

ROMANIA
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I"
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 2 [39]/2011

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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I" PRINTING HOUSE
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA



The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine is acknowledged by the National Council for Scientific Research in Higher Education as a B+ magazine

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ISSN 1842-9904 (online edition)



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GLOBALISATION OR REGIONALISATION?

*Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD**

Globalisation and regionalisation represent two of the key-concepts marking the analysis on the strategic and security environment as well as international relations evolution. Globalisation and regionalisation are current processes whose complexity gave birth to multiple controversies and dilemmas, being seen by specialists in the field as either contrary or compatible. This article approaches theories on the two concepts as well as the relation between them.

The analysis of the implications that the most recent world events have on the evolution of the globalisation and regionalisation processes represents the key point of this article.

Key-words: globalisation; regionalisation; paradigms; perspectives; economic and financial crisis; security; economy.

In the past decade, increasingly dynamic and complex events, phenomena and changes accelerated the process of redesigning the world. The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the Iraq war in 2003, the Russo-Georgian war in the summer of 2008, NATO and EU enlargement to the East, the EU reform by adopting the Lisbon treaty in December 2009 and that of NATO by adopting the New Strategic Concept in November 2010, the rise of China, global warming, nuclear threat, the emergence

of H1N1 pandemic during the war in Libya and popular revolts in North Africa and the Middle East from the beginning of 2011 and, last but not least, increased energy crisis – all these elements compete for a new order, a new rearrangement of the international system.

Schools, currents and opinions clearly outlined by some analysts, diplomats and politicians continue to be on one part or another of the characteristics prevalent in the strategic and security environment and in the international relations development:

- cooperation and competition;
- unipolarity and multipolarity;
- unilaterality and multilaterality;
- centralisation and decentralisation;
- integration and disintegration, division;
- unification and fragmentation;
- military and non-military;
- state and non-state;
- uniformisation and differentiation;
- protectionism and liberalisation;
- dependence, interdependence and independence.

All these tendencies, at first glance antagonistic, are in one form or another subsumed to major trends manifesting in the international environment: *globalisation* and *regionalisation*. The two processes give birth to a series of controversies and dilemmas. On the one hand,

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many argue that there are two contrary processes, regionalism being seen as a lever used against states that are not part of a group or another. On the other hand, they are considered compatible, economic and commercial regional blocs being a limited form of globalisation and a means of establishing a multilateral global system. The global economic and financial crisis, which started in the second half of 2008, brings attention to an older issue regarding the national benefits related to globalisation and regionalization. The state remains, in terms of economy, society and culture as the main actor of globalisation and of regionalisation, its position being more and more loaded with interdependent processes that enable it to achieve its goals only through cooperation with other countries.

Globalisation versus regionalisation

We will not insist on defining the two processes, because the meanings and interpretations are different and deal with one or more aspects of this very complex problem. Moreover, without a rigorous definition, globalisation tends to become a cliché, a grand idea to include absolutely everything that happens around us and can not be explained coherently, or the cause of all problems that the world economy and contemporary society is facing¹. Globalisation could mean the dominance of ideas, products, of powers etc., but it is neither equal nor universal. Inequalities still exist and moreover, they are widening. Globalisation unites and divides, brings near and separates, homogenises and diversifies, coalesces and crumbles, increases wealth, but also extends poverty. Consequently, the process of globalisation affects not only institutions, countries or regions, but rather the individual as the subject of all social relations.

One of the biggest difficulties in regional issues is the precise demarcation of the special borders of a region. Although many regions are indicated by clear geographical and cultural boundaries - geographical contiguity, interaction and subjective perception of belonging to a distinct community with a regional collective identity – there are always some arbitrary criteria in their definition. Thus, we can take into account other characteristics, such as a degree of social and cultural homogeneity, political

attitudes similar towards third parties, common political institutions, as an expression of political interdependence, a certain degree of economic interdependence; common behaviour criteria, such as identifying the rules on conflict management and resolution. Under these conditions, regionalisation refers mainly to increased connections and interdependencies that develop between countries within a specific region, such as North America, Europe, East Asia, etc. Regionalisation can be understood as an increase in societal integration in a given region, including undirected processes of social and economic interaction between units (such as nation-states)². As a dynamic process, it may be best explained as a continuous formation process of regions as geopolitical units, as an organised political cooperation within a group of states or as regional communities, such as pluralistic security communities³. Regionalisation is expressed in particular in economic and security fields, including motivations converging towards both forms of integration: political/security and economic.

In recent years, globalisation of world economy has increased the intensity and speed with which external shocks are propagated in the sense that events produced in various places around the world come to affect directly or indirectly, sometimes immediately, economic and social developments in different countries and regions. A major trend in current times is either the interpenetration, in some cases, or the state of conflict, in other cases, between globalisation and regionalization. In fact, there are three possible variants regarding the relations between the two processes, particularly in economy: regionalisation as a component of globalisation (converging tendencies); regionalisation as a challenge or as a response to globalisation (divergent trends), regionalisation and globalisation as parallel processes (overlapping tendencies)⁴.

Regionalisation as a component of globalization

The emergence of regionalism is more obvious at present, acting as a powerful force in the globalisation processes. If globalisation is considered a compression of temporal and spatial aspects of social relations, then regionalisation can be understood as a component of globalisation⁵. Regional integration, by supporting national economies to become more competitive on the



world market, will lead to the development of multilateral cooperation on a global scale, the adoption of liberal principles of cooperation and openness of local economies. Thus, regional integration can be interpreted as part of the international economic order (or global) at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Moreover, globalisation takes place in rather uneven dynamic patterns, rather than uniform, which reveals the processes that are less global in purpose in terms of geography. Therefore, globalisation can be expressed through regionalisation.

Regionalisation as a challenge or response to globalisation

May regionalisation lead to something different from globalisation? May regionalisation lead to a more pluralistic world order, populated by diverse and distinct patterns of socio-economic organisations⁶? Unlike the first version, the tendency towards regionalisation could be the result of a reaction and challenge to the globalisation rules, inexorable and without substance. This reaction may be motivated by any nationalistic tendencies / mercantilist or pluralist / humanistic, and in some cases, even both. First, by creating trading blocs and integration frameworks based on the principles of mercantilism, regionalisation opposes neoliberal vision of the “harmony of interests” in the global economy, favouring national and regional frameworks and interests. Instead, the tendency towards regions formation may be motivated by non-acceptance of a universal culture and ideology and by promoting at a regional level some alternative or pluralistic forms of social and political organisations, other than nation-states.

Regionalisation and globalisation as parallel processes

When we refer to the global economy, it encompasses both regionalisation tendencies - for instance, dividing international economy in the mega-regions of North America (or the two Americas), Europe and Eastern Asia - and globalisation tendencies. Within the international security environment it is more difficult to assess the existence and coexistence of security communities and complexes without a complete picture of global security. Therefore, regionalisation and globalisation could act as two processes that are parallel or overlap regarding economic and security issues⁷. The recent

economic and financial crisis has added new elements of uncertainty regarding the future of the two processes. However, we can appreciate that a number of factors and ways through which globalisation stimulates regionalisation or acts against it can or increase or decrease in intensity, such as:

Globalisation fosters regionalization

– further integration creates problems that require a collective management, which imposes the development of institutions that are more viable regionally than globally. Cultural and historical community, social systems and values homogeneity, the convergence of political and security interests and the unifying nature of domestic coalitions, facilitate to a great extent the identification of appropriate forms of management, both in drafting legislation, and especially in its implementation;

– the global nature of many problems is often exaggerated. Although there are truly global issues (nuclear weapons, pollution, climate change or biodiversity) and other issues of global significance, their effects are felt more directly in the regions. Therefore, it is more useful to operate regionally than globally, because the balance of interests and facilities at regional level exercise a more effective pressure on states to find a political response in question;

– regionalisation is the most viable model that involves reconciling the integrated market and technological pressures towards globalisation and integration on the one hand and the visible trend of fragmentation on the other hand;

– global integration can act as a powerful stimulus to economic regionalisation by increasing economic competition. Changes in technology, communications, the functioning of global markets and the development of global systems of production have had a profound impact on how governments have defined the two fundamental foreign policy objectives - economic development and political autonomy - and establishing a relationship between them.

Globalisation encroaches upon regionalisation

– globalisation is often associated with the “end of political geography”, which leads to diminishing the role of regionalisation by eliminating boundaries between countries and regional blocs;



– the increasing degree of economic interdependence, along with some global approaches (such as environmental degradation, refugees, disaster response) creates a strong demand for an approach that is not on a regional basis for aspects specific to international institutions designed to solve common problems and manage new sources of friction posed by interdependence;

– the expanding economic interdependence and the development of political economic and security cooperation within institutional structures such as G7, G20, World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), etc. created strong elements for the West rather than specific regional cohesion. Taken together, these organizations represent an important constraint on the development of coherent regional groupings.

Also, regionalisation can promote the process of globalisation not only by removing barriers to intra-regional economic activity but also by stimulating internal competition by increasing business efficiency, by reducing power of different national interest groups, by stimulating domestic legislative reforms needed in global economy. The harmonisation of regional economic policies to attract foreign investment and new technologies is a step of globalisation. On the one hand, it is much easier to undertake liberalization, in a first stage, of regional trade, given the smaller number of countries in the region compared to the 150 WTO member countries⁸. Common interests facilitate regional free trade agreements at regional level between countries. On the other hand, the nature of competition is pressing for the formation of “units” for both greater economic efficiency and political power necessary to ensure the application of rules and institutions governing the creation of the world economy. Therefore, liberal market policy and the proliferation of regional agreements lead to the overall objective of liberalising international trade.

Paradigms on the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation

Any adequate analysis of the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation requires above all an understanding of existing views on

these two issues. Therefore, these two concepts associate some of the most important scientific paradigm - functionalist, interpretive, radical humanism and radical structuralism⁹ - based on different assumptions about the nature of social science and society.

The functionalist paradigm assumes that society has a concrete existence and follows a precise sequence, thus providing a rational explanation for social reality. It emphasizes the importance of understanding order, equilibrium and social stability.

From this perspective, the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation can be analysed based on the idea of regional arrangement, based on theories such as the customs union, as the main element of the common market. The theoretical analysis included later the idea of economies of scale because there were created larger regional integrated markets. Recently, new theoretical insights derived from the theory of imperfect competition and growth theory, which bring into question the benefits of their obligations to participants as a result of economic integration in general and regional economic integration in particular.

For example, in all OECD Member States, as a form of regionalism, economic policies have favoured market mechanisms, mostly based on deregulation, privatisation, tax reform and downsizing the dimension of the public sector and improving its efficiency. Outside the OECD area, many countries have abandoned the idea of a centralised economy based on state ownership, have completed essential steps in the implementation of free trade and investment regimes and joined the global economy.

The functionalist perspective analysis believes that these developments have paved the way for greater global economic integration through trade and cross border investment flows to and from all countries¹⁰. The process involves new and enhanced regional integration agreements, which can be classified in two main categories: on the one hand, the two main blocs, the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and on the other hand smaller agreements, such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. U.S. and EU are considered to have the greatest influence on the evolution of global system of trade and investment



as they are the most important commercial entities in the world. However, their decisions are influenced by other national governments and commercial operators. A recent example is that of intensification of interventionist elements and tendencies for both international actors, given the consequences of sustained economic growth of East Asian countries, particularly China, as well as increasing participation in their consistent international trade. Corroborating this trend with the difficulty of overcoming the global financial and economic crisis, we can say that it is possible that both the U.S. and EU to stop expanding liberal trade regimes that have dominated the last half century, which would affect the balance between liberalism and interventionism worldwide¹¹.

The multilateral trade and investment system - international economic integration - is dependent, primarily, not on the extent of regional integration arrangements, but on the extent to which liberal influences or, conversely, interventionist policies affect international economic setting of the main commercial actors, in particular U.S. and EU. This balance is reflected in regional agreements, but it is not affected neither nationally nor globally. Thus, regionalisation can be compatible and can become an expression of liberalism when it is based on the general acceptance of liberal principles in international economic relations. Whether regional agreements comply with these principles or not, it depends on the internal actions of key commercial state and non-state actors¹².

Analysing the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation from another perspective, that of the *interpretive paradigm*, it is clear that the world economy is far from achieving a truly global level¹³. Currently, trade flows and financial investment are concentrated in the triad of North America - Europe - East Asia, a situation that is likely to continue for a long time now. The principle of interpretive paradigm is the basis of these assumptions according to which social reality is the result of subjective interpretations of human individuals.

From this perspective, trade blocks are vital economic institutions positioned between the global economy (WTO) and national economies. Currently, the triad of North America - Europe - East Asia dominates the world economy and is able to manage its development. A strengthened relationship between these three actors in

the global economy can sustain a minimum multilateralism as the most advantageous form of networking in support of economic stability. The three components of the triad are similar: North America is represented by NAFTA, which in turn is dominated by U.S.; EU, representing Europe as the most ambitious multilateral economic relations is the key component; the Eastern Asian bloc is represented by China and Japan, which are nation-states.

Unfortunately, especially nowadays, affected by the economic and financial crisis, EU is facing problems in managing the consensus on macroeconomic policy at supranational level. Comprising 27 national entities, it encounters the greatest difficulties in reconciling divergent interests. The main actors of the political foundations for building consensus on tax, regulatory and industry policies of the Union are still only a few nation-states belonging to the organisation. Also, the EU has not yet solved the problem of balance of power in Europe between organisation, nations and regions. The Union is unlikely to become a unified continental state such as a federal state. In all likelihood, the power and capacities of the EU will continue to be based on treaties among nation-states and on the decision-making process in which the latter play a leading role¹⁴. From this perspective, it appears that the evolution of the EU plays a crucial role in forming a multilateralist structure in the international economy as a whole.

Another perspective from which the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation can be analysed is the *paradigm of radical humanism*. It criticises the status quo and promotes the concept of the sociology of radical change. Society is defined as anti-human and the creation of reality as self-generating. Theorists of this paradigm assert that social change is possible only through a change in human consciousness.

According to the vision of radical humanism, regionalisation and globalisation are linked dialectically within the broader process of global structural change. The result is a new world order that depends on the relative strength of antagonistic social forces involved in the two dynamic processes and can not be extrapolated or predicted. In this context, the concept of globalism is seen as a programmatic globalisation. Joseph Nye argues that globalism refers to any



description and explanation of a world that is characterised by networks of connections that cross multi-continental distances, while globalisation refers to increasing or decreasing the degree of globalism¹⁵. Globalism may be defined in opposition to individualism, populism, nationalism, internationalism and regionalism.

From the perspective of the same paradigm, regionalisation is a different process. In response to globalisation, regionalisation varies by time and cultural areas in which it occurs. It homogenises regional space and reduces the sovereignty of nation-states, transforming their role, while globalisation homogenises the global space¹⁶.

Globalisation brings global awareness including also negative impressions and reactions vis-à-vis this process of creating a contrary process of globalisation. In this context, the so-called new regionalism allows control of the political and territorial point of view on the process of globalisation. New regionalism is much better explained by appealing to the world order, because any process of regionalisation has repercussions both for the region itself and on other regions of the world¹⁷. Bringing into question the concept of new regionalism, it is obvious that it must be explained primarily in relation to the old regionalism. According to radical humanism vision, there are five main differences between them:

- old regionalism was created in the bipolar world of the Cold War, while the new regionalism is created in a multipolar world. Even if the former superpowers still hold military superiority, they are becoming regional powers competing with other emerging regional powers. Radical humanism asserts that organising the world in superpowers led to a premature globalisation, and thus the decline of the superpowers has led to deglobalisation;

- old regionalism was created top-down by the superpowers, and the new regionalism is created bottom-up by states and other actors in the region;

- old regionalism was oriented inward and protectionist, new regionalism is open and compatible with a world economy in an interdependent world, even if there are preferential economic relations within the region;

- old regionalism had specific objectives regarding economy and security, but the new

regionalism is a more comprehensive and multidimensional process (trade and economics, environment, social policy, security, legitimacy, etc..)

- old regionalism was based only on formal relations of sovereign nation-states, while the new regionalism is partly based on non-state actors that play important roles at various levels of the global system located in a structural transformation process¹⁸.

Analysing the characteristics of old and new regionalisation, it is clear that they coexist in time. The world system structure enables at present regional actors to act globally, regionalisation causing a global structural change towards multipolarity. The current stage of the regionalisation process is a reflection of the decline of a hegemonic world. Within inter-regional relations, the behaviour of a region affects and is affected by the behaviour of other regions. In this context, radical humanist theorists state that the process of regionalisation is a step towards a new type of multilateralism and acts as a barrier to a potential war between civilisations¹⁹.

Finally, the *radical structuralist paradigm* argues that reality is objective and concrete. The notion of crisis is important in this paradigm. Social structures are characterised by conflicting and antagonistic relationships which at some point in time, reach a level that can not be controlled, triggering a crisis. The resulting political or economic crisis indicates the transformation of the whole system, i.e. replacing a set of structures with another one, fundamentally different.

Thus, under this paradigm, European economic integration is a consequence of capitalist concentration worldwide. Capitalism reconciles elements that seem to be completely different: on the one hand, the increase of production forces and of the degree of industry concentration, and on the other hand, the survival of the nation-state. It is obvious that the growth of productive forces has exceeded the boundaries of nation-states in Europe. International cartels and holding companies have extended their control over a significant part of the European economy. In many cases, various industries have had to extend beyond the state to survive. Depending on the political and military relations in the world, this expansionism takes either the violent, military form of the two World Wars, or the peaceful, trade form after the Second



World War²⁰. While European economic integration is a product of the concentration of capital, it acts as a force that produces, in turn, concentrated capital in Europe and worldwide. Regionalisation becomes thus a product of the natural tendency of capital accumulation, concentration, competition and expansion.

It is noted that each of these four paradigms provides a coherent logic, the two processes being conceptualised and studied in different ways, generating distinct visions on regionalisation and globalisation.

Perspectives of globalisation and regionalisation

The disastrous effects of the recent global financial crisis and economic recession that followed raised a pertinent question: *what process will prevail in the next period and what will be the balance of power between globalisation and regionalisation?* According to some opinions, this is the first systemic crisis with strong national-scale crisis of neoliberal globalisation²¹. We believe though that we will have to wait for the clarification of the situation in the global economy in order to clearly detect future developments.

However, the unique nature of economic and financial crisis in late 2008 leads us to rethink the issues related to globalisation. Features of globalisation today are different in many respects from those of the late nineteenth century, when the internationalisation of world economy started. The context has changed dramatically as a result of the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) - which had a share in global GDP of 38.64% in 2010 compared to 11.77% in 1992²² - and other economic growth “engines” in the South. In addition, the cleavages between North and South, between the EU and North America are growing more visible as a result of differences in development priorities. The South as a whole tries to participate in free trade, but it also faces protectionist practices of the developed world in the North in some sectors of the economy, especially agriculture. In addition, problems that triggered the recent crisis came from the North, which led to numerous questions on the Anglo-American economic system and generated a debate on alternative models of capitalism, from the Beijing Consensus²³ (economic not political

freedom) in a wide variety of European models. Also, the EU integration model, unchallenged for many years, is under careful review following the crisis and raises questions about the whole process of regional integration.

Also, currently a number of parallel processes of integration of socio-economic systems of the world are developing. Internet has become a global and international trading system and networks stretched to the farthest corners of the world. Financial markets and capital flows are more and more global. The best example is the decline of the phenomenon by which businessmen will invest more likely in their home countries, despite the fact that higher investment opportunities exist in other parts of the world. Relationships producer-intermediary-consumer and energy flows have expanded globally. However, we have witnessed the failure of the homogeneity regions of the world by capitalism, probably due to the “rush” of the big transnational corporations for profit and the lack of full complying with comprehensive historical, cultural, geographical or environmental differences among regions. Activities of national economies in some parts of the world are developing more and more obvious on a regional basis, as in the case of North America, Eastern Europe or Eastern Asia, while less developed countries in Africa or South America are increasingly dependent on other regions. This economic regionalisation is accompanied by a social and cultural one, and the proof lies in the trends of migration towards developed regions.

Within the political environment and within state functions large or small shocks occur on a regular basis, tending to separate more clearly the levels of organisation: national, supranational, sub-regional, regional, supra-regional, sub-global, global. This is a shock reaction in any system powerful enough, as the recent economic and financial crisis.

In the current perspective, it seems that there are two possible sources of these shocks at a global level²⁴. First, the internal stability of the socio-economic developing global system is in danger because some companies have been integrated in the global system: economic integration is far ahead of cultural integration. This leads to a certain degree of local socio-cultural instability, especially in the case of a perceived or real danger to the identity which forces local cultures to “defend”



themselves against the emergence of global culture. Widespread anti-globalisation movements and the revival of religious fanaticism are all signs of this problem and fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, one of the many symptoms, extremely dangerous. Secondly, finding a sustainable way to co-exist with the biological environment will be a key challenge, which could be perceived as an external shock. A global super-system is going to be developed, which includes the global society and global ecosystem (biosphere). This bio-social global system will consist of a set of feedback mechanisms, most of which are far from being operational.

Perhaps, in the coming years, globalisation will not be accepted as easily as in the pre-crisis period and will require some remodelling of capitalism and of this process. Strengthening regional cooperation and the growing importance of regional solutions to local problems will most likely be the key to sustainable development in the coming years. States will engage themselves in increasingly close relations with their neighbours, leading to increased regional interdependences. Providing and receiving assistance to / from other regional entities in special circumstances - natural disasters, economic problems, energy crisis etc. - should be carried out without any moral issue, but looking for long term solutions. Also, new forms of capitalism, corporate forces and nationalist, populist impulses should always be kept in balance to achieve a certain harmony between regions.

Moving from a world of nations to a world of regional interests requires complying with certain rules of inter-regional cooperation that respect regional differences in history and culture, but also geographic, natural and environmental resources, facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts and enable mutual assistance when problems arise that can not be solved by one region alone. In time, it will come to regional geographical and socio-political units viable and modern within a world system of regions formed on the basis of respect for the rights of other regions.

Conclusions

Regional economic integration is a key factor in the process of globalisation, creating the appropriate institutional and political liberalisation of international trade and economy. A global

economic system can not be developed at once, as some interim steps need to be taken. It takes an ever closer economic cooperation between a large number of countries, an open process of regionalisation, oriented towards exterior, towards achieving global free trade which would prepare state actors for a world without barriers and economic restrictions. Less developed countries will have to meet certain structural adjustments and economic reforms, while the more developed ones will have to face the rising social costs.

Whatever the pros and cons of a process or other are, we must not ignore the fact that both regionalisation and globalisation promote integration of societies and economies. Both processes have a number of advantages for the contemporary world in a number of crucial areas, such as:

- *economy*: allows companies to operate at a higher level than national, thereby increasing competition, access to new markets and brings new opportunities for economic growth. As a result, we are witnessing the gradual liberalisation of trade and opening of national economies;

- *technology*: regionalisation and globalisation have led to the development of technology and communications, so that a product, gadget or software program is more and more seldom available only in a particular country or region;

- *society*: cooperation in the political and economic fields leads to better relations between states and their citizens, reduces the possibility of conflicts and strengthens diplomacy and cooperation. Also, the prevalence of communication technologies (Internet) and free movement of people allow much closer relationships among individuals from all over the world;

- *democracy*: democracy has emerged as the dominant ideology after the Cold War and the regionalisation and globalisation have reinforced this position. Intergovernmental organisations like UN and EU promote human rights and fundamental freedoms while freedom of speech, ideas and religion is expanding more and more, even in countries where not long ago they were repressed;

- *security*: the integration process of societies and economies has led to increased interest from states in terms of security allies. Terrorist attacks and other threats of the current era will be answered unilaterally by the regional or international



community through organisations like NATO and the UN Security Council. Moreover, genocides, human rights abuses and civil wars will be less and less tolerated by an increasingly integrated world;

- *support*: in an increasingly integrated world, countries are more likely to come to the aid of a country affected by a disaster. Technology and modern communications spread real-time images of disaster throughout the world, encouraging people and governments to act;

- *ecology*: environmental issues such as global warming and climate changes affect all countries and their populations and, therefore, policy responses and counter-measures must be instituted both regionally, and especially internationally.

