenous distribution of cultural goods means, if not the power of certain capitalist enterprises to control large markets anywhere in the world?

Considering the presence of such global goods as a symbol of convergence towards the capitalist monoculture means reducing culture to its material goods; instead, culture should be seen as a symbolization and an existentially significant experience.

Benjamin Barber develops this vision of a completely mediated culture by the pure principle of transformation in consumer goods at the level of a all-enveloping global culture, through his idea of a McWorld: "McWorld is an entertaining shopping experience that brings together malls, multiplex, movie theatres, theme parks, spectator sports arenas, fast-food chains and television (with its burgeoning shopping networks) into a single vast enterprise that, on the way to maximizing its profits, transforms human beings" [12].

In spite of the evident problems connected to welfare inequality, the transformation in consumer goods is, currently, deeply rooted into the modern cultural life of the developed world, and this stands for a narrowing and an obvious convergence of the cultural experience.

The aspects of the cultures individually perceived, felt and interpreted in different contexts and local traditions lead to consolidation of cultures and thwart the linear progress of the homogenous capitalist culture. A way of interpreting global culture consists in the emphasizing of the need of historical recuperation of these non-occidental cultural traditions. Indeed, this is what can be found in *A Dictionary of Global Culture*, in which Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Lewis Gate (1998) bring items that rebalance global cultural representation, counterbalancing the supremacy of occidental figures and themes. Next to Toussaint's L'Ouverture Martin Luther appears, next to Shakespeare, the king Zulus Shaka. But this dictionary does not remove the persistent suspicions concerning occidental cultural domination which we will forthwith analyze.

These suspicions appear in the title of a book written by Serge Latouche, a French political economy specialist, who brings a serious accusation to Westernization as "a tendency to planetary uniformity" and "an international standardization of the ways of life".

J. Tomlinson considers that when we talk about Westernization, we obviously refer to the spread of European languages, especially English and of the mercantile culture, but also to "fashion, to gastronomy, musical and architectural formulas, to a type of cultural expression ruled by media, to a group of philosophical ideas and a set of values and cultural attitudes"[13].

S. Latouche considers Westernization to be a global spread of cultural and social totality. He analyzes certain Western elements – its technology, industrial economic basis, tendency towards urbanization, ethical, philosophic and religious systems. But he insists that none of these, taken separately, comprises the essence of the West, which must be regarded as a "synthetic unity of all these different manifestations, in the shape of a cultural entity, a civilization phenomenon".

He considers Westernization to be essentially a cultural phenomenon. Western civilization is for him, therefore, paradoxically anti-cultural, because it opposes through its universalizing tendency, to the survival of a varied group of local cultures. Furthermore, he supports the idea that this Westernization of culture is determined by three factors:

- expansion of transnational companies which have their own culture;
- urbanization process connected to the destruction of rural communities;
- the process of building root-less states.

His critique of the West can be interpreted as a critique of modernity. Thus, we could wonder whether social and cultural modernity is necessary identical with Western modernity, if becoming modern presupposes automatically becoming a Westerner. The Tunisian Islamist intellectual, Rached Gannouchi, describes clearly this path through modernity in a statement quoted by Manuel Castells: "The only way to accede to modernity is by our own path, that which has been traced for us by our religion, our history and our civilization".

A global culture, as A. Smith points out, would therefore be composed of number of analytically discrete elements: "effectively advertised mass commodities, a patchwork of folk or ethnic styles and motifs stripped of their context, some general ideological discourse concerned with 'human rights and values' and a standardized quantitative and 'scientific' language of communication and appraisal, all underpinned by the new information and telecommunication systems and their computerized technologies"[14].

It is clear that the author is not enthusiastic with the image he presents. He continues to describe, a potential global culture as being fundamentally "artificial", "narrow", "whimsical" and "ironic", "fluid and shapeless" and lacking all "emotional involvement to what it stands for"[15].

Conclusion

In short, global culture is clearly a culture build, without history, outside time and "without memory".

In spite of what it is believed, namely that globalization imposes the hegemony of culture, reality proves that there is a cultural resistance which endures and which becomes, as a value, ever stronger. This resistance enables the existence of cultural diversity, which can promote the common interests of society. The strengthening of identities is used, in many cases, as a control mechanism for chaotic globalization. Furthermore, identity is an instrument based on experience and a generator of meaning for human life. This meaning, which can be religious, national, ethnic, territorial or in connection with equality of rights of gender, is fundamental for human life and defines the world as much as globalization and technologies.

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STRATEGIC TENDENCIES OF SOME MAJOR INTERNATIONAL STATE-ACTORS IN 2011

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In terms of strategic developments on the international arena, last year was not characterized by sudden change-ups of the major international actor state's habitual trends: European states continued to be in a process of identification of effective economic recovery solutions within EU, as well as USA, which already implemented the economic stimulus package, succeeding to prevent a prolonged recession; China continued to strengthen its economic position at global level, simultaneously with the identification of new energy resources. Nevertheless, there were some events which could provide us arguments in the support of the idea that there were state-actors which raised their level of aspiration and consequently leading to the modification of their position on the international arena. In this regard, France and Russia' strategic trends seemed to be significant in our opinion. That is why we will further analyze them, both of them presenting, in our opinion, a common element: their actions within and towards NATO.

Key-words: strategic development; trends; France; Russia; USA; EU, economic power, military power.

1. France – Global Assertion through Local Action

Viewed as a major event of 2011, the Arab Spring – as the series of popular revolts from the North Africa and Middle Eastern states was generically named – benefited of the world and regional state-actors support in order to maintain a relative stability and not to further inflame an already conflictual situation that existed in these regions. If the US and NATO involvement did not constitute a surprise in the case of Libyan military operations, for example, France has showed quite a pragmatic attitude. In this regard, France doubled its political statements with equally military efforts, its national contribution to the international effort being surpassed only by those of the US (as depicted in Table no. 1).

As resulted from the numerous analyses of the events, France's attitude was viewed as a surprise. A close look to the French defense papers, backed up by the fact that France is the most powerful economic and military state in the Mediterranean Area, an area in which by historical tradition, France exercised a certain control over the North African states. Focusing on the economic and military dimensions, we must note that France is the second great European economic power, after Germany, and the fifth one on global level. Moreover, France is the biggest and powerful military force in EU and from the perspective of military expenditure, it is placed on the third place at global level, as well as in the nuclear power where it stands after USA and Russia.

As previously noted, most of the observers considered that France's involvement in the Libyan military operations was an opportunistic

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NATO Member States	*Ships*	*Airships*
Belgium	*1*	*6*
Canada	*1*	*11*
Denmark	*0*	*6*
France	*6*	*38*
Greece	*1*	*0*
Italy	*13*	*24*
UK	*3*	*30*
Norway	*0*	*6*
Netherlands	*1*	*7*
Spain	*2*	*6*
USA	*10*	*107*
Turkey	*6*	*0*
Other states		
Jordan	*0*	*6*
Qatar	*0*	*6*
Sweden	*0*	*9*
United Arab Emirates	*0*	*12*
Total	**44**	**274**

Table no.1 National contribution to military operations in Lybia[1]

attitude. Despite of these considerations, we believe that France has consistently pursued its national interests. This fact can be supported by the French White Paper on Defense and National Security, issued by the French government in 2008. According to it, there are four interest areas for the France security. We further mention some of these regions' traits:

1. The Arc of Crisis, lies from the Atlantic to the Sea of Oman and Indian Ocean, from where France could expand its presence in Asia (and consequently to energetic resources). In terms of stability and security, the area is characterized by some fields of concern, such as:

- resurgence of radical Islam;
- Sunni and Shi'a tensions;
- Kurd population;
- fragility of political regimes in the area

2. Sub-Saharan Africa, a region characterized by:

- the abundance of strategic minerals and energy resources that need to be exploited;
- population growth;
- weakness of state structures;
- poor governance;
- migratory waves caused by economic and social tensions;
- endemic wars (domestic and regional - Somalia, Congo, Darfur, etc..)

3. European continent and the relationship of European States with Russia are major priority issues for France. Russia and its policy on neighboring states, especially the former Soviet Union Member States remains a major European security issue, as well as the partnerships developed with other European states or with NATO.

4. North Africa, important for France by historical reasons (language, energy cooperation and economic) is already a competition arena for states like US and China or terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda. The region is characterized by various risks: social inequalities, high unemployment rates, unequal development of the region, poor educational systems, increased illegal immigration, and high exposure to migrant's transit from sub-Saharan African region, social tensions and terrorism.

All previously mentioned regions are considered as critical by France, because of their immediate vicinity to Mediterranean Area, the main argument being that Mediterranean security is in close relation[2] to European security. It is, that way, highlighted the main strategic axis[3] of French security, an axis exposed to great risks (*Figure no.*



Figure no. 1 Main French strategic axis: from Atlantic to Indian Ocean

1), as it crosses the regions from the Atlantic to the Sea of Oman and Indian Ocean. Moreover, these regions are the beneficiaries of several EU cooperation programs, as depicted in *Figure no. 2*.

It is not difficult to observe the fact that the European Neighborhood Policy program is outlined within the territory of North African states, states that recently were hosts of significant popular unrest. Development of the European Neighborhood Policy program could be a guarantee for future stability of the region, allowing France to extend its influence on the African continent as a partner or rival of USA and/or China in their race for energetic resources. In this regard, best fit instrument for France can be Mediterranean Union, project which was presented in 2008 by the French president Nicholas Sarkozy. Though, implementing this instrument requires a significant financial effort that, with the current economic crisis, seems to be rather difficult.

Another argument for reconsidering the strategic position of France is represented, in our opinion, by the strengthening of its presence in Africa or in its proximity, on direction of its strategic axis. In this respect, we believe that a good example is that the French territory was extended by administrative incorporation of Mayotte Island within the metropolitan French territory.

In terms of maritime competition in the Indian Ocean, Mayotte Island is a strategic place for France, the island being located halfway between Madagascar and Africa, providing this way quick access to the mainland and in the meantime direct access to the Indian Ocean energetic resources transport routes. The establishment of military facilities in this location is likely probable, the economic potential of the island being very low. 1/5 of the population lives below the poverty line and the unemployment rate is 25%. Former sultanate, colonized by France in 1841, Mayotte has a majority Muslim population, fact that only increase the percentage of Muslim population in a state like France, where the authorities are trying to limit cultural differences through policies prohibiting religious symbols in public.

Considering the already mentioned issues in the context of 2011 events, we may conclude that, through its actions, France wants to overcome the status of regional power, engaging, as a partner or a rival of the global great powers in the competition for energy resources.

Figure no. 2 EU Cooperation programs
Source: Laura Canali, Balcans Special Issue - 10/ 2005, Limes, http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/eu-programs

2. Russia and the Consolidation of its Power in Central Asia Region

NATO enlargement towards East was perceived by Russia as an attempt to weaken its dominant position in Eurasia, which led to a strengthening of its relations with former Soviet states by creating regional collaboration instruments that attracted other regional powers, like China and India. On the last decade, backed up by its vast energetic resources, Russia's dominant position has been strengthened by military cooperation initiatives in the Central Asia region, mainly to counterweight NATO enlargement towards a region placed in the traditional Russian influence.

Transformation of the security environment and the need to adapt its responses to new threats lead to the necessity to reform the Russian Armed forces. Thus, issuing its Military Strategy in 2010, Russia accelerated the reform process.

With an extensive military experience inherited from the Cold War Era, Russia still possesses a significant amount of forces and military equipment. A comparative chart with forces of Russia and NATO states is presented in Figure no. 4.

Armed forces reform process will not aim only a quantitative transformation, at the size level, but a qualitative, structural one, matching the traits of the contemporaneous security environment. Armed forces will be resized to the amount of 1 million, NCO professional corps will be created and control and command system will be improved[4]. Russian army will move from the military district-division-company structure to the military district-brigade-company, two reasons standing behind this decision:

- necessity to improve the response to the new security environment challenges, under former circumstances division being a too large unit, hardly fitted to the contemporary armed conflicts;
- optimization of command and control system through the avoidance of the redundant elements.

Implementing this plan of reform in a period of global economic crisis was considered rather hazardous if we have in mind the fact that, previously to crisis period, the trends of Russian military spending, compared with the US military spending were decreasing (Figure no. 5). It seems that Russia relies though on its energy resources, which translated in financial resources, which, in turn, could provide the necessary amount in order to modernize its army.

The reformation plan seemed to be a larger one, Russian authorities recently expressing

Figure no. 3. Mayotte Island location in Indian Ocean, near its main strategic axis

their expectation to become one of the top five military forces of the world. In this respect, 70% of the military equipment will be replaced with modern equipment by the year 2020. Statements on military modernization projects also indicate increased efforts in order to develop strategic forces, fabrication of new nuclear strategic weapons and 100 ships for the navy.[5]. According to the same sources, Russia wants to purchase military equipments produced by NATO Member States, for the first time in its recent history: French Mistral helicopters, amphibious class assault ships and 5^{th} generation PAK-FA combat aircraft, also produced by France.

The issue regarding modernization of nuclear strategic forces[6] is grounded on two main reasons: on the one hand it is the emplacements of the missile defense system in Europe which are located



Figure no. 4 Comparative chart with forces of Russia and NATO states



Figure no. 5 Russian military expenditure compared with US and other NATO states prior to global economic crisis

in close proximity of Russian borders, and on the other hand, a compulsory stage in meeting the *New-START* treaty, signed with the US on reducing nuclear weapons. According to the treaty, Russia's nuclear strategic forces have to be reduced by one third.

As previously mentioned, NATO enlargement towards East in conjunction with the US intention to emplace missile defense system elements on the territory of NATO Member States in Europe, has prompted a more vigorous Russian foreign policy and the development of its own missile defense system.

Although the NATO Summit in Lisbon lead to the reconciliation between NATO and Russia[7] improving US and Russia relations, some disagreements were revealed, especially on the missile defense system issue (Figure no. 6). Despite of the Russian proposition to establish a common NATO-Russia missile defense system, the participants becoming equal partners, after the Honolulu meeting on 12 November 2011, Dmitry Medvedev announced that US and Russia have different views on the missile defense issue. Moreover, during a meeting with the officers from South Military District, which took place in Vladikavkaz, Russian president states that the reaction to the emplacements of the missile defense system in Europe will be a reasonable and sufficient without blocking the dialogue

Figure no.6 Future emplacements of the US and Russia's missile defense systems.

with NATO. Thus, Dmitry Medvedev considered that Russia is preparing to answer in two ways: military and diplomatic. Russia could take military measures such us: establishment of a Radar station in Kaliningrad Region, locating offensive missile in the western and eastern side of the country, while improving security of nuclear facilities. As to the diplomatic way, Russia could adopt cooperation and further negotiations on the missile defense issue, which basically means to cooperate with NATO Member States, or to refuse further development in reducing disarmament and to benefit of its right of withdrawal in START treaty. Russia's withdrawal would mean the beginning of a new competition on ballistic missile placing the former Cold War combatant states into a new rearmament race.

Conclusions

We are of the opinion that actions taken by some of the most active state actors on the international arena can constitute predictive referential for the 2012 international environment, in a context in which Iran has to identify the answer needed to calm the tensions arisen over its nuclear program. In our view, the nature of this answer will influence not only the regional security, but also the global security on the background of the prolonged economic crisis which could lead to a transformation of the states behavior, as a necessity to adapt to the current international security environment.

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CURRENT TRENDS IN THE RELATION BETWEEN WESTERN BALKAN STATES AND THE EU. AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LIBERAL REALISM

Cristina BOGZEANU*

In spite the fact that lately European leaders seem to have paid more attention to managing economic and financial crisis' effects, the relation with the Western Balkans turns out to be still of interest for the EU. The main reason for this is constituted by the interdependency between the stability of the Western Balkan security environment and the one of the European space, interdependency which isn't at all negligible and is still topical. The consolidation of the relations between Russia and Serbia in the energy area, the continuation of the divergences between the Albanian secessionist movement from Kosovo, on the one hand, and Belgrade, on the other, Bosnia and Herzegovina's political crisis as well as the violent events which took place in North Kosovo equally emphasize this interdependency. The present paper sets itself to analyze the relation of mutual determination of the security of the two spaces considered from the perspective of liberal realism theories, especially from the one of the Regional Security Complexes, taking into account the most recent events which marked the destiny of Western Balkan states, their relation with the EU and with other actors of the international arena, as well as the relations between them.

Key-words: Regional Security Complex Theory; regional security sub-complex; interdependency; Western Balkans; EU; Russia; Serbia; Kosovo.

1. The Conceptual Framework of the Liberal Realism

Liberal realism is also known in International Relations (IR) studies as the English School of IR, British institutionalism or the School of International Society. Although the name of English School of IR is used with a higher frequency, in our demarche, we have chosen to refer to this approach of the IR as liberal realism in order to emphasize the dual nature of this theory – a *via media* between realists' pessimist vision and liberals' optimist one, offering a conceptual framework which can explain not only the functioning of the principle of the balance of power at global level, of war, but also international actors' increased tendency to

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cooperate within international organizations when there are common interests.

This flexibility of liberal realism is determined by the fact that it is influenced simultaneously by three world visions, Martin Wight, one of the most well-known representatives of this current, speaking, in this respect, about Machiavellian realism, Grotian rationalism and Kantian revolutionism[1]. Machiavellian (Hobbessian) realism sees IR history as a conflictual one. Kantian revolutionism, the most utopian of these visions, takes as a starting point the fact that human beings, irrespectively of the state within which they live, are connected through ideas, ideologies and similar interests and, as a consequence, IR are not a series of inter-state conflicts, but various forms of interactions between different social groups or community's classes. Grotian rationalism delineates as a *via media* between the visions described above – it agrees neither to states' "condemnation" to perpetual conflict, nor the utopian approach. According to the rationalist vision, states have the potential to adopt a solidary behavior within an international society, whose existence is confirmed by the laws lying at the basis of the interactions between states. Therefore, liberal realism's vision on IR identifies neither with the ones of the inherent conflictual nature of inter-state relations nor the one with of a complete concordance of international actors' interests. In accordance with this school of thought, states constitute the main actors of International Relations. Additionally, two or more states establishing relations permitting a mutual influence on their decisions compose a system of states. Liberal realists accept the fact that international system has an anarchic nature, but they don't relate this with the state of chaos or conflict, but with the absence of a central authority at international system's level. As a matter of fact, the anarchic character of international system means that there is no (global) authority beyond states to coordinate their actions at international level. At the same time, a central role in this approach is played by the notion of "international society" which implies that the actors of the global arena observe a set of rules and norms defined on the basis of a range of common values and interests which are most visible when states cooperate within international organizations.

This is the conceptual fundament lying at the basis of IR studies undertaken within liberal realism's school of thought which has had a significant impact on the way in which the relations between states are perceived. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver are two of the most important researchers coming under this current as their theories on international, regional and national security, on the mechanisms lying behind inter-state relations' dynamics are included in this manner of perceiving IR.

2. Western Balkans as a Regional Security Sub-Complex of the EU

The evolution of recent events shows not only that Western Balkans have remained in the attention of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and of NATO, but also a tendency of diminishing NATO and EU presence in Western Balkans. Moreover, as far as European leaders' speeches as concerned, one could note an oscillation between the tendency to give a significant importance to this region's security and the one to minimize their role on the European scene, as well as elusive attitudes regarding the future of these states as EU members.

In order to explain this apparently paradoxical, contradictory attitude, we set ourselves to analyze the relations between NATO and the EU, on the one hand, and Western Balkan states, on the other, from the perspective of regional security.

Under the circumstances created by the changes occurred in international security environment after the end of the Cold War, when International Relations were characterized both by competition and cooperation between powers, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver elaborated the ***Regional Security Complex Theory (RCST)***[2], considering that it might constitute a useful instrument to explain international security environment's evolution and inter-state relations. The authors compare two world perspectives order after the end of the Cold War – the neorealist one and the globalist view. The former has a global vision on international system, examining the distribution of power resources within it. Territoriality and sovereignty are key-concepts for this manner of approaching IR and security, but they cannot offer explanations either for the cooperation trends in these domains or for the existence of an entity such as the EU. The globalist perspective has the tendency to ignore states, their territorial character in IR, emphasizing the approaches giving more importance to culture, trans-national aspects or international political economy. Both worldviews can offer explanations for the evolution of international security environment but, for our demarche, the most useful worldview is the third one described by Buzan and Wæver – Regional Security Complex Theory. It contains elements from the both worldviews presented previously, but it focuses on a lower degree of analysis.

Buzan and Wæver define Regional Security Complex (RSC) as a durable (but not permanent!) structure of international system with an important geographical component which is given by the security interdependency patterns created in the course of time. In actual fact, states of RSC are geographically close, and their security is so interdependent that they may be easily distinguished from the security regions in their vicinity. This interdependency is related to a range of historical patterns of amity-enmity, cooperation-confrontation which characterize the relations between states[3]. In other words, a regional security complex can be defined as "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another"[4]. As a consequence, one could identify RSC where the pattern is the one of cooperation (North America, for instance) and RSC whose pattern is a conflictual one (Middle East). In the quoted source's vision, the interdependency between the security of states composing a RSC is determined by the consequences of international system's anarchical structure and of the balance of power, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the pressure exercised by geographical proximity.

In this context, Europe has an important place as it is a hyper-institutionalized RSC. The pattern of the interactions between states can be considered a conflictual one if one refers to Europe's history before the EU or a cooperation one when taking into account Europe after the EU.

Within this RSC – Europe, Western Balkans could play either the role of a distinct RSC, different from the one of the EU, or a regional security sub-complex of the EU. Generally, sub-complexes have the same definition as RSC, the sole distinction between them consisting in the fact that sub-complexes are part of a more ample RSC. Regional security sub-complexes constitute particular types of interdependency in the security area, but which can be integrated in a wider pattern defining a RSC overall. Nevertheless, the pattern of security interactions between these states is a conflictual one while EU pattern is cooperative. At the same time, one shall also consider international community's efforts to stabilize, securitize and mediate between Western Balkan states which, in time, could lead to the change of the interaction pattern into a cooperative one, which could have these states included in EU RSC past all doubt.

As a matter of fact, EU action in relation with Western Balkans also leaves open both possibilities. EU has been undertaking stabilization missions or civilian mission to assist these states' reform to modernization. Thus, in this case, Western Balkans can be considered a regional security sub-complex of Europe. Plus, the EU has also implemented in each one of these countries Stabilization and Association Agreements which are meant to bring Western Balkans closer to Europe, to introduce European values, principles and standards in this region. The idea lying behind these EU's undertakings was that its security is closely connected to the one of the Western Balkans. This connection was more visible after the end of the Cold War when, under the conditions of globalization, security risks and threats don't stop anymore at the border between states. Organized crime, international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have a trans-national character. Illegal migration can be analyzed in a similar way; in the context of an eventual conflict in Western Balkans, this phenomenon would surely know a considerable spread.

Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) is one of the most important indexes leading to the conclusion that Western Balkan states are one of Europe's security sub-complexes, accounting for its involvement in the various security dimensions. Another argument sustaining the idea that EU has approached Western Balkans as a European security sub-complex is the fact that they have been the object of special actions (SAP), as well as the fact that this region wasn't included in European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which regards areas included in other regional security complexes and are characterized by a lighter EU implication in security issues. ENP vises the states from EU's close vicinity; as far as they are concerned, EU has the interest to assist them in achieving prosperity, stability and democratic development[5]. As a consequence, Western Balkans' proximity to the European space as well as the fact that they were not included in ENP, but in distinct processes, contributes to arguing that they are an European security sub-complex. Concurrently, the same obvious is the fact that, although there can be found connections between the security of the EU and the one of Western Balkans, the states comprised in this sub-complex represent a particular category distinguished by a range of characteristics which cannot be found in the case of the other European states or, at least, not at such an ample extent. We refer to the delay of state construction, to the tensed relations between states or between ethnic communities within the same country, to the lack of a common national identity and to the tendency of ethnic groups composing some states' population to securitize the values of the basis of religious or ethnic belonging.

The nature of the relations between the Western Balkan states as well as their different evolution made it necessary for the EU to approach the whole sub-complex in a manner meant not only to unite them, but also adapted to the reality of each state. Thus, Western Balkans have one Member State (Slovenia), 4 candidate states (Croatia, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia) and 4 potential candidate states, among which one can identify one protectorate (Kosovo) and a semi-protectorate (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The difficulty to include Western Balkans in the category of regional security complexes or sub-complexes is determined by the fact that they are supposed to a process of change. Barry Buzan[6] identifies four options to evaluate the impact of a change on a RSC: a) ***maintenance of the statu-quo*** (supposes the maintenance of the essential structure of the complex – its distribution of power and the pattern of amity/enmity); b) ***internal transformation*** (the essential structure of the complex changes within the context of its external border, as a result of political integration, decisive change of the distribution of power or of major alternations in amity/enmity pattern); c) ***external transformation*** (the essential structure of a RSC changes through the expansion or the retraction of its external borders); d) ***overlay*** (implies the action of one or more external powers in the regional security complex, resulting in superseding the indigenous security dynamics).

At the level of Western Balkan states, one could identify characteristics of all the structural options afferent to change. The first one – maintenance of statu-quo – is represented by the conservation of amity/enmity patterns – the conflicts between the Albanese and Serbs taking place in Kosovo, the ones between the Croats, Muslims and Serbs occurred lately, especially at political level, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the dispute between the Albanese secessionist movement and Belgrade authorities are eloquent examples in this regard. Even more, as far as the distribution of power is concerned, Western Balkans' configuration remained constant – Serbia continues to play the role of the main centre of power within this regional security sub-complex despite international community's influence, the obstacles that it still has to overcome in order to achieve EU membership or the disputes it has with other states in this space.

In the case of the Western Balkans, overlay may also be identify through a certain influence of the international community in the region, through the intervention of NATO and EU, but also of some regional powers such as Russia (by supporting Serbia's position in its dispute with Kosovo and by their relations in energy area) or Turkey. Obviously, in present, the EU holds the highest responsibility in changing the pattern of interaction between Western Balkan states, which are, in our opinion, in a process of transition from an enmity pattern to a cooperative one. Furthermore, at the end of this period of change by overlay, Western Balkan States will probably get through a phase of internal transformation which would follow the European integration.

Also, the fact that this regional security sub-complex passes through a period of change, of transition in what concerns its status in relation to the EU also permits the existence of a dual discourse of European leaders as far as it is concerned. Thus, on the one hand, one could notice a rhetoric sustaining Western Balkans' European future and, on the other, a more reticent, cautious rhetoric in this regard.

But, as we mentioned at the beginning of this sub-chapter, there is also the possibility to approach Western Balkans as a regional security complex distinct from the European one, which could be translated through EU efforts to separate Western Balkans' security issues from its own, to disconnect itself from them, considering them to be external, without any connection to European security. For that matter, the notable difficulties encountered by these states in the process of adhesion can be considered arguments for this approach. Nevertheless, in our opinion, there are too few arguments to support this hypothesis as compared to the ones identified in favor of the idea of regional security sub-complex. As a consequence, Western Balkans represents a European regional security sub-complex, whose status is in full process of change, of evolution.

In conclusion, EU's constant interest in Western Balkans can be explained by the fact that these states are part of a European RSC, the security of the EU and of Western Balkan states being interdependent.

3. Signification of Recent Events Which Marked the Relation between Western Balkan Sub-complex and the EU

In our opinion, RSCT is useful in emphasizing the complex connection between EU's security and Western Balkans' security and stability. The dispute between Serbia and the authorities in Prishtina on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence of February 2008, European leaders' attitude to this issue, the significations and implications of this attitude on the relation between EU and Western Balkan states, as well as on this region's security and stability, but also the involvement of other centers of power in the political and security issues of this space are reference points of a comprehensive analysis of security from the perspective of the relation between EU and Western Balkan states.

At the level of Western Balkans, EU integration has remained a core issue and has a special importance not only for the envisaged states, but also for the EU. In this case, one could notice an attempt to reproduce in the Western Balkans the success achieved through integration until now. It is a notorious idea that integration within European communities and, later, within EU contributed to maintaining peace and stability in Europe whose history was marked by violent conflicts between the states lying in this space. The belief that the implementation of this pattern will have, implicitly, the same results in the Western Balkans has characterized EU's approach as far as this region is concerned. Additionally, the reasons laying at the basis of Buzan's and Wæver's argumentation that Western Balkans are an European regional security sub-complex also constituted elements of the justification of the importance that the maintenance of a stable and predictable Western Balkan security environment has for Europe. Integrating these states in the European club seemed, at those times, the ideal solution in this respect. Nonetheless, the actors which are part of this process have encountered in the course of time a long series of obstacles – governance issues, security risks and threats, historically-based tensed relations etc. To all these, we shall also add world economic and financial crisis, which affected both the EU and the Western Balkans. The crisis revealed that integrating states which are not prepared for this step may determine serious repercussions at political and economic level[7], which has lead to the appearance of a reticent attitude of European leaders towards the idea of receiving new Members in the Union. Furthermore, economic crisis has seriously affected Western Balkan states too, causing their receding from the moment of fulfilling the adhesion criteria.

At the same time, under the conditions in which the EU has tergiversated granting Serbia the status of candidate state, one could notice an increasing approach of the latter to Russia. Not undesignatedly Serbia's prime-minister, Ivica Dacic, appraised, in an interview to a Serb publication, that, in case his country weren't given EU candidate status until March 2012, it would strengthen the cooperation with Russia, inclusively in the military area[8]. The reason for this consists in the fact that, this year, Serbia will hold parliamentary elections and, if it hadn't obtained the support of EU and US, pro-european formation would have lost population's support, clearing the space for the assertion of euro-skeptical, nationalist and pro-Russian political formations. And, in our opinion, at least until 1st of March 2012, when Serbia got EU candidate state status, this scenario was plausible given the repeated postponement of the negotiations between EU and Serbia on the latter's membership, the support given to Kosovo's separatist movement, minifying its importance in the context of Serb national interests, identity and historical values, as well as the dangerous precedent created at the international level. Moreover, from the 27 EU Member States, five didn't rally to the position of those supporting Kosovo's independence. The exceptions are Spain, Cyprus, Romania, Greece and Slovakia and their fundamental motivation is related to the compliance with international law but, at national level, all of them would be considerably affected by the existence of a precedent created through recognizing Kosovo's independence. The situation describe above is also useful for pointing out the difficulties in EU's functioning as a unitary actor when the national interests of its Member States are not compatible.

Additionally, the enhancement of the partnership between Serbia and Russia, particularly in the military domain, would imply a range of substantial repercussions for the European security too, especially if we consider the increase of the tensions between Russia, on the one hand, and the US and its partners, on the other, in the context of installing components of the American anti-missile shield in Romania and Poland.

To all these, we could also add aspects on another domain of considerable importance for the EU – the energy dimension of security. The issue of European states' dependency on Russian hydrocarbons has been occupying for a long time a considerable place in EU's security concerns, especially after the crises of gas generated by the Russian Federation in 2005, 2006 and 2007. The diversification of import sources, as well as of the types of energy (with an emphasis on renewable energy resources which also take into account environment's protection) constitute the main solutions found at EU's level. As far as the diversification of import sources is concerned, it was designed the construction of a new pipeline – Nabucco project, which it was meant to transport gas from the Middle East, through Turkey, detouring Russia, to the North of Europe. Russians' reaction to this project was the initiation of another pipeline – South Stream – which would connect Russia to the Centre of Europe through the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Serbia, Italy and Austria. Thus, South Stream is a project which could be included in the cooperation relations between Serbia and Russia and Vladimir Putin's visit to Belgrade on 23rd of March 2011 was meant to enhance the energy partnership between the two countries[9]. With this occasion, a stress was laid on the fact that Serbia's wish to become an EU Member State doesn't represent a threat for its bi-lateral relation with Russia, although EU's energy policy fixes bars against energy cooperation between Russian Federation and European states. However, one shall not minify the importance of the partnership between Russia and Serbia not only on energy domain and on the relations established in the Western Balkans area, but also on the European relations, as Russia has turned out to be an uncomfortable, but necessary partner and an actor with a considerable importance for European security.

At the beginning of March, 2012, Serbia got EU candidate state status, but without establishing the date for the beginning of adhesion negotiations[10]. Nevertheless, the problems of Kosovo's status in relation to Serbia continue to be of current interest. At the same time, granting Serbia EU membership may prove a complicated issue. Most of EU Member States support the recognition Kosovo's independence, thus opposing to Serbia's position which argues that it is an integrant part of its national territory. Actually, by the decision took on 1st of March 2012, the EU acts contrary to the expectations which took shape during the negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina. On the one hand, this might be explained by the fact that Serbia has fulfilled Copenhagen criteria, conditioning its adhesion by recognizing Kosovo constituting, in this context, a discrimination of Serbia in relation to the evolution of other EU Member States. On the other hand, European leaders might have been reckoned the enhancement of the relations between Serbia and Russia as a warning on Serbia's getting out of EU's influence and on its closing in to Russia.

It has to be noted, however, that giving Serbia the status of EU candidate state does not guarantee that it will become a member of the European club soon. It is very unlikely, especially in the light of the recent events at EU's economic and political level, that the EU should integrate a state with real territorial problems; in our opinion, the adhesion is feasible only after a compromise solution would have been identified and assumed in the relation between Belgrade and Prishtina.

Presently, Croatia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia are EU candidate states, but they are in different stages of the adhesion process. Among them, Croatia is the closest to the moment of signing a treaty sanctioning its membership. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (still under UN jurisdiction, pursuant to Resolution no. 1244/1999) are potential candidate states. However, in spite the fact they are in their way to EU membership, a part of these states still have grave problems related to the process of state reconstruction. Serbia (despite having recently obtained candidate state status), Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the ones having such problems. This determines the emergence of two phenomena concerning not only the regions' security, but also the relations between the states composing it, as well as the relations between these states and the EU. Thus, although it is considered an engine of Western Balkans' European integration and supports European integration process of all the countries in the region, Croatia regards this process only individually, its interest being to avoid its association with states which haven't finalized yet their national reconstruction process[11]. Secondly, for the first time in EU enlargement policy, it has two roles – on the one hand, it contributes to the effective state reconstruction and to maintaining security and stability, as well as the good relations between Western Balkan states and, on the other, it has to make this reconstruction get the Western Balkans as close as possible to European standards.

Even more, internally, most of Western Balkan states continue to face problems related to institutions' consolidation, corruption, organized crime which amplify the impediments to the creation of modern states, close to this concept's international standards. Plus, the issues of institutions' consolidation as well as those related to good governance represent obvious obstacles to the optimal management of the present economic and financial crisis' effects.

Additionally, there are still ethnic and religious tensions within states. In this case, we refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina which presently transits a serious political crisis and to Kosovo, where the rivalry between Albanians and Serbs in the North is often translated in street fights. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the crisis was generated, first of all, by the dissensions between national political leaders of the two entities composing the federal state. On the one hand, one could speak about a current supporting the maintenance of the statu-quo (the Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited mostly by Croats and Bosnians) and another one claiming more autonomy and even secession (Republic of Srpska, which is inhabited by a Bosnian Serb majority). Moreover, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one could also notice a political crisis at the level of international institutions which need both reformation (adaptation to the new domestic realities of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and maintenance, given that in this case we cannot speak about a state capable of self-governance[12]. To support this idea, we could mention that, from the moment of the latest elections organized in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the forming a new government there passed whole 15 months (October 2010 – December 2011), which is a situation caused mostly by the divergent interests of the three ethnic communities composing the federal state (Serbs, Croats and Bosnians). However, even after having reached this compromise, one shall expect the tensions between the three ethnic communities to continue, as none of them has obtained what it wished[13]. As a consequence, the Republic of Srpska will continue striving in order to minimize the authority of the central institutions and threatening to secede, Croats will carry on attempting to create a third entity within the federal states and Bosnian Serbs will keep confronting both parts mentioned above as their objective is to maintain statu-quo.

In Kosovo too, one could speak about inter-ethnic conflicts and about difficulties in the process of state construction. But, in this case, the existence itself of a Kosovo-state implies numerous problems. Kosovo declared its independence on 17th of February 2008, but it isn't recognized by Serbia, in whose vision Kosovo is an entity under UN administration, but part of its national territory, under the name of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. Until 1st of December 2011, 85 from the 192 UN Member States recognized Kosovo's independence, inclusively 22 of the 27 EU Member States[14]. Presently, Kosovo is both under UN administration and EULEX Kosovo. UNMIK is still deployed according to Resolution no. 1244/1999, and is neutral in relation to Kosovo's status.

Additionally, the dissensions between the Albanese and the Serbs escalated to street fights, making it necessary for NATO troops to intervene in order to bring the situation under control. The events in 2011 which constitute in fact a re-burst of ethnic conflicts in North Kosovo ensured this entity a place on the world map of possible conflicts in 2012[15]. The reason for this is constituted by the fact that Kosovo's status in relation to Serbia hasn't been resolved by the Decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which was made public in 2010.

