STRATEGIC IMPACT

CONTENTS

REGIONALIZATION TENDENCIES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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The second half of the XX century witnessed for the first time the birth of a number of organizations that envisage security in their area of interest, the signing states jointly developing capabilities able to respond to an array of challenges brought forth by the participation in peace keeping operations, peace enforcement, conflict prevention and, more recently, post-conflict reconstruction operations, stability and transition and normalization of the economic and social life in the conflict affected areas. Although traditionally regional organizations appeared with the aim to reach a series of objectives of economic, politic or environmental nature, recent decades showed their clear implication in the field of security, these becoming extremely active, especially in cooperation with the United Nations in operations of the aforementioned types, carried out on almost all continents.

Key-words: regionalization; Intermarium; geopolitics; project; strategy.

Introduction

The world of today numbers very few states that are not integrated in at least one of the existing regional or intergovernmental organizations. Global politics can not be envisaged outside these organizations and they became a necessity, a reality and an unmistakable feature of world politics. The memory of the history of human society recorded the birth of numerous regional organizations, constituted on the basis of various criteria and interests, the dominant ones being economic, political, ethnic and environmental.

The history of Central and Eastern Europe in the XX century was marked by numerous devastating and bloody conflicts, by invasions followed by occupations, the consequences of which can be seen and perceived even today. Although reality suggests that the future of the region will be one characterized by harmonious relations and democracy, there are numerous signs indicating the fact that the period of bloody conflicts will not be over as long as rivalries between the Russian Federation and a number of countries of the former communist camp exist or between the latter.

Seeming to follow the tradition of the former century, the XXI century is no exception. The present looks both onto the past and onto the future and raises questions.

Is the regional federalization of Central and Eastern Europe an alternative to the European Union? If so, how should it be achieved?

The advantages of such an endeavor are obvious, at least from the perspective of annulling the dependency on Brussels. We would thus witness a polarization of resources of all kinds, a growth of the feeling of security and an improvement of relations between the states of the region.

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Historical perspectives of regionalization

The main historical argument in favor of the construction of a powerful federal state in Central and Eastern Europe was its geographical location of this region between Russia and Germany, two important regional powers that had a say in all the important moments of European history. Otherwise said, this European region constituted for the two powers the object of dispute, an economic prize and at the same time a bloody battlefield.

In order for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to make democratic and economic progress, large scale mutations in the European space were needed, in which Russia and Germany played a decisive role and which, beside other challenges, seem to have paved the way toward the regrouping of a federative type of the states in this area. First, Germany went through a process of "pacification" after the end of the Second World War. Later on, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia withdrew its forces, allowing its former satellites access to democracy, development and self determination.

Before the mentioned periods, the majority of the ideas to unify the region originated in Poland and most of them were dictated by historical constraints that mainly envisaged territorial issued followed by the Soviet expansion and continued by over five decades of total control exerted by the Soviet Union over the entire region.

Can it be found in the so-called Vishegrad group of 2011? If yes, to what extent? And what are its geographical and conceptual dimensions?

The paper aims to answer all these questions, and some others that will appear along this study, in order to identify Romania's possible role, place and implications on this upcoming stage.

For the beginning, we will look back to what the Polish diplomacy, strongly influenced by the Polish statesman and marshal Jozef Pilsudski[1], tried to achieve during the inter-bellum period through the creation of the "Intermarium" concept, translated as "between the seas" ("Miedzymorze" in Polish), in an attempt to ensure the independence of an important region of Europe.

This geopolitical project was meant to include Eastern Europe, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. At the same time, an even wider version was also considered, which would have included the Western Balkans, reaching the Adriatic Sea.

The idea of this potential project was in fact to create an alliance between the Central and South-East European countries and a block which, despite cultural and historic differences, was to play an important role not only on the European, but also on the world stage.

Named the Pontic-Baltic Isthmus in the European geopolitics, controlled mainly by the Tsarist Empire and later on by the USSR, the space between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea constituted in the history of mankind a geographical unit characterized by a strong political cohesion of the nations inhabiting it. In his work "Mitteleuropa" written in 1915 and re-printed in the following year, the famous German theoretician of liberalism, Friedrich Naumann[2], explaining the concept of Central Europe, characterized the nations of this region as "communities of fate", situated in the way of Russia's westward expansion, hindered by Russia from fulfilling their European destiny to which they belong and forced by circumstances to unite their forces in order to regain and keep their freedom.

The biggest part of the *Pontic-Baltic Isthmus* was constituted by the Polish-Lithuanian community which included Ukraine at the end of the middle Ages and at the beginning of the modern period.

Influenced by some Ukrainian avant-gardists, the Polish intellectuality initiated the concept of "Prometheanism" at the end of the XIX century and the Beginning of the XX, which promoted the idea of liberating the region from Russian rule and the creation of a confederation that will include all the peoples of the region.

Religious and ethnic disagreements, territorial disputes and social conflicts lead more to the isolation of the nations and peoples of the region and less to the development of a strong spirit of community which the materialization of the Pontic-Baltic project would have needed and, finally, did nothing but opened the way for conquests and occupations that first the Tsarist Empire and later on the USSR carried out using the "divide and master" principle, following models from the history of mankind – the conquest of Britain by the Romans, of Ireland by the Anglo-Saxons and of India by the British Empire.

Why regionalization in the security of Europe?

After the attacks of September 2011, the numerous changes in the security environment inevitably led to changes in the perception of states with regard to security threats in general and to security interests in particular.

These attacks caused for the first time in the North Atlantic Alliance history the recourse to Article 5 of the Treaty, which refers to collective defense. A new threat was then revealed – the Islamic militancy. In order to counter it, NATO decided to get involved in Afghanistan, leaving for the first time in its existence its traditional affairs and theatres of operations in the Euroatlantic zone (the West Balkans).

Jihadist attacks later on took place in Spain and Great Britain, confirming and, unfortunately, consecrating the actions of Islamic militants as threats to the interests of NATO member countries. Their perception of the threats of terrorism, turned global, was and continues to be different. The leaders of most European and Alliance member states consider the application of military force in the Middle East and Southern Asia for countering global terrorism an error; this, they say, can be achieved at lower costs and more effectively through the formulation and application at the level of each nation of internal laws applicable to the resident Muslim population. In the worst case scenario, they say, if the fight against global terrorism is to be carried out outside the NATO area, the solution will only be provided by clandestine operations carried out by specially trained forces. The elimination of the Al-Qaida leader in Pakistan in May 2011 corroborated with the decision to decrease the forces in Afghanistan and the media coverage of the operations, which are also destabilizing the terrorist organizations, proves that the method was adopted up to a certain extent even by the USA.

The costs of counterattack operations will be thus substantially reduced, envisaging especially the gathering of intelligence and the equipping and training o f small number of specialists, instead of the deployment of the traditional large military units and their equipment and armament.

More than Europeans, the USA have a major interest in bringing Al-Qaida leaders to justice, as they equally, from a strategic perspective,

wish to prepare Afghanistan for an efficient self-governance, capable to ensure the security of the country and to prevent the development and/or perpetuation of the terrorist networks on its territory. .

The economic crisis in Europe affecting mainly the member states from the Euro Zone, also called the "trust crisis", represents another element that influences the way in which European countries perceive threats to security, even rising doubts on the capacity of the EU and NATO to represent the political and security interests of the nation states. If this latter scenario is confirmed, new solutions have to be found. Regionalization seems to be one of the most acceptable. Is regionalization of Europe the only viable solution to ensure countries' security on the old continent?

Analyzing the attitude of some states, the answer seems to be positive. On the background of the current severe economic crisis, Germany, despite the twenty year old efforts to integrate East Germany, manifests today as a true European economic nation and, at the same time, as the political leader of Europe, a position in which, together with France, succeeded in reconciling with the Russian Federation.

The close relations between Germany and the Russian Federation, dictated in equal proportions by energy and security reasons, indicated the intention of the former to shape EU under the format it desires.

The close relations the three countries enjoy are not something many Europeans like. Dissatisfactions on this issue can be heard in the Baltic States, in Central Europe, but also in the proximity of the Russian Federation. They manifest on multiple levels, the one most at hand being the economic one. A visit by the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitri Medvedev, planned for 31 July 2011, was canceled as a consequence of the refusal of the Kyiv authorities to sign a merge agreement between the Ukrainian company NAFTOGAZ and the Russian concern GAZPROM.

France closely watches the development of Germany and the Russian-European relations, assuming an important role in the EU leadership every time an opportunity arises.

The Western countries with strong ties – Denmark, the Netherlands and Great Britain –, whose security is largely dependant on USA, try

to improve relations with them and suspiciously observe an emerging Germany having a more and more influential role on European economy.

The accession of the Baltic States to the North-Atlantic Alliance, the pro-western revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, events that occurred during a single year (the end of 2003 – November 2004) produced foreseeable effects at the level of perception of the population and leaders of NATO member states and Russia.

Positions of important actors
on the international scene

The expansion of NATO through the integration of the Baltic States was seen by Russia not only as a threat, but also as a precedent of Ukraine and Georgia, which had already announced their intentions with regard to their democratic future.

Russia will not be able to afford to lose influence over Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia or the Caucasus. It reached its objective using an entire arsenal of methods, from political intrigues (Ukraine, Moldova) to the use of military force (Georgia, August 2008), with the risk to cool relations with important actors such as USA and NATO, a situation that persists and which is unlikely to ease within the foreseeable future. If relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance experienced a détente in the first half of 2011, the relation with the USA over Georgia is at least causing anxiety.

On the 29 July 2007, the US Senate unanimously adopted a resolution that recognizes Abkhazia and South Osetia as part of Georgia, as well as the fact that these area are under Russian military occupation. The resolution also asks for the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from these areas. Through its permanent representative at NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, the Russian Federation stated the following day that the presence of its troops represents the only guarantee for regional security and stability and is determined by a possible aggression by Georgia.

The Russian side considers the resolution senseless as long as the issue was removed from the agenda of discussions of the NATO – Russian Federation Council and is legally unlawful, having no other purpose but the policy to re-launch relations between USA and the Russian federation, initiated and promoted by President Barack Obama.

In support of the Russian statement comes the representative of the South Osetian President on post conflict issues, Boris Ciociev, who considers the act of the US Senate as useless attempts to move in the eyes of the international community the responsibility for the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008.

However, the countries of Western Europe regard the comeback of Russia to the European political scene with more understanding, determined obviously by their dependency on Russian energy resources and the economic exchanges with great Eastern power. None of the Western European countries desires a Cold War type confrontation with the Russian Federation. They are, at the same time, those Alliance member states that, for the reasons already mentioned, enjoy close ties with Moscow. In contrast, the Central European states bordering the countries under the influence of the Russian federation, also known as the Intermarium countries, that is the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, see the rise of Russia as a threat, being traditionally worried by the Russian power and base their counterattacking efforts on the alliance with the countries of the West.

From its creation and until the end of the Cold War, the North-Atlantic Alliance had an enemy and a goal clearly determined. The demise of the Soviet Block eased the relations between East and West and gave a signal for conceptual and organizational changes. The need for enlargement became more and more obvious; countries that were until then enemies became partner states. The partnership between these and NATO started shyly on both sides. Finally the compatibility was demonstrated so that at the middle of the nineties the first documents were formally signed stating the intentions of both parts.

One of the current issues within NATO – and the tendency seems to manifest in the years and maybe even periods to come – is the perception of the Member States with regard to the future threats. The signatory states of the Treaty regard this issue through their national interests, and these often prove different from those of the Alliance as an entity.

In spite all these, NATO is today a group of friend countries that offers not only a democratic forum of discussions, but also standards of interoperability which facilitate the creation of ad-

hoc coalitions – "coalition of the willing"³, carried out in operations such as: combating piracy in Somalia, law enforcement in areas like Kosovo or the protection of the civil population against the forces of the Libyan leader Ghaddafi, in the first half of 2011.

Coming back to the already discussed issue of the perception of Alliance countries with regard to the threats towards their security and the priority to address them, at least three distinct options can be observed.

Firstly, there is the so-called "Atlantist" group of countries whose security orientation envisages the theaters of operations outside Europe (Afghanistan) – USA, Canada and the European group (Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark) and which want an increase in the contributions of the countries in the center of Western Europe. The unchallenged leader of the Atlantist countries is the USA, which explains among other things their option to reform the NATO decision making system, so that the secretary general receives enlarged powers through the elimination of the right of veto. This attitude serves the USA from all points of view, their interest being to have full control over decision factors. The fact that, traditionally, the political leader of the Alliance comes from an Atlantist country is not a coincidence.

Regarding the rise experienced by the Russian Federation, especially Germany and, to a lesser extent other Western European countries such as France and Italy, have a perception totally different form those of the Atlantists, USA and the states in the Intermarium. Even if, undoubtedly, Berlin has reasons to worry because of the rise of the Russian Federation, this is not perceived as a threat as long as the Russian borders are at a considerable distance from the German ones. This attitude of some Western European countries toward the Russian Federation created a certain division within EU and NATO (example: their "silence" during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008).

We continue the journey on the map of NATO towards the East, with Germany and France in leading position, the Western European states, except for the Atlantist ones, ask for a reduction of NATO troops outside the territory of the member states. For reasons related to historical links and the need to maintain favorable economic relations (Germany imports the largest part of the energy resources it needs from the Russian Federation), the states in Western Europe promote a close cooperation with the Russian Federation and the international organizations, especially the UN. From this perspective, their policy evolves in a pacifist zone, a zone in which consultations and cooperation are decisive.

In opposition with the Western state, NATO member states in Central Europe, known as the "Intermarium" states, wish for a larger involvement of the Alliance in Europe, including through the deployment of troops on their territory.

Statements in favor of the continuation of open door policies through the expansion of the Alliance towards the East and the support given to Ukraine and Georgia in this respect clearly express their attitude toward the Russian Federation, in total opposition from the pro-Russian West.

Seen with detachment by the Atlantists and courted by the states of the old continent, the Russian Federation perceives its relation with NATO from a position of equality, sometimes of superiority, and seems relaxed in relation to the Intermarium states.

The expansion of the Alliance toward the East did not produce, as expected, a unification of the continent. The integration of the Intermarium states only modified the borders imposed by the East-West confrontation of the Cold War, in the sense of their transfer on new geopolitical coordinates. The process the modified the division of Europe occurred over a relatively short period of time, in two accurately identifiable phases.

In a first phase, which marked the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union withdrew from the areas established in the Central Europe by the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, which allowed the states in this region to develop links with the North-Atlantic Alliance so that, at a later date, to gain accession in its political and military structures.

The result of these mutations determined USA to take advantage of this breach and, in order to limit the future exertion of Russian power, to concentrate more than ever on the states newly liberated from Soviet influence, a move interpreted by the Russian Federation as a "potential" reason for confrontation.

The second phase, the regaining by the Russian Federation of the influence in the Soviet era, showed that Moscow's withdrawal and regrouping

culminated in 2010 with the reversing of the results of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and, later on during the same year, in the integration of Belarus in the structures of the Russian Federation.

The redefinition of the division borders in Europe was followed by changes in the geopolitics of the old continent.

Conclusions

A final question, whose answer requires to be analyzed, is how will the EU and equally NATO capital, perceive these changes. The two organizations will have to consider reorganizations, re-dimensioning and even to reconsider the way in which they address the region. The discussion will be carried out with the region itself and not with every capital separately. Are the two organizations prepared for such mutations?

EU and NATO might see the regional federalization as an advantage, from getting rid of obligations toward the states in the region and the reduction in resources of all types and up to the simplification of the decision making process. The solving of potential crises in the region will become thus the responsibility of federations, which, for the two main political and security institutions, will become true bridge heads.

The Russian-Georgian War of 2008 and the existence of frozen conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh confirm the prognosis for tensioned periods of time, whose end will only come in time and only as a result of intelligent and assiduous diplomatic endeavor.

The regionalization of security always represented a consequence of the differences that states established and identified on certain moments of their existence. Security interests are the ones that dictate the necessity of states to join organizations that are capable to ensure their security. NATO is certainly the organization that best answered the challenges brought forth by the changes in the security environment and, consequently, the changes in the threats to the Alliance and to each Member State.

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4 ***NATO Strategic Concept, 2010.

NOTES:

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2 Friedrich Naumann (1860- 1919), politician, publicist and theoretician of liberalism in Germany.

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THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN ANARCHY AND POWER RELATIONS

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The international environment in an anarchic one, determined by relations among powers and in order for the states to achieve their objectives and maintain their security in an anarchic society, they have to rely on solutions generated by themselves and on arrangements made on their own.

Key-words: international environment; anarchy; relations between powers; balance of power; sovereignty; security.

1. Preliminary concerns

Taking into consideration the fact that states are entirely political constructions, the international political system is the most important aspect of states' environment. The international political system is *anarchy*, meaning that its main characteristic is the absence of a common government. This absence describes a structural state that encourages competitive relations, but it does not necessarily imply chaos and disorder. The states' main characteristic is sovereignty or their refusal to recognize any superior political authority other than their own.[1] The national society has an assertive governance, while the international society does not. A single state's power is only challenged by the power of other states. The states have to rely on *self-helping*, adding allies and (sometimes) the constraining power of international regulations.[2] In a self-helping system, each state divides a part of its effort not to achieve its own wealth, but to ensure the means to protect itself from others. States are worried for their survival and this concernment is conditioning their behavior.[3] Some believe that only a global government can solve this issue. Others consider that a proper order can be ensured by organizations and international treaties, almost like a world government. However, the majority believe that international relations cannot exist other than in anarchy and would continue to be dangerous.[4]

States cannot assign leadership responsibilities to a central entity, except for the case when that entity is able to protect the states it leads. The stronger the states from the influence area are and the greater each state's power is perceived as a threat for the others, the greater the power assigned to the central entity should be. The greater the power assigned to the center, the stronger the states' motivation to engage in a controlled fight. States are in a direct proportional insecurity with their freedom. If freedom is the goal, insecurity must be accepted. Organizations that proclaim authority and control relations can increase security, but at the same time they limit the freedom.[5] In this anarchic world, sustainers of realism emphasize that caution is a great virtue in foreign policy. States should pay attention not

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to the other states' intentions, but to their own abilities.

Despite its anarchy, the international system is far from being chaotic. The great majority of interactions between states submit to behavior *regulations*, such as: *sovereignty*, the most important regulation, meaning that a government has the right to do whatever it considers in its own territory: the territory imposes respect for all states' territorial integrity; *general recognition* by other states of one state's sovereignty upon its territory when it gets involved in the international system; *development of diplomatic regulations* in order to facilitate interactions between them. However, the existence of these regulations often creates a *security dilemma* – a situation where the actions of the states that are meant to ensure their security tend to threaten other states' security. This is the main cause of the arms race, in which states offer large amounts of money for weapons which they use to threaten each other, weapons that in the end do not ensure their security. The security dilemma is a negative consequence of the anarchy in the international system. The only solution for the dilemma, in the *realist theory*, is the *balance of power* or in the *liberal* theory, it is represented by the development of *regulations and institutions*.[6]

2. Visions of the anarchy of the international system

The theories of realism, neorealism, neoliberalism, neo-Marxissm, constructivism and postmodernism present in various colours and tones this system with its different components, aspects, dimensions, trends and forecasts. They cover an extremely broad range of considerations and interpretations, starting from those that see this system as anarchic, chaotic and conflictual, as each state pursues its interests and wishes to impose them at any cost or, in any case by power relations, meaning by power politics, with a remarkable selfish spirit (neorealists and realists), and continuing with those promoting the idea of the end of nation states, of omnipotence of international institutions and of the necessity of a new international order, of a different order based on international mechanisms and institutions (neoliberalists) and so on.

The fact is that the evolution of the international system based on states is not easily analyzed and evaluated. Apparently, this system has a certain linearity, a certain coherent evolution, of course, with many meanders, over the time. But a questionable linearity, as sudden changes, with complex effects, sometimes contradictory, show that the representation of community states and other elements and structures as a system is strained and even simplistic. Behavior of the system itself (if we accept that there really is such a system, as defined in systems theory) and especially of its component elements (states, international organizations and bodies, networks, structures, so on) is still one hardly predictable, with strange developments, even chaotic. The conclusions that were drawn from the analysis of the developments of international relations so far are not very clear and very firm, but partial and questionable. Hence the resurgence of many theories, which take the whole spectrum, from denying the existence of such a system or consider it as being anarchic and chaotic, up to placing it among the dynamic and complex systems that can be studied, analyzed and rigorously shaped.

2.1. Realist vision over the anarchy of the international system

Realism is considered to be the main theory able to regenerate a new paradigm of international relations.

Emerged as a reaction to idealism, being specific for the interwar period, developed after the Second World War, realism has peaked in the early years of the postwar period. It has developed especially in the Anglo-American world and was representative for the intellectual and academic effort in order to justify U.S. foreign policy in the new international conditions, pointed out by the Cold War. The entire evolution of political realism can be considered as a permanent development along the concepts and assumptions which define this theory. This could be understood as an always repeated and failed attempt to transform European diplomatic practice principles of nineteenth-century into general laws of an American social science.[7] Among the first theorists who wrote about realism we can mention: EH Carr, R. Neibuhr, I. Herz, HI Morgenthau, G. Schwarzenberger, M. Wight, N. Spykman, G. Kennan, and later were noted R. Aron, H. Bull, H. Kissinger, R.E. Osgood, R. Rosecrance, KW Thompson, KN Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer, etc..

An important feature of political realism is defining international politics as a "*struggle for power*". The significance of power both as means and goal can be the ability to influence or change the behavior of others in the desired direction or, vice versa, the ability to resist such influences through self behavior. In this respect, the state's ability to act and react is directly influenced by the function of the power it possesses.[8] That fact that states do not respond effectively to one supreme authority determines the idea that each one is concerned about its own security to ensure its survival. Therefore, national interest is perceived in terms of power, other factors such as ideological values and moral principles being irrelevant. The anarchic nature of the international system requires states achieving military power able to reach the necessary level to deter any attempted attack, which is achieved through a balance of power, stability and order being the product of optimal functioning of alliance systems. Because realists recognize the existence of conflict in international relations, cooperation is possible only if it is done in the national interest. In the international system, its structure and power swings between power capacities and equality notion, which is seen in the formal sense, meaning the equality between states.

According to the realist vision, in the international system anarchy, states usually compete and not collaborate. Although they may be strongly connected to each other, each state is looking to accomplish its own interests and objectives and is not willing to give anything up in another state's favour unless it has an advantage or it is forced by that certain state to do that. Therefore, international relations are actually power relations. Power makes the law – very much power and very little cooperation. Therefore, the most efficient counterbalance for a state's power is other states' power, and the collocation "balance of power" makes sense when it refers to the general concept expressed by one or a group of states' power used in order to counterbalance other state's or a group of states' power. It may also refer to any relation of power among states or alliances or it can just represent a relatively equal balance. Alternatively, the collocation can refer to the process through which counterbalancing coalitions were formed in order to prevent a state from conquering an entire region.[9] Alliances have a key role in the balance of power. Increasing one's own capacities against a rival is a form of power balancing, whereas forming an alliance against a threatening state is usually faster, cheaper and more efficient. When such a counterbalancing coalition has a geopolitical element – physically surrounding the threatening state – the power balancing strategy is named containment.

An attempt to substantiate the realistic theory is claimed by EH Carr, who, in his book „*The Twenty Years Crisis*", has strongly criticized idealism, revealing three major shortcomings: *motivation is considered a priority compared to interests, ethics to policy and theory to practice*[10]. Of the main ideas promoted by Carr, let us mention here only a few: policy can not be analyzed through a former program, but only by the outcomes of its current research; therefore realism means researching the consequences and, afterwards, building the arguments of the theory; the harmony of interests is nothing but a representation of power configuration that ultimately makes the interests of the dominant group to be extrapolated to the entire community[11]; all laws, principles and ideologies are determined by social conditions, and "all internationalist ideologies are mere rationalities configured by dominant power in order to protect their privileged position"[12], realism being based on willingness to consider man and social relations, especially political relations, as they really are and not how it's desired to become in the name of an ideal.[13]

Hans Morgenthau prevailed in international relations theory with the work "Politics Among Nations", a very important moment for the evolution of U.S. politics.[14] Being victorios after the Second World War, the U.S. needed a theoretical justification in foreign policy, especially since its superpower status it had created a series of global responsibilities. The main message of the book of H. Morgenthau is the concept of *power politics*, which is analyzed based on three basic human impulses: the impulse to live, to reproduce and to dominate. Having in mind the latter, mankind has been engaged in an ongoing power struggle, which has been the essence of politics and war[15]; in this context, the desire for power extracts the essence of human nature, the natural instinct to dominate. The concept of power has been undermined by assumptions such as: power is not absolute, it is always in conjunction with other powers; power is not permanent because the bases of power are

constantly changing and power is not resulting from a single factor, such as military forces, for instance.[16]

In his view, in an anarchic system, the national state controls the struggle for power, but because it can not be fully eradicated, then it's outward: „Failing to fully satisfy the desire of power within national borders, people transfer their unfulfilled aspirations on the international stage."[17] In addition, any international ordered system must be based on regulatory mechanisms from which three different mechanisms are being identified: ethics, world public opinion and international law. If they will not work, the national forces would have to leave their borders and will cause conflicts. Aspiration for power of several states configures the balance of power and the states as international policy players that will set their own interest in terms of power: given that any individual has an instinct for power and conquest, the state tends to develop and manifest its power on international level in relation to other nations.

In this context, the balance of power is not a political issue, but a natural choice, capturing several levels of the balance of power: buffer states, protective states and states of interest, namely those states for which powerful states compete and they want within their influence. Power balance can be maintained at peace, or be lost when at war, because it is being influenced by politics.

Kissinger's rise in American politics in the twentieth century, during the early '70s came amid military engagement in Vietnam; the U.S. declined in credibility and legitimacy, enabling the USSR, which meanwhile, launched an ambitious program of its weapons and expanded its influence in the world, to obtain strategic parity. Diplomacy was proposed as the main instrument for achieving foreign policy,[18] obviously adapted to the Concert of Europe system, specific to the nineteenth century, a system which was using *détente* (relaxation) as a way of creating a legitimate international order. The great powers they had in mind when referring to the new international order were China and the USSR. If, regarding China, he considered it as fitting the classical tradition of European art of government, the USSR had many elements of "*ruthless opportunism*", which caused the U.S. to adopt a containment policy when it was necessary and cooperation when it was possible. By using a policy of relaxation and various

concessions, he hoped to generate changes in the USSR and to prepare the end of the Cold War. At the same time, he also proposed the concept of *connexation* as a way of expansion, also achieved by means of a policy of containment through negotiated *connexation*, meaning a blend of political sequences in order to build an active and successful diplomacy. The core of the *connexation* policy is composed of two elements: integrating USSR in European economic structures and increasing economic benefits in order to determine the USSR to political cooperation. Therefore, the concert diplomacy could not succeed as long as the USSR was willing to accept changes in its foreign policy, but not in the internal one. Another interesting finding relates to the balance center of the superpower states, which proved questionable in the domination of international relations because the allies' dependence to a superpower does not automatically mean its authority. External relations at their level could not be addressed without taking into account internal policy, although perhaps foreign policy would have preferred the other way.

Methodological shortcomings of traditional realism led some researchers to reassess the role of power in achieving cooperation under anarchy. Neorealism differs from realism in methodology and conception of itself.[19] This theoretical approach was defined *neorealism* or *structural realism*.

Significant representatives of this theory consider that all social systems have, among others, a political sub-system in which a central role is played by the leadership problem, introducing the concept of *great hegemonic power*. This hegemonic state imposes order in international relations without appealing to conquests, exerting a benign management of the system. The main representative of this theory is considered to be K.N. Waltz, who in his *Theory of International Politics* is concerned with power distribution and defines a structure by three main features: a) an international system is hierarchical, b) the international system is anarchic, that is, each state must take care of all its essential functions and c) a structure is defined by the distribution of capabilities among its units and *war originated in human nature, in the type of regime within the state or in the characteristics of the international system*. K. Waltz also proposed a definition of the state-centered international political system

"*international structures are defined based on the fundamental political units of an era, whether they are city-states, empires or nations*". So, in his opinion, currently there is no crucial international political unit other than the state. Conversely, the structure of international political system is defined by what states do (this is why war and diplomacy are the central events of international politics). Waltz believes that the fundamental goal of states is not maximizing power, but achieving or maximizing security. This means that increasing power is really only a tool for fulfilling other purposes, but an inevitable one. His theory on the balance of power is derived from the motives (security) and actions (improving the position in terms of power) assumed. In doing so, states are tempted to balance power, not to enhance it, and considering the anarchic international domain, at some point, states will react so as to balance the distribution of power, given the constraints they are subjected to.

An important contribution to neorealism was brought by John J. Mearsheimer, who in his work, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, Norton, 2001) is not limited to the system, but aims to give a theory of foreign policy. According to him, international policy structure is the key to understanding things; he outlines five hypotheses that characterize the essential features of international politics: a) the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no governing body over governments to promulgate laws and punish criminals –sovereignty is inherent to states; b) states always have some military capability that gives them the means to strike and destroy each other; c) states can never be sure about the intentions of other states, i.e. if they will military attack them or not, d) survival is the main goal of all states in the international system, so they try to maintain territorial integrity and national independence; e) states are rational actors who think strategically about their external situation and choose the strategy that can maximize the initial goal of survival.[20] If Waltz's realism is a "defensive" in which states pursue the balance of power in anarchic environment, Mearsheimer presents an "offensive" realism in which great powers seek to maximize their power at the detriment of rivals, having hegemony as a goal. Thus, a hegemonic state is seen so powerful that it dominates all other states in the system and hegemony, the domination

of the system, which usually is interpreted as the whole world, and in this sense, war is the main way to win power.[21] Power is defined in terms of latent capacity (population, economic strength) and exercise (military power). Only great powers which possess large military capabilities are able to lead wars and dispute the hegemonic role.[22]

Compared with Waltz' states, those of Mearsheimer are more open to risk and take into account other objectives than security. If according to Waltz, powers are aimed at keeping the status quo, according to Mearsheimer, they are revisionist. Based on the distribution of capabilities, Mearsheimer outlines the following types of international structures: *balanced bipolarism, balanced multipolarism* and *unbalanced multipolarism* and in this structures he notes that multipolar systems are more unstable and prone to war than the bipolar ones because the number of significant actors increases the opportunities for war, asymmetries are more common and the risk of calculation errors in the relative power increases, as well as states' pursue of their interests.[23] In this context, it can be pointed out that both the theory of defensive realism (Waltz), and that of offensive realism (Mearsheimer), make important clarifications on the concepts of state, power, hegemony, etc. and ideas backed by realist theory of international relations.

2.2. Liberal vision over the anarchy of the international system

Liberalism (idealism) prevailed in political thought after World War I and is considered the direction that has opened the idea of international relations as an academic discipline in itself.

The disastrous consequences of World War I led to bankruptcy of the *Concert of Europe*, which was based on a policy of balance of power, led by an aristocratic diplomacy. The new model of approaching international relations was initiated and supported by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and was a confirmation of the place that the U.S. occupied on global hierarchy after the war. U.S. role growth in the world has taken place in the conditions of a Europe strongly affected by the war, who was no longer able to properly manage security issues.

The new world order proposed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, even before the end

of war, characterized by democracy, collective security and self-determination and promoted through the League of Nations (April 19, 1919)[24], which wanted to develop cooperation among nations, to ensure peace and safety, and to eliminate war,[25] was not viable. U.S. non-ratification of the Founding Act, the lack of the two great powers from the organization - Germany and Russia - have questioned its validity and durability. Moreover, the inability to impose a penalty for invading of Manchuria by Japan, for the attack on Ethiopia by Italy, the inability to prevent Hitler to occupy the demilitarized Rhineland[26], and the lack of a viable economic system, affected by the crisis in '29 – '33, led to the collapse of collective security. Those who promoted idealism failed to notice that the main sources of state action and its behavior can be found in the sphere of considerations related to power and national interest rather than that of ethics and universalism.

Starting with the '80's, in the context of the deteriorating international situation, when referring to a new Cold War, which began with the launch of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), was drafted a neoliberal research program, as a reaction to realism. The term neoliberalism is used by Joseph Nye in 1988 and in the same year, realistic researcher Joseph Grieco used the phrase "neoliberal institutionalism" in the text of an article whose title refers to "the latest (newest) liberal institutionalism."[27] Even tough conflict (not cooperation) was imposing itself as the dominant research theme, cooperation among states was the fundamental institution from which theorists like Robert Keohane, David Baldwin and Robert Powell began their research. The field of international relations needed a theory that would approach the phenomenon of cooperation, which served as the glue binding the neoliberal program of research.[28] Neoliberals accept that states are the key-actors in international relations, even if they recognize the existence of other actors, too. The state is regarded as a unitary rational actor seeking to maximize benefits in all thematic areas of international politics. Its preferences in terms of international interaction results may vary over time, but can be at any time ranked by a consistent manner in each of these areas. In neoliberal perspective, the international system is anarchic, meaning by that the absence of a worldwide government. This environment, characterized by

self-help, structures the preferences and behavior of states. But anarchy does not rule out the existence of high levels of interdependence, at least within certain states. In such an environment, states can cooperate when they have a common interest. In a cooperative arrangement, the state is a maximizer of utility, being precisely interested in absolute gains that woud get from cooperation. The main obstacle to success is failure of cooperation commitments by one or more partners (damage). This behavior occurs when the state, interpreting the international environment, concludes that by doing so, it only serves its own interest. To increase the chances of cooperation, states may try to alter the context in which interactions occur, creating international institutions and regimes. Institutions and international regimes are independent factors that facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty, increasing the available information in the context of that set of international interactions, establishing and confirming the credibility of the participating actors' reputation. States will allocate resources and will show loyalty to the norms promoted by institutions, as long as they serve the interests, and in time, international institutions can shape perceptions of political leaders in the national interest, thus facilitating international cooperation[29].

According to the liberal view, in an anarchical system, the solution to the security dilemma is represented by the international institutions that are created by states to help them manage and, where possible, to optimize the relationship among them. Under certain conditions, they may, however, soften the competition for security and promote world peace, because of their capacity to influence states to refuse the maximizing of power behavior and to refrain from calculating each important move according to the way it might affect the balance of power. [30]

Under these circumstances, the United Nations is the only world organization that can aim for these prerogatives, although this institution does not manage to be flexible, to adapt its philosophy, its features and its way of action to the new international system conditions. Actually, none of the international organizations that were created during the years, did not manage to be viable and sooner or later, they fell off the international relations scene. For example, the UNO did not succeed to manage the Yugoslavian situation, to

put an end to the bloody wars between 1992-1999, and in 2003, it proved once more its incapacity in the Iraq war, pulling out new differences among the most important powers (after an agreement referring to the Iraq disarming, the Security Council split in two when it came to the authorization to use force against Iraq – US and Great Britain were for, France, Russia and China were against. When France threatened to use its veto right against a UN resolution that authorised the war, the US-Great Britain coalition overthrew the Iraq government without the explicit support of the UN).[31] The UN has an even lesser influence upon the great powers' decisions and upon their attitude towards certain events, but especially towards the international institutions created by states in order to help them better adapt to the conditions that generate and transform the security environment. Moreover, the UN's influence upon states, as reduced as it is at present, it is even more likely to diminish even more in the future, because its decision making body - the Security Council - will probably increase the number of its members. Creating a larger Security Council with more permanent members with a veto right against the UN policies, according to some political analysts, would make practically impossible to formulate and apply the policies meant to limit the great states' action. At present, the Security Council permanent members are the great winning powers in the Second World War and no immediate change is foreseen.

3. States' motivations to appeal to international institutions

In some cases, states operate through institutions and take advantage from this. And moreover, the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so as to maintain, if not to increase, their part in world power. Basically, institutions are "arenas where the power relations are developed", according to realist and neorealist theories. When the US decided they did not want the UN General Secretary, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, to gain a second mandate, they forced his replacement despite for the fact that all the other members from the Security Council wanted him to remain in place. This is because the US is at present the most powerful state in the world and they usually impose their point of view

in the matters they consider to be important. In case they do not succeed, they choose to ignore that institution and do whatever they consider best for their national interest.[32] At the same time, the US gives the most important financial support to the UN. In addition, when one takes the entire responsibility to manage, more precisely to lead the managing process of the world's conflicts and to maintain an optimal security environment, some of the international organizations created by states can become an impediment.

Therefore, despite for the fact that international institutions become more numerous and in some opinions, more capable to determine the states to cooperate with each other, one must consider that although all countries are equal from the sovereignty perspective, when it comes to the power relations between them, including the institutions created by the states themselves, are far from being equal, and the Nations Society or the United Nations examples or any other international institution that did not and will not have a significant coercion against the great powers, is probative on this matter.

In the context of the end of the Cold War, the accelerating globalization process and the establishment of a new world order, where the anti-terrorism war is the main aspect, the United States role is very important. From strategic point of view, globalization is obviously directly related to the quality and form that shape military action, for improving the most commonly used means - during the Persian Gulf War (1991), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), which strategic chronicle called "revolution in military affairs" that means nothing else but an electronic and especially digital revolution of weapons at the highest level, through guidance and precision, of logistics and military communications. At the same time, the bombing of Yugoslavia, a sovereign and independent state, with a large number of aircrafts for 78 days (March-June 1999), by the U.S. (as a representative of NATO) to protect minorities in Kosovo, although this country was not a threat to American security in any traditional sense, shows that there occurred a major shift in public international law, which pointed out new meanings. Kosovo was the culmination of a series of interventions carried out on behalf of human rights and humanitarian values. U.S. armed forces have been deployed in Somalia, initially to support food distribution, afterwards

to bring the country's top civilian government in Haiti, to release people from a military government that had come to power through a coup in Bosnia, to end a civil war, and in Kosovo, for transferring the authority from the Serbian government to the majority population of Albanian ethnic origin.[33]

Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary of State said in *Foreign Affairs* in November 1996 that "in a world increasingly interdependent, Americans have a growing interest in how other countries are governed. The higher and more closely linked community of nations that choose democratic forms of government are, the more prosperous and secure Americans will be, because it is known that democracies are more likely to meet their international commitments, being unlikely to be involved in terrorism or environmental destruction, and going to war against each other. This statement is the essence of national security reason to support the vigorous promotion and, when necessary, defending democracy in other countries."[34] According to the new doctrine of humanitarian intervention, humanitarian beliefs are in such a way part of the American tradition that both money and, in extreme cases, even lives should be put at risk to protect these beliefs all over the world. No other country has ever announced such purposes, fact that leads to the perception that the U.S. is a world gendarme (U.S. analyst John Mearsheimer shows that the U.S. is actually "*a counterbalance external factor, not the world policeman*").[35] As Henry Kissinger observed, the greatest challenge for the American approach (and for some Western European allies) of humanitarian military intervention is that it is presented as a universal prescription applicable in all situations, without reference to historical or cultural context. As a consequence, various military interventions after the Cold War generated a debate on so-called exit strategy, which is another way to define the limits of humanitarian intervention universality.

Conclusions

There are various ways to optimize the balance of power and control of its international relations system. One way to do that is the creation of an international legal system. This is not a supranational entity, but an interstatal one. It is the International Criminal Court (ICC) and special international tribunals (eg International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). States that have signed and ratified the documents establishing the ICC and the Rome Statute, agreed that the jurisdiction of such courts should enter the trial of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, piracy, deprivation of freedom and terror committed by some heads of state or other people who have immunity. In less than a decade it has arose an unprecedented concept, the submission of international politics to judicial procedures. It spread with extraordinary speed and didn't become a subject for any systematic debates. The doctrine of universal jurisdiction asserts that there are crimes so heinous that their perpetrators should not escape justice by invoking the doctrine of sovereignty and national borders protection. But this concept does not diminish the power of states, does not affect them, nor the principle of sovereignty, but only abolishes the category of sovereign impunity, that after Westphalia did not obey but only to the divine power and its own conscience. States are deeply concerned to eliminate or limit as much anarchy and establish norms and rules generally recognized by the entire community in the world arena of power relations. In this aim, they create international intergovernmental organizations to promote and defend the interests of the relations established between them and what is between them and non-state actors.