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SECURITY COMPLEX AND REGIONAL CONCEPTS. THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION. INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AS SOLUTIONS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

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The present article presents the relevance of the security studies with a regional touch for the actors without global ambitions or capabilities, the impact of the structure and design of the international system on regional policies and regional security. As a direct option, the article chooses and motivates the option to discuss about regional security complex, with a direct impact on the Black Sea Region, to underline afterwards the effort of identifying the elements of cohesion, convergence and identity in order to realise the construct and the consecration of the Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR) as a security concept, an effort developed in the framework of the US-Romania Strategic Partnership. Finally, the thesis of the whole article underlines the institutionalizing and consistency of the relations at a regional level, good governance and functional institutions as a main motivation for promoting the liberal cognitive-institutional approach related to regional security, with the particular exemple of the Wider Black Sea Region and the fight between

relevance, effectiveness and competitive over-institutionalisation in the area.

Key-words: security complex; security concepts; Wider Black Sea Region; national interest; liberal paradygm; cognitive-institutional approach.

The study of security has evolved, after the Second World War, mainly due to military and political necessities, but also under the influences of the ongoing debates and research in social sciences¹. This train of thought started from various interpretations of the nature of security and national interest, combining interdisciplinary insertions with unique perspectives. They led to the emergence of new ideas and concepts which expanded the field of Security Studies².

Older analytical models, from the fields of International Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, failed explaining the motives behind the actions of small states which are separated from the bipolar logic³ and who lack a global behaviour, in

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the way regionalism, and, especially, the regional logic of decision-making.

Even if the US had a global outreach, there were still areas where its influence and its interests had not articulated clear policies, where America and the Soviet Union played second fiddle to regional politics. Even where America plays a substantial role and has direct interests, the rationality of regional actors may not necessarily reflect the power balance or their relations to the US – for example, Romania signed a strategic partnership with America in 1997, allowed the use of its airspace in the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo, but never recognised the independence of Kosovo.

For the US or the USSR – now Russia – international politics remain a global affair, while other countries maintain a regional influence, constrained by their lack of capacities and foreign policy options⁴. Still, some states have proved their ability to project power and exert influence out-of-area – the case of Romania in the mediation of Chinese-American relations, the Vietnamese-American relations or in the Middle East; establishing the CSCE and the Helsinki Accords⁵. This, however, does not prove that smaller states can rightfully demand a global influence, but that they merely define their interests in a regional way. Their foreign policy claims are often limited to local undertakings and strategies⁶.

From this point of view, the post-1989 formula of the international system – globalized, yet overlapping, with several global actors acting at once, with globalized reach, interests and the capability to project power, and, at the same time, with local powers who can only influence their own region; with recognised but unsubstantiated states; with sub-state actors, tribal and family customs, all of these being part of the same arrangement – is shaped by diverse and heterogeneous rules of integration, depending on the power plays and the degree of internal development and institutionalization of administration and governance.

In the age of globalisation and interdependency, the behaviour of states can no longer be reduced (or limited) solely to matters of national interest. The increasingly diverse nature of actors playing on the world stage, especially in areas with a strong establishment and a high level of integration, in which multiple political dimensions coexist (the

post-modern European Union, for example), makes simplifying theoretical models a grave error, determining false judgements by ignoring the intricate inner complexities.

Theoretically and academically, national interest is not a constant in international relations, even if an actor's relations with third parties are constant over a given period of time. A state's national interest is determined by the result of internal debates, the international context and the foreign policy conducted by it⁷, even if, on a political level, one can imagine a definition of security calibrated exclusively on a national interest, defined by internal debates, combined with a perception of risks, threats and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, making a fetish out of the national interest excludes the possibility of mutual interactions and influences, a perspective which denies the very fabric of international relations⁸. Therefore, contextualising, examining the historical depths, and maintaining a regional perspective are paramount in the understanding of International Relations (IR).

Explaining the concept of regional security.

The complex of security

During the Cold War, the logic of the power balance being dominant, the **concept of regional security** was undermined, almost completely, by political and ideological constraints, and studied in connection to the global reasoning of the two superpowers and the way states adhered to them, thus ignoring its own logic and rationalities.

At some extent, in that arrangement, the pre-eminence of bipolarism was evident, with the global system playing a major role in this type of construction. Still, multiple singularities were determined by: a) policies and standpoints prior to the bipolar system, or b) as a result of exploiting the new rules of the game in order to gain the upper hand in regional conflicts and further extend one's area of influence.

The upsurge of integrative formulas after the Cold War, under the pull of globalisation, but also out of the necessity to undermine regional pre-existing conflicts by adhering to a regional security system, based on global and regional actors coming together to prevent those conflicts from spilling over, determined a new IR debate, in the form of **regional studies** and **rational choice**,



in connection to the newly set-up institutions.

This step forward bore the marks left by the former bipolar design, especially in the buffer states between the two blocs, marred by war and conflict, where the policies of the bipolar logic prevented reconciliation. And that reconciliation was impossible without holding up to one's past errors and decisions that affected nations and peoples, and without a certain type of symbolic redemption on the part of the aggressor, in order to mend fences and rebuild trust between former enemies.

There are three main approaches in the question of regional formulas⁹:

- The **subsystem** approach, determined by historical sociology¹⁰. Subsystems can be analytical instruments, archetypes, theoretical models.

- **Subordinated systems** approach, derived from general systems theory¹¹, which involves models based on the facts of the global order, not solely on theory and axioms¹².

- **The security complex** approach, of a much recent date, tries to accommodate the two theoretical tendencies.

A **regional subsystem**¹³ shall be loosely defined as a pattern of relations among basic units in world politics which exhibits a particular degree of regularity and intensity of relations as well as awareness of interdependence among the participating units¹⁴. Such a definition covers alliances, international organisations, regional integration, security communities¹⁵, social and revolutionary movements¹⁶, regional integration¹⁷ or societal interactions in the form of trade or flow of men which occur without institutional accompaniments¹⁸.

The regional subsystem is a label, a common denominator, relevant to uphold the idea of the existence of a single, global international system placed above the regional one¹⁹. Interactions can come on intergovernmental, societal, transnational or integrated levels. The security spheres of actors are intertwined, especially regionally²⁰.

The subordinated system emphasizes the relation between the international system – seen as dominant – and its regional subunits, as opposed to the traditional perspective of states and their interactions on a local level. Originally, the dominant system building the rationalities is the bipolar world order. This system replicated the ideological conflict, using it to explain all the actions of the various actors, all around the world. But, in

reality, the closer we came to the abrupt end of the Cold War, the more singularities began to emerge. This needed a whole new explanatory toolkit²¹.

The interest for subordinated systems was spread unevenly, depending on the geographical zone in question. The Middle East took centre stage, while Africa fell into the background. Lacking a theoretical explanation, interest – and therefore the very existence of the subordinated system – was determined not by the number of interactions occurring between various states belonging to one particular region, but by its level of cohesion and its interactions with the dominant system, the international system. This phenomenon turned subordinated systems from theory to reality, as rationalities stemming from analyses based on this approach started making headway to the upper levels of government.

Furthermore, the fundamental observation derived from this analysis was that subordinated systems are not necessarily identical. One reason for these variations (postulated in the mid 1950s²²) was that that the newly instated bipolar system has not yet had the time to force this reality and to imprint itself on a rational level multiplying the same type of pattern. This explanation was intended to contradict the traditional Marxist perspective, which pleaded for multiplying the ideological conflict and exporting revolutionary instincts – and therefore local reflexes – evenly throughout the world.

But perhaps the most interesting explanation is linked to a **state's geographical position**, in and around the spheres of influence, and by the interests of the major players in the system. As a region finds itself more within the interest and sphere of influence, the more the global pattern reproduces the rules of the global system, especially if there is a high level of integration. One can assume (and easily verify) that political interest and geographical proximity have a stimulating effect over a region's level of integration²³.

This approach underlines the fact that the foreign and security policies of a state are primarily influenced by the regional context. If you take into account only the rationalities and the pattern of the system as a whole, regional anomalies appear, and thus the model fails to explain the singularities and the trends, finally altering the analysis²⁴.

Moreover, the theory of subordinated systems does not take into account the different perception



of states in connection to the problems, concepts or strategies of regional security. The cognitive revolution in psychology is used as the main analytical instrument after the generalisation of worldwide phenomena such as the global live news channel CNN, imposing a new approach in order to justify this correlation and the way collective perceptions are constructed based on individual perceptions.

Barry Buzan postulates, in the 1980s, the concept of **security complex**, which focuses on groups of states with interconnected security preoccupations, in such a way that it impacts the analysis of national security problems²⁵. This is called the Regional Security Complex Theory, used primarily in the Anglo-Saxon world, where interdependencies were already evaluated, prior to this, by connecting security to five levels (political, military, social, economic, environment) and three objects of securitization (the individual, society, and the state)²⁶.

The concept, definition and model were widely embraced in the mid-1990s, after the adoption by NATO (The Rome Strategic Concept, 1991) of The Copenhagen European Security School's definition as the official definition of security. By then, the theoretical model employed took into account a regional perspective, placed in between the state level and the international one (a double rethinking of Waltz's model which considers only the individual, the state and international levels²⁷). Apart from these, the model was empirically enforced by the processes of decolonisation and globalisation²⁸.

From an epistemological point of view, the model exhibits several unresolved features, like the size and the area covered by a region and the criteria of interdependency. All these elements point to expanding the concept of identity to include, apart from a societal, national and transnational level, a regional one.²⁹

The Black Sea, from security complex to the theorization of regional identity

The fact that the Black Sea became a security complex after 1999 is obvious due to the complexities in the ever evolving relations of the post-bipolar era. As a result, an inclusive regional organisation was founded (BSEC-OCEMN) in 1992, proposed by Turkey and upheld by Russia, as an expression of the new post Cold War affairs, bridging the ideological gap between the powers

of the bipolar era in the form of the Russian-Turkish thawing – indeed, this organisation brought together, from day one, NATO and EU countries, by the inclusion of Greece.

The OSCE Summit from Istanbul enforced, in its final declaration, the revision of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to include the withdrawal of Russian troops still deployed in Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia. This was a turning point in establishing a set of comprehensive security accords, with the involvement of the global actor – America – but with a regional impact, especially set against the backdrop of frozen conflicts, legacies of the fall of the USSR.

This is where our discussion about the fundamentals of a security complex in the Black Sea begins, by referring to the documents that insist on the interdependent security of all the states belonging to a region, and where clear military agreements exist.

As a region, the Black Sea has always been disputed, due to its dual nature of bridge or border. The sheer size of the Black Sea, the fact that it is an inland sea, with only one crossable strait controlled by one state – Turkey, plus the significant increase in the capabilities to project power, weakened the original idea of placing one's border on the Black Sea.

In addition, the strategic relevance held by the region greatly increased. America and all other major players became interested in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, because of the tremendous impact of energy security, especially after the energy crises, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and the question of a nuclear Iran (2005-2009).

The star player of the region is the post-modernistic entity which is the European Union. As of the 1st of January 2007, with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, the strategic space of the Black Sea became a buffer zone where all the major players involved intersected.

The Black Sea has always been a meeting point. This time, after 2007, Russia, NATO, EU and Turkey were all present here. Furthermore, the Black Sea became the main transit hub between EU/NATO and the Caucasus/Central Asia, where all the newly independent oil-and-gas-rich ex-soviet states were. This route bypassed not only Russia, but also Turkey.



The Black Sea provides transit to and from the conflict zones of 2001 (Afghanistan), 2003 (Iraq), but also to potential future conflict zones (Iran). Turkey's presence was a major stabilising factor for the Wider Middle East, and its continual growth in form and strategic weight influenced even the Wider Black Sea Region. Turkey thus played a counterbalancing role in the Wider Middle East by pushing its own agenda following the former borders of the Ottoman Empire.

Of more relevance to our study is the temptation to transform a security complex into a **security concept** dedicated to the region in question. The first effort in this direction was the shaping of the Wider Middle East. Following this pattern, I co-authored, and even tried to extend this euro-Atlantic concept of security to the **Wider Black Sea Region**. These efforts stem from the Strategic Partnership between Romania and America, signed in 1997. The theoretical basis for this concept was disseminated in the melting pot of the joint thinking of the CSIS in Washington DC and the Romanian Academic Society. Initially, they tried to find a coherent approach to determine the region's identity, which at that time had neither name nor was it based on the concept of security.

The first breakthrough was done by Serghy Konoplyov – the head of the Black Sea Program of Harvard's Kennedy School of Governance – and by Ronald Asmus, the director of the German Marshall Fund in Brussels. Their combined work led to the concept of the Wider Black Sea Region, which included nine states from the region: three euro-Atlantic states (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey), three Caucasian (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) and three from the "New Eastern Europe" (Moldova, Ukraine, Russia). The format was based on earlier relations between these countries and NATO, in the form of Partnerships for Peace, individual Partnerships, Intensified Dialogue, Membership Accession Plan (MAP) or full membership of the Alliance.

This effort was strengthened by Bruce Jackson³⁰, who combined his project dedicated to fledgling democracies and USA Council for NATO with a neo-conservative vision of the Frontiers of freedom – a fully integrated Europe, from the Baltic Sea to the Caspian Sea. Alongside Stephen Larabee (of RAND) and the members of the National Strategic Studies Institute of the National Defence University (USA), he elaborated

the Black Sea strategic concept³¹. We pitched in with our own contributions which were promoted throughout the region³².

Institutional integration and administrative capacity as solutions of regional security

The shared identity of the Wider Black Sea Region was closely linked to the level of cohesion and the policies of all the member states. Up until the 2003 Putin Doctrine, and the reshaping of Russia's security system, Yeltsin followed the same moral value system shared by the Euro-Atlantic train of thought. But this path was reversed, and the security formula envisioned for the Black Sea was transformed in order to accommodate a Black Sea-Russia binomial, which could handle both expansionistic tendencies and dimensions of the Russian Federation, by mimicking the EU-Russia and NATO-Russia dialogue.

NATO's interest for the region waned, starting in 2005, following Turkey's wishes not to extend Operation Active Endeavour in the Black Sea. Considering NATO's own principle of the indivisible nature of security, Romania pushed for such an option; we asked for Article 5 to be used, especially since the mission was already stationed in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey invoked the Montreux Convention of 1936, which limits the entrance of naval forces through straits belonging to a country's shoreline. Having failed to eliminate this argument and to promote an interpretation by which a country's rights deriving from its shoreline extend to the whole of NATO/EU, and after the NATO Summit in Bucharest (where the WBSR was pushed in the limelight, alongside the issue of energy security), NATO drove the region into the background. The European Union thusly became the sole arbiter.

We must also mention the multiple initiatives launched in the Black Sea by the Forum for Partnership and Development, with governmental, non-governmental and a business related dimension. The initiative has never got to a second round, even though it brought about relevant changes in the fields of environment and civil protection. The most important development came in the form of the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund office in Bucharest, which invested heavily in enhancing the projects of the civil society.



The EU's involvement determined new prospects of regional cooperation and integration. Three months after joining the EU, in March 2007, we were already discussing the possibility of a Black Sea Synergy, an initiative launched by a Romanian rapporteur, Roberta Anastase. Furthermore, the current form of the Black Sea Strategy was also the brainchild of another Romanian rapporteur, Traian Radu Ungureanu. But perhaps the most important development came in the form of EU's soft power, which shaped the theoretical debate and led to the creation of a new security complex: the Wider Black Sea Region.

The European Union has the capacity to internalize concepts and theories with the help of its bureaucracy, which are later included in the decision making process via its congested institutional framework. The Eastern European Stability Pact was created under the paradigm of the common project, by which two former enemies realise they could gain more by cooperating under the same banner rather than harbouring war. Thus, they are more interested in working together for a common purpose, rebuilding personal ties and trust and finally arriving at the phase of reconciliation. Unfortunately, this design was possible under the Thessaloniki Initiative, which stated that all countries of the Western Balkans will eventually gain full membership in the EU, a stipulation later endorsed at the European Council in Greece. Therefore, it cannot be applied on other issues.

As for the Eastern Region, the paradigm which shaped the Neighbourhood Policy was derived out of Barry Buzan's theory of the **compatibility at the border**. In a nutshell, it states that the greater the normative and insitutional disparity, the greater the difference in living standards are and the higher the risk of conflict is. The EU's policy focused on resolving these disparities, by giving selective access to the Common Market and the European common tariff system. This policy regarded the states comprised in the EU space, excepting Turkey (candidate country) and Russia (which is the subject of a special relation with the EU). Romania and Bulgaria, being full members, were not involved in this mechanism – EU-Black Sea, minus Russia.

In this debate, the liberal cognitive-institutional paradigm is of great relevance: increasing interactions, institutional integration and administrative capacity seemed to be the

way to go in the Wider Black Sea Region as a solution to regional security. The more relations are institutionalised, with their own regulations and framework, impacting directly on the internal situation of member states and their administrative capacities, the higher the degree of regional security is.

Unfortunately, the Black Sea Region was a place of singularities in this matter. CIS, the intergovernmental formula which replaced the Soviet Union, was famous for its institutional inefficiency brought upon by the large number of rules and accords which were either never ratified, or were partially ratified, working only for the benefit of the Russian Federation, the would-be creator of the system, and its ambitions for imitating the European Union, but with antipodal results.

In this region, BSEC-OCEMN, an organisation with modest gains and showing the same inefficiency as CIS, played the part of Turkey's „chair of the chef d'orchestre” of the collaboration at the level of the Black Sea, following a project of Turkey, supported by Russia, for blocking any alternative.

This could also account for the lack of interest shown in the case of The Black Sea Forum and the failure of the Black Sea Synergy – lacking funds and the political will to engage, based on EU-BSEC relation, and not EU-regional actors.

This state of affairs, far from being a counter-example, does not oppose the ideas of the constructivist approach of norms and institutions. We could say it bears a slight resemblance to Maiorescu's theory of forms without substance. On the contrary, this shows the distance between quantitative and qualitative relations, between their depth and nature, the integrative forces which give cohesion to a region and ensure the common identity by giving substance to a security concept elaborated on these grounds.

The open scenario of a Regional Security applied to the Wider Black Sea Region is based on the principles of institutionalization. Combining the school of Maiorescu, of forms without substance, with neo-institutionalism and constructivism, we reach a point where institutions, which were once hollow, gain substance only by increasing administrative capacity, thus becoming the foundation of trust building, regional cooperation and, of course, regional security.



In order to go beyond the „taken seat” scenario, of over-normalization and over-institutionalising, a phenomenon noticed by many regional observers, it is necessary to change the angle of approach, taking into account the proposed functionalities and the administrative capacities of institutions and projects. These should be based on the power of the local government in accordance to its citizens, to follow a vision and lead without having your mind set on opinion polls and publicity stunts. What counts are sobriety, quality and efficiency of relations, and not their quantity. Regional security is therefore based on organising and enhancing the administrative capacities of a new framework, and not on the pre-eminence of a certain project proposed by local actors.

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REGIONAL CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS

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The article presents a few considerations on the development of communications at distance, especially in the last 30 years and this phenomenon's effects on all social life's dimensions of the entire humankind.

In this context, it is underlined the role of these systems and networks in Romania and in the neighboring countries in the intensification of cross-border cooperation in political, economic, financial and security issues.

Key-words: communications; Internet; IT&C; cooperation; Arpanet.

1. Introduction

Individuals' will to communicate at distance is old and constant along the ages. There are books and evidences regarding the use of some means of communication by couriers, fires on highlands, pigeons, and other signals, for hundreds of years B.C.

These means of communication had often been used to warn about the enemies attacks or to announce a victory.

These empirical means have manifested and maintained until the progresses registered at the beginning of the 18th century, when famous inventors, especially from the USA and Europe, discovered electric power, electric conductors

and, then, shortly, the communication at distance, using electrical power, at the beginning, by the wire and, then, by the propagation of electromagnetic waves, generated by electronic devices, which, at the beginning were simple and, then, increasingly complicated.

So, in 1837, appeared the telegraphic transmission by wire, invented by Morse, and, in 1854, Graham Bell's telegraph.

In the very next period, the progresses are spectacular and rapid, with direct consequences on social and economic live for wide masses of individuals, mainly, in the European countries and even in the North-American continent. The new inventions and technological achievements were quickly introduced into the armies of powerful states making possible the command and control of troops on large areas and with extraordinary effects for their owners. Many military commanders understood the importance of communication technology development by electronic means and put pressure to generate funds for their quicker development. Nowadays, this phenomenon still exists and regards communication thorough various media: satellite, optical fiber, radio and radio-relay, laser etc.

We shouldn't forget the first "Internet" nucleus appeared as a result of USA Army researches, concretized in the creation of ARPANET network,

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in 1967, and, in the next 25 years (1992), one could speak about its globalization, as it was present in over 100 countries all over the continents.

These rapid and consistent scientific and technologic developments influenced and still influence billions of peoples' lives and, of course, in a very real sense, the lives of the Europeans as well, Romanians included.

The study on the previously mentioned evolutions shows the countries from the South-Eastern Europe contributed to the research and development of the communications systems at distance and implemented technical solutions and systems quickly enough for public use but also in the administration and military field.

Largely, all this evolutions have had positive effects on the cross-border pulling together and cooperation among the countries in the area and with other European countries, mainly with the great powers of the time.

2. Some historical milestones of the development of the communications at distance

For the interested ones, we could mention that the evolutions were continuous, every year appearing new devices and technologies in the most dynamic sector of development, after 1967 (ARPANET) until today.

We will refer below to the most significant elements which influenced the development in the world and in our geographical area:

- 1968 – it is created „INTEL”, a company producing micro-processors;
- 1969 – it is carried out the first phase of the precursor of Internet, which is called by the USA Army ARPANET;
- 1970 – the banal disk is created;
- 1971 – it is launched the first „chip” processor – INTEL;
- 1972 – email is introduced in ARPANET network;
- 1972 – it is done the first Local Area Network (LAN) – called ETHERNET;
- 1973 – is the year when we can speak about the apparition of Internet, following the performances of the American researchers, Cerf and Khan;
- 1981 – The American Company IBM launches the first personal computer “PC”;

- 1982 – in the world there are already 5.5 millions PCs (in only one year);
- 1983 – appears the friendly and irreplaceable Mouse;
- 1985 – Microsoft Company launches the first complex program of operation – WINDOWS 1.0;
- 1991 – in Romania – are made the first Internet connections at some universities;
- 1992 – there are 65 millions PCs in the world;
- 1992 – **Internet** is used globally being present in over 100 countries on all the continents;
- 2000 – there are 100 million systems of calculation in Internet global network, 250 million peoples connected;
- 2007 – We speak about an informational society wherein the Internet and other communication systems entered into all human life fields: politics, businesses, finances, defence, security etc. Today's world couldn't be even conceived without capabilities of communication in real time extended to the entire planet;
- 2007 – Popular sites appear and develop rapidly: My Space, Facebook, You Tube etc. These sites ease the communication between persons from different countries and cultures having positive but unfortunately, also negative impact (as it can be seen in the case of international terrorism, drug and persons traffic phenomena etc.).
- **2010 – December** – for a world population estimated at 6.93 billion of peoples, there were registered 2.095 Internet users (the range of penetration being about 30.2%).

3. Cross-border regional cooperation in the information systems field in South-Eastern Europe

There wasn't any doubt that the progresses registered globally related to the distance electronic communications won't produce immediate effects on both Romania and its neighbors.