The issue on which ICJ had to give an answer was whether "the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law"[16]. Actually, ICJ analyzed only the lawfulness of the act of declaring independence, but not the lawfulness of the act of secession and of creating a new state. This supposes a reference to people's right of auto-determination whose exertion, in case of secession, implies not only the expression of the will to secede of the ones choosing this way, but also the agreement of the state from whose territory is made the secession by reason of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity which lay at the basis of modern states' functioning[17]. Accordingly, the unilateral declaration of independence is not contrary to the norms of international law, but there cannot be created a Kosovo state as long as Serbia doesn't express its accord in this respect and ignoring its position may equal to creating a dangerous precedent in this sense. This was one of the main arguments brought about by Romania in explaining its position – auto-determination can be done only under certain conditions, implying a bi-lateral agreement between the state from whose territory a new entity secedes, on the one hand, and, on the other, the institutions of the newly created entity. But, obviously, in Kosovo's case, one could not speak about such situation.

Both entities expected this advisory opinion to be in their favor and to ease their way towards European integration. However, the conclusion of the ICJ – "the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law"[18] – seems to have failed meeting both parties' expectations as the problem of the two regional actors is to be resolved within bi-lateral negotiations. But these negotiations themselves were the ones that determined 2011 street fights[19].

North Kosovo represents a central issue of the tensions between this entity and Serbia as it is inhabited by a Serb majority, a fact which is used by Serbia to justify its claims on Kosovo. Beyond this, Kosovo and especially its northern part has an overwhelmingly importance from a cultural, historical and civilizational point of view. Serbia's justification at ICJ may be eloquent in this respect – Kosovo is Serbia's historical cradle and one of the major pillars of its identity[20]. In other words, Kosovo is for Serbia, first of all, an aspect of its national identity. This gains even more importance as the violence of the recent events from the history of the two entities has also had a strong ethnic and religious fundament. Both ethnic communities have hostile attitudes on each other.

Thus, even after ICJ made public its advisory opinion on Kosovo's status, the relation between this entity and Serbia hasn't known any improvement. The bi-lateral negotiations between them approached only technical aspects which do not imply their completely divergent national interests. As a consequence, Kosovo makes diplomatic efforts to improve its relations with US and EU in order to obtain their support in achieving its recognition as well as its integration in various international organizations. On the other hand, Serbia tries to capitalize its relations to prevent Kosovo from being recognized by more states as independent and sovereign as well from being accepted in international organizations. Serbia's position is also supported by Russia and China, both members of UN Security Council, which means that, as long as they don't recognize Kosovo, it will not become an UN member.

In this time, the political leaders of the two states prefer to negotiate technical aspects of the relations between them (the mutual recognition of university titles, the acceptance by Serbia of the identity cards issued by Kosovo in order to ease the freedom of movement etc.), but, having in view to obtain, respectively, to prevent obtaining Kosovo's recognition at international level. Beyond the consequences on security, this situation also represents obstacles for Kosovo's state construction and European integration as the attention of its institutions isn't anymore focused mainly on institutional reform and self-government capacity.

Conclusions

Despite the fact that European leaders' attention hasn't been mainly focused on enlargement policy, the events which marked the evolution of Western Balkan states in 2011 and at the beginning of 2012 reveal that this region hasn't lost its relevance to European security. The Theory of Regional Security Complex also implies explanations on the relation between regional security complexes and regional security sub-complexes, explaining European leaders' concern to maintain a stable and predictable security environment in Western Balkans. 2011 violent events in Northern Kosovo demonstrated this region's potentiality to generate conflicts. Even more, EU's massive involvement in Western Balkans by various policies, institutions and missions supposes the assumption of a responsibility regarding the security dynamics of the states comprised in this European regional security sub-complex and an eventual failure in exerting this responsibility would seriously impact on EU's credibility and legitimacy. This may also be the reason for which EU choose, in March 2012, to give Serbia the candidate country status which corroborated the idea of Western Balkans' major importance for Europe.

Generally, Western Balkan states continue to face security issues on national level, especially in the political and economic area. Plus, the relations between the countries comprised in this region are still marked by the pattern of enmity between the different ethnic and religious communities inhabiting them which make the resolution of endemic problems to be even more difficult. Nonetheless, the clear EU presence in the Western Balkans by its missions and institutions, together with the incentive received by Croatia (2011) and Serbia (2012) in what concerns the adhesion to the European club have the potential to sustain and promote the reforms in the areas mentioned above as well as the peaceful relations between the states comprised in the region envisaged in this article. On the other hand, one shall not minimize the importance and the impact which may be implied by inter-ethnic conflicts, by the issue of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence or a state which is not able of self-government such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or the sequels of the economic and financial crisis on the stability and predictability of Western Balkans' security and, implicitly, on the European one.

NOTES:

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2 Barry BUZAN, Ole WÆVER, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003.

3 Barry BUZAN, Ole WÆVER, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003, pp. 40-51.

4 Barry BUZAN, Ole WÆVER, Jaap de WILDE, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, US, 1998, p. 12.

5 For details, see the official web page of the European Neighborhood Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/howitworks_en.htm.

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7 Cristina BOGZEANU, *„National interest" Concept in European Context*, in Strategic Impact, no. 4 [41]/2011, pp. 48-59.

8 *Serbia may look to Russia if EU turns its back*, 15 February 2012, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/serbia-russia-us.f7y.

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11 Jacques RUPNIK, *The Western Balkans and the EU: "The Hour of Europe"*, Chaillot Papers, June 2011, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2011, p. 35.

12 For more details on the present political crisis' nature, causes, type, development and repercussions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Cristina BOGZEANU, *Bosnia and Herzegovina – political impasse and security issues. Repercussions on the relation with the European Union*, in Strategic Impact, no. 3 [36]/2010, pp. 48-61.

13 *A New Bosnian government. Bosnia's December Surprise*, 30th September 2011, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/12/new-bosnian-government.

14 According to the official UNMIK web page, http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/abo ut.aspx.

15 *World Conflict Map 2012*, Aviation Week Defence Technology International, January 2012, pp. 16-17, http://gb.zinio.com/reader.jsp?issue=416204141.

16 International Court of Justice, Accordance with the international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, 22 July 2010, p. 19, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf.

17 For details, see MFA Statement regarding the Advisory Opinion on the International Court of Justice, 23 July 2010, http://www.mae.ro/en/node/4168;

Transcrierea emisiunii „Actualitatea în dezbatere" – Interviu cu Bogdan Aurescu, agentul României în procesul de la Haga cu Ucraina, http://www.mae.ro/node/2842.

18 *Ibidem*, p. 43.

19 These street fights happened as a consequence of Serbia's decision to not recognize Kosovo's customs stamps. Serbian Government's decision determined Prishtina's authorities to ban the imports from Serbia as a counter-measure to Belgrade's ban on the imports from Kosovo which has been in force ever since Kosovo's declaration of independence. Kosovo's police forces took the control on the entry points of the border between Serbia and Kosovo, thus trying to exert its sovereignty in North Kosovo where EULEX hadn't succeeded in enforcing the observance of the ban. Even more, Kosovo troops met the resistance of the Serb which determined NATO's intervention. Also, NATO was the one who facilitated reaching an agreement between the two, an agreement stipulating that KFOR would control the entries on the border between Kosovo and Serbia.

20 International Court of Justice, Public Sitting held on Tuesday 1 December 2009, at the Peace Palace on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Verbatim Record, p. 32, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15710.pdf.

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NATO AND THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT – SECURITY ANCHOR IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

*Ciprian POPESCU**

Before the signing in 2010 of the Strategic Concept, NATO was resembled to an alliance in continuous searching for one new concept suitable for the XXIst century realities. Still, the Alliance after Lisbon 2010 is more than ever engaged in a series of fields, starting from collective defense, antimissile defense, energetic security, Balkan's peacekeeping operations, counterinsurgency and stabilization operations outside European borders, cyber security, these being part of the increasingly diversified portfolio of the Alliance missions. 2011 was the year of reconfiguration for NATO and Russia and as well for NATO and EU relations, these consisting in new challenges for the world's security. All these global reconfigurations are meant to offer Russia one source of stability related to the fact that NATO will not interfere into Russia's foreign issues and in its area of interest and, consequently, to offer to the newly started democracies "one balloon of oxygen" by supporting some PfP type partnerships with the NATO's Non-Member States. The New Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 in Lisbon forecasted the political will of the Member States to transpose and implement the process of NATO transformation as Alliance in an efficient and unified manner.

Key-words: NATO Strategic Concept; alliance; security; international relations; reform.

1. Preliminary Considerations

"The North-Atlantic Alliance is a unique community of peace, liberty and security with common values. But the world is in a perpetual change, transition and that is the reason the Alliance must be able to confront new threats, new challenges. This new Strategic Concept will guarantee the international stage that NATO remains as effective as always in defending our common peace, security and prosperity", stated NATO General Secretary, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

The international system suffered deep modifications following the end of the Cold War and this determined the start of a new period of profound changes in the evolution of the international relations between West and East with a profound accent on a new radical vision of the new security environment. The end of the Cold War led to a failure of traditionalist characteristic to understand security, started many constructive debates, sometimes too effervescent, over the means to determine the object and field of study, stated Jessica Tuchman Mathews, expressing that security as concept should be rethought by settling some aspects related to resources, environment and also demographic issues.

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The doctrinaire rethinking of security aimed, according to some authors, such as Ole Weaver and Harry Kissinger, the widening of security concept area and the elimination of the "approximating" vision which had as effect just a focus on aspects of the military dimension in the detriment of the other dimensions (social, political, economic and environmental). 1991 was an important moment in the reevaluation of security from the military, social, economic, political and environmental aspects and the Rome Summit was one of generators of this reassessment.

Our study intends to follow an evolution of NATO along its history, emphasizing how this institution succeeded to adapt and reconfigure the institutional aspects in order to be able to counteract the new challenges of the current security environment that could destabilize the guarantee of liberty, democratic values, human rights respect in conformity with the state of law (the preamble of North-Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 at Washington).

In the past two decades, NATO was one of the stability pillars of a bipolar world experiencing a permanent reconfiguration of power centers. NATO transformation was unavoidable owed to the new challenges it had to face (nuclear terrorism, cyber terrorism and maritime piracy).

NATO reform represents one of the "birth certificate" of Alliance's Strategic Concept that was adopted in November 2010 at Lisbon, being a milestone for understanding the current reflections on security themes.

This new reshaping of NATO security strategy definition at global level allowed the revival of new discussions at international level regarding a rethinking of methods to combat the threats characteristic for the past century, allowing the analysis of new non-conventional threats:

- risks concerning "failed states";
- extremism, fanaticism;
- oppression and acts of ethnical purification;
- disrespect of human rights;
- climate changes;
- finding new energetic resources.

This brief incursion on the issues approached in this study allowed us to remark that the new security concept must be perceived at global scale and the New Strategic Concept (NSC) confirms one more time NATO's collective role in providing stability at global level.

"2020 NATO won't be the same as 1950 NATO or even 2010. The Alliance must grow up to confront a series of new dangers".

2. The Creation of NATO

"We must remember that the only period in the world's history when there was a prolonged peace interval coincided with a balance of forces ("balance of power"). When a nation becomes stronger then its presumed competitors, there is the danger of a war. I believe the world will be safer if we have strong and healthy USA, Europe, Soviet Union, Japan, China, each of them balancing the others, not one against the other".

Countries in Western Europe and their allies from Northern America (United States of America and Canada) confronted between 1945 and 1949 a quick economic transformation, concomitantly with the worry over the USSR policy and expansionist methods. The Soviet Communist Party inoculated the states mentioned above with a certain "fear" about how would their sovereignty and independence have been respected and guaranteed according to the UN Charter and international agreements and about the replacement of the democratic regimes with other non-democratic regimes.

The year 1949 was the "birth certification" of the North-Atlantic Treaty that constituted an alliance formed by 12 states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States meant to provide their mutual collective defense.

The North-Atlantic Treaty allowed the signatory states a series of security guarantees (independency and sovereignty preservation), this shaping through a defense system accomplished for the discouragement and rejection of some forms of aggression against these signatory states and, not least, allows mutual consultation over political and military aspects that could damage those states' security.

The *Cold War Period* was an important moment to affirm major contribution to the maintenance of peace state and its edification. The alliance contributed to the overlap without the escalation in armed confrontation of some tensioned situations between the two blocks, East and West, with different values and principles, with significant military capacities. This alliance creation was the linkage for the construction of a unique military alliance in the history by:

- duration;
- military structures;
- political structures;
- misunderstandings among allies;
- institutional system;
- respect of its members' sovereignty and independence.

After the Cold War, the question was if the organization still has a reason to exist and if it can still fulfill missions in a new security environment after the fall of Berlin Wall and the USSR reform. Therefore, to counterbalance these existential uncertainties, NATO passed through a wide process of transformation, of accepting new members in order to correlate with the new international realities by emitting a series of decisions:

- opening the Alliance to new members;
- launching new partnerships with the Member States;
- restructuring NATO's internal arrangements;
- constituting an European identity for security and defense;
- accepting new types of threats.

At present, NATO remains the main security organization in the world despite some challenges (of enlargement and "out of area" operations); one can say that is was born again by the enlargement process and preventing threats against global security. Even the most pessimistic persons agree that NATO will continue, at least, to exist.

The adoption, in November 2010, of the Lisbon New Strategic Concept allows the construction of a new Alliance – one that is stronger, more credible and more flexible to the new changes of the security environment.

3. NATO's Transformation

From its creation, NATO wasn't created only as a military organization or an alliance derived from geopolitical competition or conflict. Building a community of NATO values allowed the cohesion and maintenance of a permanent contact against the new challenges (the shift from the classical forms of risk to regional, cyber vulnerabilities), NSC being one of the witnesses of these changes. The current security environment is characterized by profound transformations from the classical forms of risks to regional, asymmetrical and cyber vulnerabilities. Therefore, there is the need for a new approach of the security concept in order to answer the new threats.

As I already mentioned in the introduction, the past 20 years conferred a reshaping of NATO's strategic environment. Therefore, NATO's institutional reform represented "the birth certificate" of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, an edifying concept to understand the current reflections on security themes.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the former NATO Secretary General, stated: "*Our mission to provide security and to protect stability became more complicated. But security can be adjusted by developing some adequate ideas, by diversifying some just policies ad by choosing the most suitable ones*".

3.1. The New NATO Strategic Concept (NSC)

The evolvements from the '90s determined the elaboration of a strategic concept of the Alliance, concept that had to allow a security approach specific for the XXI century, a wider design of political and military dimensions with a series of essential elements:

- preserving the transatlantic connection;
- maintaining some flexible and effective military capacities;
- developing an European identity of security and defense;
- preventing conflicts and solving crises.

NATO Member States summit in Rome of allowed the elaboration of a Strategic Concept to define the new steps toward "a world of peace and solidarity".

This document enounces the most important principles and objectives of NATO under the circumstances of USSR collapse and after the disappearance of the danger of massive military confrontation.

To the NATO reunion in Strasbourg – Kehl on 3-4 April 2009, the chiefs of states and government within NATO mandated the Secretary General to elaborate a new NATO Strategic Concept to regulate the Alliance's missions, for the next decade or even afterwards, this having as deadline the autumn of 2010. The Secretary General's mission was to convoke and lead a group of experts with high qualification to elaborate its main guidelines under the coordination of Madeleine Albright, the former USA Secretary of State. According to the recommendations comprised in the study realized by the group of experts coordinated by Mrs. Albright, the Alliance Member States should agree to the idea that in the 2020 perspective, two major NATO imperatives will be providing security for all its members and the dynamic engagement beyond the Alliance borders in order to diminish threats.

The elaboration of NATO NSC allowed for transparency in the intentions of the signatory states to reconfigure NATO into a more flexible and enough prepared alliance to be able to tackle the new security challenges. The main phases of strategic rethinking consisted in:

- *The phase of strategic rethinking (debuted on 4 September 2009, when the NSC Group of experts officially started their activity by an informal meeting with the permanent representatives of the allied states).* The phases of strategic rethinking included *a series of NATO seminaries, as follows:*
  - 1st Seminar – *Luxemburg, 16 October 2009* – "*NATO's Fundamental Security Tasks*", organized together with Benelux countries;
  - 2nd Seminar – *Brdo (Slovenia), 13 November 2009* – "*NATO's Engagements in an Era of Globalization*", organized by Slovenia with the support of the UK;
  - 3rd Seminar – *Oslo, 13-14 January 2010* – „*Partnerships and beyond*", organized in common by Norway, Germany, *Romania* and Spain;
  - 4th Seminar – *Washington, 22-23 February 2010* – "*Transformation: Structures, Forces and Capabilities*", co-organized by the Supreme Allied Command for Transformation (SACT) and the National Defense University (NDU), with the support of USA Atlantic Council.
- *The consultation phase* (undergone between *February - July 2010* and included visits of Group in the Allied states capitals for discussions with the political, governmental and parliamentary circles and the academic environments[1]);
- *The phase of effective negotiation* of the document (debuted after the spring holiday in 2010).

The discussions concerning the NSC took place at intergovernmental level based on the project elaborated by the NATO Secretary General in the third phase of the New Strategic Concept elaboration. The decisional role over the form and content of NATO New Strategic Concept was equally shared by NATO Member States, which decided at Lisbon by consent, as usual.

The document defines *three basic tasks* of the Alliance:

- *Collective defense* – Article 5 of the Washington Treaty keeps its role of main pillar for the functioning of the Alliance. An enhanced weight is given to Article 4 (allied consultations).
- *Crises management* – compared to 1999 document, an important percentage is granted to the new risks of security and to the provision of adequate response capabilities: against terrorism, cyber attacks, energy insecurity. Building an anti-missile defense capability as part of collective defense is emphasized.
- *Security by cooperation* – PfP partnerships have an important role in the document. The relation with Russia is reflected in a balanced way by promoting practical cooperation and respect of principles lying at the basis of this relation.

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, chiefs of state and government adopted *NATO New Strategic Concept*[2], a visionary document offering guidelines for North-Atlantic Alliance action in the next 10 years.

The need to elaborate a new programmatic document came from the reality that the former Concept lasted more than 10 years and during this time there were many important changes at the NATO structural level (the increase of members) but also as regards the strategic and security environment evolution wherein the Alliance must act.

The former NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in a speech entitled "A New NATO" argued that the term "new" is legitimate and fair because the North-Atlantic Alliance passed through a deep process of transformation, based on:

- The new challenges towards security and how NATO is ready to deal with them;
- NATO reform, transformation as basically military institution (the shift from *heavy metal armies* to *agile forces - NRF*);
- The geographic reorientation by defining the interests related to a series of regions (Ukraine, Russia, the Middle East, Central Asia);
- Relations with institutions such as UN, EU to counteract threats against NATO.

Romanian Secretary of State with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogdan Aurescu, stated that the *development of NATO New Strategic Concept should not be a process of complete reinvention, but one of refining, polishing, modulation and adaptation.* What is viable and valid must be kept and what is necessary in the new context must be added. In his opinion, the role of this exercise is *to identify the current vulnerabilities, risks and threats against the Alliance security, to categorize them according to their importance and to find the adequate answers to counteract them.* If the answers cannot be found out now, we ought to show the means to be followed in order to find them. Some of the "new" security risks and challenges were already included in 1999 Strategic Concept: *terrorism, organized crime or the interruption of access to vital resources.*

Other risks we have to deal with now, such as *cyber attacks, piracy, climate changes or energetic insecurity* became more visible after the adoption of the Strategic Concept in force and the Alliance should be ready to confront them. I think NATO plays and should play a role, to be part of solutions. Starting from the primary essence of its functionality defined by the indivisibility principle of the allied states security and also by the collective defense, *an efficient NATO for XXI century will be a NATO*[3] *realistically taking into account the new parameters of international security environment and will know to assign its needed resources and to use the most suitable instruments.* And, if other international structures or organizations are maybe better positioned to manage certain types of problems, NATO should create functional partnerships with those to approach together, therefore more effective, the security risk of the future".

3.2. The New post-Iraq USA Security Strategy

This security strategy points out a moment of shift from the land involvement toward new challenges, in conformity to the new global security architecture. President Barack Obama stated: "So, yes, our military will be leaner, but the world must know — the United States is going to maintain our military superiority with Armed Forces that are agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies and threats."[4]

The ministry of US Defense, Leon Panetta, underlined that this change was necessary owed to some major problems, from the median-oriental instability, the emergence of Asian powers (China) and Russia, Iran, North Korea and, last but not least, the antiterrorism. If, until now, the American army was ready to win on two theaters (Iraq – Afghanistan), now the new strategy is based on the victory on the first theatre and to stop down the latter, destroying the enemy's ambitions. Therefore, China becomes the main actor USA must take into account militarily, but also economically and the center of gravity of the American policy is moving toward a new potential enemy – China, toward a strong partnership with India, under the circumstances in which Pakistan is presumed to be the most trustful ally of China.

The analyst Charles Scanlon declared that the decision to concentrate on Asia would have been a surprise for China's leader and "If the United States indiscreetly applies militarism in the region, it will be like a bull in a china shop, and endanger peace instead of enhancing regional stability"[5]. With all the statements, positive or negative, it can be seen for now that Russia does not matter in this equation of security and this new policy, according to Howard McKeon, would be a "*retreat from the world, in the guise of a new strategy*".[6]

The use of cyber war and the launch of drones without human crew are priorities of the new American military strategy allowing the counteraction of possible attacks of China and Iran.

"*The war tide begins to withdraw"*.

This new strategy aims to be an answer to the current security challenges, but nobody took into account:

"*How will evolve the security environment in-between 2012 -2013, as long as the Northern Korean state has another leader, Iran continues its process to enrich uranium, the Arabian Spring continues to have casualties, and the current economic crisis could destroy the economic and military identity of the EU". These are simple, but at the same time complex questions as evolution in time and which, hypothetically speaking, do not offer the slightest idea on the result.*

3.3. NATO – Russia relations after the NATO Lisbon Summit

In Zbigniew Brzezinski's view, this world of interdependencies looks like a *chessboard*. On this empty chessboard, the Lisbon Summit shaped a series of very important documents, such as:

- The NATO New Strategic Concept;
- The Final Declaration of Lisbon Summit;
- The Joint Statement of NATO – Russia Council.

Therefore, this extended study aims to analyze the interests of the both entities – the Russian Federation and NATO. One of the most serious issues of the Russian Federation was to obtain the right to veto in issues that could damage its security by NATO's enlargement close to its borders. So, *the New Strategic Concept reaffirms through Article 10 of Washington Treaty the means of enlargement and adhesion to the Alliance.*

NATO enlargement contributed in conformity to this treaty to the Allies security, the goal being *"A united and free Europe" and NATO remains open for all European democracies* that commonly agree the NATO ideals, able to assume responsibilities and obligations as Alliance's members. This reaffirmation *of Article 10 from the Treaty tries to offer Russia a guarantee by the fact that NATO will not interfere in Russia's foreign issues*[7]*, in its influence sphere*[8]*, but concomitantly offering to the new democracies being in the starting points of their existence, an air balloon by promoting some PfP type partnerships.* In an article, Alexander Kramarenko, Director of Department for Policies Planning in the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry claimed *Russia could be a NATO member under the following circumstances:*

- Russia has civil and democratic control over its armed forces, a fact easy to be confirmed from the debates exposed in the national mass-media.
- It's a widely spread habit around the occidental elites – and also amidst the wide public – to believe that the Occident knows what is better for Russia then Russia itself. When the author declared *"Russia needs NATO as «enemy», he referred to the opinions expressed by some marginal politicians and journalists, Dmitri Rogozin, Russia's commissioner to NATO being a firm adept of a strengthened relation Russia – NATO".*
- Russia's adhesion to NATO will not be a threat for China.
- A three-poled cooperation of security structures between United States of America, European Union and Russia.
- The Collective Security Treaty Organization (coordinated by Russia) does not represent an attack over NATO security. If Russia will become a NATO member, the Alliance could be transformed in a new entity. This would coincide with the current trends in the international relations field inclusively with the concept of the former counselor for national security Zbigniew Brzezinski about a security network at global level.
- Russia could, essentially, be one of the main countries in the world, is a top member of G-20, G8, BRIC an SCO, as the end of the Cold War certainly abolished its status of global superpower.

A sensitive subject analyzed in the New Strategic Concept framework was related to a possible adhesion of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance, this indirectly restating the engagements resulted after the Bucharest Summit according to which both countries will become NATO members. Thus, following the new concept, partnership with Ukraine and Georgia in the framework of NATO commissions will continue and develop, taking in consideration the Euro-Atlantic orientation and aspirations of each country.

Therefore, by NSC it is recognized that Ukraine and Georgia took important steps toward NATO adhesion, but will few exceptions, in the case of Georgia, adhesion is formally recognized, while in the case of, Ukraine only the maintenance of PfP programs.

The *New Strategic Concept* also approaches the issue of unification of decisions involving NATO and the Russian Federation[9]. Thus, the Russian Federation got a series of advantages from Article 2 of the basic principles by emphasizing the main role of the UN Security Council but not exclusively by the application of Article 5 from Washington Treaty.

"NATO Member States form a unique community of values, the Alliance being firmly dedicated to the goals and principles of United Nations Chart and of the Washington Treaty that affirms the primary responsibility of Security Council".

Pursuant to the three documents approved at the Lisbon Summit, the Russian Federation[10] got a suspension of the effects resulted in to the framework of NATO – Russia relations because of disrespecting engagements taken by:

➢ The Agreement for fire ceasing in the Russian – Georgian War;

➢ The recognition of both separatist regions Abkhazia and Southern Osetia.

The documents adopted at this Summit settle down a series of *measures to create a positive climate between both actors of the world scene, such as:*

➢ Operations *outside the borders* and missions of crises management with NATO involvement when possible;

➢ Formulations related to the *new balance of nuclear rockets* having as guidelines the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe, the diminution of the stocks of nuclear missiles with short range of action and the engagement for *a world without nuclear weapons.*

Another guarantee offered at the NATO – Russia Council was *to engage in the non-use of force or threat with the use of force throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.* In conformity with this engagement, the NRC Member States abstain from the use of force one against the other and against any other state, against its sovereignty or territorial integrity. In this argument Georgia is also included; its rights were infringed by Russia in 2008 and this fact maintains an instability bridge in the dialogue between the Russian Federation and NATO.

„We reiterate our perpetual sustaining for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty into its internationally recognized borders and appeal to Russia to fulfill the engagements taken by European Union's mediation from 12 August and 8 September 2008".

Another interesting formulation is related to the *nuclear dimension*[11] and the will to advance toward a world without nuclear weapons; this dimension will be the object of a pertinent analysis from the New Strategic Concept regard in a future study.

All these NATO declarations can't be accepted as security assurances. The New Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation does not contain aspects concerning the ideology anymore but the possibility of the actors participating at the international life to be able to provide their own security by the use of nuclear weapons. Iuri Baluevskii (the Secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation) stated that Russia will not hesitate to use the nuclear weapon if it feels its territorial integrity and state existence threatened (in concern to the Russian Center for public opinion study, over 53% from the Russian citizens consider the nuclear weapons as guarantee of the national security). The biggest danger towards the Russian Federation is considered to be NATO enlargement and its getting close to Russia (the anti-missile shield installation, the growth of military contingents in the adjacent regions of Russian influence), the enlargement process being in opposition to the political and security interests of Moscow.

3.4. NATO – EU Relations after NATO Lisbon Summit

"*We want strong allies. We don't want to be Europe's masters. We want to be Europe's partners"* (USA President, Barack Obama)

The New NATO Strategic Concept 2010 and the future *European Strategic Concept* should underline the existence of a common vision to approach the main challenges against the global system of XXI century, this lack of harmonization can orient USA interests toward Asia–Pacific area and the European Union towards neighborhood policies and this could seriously jeopardize the future transatlantic relations.

USA and Europe developed strong economic connections and this was an important impulse in the relations between these entities, president Obama sustaining that this impulse presumed also a strengthening of Europe's security and defense by "Burden Sharing" policy (a balancing of transatlantic partnership). Therefore, the former American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appreciated in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington (February 2010) that *the low interest to develop some capabilities and Europeans inhibition towards the use of military force represent an obstacle for real security and a durable peace in the XXI*st *century*.

In some researchers' vision, relations between USA and Europe will be marked by the existence of many major challenges:

➢ The need for Europeans to recognize the change of content in the transatlantic relation;

➢ The will and availability for USA to be able to negotiate with Europe (EU) – there is a certain reservation of the American partner regarding the EU will and capacity to become a partner capable to deal with a whole areal of global problems.

The creation of a common perspective USA – Europe over transatlantic security presumes *harmonization of perceptions* over the main risks and threats, *the identification and settlement of the main common interests and the resources coordination* in providing collective security. The New NATO Strategic Concept[12] will allow the affirmation *of the Alliance as main instrument of coordinating military resources and political-military decisions at transatlantic level,* while USA – EU partnership will depend by the Union's Member States coordination in matters of foreign and security policy.

Europe's answer regarding security threats does not and should not exclude USA[13], its efficiency depends on the measures through which a strong transatlantic relation can be insured. We have become used to the USA presence in Europe, this being a special guarantee of transatlantic partnership *strengthening*, but there came the moment for the Europeans to assume in a more realistic and responsible way on the insurance of their own security on the continent and NATO as organization was omnipresent in all that means providing stability and security in Europe.

„There will come a day when you, French, Russians, Italians, Germans, all the continent's nations, without loosing your distinctive qualities and your glorious individuality, will create together a superior unit and will build the European fraternity". Victor Hugo, 1849.

Conclusions

The NATO reshaping process was envisaged many years ago. Kosovo Crisis substantially contributed to the adoption of the Strategic Concept (1999), and the September 11[th] 2001 moment created an occasion to re-launch debates by fulfilling new mechanisms of international cooperation, in accordance with the current international context.

NATO reform really symbolizes how Europeans and Americans will understand to unite their destines in the future[14], the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance adopted in November 2010 at Lisbon being essential to understand how security issues are seen nowadays. This was the most necessary way to refresh global debates starting from a revival of the old methods to combat conventional threats characteristic to the last century. In one recent study on NATO enlargement it was stated: "this transformation is an old wine in new bottles, but our hope is the wine will mature in time and will gain value".

A question comes in: how will we succeed to anticipate the threats?

The answer can come from the need for NATO's military transformation to be the result of a more profound debate of essential aspects of Euro-Atlantic political interest by enhancing the military-operational efficacy of the Alliance by partnerships, a more flexible, pragmatic and close relation between NATO and EU. *The report of the experts group conducted by Madeleine Albright*, published in May 2010 underlined *a series of gaps* between NATO members with direct aim toward the policy against Russia, NATO partnerships and financial contributions. Although this NATO New Strategic Concept was adopted, the plans are less clear in fields as: NATO position in the context of a new European architecture of security (the lack of a European security strategy adapted to the new world configurations), extended partnerships (see Ukraine's case).

The economic crisis impact on the Alliance accounted for the increase of financial discrepancies between the capacities of the two entities (USA and EU). The NATO budget registers deficit, the allied troops are paid by the states sending the troops in conformity with the principle „*costs lie where they fall*". It seems the debates from the 90's over responsibility sharing could be re-launched in the hope of its proficiency. Therefore, NATO should select the missions and plan them carefully in cooperation with other international actors because in conformity with new budgetary forecasts the defense expenses could be reduced with 40% and the effectives diminished with around 50,000 militaries.

The transatlantic community will obviously depend on how it will adapt to realities generated by the European Union evolution as actor on *security scene.* Thus, ESDP, in a new form – CSDP, must impulse the partnership between NATO and EU.

A more structured relation between NATO and UN should be sustained by political consultations at strategic level – "If NATO will evolve as a UN branch, the value of a coherent strategic relation can become more obvious eliminating the contractor – subcontractor relation".

The accomplishment of a more flexible alliance to the new contextual situations will depend on *the political will of the Member States* to put in practice the New Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 at Lisbon and to efficiently and united permanence the process of NATO transformation.

The Alliance will continue to face *a series of challenges:*

➢ The fundamental role of NATO is to create "a Europe of security";

➢ Partnerships for Peace development;

➢ To strategic dialogue with Russia a permanent one;

➢ EU, UN, NATO and OSCE must keep a close cooperation and consensus;

➢ To develop partnerships with other world's states not only with the states from NATO's influence area (global partnerships) by modifying Article 10 of Washington Treaty from 1949;

➢ To strengthen Alliance's capabilities to clearly accomplish its fundamental functions – collective military actions and cooperation by security;

➢ An increased flexibility to understand what happens at political, social, economic level and their transposition in activities of missions' planning and execution;

➢ NATO Strategy doesn't become reactive but, in regard to Scheffer, the defense must be elaborated by *stability projection;*

➢ The transatlantic community must accept responsibility to act anywhere will be necessary by activities of prevention, deterrence (terrorism, humanitarian aid).

NOTES:

1 At this stage, Romania was visited by the French expert Bruno Racine and Turkish expert Ümit Pamir, between 8 - 9 April 2010.

2 The New Strategic Concept aims to be „a guiding sheet" for the next 10 years in NATO.

3 If the Alliance wants to stand as a true provider of security for its members, it must become a team player. NATO is only starting this difficult way.

4 http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/01/05/144735035/obama-military-will-be-leaner-but-ready-for-all-threats.

5 http://www.defence.pk/forums/chinese-defence/151516-china-warns-us-asia-military-strategy.html.

6 http://mckeon.house.gov/this_in_detail.aspx?NewsID=2013.

7 We, the North-Atlantic Alliance, will permanently follow the collaboration and cooperation with Russia and also with other partner states from the Euro-Atlantic space.

8 "Russia hopes that the Alliance will have in its regard a position that is more balanced, strengthened and of good vicinity", added Rogozin. The indicator of such changes can be the decision over the format of Russia and NATO participation to the new European anti-missile defense system.

9 *The foreign policy conception of* Russian Federation adopted by president Dmitri Medvedev on 12 July 2008 expresses the official vision of Russian Federation place in the XXI century, a conception that is based on fundamental changes in its position related to USA, EU and CIS – to regain its regional status, in perspective – global, emphasizing the creation of a counterbalance to USA and NATO influence, an hostile attitude against NATO enlargement, inclusively against Georgia and Ukraine admission in NATO, http://www.Kremlin. Ru/text/docs/2008/07/204108.shtml.

10 At the recent NATO Summit at Lisbon took part the Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, and this event can be seen an important success for partnership and trust development between Russia and the Alliance.

11 NATO and Russia convened to do an assessment of common threats with ballistic missiles and to develop a common analysis of future cooperation framework of cooperation in the field of defense with anti-missile shields placed in geostrategic key-points on the European continent and not only. These subjects will be discussed to the future reunion of defense ministries, in June, 2012.

12 By the New NATO Strategic Concept for the Article 5 "strategic protection-defense" from the Treaty there are brought improvements and enhancements – the clause postulates for the mutual defense and assistance – by the adoption of a new policy of "strategic protection-defense" including the continuous presence of USA in the European space by the implementation of tactical nuclear weapons and also by the edification of a transatlantic anti-missile defense architecture.

13 USA will remain the main *donator of security* for the European space. *The satellite umbrella* of the American nuclear missiles is one of the main aspects of NATO collective defense.

14 See the current forums of discussions at World Bank and International Monetary Fund level undergone in New York, G-20 Reunion in Paris on the themes related to the means to save the European economy and to look for new real, logical and implemental solutions.

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THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN THE CREATION, CONSTRUCTION AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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The concept of united Europe started from a simple idea, being afterwards put it into facts as great political projects accomplished by common values, interests and wills that moved energies and resources in order to give birth to the same bold ideal.

Who could initiate and fulfill this unification of the European states if not those with "strong voice", such as France, which was a political, economic and military power recognized not only at European level but also at global level, a status that allowed it to assume a decisive role in the construction of united European future. The result of profound involvement hall-mark of France in this demarche is obvious; we shouldn't forget that French Revolution slogan was: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", and if we look the EU constitutive treaties with their modification acts, inclusive Lisbon Treaty, we see the basic political values of the Union promotes exactly these precepts at all levels and temporal phases of European Union edification and maintenance among the important global geopolitical actors and, implicitly, the stabilization of France position as influent European state.

Key-words: France; united Europe; geopolitics; European Union; strategic role.

1. The Role of French Thinkers in the Creation of "United Europe"

The European conscience given by the cultural and intellectual unity axed on Christian universalism animated the enlightened spirits of the XIX century and steered them to see the possibility of unity by diversity in the European space. As simple ideas and often as concrete projects, peculiarly in France, writers, philosophers, representatives of the Church, politicians presented their hopes and visions about the future of the European continent. In this regard, diverse religious papers as the writings from the "Lights époque", the ideas of French Revolution, the memoirs of Napoleon, the speech of Victor Hugo about the United States of Europe, and the conceptions of Paul Valéry about European spirit can be quoted [1].

As concerns the idea of "European society", Saint-Piére Abate in his "The project of perpetual peace" paper, in 1713, presented some conditions, means and the need to create a united Europe: „*From this moment, there will exist a permanent and perpetual Society, Union, among all the Christian suzerains in order to provide the Peace in Europe*"[2]. Although, in 1814, other French thinker Saint Simon wrote about the principles and

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conditions of the reorganization of the European society. Afterwards, in 1842, Victor Hugo claimed that „*The Alliance of France with Germany is Europe's constitution*"[3].