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GEOPOLITICS OF THE HIGH NORTH - THE RACE FOR THE ARCTIC

Ana Maria GHIMIŞ*

This paper's main purpose is to develop a critical approach on one of the latest power disputes, the race for the Arctic, a region in which appear aspects related to classical realism, proving once again that national states are rational entities. They are able to choose to cooperate, but only when it is in accordance with their national interests. Thus, states remained locked in realism's views. Opposed to this fact stays the concept of security, that has evolved since the end of the Cold War, assuming five new dimensions[1], each of them being able to stay at the basis of the changes of the balance of power. Following the recent discoveries, it was proved that the High North has in its underground huge volumes of natural resources such as: gas, oil and non-energy resources. Because of these issues, the Arctic has become a clash region between five different states: the Russian Federation, United States of America, Canada, Denmark and Norway. Each of these states has its own national set of interests that are unilaterally developed. This fact generates a state of insecurity felt worldwide, because these interests are rarely common. The Arctic has the ability to change the international statu-quo, at least economically speaking, this being the reason for which states choose to race for it, but this is a race that proves to be a zero sum game. The region has become more important for the balance of power maintenance once the parties chose to develop here their military capabilities, fact that increases the possibilities of escalating to an armed conflict.

Key-words: Arctic area; energy resources; military capabilities; sovereignty; security.

Introduction

The establishment of the international statu-quo in the late 20th century determined the emergence and maintenance of a very well shaped international order, recognized by the majority of fundamental international subjects, national states. Thus, Cold War between its two superpowers (USA and USSR) led, even though it was not predictable, to equilibrium and a stable balance of power. This was to be changed once and the URSS collapsed the new millennium begun. At the beginning of the '90s, a period of transition emerged, in which the balance of power was definitely on USA's side. The international system was characterized by having a sole superpower, and other emergent powers, which soon established the rules of a multipolar world. Analyzing the current international arena, it can be said that we are passing through the second

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stage of transition, a period that is characterized by uncertainty, insecurity and change. The logic of the Cold War has not changed if we speak about the main players of the international arena; they are still the national states, which have as main objective their own national security achievement. Unlike the states, the concept of security has evolved since the end of the Cold War. As it is analyzed by Barry Buzan, the concept does not only include the traditional military capabilities, simply because the nature of the current threats are different, thus, in order to be able to effectively respond to such threats and to ensure the national and regional security, the concept needed to suffer some major changes (e.g. states saw themselves unable to respond to terrorist acts using traditional methods). Therefore, we can talk about security: economic, military, political, societal and environmental security. Military aspect is still an important part of the national security, but it is not the only one[2].

Once the Industrial Revolution started, energy resources such as natural gas or oil have become compulsory factors for states' development and maintenance of economy. But their irrational use and exploitation that generated the lack of consume sustainability. This irrationality led to the drastic decrease of existing energy volumes and also the decrease of the number of states that owned the necessary energy quantities in order to sustain their economies. Hence, these resources began to be looked upon as political tools, instead of economical ones. The entire perception of power was changed, once states realized the crucial role of energy, thus of economy. If during the Cold War period, the power of a state was measured by military equipments and technologies, which one superpower had and the other did not, nowadays, economy became a key factor for any state that wants to ensure itself a high level of security. In order to be able to develop a concise and veridical analysis, there will be taken in consideration just the energy resources and their impact on states behavior on the international arena.

Economy is seen as a key factor of power and the threats to its emergence and sustainability have continued to appear. The number of states involved in the race for establishing a favorable international statu-quo has also increased drastically. In the view of Barry Buzan, a state is threatened by another state, economically speaking, when the second is blocking the access of the first to some strategic resources, affecting the natural development of that state[3]. The second one has an advantageous position, which will generate a balance of power that is in the detriment of the other. Resources have a limited character, therefore the entire relation, be it bilateral or multilateral, transforms itself in a zero sum game, in which there is only one winner, the gain actually being the loss of the other[4]. Until recently the map of energy producing states was clearly established (the Middle East, Eurasia etc.), but now that a new region, which is believed to hide beneath its surface 30% of the undiscovered natural gas volumes and 13% of the oil resources, has emerged and has the potential of changing definitely the energy geopolitics of the entire region[5].

Disputed area

On August, the 2nd, 2007 two Russian submarines planted two national titanium flags in the Arctic Ocean. The aim of such an action was to claim a big portion of one of the biggest economic areas in the world. Regarding the legal aspect of such an action, there must be said that Russia did not have any legal right to do so. But through these flags, it clarified its intentions and it underlined its bias for an unilateral strategy, instead of following the international law and possible ways of multilateral cooperation regarding this region. If every party included in this race would follow such logic, Arctic area could easily generate an international crisis regarding the exploitation rights[6]. But why this sudden interest in a region which was believed to be frozen, therefore unapproachable if we speak about navigation and resources' exploitation?

Global warming, nowadays, technology and resources' limited character have highlighted Arctic's strategic importance. The area is considered to be the place where huge amounts of natural gas, oil and non-energy resources can be found. With the ice melting (the main effect of current global warming), resources' exploitation beneath the Arctic waters has become more feasible than it was in the past. This whole expedition meant to ensure Russian priority regarding resources exploration and exploitation and also to strengthen Russian Federation's legal demands on natural gas and oil resources[7]. But such actions could not have passed without negative reactions from other states,

which have appropriate legal demands on the area. Counteractions were predictable if we take into consideration the development level of the current international system which is to be ruled by the international law. The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: "We are not in the fifteenth century. You cannot go around the world and just plant your national flags and then say – We demand this territory[8]". But if we take into account what it is at stake, we will find Russia's actions also predictable, because whoever is going to win, it will, for certain, have a dominant position in the balance of power, at least in economic and energy terms[9].

It must be said that not the amounts of energy resources the Arctic holds are the ones jeopardizing the current balance of power or the international statu-quo, but the international legal character of this area in particular. Until recently, it was considered to be an international region, upon which no state raised legal demands. But the ice melting, the energy price increases together with the high level of technology development and increasingly obvious national interests regarding energy dependence have generated the strategic character of this region[10]. NASA climate change expert, H. Jay Zwally, declared in 2008 that in approximately 10 years the ice, which exits during the summer season in the Arctic region, will melt[11]. Ten years is not a long period of time, therefore it is natural for these states to intensify their legal demands, and now it is the perfect time to do so. But the situation is at least complicated in international law terms. As I mentioned before, the legal status of the Arctic does not allow anyone the exploit Arctic resources, because it is an international territory, therefore we can say that the region is "*no one's*". This aspect in particular complicates even more the situation if we take into consideration the fact that not even the 200 miles, considered to be part of the Economic Exclusive Areas of the five Arctic states (Denmark through Greenland, Norway, Canada, USA and Russia) are not formally accepted and recognized by all the parties involved. Thus, each state is engaging itself in a race for the Arctic, which is no longer considered a frozen area, but a power element, that could influence the balance of power in the favor of one state and against the others[12].

It must be mentioned the fact that this is not a situation in which everybody is against anybody, but it is more likely a situation in which the disputes could be characterized as being divided in groups of two or three states, that have legal demands over the area. Their demands are based on the assumption that these territories are natural extensions of their continental shelf. Following the current situation elements, we cannot speak about a state having exclusive sovereignty over the entire region, but over a given portion of the Arctic. Even so, the race for power is intense given the future benefits: energy resources, economic and geopolitical advantages, gained through the establishment of a new Northern commercial route. Regarding the first group, here we can identify USA and Canada. Their dispute over the continental shelf is akin to the dispute between the Russian Federation and Norway over the Barents Sea (the second group). Canada hasn't reached to a formal agreement with USA over its maritime frontier on Beaufort Sea, nor over the statute of the Northern Passage. Additionally, Russia has not yet ratified the treaty through which its frontiers with USA (very close to Alaska) are marked off. Another group of states is formed by Demark and Canada, which are engaged in a dispute regarding their territorial rights over the Hans Island. All these potential future conflict situations create a region which can be characterized by instability, as the Arctic expert, Scoot Borgerson, was appreciating[13].

The Legal aspect

As aforementioned, the created situation generated a legal dispute over a given territory that, until recently, was considered to be part of the system's periphery, a polar desert, which hadn't the necessary capabilities to become a point of high interest in the powerful states' agenda[14]. All five states are currently developing maps though which experts are trying to prove that certain territories are parts of their continental shelf. This is a crucial aspect because only in this particular way states can demand economic rights over the Arctic resources. The available and legitimate instrument, which can be used in this situation, is international law. The legal agreement that can be applied is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was adopted in 1982 and came into force in 1994[15]. It defines states' rights and their responsibilities over the seas and it

provides resource management and environment protection. But the most important aspect for this situation is that the Convention puts forward a framework for peaceful conflict settlement. According to it, "a state can demand exclusive economic rights over a distance that is no larger than 200 miles"[16]. But there are exceptions, through which a state can have legal demands over a territory larger than 200 miles, for example: "if a country can prove that its continental shelf is crossing away from the 200 miles, it can demand similar rights over the larger area[17]".

In order to develop a critical approach on the potential conflict situation from the Arctic region, it must be developed an analysis on each of the states' policies involved here so as to establish their national interests, their strategies, but also their logic.

The Russian Federation

Russia is the state which holds the largest amount of natural gas worldwide, exceeding in 2004 with its 1,700 trillions of cubic meters even Iran's reserves, with approximately 74%. It is thus the largest natural gas producer but, at the same time, also the biggest exporter and the 8th largest oil exporter. "The main extraction regions are: the space between Volga and Ural Mountains (Sugurova, Taimazî, Samara, Volgograd), Peciora region (Uhta), the vicinity of the Caspian Sea (Groznîi, Kuban); in the Asian side, the main extraction area is in the West Siberiade ("the third Baku") with main exploitation in the Obi stream basin (Samotlorskoe, Tiumen, Surgunt). In the Sakhalin Island, were capitalized Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II deposits of considerable amounts[18]". Regarding oil, the largest proportion of the 60 billion attested barrels lies in West Siberia, between Ural Mountains and Central Siberian platform. These deposits have transformed USSR during the 90's into a major energy producer, reaching a 12.5 million barrels production daily since 1988. A 25% proportion of the overall quantity of gas production lays in Sakhalin Island, which is situated in the Eastern region of the country, North of Japan. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, energy production fell dramatically, reaching less than 5-6 barrels a day in 1998. A market improvement was felt starting with 1999 when the industry was privatized, and the production grew

in 2004 up to 9 million barrels a day[19]. Due to the fact that energy resources are of great importance, one might consider Russia's action in 2007 is justifiable and rational. It aimed at blocking the appearance and development of another powerful state, which would have endangered its privileged position, fact that will occur if the Russians lose the probable resources from the Arctic Ocean. Thus we return to Barry Buzan's described situation, according to which a state threatens another state by blocking its access to resources, by demanding sovereignty over the area, which is supposed to harbor those resources[20].

Maybe the most publicized dispute from the Arctic area concerns the underwater Lomonosov Ridge Mountain, which lies on a distance of 1,240 miles from Siberia to Greenland and Canada[21]. Russian researchers seek proofs to demonstrate that this is a geological extension of Russia, specifically of the Siberian continental platform, and thus it may be demanded by Russia on the basis of the UN Convention regarding the 1982 Law of the Sea. The mountain which crosses the polar region is considered to be extremely rich in natural resources, from oil and natural gas (approximately 10 billion tones) to diamonds and raw metals. Russia presented its first bill at the UN in 2001, but any right was refused due to the lack of persuasive scientific proofs. Nevertheless Russia is not the only state to claim this territory; it competes with Denmark, USA and Canada. Denmark hopes to prove the fact that Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of the Danish territory of Greenland. Canada, who also claimed its rights on a limited territory since 1925, plans to spend 7 billion $ on the construction of 8 patrolling ships in the Arctic area, in its attempt to affirm its sovereignty[22].

The problem is far from being solved, especially because the mountain is composed of the entire ocean basin. In other words, it is connected to Russia on one side and to Greenland and Canada on the other side. Therefore, these states may claim the same rights over the chain but from opposite directions[23]. Until the present day, UN has proved to be insufficient when states' interests clash in a system in which "no one is entitled to command, and no one is compelled to follow"[24]. Moreover, the situation complicates even more, considering the fact that Russia's president, Dmitri Medvedev, declared that the Arctic area is

an important strategic region. According to him, Russia's demands represent the duty the current generation has towards the future one. Disposing of 20 ice breakers, of which 7 are atomic, Russia is by far the state with most capabilities in this region[25]. According to US Geological Survey (USGS), the largest amounts of oil lie in the coasts of Alaska's, Greenland's and Canada's, while natural gas resources are to be found on the coasts of Russia's, Alaska's and Norway's coasts. USA and Canada are thus the most advantaged states, fact which binds a justifiable intensification of Russia's efforts to prove the opposite[26].

Russia will make its presence felt in the Arctic area by military means as well. In July 2011, the Minister of Defence, Anatoly Serdyukov, announced that Moscow will deploy two detachments in this area, possibly in Murmansk or in Arkanghelsk[27].

Thus, the race gains a hard power dimension, but it must not be understood as having an offensive character, an armed conflict being unlikely to occur. It rather has a defensive character, of protecting the national interest. These actions reflect in facts the declarations of the Russian prime-minister, Vladimir Putin, which stated that: „we are open to dialogue with our foreign partners and with all our neighbors in the Arctic area, but we will certainly defend our own interests in a convincible and consistently manner". Hence Russia confirms its role of realist state who tries to transform any opportunity into its own benefit and the loss for others[28].

Norway

For Norway, Arctic is an area disputed with the Russian Federation over the legal sovereignty as which each state considers to be of its own. The specific area is a 60,000 nautical miles territory in the Barents Sea area. After several negotiations, Moscow and Oslo accepted to make an agreement according to which all commercial, military and fishing ships from both states are allowed to cross and use these waters for own purposes as long as they respect the environment and the natural gas and oil resources are left untouched[29].

The nature of the international system allows states to be rational, specifically due to its anarchic character, which compels them to act as such. To be rational implies self and environment awareness.

Furthermore, rationality implicates states' capability of states to „derive from this knowledge how to get the most from an action". That is to say, for each state there is an action at individual level, which is unique and quintessential for the state to obtain the most benefits[30]. State adopts unilaterally developed interests and it is not prone to cooperate, and for this specific reason it is only natural that for each state to exist a unique set of interests allowing it to get the maximum of benefits[31]. Hence the two states had rather created a win-win situation through cooperation, leaving aside the sensitive aspects[32]. Even if no state has the right to extract and explore energy resources, it is nevertheless still a win-win situation due to the fact that no actor has won to the detriment of the other (as it would occur in a zero-sum game). Thus, along with naval rights of the two states, the Russian Federation won the dispute because Norway did not gain any right of any nature over energy resources and vice-versa. It is the probable and possible type of win in an international system based on realist relations among states, in which cooperation appears only marginally and favors the directly involved states. It is the case of Russia and Norway, who preferred to cooperate in areas with no sensitive issues (even in what concerns military ships' rights, cooperation was predictable if we take into account the fact that the prospects of a war between the two states is highly unlikely, as such a scenario does not bring benefit to any of the actors), leaving aside the aspects of great importance for the interest of each actor: energy resources. These agreements were possible due to the fact that both actors registered more benefits cooperating than they would have without cooperation[33].

In what concerns Norway Strategy on the Arctic, it was adopted in December 2006 and renewed in March 2009. The main objectives this country wishes to reach are: intense international cooperation on resource exploitation, environment protection and research management. An important chapter is held by efforts to establish and sustain an active dialogue with neighboring states, partners and allies, especially with Russia. As it may be seen, the nature of the two states is obvious, while Russia acts as a single state who sees cooperation as a viable option only when it is in its benefit, Norway is the type of nation state that perceives dialogue as the only possibility to resolve the presumable disputes[34].

Canada

For this state, the Arctic represents „the key for the future prosperity of Canada", just as the Prime-Minister, Stephan Harper, declared in 2008. In order to prove the seriousness of Canada's intentions over this region, the government decided to allocate 100 million $ for the development of maps designed to attest its jurisprudence over the navigation inside the 200 miles[35]. Currently, Canadian government is elaborating *North Canada International Dimension Strategy*[36]. The main objectives this document stipulates to be are: the international accreditation of Canada's presence and position in the Northern area through national actions[37].

As aforementioned, this state is in a dispute with Russia concerning the sovereignty of the underwater mountain, Lomonosov Ridge, as well as with the USA over the waters near Alaska's frontiers. While the Americans claim it should be implemented the median line method, authorities in Canada sustain that the frontiers have already been established through the 1825 Treaty between Great Britain and Russia, according to which the border between Alaska and Yukon Territory is at 140 degrees West longitude. Considering the fact that this dispute is not under the UN jurisdiction, the two states will have to solve it bilaterally. With regard to this specific case, Canada has another national interest – the sovereign control over its own archipelago. The fact that this state considers these to be its internal waters gives it the right to claim all the ships that wish to enter these waters to ask Canadian state's permission. The USA, however, consider these waters to be put under international regime, thus the ships may cross them without any impediment, in conformity with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nonetheless, this situation raises an issue: the USA has not signed the Law of the Sea Treaty yet. States seek to follow their own national interest, and if it brings benefits to them to recognize an international organism or an international understanding, then they act accordingly[38].

In what concerns „hard security", each year the so called „sovereignty exercises" are organized in this area. The best known operation is Nanook, held in August 2009. Still, from a military point of view, Canada bought another 8 patrol ship, and the Canadian Minister of Defence, Peter MacKay, announced in June that 1000 troops will be placed in the islands in north of Canada (Baffin and Ellesmere). He also stated that „ all of these actions are undertaken to extend the permanent presence which we (the Canadians) have in the High North. It is a region in which we, as government, intend to invest". Even in this case the chances of a conflict that might occur are extremely low for the main reason that such an action would not be in the benefit of any state, given the fact that they should sustain and assume the responsibility for it[39].

United States of America

USA is in a conflict situation with Canada. This state announced its Policy over the Arctic Region in January 2009. Through this document, it is revealed a rising interest of the USA in the territory in question. The policy takes the shape of a directive. However, this type of document is rather constituent of „soft law" segment (the state is neither obliged to take urgent measures, nor has it major responsibilities. The directive takes the shape of certain standards or national interests on long term, which the policymakers need to take into account when they establish the foreign policy) than of „hard law", such as the treaties or laws. But even if it is part of this segment, the directive should not be disregarded, because through it the USA gives shape to its policies in the Arctic area, this being a region for which the Americans assert „fundamental national security interests"[40]. The most important aspect of this directive is the fact that state is willing to act unilaterally even if it understands the importance of intensified international cooperation. Hence, we can see the situation of Norway, which clearly preferred the intergovernmental cooperation card, only in the other way around. From this point of view, USA is very much alike with Russia, which prefers unilateral action in the detriment of cooperation with other states, and this is only because it is in its national interest, even though a tense situation of insecurity occurs at regional level[41].

Already disposing of the necessary capabilities to influence the international statu-quo, the USA seems to ignore the international provisions. Even if the other states are also following their own interests, all of them relate to a sole international legislative source, the UN Law of the Sea. Even

what seems to be the least cooperative state (Russia) is relating to this law. The single actor in the group of the five that does not rally to this tendency is represented by the USA. This state has not signed the Law of the Sea Treaty yet and it even sent ships in the seas considered by Canada to be its internal waters, without the latter's permission[42].

As a consequence of the fact that republicans do not want to ratify the Treaty, the USA started to be excluded from the high level discussions/ negotiations which were held inside the UN, over the problems in the Arctic. The main reason for which this treaty was not ratified might be the fear of losing part of its national sovereignty, reason for which a realist state cooperates only marginally and does not admit the primacy of the international and non-governmental organizations. Its source of power consists in the sovereignty on its own population and on a given territory. It is what defines it as being, still, the most important international actor. Though, on a costs-benefits analysis, applied on this aspect in particular, we may observe that signing the treaty will not affect its national sovereignty, but it will rather be an instrument of increasing the presence of the Americans in the Arctic area. Hence the USA, contrary to what appear to be, are the most similar to a state within a system, explained by the realist theoreticians as being an anarchic world[43]. Even if it is ready to act unilaterally, not even this state would risk to set off an armed conflict against Russia (especially unprovoked) for purely realist reasons: the Russian Federation is a regional power with excellent bilateral relations with other states such as Germany; it is an economic power if we are to take into account its resources which it disposes of and which the European industries are still dependent on. In addition, it continues to develop its military capabilities and it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council (fact that gives it the veto right). USA would need the acceptance of the Security Council through unanimity in order to have the international community's support to act and this is impossible given the fore mentioned aspects. Then, the current financial crisis along with the military missions which the USA take part to as primordial actor would transform such a conflict into an economic failure of great proportions. In what concerns a conflict with the other three states (Canada,

Denmark and Norway), especially against the European allies, it is just as highly unlikely, this time for liberal-institutionalist reasons[44].

Another important aspect is that, at least, on short term, the USA has to deal with numerous internal economic problems (the possibility to reach the default situation) which make its interest for the Arctic area not to be such urgent. This fact is demonstrated through the absence of hard security type elements (e.g.: military troops) in the North area, as Russia and Canada developed. However, American experts started in 2008 to develop maps, through which they are trying to prove that the region is the extension of the American platform, fact which would enlarge the territory the North of Alaska with 600 miles[45]. Hence the USA admits the strategic importance of the Arctic area, but do not make investments in the necessary infrastructure for energy and naval commerce development, as the other states do.

Denmark

The fifth power that is involved in the race for the Arctic is Denmark, through Greenland. This country has a dispute with Russia and Canada regarding the sovereignty of the Lomonosov Ridge. Each one of these states claims the same part of the underwater mountain and, given the fact that splitting sovereignty is not an option and that the mountain is rich in energy resources, the dispute is far from being solved.

For this state, the situation is clear and this fact can be seen in the declaration of the Danish Ambassador to USA: "In the 1930s and 1940s when Denmark and Norway contested a part of Greenland in the north-east, we went to the ICJ (International Court of Justice) to get our sovereignty confirmed. If we cannot agree on Hans Island, we could go to ICJ again[46]". Unlike Russia or USA, it has no intention to act unilaterally, because its claims are more likely to be symbolic and nationalist, through which Denmark is highlighting the fact that Greenland should be part of the state group, that is shaping international energy policies.

Conclusions

The existing disputes are far from being solved, but the parties could take as example the

case of Russia and Norway, which succeeded in cooperating, regardless the pessimistic outcasts. USA and Canada should set aside their disagreements regarding the status of the Northern waters (whether they are Canadian internal water or international waters is to be seen) and could negotiate on the navigation rules regarding the Northern Passage. Canada could also take the fore mentioned case as an example in its dispute with Russia and, together, they could cooperate in environment protection. Another field in which all five states should cooperate is in establishing the rules regarding navigation and transport. All these aspects are secondary ones, they do not solve the main issue, but they are, for certain, a big step ahead, which will create a *spill over* effect, which will increase the trust, which every state needs to have in the others[47].

Arctic region has become in the recent years a clash space, in which five powerful states are disputing their sovereignty on the energy resources, which were proven to be in the Arctic. If UN fails to settle the existing disputes in a peaceful way and the present rivalries finally generate a war, in traditional terms (although less probable to happen, it must be taken into consideration by each of the five states), then the security of the entire system will be jeopardized. These issues are far from being solved, but no matter if there would be a bilateral or multilateral solution, probably it will be realized under an anarchic international system, in which states are the most important parties. Only they can decide to cooperate or not. Therefore, ignoring the Arctic is not an option for none of the five states.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SHIELD IN EUROPE ON RUSSIA-USA RELATIONS

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Daniela RĂPAN**

The world's states seek security. Hence, the interest of the great economical and military powers to create for them a competitive defence system. In this respect, the placement of an anti-ballistic missile shield in former European communist countries is a proof.

The American project of the ABM shield in Europe will undoubtedly affect relations between Russia and USA. In its turn, the former proposed a joint ABM project. Accepting it would be a sign that Russia's status as a great world power begins to be acknowledged.

Key-words: anti-ballistic missile shield (ABM shield); security; relations of power; new world order; world power.

1. Considerations on state and non-state actors' involvement in achieving a new world order

After 1990, as a consequence of the events that occurred in Europe (revolutions in communist states, USSR dissolution, the fall of Berlin Wall, Yugoslavia's disintegration) USA remained the only world power who assumed great responsibility regarding international security. In the years to follow, after sinuous political and economic clarifications of former communist countries, the emergence of the Russian Federation, the EU and NATO enlargement, the creation of political-economic and/or military organisations, the USA role as a world leader began to be gradually challenged by state and non-state actors aspiring to an international status of great world power.

In our opinion, nowadays we are witnessing a confrontation among the world great powers for the instauration of a new world order. Practically, they are seeking to maintain or acquire influence zones, characterised on the one hand by possessions of significant natural resources, especially energy, and on the other hand, by geostrategic and geopolitical importance. In this respect, let us mention EU and NATO enlargement by receiving new members, among which several former communist countries and ex-USSR members as well as war triggering in areas of interest for USA, motivated by "democratisation" of states led by dictators like Iraq and Afghanistan.

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In their turn, the Russian Federation and emerging countries (China, India, Brazil) want the recognition of their international status of great power. To this purpose, the Russian Federation uses "the energy weapon" (the considerable resources of natural gases and oil), the veto right in the UNO Security Council and the powerful military, especially nuclear arsenal in its possession. As for the emerging countries, they compete with their important economic growth, the demographic factor (all of them have a large population) and the possibility to sustain powerful armed forces. Beginning with 2010, China apparently became the world's largest economy, judging upon its purchasing power, according to Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington[1].

While USA developed NATO not only in quantity, by adding new members to it, but also in quality, by expanding the area of responsibility beyond that envisaged in 1949 upon its creation, Russia and China developed a decade ago, along with a few smaller states, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[2] (SCO) with relatively similar objectives to NATO. On the other hand, NATO and EU have been wooing the Russian Federation by trying to lure it into different partnerships[3] - common projects of political, economic or other nature in order to maintain and insure world stability and security. Russia answered positively to some projects, but only after amending the conditions imposed[4] by the USA or the EU. In its turn, China, although it expanded its economic relations especially with USA, cooperates with the Russian Federation, India, Brazilia, EU and other important actors in various fields, tends to assert its role as a world great power, not only regional[5].

In this context, we can conclude that the fight for natural resources, especially energy, and what is more, for a new world order, is in full progress. We consider that the settlement of the ABM shield in Europe is a form of manifestation of the states' interest and of some non-state actors to preserve their existent spheres of influence that offer them a multitude of advantages (economic, political, military and environmental).

2. The need to put in place the ABM

The international security environment is in a continuous and rapid change, under the impact of social, economic, military, political and environment factors. This fluctuation of the global security environment is strongly influenced by the competition among world states and some non-state actors to impose a new world order.

In their turn, security risks and threats have various forms of manifestation, being a constant preoccupation for all states. Thus, the boom of state-of-the-art technology in fighting tools, information and communication create favourable premises for actors wishing to attack states' security. For instance, Iran announced that it begun the industrial stage of enriching uranium. Other states developed a system of medium and long-range missiles[6]. As a consequence, it becomes more and more stringent to activate existent defence systems and to set in place other ones, more performant and able to cover broader territories.

Europe, feeling threatened by the possibility of medium and long-range missiles attacks, intends to defend and consolidate the security of its states. An anti-missile shield becomes a necessity, as at the level of the European continent, *there is no coherent, common ballistic missile defence system against possible attacks*. Although states like France, UK or Germany possess modern and efficient defence systems, setting in place an anti-missile shield at national level is quite difficult because of political, operational and financial reasons. In addition, the proposal to extend a national anti-missile "umbrella" on neighbours would not be well seen politically. As a consequence, a joint community effort is needed, as no country can take upon its shoulders the financial burden of an anti-missile shield covering the European continent, not even one capable of counteracting a limited attack with a few ballistic missiles.

From the operational point of view, all European countries possess not only radar coverage, but also a communication network capable of functioning at continental level. It must not be forgotten, however, that Eastern European countries trust the American power. Initially, the Czech Republic and Poland were ready to host on their territory such an anti-missile system, in order to benefit especially from a permanent American presence. At a later stage, the American option has changed; in 2010, Romania and Bulgaria have become the states on the territory of which the ABM is going to be settled. Such an anti-missile system

requires a Command and Control system (C 2). But possessing a C2 anti-ballistic missile in order to cover and defend national territory represents, in our opinion, a nonsense, because this type of attack is correlated with a certain level of saturation (2,3 or more missiles simultaneously) and a sector from South to North, passing through East, covering almost 270 degrees.

Creating and setting in place a C2 system, as well as defining knowledge-anticipation information should be top priorities once we speak of an ABM shield in Europe. In this context, it is evident that we need to possess a performant multi-level advanced detection and alert network, as well as a C 2 centre capable of playing, for the whole continent, "an intercepting sequence requiring a decision in a few minutes."[7] Indeed, one of the major problems regarding anti-ballistic defence is that the sequence detection-trajectory validation-intercepting decision takes only a few minutes, an interval not compatible with a coordinated action among European or NATO countries in a round table. The time issue is one of the important characteristics of anti-missile defence and at the same time, it shows the importance of human presence in this system.

On the other hand, taking into account the current European defence system, as well as the difficulties of the European Defence Agency to function efficiently, it is illusory to think that the EU will be capable of defending its territory of a ballistic missile threat. At least not for some time. NATO is better prepared to tackle this issue, having in mind the USA role in this problematic, not a neutral one, as well as the "Berlin plus" agreements aiming to avoid duplication, it can be stated that Europe will not launch itself in such an adventure[8]. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that NATO owns, since the mid 1950, a network of detection and alert of air defence with C2 centres able to solve a massive attack through fight aeroplanes. NATO C2 anti-missile is a realistic solution, pragmatic, feasible from a financial point of view and undoubtedly the most acceptable for states in favour of the concept of allied anti-missile protection. As a matter of fact, the Noth-Atlantic Alliance is and will remain an instrument of collective defence, as the 2010 New Strategic Concept reiterates.

At the 19-20 November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, it was stated once again the concern for developing the capacity of the political-military organisation to defend its population and territory from a ballistic missile attack as a key element of the collective defence, contributing to the indivisible security of the Alliance.[9]

3. Russia's attitude towards an ABM shield in Europe

Russia has been and continues to be against setting in place the ABM under the USA conditions. Russia, after having surpassed the shock caused by USSR dissolution, which brought about the loss of the status of great world power, especially military, begun to take necessary steps for a comeback. Even since 2007, when the USA made the ABM known, Russia rejected it. This attitude of the Russian diplomacy manifests itself in the context of favourable internal evolutions regarding economic development.

Let us focus on four essential arguments of Russia against the creation of the ABM shield in Europe.

I. Russia's desire to regain the former international status possessed by USSR and especially to be treated by the USA as an equal

Russian diplomatic actions, and not only these, are directed towards this strategic goal. Thus, during the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, during the meeting between USA President, Barack Obama, and the Russian *President*, Dmitri Medvedev, enhancing bilateral relations was discussed, as well as enhancing NATO-Russia relations. In addition, in the Russia-NATO Council at the Summit, parties agreed to start official talks on the possibilities to connect NATO and Russian ABM shield systems in Europe. Ever since the project was made public, Russia, although opposes it, is interested in the security advantages of building such a system in its current form. Kremlin administration profoundly disagrees with American officials on setting up military systems on the territory of former Warsaw Pact countries. Also, it hopes that its opposing the project will raise severe critiques of American politics in Europe under the aegis of NATO. Russia made known the conditions under which it is going to be involved in this project, desiring an agreement which should contain legal binding measures. Moscow pretends written legal guarantees, such as an international agreement, that the ABM could

in no way serve to weaken the Russian nuclear potential[10]. Even from the beginning of talks, negotiations proved to be extremely complicated, because the Russian proposal to create a "sectorial anti-missile defence" system would mean that Russia would take upon itself to defend against missiles fired against its area of responsibility. In its turn, NATO would do the same for Western Europe.

This Russian strategy is not in line with the formal support of NATO allies and with recent military agreements among Poland, Romania and USA.

II. The proposal of concrete and responsible Russian involvement in creating the ABM

Russia is willing to cooperate with NATO in the common project of anti-ballistic shield, minding reciprocal interests and the necessity to give a collective answer to challenges in the field of missile proliferation. This declaration was made on February, 5 2011 by Russian Foreign Minister, Serghei Lavrov during the 47 Conference on Security in Munchen[11]. The Russian minister also stressed the need to change relations in the field of security*, saying that i*t is time to choose between common strategic interests and alliances of circumstance dictated by political circumstances. The window of opportunity that allows the initiation of effective cooperation stays open and it goes beyond the Russian initiative for signing a Euro-Atlantic security treaty. *The* joint missile shield project is part of the extension of this trend. *However, is should be clear that Russia's agreement to discuss cooperation on missile defence in the NATO-Russia Council does not mean that Moscow agrees to NATO projects which are being developed without Russia's participation. The procedure "take it or leave it"* is completely irrelevant in this case.

Common defence against common threats is in fact the ultimate allied security cooperation. The Russian diplomat stated that under these conditions, the ability to create an ABM shield in Europe with Russian and NATO participation will be a test of honesty in declarations regarding partnership and radical transformation of the context of our relations and at the same time a progress towards putting in practice a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security space.

According to the head of Russian diplomacy, professionals understand perfectly well today that

the achievement of U.S. plans to strengthen their own anti-missile shield covering the debate on the NATO shield, means in fact a rise at *strategic level, which is directly linked to the effectiveness of the Russian nuclear deterrent force and, therefore, will undoubtedly imply an appropriate response.* This scenario could take us back to the logic of the past and reduce the possibilities of cooperation not only in the field of missile defence, but for all security threats. All must prove that in the Euro-Atlantic area there is no state that would have reasons, plans or intentions to threaten NATO members[12], Lavrov emphasized.

III. Diminishing threats towards Romania's national security

Refusing to surrender to Russia's considerable pressure, Romania accepted on May, 3 2011 USA's proposal to host an anti-missile shield in Deveselu air base, 100 km away from the frontier with Bulgaria. There are going to be installed 24 new generation SM-3 interceptor missiles that should become operational in 2015 in Romania and in 2018 in Poland. Bulgaria is also to be included, in this respect high-level talks being engaged. These interceptor missiles are the main component of the anti-missile system that the Pentagon wishes to build in Eastern Europe in order to counter any alleged attack coming from Iran, which already possesses medium-ranged ballistic missiles. This forward step of Romanian authorities seems to have visibly deranged Moscow. As a consequence, Russia declared that putting in practice the ABM is a threat to its national security and forces it to continue developing and modernising its military infrastructure. For instance, in his second mandate, George W. Bush tried to install components of antimissile system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia's reply was to threaten the two governments with the deploying of Iskander nuclear missiles on Kalingrad territory, close to Poland and oriented towards Warsaw and Prague[13].

We appreciate that the motivation of the divergence between Russia and USA resides in their different opinions regarding the issue of strategic balance. USA seeks to affirm its superiority as to WMD. On the long run, the ABM will neutralize threats coming from other states possessing nuclear weapons. Washington wishes to impose its vision upon all other states that possess WMD. Thus, the White House changed in

its favour the balance of terror doctrine (or mutual assured destruction - MAD), dating from the Cold War period, interdicting the two superpowers at the moment - USA and Russia – to use ABM. At the same time, Washington administration is working on eliminating the possibility that nuclear deterrence of other states to diminish USA's capacity to accomplish military operations in certain regions of strategic importance. The anti-ballistic missile shield would give them the capacity to neutralize a response after the first strikes.

IV. The necessity that the USA should offer legal guarantees to Russia that the ABM is not set up against its strategic nuclear potential

Russian-American divergence regarding an ABM shield in Europe persists. NATO does not offer any guarantee that its shield is not going to be used against the Russian strategic potential. That is why Moscow insists on an integrated perimeter in order to alleviate the external menace[14]. One thing is sure: disregarding whether the ABM construction is going to be continued or not, Russia is going to enhance endeavours in fabricating and improving ballistic missiles known as Bulava, capable of going through the walls of the antimissile defence system that the USA is about to develop with an offensive intention. Thus, one can assume that in the case of unsuccessful negotiations, Russia will deploy short-range missiles close to NATO members' frontiers.

To these arguments, two more factors can be added. Thus, for the Russian elite, maintaining the strategic balance (mutual assured destruction - MAD) is both a national security guarantee in relation with nuclear states and at the same time a matter of national prestige[15]. Moscow can not compete with USA in establishing defence technologies anti-ballistic missiles. As a consequence, Russia is trying to persuade USA, by using diplomatic stratagems, to give up creating an ABM in Europe or - if they eventually install it - to change it as mush as possible so as to be incapable of neutralizing Russian arsenal.

The strategic objective of Russia's foreign policy is to impede the development of components of the American anti-missile system in Central and Eastern countries. Moscow considers this area as a part of its sphere of privileged interests regarding defence and uses for this purpose Western military presence, especially that of the USA.

Still, there are opinions according to which Russia and the USA can reach an agreement of principle in the matter of creating an ABM shield in Europe[16]. To this end, it would be necessary to fulfil some requests: all NATO members should perceive the same way the need to build relations based on equality principle, security indivisibility and common trust and their acceptance of Russia's proposal to divide in sectors responsibility regarding the ABM shield[17].

4. Russia-NATO relations in the light of installing the ABM shield in Europe

Russia aims to regain and to reaffirm its status as a world actor that USSR once had. Recognition of this status by the USA would be a prime factor. But Russia's aspiration to be seen as a great world power seems to be hindered by the hostility dating back to the Cold War in its relations with USA[18]. The implementation of the ABM shield in Europe by the USA project is an additional hostility.

Russia deems that implementing the USA project of installing the ABM in countries that were members of the Warsaw pact is a threat for its strategic potential. If USA and NATO accomplish the ABM without taking into account Russia's opinion, it is possible that the latter denounce Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In order to calm Russia, legal foundations should be assured instead of political declarations[19].

During the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, proposed creating an ABM shield with Russian participation, that is of an indivisible system which should integrate common military components, Russian and allied. Russia would defend its territory and NATO the territory of its Member States. A management centre would coordinate the functioning of these two segments of the system. But USA and NATO oppose this idea, the Alliance officials insisting on creating two separate ABMs, coordinated between them. Victor Essin, Vice-President of the Academy for Security, Defence, Law, and Order Studies opinioned that "the key factor that prohibits the approaching of Russia's position to that of the United States or more generally to NATO Member States regarding the principles of construction and designing an ABM shield in Europe*, is the* deficit of trust among parties, reminiscent since the Cold

War. It is a major obstacle to the creation of a joint missile defence in Europe."[20]

Joint anti-missile defence in Europe would become reality if USA and its allies would take into account Russia's proposal.

In this context, it seems that a compromise that would affect neither U.S. interests *n*or those of Russia or Europe is absolutely necessary. A joint missile project would be a real surpass of the problem of strategic stability, reminiscent of Cold War confrontation, in relations between Moscow and Washington. Basically, Russia *does not* want to be excluded from the process of a new world order. Ignoring Russia's objections and proposals to the ABM installation signifies not recognizing its status of global great power.

Conclusions

At present, we are witnessing a more or less evident dispute among the world's great powers for creating a new world order. The contribution to this endeavour is a significant indicator of the high international status of a state. The competition among the USA and the emergent countries – Russia, China, India and Brazil – aspiring to this global status is in line with this tendency.

Implementing the American project regarding the ABM shield in Europe can be seen as an indicator of the high international status of the USA. In order to properly answer this challenge, Russia joined several political-economic organisations (for instance Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and other more or less formal bodies, such as BRICS; the member quality in these entities brings Russia added value in terms of global power.

In our opinion, ignoring Russia's objections and proposals regarding the ABM shield in Europe will lead to a chill in USA - Russia relations and to tension in regional and even international security environment. On the other hand, accepting a compromise regarding the ABM based on Russian proposals would lead to a loosening of Russian - American relations and to maintaining stability of regional and international security.

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SECURITY DILEMMAS: SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE APPROACHES ON ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SHIELD

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Characteristics of current security environment, while posing new complex problems in achieving security, can be studied based on some of the theoretical models that also explained world during the Cold War. Thus, this paper proposes the application of security dilemma theory in a realistic analysis of one of the most pressing issues on the agenda of International Relations in recent years, namely anti-ballistic missile shield. We refer to three points of view belonging to the main parties involved in the process: United States of America, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the scientific community that has an objective view on this issue, one could say.