Following the evolutions we have already showed briefly in the previous part of our paper, we can remind the apparition of the first global organization – called today “The International Telecommunication Union” (ITU), in 1866, which became, in 1947, the specialized UN body, including today 192 member countries.

We shall mention that Romania is founder member (1866) and, also, some of our neighbors



COUNTRY	Population – millions of inhabitants	Internet users – millions	Penetration ratio %
<i>Romania</i>	<i>21.959</i>	<i>7.786</i>	<i>35.5%</i>
<i>Serbia</i>	<i>7.344</i>	<i>4.107</i>	<i>55.9%</i>
<i>Hungary</i>	<i>9.992</i>	<i>6.176</i>	<i>61.8%</i>
<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>45.415</i>	<i>15.3</i>	<i>33.7%</i>
<i>Albania</i>	<i>2.986</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>43.5%</i>
<i>Croatia</i>	<i>4.486</i>	<i>2.244</i>	<i>50.0%</i>
<i>Republic of Moldova</i>	<i>4.317</i>	<i>1.295</i>	<i>30.0%</i>

Table no. 1 Internet users in Romania and the neighboring countries (31.12.2010)

became ITU members; among them, we shall number the following: Ukraine (1947), Hungary (1866), Bulgaria (1880), Serbia (2001), the Republic of Moldova (1992), participating at the developments in technologies, rules and operation procedures which are accepted globally.

In time (especially in the last 60 years), in Romania and in the neighboring countries, were developed national, departmental, military and private communication systems and, logically, they were interconnected, no matter if they were military systems or of a different nature, by cable, optical fiber, radio, radio-relay or by communication satellites.

These connections, which presently have a special development, facilitated and continue to facilitate cross-border communications between the political, economic, financial, banking, military etc. organizations as well as between citizens, by all known means: voice, data, videoconference, Internet, television, using global, regional and national networks on the basis of protocols and agreements settled among the parties.

All these communications contribute essentially to the promotion of neighbor countries' good relations, to the development of businesses and trade of goods and services, to citizens' movement, to border monitoring and areas with ecological and environmental risks (the Black Sea, the Danube, nuclear and industrial installations etc.).

Nowadays, in Romania, there are many national networks, part of the patrimony of some commercial organizations and societies, which all have land, radio, radio-relay and

satellite connections with similar networks from the neighboring countries, as well as with other countries from Europe and from the world.

Here, we can remember:

- a. The National Network of optical fiber of S.N. Romtelecom S.A. (Figure no. 1);
- b. The Radio-Relays Network of S.N. Radiocomunicații S.A. (Figure no. 2);
- c. The Telecommunication Network of S.C. Electrica S.A. (Figure no. 3);
- d. The optical fiber network of S.C. Telecomunicații SNCFR S.A. (Figure no. 4).

Special telecommunications are under the responsibility of **Special Telecommunications Service (STS)**, of the military services of the Ministry of National Defence and of the Ministry of Interior (including the one of General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations) and have strong connections with the organizations in which Romania is part (EU, NATO) and with all the neighboring countries in order to fulfill the obligations resulted from the multilateral and bilateral treaties, protocols and agreements.

Under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, all the organizations owing radio-electronic communications participate at the harmonization of the use of frequency specter in the border areas, in the South-Eastern Europe area, Europe and globally.

We shouldn't forget the mobile telephony networks' development in the last 20 years which accelerated cross-border communication under the conditions of an increased mobility of subscribers by offering voice, data and video services for




Figure no. 1



Figure no. 2




Figure no. 3



Figure no. 4



reasonable prices and with a special quality. We can also realize a presentation of Internet's current development stage in our area and to appreciate the speed of penetration after 1991, as in *Table no. 1*.

This evolution led to a high democratization of the access to communication with effects, which are generally positive, for the cooperation between organizations and between citizens.

4. Some conclusions

In our geographical area, **evolutions in IT&C** follow closely the global trend, being in line with the actual context of globalization.

Real time communications – by various media and in the forms known today (voice, data, videoconference etc.) – ease cross-border and global affairs, being a catalyst and a technological support for the movement of goods and services, for money and values transfer, for creating connections between citizens from different cultures and countries.

Last but not least, we could say the military and special communication systems contribute

directly to the enhancement of the state of security in the area and to the defence of citizens' goods and lives.

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REGIONAL COOPERATION MODELS. CASE STUDY - KOSOVO

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The text approaches various forms of international cooperation that one can find within the wide historical borders of the Kosovo situation. Consequently, we will focus on the history of the province as well as the contemporary developments that have occurred in the post-conflict timeframe. By doing this, we will manage to identify numerous forms of international cooperation within the province, while assessing, at the same time, by employing statistic data, the different rates of success of each form of cooperation. Without a doubt, discussions about the economic and political situation of Kosovo will weigh heavily within the text.

Key-words: Kosovo; international cooperation; economy; post-conflict recovery; security.

1. Introduction

Within an international environment that is more and more interlinked due to the globalisation process, security challenges tend to spread a lot faster and to affect a wider set of international actors, whether they are initially part of crisis or not. The countries in which one may identify armed conflicts are especially sovereign entities which risk a regional destabilisation of the security

field which seems to have its sources frequently in ethnic conflicts. After the end of the Cold War, The International Community has engaged itself in a range of several visible actions of regional cooperation efforts, in managing armed crisis and stabilisation of post-war areas within the states that are threatened by crises, a result of confronting with security risks that usually appeared as punctual events within sovereign entities.

Regional Cooperation is one of the key-factors that sustain the social, political and economic post-conflict recovery of the states because the conflict phase undermines the legitimacy, the authority and the effectiveness of the state which confronts itself with a situation of this type.¹ That is why the authority can be recovered by establishing a social contract (which imposes a mutual relation between state and citizen: the state ensures the security of the citizens, the justice and economic opportunities in return of recognition in terms of authority) and by regaining the capacity of introducing and implementing the policies for the proper functioning of the regime and for the fast establishment of the individual and collective security. Post-conflict recovery is a complex process with several phases and its period differs from case to case because of problems that can

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occur during it. The absence of collective security during the conflict can become a weigh for the recovery process, especially for the economic development. That is why insuring security for all citizens and the implementing the “rule of law” operation are two priorities of the post-conflict recovery process.. Concerning the legitimacy, it is also important to reestablish the representative institutions of the regime in order to prevent the risk of the conflict recurrence , maintained by political exclusion and by socio-economical and inter-ethnic inequalities.²

“Material resources acquire a special significance for human action only through the knowledge structures largely shared”³. Starting with this aspect, we tried to outline the historical-geographic borders of Kosovo in order to understand the implications that underline the risks in relating with neighbouring states. Taking a look over the geographic position of the state we can understand its importance on the international arena; situated in Central Europe, Kosovo and the Western Balkans states have around them territories of the most important and powerful organisations in the world. From here comes the desire of reestablishing peace and order in this area. Obviously, the discussion about the resources of Kosovo can generate a total image over the sustainability of forming a new state. Taking into account the classical realistic paradigm, we can understand the diplomatic positioning of Kosovo in the international arena. For the classical realistic theory, resources of a state are important, just as the territory, population or the quality of governance that can offer real information about its power and sustainability, but the quality of the diplomatic apparatus represents that essential element which organises all these indicators of power together, placing a certain state in the hierarchy of International Relations.⁴ For an actor aspiring for the sovereign title, the quality of the diplomatic apparatus is essential because this can lead to its recognition among states actors of the international arena. We intend to continue on isolating a sort of regional cooperation forms that can be essential for the Kosovo situation from the moment of the occidental intervention in 1999 till nowadays, following the important regional cooperation episodes, as the internal civil conflict, the uncertain economic situation and the internal corruption.

2. A short history of Kosovo

Kosovo has been under UN administration from 1999, when Serbian authorities were forced to leave the province, as a result of NATO attacks; from that moment, the impossibility of Serbia to maintain control over the province was obvious. Through the 1244 Resolution of the UN Security Council, the sovereignty prerogatives of Serbia over Kosovo were maintained. According to the principles of the Public International Law and also the fact that in both Yugoslavia and Kosovo these were initially breached (bombing Serbia and Kosovo without a resolution of SC of the UN), now we are witnessing a new practice in International law: maintaining the appearances of legality and legitimacy, while skilfully, by tacit acceptance and implementing solutions under less concrete or resonant ways, combined with a decisive pressing from the important economical and military members of the international community, the map of the world and the international arena are redesigned. The unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, on February 17, 2008, wasn't a surprise: ever since the NATO bombings, Serbia's province was under international protectorate, with a quasi independent status. NATO's proposed solution for Kosovo, through the Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, faced Russia and Serbia's opposition, the latter being placed in the position to accept the loss of Kosovo through a paper which was not explicitly providing this, but which was expressing this through its prerogatives, from which benefited the province which was about to become a state with an independence apparently protected by the international community.

The blocking maintained by the different positions of the parties, Russia's right of veto in the UN SC and acceptance Ahtisaari's plan of as a solution for the Kosovar problem by the majority of world's states and especially by the most important military powers and democracies were forecasting in a certain way a unilateral initiative of the Kosovar side, which was about to be sustained by recognition by these, after proclaiming the independence.

Analysing the origins of the Serbian-Kosovar conflict, we can observe that “the conflict attraction's subject and that of rejecting the



political, economic and ideological foreign influence was a constant element in the Balkans' history"⁵, and that the foreign elements in the Balkan area were accepted and modified based on national tradition and prejudices of each state. "The essential element of the Balkans' life has its origins in the historical experience and in the echo of the reactions appeared after the foreign invasion of the vulnerable peninsula."⁶ As many other Europeans, a great part of the people that lived on the territories of ex-Yugoslavia: Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, people from Montenegro, Macedonians, Albanians, Muslims slavs from Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, as any other possible combination among all these have seen and still tend to see the world in general and people through their ethnic identity; they even define themselves through cultural and economic differences, through their heritage and religious traditions, the hate and envy for one another and not through accomplishments or remarkable events. This vision is largely used by actors in order to play with the international realities and to achieve their goals. The situation is not hard to discover among the multicoloured international territories, from ethnic perspective.

"Not so far in history, Yugoslavia, as many other European countries, appeared from the Second World War's ruins. Western republics - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with a great part of present Serbia - were some time parts of the Habsburg Empire. The Eastern republics - Montenegro, Macedonia and the South-Eastern part of Serbia, including Kosovo - were under the power of the Ottoman Empire; a strange mixture of people, languages and religions, under the administration of a single and powerful sultan"⁷.

The demand for Kosovo territory by Serbs and Albanians is a controversial subject. For the Christian-orthodox Serbs, Kosovo is both spiritual and religious cradle, but also the space where they had decisive battles. Albanians, in addition to the numeric advantage inside the province, also have as a solid argument the tradition and the fact that they are descendants of the Illyrian tribes, inhabitants of the Western Balkans area lots of centuries before Slavs.⁸

As we will see, the atrocities committed by both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo have known a recurrence in the contemporary period. Even if general public discussions tend to outline

especially the atrocities or crime-wars committed by Serbs against Kosovar Albanians during the Milosevic regime, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, outlines in a recent report the fact that Albanians from Kosovo also had the tendency to apply inhuman treatments and made illicit trafficking in human organs in special bases organised in Albanian sovereign space.⁹

Following the history of Kosovo, one observes how Tito preferred maintaining Kosovo as a part of Serbia, without having the status of a province with its own autonomy and without recognition for the Albanian minority, position which was enforced by the Constitution in 1946. The Tito-Stalin conflict in 1948 imposed limits between Yugoslavia and Albania¹⁰, considered to be Moscow's ally. Through the 1963 Constitution, the little autonomy of Kosovo was reduced even more, culminating with the subordination of the province to Serbia more than to Federal Yugoslavia. In 1967 Tito visited Kosovo for the first time, gaining the sympathy of the Albanian people by simply removing from Kosovo governance, Alexander Ranković, a Serbian leader known for brutal punishments towards the Albanian separatists' actions. Other concessions in the benefit of the Albanian people were about language, education and culture, having as a predictable result a real explosion of Albanian nationalism. One of the immediate consequences was a massive wave of Albanians immigrants from South, in contrast with a huge emigration of the Serbs from this area, so that, sustained by the ascendant birth rate, Albanian people rate increased in short time from 67% to 74% from the entire Kosovar number¹¹.

Kosovo's autonomy is considerably strengthened only through the 1974 Constitution, when the province becomes one of the 8 divisions of the federation, with a constitution, a government, a territorial defence force and the right of veto at federal level¹².

Although, far from being a republic¹³, Kosovo gains equal authority with that of Serbia. Celebrating a century from the first Prizren Convention generated a powerful reactivation of Albanian nationalism, this time, with a reduced loyalty for Federal Yugoslavia, burdened by social obligations imposed by the Albanian people, in a continuous growth¹⁴.

In short time after Tito's death (the 4th of May, 1980), social movements without precedent



seized Kosovo. Revolts organised by students of the University in Pristina (28% from the number of the province's people) spread all over Kosovo. Serbs and Montenegrins were victims of the Albanians, as they were setting fire and robbing their properties. The whole Kosovar education system and especially Pristina University became in Serbs' opinion, the cradle of the Albanians' nationalism. Among other destabilising effects for the whole federation, Albanians saw in Tito's death the loss of a powerful ally, a defender of their rights. As a result, the number of nationalist actions of Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonian in territory intensified¹⁵.

Regarding the social world as a result of the international actors' interaction, the social context that we studied allowed us to analyse the immediate consequences of the facts, but also to imagine some future scripts that will have as a reference moment the independence of Kosovo. "Kosovo always had a special place in Serbs' hearts and history, thus they consider it as their own. For the Albanian majority in Kosovo, the independence is equal with straightening a historical evil. If Kosovo is Serbs' heart, Albanians conclude: Serbia's heart beats in a foreign body"¹⁶. We should also add the fact that, maintaining proportions, the inclusion problem in Kosovo resonates with the argument according to which "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom's fighter."¹⁷ In other words, Kosovo's situation is in a certain way irreconcilable, similar to the terrorist one, regarding from the ethnic-religious cleavage points of view.

3. Regional cooperation for the removal of Milosević

After Tito's death, Ivan Stambolić becomes prime-minister of Serbia. Along with Slobodan Milosević, his protected, Stambolić claims his intention of transforming Serbia in a central power of the federation, cancelling at the same time the autonomy of Kosovo. In March 1989 Yugoslavia's Constitution is emendated and Serbia has direct control over Kosovo. The situation is getting worse and movements are violently repressed by authorities; Serbia, is taking the direct control over Kosovo. In July 1990, the Serbian Government prevents the Kosovar Parliament's session. In return, the Albanian parliamentarians proclaim the sovereignty of Republic of Kosovo

within the Yugoslav Federation. Serbia dissolves the parliament and takes the executive control. The last strike is in September 1990, when, by modifying the Constitution of Serbia, Kosovo is proclaimed region of Serbia under the National Serbian Parliament's control¹⁸. In December 1992 elections are held in Yugoslavia, but Albanians refuse to participate, following the advice of the unrecognised Republic of Kosovo's parliament. The Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević, intensifies pressings in Kosovo and till 1993, almost 400 000 Albanians leave Kosovo because of the socio-economic decline. The Dayton Accord, in 1995, which outlined the end of the Bosnia-Serb conflict, did not bring either the recognition of the independence demands' legitimacy of Kosovar Albanians¹⁹.

The USA is trying to find a solution for the problem (which had already forced a great number of people to search refuge in neighbouring countries), through the Rambouillet Accord, in February 1999, proposing an autonomous status of 3 years for Kosovo, in exchange for the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and of the extraterritoriality right of NATO in Serbia and Montenegro. KLA signs the accord, taking into account the stubbornness of the Serbian representatives, who refused to agree²⁰. The Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević, accused USA of favouring the Albanians during the negotiations, refusing a last proposal of the American special envoy, Richard Holdbrooke, of solutioning the conflict peacefully. Consequently, on March 26, 1999, NATO has authorised the launching of the air-attacks over Serbia, having as declared goal the stopping of the genocide and crimes committed by the Serbian Government against Albanians from Kosovo²¹. The decision takes place in the same day when Evgheni Primakov was expected to Washington, after Madeleine Albright and Albert Gore made pressures, without the consensus of UNO, because of the opposition of Russia and China²².

USA's position was outlined by President Bill Clinton, who addressed in June 1999 the KFOR's troupes in Macedonia. His declaration, known as "Clinton Doctrine", sustains the intervention's legitimacy, by invoking the humanitarian regulations. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Robin Cook, expressed his confidence in NATO's action, concluding that



the lack of involvement would lead to results with severe implications than those of actions, namely transforming into accomplices to the atrocities²³. Wanting to avoid an even grater tragedy, Western policy makers decided to develop a core of states which, through regional cooperation, were to prevent a double threat - what was called genocide at that time and the threat that Milosevic represented and that was a security risk in the region.

4. Corruption and war crimes in Kosovo, important economic factors

The corruption did not pass unobserved on the international arena, as it overlapped over the legislative void inside the new state. One of the most popular disputes nowadays in Kosovo is that of the property over terrains and buildings, this being the triggering factor of the violent conflicts over the past years. Justice functionaries have the reputation of corrupt people, invoking the lack of legislation for properties on litigation. Frequently, bribery, threats, violence and blackmail are ways of solving litigations over properties. The majority of Serbian people, ex-land owners or properties-owners of the houses taken by Albanians after the end of the war are having difficulties in regaining the title of property or give up under violent pressures, being discouraged by the lack of Kosovar institutions' interest.

"The real implementing of a legislative system is difficult because of the conflict which created over the years tensions between social groups and which affects the entire activity of the government apparatus of fighting with old economic and socio-cultural method of the repression period²⁴." On the other hand, one can say that the reputation of Kosovo as an impossible to govern and corrupt country is exaggerated because the criminality rate is low, way bellow the average of EU countries, while the inter-ethnic conflicts are dropping, without representing a general state of unsafety for the minority of Serbs. The lack of the efficiency of the justice system is however more visible in the Northern side of the Ibar river, an area controlled by Serbian authorities. The Serbian courts of justice refuse to cooperate with the Albanian ones or with the police units from the rest of Kosovo²⁵. Corruption rates, bellow European average, can be regarded as a consequence of the small number

of citizens in Kosovo, and not as a victory of the Kosovar justice apparatus. We can argue the fact that, taking into account a small demographic index, there is a great possibility for the statistics regarding average corruption to be smaller than the European average for the simple fact that the European average of the corruption's rate is made out on a greater demographic sample than that of Kosovo.

Even if most public speeches describe the atrocities committed by Serbs against Albanians in Kosovo, we want to observe, in the following, the fact that this is not necessarily true. To this extent, we shall pay attention to a document emitted by the Council of Europe, which debunks to a certain extent the position of incontestable victim of people in Kosovo. We decided to do so in order to offer an impartiality and objectivity note to our study. In other words, as long as there are official sources which reveal inhuman treatments committed by Albanians and Kosovar Albanians to Serbs, there is no pertinent reason to pass over them. The Committee of Human Rights of the Council of Europe emitted on the 12th of December, 2010 the report "Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo", observing that "Serbs and Kosovar Albanians were held in detention in secret places from North Albania, submitted to inhuman treatments before their complete disappearance. These centres were under KLA's control²⁶." Although the number of victims is not estimated in the mentioned document, it was discovered that different factions of KLA organised with Albania's support a number of detention centres and trafficking systems that had a main activity: narcotics traffic and human organs traffic²⁷. Far from being a type of combating the Serbian threat, the unofficial policy of KLA had as goal to obtain financial resources vitals for its guerrilla activities. The most worrying fact is that all these illicit and injurious activities for human integrity and security continued as well after the end of the war in 1999, especially the problem regarding the human organs trafficking. Although military hostilities came to an end, KLA continues to function in a double sense. On the one hand a number of ex KLA members will activate in the political circle of Kosovo after the declaration of independence. On the other hand, the same political actors maintain a powerful control



over the profitable illicit activities of KLA. For example “in confidential reports realised in a decade, agencies involved in combating drugs trafficking from 5 states, identified Hashim Thaqi as being the only one to exert violent control over the narcotics contraband²⁸.”

Intelligent services from Germany, Greece, Italy and England found Thaqi as being “the most dangerous head of illicit affairs and organised crime from KLA”²⁹. Despite his political presence in Kosovo, Thaqi had a tumultuous guerrilla past when he was calling himself “The Snake” because of his well-known capacity of avoiding capture³⁰.

5. The economy of the new state Kosovo³¹

Beginning with 1999, the economy of Kosovo has severely dropped, in the same time with the loss of the export markets and the collapse of its own enterprises. Poor economic policies, international sanctions, bankruptcy and foreign investors’ deterrence on the internal market had feed the decline of the industrialising process. The extractive industry, energy and agriculture—the principal fallen pillar of Kosovo ex-economy complete the deplorable economic situation³².

From the economic point of view, the situation of the new state is unclear. Till the moment when the International Court of Justice issued the verdict referring to the legality of the accomplished fact, it was said that the deplorable state of the Kosovar economy is a consequence of its inexact status, reason for which foreign investments were deterred. Anyway, it was expected that the declaring of independence, the positive consultative advice of the Court and its recognition (74 states recognized the independence of Kosovo so far) will open the way for new foreign investments. This did not happen. The Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Kosovo, Shpend Ahmeti expressed his worries, in a public analyse of the imports (1, 3 billion euros) and that of exports (130 billion euros). He stated that the massive reserves of lignite and minerals are the unique resources that feed the utopist image of a rich Kosovo. The independence did not modify the situation of the internal market in any single way, moreover, the taxes, higher than those in the area impose barriers to investors. The solution could come in the same time with the lowering of tax levels and the development of business³³.

Taking into account the lack of a governmental apparatus that can promote policies meant to encourage foreign investments, the economic status of Kosovo is quite poor. For 2008, CIA was observing that the GDP was at about 5.300.000.000 \$. For 2009, the World Bank was mentioning a GDP at about 5.387.332.993 \$. The growth is not significant especially when we take into account that numbers given by CIA are usually estimates. In other words, Kosovo’s GDP did not grow considerably during one year. If we take into account the GDP in 2009 and the population mentioned by CIA and World Bank (1.800.000), we can observe that GDP per capita is placed somewhere around 2.968 \$. Kosovo exported goods, products and services evaluated at about 527.000.000 \$ in 2010 and imported products at about 2, 6 billion \$. These numbers have certain relevance if we decide to put them in a proper context, taking into account the poverty rate in Kosovo. According to the World Bank, in 2006 the percentage of people who lived in poverty was at about 45, 1% from population. In 2009 we observe a minimal positive change; it seems that 43, 5% from population lives in poverty. CIA estimates, in an optimist manner we would add, that in 2010 the percentage will drop to 30%. Even if the percentage of those who live in poverty conditions is a high one, CIA finds an index of inequality in fortunes’ distribution (GINI) of just 30 (0,3), which places Kosovo on the 115th place in the world. Taking into account the GDP, Kosovo is in 2010, as CIA confirmed, on the 158th place in the world, under Somalia, Montenegro or the Republic of Moldova. Obviously, all of these countries have a larger population than Kosovo and that is why we can understand at a theoretical stage the dropped level of Kosovo’s GDP. The explanation is not sufficient, taking into account that Somalia is not totally governable and that the Somalia government can’t extend its control on more than over a small area of the state. More than that, we can’t expect a growth of the Kosovo population because facing poverty perspectives, a lot of young people will decide to leave their country, which will bring a great negative impact on the national economy of the state. Furthermore, placing Kosovo after Somalia does not represent a personal endeavour of discrediting a new state, but the way of observing that at European stage, the economy of a state is weaker than the one of a



non-European state, which is a good illustration of failed state. For reasons that concern the surface, the demography, the European crisis context, in the past - ethnic internal conflicts, the dependence of foreign aid, Kosovo does not seem to have the capacity to improve by itself its own economic capacities, on a medium or long term.