After the analysis of the presented facts, we can easily assume that the ideas of unification of the European countries are especially generated by the French intellectuality, are determined by political factors, respectively the wish to preserve peace and stability on the continent and in the world. Their projects propose a political unification in a narrow field, into some confederative alliances to respect peoples sovereignty, but it was proved that the nowadays participation in the European organization supposes the option of some general interests defense and the acceptation of some limitation of sovereignty. Although, they were the adepts of some independent institutions, with representative of the Member States but which to act in the favor of general interest as for the Union to generate a common law to be asserted to the member countries. Also, French authors were the ones to propose that the Union should function on the basis of the proportionality principle, considering that the vote system limits the Member States' independence and sovereignty. Practically, in these projects there are found ideas and principles proved to be just and realistic by their effective application in the integration process, true, after two centuries.

2. The European Project, from Simple Idea to Action

The idea of united Europe, promoted since XVII century, was reborn in the inter-bellum period because of the geopolitical context existent in that times, characterized by the crisis of sovereign European national states' system and by the economic decline of the old continent compared to the ascension of some extra-European states. Thus, the idea of European unification was seen as solution to rebuild this space.

In 1923, on the initiative of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, in Vienna, "the Pan-European movement" is constituted. Its role was to militate for the creation of a European confederation on the basis of French-German reconciliation in order to defend Europe of two dangers: a political one from the East (the Soviet Russia) and an economic one from West (the United States of America)[4].

However, another event marked this period, taking place in September 1929, as a proposal presented to the Nations Societies Assembling over the elaboration of a project to create the United States of Europe by the moment's Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, known as sustainer of the idea of Europe federalization. The goal aimed by the proposal handed in to the European governs by Briand consisted in preserving peace and prosperity by the settlement of a unique relation between European peoples. The specific climate for the inter-bellum period determines the Briand project to remain without finality because many of the European states expressed their skepticism or even disagreement against this initiative to organize a European federal union; however, the initiative remained as milestone, a kind of debut of the process to constitute the European Community.

The end of the World War II put the European states in front of a differently new and difficult situation. The destructions of war were huge: economic losses, profound displacement of the entire productive apparatus, the dividing of continent by the creation of political-military blocks and the starting of the Cold War. Europe had lost its role as global power center and this determined it to search for viable solutions to confront the newly appeared economic, political and cultural provocations.

At the proposal of the president of the United States of America at the time, Harry S. Truman, financial and military support was offered to Greece and Turkey in their effort to resist the intentions to be submitted to Europe by armed means or economic and diplomatic pressures. Jean Monnet appreciates the plan as the moment of apparition of a new type of international relations: „*to help the others in order to help yourself*"[5]. USA were interested in helping Europe not only to avoid the promotion and extension of communism but also to offer a solution for the economic recession they were experiencing.

Marshall Plan was designed under the form of a contribution to a European effort of economic re-launching. European countries were requested to elaborate a common plan on the basis of existent resources and deficits assessment. Sixteen countries of the Occidental Europe and Soviet Russia gathered in Paris. The soviets' refusal to participate to an ensemble program opposite to the nations' sovereignty is followed by the USSR satellites refusal, and this lead to the decisive breach of Europe. The plan's beneficiaries will be only the countries of Occidental Europe which, in order to answer the offer made by the Americans, signed in Paris, in 1948, the Convention for European Economic Co-operation constituting OEEC (The Organization for European Economic Co-operation), which, afterwards becomes OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development)[6].

For the following evolution of Western Europe, it is significant Monnet's opinion expressed in a letter sent to Georges Bidoult, ex-president of the European Council: „*The effort of different countries, in the actual national frameworks, in my regard, won't be enough. It is an illusion the idea that 16 sovereign countries can effectively cooperate. I think only the creation of a West federation including England will allow us, in time, to solve the problems and finally, to stop the war"*. Therefore, is obvious that the solution, in Monnet's vision, couldn't be but a federation of the West[7].

The reconciliation of the two eternal rivals was the mean by which there were hopes for the preservation of peace on the continent. The importance of coal and steel production, as well as the existent complementarily situation in the field between France and Germany made the solution to be seen here.

3. The Role of France in the Edification of the European Union

On May 9, 1950, Schuman, following Monnet's guidance, proposes to Germany the placement of French-German production of coal and steel under an international authority open to the participation of other European countries as well. Six countries (France, Western Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Holland and Luxembourg) accepted the plan and signed in Paris, on April 18, 1951, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

Through its institutions and functioning mechanisms, ECSC represented the first concrete achievement on the way of Europe's unification on federal bases and, then, became part of the European Union. The Treaty was considered the foundation for bringing Europe to peace after the World War II. Some of the former enemy nations reached to commonly use the coal and steel production, which were along the conflagration times the most solicited resources[8]. Afterwards, there were signed the treaties instituting the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) by the same six countries. Their treaties of creation are known as Rome Treaties and entered into force on January 1, 1958.

In the '60s, the Fouchet plan was the first important moment for the economic integration. After France's initiative, the Council of Ministers decided to form a commission led by Christian Fouchet, for the elaboration of a project of political reunion. The union was to be led by a Council formed by chiefs of states and governments which would unanimously decide a Parliamentary Assembly with consultative role and a European Political Commission, with technical role, being composed by specialists. Thus, it was a project based on intergovernmental cooperation, seen as a threat against the existent Communities' structures. Belgium and Holland opposed to the project and what was hoped to be the chance of political unification remained as a failed tentative.

Yet, on the other hand, the most well-known moment of the federalism – intergovernmental cooperation controversy was "the empty chairs crisis", as the first institutional crisis from the history of the integration process. The conflict was generated by Commission's proposal to create a system of own budgetary resources needed to finance common expenses, especially the ones needed to apply the Common Agricultural Policy. The EEC budget was to gain characteristics of a federal budget, the Community owing the role to administrate it in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty. In this moment, France refused the proposal and withdrawn from the negotiation table, blocking the decision-taking in the Council. In January 1966, France came back over the Commission's proposal and by the so-called "Luxembourg compromise", mechanism by which, for the fields under the incidents of majority vote, if one country invoked a very important interest, the discussion had to be continued until an unanimously accord was found. The exception became rule until the release of the Single European Act in 1986, the majority of decisions in the Council being unanimously taken. The "Luxembourg compromise" initiated by the

French government confirmed once more that the integration was a project with federalist pretensions, fulfilled by intergovernmental cooperation. The essential role came to the Member States and any trial to emphasize Communities' supranational character was harshly penalized. In the conception of those times, Europe should have been owned by Europeans and the supranational institutions couldn't come before national states[9].

"The United States of Europe" formula, launched a long time ago by Victor Hugo, joined energies toward the political building of a united Europe in the first post-bellum years. Still, it was rapidly abandoned in the favor of a more supple formula – "The Europe of nations", "the Europe of peoples", "the Europe of citizens", "The European Federation", but without an effort to define its form or means of accomplishment. The treaties limited themselves to stipulate that the signatory countries want to achieve an ever closer union among Member States. The conceptual ambiguity was also transmitted in the actions' plan leading to frequent crises in the political integration plan. Still, the European project benefited of an element of continuity – the functionalist method. The essence of the functionalist, communitarian method is to integrate by economy, with small steps, into a pattern of cooperation which should allow the prominence of interdependencies and development of solidarity, in other words, "*to veil politics into an economic strategy of functional growth*"[10] on the basis of a cumulative logics of integration and respecting the rhythm of evolvement specific for every Member State. This first phase of the European construction allows us to precise the factors forming the basis of the integration process: the need to preserve peace and stability on the European continent, the fear against the danger represented by the Eastern communism, the will of the Western European states to detach from the American dependence and to regain their lost role on the international political and economic scene.

On June 19, 1990 is signed the Schengen Agreement (by France, Germany, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg) regarding the free movement of persons.

French people saw the Euro currency creation as an important symbol of progress toward the fulfillment of the United States of Europe. In 60's, Jacques Delors, former ministry of Finance, requested a single currency into a paper called "One single market, one single currency", where argued that an agreement of free market in Europe can function if the members use a single currency. Afterwards, in 1999, the European single currency was launched in 11 European states who had accomplished the convergence criteria. These states were France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland and Ireland.

There existed many adhesion waves followed by the accession as full EU members of other states, presently the organization comprising 27 countries. From its posture as founding member of the European Union, France has the right to decide over the acceptance of the new Member States in the organization. Nowadays, the situation is still available for the new candidates and France's support remains one of the most important chances for their accession.

4. France in Today's European Union

Presently, the European Union has developed a single market in the framework of a standardized and unified system of laws applying to all Member States. In the Schengen Area (including EU Member and non-Member States) custom controls were abolished. EU policies support and guarantee free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, there were emitted laws in the justice and home affairs field and common policies in the field of commerce, agriculture, fishery and regional development are preserved. Presently, the Euro Zone is composed of 17 states. By the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU has developed a limited role in the international security relations.

Since the '50s, the reconciliation and then the cooperation with Germany allowed France to play an important role in the European building framework, despite the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in May 2005, as it is considered a country partisan to the concept of European Union, strongly integrated by political regards.

France held the European Union presidency ten times[11]; the most recent was in the latter semester of the year 2008.

Within the EU, decisions are taken democratically by the twenty seven Member States. Still, bigger countries, as France or Germany, have more votes then the countries with less population, such as Ireland or Luxembourg. So, France, for 2009-2014, has as representatives 72 out of the total of 736 deputies of the European Parliament[12]. The decisions in the European Union Council are taken on the basis of qualified majority for most of the topics and by unanimous vote for issues sensible for ESDP, fiscal policy, or the immigration and asylum policy. From the total of 345 votes, France has 29[13]. Also, in the Committee of the Regions there are 24 French representatives elected from the regional commissions, general councils and municipalities. They advice over all European projects relevant for local communities, such as: transport networks, planning, public health etc.[14]

4.1. France – Engine of the European Union

France has 65.35 millions inhabitants[15] and represents the largest country of the European Union, with a surface of 551,670 km^2 [16], laying from the Northern Sea to the Mediterranean Sea (118.46 inhabitants per km^2).

France is one of the 11 countries from the European Union launching the Euro currency since January 1, 1999, which completely replaced the French franc at the beginning of 2002; it is the second most powerful economy of the Euro Zone, after Germany.

With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 2.7 trillions US dollars estimated for 2011, it represents the fifth power of the global economy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecasted an increase of the French GDP with 0.3% in 2012[17].

France owns varied mineral resources, but a modest and decreasing production, appealing more and more to the import of raw materials and semi-fabricated. The industry has a high technological level, competitive especially in aeronautics, rolling material, nuclear energy and food industry. In the ensemble of the global economy, France eroded its position in the last two decades (in 1970, it represented 8.2% from the industrial production of OECD, and in 1990 only 5.7%)[18], but still remains among the most important economies of the globe. In 2008, in order to increase France's competitiveness, the National Assembly approved four laws proposed by the French government to modernize the economy and reform the labor market[19].

The place occupied in the top of Euro economies is also justified by the agricultural productions. Thus, for 2008-2010, France (23% from EU-27 total) was the greatest producer of cereals, followed by Germany (16.1%), Poland (9.5%), the UK (7.5%), Spain (6.9%) and Italy (6.4%). For all the essential types of cereals cropped in EU (wheat, barley and corn), France was the main producer[20].

France is the second biggest agricultural producer in the world, after the United States of America. 66% from the agricultural production of France in 2011 was exported to other EU Member States[21]. France is situated on the first place in Europe and fifth in the world regarding wheat production in 2009[22]. For centuries, France was one of the dominant agricultural centers of Europe. Nowadays, France is still on the top of Europe agriculture, excluding the Russian Federation. With about 730,000 farms, about 7% from the labor force is engaged in agriculture or in similar sectors, as the fishery or wood processing. The country's viticulture is widely represented, being situated on the second place in the world regarding the production of grapes and wines. Also, France takes fifth place in the world and second in EU for the milk production[23]. France is the main producer of beef meet in EU. Thus, in 2010, it was estimated that in France there were bred about 4.1 millions live stocks[24].

The network of communications is well developed and polarized toward the capital. The commercial balance of France is equilibrated, its main partners being EEC countries. The tourism has a significant contribution (over 20 billions USD yearly) to the payment sheet balance[25]. The foreign financial aid granted by France totals 7.5 billions USD, yearly. In this concern, France contributes with 18% to the development aid granted by EU and participates in the multilateral aid programs of UN banks of development[26]. The Policy of energetic reconversion (the reduction of dependency from the import of hydro-carbonates) leaded to the growth to 75% of the nuclear plants percentage in the production of electric power (first place in the globe)[27]. The great industrial concentrations are: the Parisian region, the Rhine valley, the inferior Seine, and Lyon area. The industrial production is extremely diversified, and the biggest weight regarding export is held by the following: auto-vehicles industry, industrial equipments, aeronautics, synthesis chemistry and food industry (butter, cheese and wine).

Also, the inflation level in France, between 2004-2007, spoke for the country's economic stability, fluctuating to a range of 1.8%, being lower than the average in EU, that is 2.2%[28]. A lower yearly inflation figure was registered only in some Nordic states such as Finland, Denmark and Holland. In 2010, a study provided by a British institute showed that France was on the first place concerning the living standard of the population in European states. The following reference elements were taken into account: the revenue left per household after the payment of taxes and rates, the quantum of added value tax claimed for goods and services, the range of working hours per week, the pensioning age, the number of free days per year, the level of expenses for education and the level of expenses for health[29].

France, in its quality as important actor of the European Union exercises its right to sustain or not the candidatures of the new states wishing to adhere. In this context, France supported on the occasion of the European Council on December 9, 2011, Serbia's candidature to the EU, under the conditions of "concrete progress" in the dialogue with Kosovo, but continues to oppose to Turkey's candidature. In exchange, Paris considers "premature" the initiation of discussions to grant, in December, the candidate status to Montenegro, proposing the re-discussion of the subject at the half of 2012. As concerns Kosovo, France is in the favor of an "agreement of principle to initiate the dialogue on the themes of visas and to fix a term for their elimination". Still, the French government categorically opposes any perspective regarding Turkey's admission in the European Union framework[30].

At the same time, France, allied for the same time with Germany, gave an ultimatum in an open letter sent to the European Council president, Herman Van Rompuy, to those opposing EU policy, for example the countries that are not part from the group of nine outside the Euro zone, from which we exclude Romania, whose president spoke long ago about adopting this measure at European level[31].

4.2. The Foreign French Policy and the Investments in the Defense Field

The foreign policy of France was strongly influenced by its character of founding member of the European Union. Also, France is an active member in many international bodies: the United Nations, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, World Trade Organization, the Secretariat of Pacific Community and the Commission of the Indian Ocean. It is also an associated member of Caribbean States Association and the main member of International Francophone Organization. It hosts the headquarters of the following international organizations: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, UNESCO, Interpol and the International Bureau for Weights and Measures.

France is one of the five countries officially recognized as "possessor of nuclear weapons" by the Treaty of nuclear nonproliferation, with 350 nuclear ogives, being the third nuclear power[32]. Commonly with the United Kingdom, the French army is, financially speaking, one of the most endowed armies in Europe, because together the both countries represent 40% from the military expenses of the EU. France grants the army 2.5% from GDP (a budget of 38 billions Euros in 2006), while the majority of EU countries grant only 1.5% from GDP, as the data provided by the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) show[33].

Since 1996, the French army is professionalized. Through its army, France has an important presence in Kosovo and the Ivory Coast, and as well as in the Middle East and in the French overseas territories where it provides the peace maintenance and securing of maritime routes. A significant part of the military equipment is made in France: Rafale fighter, Charles de Gaulle carrier, Exocet missiles and Leclerc tank.

Although France withdrew from Eurofighter project, it invests in many European projects, such as Eurocopter Tiger, multifunctional frigates, UCAV nEUROn demonstrator and Airbus A400M airplane[34].

France occupies the third place in the world as concerns the budgetary military expenditures, which in 2010 had a value of 44,788,000,000 Euro, representing 2.32% from the country's GDP, the lowest value of French military expenditures up to now[35]. Also, its army comprises 465,079 persons representing military personnel, out of which 243,000 – active personnel, 70,300 – reserve personnel and 151,779 – paramilitary personnel[36]. As regards the European navy forces, France participates to the European naval defense with 10 submarines, 12 frigates, 9 corvettes, one transport ship, 5 war amphibious ships, 11 fighting minors and 17 patrol vessels[37].

4.3. France and the Current Economic-financial Crisis

according to the Council Recommendation in July 12, 2011 regarding France's National Reform Program that also comprises the Council's opinion over the updated France Stability Program for 2011-2014[38], France was less affected by the economic-financial crisis compared with other EU Member States. Its GDP drop was only of about 2.7% in 2009, in part owed to the economic instability and the maintenance of households' consumption. In 2010, the economy revived and the GDP increased with 1.5%. Anyway, the economic crisis impacted substantially over the French public finances. Owed to the discretionary fiscal stimuli, the governmental deficit increased from 3.3% from GDP in 2008, to 7.5% in 2009. Also, the crisis exacerbated the insufficient use of labor force and the structural weaknesses of French labor market, where there were registered a relatively high level of unemployment rate in 2010 (9.7%). Moreover, the balance of commerce with goods gradually decayed in the last decade of 2011 year, underlining the challanges of the French companies as cost and prize competitiveness.

The director general of French Statistics Institute, Jean-Philippe Cotis, appreciated that „*The crisis made France to irremediably loose 3% from its Gross Domestic Product by the diminution of social revenues and from taxes"*. Also, the International Monetary Fund underlines in a report that France economic revival remained fragile and the perspectives are very uncertain[39].

In January 2012, Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating agency disturbed the Euro Zone, retrograding France, Austria, Spain, Italy, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Portugal ratings. The consequences of this decision will bring huge disservices to those countries, to the Euro Zone and to the entire European Union. The European Commission harshly attacked S&P for retrograding the most powerful economies of the Euro Zone, among which France. The Commission's position was presented by the voice of European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Olli Rehn, who expressed "the regret for the aberrant decision of S&P", which lowered on January 13, 2012, the rating of nine countries from the Euro Zone[40].

Everything started on the background of the sterile discussions over Greece debt. The Greek government did not reach a consensus with the investors over the debt haircut (diminution) with 50%[41]. Therefore, the country could go bankrupt in March 2012 because it depends very much on a huge loan from IMF, loan which will be granted only if Greece comes to an understanding with its investors.

As concerns France, the S&P decision can provoke a domino effect at local level that will induct the retrograding of the rating for banks, banking institutions, but also cities, as stated the analyst Norbert Gaillard for Le Figaro. This will lead to the increase of debt cost and „*could cause an increase of the local taxes*"[42].

After, at the end of last year, the investors' fear to loan states belonging to the Euro Zone also affected Germany, the pillar of trust and stability of the region, at present, not even the S&P decision to retrograde nine countries does not scare the markets anymore; France and Spain attracted 14.5 billions euro at smaller and smaller rates of interests[43]. In the first auction after the lost of AAA rating with S&P, France sold debts on medium and long term totaled at 7.97 billions euro, very close to the programmed target of 8 billions euro, informs Bloomberg. The average performance for the two years titles was negotiated to 1.05%, diminished compared to the level of 1.58% from October 2011[44]. France's obligations for 10 years were transacted on the market on performances of 3.09%, decreased from 3.13%, as they were on December 5, 2011, when S&P threatened with cutting the rating. France sold bonds indexed at 10 years inflation in sum of 425 millions euro, to a performance of 1.07%, decreased from 2.32% as they were in November 2011[45].

The risks within the Euro Zone seem to worsen as S&P prognoses show for a period of two years, therefore new retrogrades are possible[46].

For the future, in 2020 Europe Strategy, France fixed as main goals the following:

- to diminish with one third the exposure rate to risk of poverty in time for 2007-2012 or with 1,600,000 persons;
- to increase the rate of labor force occupation with 75%;
- to increase the budget for research-development with 3%;
- to reduce the emissions of CO_2 with 14%;
- to increase the renewable sources of energy with 23%;
- to rise up the energetic efficiency by the reduction of energy consumption with 34 Mtoe;

- to reduce the early school abandon with 9.5%;
- to promote the tertiary education in order to grow it up with 50% from the present date[47].

Conclusions

After 60 years, the European Union became a unique case of international organization composed of 27 members with full rights and interests not always convergent but that has many of the characteristics of a unitary state: common laws, frontiers and currency. Therefore, the European Union looks like an automobile trying to circulate on bicycle wheels. A strong blow of wind was enough of for this fragile machinery to be threatened. And the wind became a storm: the crisis of sovereign debts[48]. The same pragmatism compelled Europe's leaders to suddenly become aware of the necessity to change the wheels and, in February 2011, Germany's chancellor and the French president advanced the first radicalized draft of common European economic governance. A pertinent question could be: when will Europe's play of French-German Empire cease to be a simple game? Answers kept coming lately, as after a few months of adjustment and negotiations, discussions over the United States of Europe were resumed.

Whether we refer to the socialists Gerhard Schroeder, Jacques Delors or the democrat Wolfgang Schauble, or to Jean-Claude Trichet, president of European Central Bank, or Antonio Borges, chief of the European unit of the International Monetary Fund – all of them speak of giving up the national sovereignty in the favor of Brussels and of the European Monetary Union passing to the next level: the fiscal union. The change in the speech of the European leaders is notable in the context of lowered popularity of the European Union among its peoples.

France is a European leader owed to its size, advanced economy, quality of member in European organizations, strong military power and energetic diplomacy. Generally, France aimed to strengthen the European Union economic and political global influence and to increase its role in the European common defense.

For France, to reach a European political union is a way of enhancing Europe's role in the world and that of France in the European framework. Still, this goal is more difficult to reach now, faced to the beginning of the crisis in the Euro Zone. Through its attack on the UK and the attempt to determine the increase of financing costs for it, France created conflict and tensions on the whole continent.

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EUROPEAN UNION POLICY REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

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The unprecedented urban, industrial and agricultural development in the second half of the 20th century had a number of consequences (significant depletion of natural resources, concentration and accumulation of pollution, increase of technological risks) which led to widespread degradation of environmental quality.

Finding solutions to manage these consequences pressed numerous states and international organizations to develop important instruments in order to protect and conserve the natural environment against involuntar and voluntar human aggression.

EU is an important organisation involved in this process and its results regarding regional and global environmental problems represent a necessary solution for the future.

Key-words: security; environmental policy; environment action program; environmental protection; sustainable development.

1. Preliminary Considerations

Demographic growth and unprecedented development of all branches of activity led to a greater consumption of raw materials and energy. The intense explotation of natural resources reveals not only economic development, but also some major imbalances.

The issue of environmental security caught the European Union's interest as it became increasingly clear that natural resources and reducing pollution effects could not be countered effectively only within national borders. Environmental sources of insecurity are multiple and some time unexpected, therefore focus on environmental security must fall while on *prophylaxis and therapy*.[1]

According to Community documents, environmental security has become the fundamental premise of sustainable development. Ecological EU has become a major reality and together with the political, economic and social EU itaims to promote sustainable development.

2. Community Action Regarding Environmental Policy

Treaties establishing European Communities (European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community) of the 50' make no reference to environmental issues.

Until 1987, EU community environmental regulations were based on two articles from the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (signed in Rome on March 25, 1957) respectively article 100 which provided for the harmonization of the laws of the Member States had

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a direct impact on the establishment or operation of the common market, and the article 235 which referred to the measures necessary to achieve one of the objectives of the European Community.[2]

After 1973, in the European Economic Community and later in the European Union there were adopted several action programs, which expressed the community's environmental vision and set a timetable for specific actions performed during each program.[3]

At the Paris Summit of 1972 it was decided that environmental issues should be pursued not only by Member States, but also by the European Economic Community. As a result of the Summit, the following year was approved *the first Environmental Action Programme* (1973-1976), defining the basic principles and objectives of Community environmental policy and identifying general actions to achieve it. *The second Environmental Action Programme* (1977-1981) was a continuation of the former, with the difference that it customized the general actions set out in the previous one., Community action priorities on environmental protection were introduced for the first time by *the third Environmental Action Programme* (1983-1986), which established a series of new concepts (such as the integration of environmental aspects into other Community policies, preventive approach) and defined a global strategy by integrating environmental interests in other Community policies and preventive environmental and resource saving, making the transition from pollution control to its prevention.

The Single European Act (1987) is a reference point of European environmental policy; it was first mentioned in a treaty among the new powers of the European Community institutions, environmental protection and research. In the year 1987 *the fourth Environmental Action Programme* (1987-1992) was adopted. Continuing the preventive environmental strategy of the previous program, this program aimed to make environmental protection an essential element of any policy of economic and social community. The main lines of action established by this program were: the full and effective implementation of Community legislation in force; control of the environmental impact of all substances and sources of pollution; a better access to information for the public and better dissemination of information; creating jobs in the field. Also, the program emphasized the need to promote international cooperation on environment protection and to assist countries facing environmental problems in this field. Based on this program, the EU initiated research programs on the environment, eg: Science and Technology for Environmental Protection (STEP) and the European Programme on Climatology and Natural Hazards (EPOCH).

The Maastricht Treaty (1992) brings environment protection a full status in European policies. Starting from the fact that a healthy environment is essential for long-term property and for the quality of life, *the fifth Environmental Action Programme* (1993-2000), entitled "Towards a sustainable and respectful development of the environment", turns sustainable development in a strategy of the EU environmental policy.

The program was made up of three parts:

- the first part presented the state of the environment in EU countries and growing threats to the environment, suggests a new strategy for separation trends and promote sustainable development requirements;
- the second part presented a summary of threats and ecological problems in the international context and specifed what the European Union and the Member States were going to do (or could do) under international or bilateral cooperation, in terms of environmental issues at regional or international level;
- the third part examined issues related to choice of priorities and cost structure.

It should be noted that the program addresses a number of environmental issues (e.g.: climate change, air pollution, depletion of natural resources and biological diversity, diminishing and pollution of water resources, deterioration of urban environment, waste etc.) not in an individual manner, but as symptoms of bad management and resource utilization. The program also specifies that environmental degradation is caused by consumption patterns and behavior and highlights five main sectors that can degrade the environment and consume natural resources, especially: industry, transportation, energy, agriculture and tourism.

To achieve real results, the program gives priority to the following directions:

- the sustainable management of natural resources;
- integrated control of pollution and waste prevention actions;

- reduction of energy consumption coming from non-regenerable sources;
- improving mobility management, in accordance with the logic of environment, of settlements and ways of transportation;
- improving health and security, especially regarding risk assessment and management;
- nuclear security and radiation protection.

Through this program there were established six elements of the EU sustainable development actions:

- integrating the environmental considerations into other policies;
- partnership and shared responsibilities between the European Union, Member States, business environment and the public;
- extending the span of environmental policy instruments: taxes, subsidies, ferm agreements;
- changing the schemes of consumption and production;
- the aplication of EU legislation by Member States, enterprises etc.
- international cooperation within the "Agenda 21" of the United Nations in the context of the fifth environmental action program.

An important moment in the environmental protection was *the Treaty of Amsterdam* (1999), which was the legal basis of the policy in the field and of sustainable development in the EU. Due to this treaty, the Committee of the Regions has a greater administrative autonomy, and the areas in which this institution is consulted was extended, including: employment, social affairs, public health, *environmental protection*, social fund, professional training and transportation.

Although the fifth program has particularly contributed to improve the environmental situation, there remained a number of serious environmental problems whose solution required the implementation of complementary measures. As a result, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union debated, in 2001, *the Sixth Environmental Action Programme* entitled "Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice".

The program set priorities and major objectives of EU environmental policy for 2001-2010 period and detailed in particular the "environment" component of the sustainable development in the more general context of improving the overall state of the environment and quality of life in the European Union. Among the measures set in this program, we mentioned: consumers will receive necessary information to choose products that meet requirements regarding environmental protection, thus orienting the market; Member States and candidate states subventions will have to encourage environmentally friendly practices.

A new look brought by this program is the adoption of an "Integrated Product Policy" (Integrated Product Policy - IPP), aimed at reducing environmental degradation products throughout their life cycle, thus leading to development of organic products.

3. Environment Protection under Lisbon Treaty

An important Community document, *the Treaty of Lisbon* (in force from 1 December 2009), mentions that one of the European Union objectives is to help Europe's sustainable development. According to this treaty, sustainable development is based mainly on a high level of environmental protection and improvement.

This Treaty states that the environment is one of the areas where both the European Union and Member States have responsibilities. Combating global climate change is a specific objective of the EU environmental policy. Environmental protection, the EU and its Member States shall cooperate with third countries and competent international organizations (Article 191(4)). According to the same article[4], the European Union environmental policy contributes to the following objectives:

- preserving, protecting and improving the environment;
- protecting human health;
- prudent and rational utilization of natural resources;
- promoting measures at international level to deal with environmental problems and especially regional or global climate changing.

The European Union takes into account, when drafting its environmental policy, of a number of issues:

- scientific and technical data available;
- environmental conditions in different regions of the Union;
- benefits and costs of action or inaction;
- economic and social development of the Union as a whole and the balanced development of its regions.

The European Union environmental policy is designed to achieve a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in different regions of the Union. This policy is based on several principles: *the principle of "the polluter pays"; the principle of preventive action, the precautionary principle, the principle of high protection of the environment, the integration principle, the principle of proximity*.

4. The Environmental Protection According to the EU Sustainable Development Strategy

The first Sustainable Development Strategy of the European Union was adopted by the European Council in Gothenburg in 2001, to which was added an external dimension, at the European Council in Barcelona in 2002, having as landmark the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002).

In 2005 the Commission launched a review of the Sustainable Development Strategy, a process that included several steps[5]:

-the first stage begins in February 2005: the Commission published an initial assessment and criticism of progress since 2001. They also described the non-sustainable development directions which had negative effects: the climate changing, threats to public health, increasing poverty and social exclusion, natural resource depletion and damage to biodiversity;

-the second stage starts in June 2005: heads of state and government in the European Union adopted a declaration on guidelines for sustainable development and argued that the renewed Lisbon agenda is an essential component of the all-inclusive sustainable development;

- the third stage begins on December 13, 2005: after consulting with several institutions and people involved, the Commission presented a proposal for review, which emphasized six priorities: climate change, health, social exclusion, transport, natural resources and poverty. Also, there were identified ways needed to solve these problems;

- the fourth stage begins in June 2006: then was adopted the Sustainable Development Strategy for an enlarged European Union based on the Gothenburg strategy as a result of the process begun in 2005. This strategy is desired to be a link for public policy makers and public opinion to change behavior in European society and the active involvement of policy makers, public and private, and of citizens in developing, implementing and monitoring sustainable development objectives.[6] The strategy promotes the active development on a large scale and ensures that internal and external policies of the Union are in line with sustainable development and international commitments.

The main objectives of the Sustainable Development Strategy of the European Union are[7]:

- *environmental protection*: protecting the Earth's capacity to maintain life in all its diversity, respecting the limits of the planet's natural resources and ensuring a high level of environmental protection and quality improvement; preventing and reducing of environmental pollution and promoting sustainable production and consumption in order to determine the termination of the connection between economic growth and environmental degradation;

- *equity and social cohesion*: promoting a democratic, secure and fair society which takes into account social inclusion and healthy living principles regarding fundamental rights and cultural diversity, creates equal opportunities and combats discrimination in all its forms;

- *economic prosperity*: promoting a prosperous, innovative, rigorous, competitive and eco-efficient economy which provides high living standards and opportunities of full high quality and employment throughout the Union;

- *respect of international commitments*: encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and protecting their stability in the world based on peace, security and freedom; actively promoting sustainable development worldwide and ensuring that internal and external EU policies agree with the global sustainable development and with international commitments.

The Europe strategy 2020[8] established the following priorities: sustaining a more efficient, greener and more competitive economy in terms of use of resources, together with smart and inclusive growth of inclusion. The priority objectives can be achieved both due to European assets (presented in the Strategy) and the respect that each and everyone of us ows to the environment.

European Union sustainable development strategies are to some extent a sort of "aids" complementary to standard instruments and act as incentives for the adoption of environmental protection measures or emphasizing the tendency towards an approach based on the principle of volunteering.

5. Institutional Actors Involved in the European Environmental Policy

In the European Union environmental policy there are involved a large number of institutional players, who are always in consultation with the governments of the Member States, with international organizations, NGOs etc.

Decisions of institutional actors are involved in the environmental policy and are determined in accordance with the principles established in the EC Treaty (175).[9]

The main institutional actors involved in EU environmental policy are:

- *Directorate General Environment with the European Commission*, created in 1981, directly responsible for developing and ensuring the implementation of environmental policy, whose role is to initiate and complete the new legislation in the field and ensure that such measures adopted will be implemented by Member States;

- *Environment Council,* part of the EU Council, has several meetings per year to coordinate environmental policies of the Member States;

- *Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy*, with the European Parliament, established in 1973, is formed by specialists responsible for legislative initiatives on environmental protection and consumer protection;

- *Economic and Social Committee* has an advisory role in the decision process, illustrating the generality of environmental protection policies;

- *Committee of the Regions* has a consultative role and ensures the involvement of regional and local authorities in the Community decision;

- *European Environment Agency*, with the headquarters in Copenhagen, has as main objectives collecting, processing and providing information regarding the environment towards decision-makers and the public. This objective is achieved by continuous monitoring of environmental activities and timely reportings of imminent problems.The activity of the Agency consist in: providing information on which policy decisions are based; promoting of all best practice in technology and environmental protection, supporting the European Commission to disseminate the results of environmental research.

Together with the European Environment Agency, there was established the *Environmental Information and Observation Network - EIONET*, that connects national information networks of the Member States. Communications and reports of this network on environmental situation play a crucial role in adopting new strategies and measures for environmental protection at EU level and provide a basis for most of the Commission decisions in this field, as the network is not directly involved in the decision-making process.

In order to apply environmental policy within the the European Union, there are used several tools:

- *legislative instruments*, creating the legal framework of Community environmental policy, are represented by the existing legislation in this area, namely more than 200 acts (directives, regulations and decisions); they were adopted since 1970;

- *technical tools* ensuring the quality standards regarding the environment and use the best technology available in this moment; in this category are included standards and emission limits, the best technologies available at the moment, the denomination "eco" (eco-labeling), the applicable criteria for the environmental inspections in the Member States;

- *financial instruments*, including: Life Program and Cohesion Fund.

LIFE program was launched in 1992 in order to co-finance projects of environmental protection in EU countries, this program passed through different stages: first phase (1992-1995) with a budget of 400 million euros, the second phase (1996-1999), with a budget of 450 million euros and the third phase (2000-2004) with a budget of 640 million euros. For 2007-2013, the European Commission instrument of environmental policies related to this program, called „LIFE +" will provide about 1.7 billion for projects on nature conservation, environmental technologies and environmental communication.[10]

Cohesion Fund was established by the Treaty of Maastricht and became operational in 1994. This fund has the following characteristics:

- limited sphere of action of this fund will provide financial support only to Member States with a GDP / capital below 90% of EU average;

- the financial support is limited to co-finance projects in the fields of environmental protection and development of trans-European transport networks;

- financial support is given to those states that have developed programs, which accept the conditions relating to budget deficit limits as it considers the link between the fund and the objective of achieving economic and monetary union.

Conclusions

The European Union has acquired the status of senior author of the policy environment at national, regional and international levels. The most striking example is the nearly 70% of the commitments set and achieved at European level in 1992.[11]

In the present, the European environmental security priorities are: climate change, preserving biodiversity, reducing pollution causing health problems and more responsible use of natural resources.

Trough this major impact wich he generates on the environment, environmental protection requires better public awareness. Therefore environmental education carried out in any area of social life can help improve the environment and improve the relationship between man and nature. A series of actions aimed at protecting the environment at European level can be listed: 16 to 22 September 2010 – European Mobility Week, May 24, 2011 – European Day of Parks. The environmental education is a component of the safety education, and it helps to maintain individual, national and international security.

For the European Union, environmental policy remains one of the most difficult policies, whose implementation is not likely to succeed without the support of institutions with responsibilities in this area within the Member States, but also of the population. Preserving environmental security and the existence of a clean and healthy environment are important aspects of quality and prosperity of life that we wish for ourselves and for future generations.

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APPROACHES OF THE CORRELATION SPACE–TIME–TECHNOLOGY SPECIFIC TO FUTURE'S WAR

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The beginning of the millennium underscores peculiar aspects of military conflicts. The contemporary military phenomenon shows that the current armed conflicts receive new dimensions upon the impact of the factors space–time–technology in the future's war.

The new security environment challenges have convinced world's states of the need to transform their armed forces in order to tackle adequately security risks and threats.

Key-words: correlation; space; time; technology; future's war.

1. Interdependency between Future's War Qualitative Transformations and the New Forms of Military Confrontations

War, as a complex phenomenon, has evolved at the same time with the development of human society, more precisely with progress in science and technology. Thus, in nearly any epoch of humankind evolution, each novelty in science and technology found an appliance in the military field, enhancing thus the destructive capacity of combat means. At the same time, changes of combat means came together with changes in the conceptions of waging wars, in doctrines and strategies of various national armies' or alliance armies'. We deem that this process is still in progress, especially as a consequence of revolution in military affairs (RMA) and of the implementation of new IT&C technologies in the armies of the world's states. At present, information on own troops, as well as on those of the enemy, are collected, processed and used almost in real time and at all levels of military hierarchy, rendering decision-making easier.

In this context, we are witnessing the emergence of theories on warfare that are supported by the new paradigms. Among these, we highlight: *"war among population", "four generation war", "asymmetrical conflict", "effects-based operations" and "network-based war"*[1].