Key-words: security dilemma; power; anti-ballistic missile shield; arms race; USA; Iran.

IR agenda has been substantially amended in recent years by introducing new elements, such as collective effort in the financial crisis, and updating others, such as missile defense issues. Not incidentally, the latter, although it dominated international discourse over 40 years ago, has been brought to the attention of policy makers with more magnitude. It is known that globalization has not only positive but also negative or perverse effects. It facilitates access to technology and to material and human resources, allowing state and non-state actors to develop missile and nuclear capabilities which constitute a security risk to others. The analysis of this topic must be based on some basic concepts of the security studies, such as the classic security dilemma.

Theoretical benchmarks

A quick look at the data on the issue of anti-ballistic missile shield leads to Realist and Neorealist theory of IR. Assumptions promoted by the representatives of these schools of thought (Herman Kahn, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer) refer to an international system where States seek to obtain increasingly more resources, develop offensive military capabilities for defense and expansion of power in order to achieve national security, and their relations are dominated by a lack of mutual trust and uncertainty. Currently, there is a trend to approach IR based on the ideal of human security in a more optimistic view than one of the neorealist, but we can not ignore that a player achieving security, as perceived and represented by it, may cause insecurity to another. This concerns the classic *security dilemma*[1] or the *spiral model*[2] that refers to any situation where a State action seeking to increase its security level (increasing military power or creating alliances) can determine another to respond with similar measures giving rise to

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increasing tensions which could lead to a conflict that is undesirable, in fact, by either party.

Security dilemma may vary over time and space because its magnitude and nature depend on two variables: the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation[3]. This aspect of the offense-defense theory is illustrated through four scenarios referring to the intensity of security dilemma[4].

The first scenario refers to a situation where offensive behavior is not distinguished from the defensive one, but the first has an advantage. In this case, the security dilemma is *very intense* and the security environment is very dangerous because States behave in an aggressive manner, increasing the possibility for triggering arms race, while the chances of cooperation are minimal.

The second scenario refers to the same situation in which offensive and defensive behaviors are not different, but the latter has an advantage. Here, the security dilemma is *intense*, but a State can increase security without jeopardizing the security of other States.

In the third scenario, offensive behavior is different from the defensive one and dominates it. The security dilemma is *not intense*, though problems exist. Thus, although the security environment is safe, offensive behavior has an advantage that can lead to a future aggression.

Finally, the fourth scenario illustrates a situation in which defensive behavior is different from and dominates the offensive one. In this case, the security dilemma has *mild or no intensity* and the security environment is very safe, because there is no threat of an offensive action. In this case, the State has the opportunity to increase its defense budget and other resources required for its development.

Analyzing the above scenarios and correlating them with the current geopolitical and geostrategic situation, we argue that the issue of implementation of the anti-ballistic missile shield, seen from three different perspectives, fits within three of the four scenarios. They belong to the two main parties involved in the process – United States of America, illustrating the defensive behavior, and States considered to be the threat (players who want greater role and status on the international stage by conducting missile and nuclear capabilities, mainly Iran), representing the offensive behavior –, but also the scientific community that has an objective view on this issue, one could say.

USA and the second security scenario

U.S. concern to develop a missile defense system started in the '60s, initially beside the USSR (Ballistic Missile Treaty – ABM, 1972), then in the late '70s and early '80s, when relations between these two actors were damaged, in competition with the interests of the Soviet Union (launched in 1983, the project American Strategic Defense Initiative or „Stars War"). The end of the Cold War was also marked by the resumption of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on strategic offensive weapons, but with ups (signing the START I and START III in 1991 in 2010) and downs (U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001 and in response, Russia withdrawal from the START II in 2002).

In 2009, the U.S. President, Barack Obama, has approved the recommendation of Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe, defense of U.S. and allied deployed forces, U.S. and Allies' territory. This proposal changes the 2007 American project of the Bush Administration as the experts have pointed to two new major elements in the security environment:

– New Threat Assessment: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected. The 2009 Assessment projects that, in the near-term, the greatest missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as well as to U.S. deployed personnel – military and civilian –and their accompanying families in the Middle East and in Europe.

– Advances in Capabilities and Technologies: Over the past several years, U.S. missile defense capabilities and technologies have advanced significantly, offering a more flexible, capable, and cost-effective architecture[5].

This approach is based on six political priorities that are recommended by the American President: the U.S. will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack; the U.S. will defend against regional missile threats to American forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves; before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions; the commitment

to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term; U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change; the U.S. will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense[6].

According to supporters of this project, the new approach has clear advantages over the one of the Bush Administration:

- Increases the capacity to defend Europe, while the threat of short-range or medium-range missiles are increasing (in this sense, the approach of the current U.S. administration takes into account and respond to the latest assessment of the attacks missile risk);

- Meets the current threats and can incorporate much faster and easier the new technologies as they evolve;

- Becomes operational more quickly than its predecessor, so basically, the materialization of the new option for missile defense system will be ready six or seven years earlier than the previous plan[7].

According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, published on 1st of February 2010 by the U.S. Department of Defense, there are four stages of achievement[8]:

– Phase One (in progress) – Protecting some parts of South East Europe, by deploying radar and SM-3 interceptors on ships, with the location of a forward-based radar system, which will detect launched rockets since the upward stage of the trajectory. The first phase began on March 7th, 2011, by launching the Aegis equipped ship „USS Monterey" in the Mediterranean;

– Phase Two (in the 2015 timeframe) – Expanding the Allies' protection by deploying a more capable version of the SM-3 interceptor (it allows land-based launching) and a new radar base. They will be land-based in South-Eastern Europe;

– Phase Three (in the 2018 timeframe) – Extending system's coverage to all European NATO Member States by deploying a land base in Poland and continuing development of new sea-based and land-based SM-3 interceptors;

– Phase Four (in the 2020 timeframe) – Extending protection from possible intercontinental missiles attacks by further development of SM-3 missile and radar systems.

The Report considers this architecture as a U.S. national contribution to the development of the NATO missile defense system, which the Allies can help by hosting some components on their national territory. Furthermore, Washington wants to strengthen international cooperation in this field. In Europe, the implementation of the Adaptive Phased Approach will be made in context of NATO, while in the East Asia and in the Middle East will be enhanced bilateral relations. In addition, the U.S. want to engage in this process States like Russia and China, which heavily supported Iran in its weapons programs. [9]

Analyzing the U.S. strategy, it is obvious that according to the U.S. vision, the implementation of the anti-ballistic missile shield does nothing but increasing its national security, without jeopardizing the security of other countries, but rather enhancing it. *Security dilemma is intense*, because it is considered that the threat exists, but the advantage held by the defensive behavior overwhelms the offensive one. According to the author of the theoretical scenarios, scenario number two corresponds to several periods in history: the attack is often more difficult than defense due to the resistance of fortifications and the difficulty of obstacles, but the exclusively defensive positions are not always possible because the fortifications are backed by armed forces and mobile weapons that can perform an attack[10]. We can not take into account the first scenario because it assumes that the temptation to attack first is great to the parties, being no possibility that their security could be enhanced simultaneously. If, however, a State like Iran could succeed by its actions in changing the statu-quo of the international system, a strong State which complies with international standards, such as the U.S., could counter the challenges brought by the former.

Iran and the fourth security scenario

One of the main threats to international security is considered to be the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even during the Bush Administration, the Islamic Republic of Iran was considered to be a strategic threat to U.S., because there was suspicion of development and testing of nuclear programs, especially, ballistic missile programs with different loads of mass destruction. Under the new U.S. National Security Strategy[11], Iran is among the leading developers with hostile intentions of such weapons of mass destruction.

In fact, this country is in the „red zone" on 2011 Failed States Index, ranked 35 out of 177 countries analyzed by the Fund for Peace[12].

Even if the Western world considers this actor a threat to security, according to the Iranian officials, all nuclear developments are of civil nature (electricity generation and supply of fuel for medical reactors). It is obvious that for Iran, *security dilemma has mild or no intensity*. Analyzing statements of Iranian leaders[13], we see that, for them, in terms of the dilemma, the security environment is twice as safe: Iranian state invests resources in its development and welfare of its citizens.

However, in the current general psycho-social representation, the Islamic Republic of Iran is both a source of threats to the world, and a State subjected to complex transformations. The main problem facing the international community is the disagreement of Iran to halt uranium enrichment program. The American position is clear: *any solution* must include the permanent cessation of Iranian efforts to enrich and reprocess uranium and the destruction of facilities for these activities[14]. Washington fears that Iran could follow North Korea's model, which withdrew several years ago from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from its territory. In April 2010, the Obama Administration tried to compel a new round of sanctions in response to further development of Iranian nuclear program, but India and China opposed.

The main economic advantage of Iran – the energy resources – makes this State not only a State with nuclear claims threatening world peace and security, but more. It occupies a strategic position in the Northern Persian Gulf, with direct access to oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and United Arab Emirates, where, overall, is more than half of known worldwide oil reserves. Iran is open to the Strait of Hormuz, where, every day, pass 40% of world oil exports. Moreover, Iran is a major supplier of oil and natural gas to China, India and Japan, considering that it has the third largest oil reserve in the world, estimated at 137.6 billion barrels, and the second largest natural gas reserve in the world of about 26.91 trillion m³.[15]

As regards relations with Russia, they have become much closer, despite Moscow's past desire to annex Iranian territories, war against Muslims in Afghanistan and the other two wars against Muslim Chechens. However, analysts say that good relations are not based on humanitarian interests of the two governments but rather on business interests. Technology transfer and information from Russia to Iran is based only on Iran's capacity to pay. Moreover, in the light of recent events, Russian officials seem to overlook Iran's nuclear ambitions, saying that nuclear assistance program has no connection with nuclear proliferation.

Iran has special relations, especially in the military area, with China. Beijing has sold to Tehran thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, dozens of small capacity warships, missile systems and their manufacturing technology, and it provided assistance in developing Iran's programs of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, in Iran, the military plays an important role. Although officials say that they are trying to reduce its influence in the society, early events have shown the strength of the Iranian Armed Forces.

The most sensitive problem regards the Iranian weapons. Statistics show that Iran has 1,565 tanks, 3 frigates, 3 submarines, 186 ground fighting aircrafts and 74 combat aircrafts[16]. Still they are not the threat to regional and international security, but missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons that these means can be equipped to fight. Today, the record on Iranian missiles is incomplete, but, in terms of biological weapons, it seems that Iran began to develop them during the war with Iraq. Although Iran ratified the Convention on Biological Weapons, the Islamic Republic has advanced research and development programs on this type of weapons and it is suspected to study both toxins and living organisms that can be used as biological weapons. The technology for chemical weapons production is also developed. Iran has ratified the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which compel it to stop for years such programs. However, Iran continues improving and expanding the infrastructure for chemical weapons production, indicating that it wants to maintain a robust capability of carrying a potential chemical warfare.

The most delicate issue on Iran and weapons of mass destruction is about nuclear weapons. It seems that the regime in Tehran has deployed the nuclear activities all over the country, thus reducing the risk of detection[17]. IAEA officials say

Iran has no nuclear weapons yet, but it is likely to be able to produce them in short time. This will create an enormous pressure on the countries in the region. Perhaps countries like Egypt and Syria, located between two nuclear powers – Iran and Israel – will accelerate their nuclear programs, hence resulting in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

All these predictions seem to be deeply rooted in reality, especially since the recent actions of Iran are against international controls. UN Security Council adopted several Resolutions (No. 1696 in July 2006, no. 1737 in December 2006, no. 1747 in March 2007, no. 1803 in March 2008, no. 1835 in September 2008, no. 1929 in June 2010) that require Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program and to reprocess activities and comply with obligations and responsibilities under the provisions of the IAEA. Not only the Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929, but also the Executive Orders no. 13382 and no. 13224, issued by the U.S., are addressing both individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic programs and to some entities performing terrorist activities[18].

In addition, Iran has not responded positively to the negotiations with three European Union Member States – France, Germany and UK – who want to stop uranium enrichment program. Iranian officials have said that, just as they agreed during 2004 negotiations, the program is stopped, but only for a short period of time because they have the right to access nuclear technology as long as it is used for peaceful purposes. However, the EU is not certain that Iran will not cross the thin line between the civilian nuclear program and the military one.

The third security scenario: threat and response

Iran is considered at the level of public discourse only a State that develops programs essential to the welfare of its citizens. However, the data indicate a different situation, different from the Iranian vision that is placed in the fourth scenario. Analyzing in an objective manner the two versions of the same problems, namely the threat of ballistic missiles and response to it in the U.S. and Iran views, we see that the international situation corresponds to the third scenario.

There is *a security dilemma that is not intense*, but the defensive behavior is dominated by the offensive one, and an outbreak of aggression is possible. It is unlikely that this will become reality, but if it happens, a State that respects international rules can still use preventive actions than wait to be attacked and to defend. However, if the State chooses only to strengthen its defensive systems – in theory, the necessary conditions of cooperation between the two actors are created – and to wait for offensive deployment of the other party, the situation is far from being solved: the two sides will look with suspicion at every action of the other, being leaded by mistrust, hostility and war. Consequently, even if the security dilemma in the third scenario is not intense, a world in such a situation can quickly become unstable and may develop a spiral of tension and conflict[19].

Thus, an objective analysis of this issue shows that the situation is more complicated than it appears from the statements of both parties. We are dealing with two different operating States, but they are in the same position: actors who seek for security. Representatives of Structural Realism, like John Mearsheimer[20], believe that this type of States wants to maximize their relative power for an obvious reason: the greater the military advantage over other States is, the higher the degree of security they have. This type of behavior has not changed in the last 15 years, when Mearsheimer proposed the theory that we refer to, so that mankind is still confronted with dilemmas that may exacerbate tensions. The nuclear weapons developed by some States and the means of defense (anti-ballistic missile shield) developed by other States/organizations are now a distinct facet of the complex relations of power.

NOTES:

1 John HERZ suggested this concept in the paper *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, published in 1950 in the „World Politics" (Vol. 2, No. 2, Cambridge University Press, pp. 157-180, Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2009187. pdf), defining it as a situation where attempts for self-helping of human individuals, groups, leaders and states pursuing their security needs, regardless of intentions, tend to lead to increased insecurity for other actors, when each actor interprets its own measures as defensive and other measures as a potential threat (p. 157).

2 This term was introduced by Robert JERVIS in

1978 and describes how interactions between states that seek only to achieve security can fuel competition between them and create political unrest (*Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma* in „World Politics", Vol. 30, No. 2, Cambridge University Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958.pdf, pp. 167-214).

3 GLASER, Charles L., *The Security Dilemma Revisited*, in "World Politics", Vol. 50, No. 1, Fiftieth Anniversary Special Issue October 1997, Cambridge University Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25054031.pdf, pp. 171-201, p. 171.

4 JERVIS, Robert, *Cited Work*, 1978, pp. 211-214.

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WHO WILL DOMINATE THE XXI^{ST} CENTURY? THE NEW STRUCTURE OF POWER

Alexandru Mihai GHIGIU*

How will international relations evolve and how is going to be shaped the new power structure in the 21st century has been and still is a constant concern of those working or studying foreign affairs.

The evolution of the world after the Cold War and the events following this moment seemed to prefigure a century of American domination. New threats to international security, economic crisis and the extraordinary development of emerging markets have shattered the idea of a unipolar world causing a „predictions" race about who will dominate the first century of the new millennium.

In this scenario we should put countries such as China, India, Russia or Brazil, as well as organisations like European Union in a key position. To these actors we should add phenomena developed centuries ago, that have reached now an unprecedented development: terrorism, religious wars, the struggle for resources etc.

Key-words: international security; global actors; structures of power; global economic relations; geopolitics; centers of power; globalization; emerging countries.

1. Preliminary Considerations

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, U.S. has represented and continues to be the main economic and political force in the world, being the only superpower. For several years, however, is discussed the idea that the world is moving towards a multipolar system, where the U.S. will continue to be an important pillar, like the European Union, Russia or China, which will be important forces in different parts of the world.

The vast majority of specialists in International Relations consider that the end of this process of reshaping the political and economic relations in the international system will be multipolarity. The world is trying now to develop a traditional multipolar system. Countries like USA, China, Germany, Japan or Russia are the most likely actors that will play the role of „pole" and several other states, most likely India, Brazil and South Africa, may join them. There are several issues able to change the traditional multipolar structure based on state. Indeed, scholars generally agree on the fact that the system will not look and operate like the multipolar system existing during the Second World War.

One of the possible changes is that in which the United Nations and other global organizations would become more independent and stronger. Another scenario is the possible development of regional poles. Europe, under the umbrella of the European Union, could become such a pole. North American pole is also possible to develop (by strengthening the economic bloc – NAFTA), and another pole of power is emerging on the Asian continent with China as leader; at the same time, Russia, through its strategic alliances will

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have a major impact on the balance of power in the system[1].

Analysts predict that the world as we know it now will not remain like this for a long period. If we got used with the dominant position of the United States, Japan or Germany in the political or the economic field, things are about to change. At least four new powers are preparing to enter the top rankings.

The 21st century will not be the „new American century" that neoconservatives dreamed in the late 1990s. Will it be the „anti-American century" that various analysts are talking about? For sure the world will not come back to an „unipolar" system in which U.S. or Western hegemony is accepted worldwide[2].

2. The international system from unipolarity to a possible multipolarity

The starting point for my analysis is the revolutionary changes occurring in recent years. The period 2003 - 2010 is the third phase of a process that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued with the attack of 11 September 2001 and brings in the foreground scene the globalized terrorism. The last act is characterized by a new phase of power relations between the main actors, relations influenced by the spectacular growth of India and China, by reaffirming Russia as a threat to its neighbors, but also as a dangerous and indispensable interlocutor for the West[3].

This third phase is not less important than the two that preceded it. We can notice that the effects of the first act were seen in Russia's evolution towards democracy and in the undisputed supremacy of the United States, but these effects have already passed in the background. As for September 11, its value has not lost the symbolic importance, but politically speaking, the attacks (even if they ravaged the international scene) were important only on the short term, primarily, through U.S. and its allies' response.

Today the situation is defined primarily by the American influence and power crisis. Terms like „uni-polarity" or „hyper-power" have lost much of their coverage. But these terms will not be replaced by a multi-polar concert of powers (the European concert model of the nineteenth century - the realist school), nor by the rule of multilateral institutions (liberal school).

Classical balance of alliances, international institutions and power relations maintain a minimum of functional rationality and moderation in international affairs, but their effects are, in the best case, fragmentary and fragile. Their mechanisms are permanently diverted or blocked by a whole load of passion and myths, by armed prophets and their fanatic followers, fragile structures and uncontrolled social and cultural developments. Current international order does not really deserve this name: it is a heterogeneous and contradictory order, both by the nature and the dimensions of its components.

One dominant trend seems to be the confrontation, sometimes directly, or more diffuse, between West and South, in which China and Russia play a complex role of arbitrators and balance. For the West, these two countries are irreplaceable partners and also dangerous competitors, and in some cases, declared or potential enemies.

Another trend is represented by the religious, ethnic and social divisions, even within the South, especially in the Middle East. It is possible that these divisions will create opportunities for a new alignment of states. United States may try to exploit them as they are doing now with the divisions between Shiite and Sunni, striving to create an Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran. But such attempts are confronted with the fragility of these regimes, the distrust and hostility of most of their populations (in varying degrees) against the United States, Israel and the West, and at the same time with national rivalries. Most worrying feature of the current scene is, perhaps, a permanent or intermittent proliferation of civil wars (religious, ethnic, political or economic) which threatens to expand and contaminate entire regions, like West Asia, the Middle East or North Africa[4].

If the threat materializes, the control and peacemaking from the outside – by the great powers or international organizations – would be turned into a Sisyphean labor. Of course, this situation is not the result of the last three or four years. Its roots are in processes such as globalization, strong affirmation of Asia, demographic and psychological decline of Europe or Russia's strong recovery (driven by high energy prices and the Putin-Medvedev regime).

The result is a world in which old hierarchies, even if they still seem to be valid, are fundamentally

questioned. The United States continues to be the richest country, most full of resources, a country where population growth is exceptional among developed countries, an element that demonstrates vitality. US is the only state that can intervene anywhere on the globe and whose actions aim is to "save the world", even if sometimes they put it in danger[5].

But U.S. aspiration for power, paradoxically combined with a sense of vulnerability, is put to the test. The United States is now facing a world, from which they cannot withdraw, but they can't control and, apparently, they can not even understand. The rise of new powers is nothing new for the United States, they are used to such challenges regularly coming from Germany, Russia, Japan or China, challenges that, so far, they have successfully coped with, both in war and in peacetime. Americans began to be worried about the complexity and ambiguity of their relations with these new powers, unable to classify them definitively as friends, enemies or competitors[6]. Even more surprising for them is the power of a small number of countries, also from their sphere of influence in Latin America, able to defy them. Not mentioning Castro, Chavez or Morales is enough to remember that the United States could not persuade Mexico and Chile to vote for their anti-Iraq Resolution of 2003. In this picture we should add the hostility of some groups challenging the main asset of Americans – the positive perception that they always had about their country and its role in the world.

It's also interesting to analyze the phenomena that occur at the beginning of this century, particularly terrorism, namely asymmetrical warfare. So in a game that includes a military giant this one should have no problem in winning, but when the opponent refuses the classic game rules and impose its own strategy, the events can become complicated. Beyond the balance of forces, the enemy behavior is favored by a number of beliefs or values, which refuses to distinguish between combatants and innocent civilians, between enemies and populations. They enjoy the number of casualties caused to the countries declared enemy or even among their own terrorists, if they revere suicide and martyrdom. The liberal democracies are in front of a classic dilemma: to adopt the enemy methods (in the name of effectiveness) and to compete with him or to fight

with their hands tied. The dilemma is even more difficult if we consider an essential and relatively new element: the decisive factor is not the power of the two sides, but a third element, namely the people who are victims, award and arbitrators at the same time.

As general Sir Rupert Smith points out in a fundamental book[7], conflicts and confrontations which replaced the "interstate industrial wars" – he is calling them "nations' wars" – are waged not so much to destroy an enemy, to occupy a territory or to get resources, but to influence their people's will and loyalty. The target are the people in that country, but also public opinion in the metropolis, in the region and worldwide.

Another opposition force is nationalism or the resistance to occupation and foreign influence. No matter how benevolent it is, any attempt to „build a nation" from the top to the bottom or from outside cannot escape from the suspicion of neocolonialism. Traditionalist or nationalist resistance can gain an offensive aspect and modernization measures can lead to aggressive assertion of traditional cultures, and even to civil war or genocide. In these circumstances, intervention by western powers to protect humanity may be appropriate and even moral. But another factor can complicate the international context, given that from Uzbekistan to Serbia and from Zimbabwe and to Sudan, Russia and China can block the efforts of westerners, by supporting oppressive governments in exchange for economic and strategic advantages[8].

Compared to the 1990s era, western powers must now negotiate and bargain hard with some nasty rivals whose approval or abstention is crucial, especially in the UN. They are tempted to buy Moscow's support against Iran's nuclear policy, abstaining on matters relating Ukraine, Georgia and Kosovo, not to mention human rights in Russia. Western opposition to the policy of certain countries can become a global negotiation, during which legal rules and ethical principles are likely to become an object of bargaining.

3. Emerging countries – a key player in the new distribution of power

Another aspect that deserves to be analyzed in my paper is given by the changing of the global power hierarchy. Thus, we should begin

by explaining the acronym „BRIC", a term that Goldman Sachs, an American investment group, used for the first time in 2001, referring to the four countries known as having a rapid economic growth, countries that have entered or will enter the club of great powers. These are Brazil, Russia, India and China. At this, Goldman Sachs added recently Mexico and BRIC became BRIMC, but there are options that include South Africa or the Arab states[9].

Goldman Sachs Group anticipates that the economies of these countries will eclipse all existing great powers by 2050. Together, BRIC countries collect more than 25% of the total surface of the Earth, 40% of the world's population and a gross domestic product of $ 21,435 trillion. Together, it would be an unstoppable force, and would occupy a place in any world ranking. Aware of this, the leaders of the four countries have already begun to establish relationships and connections, making alliances aimed, firstly, at overthrowing the U.S. dominance in both the economic and the political domain. In a first stage, China and Russia formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), together with ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia, rich in energy resources. Therefore, the two powers, and India as observer state, control huge oil reserves in an area where the Americans have tried several times to expand their influence. An analysis conducted in April by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) states that the economies of countries are now rising by an average increase of 7.1%, while the economies of the so-called „advanced" will grow only with 1.5 - 1.7% at the same time[10].

According to these forecasts, China will surpass the U.S. in the economic development field until 2025, India will reach the level U.S. by 2040, and the BRIC countries, per total, will overtake G8 by 2025. The figures presented by the World Trade Organization (WTO) support these hypotheses. According to WTO, more than half of global trade growth is due to countries in full boom. China has surpassed Germany and become the largest exporter in the world; moreover, many of the most active countries in the trade are on the Asian continent. There is sufficient and cheap manpower, but also qualified. These countries had benefited as a result of increasing commodity prices, but they had to pass over many obstacles such as the lack of raw materials and energy.

China is already recognized as a world power, at least in economic field. In terms of population, is on the first place in the world with 1.4 billion people. Despite the fact that it is led by a communist regime, China has developed rapidly in recent years and has already caught the developed countries and surpassed many of them. In the past 25 years, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country increased by 9 % per year, the fastest growing, and the Chinese economy is currently on the 2nd place in the world, according to the figures released by the Central Bank of Beijing[11].

China's spectacular growth is due, first of all, to the reputation of "low-cost" manufacturer that it has built in recent years. There are many, good and cheap workers, a decent infrastructure, technology, all leading to an advantageous level of productivity. Therefore, many foreign investors come into the country and brought 90 billion dollars only in 2010. Also, in terms of tourists, China was ranked in the top four most visited countries. Many analysts, economic or political, appreciate that the U.S. will no longer keep the leader chair for a long time, considering that China is growing so spectacularly, from all points of view[12].

One of these analysts is James Kynge, journalist at the prestigious publication „Financial Times", who was charged with this Asian country for many years. Kynge tries to prove that China's rise in the last 20 years is quite similar with the U.S. one in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The journalist writes about the benefits of China's modern infrastructure combined with cheap and good labor, elements that transformed the country in the „new industrial center of the world" – exactly what was once America. The Chinese are working long and hard, for low wages. In fact, a Chinese is receiving about the same money as an American in the nineteenth century, according to specialists from the Financial Times.

He calculated that a worker in Chicago, in 1850, was receiving three times more than a Chinese today for the same job. What consequences does this fact have? Westerners began to lose their jobs because most companies have shifted and relocated in China, where it was much cheaper and more convenient to produce something than home. After China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, wages and the number of jobs from western countries have decreased. In

the U.S., about three million workers lost their jobs, and in Western Europe, unemployment rose to almost 9%, according to American journalist.

Russia, on the other hand, is another strong opponent of U.S. on the political ground and, lately also on the economic field. In terms of surface, Russia is the largest country in the world, occupying one-eighth of the total area of the globe. It is so great that has neighbors both in the Far East (China) and in Europe (Norway, for example). Moreover, it is located at a stone's throw from the United States and also Japan. Like population, however, is only on the 9th place in the world, with 142 million inhabitants. Not this information, however, put Russia among the world powers, but its energy resources and mineral reserves, the largest in the world[13]. This, on one hand, because, on the other hand, the country is one of the recognized nuclear powers and has one of the biggest arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. After Vladimir Putin coming to power in 2000, Russia began to rise slowly but surely; economy has prospered, wages have increased eight times, and unemployment rate has halved. Moscow's external strengths are oil and gas, but also wood – these, along with metals, are totaling about 80% of the country's exports. Besides economic development, Russia is recognized also for quality education, research and innovation. According to UNESCO, Russia has the most university graduates in Europe.

Among China's neighbors is also the next country of BRIC, India. Known mostly for its trade routes in ancient times, India is now perceived as a poor country, whose people suffer from malnutrition and are mostly illiterate. Then why is this country in the same category with Russia and China? Primarily due to the large number of people – it is the second among the most populated countries with 1.1 billion citizens, but also because of reforms initiated in recent years, Indian economy is the second in terms of development speed, according to a study published in the U.S. last year. Labor force is, like in China, plentiful and cheap - more than 500 million people are able to work in this country.

Due to population has also increased Brazil's economy, the fifth largest country in the world. Brazil is in 5th place in terms of number of inhabitants too, almost 190 million citizens. In South America, this country dominates both charts, being the largest and most populated. Well-designed economic reforms led to the development of the country, which became the tenth economy in the world and ninth in terms of gross domestic product, according to IMF and World Bank. Once they have developed the internal sectors of the economy (agriculture, mining, services), the Brazilians have focused on exports, selling abroad all sorts of products from coffee and soy to airplanes and automobiles, from electronics and footwear, to orange juice and steel[14].

What is the secret of the countries that aspire to the title of world economic leaders? Firstly, work. Their main advantage is the large number of people able to work, workers who do not demand high salaries, but are willing to work long and hard. Secondly, well-developed economic reforms, continuity and determination of authorities to put things in motion. In 2002, Brazil received from IMF a record assistance of 30 billion dollars, meant to re-launch the economy. Brazilian leaders have used money very inspired, so that the loan was returned one year before the deadline, in 2005. The economy has been redressed, and the authorities begin to consider the infrastructure. In 2007, officials launched a four years plan to modernize roads, ports and factories, which at the end will cost $ 300 billion. About the same plan has been applied in communist China, which managed to impress everyone with the infrastructure revealed during the Summer Olympics in Beijing[15].

Altogether, the political elite of the four states that are now in full boom showed seriousness and professionalism when they worked for the development of their countries. This is because they understand, perhaps, that countries led by amateurs will never be able to compare with world powers like the U.S., Japan or Germany.

4. Where is Europe in the new context?

In Europe, strong traditions and historical development plans, based on national cultural specificity, have created a culture of independent and sovereign nation-state. Today the European Union is part of the natural need of transformation, from a Europe of nation-states torn by conflicts and problems written in old pages of history, to a modern Europe where every country should become an equal partner in a community of independent states. But this requires inter-state

relations based on equality, a new phenomenon, still "green" in a separated Europe where "frozen" conflicts are still smoldering. The European Union is trying to create a political, economic and military configuration. But the European crystallization process will be long and will have to go through many convulsions before reaching an irreversible path, which is normal if we consider the millennial violent experience of the peoples of Europe[16].

EU will not succeed to become a truly global player as long as the Community itself has been questioned during the economic crisis, when countries like Germany were reluctant to help his sister of union, namely Greece. In those moments, many analysts began to wonder what chances has such a union, especially because the economic aspect is considered to be the basis of European construction, and this basis is shaken by various rumors, major countries threatening that they would withdraw from the Economic and Monetary Union.

Another important aspect is the foreign policy of the Member States, a policy which in many cases, due to states' actions, creates huge damages for the Community. A good example is the Member States relation with Russia, so if the major players (France, Germany, Italy) have a privileged relation with Moscow, the small states, particularly in Eastern Europe (Baltic states, Romania), see in their larger neighbor from the East a potential threat and feel that their European allies betrayed them and scarified the common good for their national interest.

In these circumstances, EU's position as international actor is questionable and seems to be obvious that the European-American domination of the world is about to go down.

Conclusions

Analyzing the above, we can highlight some relative certainty:
• establishment of a multi-polar global system, by increasing the influence of China, India and other countries and non-state actors;
• U.S. will remain the most powerful country, but will be less dominant, and American leaders will have choose between domestic and foreign policy priorities;
• consumption will continue to increase, according to current population growth, which will put pressure on energy production, food and water resources;
• the population of countries such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen will continue to have a rapid growth path;
• the potential for a new conflict will increase especially in the Middle East, where the U.S. will act as a regional balancing factor, but other powers outside the region such as Russia, China and India will play a greater role;
• terrorism is unlikely to disappear in the next period, but its influence will decrease if economic growth continues in the Middle East and unemployment among young people in this geographical area will be reduced;
• Europe's military capabilities will be reduced significantly, which will lead to a weakening of the Europeans traditional alliances.

Is important in the next period to observe what will be made the transition to alternative energies, how will climate change affect the world, how the current economic crisis will end, what will happen in the Middle East (Iran - Iraq - Israel), and especially how will evolve the multilateral organizations like the UN, NATO or the EU ? To all these questions only time can answer.

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DEMILITARIZATION OF EUROPE AND REMILITARIZATION OF USA. CERTAINTIES AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATION

Gabriela TRANCIUC*

The demilitarization of Europe', increasingly tackled during the past decade against the background of the public and political pressure in the European countries, generates difficulties in strengthening the ability to efficiently counter common threats, with a negative impact on achieving 'real security ' and 'lasting peace' in the 21st century. Emphasizing the relevance of pros and cons of controversies within the transatlantic relationship, this paper aims to highlight the need to avoid unilateral, subjective actions and the importance of promoting a strong European-US dialogue on the security concept that should turn into a comprehensive approach, by renouncing the military capability highlights and including the civilian and institutional tools which contribute to the efficient management of crisis situations. The different perspectives over the security concept should not generate tension, but complementarity in the joint efforts aimed at ensuring Euro-Atlantic security.

Key-words: demilitarization; remilitarization; Europe; the United States; comprehensive approach; security; transatlantic relationship.

Right now, the alliance faces very serious, long-term, systemic problems. The NATO budgetary crisis is a case in point and a symptom of deeper problems with the way NATO perceives threats, formulates requirements, and prioritizes and allocates resources. (...) The problem is not just underfunding NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and national defense budgets have fallen consistently – even with unprecedented operations outside NATO's territory over the past five years. Just 5 of 28 allies achieve the defense-spending target of 2 percent of GDP. These budget limitations relate to a larger cultural and political trend affecting the alliance. One of the triumphs of the last century was the pacification of Europe after ages of ruinous warfare. But (...) we have reached an inflection point, where much of the continent has gone too far in the other direction. The demilitarization of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st. Not only

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can real or perceived weakness be a temptation to miscalculation and aggression, but, on a more basic level, the resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared threats.[1]

1. Foreword

The speech delivered by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates during the Washington Seminar on NATO's New Strategic Concept (February 2010) generated reverberations in the European and US political and academic circles, especially as far as the transatlantic relationship problems mainly related to the political and financial burden-sharing are concerned.

At the end of his discourse, Robert Gates highlighted that the review of NATO's Strategic Concept should not delay the reforms and deflect the attention from NATO's 'structural', 'systemic' problems, especially the Alliance 'budgetary crisis', seen as a result ('symptom') of the **discrepancy between the security threats and the European states' small investments** in collective security and defense (just five of the 28 NATO member countries allocate more than 2 percent of their GDP to the defense sector), considering that the security environment has become more complex, and the Alliance's tasks have expanded. **'The demilitarization of Europe', increasingly tackled during the past decade against the background of the public and political pressure in the European countries**, generates **difficulties in strengthening the ability to efficiently counter common threats**, with a negative impact on achieving 'real security' and 'lasting peace' in the 21st century.

The US-Europe disagreements over the understanding of the way to achieve security and the burden sharing (implicitly the defense investments) **are not new**, being resuscitated within the context of the overhaul of NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted during the NATO's Lisbon Summit (November 2010).

Since the end of the Cold War, the transatlantic relationship, consolidated within NATO, has represented the foundation of the European security. The difficult moments that followed, the conflicts and peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, the September 11 attacks, the war on terror in Afghanistan, the assistance for Iraq's reconstruction, the current security challenges have proved NATO's relevance and the importance of transatlantic cohesion, despite certain differences over the sharing of European and international security burdens.

Emphasizing the relevance of pros and cons of controversies within the transatlantic relationship, this paper aims to highlight the need to avoid unilateral, subjective actions and **the importance of promoting a strong European-US dialogue on the security concept** that should turn into a **comprehensive approach**, by renouncing the military capability highlights and including the civilian and institutional tools which contribute to the efficient management of crisis situations. The different perspectives over the security concept should not generate tension, but **complementarity in the joint efforts aimed at ensuring Euro-Atlantic security**.

2. History of Transatlantic Relations

During the Cold War, the transatlantic relations experienced a period of strong development and cooperation, fostered by the existence of a common enemy – the Soviet Union. Once that specific threat was gone, the European countries faced the impossibility of identifying a common enemy and the need to cope with diffuse, dynamic, borderless, and unpredictable threats[2]. The new security environment required the establishment of international cooperation and security mechanisms. Thus, the architectural debates of the early 1990s that put forward four competing visions of European security[3] resulted in the victory of the Anglo-American idea supporting NATO's centrality. While none of the European states supported Russia's proposal - which has recently forwarded the proposal of establishing a European Security Treaty - of a concert of Europe, the C/OSCE (the German-Czech idea) and the EU (the French-Belgian perspective) were mainly **challenged by the Balkan crisis**, revealing their impotence to affect the situation on the ground. Although NATO's role in the Balkans has been often criticized[4], the Alliance proved to be the only organization able to put an end to hostilities.

Nevertheless, the Europeans' concern that the US might not be interested in protecting the European security triggered Europe's desire to develop its own defense capacity. The strong

belief that situations similar to that in the Balkans could reoccur, and the US would not intervene, determined the European countries (mainly France, Germany, but also Great Britain) to promote the idea of creating European armed forces, independent from the US capabilities, and developing a common security policy (launched during the 1998 Anglo-French Summit held at Saint Malo).

At the same time, **a new challenge** for the transatlantic relationship emerged at the beginning of the third millennium: the new position of **the US** in the international system has created predisposition to **unilateralism and hegemonic behavior** in the US foreign policy. This tendency started during President Bill Clinton's term and reached its climax during President George W. Bush's first mandate.

Some analysts[5] claim that the US domination of the international system has been an objective of the American policy since the World War II. The United States' attitude on the international scene was aimed at accomplishing that goal (the policy towards Germany and Japan focused on preventing their re-emergence as great powers, Great Britain's subordination through economic concessions, and containment policy against the Soviet Union). The end of the Cold War represented an ideological and geopolitical victory that confirmed the US hegemony.

According to the American political analyst Christopher Layne, the hegemony is a purpose in itself, an inherent aspiration of the US policy that would have been pursued with or without Russia. The US superiority and exceptionalism are universal concepts of the American culture, mirrored also in the American security strategy. This idea was highlighted in the political documents issued by the American Presidents in the post-Cold War era. The first Defense Planning Guidance drafted at the end of the Cold War (1992), during George H. W. Bush's Presidency, clearly asserted the US goal 'of ensuring that no new rival power will emerge'. President Clinton's security policy promoted the imperative of the American leadership ('indispensable nation'), 'no international politics without the US', the US military policy focusing on the 'full spectrum dominance'. George W. Bush's 2002 security strategy emphasized the need to ensure 'no other nation surpasses or even equals the US'.

This attitude was accompanied by **the European reticence** to accept the new status of the US, doubled by the idea of abandoning the transatlantic partnership. Some European countries encouraged the '**autonomy**' and distancing from their ally's policies and inclinations claiming even if Europe could not compete with the American military power, it could build an independent approach based on its 'soft-power' resources (especially economic ones)[6].

The hegemony-autonomy binomial contributed to the deepening of the crisis in the transatlantic relationship and the growing gap between the US and European military capabilities, which made some analysts conclude that a new division of labor had occurred in the international system, where the United States would 'fight', the EU would provide 'finances' and the United Nations would 'feed' (providing humanitarian assistance). Stanley Sloan - Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative - claims that the international system faced two 'transatlantic maladies', the two patients, the US and Europe, suffering from 'uni-polaritis', respectively 'delusions of grandeur'.