The First Report of Human Development launched by United Nations Development Programme in 1990 introduced a new key concept: "people are the real fortune of the states. Progress can be achieved only by offering an equal opportunity for everyone and by cumulating their efforts and energies. It doesn't matter how much the national economy can develop, states remain poor from the material and spiritual point of view if every member of the society does not receive equal chances³⁴." The challenge for Kosovo is that of discovering a new strategy for regaining the hidden potential of this small, but important side of Europe. The economic development, although necessary and expected, is not the key in the process of stabilisation of the new state on the international arena, concludes UNDP. The citizens of the former republics of Serbia must work together to apply a sustainable solution, no matter ethnic or religious roots. It is difficult to believe that this thing will happen in the closer future, when the conflict between the two ethnic structures brings together hate and envy one for another, feelings with strong historical roots in the past. A given solution like this, which can attack internal tensions and can bring the hope of an economic development excludes the fact that political actors in Kosovo do not have sufficient resources to generate an economic sustainable growth, even when they are in front of a low-probable internal ethnic peace situation.

6. Donors for Kosovo. Why does the West want to stop donations?

In front of discouraging economic perspectives, political leaders from the Occident have engaged themselves in a new form of regional cooperation for sustaining the new state through donations. International donor community played an important role for Kosovo. Between 1999-2003, Kosovo received 1, 96 billion euros. Only EU offered 1 billion euros for reconstruction and stabilisation of the new program CARDS (Community

Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation). International consistent aid was offered for houses reconstruction and infrastructure (roads network, schools and medical centres) and social aid (82% of Albanians and Kosovo ethnics received aids, comparing to that of 14% of the Serbs in the area, an action which can feed the internal ethnic cleavage). What was the result of this synchronised effort? Between 2005-2008, the GDP developed to 4% and even 5, 4 % annual average in 2008, say UNDP experts. Accelerating the process of privatisation in 2005 has led to a growth of the investments' level (local and foreign) and to an improvement of exports³⁵. Any way, the economic crisis did not pass over Kosovo, affecting its economic area which seemed to become more stabile, and that because of the decline of the exports and that of foreign investments. „Exports have registered a dropped of 18 percentages (from 198, 5 billion euros in 2008 to 162, 6 billion euros in 2009). According to CBK, in 2009, direct foreign investments have dropped with 20, 5% (from 366 billion euros in 2008 to 291 billion euros in 2009)³⁶. For 2010, Kosovo received only from UN, through The Development Program of the United Nations Organization more than 8 billion euros. Among the most important donors that brought their support over the time for the improvement of the situation of Kosovo we may find USA, UN through The United Nations Development Program and as states implicated in Regional Cooperation for Kosovo, Italy, Greece (that built a series of housing facilities for free in Kosovo in 1999³⁷), Finland, Holland and Germany³⁸.

Unfortunately, this optimist explanation of the economic phenomenon of Kosovo is one that tends to deform a sad reality. We mustn't let ourselves deluded by the minimal economic victory obtained by Kosovo, inclusively through the financial contribution of the states elements engaged in regional cooperation because all these, donations made by the international environment were not sufficient. In the crisis context these dropped because great donors have redirected the financial means in the direction of the recovery of their own economy³⁹. Also, the African experience tends to demonstrate the fact that cash donations, although blur a series of problems, do not treat the major issue. Donations made in the sovereign, not stabile (from the economic and security point of



view) spaces did not realise anything but to create a dependence of the local governments which, counting on the international bank of donors became players in a game of dependency towards financial resources that are not in a real way sustainable products of their own environment. Despite its light temporary improvement of the economic index, Kosovo continues to be an extremely poorly managed state from the economic point of view, taking into account that the percentage of exports represents just 10 % from that of imports⁴⁰. A state dependent on foreign aid will delay investments of sustainable development because a considerable number of voices from the international community, including important donors for Kosovo, such as Italy, request the immediate need of internal reforms and legal stabile law projects that can sustain from inside the economic phenomenon, intending at the same time to drop the amounts of investments in Kosovo⁴¹. In the lack of internal reforms, harsh enough but also sufficiently adapted to Kosovo's very specific needs, the new state risks becoming a tick-state, problem that all those states cooperating at regional level for sustaining Kosovo are trying to bypass.

7. EULEX Mission

Another form of regional cooperation for sustaining Kosovo is the one realised through EULEX Mission. Lluís Maria de Puig, the former president of the Parliamentary Assembly of The Council of Europe (PACE) stated that “no matter its status, Kosovo should be a safe area for its citizens, whatever their ethnic origins, in which tolerance, multiculturalism and the democratic values should be shared by population and institutions⁴².” What is the solution that will include all these prerogatives? In February 2008, EU decided to launch the “Rule of Law (EULEX) mission”, its direct coordinator in Kosovo, being Yves de Kermabon. The principal objective is that of sustaining the authorities in Kosovo through monitoring, guiding and advising in the incident domains of the Rule of Law (police, justice and frontier). The priorities of the mission are considered to be the immediate concerns regarding minorities protection, corruption and fight against organised crime. An example of regional cooperation, the EU Mission, Rule of Law (EULEX) is the biggest civil

mission ever launched under CSDP's (Common Security and Defence Policy) aegis. The central proposed objective is that of offering support and assistance to the authorities of Kosovo in the domains of police, justice and customs area, not with a governing role, but with that of monitoring, guiding and advising, while maintaining in the same time a limited number of capacities of execution. EULEX is acting in conformity with the general framework of the UN 1244 Resolution and has a command chain in Bruxelles. There are 3000 officers, of which 2000 are foreign citizens⁴³. **Romania** participates with important effectives of experts in police, custom area, justice, and a unit of special interventions, virtue to the same partnership, but excludes any type of official particular relations with the Republic of Kosovo. From Romanian point of view, Kosovo is part of Serbia, temporary administrated and assisted by UN, due to 1244 Resolution and EU mission EULEX⁴⁴. (“The decision of not recognising the independence of the province is based on the Romanian conviction that this independence, proclaimed in a unilateral way, did not respect the rules and principles of the International applicable Law. Romania's advocacies to the International Court of Justice were concentrated only on the law elements, political approaches or factual interpretations being excluded⁴⁵.”)

The CSDP mission assists the judiciary authorities and the law enforcement agencies in Kosovo, in their progress for a durable and responsible development, through the consolidation of independent, multi-ethnic systems of police, justice and customs, assuring their independence from any political intervention and their accession to international recognised standards through best practices⁴⁶.

After more than two years from the moment of declaring its independence, Kosovo is confronting major disequilibrium in the legislative area and an unsatisfying justice system, disappointing for its citizens. Police officers, magistrates and judges prove to be inefficient, rather subordinated to the political class, usually committing abuses in virtue of their functions. Organised crime and corruption, largely spread in Kosovo, are far from being kept under control, although the government had recently some notable interventions, demitting a series of high-rank officers, announcing in this way the desire of taking reforming measures of the government apparatus on a long term⁴⁷.



The general impression among citizens is that their state is led by corrupt political elite manipulating the entire society. The “Rule of Law” Mission, EULEX, investigates corruption among officials, finding major errors in the state institutions’ functioning. In fact, this situation discourages foreign investments in a country overwhelmed by poverty.

The EULEX mission is cautious for the moment with sending police officers and officers on the Northern frontier. Some of the existing attempts of controlling the public order and collect customs duties for the budget of Kosovo in North ended with violent conflicts and victims among international forces and also with the tensioning of the diplomatic-relation between Serbs and Albanians, via EULEX⁴⁸.

Law enforcement and combating poverty in Kosovo are scarce, compared to other ex-members of the Yugoslav Federation, the principal obstacle in shuttering reforms being the lack of experience of the Kosovo’s governors. The single notable achievement of Hashim Thaçi’s cabinet was the peaceful transition to an independent state, without violent conflicts and human losses. A report of the European Commission in November 2009 characterises the justice system of Kosovo as being “underperforming, under political control and inefficient⁴⁹”.

8. Conclusions

In Kosovo, there can be identified four cases of regional cooperation aimed at two specific areas of interest. We can identify one form of regional cooperation for the removal of Milosevic by the occidentals. This model of regional cooperation can be placed in the area of managing conflict in order to find a solution. Later, there were engaged forms of regional cooperation that seek to address post-conflict stabilisation. The first is that of governing the Province of Kosovo through the international community’s support (UN, EU).

While and after declaring the independence, another regional cooperation form conducted by the international community was that of normalising the mechanism of maintaining peace and promoting the internal spirit of law through EULEX means. That is why the Occidental states are engaging themselves in an active way, unfortunately for Kosovo, less and less, in

activities of supporting the economic situation, through donations.

Despite a great regional cooperation effort for the stabilisation of the right trajectory of the young state, up to now, the efforts of the international community seem not to be sufficient for improving the situation in Kosovo, especially when we pay attention to the economy. Obviously, in the future, European countries and international organisations could support Kosovo, not through cash aids tending to transform Pristine in a tick capital, but through a greater effort of expertise in order to transform the process of implementing reforms in an easier and long-lasting one. Such a strategy could consolidate Kosovo at the level of its political actions, proving, on the long term, its political maturity.

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THE IMPACT OF CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL COOPERATION ON NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

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Regional cooperation is a phenomenon spread around the whole world. Its effects reflect on national and European security because it increases the mutual trust between the involved actors. Trans-border regional cooperation is one of its forms of manifestation which has known a pronounced development lately.

The European Union supports and encourages regional cooperation, inclusively its version known as trans-border regional cooperation.

Romania is an active and responsible participant in trans-border regional cooperation with the neighboring states, both EU and non-EU member states.

Key-words: regional cooperation; trans-border regional cooperation; the European Union; national security.

1. EU's conception on regional cooperation

Europe needs regions¹. They are not only one of the engines of the European construction (actual examples of their realization may be found in the regions which are members of the European Regional Assembly – ERA), but they also represent a closer level to the European citizen, the one which

would allow him to identify easier with the great Europe. Additionally, the regional fact corresponds to a will to democratize the European construction: be closer to the citizen in a great entirety and to make each one of them to understand that Europe is being constructed by actual projects. Presently, there are made efforts to make the regions acquire more importance and to prove their added value to multi-level governance and to subsidiarity.

Nowadays, regional cooperation is an undeniable reality in the space encompassed between the EU's borders. There are many euro-regions constituted within the EU. The relations between the euro-regions and the states in which their components are included are quite complex and they may trigger consequences for the states and the population from this space and even for the EU's future.

Towards a correct understanding of the meaning of the terms **region**, **euro-region**, **regionalization**, **regionalism** and **regional cooperation**, we shall continue by defining these notions.

By **region**, one usually understands, from a geographical perspective, an area which presents some common characteristics which it synthesizes but which lack administrative or government

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structures. At the same time, the term “region” is used at supra-national level to describe some regions in the world, such as Europe or Australia. In the EU parlance, the term frequently refers to a statistic classification which has no relation with an infra-national government structure, such as NUTS classification (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics). None of these definitions reflects what ERA understands by “region”. ERA’s declaration on regionalism defines the **euro-region** as “the territorial public entity corresponding to the level which is situated immediately below the state’s level and having an administration with its own political power” (Article 1.1.)². Accordingly to this definition, the European regions are not at all a homogenous entity, but they vary depending on their size, population, institutional structures, their financial competencies and powers. On the one hand, there are federal structures similar to the ones from Germany, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, which have legislative power in a wide range of areas. On the other hand, there are regions situated in relatively centralized countries, such as France, which have less power and operate in an extremely restrictive national framework. Nevertheless, all the regions have the same fundamental objective: to elaborate politics in a democratic way and to provide services to the citizens at a level sufficiently low in order to be as close as possible to their needs and sufficiently high in order to offer significant economies.

In fact, euro-regions are formed by sub-regional cooperation, which contributes to the development of the economic and social cohesion of some trans-border geographical spaces which include administrative and territorial unit from neighboring countries which may be or not members of the EU³.

Cooperation within this framework consists in creating direct and permanent connection between regions and communities situated on the both sides of national frontiers on the basis of local authorities’ competencies and in conformity with the national law. The promotion of trans-border cooperation by euro-regions is based on:

- The increase of trust and tolerance, of good understanding and good neighborhood relations, especially in the border areas which usually are inhabited by minorities;
- The improvement of the efficiency and capacity to provide services to the citizens by as-

sociating public and private facilities and services on the both sides of the frontier;

- The management of some problems implying common responsibility, coordination and action: the protection of the environment, decreasing the vulnerabilities to natural or man-made hazards etc.;

- The coordination of the policies which are of common interest, such as the ones from the areas of regional planning, urban and rural development, flood protection;

- The establishment of trans-border cooperation organisms so that trans-border relation would be supported and enhanced.

Regionalization is the process consisting in the creation of sub-unities within the state and in transferring some of the central government’s powers to these sub-unities. The latter represent an intermediate level of governance between the national state and municipalities.

Regionalism is a political notion which favors the regionalization process. It is generally considered that it implies some efforts of the regions to obtain a certain degree of political autonomy. Nonetheless, regionalism shouldn’t be confounded with separatism which refers to the separation of a certain region from the national state in order to create another individual state or to join a neighbor country. Regionalism is also different from federalism, although the latter may represent a sub-category of regionalism. In a federal system, sovereignty is shared between the central authority and constitutive political units; but, this isn’t necessarily the case for other forms of regionalism. Federalism emerges either because some entities confederate, ceding a part of their sovereignty to a central authority, or because the central authority cedes some powers to the constitutive parts.

Regionalism concept has its roots in the principle of subsidiarity. This principle implies the fact that the decisions should be made at the level which is the closest one to the citizens. “Subsidiarity” term supposes that the central authority should have a subsidiary function and it executes only the tasks that can not be ensured sufficiently at the inferior management levels. The treaty of Lisbon defines subsidiarity as follows: “under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives



of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level". The EU institutions apply the principle of subsidiarity according to the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National parliaments oversee the compliance with the principle of subsidiarity according to the procedure provided by this protocol (the new Article 3b, inserted in the Treaty of Lisbon), which is meant to get the decision-making authorities closer to the ones affected by the decisions and, therefore, increases its efficacy.

When observing the regionalization processes, one could note the existence of numerous common characteristics. If, on the one hand, regionalism's assertion follows each state's logics, there are many repeating catalyst external factors (the new exigencies of the European construction, the need to extend the territory, the need to implement democracy in a more efficient way) and require an intermediate level, known under the name of region. This is even more obvious if the region's evolution is compared with the other local powers which assert themselves in hundreds of years while the region has a very rapid development. Indeed, there are necessary only fifty years for a region to reach the level of other government echelons, covering the gap between particular and general interests which have to be guaranteed by a central government.

There is a diversity of regionalism's forms of manifestation in Europe. The issues which are worth being fathomed in most of the countries concern regional political and institutional enhancement as well as an adequate financial support in order to cope with its various tasks.

On the basis of the origination, existence, organization and functioning of the various regional forms of cooperation in the EU, there are a range of fundamental documents⁴. The Council of Europe, by the documents issued in the area of trans-border cooperation, as well as by the activity of the *Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe* (which took place for the first time in 1975 and, in 1994, its name was changed, becoming the *Congress of Local and Regional Authorities*) played an essential role in supporting the initiatives of constituting the euro-regions.

The European Community launched, in 1975, two regional policy instruments, a financial and a political one: *The European Fund for Economic and Regional Development* (EFRD) and the *Committee of Regional Policy* (CRP).

These instruments have an essentially economic view as their objective is to support the regions placed below the communitarian development average.

At its turn, the Treaty of Lisbon has an important contribution to the consolidation of regional cooperation in Europe, as it establishes the territorial dimension in all the processes of European integration. Plus, the Treaty of Lisbon, among other important changes, consolidates the mechanisms of multi-level government. Thus, there are three main areas on which the Treaty of Lisbon has implications for the local and regional levels of government:

1) It recognizes and establishes for the first time the local and regional autonomy within the EU member states. This issue is important because it demonstrates that the member states have to recognize the autonomy they authorize to some of their regional entities.

2) Reaffirms the principle of subsidiarity which has implications for the assertion of regional, national and local competencies when a certain measure or decision is more efficient if it is made at this level (local or regional) and not at the EU's level. Thus, the Treaty confers more importance to the local and regional authorities accordingly to the principle of subsidiarity.

3) It gives an increased role to national parliaments by Protocol no. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

This protocol encourages an increased participation of the national parliaments to the EU's activities. Thus, they are supported in enhancing their capacity to express their points of view on the draft legislative acts.

Moreover, national and regional parliaments have, hence, the possibility to closer overview the European legislation, due to the mechanism of rapid warning in case the principle of subsidiarity wouldn't be respected.

This obviously implies a higher participation of regional parliaments which have, in conformity with the competencies they were attributed, a higher authority on deciding within their competencies.



2. Romania – a participant at trans-border regional cooperation

The cooperation within the euro-regions consists in creating direct connection between regions and communities situated on the both sides of national frontiers on the basis of local authorities' competencies, as they are defined within the national law⁵. In Western Europe, they function efficiently and the advantages of such forms of cooperation are undeniable: the increase of the dynamism of economic and commercial relations between the members; encouraging cultural, artistic, scientific exchanges, the contacts between individuals and human communities; cooperation in environment protection; ensuring rapid and efficient systems of communication and transport; development of trans-boundary relations in various areas. A catalyst role in euro-regions' development is played by the EU or by other international financial institutions which consists in granting financial assistance for encouraging investments and cooperation programs in the euro-regions.

Romania's Government Emergency Order no. 120/1998 for the ratification by Romania of the European framework-convention on trans-border cooperation of collectivities and territorial authorities, adopted at Madrid, on 21st of May 1980, constitutes the legislative framework in which trans-border cooperation actions are undertaken by local authorities and communities in our country⁶. At the same time, Romania is part in the European Chart of Local Autonomy, adopted at Strasbourg, on 15th of October 1985, and ratified by our country by the Law no. 199/1997.

Accordingly to the provisions of the Convention of Madrid, trans-border regional cooperation regards the enhancement and development of the neighborhood relations between collectivities and territorial authorities depending on two or more contracting-parties, as well as the conclusion of agreements and understanding which may be useful for this aim.

The collectivities, authorities or organisms designed to exert regional functions are, according to the Romanian law, county's councils and local councils.

After the effective legislation, Romania participates in the following euro-regions:

1) **“Carpatica” Euro-Region**: was established at Debrețen (14th of February 1993), during a meeting of the foreign affairs ministers and of the representatives of the local administrations from Poland, Ukraine and Hungary. **Romania has been participating since 29th of April 1997**, in this euro-region being included the counties of Bihor, Botoșani, Maramaureș, Satu Mare, Sălaj, Suceava and Harghita. Slovakia became member of this euro-region on 25th of November 1999.

“Carpatica” Euro-Region covers 161,192 km²; its population exceeds 16 million inhabitants and encompasses five Hungarian counties, nine Slovakian counties, four Polish ones, four Ukrainian regions (Cernăuți included) and seven Romanian counties.

2) **“Dunăre-Criș-Mureș-Tisa” Euro-Region/DCMT**. The cooperation under this format originates in the *Bilateral Cooperation Agreement between Timiș county (Romania) and Csongrad (Hungary)*, the *Protocol on the Regional Cooperation Dunăre-Criș-Mureș-Tisa* being signed in 1997. Partners in this format are four Romanian counties (Timiș, Arad, Caraș-Severin, Hunedoara), four counties in Hungary (Csongrad, Bekes, Jacz Nagykun Szolnok, Bacs-Kiskun Kiskun) and Voivodina region in Serbia and Montenegro.

This cooperation's aim is to develop and extend the relations between the local communities and authorities in the areas of economy, education, culture, health, science and sport as well as the cooperation from the perspective of european integration.

3) **“Danube 21” Euro-Region**. The foundation documents of **“Danube 21” trans-border cooperation association** were signed at Vidin, on 18th of January 2002, by the mayors of the cities of Calafat, Vidin and Zaicear. This euro-region encompasses urban and rural euro-regions from the riverain areas of the Danube, from Romania (Calafat, the townships of Poiana Mare, Desa, Cetate and Ciuperceii Noi), from Bulgaria (Vidin and Rujiniți, Macriș, Belogradcic, Lom, Kula, Dimovo and Novo Selo) and Serbia and Montenegro (Zaicear and Sokobania, Kladovo, Bolivat, Kniajevat, Bor, Negotin and Madanpec).

The association's activity takes place within some work groups constituted on the areas of the Euro-region's strategic development: culture and education; economic development; sport, tourism



and youth; environment protection; agriculture; health and social protection.

The aim of the cooperation under this format is to solve some common issues which these areas situated at a large distance from the administration centers have to cope with. Additionally, the seriousness of these problems is increased by the fact that those localities lack the economic and transport infrastructures, are dependent on agriculture and have a low economic development level and a high unemployment rate.

4) **“Giurgiu-Ruse” Euro-Region** was established by the **Convention** signed by the **mayors of the municipalities of Giurgiu and Ruse**, at Giurgiu, on 23rd of April 2001, registered subsequently at the Council of Europe and encompassed the mayor’s offices of Giurgiu, Ruse and the non-governmental organization Ruse Municipal Energetic Agency.

This euro-region has a common office and a commission for the environment protection and health, which meets quarterly and analyses the problems related to the environment protection, human and animal health, proposing their solutions to the two municipalities’ local administrations.

5) **“Southern Danube” Euro-Region** was created in March 2001 and encompasses trans-border cooperation associations from Romania and Bulgaria. On behalf of Romania, there participate the following entities: Southern Danube Association, composed of the local councils of the municipalities of Alexandria, Turnu Măgurele, Roşiorii de Vede and Zimnicea (Teleorman county) and, on behalf of Bulgaria, participates the Association “Evroregion Dunav Jug”. This euro-region is based in Sviştov (Bulgaria). Its activity is low.

6) **“Danubius” Euro-Region** was created in 2002, at the initiative of the County council of Giurgiu and of Ruse mayor’s office and is an association comprising Ruse county (Bulgaria) and Giurgiu county (Romania). The activity within this euro-region hasn’t known substantial evolutions.

7) **“Lower Danube” Euro-Region** is the result of the intercessions of the local and regional authorities in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and of the positive evolution of the relations between the three states. This Euro-Region was established at Romania’s initiative, at the beginning of 1997.

8) **“Upper Prut” Euro-Region**. The idea of creating this euro-region was registered, at Romania’s initiative, in the **Treaty on Good Neighborhood Relations and Cooperation between Romania and Ukraine**, signed on 2nd of June 1997. “Upper Prut” encompasses the counties of Botoşani and Suceava from Romania and Bălţi and Edineţ from the Republic of Moldova and Cernăuţi region from Ukraine. On 22nd of September 2000, was signed the **Agreement of establishment of “Upper Prut” Euro-region**.

9) **“Siret-Prut-Nistru” Euro-Region**. As a result of a joint initiative of the county councils of Romania and the Republic of Moldova, the **Protocol on trans-border cooperation of the “Siret-Prut-Nistru” Euro-Region** was signed at Iaşi, on 18th September 2002; this euro-region includes the counties of Iaşi, Vaslui and Neamţ (Romania) and Chişinău, Ungheni, Lăpuşna (the Republic of Moldova). Within this euro-region, there is given a special attention to the cooperation at a local administrative level in the areas of economy, culture, education and children protection.

At Ungheni, on 4th of December 2002, took place the **Meeting of the Presidents Forum** and, with this occasion, was signed the **Functioning Status of “Siret-Prut-Nistru” Euro-region**.

10) **“Middle Danube – Iron Gates” Euro-Region**. Following a joint initiative of the concerned counties from Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, at Vidin, on 6th of October 2005, were signed the **Agreement of Association and the Status of the “Middle Danube – Iron Gates” Euro-Region**, which includes the counties of Mehedinţi (Romania), Vidin (Bulgaria) and Kladovo city and Bor District (Serbia and Montenegro). At the same time, there is also a colaboration at the level of the mayories of Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Orşova and Vidin, as well as between the Serb and Romanian management of “Iron Gates” National Park, which Bulgaria intends to join in the following period of time, when it would present an environment project for the National Park.