As it is well known, conventional wars were waged in open space, on land, at sea or in air. Nowadays, is seems that the urban environment is becoming the theatre of armed confrontation. That is why we are going to focus our attention on ***war in urban environment and war among population.***

In specialised literature, ***war in urban environment*** is widely described. In a nutshell, its analysis refers to the following main aspects that confronting actors have in mind: cities, having a numerous population, are an important source

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for recruiting combatants, offering possibilities to train specialised fighters in various domains, being necessary a diversification of its forms of resistance and a financial, technical and medical insurance; in the city, detailed information on the adversary can be collected by means of specific procedures; the compact liveable space of the city, the relatively small distances between different locations and the possibility to cross them in a short time, even by foot, allow for deploying of so called *blitz* (thunder) actions that can take from a few minutes up to 2 or 3 hours; in the city, it is much easier to organise and to put in practice forms and procedures of fight, such as: surprise attacks, ambushes, harassments, opening fire from the top of buildings, left or damaged buildings and so on; buildings arranged as resistance points can be kept and defended with little forces; there is a varied possibility to supply technology and raw material necessary for fabricating and fixing armament and equipment; obtaining easily connection and transmission lines due to telephone, telegraph communication lines and other means existent during peacetime; psychology influencing actions can occur in wide range of forms, procedures and methods, starting with modern ones and up to those improvised (inscriptions on walls, sidewalks etc.)[2].

In order to achieve its aims, the resistance movement of one of the confrontation actors in the urban environment may organise in armed fight formations and support formations. They have support from the civil population in the area that grant human, logistic and information support necessary for waging the guerrilla fight and especially the moral support that nourishes the fight for a cause. It is compulsory for the urban guerrilla to act according to conspirational rules which should not lead to discontinuity of communication with the civil population in the area, nor at the isolation of formations from one another, as in this way the movement would considerably lose its force.

Recent events in Afghanistan, where NATO soldiers are harassed on a daily basis by Talibans, insurgents, as well as by local guerrilla forces, underline once again the need for troops to be trained in the issues of organising, preparing and deploying of war in urban environment.

The new paradigm of ***war among population*** is frequently debated in specialised literature[3]. Thus, the Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld refers to the transformation of war[4], the disappearance of conventional interstate war and its replacement with forms of conflict that engage new political organisations. Indeed, new wars are not, as they used to be, classical conventional wars, great industrial, technological inter-state wars, of high intensity. New wars are irregular, asymmetrical, fourth generation wars[5] with very mobile and invisible enemies. In the case of this type of armed conflict, fights are of a low intensity, with actors that are not necessarily states, the enemy more often than not being a non-state actor. These may be insurgents, guerrilla or terrorists that find themselves in the urban environment in order to find a shelter. The new context of armed conflict is that of war among population, where it is impossible to give the enemy the final struck in its weak points, as they do not exist. On the other hand, in this case, national armed forces and/or those in an international military coalition under UNO mandate are concerned with the use of violence with restrictions, in order not to produce collateral damages or kill civilians or destroy public and private goods. Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts are a proof of what a war among population means.

This new paradigm and this new way of waging a war should persuade political and military decision-makers to reflect in a serious manner on the military strategy, doctrine and means to be used in a particularly urban environment and with a considerable density of population in a future armed conflict.

However, most of nowadays conflicts do not differ, in terms of their typology, of ancient conflicts. Nations continue to fight for power, frontiers, resources, markets and influence. Thus, the majority of current confrontations are of the following typology: frontier or territorial, religious-based, inter-ethnic, economic military conflicts, guerrilla wars, terrorism and military actions against terrorism[6].

All the above-mentioned conflicts have a diversified technological support, from classical weapons and the use of plastic explosive charging to CBRN weapons or the use of their components, to the use of weapon system of great precision and of networks of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).

In the international context of the new millennium, many European countries started to transform their military structures, preparing to face new types of threats.

At the moment, the war extends its area of manifestation and, under these conditions, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between peace and war, between a conflictual situation and a non-conflictual one, between military and non-military conflicts. Both types of conflicts commence because of conflictual interests and as a consequence of more or less responsible political decisions. If, on the one hand, when we refer to military conflicts we generally deal with symmetries or asymmetries, as there are two armed forces of military structures that confront each other, on the other hand, when we refer to non-military conflicts, asymmetries are dominant[7]. The two types of conflicts can be defined according to the following, more important, elements: profound knowledge of reality; predominance of information in real-time; data-bases; strategic domination; networks; adaptability and flexibility of structures and actions; adequate logistic support; rapid reaction; finality.

Theoretically, the effects that could be obtained by the enemy forces can be achieved by applying the network based war (NBW). In this respect, Iraq operations in 2003 war and, to some extent, post-conflict operations, to which we can ad experiences in Afghanistan and those of Yugoslavia's bombing, are the only real actions in which NBW concept was applied. It is absolutely necessary to ad a network logistic capacity to concentrate logistic effort over the operational effort. At present, only the US has such capabilities, while the EU has just started to acquire them[8].

In order to achieve its own NBW system, the stress is put on widening the Internet band in order for it to allow the use of this network in the C4I2SR system and on the achieving the specific means (sensors, hit systems, unconventional means etc.) in order to succeed in counter-terrorist, crises management and post-conflict operations.

2. Correlation Space-Time-Technology in Future's War

The modern military phenomenon is characterized by sheer complexity, dynamism, multidimensionality and involvement in armed conflicts of state and non-state actors. These defining traits of the military phenomenon are exacerbated by the following elements: *demassification of armed forces and the shift towards professionalization of the army; reducing armament; banning certain categories of weapons (e.g. chemical and bacteriological weapons); introduction of advanced technologies, modulation of structures; professionalization of military personnel; hitting decisive points and enemy centres of gravity, enhancing the importance of vertical manoeuvre and aerospace; integrated and simultaneous use of military force categories*[9]. At the same time, they all involve substantial changes in military thinking and lead to a new configuration of future warfare and of stability operations under strategic, operational and tactical decisions taken in a short time.

Political-strategic determinants required by the specifications of asymmetrical confrontations typical of the XXI[st] century imply space (real, physical, virtual, cybernetic space), time and technology in a complete interdependency and interaction.

In order to underscore the correlation among the three factors – space, time, technology – we appreciate as necessary to present each and every one of them and the way in which they interact.

The space of military confrontations has evolved over time, due to influences following factors: endowment with equipment, adequate platforms and weapons systems, capacity of manoeuvre (movement of forces on extended spaces, organization (structures and effectives), effects of means of hitting, effectiveness and flexibility of logistics support, operational and risk management, military art.

According to political-strategic development trends, on the global scale, in the dominant power centres – USA, Russia, China and the alliances – there are studied the particular characteristics of the future military conflict in terms of deploying flexible and asymmetric military actions. In this context, space is approached according to several operations and may be: global space; space of some areas of the world; space / area of strategic interest, national space.

Lately, phrases like *fluid situation, fluid doctrine, fluid combat actions, fluid battlefield, fluid battle space (FBS)* are used.

"Fluid battle space" (FBS) reports itself, particularly to peculiar changes occurring in war physiognomy, by introduction of *stealth* technology, battlefield digitization, using new systems and intelligent weapons platforms, performant sensor, C4 I2 SR systems etc.

FBS is defined as a multidimensional space in which occur asymmetrical actions, characterized by mobility, dispersability, decentralization, manoeuvrability, flexibility appropriate to actions taken – whether they are land, water, air, space, information, psychological and special operations – waged simultaneously at all three levels (strategic, operational and tactical), continuously and in a brisk, with an aim to decisively hit centres of gravity and decisive points for defeating the enemy psychologically and physically[10].

So, FBS is characterized, in the broadest sense, of great mobility, of extraordinary speed of military action, ever since its initiation, of the efficiency, handling and anticipating of events, as well as dominating the battlefield and the opponent.

It is obvious that FSB means a full correlation of the three terms mentioned in the beginning, i.e. *space-time-technology*. Closely related with the analysis of the evolution of the location of warfare, analysis of the second factor, namely –time / duration of confrontation provide understanding of the correlation existent between both factors, but also between them and technology.

Time or duration of the confrontation, as a fundamental element defining the temporal framing of action between opponents is determined by the same factors that have influenced their conduct space.

Depending on the evolution of the military phenomenon, from *First Wave wars* the concept of *Blitzkrieg* was designed and materialized and it the shift was made towards the new type of war of the *Third Wave*. At present, time / duration of confrontations is a dynamic feature of military actions, based on the possession and use of information acquired almost in real time. The acquired feature of the modern battlefield is dynamism, as a tendency manifesting itself in the physiognomy of the fight to increase the decisive character of the confrontation as a result of continuous development and at a fast pace of combat means. In this sense, within military actions of the future war, in addition to compression of hostilities duration, the duration of the fight itself becomes linear, without interruption imposed by the day-night alternation, favourable or unfavourable weather, contact objective – in-depth objective. It may be noted, therefore, that in the new type of war, time has become a critical variable, which makes so that step by step actions be replaced by simultaneous actions in the multidimensional confrontation space[11].

Deployment speed of military operations is assisted by computer, telecommunications and satellites. Logistic support (network based) of actions conducted in all media, *just in time*, by using related sensors, increases speed of reaction of forces by proactive supporting action.

The space-time dimension of the military action is more dynamic than any other. A significant impact upon it have both factors determined by the specific of military actions, as well as those related to characteristics of the environmental in which these actions are conducted. Therefore, taking both sets of factors into account in the design and materialization of military action is an urgent necessity.

Space-time dimension of military action is operationalized by two variables: time and space (*space* defines the place, the real and / or virtual environment, and *time* – past, present and future), necessary and sufficient for organizing and carrying out military action. They are in a continuous interaction and interdependence and it is difficult to separate them when considering military action in all its complexity and dynamism.

The space in which military actions are conducted recently expanded with two new environments – *cosmic space* and *cyberspace*. The influence of cosmic space is almost ubiquitous, and in the future it will be decisive. The cosmic space creates relatively infinite advantages through two concepts – *integrated battle space* and *information superiority* – on which armies organize and operationalize nowadays.

One can refer to a *space of military actions*, as to that in which operations are carried out and their direct effects are felt. It is greatly influenced by events and manifestations in the political space. In this sense, *Desert Storm* operation, held in 1991 against Iraq, under UN mandate, by a US-led international coalition, showed the main features of future operations that will take place in the area of military action.

The evolution of time and space has always been correlated with the technological factor specific to military actions which to determine the increase of the killing / destruction force in the space of future confrontations.

The technological factor in future confrontations is based on the huge progress of science and technology, materialized through the revolution in military affairs. To this end, classical weapons (conventional) have permanently undergone significant modernization, a fact which imposed differentiation in the content of the concept of conventional weapons and combat equipment. Thus, there appeared the notions of *weapons, technical equipment and modern combat platforms* which make the distinction between weapons and traditional technique.

Local military conflicts of the past decade have shown that at war there is a shift of effort towards information and electronic confrontation, carried out in the increasingly extensive electromagnetic spectrum, states' military capacity becoming increasingly dependent on the possibilities of collecting, processing, transmission, use and protection of information to the enemy. Therefore, achieving superiority in the use of electromagnetic spectrum for military needs becomes a priority, and the asymmetry in this area is more than obvious.

Electronic confrontation, as main form of asymmetric confrontation, has a dynamic evolution, driven by the need to adapt its processes and resources to research requirements and neutralization of electronic military systems and equipment, which are rapidly modernizing. This is carried out continuously, in specific forms, at all levels, with the participation of specialized and unspecialized forces.

The analysis of retechnologisation and endowment processes in the military field highlights specialists' concern to achieve and experience constantly new weapons and intelligent ammunition of high precision. They require diversification of damages and reduction of collateral damages (material, human and environmental). For the future, targeted lethality of "killer technologies" will allow the destruction of key elements of military objectives without killing combatants or completely destroy target data.

The duel weapon against weapon will continue, technology being the key element that will provide superiority on the modern battlefield by compressing time to materialize the decision. Thus, a major goal is the renewal of weapon systems, with rapid implementation, which involves the tendency to shorten the period of maintenance in endowing troops which each technology generation.

Electronic technologies (microelectronics) have a direct influence on the fighting power of troops. In this regard, it is particularly noted telecommunications development and the efficient use of satellite communications systems.

In the command and control structures, there are implemented control systems for conducting military actions that are highly automated and computerized and that have a critical role in drafting military plans and decisions for solving administrative and managerial problems, for carrying out the control of arms, platforms and equipment battle's efficiency.

For instance, laser usage has an extended applicability in the military field. By various effects triggered (thermic, photochemical, electrical, mechanical, quantic) and the way it works, it becomes is a modern and promising field of applications for military equipment, with growth opportunities in the following areas: telemetry and target location on earth, in air, under water and outer space; routing and self-routing of missiles; space and ground based communications; girometry applied to ships and missiles; computing technique with very fast action; weapons based on radiation, which have a destructive effect on living force and on fighting technology; holography applied to classifying documents; simulation of firing using infantry and anti-tank weaponry; monitoring of directions, areas or enclosures; deactivating nuclear and thermonuclear explosions; analyzing contamination of atmosphere with toxic and radioactive substances, etc.[12].

The use of optical fibres, which, together with microelectronics, have revolutionized the current telecommunications system, makes possible the processing, storage and transmission of information to hundreds of miles.

Mechanico-chemical, as well as electronic technologies, have a direct influence on the level of combat power of troops by the quality of arms, mouths of fire, ammunition, explosive materials etc., which are practically part of it (technical component).

In the immediate future, armies which have state-of-the-art technology are those that compress time and space to achieve actional objectives according to their own strategic options. To this end, other armies must make special efforts at all levels, especially at high-tech level in order to have military structures with a high level of combat power to seek the appropriate military requirements of future warfare.

Conclusions

It is possible that future armed confrontations will take place mainly in urban areas and among population. Hence, the need for combatants belonging to a national army and/or international military coalition under UN mandate to use violence very carefully, so as to avoid the increase of collateral victims.

The actors confronting each other in future warfare will be the national armies and/or international coalition under UN mandate against non-state actors (insurgents, guerrillas, paramilitary units of the drug cartels). The latter will use, more often than not, combat methods and procedures specific to asymmetric war as well as practices of terrorist nature.

Space, time and technology are and will be factors with significant impact on strategy and tactics used in future war. In addition, the emergence of virtual space (cyberspace) will increase the complexity of future warfare. Therefore, armies must prepare thoroughly for cyberwar.

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FUTURE STRATEGIES TO INSURE GLOBAL MILITARY SECURITY. PHYSIOGNOMY, TYPOLOGY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF WARFARE

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Global military security, just as globalization itself, is in an ample process of searching in order to find some viable and sustainable solutions so as: to involve as much possible all worlds' states and their resources; to assure the achievement of all countries' interests, as parts of global interests; to guarantee everybody's security as components of global security. Essentially, the future security strategies will bear the mark of globalization process and will be characterized by an extreme dynamism, punctual convergence regarding the objectives and resources and will be defining for the long term evolution of security environment and war's physiognomy.

Key-words: security; globalization; strategies; war.

1. General Considerations

Although it can be stated that important steps have been taken towards globalization and towards providing global security, the current international situation is peculiarly dynamic if not somehow confuse, owed to the following considerations:

• The political and economic interests of big centers of power converge towards the resources existent in narrow areas of the world as the big transnational corporations are involving themselves more and more in the political life in order to be able to accomplish their interests.

• Major international bodies and institutions with global scale attributions loose some of the powers they were invested with in favor of some less influent ones, unable to exercise their attributions except in narrow areas.

• Political-military bodies as the alliances, peculiarly the North-Atlantic Alliance, have a strange evolution because instead of becoming stronger by admitting new members, it seems they decay owed to the existent group interests divergences with increasing profoundness.

• The risks and threats against security at global, area or regional level are in a process of diversification and accentuation, of passing to a more obvious asymmetry status.

• The number of states without opinion on globalization is quite high some of them being open against globalization, and situating themselves outside this process.

• Despite all the efforts done by the international community, the population's state of poverty is becoming more and more obvious and along with other factors, it determines an increasing migration, from the poor areas to the rich ones, from the

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undemocratic states to the democratic ones, from south to north and from east to west.

These reasons, as well as others, compel specialists in the military field and also politicians to find and adopt new security strategies to preserve a climate of peace and stability on the entire planet – strategies which will cumulate political, diplomatic, scientific, cultural and also military aspects. As concerns the future global strategies of security, we consider important a few milestones, as follows:

- Political-military alliances' and coalitions' policy will become topical and no state will be able to initiate military actions to achieve its own interests if those do not converge with global interests.
- There will resort to the adoption of political isolation of problematic states which, besides the fact they themselves lead an isolationist policy, they also contribute to the amplification of risks and threats against some states, or even global security.
- Diplomacy will add to the direct methods the indirect methods, regarding especially those neighbors and countries having cooperation relations with problematic states.
- Threat with use of force will gain new dimensions and will be able to be exercised by multiple means and environments.
- Nonmilitary actions (blackmail, disinformation, manipulation, information obstruction, espionage) will be omnipresent, intense and their result will be rigorously measured and exploited.
- Access to technology, resources, information will be severely managed by the international community and allowed only under certain conditions.
- The creation of monitoring and control centers in many areas of the world with attributions of coordination in crises situations.
- The hostile actions, dangers, risks and threats will be analyzed more attentively and they will be answered more quickly.

War, meaning the military conflict, will have an entirely different appearance and its physiognomy will be a perfect radiography of the human society.

Recent studies emphasize that computerization and engaged fight by the co-allied forces in regional conflicts will be features of the war in the newly started century. Instability already gains terrain and the confrontations became explosive, comprising a whole range of internal crises with social, religious, economic character and even interstate rivalries. *"War's configuration was, is and will continue to be strongly conditioned by the economic systems".*[1]

The military conflicts after the IInd World War, by their objectives, size and means of deployment fully benefited of techniques and technologies achievements of the informational era; this clearly shows a good part of what will be defining for the future military actions, such as: actions' development in all environments (land, air, water, underwater and cosmos); the use of diversified forces and means with a great mobility, firepower (carry, precision, effect of annihilation and destruction); the use of some very powerful and more precise weapons and systems of weapons (as "pinhead") which will cause damages in spaces rigorously surrounded and minimal collateral casualties; the transparency of action theatres owed to the conjugation of observance satellites, radars and active and passive means of detection by contact; the hits applied the same effectively at contact and in depth concomitantly with the existence of some efficacious counter-measures; the rapid dispersions and concentrations of forces and means; existence of common space of disposal and maneuver for the confronting adversaries; the battle actions with peculiar maneuver character especially insisting on encirclement and return; the space of battle electronically saturated; the great consumption of ammunition, carburant and other resources, huge material losses, ways and means of communication, art works, but also meaningful displacements of population, on ethnical, religious criteria, etc.; the trend to avoid direct, frontal confrontation between numerous forces and means, the accent being put on actions lead with large formations with a great firepower, relative autonomy of action, a great diversity of procedures, tactics, especially to the flanks, in intervals and in the depth of enemy's dispositions when and where the enemy lest expects; the engagement in battle of real professionals.

The military annalists unanimously agree that "*tomorrow wars will have a sure integrator character as the participation into conflict of all categories of armed forces which will act in the three media: land, air and sea. If these forces are added to the cosmic used for surveillance, supervision* *and communication, we will have a complete picture over the real dimension comprising all the environments in the military action*"[2].

2. Future War Physiognomy

In the future's war, the cybernetic theater of military operations will become a reality. Presently, the battle is very mobile in its manifesting means and all conditions for its continuous amplification exist because it has more diversified means to manifest.

In the XXI[st] century, aggressions will often rise instantly, the battle will be on the short term, but very tough and difficult to counteract. The issue of future existence of cybernetic battlefield rises, among others, two aspects with different significations.

The main aspect refers to the integration of computerization process of troops leading with the armament systems, to the apparition and use of robots, remote vehicles and intelligent ammunitions.

The second aspect will be defined by the work methodology under the computerization conditions, by battle scenarios and especially by military actions undergoing with simultaneous use of troops and elements used to monitor the enemy's activity, own troops reactions, environmental conditions influence, as well as the suitability and efficacy of the decisions taken.

The modern battle led by different types of units needs the rapid take-over and procession of information in the entire battlefield. The successful integration of informatics systems that already start to materialize in some modern armies as was proved in some recent operations („Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, then „Freedom for Iraqi"), as well as the development of new techniques and procedures to use them in full capacity will bring their users the needed superiority to be victorious. The success in battle will involve perfected systems for troops command, enhanced capacity of synchronization of direct fire and from covered positions, quicker and comprehensive access to information, better knowledge in real time of the situation in the conflict area and more efficient protection of own forces.

The future coordinates of informational field development, inclusively those of tactical level are given, on the one hand, by the more and more intensive use of automated systems of leadership and armament and, on the other hand, by the acceleration of its computerization.

Although nowadays the computerized battlefield of the future is merely intuited and even mistrusted by some combatants, it already reveals enough elements shaping it and granting it many possibilities to develop, such as: the multitude of automated and armament systems; the fulfillment of coordination of some diverse categories of force and armament in the battle under the conditions impelled by the compression of the operative time; the multifunctional battle forces along the offensive and peculiarly in defensive acts; the human forces preservation and the acceptance to use them only in very hard situations or to consolidate the success; the compensation of the physiological limits of commandants, fighters and operators by using the automated systems of battle; the use of robots for activities of great efforts, long time, sacrifices or actions under complex conditions.

Referring to the same fact, meaning the future wars physiognomy, active militaries with rich experience (General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James Dubik) defined five trends: increased lethality and dispersion; grown volume and precision of fire; massive integration of technologies; bigger effect achievement; perfecting in the means for providing invisibility and for objectives detection.

Military annalists recently identified an assembling set of distinctive features of a future nonlinear war: the absence of some well defined spatial limits; the combination of offensive and defensive operations; increased role of computerized systems in achieving cooperation; the undergoing of some concentrated hits of radio-electronic weapons of high precision, of lasers and weapons with super-frequency, of big groups of helicopters and radio-electronic means.[3] The armaments will continuously improve. We will assist to a globalization of defense industry to answer in this way to the participation in the military conflicts of some coalitions that will presume as all the systems within it to be inter-operational and safe.

The future war will be waged with military systems with inter-categories forces – land, air and marine troops distributed on thousands or tens of thousands of kilometers under the conditions of disappearance of limits between echelons, in all the environments, operations having a profound joint and multinational character. Tactical, operative and especially ballistic missiles will give a new dimension to the future battlefield, consisting in the coverage or support to hundreds and even thousands of kilometers. Robots and intelligent weapons with high impact precision or with individual possibilities to recognize and scan the objective at large distance will also contribute to the increase of military actions efficiency.

The future imperiously asks for militaries that are intelligent, cerebral, well physically and psychically trained, very well educated, instructed and motivated, able to use the armament and advanced technologies in their entire capacity and also to resist psychologically to the formidable pressure generated by stressful factors specific for the battlefield, for the battle led to influence the soldiers' conscience, their system of values, beliefs and expectations.

„Micro-electronic systems – declares the military analyst and strategist James Adams – *will allow to the tomorrow soldier to go to war with small airships in his haversack which can fly ahead of him to smell, see and here what is beyond the hill, or in the next building. Supplementary information will be provided by sensors disguised in grass, portion of sand or even dust clouds, processed by a computer and distributed where needed"*[4]. Therefore, in the future wars, as Alvin and Heidi Toffler wrote, the accent will be, "*on education and skills, and less on brute force. The new army needs soldiers that use their brain, can treat with a diversity of peoples and cultures, can tolerate ambiguity, can take initiative and can question even to the situation to discuss the authority"*[5].

So, it can be affirmed that in the future will continue to appear spectacular elements – some, hardly to anticipate even by the specialists in the art of war – which, surely, will change the physiognomy of the armed conflicts.

Undoubtedly, each of these issues and all gathered deserve detailed analyses, debates and thorough presentations because of their understanding depends the adaptation of strategies and military doctrines, the action of training commandments and soldiers, and also military structures and other elements which will be engaged in battles.

The international economic system shows a new type of war characterized by the increasing confrontation in nonmilitary fields and the more reasonable use of the armed battle by the use of forces groups and ultra-specialized means of modern war. In this type of war there are used systems of smart weapons with extraordinary characteristics. This is a specific element to be taken into account in the future war. The new type of war represents a spectacular passing from the surface to point, from massiveness to versatility. The strategic space becomes fluid and the military operations and actions gains an integrated, rapid and punctiform character. The confrontation space is, since now, where there are the main objectives of the belligerent parties, peculiarly, owed to the technological and military confrontation that got a new dimension, the cosmic one. We observe the trend of decrease in war's duration but the time needed to prepare the strategic actions considerably increases.

The victory can be obtained by a little number of actions, operations and strategic, but decisive battles. The hits precision applied to the selected objectives of the adversary considerably decreases the consumptions of war, especially collateral ones, while the measure of destruction to the objective tends towards maximum percentages. The civilian losses become more accidental and the confrontation in all fields moves from the material sphere in the intelligence one.

From this regard, war becomes a confrontation between professionals away from the idea of involving the civil society in such actions. The decision (that tends to be more prospective) and the strategic leadership executed in real time will determine that the reaction speed of the military systems be optimum.

The information opportunity and, consequently, the rapidity and quality of decision, supply many times the deficit of forces and means. All these determine us to agree with the affirmation "*under the conditions in which not all states can accomplish in a reasonable time delay the transition to a new type of war, the apparition of some disproportioned confrontations is possible, fact which could lead to the force replacement by nuclear deterrence with another threat, namely the incompatibility of confrontation with rational means*". The ability to dominate an adversary in quick time, under diminished risk and with lower costs, in the entire specter of operations possible in war, will become a *sine qua non* condition of specialists in military strategy from the informational era[6].

The countries transgression from the industrial system to the informational system under the conditions of huge gaps, although it will not be very difficult (in the most countries there were already built compatible informatics systems and the computer became a work instrument in everybody's hand), still, it will not be very easy. The military directives are still inflexible, many of those being based on massive ripostes and even on the conception of total wars. Modern countries yet did not renounce to the nuclear deterrence doctrine and the poor developed countries threaten with the total war, guerilla war and terrorist war.

3. Theories on the Military Phenomenon

As concerns the future's war and future's armed conflict, there can be shown three theories, interesting in their content and the profoundness of the expressed ideas and by the international vision on the military phenomenon.

In the classical theory is shown that the armed forces will maintain their role of deterrence and military action attending politics, leading national or multinational (inter-allied) missions. War will be more under "international control" (Blue Helmets, forces of rapid reaction) and the armed conflict will be much more limited and will undergo certain intermittences (pulsating).

The optimistic theory, which some specialists consider a utopia, expresses the trends and wills "*to internationalize the nuclear, strategic means*". The classical war can be prevented by means of nuclear deterrence and where it starts the armed battle must insure the strategy of the accomplished fact.

The pessimistic vision on war and armed conflict bases its theory on the considerable increase of armed forces importance because the regional, continental and global trends of geopolitics and geo-strategy could involve wars in different "hot spots", inclusively a world war in order to impose "*international institutions belonging to one civilization*".

The present political-military context with characteristics of instability, uncertainty and unknown, but which "moves" toward the integration, stimulates the activity of strategic schools toward vision, toward thinking in time. The results are expressed in the content of the Revolution in Military Affairs and underline the major implications over the military and strategic doctrines, armament and fight techniques, armed forces organization, military actions ongoing and their leadership.

The military doctrine gains importance in the sphere of organization and endowment of military systems through the incorporation of new ideas, technologies and organizational models. Strategic doctrines (operational strategies) should be real and express directly the experience accumulated in the military confrontation, the results of laboratory experiments and the preoccupations to instrument new fight techniques at the accomplished performances level; in this way, they continue to be "the main factor of change" anticipating the technological development of international plan in order to obtain the military victory in the future armed confrontations.

As regards the armament and techniques of fight, "their digitalized connecting" to the system is needed in order to be integrated led and their speed and precision of action will become dominant military demands. Also, they must exploit the existent technologic advancement and to increase it in order to a better expression of the deterrence function of the military confrontation.

In the organization of armed forces spectacular modifications will be noted. By their quantitative diminution, training and leadership improvement and the optimization of organizational structures to the strategic doctrine and technical endowment, they will gain the capacity to undergo synchronized and integrated battle actions, fights and parallel operations, lead in rapid rhythm and with high effect of destruction of adversary's military power and his will to oppose organized armed resistance. On actional plan, they will gain few main characteristics: doctrinal flexibility; strategic mobility; action agility; modeling and modularity.

Conclusions

Waging military actions will underline: the continuous cooperation of forces and means; the coordination of integrated operations; the simultaneous undergoing of military confrontation on different directions and sections, on the entire depth of the operational space; the maintenance, penetration, opportune exploitation and efforts concentration to defeat enemy forces in parts and optionally by simultaneous hitting the "centers of strategic gravitation" and operational forces in order to destroy the capacity of response of the adversary.

The future military actions command will suffer obvious mutations, among which:

• The elaboration of decisions will comprise one combination of human and artificial intelligence and will become "*less sequential, more simultaneous and always anticipative*".

• The increase of importance of information and, consequently, the continuous improvement of command-control bodies functionality by shifting from the C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence) system to C4 I2 S.R. system (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).

• The maintenance of actions' coherence in space and time between diverse forces and means participating in the military actions.

• The diminution of decision-taking and action time by decentralizing leadership.

• The creation of favorable conditions for all the operational levels to be able to design "*forces and means and firepower in real time*" along the efforts' concentration on the main directions and over main objectives.

• *"The optimization of resources for leading"* in order to make possible the simultaneous and coherent development of steps and distinctive phases of operations.

In the political plan, the relation "*military budget – scientific research – top military industry – implementation in the new structures of actions*" will represent the future of "*strategic art*" of waging a war.

The future of war and particularly of strategies of armed confrontations will be determined by "*the permanent efficiency increase of military doctrine content*", expressed in:

- The valorization of modern technologies results;
- The improvement of military systems;
- The adoption of their organizational structure and the provision of full functionality of the compounding elements but also as a whole;
- The adaptation of strategic/operational doctrines to the new demands of the military confrontation.

Therefore, for specialists in the military field, the following question becomes almost obsessive: what kind of military conflict will characterize the near future? We consider that through the future studies and analyses in the field there will also be elucidated strategies to preserve global security.

NOTES:

1 Paul VASILE, *Conflictele secolului XXI, proiecţii în spaţiul strategic,* Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 13.

2 Teodor FRUNZETI; Mircea MUREŞAN; Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Război şi Haos*, Editura CTEA, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 228.

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NAVAL FORCES' ROLE IN FIGHTING MARITIME TERRORISM

*Aurel PUICHILIȚĂ**

The beginning of the XXI[st] century surprised the global naval forces relatively unprepared for the fight against terrorism that has extended into the maritime environment. Naval platforms of the last generation proved to be atypical when it comes to the confrontation with boats and tactics used by terrorists. The efficiency in combating maritime terrorism can be enhanced by appropriate selection of the type of ships to be used in high seas and other technologies to fight against terrorism in harbour basins. Adapting preparation for skills training on the correct approach to the concept of force protection to future members of the crews is a new opportunity that is to be fructified. Combating the marine mine action, together with specific Intelligence activity, are the main directions towards naval forces' efforts to counter maritime terrorism. EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) divers are the first line in dealing with terrorist elements acting in the aquatic environment.

Key-words: terrorism; naval; maritime; marine; mine; divers.

Introduction

In an attempt to highlight the role of naval forces in the fight against maritime terrorism, two reflection issues have emerged. The first one deals with whether naval forces are prepared and whether they are the most effective tool to counter terrorism at sea. The second issue reflects on whether terrorism and piracy are the main threats to world shipping.

In my opinion, the answer to the first matter may be significantly different, according to naval forces to which we may refer. The U.S. Navy, having regard to the tasks and the enemy against which it was designed, proves to be less effective in the fight against organized crime and terrorism in international waters, which resembles more the nineteenth century battle rather than the twenty-first century one. Even though they are able to fight similar platform at considerable distances, US Navy ships available for action in the planetary ocean are less effective in "asymmetric warfare" when it comes to suppressing piracy and maritime terrorism. Instead, the Coast Guard ships are very effective in national waters and contiguous zones because they have sufficient technical means to fight organized crime in the area of responsibility, justifying the resources being allocated.

Regarding the second reflection issue, I believe that piracy and maritime terrorism, even if they are only part of the many causes that determine "sea clutter" affecting the maritime trade, it should be a priority to fight against them, not only for coastal states but also for other countries, given the global implications.

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1. Necessary Organizational Measures at the Naval Forces Level in order to Effectively Combat Maritime Terrorism

It is known that weapon technologies have produced large or small changes in organization structure and tactical use of combat forces. The ability to adapt to new requirements has always depended on the economic power of the state and investments in applicative research. We have the example of traditional fleets of the US, UK, Germany and Turkey, which have evolved in the same direction, overcoming their need of defence at the end of the "Cold War".

The developing concept of multi-role vessels was beneficial for the same maritime powers because they succeeded developing their naval projects and implementing this concept within a reasonable time. Somehow, these projects reduced part of the disadvantages induced by large ships. Despite the fact that they were equipped with weapon systems that allowed them to hit targets from considerable distances, they represented very vulnerable targets. For this reason, a large number of specialized battle ships able to provide close and immediate protection were assigned to protect them. The technological development has enabled the integration of advanced weapon systems for all environments, including platforms with much smaller displacements, without giving up its own air component (helicopter craft) or equivalent firepower and long-range of action. The most important gain of the multi-role ship is the mobility and self-defence capacity in submarine environment, surface and air, at distances that usually exceed the possibilities of discovery for enemy ships with similar displacements from the previous generation.

Even these vessels are considered ineffective in the fight against maritime terrorism and piracy. Costs of investment in technology and crews training still prove too high compared with what they have to fight: pirate or terrorist ships that, in the worst case, may oppose arresting using portable grenade launchers. It is obvious that the ship which would ensure increased effectiveness in the fight against organized crime and terrorism at sea must have specific features of the Coast Guard vessel, but keep the possibility of a frigate in terms of range, capabilities "data Link", AIS (Automatic Identification System) and access to a database in real-time in order to assist the decision to interrogate or combat any suspicious ships and illegal activities.

The need for action in high seas at large distances from the national territory leads to somewhat larger platforms the size of corvettes to ensure required staff accommodation for medium term missions. Ideally, the Coast Guard of coastal states is called to act. This is why one of the missions of Operation "Ocean Shield" is to encourage countries in the region to build their own Coast Guard structures. These structures can be instructed on request by the naval forces in the area and certainly will be supported by the international community, which anyway pays a lot for maintaining security shipping traffic in certain areas to an acceptable level.

The necessary organizational measures to combat maritime terrorism must be analyzed from two perspectives:

- organizational measures concerning anti-terrorism defence (passive measures);
- organizational measures necessary to participate in counterterrorist missions (active measures).

To be more specific, I will refer to the potential of the Romanian Navy to develop naval capabilities to combat maritime terrorism.

Addressing the concept of "force protection" in Romanian Navy came with the entrance in use of the first type-22 frigates. The ship was taken over from the British navy with the specific staff training being done at NATO standards. Considering the specific procedure of "force protection" relatively simple to implement on board of the other ships and given the context of the terrorist attacks on the USS "Cole" in 2000 and the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 it is understandable why they wanted rapid implementation of this concept to all Navy ships.

Personally, I think this issue should be reconsidered since implementation of the concept was in some cases formal. For a more accurate chronological approach to the phenomenon, prior to the design and installation on board of certain devices to support self-defence, the preparation of the entire crew awareness of the procedures should be initiated. The crew is the one to analyze the best possibilities for implementing the concept to the specifics of each vessel for different situations and levels of threat. Crew training is part of a daily routine, but for greater defence efficiency the initial theoretical training and arrangements made to support the "force protection" procedure should be done on a realistic basis.

To increase the antiterrorist capability, I think the Romanian Navy can implement the following passive measures:

- make use of the experience of NATO naval forces in the implementation of the "force protection" concept;
- realistic implementation of the "force protection"concept when it comes to both ships and land targets with high assessed risk (including any related facilities);
- update the Mission Needs Document (MND) and the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of the vessels planned to enter the procurement process by considering the "force protection" concept;
- efficient use of simulation training facilities in order to train and evaluate the Combat Information Centre (CIC) staff and other crew members designated to combat piracy and maritime terrorism;
- establish a mandatory volume of knowledge necessary for Navy students to familiarize themselves with the topic and understand the responsibility required to address anti-terrorist measures on board of the ship.

Using the experience of NATO Member States Navy is at hand, given the frequent contacts with the Romanian Navy crews during training exercises and workshops. I also relate to the use of the "list of measures to protect ships in harbours" produced by the Working Group CHENS (***CH****iefs of* ***E****uropean* ***N****avie****S***) to protect ships in harbours, during 2005 and 2006 meetings. This list, most probably endorsed in the 2007 CHENS annual meeting, contains a very elaborate collection of means and possible measures for the protection of ships in ports, grouped by different environments (land, surface water, air and submarine). The list is a comprehensive catalogue of measures which aim to standardize port security activities of ships among European nations, facilitating better cooperation in this regard. The measures in this list will not create further obligation for European States, being only subject to prior arrangements for ship visits to ports belonging to NATO Member States. In this sense, the visitors may issue a list of codes regarding ship security services that they want to be provided during the port visit. The visited military port authority confirms point by point the possibility or impossibility of implementing the list by consulting it. Based on this response, the commander of the ship may decide to supplement the safety deployment, if possible to contract services from shipping agencies or revoke entry into the port for security reason. Up to this date, the list referred to is not in possession of our military port commanders. The same document can be an ideal instrument in modern and standard-based approach to port security, namely investment in equipment.