The events of September 11, 2001 were a **key moment for the transatlantic relationship**, being considered a missed opportunity. The terrorist attacks against the US initially generated an impressive solidarity, with leaders from across the European continent expressing their unequivocal support for the United States[7]. In France, the newspaper *Le Monde*, not known for reflexive Atlanticism[8], was the first in Europe to declare that 'We are all Americans'[9]. In the days following the attacks it became clear that while the United States appreciated the allies' declaration of solidarity, Washington had no intention of asking NATO to lead or even to be closely involved in the eventual military response. Paul Wolfowitz, the then US Deputy Defense Secretary, declared that the effort 'would be made up of many coalitions in different parts of the world', making clear the shift from the old concept 'the coalition determines the mission' to the new, reversed one 'the mission determines the coalition'[10]. The European leaders emphasized that their commitment to the alliance – immediately after invoking Article 5 – did not represented a 'blank cheque' for the US (Tony Blair quoted by Gordon, 2001-02:94). If the Europeans were satisfied with the Bush administration's initial response, many even having the impression

of a new American emphasis on multilateralism, the American unilateral policy that followed changed dramatically their attitude. As Ronald D. Asmus argues, 'somewhere between Kabul and Baghdad, then, the United States and Europe lost each other'[11].

Many argue that the Europe and America are divided by **an ideology gap**. 'Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus'[12]. Others[13] consider that the transatlantic relations suffer greatly from a reciprocal inability of Americans and Europeans to understand and accept other's motives for international activity. Until 1989, a single and common enemy diminished the differences and rendered them a minor distinction. As the Soviet threat faded, 'the other' has become the new threat. One might characterize the post-September 11 war as a confrontation in which eradicating the presence of the other is the war aim. For both the United States and Europe, 'this turns into an identity war'. The contemporary incompatibility between the US and European senses of identity, however, is not derived from September 11. The US tendency to see identity in black-and-white, good-versus-bad, with-us-or-against-us dichotomies was present in prior decades but September 11 accentuated it sharply. When Bush said, in a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, 'Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists', Europe recoiled, as the thought that Americans would no longer accept an emerging identity known as Europe generated angst. 'After September 11, Americans seemed to be calling not just for burden-sharing but identity subservience'[14].

The flip side of the Bush administration go-it-alone approach was the French proposal that the EU too must go its own way and act as a counterweight to American power[15]. The political and military developments (the strengthening of a security and defense policy, the EU civilian missions and the consolidation of military and foreign policy structures) at the EU level can be interpreted as a natural consequence of these evolutions.

However, the developments in the last decade – the takeover by NATO of the ISAF operations in Afghanistan (2003) and the presence of the European countries' forces in the theater of operation, France's reintegration into NATO (Strasbourg-Kehl NATO summit, in April 2009)[16],

the consolidation of the US-France political relations (due to the change of presidents), the development of the EU-US cooperation (concluding some security agreements) – sustain the idea that **any disagreement or crisis moment in the transatlantic cooperation has not been only a challenge but an opportunity, as well**.

Although the withdrawal of the European allies from Afghanistan (the Netherlands) triggered Robert Gates' criticism against the Europeans (February 2010), it did nothing but confirm that 'we live in a changing world, where the transatlantic relations have to obviously adapt to the new demands and developments.'[17]

3. Europe's Demilitarization versus US Militarization

As no major military conflict could emerge at the European level, the European priorities have focused on other fields than defense. Due to the different perceptions on security threats, the US and European ways to approach the security environment challenges have been characterized through the militarization-demilitarization binomial. Robert Gates' discourse draws the attention again to the transatlantic debate on the conflicting opinions on sharing political, military, and financial burdens. The debate can be explained from the perspective of threat assessment, security culture development, security identity and understanding of burden sharing.

3.1. Threat Perception and Defense Investments

The Europeans have a different security threat perception and, implicitly, other strategies aimed at countering newly emerging threats. Robert Gates has highlighted this idea when referring to the security interests, which are no longer linked to the territorial integrity but to the instability abroad. Europe does not face a real challenge of an inter-state large-scale war, but it is concerned with the home-grown terrorism. Therefore, the strategy to deal with this growing threat is the peaceful settlement of this problem by combining the economic dimension (ensuring people's welfare) with efficient security and control mechanisms. This is part of a defensive strategy to counter the threat in Europe ('at home'), unlike the US

offensive strategy of targeting the external source of the threat. A potential explanation also resides in the colonial past of Europe, which is currently reluctant to promote a military intervention policy in different regions.[18]

Building on the different ways of understanding security in Europe and the US, Gunther Hellman (pro-European, apologist of the idealist/constructivist trend)[19], advances the idea that there is a **disagreement in threat perceptions, which generates a different perspective over the (de)militarization trends** (military investments).

Since 1980, the defense expenditure share (representing a percentage of GDP) in Europe and the US have symmetrically developed. Both the US and Europe have taken similar cuts in defense spending in the 1990s.

The discrepancies have begun to appear only after September 11. If, after 2001, the percentage of GDP for the US defense increased from almost 3% to 4.9%, in 2009, in the European states it dropped from almost 3% to below 2%, during the same year. However, in 2006, the EU-25 defense budget was almost the same with the 1985 budget of the same group of states, in a different security environment.

The EU defense expenditures as a percentage of the global spending rose after the end of the Cold War and have decreased relatively recently. In 2006, the EU-25 accounted for 1/5 of the total global defense expenditures.

As compared to other 'great powers', the defense percentage was impressive. In 2006, the EU-25 spent double of the combined defense expenditure of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC).

The budgets of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy exceeded the ones of BRIC. France and Great Britain alone overtook China's defense budget. Germany's and Italy's budgets also overtook Russia's.[20]

Although the percentage or amount of the defense expenditure percentage is not an indicator of an efficient resource use, the European states earmark important defense funds, even if the classical military threats have diminished. From the Europeans' point of view, the high defense expenditures within the current security environment and the efficient use of resources rather than Europe's demilitarization might represent a problem.

3.2. Security Concept

In Europe and the US, **different security cultures** have developed after the Cold War and the September 11 events. **Europe** has adopted a broader security concept, focusing on the cross-border dimension (taking into account the threat dynamics) – '**cross-national security'**, while the **US** has put an emphasis on the **national security** concept.

As for Europe, the cross-national security concept has not developed because the EU wanted to assert itself as a new type of international actor, motivated by high moral principles and standards, but it is a result, on the one hand, of the merger between Europe's historical experience and the development of foreign policy and security institutions and, on the other hand, of the change in the security perception based on the security environment optimization, relationship among the great powers, the EU's material resources, global and regional ambitions of some EU member states and representatives, institutional constraints at the national level (making the EU become 'a unique actor in ensuring global security').[21]

The border does no longer represent a reference point in defining security or threats (perceived as an external factor jeopardizing territorial integrity). The initial logic of the national security, which implies the 'containment' of the opponents, is overcome through promoting the concepts of integration, expansion, partnership, through the symbolic elimination of borders and traditional security practices.

The security concept is defined according to the security reference point, the way of perceiving risk sources and threat-prevention tools. For instance, the UK security strategy, although based on a traditional approach of the security concept, whose referent is the nation and its citizens, it does no longer consider the traditional competition among the great powers a potential risk source, and the security environment is characterized as complex and unpredictable, the risks and threats being generated by multiple interconnected factors that overpass the national border. These elements can be found in the security strategies of most European states.

The change in the EU security perception is the result of approaching security at the national

level and acknowledging that conventional threats are less likely to emerge. The EU does not act as a 'normative power', which teaches lessons or imposes ethical standards, but the changes in the security environment, the need to cooperate, the nationwide financial and material constraints have altered the European security paradigm.

The understanding of cross-national security explains the EU's different approach as compared to the US aggressive pre-emptive strategy. The EU does not want to assert itself as a threatening global actor, but intends to promote joint security objectives.

The European countries have the advantage of institutional alternatives, NATO and the EU being complementary organizations that promote traditional security guidelines (NATO) or supra-national/multilateral approaches (EU – ESDP as an instrument of disseminating the 'effective multilateralism').

Some analysts claim that Robert Gates' perspective is unilateral and limitative[22]. The question whether the British are also included in the category of Europeans emerges when Gates talks about the 'averse attitude towards military force and the risks that go with it'. NATO, seen by many Europeans as a defensive military organization, consecrated, through the Washington Treaty, Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, according to which the signatory states commit themselves not to use force in international relations. Under such circumstances, another question arises: what is wrong with the Europeans' reluctant attitude towards the use of military force?

The current security environment reveals that the newly-emerged complex threats need new countering methods. The US and Europe have to launch a reflection process on the efficiency of using military force or, as Hellman put it, a debate over the compatibility of national and cross-national security concepts. In order to overcome the averse attitude, the Europeans should better explain the notion of foreign and security policy and to promote an enhanced dialogue with the US in order to capitalize on the security opportunities[23].

3.3. Security Identity

In Hellmann's opinion, although there are some disagreements between the US and Europe, they share the same security identity. Hellman is not a supporter of the skeptical Atlanticists or of neo-realists predicting the Alliance's dismantlement. The US and Europe are not different entities, but a monolithic bloc ('the West', from the point of view of China, Russia, etc.) sharing the same values and interests.

The difference between Europe's 'demilitarization' and the US's 'remilitarization' comes from the different perception over the use of military force, understood as aggression or tragedy in Europe and heroism in the US. These views should not impede cooperation and give satisfaction to Russia or China, for instance, to see the reference point of the collective militarization below zero ('...Russia or China would probably be pleased if a lower zero-point of militarization could be reached as a collective point of reference.'). Meeting the 'real security' and 'enduring peace' desiderate depends on 'the eyes of the beholder'.

3.4. Burden Sharing

The debate on the transatlantic relationship is artificial if reduced only to the way the military capabilities are used, according to Robert Gates' speech[24]. The transatlantic cohesion is influenced by the trust level, by assuming and sharing burdens. The 'burden sharing' principle should be extended and adapted to the security environment reality, overcoming the Cold War approach focused on military force.

Starting from the security environment assessment, a balanced share of missions and tasks assumed within NATO should be ensured. The problem of sharing burdens is strictly related to the available resources and capabilities, but also to the member states' political will to invest and deploy these capabilities during crisis situations. The lack of political will influences the resource availability and the other way round. The transatlantic cohesion is very important, as its absence entails the lack of commitments and, implicitly, of the political will to get involved in situations which do not affect national interests.

From this perspective, the current dissent on providing equal contributions in Afghanistan can be interpreted as the aftershock of the Iraq crisis and the result of an overextension of solidarity from 2003 to 2005. Based on the lessons learnt from the European partners' poor performance in coping with the Balkan crisis, the Bush Adminis-

tration tried, if not to abandon, to at least ignore the Alliance structures after 2001. Instead of a joint NATO effort, the US intervention in Afghanistan was built upon an ad-hoc coalition, the same approach being also used in Iraq, in 2003. In 2006, the US has started to change its policy and tried to convince the European allies to provide more support for Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2006, efforts from both sides and the political changes have contributed to the consolidation of the transatlantic relationship. This has been the result of the acknowledgement that the US cannot solve all security problems on its own while the European partners are not able to remain unaffected by global developments. The understanding that Europe does not represent 'a Kantian island of peace', and the US is not the world's gendarme could be the starting point for renewed Alliance cohesion and a new balanced share of burdens.

Along with the new Strategic Concept, NATO needs **a new approach on burden sharing**, staring from the assessment of threats and capabilities which the allies can provide in order to efficiently respond during crisis situations. The current concept which the US promotes, especially focused on military capabilities (*guns and boots on the ground*), should be mirrored into a new **comprehensive** formula[25] which should include assets like civilian and humanitarian aid, development projects, training and education capabilities, legal and administrative assistance, donations, and even efforts and investments of other institutions or mechanisms that do not exclusively belong to NATO[26].

4. Future of Transatlantic Relationship

The international relations theory provides at least two different views on the way in which the transatlantic relationship will evolve: the neorealist view and the constructivist one.

The supporters of the neorealist approach (Christopher Layne) warn over the future of the transatlantic relationship which will lose its current relevance. Europe will have to focus on the consolidation of its own defense and security capabilities ('Europe has to take care of itself'), while the Eastern European states which assess threats differently (frozen conflicts, Russia's influence) should convince Brussels of the need for new strategic directions.

Currently, there are three factors which lead to the conclusion that Europe will no longer be included among the priorities on the US foreign policy agenda:

- the tightening economic constraints amid the financial crisis;
- the focus on the strategic interests in Asia;
- the domestic (including demographic and social) pressures and the difficulty in explaining the population why the EU, with a larger GDP than the US, still appeals to the US security guarantees and defense mechanisms.

The US unilateralism will further exist and it is an illusion to believe that the multilateralism has taken its place once the Administration changed. Obama has not radically changed this policy. The reason for further promoting the unilateralism resides in the fact that a power ensuring a balance at the international level should exist, as multilateralism promotes different interests, and implicitly conflicts (war-prone system). The US supports multilateralism only when the allies do as the US pleases, while the US principle in the international relations is 'nice guys finish last'.

The vigor of the transatlantic relationship is affected by a more powerful 'virus' than the one emerged during President Bush's first mandate (triggered by the Iraq war). The recent problems in the US-Europe cooperation (amid the intervention in Afghanistan, the Guantanamo issue, the financial crisis, the European Parliament's vote against the SWIFT agreements) consolidate Obama's policy pragmatism (expressed in his Strasbourg speech: 'you are not indispensable to us ... but ... we remain indispensable to you').

The recent developments within the EU in relation to the Lisbon Treaty offer the EU important opportunities to promote its foreign policy and assert itself as a global actor, although there are still powerful centrifugal forces within the Union (for example: divergent opinions on the policy towards Russia). Despite the 'strategic vacuum' within Europe, some analysts claim that NATO does no longer represent the central pillar of the European security architecture[27].

The different views promoted by the US and Europe towards Russia – the catalyst factor of the North-Atlantic Alliance – support the argument to reduce NATO's relevance. The current strategic environment is dominated by three main actors: the US, Europe, and Russia, while a new model of

trilateral relationship will be difficult to establish (comparison with *ménage à trois*, where one of the partners is *la maîtresse*).[28]

Despite these arguments, the US and Europe, with their moments of crisis or disagreement, have further cooperated, united in front of the common challenges. There is a **joint security agenda** which includes risks and threats, such as: terrorism, proliferation, failed states, emerging powers (China), instability zones (Middle East, Central Asia), economic challenges (financial crisis) and political challenges (political Islam), along with the new risks posed by cyber attacks and the access to energy resources.

The strategies and actions promoted by Europe and the US are different, but the threat nature is the same, while the solutions can be found only through joint and complementary efforts.

At the same time, the transatlantic relationship benefits from the **advantage of sharing the same set of values, principles and history.**

The classic debate, revived by Robert Gates, is obsolete and brings nothing new. The disagreements between the US and Europe have lasted for over 20 years and tend to become pure rhetoric if **a new cooperation mechanism is not identified starting from the current advantages and opportunities**.

The US should overcome its old rhetoric and nostalgia within NATO. The US needs to promote a cooperation based on innovation principles, adapted to the current security environment ('many creative architects are needed to build a new design and diversify the transatlantic roads'[29]).

Conclusions

The US and Europe are **strategic partners** in ensuring European and Euro-Atlantic security, although there have been key moments in the history which have contributed to the transatlantic cohesion.

Despite different perceptions on security and the way to respond to threats, there are also common preoccupations and interests to adjust to the new security environment requirements and to identify common solutions to prevent and counter cross-border security risks and threats.

At the same time, the different view or approach on security does not necessarily imply antagonism or dissent, but it can constructively lead to **complementary efforts** aimed at ensuring transatlantic security and stability.

It has already become a cliché to assert that there is no organization which can contribute alone and in isolation to building an international sustainable security environment. Each organization presents comparative advantages that can be used within a **network of key organizations** (*interlocking institutions*) which can provide complementary security capabilities. If certain critics claim that NATO does no longer represent the central pillar of the European security, they cannot deny that the Alliance is an essential part of this network which can contribute to ensuring the European security.

It is also obvious that Europe needs NATO. 'Multilateralism in NATO is the only viable alternative to US unilateralism'[30]. The better-integrated European capabilities will boost Europe's voice within the Alliance. Moreover, the future cooperation between Europe and the US can rely on the harmonious use of hard and soft capabilities. However, the US and Europe should provide both types of capabilities in order to avoid another dispute over the equal burden-sharing issue.

For Romania, the transatlantic relationship further remains the fundamental premise of the European security. The security and efficiency of the US and EU joint commitment against the contemporary threats depend to a large extent on the consistency and balance of the transatlantic partnership. Any disagreement or crisis situation emerged in the transatlantic cooperation should be viewed not only as a challenge, but also as an opportunity. In the current security context, it is obvious that the transatlantic relationship should also adapt to the new requirements and developments.

The myth or fear that the US-Europe antagonism will determine the European pillar's separation from the transatlantic relationship cannot be validated. The changes in the security environment and the need to cooperate will contribute to further maintaining and enhancing the transatlantic dialogue.

The transatlantic cohesion, based on a shared history and a set of common values and principles, should ensure a **joint strategic approach to the security transformation in the 21st century** through a concerted vision on extending security at the European and international level.

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CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO MODERN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

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Protection of human life and life-style refers especially to ensuring the continuous and safe functioning of those infrastructures that are vital to society, which use different forms of energy (thermal, hydraulic, electrical or wind power), services and facilities at standards imposed by the ever-changing modern society.

The unprecedented increase in the last decades of risks and threats to the vital objectives of states and international organisms, coupled with the increase in their number and vulnerability have led to the settlement of the new concept known as critical infrastructure.

The definition of critical infrastructures and the approaches to their protection are different from a country to another, from an organization to another, but some common structural elements, measures undertaken, compatible functions and responsibilities can still be identified.

Key-words: critical infrastructures; vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures; national critical infrastructure; European critical infrastructure.

1.1. General aspects

The accelerated socio-economic development of the last decades has made modern life dependent upon a series of physical systems, services and economic, financial, informational, educational facilities etc., which people use in a way or another at every moment of their lives. We have electricity and water, processed food and emergency medical assistance, education and information, financial and administrative services, the same as we benefit from transportation and several means of electronic telecommunications.

Critical infrastructures do not become critical only when being under attack or because of attacks on them, but because of other causes that may be difficult to trace and analyze. So, after the terrorist attacks on 11th September 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it has been considered that infrastructures can become critical also because of terrorist attacks or other threats, usually asymmetrical.

When entering the new millennium, the military field has also entered a period in which the war is affected by the strategic changes of the environment and the rapid technological changes. World's states experience the transition from the industrial to the information era.

The total engagement in the global war against terrorism in the new era of globalization, together with the experience gained during the recent military operations have generated the reorientation of the Armed Forces towards the super technologized war and towards the means provided by the industrial facilities and by the modern critical infrastructures.

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
Figure no. 1 IC structure as a state of metasystems (system of systems)
Source: Dr.Ing. Septimiu CACEU , Rezilienta Infrastructurilor Critice din Gestiunea Sectorului Transporturi
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Thus, the American concept presented in the "Joint Vision 2020" highlights: information superiority, high-level decision making, dominant maneuver, precision of engagement, focal logistics and protection of all dimensions. It generally involves a new approach towards the fulfillment of missions, a new understanding of organizations and their interrelations, and of the way in which systems, capabilities and modern critical infrastructures are purchased and exploited.

The security and economy of all world's states, and all their citizens' welfare depend on certain infrastructures and services they provide. The existence and use of certain services (for example: telecommunication and power networks, banking and transportation systems, health services, provision of drinking water and food) are crucial for these states to function[1].

Modern **critical infrastructures are based on the** ability to interconnect various systems and networks in order to furnish global coverage for the transmission of information, and the coordination of their functionality at optimal planned parameters due to the relationships of dependence and interdependence, in this respect being necessary a modern approach, and their evaluation and study as a complex architecture, as a "system of systems" (**Figure no. 1**).

In the current context generated by the complex and contradictory forms that characterize the globalization phenomenon, have appeared scientific approaches that, by analyzing the variety and dynamics of processes undertaken by the modern world, have broadened considerably the limits that shape the content of infrastructure[2]. The destruction and disruption of an infrastructure that furnishes essential services involve, among others, the loss of human lives, loss of property, and the collapse of public trust.

Critical infrastructures, regardless of their location, can be affected, destroyed, or disrupted because of deliberate terrorism acts, natural

disasters, neglect, accidents, criminal activities or lately, because of hackers, if we refer to the infrastructure of the virtual space. It would be ideal if any destruction or manipulation of the critical infrastructure be, if possible, of short duration, nonrepetitive and easy to manage, geographically isolated, and less detrimental to other regional or national infrastructure sectors.

The critical infrastructure of the European states currently obeys a series of obligations and protection measures.

The destruction or loss of one of the infrastructure's parts from a Member State can have negative effects on other Member States or even on the whole European economy. This is becoming increasingly possible as new technologies (for example: the Internet) and the market liberalization (for example: electricity and fuel supply) show that the majority of national infrastructures is part of a more complex regional network.

The existent interdependencies between sectors create the framework in which an event (dysfunctionality, damage, destruction etc.) can have a cascade effect on other sectors and socio-economic fields, which do not a have an immediate or evident connection. For example, a terrorist attack on an electric power distribution company could interrupt the power supply of a large area and could disrupt the supply of other services including the medical ones because lack of electricity.

Interdependencies exist both within and between different fields, and sectors of the industry, geographical jurisdiction and authorities of the Member States, especially those that possess information and communication technologies.

Many companies operate cross-border services and, therefore, have many obligations in terms of critical infrastructure. From a purely economic point of view, the existence of a multitude of levels and protection standards in the EU Member States leads to an increase in the costs of business, and companies need to multiply their security expenses. The problem is that a low level of critical infrastructure of certain Member States can lead to the increase of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities of other Member States. The basic principle of coexistence and of sharing a common space involves the obligation that no co-owner of the space should pose any risk or threat to the others, in a deliberate way or not[3].

The problem that imposes measures to be taken reprezents the vulnerability of infrastructures at all levels, and implicitly, of the services they offer.

This situation applies to all critical infrastructures, regardless of their importance at the European, national or regional level. The effects can be both direct (for example: consequences of terrorist attacks) and indirect (for example: cease of certain services because of certain infrastructures' problems). As the development area and standards of technological systems have grown, the economic and social losses have also increased because of potential destructions. The source of major destruction resides in the technical mishaps and managerial errors, coupled with natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Also, economic and social activities are becoming increasingly interdependent so that the actions of an organization can have positive or negative consequences on other organizations.

The cumulative impact of terrorist attacks or of natural desastres has imposed new standards of common governance in a public-private partnership on critical infrastructures. According to the fact that the state is fully responsible for the protection of lives and properties, its main attributions are to ensure the legal framework for the public sector to function, the correction of mistakes or market results (when social values such as equity or fairness are infringed), and to stimulate or forbid the consumption of certain goods and services.[4]

Discussions about the nature of the relationships between the public and the private sector cannot elude the problem of protecting the critical infrastructure. From a practical point of view, the state has the monopoly of the society infrastructure.

Having this central position, the state has chosen development policies and methods to implement the strategies in the field, as its attribute is to plan, organize, and coordinate the activities at all levels (strategic, regional, and local).

The protection of employees, income and goods represents the components of the well-designed plan to reduce losses. If an owner/critical infrastructure operator is unable to identify the vulnerabilities of the threats he is subjected to, and evaluate the impact of potential losses, the continuity of his company may be endangered. As owners or critical infrastructure operators may

have good reasons not to make public the breaches in their security systems, it is necessary to design a number of procedures in order to evaluate the costs of these incidents within the state[5].

While many EU Member States, among which Romania, have already identified their national critical infrastructure and have imposed strict measures of protection, others have not yet made any serious effort to identify the critical infrastructure on each field and create the adequate legal framework.

According to internal and external requirements, Romania, defined by Nicolae Iorga as "a state of European necessity" due to its existence as a pivot of a special geopolitical configuration, has to participate in the common effort to approach and implement the new concept for the following reasons that influence in a decisive way national security: beneficiary of the globalization phenomenon, EU member state, member of the North-Atlantic Alliance, and a state from the Balkan and Black Sea area[6].

A primary positive signal has been the establishment at the inter-ministry level of a work group, which is headed by the Ministry of Administration and Interior, through its specialized structure - The General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, and which has as a main research task the mission to find timely implementation ways at all levels of the European legislation in the field.

1.2. Conceptual delineation

European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection, launched in December 2006, gives the following definition of the concept: "Critical infrastructures are the physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in the Member States."[7].

The directive of the Council of the European Union of December 2008 stipulates the responsibility of Member States to identify critical infrastructure within the national borders and establish as well as manage specific protection measures for the declared purpose to contribute to the protection of persons[8].

According to the aforementioned directive, "critical infrastructure" is an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.

The aforementioned directive is a step forward within the gradually approach towards the identification and establishment of European critical infrastructures (ECI), and the evaluation of the necessity to improve their protection. The main and final responsibility for the protection of ECI lies with the Member States and, respectively, with the owners/operators of these critical infrastructures. According to the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 98 from 03.11.2010, regarding the identification, prioritization and protection of critical infrastructures, we will further present the concepts of national critical infrastructure and European critical infrastructure.

Thus, "**national critical infrastructure is a** system or a part thereof, located on the national territory, which is essential to maintaining the vital functions of society, health, safety, security, well-being, and whose destruction would have a significant impact at national level because of the impossibility to maintain those functions.

European critical infrastructure is a national critical infrastructure whose disruption or destruction would have a significant impact on at least two Member States of the European Union. The importance of the impact is evaluated from the perspective of the intersectorial criteria. This includes the effects that result from the intersectorial relationships of dependence on other types of infrastructures"[9].

Reputed military analysts argue that CI is a "good asset that is vital to the functioning of economy and society" and PCI represents "**all the** established measures for the reduction of blockage risks for the functioning or destruction of a critical infrastructure"[10]. Regarding the PCI, two working hypotheses are accepted: the impossibility to have total protection, and the lack of a general model.

Generically, CI includes: telecommunications, water and energy supply services, gas and oil storage and delivery, banking and finance systems, emergency systems, and continuity of government (figure nr. 2).

The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1996) from the USA

Figure no. 2 The systemic integrated model of USA critical infrastructures
Source: Andy PURDY, President's critical infrastructure protection board, The White Hose, apurdy@nsc.eop.
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considered that national security, economy, and survival of industrialized world depend on energy, communication, and computers.

The evolution of society has determined the reconsideration of the point of reference so the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003, USA) proposed a new definition of CI as referring to: "public and private institutions in the sectors of agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping."[11].

According to NATO's definition, CIs are those: "facilities, systems, and networks, and physical or virtual IT services and equipment, the disabling or destruction of which would have a severe impact on populations, public health, security, economic activity, the environment, democratic governance, or the ability of the government of a Member State to operate effectively."[12]

CI Protection includes programs, activities and actions taken by governments, owners, operators, and stakeholders in order to secure these infrastructures. Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee

within NATO has designated the eight committees under its auspices to find solutions to identify in a unified way the problems related to the definition criteria of CI, to the models and methods of risk analysis and risk identification as well as to their protection methods.

From the EU's perspective, CIs include: "telecommunications, energy and water supplies, power grids, banking and finance services, food production and supply, health care services, transport and distribution, financial services, defense and public order services(the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie, and the Police)."

In the last few years, a series of EU Member States, as well as Australia and Canada have taken substantial steps in the PCI, founding responsible organisms, defining procedures and methodologies, allocating important resources for the protection of infrastructures considered critical, essential or vital.

The European Council (June, 2004) asked the European Commission and the High Representative to establish a global strategy regarding the consolidation and protection of CI. A new definition of CI was presented according

to which: "Critical infrastructures consist of those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in the Member States." European integration, on the background of current interdependencies has generated the increase of the vulnerability degree of CI within the EU Member States. According to the European Commission, three essential criteria for the identification of CI can be accepted:

1. the extent of the geographical area; 2. magnitude - incidental (null, minimal, moderate or high), economic, on the public domain, on the environment, etc.; 3. effects with respect to time – the timeframe after which the consequences become major or grave.

Within a study conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies of Defense and Security, within the National Defense University, Bucharest, entitled "Critical Infrastructures. Dangers, threats towards them. Protection systems" the authors, Grigore Alexandrescu,PhD. and Gheorghe Văduva, PhD. approach the problem of PCI from a systemic perspective.

In the authors' opinion, according to the location, the role, the importance for the systems' establishment, functionality, and their security, we can distinguish the following types of infrastructures: common infrastructures - CO; special infrastructures - SI; critical infrastructures - CI.

Infrastructures are part of the resistance structures of a system, are relational and functional, and represent the necessary basis so that the system can identify itself, become individualized, relate to other systems, become stable, and, in the end, become operational.

Common infrastructures are a structure, a framework, which endure the construction and fuctionalization of a system. These infrastructures do not possess extraordinary features, except from those that justify their existence and presence within systems and processes, such as: railways, towns, schools, libraries etc., and some of them, under certain circumstances, can become special and even critical. For example, settlement in the vicinity of airways, powerful communication centers, nuclear power plants, railway nodes etc. can be part of special infrastructures and, sometimes, even of critical ones.

Special Infrastructures play a specific role in the functionality of systems and processes, providing them with enhanced efficiency, quality, comfort and performance. Generally speaking, special infrastructures are performance structures, some of which can have, if extended or transformed (modernized), an important role in establishing and securing systems, and can get in the category of critical infrastructures.

Critical infrastructures are those infrastructures with an important role in ensuring security, in the functionality of systems, and in the economic, social, political, information and military processes.

Infrastructures are considered critical because:
- they are unique within the infrastructures of a system or process;
- they are of vital importance as material and virtual support (of network), in the functionality of systems and in the economic, social, political, information and military processes etc.;
- they have an important, irreplaceable role in the establishment, fiability, safety, functionality and especially in the security of systems;
- they are vulnerable to direct threats, and to those that target the systems whose components they are;

These types of infrastructures exist in all the countries. They are not arbitrary established, but identified and evaluated as being critical. In other words, from the amount of infrastructures that form a system (process) or contribute to its function, only some of them are considered critical.

The criteria used to evaluate these are variable. Specialists consider that from the point of view of structures with attributions in the field of national security, and from the perspective of military operations, the following criteria can be taken into account:
- the physical criterion, or the one of presence (the position within other infrastructures, the dimension, dispersion, fiability etc.);
- the functional criterion, or the one of the role (what the respective infrastructure actually "does");
- the security criterion (which is its role in the safety and security of the system);
- the flexibility criterion (which shows that these is a certain dynamics and certain flexibility regarding the critical structures, some of the common ones transforming themselves, under certain circumstances, in critical infrastructures or the other way around);

- the unpredictability criterion (which shows that some of the structures can suddenly become critical);

The need for a national systemic, for the profound, and comprehensive approach of PCI as a factor of national security, involves taking into account all the stages prior to protection programs, emergency plans, and standardized operational procedures, from their position as components of the managerial view that develop these strategic elements.[13].

Taking into account the type of dangers and threats to the national critical infrastructures, the law projects regarding Romania's national security from 2007 list the following threats: degradation or destruction of main power lines and water supply systems, of communication networks, hydro-energy infrastructures, including protection systems against accidents and calamities, the lack of reserves for humanitarian needs and intervention in case of emergency situations, mobilization in case of war, also preventing the vulnerabilities posed by activities with high nuclear, chemical, bacteriological risk, and others that can produce catastrophes and disasters.

Conclusions

Critical infrastructures have always been the most sensible, vulnerable elements of a system and process. Critical infrastructures will always be highly risky because usually they are the first targeted when the destabilization or the destruction of a system or process is meant. The identification, optimization, and security of critical infrastructures are an indisputable priority for both the structures that manage them or coordinate them, and for those who intend to attack, destabilize, and destroy them.

When there are significant disruptions of services or facilities which are indispensable to the daily life of the citizen or they society, it is easy to understand that critical infrastructures can be found among or are themselves those production capacities, emergency or communitarian services and other administrative facilities, designed to provide the services required by the modern society, and which, if interrupted, can disrupt the daily way of life of human society, and especially, can generate the damage or even the loss of human lives.

Infrastructures that operate at the national,

continental or global level are increasingly dependent upon other infrastructures and services, upon sources and energetic resources, upon hi-tech systems and information distribution ones, both horizontally and vertically, towards other infrastructures and critical service, vital for the human communities around the globe.

According to specialists, protection of critical infrastructures represents a field whose scientific and operational content is strictly delimited, having specific research methods lying at the junction of more specialties such as: security and defense, logistics, management of civil emergency, risk management, defense against the effects of disasters, prevention of criminal and terrorist activities, or ensurance of safety and public order.

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INFORMATION SECURITY – PART OF ECONOMIC SECURITY

Valeriu IVAN*

In an economy where information supply has greatly increased, power belongs to those who are able, at the proper time, to gather, examine and synthesize, as fast as possible, the relevant data and information available in the competitive environment. This observation seems valid from Small and Medium Businesses to Multinational Corporations and economic activities in which governments are involved. Some states are aware of such competition and, in order to be able to meet the challenge, they have conceived, have applied and now are benefiting of the rewards of some genuine economic war doctrines.

The lack of a national institutionalized system capable to support the informational efforts of local companies determines a competitive disadvantage for them on the global economic scene. The perpetuation of this situation has the characteristics specific to a vulnerability which affects national economic security, wherefore the encouragement of informational capabilities development – with emphasis on competitive intelligence and information protection – must become a priority in the national security strategy.

Key-words: economic security; competitive intelligence; information; competitiveness; economy; economic war.

I. General information concerning the fight for economic supremacy

The strategic surprise of the fall of the Iron Curtain – without firing a single gunshot, after 40 years of arsenals without precedent in human history – has caused the rapidity with which subsequent events took place. The Cold War era ended in 1989. Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty, in 1949, the form and nature of international alliances haven't experienced such a variation. The end of the Cold War generated a whole geostrategic tectonics and the resulting repercussions haven't reached an equilibrium stage yet. On the 9th of November 1989, the day when the Berlin Wall fell, the old world disappeared. On the 10th of November 1989 a new world was born.

Although there were judgments according to which history was going to end with the events subsequent to the day of 9th November and an era of peace and understanding was going to begin[1], the day of 11th September (2001) irreversibly came and showed to the whole planet that problems did not end.

The end of the Ideological War marked the undeniable victory of Capitalism and its embracement by most of the states belonging to the former Soviet Bloc and its sphere of influence. The whole mankind accepts this equilibrium – probably

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unstable – as well as the geo-economic framework which governs commercial relations: Liberalism. Even China, which apparently keeps the communist political system, has quickly adjusted to meet the market economy requirements, becoming one of the main competitors on the global market.

Nevertheless, what happened with the great conflict potential? Considering a principle in physics, it can be said that nothing is lost, everything is transformed. What has changed it is the nature of conflicts and, somehow, of belligerents. The fights are no longer led only to conquer lands or to get autonomy or independence; conflicts have become mainly economic, with emphasis on resources and markets. The main conflicts among states, via companies or non-governmental organizations, are, above all, commercial.

It remains to be seen which international actor will require the leadership and whether this will be, as matter stands, one of economic nature. The necessary amount of information for economic expansion refers to all that is characteristic to a model of society, from the viewpoint of the social system, lifestyle, moral, law, customs, traditions, cultural identity and so on. Market does not have standard characteristics anywhere in the world, taking into consideration the fact that, from one nation to another, we face different visions of society and of the way the individual relates to society, sometimes with contradictory constituents. Market has rapidly become global, yet, one cannot say the same thing about the values assumed by each individual, community, nation or culture.

The challenge of the moment seems to be the deceleration of the dominant values of a global future and of the states or supranational entities which can be vectors of influence. At least for the time being, there is no vector more suitable than economy to form the behavior of people belonging to different societies. Globalization is not directed towards ethic goals, it does not have its own way and it will be the result of human actions. According to the present state of things, we can say, paraphrasing Heidegger, that it represents the instinctive desire for power, hidden under the cover of the desire for change.[2]

Defeated by abdication, the envisaged socialist economy has found its place in the trunk with useless stuff of history. As a winner, market economy has no longer any obstacle in its way. Nevertheless, the recent reality shows us that,

just like its defeated enemy, the latter one is not infallible. The saying "let the market work and economic success will be guaranteed" has proved being able to lead companies, banks and maybe states to bankruptcy.

In order for "the invisible hand" of the market to operate correctly, the rules of free competition must be the same for everybody, and the contextual conditions relatively similar, conditions fulfilled only on a market with perfect competition. But perfect competition is only isolated and for short periods of time.

According to the economist Jean Gabszewicz[3], at least four conditions should be met for a perfect competition to exist – a theoretical model used in competition analysis:

a. Atomicity – a large number of salesmen and purchasers, so that isolated transactions be insignificant against the overall volume of transactions;

b. Free entry – the emergence of new producers is allowed, and they may entry and exit the markets arbitrarily;

c. Homogeneity of goods belonging to the same branch – for the customer it does not matter what seller he buys from;

d. Complete information – companies and purchasers know all products and prices on the market at the same time.

In terms of the subject approached, there are problems with the 4th criterion, according to which all economic agents (buyers and sellers) should detain all the information regarding the product price and quality. Ideally speaking, provided such condition was fulfilled, there would be a single price on the market, the sellers being subject to it (a purely theoretical situation, where the supply and demand are simultaneously known by offerers and purchasers). This condition is not likely to be met as not all market actors detain the same information. Consequently, those who are informed on time have a competitive advantage and they manage, virtually, to defeat the uninformed and misinformed ones.

The problem of information asymmetry, such as they called the unequal access to economic information, has aroused researchers' interest and for revealing its implications, George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz have been awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in the year 2001[4].

The stake for each actor is to anticipate/know the actions of competitors so that he can always be a step forward. So, he needs to know, as early as possible, the strategy of others concerning research, production and sale. If an economic agent intends to manufacture more and cheaper, then competitors should be ready to counteract. Competitive advantage is obtained through information and the information is obtained through means and methods which carry back to those used during the war.

The economic war represents a controversial and difficult to define concept. For most people, a war can be only military. Otherwise, the Romanian Explanatory Dictionary approaches this, starting the term's definition with the following explanation: armed conflict. In a similar approach, Larousse, 2004 edition, provides the following definition: "war means the use of armed force in order to solve a conflict between two or more organized collectivities: clans, factions, states. It consists of the fact that every opponent is trying to determine the other one to submit to his will." This definition has a part which can be applied to our problem. If a war means to impose others your own will, then its economic equivalent pursues the same goal. The question is to determine competitors to submit to our will, that is, to diminish their potential or destroy them. The economic war is the silent but total war. Resources, technology, productivity, markets and profit represent an arsenal used by actors of a generalized conflict. Just like any other war, it causes victims. Not necessarily dead or wounded but, usually, unemployed, poor people, orphans of an economy that refuses to satiate everybody. With no ethics or pity in achieving a single goal: permanently extending the area of influence. Companies are the main actors of this war where they fight with or without governments' support.

Information is the means of meeting the goals in international economic competitions. In order to survive, each actor should protect his own information patrimony and, at the same time, strive to know that of competitors.

With the new technologies in information and communication domains, the weak point of a company moves from the product or services to the information which allows preserving the product/service competitiveness. The product or the services are less important than how they sell it. "International competition is not achieved, or it is less and less achieved, by means of technological performance (…). The simple relation quality-price does not always make the difference (…). Competition can often be won when you know and break the ground from the human factor viewpoint before receiving the proper commercial proposal, when you have the ability to determine and state strategic goals, to encourage their development, then to compromise all possible means to determine them to make a decision in your way"[5]. There is no un-influenced economic competition. States need information to maintain their position on international level and to assist their companies.

In a period when information supply has greatly increased, power belongs to those who are able, at the proper time, to gather, examine and synthesize, as fast as possible, the relevant data and information available in the competitive environment. Almost 90% of this amount is available due to data banks, press, specialized publications, symposiums or the Internet. The rest of 10% is considered to be extremely important and sensitive, which is usually obtained from close sources and deceitfully (grey information) or illegally (black information). The most severe fights among international actors are held for this 10%[6].

Those who wondered found out that, in this game, there are no rules and the lack of interests/economic information protection does not forgive and costs much. A relevant example is the document presented at the French National Assembly by the deputy Bernard Carayon, in the 2004, which clearly shows the fact that, no matter the partnerships or international treaties, economic competition often remains outside the rules[7].

The developed countries are aware of such competition and, in order to be able to meet the challenge, they have conceived, applied and now are reaping the rewards of some genuine economic war doctrines, with emphasis on promoting the interests of resident companies and of the economic branches considered as priorities for development, as well as on gathering/protecting innovative technologies.