11) **“Inferior Danube” Euro-Region**. At Călăraşi, on 15th of November, there was concluded the **Agreement on the establishment of “Inferior Danube” Euro-Region**, which encompasses parts of the counties of Călăraşi, Ialomiţa and Constanţa (Romania) and Silistra and Dobric (Bulgaria).

3. Possible effects of trans-border regional cooperation on national and European security

In our opinion, both national and European security, as intentional, sentient and responsible constructs of national state's institutions and of the EU's institutions, of the European and national citizens, of national and European civil society, are affected by regional trans-border cooperation. The latter has various effects on national and European security. Thus, some trans-border regional cooperation's sequels may have a positive influence on national and European security and others may trigger negative effects.

We reckon that, among the favorable effects of trans-border regional cooperation in matters of national and European security, there are the following:

- A better mutual acquaintanceship between the populations living in the areas involved in the cooperation process;
- The economic development of the regions realizing trans-border regional cooperation;
- The establishment of inter-state relations of collaboration and cooperation in the social, political, cultural, scientific and educational domains in the border areas, where the euro-regions are created;
- The decision-making process gets closer to the citizen in the areas which he might be directly interested in;
- Trans-border regional cooperation turns up to be a way to bind the populations on their birth places and, therefore, to reduce the migration of employable population⁷;
- The increase of mutual trust between the actors involved in trans-border regional cooperation.

In our opinion, among the effects of trans-border regional cooperation with a negative influence on national and European security, there are the following:

- *The efforts to hide some tensed relations between some EU member states, as a result of the territorial consequence of the Second World War.* Thus, the aim of the creation of trans-border regional cooperation is, according to the official texts, the following: "giving up obstacles and distortion factors in these regions as well as growing out of the frontier or, at least, the reduction of its

importance to a mere administrative frontier"⁸. This objective has triggered enormous political, geopolitical and social consequences for the entire Europe, especially, since the '90s, when Central European countries which were on the verge to begin their EU integration process, were getting out of their Communist regimes. ARFE's trans-border cooperation chart, elaborated in 2000, underlines the extent of this policy in Europe⁹. In order to achieve a clear vision on these types of euro-regions, the chart, referring to the territories around Germany, is remarkable. Among others, it shows that the euro-regions created along the German-Polish, respectively, German-Czech frontiers partially overlap on the German territories before 1945. It may be useful to emphasize that the euro-regions along the Czech frontier correspond to the territory of the former Sudetenland, inhabited by a German population banished in 1945-1946, as a result of Benes' decrees.

- *Determines the diminishing of national state role, by creating other decision-making structures in territories belonging to the former.* Thus, as a result of trans-border regional cooperation, we witness a dissolution of the frontiers which triggers two consequences¹⁰. Firstly, due to the recognition of the ethnic-linguistic phenomenon within the EU's instances (the chart of regional or minority languages, the framework convention for the protection of minorities, the chart of fundamental rights), ethnic groups wouldn't have to be divided because of an immovable national frontier. Secondly, on the grounds of the wish to create an unique economic market, the decrease of the national borders' role allows to fathom the economic, technologic or transport exchanges, but also favors the administrative and fiscal leveling (for instance, Alsace) and facilitates the creation of Strasbourg/Kehl district, as ARFE states in the report named "Fundamental principles of a regional framework-operation by INTERREG IIC"¹¹;

- *Trans-border regional cooperation determines the progressive disappearance of the administrative or legislative problems.* Trans-border regional cooperation projects develop around three main axes: *regional framework-operation, target-project and network*¹². In other words, the policy of regionalization aims at the progressive disappearance of the national frontier in the advantage of a flexible administrative frontier;



➤ *The growth of the regions' power as they achieve a political authority and are led by a president with a considerable degree of authority, similarly to the governors of the American states, but relating more with Bruxelles, a supra-national authority, and not with the national authorities; the possibility of regrouping the regions according to economic and/or ethnic criteria*¹³.

Conclusions

Trans-border regional cooperation is a reality of our present lives. In the European Union, the enhanced cooperation among the member states, on the one hand, and the non-member states and the candidate countries, on the other, is encouraged by the Treaty of Lisbon¹⁴. Thus, the willing states may develop an enhanced cooperation among them. This form of cooperation aims at promoting the interests of the EU and of the member states. The decision on the enhanced regional cooperation is made by the EU Council, by the vote of the member states which participate in a certain form of cooperation. On the other hand, the acts adopted within an enhanced regional cooperation determine obligations and rights only for the participant member states.

Trans-border regional cooperation's consequences are both positive and negative in report to the European and national security. National security is an intentional, sentient and responsible construct of the state's institutions with competencies in this domain, of non-governmental organizations with security vocation and of the state's citizens. On the other hand, national security is a component of the European security. At its turn, European security is shared by all the EU's member states.

Romania is an active and responsible participant at the process of euro-regions' assertion, by the relations established in this area with neighbor countries, EU members of non-members. Thus, Romania is part in eleven euro-regions, whose activity is significant for the sustainable development of the areas included in this space and for the national security.

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ROMANIA'S COOPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION. ROMANIA-BULGARIA RELATION IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

*Eleonora-Alice STOIAN**

The article present an assessment of the key challenges and opportunities for cooperation between Romania and the countries of the Wider Black Sea Area, highlighting some prospects to strengthening it.

The geostrategic space in which Romania is placed offers plenty of opportunities for cooperation and for the development of concrete projects, in the political, economic, cultural and energy fields. However, to ensure the stability and security needed by everyday life, it is important to increase confidence among the countries in the region. To this end, focusing on Bulgaria, I analyze Romania's political-military relations with the countries in the region, both in large formats, within international organizations and in bilateral formats, in order to identify those areas of interest that could provide mutual benefits.

Given the financial and economic crisis that affect the defence budgets of all countries in the region, some models of cooperation based on the principle of "pooling and sharing" might be considered for their economic efficiency.

Key-words: cooperation; the Wider Black Sea Area; Bulgaria; organizations; maritime security; bilateral; multilateral; regional.

Regional cooperation is an important component of Romanian diplomacy, which contributes to strengthening the political dialogue, to the development of regional projects and has proved to be complementary to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes.

Romania and Bulgaria cooperate in most Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) organizations, which they consider helpful in achieving their national objectives. A priority of Romania is the transformation of the WBSA into a space defined by cooperation, security and stability. This is achievable through developing two major components:

1. Cooperation in extended formats (multilateral, trilateral and cross-border), namely:

- the increase of the efficiency of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC),

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the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor), the Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH);

- increased involvement of the EU in the region, through the initiation and launching of projects within the Black Sea Synergy initiative;
- development of the Black Sea Euro-region;
- revival of the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership and proper functioning of the Black Sea Trust (BST)¹.

2. Bilateral cooperation with countries in the region

1. Cooperation in extended formats

1.1. Cooperation in multilateral, trilateral and cross-border cooperation

Cooperation in these formats, under the form of euro-regions, provides a framework for the development of various types of projects.

Conversely to the past decade, when the benefits of regional cooperation were especially measured in political terms and in rebuilding mutual trust between the region's countries, the challenge of the present days is the identification and backing of specific projects that will lead to the transformation and development of the region as a whole and of each and every state alike, so that the living standards of their population would improve.

The dynamics of the cooperation in the region is demonstrated by the attention given to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC²—an initiative mainly aimed at fostering economic cooperation and implementing reforms required by the transition to market economy); naval cooperation, aimed at ensuring security of the sea and enhance mutual trust (Blackseafor, Operation Black Sea Harmony³) and the EU initiatives, such as the Black Sea Synergy. The latter is a regional dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), aiming at completing the Eastern Partnership, boosting the existing cooperation processes, opening space for cooperation with Russia, Turkey and the EU's eastern neighbors, creating a favorable climate to settle the protracted regional “frozen” conflicts in the region⁴.

1.2. Trilateral formats of cooperation

Trilateral format cooperation (trilaterals) represents flexible form of sub-regional cooperation, which works in accordance with

the principles agreed upon by the participating countries. The objectives, areas of cooperation, mechanisms, legal frameworks and the degree of institutionalization are different, in accordance with the interests and practices of the member states.

Romania - Bulgaria - Turkey and Romania - Bulgaria - Greece trilaterals have contributed, at the time of their creation (1995-1997), to the stabilization of the Central-Southern areas of Europe and of the Balkans. These areas faced major crises and devastating conflicts caused by the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. It was important, at that time, that the conditions, mechanisms and institutions were put in place in order to prevent similar crises and provide lasting solutions.

The two trilaterals have several dimensions, as follows:

- *political dimension* – the three countries have convergent fundamental interests and a common will to contribute to the development, good neighborliness and democracy in the region;

- *security dimension* – they are willing to cooperate in combating organized crime, illegal trafficking of weapons, drugs, persons etc.;

- *economic dimension* – they focus on enhancing cooperation in transport and energy infrastructure, in economic exchanges and trade relations, in tourism and development.

The most recent Romania - Bulgaria - Greece meeting was held at Foreign Ministers' level, in Bucharest, on the 21st of May 2010. A joint declaration on the Western Balkans, an area of interest for all three states, was issued.

Trilaterals proved beneficial in strengthening the support provided by Turkey and Greece (NATO members), in achieving the strategic objective of Romania and Bulgaria: joining NATO.

1.3. Cross-border cooperation

During 2007-2013, Romania will be granted EU financial assistance to develop programs and projects in European territorial cooperation (cross-border, transnational and interregional) aimed at creating a balanced development of the EU area, by encouraging cooperation and exchanges of best practices among the EU regions. Romania and Bulgaria cooperate within the framework of the Border Cooperation Program, which was officially launched on February 15, 2008, in Călărași.



The initiation of **Black Sea Euro-region**, in 2006, was aimed at contributing to the development of cross-border cooperation between local authorities, to good governance and implementation of the rule of law.

2. Bilateral cooperation with the countries in the region

2.1. *Challenges and opportunities of cooperation with the states of the Wider Black Sea Area*

Located at the south-eastern border of the European Union and NATO, the Wider Black Sea Area is both a scene of confrontation in the political, economic and military field between key international actors, and a bridge connecting the Caucasus - Central Asia with South-Eastern and Western Europe. WBSA is regarded by the international community⁵ as a distinct area, consisting of nine states, each of them with a different view on security issues:

- Six littoral states – Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Georgia and Turkey;
- Three states in the close proximity of the littoral area – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova.

Given the diversity in terms of ethnic, political and cultural values, the divergent interests and the countries' membership in various international organizations (NATO, EU, OSCE, CIS, GUAM, CSTO), the WBSA has not reached a common approach to security risks, nor did it generate a constant concern from the Western states.

2.2. *Present situation*

The political and diplomatic relations between Romania and **Ukraine** were relatively tense during the entire existence of Ukraine as an independent state, including the "orange" period. At that time, there were decided the re-deployment of military units to the south-west border of Ukraine (with Romania) and the continuation of the Bâstroe Channel. Anti-Romanian rhetoric has become increasingly high, especially after Ukraine losing the process at the International Court of Justice in The Hague on the delimitation of the continental shelf and in the context of the recent presidential elections. During the campaign, Romania has become a favorite target of politicians and "analysts", who stated that it represents the most important external threat.

Relations have stalled in early 2010, after the installation of the new Ukrainian administration, led by Viktor Yanukovich. The main issues which continue to be at stake refer to:

- the so-called Romanian claims to a part of Bukovina (Cernăuți) and Southern Bessarabia (Odessa region);
- the Romanian identity of the Romanian minority in Ukraine;
- the construction of the Bâstroe channel by Ukraine;
- the so-called amendment of border line, by the inclusion of the Maican Island in the Romanian area (due to the changes of the Danube riverbed);
- the espionage affair in 2009, which ended up with the expulsion of both Romanian and Ukrainian defence attachés;
- the issue of recovering the Romanian investments in the Krivoi Rog steel mill⁶ etc.

The relations between Romania and **the Russian Federation** are marked by the different approaches to historical, economic and cultural issues. Last year, Russian rhetoric against Romania has intensified following: the Romanian agreements with the US on the deployment of anti-missile system elements; different views on resolving the conflict in Transnistria; Romanian support for Moldova's integration into the European community; Romania's approaches to find an alternative supply of natural gas; Romanian proposals to grant an international status to the Black Sea Area and its vision on the wide range of security challenges in the Wider Black Sea Area; Romanian opposition to the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in Ukraine, as well as well as to the extension of its term of presence, its modernization and equipping.

The relationship between Romania and the **Republic of Moldova** has been characterized by normalization. Romania supports Moldova's European course, decided by the present Moldavian leadership who placed the European integration goal at the forefront of its foreign policy. On the political level, the main measures taken by the Romanian government were: the elimination of visa requirements – established by the former communist government, the increase of Romanian investments in Moldova, opening of Romanian consulates in Bălți and Cahul, providing Romanian citizenship to Moldovan citizens, signing the agreement on local border



traffic – that allows Moldovans who live at a distance of 50 kilometers from the border with Romania to travel freely to Romania.

Although, in Moldova, the intense debate continues about the precise political orientation of this country and a large segment of the Moldovan society does not want to “upset” Moscow, the early parliamentary elections in 2010 and the new political configuration in 2011 – when the Alliance for European Integration was able to form the government give us hope for a fruitful cooperation in the future.

The peaceful settlement of the conflict in Transnistria is a political priority for Romania. We support the resumption of the formal negotiations, without preconditions, in the established format of “5+2”⁷, the observance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova, of the international rules and commitments of replacing the Russian-led peacekeeping troops with a multinational civilian mission.

Romania has strong commercial ties with **Turkey**, a common view on certain energy projects such as Nabucco/the EU Southern Corridor or the interconnection of the energy supply lines through a submarine cable. Turkey's support for Romania's integration into NATO and Romania's support for Turkey's EU membership are important facets of this relationship. Romania and Turkey work together in regional initiatives to prevent and combat threats to maritime security. The main issues at stake are related to the ways of ensuring security and the role of the regional security structures – Blackseafor and Operation Black Sea Harmony. Turkey, together with Russia, supports the principle of regional ownership (according to this, the security of the sea should be provided by the riparian states) and blocks any attempt to open/internationalize the Black Sea Area. On the alleged reason of concern for the increased maritime activity in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, Turkey promotes the ad litteram observance of the Montreux Convention (1936) principles, referring to the Turkish management of the Straits.

Relations with **Georgia** are defined by Romania's support for the territorial integrity of this country, for the return of the two breakaway republics (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) under the authority of Tbilisi, for stepping up efforts for Georgia's getting NATO membership. Romania participates in the EU Monitoring Mission

(EUMM), which aims to stabilize the situation in the conflict area. Romania is interested in developing a good relation with Georgia due to common interests – particularly, in energy security⁸, maintaining Georgia in the Caspian energy transit, ensuring energy supplies to the Black Sea Area states.

2.1.2. Political-military perspective

On short time, the threats to Romania's national security will remain low. Neither Russia nor Ukraine nor any other state takes into consideration a military confrontation with a NATO member. The major challenges to international security and to Romania will continue to be the hot spots and protracted regional (“frozen”) conflicts of the former Soviet Union area.

Romania will continue to cooperate with Ukraine on the basis of good neighborhood. A democratic, prosperous Ukrainian state, based on the rule of law, is of a vital interest for Romania. However, we are concerned because of the Ukrainian foreign policy shift towards the Russian Federation, which turns Ukraine into a supporter of Moscow's interests in the region. Nevertheless, we shall express our concern that any Romanian or Moldavian regional security initiative, which would be contrary to the interests of Moscow (collaboration in political, military, economic formats, the problem of Transnistria and the request to withdraw the Russian forces from the Republic of Moldova, the European orientation of Chisinau's foreign policy, the planned installation of anti-missile shield in Romania) will be considered inappropriate by Kiev, and this the reason for which the dialogue with Ukraine will remain difficult.

A potential conflict area perpetuates close to the territory of Romania – in Transnistria, as a result of the existing Russian military presence and increased military activities in the region.

The installation of a new political power in Chisinau, which advocates for the development of the relation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, has led to the intensification of Russian-Ukrainian joint rhetoric, these two states trying to assert their “great power” ambitions in the area.

Turkey will continue to take advantage of its geopolitical position as transit zone for energy corridors and will use this advantage in the negotiations for accession to the European Union



and for the development of a special relation with Russia.

Romania's relations with **Georgia** will continue to be based on common political and economic interests.

In the recent years, the relation with **Azerbaijan** has developed and continues to register an upward trend. Consequently, opportunities for Romania's economy and energy sector are created, and this can be useful for the development of AGRI. Romania has the opportunity to strengthen its important position as a bridge between the Central Asia, Caucasus and the EU. As a NATO Contact Point Embassy (CPE) in Azerbaijan, from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2012, Romania will benefit from economic opportunities and enhanced diplomatic contacts.

Relations with **Armenia** ought to be developed in a more dynamic way, as up to now they were modest due to Romania's policy of supporting the integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan⁹, with whom Armenia has a protracted regional conflict over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.

2.2. Romanian-Bulgarian cooperation¹⁰

Throughout the earlier or later history, relations with the countries of the WBSA were sometimes tense because of different sensitivities of the political class. But in the recent years, especially after going past the "syndrome" of competition for NATO or EU membership, Romania's relation with Bulgaria was at high levels.

Whethertaking steps "in tandem" for integration into NATO or EU, participating in ISAF¹¹ or other theaters of operations (KFOR, EUFOR-Althea or EULEX) or later, preparing to join the Schengen area, Romania and Bulgaria have made a united pledge to convince the international community that they deserve to be included and taken into account in the Euro-Atlantic or European high level decision-making forums. Key instruments through which we carry out cooperation are from the diplomatic, political, economic, military domains.

In September 2009, 130 years of diplomatic relations between Romania and Bulgaria were celebrated. A regular intense political and diplomatic dialogue and a dynamic cooperation across sectors is in place.

The cooperation between the two countries takes place under the Treaty of friendship,

cooperation and good neighborly relations, signed in Sofia, on February 27, 1992.

The Romanian communities in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian ones in Romania help strengthening the existing historical ties. According to the 2001 census, 10,556 Macedonian Romanians and 1088 Romanian were registered in Bulgaria. But the figures are debatable, as the president of the Association of Romanian Ethnic in Bulgaria, Ivo Gheorgiev estimated the number of ethnic Romanians to 150,000¹² (the second, after the Turkish minority), while recognizing that the villages are deserted over 60%. Romanians in Bulgaria can be found in the Danube area, the Timok Valley, within the country, the Balkan Mountains and the Dobrogea area.

In the past ten years, bilateral trade increased steadily, and there is a positive trade balance for Romania.

Romania cooperates with Bulgaria on bilateral level and within the **regional maritime security mechanisms**.

2.2.1. Military bilateral cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria

The bilateral military cooperation has been developed in areas such as: defence and security policy, planning, programming and budgeting, monitoring and evaluation of the armed forces, strategic planning, leadership, military, air defence and airspace management, education and training of troops, military police, communications and information technology, military law, human resource management, public relations, military education, technical-military etc. Annual meetings of experts in airspace management aim at optimizing the air traffic flow, implementing NATO standard procedures and improving flight safety. From 1994 to 2010, ten bilateral defence agreements have been signed.

2.2.2. The cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria within regional formats and maritime security mechanisms

In the format of regional maritime security mechanisms, the cooperation between the two states materializes in the South Eastern Defence Ministerial Meetings Process (SEDM), South-Eastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG), Black Sea Naval Cooperation Group (Blackseafor), the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information



Center from Burgas (BSBCIC), the Center for Combating Organized Crime of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and the EU regional initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy, Danube Strategy etc.

Romania supports Bulgaria in developing SEDM projects, especially during July 2009-July 2011, when Bulgaria holds the presidency of the structure.

Cooperation within Blackseafor (BSF) aims at increasing interoperability, carrying out research and rescue operations (SAR), soft security, humanitarian, environmental protection and, more recently (after 9/11/2001), preventing and combating terrorism.

Romania wants to maintain the current format of the BSF and avoid its transformation into a permanent force, so that the BSF would continue to carry out its traditional missions. We appreciate that the main operational tool in preventing and combating terrorism in the Black Sea should be the Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH).

OBSH is an initiative of Turkey, launched in 2004. Its mission is combating terrorism and asymmetric threats. The initiative is similar to NATO operation "Active Endeavour" in the Mediterranean Sea. While, initially, Bulgaria has not supported the initiative, it has recently declared the intention to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey to participate in OBSH.

Romania is in favor of a "labor division" between Blackseafor and OBSH and is concerned that the transformation of Blackseafor into a permanent structure will not allow the participation of non-littoral states and will prevent the opening and internationalization of the Black Sea Area. Bulgaria, however, sees Blackseafor as a permanent force, mandated to carry out missions of preventing terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction¹³.

Conclusions

Against the background of the economic crisis and the reduction of defence budgets, we notice the growing interest of NATO or EU member states to find cooperation partners outside or inside the Euro-Atlantic area or community. Thus, the five Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland), some of them only NATO members, the others only EU members, cooperate

within the Nordic Cooperation Group. Britain and France have started an unprecedented military cooperation to include joint expeditionary forces and the mutual use of the two countries' facilities. Another visible trend in recent years is Germany going closer to the Russian Federation, particularly in the political, economic and military field.

All these developments suggest that a teaming-up of states might be possible in the South-Eastern Europe too. We may consider, also, the Visegrad¹⁴ + Ukraine model, by which the member states proposed to add a military dimension to the arrangement that existed before their integration into NATO.

A greater cooperation and policy coordination of Romania with Bulgaria and Turkey (all of them NATO members) is feasible. Additionally, we can think about getting closer to the Republic of Moldova, a neutral state, if it shows interest in cooperation with these states or the Alliance.

Actually, a teaming-up of Romania and Turkey is suggested also by the political-military analyst George Friedman¹⁵, founder of STRATFOR. Noting with some surprise the good relations of the Romanians with the heirs of the Ottoman Empire, the above-mentioned author suggests the deepening of these relations. Of course, it is Bulgaria that offers the contiguous space to Turkey. The resulted area of cooperation would make sense, from the perspective of the USA and EU, too. Obviously, such cooperation would be beneficial for Turkey too, in its efforts to move closer to the European Union.

As a reasoning, the well-known analyst points out that Romania should not take NATO and EU membership for granted, seeking its "redemption" in the belongingness to these organizations or relaxing at the thought that the USA or NATO will immediately "jump" to its rescue.

In the same idea, we consider that Romania must move beyond a kind of „psychological comfort" and develop regional cooperation, in its capacity of sovereign state, which has as primary responsibility the commitment to manage its future and ensure the safety of its citizens.

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7 The Republic of Moldova, the Self Proclaimed Transnistria Republic, the Russian Federation, OSCE, Ukraine, as well as the USA and EU as observers.

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REVIEWS ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN PREVENTING AND COMBATING CROSS-BORDER CRIME

*Valentin GIUPANĂ**

Organised crime in the context of globalisation became a cross-border phenomenon, so that its effective control can be achieved only through global, regional and subregional integrated systems. Moreover, national and international instruments to combat cross-border organized crime must provide real-time operating solutions, as cross-border criminal acts are conducted very fast, and the coordinators of these networks succeed in placing the illegal product of crime in the legal circuit, and thus sanctioning is much more difficult and it is almost impossible to remove all the consequences.

Keywords: cross-border crime, globalisation, threats, evolution, interdependency, cooperation

Recognizing the phenomenon of cross-border organized crime as the main threat to security¹ must generate from the responsible factors a major reaction, a conjugation of efforts to counter the very serious effects that may occur in society as a whole, but also regionally and globally.