Realistic implementation of the "force protection" concept refers to the establishment of staff to be allocated for self-defence based on thorough analysis of the terrorist threat and its importance. Realism derives from a logical approach to the concept, starting with - analysis - equipment - training - and ending with the residual risk assessment. For a more efficient implementation of anti-terrorist measures, conventionally, the terrorist threat level is measured on several levels, each of which has an assigned code. Declaring a terrorist-level alert and hence the necessary security measures it involves is an attribute of the national state leadership, an agency or a local commander who receives the information from official sources or an anonymous threat.

The update MND and ORD for projects that are in the ship acquisition programme materialize in a formal action, since currently formulating requirements are based on the consultation of a modern project which already has these types of facilities.

Training facilities in the Romanian Navy provide favourable conditions to simulate situations that are subject to rejection of a terrorist attack or conduct missions to combat piracy at sea. In fact, during training simulation exercises are "injected" into the system the moments that lead to action to defend against a suspect vessels or aircraft, which begin with interrogation, warnings issue according to standard procedures, and finally deciding to avoid the target by manoeuvring the ship or use of lethal weapons at a safety limit set distance.

Training of crews in combat action against piracy and maritime terrorism must be addressed in situations of increasingly complex problems that lead to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions or the correct application of international, maritime and humanitarian law.

Approaching in educational institutions of the Romanian Navy the topic of force protection and anti-terrorist measures allows students to reflect on this issue and give it due weight early in their career. Given my personal experience aboard Navy ships, I could safely say that the previous generation is sceptical about the effectiveness of anti-terrorist measures implemented on board. I honestly hope that future experience will not give them the opportunity to find out who is right or wrong in this particular aspect.

Among the necessary organizational measures in the Romanian Navy to enhance counter-terrorism readiness I consider to be relevant the following:

- continuing participation of ships and naval personnel in operations against maritime terrorism or piracy "Operation Active Endeavour" type and "Ocean Shield" or "Atalanta";
- continuing participation in the structures of special operations forces in counter-terrorist operations missions in theatres;
- participation of EOD structures in operation theatres for specific missions;
- continuation of regular performance checks of immerse structures of extremely important port infrastructure elements meant to detect IED (Improvised Explosive Device);
- further training courses and equipping "boarding teams" suitable for vessels carrying out the tasks of combating piracy and terrorism at sea;
- developing military intelligence capacity in order to meet their needs.

Participation type-22 frigates in the operation "Active Endeavour" is considered a success both nationally and within the Alliance, even if on the dedicated web site Romania seems to have had no contribution. Crew experience in performing interrogations and real "boarding" missions is considered valuable combat experience and lessons learned, relevant for the source to be trained in this purpose. Application of provisions relating to "boarding" of the ATP-71 - Allied Manual for Maritime Interdiction is done with discretion, contextually, not to generate greater pressure than those created by the action itself.

The "boarding" team attitude must be harmonized with the level of cooperation shown by the controlled ship, without compromising the safety procedures. Regarding this, one important factor which dictates the attitude of the control team is the position in which the weapons are kept. It is not the same thing to keep guns in firing position on the staff whilst on board or display a relaxed attitude with gun directed obliquely down the pipe, but should always be ready to use them. Details on this matter cannot be fully learned during training. The theatre experience makes the difference.

Although there are opinions on certain echelons that the Romanian Navy should not be involved with the structure of special operations forces in theatres of land operations, I personally think that the combat experience gained so far by participating in these kinds of missions is beneficial for the unit as a whole.

Although EOD divers are not that visible, they have more opportunities for training, both during the real intervention to land sites and checks of immerse structures for anti-terrorist purposes.

The Intelligence structure of the Navy must have all the information necessary to conduct effective and safe antiterrorist and counter-terrorist actions.

Last but not least, Navy Staff should initiate dialogue between the Romanian Naval Authority (Constanța Maritime Ports Administration and Navigable Channels Administration) and leading military ports, in order to synchronize all actions, apart from other activities on pollution issue and SAR (Search and Rescue).

2. MCM Component in Support of Counterterrorism

Mine Counter Measure (MCM) represents a distinct domain in the Navy with no regard of fleet size available to the state, given the damage this weapon considered both primitive and modern can cause.

In the report for U.S. Congress members initiated by the Congressional Research Service in 2007, it is mentioned about the FBI warning (Federal Bureau of Investigation) for imminent use of improvised marine mines by terrorists[1]. Even if the use of marine mines was not a pattern of terrorist attacks, the economic impact that a mine threat can cause to a harbour like Constanța or Amsterdam are difficult to compute. The current context in which developed countries are dependent on energy resources and raw materials more than ever and poor countries on food aid, shipping has become the "Achilles heel" of the world's economy.

The use of marine mine tactics is very simple, their launching means are varied and effective action can be efficiently dissimulated. Without reiterating the threat that mine can cause on the maritime channels, waterways, straits, and other areas of intense transit, I want to make an assessments of the risks posed by mines to harbours and the Navy role in implementing mine counter measures. The number of vulnerabilities created by the use of marine mines and underwater improvised explosive devices in harbours is as high as the types of mines that have been manufactured and used in the last century. Virtually, all the aquatic space of a harbour may be used to launch mines, be it along of quays where vessels operate, the approaching channels to the harbour or the manoeuvre space of the inner harbour, given that all the port water surface is crossed more or less often by ships.

The type of marine mines subject to attack a harbour are mainly the bottom mines taking into account the relatively shallow water inside and on their approaching channels. The effect of a mine explosion meters under a ship hull is devastating, due to the destructive effect concentrating on the vertical direction opposite to the ground. Relatively small distances between the launched mine and the hull of a ship crossing the surface make the task easier of designing sensors that activate and detonate the mine; at these distances the physical fields values of a ship are very high. The same scale of damage was caused to the shell of the USS "Cole" in 2000 where it was estimated the use of 270 kilo of explosives that can be caused by a load of several kilo, placed under the keel of a ship.

Regardless of the type of mine used, its size and location, their discovery is almost impossible without modern technologies of underwater detection, specifically ship "mine hunters". The search of mines using divers, apart from it being risky and difficult, it is also hardly productive. For example, an area of 2,500 sq.m (50x50m) in good visibility conditions is covered by a team of two divers in about 30 minutes, while modern means using side scanning cover the same area in less than two minutes. Extrapolating, the time needed to cover an approaching channel to harbour is totally unacceptable for searching using diver's method. This represents a valid reason to induce authorities to make efforts in order to achieve mine hunters and related technology.

Maintaining freedom of navigation in national waters is a core Navy mission, both in peacetime and in crisis or armed conflict. Romania's position in current security arrangements offers a protective umbrella that will keep away from any armed conflict, but it is not relevant in the fight against maritime terrorism and terrorism in general. Moreover, its status of U.S. ally against global terrorism raises exposure to terrorist attacks, namely maritime terrorism. In this context, ensuring freedom of navigation on approaching channels and coastal waterways can be achieved using mine hunters, the only ones able to address the harbour and coastal areas.

Due to the rapid development of autonomous underwater vehicle technology - Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) by integrating the best navigation systems, multi-beam side scan sonar and associated software there have been developed a number of independent vehicles, capable of acquiring high-resolution hydro-acoustic images of an important immerse area, in harbours or deep waters, moving on parallel paths previously established by programming. Versions of these AUV are available on depth ranges, even exceeding 5,000 meters. The most popular producers of this kind of vehicles are Hydroid and Kongsberg Maritime. The independence of these AUV is relative, meaning that in order to obtain a hydro-acoustic image with precise coordinates it is necessary to use a positioning system, which constitutes the reference for the navigation system of the AUV. Embedded sensors for navigation purpose in the AUV are usually the pressure sensor / depth, digital magnetic compass using "HALL" sensor, depth sonar and accelerometers, which assist the inertial navigation system. The accuracy of these sensors and system as a whole is not satisfactory for medium or long time underwater operations and, therefore, the use of the referential system is preferred. In this case, the precision of navigation increases to tens of centimetres. A modern solution developed by Bluefin Robotics[2] is the use of a precise digital magnetic compass combined with a precision GPS receiver for periodically upgrading the position of the AUV, usually after completing a line, temporary surfacing. This method combines the advantage of a total autonomy from any referential system with the acceptable precision of a GPS receiver. AUV operating speed is around 3 Nd and the side scan sonar covers adjacent spaces tracing an image stripe of 50 to 100 meters wide, depending on water depth and desired image resolution.

The main advantage that the AUV offers to harbour security is the independence, operational simplicity and repeatability of scanning tasks. Discovery of potential risks can be revealed using the similar technology of fixed sonar, by superimposing images taken at different time intervals. Programming an AUV to carry out a task of scanning is establishing an electronic map of the points between which it will navigate, setting immersion, speed and type of data to be acquired; in our case, it represents the type of scanning to be performed, usually resulting in a network of parallel segments. This route with related information is transferred to the computer memory board of the AUV for execution. After the scan, the data is downloaded from the AUV on-board computer to the computer that will run complementary applications of image analysis, identification of points of interest or even comparing two images by overlapping. Points of interest arising are checked using ROV or EOD divers where possible, based on coordinates provided by the graphical application. This way, an efficient mine clearance check can be done in harbour areas in a time scale of hours considered reasonable or of high efficiency. A representative element for the arsenal of AUV is considered REMUS[3] (Remote Environmental Measuring Units). This is a system which confers great portability and user-friendly interface. It can be acquired in three different versions corresponding to the maximum operating depth of 100, 300, or 6000 meters.

For example, we analyze the REMUS-100 variant, the lightweight and compact version, designed for operation in coastal areas to a maximum depth of 100 meters. This system can be configured to meet all requirements for data acquisition on demand. The AUV has become a benchmark product, recommended by thousands of coastal missions executed and tens of thousands of hours spent underwater, recommended by experts for the following reasons:

- high repeatability - ensured by high standards for design and execution of the system;
- reliability demonstrated in the 10 years of production and tens of thousands of hours of field operation;
- compact and lightweight product - weighing under 37 kilos, easy to launch and recover;
- ease of operation - with an intuitive graphic interface allows anyone to become a good operator after only a few hours of training;
- was chosen by the U.S. Navy as a tool for MCM operations in coastal waters.

Typical applications for the REMUS-100 are[4]:
- hydrographical survey;
- MCM operations;
- harbour security operations;
- environmental monitoring;
- mapping the wreckage debris;
- search and rescue operations;
- fisheries operations;
- mapping and scientific sampling.

The main problem of the MCM operators begins with the discovery of marine mines or improvised explosive devices (IED) on critical immersing infrastructure structures or even in the harbour water. The procedure for removing the threat of mines in high seas is relatively simple by using remote destroying systems from mine hunters or divers planting loads on them. This is not possible in a port due to the damage which may arise from the proximity to harbour facilities (immerse oil tanks, floating and dry docks or locks).

When it comes to marine mines with high explosive charge, the first solution that is required is lifting and towing them underwater using special parachutes outside the perimeter of the harbour for disposal. If the discovered mine has removal protection or the procedure proves to be risky, having taken all critical infrastructure protection a special device will be used in an attempt to disrupt the mechanism / circuit designated to initiate the explosion. This is based on the use of special procedures for each type of mine using the disrupter, which gives controlled explosions directed towards certain mechanisms. The use of the disrupter does not exclude the possibility of failure or even the worst scenario, explosion of the mine, but it represents the only option for disposal of magnetic mines on the hull of a ship with removal protection.

Simultaneous use of several similar REMUS systems to efficiently cover the surface of a harbour, together with action of mine hunters on approach channel to harbour and coastal waterways, contribute decisively to ensuring freedom of navigation and deterring aggressors in using mines, due to the ability of the Navy to find and dispose of them.

Conclusions

Naval forces, even if they cannot intervene to eliminate the factors that generate and maintain terrorist phenomenon at sea, are an effective tool to combating it and maintaining maritime security to an acceptable level. Mitigating the potential effects that can lead to naval terrorism in maritime trade is possible only through coherent reactions to the information provided by intelligence services.

Training, equipping and maintaining a high level of training for naval forces engaged in combating terrorism has become a prime concern for naval forces belonging to countries with major interests in maintaining an acceptable level of safety of the maritime transport. Efforts in this regard are also made by the equipment industry to develop underwater imaging technology, detection of sea mines and improvised explosive devices.

In combating maritime terrorism, a wide of range naval forces and means are involved; from dedicated naval platforms (mine hunters) to multi-role ship type frigates and the patrol vessels of the Coast Guard, the naval detachments of Special Operations Forces and EOD diver groups. The specific technical equipment of these forces must ensure a low risk during the conduct of combat actions acceptable for a fighter. The Romanian Navy strives for the purposes of equipping and training of forces involved in the fight against maritime terrorism, having some relevant combat experience along with Alliance partners.

NOTES:

1 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf, the official site of “Federation of American Scientists”, accessed on 13.10.2011.

2 http://www.bluefinrobotics.com/technology/navigation/compass-based/, the official site of “Bluefin Robotics” Company, accessed on 20.10.2011.

3 http://www.km.kongsberg.com/**,** the official site of “Kongsberg Maritime” Company, accessed on 13.10.2011.

4 *Idem.*

THE SOCIAL ISSUE OF THE PRESENT DAY'S WORLD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MIGRATIONS AND FOR HUMAN AND SOCIAL SECURITY

*Maria STOICOVICI, PhD**

Globalization unifies the planet from the financial and commercial point of view, and, at the same time, it determines polarization of society both inside the countries, and between countries. This has triggered a severe social issue consisting in impoverishing more than half of the world population. The massive numerical growth of the population contributes to deepening this process and then, people, out of the survival instinct, migrate in search for the better. Confronting ever greater and more frequent migratory waves, Europe closes or manifests violently. Europe has elaborated social and human security policies, but it fears to apply them for various reasons. The success of these policies does not consist in obstructing migration but in encouraging it, in such a way as all parts involved should benefit, the migrants should be considered with dignity and an intercultural dialogue should be initiated and maintained with the ones settled on the old continent.

Key-words: social issue; poverty; migration; policies; security; intercultural dialogue.

1. Globalization, Migration and Security

The need for a detailed analysis of the current social issue began the moment when, studying contemporary migrations, it became obvious that, the same as other current phenomena, migrations cannot be understood independently from globalization any longer. And yet, what is their connection with this phenomenon, as long as they have been, since ancient times, before its manifestation? The explanation is that globalization launches a deep social issue with migration as a consequence. How did this issue appear and why, what are its consequences for the human and social security are the aspects to be dealt with next.

2. The Social Issue in Globalization

For more than forty years after the World War II, known as the Cold War years, the structures of the international society were marked by the bipolar balance based on nuclear terror. The arms race materialized force ratios, oppression systems and spheres of influence. Its end was a new openness in international relations, which led to eliminate certain clichés regarding "western world" and "Eastern countries", and made the concept of "the Third World" depreciate. Political changes occurred, demography increased, especially in Asia and Africa, changes of the capitalist system were produced (progress in the production mode, the enormous increase in the international financial

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and commercial flows), under the impulse of transnational companies and banks. New poles of economic increase appeared in China, India, as well as in other parts of Asia and Latin America (Brazil). All these changes are closely connected with the globalization phenomenon and are accompanied by strong social polarizations with deep consequences on national and international security.

For now, we cannot know the nature and consequences of globalization yet, but one thing is certain: the structures of the international relations, the dominant model of the national state undergo a period of crisis. We see our societies lose their ideological and cultural landmarks, and more and more individuals leave their countries and go *ubi bene*. We feel that intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms grow weaker, and governments, that are responsible for managing this period of mutations regarding all aspects of the economic and social life, fail to provide social protection of their countries' citizens. This is the reason why the globalization social issue is today the focus of ideological debates and confrontations in the world policy. It has unprecedented proportions, which concern all humanity.

There are people in the XXIst century who live "below the poverty threshold", whose life is marked by violence, whose working conditions are very severe, and among whom children and women's exploitation are widely practised, mainly in Asia. These are people who live in different countries, in villages and cities at the outskirts of the production and trade centres, areas where social polarizations between the rich and the poor show similitudes with realities two centuries ago. The enormous social differences produce migration flows from the countryside to cities, or worldwide flows. Demographic pressures, unemployment, incomplete use of the work force, and class conflicts are among the causes of these massive population movements. They are similar to those that caused the migrations from Europe to the Americas or colonies more than one century ago. Moreover, the social issue cannot be dissociated from the environment damages, which, in turn threaten humanity survival.

If the working class conquered its rights after political confrontations within countries, in the globalization era the working people social situation is determined by transnational realities. While, inside the countries, most governments do not succeed in completely mastering the settlement mechanisms of the internal social issue, outside, international mechanisms cannot solve, negociate or arbitrate the conflicts determined by this issue. Sometimes the policies recommended by them worsen social polarizations in poor countries. The parties and trade-unions have organization difficulties in each country (the latter, especially, keep losing their influence). They cannot even have common political positions in order to face transnational companies' strategies.

As we stated before, after World War II, some countries, as a result of a long term modernization process (from Asia – South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, China and India – and from Latin America) experienced a certain economic and social development, but today we cannot forget that almost 1.7 billion people live in nearly absolute poverty[1] and nearly three billion people survive with two dollars per day[2]. Almost half of the population in South Asia and Sub-Saharian Africa, a quarter in Latin America and the Caribbean Islands, a third in the Middle East and North Africa live in extreme poverty. If we add the figures mentioned above, we reach the conclusion that more than half of current population all over the world[3] is extremely poor. It is impossible that these social realities should not represent major security risks.

Today, poverty should be perceived mainly as a political phenomenon. It is the natural consequence of weak solidarity ratios and, therefore, of weak political integration mechanisms. This is also determined by exclusion, social disintegration, is the result of weakening community structures and translates the public powers weakness. There is, however, a large consensus in international organizations and scientific community as to the part the public powers should play in the development of the poor countries. The state must contribute to settle and maintain a favourable institutional framework to favour internal security, to the economic and social welfare, to protect the environment.

3. The New Planetary Challenges and Their Causes

Currently, the new planetary challenges are overpopulation and migrations. Through its dimensions, the demographic evolution, or, more exactly overpopulation, becomes a great stake of the international policy, as it cannot be dissociated from poverty, migrations, natural resources exhaustion, all kinds of pollution, conflicts and humanitarian tragedies.[4] This produces impressive mutations in the space distribution and in the age pyramid, and nobody can analyse or anticipate the significance and consequences of these changes.

Theoretically, population growth, especially city population growth should determine vast proportion cultural, social and political changes as, from ancient times, cities have been in the centre of civilization processes, at the crossroads of great population movements, of the ideas and information change regarding the scientific and technical progress. Political power consolidated in urban areas, but it was also contested. The core of economic activities, industries, services, the main educational, training and research institutes also concentrated there. Generally, urban agglomerations benefit from the best communications, health and energy infrastructures. They offer populations the greatest chances to find jobs and enjoy diverse cultural activities. But reality is not always in accordance with the theory.

Migrations, another great planetary challenge of the contemporary era, became one of the most delicate social, economic and political issue in the last years. If they are not carefully managed, they can cause severe social and political tensions, they can affect the security of both origin countries and destination countries, in all its dimensions.[5]

The number of people living out of their origin countries is approximately 214 millions (OIM)[6], regardless of the millions of clandestine immigrants.[7] These movements have risen in amplitude in the whole southern hemisphere countries.

Trades of goods and services necessary for the globalization dynamics encourage migrations indisputably. Communications development, decrease of transportation costs, information networks progress reflecting the ways of life disparities, increase of economic interactions between different parts of the world and regional integrations have favoured travels of business people, tourists, students and people determined to settle in one country temporarily or for ever, in order to find a job or to escape from the oppression or war.

Attaining the impressive figures referring to international migration mentioned above was the result of special economic events. Thus, the critical debt of the Third World countries, made public at the beginning of the 1980s, resulted in rating the indebted countries by institutions such as Bretton Woods, Programmes of Structural Adjustment, (P.S.A.) etc. These programmes are characterized, among others, by privatization of the state companies, accompanied by massive unemployment, severe cuts in the social budgets (health, education), decrease of real wages. All this led to pauperization of these countries population. Moreover, productivistic agriculture has been imposed (practised on large areas, which deprived soils) and forests have been sold to multinational companies. Pauperization has been deepened then by the wars caused by political élites, which impoverished the poor more and more.

Faced with such a situation, the survival instinct determines communities and individuals to resort to migration. The main migratory movement is from South to North. Migration has become an answer to the consequences of economic neo-liberalization produced by the debt crisis not only of communities and individuals, but also of countries. Thus, for example, a work migration of the Philippines, Pakistan and Bangladesh to Hong-Kong, Singapore, Middle East, Europe, North America has been initiated under the Economic Cooperation for Asia and the Pacific (APEC). The work force, inclusively under the form of almost slaved housewife work hand is exported the same as goods. It is very cheap, overexploited and its status is illegality, because it includes a lot of women and children. Legal workforce is also subject to discrimination (for example, 250,000 Argentinians of the middle class immigrated to Spain or Italy during the three years of Argentinian crisis, 2000-2002)[8]. Its condition does not differ too much from one country to another. For example, the foreign doctors working in France drew the attention to the discriminations to which they are victims regarding work conditions (longer hours, more frequent guards) and income (lower than French doctors).

The migrants' fate is compensated only by the huge amount of transfers to the origin country: 100 billion dollars per year declared as to 300 billion not declared; in Latin America and the Caribbean Islands transfers increased from 38 to approximately 45 billion dollars from 2003 to 2004.[9]

4. The Social Issue and its Implications for Human and Social Security. Solutions for Peaceful Living Together

Faced with migration coming from all around the world, the European developed countries had to take security measures by carefully controlling the borders and to manifest, sometimes violently, against the people who were trying to escape from the poverty, war, religious or political totalitarism in their country. Numerous reports denounced cases of death of shooting, hits, wounds and other ill treatments whose victims were migrants of the two Mediterranean seashores. Patrols at the Spanish and Morocco borders used and are still using violence almost without control and obedience to their countries law, or to the European or international law, which stipulates respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, human rights, including minority rights.[10]

Although The International Law Court or The Interamerican Human Rights Court keep reminding of states' obligations towards migrants (refugees, asylum seekers), there are frequent cases of illegal and illegitimate freedom deprivations, ill-treatment or laws with xenophobe, even racist connotation practised in France, Spain, Morocco, Italy. Europe wants to close into „its fortress", leaving the responsibility to protect it from a new kind of „invaders" to Spain, Italy and Greece, and initiates in this way a systematic policy of human rights violation. In this respect China is denounced, sanctions are requested for Iran, but countries in the Union did not hesitate to sign agreements with Libia to repress migrants, Ange Bergson Lendja Ngnemzu says.[11] The economic and financial crisis has led to hardening both the acceptance conditions in these countries and the sanctions for illegal crossing the borders.

Inside the European countries there are difficulties in providing human security. This is an "integral part of the state of being" (Ange Bergson Lendja Ngnemzu). It means „physical security of individuals, their economic and social welfare, respect for their dignity and values. Security is considered a public good, meeting the strategic requirement for promoting sustainable human development, and promoting peace and national, regional and international stability." We know that this concept is translated by public policies. Sovereign countries must protect their citizens (both national and immigrants) from avoidable catastrophes, otherwise the international community is responsible for human security.

There are also difficulties in applying social security policies. The social policies refer to various aspects – investments in basic social services, labour protection law, respect of fundamental rights. They are closely connected with the employment policy, as the greatest part of social insurance is financed from work income and provide protection against working capacity risks such as unemployment, illness, infirmity and old age. The results regarding social security and work place greatly depend on the economic development and contribute to the social-economic development process.

Social security is an integral part of the development process. Synergies are therefore necessary among the social protection, work places and development policies. These synergies are present in different sectors of the social policies – health, education, homes, social welfare – and in certain domains of the economic policy, especially macroeconomic and sectorial policies (small companies promotion, for example), but it is not enough that they should exist, they should also materialize. Most of the times, social protection policies fail. France's example is well known. In the 1980s, territories identified as problematical were places for experiments. Thus *the Prioritary Education Area, Social Development of Neighbourhoods, Criminality Prevention Communal Councils* were founded.[12] These measures had unexpected effects on the immigrants (stigmatization increase, repressive measures intensification). While popular masses' conditions degraded continuously (instability, poverty, endemic unemployment, massive school failure, lack of perspective, increase of segregation phenomena, urban area degradation), the measures to stop it failed, and thus, peoples' hopes for the better were ruined, which made them discredit the policies and the institutions responsible for their application.

On the other hand, migrants' and their families' welfare and security (South-South) decreased dramatically because they could not always benefit from the social security programmes in force in the origin or receiving country.

What are the explanations of these policies failures? At the macro level, they depend first of all on the transformations produced in the security issues hierarchy.

The first transformation: the great powers (The USA, Russia and China) have turned the fight against terrorism into the first priority, and human and personal rights into the second priority. This measure is applied to the other countries, too, when countries security is globalized and the threat may come from anywhere.

The second transformation refers to the social instability level. There are several people freedom movements at present. These movements (either from Cecenia or The Palestine) are already considered real terrorist ostracized organizations, with no right to exist. Transformation of their discourse originates in the deep social reality of certain Latin-American countries, where drug-terrorism is now defined as "an alliance among terrorist organizations, drug dealers and criminal organizations". Terrorism, drugs and crime have contributed to the great transformation: large parts of the society became criminal.

In human security, a broader field than personal security is, as it treats life quality in general and social justice, progress is nonexistent as long as economy liberalization and markets globalization increase social inequalities and the gap between the rich and the poor. Politics has lost part of its reason to be: country, regional and international security exigencies will prevail on those referring to social justice.

Then, human and social policies failures are also due to the European specific way of considering immigration on their continent. For them this is a real challenge, it is the main issue. If many people left Europe up to the XIX^th^ century, in the XX^th^ century this place was looked for by more and more people. Why does this situation create problems? Is it because Europe's "discovery" as immigration area overlaps another moment, when it tries to make up a whole? The Union's preoccupations with recovering after war, integrating as many European countries as possible, have been shaken by the invasion of more and more immigrants. Europeans' adaptation to "common living" raises totally different problems than non-Europeans' adaptation. Migrations cause social troubles in any European countries, mainly because each country has its own political order and exigency on "foreigners" admission.

If immigrants were received at first, admission requirements hardened and Europe slowly "closed" for them. Even if European demography decreases and countries still need work force, despite the economic and financial crisis begun in 2008, today we are witnessing a shameful treatment of the migrants, manifested through violence to them, illegal and illegitimate freedom privation, xenophobe and racist connotation laws, etc. And this is because European identity is based on the ethnic-cultural-national symbiosis which differentiates, excludes and refuses to understand that the new world structure tends to a new political model that transcends national borders. Thus, for Europeans, the main threats are: 1) migration and transformations caused by integration and 2) conflicts between ethnic communities. They aim at Europeans' identity dimensions: language, faith, culture.

The arguments to support their position first of all refer to the conception about the nation and then to the elements influencing inter-ethnic relations (language, identity, and culture). Thus, **nation** continues to be "a privileged identification place" and "a settlement court" for the old continent. It transcends any type of differences (social, religious, identity) between populations and integrate them into an entity organized through a common political project. It also creates the political space inside which the relationships, rivalries, and conflicts between individuals and groups are settled. For an individual, belonging to a nation is synonymous with belonging to a country.

The challenge which **European identity** has to face nowadays is that while its classical definition mode is based on the ethnic-cultural-national symbiosis, consolidated by the national country, it differentiates and excludes. Accepting and including the Other (who does not share the same ethnic and cultural attributes) is against the identity construction logics, disorganizing the identity.

From the migration perspective, **language** is a decisive factor for integration in and adaptation to the destination country reality. Many times, the language difference, as well as the **religion** one, represents the social distance that, being too great sometimes, can prevent the migrants' acceptance in the destination country.

If the European identity differentiates and excludes, can it be interested in finding ways of relating to others? One thing is certain: in the European society cultural diversity is already an every day reality, the respect for it must reflect the respect for fundamental rights, it is "the knowledge, wisdom and dynamism plurality", it is a humanity collective force acknowledged by more and more international forums.[13]

In a Europe that has known a long Christian tradition, Islam advances deeper and deeper and this worries. We all see "pluralization of society" both politically and socially, economically, culturally, ethnically. Adolf Muschg says in an article that: "The ethnic does not compulsorily mean sending to categories and secluding people in identities, but it signifies the possibility to eventually publicly express the fact that differences manifest themselves by different ethnic, national and linguistic affiliations, and by confessional differences and that this pluralization is not only generic, but also internal to plural faiths communities"[14].

An inter-religious dialogue would be successful only together with a dialogue between religions and societies. It is only laity that can facilitate the dialogue between religions because it makes us equal and allows us to discuss from an equal basis. As Haim Korsia remarks[15] "The dialogue between religions is not the result of our society opening spirit, but the religions initial project. The spirit opening, and the laity concept have allowed for this dialogue between religions".

There has always been intercultural communication. People needed to understand each other, first for trades then in difficult moments (wars), they wanted to discover or learn, and all this through intercultural contacts.

Migrations have played and still play an important part in the intercultural communication. They contribute to the internal differentiation of the destination societies, both ethnically and socially.

If in the past, **culture** had a local character, with only few influences from the outside, today it suffers deep and quick changes on the very spot they were created. A contribution to this has brought communication technologies development, that have facilitated multiplication of cultural influences so that "mankind said good bye to the world that could be considered a cultures mosaic made up of separate pieces with well-defined boundaries".[16] Thanks to the complex cultural interconnexions and interdependencies culture spreads quickly and everywhere in the world, and intercultural communication only raises the problem of its own cultural heritage descentralization and reevaluation, of changing the angle of sight from the Other's perspective and finding possibilities to understand each other (of the similitudes in different cultures) in order to avoid confrontation and security problems. Intercultural communication is successful when common features are identified and values are shared.

Conclusions

We are living in an epoch of deep mutations, when the social issue appeared as a result of globalization cannot be managed either inside or outside the countries and, therefore, it worsens and menaces the whole humanity. It means poverty, considered today a political phenomenon and a security risk. The new planetary challenges, as well as overpopulation and migration are closely related to poverty, resource exhaustion, pollution, conflicts and humanitarian tragedies.

The current social issue has numerous implications in providing human and social security inside the migrants' destination countries. Their policies failure is explained by the new hierarchy of the security issues at the international level, which put provision of the social justice on the second place, and by the way Europe considers immigration. The old continent must "open" and facilitate intercultural communication of millions of people, who, choosing it as a destination place, land of hope, settled here in the second half of the last century. And this, by coherent, just and first of all profoundly humane policies. A compromise, a structure and an integration are necessary in order to have a society made up of a variety of ethnicity.

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2 http://www.goodplanet.info/Societe/Pauvrete/Pauvrete-et-developpement/(theme)/1383, 500 millions de pauvres en moins de 20 ans.

3 The world population was in November 2011 over 7 billion ingabitants.

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5 Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *Migrație și securitate*, ed. Universității de Apărare „ Carol I", București, 2008.

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12 Elisabeth JACOB – *Intensification des derives sécuritaires: contexte d'émergences et conséquences sur le terrain* in http://socio-logos.revues.org/2502.

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14 Valérie Amiraux - lector of sociology at CNRS, currently detached at the Univerity Institute in Forence for research in moslims' religious discriminations in Europe, *Acteurs de l'Islam entre Allemagne et Turquie* c/o l'Harmattan; Islam-Christian Friendship Group.

15 Rabbin, Israeli Air Force general, General Secretary of the French Rabbinical Association, working with the Great Rabi of France.

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EXTERNAL MIGRATION – A DEVELOPMENTAL TOOL FOR ROMANIA. BETWEEN OPPORTUNITY AND RISK

Ionel STOICA, PhD*

The relation between international migration and development is intensely studied and debated in the international forums, as well as in the national scientific circles. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that it has reached to a paradigm in this respect, the results being quite different from one country to another and, even in the case of a single country, the sense of the relation can fluctuate depending on the social, political and economic context and the form of the migration that prevails at a certain moment (temporary or permanent migration). Starting from the premise that the external migration of Romanians, at its current level, has a substantial impact on all the fields of activity and on Romanian society as a whole, this paper aims to focus on this impact in an analytical manner.

Key-words: migration; development; financial remittances; social remittances; demography; Romania.

1. Preliminary Considerations on the Migration Phenomenon

Starting from 1990, but especially after 2002, Romanians' external migration has registered a substantial intensification. Naturally, the phenomenon has entered under the supervision of Romanian authorities. A phenomenon having such amplitude[1] has a profound impact on the affected communities and, if we take into consideration the fact that Romanian emigrants come from all the regions of the country, we can understand why the phenomenon must represent a priority within the governmental policies related to country's development. At the same time, all the elements that define the qualitative and quantitative content of external Romanian migration (motivations for migration, trends of the phenomenon, the profile of the Romanian emigrant, the period / type of migration, the financial behavior of the emigrants and even the changes registered in the emigrants behavior after they return to Romania, including their reintegration into the Romanian society) have to represent an important point in the mix composing the policies of development at national level. An analysis of external migration's impact of on development is even more necessary at present, both with regard to the multiple and profound implications that this process has on Romanian society as a whole, and from the perspective that Romanians have become the biggest intra-communitarian immigrants group (according to Eurostat, approximately 1.7 millions, representing 15% from the total foreign citizens coming from another Member State of the European Union).

The accuracy of such an analysis is marked by incertitude due to the ambivalence of the relation

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between international migration and development, as reflected in the literature, but also to the fact that formulating a definitive conclusion regarding the effects on medium and long term migration, both on those who emigrated and on their families, on the relationship established inside them and, especially, on children, represent a speculative attempt, as long as the process is in an ascendant phase and the time elapsed till now is not sufficient to identify clear evolution trends.

This paper aims at underlining, through an analytical approach, the impact that external migration has, for the moment, on Romanian society. For the clarity of this demarche, the analysis has been structured on the economical, social, demographic and political fields.

Throughout this analysis, we took into consideration that the development of a nation refers to the combined processes of capital accumulation, increasing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, developing the habits and abilities of the population, as well as of other economical and social changes[2].

2. Romanian Emigration's Impact on the Economic Field

In the economic field, the most obvious impact of the external migration (and also the easiest to be measured) is related to the remittance sent by Romanian emigrants and to the opportunity cost associated with leaving Romanian labor market by these persons. Concretely, this last aspect refers especially to the capacity of the labor forces remaining in the country to implement the projects of development and modernization in which Romanian authorities have involved.

2.1 Romanian Emigrants' Financial Remittances

As Romanian emigration flow is increasing, the volume of the financial remittances associated with these flows and sent towards Romania have also increased (Table no.1), these having an important weight in the GDP.

Remittances of Romanians working abroad were of 38.819 billion US dollars in the period 2005-2010. In 2007, Romania was situated among the first 10 countries in the world regarding the absolute value of emigrants' financial remittances (10th position in 2007 and 8th position in 2008). In 2010, Romania was situated on 22nd place at world level regarding the absolute value of emigrants' remittances[3].

2.1.1 Financial Remittances' Positive Effects

At individual level, remittances of Romanian emigrants permit the fulfilment of some essential needs, the insurance of a better access to services and a higher living standard; at the same time, these flows have contributed to reducing poverty, especially due to the fact that a large part of these remittances gets in the poorest areas of the country and has diminished the social pressure on the various governments after 1990. According to the study "*Sending money home: Worldwide remittance flows to developing countries*", of the International Fund for Agriculture Development (United Nations), in collaboration with Inter-American Bank for Development, around 50% from the remittances of Romanian emigrants, in 2006, have been oriented towards rural areas[4].

At macroeconomic level, Romanian emigrants' remittances have contributed to the improvement of credit conditions for Romania on the international financial markets, due to the constancy of these flows in the last decade. As the current situation shows, in the economic crisis period, Romanian emigrants remain the most loyal investors in Romanian economy.

Despite the positive role of these remittances, it cannot be said that their maximization represents a priority for Romanian state authorities. Thus, although the number of Romanian emigrants is high and the process started several years ago, the cost of these remittances remains quite high in the absence of a serious involvement of the Romanian authorities, which not only do not seem to be concerned with the welfare of Romanian emigrants (depriving them of important amounts of money, as a result of the high costs of the financial remittances), but they also renounce a profit for themselves, substantial and for a long time.

2.1.2 Financial Remittances' Negative Effects

On the other hand, Romanians spend remittances from migration especially for current consumption, purchasing domestic goods, auto-vehicles, repairing, modernizing or constructing houses, medical services, education and the payment of some debts or credits. In particular, emigrants coming from rural areas have invested – al-

Year / Volume of remittances	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
	3.1	3.9	5.2	7.16	8.7	2.9	3.85	4.0

Table no. 1 - Volume of remittances sent by Romanian emigrants, 2004 - 2011 (billion Euros)
Source: National Bank of Romania

though modest amounts of money – in machinery for agriculture and sometimes in activities in the zoo-technical field. Only 0.1% of Romanian remittances were oriented towards purchasing agriculture equipment and approximately 0.5% from the total remittances was invested for initiating some family businesses[5].