In this respect, ever since 1975, the Washington administration set up a Committee on Foreign Investments, ruled by the Secretary of the Treasury, *Committee on Foreign Investments in*

the United States, which refused, for example, the merge between Alcatel and Luccent, as well as that between Eutelsat and the main American satellite operator. Clinton Administration showed to be extremely interested in consolidating their means in terms of economic intelligence: in 1993 the *National Economic Council* was set up, a forum in charge with supplying economic information to the USA President and, in 1996, *Economic Espionage Act[8] was voted*, a document which consolidated the business secret protection.

A report issued partly by American university teachers on CIA's request, "Japan 2000", is the document which, in 1991, proved that a good part of the "Japanese miracle" relied on a coherent strategy of getting economic information. This document shows how, several years ago, Japan became one of the first economic powers, in spite of its infrastructure destroyed during World War II. "Japan 2000" reveals the magic Japanese recipe, based on an aggressive doctrine of collecting economic information on an international level. Among the drawn conclusions, the report submits the strategy for power of the United States in the coming years: "The acquired power becomes the basic element for the future instruments of coercion and control whose efficiency will depend on a judicious use of force, wealth and knowledge, all these elements forming the power frame. The countries which will be able to make strategic use of these three elements will obtain the biggest advantage if they alternate, in parallel, the promise of some advantage and the threat with some constraints, exploiting information technology to the maximum"[9].

Since 1995, the security strategy of the United States has relied on three pillars: the military, economic and cultural component[10]. Joseph S. Nye, the Dean of JFK School of Government from Harvard University, stated in an article published in the magazine Foreign Affairs ("America's information edge" - no. 75 of 1996), that "the state which will be leading the information revolution will be much more powerful than any other"[11]. The USA is greatly investing in developing its own ways of providing economic information to the government and companies.

Immediately after World War II, the Japanese have perfected a unique system of collecting and processing economic information, a complex and extremely difficult approach whose main support was the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade. Through this Ministry and with the help of some efficient information technique, the Japanese managed to gain on in many fields: shipbuilding and vehicles, cars construction, computers, automation etc.

France has started to show great importance to economic information since 1994, with the emergence of the report entitled "*Intelligence économique et stratégie des enterprises*"[12]. The specialists who drew the report were in charge with performing a comparative analysis of the main national systems on economic intelligence, taking into consideration the systems in Japan, the United States, Germany, Italy, China, Russia etc. The report also identifies problems in the French information systems and makes proposals for managing economic information in private companies.

Great Britain placed the information problem in the centre of economic strategy as early as 1998. This strategy is presented in a report entitled *"Our competitive future: the knowledge economy"[13]*. The same observation, the same approach: changing the administration policies in order to assist the British Companies.

Germany managed in the '90s to merge SMEs' interests with those of large companies and lands/state by means of repeated sessions of training on competitiveness through information. The German system, closely related to the economic doctrine ORDOliberalism is simple and efficient, being a resultant between private and state interests, rationalized by the mentioned doctrine.

China does not have an economic strategy as we understand it at present or as it is seen in West[14]. Still, Beijing admits the existence of a world ruled by conflicts among great powers, especially in the economic field. In a paper drawn up by two officers in the Chinese Army, published in France[15], the authors speak about the new wars, regrouped under the acronym MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), including commercial wars, financial wars, ecologic wars etc. Ever since the late '90s, the Chinese Government has been leading a policy based on information, which mainly focuses on the control upon the technologies of the future. Even if it benefits of important strategic advantages – its culture in terms of patience, demography etc. – China makes all efforts to gain on in technology and science, relying on information obtained from all types of sources. It is known that, between the emergence of a new product, whose success is

waited for, anywhere in the world, and the moment when the label says "made in China" it is only several days/weeks.

There are few countries which have chosen proper strategies concerning the state support for sustaining the information component of companies' competitiveness. Spain, Italy and Portugal have no national economic intelligence strategies but powerful companies in these states have complex programs of competitive intelligence.

The states in Eastern Europe, including Romania, have no national programs and there are no significant initiatives for adjusting to the trends in the field of the economically developed countries.

Internal political fights in these states do not allow the setting of a critical mass which could direct the resources towards the development of a real system for increasing economic competitiveness. Moreover, because of mistakes made in the economic field they have become easy victims for economic intelligence of those who understood the arsenal they need to conquer lands and human minds at present. From this point of view, it is relevant the experience of privatizing companies and then undergoing "feasibility studies" and "independent audits".

In a document of 2010 of the European Commission[16] - *The Audit Policy: Crisis Lessons* – they appreciate that 90% of the audit market is divided in four large companies, the most important one being in USA, followed by two others in Great Britain and one in Holland. The way in which these companies have managed to develop is not common, in that each represents, in fact, a conglomeration of smaller companies, with similar working procedures and data bases[17]…

The economy in the countries in Eastern Europe has undergone extensive redundancy processes, based, to a great extent, on feasibility studies, audits and analyses undertaken by these outstanding companies. To a large extent, those studies were paid for from grants provided by countries from Western Europe or by internal financial bodies. Looking back to the economy of these states, it can be easily observed who took advantage of the economic information collected and processed on that occasion.

II. Competitive Intelligence

Increasing the economic competitiveness of a company by means of intelligence assumes the development based on the knowledge/information collected through internal modernization of some specific capabilities (analyses, assessments, patterns and multiple estimations according to alternative scenarios).

From this perspective, the platform supported by competitive intelligence can develop a new type of understanding and approach of the challenge of competitiveness, statement supported having in view that 80% of large European companies operate with such programs and over 55% are assisted by means of using some competitive intelligence software applications, integrated with business intelligence and knowledge management systems.

Business intelligence, as competitive intelligence is also known, is defined as all the operations through which data and information are collected and processed, eventually generating intelligence which is spread towards beneficiaries.

Georg Roukis examines competitive intelligence in familiar terms for those acquainted with government intelligence: collection, analysis, interception, counter-information and information systems security[18].

Arthur S. Hulnik also finds similarities between the two domains. He presents three aspects of government intelligence easy to be transferred to the business sector: data collecting, data analysis and information systems security[19].

One of the main goals of competitive intelligence is that of becoming aware of the early warning role and preventing the surprises that could have a major impact on the market quota, reputation, turnover and long-term and short-term profitability.

No matter the strategic approach or the framework the company chooses for business management, there is no single element as fundamental for competitive strategy as the information about competitors. The information about competitors should have a unique goal – developing policies and strategies necessary for the transfer of advantages and consistency to the common market, from individual competitors to one's own company.

A company which does not analyze and severely monitor its main competitors is not able to formulate or implement a sound competition strategy. Competitive intelligence supports

managerial decision concerning a business positioning for maximizing the value of capacities which make it distinctive from its competitors.

What is the role of state, of government environment in business intelligence? The example of other European countries and not only shows some action directions, which need debate and decision assumed on strategic level:

- building opinions and becoming aware of the information role in economic processes;

- assisting the setting up of specific capabilities and specialists teaching/training;

- facilitating the development of virtual cooperation platforms for economic branches;

- achieving a strategic public-private partnership on national level in the field of information/ knowledge management;

- consultancy and support.

For example, by creating a junction point, as coordination structure and interface with the information services and economic environment, which can integrate the five possible responsibilities, the government environment can support the use of the human resource that detains the expertise of information processing and assessing. Developing, with the state support, such programs, starts from an undeniable fact: almost all of the Romanian companies lack competence, abilities and resources specific for developing some competitive intelligence activities and operations.

As it has been said, information is the means by which pursued goals are achieved in economic competition. In order to be the best, it is not enough to produce the best products at the best price; you must also know the market and the competitors very well, protecting, at the same time, the strategic information. World competition is merciless and it becomes more and more clear that, in the present geo-economic system, only creative and versatile companies are likely to win. Winners are always among the most able, the ones who manage to get the information before others.

Analyzing the relation between economy and security, Professor Daniel Dăianu draws the attention upon the increasing vulnerability of economies in transition. Narrowly, vulnerability refers to its economic dimensions, to the incapacity of overcoming local and foreign shocks. To a large extent, vulnerability marks state's incapacity to ensure citizens a proper life standard and it proves the existence of some important internal conflicts, a fragmentation and a centrifugal tendency of its force, which can be seen as real threats to national security. Daniel Dăianu considers that these phenomena increase the temptation of imposing authoritarian political solutions, in replace for weak state structures[20].

Watson Institute for International Studies is similarly concluding in an interactive matrix of security[21] which ranks the risks for various entities, potentially secured: individual, state, group of states (close in values, common history etc.), network (designating mainly a group of states that use common parts of critical infrastructure) and the whole world. Thus, the maximum level of danger is not represented by war, terrorism, pandemic, conflict for resources or mass destruction weapons, rather than by the possibility that the state fails. For a state to be classified like this, the authors of this proposal enumerate some conditions such as: population poverty, lack of economic stability, incapacity of providing social assistance or individual security, proliferation of organized crime, state's de-legitimization (a weakening of state's capacity to implement rules, collect taxes and detain control upon violence), political and religious extremism.

A state whose economy cannot support the population prosperity and the institutions meant to ensure social interest harmony (defense, order, health, education, retirement etc) loses its raison d'être. In fact, the citizens of a democratic state are deprived of a part of their incomes – through taxes and imposts – and of a part of their freedom – by having to obey the law – in order to be provided by the state the best services. This is possible only in a strong economy which can allow the sufficient collection of taxes.

Economic security also means decreasing state's vulnerability against external and internal shocks as well as against economic penalties (…). Thus, some specialists consider that ensuring economic security is an essential component of national security policy[22].

National security refers to states' protection against external and internal threats to their national interests. The interests and threats are emphasized and defined differently according to each and every state and there is not any agreement concerning the nature or size of threats that can cause (justify) security reactions[23]. The lack of interest in some states in economic security or the misunderstanding of the phrase's content can mean their defeat, as, just like any war, the economic war will have winners and losers.

Conclusions

High performance organizations strongly believe that for being competitive, they must anticipate correctly the changes within the field of activity or the general context where they operate. They also know that for obtaining this competitive advantage they need resources which should allow changing data and information into intelligence products – analyses, syntheses and assessments – which should lay at the foundation of decision making under low uncertainty conditions.

The project of changing the economy into one based on information and knowledge does not consist only in taking up new instruments and concepts but also in creating/using an institutional framework enriched for their use, activities which can be valued by means of structures such as virtual community of experts, decision information infrastructures and virtual information community.

Facilitating surprise avoidance by early warning and the management of risks/opportunities caused by the business environment dynamics, the shown practices and instruments allow action on the market, instead of reaction, like a player aware of the game rules of his potential and that of the competitors. Using these practices on government's level it is less probable for the economy to be "taken aback" by external crisis with economic impact or of another nature. By better understanding of what happens on the market and through a proper assessment of the strategic/tactic impact of monitored actions, the system supports the permanent equilibrium of competitive strategies and tactics for companies, economic branches and the economy on the whole.

Locally, economic security supposes maximizing the relative economic power of the state on the grounds that economic power is desired and that national power, including the military one, depends on economic power, too. The assistance the state can provide, within some private-public partnerships, can begin with assuming a pro-active role in promoting economic interests, a complementary role to that assumed by a defender of constitutional values: market economy, fair competition, financial system, banking activity, social protection, national scientific and technological research and copyright.

If the key of economic security in a state is the position of the state and of outstanding companies in the trade international network, of production and finance, then the key of the economic system seems to be the steadiness of the whole market relations system in itself. This network includes a complicated interaction of contracts, credits, communication, transport etc. When it is valid, most of the actors' prosper, bankruptcy being, of course, present. When it is not valid, all actors suffer, the classical example being the economic crisis of the '30s. Partly, this comparison refers to the levels of prosperity and to the fear that the Great Depression re-occurs, but it also reflects the concern suggested by the famous words of Frédéric Bastiat [24]: "if goods cannot cross borders, then soldiers will do it".

In conclusion, between state and national security, on the one hand, and between business environment and competitive intelligence, on the other hand, there is a close relation, which, if it is highly functional, can contribute to achieving the goals of both parties. Thus, by promoting a national coherent and unitary strategic vision in the field of competitive intelligence, subject to national interests, the investors present on various markets or willing to place capital are encouraged/ supported in the development of their business. In its turn, business environment can contribute, by implementing its own intelligence plans, to obtaining/consolidating a significant position on economic-financial and commercial segments, implicitly operating for the state prosperity.

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NATURAL DISASTERS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Irina TĂTARU*

National security is and must be considered a public propriety that has to be accomplished by competent state institutions, continuously and equally, for all its citizens. Often, national security is endangered by natural risks and threats (earthquakes, flood, storms etc.).

A significant part of these threats are generated by human activities that often damage irreversibly the natural environment. Lately, state institutions and nongovernmental ecological organizations are increasingly interested in protecting the environment.

Key-words: national security; environment security; earthquakes; hurricanes; global warming.

1. General considerations regarding national security

In its broadest sense, the concept of security is defined in different ways. Coming from the Latin term securitas-securitatis, "security" means "the state of being sheltered by any danger, a sense of thrust and peace generated by the lack of any danger". Security is considered, most often, as a functional condition for the existence of any formal or informal social group, for the existence of any social, economical, political organization interacting with the action of some disturbing internal or external factors of the same organization.

At the same level, national security can be defined from many points of view. Firstly, national security is a state defined by multiple social, economical, political, cultural, military, environmental conditions, necessary for the existence and the activities of the citizens. Dangers, risks and threats exist, but they are known and controlled by national institutions. Secondly, national security is a construct, meaning that it is the creation of each state, according to its internal and external resources, to its specific vulnerabilities, threats and risks. Finally, national security is an important part of regional security and, therefore, of international security. Therefore, we can say that national security is strongly related to state, whose first mission is to protect its citizens. In other words, security is a public property, equally distributed among the citizens of a country.

In order to support this affirmation, we quote the "National Security Strategy of Romania": "National security represents the fundamental condition for the existence of the Romanian nation and state and a fundamental objective of governance; security has as reference area national values, interests and objectives. National security is an inalienable right emerging from people's full sovereignty, being based on the constitutional order and created in the context of the European construction, of the euro-atlantic cooperation and global evolutions"[1]. Security is the attribute of any

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independent sovereign state, meaning that each national state has the obligation to ensure all the necessary conditions so that its citizens feel safe from any risk, danger or threat for as long as they respect and act in accordance with the established social rules and regulations.

National security options must have as sources internal reality and international environment and it has to be defined by citizens' common interests as well as by the national potential to support it. National security's objectives are the protection of fundamental liberties, the defense of the national, sovereign and independent state, the consolidation of public order and democratic institutions, the assurance of a decent life for the citizens, the defence and promotion of national interests abroad. These objectives can be achieved through political, legal, diplomatic, economic, social, military, public relations and informational means and trough a solid cooperation with other states and political, economical, security organizations from the regional and international environment. These objectives are adapted to the peculiar situation of each national state and it acts consistently, systematically and permanently for their achievement.

National Defense Strategy[2] has consistent remarks regarding national security. Thus, this document underlines the essential means to ensure national security: state's current development needs, citizen's safety, the assurance of a certain level of prosperity, the promotion and protection of national interests.

2. Environmental security – a national, regional and global priority

At a certain extent, environmental security is a component of national security. Due to the damages the natural environment suffered because of different phenomena such as earthquakes, storms, and drought or because of human actions performed in order to get more space and arable land, today, environmental security is a national, regional, global issue. The pollution of soil, of subsoil, air, the brutal intervention of human beings over nature has generated an alteration of fauna and flora, endangering the very human existence.

Thus, in the last decades, like a real "mega-being", "mother nature" has began to react to the irresponsible actions of the humans and the magnitude of its reactions sometimes cannot be understood or administrated by human kind[3]. The damages resulted in several decades can be fixed, globally, only by solutions requiring several decades. Unfortunately, some processes are irreversible and nature's force is sometimes difficult to imagine and even more difficult to counteract. Human beings, part of bios and of global ecosystem, are the only component that can slow down the dynamic of their confrontation with the environment. The God of co-existence and natural equilibrium must replace the god of profit. The final goal of this process is achieving again the balance between ecosystems' different components.

For this purpose, adequate measures must be enforced at national and international level.

From the perspective of the definitions mentioned above, a serious threat for national security is represented by natural disasters. It is well known the fact that these natural disasters are regardless of borders, state, political color or economic development. It is true that the economic development of a state and the dimensions of the damages caused by natural disasters are proportional. At the same time, the measures taken against these natural events can decrease not only the material damages, but also the loss of human lives. Unfortunately, this situation is common only in states with high economic development, for the others the loss of human lives still being a reality.

Thus, it is necessary to adopt at national, regional and global level, a set of coherent measures in order to protect the environment, to limit the negative effects of natural catastrophes and technological accidents caused by humans, in order to decrease the unwanted consequences of global warming. So, we must not forget that there is a strong relation between national security and environmental security. That is why, protecting the environment means ensuring the national security necessary for human life and activities.

3. Dangerous meteorological phenomena and national security

In the past few years, among dangerous natural phenomena increasingly affecting broad areas, there are the meteorological ones, with an increasingly profound intensity and frequency.

The intensity of storms is correlated to global warming. The growth of temperature at the surface of the soil determines a supplementary thermo-radiation that causes intense storms, with huge damages.

A great natural catastrophe is the one overtaking the capacity of a region to remediate the effects without international assistance. During the '60s, economic losses caused by these phenomena totalized 69 billion dollars and, during the '90s, the losses were 536 billion dollars, almost eight time more[4].

Often, natural disasters are revealed as unexpected and rare tragedies, but even so, they happen more and more often and they affect more people and cause bigger and bigger damages. In the past few years, we have noticed a growing tendency of these phenomena, every year. The Epidemiological Disasters Research Center (CRED) registered approximately 173 natural disasters per year in 1980, 236 in 1990 and 430 in 2005. Those killed 89,713 people and affected other 162 million around the world[5]. CRED defines natural disaster as the incident that kills 10 or more people, affects 100 or more people or necessitates declaring case of emergency or requiring international help or assistance[6].

Disaster is a rare or abnormal danger affecting communities and vulnerable geographical zones. It causes significant damages and victims, leaves the affected areas in incapacity to function normally and imposes external assistance[7].

All natural disasters affect national security in all its significant dimensions – economic, social, and environmental – with a powerful influence on citizens' security. So, one shall adopt adequate measures in order to reduce the vulnerabilities of people, groups, communities in front of natural disasters. These measures could suppose political, legal, administrative, planning, infrastructure related actions. These measures can be situated at the meeting point between development and working in emergency situations:

• Planning of space and land use, enhancement of the infrastructure (e.g. building codes and techniques);

• Sustainable resources management (e.g. systems of stocking food);

• Establishing social and organizational structures in order to analyze risks, prevention measures as well as measures to improve the

reaction to extreme events;

• The necessary knowledge for institutions and population.

Also, it is necessary to anticipate interventions in case of disaster, such as:

• Emergency plans, evacuation plans, stocks of food and medicines;

• Consolidation of local and national structures providing protection against disasters and of the rescue services;

• Exercises and training against disasters;

• Early warning systems.

4. The impact of natural disasters over national security

In our opinion, natural disasters have a direct, significant and consistent impact on national security. This impact is translated into human lives losses and material damages. It is enough to remember the effects of the earthquake in Japan that destroyed the nuclear plant from Fukushima. As a result of this disaster 13,116 people died and 14,377 are missing. This was the most expensive natural disaster at global level, the overall damages caused by the earthquake and the tsunami rising up to 16-25 000 billion yens (185-308 billion dollars). The reconstruction of the affected area could take up to 5 years[8].

We can say the same thing about the recent hurricane that hit the East Coast of the United States of America: Irene caused damages of approximately 3-6 billion dollars[9]. Other sources estimate the losses at approximately 7 billion dollars[10] and 38 killed in the USA and 2 in Canada. Such flood hadn't been registered for 75 years.

An even more devastating hurricane was Katrina, which happened in august 2005. At least 18,36 people died because of Katrina and the flood that followed. Katrina was the biggest hurricane after the Okeechobee in 1928. Material losses were estimated at 81,2 billion dollars, the biggest damages caused by a hurricane, in the entire history of the USA[11]. The effects of this hurricane could be seen a long time after it ended.

The flood in North-Eastern Australia at the beginning of this year affected the GDP of the country with 10 billion dollars, a major economic impact. The economic growth of Australia could decrease with a 1% because of this disaster, accordingly to Stephen Walters, chief economist

at JP Morgan Bank. At the same time, the flood affected coal and other raw materials exports, for more than a year. At least 12 people died and other 90 are missing. The water destroyed houses and cars. The Australian authorities speak about the most severe flood in the last 40 years and assert that water covered a territory bigger than France and Germany, together[12].

Such natural phenomena happen more and more frequently in our country, generating a series of negative consequences. Such extreme meteorological phenomena affected Romania in the last years. The flood of July 2010 caused material losses of approximately 867 million euros and the government had to request the financial support of the Fund of Solidary. This year the entire country was affected by high temperature followed by violent storms and hail that caused damages to houses, infrastructure and agriculture. The damages caused by strong wind and hail were significant. Only in the region Suceava, the losses raise up to approximately 3 million euro[13].

All this phenomena were ascribed to global warming. The European Environment Agency shows that in a few decades, Romania will confront flood, desertification, extreme meteorological phenomena and the disappearance of some fauna and flora species. This will happen if the effects of global warming aren't stopped. Specialists sustain that, if the global warming process isn't reduced, the water level in The Black Sea could increase in an alarming manner. The Danube Delta could be flooded totally and cities like Tulcea, Galati, Braila and Sulina could also be partially inundated. Also, the coast between Sulina and Vama Veche is in danger. Romania will also have the problem of the appearance of some desert areas: the Western part of Oltenia and the South-Eastern part of Banat, where the phenomenon is already present. The most severe influences of weather changes could be noticed only after 2100[14].

Conclusions

National security strategies of EU members consider vulnerabilities, but also the need for protecting critical infrastructures, meaning inclusively the continuity of activities in such dramatically changes, with the capacity to recover from such a shock[15]. Individual's security is also affected by natural disasters.

Romania is situated in a European area with a high risk of devastating earthquakes and this reality must be understood by public central or local authorities whose priorities have to include a permanent training of the population, in order to develop an adequate behavior – before, during and after emergency situations. Lately, we have had to deal with such effects of special natural phenomena, effects that required common efforts in order to limit or eliminate them and to supply the population with water and food. In the future, we have to develop "The national platform for reducing the disaster risk", in accordance with the objectives established by "The International Strategy for Reducing Disasters"[16].

Only a sustained international effort for reducing global warming effects and to consolidate the protection against extreme natural phenomena could lead us to a decrease of human lives' losses and material damages and to an adequate and possible national, regional and global security.

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THE RELATION BETWEEN GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

Filofteia REPEZ, PhD*

Amid institutional changes due to globalization and EU enlargement, the concept of "good governance" is situated in the forefront of political, economic and social life. The implementation of this concept is realized in each state by the public administration.

Good governance is considered the fundamental condition for security and welfare, a tool by which democracy passes from the level of concepts and theories to real life. Citizens appreciate the good governance of public administration through measures which help combating insecurity, inequity and poverty.

For the assessment of good governance, specialists in economic, political and social sciences established a series of indicators. Good governance established with these indicators expresses a desideratum and a way of achieving security, of ensuring a favorable framework for human development.

Key-words: security; good governance; political dimension; indicators; principles.

General considerations relating to governance

The concept of governance is not new. Early discussions relating to governance date from the year 400 B.C., contained in Arthashastra, a treatise concerning government, attributed to Kautilya, deemed to be the prime minister of the king in India at that time[1]. In this treatise, Kautilya presented the key pillars of the art of governing, stressing the importance of justice, ethics and anti-autocratic tendencies. He identifies the duty of the king to protect the wealth of the state and of its subjects, to enhance, maintain and protect this wealth and defend the interests of subjects of the kingdom.

Despite the origin of the concept, over time, it was not formed any strong consensus around a single definition of governance.

Researchers and governmental and non-governmental organizations were given a variety of definitions. Some definitions are so broad that they cover almost every field (for example: definitions that refer to rules, enforcement mechanisms and organizations specified in World Bank Report concerning world development since 2002); others, such as the definition suggested by North (since 2000), are not only large but also present the risk of references from good governance to development almost tautological (for example: "How do we justify poverty in the midst of a crowd? … We must create incentives for people to invest in more efficient technology, in increasing their skills and organizing efficiently markets... Are these incentives incorporated in the institutions?[2]")

Politics and sociology have often identified the political activity with the activity of the government, identification which is not far from reality. However, it is necessary to remember that "politics is not limited to governance, but governance is the „finality" of political activities."[3]

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International agencies and major international organizations consider governance as an activity aimed at monitoring and controlling the company so as to pursue a direction that reflects their programmatic needs[4].

Although there are many definitions of governance, there is a common point which emphasizes the importance of each state to be able to operate in accordance with the rule of law[5].

Governance involves all governmental and non-governmental institutions participating in policy making processes.

We consider necessary to present some concrete points of view on the definition of governance:

- United Nations Organization considers governance as that system of values, policies and institutions by which society manages its economic, political and social problems;

- European Commission, as the main forum of the European Union for solving problems of this type, believes that governance refers to the ability of states to „serve" the citizens, the rules, processes and behaviors by which interests are expressed and managed and by which power is exercised within society;

- World Bank defines governance through traditions and institutions by which, in a country, the authority is exercised in order to achieve the common good[6]. Daniel Kaufmann, World Bank representative, in his work "Myths and realities of governance and corruption"[7] , believes that government consists in three aspects: process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced (political dimension); government's ability to effectively manage resources and implement policies (economic dimension); respect of citizens and state for national institutions (the institutional respect dimension).

Romanian doctrine defines the concept of governance as a goal of state power, which is exercised through instruments of domination and coercive force, which, at their turn, must be legitimate.

A distinction is made between the governed as holders of political power and the governing as owners of state power. Relations between them occur as follows:

- on the one hand, by the fact that the governed entrust the exercise of some of political power prerogatives to the governing and by the control of the former on latter's activity;

- on the other hand, as power relations embodied in commandments, orders, instructions imposed by the specialized politics subjects (governing) to the members of the community, individually or grouped on social, political, professional, economic criteria etc.[8]

In this article, I choose to define governance, broadly, as the process of decision making by which decisions are or aren't implemented.

Based on the criterion of developing economic and political integration structures, *governance's organizational forms and its modalities of operating on levels of social organization*[9] are:

- local governance (sub-national);

- national governance;

- governance within supranational structures (the most convincing example is the European Union);

- global governance, through the institutions of the United Nations or other international institutions.

Regarding the functions of governance, there have been issued different views[10]:

- from the point of view of American researchers, governance's functions are provided in the Constitution, namely: promoting justice, punishing those who are wrong and defending those who act right; ensure internal peace; defense against external threats; promoting welfare towards equal opportunities; protection of freedom, life and property;

- from the point of view of European researchers, governance's functions are classified in: general functions (necessary to maintain cohesion, integrity and directing society, as a whole, including the activity of societal leadership and of the policy development) and specific functions (necessary to properly fulfill the general functions, including: allocation and resource mobilization, ensuring macro-economic stability, maintaining order and social peace, achieving social justice, protection and stimulation of national culture, regulating the relations with the international environment).

The methodology for assessing governance, respectively, good governance or bad governance is achieved by development agencies and international organizations. The starting point for analyzing governance is the human being. Reported to the individual, good governance is considered a public good people have title to; it also emphasizes the importance of norms and rules

by which society is governed and by which its development process is realized.

Global governance refers to the cooperation between countries relating to common challenges. If these challenges were initially limited to peace and security, during the last years, they have expanded significantly and now including: trade negotiations for tariff reductions, agriculture and intellectual property rights, reactions to economic and financial crisis, to environmental issues (such as climate change and biodiversity), to counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation, migration, traffic of drugs and human beings, health risks (for example: pandemics). Cooperation on such issues is achieved through formal institutions, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, European Union and through informal meetings at high level such as G8, G20 and intergovernmental conferences concerning climate change and biodiversity[11].

Benchmarks of good governance

Political-juridical language of states, but also of international organizations, such as the United Nations, European Union, International Monetary Fund or World Bank, was enriched with a new expression, *good governance, known as a human right to be well managed, identifying for this a number of conditions or assessment indicators.*

Etymologically, the concept of good governance is mentioned much earlier. For example, in ancient Greece, Aristotle in his work named „Politics” places the masses (referring to citizens) among the legitimate candidates to sovereignty, as long as they possess certain qualities necessary for the good governance of the city, even if individual members do not possess these qualities.

Another example supporting the idea that good governance is deeply rooted in history, comes from the Laws of Manu (considered the first man in Hindu tradition), which set out the doctrines of good governance, but also warnings against bad governance.

Over the years, Niccolo Machiavelli teaches *The Prince* that „the little don't matter" because „when governing, if it is necessary, you must also accept evil" and „learn not to be good"; the fact that, at that time, good governance was only a sovereign's right is demonstrated by the fact that „war, institutions and laws concerning him are the

only preoccupation to which the prince should devote his thoughts and skill"[12].

World Bank experts suggested, for example, six indicators by which governance is measured periodically in various countries around the world: participative democracy and freedom of expression, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption control[13].

The concept of good governance has taken on different connotations in the European Union, which directly concerns not only member states, but also the whole institutional system. Political events that occurred after the Cold War emphasized the need for urgent action necessary for adapting governance stipulated within the treaties in force and a wider debate about the future of the European Union. There were elaborated the basic documents such as: White Charter on European Governance, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.

The White Charter on European Governance, adopted by the European Commission in 2001, lists the five principles of European governance:

- *Openness:* institutions must work more open;

- *Participation:* quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the political chain, from conception to implementation;

- *Responsibility:* the roles in the legislative and executive processes should be clear;

- *Efficiency:* policies must be clear and timely, providing what is necessary based on clear objectives, an assessment of the future impact and, when possible, prior experience;

- *Coherence:* policies and action must be coherent and understandable.

These principles are applied to all levels of governance: global, European, national, regional and local.

According to the Treaty on European Union (article 15), in order to promote good governance and to ensure participation of civil society, institutions, offices and EU agencies, act according to the principles of transparency. Good governance represents a way to bring the EU closer to its citizens, hoping that decision making process would be more transparent.

Figure 1: Good governance – schematic representation[15]

Ensuring stability and good governance in the immediate vicinity of the European Union is a strategic goal of European security (together with building an international order based on effective multilateralism and an appropriate response to new and old threats), mentioned in the document entitled „A Secure Europe in a Better World", presented by Javier Solana, on June 20th, 2003. This goal requires extending the security zone around Europe and to ensure that countries in this area (Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, countries in the Mediterranean) are well-governed. The ideal scenario for the EU security is represented by forming a circle of well-governed and friendly states, which must be open to political-economic influence of the united Europe.

At European level, good governance involves cooperation between established authorities at central level whit local authorities. At the local level, good governance is given by a number of parameters: initiatives of public authorities for efficiency of public administration; the extent to which local governments inform the community about its activities; the extent to which local governments ensure consultation and stakeholder participation in decision-making process; the extent to which the integrity of staff is ensured at the local government's level; the extent to which local authorities are concerned to respond to citizens' needs regarding the quality of public services.

In Romania, good governance is considered to be an essential tool in constructing national security, one of the ways to ensure the promotion, protection and defense of the values and interests considered vital for achieving national objectives[14].

Good governance becomes the impulse of change in the public domain, means citizens' participation, efficiency through competition with the private sector, strategic planning and entrepreneurial management. Considered this way, good governance requires: managerial efficiency (advanced transformation of public resources in services and infrastructure elements), receptivity (the degree to which the authorities respond to the real needs of citizens), free flow of information (from the administrative authorities towards civil society and vice versa).

Good governance can be illustrated in *Figure 1*.

According to this representation, public authorities should provide to citizens, regardless of gender, religion or ethnicity etc., enough opportunities to express their point of view about the nature or quality of public services. The performance of administrative activities depends largely on the efficiency of communication between government and civil society. Availability of local communities to get involved in financing infrastructure and administrative services production increases proportionally with the involvement of local authorities in meeting

the needs of the community. Good governance considers citizens as partners contributing to the results of public administration.

Attributes of good governance (transparency, participation, openness, equality of citizens before the administration, responsibility, efficiency) are considered principles of public administration by many researchers in administrative law and science.

Security and good governance in Romania

The fact that non-military dimension of security has gone to prevail upon military dimension is neither secret nor a step backwards. This change is related to the fact that, with the end of the Cold War, military threat has diminished, being replaced by new risks, dangers and threats of political, economic, social and ecological nature.

The political dimension of security (part of non-military dimension) can be analyzed on two levels: the internal one, where the concepts of *good governance and bad governance have a central role, and external one, related to international security or international law*[16].

A detailed analysis shows that good governance brings together three non-military dimensions of security: political, economic and social dimension. For this reason, increasing the quality of governance and public administration is a challenge which must be a priority in order to cope with various challenges arising in society.

International and regional cooperation, as well as the common approach of various challenges in the security environment can be solutions for good governance. These challenges can emerge from both internal security environment (prevention and settlement of internal disputes, protection against crime, domestic crises etc.) as well as the external security environment (global financial crisis, terrorism, negative effects of globalization, conflicts etc.).

The National Security Strategy of Romania (2007) provides that good governance is a prerequisite for the security and prosperity, an instrument by which democracy passes from the conceptual and theoretical level to real life. This is the cumulative measurement unit by which social life validates the outcome of democratic elections, proves the realism of the programs and political

forces' ability to deliver on their promises, with strict observance of democratic standards. Good governance assesses the success of the measures to combat insecurity, inequality and poverty and establishes the necessary corrections[17].

Priorities to achieve good governance in Romania are the following[18]:
- Promoting democracy;
- Fight against weapons of mass destruction;
- Internal security – a systemic and comprehensive approach;
- Professional and efficient public administration;
- Democratic justice;
- Fighting corruption;
- Convergence between security policy and development policy.

Good governance should be seen as transparent and accountable governance, based on the laws and acts in force and allowing an equitable representation of stakeholders in the elaboration and formulation of policies and public decisions as well as citizens' participation in the operation of public administration.

The National Defense Strategy (2010) considers good governance as a prerequisite of security and prosperity. The main factors involved in good governance are the state and civil society. National interests and national security objectives are designed to run within the security matrix and in the spirit of good governance.

Citizens have an important role in maintaining good governance; they must be constantly informed about the work of public authorities and should it. In this regard, some nationally representative NGOs have implemented several projects promoting the role of local communities in achieving good governance. A first example is given by the 22 NGOs who proposed the promotion of good governance principles and standards in Romania. This initiative can be considered an example to be followed, especially since the representatives of the Network of Integrity and Good Governance had meetings with foreign representatives such as: the European Council for Associations of General Interest, the European Citizen Action Service and the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation[19]. It is also worth mentioning the programs from the series of initiatives of strategic advocacy in order to support and protect the public interest,

which are designed to promote transparency and accountability in the activities of government and other central or local authorities[20].

A reply to new threats regarding national, regional and global security may be one that refers to new principles of organizing regional and global security: democracy, good governance and rule of law implying that relations between states shall consider the competing interests, without resorting to using force for resolving conflicts.

In the World Bank report titled "Worldwide Governance Indicators", which has been elaborated since 2009 and which analyses six dimensions of governance for 212 countries (participative democracy and freedom of expression, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption), Romania has not increased, which indicates that there are many problems in this area[21].

Based on the experience, in security it is required increasing the number of projects dedicated to good governance, projects whose proposals are accepted by public authorities (where applicable). Attracting citizens in developing and implementing administrative decision is beneficial for achieving good governance at local level, which, at its turn, contributes to good governance at national level.

Conclusions

In the last years, the concept of good governance has been increasingly used both in the language of politicians and ordinary people. The use of this concept is not at random; we can even call it a desire of all because through good governance, living standards are improved and it is made a contribution to reducing security threats and vulnerabilities.

Governance is the cumulative measurement unit by which social life validates the outcome of democratic elections, proves the realism of programs and the ability of political forces to fulfill promises with the strict observance of democratic standards. Therefore, good governance is not only effective management, but also public participation, democracy and human rights orientation towards new and continuous innovation. We can say that good governance is the key driver of development. Decentralization of authority

and resources facilitates good governance, giving the government and nongovernmental players an increased role.

Good governance is the basic condition for maintaining security in a rapidly changing world. This requires (political, legal, and administrative) institutions in which citizens can trust and participate in making decisions affecting their lives, as well as the political will to make improvements in governance. If we were to express mathematically the relation between good governance and security, I would express it this way: **security ↔ good governance**.

Reality has shown that good governance is an ideal and that every ideal is difficult to be fully achieved.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIGRATION PHENOMENON ON ROMANIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

Ionel STOICA, PhD*

After the end of the Cold War, a range of international issues has become, in a very short time in some cases, a security subject. International migration - one of these subjects - shows particular shades from the perspective of security, especially because of the fact that its impact is analyzed and interpreted from a different perspective by the countries of origin, respectively as destination of international migration.

The impact of migration is often measured through the tangible flows generated by the process or it focuses on the current results of the process. Of an equal importance to the national security are also the intangible flows, as well as the opportunity costs. In the case of Romania, the relationship between external migration and national security presents particularities in the current regional and international context. This paper aims to analyze those consequences (effects) of the external migration that seem to become possible risks for the national security on the long term.

Key-words: migration; brain migration; security; development; demography; trafficking in persons; Romania.

1. Preliminary considerations

The end of the Cold War generated significant changes in the classic paradigm of traditional security. Although the risk of classic conflicts has not disappeared all over the world, other approaches have prevailed, that focus on non-military risks regarding security. The most comprehensive framework of analysis of security has been elaborated by Barry Buzan[1] and Ole Waever[2]. They argue that security presupposes the survival in face of an existential threat, referring to a certain aspect – state, nation, sovereignty etc.. Waever argues that a subject becomes a security issue when it is presented as such, regardless of the reality. In other words, security is a concept following politization.

As far as the connection between migration and security is concerned, Nazli Choucri argued that this is "the connection between migration and security is particularly challenging and problematic because, migration, security, and the linkage between the two are inherently subjective concepts"[3]. According to Choucri, several aspects illustrate the subjective character of the definition of the key terms. In the field of migration, for instance, these are:

- what one sees depends on the way in which he or she regards the process;
- those who register define those who are registered;
- what is registered depends on who registers, in what way and with what aim.

In the field of security, the relevant aspects are:

- someone's security may represent someone else's insecurity;
- strategies projected to create security may lead to an enhanced insecurity;
- security may be an objective term, but because

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it depends on who analyses the security state, it becomes subjective.

Apart from this inherent subjectivism, the analysis of the migrationist phenomenon's implications on the security imposes a strict delimitation from the perspective of the countries of origin, respectively the countries of destination of international migration. From the perspective of the first category of states, the international migration implications refer especially to: changes in the demographic ethnic and racial structure and composition of those societies; forming of transnational communities; the safety of the citizen (as the organized criminality is increasing, frequently associated with the intensification of the illegal migration); the financial constrains related to the allocation of resources (water, food, transportation) and the use of infrastructure (increasing pressure on the resources and infrastructure may generate hostile feelings from the local population); difficulties linked to environment (when immigrants do not respect environmental standards, they may be seen as a threat to the environment security in the respective country).

From the perspective of the country of origin, international migration - security nexus, we should take into consideration aspects such as: economic development on the long term; social cohesion; the international political profile and - in some cases - the demographic construction.

In the particular case of Romania, the relationship external migration – national security presents special peculiarities in the current regional and international context. For instance, the lack of high-skilled labour force jeopardizes not only the finalizing of the current development projects, but also of the future ones. The decrease of the available labor force - either as a result of the diminishing volume of the population or as a consequence of its ageing or of the external migration - creates the premise of some major malfunctions on the long term in the social security system. Unfortunately, such challenges are not always correctly understood and approached in today's Romanian society. Even when these challenges become obvious (and the political decision factors claim the necessity of some urgent measures to counteract the negative effects that take shape and - if possible - of finding positive results for Romania) the implementation of such measures is delayed.