According to Romanian Language Explanatory Dictionary (DEX)², the term “international crime” is “a very serious offence against war laws and customs, as well as against international peace and human-kind”. According to the same bibliographical source, the term “criminality” shall include “all crimes committed in a given territory in a given period”; in our view, this is the best to name the criminal phenomenon.

The concept of cross-border organized crime is thus determined by the connection of organized crime with transnational crime. Basically, the criminal activity of this kind of network receives an international character, being used regional, continental and intercontinental circuits.

Being aware of the extremely high danger posed by organized crime offences in the field, Romania adopted a special law governing this very sensitive area. Defining a criminal organisation group, Law no. 39 of 21 January 2003 on preventing and combating organized crime, stipulates that it is “a structured group, formed of three or more persons, exists for a period of time and acts in a coordinated manner in order to commit one or more serious crimes, to obtain directly or indirectly a financial or other kind of material benefit.”³

National legislation provides for the situation in which an occasionally organized criminal group is not subject to the law preventing and combating organized crime, even if it was created in order to commit a crime. Thereby, “an organized criminal group is not a group formed occasionally in the immediate purpose of committing one or more crimes and which has no continuity or an pre-determined structure or roles for its members ...”.

Romanian law on preventing and combating organized crime also establishes crimes covered by this normative act. Among these we mention: murder, aggravated murder, slavery, blackmail, illegal deprivation of liberty, counterfeiting

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currency and other valuables, drugs or precursors trafficking, money-laundering, etc. It thus appears that serious social danger, along with the aspects listed above represent a condition for a criminal action to be placed in the category of organised crime.

The phenomenon of cross-border organised crime has emerged and is expanding with the development of globalisation, the influences of economic, finance and banking activities, transport and particularly leading technology and communications, causing its consolidation, especially that harmonisation of national legislation in the field of countering cross-border organised crime is still to be accomplished.

The main areas of intervention specific to this strategic objective are: ensuring a coherent and effective policy for combating illegal migration; preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and eliminating the negative effects it has on individuals and on society; combating drug trafficking and consumption and also improving support services for victims; prevention and combating the cyber-crime phenomenon and last but not least fighting against money laundering and against financing criminal activities including terrorism.

Romania is party to all international conventions on combating cross-border organized crime, having concluded regional and bilateral agreements and arrangements and participates effectively and actively in activities that are organized internationally to prevent and combat this criminal phenomenon.

In this respect, on a national level, preventing and combating cross-border organised crime is carried out in accordance with the provisions undertaken by ratifying international conventions to which Romania is party and in compliance with international regulations and domestic law in the field.

The international community and especially the European one encourages and supports international cooperation, considered by specialists as a way to effectively fight against cross-border organised crime.

The available tools are very diverse, ranging from legislation, best practices and recommendations to institutional tools, represented by organisations and international cooperation bodies. Furthermore, the need for cooperation with authori-

ties of other states are manifested at the individual level, represented by the official responsible for investigating offences, up to the level of authority, such as law enforcement authorities (ministries, judicial and police structures and sub-structures, etc.).

Romania's accession to the European Union has meant in terms of preventing and combating cross-border organized crime harmonisation of legislation, but also creating necessary structures, according to the recommendations and best practices of the European Union.

Romania is still in the process of adapting to European standards, as the dynamics of cross-border crime requires the authorities to adopt new laws and to create flexible structures whose target is fighting against new crime manifestation forms.

Moreover, in view of accession to the Schengen Area, Romania will have to be able to ensure the security of a large part of the European Union's external border. In this respect, the institutional and legal framework must meet EU requirements and be perfectly compatible with those of the European partners.

Securing the state frontier requires the effective participation of all state structures and organisations with responsibilities on the border in pursuit of an integrated border management compatible with EU practices; this translates by **"a complex system of measures, actions and activities developed at central and territorial level that ensure border security, maintaining normality, deploying a safe and smooth control at the border as well as protecting the Romanian state's interests in relations with neighbouring states"**⁴⁷.

As a complex task, cooperation should cover on the one hand internal relations among law enforcement authorities, between them, NGOs and civil society organizations and on the other hand external relations between law enforcement authorities in partner countries, bilateral or multilateral agreement between them and international cooperation bodies or organisations. Also, cooperation should aim mainly to prevent, achieved largely through the contribution of civil society and to combat, which is solely the responsibility of law enforcement authorities.

The international community perceives international cooperation as an important key to counter cross-border organized crime, even as a



precondition for making this multidimensional fight more effective.⁵

However, there must be made a difference between judicial and police cooperation, terms that circumscribe to two main fields: justice and security. Although they go hand in hand, both are determined to one another and ensure each other.⁶

The exchange of information covers generally the first phase of documenting criminal activities, gathering information necessary to knowing the mode of action of criminal groups and their members, but also the procedures for recovery of income from cross-border illegal activities. Our opinion is that the activity of international cooperation should focus on: exchange of data and information relating to individuals, organisations, networks, means of transport and goods connected with an investigated criminal activity; operational activities, legal and information assistance to implement, national and international legislation and regulations in the field of police and customs; **insurance of mutual technical assistance** by exchange of expertise, knowledge and professional, scientific and technical resources; personnel comprehensive training in various areas of law enforcement.

At the basis of measures for preventing and combating cross-border organized crime are certain modes of action such as finding and eradicating the main causes favouring their emergence and manifestation.

According to specialists, prevention is achieved by several ways:

- prevention through law enforcement, which mainly involves finding and suppressing offences, is a post-factum intervention having a warning role for future breaches;
- prevention by establishing actions and measures that can hinder criminal activity, a key matter for the appropriate conceptual component of preventing and combating, effectively adapted to determine the directions and timing of the crime manifestations;
- prevention through preparing the victim / target for self-defence - by victim understanding both an individual or the community, as well as intrinsic values - institutions, goals or goods for which preventive concepts and procedures are prepared and applied;
- prevention through measures of improving the democratic relations of the community, based

on the promotion and observance of legality in all spheres (social, economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural etc.).

- prevention through promoting social justice.

Each institution engaged in combating unconventional threats to security must keep order in its structure. The government must know what each of these institutions does and how cooperation is realised among parts of the system. A failure in this area may have important implications internationally.

We believe that, in accordance with the evolution of the cross-border crime phenomenon, bilateral or regional cooperation, at least in Europe, will become increasingly necessary. Therefore, emphasis should be made on widening regional organizations work on a continental scale, by the efforts of Member States to harmonize legislation and procedures. This is due to the mode of action of cross-border criminal groups, which are currently expanding their activities in several regions and even continents.

The necessity for international cooperation is given on the one hand, by the need of authorities to benefit from the support of experienced staff and on the other hand, by the need for dismantling all segments of trans-national organized criminal groups.

Not only in Romania, but also in other countries' legislation, international comity and reciprocity have been established. Thus, if there is no international convention on judicial cooperation, states may request assistance under international comity, based on a request sent through diplomatic channels by the requesting state and with a written assurance of reciprocity from the competent authority of that state.

Moreover, lack of reciprocity is not a consistent reason to refuse the request for assistance provided that: the required assistance should prove necessary due to the nature of the crime or the need to fight against certain forms of serious crime; the request should contribute to the improvement of the defendant or convict situation or to his social reintegration; it should serve to clarify the legal situation of a citizen of the requested state.

In a bid to broaden the scope of cooperation and due to the fact that not every request for assistance meets the requirements of judicial cooperation in criminal matters aimed at preventing, detecting, investigating and bringing to justice cross-border



crimes perpetrators, states have provided legal and institutional instruments through which the exchange of data and information can be achieved. Generally, this activity is about transmitting upon request or on its own initiative information with operational value, on persons or criminal actions that are not criminally investigated, as required for the request of judicial assistance in criminal matters. Due to the trans-boundary nature and its specific ways of manifestation, organised crime cannot be investigated by law enforcement authorities only at national level, without requiring cooperation and support of international community.

The combat against cross-border organised crime is getting a more and more visible global character, and this approach will significantly influence political developments in certain geographical areas and, overall, those in the international arena, being capable to lead to isolating some regimes, reconfiguration of power relations in specific geopolitical spaces, and, to a certain extent, to expedite the process of reforming the UN, an organization which should more decisively assume finding practical, efficient solutions to the challenges which world security is facing.

The continuous development of national and international legal framework demonstrates Romania's and Euro-Atlantic states' concern towards the threat of cross-border organised crime, being the grounding of concrete plans and action programs and changing, by the effects of their application, the security environment architecture. Any pertinent analysis of the current security environment cannot exclude the presence of new non-state factors, represented by terrorist and cross-border organised crime groups and organisations. Romania is party to international conventions on combating cross-border organised crime, having concluded a series of agreements and arrangements on a bilateral and regional level and participates effectively in activities that are organized internationally to prevent and combat this phenomenon.

In this respect, on a national level, preventing and combating cross-border organised crime is carried out in accordance with the provisions undertaken by ratifying international conventions to which Romania is party and in compliance with international regulations and domestic law in the field.

Organised crime in the context of globalisation has become a cross-border phenomenon and thus, its combat can no more be achieved by nation states, but within integrated global, regional and sub-regional organisations. Moreover, national and international instruments to combat cross-border organised crime must provide real-time operating solutions, as cross-border criminal acts are conducted very quickly, and the coordinators of these networks succeed in placing the illegal product of crimes in the legal circuit, thus making it more difficult to apply sanctions and almost impossible to remove all the consequences.

With this brief presentation we tried to emphasize that both the regulatory and the actional framework of combating cross-border organised crime at national, regional and international level must continuously improve as a solution to respond to the ongoing transformation of threats generated by this phenomenon.

In conclusion, efficient cooperation at national, international and inter-departmental level is the main determining element in the activity of prevention and combating cross-border crime.

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BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY IN CASE OF ACCIDENTAL POLLUTION. TWO STUDY CASES

Francisc TOBĂ, PhD

International cooperation in environment security field, particularly with regard to the environment incidents, in cross-border basins, is one of the priorities of the institutions and countries in the region, including Romania, Hungary and Ukraine. A problem of utmost importance is the mining leases and the derelict ponds with a high pollution potential for public and environment security. Accidental pollutions caused by environment incidents, such as Baia Mare and Baia Borșa (Romania) and Ajka (Hungary), cases which are the subject-matter of the present survey, highlight that Europe and, particularly, ex-communist countries are confronted with the issue of the preserved, abandoned or still operational decantation ponds. Pollution potential management is one of the greatest challenges for the environment security in the hydrographic basins in the territory of several European countries.

Key-words: environment security; accidental pollution; hydrographic basins; decantation ponds.

Introduction

In a globalising world, environment security becomes more and more a priority on the agenda of local and world decision makers. In our opinion, environment security refers to both security of the bios (which also includes the human being) and of natural resources, but, above all, to maintaining a balance between human civilisation and evolution, on the one hand, and the natural environment potential to sustain it, on the other.

One can identify conditional relations between national security and environment security resulting from the very role played by the natural environment as a main supplier of security resources. Environment incidents, of natural or human activity causes, have increasingly become factors of vulnerability for a nation security potential. Environment security is pre-eminently a cross-border issue where cooperation in prevention and management of certain incidents constitutes a primary condition. Chernobyl atomic disaster in

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1986 is perhaps the most serious warning in this sense.

The accidental pollution phenomenon with a cross-border impact is a real challenge for specialists in environment sciences as well as for authorities, communities or citizens. The existence of certain hydrographic basins on the territory of several neighbouring countries imposes an integrating approach in the case of significant pollution, a regional cooperation which would enable the identification of the main pollution sources at national level, including management methods for the serious incidents resulting from cross-border pollution sources.

In this sense, bilateral cooperation between Romania and Hungary in case of accidental pollutions is an eloquent example and the two presented cases, which occurred at a decade time interval, will point out the particularities of this cooperation.

Case 1 –Accidents occurred at Baia Mare and Baia Borșa

This case survey is based on the report issued by the international commission for the assessment of the accident which occurred at Baia Mare, in accordance with the tasks imposed by commissioner Margot Wallström and supported by the environment ministers of Hungary and Romania, in connection with the accidents that occurred at Baia Mare and Baia Borșa, in January and March 2000.

The following set of questions was imposed:

1. What happened and why did it happen?
2. What are the damages caused?
3. What other dangerous locations remained in Tisa hydrographic basin?
4. What are the recommendations in order to minimise the risks of similar accidents to occur?

The report was issued following thorough documentation achieved both in the area where the accidents occurred and in the affected areas, by taking into account the opinions of local authorities, of NGO's, and of the citizens. The governments of Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia made available the results of their own investigations. Access to the investigations conducted by UNEP and EEC and to those conducted by the German and Dutch agencies and WWF was also possible. Independent investigations were also ordered to enable the understanding of certain particular

aspects regarding environment regulations, technologies and security.

The consequences could have been of a higher magnitude as 120 tons of cyanide and 20.000 tons of heavy metal sediments were discharged in the environment. There were no deaths or serious mass illnesses. The factors which limited the negative consequences were, on the one hand, the ice layer that covered the waters on a 200 km distance downstream Baia Mare and, on the other hand, the floods (the most serious in the last 100 years) which carried and dispersed the heavy metals and thus reduced the concentration level in the hydrographic and water meadow system.

Similar situations are present in other locations as well, hence the real potential for this kind of accidents to occur again. The requirement is therefore to produce a risk evaluation map and a set of actions that would enable an adequate management. The authors of the report consider it opportune to issue a "Guide for Industry" to clarify the mining industry regulations for the extractive and ore processing industry, in accordance with EU documents. The guide would also enable an integrating approach of the industries' obligations and the awareness at the public opinion level, regarding the amount of insecurity that may be provided by this field of activity and the manner in which responsibilities should be assigned in these cases, including civil emergencies management.

1. What happened?

On 30th of January 2000, in the evening, in the proximity of Baia Mare town, a dam of the decantation pond from an old store mining sterile installation burst. As a result of this accidental pollution, 100.000 m³ of waste water which contained about 120 tons of cyanides and heavy metals were discharged in Lăpuș River and, subsequently, in Someș and Tisa rivers. Through Hungary, the pollution factor reached the Danube.

On 10th of March 2000, another mining sterile dam burst at Baia Borșa, in a region near the border with Ukraine. As a result, 20.000 tons of sediments were discharged in Novăț River, an affluent of the Vișeu and Tisa rivers.

The Table no. 2 summarises the reasons that led to the two accidental pollutions.

Considering the assumptions, it becomes obvious that there is a real potential to further

Baia Mare	Baia Borşa
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Design errors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use of a closed circuit installation without explicit provisions for water excess overflow /store capacity; -Inappropriate dam wall because of the lack of homogeneity of the sterile; - Non-functional hydro-cyclones at very low temperatures. 	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Design errors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Use of an installation without explicit provision for water excess overflow; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non-functional pumps; - Inadequate design of precipitation drain.
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Authorisation Deficiencies</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Errors in the initial study regarding the impact on the environment; - Errors in the evaluation of the weather conditions impact on the respective mining location design; - There is no clear responsibility regarding the process security in the actions taken for the authorisation purpose which is solid and diffuse; - Inadequate monitoring requirements. 	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Authorisation Deficiencies</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The installation was operated without environment protection authorisation.
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Operation Deficiencies</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non-compliance with the design requirements as concerns the dam wall construction elements. 	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Operation Deficiencies</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inadequate maintenance of the pipes and pumps. - Lack of a plan for emergency situations.
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Weather conditions</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">A combination of extreme, but not unprecedented weather conditions.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Weather conditions</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">A combination of extreme, but not unprecedented weather conditions.</p>

Table no. 1

generate accidental pollution and the weather conditions have done nothing but favouring the two accidents.

2. The Impact of accidental pollutions

The pollution accident of Baia Mare caused the overflow of a noxious mixture of cyanide and copper initially in Tisa River and then, through the Danube, in the Black Sea. This accidental pollution had a major impact on the existing ecosystems of the affected hydrographic area but, because the pollution was made of dissolved materials, no pollutant deposits were found. Actually, after the passing of this noxious material, no significant

cyanide quantities were left in the river or on the banks.

The pollution case of Baia Borşa was totally different since the whole quantity of mud and water with a high content of mud and heavy metals was discharged in Novăț River. The largest quantity of mud was left in the pond area while the polluted water was discharged in Vişeu River bed and then in the upper stream of Tisa River. The majority of the heavy metals contained by the water made a deposit on the upper stream of Tisa. Significant floods occurred at a short time after this accidental pollution as a result of rapid heating. This produced a new driving and a dispersion of the heavy metals.



The impact on the community's health on a short term was not significant, as there was no record of deaths or mass illnesses. The actions taken quickly and efficiently by the authorities regarding potable water supply had any risk in this respect eliminated.

On a long term, the impact on Tisa River's ecosystems can be assessed only by an adequate follow-up process.

3. Communication

The adequate management of the civil emergency situations such as accidental pollutions assumes a performance management in the area of communication between institutions and with people. People, if warned and if they have similar information, can become active factors in solving the emergency situation.

Commissionaire Margot Wallström's visit, accompanied by the Romanian and Hungarian ministers of environment, created favourable premises for calming down public opinion and increasing people's trust in the state institutions' potential to solve the situation rapidly and efficiently.

The analysis of this subject has highlighted that the citizens of the three countries, Romania, Hungary and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have a different information culture concurrently with the relatively different interest of the officials relative to the citizens' sensitivity for information of the kind. A version of the PNUM/OCHA Report was published for the people's access, in four languages, through the Regional Environment Centre of Szentendre (Hungary) and was disseminated via the Non-Governmental Organizations.

These cases have pointed out that, in the trans-border cooperation for the achievement of an increased European security, the International Commission for the Danube Protection must identify and develop performance capabilities in the public relations field, providing in the shortest possible time the required information on the environment security incidents. The cases have demonstrated the action potential of the interpersonal relations of specialists, which potentates the process of implementation of bilateral agreements between Hungary and Romania.

4. Regulation Framework

Regarding the possible solutions to avoid accidental pollutions, there are two major fields

that must be settled: 1) those which concern the technologies in use and 2) those which concern the legal matrix.

Analyses have been performed in possible alternative technologies which exclude the use of cyanides for the mineral residues processing and in using a less toxic separation agent. Specialists in the industrial field who use this technology claim that, at this moment, there is no other better solution in terms of cost efficiency and less toxicity.

A solution would be the development of fundamental research in this field and the identification of new technological solutions. If cyanide technology cannot be replaced, the report authors' recommendation is that no new processing installation which uses cyanide should then store cyanide water in open ponds exposed to the various weather conditions. Cyanide must be removed from the mixture in the installation so that toxic substances should not be discharged in the ponds any longer. The solution is viable both from a technological and an economical point of view. A rapid evaluation of all the processing installations is therefore required in order to implement the technological process modifications that would allow us to obtain this result.

Regarding the legal framework to be considered, the mining companies, including the managers and all the workers, must focus on developing and observing a real security culture. The awareness of dangers will allow their adequate management. The ISO 9000 (quality management), ISO 14.000 (environment management) standards or the EU EAMS Scheme will be applied.

As concerns the regulation framework, we should take into consideration the following fields:

- design and approval;
- operation;
- waste management;
- close down;
- abandoned location.

One of the issues of utmost importance concerns the abandoned mining locations and ponds with a high impact on public and environment security. A list including a number of 23 dangerous mining and ore processing locations was drawn up in September 2000 and the Romanian, Hungarian and Slovakian governments assumed the responsibility to monitor them and to take all the actions regarding the necessary corrections. This list does not include



the abandoned locations. These represent a high potential risk of discharging the toxic substances and heavy metals in the natural environment. The abandoned mining locations are a pan-European problem that requires a continental approach.

One of the European approaches represents the firm obligation in the authorisation content to close down the new mining workings. An example in this respect is the ore processing installation at Lisheen (Ireland) which has a yearly production of 1.500.000 tons of ore. The authorisation issued in 1997 requires explicitly the implementation, up-dating and revision of an Environment Quality System which includes A Mine Close Down Plan and a Permanent Protection Plan. As a guarantee, the holder of the authorisation was compelled to deposit the amount of € 12.2 million to finance the Close Down Plan and the amount of €1.7 million to finance the Permanent Protection Plan.

One of the biggest problems refers to the mining locations that ceased their activity but were closed down inadequately. A classification of these mining locations includes the locations without an owner, those whose owner cannot be identified or those whose owner is insolvent and is unable to finance the close down. Identification of the financing solutions and the development of an adequate legal framework are necessary in these cases.

The abandoned locations' issue should be solved by the identification, in a first stage, of a list including the priorities in terms of the risks for each mining location based on a jointly agreed methodology of risk evaluation. The study regarding the Tisa basin drawn up by the International Commission for the Danube Protection, in the summer of the year 2000, should be extended in the second stage. The third stage must cover the completion of the Romanian authorities' inventory regarding the abandoned and dangerous ponds and the issue of a joint list of pollution sources in Tisa basin, as identified on 5th of October 2000, by a group of Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak and Ukrainian experts. The EU Commission involvement is required in order to speed up the completion of this process and to obtain a single approach.

5. Tisa Basin from the perspective of sustainable development

The accidental pollution case at Baia Borşa determined the decision-making factors of the

countries involved in Tisa Basin management to request the experts' list containing the high risk mining locations. This approach was the result of close cooperation with the International Commission for the Danube Protection and was completed on 25th of August 2000.

Sustainable development in this hydrographic area must have as a starting point the reduction of the number of environment incidents and this objective can be attained only by adopting an integrated regional program developed in accordance with the EU Water Framework Directives which refer to cross-border waters' management under regional cooperation. The correction for the polluting locations of Tisa basin was achieved by setting up a joint commission of experts from Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine which had the first round of discussions in January 2001 in order to establish a set of proposals regarding the Environment Joint Program for Tisa Basin.

The general objective of this program is to improve the quality of life for the inhabitants of Tisa Basin, to increase the environment security, to protect natural and environment values by developing a sustainable water quality management and reducing the pollution risks.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

The authors of the report have reached the conclusion that these accidental pollutions were possible due to the following:

- inadequate decantation ponds;
- Romanian Authorities validation of insecure designs;
- Incorrect follow-up of project achievement and dam operation;
- Significant, but not decisive role of severe weather conditions.

The consequences of these accidental pollutions were:

- insignificant for public health;
- significant for natural and economic environment – the recovery speed of Tisa River was impressive;
- the increased importance of abandoned ponds in terms of environment security risks.

Regarding the Regulation framework, the recommendations can be distinguished as follows:



- interdiction of closed circuit process technological solutions unless they include feasible excess water overflow and storage solutions;
- technological solutions must provide the removal of cyanides and of other dangerous substances before the sterile is stored in the decantation ponds;
- review of the European legislation on mining and ore processing;
- promoting a security culture in the industrial units in this field;
- compulsory actions regarding the closing down and the permanent protection of mines and decantation ponds.

Case 2 – The Ajka disaster

An accidental pollution occurred on 4th of October 2010 at the bauxite-aluminum plants in Ajka, which were under the ownership of the Hungarian MAL Company and located west Hungary, at 160 km distance from the capital, Budapest. This is considered the most serious industrial accident in the history of the neighbour country.

A tank cracked and 700.000 m³ of toxic slime was discharged on an area of 40 km², the most affected place being Kolontar. The arsenic, aluminium and organic carbon concentration exceeded the acceptable limits at the level of Torna Brook, seriously affecting the ecosystems of the Torna and Marca Brooks. The sludge, to a large extent diluted, reached Raba River, a direct affluent of the Danube and then the river.

The situation determined the involvement of the Hungarian Authority for the Management of Disasters. Veszprem, Győr-Moson-Sopron and Vas regions were the regions for which a state of emergency was declared. The state of emergency was subsequently extended until 31st of March 2011.