The lack of interest for investment in agriculture can be explained through the lack of the irrigation system and its poor development, the lack of state subventions, the competition (often incorrect) with foreign companies and the high costs that the agriculture activity implies in the new Romanian context (the restoration of agricultural fields to their rightful owners led to the segmentation of the plots and, implicitly, to the decrease of their productivity). To these, it can be added the fact that an increasing number of persons living in rural areas have meanwhile oriented towards activities in construction or commerce, either as an effect of migration, or prior to this process – as this kind of activities is more profitable.

Only a small part of the remittances is allocated to investments generating jobs and economic progress or for professional training of emigrants (but the majority of these emigrants invest in their children's education). This behavior has the roots in the social and economic context of Romania prior to 1989 (and, at a certain extent, even in the current context which does not encourage investments on the long term), when communist regime did not stimulate individual investments in education (in the sense of permanent training of the employees), under the conditions of the lack of a real competition on the labor market or a more complex segmentation of it.

Under these conditions, naturally, critical opinions have raised regarding spending the financial remittances. But these opinions do not take into consideration the degree of poverty of those who emigrated and also of those remaining home. If we bear in mind Maslow's pyramid of human needs, we can understand why remittances are spent preponderantly on consumption. Moreover, we have to consider the fact that prior to the current migration, entrepreneurial spirit was underdeveloped in Romania (largely, because communist regime did not encouraged the free initiative, but also because of a lack of sustained contacts with a culture where this spirit was more developed). Remittances' substantial increase had negative effects from a macroeconomic perspective. The negative impact is reflected on the commercial balance of the country, the increase of inflation, the stimulation of imports, the diminishing of the interest for labor from the side of the benefactors of these remittances and unsustainable increase of prices in the housing sector.

To some extent, remittances have led to an economic dependence cycle that does not encourage the development in the receiving communities. This last consequence is especially important because it can affect whole communities and its negative effects will be seen on the long term. Those who remain in the country and make a living on remittances are not interested in enriching their knowledge or developing their spirit of initiative in order to ensure a decent living. The areas that live at a large extent on remittances condemn themselves to economic, social and cultural stagnation. On the one hand, those areas wouldn't have had welfare without remittances; on the other hand, these remittances are those that condemn them to economic stagnation.

These considerations make us say that migration represents rather a palliative that mitigates the welfare of the families affected and it does not lead to a sustained economic growth for these communities. Romanian economy cannot be based too much on emigrants' remittances – an aspect that has became more evident after the breaking out of the current global financial and economic crisis. Moreover, as Romanians from outside the country reunify their families abroad, remittances towards Romania are diminishing.

2.2 Emigrants' Social Remittances

Migration generates not only material and financial flows, but also immaterial flows, materialized in ideas, knowledge, customs and life styles. The first category of flows is more important on the short term, but the second plays an essential role on the overall evolution of the societies that are sources of the international migration on the medium and long term. Emigration has contributed to changes in Romanian behavior (in the first stage of those who emigrated; after that – of those remaining at home), both related their attitude towards work or towards consumption, but also regarding the ways in which they spend their free time. Thus, emigration has contributed to:

• ***The development of entrepreneurial spirit in Romania***. As long as Romanian emigration's experience in developed societies – characterized by innovation and developed entrepreneurial spirit – continues, knowledge and entrepreneurial skills of Romanian emigrants will continue to improve and will begin to be applied on a large scale in Romania. Investment behavior of Romanian emigrants has influenced, up to a point, those remaining at home.

• ***The creation and formation of a new ethics of labor***. Migration has brought an evident gain regarding labor ethics and business administration. The experience of working abroad contributes to the formation of a new ethics of labor. This fact is more visible especially in the case of transnational companies operating in Romania that hired Romanian emigrants. These companies identified in the returning Romanian emigrants an indispensable element in working with Romanian authorities and local population; they are those who succeed in harmonizing the requirements of the foreign managers with the specific conditions of the labor market in Romania, in an efficient manner for these companies. After returning home, Romanian emigrants suffered fundamental changes at mental and attitudinal level[6]; they are more critical and more concerned with the domestic political life, but, at the same time, they are more optimistic regarding the future. They come back with higher endeavors that favor the social criticism, they have a different ethics of labor, a better understanding of free time and of discipline.

• ***Westernization of Romanian consumption model***. Romanian emigrants have also been contributing to Romania's transition towards the capitalist model of society in other ways. Delocalization and emigrants contributed to the Westernization of Romanian consumption model. The experience of migration also changes the protagonists' behavior.

Migration contributes to the formation of a new consumption model, close to that of the middle class in the advanced capitalist countries.

3. Romanian Emigration's Impact on the Social Field

3.1 Social Effects of Parents' Migration on their Children

One of the consequences with profound negative implications of Romanian emigration is that an important part of the current generation of children in Romania grows up without the priceless support of their parents.

According to data provided by the National Authority for Children Protection, institution legally responsible with the monitorization of lonely children, in the first quarter of 2011, in Romania there are 88,868 children whose parents worked abroad. From those, 26,747 children have both parents working abroad.

On 30th of June 2007, The National Authority for Children Protection, the institution legally responsible with monitoring the cases of left-alone children, announced that in Romania there were 82,464 children whose parents were gone at work abroad, coming from 56,202 families. Still, the real figure is much higher.

Parents' migration for work induces a range of effects on their children, both positive and negative. Among the positive effects, the most important is the **increased level of wellbeing of children**. The funds gained from migration support, sometimes decisively, the continuation of studies at post-high school and university level.

On the other hand, parents' **emigration has a preponderant negative impact on their children**, illustrated in:

• **The decrease of their interest for school** and, as a consequence, their school results are poor. In most of cases, the transfer of the children to a school abroad had negative consequences on their educational development. Migration, even when it is temporary, has long term effects on the psycho-social evolution of children affected by the process.

• **The appearance of psychical disorders**. Migration leaves deep scars not only on school results (most often, generated by the difficulties linked to the process of accommodation to a new education system, in the case of those who emigrated, or the lack of the supervision by an adult person, in the case of those who remained at home), but also in their psycho-affective evolution.

A higher frequency of the depressive disorders can also be noticed in the case of children living abroad. The effects of parents' migration on the children remaining at home depends, firstly, on the period of migration, but their intensity cannot be measured or assessed as long as the process is in progress. Therefore, the negative implications of migration on the next generations may be correctly assessed after several decades and at that time it will be too late to be eradicated.

• **Deterioration of the relationship between children and the parent remaining at home**. Cases presented by Romanian mass-media, more and more numerous, in the last years, revealed that the emigration of one of the parents led to a gradual deterioration of the relationship between the children and the parent remaining at home. This fact has important implications on the future psycho-affective development of the children and on their emotional stability.

• **The lack of a parental model that should guide children towards stable life conceptions and values**. Children socialization is affected when they are left exclusively in their grandparents care.

3.2 Effects on Family's Cohesion and on Relationships between Spouses

There are not few cases when migration led to the divorce of the couples. Sometimes, migration led to divorce; in other cases, migration appears as a survival strategy after divorce. In the first case, we have to consider that migration leads to the weakening of the relationship within the family, either as a consequence of physical distance between spouses, or as a result of the difficulties inherent to migration. Especially when migration lasts more years, emigrant parent is under the risk of becoming depressed. On the other hand, the parent remaining at home, facing difficulties related to family's tasks, now resting entirely on his or her shoulders, may consider divorce a feasible solution followed, perhaps, by a new marriage.

The second hypothesis is motivated by the need to gain the financial resources necessary to sustain the family by a single working person. Nevertheless, this situation appears especially when the parent who takes care of children can rely on the support of the extended family (grandparents or other relatives).

3.3 The Impact of Emigration on Romanian Labor Market

Labor force's emigration in a period of sustained economic growth, registered during the last years, has created a deficit in the labor force for some economy sectors, such as construction, health, financial services and agriculture. This deficit jeopardizes the infrastructure projects in progress. According to the governor of The National Bank of Romania, Mugur Isărescu, a year after joining the European Union, Romania succeeded in attracting only 440 million Euros, respectively 21% from the total amount of money put at its disposal by the European Union. From that amount, 32% represented structural and cohesion funds and only 3% were for agriculture and rural development. The same indicator in the case of the Czech Republic was 41% in the joining year, in Poland was 42%, in Slovakia 41% and in Hungary 42% – consequently, approximately double by comparison with Romania.

According to official data, between 01.01.2007 and 31.08.2010, Romania succeeded to attract about one billion Euro from European funds, which represents almost 20% from the money allocated between 2007 and 2009 or approximately 12% from the funds allocated to Romania for 2007-2010 period.

At present, Romania contributes to the European funds with higher amounts of money than it succeeds in attracting, a fact that reflects the major macroeconomic lack of balance. If the process of accessing the European funds will not be accelerated, Romania will remain a poorly developed country, a net contributor to the European budget.

In full process of economic growth, human capital plays a crucial role in ensuring the economic and labor productivity growth. Romania is facing a problem of competitiveness which has its roots in the low level of qualification of its labor force. In the last years, this indicator has been increasing, but insufficiently, from 27.9% in 2000 from the



Figure no. 1 – Population of Romania: 1990 – 2010 (in millions of persons)
Source: National Institute of Statistics.

average productivity at the level of EU-25 to 35.3% in 2004[7]. World Competitiveness Yearbook placed Romania on 54 from the 58 economies analysed[8]. Even big transnational companies operating in Romania are facing this problem. Productivity per employee inside the branches of the main international companies is, currently, up to six times lower than that of the group level. The low degree of automation and the lack of mobility of the labor force are the main causes for these major differences. Most of the companies base their strategies on reducing the costs, but not on recruiting the adequate labor force.

Unfortunately, it cannot be counted too much on the return of Romanian people working abroad, despite the fact that, at the beginning of the 2009, it was assessed that approximately 100,000 people were to come back in Romania from Spain, because of the global financial crisis; this fact did not happen, Romanians preferring to remain in Spain, even with their income severely reduced, for a furlough pay of 800 - 1.000 Euros. At present, from these 276,216 Romanians paying contributions to the social insurances system in Spain (the largest number of foreign people paying contributions to the social assurance system in this country), 71,000 receive unemployment income. It is less probable that they will return to Romania in large numbers, if the domestic economic situation will not improve, because they have been in Spain for a long time and they already know this place where, unlike in Romania, there is stability and economic predictability.

3.4 Romanian Emigration's Impact on the Demographic Field

A country's development cannot be imagined and analyzed excluding an element that is defining for every country: its population. From the beginning of modern times, there was a close relation between the increase in population and the political affirmation of a state, population being the only safe capital[9]. On the other hand, the dynamics of the emigrational flows cannot be analyzed without knowing the evolution trends of the population.

Two major demographic evolutions characterize the population of Romania nowadays: its decline in absolute number and external migration. While in 1990, Romania's population was 23.2 million persons, on January the 1[st] *2010 Romania's population was of 21.462 million persons (NIS), and in October 20111, it was estimated at 19 million persons[10]. Consequently, in the period 1990 - 2010, Romania has lost 1.738 million persons (Fig. 1), that is* 7.4% from the total population registered in 1990 (Fig.1). The **depopulation trend** will continue in Romania on the medium and long term. Euromonitor estimations show that the demographic decline of Romania will continue and the current projections referring to 2050 suggest a demographic matrix completely different from the



Figure no. 2 – Components of Romanian population's decrease, 1991 - 2010
Source: Author's calculations, based on the data from Romania Statistical Yearbook 2011

current one, in which retired persons will represent more than half of Romania's population[11].

Migration contribution to the dynamics of the total population and to the labour potential in Romania can also be made evident through the comparative and combined analysis of natural and migratory growth.

Officially registered migration represents 10.5% from the shrunken population, the rest being caused by the natural negative growth (31.5%) and unregistered external migration (58%) (see Figure no. 2). The decline registered at present can be attributed to birth rate's diminishing and, up to a point, to longevity's decline. Birth rate's decrease can be understood in relation with the economic sever transition process that the country passed through for approximately a decade. Longevity's decline can be regarded in relation with the low level of living standard and with poverty. As far as the birth rate is concerned, we have to emphasize that its decline has started even before 1990. Thus, while in 1970, in Romania were registered annually 20 live births at 1,000 persons, in the '80s the same ratio was of 15 for 1,000 persons and in the '90s there were registered 10 live births at 1,000 persons.

Another important aspect of demographic nature, which cannot be ignored when someone estimates the costs of the definitive migration, is fertile women's emigration. The loss of human potential is higher in women's case. The younger they are, the more children they may have, but they are born and/or raised abroad.

It can be assessed that the demographic decline that lasts for two decades (caused by the natural diminishing population and the external emigration), the ageing population as a result of the diminishing fertility ratio, the increase of life expectancy and the emigration of an important part of the young population have led to an accumulation of a high negative potential for the Romanian nation as a result of the deterioration of its entire demographic construction.

4. Implications of Romanians' Emigration in the Political Field

Romanians' migration is beneficial not only to themselves or to their country, but also to the societies receiving them. In some fields of activity, their contribution is really substantial. Romanian emigrants' contribution is officially recognized, especially in those countries where their number is significant. In a report of Caritas[12] organization, published in 2008 (cited by Hotnews), it is showed that Romanians working in Italy contribute with 1.2% to Italy's GDP.

"Romanian immigrants are a gift for the Spanish society and a motor for the progress of its economy, because they are very well educated, hard working and learn Spanish language quite quickly", stated Lucia Figar[13], adviser on immigration issue for the community of Madrid.

Despite this positive impact, we have witnessed, especially in the last two years, to an extremely aggressive media campaign in the countries of destination towards the Romanian immigrants. A combination of issues having migration as a central topic ("migration and labor market", „migration and organized crime", „security and migration") held the headlines of more publications in these countries. This fact has amplified frustration, hostility and xenophobic feelings of some segments of the population in these countries towards Romanian immigrants, existing the risk for these attacks to change/shape the political agenda of the governments in these countries, especially in the current context characterized by the global economic and financial crisis which is severely affecting the safety of jobs and the social security system in the countries where Romanians have emigrated.

All these perceptions and attitudes have a direct connection with the political evolutions at the continental level in the last years, more precisely with the ascendance to power in various countries in Western and Northern Europe, of extreme right parties (traditionally, anti-immigration), some of them having representatives in the European Parliament (EP). Thus, in Denmark, Danish Popular Party gained two seats in EP, in Finland, Perussuomalaiset offered European Union the first extremist deputy, in Greece, LAOS party, led by the radical journalist Georgios Karatzaferis, has two representatives in the EP, in Italy, the Northern League, an anti-immigrants party gained eight seats in the EP (the situation of the extreme right parties in Italy is more difficult to assess, because of the fact that other two parties post and neo-fascist, led by Gianfanco Fini and Alessandra Mussolini, merged in 2009 with the Northern League), the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands gained four seats in the EP, in Austria, a party with the same name gained four representatives in the EP and in France, the current president, Nicolas Sarkozy, won the presidential elections using an anti-immigration rhetoric.

In their vast majority, negative perceptions that have taken shape in the course of time in Western societies were proven to be false. In order to give only one example, the fear of the Western people that the Romanians workers "will invade" the labor markets in these states did not come true. In a report of the Central Bank of Italy, delivered to mass-media in August 2009, it is said that the increasing number of Romanian immigrants in the Peninsula did not lead to the reduction of the number of jobs among Italians; conversely, it has increased the number of jobs for Italians having higher qualifications. In the same report, it is said that unemployment rate registered among Romanian immigrants in Italy is lower than among the Italians and the salary level for Romanians represents approximately 50-60% from that of the Italians, for the same activity carried out.

German researchers from the Institute for the Study of Future and those from Economics Research Institute consider that the German authorities' decision to maintain, even partially, restrictions regarding Romanian workers access on the Germany labour market[14] is a mistake that will negatively affect German economy, underlying, at the same time, that countries being first to open their boundaries after the European Union enlargement in 2004 were those that gained greater benefits from international migration.

Western states are facing structural problems on labor markets, demographic decline, but also a lack of sufficient and adequate labor force, from the perspective of the demand on the labor markets in the conditions of the intensification of the global competition. That is why the attitude of these states seems to be difficult to understand. If we are to refer only to Romanian illegal emigrants in Italy, around 95% of them have a job (according to the executive secretary of the Romanian Party in Italy), which makes their forced expulsion to have a substantial impact on Italian labor market, because of the large number of Romanians being in this situation.

The inability of the governments of these countries to identify solutions to these problems has determined them to search for a scapegoat. In this sense, immigrants represented an easy target, especially because they cannot defend themselves in these societies. Moreover, identifying them as a source of the many problems in these societies offers an important advantage – that of fuelling the social cohesion of these societies, by replacing the old enemy represented by the communist ideology with a new one, situated of course, we can say, outside these societies. And if this scapegoat comes from Romania, an Eastern and orthodox country, having different values than those of the European family, a country where many "strange" things occur, then this makes things even easier for these societies.

All these measures have fuelled the negative feelings and perceptions towards Romanians, with unfavorable consequences for their integration into the destination societies and for their working and living conditions in these countries.

But not only the negative media companies launched by different publications in Western countries have contributed to the formation of an unfavorable image of Romania, but also Romanian publications that permanently put the spotlight on issues related to poverty, corruption, inadequate living conditions inside Romania (without proposing feasible solutions for these problems), creating, thus, and insisting on alleged differences between Romania and other countries on the continent. We have often placed ourselves out of Europe, without understanding what being in Europe really meant. Romanian publications have often presented the difficulties faced by Romanian emigrants in darker colors than those from Western countries.

Instead, Romanian mass-media turns a blind eye almost completely to the success stories of Romanian emigrants – an aspect that would mitigate the experience, undoubtedly difficult, of their migration.

At individual level, we let ourselves to be the victims of manipulation too easily and Romanian state's institutions do not do all what they have to and can do in order to remediate the situation. Romanian emigrants are those that have to face on their own this negative and sometimes even hostile perception from Western societies because migration represents the field where the perceptions about others is formed, strengthened, discovered and accepted.

In this sense, it is important to mention the fact that at the beginning of the '90s, Western countries faced a wave of applicants for asylum and illegal immigrants from Romania, as well as from other former communist countries, among which there was a large number of Rroma ethnics. Because of the large number of those coming from Romania (in Italy, for instance, the non-governmental organization Opera Nomadi estimated their number at 60,000, in February 2009[15]), at public opinion's level, in these countries, there was created the perception that Romanians are, in fact, Rroma citizens.

There were even cases of Rroma ethnics belonging to other European countries, living illegally in the United Kingdom that called themselves Romanian citizens (it is very well known the cases of some Rroma coming from the Czech Republic living in the United Kingdom that declared that they came from Romania – thus, hoping they will benefit for more benevolence from the British citizens, as they came from a poor country).

5. The Importance of Romanian Emigrants' Profile from the Perspective of Romania's Processes of Economic and Social Development

Another aspect that has to be taken into consideration when the nexus between external migration and development is analyzed is the profile of Romanian emigrants because this element, besides the study and understanding of the multiple implications of migration, has to represent a starting point in the elaboration of national policies on migration (starting from the idea that, if the process is beneficial, it has to be stimulated; otherwise, if it triggers negative effects, it has to be restricted in some way, its completely eradication being impossible[16]).

Emigrants' profile refers to some coordinates, such as: age, gender, education, area of residence. Thus, knowing the average age of Romanian emigrants is necessary in elaborating national educational plans, policies related to labor market, pension plans and social security policies.

Knowing Romanian emigrants' gender (male/female) represents a useful tool in projecting the demographic policies and in mitigating the negative effects that migration brings on the affected families. For instance, for children remaining at home, it is important whether the parent at home is his/her mother or father.

The education level of Romanian emigrant is relevant for establishing the deficit of labor force on levels of qualification and for counteracting the negative effects of that deficit, as well as for adjusting the strategies of motivating those that have emigrated to return in Romania.

In the light of the fact that the domestic mobility of labor force is low, the diminishing of the volume of labor force in a region inside Romania, as a result of external migration, has the potential to create serious problems from the perspective of regional development process, the deficit created in this way could not be compensated by relocating the labor force from one region to another or by immigration – the last being modest in the case of Romania.

At the same time, knowing the profile of Romanian emigrants, as well as the contribution of Romanian emigration (often, this contribution is referred to in the financial terms) to the development of the destination societies would serve Romanian authorities in supporting the cause of Romanian emigrants (this involvement is absolutely necessary in the current international context, especially where there is a large number of Romanian emigrants).

Knowing the profile of Romanian emigrant is useful not only to Romania, but also to the destination countries of Romanian migration. Romanian emigrant's belonging to a certain region means that this would put its fingerprint on certain mentalities (for instance, the attitude towards work, the feeling of responsibility, the entrepreneurial spirit etc.). These aspects are of real interest for the destination countries, but they also have implications on the behavior of the emigrant when he or she comes back to Romania. Current data reveal that the structure of permanent emigration flows is dominated by the persons aged between 26 and 40 years old (more than 50.5% in 2008), most of them, female (approximately 65% in 2008), with high school or post high school education (42.5% in 2008), although recently, a significant ratio has been represented by persons graduating universities (33% in 2008). In the last decade, gifted young people left Romania even before finishing high school[17].

Emigration of skilled persons represents a huge loss of human capital that cannot be compensated by the remittances of those who emigrated. High-skilled persons are probably from those who emigrate on the long term or perhaps definitively. For them, the argument related to salary (that has increased in the last years) is not enough to persuade them to come back to Romania, a range of other factors – such as the quality of health system, that of education and public administration (corruption etc.) – being also of equal importance. Apart from the fact that the substantial investment the Romanian state has made in the education and training of these persons cannot be retrieved anymore, it cannot be accounted for their contribution to the general development of the country[18]. The phenomenon is all the more worrying as keeping in the country the gifted young people remains a problem without solutions, as long as national economy does not offer attractive alternatives.

In the context of globalization, knowledge has become a differentiating factor on the international labor market and skilled labor force has become a rare element on this market, compared to the relative abundance of capital and unskilled labor force. For developing countries, such as Romania, this is an important aspect because on the one hand, the mobility of the financial flows abroad offers opportunities for the development of their economies, and, on the other hand, the volatility of these economies and the possibility to be used in speculative actions (for instance, to attack the national currency) is increasing – that is a real threat for their stability and for employment level of labor force in that country.

Conclusions

There is a biunique relation between migration and development. If migration is well managed, it can be a useful tool for development and development, at its turn, can influence the dynamics and structure of migration. For this reason, and taking into consideration that in the future migration will imply, in its largest proportion, the movement of the people from the developing to developed countries, the correct understanding of the relation between migration and development is essential not only for managing migration, but also for sustainable development at the global level.

As we emphasized in this paper, Romanians' external migration has turned out to be a phenomenon with genuine positive consequences. But we believe that the benefits of the process are rather partial and only on short term. Negative effects induced by migration on Romanian labor market, corroborated with the constant demographic decline after 1990, represent serious drawbacks on the long term country's development.

An analysis of the consequences of Romanians' external migration from an economic perspective – under the aspect of the opportunity cost (that is what Romania would have gained benefiting from its entire labor force, but that it was not able to use because of external migration) – reveals that the advantages gained on short term will not be compensated by the loss on the long run. Remittances of the Romanian emigrants, the main benefit of Romanians' external migration, should not be considered a safe long term flow of income, as they depend at a large extent on factors that Romanian state cannot control, such as the dynamics of the economies in the destination countries and the future policies of these countries in the field of migration. In special conditions, as the current global financial crisis is, the volume of these remittances is severely affected.

As in the case of other processes related to development, in the case of migration, things should be regarded with shades of difference, without exaggerations from one side or another of the costs-benefits balance. Most probably, the solution has to aim at stimulating some segments/types of migration, others being preferably to be reduced (in the first place, skilled persons' migration).

The development of Romanian society will depend, mainly, on the stock of human capital the country will succeed not only to create, but also to maintain in the national economy. The massive emigration of the Romanian labor force makes the human capital stock of the country to be volatile. Nevertheless, this volatility is lower than that of the financial capital. Therefore, investments in human capital are more stable and, in the course of time, they generate safer and better profits than attracting foreign direct investments. Moreover, human capital acts as a magnet for foreign companies that decide to delocalize their activities in the countries where there is skilled and abundant labor force. Consequently, it is not necessary to search for foreign capital in order to bring it into Romanian economy, as it will come anyway where there are favorable conditions for a good profit. The increasing labor productivity, the abundance of the experts and the low cost of the labor force represent favorable arguments for such a profit.

For Romania, cost/benefit ratio resulting from external migration depends mainly on the level of education of those who emigrate, especially between those who have university degrees and the unskilled ones.

Present studies indicate that developed European countries will need foreign labor force in order to maintain the social insurance and pension systems feasible. In these conditions, it is quite possible that the adjustment of the policies in the field of labor market and immigration in these countries (which seems to be inevitable) to be aimed at attracting young persons from poorer countries on the continent (this solution being more desirable than that of recruiting persons coming from areas associated with extremism) – and that not only for economic growth reason, but also as a demographic tool. Such a scenario would have a profound negative impact on developing countries on the continent, such as Romania – an aspect that should not continue to be decried.

NOTES:

1 There were formulated various estimations regarding the number of Romanians who emigrated, most of those around the figure of 2.5 millions. Catholic charity Caritas in Italy estimates (2010) the number of Romanian immigrants in EU member states is estimated to be 2.3 million, most of them – 80 per cent – in Italy and Spain.

2 Joshua GOLDSTEIN, Jon C. PEVEHOUSE, *Relatii internationale*, Polirom Publishinghouse, 2007, p. 645.

3 Sursa: World Bank, *Migration and remmitances*, 2011, Washington D.C..

4 *Ziarul financiar*, 24th October 2007.

5 Alexandra DELCEA, *International migration and remittances*, Paralela 45 Publishinghouse, Bucharest, p. 109.

6 Corneliu IATU, *Les implications des tendances démographiques en Roumanie postrévolutionnaire*, XLIIIème colloque de l'ASRDLF, Grenoble-Chambéry, 11-13 Juillet 2007.

7 *Sectorial Operational Program The increase of economic competitively – 2nd Version*, Ministry of Economy, November 2006, http://www.minind.ro/fonduri_structurale/POS_CCE_final_2_15_12_06.pdf.

8 Anuarul Competitivității Mondiale reprezintă o analiză a competitivității a 58 de economii, folosind 327 de criterii. Este perceput ca o autoritate în lumea economică; se publică neîntrerupt, începând din anul 1989.

9 Vasile S. CUCU, *Fragmente din geopolitica României*, Transversal Publishinghouse, Târgoviște, 2007, p. 147.

10 According to the preliminary results of the Populationd and Household Census, organized in 20-31.10.2011.

11 Vasile S. CUCU, quoted work, p. 149.

12 Evenimentul zilei daily newspaper, 13 June 2008.

13 http://www.presa-zilei.ro/stire/884/romani-spania.html.

14 At present, Germany practices a partial liberalisation of the labour market for the Romanian workers, favorizing especially those highly skilled.

15 *Immigrant crime poisons Italy-Romania relations,* http://www.romanianewswatch.com/2009/02/immigrant-crime-poisons-italy-romania.html.

16 For a detailed analysis on Romanian emigrants' profile, see Silviu NEGUȚ, Ionel STOICA, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, *Est-ce qu'il y a un modèle de la migration roumaine?*, în *Processi di globalizzazione ed equilibri demografici*, editori Luigi Di COMITE, Marisa A. VALLERI, Stefania GIRONE, Cacucci EDITORE, Quaderni del Dipartimento per lo studio delle Società mediterranee, Bari, 2010, pp. 191-216.

17 Silviu NEGUȚ, Valeriu RUSU, Anca DUMITRESCU, *The exodus of the labor force from the perspective of Romanian society*, vol. *Science Policy, Mobility and Brain Drain*, Leeds, United Kingdom, July 2003, pp.42-54.

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THE DECISION PROCESS OF COMBAT HELICOPTERS CREW IN AFGHANISTAN HYBRID THREATS ENVIRONMENT

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The following article dwells on the decision process of combat helicopter crew during combat actions conducted in a hybrid threats environment in Afghanistan. The hybrid threats environment gives necessary knowledge which could be used in future military activities, especially during the flight of combat helicopters where danger is a factor to be considered.

The analysis of the behavioural reactions of the combat helicopter crew helps us identify the human errors which may occur while conducting combat operations in a hybrid threats environment. This is why the combat helicopter crew is a good indicator of reliability in a systematic evaluation of factors affecting pilots and flight engineers.

Key-words: decision process; hybrid threats; human factors; combat helicopter crew.

Introduction

This article presents an analysis of threats caused by terrorist groups. The analysis is based on evidences and experiences from the lost missions carried out by the helicopters of the Polish Independent Air Group in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2009.

Hybrid threats are of great importance when they are analysed in relation with the reliability and motivation factors which occur during the decision process of the combat helicopters crews. For instance, the combat misisons conducted in a hybrid threats environment give an opportunity to enhance the motivation factor – a component of the decision process of the combat helicopter crew, – which is a relatively permanent or long-term value which contributes to the enhancement of the crew's overall flight experience. The analysis of the reliability of a combat helicopter crew is an important factor which helps identify the human errors. The causes as well as the related effects of the human errors can be identified during combat misions in a hybrid threats environment. The combat helicopter crew reliability analysis helps in a systematic evaluation of factors affecting pilots, co-pilots, flight engineers and other aviation personnel.

Military conflicts bring limitations to the understanding of a variety of combat helicopter crew activities. This is why in the modern warfare, with different demands, there is a choice of procedures used in a conventional war and war against terrorism, as it can be seen in Figure no. 1.

While planning the flight mission and simultaneously delivering feedback information, the combat helicopter crew has to rapidly make correct decisions to counter a wide spectrum of threats.

Multimodal dangerous situations are often defined as hybrid threats, which are changed by irregular and traditional conflicts. This is why

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

Figure no.1 Balancing the modern warfare
Source: Hoffman Frank G., Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, Strategic Forum no. 240, April 2009.

the air missions of combat helicopters in a hybrid threats environment should be prepared and started with the analysis of readiness and risk implications. The operational risk assessment must include combat helicopter crew's decision process. Another important thing is that combat helicopter most likely presents a unique combination of flight tactics including the genetic heritage and experience of aviation crew in a strategic environment (e.g. terrorism, selective strike or counter-insurgency). The "hybrid threats" construct appears to be an important value in time, as it:

- describes the evolving character of a conflict better than counter-insurgency,
- challenges current "conventional" (only schematic military operation) thinking which develops intellectual abilities of military members who conduct an operation,
- highlights the true granularity or breadth of human conflict spectrum,
- raises the awareness of potential risks and related costs presented by the various options in the ongoing debate between threats and the relative value of military potential.[1]

The hybrid threats create room for the development of new capabilities for a range of military air operations conducted by combat helicopter crews.

1. Combat helicopter crew decision loop in hybrid threats environment

The decision loop philosophy of the combat helicopter crew offers the best solution for the analysis of aircraft effectiveness during flights in hybrid threats environments. The philosophy is to influence on the changes in air equipment which already exist in helicopters.[2]

Modern knowledge and experience are used to provide interpretation of crews' behaviours. Above all, the air operation should include a model of crew decision loop which allows:

- a large growth in mission potential,
- progressive involvement of air tactics,
- plan constraint and strategy choices,
- integration of equipment selected by pilots and crew,
- experiences for real and low risk aviation tasks,
- cooperation during training, maintenance and operations of future air missions.

Such model, above all, will be able to assure an effective decision making process and expected behaviour of a crew during combat flight.

The decision process of pilots (crews) imposes unique elements on helicopter survivability and airworthiness during flight missions. Here are problems that a helicopter crew may face:

- requirements for different cockpit configuration,
- interface compatible with other systems,
- correct crew training elements (level of training, qualifications etc.),
- prophylaxis of crew,
- professional crew schedules.

Another aspect of the decision process of the helicopter crew is its dependence on the type of flight. When considering different types of helicopter flight, one will notice significant differences in the amount of crews' stress during duty periods. For instance, while considering the difference in manoeuvre capabilities of helicopters,

Type of flight	Multiplier
Day	1.0
Day contour	1.3
Instrument flight	1.4
Night flight	1.4
Day nap of the earth (NOE)	1.6
Night terrain flight	2.1
Night flight with night vision devices (goggle)	2.3

Table no. 1 Crew Endurance Guide
Source: Whyte G., Fatal Traps for Helicopter Pilots, New Zealand, Reed publishing, 2003

it should be remembered that 1.6 hours of standard daily flight duty is equal to 1 hour of nap-of-the-earth flight (NOE). Also, 2.3 hours of standard flight is equivalent to 1 hour of night flight performed with vision goggles. That is why these multipliers are used to determine the maximum flight time by a helicopter, as it can be seen in table.1. It is very important to determine crews' workload and performance during duty period and leave them 24 hours for proper rest.

Keeping in mind the success of a flight mission conducted in a hybrid threats environment, the decision loop should support activities of crews involved in the operation process (fig.2). Above all, the decision loop describes their physical condition factors (e.g. genetic heritage, acquiring knowledge etc.) in order to take an immediate and correct decision and completely fulfil a given task.

All components of this loop relate to: requirements, analysis of intention, decisions and activities correlated with habits, behaviours and reactions.

The requirements are applicable to the collection of information on hybrid threats. The combat helicopter crew has to be capable of adapting itself to unpredictable circumstances created by hybrid threats during flight mission. The analysis of intention related to genetic heritage, cultural conditions, experience and intellectual developments gives the action plan an additional element in the decision-making process of helicopter crew. The crew's decision is a final condition of the realization of definite activities.

Another aspect of the team's activity, which must be considered to achieve success in military tasks and operations, is feedback information which is a return message about an interactive development within the context of events. The feedback information is the recognition of a situation between the decision process for activities and the requirements for analysis of crew intention. To sum up, the decision loop shows the process of forecasting ways of behaviour in a wide spectrum of war against terrorism.

2. The combat helicopter as a component of stabilization operations conducted in a hybrid threats environment

Stabilization operations include all the activities of an operational situation in the conflict zone where hybrid threats are present. Unfortunately, in the conflict zone with hybrid threats, the range of activities is not clearly stated in what regards the achievement of peace.

The creation of a stabilization missions is understood as a designed action with dangerous situations. In difficult cases, these actions should be supported by useful information about the specific conflict.[3]

In order to prepare professional air force operations, all threats must be recognized within a conflict zone. Stabilization missions are also shaped by political procedures and civil-military cooperation in accordance with international law.[4]

The missions and tasks conducted by combat helicopters during stabilization operations may include:

- humanitarian aid,
- support for governmental rules,



Figure no. 2 Crew decision loop in hybrid threats
Source: Augustyn S., Decision Model for Needs Increase of Combat Helicopter Survivability, Warsaw, National Defence University, 2009

- support for counter-insurgency,
- selective strikes against terrorist elements,
- evacuation of non-combatants (especially children and the elderly),
- defence of adjacent friendly countries,
- arms control,
- peacekeeping operations,
- show of force (Figure no. 3).

One method of achieving political stabilization through the use of combat helicopters is by stabilization operations which should be analyzed through the temporary air operations which reduce the number of threats (e.g. terrorist acts, selective strikes or counter-insurgency).

These facts certainly create negative economic and political situations. Consequently, a stabilization operation in a hybrid threats environment requires well-qualified members of combat helicopters crews; consequently the same applies to the ground personnel. It is also necessary to create special procedures in air tactic through the improvement of training programs. That is why the combat helicopter crew readiness and effectiveness should be used by the rational service and management of hardware which belong to aviation infrastructure. All the maintenance procedures of aircraft equipment should be created at the level of operational and functional tasks. These tasks allow the execution of certain air missions with available resources by using new technology.

Another very important element is to perform a roster of combat helicopter crew readiness and strike response during the occurrence of hazardous situations. That is why the performance of a combat helicopter crew is constrained by:

- knowledge of the flight area within a range of at least 150 km from the airport to base, its landmarks, bodies of water, terrain and airport network,
- designing of a complete personal navigation equipment,
- knowledge of survival methods,
- providing medical first aid,
- knowledge of the current state of air operations in the respective area and weather,
- observation of the rules of flight safety while performing tasks.



Figure no. 3 Frequency of combat helicopters use in hybrid threats
Source: Hoffman Frank G., Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, Strategic Forum no. 240, April 2009

During an accident, combat helicopter crews should gather information about:

- specificity of the location of the accident;
- map analysis of the accident area;

The crew should also:

- contact the commander of a convoy by means of radio communication,
- determine the mental and/or physical condition of the victims,
- determine the extent of the assistance needed,
- assess the conditions and the possibility of landing near the accident site,
- provide assistance to the victims, report directly to the operations commander.

The standard procedure implies that combat helicopter crews have sufficient training before they set out for stabilization missions. The training should cover radio communications and knowledge of procedures, which are necessary for guidance of combat helicopter flights during convoy escorts in order to create protection against terrorist threats. During stabilization missions, combat helicopter crews should also be familiar with the special conditions of flights under new and unpredictable circumstances.

In addition, if helicopter crews get employed in a rapid reaction group, they can undergo training with multi-ethnic soldiers having different combat experience and skills that must be shared with the crews in order to provide a high level of security for convoys and support of combat operations. That is why the advantage of using combat helicopters in stabilization missions is an efficient activity for all peace support operations.