The importance of Romanian external migration is acknowledged by the Romanian state's authorities. Thus, in Romania's National Defence Strategy (2010) is stated that the massive external migration of the Romanian population represents a vulnerability for our country.

2. Implications of Romanian emigration on some fields of the national security

This paper aims to analyse the implications of Romanian emigration upon national security, starting from the current analytical framework for security. We will focus on the negative consequences that migration has on national security because these are, in our opinion, more numerous and evidently have a deeper impact on the security issue than the positive consequences do. Our paper attempts an analysis of the economic, social, political and demographic fields.

In the economic filed, from the perspective of the national security, even the positive effects currently registered by diminishing the poverty level and increasing the living standard of the families of those migrating (as a consequence of the increasing remittances' volume of the emigrants), have to be seen with caution, because, on the long term, they may have a boomerang effect. Concretely, remittances - the main benefit of the Romanian emigrants' - should not be considered a permanent and safe flow of income on the long term as they depend, in a large measure, on factors that the Romanian state cannot control, such as the dynamics of the economies in the countries of destination of the Romanian migration and on the future migration policies in those countries. Moreover, as it is currently noticed, in special situations, such as the current global financial and economic crisis, the volume of these flows is drastically reduced.

In the case of some communities with high migration rates, the remittances have led to a cycle of economic dependence that does not encourage the development. Thus, the communities left at home and living on remittances are not interested in ensuring a decent life on their own. In a way, these communities sentence themselves to an economic stagnation.

An important distinct impact on the national security will have, especially on the long term (although its negative effects are evident even at

Year	Physicians		Family physicians		Dentists		Pharmacists		Nurses	
	RO	EU-25	RO	EU-25	RO	EU-25	RO	EU-25	RO	EU-25
1995	1.77	3.13			0.27	0. 57	0.12	0.68	4.31	7.32
1996	1.81	3.19			0.26	0.58	0.11	0.71	4.41	7.40
1997	1.79	3.23			0.24	0.59	0.8	0.71	4.06	7.40
1998	1.84	3.26			0,24	0.60	0.7	0.72	4.09	7.47
1999	1,91	3.31			0.23	0.60	0.7	0.73	4.04	7.52
2000	1.89	3.37	0.51		0.22	0.60	0.7	0.75	4.02	7.60
2001	1.89	3.40	0.51		0.23	0.61	0.7	0.77	4.03	7.67
2002	1.91	3.43	0.52		0.22	0.62	0.6	0.78	4.18	7.79
2003	1.96	3.19	0.53		0.23	0.60	0.6	0.76	3.99	6.90
2004	1.98	3.21	0.53		0.23	0.61	0.6	0.72	4.01	6.94
2005	1.95	3.18	0.53		0.22	0.60	0.5		3.72	7.00

Table 1 - Sanitation personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, Romania and EU-25
Source: World Health Organization/Europe - The European Database HFA, 2007 and Ministry of Health -
Yearbook of sanitary statistics 2005

present), the permanent migration of the Romanian brains. The financial remittances of those high-skilled cannot compensate the huge loss that their migration represents for the Romanian society. As well as this, according to the National Bank of Romania (NBR), correlated to those of the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development Countries (OECD), as the education level of the migrants is lowering, the remittances volume is increasing. This situation is true in the case of the Romanian brains emigration, if we take into consideration that money sent by the Romanian migrants in Spain and Italy cumulated represent 67% of the total Romanian remittances (4.9 billions euros). We have to keep in mind that the percentage of Romanian employees who graduated universities reaches only 9.8% in Italy and 13.1% in Spain. On the other hand, the Romanians working in Canada, where 53.9% have graduated universities, sent at home only 23 million euros in 2005 and less than 20 million euros in 2008. Similarly, the remittances of the Romanian working in Switzerland, where about half of the Romanian emigrants have graduated universities, were around 29 million euros in 2007 and 27 million euros in 2005. Thus, Romanians working in Italy sent, on average, approximately 13,500 euros in 2005, while those working in Canada sent only 374 euros[4].

While up to 2007, the main categories of Romanian high-skilled emigrants were engineers and information technology specialists, during the past few years we can observe a larger range of specializations of those emigrating. An important component of the Romanian brain emigration, with extremely negative consequences for the health of the population is represented by **physicians.** The phenomenon - specific to all world countries - is especially worrying in the eastern European countries, where its intensity has reached very high cottas in the last years. In Romania, the phenomenon has amplified especially beginning with 2007 and may create major disequilibria in ensuring health services in accordance with the population's needs. Thus, in the first nine months of 2008, 4% of the total physicians in Romania have emigrated, compared to 4% for the entire year of 2007[5]. If we take into consideration that the World Health Organization considers that a deficit of 2% of the practicing physicians in a country represents red code for the authorities in that country, which means that the system can enter a crisis on the short term or longer – implicitly that it will collapse – we can understand the dimension of the phenomenon and the concern that should overwhelm Romanian authorities. In the period January - August 2008, 957 persons applied to the Romanian Physicians College for moral probity certificates in order to be allowed to work abroad. The most were delivered in Bucharest (309), Iaşi, Timiş (both counties with 102), Cluj (63), Caraş-Severin (40), Vaslui (35) and Constanţa (25). This occurs in the conditions of an insufficient supply of

medical-sanitation personnel (physicians, dentists, pharmacists and other category of sanitary personnel) of the medical units in Romania, compared to other European countries.

A statistics of the World Health Organization ranked Romania on the 33rd position out of 35 countries analyzed, with 1.9 physicians for 1,000 inhabitants. In the European Union, the average is 3.3 physicians for 1,000 inhabitants[6]. According to some Romanian specialists (Mircea Cinteză, former president of the Phisicians College in Romania), the Romanian sanitation system registers a deficit of 40,000 physicians, being one of the fields most confronted with personnel deficit, beside construction, textile industry and tourism.

In the period 2002 - 2005, data delivered by the Sanitas and The Sanitas Solidarity organizations show the following distribution of the migrating nurses: more than 2,500 in Italy, more than 1,200 in Hungary, more than 1,000 in Germany, more than 6000 in the United Kingdom and more than 500 in Switzerland. Part of the Romanian physicians that emigrated in the past years returned to Romania and currently work here in private cliniques, for salaries comparable to those in the Occident[7].

A relatively new component of the Romanian brain emigration is students' migration. The educational context favored students' mobility, which later on transformed into migration. While in 1990, according to official statistics, only 6% of those graduating Romanian universities emigrated, in 2000 this rate was at 23% of total graduating persons. The period of college studies is a first contact for Romanian students with the society and the culture of the destination countries and in many cases a step that precedes their entrance on the labour markets in these countries. The friends networks that foreign students create during their university studies offer them further opportunities on the labour markets in the countries where they studied. As a matter of fact, Meyer and Hernandez argue[8] that about two third of the experts in research-development at the world level entered the countries where they work as students, and Steven Vertovec argues that "the experience of being a foreign student significantly raises the probability of being an immigrant in a further stage."[9]

In the context of globalization, knowledge has become a differentiating factor on the international labour market and the skilled labour force has become a rare element on this market compared to the relative abundance of the financial capital and the unskilled labour force. For the developing countries, as Romania is, this is a very important aspect because, on the one hand, the mobility of the financial flows abroad offers opportunities for the development of their economies and, on the other hand, the volatility of those economies is increasing, as well as the possibility to be used for speculative goals (for instance, in attacking the national currency) - which represents in itself a real threat for their stability and for the employment level of the labour force in those countries.

The insufficient stock of well qualified human resources puts under question the governmental capacity to attract European funds and, implicitly, to implement the current and future development projects. Moreover, this situation makes the obtained funds to be spent ineffectively (by paying some exaggerated amounts of money to foreign experts), as it currently happens. According to the governor of The National Bank of Romania, Mugur Isărescu, a year after joining The European Union, Romania succeeded in attracting only 440 millions euro, respectively 21% from the total amount of money put at its disposal by the European Union. From that amount, 32% represented structural and cohesion funds and only 3% were for agriculture and rural development. The same indicator in the case of the Czech Republic was 41% in the joining year, in Poland was 42%, in Slovakia 41% and in Hungary 42% - consequently approximately double than that of Romania. For the time being, Romania contributes to the European funds with higher amounts of money than it succeeds in attracting, a fact that reflects the major macroeconomic lack of balance. If the process of accessing European funds will not be accelerated, Romania will remain a poorly developed country, a net contributor to the European budget.

Regarding **the social aspect**, migration has a range of negative consequences that, on the long term, will have repercussions on the national security. These consequences are already visible on the family level of those who emigrated.

The external migration has generated deep social gaps inside the families involved in the process and inside the communities from which those families come. The family is the only comforting framework, be it temporarily, of migration difficulties, being a space not only

for intimity, but also for unconditioned support. During migration, the integrity and cohesion of the emigrant's family suffer deep changes that reffer not only to the emotional sphere, bu also to the ways in which the relationship between family members is constructed and established. These changes in relationships do not correspond to traditional ones, operating prior to migration.

The majority of Romanian emigrants are young population. The contact with the western societies has changed their value system, their goals and expectations. Research indicates that friendship among Romanians has lost significance after migration. Even after coming back in Romania, these emigrants do not pay visits to their friends as much as they previously did prior to the migration moment and their conversations are not as free as before. This evolution is a consequence of the fact that people have started to value free time more, but also of the increasing pride.

The economic and cultural emancipation and the increasing rate of women in the emigrating population have lead to the reshaping of gender roles inside the family. While before migration, the role of women was rather passive and their work often did not receive sufficient recognition in society, new models regarding the family life have appeared, that changed social expectations, even in the case of those that never emigrated.

Perhaps the deepest negative effect of migration can be noticed in the case of children left home. If during the first years of migration the family lacked a single emigrating parent, starting with 2007, the number of the families in which both parents emigrated for work increased, children being left with other relatives, acquaintances or even in the care of state institutions,.

The effects were dramatic not only as the school results are concerned, or their attitude towards society, their interior equilibrium, but also regarding their health. Let us mention the psychical disorders that registered an alarming increase in the case of those children. As a result, parents' migration, beside the fact that has deprived the society from a much needed labour force in the current socio-economic stage, it will moreover deprive it of the labour force of the next generation; moreover, it will increase the state's expenses with health services for those children.

At the same time, on the medium and long term, the massive emigration of the Romanian workers will affect the social security system functioning, with unpredictable effects on the social cohesion and, implicitly, on the domestic stability and the national security.

As for politics, migration has the effect of shaping the international political profile of Romania and to influence its relations with the destination countries of Romanian emigrants. For Romania, emigrants represent a source of social, financial, cultural and political capital[10]. In fact, they represent another interface than the official one between Romania and the other countries in the world, being the most entitled to promote the national values. Sometimes, they can be more effective than state authorities in promoting national interests because they can act simultaneously in the destination country and in Romania and they can make up a virtual extension of national resources. In this respect we have in mind that the territory of a state may currently be seen as a virtual space, not only a physical one.

Romanian emigrants represent an important asset in the context of the European integration of Romania, if we bear in mind that this process means, first and foremost, the values system convergence promoted by European countries. They may act as catalizers of the Romanian society transformation, in other words helping achieve a convergence of the Romanian values and life style with European ones. Achieving this kind of convergence is fundamental for the European Union stability, its importance in the context of the global financial crisis already taking unexpected turns until recently (some American experts argue that the European project is unsustainable due to the cultural differences among Member States, an aspect that reflects itself in the labour ethics as well). The persistence of some mentalities specific to the communist era that Romania went through show the acute need and the importance of this kind of convergence in the modernizing process of the country and in placing it on an irreversible path towards economic and social progress. Moreover, the economic convergence (frequently invoked) is conditioned by the values' convergence.

In the last years, the image of Romanian employees abroad has constantly improved, an aspect recognized even by officials in those countries registering numerous attacks towards Romanian emigrants (we refer here especially to Italy). Unfortunately, the Rroma ethnics behavior continue to put in a bad light Romanian emigrants

Figure 1 - Components of the population's decrease 1991 - 2008;
Source: Author's calculus, on the basis of the Statistical Yearbook of Romania 2009, Institute of the National Statistics (2010)

as a whole - aspect undermining the efforts of the majority of the Romanian emigrants as well as of the Romanian state authorities.

An important aspect affecting the international image of Romania, with implications on the international political profile of the country, represents the lack of cohesion at the Romanian Diaspora's level. In the last years, Romanian authorities made sustained efforts to improve the situation, with some positive results.

In the demographic field, population is generally included by many international relations studies among factors generating power to states[11]. An important element supporting the inclusion of the demographic factor in the category of those exercising a decisive influence in the power spectrum is that demographic trends are indicators of the potential, but also of the actual risks for a state. Compared to the changes of other nature - economic, political, technological, and social - the demographic ones which occur very slowly and regularly enough are almost impossible to counteract on the short and medium term and their impact is on the long term. Demographic trends are perhaps the most difficult to influence through national policies and strategies because they do not depend only on a particular, political or economic context, but encapsulate the evolution matrix of a nation. Some researchers argue that the major demographic changes determine changes in the domestic policies of a state, and that creates security concerns for its neibghouring states[12].

In the period between 1990 and 2006, Romania lost 1.5 millions inhabitants, that is 6.5% of its total population registered in 1990, and the trend of depopulation will continue in Romania on the medium and long term[13,14]. The biggest part of this lost is due to external migration (see Figure

1). The officially registered migration represents 12% of the decreasing population, the rest being owed to the negative natural growth (34%) and the unregistered migration (54%).

As far as Romania is concerned, as a combined effect of the decrease of the natality rate and the increase of the external migration, the population's structure on age groups has changed - with important implications on the future of the domestic labour force. The ageing population process is also becoming visible, especially in some rural areas. The percentage of the ageing population is already higher than that of the young population (19.3%, compared to 16.1%[15]). As a consequence of migration, the natality and fertility rates have negative trends, taking into account that the young population has an important weight in the migration process.

Another important aspect that should not be ignored when estimating the costs of permanent migration, is *fertile women migration*. In the case of women, the loss of the human potential is larger than in the case of men. The younger they are, the more children they can have, children they give birth to and grow abroad.

The prolonged demographic decline that has been lasting for around a decade (due to the natural decrease and external migration) and the ageing population, as a result of the diminishing fertility rate, increasing life expectancy and emigration of an important part of the young population lead to the deterioration of the entire national demographic construction[16].

3. Immigration and some of its effects on the national security

A phenomenon with deep negative consequences on national security is illegal migration and hu-

Fig. 2 - The dynamics of the human trafficking victims 2004 - 2009;
Source: Aspects regarding women trafficking in Romania, National Agency against Trafficking in Persons,
Bucharest, 2009.

man trafficking. Due to its geostrategic position, at the European Union's border, and at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), Romania is facing an increasing pressure from its national security threats, because, among others, of the intensification, especially in the region, of the illegal migration phenomenon, human trafficking and organized criminality, in general. In a report of the International Migration Organization (IOM) it is estimated that around 400,000 women from Eastern Europe are annually trafficked for prostitution. Romania is also included in that list. According to IOM (2003), approximately 20,000 women were trafficked from Romania. According to the same sources, 10-15% from those women were underage. The number of trafficked women

has gradually diminished, starting with 2005, but it continues to remain high even at present (see Figure 2).

Starting with 2006, the ratio of trafficked women has constantly been reduced, from 77% in 2006, to 54% in 2007, 49% in 2008 and 30.8% in 2009. The majority of victims are young persons, which suggests an increasing weight of those trafficked for work - in the men's case – or for sexual services - in that of women (see Figure 3).

In the case of Romania, a paradoxical situation can be noticed: on the one hand, the intensity of trafficking in persons on the national territory was reduced; on the other hand, it is registering an increase in the smuggling with labour force inside the country, a situation showing that, in Romania,


Fig. 3 - Distribution of human trafficking victims, by gender and age;
Source: Aspects regarding women trafficking in Romania, National Agency against Trafficking in Persons,
Bucharest, 2010.

Type of exploitation	Number of trafficked persons	Per cents
work	425	45.4
sex	426	43.4
begging	74	7.9
pickpocketing	8	0.9
infantile pornography	2	0.2
Internet pornography	2	0.2
Unspecified goals	19	2.0

Table 2 - Number of Romanian citizens, victims of the human trafficking in the first half of 2007, according to the type of exploitation
Source: National Agency against Trafficking in Persons, Bucharest, Semestrial Report, First half, 2007, http://anitp.mira.gov.ro/ro/docs/raport_semestrial_2007.pdf.

there is an increasing demand for foreign labour force, but also an interest of the foreigners for Romania.

Starting with 2007, the number of the work exploitation victims (425) exceeds that of sexual exploitation victims (406). In 2007, 74 victims were registered as exploited through begging, 8 for pickpocketing, two for infantile pornography and two for pornography on Internet. There were no reported cases of organs trafficking. This list is presented in Table 2.

The intensity of the phenomenon and the geostrategic position of Romania have led to pressure from the international organizations on the Romanian authorities for implementing effective policies in order to solve these issues.[17]. Starting with 2001, Romanian authorities have taken some measures aimed at preventing and combating human trafficking, especially that of minors. In 2004, the government presented the project of the National Plan for Preventing and Combating Minors' Trafficking; there were also established institutions for assisting victims. Despite these efforts, an agency within The State Department (United States), which carries out its activity inside a larger framework of The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and that is specialized in the assessment of the effectiveness of anti-traffic policies, was maintaining Romania on the list of countries having serious problems in this sense.

Conclusions

International migration induces a series of security risks for Romania. The massive emigration of Romanians has avoided a serious social crisis (the mass unemployment that would generate social tensions hard to imagine at this moment) that would lead to a political crisis. However, on the long term, it will generate new crises (with manifestations of another nature) with direct consequences on the national security, whose effects are more difficult to anticipate with accuracy. The lack of personnel with proven competences necessary for the elaboration and implementation of the projects financed through European funds and, generally, of the labour force necessary for finalizing the development projects and modernizing the country, an aged population that is facing a frail medical-sanitation system and lacking the best experts (in part, a consequence of emigration of the personnel), the severe demographic decline which characterized the Romanian society in the last two decades (with consequences on ensuring the future working resources of the country) and the emigration of the young population able to procreate represent risks in any analysis on national security.

From the economic perspective, an analysis of the consequences under the aspect of the opportunity cost (that is what Romania would have gained benefiting from its entire labour force, but that it could not have used because of the external migration) reveals that the advantages gained on short term will not be compensated by the loss in the long run.

Although the positive effects of migration cannot be contested, especially on the economic field, its negative effects should not be ignored or minimised, especially those in the social field. The

traumatic experience that emigrants' children go through at an early age will affect their personality, their capacity to adapt in society, their ideals and endeavours – all these with deep consequences for the future of the Romanian society.

Migration has already generated negative effects on the Romanian labour market. These effects, corroborated with the constant demographic decline registered after 1990, constitute serious drawbacks on the way of the country's development on the long term.

For the future, the labour force market in Romania will face situations hard to estimate, that will depend, in no less cases, on the economic agents' evolution on the European market. On the other hand, the increasing costs of the labour force after Romania has joined the European Union, could determine the reorientation of foreign investors towards other areas.

Romania will remain a high interest area for the international scientific research – an aspect illustrated by the intensity of the brain drain in the last years. Those high-skilled are probably those who emigrated on the long term or perhaps for ever. They got well-paid jobs, enjoy similar working conditions with the native population in the countries of destinations, have another attitude towards the host societies and different (higher) aspirations in life. Apart from the fact that the substantial investment the Romanian state has made in the education and training of these persons canot be retrieved anymore, it cannot be accounted for their contribution to the general development of the country[18].

A solution we should permanently have in mind is that of attracting the Romanian students training in foreign institutions and reabsorbing them in Romania. For that, it is necessary to establish a viable strategy to persuade those teenagers and Romanian specialists who emigrated for work to come back into Romania in a time when they can still be useful for the Romanian society. Other solutions would be: providing benefits for those that employ Romanian teenagers that come back in the country, improving the credit systems for purchasing a house etc.. It can even be discussed the subjective (natural) trend of returning to the native country, perhaps with some financial benefits that the Romanian state should and may allow for itself.

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17From the geopolitic point of view , the Romanian coast of The Black Sea is an important strategic point for NATO and for USA. After joining NATO, in 2004, and the EU, in 2007, Romania was constrained to initiate measures of combating the illegal migration and, especially, human trafficking. Following this goal, there were established several non-governmental organisation that have as object of activity the diminishing of this phenomenon.

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EUROPE AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY TO MANAGE ENERGY SECURITY

Cosmin Gabriel PĂCURARU*

Russian Federation's foreign policy is strongly related to EU's energy „hunger". In Russian foreign policy's equation, a great importance is given to natural gas export and to the dependency rate of the European states on it. Russia's discriminating attitude and each country's interests make a common European energy policy impossible to achieve in the near future. If the European Commission makes such a decision, it would shelter the European Union members and non-members of a possible shakedown.

Key-words: Russia; European Union; security; energy; blackmail/shakedown; foreign politics/ policies.

Divergent strategies of energy security

In the last months, Barosso's Commission II efforts to realize a common energy strategy are blown away by Germany who changed its relationship and energy strategy towards Russia. The Bundestag voted to stop using nuclear energy until 2022, expressing their fear of a potential accident similar to the one in Fukushima.

But things are not as they seem! Let's not forget that, beginning with the 60's, Germany, at that time, The Federal Republic of Germany, began to make great business deals in the energy domain with the Soviet Union. Even since those days, the Kremlin had discovered the power it possesses: natural gas resources. Afterwards, France, Austria, and Italy changed their strategies

of foreign politics towards USSR. Until 1990 it was simple: on the one hand, there was a hunger for technology and the financial resources necessary to sustain the state and the war in Afghanistan, and, on the other hand, the necessity for industrial development sustained by a growing use of energy, made the ideological and political barriers easily passable, to the despair of the United States, the most important NATO member.

After the fall of the USSR and especially after the rise of Vladimir Putin, Russian foreign policy was oriented to winning political influence and direct economic advantages in the countries importing or transit Russian gas. In the new strategy, elaborated under the guidance of Vladimir Putin, are highlighted the most important ways of action[1]:

1. European Union member states shall to become increasingly dependent of Russian natural gas;

2. Major investments in pipelines;

3. Market diversification by extending their exports to China;

4. Increasing the capacity of transport from the former USSR countries: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan to the Occident;

5. Creating intermediary companies in the occidental countries to be in charge of gas imports;

6. Associating Gazprom with "old business partners" in a variety of companies;

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7. Full acquisition or shareholding in a large number of gas production and distribution companies or producers of railways for the extraction industry and transport of gas or infrastructure companies (communications, railways etc.) from as many European countries as possible, especially EU's member states in exchange of a smaller gas price.

Applying the principle "follow the money", we notice a great lack of transparency not only in the commercial schemes of gas export but also in banking, recovering the resulting money, that don't always return to Gazprom and, implicitly, to Russia.

Analyzing the activity of intermediary companies and the persons involved in these volatile companies, we can conclude that Russia aims at infiltrating agents of influence in all the structures of political decision of European countries, institutions, and in companies which are part of commercial agreements, reaching to the ownership of important ventures in transnational companies[2].

Likewise, Russia does not negotiate to any state and Russian companies don't trade with any company. Trading position is always superior to those who Russia is doing business with, trying to impose solutions that are not always lucrative the importer[3].

Looking back in the last years, it becomes clear that Russia is trying at any price to influence the national politics of all the European states by controlling energy resources, the access to energy market, by controlling gas and oil transport routes and dominating the competition[4]. To all these, we shall also mention buying companies that offer a monopoly position or, at least, an oligopoly in various important economic branches.

At this moment, Russia implements the policy of "energy pliers" policy, its main partners being Germany (North Stream) and Italy (South Stream)[5]. Pipelines providing natural gas to Western Europe, pipelines which transit countries like Ukraine and Belarus (with a political instability potential), the Baltic Countries and Poland (each with a moderate anti-Russian policy), are completed by North Stream, whose target is, on the one hand, boosting Russian economic influence especially in Germany, Denmark, and in the Southern Countries and, on the other hand, dimming the European influence on the transit countries. South Stream is also included in this equation.

In this policy is also subscribed Russia's influence on the policies of the countries and communities involved in the alternative European projects: Nabucco and AGRI. This influence is observed in Turkey's position (which uses Russian gas in a proportion of 76% of the necessary through Blue Stream), in Bulgaria's position (which is included in the South Stream project), and in Germany's position (through the RWE company with which Gazprom is associated with in a couple of companies).

Security terms understood differently

Taking in account the definition of threat[6], understood from the perspective of national security, as "someone's or something's action that has the potential of interfering with national interests" from emerged the term "security policy which should be deduced from the analysis of threats that generate adequate reactions to reduce the harm done by these threats"[7], we can affirm that the European Union and implicitly Romania are under energy threat of the independent policies carried out by Germany and Italy, being in correspondence with that of Russia's, which has the main political influence from the monopolist position of raw materials producer and transporter.

This position reveals EU countries to risks and vulnerabilities. Economic threats to internal stability of a state under the conditions in which some states follow economic strategies based on maximizing profits, achieving monopoly, combining economics with politics, lead to geopolitical imbalances which can degenerate into conflicts. These threats need to be tracked down, analyzed and stopped.

"Economic defense is under the responsibility of state institutions whose competencies are settled through appropriate laws of this domain of activity. It regards the production and circulation of resources, diminishing national competition in a globalized economy, defending data bases and technological transfers, combating illicit exploitations of brevets, disinformation and counterfeiting"[8].

The European Commission has understood that "at economic level, collective defense can contribute to raising the ratings of a country, to increasing trust for strategic foreign investments

in establishing the business area in the respective country, to improve the exchange of goods and services with foreign partners"[9]. The characteristics of collective defense are: voluntary character, selectivity, openness, permittivity, organized character, judicial basis, legitimacy, discouragement.

Thus, taking into account the common interests and passing over egocentric economic interests of multinational companies, EU countries, especially in the second term of the Barroso Commission, have begun to elaborate common defense policies. The European energy strategy is a document that highlights the collective defense strategies in the energy domain of the EU's member states and neighbors of potential pressures exercised by Russia and transit states (Ukraine, Belarus, and the Republic of Moldova).

In today's conjuncture, whilst the international system is made up of states and other international actors in a circuit of political, military, and economic relations, the economic security is given not only by the actor's economic security but also by the security of supply and sale markets as well by the transportation security.

There are three ways of approaching economic security:

- Conservatory: economic security is part of national security and state politics.

- Liberal: state's intervention is eliminated and it is considered that market should develop and operate independently.

- Socialist: there are taken into consideration justice and social equality which should intervene in economy when social imbalances are produced[10].

In the last years, in the conjuncture of market globalization and great international concerns development, the opening of East-European ex-communist economies and of Russian expansionist economic policies, we can observe a redefinition of economic security concept from the perspective of the reference between the native and foreign property on natural resources and transportation. The countries that had a liberal approach on the economic growth by selling or granting resources, redefine their economic security policies, especially the energy security ones.

Energy security of a state is integrated in national security doctrine. Taking into account the principle of collective security, European Union countries, North Atlantic Treaty members, and the ex-USSR countries from the Caucasus elaborated common energy strategies on medium and long terms[11]. At this year's beginning, Russia remade its energy strategy. We can deduce that there is a new tendency in the international relations as a consequence of awareness (of each state's political forces) of the fact that energy has become a currency and a risk factor on national and regional security. Taking in consideration the recent history, with examples of monopolization of economic domains by exterior forces, we can consider that energy security is closely related to each state's economic and infrastructure security.

Economic security can be reduced to relevant problems from a practical point of view:

- state's capacity to maintain independent production units in a global market;

- state's capacity to gain access to energy sources and strategic material;

- the eventuality that the economic dependency on the international market to be used for achieving political purposes;

- the possibility for the global market to raise economic imbalances between states;

- the risk of economic globalization, which results in diminishing the economic functions of a state, in generating an underground economy, illicit trade, illicit traffic of technology, or in affecting the environment;

- the risk that the global economy would enter in a crisis due to wrong economic policies, weak political governance, weak international institutes, financial instability[12].

Lately, the main discussion is about the possible energy threat making reference to Russia or the Russian economic organizations more or less under the direct control of the Russian Federation, having connotations and references to intelligence and security area.

In the 90's, the European states were under the control of left wing political forces, of social-democratic orientation and where citizen's security was the national policy. In 2000, when Vladimir Putin came to power, the Russian Federation entered a period of economic "recharge" which led to a re-design of foreign policy based on doctrines which are very similar to the imperialistic ones in the tsarist and soviet periods. This fact made the EU countries to reevaluate the definition of national security, emphasizing national and regional security, renouncing at citizen's security doctrines.

If we analyze Poland's position, which in the '90s sold 100% of the actions of the national gas distributor to Gazprom, on the criterion that the polish citizen will benefit of lower prices at a thousand cubic meters (the polish industry benefited of this facility, which at the end falls to the small cost prices of the products incorporating a large quantity of energy), we can say that, today, Gazprom's dominating position in the polish economy is very disturbing. Taking into account the introduction of new extraction technologies of shale gas, the fact that Poland holds an enormous reserve of shale gas which can affect Russian energy monopoly exercised on the European countries[13] and the fact that the American company Amoco, the owner of the extraction technology, signed with Polish authorities an extraction contract, we can analyze the difficult position the Polish government is put in, being unable to distribute its own gas to its citizens or to neighboring countries.

Another case study is the PR campaign sustained by the Gas de France society in Bucharest that sustains the idea that individual apartment heating systems reduce the consume of gas by citizens, an unreal fact proven and demonstrated in cities totally uncoupled to central heating systems, where production costs for heated water are 2-2.5 times higher than in cities benefiting of central heating systems. This action is in fact an energy security threat to Bucharest metropolitan zone and a threat to the material safety of the citizen. The campaign took place between April and May 2011, using personalized letters and premium influential written press, which wrote boasting articles to the individual apartment heating systems. The campaign's motivation was that of feeding the national energy dependence (more than 10% of the homes located in Bucharest) as a result of the rise of gas consumption and having the objective maximizing the profit of the distributing company (GdF) and of the import companies under the control of Gazprom.

In this way, we can conclude that state's security should account for the regional security and include the citizen's security component

USSR's energy industry: a determinant factor in international relations

Analyzing the relation between the Common Market State with USSR, we can affirm that the only criteria that worked were those of profit maximization. Even since the '60s, the foundation for cooperation of the largest German, French, or Italian companies was set with the soviet authorities breaking the COCOM's embargo accord (*Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls* – signed by NATO's member states and had the role to establish common economic policies, inclusively lists of technologies and strategic equipment that are under the interdiction of being exported to the East). Cooperation begun through the Mannesmann and Phoenix Rheinruhr concerns that delivered steel pipes for USSR, the first east-west pipe being inaugurated in 1973 at the border between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and, as a result, FRG became Moscow's most important economic partner in the same year. The Christian-Democrat Party's and Chancellor's Konrad Adenauer coming to power brought the respect of NATO's partners' agreements by suspending the commercial contracts with USSR. Important companies such as (Salzgitter AG, Siemens, Haniel, IG Farben, Thyssen, Hoechst, and AEG) immediately cancelled their sponsorship to this party, determining the coming to power of the social-democrats led by Willie Brandt, the founder of "Realpolitik", a term that redefines a new vision in the trade with USSR. The term is immediately borrowed by the Italians and Austrians, which began to import gas from Russia through TAG I and TAG II pipes with ENI (89%) and OMV (11%) as shareholders[14].

Knowing Hungary's problems (Hungarian Revolution – 1956) and those of Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring – 1968) in their relation with USSR, FRG signs one of the biggest commercial contracts: the pipeline Siberia – Western Europe, in value of 1.2 billion marks and the IGAT I Pipe (Iranian Gas Trunk line) which transformed the USSR in an important transporter. The result was that commerce between Common Market and USSR doubled in only 3 years.

Due to the oil crisis in 1973, industrialized European states turned toward natural gasses, especially, the Russian ones, making last generation technology (automatic equipment and know-how) to arrive in the Soviet Union. This way, the first pipeline connecting Siberia with France is put in function, the MEAGAL Pipeline with EON (51%), GDF Suez (44%) and OMV (5%)

as shareholders[15]. But the automatic equipment imported to the USSR is used to improve SS20 rockets which were directed against Western Europe in 1977. Even after the beginning of the War in Afghanistan and the Syndicate Revolts in Poland, the Common Market states seals the biggest contract ever signed with the USSR: "the contract of the century – the Siberia-Europe Pipeline" which connected the largest gas storage facility Urengoi-Ujgorod and Western Europe, with a pipeline of 5,400 km that would permit to upgrade the gas volume imported from 25 to 40 billion cubic meters per year and would meet the demands of other potential clients such as Italy, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Greece.

In that period, the use of Russian gas in FRG reached up to 20%, in Austria to 67%, in France to 14%, and in Finland to 100%. It is necessary to remind that in those days, steel industry was in recession and unemployment was rising. Pressures were made by Mannesmann, Benteler, Vallourec, Dalmine, and British Steel, for a contract of 5,400 km of pipeline (20 million tons of steel), meaning profit. Additionally, there were also the pumping station construction technology and the electronic material of the installations. CIA's calculations show that the foreign bills obtained by the USSR could cover without a problem the Red Army's expenses in Afghanistan.

In that period, CIA analysts forwarded some documents to the European offices explaining the danger of dependency on USSR's energy, thus given to the Russians the possibility to make political and strategic pressure. But the naivety of the French and German surpassed any imagination: the banks lent millions of dollars to USSR (loans guaranteed by the two states), these being refundable in natural gas. This made the two states even more dependent through the risk of a banking system crisis[16]. The administration in Kremlin negotiated very well: 11 dollars for a thousand cubic meters for an even greater energy dependency for Europe and the possibility of a price increase in the next decade.

At the moment, the dual approach of the four European states (FRG, France, Italy, and Austria) was becoming more and more visible: on the one hand, they were criticizing USSR for its policies in Afghanistan and Poland, for their arms policy and for not respecting the human rights, and, on the other hand, they were encouraging the large corporations to sign contracts with USSR and to furnish technology (which was under US license and was defying any embargo).

In 1980, the US started a plan to crush the soviet economy. Starting from the fact that USSR is sustaining its state from foreign bills won from export of oil and natural gas, its strategy was to lower the price of oil and gas on the global market. This way, Saudi Arabia rose their production 4 times and oil's price dropped from 30$/baril to 12$/baril. This made that, in 1986, USSR's balance of payment had a deficit of 1.4 billion dollars under the conditions in which a year before it had registered a surplus of 700 million dollars, in the situation where natural gas production increased to 587 billion metric cubes per year[17]. This economic imbalance brought to one of the biggest food crises USSR has ever seen, the government not being even able to import grain (30% of the consume was import-based) and to rationalize food consumption. The new administration represented by Mihail Gorbachev was unable to manage the economic crisis that was slowly transforming into a political crisis, which brought the fall of the USSR. USSR's debt increased from 28 billion $ in 1986 to 54 billion $ in 1989.

The new Russian strategy

In extraction, stocking, and transport of gas industry, the Soviet Union left behind 160,000 km of pipelines, 350 pressing stations and dozens of gas storage facilities, located in the new-formed republics: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and the Republic of Moldova.

At that time (not taking in consideration the newly-discovered reserves), approximately 80% of the gas reserves were in Russia, 10% in Turkmenistan and the rest in Ukraine and the Caspian area.

The problem was that 25% of the pipelines were in Ukraine (32,000 km with 120 pressing and pumping stations) and 13 immense gas storage facilities. This reality made Ukraine to become the biggest importer of gas (30 billion cm/year) and the most important transit country: 100 billion cm, representing the occidental countries' export. Knowing that 80% of Russia's total export was gas, Russia had to control the entire infrastructure inherited from the USSR. This fact came true at

the Alma Ata meeting of the presidents from the former USSR countries, which would soon form the Independent States Community (ISC) in 1991. This trial to manage actives in ex-USSR states failed to be put in action, as they were transferred to the newly financed Turkmen Gazprom and UkrGazprom in 1992[18].

Yeltsin era along with the "mass privatization" of Russian companies represents a defining period for the new Russian economy order. We have a couple of directions to analyze: vertical reorganization of economy, the shift from patrimony to the extraction industry's private sector and the appearance of oligarchies. The privatization program in Russia ends in 1992. It can be described as follows – every Russian citizen who is at least 18 years old receives a 10,000 rubles voucher, subscribing to one of the societies waiting to be privatized. There are two new policies formed in the energy domain: one for oil industry and another for gas industry.

A couple of national and regional gigantic energy companies are built and they hold the extraction, transport, and processing wings. The biggest societies are LukOil, TNK, Rosneft, and Yukos. The subscription coupon is deliberately delayed for the working-class citizen, so they cannot use it. "Black market" coupon appears. At this moment, the "oligarchy" class clotted and it intuited the "privatization" potential and through the investment banks they founded started to organize a "gray market", the acquisition price increased to 10% of the nominal value. Later, these privatization coupons were used so the handful of new business people could detain control over oil extraction industry companies. It's a well-known fact that along with oil, natural gas is also extracted, but the proportion of gas extraction is too minute, the societies having a share just below 5%.

Viktor Chernomyrdin, the prime minister at that time and ex-second minister of gas and first director of Gazprom, protected this concern throwing out laws to fiscal facilities especially for him.

Vladimir Putin's coming to Kremlin was a milestone in Russia's foreign policy and implicitly in the internal policy of total control on energy companies. In this period, there were designed the principles of extraction, transport, export, and foreign policy, principles to which we referred in


Figure no. 1 – The decline in Russian gas production Source: The Future of Russian gas and Gazprom, pr. Jonathan Stern, director Gas Research of Oxford Institute, Centre of Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2006

the first page of this text.

From the geopolitical analyses, Russia began to develop ways to detour Ukraine. These analyses turned out to be true after the gas crisis generated by Ukraine in 2005, followed by the one in 2008. There were realized new pipeline routes: Blue Stream which connects Turkey and Russia, BBL Pipeline that connects Holland to Great Britain, North Stream Pipeline that links Russia and Germany (under the Baltic Sea, detouring the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus, dimming their role in foreign regional politics), South Stream – which is still in the planning stage – that connects Russia with the EU countries (under the Black Sea, avoiding Ukraine).

Since 2009, when the financial crisis deeply affected European industries, for the first time it was created an imbalance between offer and demand, offer becoming larger than demand. Energy market's dynamics is becoming more and more unforeseeable. The previsions of the specialists from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in 2006 showed a decline in demand and, implicitly, in gas extraction. This prevision was also made by the Center of International and Strategic Studies in Washington, as it is illustrated in Figure no. 1.

In the same study[19], it is foreseen that independent producers would develop by raising their production. This prevision could remain valid at least for oil industry's "big 4": LukOil, Rosneft, TNK-BP and Yukos, the other smaller companies, not having their own pipeline network, could be swallowed[20] by the giant Gazprom.

In the last three years of crisis, Russia was powerfully hit by the fact that its gas exports fell by almost 20% in 2009, not forgetting that 80%

Figure no. 2 – Price variation around the world
Source: 60 years BP Statistical Review World Energy,
p. 27

of Russian exports represent natural gas and that they have a big contribution in Russia's GDP.

Analyzing the gas price variation which has no relation to the global crisis, but only to the regional political crisis, and here we are referring to the two major leaps in 2005 and 2008 that intervened after the misunderstandings between Ukraine and Russia (illustrate in Figure no. 2), we can appreciate that in this context, Russia's need for funds could result in another gas crisis which would automatically result in increasing the prices.

Energy strategies in the geostrategic context

The International Energy Agency's previsions show that, in 2000, a third of EU's energy consumption came from Russian gasses, and, in 2008, EU's member states imported 40% of the necessary energy and, in 2030, the import is expected to reach a milestone of 66%[21]. These numbers show that the demand rises with 1.5% per year.

Starting with 2004, along with the founding of the European Commission led by Jose Emanuel Barroso, the first trials were made to create a common European energy strategy. The commissioner on energy affairs, Andris Piebalgs, Lithuania's representative, didn't pay much attention to alternative energy that had begun to take shape in southern Europe, projects meant to totally eliminate the dependency on Russian gas imports. In this period, appeared the idea of importing gas from other sources: the Caspian Countries and the Middle East. Some South-East European countries, along with Turkey, conceived Nabucco and AGRI projects. But there are delay reasons of this common strategy, implicitly, in its design and construction: the financial crisis and

the fact that the great companies producing rolling stock and the banks have already invested in North Stream project which, today, is in the finalization stage and it is said to cover the European energy necessary for the next few years.