Greenpeace stated that after the tank breaking in October 2010, MAL ran out of sufficient tanks for the storage of toxic substances and uses an illegal drain system of natural water. Ecologists consider this accident more serious than the accident which occurred in 2000 at Baia Mare. At Baia Mare and Baia Borșa, the accident did not produce any human victims whereas the environment incident in Hungary caused the death of 11 people.

Hungarian ecologists pointed out that the seven tanks located at only 100 km distance on the north-west of Budapest, contain 12 million tons of

toxic residues that have been accumulated since 1945. This quantity is 10 times larger than the one discharged on 4th of October 2010. A massive discharge would jeopardise all the potable water reserves of Hungary.

On the occasion of the visit in Budapest and at Ajka, on 28th of October 2010, the Minister of Environment and Forests, Laszlo Borbely, proposed to set up a joint Romanian-Hungarian commission for the management of the ecologic disasters. The minister's proposal also referred to the creation of a fund at the EU level which would serve for the removal of the effects produced by the accidental pollutions and for the reconsideration of the actions to be taken at the EU level, in such situations.

Romanian and Hungarian parties have agreed to set up a Joint Institute of Research for Tisa Basin, the Interregional Development Project for South Tisa and also the Joint management of the National Parks Cefa and Koros-Maros.

The environment ministers attending the UNEP meeting, held in Nairobi, agreed on the idea of rewriting certain smaller projects between Hungary and Romania (the Ministry for Development) so that they should become master projects in the cross-border cooperation. One of the objectives is to create a joint training centre at Oradea or Arad with the participation of specialists not only from Hungary and Romania, but also from Ukraine, Moldavia or Belarus.

On the 12th of October 2010, the famous newspaper Washington Post noted that the in the majority of ex-communist countries, abandoned mines and tanks for toxic substances constitute a real danger, a time bomb, for the environment security.

The water contaminated with heavy metals from the abandoned mines is discharged in the ground water layer and in the rivers. Washington Post sustains that, in Hungary, a chemical plant complex produces over 100.000 tons of toxic substances yearly and the soil of eastern Slovakia is contaminated with biphenyl poly-chlorates which may cause cancer. In Bulgaria, the most serious accidental pollution occurred in 1996 when the walls of a residue tank from the copper processing works at Zgoringrad gave way. The accident caused the death of 448 people and a whole area became improper for human activities.

An aspect that should be always taken into consideration is the fact that in the majority of



cases, inspections are carried out only on the operational tanks.

The ecologic incident from Ajka is considered the second in magnitude at the 2010 level, after the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig platform in the Gulf of Mexico.

The discharge of crude oil in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico could be stopped only two months after the explosion. The losses estimated, at the level of November 2010, amount to 40 billion dollars only for British Petroleum. The impact on local economy and on associated ecosystems is difficult to be estimated and specialists consider the effects will be felt for at least a decade.

Conclusions

Global processes have created the premises for the cross-border economic development based on still imperfect regulations and have imposed the reconsideration of the concepts regarding cross-border or regional cooperation.

If the globalisation process evolution over the years in the economic and financial fields proves that the gap between the very rich and the very poor has deepened, the globalisation dividends are assumed only by certain people and the costs are paid by the others, as far as the environment security is concerned, the reality cruelly proves that we are all on the same side of the barricade.

The quality of the environment, its potential to support the evolution of our civilisation on Earth and the direction in which the inhabitants of “the global village” are “riding” becomes everybody’s problem, the environment security being the field in which all of us MUST become beneficiaries and suppliers of security. Global and local decision makers tend to focus more and more on environment incidents’ issue as a result of high recovery costs and, especially, as a result of their cross-border character and of the real difficulties in managing possible material and human damages.

Environment incidents referred to in this study highlight the necessity to approach the problem from the following points of view:

- the development of a national “map” containing all the objectives and environment risk evaluation;
- the implementation of an environment security culture depending on the real status parameters;
- the simultaneous development of solution

technologies that enable an increased security of the installations and the implementation of certain early alert actions;

- the identification of the most efficient methods of communication between the national entities at the cross-border level, especially in those water basins that pass the territory of several countries, and acting based on joint intervention procedures.

There are solutions for accidental pollution most often in a responsible approach from those who design and manufacture these installations, as well as from those in charge of monitoring and taking actions in this sensitive field and the European principle of prevention must become a reference system for all actions related to the environment.

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COOPERATION IN THE AREAS OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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The problem of resources of all kinds is an urgent topic at the moment, and it is being more and more frequently discussed lately in academia, politics and media. Everyone is seeking solutions for energy, food and water supplies. Uncontrolled exploitation of soil and subsoil of the earth led ultimately, among other things, in addition to soil degradation, to significant climate change, with important implications on national security. The issue of energy resources will be solved by using alternative resources. The national security, the resources and the environment are interrelated, as they are essential tool for life and develop only together. The solution to these problems is regional cooperation.

Key-words: security; resources; environment; energy potential; cooperation.

Lately, energy and climate change are addressed complementarily in the EU in the context of a renewed vision for the European and world economic development. Common approach of these two policies has become a strategic option, given the major impact that the climate change phenomenon generates on the economy and society. There are also considered the effects of the activity in the energy sector as the main

contributor to global warming, particularly because of pollution resulting from burning fossil fuels.

In March 2007, during the Spring European Council, Heads of State and Government of Member States have adopted a Joint Action Plan of the European Union's energy / climate change, for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the increase of energy sources with a low carbon dioxide. There have been validated the targets of the Plan predicting that by 2020, the Union must reduce by 20% the greenhouse gas emissions, to reach a level of 20% renewable energy in total energy consumption, to decrease energy consumption by 20% and to reach a level of 10% biofuels out of the total fuel quantity.

On 23 January 2008, the European Commission presented a package of draft legislation needed to define sharing between Member States of the objectives agreed at Community level in the fields of energy / climate change.

On 13-14 March 2008 European Council welcomed the Commission's proposals, stressing the need to take into account the division between the Member States of targets for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, of the potential, the circumstances and specificity of national

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economies, and the need to ensure sustainable economic growth throughout the Union.

Romania voiced its support for strengthening the EU's role as world leader in combating climate change through the commitment to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 20% at EU level by 2020¹.

In June 2008, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development of Romania proposed a draft *on The National Sustainable Development Strategy of Romania. Horizons 2013-2020-2030² (SDS)*. The proposed strategic objectives on short, medium and long term are:

- Horizon 2013: incorporating the principles and practices of sustainable development, according to EU requirements in all programs and policies of Romania;
- Horizon 2020: reaching the current average level (with reference to the figures of 2006) EU-27, according to basic indicators of sustainable development;
- Horizon 2030: getting significantly closer to the average that year of EU Member States in terms of sustainable development indicators.

Among the supplements to these objectives can also be found the use of the best available technologies, from economically and environmentally point of view, for the investment decisions of public funds at national, regional and local level and in order to stimulate such decisions by private capital; firmly introducing eco-efficiency criteria in all production and service activities.

In the SDS of Romania, the main strategic directions of the energy policy, in accordance with the objectives and policies agreed at EU level are:

- Energy security: maintaining national sovereignty over primary energy resources and respecting the national energy options; increasing security of energy supply and maintaining import dependency at an acceptable level by diversifying import sources, own energy resources, national and regional routes and transport networks; developing regional cooperation to protect critical energy infrastructure;
- The improvement of energy efficiency throughout the chain resources- production transport-distribution-final consumption by optimising production and distribution processes and reducing overall consumption of primary

energy compared to products or services; increasing the share of electricity produced from renewable resources in total consumption and in electricity production; using rationally and efficiently primary non-renewable resources and progressively decreasing their share in final consumption; promoting the production of electricity and heat in high efficiency cogeneration plants; using secondary energy resources; supporting research, development and innovation in the energy sector, focusing on increasing eco-efficiency; reducing the negative impact of energy sector on the environment and complying with obligations in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants;

- Competitiveness: further developing and improving competitive electricity markets, natural gas, oil, uranium, coal, green certificates, energy services in the context of regional integration; increasing participation in the EU emission allowance trading greenhouse gas emissions; liberalisation of energy transit and insuring constant and non-discriminatory access of market participants to the transmission, distribution and international interconnections; developing energy infrastructure, further restructuring and privatisation in the fields of electricity, heat and gas; continuing the process of restructuring the extraction and use of lignite in order to increase profitability and capital market access; setting up a regional energy exchange and the continuing Romania's participation in the process of strengthening the European energy markets.

- In order to limit the impact of energy sector on climate change, greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced by 10% in 2013 compared with base year 1989. Romania will participate actively, within the EU framework, in agreeing targets for the second implementation period, post-2012, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the negotiation of comprehensive international agreements. Primary energy intensity will decrease in 2013 to 0.34 tons of oil equivalent (toe) per 1000 EUR - 2005 (versus 0.511 toe/1.000 EUR - 2006), and final energy intensity to 0.23 toe/1.000 EUR - 2005. According to the National Strategy on energy efficiency, energy intensity will be reduced at the end of 2015, with a percentage between 50% (optimistic scenario) and 30% (pessimistic scenario) compared to 2005 figures,



in the context of an estimated GDP dynamics of 5.4% in the period 2003-2015³.

On the other hand, at present, the overall objective of SDS / EU is to ensure that transport systems must meet the needs of economic, social and environmental aspects of society, reducing at the same time to a minimum the undesirable impact on the economy, society and environment.

Development, specialisation and improved quality of services is not an end in itself, but a specific instrument for increasing efficiency of modern economies and competitiveness in all other economic and social sectors. The contribution brought by the research-development-innovation services, information technologies, transport and communications, training and continuous improvement of workforce, financial intermediation, far from inhibiting the development of directly productive sectors (industry, construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing and fish farming), highlights the potential of modernisation and efficiency of resource use.

The Danube has great energy potential, both hydrological and wind, which are clean and inexhaustible sources. The Danube region has a great capacity in terms of renewable energy. The exploitation of wind energy is in a pioneering phase, but this region has considerable potential. Unfortunately, in Romania, obtaining electricity from clean sources has a very small percentage, only 11% in 2010 and is expected to increase up to 11.2% in 2015.

In the Strategy for the Danube region, promoting sustainable energy resources and better coordination of environmental policy are a priority, along with modernisation of the energy, implementation of the European Energy Program, and strengthening the Trans-European Transport (TEN-T), which could bring substantial improvements for the region.

This year marks the 155th anniversary of the Peace Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856), after the Crimean War (1853-1856), a treaty which included provisions for the internationalisation of the Danube, the set up of the Danube Commission, and proclaiming neutrality of the Black Sea.

The European Danube Commission was the first international organisation - in the context of the nineteenth century - dedicated to the Danube cooperation. Danube Commission (DC) is an inter-governmental international organisation based in

Budapest (1954), which carries out its work under the Convention on the navigation regime on the Danube, signed on 18 August 1948 in Belgrade.

On June 29, 1994, 11 of the States in the Danube Basin (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine) and the European Commission signed in Sofia (Bulgaria), the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube, bringing to public attention the need to protect this river. Subsequently, the Convention was signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. These countries are parties to the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube⁴.

International Commission for the Protection of the River Danube (ICPDR), based in Vienna (Austria), coordinates all activities in the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube. Its mission is to promote and coordinate sustainable and equitable management of water, including conservation, improvement and rational use of water for the benefit of the Danube River Basin countries and their inhabitants.

ICPDR is composed of national delegations of the States Parties to the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube. These delegations are made up of senior government officials, experts, representatives of civil society and scientific community.

Romania became a member of the International Commission for the Protection of the River Danube in 1995, with ratification by Law no. 14/1995, of the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube⁵.

Lower Danube Green Corridor Declaration, signed in 2000 by environment ministers from Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Moldova aimed to protect 775,000 ha of existing protected areas and to designate *new* protected areas on an area of 160,000 ha along the 1000 km - *the corridor's* length⁶.

Danube Cooperation Process (CAP) was officially launched in Vienna on 27 May 2002, following a joint initiative of Romania, Austria, European Commission and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe⁷.

Danube Cooperation Process stipulates the improvement of cooperation among states in the



region at political level and also in the sphere of economy, sustainable development, transport, shipping, tourism, culture and sub-regions.

The pillars underpinning the Danube Strategy are⁸:

- Interconnection of the Danube region (for example, improving mobility, promoting a sustainable energy policy, of culture and tourism);

- Environmental Protection in the Danube region (for example, restoring water quality, environmental risk management and biodiversity conservation);

- Increasing prosperity in the Danube region (for example, developing the research capacity, education and information technology, the support of business competitiveness and investment in people skills);

- Strengthening the Danube region (for example improving institutional capacity and enhancing cooperation in order to combat organised crime).

The strategy will focus on specific areas for priority action, such as improving navigability, water quality, the development of cooperation in the field of security and improving the tourism potential.

Romania's participation in the EU Strategy for the Danube region brings many advantages, not only to our country but also across Europe:

- A dynamic Danube region, competitive and prosperous;

- Development of integrated transport systems and environmental monitoring based on new technologies;

- Cleaner water, protection of biodiversity, fight against pollution and reduce of flood risk at the border;

- Improvement of administrative capacity, fostering cultural exchanges and "people to people" contacts.

Since they are essential to life and they develop only together, national security, resources and environment are interrelated. Without a healthy environment there can be no economic development, and without the latter, security can't be provided neither at national level, nor at European level. Danube is a cohesion factor among these elements.

NOTES:

1 Romania, 2nd place in the EU in decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases, <http://www.stopco2.ro/2010/04/01/romania-locul-2-in-ue-la-scaderea-emisiilor-de-gaze-cu-efect-de-sera/>.

2 The National Sustainable Development Strategy of Romania., <http://strategia.ncsd.ro/>.

3 * * * The Sustainable Development Strategy of Romania., Bucharest, 2008, p. 42.

4 http://www.mmediu.ro/vechi/departament_ape/fluviul_dunarea/documentar_ziua_dunarii2008.doc.

5 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/54254621/25/Comisia-Interna%C5%A3ional%C4%83-pentru-Protec%C5%A3ia-Fluviului-Dun%C4%83rea>.

6 <http://www.stopco2.ro/2010/02/18/s-au-sarbatorit-10-ani-de-cooperare-internationala-in-bazinul-dunarii/>.

7 <http://old.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=7271&idlnk=1&cat=3>.

8 <http://danubeedu.org/2011/02/03/strategia-dunarii-coordonatori-de-domenii-prioritare/>.



THE EUROPEAN UNION – FROM REGIONAL COOPERATION TO UNITARY ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Dorel BUȘE, PhD**

In the era of globalization, the evolution of the international system has led to major reconfigurations of Europe at the beginning of the millennium, and under these circumstances, the question is what role would the EU play and what kind of power would it be in a multipolar world. A multinational union is fundamentally different from other great powers, and its success depends on internal and external actions and on the will of other major powers. It is clear that the country which will win the economic race in which most countries are involved today (US, Europe, China and Japan being the most important economic superpower), will also rule the world.

Key-words: multinational union; global player; unitary actor; super-state; multilateralism; European Security Strategy.

According to some political analysts, the European Union represents the most probable competitor regarding the assumption and the administration of global businesses. EU represents a particular case when we analyze the international organizations, due to the centripetal evolution process; from a treaty to another, it can be noticed an incessant coagulation, tending to form a unitary actor. At present, after six enlargement, the EU comprises 27 member states: Belgium

(1952), France (1952), Germany (1952), Italy (1952), Luxembourg (1952), Netherlands (1952), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986), Austria (1995), Finland (1995), Sweden (1995), Cyprus (2004), Estonia (2004), Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), Malta (2004), Poland (2004), Czech Republic (2004), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Hungary (2004), Bulgaria (2007) and Romania (2007). If from the demographic (492.387.344 people in the present form), cultural and economic point of view European Union overtakes the United States, by cumulating the gross national income from all member state (14.9 trillions \$ in the new form), in order to become a world power, the EU should be strengthening itself (by solving the difficult issue achieving a common position of its member states and a unification in their actions, the oscillation of the UK between the EU and USA – it continues to stay out of the Euro area –, the absence of a unique European army, as well as the low economic level, and not only, of the ex-communist states) and fortify its institutions, to use a single currency (fact which has already happened) and to build a common diplomacy and defence. All these goals are about to become true in the very next future, even if some politicians (e.g. Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher)

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consider that the appearance of an European super-state could generate a more dangerous world, with blocks of power in competition¹.

A first step made by the EU to become an important political power in the international system was the decision of enlargement from Helsinki. In this way, the EU ensures its supereminence in the international system. The adhesion of the Baltic States regards limiting Russia's access at the Baltic Sea; the adherence of Romania and Bulgaria sights out limiting Russia's access at the Black Sea. The adherence of Malta, situated between Sicily and the African shore, offers the EU the advantage to have the upper hand of the Mediterranean Sea and to exert its influence on the African Continent. The adhesion of Cyprus, located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, close to Turkey, between Europe, Asia Minor and North Africa, confers control not only on Africa, but also in Asia Minor. Candidate countries, such as Turkey, can grant EU an easier connection with Asia and Middle East, through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. If we are taking into account Simion Mehedinti's statement, which says that: „nation's power increases and decreases depend on the variations of their populations' number”, the decision of territorial enlargement has another justification. The European Union's power will increase not only due to the enlarged population number, but as a result of the included territories (Ray Cline's formula is well known: the perceived power is offered by both the population and the territory, not only by the economic and military power, planning and will²).

The European security strategy (ESS), realized as a result of the EU misunderstandings over the Iraq intervention, and adopted in December 2003, at the European Council in Rome, represents an attempt to establish a common European view, regarding the new international security challenges and marks an important step forward through a better coordination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. European security strategy, named “A secure Europe in a better world”³, involves an important change of paradigm: the European Union considers itself a global actor, prepared to assume its role in global security issues. ESS consists in three sections, the first of them presenting an European analysis of the present security context (poverty, diseases, competition for limited resources and global warming, which

may have a negative impact on the security of the EU's member states; the second section identifies three major strategic objectives for the EU and the third one marks out EU's political implications. After the risk models identified by NATO Strategic Concept and USA National Security Strategy, ESS finds five major challenges, which are interconnected: *terrorism* – Europe being an important target and a base for the afferent organizations; *the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction*; *regional conflicts* taking place in the entire world or in the EU's neighborhood, a fact that can lead to extremism, terrorism or *failed states*, which can undermine global governance and contribute to regional instability and which may also be related to obvious threats, such as organized crime and terrorism; *the organized crime*, which may be associated with terrorism and weak states.

ESS admits that the EU can use military force to deter the fabrication of weapons of mass destruction and affirms its support in regard to preemptive attacks. Relating to these instruments of countering these risks, after 9/11, nobody can doubt the self-defense right stipulated, in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. If, for the Americans, the legal self-defense right becomes a permanent right, some kind of moral necessity due to a certain situation (USA receives this special regulation *de facto*, in the name of democracy's self-defense, which is above the international law, because they don't need the UN resolution for self-defense), ESS asks for a mandate from the UN Security Council, before launching any action. From the European point of view, applying force and unilateralism in international relations are concepts difficult to accept. Nowadays, no country can approach all the complex problems independently. In a world of global menaces, global security and prosperity depend on the existence of a multifunctional system.

To defend and promote the interests and the values of the EU, ESS settles the next strategic objectives:

- *Addressing the threats* – by establishing measures to stop terrorist financing; a USA agreement regarding the mutual assistance, politics referring to non-proliferation; implication in regional conflict management, especially in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo;



- *Reinforcing security in the neighborhood*, which means promoting a ring of states, well governed in the East and on the borders of the Mediterranean;

- *To set up an international order based on an efficient multilateralism* – ESS emphasizes the importance of transatlantic connections and the need for the USA and the EU act like equal partners. The EU has to be more active, more capable and more coherent in order to be able to use effectively all its instruments and to make progresses in creating a coherent foreign and crises management policy. European defence advances at rapid strides, often due to the international events which determine the European leaders to consolidate their cooperation. Regarding the development of the European Security and Defense Policy, there are different points of view. On the one hand, there is an opinion according to which this European policy is a step forward in the European integration process, as the creation of an European force capable to act independently will give the EU a certain hard power to support the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to develop common military forces to lead a series of operations, without NATO and USA assistance. On the other hand, there is a conception according to which an institution including an assurance of mutual security is not tempting.

The engagement regarding the collective defence of member states is also stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. It is considered that the Union's competences contains all the foreign policy's fields, including all the items that refer to the Union's security and a gradual definition of the common security policy, which may lead to a common defence⁴. This policy is built on the basis of mutual solidarity development of member states, by identifying general interest issues and accomplishing a higher level of convergence of member states' actions, establishing the obligation to respect Union's action in this area as an upshot of the unconditioned and active support of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)⁵. An important role inside of CFSP will be played by the two high positions in the European institutional structure: the President of the European Council and the EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy⁶.

The Treaty of Lisbon brings new regulations regarding the increase of the missions' number⁷,

in which the Union may use civilian and military tools, which can contribute to the efforts to counter terrorism, including the support for the third countries in combating terrorism on their territories. In addition, member states that meet the highest military capacities and which have subscribed to more binding commitments, in order to fulfill the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union⁸. The also Treaty introduces the initial fund for the management of operations and improves the support capacity of the European Defence Agency⁹. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces in this field a *mutual defence clause*¹⁰, according to which, if a member state is a victim of an armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall provide assistance and support by all means available, in accordance with the Article 51 of the UN Charter. This does not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of member states. No matter how will it evolve, CFSP will play an important role in the European security and will affect the transatlantic relations. However, it is excluded for the EU to become a competitor for NATO in terms of missions, purpose and size or to develop military capabilities comparable to those of the US.

Through the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy/ Common Security and Defense Policy, the European Union adds a political dimension to its role as economic and commercial power, but there are still many steps to do in order to achieve a global involvement in solving conflicts, because its "hard power" deficit will significantly limit the potential of "soft power". If, for example, another tsunami devastated the South Pacific again, the absence of the expeditionary capacities (strategic transport) would block the EU to become a relevant actor. In the case of Iran's becoming a nuclear power, Brussels would not own a pressure capital capable of intimidating Teheran or determining regional policy changes. As far as peace agreement between Israel and Palestine is concerned, neither side would like the EU to be the only mediator or guarantor of peace agreement and, on the account of such disability, the more powerful neighbors will seek to manipulate for their own benefit the cleavages of such a construction¹¹.

The development of the EU system security represents one of the most important problems



of this organization: Will the EU turn into a defensive alliance? Military analysts consider that for the success of the building process of European defence, we need a division of capacities and responsibilities of procurement in Europe and after that each country, depending on traditions and skills, would produce only one specialized component of the defence system. For example, the German could produce armor-clad, the British – aircrafts and missiles, the French and Italian – telecommunication devices and radars, the Dutch – individual equipment etc. In this context, the experts of the main European structures call into question some issues: What else does the European Union need to meet the defining elements of an alliance, after having agreed the establishment of a common Major Staff of the EU, which will have an operational force of approximately 60,000 troops? Are the European states disposed to ensure their security conjointly with the US or not? If the answer of this question is positive, what form will the European security structure have at the begging of the 21st century, so as to avoid doubling or discharging the US aid? How will the transatlantic relationships look in the next 10 or 20 years?

But implementing the Treaty of Lisbon, with all its innovations, redefines the EU's role in a globalized world and, thus, the Union will better assert itself at the international level. Hereby, the Treaty of Lisbon, officially called The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and The European Community, was signed on 13 December 2007, in the capital of Portugal. Moreover, the treaty does not replace (as would have happened in case of the adoption of the Constitution), it only amends other existing treaties, providing to the EU the legal frameworks and tools necessary to streamline the European decision-making and to deal with the new international challenges. Among the main institutional changes of the new treaty are: granting legal personality to the European Union and the possibility for a member state to withdraw from the Union (which was not provided before); the efficiency of the decision making within the EU's Council; greater legislative powers for the European Parliament in adopting EU's budget, agricultural policy, justice etc.; delegation of power to the national parliaments and European citizens. Citizens get the right of legislative initiative. The treaty extends the EU

competences in a series of communitarian fields, including energy policy, security, public health, climate change, territorial cohesion, humanitarian aid, research, space etc.; the establishment of two new high-level positions within Union – President of the European Union, elected for a period of 2.5 years and the High Representative of European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The latter, unlike the old law, will have a triple role: firstly, he/she represents the EU in CFSP matters; secondly he/she chairs the Council of Foreign Affairs, contributes to the elaboration and implementation of CFSP; thirdly, he/she plays the role of the Commission Vice-president, cumulating, therefore, three functions related with the foreign relations¹².