Open terrain brings the helicopter crew in dangerous situation created by terrorist groups, whereas in urban areas different unpredictable situations may occur. The combat helicopters have lower chances of survival at a time of an attack launched by guerrillas because the camouflage has grown dramatically in order to arise difficulties with recognition of combat helicopters, therefore, if possible, helicopters should avoid flying within dense urban areas.

3. Lessons learnt from the use of combat helicopters of the Polish Air Force during activities in Afghanistan from 2008 till 2009

The analysis of hybrid threats in order to prepare the Polish combat helicopter group for the mission in Afghanistan was based also on the experience of the Soviet troops' activities from 1979 to 1989.

During their military operation in Afghanistan, the Soviets heavily employed air assets, especially combat helicopters. It was important that during Afghan operations the Soviets used helicopters

The altitude above ground level [m]	The relative amount of combat helicopter's damages [%]
0 - 200	22-24
200 - 400	8 - 10
400 - 600	16-18
600 - 800	14-16
800 - 1000	12-14
1000 - 1200	10-12
1200 - 1400	3 - 5
1400 - 1600	1 - 3
1600 - 1800	2 - 4
1800 - 2000	2 - 4

Table no. 2 The relative percentage amount of combat helicopter's damage depending on the altitude
Source: Wołodko A. and Goryszkow W. Helicopter in Afghanistan. Moscow, 1993, p. 50

of the same type: Mi-24 (Hind) and Mi-17 (Hip) also known as upgraded Mi-8 MT. Therefore, the Soviet experience in air operations in Afghanistan is of a great value because it provides a particular focus on how to use aviation assets in specific Afghan context against rebels armed with anti-aircraft weapons.

The study "Helicopters in Afghanistan"[5] concludes that Mujaheddins' (Islamic guerrilla fighters) anti-helicopter missiles action depended on the altitude and the type of tasks during these combat air operations. The assault helicopters Mi-24 were the most likely target of rebels' fire during the air support of the ground troops. There was from 5% to 47% cases during convoy escorts and from 25% to 27% of all such incidents. What is more, transportation helicopters Mi-17 were the most vulnerable, the most likely targets of rebels' fire during landings: from 48% to 50% incidents occurred. Almost the entire rebel fire impact on combat helicopters was during the conduct of flight task. In the case of helicopter Mi – 8MT about 87% - 89% of hits occurred during the flight task, and approximately 4% - 6% hits occurred during take-offs and landings.

Table no. 2 shows the scale of combat helicopter's damage, depending on the altitude.

The Soviet experience from the use of combat helicopters in Afghanistan indicates that most dangerous rebel fire occurred during flights at altitudes up to 200 m above ground level (22% -24%) and between 400 m and 600 m (16% - 18%).

Very interesting from the point of view of the pilot (crew) decision process in hybrid threats is the case analysis of hits upon a helicopter depending on:

- the stage of the attack on the target,
- the number of fired missiles,
- the influence of major types of damage on the safety system.

For the attack helicopters Mi – 24, the greatest number of hits were recorded during:

- the first direct attack on the target (from 75 to 77 hits),
- the subsequent attacks on the target (from 52 to 54 hits),
- the fire from below and rear (from 48 to 50 hits).

Whereas for transportation helicopters Mi – 8MT most hits were recorded during:

- the subsequent approaches to target (from 73 to 75 hits),
- the first approach to target (from 53 to 55 hits).

In analysing the aforementioned types of helicopters, there can be seen different level of hits quality which depends on the approach to the target, e.g. phase of military activity or approach sequence to the target. A database of sequences approaches to the target with information about how, why and where dangerous attacks occurred allows avoiding further losses in the future. Each Soviet helicopter operation in Afghanistan reported 50% frequency of being hit by one bullet, about 25% of them with two bullets and 12% rate of being hit by several bullets. The Soviet experience also shows most failures caused by enemy fire were, in the following order, in:

- main rotors,
- tail rotors,
- turbine engines,
- mechanical, structural elements of the airframe,
- gear box,
- radio-electronic elements.

The main active mujaheddin's warfare means consisted of multi-calibre sets of anti-aircraft machine guns, grenade launchers and mines and "ground-air" missiles. It should be especially emphasized that in the first half of the period of combat operations by the Soviet Army at the time in Afghanistan, the predominant warfare means consisted of small or big calibre guns, especially anti combat helicopter missiles.

Soviet Force's real tactics of combat helicopters was adapted and developed based on previous experiences. Against combat helicopters the enemy used the following weapons:

- anti-aircraft missiles,
- anti-aircraft artillery fire,
- other anti-aircraft means e.g. small arms, IED (Improvised Explosive Device) etc.[6]

This is why the aviation activities in the framework of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) are difficult to determine. The most common forms of the interaction which are against combat helicopters were applicable by shooting small weapons (kbkAK, PK-7, 62mm) and RPG sets (anti-tank weapon), however the multi-calibre machine guns were a typical kind of the weapons commonly used.[7]

In this analyzed period, coalition forces' helicopters were hit by "ground-air" missiles (Arrow, Needle, Stinger, NH - 5) as one of the forms of hybrid threats. Despite the absence of such situations from 2008 to 2009, which was related to shooting of missiles against combat helicopters in Afghanistan, these situations could reoccur. Improvised explosive devices are still used as a widespread impact in Mujaheddin's warfare.

The IEDs were the biggest threat for coalition troops during stabilization tasks and also for the combat helicopters. The rebels' attacks were quite often against moving convoys of vehicles and aircraft e.g. QRF (Quick Reaction Force), CAS (Confined Area Search) or MEDEVAC (Medical Evacuation). Consequently, IEDs have been placed in the most convenient locations for possible landings of helicopters. Due to IEDs, the US Air Force lost one MEDEVAC helicopter. There were also a lot of situations related to attempts to destroy landing areas for combat helicopters.

Tactics of the Afghan rebels against the helicopters were based on lessons learnt during the war with the former Soviet Union. The biggest problem was the impact of the rebel fire on combat helicopters at the moment of landing by night. As the coalition forces have NVG (Night Vision Goggle) this gave them a higher level of safety against a potential enemy attack. In the period from 2008-2009, combat helicopters avoided the greatest hybrid threats by using the tactics of an Independent Air Group. Combat helicopters crews conducted independent operations by using the shape of terrain during missions at an appropriate altitude, about 300 - 400 m. In order to use manoeuvres against anti-aircraft artillery and anti-missiles rockets, specific attention was paid to the proper selection of the helicopter flight manoeuvre.

Flight at low altitudes was the most effective way of avoiding warfare losses by combat helicopters in Afghanistan in the years 2008 – 2009. Helicopter activities provided good protection for ground forces and for creating tactic manoeuvres of combat helicopters to avoid fire of anti-aircraft artillery, helicopter crew made continuous planning of their mission during the entire flight over the hostile territory including dangerous terrain conditions like obstacles, buildings. One effective way was by reducing the altitude in the terrain to obtain the maximum effectiveness of helicopter. The flight of a combat helicopter was carried out by means of a "snake" manoeuvre with maximum speed and periodic changes of altitude.[8]

Analyzing combat helicopters Mi-24 and Mi-17 during ISAF operation, as well as their own experience resulting from the galvanizing impact (what means arousing the awareness or action) of terrorist groups on the Polish air combat mission, Polish soldiers were intended to ensure safe execution of tasks by the helicopters of the Independent Air Group.

From 2008 till 2009, a series of events took place; it was recommended to take in considera-tion operations carried out by helicopters (2xMi17, 1xMi-24) on the road between Ghazni and Sharan.

The Polish crew of a helicopter patrol recognized a damaged coalition vehicle. They called Polish soldiers for assistance. The helicopter crew decided to land on the ground. After landing, they took on board a wounded soldier in order to transport him to the hospital in Bagram base. During the combat helicopter's take-off the Mi-17 1V was shot at by rebels from nearby buildings. Due to damage of tail rotor blades, this helicopter had to land as soon as possible. In July 2009, during support of an Afghan patrol, a pair of Mi-24 helicopters were fired at by a small enemy group (with about 80 - 120 rounds) from the area of buildings near a village. The helicopters' crew decision was to return to the base of Ghazni because they did not clearly know the situation in regards to the rebel fire. After the return with more coalition ground forces to this dangerous area, there were no rebels left.

Another example is from August 2009, when a pair of Mi-17s performed the task of supporting the Afghan National Army. During the flight, one of helicopters, which was in the far-right hemisphere, noticed an self-propelled grenade fire. After a short briefing on the event, it was decided to abort the task and return to the Ghazni base. In the second event, the pair of Mi-17s was performing the task of supporting a Polish patrol in the district of Ajiristan. During the pick-up of soldiers, these helicopters were shot at by rebels' antitank grenades. After landing, one of these helicopters had several damages in the fuselage. Another event was when the Mi-17 helicopter was shot at by an antitank grenade. At the same time, combat helicopter Mi-24 supported by the second Mi-17 was also shot at with small arms fire. The first helicopter Mi-17 had to take off immediately with anti-grenade shatters on the airframe.

On October 2009, a pair of Mi-24 helicopters were shot at, during flight, by rebels from buildings located approximately 1000 m from the runway near the Ghazni base. Fortunately, the helicopters did not suffer any damage. Another horrible situation was during a combat flight where the crew of a Mi-17 helicopter heard two dull sounds in the airframe. In this case there was no gunfire from the ground. The crew checked the performance of the power plant installation and on-board control systems of this helicopter. The flight values parameters were correct. The crew decided to continue the air mission to the Ghazni base. However, during technical inspection, there was found one gap at the bottom of the cockpit. The bullet pierced the floor and damaged the lower lateral control indicator. This damage consisted of 14 holes of main gear and shrapnel defects of the oil cooler right guard. Moreover, on the left pocket hydraulic block, three shatters and damage of the leather covers of the hydraulic main installation were discovered.

Based on the above events, there could be seen the specific intensity of rebels' military activities, particularly during the summer. This is why the Independent Air Group was prepared for special tactics, including events in real missions e.g. depending on the terrain (the location of landing sites above sea level) or atmospheric conditions (high temperatures, strong winds, large dust storms). Moreover, additional indicators measured the capabilities of Mi-24 and Mi-17 1V helicopters e.g. their maximum range, tactical radius , etc. Especially, when the tactics of terrorist groups were changing frequently, such as the means of their attacks on coalition helicopters e.g. with small arms, heavy machine guns, grenade launchers and portable short-range rocket kits etc.[9] In order to ensure the safety of the helicopters' crews in the IAG (Independent Air Group), the aviation tactics were performed by a pair of helicopters. The tactical group was made up by two Mi-24 helicopters and two Mi-17 1V helicopters. The Mi-24 helicopters served as a combat guard to reduce the risk of attack on Mi-17 1V by rebels. Furthermore, before each of the tasks, the helicopter's crew was informed about the meteorological situation, the enemy's activity areas and current position of allied patrols. In addition, each crew member of a helicopter had to possess skills to conduct surveillance of the airspace and land in the designated sector. Correct recognition of the mission area allowed the performance of tasks in the space air up to 1000 m above ground level.

In order to avoid small arms and anti-tank rebel fire, the combat helicopters had to fly at an altitude no less than 200–300 m above the ground. What is more, these helicopters had to avoid short flights over areas of farm buildings and 2/3 of the sloping mountain-sides. If there was a likelihood of the rebel's use of anti-aircraft weapons (based on reconnaissance data), there existed a selection of routes in this area. Helicopters were using the mode of natural terrain if the flight-profile was not possible to perform. However, helicopter flight routes were planned by using reporting points ACP (Air Check Point). Of course, if flight plans were along the same routes, they were fixed by daytime.

If we consider security departures and landings of helicopters in FOB (Forward Operating Base) Ghazni, it has to be observed that there was continuous monitoring over a range of approximately 25 km by cameras mounted on the aircraft. Moreover, the Mi-17 helicopters which supplied troops in the area of operations were always supported by Mi-24 helicopters. This was very important because the operation area is not safe during the manoeuvre of landing and take-off on the ground. In this case, the Mi-24 combat helicopter manoeuvre connected with the helicopter Mi-17 was created by flight parameters approximately 300 - 500 m and vertical about 100 m. Due to new tactics, the helicopters' crew had continuous observation in order to immediately defend themselves against a possible rebel attack. During flight of combat helicopters, the internal circle manoeuvre near buildings was performed from 50 m to 100 m, while the external circle kept the altitude of 200 – 300 m. For the simultaneous isolation of the enemy in the operation areas, this manoeuvre gave a very good result for executing compartment cover on the ground. This tactic could also be used by helicopters Mi-17 during airlift missions. Under conditions of high temperatures, the best operations of helicopter transport were at night, by using NVG (Night Vision Goggles) to decrease the risk of helicopter destruction by the enemy. Every flight of helicopter was supplied with reinforcement of the strength arrangements of the helicopter's crew in order to reduce their sitting time on the ground near enemy fire.[10]

Before air mission, the commander of helicopter's crew had to reduce the number of passengers or cargo quantity to decrease the maximum take-off weight of helicopter, because the take-off weight correlated with weather conditions which changed every day, especially during flights in the summer time, with high air temperatures between 10.00 - 16.00 hours, local time. Flights of helicopters between sunset and sunrise were performed only with the use of night-vision goggles at the illumination level not less than 25%. This was very important for the safety of combat helicopters, because during the period between dawn /sunrise/ and dusk /sunset, the combat helicopters were very visible by the enemy. Based on practical experience from previous missions including Iraq, the air missions become more effective in combat tasks, as well as in the development of helicopter's crew skills in coalition missions against terrorism. Experiences of previous air mission have given more important information especially for MEDEVAC helicopters' crew to:

- arrange for first aid,
- support of other coalition groups.

Furthermore, the Mi-17 helicopters supplied equipment which was useful for survival and defence against a possible attack e.g. medical supplies, water, food, ammunition and sleeping bags, etc. Allowing for classified information about destroyed equipment by satellite phone or mobile from TOC (Tactical Operation Centre) / IAG (Independent Air Group) the commander of ground force chose the place waiting for the arrival of rescue forces and then soldiers organized a defence against rebels.

At that time, the commander of the helicopter immediately sent necessary information to TOC PTF (Polish Task Force) / IAG for employing the MEDEVAC system. In the case of communications the TOC provided special information for combat helicopters. However, if the terrain and the technical capabilities allowed for a safe landing, the second helicopter Mi-17 picked up the survivors on board.

To sum up, the Independent Air Group made a huge effort for physical training of pilots (crew) of helicopters in the harsh Afghan conditions. The analysis of the hybrid threats shows that the coalition tactics was created by "philosophy" of night flying with the use of night vision sets. The helicopters' crews from the Independent Air Group subsequently changed procedures during flights in Afghanistan. This is a combination among helicopter crew manual skills and procedures of combat mission.[11]

Conclusion

Recently, all over the world there has been an escalation of local wars and terrorism that claim many human lives. The dangerous situations have especially religious or ethnic origins with exceptional fanaticism and cruelty involved. Consequently, states are engaged to combat those threats by main military actions within an alliance or a coalition of organizations and international security activities through the combined different forces. Military actions are often supported by combat helicopters against hybrid threats.

That is why the decision of combat helicopters' crews taken while flying in a hybrid threats environment should be based upon certain assumptions:

1. Contemporary development of physiological characteristics allows creating a system for defining survivability of a helicopter with the decision loop of crew.
2. The proper level of helicopter's resistance is created by the appropriate time in decision process of combat helicopter crew during an air mission.
3. The new approach to air mission analysis of combat helicopter crew influences on development of technology and knowledge, enriching the procedure of aviation tactics during hybrid threats.

The use of combat helicopters is one of the forms of increasing security and morale among the crew and the soldiers of the coalition forces, which results in increasing the opportunities for conducting operational and tactical missions in hybrid threats environment.

NOTES:

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INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN HEALTH CARDS AND THE EUROPEAN LEGAL STANDARDS ON HUMAN RIGHTS[1]

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Biometrical practices represent a post-modern type of slavery in the XXI century, being incompatible with human rights, the rule of law and democracy; these practices mustn't be tolerated by the international community, or by states that are members in international organizations having as main purpose to insure high democratic standards. "Legal" acts emitted by Romanian authorities regarding the introduction of biometric health cards in Romania are incompatible with the provisions of regional fundamental legal instruments, ratified or signed by Romania, as a democratic state. The EU, as well as Romanian authorities, in recommending or imposing some measures, actions, policies or normative acts, must respect not only human rights, the rights of European citizens, regional and international legal instruments, but also the Romanian constitutional provisions.

Key-words: biometry; electronic health cards; patients' rights; confidentiality of medical data; democracy; electronic totalitarianism, European Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Citizens.

1. Incompatibility in Terms of Incidental European Conventions

The group of legislative documents on health cards, analyzed here[2], are incompatible with human rights and fundamental freedoms, as guaranteed including **by a regional legislative instrument, fundamental for the European law, such as the European Convention on Human Rights[3] (ECHR), to which Romania is a party**. In the present case, we see that, instead of specifically observing on national level this defining legal instrument for a democratic state and rule of law, the temporary authorities of the Romanian state agreed to introduce in Romania and for the people living here, a number of provisions that are incompatible with human rights and fundamental freedoms, and therefore with the provisions of ECHR, which legally protects such rights and freedoms in Europe.

Thus, under the Convention, in Article 1, the **States Parties undertake to recognize for any person within their jurisdiction all the rights and freedoms defined in Title I of the Convention**. Therefore, the Romanian state, **before** issuing regulations that (**mandatory or optionally**) introduce biometric practices and documents for persons under its jurisdiction, **should have checked** their compatibility with the human rights, in terms of regional, national and international legal instruments. **Such a verification would have clearly showed a case of incompatibility between biometrics and human rights, rule of law and democratic state**, a situation requiring the strict align-

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ment of the Romanian state to the requirement of complying with *jus cogens, international treaties concerning the protection of human rights and including its own constitution !...*

However, this has not been achieved, and the public authorities of the Romanian state are in a position to have signed and implemented[4] legislative documents clearly violating human rights, abolishing them by their very essence, also in violation of the national, regional and international legal rules protecting them.

Thus, **the right to health of the human person**, conditioned up to abolition by the internal normative acts by which the public authorities issue health cards to persons under their jurisdiction, **is an inherent right derived from the right to life** and conditioning the latter. Thus, art. 2, Title I / ECHR, guaranteeing the right to life of every person and requiring the States Parties to **protect it by law** (not to condition, relativize, affect it in any way by legislative documents and measures taken, in this case, by biometric practices), is implicitly violated. However, **health cards issued under the two internal legislative documents practically lead to the violation of the right to life of persons within the jurisdiction of the Romanian state** because it **conditions** the state healthcare by peoples' **acceptance** of the **health card**,in total contempt of the whole set of principles of international law, as well as the human rights and freedoms, seen in their inter-conditionality (so, not only the violation in its essence of the right to life, intrinsically related to the right to health).

Art. 3/ECHR, banning torture and inhuman or degrading treatments is also violated (in terms of rule of law, democratic state respecting the human person, **imposing** a biometric act to persons belonging to such a type of state **is not admissible**, while **biometrics is a practice specific to the totalitarian state and a police regime, abolishing human rights and fundamental freedoms)**. Biometrics, in terms of the ECHR text, **is perfectly assimilated both to the international legal definition of torture and a degrading, humiliating and inhuman treatment,** whereas **it directly, fully, finally affects, in its essence, both the human dignity and freedom,** that are inherent to the human being, according to all international specific legal documents.

Corroborated with the two articles above, violated by the biometric practice (in this case, biometric health cards issued to persons under the jurisdiction of the Romanian state, **with violation of the principle of non-discrimination in its essence**, by ***imposing a discrimination between such persons on grounds of religion, personal opinion, freedom of conscience),*** we also mention the flagrant violation of Art. 4 and 5 of the Convention. Thus, due to the fact that **biometrics is in its essence a totalitarian practice of monitoring, controlling, surveillance of the human person, abolishing the human dignity and freedom in its essence** - inherent to the human person - it results that **the persons having biometric acts for defining their** (professional, patient, employee, passenger, citizen, etc.) **status with such documents, are persons who lost their status of free and dignified beings**, no longer enjoying all the rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by international documents on human rights in relation to other persons who enjoy all these rights whereas they are not defined by biometric documents.

Such persons, **due to the fact that they are transformed from subjects to objects**, while their freedom, human dignity and their rights as human persons are **essentially** affected, rights which the state and the entire international community (since it defines itself as a democratic, not an *apparently* democratic one) have to respect and not to abolish, **are not free and dignified persons any more, being legally assimilated to slaves** (in terms of these ***pseudo-legislations*** starting to gradually seep their poisonous fumes into the democratic body of the national rules of states, at the beginning of the XXI century, similarly to weeds in a tidy park, with fragrant flowers).

A lawyer of the XXI century should be very careful to thoroughly and promptly punish any attempts of this kind meant to leave unnoticed flagrant violations to the rule of law, democracy and human rights through such pseudo-legislations (i.e., **through false legislative documents, which mimic a compatibility with democracy when in fact they are exactly its opposite**), announcing the dawn of a very dangerous type of electronic totalitarianism as a new kind of enslavement of the human person[5] and putting into question the fundamental pillars of the international, national, European democratic order, at the beginning of the XXI century (with its own proto-forms of slavery and totalitarianisms).

Thus, countries adopting *de facto* or *de jure* biometric practices **violate the principle of discrimination, whereas they treat persons under their jurisdiction as slaves and not as free, worthy people enjoying the plenitude of human rights and fundamental freedoms**. At this point, there is a clear **gap** between biometrics and the obligations of the rule of law, democratic state, not only to respect human rights **but to also consider them as supreme values and to guarantee to all persons** under its jurisdiction their full observance.

The XXI century can easily, inconspicuously introduce **new forms of slavery, specific to an asymmetrical relation of power**, where the human person no longer enjoys the plenitude of human rights and fundamental freedoms and is deprived of these (which is **completely illegal**, in terms of the contemporary international, European legal order), which already shows a behaviour that is specific to a **totalitarian** state.

A post-modern form of slavery in the XXI century is biometrics, so this practice incompatible with the human rights, the rule of law and democracy should not be tolerated by the international community and the Member States within organizations aiming high democratic standards (especially aiming to convert themselves into *providers and models of democracy for countries in other areas*, still in pre-democratic forms or even in forms of totalitarianism specific to the XX century).

The international world is not uniform **but the set of values, principles and legal norms of the international legal community is very clear**, with direct consequences **on the credibility of that state as a democratic state of law and respecting human rights.**

Next, we mention again Art. 5/ECHR, flagrantly violated, and that by issuing health cards, *an article that also establishes, in relation to the right to life, the interdiction of inhuman and degrading treatments, the interdiction of slavery, and human right to freedom and security*, other rights as well, that can not be conditioned, affected or abolished by the States Parties to such a Convention (as we see happening with the Romanian state, through legislative acts introducing biometric documents on persons under their jurisdiction). By these biometric documents and practices, **the exercise of rights and freedoms** of these people (freedom of movement, freedom of thought, conscience, religion, right to protection of the law, right to life, health, etc..) **is unlawfully and undemocratically conditioned by the acceptance of various types of biometric documents** (biometric passports, electronic ID cards, biometric driving licenses, health cards, public transport chip cards issued to specific groups such as war veterans and pensioners and their list goes on).

At the same time, **in relation to the right to health, there is the patient's right to confidentiality in his relationship with his doctor**, a relationship in which neither the state nor any other group of people, media and others **can interfere in any way to access the medical data of the patient.** This right to confidentiality of the patient **is included in the broader right of respect for his private life, including his correspondence[6].**

Also, Art. 9 and Article 10 / ECHR are infringed by the introduction of health cards and other biometric documents in Romania, **as a majority Orthodox state and as a democratic state of law assuming the obligation on constitutional level to respect human rights as supreme values and to guarantee them**. However, this is not actually happening in its territory, **where we meet a series of legislative documents imposing, without citizens' agreement, contrary to their religion and conscience[7], their right to health, freedom and dignity and other human rights and fundamental freedoms, practices and biometric documents.**

Art 9/ECHR protects **any person**'s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion against the illegal behaviour of public authorities, while Art. 10 protects the human person's freedom of expression, considered as fundamental for the functioning of a democratic society and the rule of law. These freedoms **are violated in their letter and spirit,** through the provisions of the legislative documents for the introduction of health cards in Romania, **as a majority Orthodox state, with an Orthodox tradition older than 2000 years**. The introduction of biometric practices in the territory **of such State does not show only bad faith and defiance of the religious senses of the majority population and crass ignorance of the country's national identity of religious type, but moreover shows the non-application of the principle *pacta sunt servanda***, the duly fulfilment and in good faith by the Romanian State of its regional and international commitments.

According to Art. 13, the States Parties recognize to any person whose rights and freedoms recognized by the ECHR were violated, the right to effectively **address a national authority, even when the violation was produced by persons who acted while exercising their official attributions (in this case).** Likewise, any state (defined as contracting party in the Art. 24) is entitled to notify the European Commission of Human Rights, through the General Secretary of the Council of Europe on the violation of human rights (in this case, by the Romanian state introducing biometric practices on persons under its jurisdiction): Art.24/ ECHR.

Also, any NGO, natural person, group of individuals who consider themselves as victims of a violation by the Romanian State, as a State Party to the ECHR, of the rights recognized by that legal instrument (Article 25/Convention), can refer to the Commission, for the violation of such rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR, after terminating the internal means of appeal.

Protocol no. 11 to the Convention (restructuring the control mechanism established by the Convention), establishes **a new Title II** concerning other institution with jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by the States Parties to the Convention: the **European Court of Human Rights**. That Court, under Art. 33, can be **notified by any State Party against the Romanian state**, which is guilty of violating human rights (in this case, by introducing biometric practices in its territory and relating to persons under its jurisdiction). Based on Art. 34 of the Protocol, the Court can be notified not only by states **but also by any natural person, any NGO or group of individuals** who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention and its Protocols (and **the express obligation of States Parties is not to hinder *by any measure the effective exercise* of such right).**

From the Series of European Treaties no. 164[8], we also mention in the case of violation of human rights by the Romanian state authorities, other legal instrument, namely the *Convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human being on the application of biology and medicine*[9], within the Council of Europe.

Thus, by the issuance of health cards, we consider that human freedom and dignity are abolished in their essence, leading to a position of the Romanian state that is **contrary to Art. 1, Chapter 1/Convention**, which mentions the express legal obligation of the States Parties (including the Romanian state) **to protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and to guarantee everyone, without discrimination**, the respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms concerning the application of biology and medicine. Furthermore, the Romanian state is obliged to undertake, within the domestic legislation, the **measures necessary to implement the provisions** of the Convention (**certainly not to violate the rights recognized in the Convention**, dignity and identity of all human beings as the Romanian state authorities do through the legislative documents on health cards). In addition, we should highlight the fact that Art. 1/Convention **links human dignity to the non-discrimination principle and the right to identity of all human beings and respect for their integrity**, which helps us define as accurately and fully as possible the legal content of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the right to health, analyzed in this case, which is clearly violated by the introduction of biometric practices.

The same regional legal instrument to which Romania is party, states in two articles (Art. 2 and Art. 3) the **principle of priority of the human being** (over the sole interest of society or science), which is **a clear legal guarantee to the excesses of science or abuses and temptations of power of the state against the human person (as the biometric practice is).** Article 3 provides the obligation of the States Parties (an obligation that is also breached by the Romanian state through the introduction of biometric health cards) to ensure **equitable access to health care within their jurisdiction**. This is precisely is violated by Title IX of the **health reform law nr.95/2006**, by the draft of **Government Decision** approving the methodological norms for application of the provisions concerning the national social security health card in Title IX - European card and national social security health card in Law 95/2006 on the healthcare reform, with subsequent amendments and completions, and by **two ministerial orders** no. 1105 of 29.12.2010 and no. 1571 of 29.12.2010 in relation to health cards.

These legislative documents introduce **a discrimination among people**, while their access to health care in the state system **is conditioned absolutely illegally** by the acceptance of the health card, **otherwise the person being deprived of his fundamental right to health**, since the Romanian State recognize it **only to the health cardholders to provide them with medical services** (services to which the person is entitled under all legal internal, regional, or international norms concerning his right to health).

Likewise, Article 10, Chapter III of the Convention, **concerning the protection of the private life, related to the patient's right to the confidentiality of his data**, by virtue of a **relationship with his doctor**, considered as "**personal**", **of ensuring his right to health** (namely to not disclose any data to a third party, **including the third State in the relationship**, without the patient's consent), is also violated.

According to Art. 10, paragraph 1 of the Convention, **everyone has the right to respect for private life in relation to information about his or her health**, so may oppose perfectly validly to any public authority that would impose him to accept health cards, the **observance of the legal obligation provided by this Article. Information on his health, in all its forms, on all types of medical services and medical interventions, are part of the right to health, the right to receive healthcare without discrimination from the state, the right to physical and mental integrity, the right to respect for private life.** Biometric practices do not constitute "exceptional circumstances" to restrict such fundamental human rights because they are **continuous, permanent and abolish the human rights in their essence**. While being characteristic of a type of **totalitarian state**, biometric documents **can not be allowed and authenticated in any way and in any condition within a democratic, millennial and majority Orthodox state of law, as Romania.**

2. Incompatibility with the Patients' Code

Another legal document was adopted following the European Conference on Patients' Rights (Amsterdam, 30 March 1994) under the auspices of the Regional Office for Europe of the World Health Organisation. On that occasion, **a series of principles were set to promote the Patients' Rights Code**, which must necessarily be observed by those working in the public and private health system[10]. It is a legal document that became a universal code of the patients' rights and **that was assimilated as a law[11] in Romania**, having as main purpose the legal confirmation of **the patients' fundamental rights in the field of healthcare, the protection of their dignity and integrity** and being inspired by the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Among **the patients' rights violated** by the two internal legislative documents introducing biometric health cards in Romania, according to the universal code of rights, adopted at the European Conference in Amsterdam, are the following: **the right of each patient to decide his own fate when he is confronting a disease** (a right that is violated by the Romanian state authorities through the **discriminations** they bring to the groups of patients, *depending on the possession or absence of the health card*), **the patients' right to self-security, to physical and mental integrity** (affected by the two legislative documents according to which the Romanian state provides this right *to cardholders only, while excluding the others from benefiting of it*, with direct consequences on the person's health, integrity and security), **the right of each patient to have his moral and cultural values and religious and philosophical convictions respected, even as far as the medical care is concerned** (a right that is affected by the *incompatibility between the practice of biometrics and the Christian religion, democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms*, including freedom of religion, freedom of thought, of opinion, the principle of non-discrimination). The most important right given in the legal code and **undergoing a practical dissolution in its essence**, by introducing biometric documents such as health cards, is **the patients' right to confidentiality and privacy generally and particularly about his health condition**.

The code clearly states that **no information about a person's identity and medical condition can be provided to anyone** (not even to the Romanian state or other individuals, groups, organizations, international financial groups, trans-national companies, etc.) without the person's consent. In addition, **confidentiality must be**

maintained even after the patient's death. Thus, any pressure from the state so that patients convert into simple figures wearing "the badge with personal data regarding their health" around their necks (the biometric health card) is a **direct violation** of this right of the patient **that is included in the legal content of the right to health as a fundamental human right.** Confidentiality **can not be relativized, questioned or even abolished by putting the data on electronic media**, where any person skilled in technologies for breaking security codes may have access, **with direct consequences on life, health, security, physical and mental state integrity, freedom or dignity of the person** (the problem becomes more acute **for top officials who become sure targets** of computer attacks, in this case, and whose fundamental rights, as human beings, **are violated**, together with the direct issue on their **vulnerability**, *as a matter of national security and protection of the high officials in the XXI century*).

If the top officials are, say, "free thinkers" and do not accept biometrics as an idea or if they belong to a religion that does not accept biometric practices, considering them to be contrary to the freedom and dignity of man, regarded as an image and likeness of God, **the problem becomes even more serious, whereas the state practically forces the person to receive a biometric document to qualify for medical services in the state system, creating direct discrimination among citizens** (*violation of the constitutional principle of equality of all before law*).

Thus, the state can reach an absurd and undemocratic situation of *conditioning* the high official concerned to exercise his public function (!!!) (ie, to travel on business, take care of the health in the country of origin, to be able to observe religious or philosophical precepts, to have own opinion on biometrics, etc.) **by the possession of a biometric document** (in this case, health card), leading to **an illegal behaviour of the state concerned, violation of the fundamental rights of the high official as a human person, making him/her unable to exercise the public function and especially to his/her vulnerability as a person** (jeopardizing the official's life, integrity, and security) due to rejection of the biometric document, regardless of its type. Such behaviour of the state is not democratic, is not specific to a rule of law, abolishes the fundamental human rights and **marks the transition to a radical police state, far from any democratic standard.**

We **warn** here, in a **very serious manner,** that **the European and national legislation on data protection is designed to protect the public data of the person, *given by consent and not to violate or abolish human rights, as the biometric practice does*.**

Legislation on data protection can not be used by any State, group of people, individual, international organization or international financial group in order to establish a direct or indirect control or form of supervision in any way, on the human person. Data protection **can not serve states or such interest groups as a pretext to harm or violate the human rights**, namely freedom, human dignity, life, personal security, and in no case can it serve as a pretext for introducing biometric practices, incompatible in their essence with the democratic state of law and fundamental human rights.

This needs to be taken into account by all EU institutions when developing and adopting European legal documents[12], by all international organizations, integration or others, and also by all states that expressly undertook, by legal regional, international or national instruments (constitutions), to respect human rights, democracy and rule of law, and to consider them as supreme values in the state.

3. Incompatibility with the New EU Constitutional Treaty (Lisbon Treaty)

Art. 1a/TEU of the Treaty of Lisbon (amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community) in 2007, expressly provides that "The Union **is founded** on the values of respect for *human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights*", this article provides that the above values "**are common** to the Member States" (and therefore to the Romanian state, which **should have strictly and totally taken them into account, before** adopting such legislative documents).

This situation puts **the Union in an unprecedented situation, because it must defend this set of values and penalize the state flagrantly and systematically violating human rights and freedoms** (in this case, by imposing biometric documents, corresponding to a totalitarian government, not to a democratic one). We also quote Art. 3a/TEU, paragraph 2 amending the Lisbon Treaty, by which the Union undertakes to respect among others, national identity of states, as well as their equality in relation to the Treaties (while the Charter of Fundamental Rights is an integral part thereof). So, **it is not only that the EU should not encourage or tolerate totalitarian or biometric practices in the Member States** but it **should also refrain from issuing by all its institutions European legal documents recommending or implementing directly and immediately on the territory of the Member States a biometric or other measure that would have the effect of restricting or putting into question, or worse, abolishing of human rights and fundamental freedoms**.

Relating to the democratic values on which the Union is based should be **an ongoing process and not limit itself to the declarative level**, otherwise there is a risk of creating **a gap between a purely declarative democracy and a reality of totalitarian type, which is not desirable**.

Also, the Union and all Member States should take account of Art. 6 / TEU amending Lisbon Treaty, by which **the EU undertakes to respect the rights and freedoms provided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union** of 7 December 2000 and to consider **the general principles of European law**, fundamental rights as resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and as guaranteed in the ECHR.

Within the EU, Art. 7/TEU amending the Lisbon Treaty **can turn against the state that violates human rights and fundamental freedoms** (in this case, by the introduction of health cards as a biometric practice) as one of the forms of penalizing the state guilty of putting into question the general values and principles of the European law.

4. Incompatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU Citizens

According to this legal document considered as an **integral part** of the constituent treaties of the EU and having the **same legal value** as those in the hierarchy of European law, we see even from its preamble how the EU *defines itself as being based "on the indivisible and universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity ... on the principles of democracy and rule of law "*. Moreover, the Union is an entity in which we find **the human person located at the heart of its actions and policies** and therefore both the EU citizenship and the area of freedom, security and justice **must always relate to the fundamental human rights and they should be fully and effectively observed across the EU**.

Following the preamble of the Charter, we notice how the EU's explicit purpose is to "*contribute to the preservation and development of these common values*" while "respecting the diversity of cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe, as well as the national identities of the Member States", among others. This is why we ask ourselves how, **in a Union thus constituted, there can be tolerated biometric practices that violate not only the rule of law, democratic state and** fundamental human rights (on which the Union is founded, according to the Charter) but also violate the EU's obligation to respect the diversity of cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe (namely, the specific culture of the Romanian people, organized around orthodoxy; the Orthodox tradition and precepts, as well as the national identity of religious type of Romania, where over 86% of the population declare themselves Orthodox Christians[13], are violated).

The legislative documents on health cards violate the provisions of the Charter **even from the first article** (which, not incidentally, confirms **precisely the human dignity** in the title I called "*Dignity*"). Article 1 / Charter states as clearly as possible **inviolability of human dignity to be respected and protected by the States Parties** (in this case, democratic states and rule of law) and which, through each provision on health cards (regardless of their type), the legislative documents that are incident here abolish in its essence. So, in terms of Art. 1/Charter, the Romanian state **does not meet its express legal obligation to respect and protect human dignity, which it abolishes by the biometric practices** specific to a **totalitarian and degrading** behavior to the human person and his rights.