In the Caspian geopolitical equation, some modifications have intervened even since the middle '90s when American companies penetrated on the oil and natural gas extraction market in the Caspian Sea, in the Russian riparian zones, and in the ex-USSR countries considered by Kremlin to be under its sphere of influence: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The countries that warmed their relations with the US and the EU's member states automatically had their relations with Russia cooled. Political and interethnic tensions rose which, in the case of Georgia, brought to the separation of a territory (South Ossetia). The outcome is that the administrations of Azerbaijan, Georgian, and Armenian have got even closer to US and EU's member states, signing various treaties and political and economical agreements with the two important players, most of these acts being related to the collaboration in the energy sector.

Taking into account the potential of gas production and transport of the Caspian area (Turkmenistan – 80 billion m^3/year, Kazakhstan – 50 billion m^3/year, Uzbekistan – 25 billion m^3/year), the European Union appreciated that, in the energy equation, this area is very important. If we take into consideration gas acquisition price at the border by Russia from these countries, prices varying between 65$ and 110$ for 1000 cubic meters in the situation where Russia re-exports today with prices that sometimes exceed 450$ for 1000 cubic meters, we can conclude that the EU offer is much more advantageous than the Russian one. Adding the fact that these countries could become propitious markets for European goods, the European Union's interests for enhancing diplomatic and commercial relation with these countries has grown.

Kremlin intuited the new EU direction and Putin Government elaborated, in 2010, a new energy strategy with the main course of action in the foreign policy: Gazprom should acquire, or become a shareholder in energy, transport and utilities companies in the entire world[22].

Comparing the sell price of gas and the political and economic pressures applied to the important countries by Russia, one could get a clear imagine

Country	Dependency rate
Bulgaria	100%
Slovakia	100%
Finland	100%
Estonia	100%
Lithuania	100%
Greece	100%
Denmark	100%
Belgium	100%
Lithuania	100%
Austria	75%
Czech Republic	75%
Hungary	75%
Poland	67%
Romania	52%
Slovenia	51%
Germany	42%
Italia	33%
France	23%
Holland	12%

Chart – European Union member states' dependency on Russian gas

Serbia	100%
Croatia	88%
Turkey	76%
Switzerland	12%

*Chart – The dependency rate of non-EU states on Russian gas*
Sources: Eurostat – 2007 report, CRS- Report for Congress – The European Union' Energy Security Challenges (2008), ECFR – Beyond dependence (2009)

on the success of these Russian actions. Thus, in 2007, Belarus imported gas with 46$ for 1000 cubic meters under the conditions in which 50% of the holdings of the national distributor, BelTranzGaz, are owned by Gazprom and the majority of the Belarusian economic domains have Russian shareholders. In 2005, the Republic of Moldova was buying gas with 110$ for 1000 cubic meters and, in 2006, with 160$, at half price than the European states. In 2007, when Tarlev government wanted the growth of the participation for the Moldavian state to more than 50%, (the other 50% belonging to Gazprom), the price of imported gas by the Republic of Moldova doubled to 300$ for 1000 cubic meters. Transnistria, Moldova's separatist region, imports gas at the declared price of 60$ for 1000 cubic meters, but because this region's debt has constantly grown because of the fact that the gas has never been paid, reaching 2 billion dollars.

Until 2004, Ukraine paid under 200$ for 1000 m³ but, in 2005, Russia raised the price to 230$. Not liking this price, Ukraine unleashed a gas crisis. Today, Ukraine pays approximately 300$ for 1000 m³. Poland, having Gazprom as the absolute shareholder in the ex-national gas transport and distribution company, buys until 2008 gas with the price of 120$ for 1000 m³, and Germany has always had the advantage of preferential gas prices. Until 2006, Germany paid 235$ for 1000 m³ in the situation in which the other European countries were paying around 300% for 1000 per cubic meters[23].

The impossibility of an EU common energy strategy

In the equation of coordinating the energy strategies of EU's member states, we have to take

Figure no. 3 – Russian gas export percentage/countries
Source: EIA (US Energy Information Administration)

into account at least two factors: the dependency rate of Russian gas (shown in the chart below) and each country's percentage from in total export of Russian gas

We can observe that half of the Union's countries have a great dependency rate, the percentage of Russian gas consumption being over 50%.

But not all countries are important in the pay balance resulting from Russian gas export.

We also need to analyze how dependent Russia is of gas export depending on the export size of every country and the money that it wins, as we see in Figure no. 3.

We can observe that the sums collected by Russia from the gas-importing countries vary in their extension. If Germany has the most important place (in the EU countries) followed by Italy, France, Poland, the Baltic Countries (all in one place), Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria, the others count less in the Russian foreign pay balance.

From this, one could conclude that Russia makes differences, in its foreign policy, between the countries that are over 3% in this ranking and those under 3% of the total gas export. We can conclude that Russia wants a different treatment for every country and is against the existence of a common European energy strategy that could disadvantage Russia.

In the Union's statistics, it is shown that 84% of gas consumption is represented by imports through pipelines in this order: 52% from Russia, 31% from Norway, 12% from Algeria, 3% from Libya,

2% from Iran[24]. Thereby, this shows that Russia has to have an important place in the elaboration of the energy strategy in the near future.

Analyzing the European energy strategy draft, elaborated by the Barroso Commission, we can conclude that it is meant to be a "release from the energy pliers of North Stream and South Stream" through the two major energy projects: Nabucco and AGRI (as seen in figure no. 4).

Analyzing Russia's attitude in the last few years, one could assert that it is preparing to reduce exports to EU, confirming the European Commission's wish to detach from the monopoly of Russian gas. This is deducted from Vladimir Putin's visit to China, in 2006, where he signed a contract for two pipeline routes (which pass off Mongolia), a corridor parallel to the Pacific coast and another one which passes through Turkmenistan, which will transport over 80 billion m³/year.

Figure no. 4 – Nabucco and AGRI routes
Source: STRAFOR

Taking into account that these two new routes need time and money to be put in use, we conclude that, in the last months, Russia has been continuing its policy for the separation of the EU countries, offering greater advantages to Germany.

Conclusions

The first conclusion is that the European Union cannot have, in the near future a common energy policy because its member states' interests which sometimes ate divergent. The second motive of the impossibility of creating a common energy policy is represented by Russia's efforts in foreign policy to separate the Union by discriminating the main gas importers, offering smaller prices in exchange for Russian investment possibilities in the respective countries.

Russia, knowing the gas and oil dependency rate of European countries and the period of resource running-out, offered, at the beginning of partnerships, advantageous energy contracts. After a period of time, after these states became dependent of imported Russian resources, Kremlin can adopt whenever it wants blackmail policy, like it already did with a couple of countries, having the following examples: acquisition of cell phone companies in some Caspian countries, Acquisitioning MOL – Hungary's main energy company, NIS – Serbia's main energy company, or imposing the construction of nuclear plants with Russian technology in Turkey and Bulgaria.

The only chance of the European Union to protect itself from future blackmail is to elaborate and respect a common energy strategy, leaving behind immediate national interests in the favor of common collective defense interests with an unlimited timeline.

In 2007, the European Commission elaborated the "European Energy Policy" document that traces the most important ways of action, which include: competition assurance on the energy market, research development in the energy domain, the use of alternative energy sources, and most important, the elaboration of a common energy strategy for all the member states. If this document would become a European Commission decision, the common energy security problem could be solved, all the member countries, and EU non-member countries, could be sheltered from a possible Russian shakedown.

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THE COLD WAR FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

Constantin MOŞTOFLEI, PhD*

The collocation "the End of the Cold War" is, by the frequency of its use in the last two decades, in politicians' language, in the context of international relations and also in specialised literature of occidental origin, a reality to be considered. Signalling the End of the Cold War is differently perceived depending on what is understood from its content but also on the perspective of analysis of the respective changes. Since when can we speak about a cold war? Which are its elements? Did it really end?

Key-words: war; cold war; military potential; arming race; ballistic missile; anti-missile defense; anti-missile shield.

1. Introduction

The message of intervened changes in the international life as it results from what has been said and written starting from 1990 onward can be considered the one generated by the collocation "the end of the Cold War".

The approaches' diversity is mainly determined by politicians who very often appeal in their rhetoric to metaphors and by specialists who, in their scientific papers, accept, repeat or even seek for justifications. Secondly, an explanation can be found in the motivations of peoples using the mentioned collocation, sustained by interests pursued at a given moment or a given period of time. Thirdly, the definition of the cold war must be also correlated with the conceptual confusion existent regarding the war phenomenon.

2. What is war?

Clausewitz's saying "war is a continuation of politics with other means" is generally assimilated with the definition of war. Indeed, in his work *On war*[1], we notice that the first chapter, entitled "What is war?" there are several sub-chapters among which: "2. Definition" and "24. War is a mere continuation of policy by other means". In sub-chapter 2, Clausewitz specifies that "War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale." adding that "Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will"[2], and in sub-chapter 24, he explains that "war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means"[3]. Therefore, in fact, we are confronted with an elusion of a true definition of war by Clausewitz, making appeal to a commentary, to an interpretation of the German theorist, which we consider closer to a metaphor.

Let us also signal the association between war and armed conflict (categorized as *low*, *medium* and *large intensity* in the American military

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regulations) required in our opinion by the necessity of delimitations of juridical-diplomatic nature, in order to break away from the restrictions coming from war law, defined by the European system from Hague and Geneva[4]. According to the modern war typology, often there is not made a distinction between war and conflict[5], the collocation *war/armed* conflict being used.

Raymond Aron appreciated that the biggest accomplishment of Clausewitz is the three-dimensioned definition that emphasizes the relation between the three notions used: war, policy and violent means. Still, the basic element for every definition of war is violence, and the confrontation between belligerents has a strongly destructive character. Usually, the confrontation is not limited to the military field as such, involving all fields of social live, but the armed fight has the determined, decisive role.

In specialty works of the '80s, a new type of war was analyzed, which was called "war of fourth generation" following the apparition of unconventional forms of battle that allowed the successful combating of an opponent's not only by military means. Lacking a unanimously accepted definition, war of fourth generation is considered as: "a modern form of insurgency"[6], "the tactics of weak people"[7] or "a war method which in order to obtain victory uses: undermining of the enemy's power; exploitation of his weaknesses; asymmetrical operations"[8].

Field's literature registers more and more opinions concerning future conflicts' physiognomy, weapons' selection, their non-lethal effect etc. The classification military and non-military actions does not correspond anymore to violence and non-violence concepts. By actions which aren't undergone by army or militaries are obtained destructive, violent effects (for example, organized crime, terrorism, violent extremism, etc.); likewise, military power projection aims, by using forces and specific means, to reduce and even avoid personnel casualties as well as destruction of goods and infrastructure from the operational area. The dilution and avoidance of the violent character of military actions by adopting strategies and tactics excluding physical destructive effects are more and more agreed by political-military decision makers.

The lack of trenchant delimitations of the war domain and the inclusion of non-violent means in its specific action sphere, as well as of those that aren't performed by militaries determined different conceptual approaches. Therefore, war is regarded as a social, political and military phenomenon and is defined by typological elements as: nuclear, classical, generalized or limited, conventional, chemical, bacteriological, of national defense, guerilla, global, local, civil etc. Also, there can be found frequent denominations resulted from associating the word "war" with the ones assigning diverse fields and which, in the end, lead to terms/ collocations resulting in metaphors: wine, code, economic, energetic, informational war, frozen war / conflict; terror war; etc. and, why not, cold war.

Referring strictly to the definition of the new type of war, that of the future, it is appreciated that it must be variable – comprehensive but also specific, clear but also vague, and the concept should delimitate itself by focalizing on the following elements: its nature; contingencies; actors; producers; provocations; threats; combatants' goals; targets; weapons and advantages; victory and defeat.

At the same time, we believe we should also look for responses to the following questions: is the Clausewitzian formula available for terrorism and violent extremism fighting? Do the non-violent independent military actions (physical, informational, imagological, radio-electronical etc.) belong to the war concept? Do military actions that exclude the use of force (peace-keeping operations, peace rebuilding, peace enforcement, peace support, or peace implementation) belong to the concept of war? Do the new types of war ("command & control" – blocking and distortion of command and control - informational, psychological, media war etc.) presume the necessity to reevaluate the content and sphere of war notion and, consequently, its definition?

3. On the Cold War

The first use of the collocation "cold war" is attributed to Herbert Bayard Swope (1882-1958) in the speeches he wrote for Bernard Baruch (1870-1965). After Baruch addressed the Senate Committee for War Investigations, on October 24, 1948, "Let us not be deceived, we are today in the midst of a Cold War.", the press took on the

collocation and it became common[9]. As surprising as it might seem, the father of the Cold War collocation is a Spanish who lived in the Middle Ages: don Jose Manuel de Castillia and Leon used cold war formula to identify the conflict between the Christian kingdoms from the Northern part of Iberian Peninsula and the Arabians, settled in the same peninsula, a military conflict different by the usual ones because it started without a war declaration and ended without a peace treaty[10].

Concerning the contemporary period, it is appreciated that an answer unanimously accepted was not given to the question "When did the cold war start?" opinions being shared between two variants: first (non-violent) confrontations among the great allied power (USSR, Great Britain and USA) regarding the reorganization of the post-bellum world at Teheran Conference (November, 28 –December 1, 1943)[11] and the moment of first controversies among them, after the end of World War II[12].

It is estimated that the term was launched after the World War II in order to describe the situation (military preparation, mutual reasons for distrust, global political rivalry) between USA and Soviet Union[13] and was defined as "war lead by other means than military which emphasizes the ideological conflict and an international level of significant tension"[14], as "extreme stage of tension involving the rivalry between two or among more nations, everyone taking measures other than open military actions to dominate one another"[15].

In a renowned dictionary[16] is shown that the collocation Cold War was invented by Baruch in 1947 to describe the tensions appeared, on the one hand, between the Soviet Union and Eastern European states under its influence, and on the other hand, between USA and its allies from Occidental Europe.

According to the mentioned dictionary, "The Cold War can be divided in three periods: the first period, the most hostile stage, began after the Potsdam Conference, includes the Civil war in Greece (1946-1949) and the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and reached a first top point during the Korean War (1950-1953). After Stalin's death, in 1953, a certain relaxation was registered, but it went on until Cuban missiles crisis, in 1962. Missiles crisis brought both superpowers, USA and USSR, near to a nuclear war, and this determined a change of attitude that lead to the first efforts towards disarming. Despite the fact that indirect confrontations between USA and USSR never ceased, let us take for instance the Vietnam War, in the `60s, tensions begun to loosen up. This trend culminated with "Ostpolitik" initiated by Willy Brandt starting since 1969, Helsinki Conference (1973-1975) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe after 1975. The so-called détente (relaxation) phase ceased in 1979 with the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the annihilation of "Solidarity" movement in Poland in 1980 and the placement of SS-20 Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe, to which NATO responded by placing Pershing American missiles in Western Europe. Tensions softened after the election of Gorbaciov in USSR because he considered that the precarious economic situation of his country would never allow him to keep up with USA in the arms race. In 1988, USSR officially declared that it will not interfere anymore in another state's home affairs. At the end of the `80s, relations between USSR and USA took a better turn and in 1991, after Soviet Union's dismantling, American president Bush officially declared "the end of the Cold War"[17].

In western specialised literature other approaches on this theme can also be found[18]. At the same time, the variant that the Cold War started … during the World War I must also be regarded[19].

In the specialty literature of the former socialist states were also citations to the cold war whose content and message were subordinated to own ideology and propaganda. For example, in Romania, it was appreciated that the Cold War represents the tension intervened in the international relations in the period following the World War II, by imperialist circles policy aimed against socialist states[20]. According to another source, the Cold War is characterized by the maintenance of some aggressive imperialist circles of an animosity climate among states with different social regimes by systematic lead of hostile propaganda, of embargo policy by using blockade and boycott against socialist states. Simultaneously, there were appreciations that it was because of the reaction of peace loving forces that the cold war was hindered from becoming a new international conflagration[21]. Abandoning the old mentality, at present, the cold war is understood as confrontation on political, diplomatic, economic,

social, cultural, ecological, military, etc. levels without reaching violence with destructive effects among the main protagonists (world's powers) and it is considered that the Cold War ended with the dismantling of USSR.

The relaxation in the security policy registered since 1989 allowed a certain diminution of the military presence, concomitantly with the proliferation of non-military actions aiming to obtain superior effects even to the ones based on violence. More and more voices advocate the idea that non-violent actions tend to become the main type of threat against countries. The real advantages of such actions recommend them to be used more and even to the detriment of violent actions. Among the advantages of non-violent actions, we mention:

- they are hard to delimitate and qualify as being specific to conflict situations; they are at the border between legal and illegal, between moral and immoral, they can be easily masked and are not sanctioned by the international law of conflicts;

- they can be undergone without crossing from the peace state to war state; most of the times, non-violent actions are developed up to the limit of belligerence state;

- they do not need the public opinion agreement and do not bring about its disapproval, because its specific forms of development generate dissimulated effects, difficult to be seen;

- with their help can be obtained major gains with minimum expenses.

The induction and cultivation of a euphoric state in the national and international public opinion determined by the disappearance of danger is easy to be exploited by national and transnational political factors. To consider the Russian Federation and, why not, the Community of Independent States as representing much too little from the ex-USSR potential is far-fetched.

If there is something to be learned from history – said Henry Kissinger in his memoirs – that something is that "without balance there is no peace" [22]. Of course, this balance refers to two protagonists of a possible armed confrontation. There is a principle politicians known very well and apply with the support of their military advisers who see this balance through unitary value of forces report (military potentials) corresponding to possible adversaries from an armed conflict.

The context of the previously exposed ideas determines us to approach European and global security from the cold war phenomenon perspective, also regarded through the analytical filter specific to the military.

In order to obtain victory in a fight, operation, battle and, why not, in a war, the military is bound to respect the prerequisites of armed fight laws, the one of relations of forces that conditions the obtaining of success in battle on the accomplishment of superiority of forces and means against the opponent, in the main sectors and directions.

At state level, favorable relations of forces can be achieved by the action over own national military potential by increasing it or over the opponent's potential by introducing some measures which should lead to its diminution.

We define *national military potential* as being the totality of human, technical, material, financial resources a state is able to produce and provide for in a determined period of time in order to wage a war. It depends on the capacity and the quality of existent intern resources, on the possibilities of their supplementation on internal plan, but also on the international context in order to obtain and maintain some favorable factors to refresh an enrich the respective resources.

The increase of own military potential can be provided by supplementation of forces (effectives) and number of fight systems in the army's endowment and by their quality enhancement resulted from the acquisition of modern fight technique, nationally made or imported.

The same actional attitude can be adopted by the opponent and, this way, the arms race between the future protagonists is released. If we speak about two global military powers, with own developed armament industries, there are two possibilities: direct involvement in armed conflicts (officially only the participation of one of them will be recognized) or indirect by means of other states that are in their influence sphere but with much less military potential, to which they will deliver the necessary ammunition and fighting technique that, on this occasion, they can test from all points of view. Therefore, we believe that almost all local military conflicts represent, all in all, at global level, forms of intensification of the arms race.

The intensification of the arms race between two global military powers can also aim, at a

given time, beside the increase of own military potential, to exhaust the opponent economically and financially.

Aware that the efforts corresponding to the engagement into an arms race are also reflected over national economies' and societies' evolutions in the respective countries, the great powers appeal to agreements for mutual limitation of armaments, initially in the nuclear field, this being the most expensive and then of classical armament.

It is known that one state's military potential size is limited by o series of internal and external factors. Among the objective factors of internal nature we remind: the number of inhabitants apt to be included in the national military system with permanent and reserve status; quantity and quality of armament systems and fight technique already in the army's endowment; national economy capacity to sustain the military effort during peacetime; volume and quality of national defense infrastructure, etc. The Main subjective factor influencing the national military potential, is in our regard, the national defense conception adopted and sustained by the political power and materialized in establishing the types of armed conflict in which they presume the country could the be involved in, the level allotted from the gross domestic product for defense, the strategies of accomplishment and maintenance of modern standards in the armed forces (endowment and organizational-functional structuring) etc..

The compensation of unfavorable effects of these factors is fulfilled by creation of political-military alliances. Even if efforts are being made to form such alliances among neighbor countries of small and medium size, with almost equal military potentials, the general trend is polarization of such states toward great powers or toward other alliances where is involved at least one great power. That great power acts in order to strengthen the alliance which it leads but, at the same time, is also interested by the evolution of the alliance in which the opponent great power activates. Therefore, it will try, by all possible means, to weaken its opponent's military potential including by acting in order to decompose the other alliance or even the respective power as a state.

All the exposed phenomena create the specific framework of evolutions between two successive reshaping of influence areas by the great global political-military powers; Exemplification was not deemed necessary, as we can easily find such examples along the military phenomena specific for post-bellum Europe.

Europe knew two such reconfigurations stipulated by peace treaties signed after both global conflagrations. Moreover, among the great powers belonging to the same party, there were registered, at some point, misunderstandings on the means of exerting influence.

Presently, it can be seen that Europe is experiencing a new reshaping of influence areas of great global powers, USA and the Russian Federation, changes being in an initial phase, made without armed violence between the protagonists. The important aspect is for these to have a finality which excludes armed conflicts.

Transformations registered in the mentioned areas are the result of nonviolent actions, excepting Romania and ex-Yugoslavia.

Is known that when in an area appears a vacuum of power, the nearest great power is interested in filling it. The Russian Federation, although is confronted with internal economic and other nature issues, being in a process of consolidation, it could not abstain from whishing to regain its influence, if not for the entire area, at least in the regions it considers important for its interests. USA, although geographically far from the mentioned area, is Russia's neighbor through NATO.

The central and Eastern European area where Romania is also included, is mainly, the object of competitive interest of the two great global military powers - USA and Russian Federation - which are at different stages regarding their power cycle evolution.

Resizing of influence areas represents for the great global powers, in their power cycle evolution, a major objective. If this objective isn't accomplished as a consequence of an armed conflict among them, it can be done only after a long process comprising several stages. The existence, succession or simultaneity of the stages, as well as their order of occurrence are not an imperative. These stages could be:

- increasing own national and stable allies' military potentials / taking measures in order to diminish national military potentials of the states considered as possible opponents;

- attiring new members in the political-military

alliance whose leader the great power is (creating of alliances in there do not exist yet) / quantitative and qualitative diminishing (destructuring) the opponent alliance;

- modifying the geopolitical spectrum of the interest area by statal dismantling of region's countries / remaking even partially and under different forms of previous state structures.

The diminution of one country's military potential can be fulfilled by imposing (self-imposing induction), more or less masked, of the following means:

- adopting some limited ambits for quantitative and qualitative dimension of armed forces;

- adopting small defense budgets allowing the national military body to survive, with considerable efforts, being unable to develop;

- reducing the duration of the military service, with direct repercussions related to recruitment deficits in the conscription situation and of forming reserve forces poorly trained professionally;

- adopting high rates of profesionalisation of the army, despite the presumed substantial costs;

- participating in international military operations with many effectives and bearing very high expenses, ignoring the fulfilment of own military body priorities;

- participating in common military activities consuming very much material and financial resources, representing unimportant actions for the basic army mission;

- diminishing national defense industries potential up to their dismantling and elimination.

A problem that preoccupied the great powers in the Cold War period was the "competition" regarding possession of ballistic missiles and protection against them. This competition is mainly undergone between the two nuclear superpowers: Russian Federation and United States of America (START Treaties provisions exclusively refers to these superpowers, disregarding their power cycle). Still, we shouldn't exclude the other nuclear powers: UK, France, China, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea and possibly, Iran.

We appreciate that a presently we are witnessing a new arms race in the mentioned field. Those who own ballistic missiles are interested in perfecting their own means (by increasing the action distance, increasing the number of charges, by creating means to mislead over the regarded objectives and real charges etc.), concomitantly with producing means of combating ballistic missiles of potential adversaries, able to penetrate any anti-missile shield.

Along March 2009 – January 2010, the Pentagon did a detailed analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and even since September 2009, USA Administration went public with its decision to implement in Europe, under NATO aegis, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA).

In accordance with the statement of the American Defense Secretary Robert Gates in the foreword of he Report published on February 1, 2010 is shown that: "The protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority. The threat to our deployed military forces and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly"[23]. Very soon after the analysis became official, Obama Administration took to action.

But only few days later, on February 5, 2010, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev announced that he approved the new "Military Doctrine of Russian Federation" and "State policy principles on nuclear deterrence until 2020" out of which results that Russia's security is confronting, among others, with the following risks and threats:

- NATO enlargement more and more close to Russia's frontiers;

- deployment of foreign military contingents on the territory of Russia's neighbor countries' or its allies;

- development and use of anti-missile defense systems that undermine stability at global level and disrupt strategic balance of power, space militarization and deployment of strategic nuclear weapons[24].

Surely, in order to provide their security, all great powers rely on nuclear capacities and nuclear weapon use. In this regard, it is shown that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons as response to an attack against it or its allies with nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or as response to an aggression using conventional weapons.

In the following period, Russian Federation, through its representatives at highest levels formulated warnings and even threats that regarded:

- development of its offensive potential of nuclear capacities if NATO and USA do not reach to an agreement with Moscow on the theme of

cooperation as regards the European anti-missile defense;

- Russia withdrawal from the new START Treaty that entered into force at the beginning of this year if the anti-missile shield will function without collaboration with Kremlin;

- The West could confront a new Cold War if it doesn't answer to worries emitted by Russia concerning the anti-missile shield project in Europe;

- Moscow's will to be full right member in the anti-missile defense system in Europe refusing the idea of a shield only under sole occidental control, covering a part of Russian territory;

Russian president also requested juridical guarantees from USA/NATO that the shield will never be aimed against Russia, which American refuse to offer.

In the Pentagon report regarding the Ballistic Missile Defense is seen that, at present, only Russia and China have the capacity to launch a large attack with ballistic missile over American territory, but this is unlikely and is not an objective of the Ballistic Missile Defense. Concerning Russia, the American Administration aims to get to a military statute in accordance to their relation after the Cold War. This could mean that US recognize that, at present, their relations with Russia are a consequence of the Cold War period.

In his turn, president Dmitri Medvedev in a large press conference that took place in May 2011 warned that Russia could give up the new nuclear disarming treaty signed with the United States and he risks coming back to the Cold War if in the near future an agreement regarding the American anti-missile shield will not be signed. If NATO, stated the Russian president, will not approach the mutually proposed issues with president Barack Obama related to the creation of a common pattern of anti-missile defense, then Russia will act in conformity to a scenario which will bring us back in the Cold War era.

The other states passed through transition period and the effects of economic-financial crisis and went out of the recession in different ways, some with hardships and even incoherencies. The adopted solutions to solve some specific issues for the Cold War correspond to the way in which they regard national interests, the interests of alliances they adhered to and in are in conformity with their agreed partnerships.

Conclusions

The bipolar and the multipolar structure of the global military power, the type and evolution of relations among protagonists are key factors defining the content of cold war concept.

The concept of Cold war is valid only if we refer to two or more well-defined protagonists, grouped into two distinct parties. In our regard, the protagonists' military potentials levels mustn't prevail. So, could be considered as cold war period one characterizing relations between two states of small or middle dimensions between which is manifesting a mutual and permanent suspicion, a rivalry aiming the domination of one over the other.

When we refer exclusively to USA and USSR, we can speak about the end of the cold war because one of the partners, USSR, doesn't exist anymore.

What's going on presently between USA and the Russian Federation, despite some accepted compromises of the both parties, represents more the beginning of a new cycle of cold war.

Its way of manifestation is somehow different because in the current stage under the great powers attention are countries disposed in the areas of interest regarded by those: Central, Eastern and Northern (Baltic) Europe and more recent the North-African states and the Near East, where "the Arabian spring" stresses manifestations of violent extremism.

A new arms race along which goes the accomplishment of European anti-missile shield correlated with the world economic-financial crisis, the duration of the recession and their development perspective determines us to consider that Cold War phenomenon will continue to manifest.

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KAMIKAZE PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE SUPREME SACRIFICE
IN INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST ATTACKS

Nicolae RADU, PhD*

History contains many conflicts that led to the loss of thousands and hundreds of thousands of lives. Many of those who gave their lives for a belief can be considered terrorists today, but also may be honored as heroes. "Kamikaze" is a word that calls us to reflection. The Second World War fully established this word. What does this mean? Who was kamikaze? Is it about suicide pilots, called the Knights of the Divine Wind (Japanese kamikaze - "divine wind"), who were crushing along with their aircraft on the aircraft carriers, desperately refusing the idea of defeat? In November 1944, a statement of the Japanese forces Headquarters announced an unprecedented event: nine young Japanese aviators sank an American battleship, rushing into the ship with their planes loaded with bombs. The example of these pilots, according to the bulletin, has been followed by thousands of other young people. Thus, Admiral Onishi Takijro passed to implement the project Ooka or "Cherry Blossom". In April 1945, in the Battle of Okinawa, over 2,000 Japanese planes hit the American fleet, destroying more than 300 ships and killing more than 5,000 American soldiers. Many of the Japanese planes, without ammunition, struck the ships with the force of a lightning. Things are not unimportant, especially if we look to the Muslim world. Without the intent to develop the subject of martyrdom we are wondering ourselves however

whether it has become an incentive for the holy war?

Key-words: kamikaze; martyrs for Allah; Al-Qaeda; brides of Allah; the way to Paradise.

1. Suicide missions

The mobilization of the kamikaze pilots, considered as the largest in history, still remains a frame of reference. Samurai code and "Bushido honor code" are the cornerstone keys in understanding kamikaze's psihology. Kamikaze's pilots last letters to their families, written shortly before their last flight, indicate that while some met suicidal act with excitement, others regarded it as a duty that must be fullfiled. It is clear that they were prepared to die even before entering the combat mission. "It is easy to talk about death as something abstract, as philosophers do. The real death is what I fear and I do not know if I may overcome this... But I got into a point of no return. I have to plunge the plane into a enemy ship. To be honest, I can not say if death for the Emperor comes from my heart. But it's written for me to die for the Emperor"[1].

In the Middle East, the "official" debut of the contemporary era of kamikaze attacks took place in April 1983 during an attempt against the U.S. embassy in Beirut[2]. Self-sacrifice is not a defeat,

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a loss, but a choice. The fighter for Allah, who sacrifices his life for faith is the one who, beyond the gravity of his actions, is the mudjahid who gains the victory[3].

Quran's teaching[4] regarding admission into paradise (Sura 55, 52) of those killed in jihad inspired the Muslims over the centuries, motivating them to fight to the death for Allah's holy cause. Extending these teachings in a simple interpretation carried out on "Mohamed Atta's will", one of the bombers of September 11, 2001, we wonder if, according to tradition, he is still inspiring young Muslims to become "suicide bombers". Islam preaches bodily resurrection of the dead. If the righteous will be rewarded with the pleasures of Paradise ("Jannah"), the rest will be punished in hell ("Jahannam" – Hell, from the Hebrew "ge-Hinnom" or "valley of Hinnom", represented as Gehenna). Paradise is described as a place where "they will lie on carpets lined with Broca. Believers are promised not only flower gardens, abundant food and fresh wells, but also beautiful virgins. Seventy-two virgins will be created for the great joy of the smallest of believers" (Koran, Sura 55, 52-58).

He who gives his life for Islam is venerated by the whole community. The attack should be accomplished first of all for Allah. If you do it for personal reasons, for the reward the family receives, it diminishes the value of the sacrifice. So says an attacker: "if one of us commit suicide for glory, will not be accepted as martyr for Allah"[5]. He who "makes a symbol of love out of death, a witness to the truth, is a martyr (....). He lives. He is here among us. In the bosom of God, for ever, but also everywhere in the mass souls of the faithful. He who, instead, chooses dishonor to save his life, that one is, in the face of history, nothing but a repugnant living-dead traitor"[6].

2. Holy Martyrs

Unlocking the kamikaze psychology, it remains inexplicably that ever more children in the Muslim world aspire to martyrdom, as those in the West tend to become film stars. The inscriptions found on the walls of kindergartens run by Hamas claiming that: "Today's children are tomorrow's Shuhada ("holy martyrs")", do not need any further comment. Nabil Belkacemi attack committed by a 15 year-old boy requires a deeper analysis. Using a car bomb, he

provoked, on September 8, 2007, a bomb explosion in eastern Algeria, causing 30 deaths. His family was not aware of his involvement in terrorist activities. Mother and grandmother found out the news from a reporter at the Algerian "Al-Chourouk" newspaper, being forced to accept reality[7]. Even the brothers, who claim that they had very good relations with Nabil did not suspect for a moment what he was doing. One of them promised to avenge those who have turned the boy into a murderer at a tender age. Nabil Belkacemi ran away from home a few days before committing the attack. He called his father from a secret number, to ensure him he was well and to apologize for any inconvenience caused to the family by his departure. The next day he spoke with his mother, promising he would return home before Ramadan. Shortly after the attack, his name appeared in a statement posted on an Islamist website, in which the Maghreb Al-Qaeda branch claimed the attack.

● In January 2008, Admiral Gregory Smith said, according to AFP news Agency, quoted by NewsIn, that Al-Qaeda supporters in Iraq are using children to commit suicide bombings. 15 year-old boys are sent on suicide missions to sow death, one of the bloodiest attacks being committed during a funeral in Tikrit, 180 kilometers north of Baghdad. According to Algerian security services[8], between December 2006 and April 2007, over 50 boys under 16 years have joined the terrorist groups.

● In the need for understanding, we can not refrain ourselves from asking questions on terrorist psychology. In this respect, social science researchers[9] have concluded that terrorism can not be attributed to psycho-pathological problems and personality disorders. Thus, Crenshaw said that "the most obvious common characteristic of terrorists is their normality."[10] One can speak of young people deprived of prospects? Naturally, reality contradicts existing theories. Even if we admit that terrorists are people with personality disorders and psycho-pathology, we must not forget that they belong to social groups[11]. These are working based on discretion, trust and mutual support and are recruiting people who can not be easily spotted in public.

Mouthpiece of frustration

Forces behind the terrorist usually include the run from their own personality and isolation.

Uncertainty, the search for danger associated with suicidal tendencies, assertion of masculinity or femininity are interesting elements defining the profile of a possible candidate to terrorism. Attacks planned by terrorist organizations are often the answer to frustrations in the fight for power or for the removal of inconvenient state of things, by violent means, beyond the law. Turning their cause into war is very important for terrorists, as they seek to check their faith through military confrontations. Bin Laden is the most eloquent example. Considered the "mouthpiece of frustration, alienation and neglect", Al-Qaeda's chief held a very strong trust capital in countries like Saudi Arabia or Yemen. More than once, his deeds became legend.

According to an interview by Al-Quds Al-Arabya newspaper with Abu Jandal, a close friend of bin Laden, the letter could be considered "a very modest person". Being in a position to choose between a house equipped with all comforts and an austere one, lacking water and electricity, bin Laden stopped on the latter, saying that he wanted to live like those close to the Prophet did and like early Muslims".

A study by a group of specialists from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism[12] considers the self-destructive behavior of Palestinian terrorists as a result of two types of suicide: altruism and fatalism. Based on typology of altruistic traits, the study made the following assumptions: compared with those who do not commit suicide attacks, suicide terrorists are going through a process of long socialization in the terrorist organization; it is assumed that suicide terrorists are more religious than those who do not participate in suicide bombings, based on education and religious ideology. Taking as a starting point the features of the fatalistic type, the assumptions were complemented by the following remarks: a. Suicide bombers are young; b. Suicide bombers are single; c. They have a weak socio-economic status; d. Suicide bombers are mostly men.

The necessary research database was created in two stages: initially were detected all terrorist attacks events, suicidal or non-suicidal, in Israel in the last decade. This was supported by the Ha'aretz Israeli daily. In a second step was established a quantitative database that included theoretical characteristics relevant to the terrorist profile. The sample used was composed of 823 terrorists who participated in various activities during April 1993 - February 2002, out of which: 743 were non-suicide terrorists and 80 were suicide terrorists. The nature of the terrorist attack was the dependent variable in this research and as independent variables were used: previous experience in terrorist attacks, type of education, ideological affiliation, age, marital status, socio-economic background and gender.

The conclusion was that suicide terrorists have a more deeply religious background than non-suicide terrorists, the percentage of those involved in suicidal attacks being 82,8%, much higher than that of terrorists not involved in suicide bombings. This is explained by the fact that the main locations of recruitment used by terrorist organizations are religious schools. They confirmed the hypothesis that suicide terrorists are not married - a percentage of 84,2%, much higher than for non-suicide terrorists - 60% and from less socio-economic developed areas. Although in suicidal terrorist attacks male participation is dominant, it should not be overlooked that female involvement has grown substantially in recent years.

3. Kamikaze Women

Women occupy a special place in decrypting the kamikaze psychology. Whether we look at Islamic terrorism, whether it's about Chechen terrorism, we are witnessing a change of strategy in accomplishing suicide operations. Under these conditions, Stoianovici[13] launched the question: what can cause a woman to put a belt with a dynamite load and then to detonate it in a crowded place?

There are multiple answers. One reason women are used as kamikaze is that women seem to attract less suspicion than men and can more easily avoid security measures pretending to be pregnant, with explosives around their waist[14]. American psychiatrist Sageman said that he reviewed 55 women linked directly to Al Qaeda and so it can be concluded that they are ready to take violent action against "the far away enemy, the United States and its allies". "There are laborers among them, but also doctors or lawyers", appreciated the CIA officer. "A woman can sacrifice herself for the cause the same way as a man. They are voluntary, no need to convince them"[15].

In this context, it seems that it was not by chance that Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the armed fist of Fatah group, made known recently that it recruited 100 Palestinian women who would start suicide attacks, establishing a secret military unit for kamikaze women in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. In this respect, to illustrate the trend of using women in achieving terrorist attacks by the "kamikaze" method, below are some examples we consider as edifying.

● On April 9, 1985, San Mheidh, a young 16-year-old Shiite, driving a car loaded with explosives, entered into a checkpoint of the Israeli army, killing two soldiers. By the end of 2000, only two terrorist organizations have frequently used women in suicide missions: Kurdistan Workers' Party (PPK) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil (LTTE). For example, in the case of LTTE, about one third of the members of the famous commandos called "Black Tigers" specialized in suicide bombings, are women. The best known terrorist attack committed by a member of the LTTE is one in which the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was killed. In an election rally the terrorist woman came in close proximity to the Premier, wearing under her robe an explosive belt that gave her the appearance of a pregnant woman.

● The first suicide attack committed by a female registered in Israel took place on January 28, 2002 at the entry of a shoe store in Jerusalem; it was conducted by Wafa Idris, a Palestinian nurse ged 28, claiming one dead and 100 wounded. In February 2002, Daria Abu Aysha[16], a Palestinian student, aged 20, blown herself up in a West Bank checkpoint, injuring three Israeli soldiers. A month later, Ayat Akhras, aged 18, detonated an explosive device in a Jerusalem supermarket, killing two people and injuring another 150. All three were recruited by "Al-Aqsa" Martyrs Brigades, a particularly active Palestinian terrorist group, which appeared at the end of September 2000, and according to Israeli experts, has established a special unit of female suicide terrorists.

● In October 2003, in a restaurant in Haifa, Hanadi Darajat, a Palestinian lawyer, 23 years old, committed a suicide attack resulted in 20 deaths to avenge the death of her brother and cousin, shot four months earlier in the city of Jenin by the Israeli army. In fact, her story is a classic, a textbook example for something that

Westerners understand it quite difficult: how is it that among fundamentalists appear so many educated, with a past that could be characterized rather as progressive? "Hanadi comes from a poor family. Her parents were forced to leave their native village during the war that led to the formation of Israel. They fled to Jenin. The village is surrounded by military control points, is virtually isolated from the West Bank, tanks patrolling the streets, traffic restrictions are almost constant, there are no stores ... It is impossible to leave it, it's almost impossible to live there. Jenin - the city of martyrs. Jenin - the city where violent death is part of everyday life and the walls are covered with hundreds of portraits of those killed. Hanadi's father is disabled, suffering from chronic hepatitis. The financial support of the family was the older brother, Fardi. Fardi was, until 23 years old, a trader of vegetables and fruits. He put food on the table of his parents, the five sisters and a younger brother. Fardi ... was. Until one day in May in which he and his cousin were killed by an Israeli commando. For the Hebrew state it was a military victory against Islamic Jihad. Fardi's mother claims that her son was not part of the militants. But his photos and his cousin appeared in posters with Islamic Jihad martyrs that displays on the walls of Jenin. (...) When Fardi became past, Hanadi was in Jordan. She was searching gifts for her brother's wedding. She was the one that found him a bride, she offered the first moment of full joy for the family, she had to buy the bridegroom suit... Returning to Jenin on a short notice, with the gifts in her arms, she was the one who identified the body at the morgue. What happened from May on, noone seems to know. It is known only that that night, Hanadi started listening to tapes with verses from the Quran. But she was still talking about the law office that she was going to open and that will bare the family name. In October 2003, Hanadi was in Haifa, in the famous Maxim's restaurant. Jews were to celebrate Yom Kippur starting with the following day. The restaurant is full of happy people, men and women, children and elderly. And Hanadi. She wears clothes and make-up in a Western-style, blends perfectly with the crowd taking advantage of holiday weekends. And her mother is happy: in the morning, when he left home, she said she was going to work, that she was going to conclude a contract that will earn her the equivalent of $ 500 - a small fortune for

the poor family. The time is 14.15. The restaurant is crowded. Hanadi Taysser Darajat has a strong "argument" for the following "negotiation": a belt with 15 kilograms of explosives. And has a few moments to take a decision ... ." Hanadi's decision meant the death of 19 civilians and the injuring of other 30. At least three of the dead were children[17]. Last image broadcast by Arab television has been, according to tradition, that of Hanadi martyr, wearing Western make-up, but having in the background black and gold flag of Islamic Jihad.

4. Brides of Allah

Chechen suicide women are called "şakidki". Also known as "black widows" or "Brides of Allah"[18] they are ready to sacrifice their lives to avenge the death of husbands, fathers and brothers killed in guerrilla clashes with Russian troops. Prior to detonating the "martyr's belt" that they bear around their waist, they are often making confessions on video tapes full of songs and slogans of Islam. The first suicide bombings perpetrated by women in Russia took place after the start of the second war in Chechnya and federal troops entrance into the separatist republic, on October 1, 1999.

Thus, on 7 June 2000, Baraieva Khali, 22, attacked a Russian military base from Alhan-Iurt, by driving a truck filled with explosives and causing the death of 27 people. Later, a Russian general was killed by a Chechen woman as well. The first suicide attack involving "Brides of Allah" was that of 7 June 2000, when they attacked the Russian military base at the Alhan-Iurt, resulting in 27 deaths. Then came the attacks of 12 May 2003 at Znamenskoie, northern Chechnya, which ended with 60 dead and 250 wounded people, 14 May 2003 in Chechnya, resulting in 18 deaths, 5 June 2003 in North Ossetia, resulting in 20 deaths, 5 July 2003 during a rock festival held in Moscow, where 15 people were killed, 31 August 2004 in Moscow, two car bombs exploded at the entrance to the metro station "Ruskaia" resulting in 10 dead and 50 injured[19].

In October 2002, over 800 people in Moscow theater "Dubrovka" were taken hostage by a Chechen commando, among whose members were people who wore the Islamic veil on their face and traditional "martyr's belt" around the waist.

Two of them were sisters, were abducted from a Chechen village and raped by Russian soldiers. When security forces stormed the theater, they also killed the 19 terrorist females which were part of the commando[20].

Considering the mode of action, what can one understand? Basically, we are dealing with a liberalization of recruiting people for suicide actions, women entering the category of those willing to sacrifice themselves in the name of an ideal, the use of "kamikaze-women" in terrorist attacks becoming increasingly more common.

Ganiyeva Raisa[21] is another example. A native of Chechnya, Raisa is the sister of the two women who were part of the suicide terrorist commando involved in October 2002, at a theater hostage crisis in Moscow. Her sisters, Fatima and Milan, were killed during an anti-terrorist troops intervention. Like nearly 130 other people who came to see a play. "Ganiyev family was made up of ten brothers and sisters. Now only four are still alive. Three of the dead are victims of the second Russian campaign in Chechnya. However, their parents did everything that stayed in their power to protect their children from the influence of wahhabi groups. Their opposition and even the father's threats have remained unanswered: brothers became members of armed groups. Of the survivors, Rustam is most active. He is direct subordinate of the warrior leader Shamil Bassaiev and participated in organizing several large-scale actions. In fact, he is the one who brought the sisters in the group that the Russian press called "Black Widows". They are wives or sisters of Chechen fighters who died or were missing during the conflict with Russia. They are women who have chosen the fate of suicide. They put dynamite belts or drive trucks loaded with explosives and try to destroy targets that have been designated to them. Objectives can be military - as was the case of the bus carrying soldiers and was blown at Mozdok - or can be political figures - as of May 2003 bombing of a Muslim festival, targeting a series of pro-Russian officials – or can be simple civilians among whom terror must be installed - as was the case of the two kamikaze who tried to mingle through participants in a rock concert held on an airfield in Moscow. All just to prove that Chechen resistance is strong and that brothers and their wives have not died in vain. (...). August 2003. Raisa is in Moscow, in front of the Russian

secret service building, FSB. It's been almost a year since her sisters were killed, along with all members of the Chechen commando in the Russian capital theater. Before her, in the building, are those that have decimated her family. Unlike Hanadi, she is a woman with almost no personal history, her life was the life of others. But, like her sister in the West Bank, Raisa Ganiyeva in Chechnya must take a decision. And she only has a few moments. Contrary to any expectations, the decision was extremely unusual: Raisa surrendered to FSB. Russian military authorities promised her protection from Chechen fighters and especially from her brother. The price of this protection... only she and the FSB agents know it. However, the Ganiyev family has lost another two children, who are alive but dead for each other and both for the world. One is the terrorist, the other is a traitor".[22]

Increased presence of female suicide terrorists in a society where tradition is opposed to women's engagement in combat can be considered, perhaps, in the context of the past decade, as a transition to "palestinisation" of the Russian-Chechen conflict, or just a sign of despair? Should it mean just an attempt to reinstate a state of affairs?

Instead of conclusions:

The terrorist goes through a rigorous evaluation process within the organization, with a deep religious education. "Al Qaeda Manual"[23] describes the qualities on which organization members are recruited, "each member must be able to withstand bloodshed, murder, arrests and imprisonment. He must be able, if necessary, to kill one or more of his companions. He must be able to bear the deprivation and degrading treatment that could be exposed by the enemy. He should not sell itself to the enemy, nor to sacrifice religion for the sake of freedom.

If in the case of kamikaze pilots, "born for sacrifice", it is known that their last words before dying were "Long live the Emperor", although Hayashi Ichizo did not hesitate to say "However, I'm sure that was a lie. Everyone was shouting the same thing I did. We cried for our mothers", is this also true for suicide terrorists, be they children, women or men? After shouting the name of Allah, does the terrorist apologize to his mother? Certainly yes, as the mother's grieving face, that of

the husband or wife and children being the most precious memories that they cherish in the soul.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2.0: THE BALANCE OF POWER IN CYBERSPACE

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This paper has as main objective to emphasize the characteristics of a new "dimension" - cyberspace centered - of international relations (IR 2.0). Together with an entire spectrum of new threats and risks, ranging from individual cyber attacks to e-war, IR 2.0 promotes a new formula for analysis, which could be labeled as netpolitik or cyberpolitik. The netpolitik / cyberpolitik could be built taking into account the new features of power / balance of power within the cyberspace and envisages the use of coherent approaches such as the "Cyber Triad" in dealing with the diversity of obstacles and actors across the management of cyber threats. In the meantime, the development of the netpolitik / cyberpolitik is emphasizing a specific, but significant feature: an efficient cyber defense is dependent both on a thorough cooperation between states at regional / global level, as well as between governments and private sector.

Keywords: international relations 2.0; cyber attack; cyber threat; cyber warfare; e-war; netpolitik; cyberpolitik; Cyber Triad; cyberspace.

In mid-December 2009, Google Inc. and other 33 companies, including financial institutions and defense contractors, were victims of a cyber attack aimed at stealing the source codes of their projects.

The topic became more relevant to the public the moment that iDefense[1] has published a report with technical details about the cyber attack and Google Inc. disclosed the incident to the public, namely in mid-January 2010. Beyond the technical details, researchers from both organizations have pointed out that the source IPs[2] originated from China.

The complexity and the degree of coordination of the attack worried both political leadership and various units of the US military establishment. While - on the political level - the avalanche of China's official denials and exchange of mutual accusations climaxed with Secretary Hillary Clinton's remarks on Internet freedom, widely broadcasted worldwide[3], Pentagon leaders simulated the response to a scenario of a complex cyber attack which would be aimed at paralyzing US energetic, financial and communications networks. Conclusions: the enemy is invisible, anonymous and unpredictable, while military commanders do not even have the legal authority to respond, given that the attack objective is unclear - vandalism, theft of trade secrets, an attack sponsored by other states meant to paralyze the US or perhaps an early stage of a conventional conflict.

Moreover, since the source of the attack is difficult to "define" in legal terms, there is

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no way to discourage its perpetrator. National Security Agency (NSA) representatives have even discussed the issue of launching a preemptive US cyber attack, if there is some evidence of an imminent cyber attack against the United States.

From weapons of mass destruction to weapons of mass disruption: cyberspace as a dimension of the "battlefield"

Large-scale cyber attacks are not a new security threat. Everything I described earlier originates in the period subsequent to the end of the Cold War, being labeled in multiple ways as e-war, cyber war, electronic war or war over the Internet.

The cyber attack on Estonia back in 2007 was not the first major "e-conflict". In 1999, in the context of the former Yugoslavia conflict, another silent "war" occurred, whose participants were, on one hand, Serbian, Russian or even Chinese hackers communities (after bombing the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) and, on the other hand, the U.S. or NATO specialists. War manifestation: infiltration, blocking or attacking with malicious software the enemies' information systems, modifying the design and the content of official sites or blocking news websites.

This first e-war's singularity is that the involved "sides" diversity makes its "encoding" extremely difficult. Thus, in the 1999 e-war two networks competed – one of several ad-hoc communities (Serbian and Russian hackers) without legal "personality" and another which could be legally defined (NATO/ U.S.A.), but powerless over an army of lonely e-warriors, hardly detectable and also difficult to put on trial.

In Estonia's case (2007), the two belligerents were basically clear-cut – communities of Russian hackers against the Estonian government, subsequent to an incident related to the relocation of a controversial Soviet World War II war memorial. Estonia's e-war in 2007 is, however, important in terms of this sort of conflict encoding speed-up and also of the technical and doctrinaire support development for training future e-forces.

In terms of definitions, the "cyber-attack" expression is already accepted in various international security organizations language, starting with the UN. Moreover, U.S.A. and Russia have initiated discussions under an UN arms control committee, to enhance Internet security and limit the use of cyberspace for military purposes. With respect to technical support, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has developed since 2008 a national cyber polygon (cyber-range) in order to improve U.S. forces' ability to conduct offensive or defensive cyber operations.

The third major e-warfare was conducted in parallel with the conventional conflict between the Russian Federation and Georgia in August 2008. It was somehow a replica of e-war in 1999, provided that the means exploited by Russian "cyber-warriors" were more complex (i.e. the automation of *Denial-of-Service*[4] attacks has blocked Georgian government official/ news sites for significant periods of time).

The last relevant confrontation emphasizing power changes in cyberspace is the series of conflicts between China and U.S.A., one significant episode being just the one briefed in the preamble of this article[5].

One might say, by analogy, that this confrontation is the counterpart of a "cold war" in cyberspace: it uncoils on a longer period of time, at a "sinusoidal" pace and each combatant is trying to avoid disclosure and open confrontation, while accumulating information about the opponent, especially in regard to military projects. High-tech "products" and consistent conceptual developments used in the confrontation reveal that, regardless of the progress in specific research, the vulnerabilities seem to multiply at breakneck speed. Thus, the U.S.A. – leader in this field – is a constant victim of cyber attacks, in both governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Although I mentioned as well various "communities" as parts of described e-war, we could perceive the above-mentioned conflicts as taking place - theoretically - between two states: the actions of each "community" (the Russian and the Chinese in Yugoslavia or only the Russian one in Estonia and Georgia) represented a "continuation of politics *[of states belonging to these communities]* by other means". In addition, the described e-wars have been either dimensions of a conventional conflict (Yugoslavia, Georgia) or self-standing conflicts between relatively "identifiable" or "easy to establish" parties (Estonia, China-USA).

From sub-national to supra-national: the term "power" in the "equation" IR 2.0

Considering the increasing of the e-war type events (four major conflicts of the past decade and the significant raise in the number of isolated cyber-attacks), experts have pointed out that these developments led on a new formula for analysis in approaching international relations – *netpolitik*[6] or *cyberpolitik*.[7]

The central element of that formula is the very modification of the concept of power and the implications of this transfiguration on the specific actors and tools of international relations. At the same time, if we rally to the general trend in "cybernetizating" the language, we would say that in cyberspace there is a new „version" of international relations - IR 2.0 - wherein, for instance, *realpolitik*'s role could be taken by the *cyberpolitik*'s, and **the classical concepts of power and balance of power could gain new values**.

Firstly, the global information network connection provides **access for any individual, community or organization to knowledge and technology and thus to power**. This enable an individual, an ad-hoc community or an obscure organization to play a much more substantial role than a state or an international organization in setting up the structure of power, both in cyberspace and in the conventional one.

Secondly, the accession to power of some actors whose behavior is difficult to encode and foretoken presume some sort of **"Brownian" distribution of power**, to the detriment of the relatively stable hierarchy we were used to. The unipolar international system still existing in the conventional space cannot be found in cyberspace. Even the centers of power are changing too quickly to be able to predict or even define the system status at a specific moment in time - a man driven by anti-system ideals or a transnational community of hackers with a certain ideology can influence a significant actor's behavior on the international scene, without previously showing its intentions.

A third substantive alteration to the concept of power aims **the manner of exerting it**. For that purpose, the classical offense-defense dichotomy of the conventional conflict cannot be stated clearly enough in cyberspace. However,

in the conventional space as well, due to the "proliferation" of non-state actors and rapid changes in the international architecture of power, the concept of defense has been "impregnated" with a preemptive nature.

The difference would be that - while in conventional space, an imminent hostile action can be predicted (there are data such as merging forces, the presence of radiation in case of nuclear materials etc.) - in cyberspace, given the very short time the attack takes effect (seconds), we can speak more of consequences management. Thus, in cyberspace, the preemptive nature would be seen rather as preventive, i.e. destroying a potential threat before becoming manifest. A preemptive e-war becomes, in this way, "illegal", UN Charter covering only the right of states to defend themselves if the aggression is clearly outlined and the threat becomes real and imminent.

As previously mentioned, by re-defining the access to power, respectively its distribution and exercise, forecasting the power system status in cyberspace at a moment in time is quite difficult. However, as a benchmark, we can use a **three-structured array** (also currently applied in conventional space) - **supra-national, national and sub-national** - respectively three dimensions - **doctrinaire, technical and human**. While supra-national actors (intergovernmental security organizations) and the sub-national ones (individuals, communities or organizations) have gone forward significantly solely in particular dimensions, countries like USA, China, Russia, France and Israel[8] dominate both the doctrinaire "space" and also the technical and human one.

Whereas the applicability of such array leads to the existence of a certain principle ordering the power architecture in cyberspace, its stability at some point being quickly altered by any of the involved actors, even if they do not dominate all specified dimensions.

Moreover, the setup of sub-national/ non-state actors, connected with increasing complexity of specific means/ tools may lead to apparently non-manageable cyber attack scenarios. A potential worst case scenario might involve a terrorist organization or a virtual "alliance" of entities of the kind[9], which would be able to use "high-end" tools like Conficker or Stuxnet. **Conficker**, a silent software - continuously developing - may "flood" the computers/ the network without a direct

physical connection (via storage media) to steal data or to facilitate their remote control. **Stuxnet -** a „guided cyber-missile"[10] - is currently affecting the functionality of industrial supervisory control and data acquisition software (SCADA, also used in nuclear plants construction).

Ultimately, a "Brownian" distribution of power in cyberspace brings into focus the **nuclear factor**. An extremely pessimist scenario involves addressing the possibility to penetrate Nuclear Command and Control and Communications systems (NC3) of the states with capabilities in the field. In the context of dramatic information technology progress and the need to ensure an integrated command over nuclear weapons systems (NC3), there are several ways to "influence" a scenario with "variables" of this kind - direct control over the use of a missiles with nuclear warheads, instigating a nation to use rockets with nuclear warheads or getting information for theft of nuclear devices from a state's arsenal[11] or for building a "dirty" bomb (combination of conventional explosives and radioactive materials).[12]

Balance of power in cyberspace: potential "descriptors" of information asymmetry

Although the concept of power acquires new meanings, one could use the phrase "balance of power" - in the classical acceptance of the international relations theory - and in cyberspace. In most senses[13], simplified, balance of power aimed at achieving a "parity" of forces/ capabilities in order to avoid the emergence of one side's hegemony and it is done either by "subscription" to an arms race or by rallying to an alliance/ alliance system. However, in addressing the balance of power interjects a different notion of the classical international relations theory - deterrence, whose significance is still intensely debated even in conventional space.

In context, as "descriptors" in approaching the balance of power associated to cyberspace (including deterrence), I will bring to your attention **three results** from a multinational study promoted in April 2010[14]: the **major impediments** in addressing cyber threats, the **diversity of actors** (in terms of their "goals" in cyberspace) and **a "model" for managing the threats** of this kind similar to nuclear field ("cyber Triad").

As major impediments, the above-mentioned study brings into focus **the technical difficulties**, **the absence of social responsibility** (related to the lack of a suitable sight on security facets of this type of threats) and **the unsuitable international cooperation**[15]. However, although the study is focused on the information technology progress and the international cooperation related issues - elements in relation to which significant progress is made, notwithstanding the states' sometimes divergent stakes in cyberspace – a significant factor is the **social "responsabilization" or even the corporative one in regard to potential facets of a cyber attack**. Personal computers or local networks protection, respectively the communication about a new threat to specialized software producers or intervention centers are actions which may prevent the formation of some botnets[16], needed – for instance – to magnify the DoS attacks effects or may limit uncontrolled spread of a computer virus.

Actors typology suggested by the study in question can be addressed by their impact on the "state" of equilibrium in cyberspace. Thus, we can identify the following such actors: **neutral** (users, operators, administrators), **with little influence** (hackers or NGOs, to promote a political agenda), **medium influence** (state-financed "network combatants" - in *Law Enforcement* network - or private companies) or **high influence** (terrorists/ cyber criminals, governments that use cyberspace for military-political purposes)[17]. Significant difference in terms of capabilities "parity" of actors from cyberspace beside the conventional one consist in - as I mentioned earlier - any actor's possibility to "access" a position of strength despite the asymmetry in terms of capabilities and funding (although a state has the technology and resources, its systems can be "annihilated" in cyberspace with simple, accessible and low cost cyber "tools").

In relation to the major impediments, the typology of actors, as well as the four necessary elements to achieve deterrence in cyberspace (attribution, location, response and transparency[18]), a possible approach to cyber threats can be built-up around the phrase "**cyber Triad**", possible sighted on three dimensions: **resilience**, **attribution** and **offensive capabilities**. The three dimensions envision, in fact, three types of capabilities. First dimension relates to the capabilities of the current

IT infrastructure (including home computers) which ensure, by a proper security approach (*software* and *hardware*), the resilience of infrastructure as a whole. The second dimension is focused on "tracking down" the geographical source of the attack and identifying the attacker and the third, offensive capabilities (especially *software*), aims to transpose "preemption" from conventional space to cyberspace[19]. However, unlike "nuclear Triad", the efficiency of "cyber Triad" depends to a high degree on the scope of institutional cooperation with the general public and the private sector, given that the last two entities manage a significant percentage of the a nation's information infrastructure (85 percent in the U.S. case, for example[20]). In this way we are getting back to the relevance of social or corporate responsibility in addressing cyber threats.

Concluding remarks or some potential reference points in approaching cybersecurity

In short, the IR 2.0 world, beyond adding a new dimension to the "battlefield", it brings substantial alterations to power characteristics and its manner of manifestation. Therefore, an essential concern, especially regarding e-war, would be: will the state entities continue also to be the main actors for the IR 2.0 environment?

As previously mentioned, the states are the only actors capable of dominating all the dimensions in the cyberspace (doctrinaire, technical and human). Which would be then the difference for the IR 2.0 environment, from states' perspective? If in the case of the conventional environment we can speak of a monopoly over the use of power, and implicitly over the resources to wage war, this monopoly is no longer present in the IR 2.0 environment. The possibility of each actor - an individual, a group / organization or a state - to take over to power is not restricted by any means. We could thus see - while the conventional space is dominated by a hierarchical power structure - the IR 2.0 environment structured more as a network, where the power is equally distributed between its nodes.

However, the sequential approaches of the non-state actors (in the context of developing only certain dimensions in cyberspace, for the purpose of pursuing specific actions) are granting states for a "privileged" position within the new power structure. In these circumstances are the current conceptual (strategies and policies) or operational (structures and capabilities) developments comprehensive enough for a coherent approach - by the states - of the new battlefield dimension or, even more, for a coherent approach of the new values of power?

Assessing the approaches of some significant actors in the IR 2.0, we could consider both the cyberspace related conceptual and operational developments as being on ascendant trends. An essential feature of these developments consists of **designing "dedicated" strategies**, apart from the national security programmatic documents. For example, in the US case, the effects of George Bush presidential directive from January 2008 launching of the *Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative* have been assessed in the framework of Obama Administration *Cyberspace Policy Review*, emphasizing the significance of the cyber domain within the national security sphere[21].

The need to concentrate all the nationally responsible institutions efforts in the cyber domain was felt also in Romania's case, which has launched a debate on the Strategy for cybersecurity (published on the site of the Ministry for Communications and Information Technology).

At the operational level, both approaches have as central ideas **to connect the national networks and systems** under the aegis of either a *National Cybersecurity Center* (located within the Department of Homeland Security, in the case of US), or a *National System for Cybersecurity* (in Romania's case), as well as **to create Computer Emergency Response Teams** (CERT).

Unifying the national efforts is necessary, but not sufficient in cyber threats domain. Somehow, the evolution of the cyber threats can be compared with that of terrorism: freedom of action of non-state actors (much more restricted for the states), associated with the magnitude of the effects they can produce - including in conventional space - entails **cooperative answers to global/ regional** in maintaining the balance of power. In the meantime, unlike terrorism, cyber threats management requires the increase in governmental and corporate specialists communication (both nationally and internationally), with the purpose of transferring knowledge and good practices in the cyber domain or of early warning in case of the emergence of a new threat of this type.

The regional cooperative solutions bring an added value to the national initiatives for cyber defence, especially by distributing the pressures generated by the technical limitations: a national system or 1-2 national CERTs cannot be compared - in managing a cyber attack - with the actions of 27-28 such structures. Meanwhile, a multi-dimensional approach, such as the one NATO has, covers a wide range of demarches, from facilitating exchanges of information on cyber attacks, building a dedicated multi-national agency (*Cyber Defence Management Authority* in NATO's case) to the coordination / integration - at the Alliance's level - of national early warning / response capabilities in this field (according to the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010)[22]. Moreover, in order to facilitate an integrated answer - taking into account the diversity of regional organizations members - the running of multi-national exercises in the cyber domain became an usual practice[23] (including or with the intent to include the corporate specialists).

As for the global level, a solution such as the **development of an international Internet "governance" system** (implicitly of some connections security protocols) under the aegis of International Telecommunication Union[24], in conjunction with signing **an international agreement** similar to those of conventional/ nuclear arms control but **focused on "cyber weapons"** within UN could provide an adequate description of the system "status" at a moment in time or the identification of its potential future trends.

On the other hand, the initiatives to control the use of networks / personal computers / connecting protocols could be seen as inflicting on the human rights, while there is a trend to consider Internet access as a fundamental human right[25]. Against the same background of the comparing the cyber domain with the approach on terrorism, we could consider the analysis of Patriot Act implications in the US as an important resource for "lessons learned", in case of initiating a similar legislative package for countering cyber threats.

The IR 2.0 environement becomes gains much more complexity if we are taking into account that the e-war is not the only dynamic in its materialization patterns. For the time being, e-diplomacy is almost equally visible and launching platforms such as e-government, e-republic etc. is the seed of new formula previously mentioned – *netpolitik / cyberpolitik*, which would have the same relevance for cyberspace as *realpolitik*'s for the conventional one.

Even though the new formula for analysis will take over a large amount of the concepts validated by the "traditional" theory of international relations, their features and manner of manifestation will require an approach with completely different reference points, within the framework of the perpetual multi-polar anarchy describing the IR 2.0 environment.

NOTES:

1 iDefence is a comprehensive Internet portal that helps protect account holders from the threat of identity theft. Founded in May 1998, it provided an exhaustive analysis about cyber threats to several governments or private companies. In July 2005, iDefence was purchased by VeriSign Inc, the trusted provider of Internet infrastructure services for the networked world. (http://verisigninc.com, accessed on May 20, 2011).

2 An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is a numerical label assigned to each device (e.g., computer, printer) participating in a computer network that uses the Internet Protocol for communication. An IP address serves two principal functions: host or network interface identification and location addressing.

3 Remarks on Internet Freedom, by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Washington DC, January 21, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm, accessed on May 20, 2011.

4 In a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from accessing information or services. The most common and obvious type of DoS attack occurs when an attacker „floods" a network with information. (http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html, accessed on May 18, 2011).

5 Other significant episodes: Titan Rain (2004), on the discovery of a cyber espionage network in Guangdong, China, which stole information from military laboratories, from NASA or other U.S. governmental or non-governmental organizations; GhostNet (2009), on the discovery of another China-based network, which has penetrated over 1,200 systems in other 102 states, besides the U.S.A..

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7 ROTHKOPF, David J., Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of Power in the Information Age, Journal of International Affairs, Volume 51, Nr. 2, Spring 1998.

8 McAfee Virtual Criminology Report 2009, http://resources.mcafee.com/content/ NACriminologyReport2009NF, accessed on May 18, 2011.

9 In 2001 Al Qaeda Alliance Online was formed, being responsible for creating more viruses spread through emails. Although today it is no longer active, this „alliance" in cyberspace has been a worrying step and - amid the „sophistication" of attacks and providing ready-made solutions/ software - the idea could be put back in place by terrorist organizations. Besides the fact that such approach creates the premise for the „unification" of terrorist groups forces geographically dissipated - from those involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to those originated in Pakistan - it is also effective in regard to associated costs. (See also Gary R. Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age. E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments, Pluto Press, London, 2003)

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11 It is worth to mention the incident in 2007 when the U.S. Air Force unwillingly moved six missiles with nuclear warheads (it was believed that the warheads were separated before shipping) and they stuck in Barksdale Air Base (Louisiana) mounted on a B-52 bomber and left unguarded for 36 hours.

12 FRITZ, Jason, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, http://www.icnnd.org/research/ Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf, accessed on December 16, 2010.

13 I used as literature Britannica Online, Oxford Dictionary of Politics and Columbia Encyclopedia, with references to theoreticians who played an important role in the advancement/ approaching the phrase "balance of power" (Mearsheimer, Morgenthau).

14 NAGORSKI, Andrew (ed.), Global Cyber Deterrence. Views from China, the U.S., Russia, India, and Norway, The EastWest Institute, 2010, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/CyberDeterrenceWeb.pdf, accesed on December 16, 2010.

15 TANG, Lan, ZHANG, Xin, The View from China. Can Cyber Deterrence Work? in Andrew Nagorski (ed.), op.cit., p. 1-3.

16 A botnet or robot network is a group of computers running a computer application controlled and manipulated only by the owner or the software source. Usually though, when people talk about botnets, they are talking about a group of computers infected with the malicious kind of robot software, the bots that, once successfully installed in a computer, transform the computer into a zombie or a drone, unable to resist the commands of the bot commander. (http://www.tech-faq.com/botnet.html, accessed on May 19, 2011)

17 GRIGORIEV, Dmitry, The View from Russia. Russian Priorities and Steps Towards Cybersecurity in Andrew Nagorski (ed.), op.cit., p. 5-8.

18 McCONNELL, Mike, Mike McConnell on how to win the cyber-war we're losing, Washington Post, February 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.html, accesed on December 16, 2010.

19 RADUEGE, Harry, The View from the United States. Fighting Weapons of Mass Disruption: Why America Needs a „Cyber Triad" in Andrew Nagorski (ed.), op.cit., p. 3-5.

20 RADUEGE, Harry, op.cit., p. 4.

21 It is worth mentioning that similar reviews were performed for defense (Quadrennial Defense Review), foreign policy (Quadrennial Defense and Development Review), nuclear (Nuclear Policy Review), ballistic missile (Ballistic Missile Defense Review) or space policies (Space Policy Review).

22 www.nato.int.

23 We could mention here NATO's exercise „Cyber Coalition" (third edition in 2010), and in the case of EU the „Cyber Europe" exercise (first edition in 2010). For both exercises there is to be noted the intention to bring at the table all the actors with potential responsibilities in ensuring cybersecurity.

24 ITU is the leading United Nations agency for information and communication technology issues (http://www.itu.int/ net/about/index.aspx, accessed on May 19, 2011)

25 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf, accessed on July 15, 2011.

WORLD 2011. POLITICAL AND MILITARY ENCICLOPEDIA (STRATEGIC AND SECURITY STUDIES)

"World 2011. Political and military encyclopedia (Strategic and security studies)" was published in 2011, at the Publishinghouse of the Armed Forces' Technical and Editorial Centre, being coordinated by Teodor Frunzeti, PhD, and Vladimir Zodian, PhD. This volume is a coherent continuance of the similar paperworks published in 2005, 2007 and 2009 and is meant to analyze not only the recent evolutions of the international security environment, but also the contribution of main state and non-state actors to this process. Similarly to the previous volumes, this one also contains research studies on "hot" up-to-date themes, the approach being accessible not only to specialists, but also to the general public. "World 2011" was edited under the logo of the Romanian Scientists' Academy, the Military Section, and with the participation of the Society of Military Writers and of the Group of Conflicts' Analysis and Prognosis PSV.

The 820-page volume,is divided in three main parts preceded by an introductive chapter and followed by a selective bibliography. Each part contains several political, military and security studies, elaborated by specialists in these domains. The studies are signed by renowned names in the areas mentioned above: Teodor Frunzeti, PhD, Vladimir Zodian, PhD, M.V. Zodian, Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD, Cristian **Băhnăreanu, PhD,** Adrian Pandea, Maria Postevka, Răzvan Beschea, Ioana Ionescu, George Necula-Spiru, Şerban Pavelescu, Silviu Dumitrache.

The introductive chapter highlights the main characteristics of the international security environment between 2009 and 2011, laying an emphasis on the most prominent phenomena and events. According to the authors, the defining feature of the mentioned period of time is undoubtedly the world economic and financial crisis which determined the emergence of a debate on the future of world economy. Moreover, this crisis also messages possible mutations of the international security environment because, despite the fact that the crisis has affected all the economies of the world, it also accelerated and increased the importance of the "change of the economic interest from West to East", to India and, especially, China, a state which seems to be the first one to overtake the United States of America, from an economic point of view.

As presently one could speak about a changing international security environment and world order, in our opinion, this volume has a comprehensive approach of this subject, being a useful tool to understand the mutations taking place at the international level. This because the first part includes studies on International Relations, but also analyses on the present economic situation and on Romania's foreign policy in the period marked by this phenomenon. The second part is dedicated to regional analyses and case studies of state and non-state actors (Turkey, states from Asia, Latin America, Africa), as well as of some regions which have a high potential to become or even represent risk areas (Wider Black Sea Area, Iraq, Iran). Additionally, there are also taken into consideration issues related to South-Eastern Europe as well as to the popular riots in Northern Africa and Middles East, which marked the beginning of this year. The third part of the book refers to the present military issues.

The first part of the volume, the one reporting to security studies, contains the following chapters: *National power and military power, International regions, World Economic Status (2009-2010), Sustainable development – a viable desideratum in a world in crisis?, Romania's Foreign Policy (2010-2011).* The first two studies approach theoretical aspects related to International Relations, emphasizing the novelties in this area. The conceptual aspects of the "power" idea and of "crisis" and "conflict", the theorizations on their evolution in the contemporary period represent the starting point of an authorized analysis of

the international security environment. The presentation and the study of the most recent theories of International Relations are equally useful, as most of them refer to events which we experience nowadays. The third study of this part also has a considerable importance as it represents an analysis, done by a specialist in the area, of the world economic crisis, on the international financial system, as well as on the financial situation of the main actors of the international arena. This demarche is succeeded by another research, focused on the viability of "sustainable development" desideratum, approached from a sociological point of view. The last study of this part comprises a presentation of the most notable events related to Romania's foreign policy between 2010 and 2011, a presentation which could turn out to be very useful for understanding our country's reaction to crisis and the extent to which the crisis influenced foreign policy objectives' achievement.

The second part of the volume we submit to your attention is dedicated, as we have mentioned before, to regional analysis, the accent being laid on the contribution of various actors of the international arena to the evolution of the international security environment. In this particular case, one could identify two dimensions – on the one hand, it continues the demarches made in the previous volumes of this collection, by developing a strategic analysis of the concerned period of time (2009-2011), and, on the other hand, it also brings up some novelty issues. We refer to the chapter focused on the popular riots which marked the beginning of this year in Northern Africa and Middle East. It is also the broadest part of the book, including most of the studies. By its novelty character, as well as by its applicative nature, by the objective analyses of the evolutions in some regions, this book could represent an extremely useful document for the ones preoccupied by the study of International

Relations, for decision-makers and for the ones in charge with elaborating security, defence and foreign policy strategies. The authorized conclusions of the authors contributing to this part of the volume could also be useful to the ones whose education involves thorough knowledge of the international security environment, on power centers and on the mechanisms by which they interact.

The last part of "World 2011" has a military nature, being dedicated to the topical subjects in this domain. This part of the volume, which is realized by militaries and scholars which carry on their activity in military institutions, presents the most recent evolutions in this domain on the conceptual and political levels. There are examined the following issues: a) the Revolution in Military Affairs; b) military doctrines, strategies and policies at the beginning of the 3rd millennium; c) military science at the beginning of this millennium; d) military conflicts and the Revolution in Military Affairs after the Cold War.

In conclusion, the work *"World 2011. Political and military encyclopedia (Strategic and security studies)"* represents a valuable volume, an extremely useful document to everyone interested in International Relations, security and defence studies, given their professional or educational activity. The book – ample, coherent and accessible to various categories of readers – constitutes a continuation of the efforts which begun in 2005 and presents updated information on extremely important subjects also approached by mass-media, in academic or political environments, on phenomena with a notable impact on security, considered in all its levels. At the same time, even more could this work be considered a reference book of the studies in this area as the authors succeed in imprinting it both a theoretical and applied character which, finally, could be translated in numerous advantages at social level.

C.B.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JULY – SEPTEMBER 2011

The most recent studies published within the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) are "The institutional reform of the EU from the perspective of the Common Security and Defence Policy" and "The arms race in the arc of insecurity from EU's Eastern vicinity. Consequences for Romania". Additionally, CDSSS scientific researchers wrote, upon request from the General Staff, a country study entitled "The status and role of BRICS", in which they emphasized the importance of the emergent powers – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – within the dynamics of the international security environment.

Between 22ⁿᵈ and 25ᵗʰ September 2011, "Carol I" National Defence University participated in the 7ᵗʰ edition of the **International Exhibition for Military Equipment – EXPOMIL 2011,** *where the educational offer and the recent results of CDSSS' scientific research activities were exposed.*

The most important future scientific activity of the Center is the **Annual International Scientific Session**, *which will take place between* **17ᵗʰ and 18ᵗʰ November 2011** *and whose theme is* **"The balance of power and the security environment"**. *There were invited specialists in security, national defence and International Relations from Romania and abroad. Within this session, the following issues are to be approached: Trends in security environment's protection; The evolution of International Relations and balance of power; Current challenges for the security environment; Regional/international centers of power and their influence on the security environment; The status and role of international organizations in maintaining security. The paperworks will be published in a volume with ISBN code.*

Those interested in participating in this event are invited to register with scientific paperworks on the subjects mentioned above. More information on the session can be found on our website, http://cssas.unap.ro.

Irina TĂTARU

EXPOMIL 2011

Between 22nd and 25th September 2011, Romexpo Exhibition Center hosted the 7th edition of the **International Exhibition for Military Equipment – EXPOMIL 2011**.

Since 1999, this exhibition enrolls in the international circuit of military services and national defense events and it is organized in Romania every two years.

The organizations and institutions involved in the development of EXPOMIL 2011 are: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business Environment, Ministry of National Defense, Romanian Business Association of Military Technique Manufacturers – PATROMIL and the Association of Romanian Aeronautical Companies – OPIAR.

The exhibitors who participate at this event have the opportunity to present their technology and build-up new business connections in the domain.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FOREIGN AUTHORS

On **selecting articles**, the following aspects are taken into consideration: the theme of the article must be in line with the subjects dealt by the magazine (up-to-date topics related to security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, political and military aspects), originality of the paper, scientific content and adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the magazine, as well as its novelty character (it should not have been priorly published), a relevant bibliography.

Foreign authors shall send their article in English, for the **scientific evaluation process**, which is developed according to the principle **double blind peer review**.

Consequently to the evaluation, the article:

a) is accepted for publication as such;

b) may be published if the author makes completions/modifications;

c) is rejected.

The **article's length** may vary between 5-15 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures – if any), it shall be written with Times New Roman font, size 11, one line spacing. Translation into Romanian for the Romanian edition of the magazine will be provided by the editor.

The text has to present a logic **structure**. It is recommended to organize it in chapters and to have an introduction and conclusions. The title shall be written in capital bold letters,

The text has to be preceded by: **a short presentation of the author** (given name and last name, e-mail address, institutional affiliation, military rank, academic title, PhD candidate status etc) and an **abstract** which is not to exceed 150 words, and 5-8 **key-words**.

Quoting shall be done according to academic regulations, in the form of endnotes, as follows: last name of the author(s), in capital letters, name, title of the work, place and publishing house, year of publication, quoted page(s). Internet links shall be given in full. For the tables and figures, which are to be sent in JPEG format, the source shall be mentioned at the bottom of the image. Bibliographic sources shall be alphabetically arranged.

The document shall be **saved** as Word Document (*.doc).

Articles shall be sent electronically to our e-mail cssas@unap.ro, in accordance with the following time framework: for no. 1 – 01 December – 15 January; for no. 2 – 01 March - 15 April; for no. 3 - 01 June 15 July; for no. 4 - 01 September - 15 October.

The article should not contain any party political connotations. Authors assume full responsibility for the content of their articles. Authors can publish only one article by issue. The articles will not use classified information.

Our address is: National Defence University "Carol I", the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93, e-mail: cssas@unap.ro, web address: http://cssas.unap.ro, http://impactstrategic.unap.ro

STRATEGIC IMPACT quarterly scientific magazine has been edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University for ten years in Romanian and seven years in English. The magazine is acknowledged locally and internationally for its wide area of topics - political-military topicality, security and military strategy, NATO and EU actions, informational society, peace and future's war. Our readers will find in it strategic analysis, synthesis and evaluations, points of view on the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT collaborates with renowned experts, both national and international, from the scientific research environment and from civilian and military academia. National collaborations involve the Ministry of National Defence, General Staff, services' staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state's organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine's quality is confirmed by its presence on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions such as Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S., The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies. Also, the magazine is included in international databases: CEEOL - Central and Eastern European Online Library (Germany), Index Copernicus International (Poland).

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine, proving the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued in two separate editions in Romanian and in English and disseminated in the national and international scientific environment and in institutions involved in security and defence.