Further, other articles of the Charter are violated as well, by the introduction of biometrics **in Romania as a country with an Orthodox identity and tradition, with an Orthodox majority, with a democratic character of rule of law and state that undertakes to guarantee respect for human rights within its territory**:

Art. 2 (**right to life** which is affected by the non-observance by the Romanian state of its obligation to provide medical services to persons, without discrimination, and therefore to health cards non-holders), Art. 3 (**right of any individual to physical and mental integrity**, which is affected due to the non-observance by the Romanian state of the right to health of persons within its jurisdiction); Art. 4 (**interdiction of torture and inhuman or degrading treatments**, biometrics **directly affecting the dignity, freedom and integrity of the human person, being thus included also in the legal definition** of torture and inhuman and degrading treatments meant to treat people as an object, not as a person, as a number rather than a name, **to refuse them the right to identity and uniqueness and to recognize fundamental rights depending on the possession of a biometric document, which is inadmissible**). Further, Art. 5/Charter is breached (**interdiction of slavery, the biometric document bring a means of control, surveillance of the human person that is deprived of his freedom and dignity as a unique human being**).

Title II of the Charter ("*Freedoms*") recognizes throughout the EU other rights and freedoms of the human person (regardless of the status of European citizen) such as **the right to freedom and security** (Article 6, also flagrantly violated by the Romanian state by introducing health cards), and **respect for the private life of everyone** (Article 7).

The Charter also provides a **right to protection of personal data** (in Art. 8) but we mention again that **it can not set itself up in any way and under no circumstances as a pretext for violating, totally or partially damaging, questioning or abolishing of human** rights and fundamental freedoms, as in case of introducing biometric practices across the EU (in this case, the Romanian state as an EU Member State). "*Protection of personal data*" can not cover methods, documents or measures having non-democratic, totalitarian, police nature or abolishing human rights and freedoms on the territory of any state considering itself to be democratic. **Article 8 can not be used to establish in the EU's territory a police space, using biometric practices**[14], in particular by the introduction of health cards, regardless of their type, as the Romanian state's authorities did by two legislative documents **completely detached from the obligations of that state assumed at national, regional and international levels**.

Further, the introduction of these health cards **abolishes in its essence the freedom of thought, conscience and especially religion of people living in an Orthodox country like Romania** (freedom protected by Art. 10/Charter, which those legislative documents violate). The **right to conscientious objection**, in accordance with the internal law governing it, is expressly mentioned in paragraph 2, Art. 10 / Charter, so the Romanian state should have also taken into account **the specific right, derived from freedom of conscience**, when issued rules for introducing biometric practices within a majority Orthodox country, through its foundation and history.

Further, the two legislative documents in question violate articles of Title III ("Equality"), namely Art. 20 (**equality of all persons before law**, which is not observed, whereas people that do not old **the biometric card are put by the Romanian state in a position of inferiority and even punishment (!!!), risking to be fined or penalized for not agreeing with such practices and their application on them**).

The legislative documents on the health cards violate Art. 21 (**non-discrimination**, whereas the introduction of health cards **creates direct discriminations between the card holders and non-holders concerning their access to health services provided by the state, discriminations that can also refer to the criterion of religion, opinion or belief, which is expressly forbidden in the EU, by that article).**

Another article put in question (by the *EU toleration* of such biometric practices in one of its Member States) is Art. 23/Charter, *directly referring to the Union and imposing it the express obligation* **to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity** of the Member States (including therefore, in case of introduction of the biometric practices in a Member State .... with tradition, identity and religious majority of Orthodox type, **this specificity is not observed in any way, causing also legal liability from the Union**, which should have taken measures to remove the biometric practices from the territory of a Member State, but it did not).

Article 35 / Charter directly concerns the **right to health**, **recognized to everyone** in the EU, not only to European citizens. This right **is violated by the Romanian state, which does not ensure its correct**

application on persons under its jurisdiction, since it introduces health cards as biometric documents, **conditioning them unnaturally, in an unfair and punitive way, precisely like a police state and not as a democratic state, by the compulsory receipt thereof by its citizens.** This creates **discriminations among European citizens**, including in relation to the protection of health, namely among persons within the jurisdiction of the Romanian state who are eligible for medical services of the Romanian state only if they have a health card and other persons under the jurisdiction of other EU countries, with full and unconditional access to medical services of the EU state where they live or are).

The provisions of Art. 53 and 54 of the Charter, **which prohibit the abuse of right** (ie, prohibit the Romanian state, in this case, to construe any provision of this Charter as *implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act against any of the rights and freedoms recognized by this document or to impose broader restrictions than those included in this Charter*), should also be taken into account. In this case, the introduction of health cards does not lead to a restriction but **a dissolution of the essence** of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the form in which they are protected by this document.

In conclusion, we hereby warn that the introduction in any form (directly or indirectly, compulsory or optionally) of any biometric measure or practice by the Romanian state against individuals (regardless of their state, Romanian or foreign citizens) in any way subject to its jurisdiction, is a form of violation of European citizens' rights and fundamental human rights, a non-democratic form of control, surveillance of the human person, specific to a model of police, totalitarian state, which is converted into a direct responsibility of the authorities that signed such documents, legally and politically, as well as the European institutions that recommended, in one way or another, such kinds of documents and practices.

NOTES:

1 The policy of the Romanian state, as a democratic state, rule of law, a state where respect for the human rights is the supreme value and is guaranteed (Art.1/ Constitution), as an EU member state, a member of OSCE, the Council of Europe and the Community of Democracies, **is (and should be) to *fully* observe the human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law and democracy in all internal normative acts and in all actions of the Romanian public authorities**. Any legislative document and any administrative measure for the implementation of a legislative document (such as, in this case, biometric ones), which affects, dissolves or partially or fully violates the letter or spirit of human rights and fundamental freedoms **induces responsibility of the signatories of the document or the authorities that implemented such measure, and also of the Romanian state, on national, European and international level.**

2 In this case, **the whole Title IX of the health reform law no. 95/2006**; the draft of **Government Decision** approving the methodological rules for the application of national provisions on national social security health card in Title IX European card and national social security health card of Law 95/2006 on healthcare reform, as subsequently amended and completed; **the two ministerial orders** no. 1105 of 29.12.2010 and no. 1571 of 29.12.2010 in relation to health cards.

3 Adopted at Rome on November 4, 1950; into force on September 3, 1953. Romania ratified the Convention by Law 39 of May 18, 1994, published in the Official Gazette no. 135 of May 31, 1994.

4 By ***resuming* the auction** in September 2011 by the Ministry of Health **(resulting in the *continued* nature of the offense of abuse of office and the *systematic* nature of violation of human rights)** on health cards, **the Romanian authorities continue to be outside the constitutional, European and international legal norms on human rights** and therefore **commit an illegal action in terms of public international law, European law, of its own national law and human rights, for which they directly and unconditionally assume legal** (including penal, by abuse of office against public interests, considering that **the public interest here directly and unconditionally concerns the protection of the national identity** that is not of any type **but a religious, majority and millennial Orthodox identity, incompatible in its essence with the biometric practices**) **liability**. The Romanian authorities completely ignore the type of country they represent: a majority and millennial Orthodox country, while **behaving as nihilistic and also illegal authorities**, whereas they do not consider any of the incidental abovementioned normative documents in this case, through which Romania assumed obligations on European and international level, and violate the Constitution of this country.

5 A democratic, EU founder state, such as Germany made the same mistake, which, we learn, in August-September 2011 as well, begins to issue for the

foreigners on its territory, work and residence permits of electronic type, with a chip. This is again a form of flagrant violation of fundamental human rights (in this case, the principle of non-discrimination among human persons, the violation of labour right, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of movement, especially since Germany is an EU member country assuming through the Lisbon Treaty the express obligation to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms and especially if we take into account that there is a Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Citizen, which is integrant part of the Lisbon Treaty). Thus, we see democratic countries promptly heading towards electronic forms of totalitarianism, which not only violate the rights of European citizens, but also the fundamental human rights, **precisely through the pseudo-legislations way** (as defined above).

6 Involvement of the Romanian Post and any other public or private courier service for distribution of biometric documents, irrespective of their type (health cards or others) is illegal because, besides the public authorities that implemented the biometric measure, the courier services, including the Romanian Post, **a public body**, which should not be abusively used by the state in violating or affecting the human rights or violating the Constitution, regional and international documents to which Romania is party, shall be also liable for the violation of the human rights. **The principle of legality**, a basic principle of the administrative law, under which **any public authority must exercise its powers in accordance with the legal framework** (in this case, the Constitution, international, regional and national documents protecting human rights and not to violate them), **opposes**.

7 Apart from the question of **violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms** (**universal** dimension of the legal culture specific to the UN order, as a contemporary legal order), one can find also **disregard, by the Romanian authorities, of the national identity** (of religious type, ie majority and millennial Orthodox) of Romanians. The Romanian authorities have not adapted their type of policy based on the **essential requirements relating to the national security strategies, as strategies for preserving the national identity of this country**. The main object of any national security strategy is **the survival of this nation and the essential constituent of survival is the cultural identity** (unit of language, religion and culture, in case of the Romanian people), which is in essence **a majority and millenary Orthodox identity**, ie incompatible with practices such as biometrics. In their strategies, the Romanian authorities should have been concerned **to protecting** the cultural identity of the Romanians, **not to clearly violating it**, **while proving not only incompetence but also a blatant disregard of the national interest**, thus not culpably taking into account the objective of preserving the national identity. Mircea Malița specifies very clearly in a recently published work that "identity is a product of culture" and that "the purpose of the survival of a people is to maintain its identity", where "traditions and values measure the importance of the vital interests for a people and are essential for the behavior and mentality "(ie, not just for the profile of a people, but also for the issue of its survival in history). Strategies ignoring these aspects can not meet these essential needs of the Romanian people and therefore must be removed as unreliable. See Mircea Malița, Wisdom of the Earth. Strategies for survival in the history of the Romanian people, Editura Corint, Bucharest, 2010, p. 261.

8 The Romanian Institute for Human Rights, *The main international instruments on human rights to which Romania is party*, Volume II, *Regional instruments*, Bucharest, 1997, Official Gazette, p. 338.

9 Adopted in Oviedo on April, 4, 1997. Romania signed the Convention on April, 4, 1997.

10 Octavian Popescu - *The right to health and the health of this right*, the Romanian Institute for Human Rights, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 79-80.

11 Law on the Patients' Rights, adopted in Bucharest, on January, 20, 2003.

12 Under the Lisbon Treaty, Art. 3a/TEU, **the EU has the express obligation to respect the national identity of its Member States, which is, in the case of Romania, of religious type (millennial and majority Orthodox).** In case of a breach of such express legal obligation by the EU within the legal relationship with any Member State, it has a variety of legal ways to prosecute it, including leaving the Union for such a reason.

13 See the census of 2002, on grounds of religion, in which Orthodox religion represents 86.7% for a population of 21,698,181 inhabitants. Also, geopolitically and historically, Romanians have been traditionally a bastion of Orthodoxism defense in Europe, starting with the Edict of Milan (313 AD, here taken as conventional time) when Christianity was recognized in the Roman Empire as a religion equal to other denominations. See the geopolitical study of Vasile Simileanu, *Romania, geopolitical tensions*, Geopolitica magasine, Editura Top Form, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 9-15. About the millennial Orthodox Christian identity of the Romanian people see in detail, the work of the priest Prof. Mircea Păcurariu, *History of the Romanian Orthodox Church*, Bible and Mission Institute Publishing House of the Romanian Orthodox Church, Bucharest, 2006.

14 In relation to biometric practices, see also related articles such as: Mădălina Virginia Antonescu, *Implications of incompatibility between biometrics and human rights on human security* in Strategic Impact, no. 3 (36) / 2010, pp. 112-124, Mădălina Virginia Antonescu *Issue of biometric passports and freedom of thought,*

opinion and religion, Strategic Impact, no. 1 (34) / 2010, pages 112-129, Mădălina Virginia Antonescu, *Biometrics, human freedom and human dignity, at the beginning of the XXI century*, participation in session of scientific communications *Defense and security prospects in Europe*, 19-20 November 2009, Vol IV, Editura UNAP, Bucharest, 2009, pp. 186-216.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY LEADER'S DECISION

*Ciprian PRIPOAE-ŞERBĂNESCU**

How war is defined will further establish the context and needs for additional adjustments in military training and education. The most recent paradigms such as "network operation" or "effect-based operations" will increasingly demand new mental skills from military decision makers.

Researches on ill-structured problems solving under uncertainty have indicated that using only a single decision-making method is inappropriate and counterproductive. Decision makers naturally make use of intuitive methods that emphasize experience and native ways of thinking and judgment rather than using a standard algorithm for problem solving. As a response to the "orthodox" method of decision making (MDMP), there has been suggested the alternative of practical thinking inspired by naturalistic psychology. Thus, there are taken into account cognitive limitations and mental traps induced inherently by decisional process. Practical thinking suggests a reflective, questioning, integrative thinking style, by which the decision maker will continually define problems that arise, will find and evaluate solutions and effects generating an individual system of control and evaluation.

Key-words: subjectivity; Military Decision Making Process (MDM); practical thinking; systems thinking; uncertainty; meta-cognition.

1. War, between Old and New

In the course of time, war phenomenon has been continuously defined and re-defined, each definition being marked by the thinkers of the respective era. From Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, every definition was marked by the foremost importance of the war's aftermath. History is full of bloody battles and wars fought for causes and ideals that shaped lives of entire generations. Wars will remain crucial moments in history, which require all attention, as they were critical juncture for sovereignty, independence or even nations' survival.

The analyses on recent conflicts elaborated by contemporary military thinkers created new visions which take the shape of new paradigms of armed conflicts. Among them, the most discussed ones are „fourth generation warfare (4GW)", „asymmetric warfare", „effect-based operations (EBO)" or „wars fought among civilian populations"[1]. Irrespectively the paradigm, Armed Forces have to operate in an environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity[2]. Each of the above mentioned attributes will need to be duplicated by new mental abilities of military leaders, abilities reflected in the necessity to give coherence and meaning within in a typically complex and chaotic phenomenon.

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In an operational environment with insufficient, but still overwhelming information, the effort to fit every piece of puzzle into a clear picture, to give relevance in a continuous flow of events and to make decisions will be more and more a difficult and challenging process. Acting as a decider, military leader will be facing a tremendous mental effort to find solutions in a delicate balance between constraint and initiative, repeating patterns and initiative, between model and inspiration.

2. Subjectivity in Knowledge

The increasing importance given to human action outcomes' significance, the increasingly high stakes that military conflicts have for human society have drawn theorists attention on the process of problem solving and decision making in order to make them more efficient. The results were crystallized in *normative theories*, in which the decision-maker is assumed to be well informed, able to reason (almost) perfectly and rationally. But reality has shown the relativity of these theories, as long as there cannot be made a break between decision-making process, environment and decision-maker, seen primarily as a source of errors. The way the human being give significance to the world and surrounding phenomena, the way in which he understands and explains it is a profoundly subjective process that introduces variables that cannot be quantified.

Human beings build their own version of reality based on the information provided by the sources, from digitized information sources to senses. The *significance* of information will always be found at the intersection between its attributes, decision-maker's subjectivity and the context in which the subject makes the interpretation. The mental framework becomes a critical determinant in which information is considered relevant or not and how it will be processed and interpreted.

What it is overlooked by normative and descriptive theories is the fact that, from the very input, environmental signals are filtered and selected, associated to a meaning through a physiological and mental process which is often subconscious[3]. What we perceive and how we process information is fundamentally influenced by psycho-physiological characteristics of individual, his previous experience, education, cultural values, role-related requirements, organizational rules, as well as information specificity.

This process can be compared with looking through a "pair of eyeglasses" that directs and concentrates and, implicitly, distorting the image which is seen. In order to see beyond the decisions we make, it is necessary to be aware of the nature of the "lenses" filtering out the world and its phenomena. And to make things even more challenging, in the case of military leaders, they must also understand the enemy. To understand the actions of your opponent, you must not only have information about it, but also see things through his own "lenses", whether they are called mental models, preconceptions or assumptions. To see the options their opponent is aware of, decision makers need to understand his values, his assumptions (which, of course, often includes themselves too), and even his errors of comprehension and perception.

3. MDMP, Practical Thinking and Systemic Thinking – Continuum or Exclusion?

The dynamism, asymmetry and heterogeneity of the forces involved in conflicts of the last 30 years are the markers of a new reality which makes virtually impossible the existence of a "master mind" acting as an "oracle" able to know all the details, to make accurate predictions, let alone the difficulty to integrate in a timely manner the evolution of all forces implicated. The increasing independence of military units, the continuous need to adapt and survive makes the necessity for a more decentralized leadership to be even more obvious. Commanders at all levels and staff officers will be more often under pressure to make sound, reliable and consistent judgments, in a complex, ambiguous information environment, always under time pressure. Therefore, one of the major objectives for military leaders' education should be the development of a personal decision-making style and the raise of self-confidence by growing aware of their strengths, weaknesses and of the guarantees given by their own way of thinking.

Choosing this phrase may be surprising but the confidence in one's own management is a synthetic indicator which grasps a wide range of subjacent processes and qualities of the decision maker. Self-confidence becomes possible when having a solid motivation, a reflexive, flexible, inquiring, integrative thinking style which can assure an inner mental freedom to face any exterior situation, regardless its complexity or difficulty.

Maybe the first step in this direction was made by including in the education curricula for commander officers of Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). This was designed as a support tool for rational decision to represent battle field and to reach logical decisions. MDMP is analytically structured as a series of logical sequences by which it is analyzed the situation, it is elaborated a range of solutions, there are compared and chosen the optimal versions for problem solving[4]. The selected option becomes the tactical plan and the commander will arrange accordingly his forces in space and time to accomplish his mission. What MDMP essentially offers is the safety that all key planning and control elements were taken into account, being basically a check-list.

Yet, recent studies made both in civilian and military areas seem to indicate that MDMP has serious limitations, questioning its utility and efficiency as a decision tool. The most acute critique comes from decision-making theoreticians, as well as from Iraq and Afghanistan veteran officers who argue that the tempo, the diversity of armament systems and the ambiguity of the battle carried out at battalion/brigade level demands rather an intuitive decision making process (Recognition –primed decision – RPD)[5]. From the naturalistic psychology standing point, it is questioned whether MDMP is a biased proof decision method or it can disclose psychological errors or hooks which are innate in the decision making process. Moreover, most of the instructions regarding MDMP are mainly focused on the external structure of the process (sequence, the best use of decision matrixes or staff's coordination activities).

Constant importance given to what really makes C2 to be efficient as the continuous interest in the effectiveness of problem solving leads to surprising discoveries. In 1993, in his "Overview of Army tactical planning performance research", J. Fallesen points out an unexpected conclusion: "there is a disconnection between what procedures are taught for the tactical decision making process and what is actually done in training, combat, or other operational settings" and "how command is described to be done and how is actually done are not the same". These observations are in accordance with the field of naturalistic psychology which indicates that, in a dynamic and uncertain situation, most of the people don't use standard logic, and even more rarely they choose "the optimal" between a series of alternatives[6]. Researches show that decision makers use rather previous experience and rely on the ability to intuitively generate a feasible solution[7]. These insights were synthesized by naturalistic psychology theoreticians by observing the subject during activity in his natural environment. Thus, naturalistic psychology indicates as being really practical and efficient the educative means praising and enhancing specific intrinsic psychological abilities which will be furthermore explored and consolidated through reflexive-interrogative mental function.

Classical model of decision-making implies a way of reasoning by using formal logic which is often inadequate and many times useless in complex, dynamic, uncertain environment where armed forces naturally operate[8]. Formal logic which is implicit in such models is ignorant regarding content and context, but this is exactly what people do all the time, we search for significance, meaning, suggestions from immediate context in order to understand and adapt. At the basis of MDMP laying a logical thinking that operates with sure pieces of information, with False or True values, but it is increasingly difficult to find this sureness in the complexity of the battle field.

In everyday situations we mostly operate with highly contextualized significations. Kahneman and Tversky created a theoretical framework which supports the hypothesis that when confronted with an intense sensorial-informational flux, in incertitude, risk or ambiguity conditions subjects are predisposed to reduce complexity using heuristics[9]. In this process of simplifying a high volume of information, individuals inject biases which derive from unconscious errors generated by mental methods to simplify. The hitch which mental process induces on decision makers is inevitable, it cannot be by-passed. But the logic within MDMP process simply ignores such evidences. What it can be done is to educate people how to recognize these mental obstacles and how to develop procedures to compensate it. And this is made possible by one of the alternatives to the traditional way of thinking based on rational model, formal logic and algorithms to make decisions, an option called *practical thinking*. Practical thinking is inspired by the field of naturalistic psychology, which focuses on *how* people really think and behave in reality, rather than how they should. Practical thinking is not concerned with a normative model of thinking or behavior. This approach asserts the necessity that individuals should use experience, knowledge, evaluative abilities to explore, continuously define and re-define problems that arise, to find and evaluate solutions, to comprehend the consequences. Also, it has become important the process of learning to manage thinking time on short term and how to prepare ourselves for future problems. Essentially, practical thinking is focused on individuals' ability to think originally, with "their own mind", and much lesser to approximate reality to a sole model, alleged as universally viable. This sort of thinking relies much less on theory, which loses its control function, decision makers having the freedom to create their own control and evaluation system. As part of the process, it becomes essential to accept the idea that incertitude is ubiquitous, and that there is never a single answer to problems and the whole mental process should be orientated on aims and objectives rather than observe an algorithm, comprising rigorous steps to be made.

"Practical thinking" is an umbrella concept which covers different concepts such as critical thinking, creative thinking, meta-cognition and integrative thinking. At the intersection of these processes, it is crystallized a mental functional model which guarantee the decision maker the inner freedom to explore and define situations and contexts in a unique way, unmatched by any other model. On the one hand, critical thinking is evaluative, convergent, interrogative and cautious with anything that can be defined as axiom. It envelops specific mental abilities, the most relevant being considered analysis, explication, interpretation, evaluation.

On the other hand, creative thinking is generative, daring and divergent. When combined, these forms of thinking approximate the way people naturally think. The plus brought by this mixture is reflected in the higher ability to adapt under incertitude conditions, the easier identification of alternative solutions, in finding hidden assumptions, in the skills to integrate and give meaning to disparate and complex net elements, in the development of the capacity to define and identify problems.

While MDMP algorithm is run by using a formal logic, practical thinking relies on situational logic. Situational logic starts by taking into consideration the uniqueness and specificity of the current situation rather than using general approaches. The situation is considered to be unique, so it has to be judged and filtered in the terms of its unique logic, rather than as a particular example of a wider range of comparable situations.

Situational logic usually focuses on discovering cause-effect or means-finality relations. Leaders have to discover and comprehend adversary's objectives and to understand how and why the adversary reckons that certain means and ways of using them will allow him to accomplish his objectives. It is also vital to understand what the enemy searches to obtain in terms of effects, losses and the disposition of forces. This manner of thinking has the advantage that allows integrating a large and diverse volume of information. Without such insight, it would be difficult and often risky to explain, comprehend and predict enemy's actions. This analysis begins when the leader involves in the process of selection, filtration, and organization of information. But this complex process can be efficiently done only by taking into account unconscious or conscious assumptions, hypothesis or heuristics.

The question arising isn't whether the previous hypotheses or one's expectations will influence the understanding and analysis of the situation, but how much this influence will be explicit or it will remain hidden. This mental distinction is fundamental. For each hypothesis, leaders should ask themselves what they further expect to see and what it is hidden. What are the series of events which he should already see or expect to happen, what are the signs and clues he should notice? And furthermore, if the evidence is not there, why it is not? Is it because it is hidden, it didn't happen, it isn't naturally observable or the "sensors" missed it? The absence of indicators and information is equally significant as their presence. For instance, when we consider the possibility for an enemy to attack, the measures which he didn't take for preparing his armed forces for attack may be more significant than what has he already done. One could reject the possibility for the adversary to try to deceive because there is no evidence in this respect, but rejection isn't justified under these conditions. If deceit is thoroughly planned and correctly implemented, no one should expect to find proofs of its existence easily. This possibility should not be rejected until its invalidation, or at least until after having made a systematic search for evidences. One's attention tends to focus on what it is reported rather than what it is not. It takes a great conscious effort to think about what it is missing, but should be present if a certain hypothesis is considered right.

Probably one of the most remarkable cognitive ability supposed by practical thinking is meta-cognition. It is remarkable because it permits the decision maker to improve his thinking process itself. In the last 35 years, there have been given many definitions for meta-cognition concept or "thinking about thinking". A recent one describes meta-cognition as the "knowledge and beliefs about their own cognitive processes and the efforts to regulate these cognitive processes to maximize learning and memory"[10].

Meta-cognition plays a major function in communication, understanding, reading, language, self-control, self-education or problem solving. Meta-cognition is critique and reflexive with thinking itself, a way of self regulating itself. Each processes mentioned above becomes the subject of reflection by using the question: "What and how am I doing in my mind right now?"

Closely related with meta-cognition is integrative thinking ability. Integrative thinking is an essential skill in leadership process because of the high diversity of factors interacting on the battlefield and of high frequency of decision making. Integrative thinking is reflected on the capacity to correctly identify cause-effect relations, correlations between events, personal capacity to perceive phenomena from another perspective which is different from the subject's own one, to assume partners' perspectives and to integrate them functionally. Integration has also a temporal aspect as decision maker will be able to learn from previous experience, consequently, improving his performance. This ability is to some extent innate and partially educated. It is based on individual's aptitude to remain open to new ideas, on lifelong learning, but also on the respect for the Other as a source of valuable assessment. Using the metaphor of the Greek poet Archiloches[11], we can say that such subjects are rather foxes than hedgehogs. Psychological attributes required for such mental setting are intelligence, synthetic thinking, coherent and stable self image, a high self-esteem, assertiveness and capacity to tolerate ambiguity, to integrate opposites, empathy. Integrative thinking skills are an essential step in the development of intuition.

Second major factor that applies pressure on the traditional way to describe and explain various phenomena, including military conflict and how decisions are made, is the systemic paradigm. Emergence of general systems theory, whose origin is attributed to the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, has marked an epistemological leap from Newtonian scientific view, beyond reductionist methods of investigation. New modeling paradigms which aiming at shaping military conflict ("war among the population", "networked operations" and "effect-based operations") conceptualize phenomena that are included in complex systems' theory. Systems' theory, systems' thinking and general systems' theory are nowadays considered to be the ideal scientific framework for information integration, a real science of integrated and coherent phenomena.

Practice seems to support the hypothesis that every time when military planning and control was made in a systemic paradigm, results were backed by a sound, positive operational logic. It is natural as long it determined the decision maker to think in terms of interaction, exchanges, links, transformations, purpose, and all concepts that shape military conflict phenomena. Systemic theory is useful to shape enemy's image, in terms of intention, position, and means.

These are arguments that support the idea of improving the military education of future leaders by using practical thinking and systemic thinking. Even if it sounds magniloquent, systemic thinking is a natural ability taken to superior levels trough education. The key-idea lying at the basis of systemic thinking is that "everything is systemic", stressing the importance of non-linear multiple interactions, rather than the one of linear cause-effect chain.

In other words, every part of the network is influenced by and influences the rest of the system, all parts creating an intermediary state of the system which is more than the mere sum of its composing parts. Therefore, organizations or social phenomena should to be naturally understood through systemic thinking. But it is not that easy because the first obstacle is our very mind.

Often, despite our awareness that everything is systemic, the fundamental way in which thinking operates is through analysis, which means decomposing into pieces the ensemble and to place these pieces in a linear string with linear causality. It is simply because our mind functions linearly. This is not necessarily undesirable or bad, but we will unwillingly tend to lose sight of the complex, multiple, circular interactions. The reason we think rather linear is due to the "cognitive economy" principle. This is facilitated by "frames", that provide a quick and simple information processing[12]. Thus, people use these mental filters to create meaning and purpose in the flow of information they receive. Normally we use the least amount of mental energy for most of the tasks, while preserving resources for difficult mental jobs. And, obviously, systemic thinking demands more attention as it supposes cognitive effort.

Conclusions

From the epic confrontation between David and Goliath, we learned what asymmetry is. One of the opponents will always try to think and act in order to minimize the opponent's advantages and to maximize their qualities. In the absence of appropriate technological adjustments to compensate for the reduced size of Romanian Armed Forces, current and future leaders must rather find asymmetrical answers when facing potentially superior adversaries. And these asymmetric solutions can only be rooted in thinking itself.

Liberty of action continues to remain a basic principle of the military combat. But freedom on the battlefield can be achieved only as a reflection of the subject's freedom of thought and confidence in his deliberations.

Military decision makers have a variety of personalities, education and experience. To support the validity of a single decisional pattern in such a wide variety of personalities and tactical situations was proven to be a limitation and even an error. Some positions require special training in decision making using judgments derived through formalized algorithms as MDMP. Thus it is justified the need for a clear distinction of situations and circumstances requiring such procedures. But if this "instrumental" method becomes, by extension, the only official way of thinking, it is possible for the long-term operational performance of military leaders and, hence, of the armed forces, to come to harm.

Therefore, we advocate the need for a general military training focused on practical thinking for future military decision makers. Perhaps the most valuable tool possessed by commanders at all levels is their ability to understand, think, reason and decide and practical thinking will only intensify and systematize these faculties. Military decision makers should be aware of their own thinking process in all its complexity, covering motivational, emotional and cognitive-rational factors. They must be reflective of how they judge, how they come at their conclusions and what the effects of their decisions are. To avoid inconsistency, lack of clarity, errors and poor argumentative judgment, decision makers will have to distinguish between what they know and what they think they know, to make a clear distinction between reality and their own representation on reality.

This topic is both controversial and challenging. Trying to educate many individuals of this profession to consider things in this way will probably meet institutional resistance. Military are educated as "doers" rather than "thinkers" and the change described by this article would require a re-thinking of the curriculum throughout the entire educational process, from the level of Military Academies to the height of National Defence University or National Defence College. The crystallization of interdisciplinary collectives meant to shape lessons' content, of a valuable group of instructors with proven psycho-pedagogical skills, using attractive, exciting and inter-active training methods are some of the steps that such process would require. In the light of these ideas, the most suitable candidates for military education will be those characterized by creativity, flexibility, propensity for self-education, efficiency and results-oriented.

Although less visible and obviously more silent, education of military leaders can have a real strategic impact on Romanian armed forces' performance which could be confirmed only by the audit of a future war. And history of great confrontations goes in the favor of leaders educated to be foxes[13] in the detriment of hedgehogs.

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AL QAEDA VS. THE WORLD. AFTER 10 YEARS



Al Qaeda vs. the World. After 10 Years was published in 2011 by TOP FORM Publishing House, under the careful guidance of Prof. Vasile Simileanu, PhD. The author, Cristian BARNA, PhD, is associate professor at *"Mihai Viteazul"* National Intelligence Academy and currently is leading the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Faculty of Intelligence. His interests have long exceeded the formal framework, for which he manages to surprise us every time with direct approaches, well documented, sometimes even "sharp" with and about international terrorism. Thus, *Al Qaeda vs. the World. After 10 Years*, is a meritorious work, a work that incites to knowledge. With an easily accessible format, the work of 172 pages, divided into four chapters, calls for reflection: when will end the war against international terrorism?

Throughout the book our attention is provoked by a variety of topics related even to the unique through the analysis undertaken. Surprisingly or not, the approach initiated by the author helps to decrypt major themes, namely "multiculturalism versus Islamophobia in the EU; Jihad in Europe" and provides a relevant answer to the question "is Romania the target of terrorism with Islamic fundamentalist origins?" In this context, the objective of the Western world cannot be only the military counter offensive or "democratization" of the Muslim world, but the West must pursue a religious and ideological dimension: "winning the hearts and minds" of Muslims, that is exerting active pressure for religious, political, social and economic reform in the Muslim world, to finally release from any justification of violence. In essence, the Islamic fundamentalist discourse, which promises paradise to those who commit acts of terrorism must be countered by a legitimate religious force within the Muslim world itself.

Undoubtedly, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have forced a rethinking of globalization, democracy and global security by demonstrating that, in the contemporary era, global, national and local levels intersect themselves. September 11, 2001 was a global event that affected an interconnected, but conflictual world.

Today, after 10 years of efforts and sacrifices made by the specialized structures in terrorism response, the elimination of Osama bin Laden from the Jihadist equation is undoubtedly the legitimate signal of ending the security paradigm called "global terrorism inspired by Al Qaeda". Cristian BARNA catches in the most clear way, by direct formulations and conclusions based on rigorous analysis: it does not mean that the Jihadist threat will disappear, but, in a way, we'll see a "territorialisation" of terrorism with Islamic fundamentalist origins, and the possible consolidation of Al Qaeda militant's positions from Iraq and Afghanistan in North Africa could have negative consequences for the entire world, and especially for Europe.

Al Qaeda vs. the World. After 10 Years means a lot to those involved in understanding Islam. The author presents Islam as a human faith, tolerant and progressive, confronting the vision experiencing of a hanged man on a vengeful God and a humanity led by prohibitive laws.

The approach calls for reflection, but for the truth as well. Given this state of mind, which crossed and still crosses the Muslim world, the response to the threat of terrorism with Islamic fundamentalist origins must be more than bombing Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nicolae RADU, PhD*

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ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JANUARY - MARCH 2012

In the first three months of 2012, by the efforts of CDSSS members, three studies were published, namely ***The Role of NATO and EU in the Crisis Management in Western Balcans***, ***Military Strategic Management and Leadership in the Future Armed Conflicts*** and ***Potential Crises to National Security: Prevention, Limitation, and Resolution of Crisis Situations***.

Consistent to the policy of broadening the scope and space of cooperation with similar institutions, a group of researchers and experts of the Centre has performed, in February (20-22), a visit to the Centre for Strategic Partnership of the Regional Branch of National Institute for Strategic Studies in Uzhgorod, Ukraine. On this occasion, the two institutions signed a memorandum of cooperation and committed to actively participate in mutual conferences and scientific seminars.

On the CDSSS' agenda, an incoming activity organized by the Centre is the scientific seminar with international participation, which reached its XII[th] edition, to be held on 17 May 2012. This year's theme is ***National Interests versus Community Interests in the European Union***. At the activity have been invited to participate personalities from the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Administration and Interior, rectors of military and civil universities and other personalities of the scientific community from Romania and other countries.

Irina TĂTARU

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FOREIGN AUTHORS

We welcome people interested in publishing articles in the bilingual scientific magazine Strategic Impact, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

Deadlines: **foreign authors will send their articles in English** to the editor's e-mail address, **cssas@unap.ro**, according to the following time schedule: **15 January (no. 1); 15 April (no. 2); 15 July (no. 3) and 15 October (no. 4).**

The **scientific evaluation process** is developed according to the principle **double blind peer review,** by experienced university teaching staff and scientific researchers. Consequently to the evaluation, there are three possiblities: **a) the article is accepted for publication as such or with minor changes; b) the article may be published if the author makes recommended improvements; c) the article is rejected.**

The **criteria of selecting articles** are the following: the theme of the article must be in line with the subjects dealt by the magazine (up-to-date topics related to security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, political and military aspects); the quality of the scientific content; originality of the paper; novelty character - it should not have been priorly published; a relevant bibliography comprising recent and prestigious specialized works; and adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the magazine.

If the article is accepted for publication, translation for the Romanian edition of the magazine will be provided by the editor.

The **article's length** may vary between **6-10 pages** (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures – if any).

The text has to present **a logic structure**. It is recommended to organize it in chapters and to have an introduction and conclusions.

Page settings: margins – 2 cm, A 4 paper.

Times New Roman font, size 11, one line spacing.

The **title** shall be centered, in capital, bold letters.

The text has to be preceded by the following elements:

A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements (given name, last name (capitalized), e-mail address, main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank - if that is the case, academic title, the field in which (s)he is PhD or PhD candidate, city and country of residence).

A relevant **abstract** which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters).

5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters).

Tables / graphics / figures shall also be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format. Below will be mentioned (in TNR, font 10, italic) "Table no. 1 title" or "Figure no. 1 title" and the source shall be also mentioned at the bottom of the image.

References shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of endnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen in the example below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: Joshua S. GOLDSTEIN; Jon C. PEVEHOUSE, *International Relations,* Longman Publishing House; 2010, pp. 356-382.

Example of article: Teodor FRUNZETI; Marius HANGANU, *New Paradigms of Armed Combat and their Influence on Military Forces' Training*, in Strategic Impact, no. 4/2011, Bucharest, pp. 5-15.

Bibliography shall contain only the most relevant works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen in the example below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVEHOUSE, Jon C., *International Relations,* Longman Publishing House; 2010.

Example of article: FRUNZETI, Teodor; HANGANU, Marius, *New Paradigms of Armed Combat and their Influence on Military Forces' Training*, in Strategic Impact, no. 4/2011, Bucharest.

Internet sources will be quoted giving the link in full, mentioning, where relevant, what that site represents / the title and author of the consulted work, as well as the day it was accessed.

The document shall be **saved** as Word Document (*.doc.)

English language has to correspond to academic standards.

Failing to comply with these rules will trigger the rejection of the article.

Authors are fully responsible for their articles' content, according to the provisions of Law no. 206 / 2004 regarding good conduct in scientific research, technological development and innovation.

Editors have the right to make necessary improvements on the texts.

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