Therefore, the Treaty represents the evolution of a half century integrating process, which requires, as effect of entrainment, new political formula with more effective and stronger institutions. Time will show if this treaty is only a reforming treaty of EU's institutions, which takes small steps towards a political union, or will make us the witnesses of the disintegration of sovereign states into a federalist union. In conclusion, we can say that considering all the above and starting from the question of the foreign minister of France, Jean François Poncet, about the future of Europe: "economic space or world power"¹³, it seems that by the new steps made, The Union wants to accomplish both and the EU will keep its place in the race for achieving the status of world power in the 21st century if its succeeds in managing as efficiently as possible the enlargement, the market places, raw materials imports and high technology products exports, the elimination of economic disparities between member countries and institutional reform will depend its staying on the race to win the world power supremacy for the twenty-first century.

American experts consider the implications of such a complex process, such as the creation of European security, unparalleled in the whole history. Never since the formation of modern states, can be found a voluntary integration at all levels of certain state entities, as the present of the EU reflects. But, the European Union does not fully represent geographical Europe.

Thus, the international political and military organizations should consider the following issues:



- What will be the role of the Council of Europe, when the Union will adopt the Charter of Fundamental Rights for its Member States?
- What role will OSCE have in the moment when the EU will cover all the European states, which are currently members of OSCE?
- Will OSCE remain the only regional forum for dialogue with Russia?
- Will the ex-soviet states, excepting the Baltic States, remain the only European countries outside of the EU?
- Which will be the terms of cooperation between the EU and Russia, plus former Soviet Countries?

NOTES:

1 Accordingly to <http://www.scribube.com/stiinta/stiinte-politice/decizia-de-extindere-catre-est15111242122.php>, accessed on 09.02.2011.

2 Ibidem.

3 A European Strategic Concept - defence aspect, p. 10.

4 European Union Treaty, art. 24, at http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/library/index_ro.htm, accessed on 23.02.2011.

5 Ibidem, Art. 24, p. 3.

6 For details see the Lisbon Treaty, available from http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles/displayArticle/articleID_12996/Tratatul-de-la-Lisabona.html, accessed on 28.01.2011.

7 For details see the European Union Treaty art. 43, available from http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/library/index_ro.htm, accessed on 14.12.2010.

8 Ibidem art. 42, p. 6, art. 46 (Protocol no.1 0 regarding the structured cooperation settled by art. 42 from the European Union Treaty)

9 Ibidem art. 42, p. 3, art. 45.

10 Ibidem art. 42, p. 7.

11 Accordingly to <http://www.revista22.ro/ue-in-geopolitica-secolului-xxi-5415.html>, accessed on 02.05.2011.

12 The Lisbon Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Lisabona, 2007, pg.202, available from http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/library/index_ro.htm, accessed on 02.05.2011.

13 Accordingly to <http://www.scribube.com/stiinta/stiinte-politice/decizia-de-extindere-catre-est15111242122.php>, accessed on 04.05.2011.



THE EU ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD – MOTIVATIONS AND LIMITS

*Agnes NICOLESCU**

In spite of the geographical proximity to the Middle East and Africa, the EU has not formulated over the years a coherent strategy towards these regions that are vital for securing Europe's energy supplies. More than that, the EU has relied almost exclusively on the US to cope with the conflicts which have become a constant in its Southern neighbourhood, although these have given enough reasons of concern to European leaders. Both the EU and the US have continued to offer financial support to the regimes in Northern Africa, without making funding dependent on the implementation of political reforms in these countries. As regards EU's role in the efforts aiming to bring to a solution the conflicts in the Caucasus, it is strongly limited by the action of prominent actors in the region, such as Russia.

Key-words: European Neighbourhood Policy; Turkey; non-state actors; indirect instruments of crisis management.

The EU role in crisis management in North Africa and Middle East

The popular uprisings of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have brought to the attention of the EU

the issue of regime transformation in Northern Africa. On the other hand, new regional actors, such as Turkey, are striving to shape the balance of the region in their favour, serving at the same time as role models and catalysts of change. In an international context that is increasingly multipolar, the action of non-state organisations, like Hamas and Hezbollah, which are acting as self-established actors in the Middle East, should not be overlooked.

At the same time, the initiatives undertaken by Brussels with regard to the countries in its Southern neighbourhood have had more impact on their socio-economic development than a political influence on the developments in the region¹.

On the other hand, Turkey's importance for the EU in the Middle East area has increased. Ankara's ties with its Muslim neighbours are strong, being religious, economic, cultural and historical. In this context, the question arises as to which extent the EU's policy in the Middle East is convergent with that of Turkey, as long as the latter aims to become an independent actor in the area. Turkey is in favour of a peaceful Middle East area, insisting, for instance, on a negotiated solution in the case of Iran, as the sanctions demanded to be imposed

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on the latter would only lead to instability and strained relations with Tehran.

From this perspective, it can be asserted that Turkey is drifting to a certain extent from the policies promoted by Brussels in the region. Ever since its coming into power, AKP party has focused on consolidating relations with the Muslim neighbours, promoting a message centred around the idea of a particularly special contribution of Turkey in this area. Ankara's foreign policy priority seems increasingly to be that of achieving a regional power status rather than seeking the harmonisation with the EU's objectives². The affirmation of the regional power status may even come into opposition with the Europeans' expectations in terms of security and foreign policy in the area.

It is not surprising that during the Turkish - Arabian Cooperation forum, held in 2010, the Foreign Affairs minister Davutoğlu announced a plan aiming at the creation of a free trade area which would entail Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. This entity would supposedly constitute the basis for a unique political and economic block reuniting Muslim states from the Middle East and Northern Africa³.

Egypt and Tunisia represent two states in transition towards democracy, in which the plurality of political systems is still weak. In Egypt's case, both the EU and the US have been very cautious in supporting the implementation of political reforms in Egypt, for fear this may destabilize the regime and, consequently, their own interests in the area (Durac, 2009).

The action plan for Egypt elaborated in the framework of the Neighbourhood European Policy has put into discussion only the necessity to consolidate participation to the political life and elections or the exchange of experience in the electoral field and the support for the strengthening of state capacities⁴. The ambiguous nature of the EU and the US has also manifested in relation to the forces of the Opposition in Egypt, most probably out of fear for the consequences of a potential revival of the Islamist movements (Balfour & Cugusi, 2010; Droz-Vincent, 2010).

Both the US and the EU preferred holding talks with representatives of the power, without making extended efforts to consolidate relations with non-state representatives. As opposed to its Eastern neighbours, the action plan elaborated in

the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy was not discussed with the main political actors and representatives of the civil society, but with a few high-level political leaders⁵.

More than that, although political reforms have not continued in Egypt, Western governments continued to give economic support to the ruling regime, without posing any conditions in this regard. Despite an accentuated authoritarianism, the EU has increased the funds allocated to Egypt as part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for the period 2011-2013, reducing at the same time the funding destined for promoting and protecting human rights⁶.

As regards Palestine, the main issue which concerns the public opinion is auto-determination and, to a very little extent, the state of democracy.

In the case of Northern Africa crises, the EU has resorted so far to indirect crisis management instruments, by providing financial and diplomatic support, through the United Nations and the African Union. Since the EU repetitively expressed support for UN and OSCE missions in regions with conflict potential, these efforts must be taken into consideration when evaluating EU's contribution to crisis management in its proximity.

Member states such as France and Germany play an essential role in defining the policy and governance in the field of crisis management in the EU and NATO, but their capacity is drastically limited at the level of the United Nations Organisation. The European Commission in particular played an important role in sponsoring peace missions initiated by the African Union.

These operations represent an important but often neglected aspect of the European capacities. Except for Afghanistan, European efforts in the crisis management field focus on preventing conflicts, ensuring post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans. In what concerns the European presence in Iraq, EU's police mission has had a rather low impact on the long-term stability. European involvement in Afghanistan highlights the problems associated with long - term peace consolidation efforts. Under these conditions, in the future, it is expected that EU states will continue to resort to indirect action instruments in the fragile neighbouring states, through the UN, NATO, OSCE or the African Union.

In order to provide an overview of EU's efforts regarding crisis management in 2010, it should



be mentioned that operations in Afghanistan, the Balkan area and more recently, in Libya, raised significant questions about Europe's future capacities in crisis situations. As the authors of the study "European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010"⁷ draw attention, many of the recent challenges faced by Member States in the field of crisis management are the result of EU's inability to draw lessons from the mistakes of the past decades.

West Africa represented a major concern for the EU in 2010. Some member states continue to be preoccupied with their former colonies. It is the case of France – focusing on the Ivory Coast or that of Great Britain's relation with Sierra Leone. Of all these, Maghreb region faces increased Al Qaeda activity and intense drug traffic. An alarming aspect is that the Common security and defence policy has experienced a decline when the European Council's proposal to send a mission to support the government in states affected by Al-Qaeda was rejected.

On the Ivory Coast, French troops refrained from intervening and main efforts to resolve the crisis involved the USA, African Union and the Economic Community of West African States⁸. The EU has more negotiating capacity in Western Africa than on the rest of the continent and French interventions in Mali and Mauritania are valuable contributions to the international fight against Al-Qaeda.

EU's Role in Crisis Management in the Caucasus region

EU has also set itself the goal to contribute to easing Georgian- Abkhazian relations as well as with South Ossetia and to avoid confrontations between Tbilisi and Moscow. This would threaten the stability of the whole region. At the same time, EU's cautious approach on this issue is justified by the desire for tighter relations with Russia.

Regarding success in achieving the objectives mentioned above, no important progress was made in 2010. EU managed to keep negotiations going between Georgia and Russia, during discussions sponsored by OSCE and the UN, without significant results however. Humanitarian issues about the refugees were not tackled accordingly, with representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia threatening to leave the negotiations. Since then, Georgia has tried to have the initiative, proposing

an agreement with Russia, which aimed to ensure a refraining on both parties from a unilateral use of force.

The EU would also want to play a more significant role in speeding up a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, but its capacity to influence the behaviour of the main actors in the region is very limited. The EU would like to negotiate a stop to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia by assuming a more important role in the Minsk group of OSCE. The EU is one of the co-presidents of the Minsk group, alongside with Russia and the United States of America, being permanently represented by France, a state preoccupied with having closer relations to Russia. Although member states support this objective, the EU has less negotiating capacity in Nagorno Karabakh than any other actor involved. Brussels can only limit itself to making statements regarding the tense situation in the region.

Russia remains the main mediator in the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, given its military and political potential. In the context of the latest high level reunions and agreements between Russia and Armenia, especially a military collaboration agreement signed by the two states, Azerbaijan has the impression that Moscow favours Yerevan. The EU is increasingly dependent on cooperation with Azerbaijan in what concerns energy supply. Consequently, the former has tempered its discourse regarding human rights and democratic principles, in its dialogue with Azerbaijan and Armenia.

In 2010, Brussels initiated negotiations on an Association agreement with Baku and Yerevan, without imposing a condition on the progress made in the Nagorno conflict. A negative aspect is that the EU did not manage to Turkey, a major actor in the region, in the negotiation process.

Conclusions

A rethinking of the mechanisms and policies used by the EU in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood is necessary, so that its efforts for the respect of human rights and the rule of law are better compensated. In this regard, it would be beneficial to elaborate and implement innovative ways of cooperating with Turkey, in view of holding training programmes or common civil crisis management missions, with countries



in Northern Africa as beneficiaries. A question arises as whether the model set by Turkey, a state combining Islamism and a functional democratic regime, could be applied to the rest of the Middle East. If in Turkey's case, the secular nature of the state is enshrined in the Constitution and there is a series of facilitating factors, such as membership in the Council of Europe and NATO, these elements are clearly missing in Maghreb countries.

At the same time, it is necessary to reconsider the existing security paradigm in the North Africa and Middle East area, which is very difficult to achieve without finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For a start, the EU and the US may try to work together reasonable solutions to important issues such as shared governance of Palestine and the status of Hamas⁹.

NOTE: *The opinions expressed in the current article do not represent the position of the European Institute of Romania.*

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1 Timo BEHR (editor), Hard Choices – The EU's Options in a Changing Middle East, FIIA report 28, p. 7.

2 Gareth EVANS, Turkey and the EU in the Middle East, p. 16.

3 Ibidem 1, p. 18.

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PROSPECTS OF THE WESTERN BALKANS DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF SECURITY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION

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The profound economic crisis requires the reevaluation of the usefulness of EU's policy instruments. It is said that structural and cohesion funds must be used more to counteract the recession's effects and for fiscal consolidation in the euro area countries.

The current challenges to peace and security require a global response based on cooperation and an effective multilateral system. At the level of the financial-economic system, in the component states of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, we can speak of a differential evolution, driven by specific national policies. All countries need to focus on good governance, rule of law and the acceleration of economic reform.

Western Balkan countries are surrounded on all sides by EU Member States. The prospect of membership encouraged them to prioritize their objectives that they share with the EU. Cooperation between NATO and the EU in the Balkans provided the best example of what the two organizations can do together.

Key-words: regional cooperation; membership perspectives; economic system.

Introduction

For most of the Balkan countries, the transition to market economy has opened a new era of economic cooperation and mutually beneficial relations between them. For their neighbors, this has contributed to the restoration of the historical relations, economic and trade relations with these countries, which, in post-war period, have been a significant contraction in relative terms. Although armed conflicts, political differences, and internal economic imbalances do not allow the development of economic relations with all neighboring countries, there have established ties in trade, investment, labor mobility and technological cooperation. Return of peace in former Yugoslavia has also led to a significant increase of the economic cooperation with these countries.

The international crisis pointed out and accentuated divisions within the European Union. The term „variable geometry” pulls back the crisis with years. We talk here about the scarcity of economic convergence, tensions in the

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mechanisms of decision, failure of EU policies. Variable geometry dimensions can be dangerous if we examine the situation in terms of the economies of EU countries. Sovereign debt crisis divided the euro zone into two areas: one that has emerged from recession and has not had to resort to austerity measures (fiscal consolidation) and a southern flank (plus Ireland), which is threatened by the dynamics of vicious circles.

The Balkans are particularly vulnerable in this area by the lack of automatic stabilization and lack of social protection systems and by the lack of an easier access to finance and support mechanisms in the euro area. In the broader European context, the crisis has had at least three negative effects on the Balkans:

- Primarily, concerned with economic issues, the EU put the enlargement on a second place on the agenda.

- Secondly, the fight against the crisis of resources uses most of the resources of Balkan governments and as well as the attention to the reforms required for accession.

- Thirdly, because the EU requires the creation of a new regime of economic governance, beyond any doubt, there will be put more emphasis on economic and financial policies of candidate countries. Perhaps the EU will seek to prevent directly or indirectly to accession of the countries which are generally perceived as economically weak and unable to comply with stricter rules.

The Western Balkans region – the economic situation and the impact of the financial crisis

Countries outside the euro area are divided into several categories, depending on: the size of the imbalances in the phase of fiscal consolidation in which they are (where major adjustments were necessary), monetary policy rules and exchange rate if they appeal to external financial assistance, whether they are in the Schengen area or not. If the EU doesn't create effective policies to stimulate economic convergence, simple mechanisms at the national level will not be able to counter the economic trends of fragmentation. The profound crisis requires reconsideration and usefulness of policy instruments at the EU level. Some argue that structural and cohesion funds must be used more to counteract the recession's effects of fiscal consolidation in the euro area countries. Romania,

for example, is still very low on the absorption of these European funds.

The world food crisis highlights an extremely valuable asset of our country: the land of good quality. Agricultural land in Romania is an asset to be capably capitalized for obtaining EU funds for modernizing rural areas, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform. We can observe that EU membership, even the euro area membership doesn't a country exempt anymore from being forced to assume a multilateral engagement with international donors (IMF, WB, and EBRD). Romania should carefully consider the proposals for reform of EU economic governance. We need to:

- have fiscal consolidation in order to not have the chances of sustainable growth reduced by decreasing public investment in critical thresholds;

- have multi-annual budgetary programming in accordance with EU policy coordination;

- fight against corruption in the public sector.

Romania ranks first in the European Union if we take into account the increase of consumer prices in January 2011: 7%, compared with the first month of last year, while the EU inflation stood at 2.7%, accordingly to the data provided by Eurostat. In the last month of 2010, consumer prices in Romania rose at an annual rate 7.9%, which was also the highest in the EU. In the EU, the indicator was placed at 2.7%. On top of the highest inflation since January 2011, Romania is followed by Estonia (5.1%) and Greece (4.9%). The lowest annual rates are observed in Ireland (0.2%) and Sweden (1.4%). In Hungary, consumer prices have raised at an annual rate of 4% and, in Bulgaria, it grew with 4.3%. In Germany, France and Britain, inflation stood at 2%, 1.9%, respectively 4%. Compared with December 2010, annual inflation accelerated in 15 member states and decreased other countries. National Institute of Statistics announced in February that annual inflation has dropped from 7.96%, in December 2010, to 6.99%, in January 2011, after the monthly rate increased to 0.77%, mainly due to higher prices of vegetables, fruit, fuel, heat, books, magazines and newspapers.

For Romania, stabilization and growth are expected. Although GDP declined in the last



quarter of 2010, indicators are expected to resume growth in 2011. Growth is expected to be of 1-1.5%, in 2011, after having reached 2%, in 2010. Inflation is projected at just over 8% at the end of this year, 2011, following the VAT increase. Improving absorption of EU structural funds is critical to ensure the necessary investments in the strict budgetary constraints. The banking system was affected by the crisis, but remains well capitalized and has cash flow. Non-performing loans (NPL) are likely to continue to grow until mid-2011, due to weak economic activity. Capital reserves remain large. Balance of payments remains largely unchanged. The current account deficit remains at about 5.5% of GDP and is estimated to grow by 6% by 2012.

Imposed reforms and measures that were taken can be very easily integrated in the countries of Western Balkans region. Towards the removal of authoritarian regimes, recent developments in some countries in the region demonstrate the universality of democratic values and human rights. One cannot make progress in peace and development if it ignores human rights and democracy. The current challenges to peace and security requires a global response based on cooperation and an effective multilateral system.

Regarding the financial-economic system of component states of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, we can speak about a differential evolution, driven by specific national policies¹. Croatia has attracted massive foreign investment in all sectors of the economy. Despite its size, in Montenegro, the rapid adoption of the euro as its currency exchange and strong reforms, initiated after the detachment from Serbia, boosted and increased the domestic market. For Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, political barriers have hindered the advance of reforms, and in the case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – FYROM**), the small size of the market, reported to the potential they offer, is too low.

Because of constitutional constraints, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has a complex legal and institutional framework. This country's economy and infrastructure were virtually "swept" during the armed conflicts of the '90s; this is reflected in the "picture" of the internal market. There have been huge damage to the national level, but after a difficult period dedicated losses' recovery, Bosnia

and Herzegovina has undergone and continues to pass through a transitional period. Growth trends in economic indicators have been felt by the population only in recent years. Internally, trade practices and unsubstantiated dumping prices may lead to the collapse of the system.

The desire to join the European Union has meant progress for Croatia superior to those made by the other ex-Yugoslav states. Legislation has been amended in line with EU directives: thus, when joining the European Community, Croatian insurers will be able to market insurance products in the EU states, as EU insurers will be able to operate in Croatia. From an economic perspective, tourism is the basic economic branch in Croatia, the number of tourists is 10 million per year. Tourism provides one fifth of the country's total gross domestic product. In the view of some analysts, the economy is based too much on tourism, which is vulnerable to global economic development and international policies. However, despite the crisis, tourism has dropped less significantly than other sectors of Croatian economy. For 2011, local authorities seek to maintain the unemployment rate registered at the end of 2010 parameters, and the same in the case of shared income.

Kosovo is a former Yugoslav republic with a special status. By October 2010, 71 UN member states, 22 of the 27 European Union member states and 24 of the 28 NATO member states recognized its independence. Romania did not recognize Kosovo's independence because it doesn't support unilateral separatism, which is contrary to international law. Kosovo became a member of the IMF and World Bank under the name of Republic of Kosovo. The domestic market is still very young.

FYROM has been destabilized by the war in Kosovo in 1999, when about 360,000 Kosovo Albanians fled to its territory. In terms of domestic market, a general legislative framework has been prepared in accordance with European Union directives. In recent years, the economy has registered an upward trend, with significant increases.

An important branch of the Montenegrin economy is the tourism. It is part of a comprehensive long-term development project. Investments made in recent years have resulted in obtaining one of the largest dynamics in the world. Currently, Montenegro is under a continuous process of



liberalization, privatization and restructuring of economic sectors. The main purpose is joining the European Union and NATO. Maturity in economic policy has been established by Montenegrins since 2002, by adopting the euro as their currency. However, the Government of Montenegro has developed a comprehensive development program, headed in two directions, one leading to growth of tourism sector, the other aiming at privatization and attracting foreign investors; the final target is to develop infrastructure and, consequently, creating new jobs. Negative influences of institutional and legal framework are visible and are in accordance with EU Directives.

In terms of regulation, the internal market in Serbia undergone great changes in 2004, when laws were amended in accordance with EU Directives, and thus introduced new solvency standards and the National Bank was appointed supervisor. In order to protect and ensure investors, following the implementation of these laws, the National Bank revoked licenses of several companies that did not meet the criteria set by law. This has resulted in increased transparency across markets. To create a mature and competitive market, as the basic segment of the financial system, some actions are required. Among these, we shall mention: focus on players from various areas of corporate governance, improving risk management procedures and techniques for assessing the investment, increase transparency in the relationship with customers.

As regards the Croatia's EU accession² negotiations, this country has reached the final phase, showing all the countries involved in this process that adherence can become a reality. Serbia has submitted its application for membership. Reports on applications for accession of Montenegro and Albania were published in late 2010. There has been significant progress in the liberalization of visas for the Western Balkan countries, in solving the long-lasting settlement of bilateral disputes between Slovenia and Croatia a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo³ is, currently, under process of being prepared. However, many challenges persist. Due to the global financial crisis, the pace of reform has slowed.

The Euro-Atlantic integration is required to accelerate reforms and involvement of all stakeholders for better governance, there must be insisted on strengthening the rule of law,

accelerating economic reform and improving their capacity to adopt and implement the *acquis communautaire*. This leaves open some bilateral issues and regional cooperation is hampered by differences over Kosovo's status. Enlargement serves the interests of both the Union and the countries wishing to join. EU enlargement⁴ contributes not only to the stability of Europe but also to its citizens' the security and welfare. Countries involved in the accession process try to reach European standards in all areas of EU treaties. This would support the Union in achieving its own objectives. Currently, one of the most important objectives is finding a solution to the economic crisis, restore growth, and create jobs through 2020 reform strategy and strengthening security in the EU.

The European Commission's program for 2011 is to intensify the economic dialogue with countries involved in the accession process, which will allow concentrating efforts to overcome the crisis and create jobs. This is demonstrated by past experience – in 1998-2008, trade between old and new Member States has tripled, from 150 billion to 450 billion Euros. EU enlargement process provided financial resources to intervene, along with international financial institutions, to maintain economic stability in times of crisis.

In Croatia, the coming to power of Ivo Josipovic, in early 2010, changed the position of Croatia towards Serbia. The two countries have concluded that only diplomatic means can solve the problem of repatriation of refugees from Croatia, the border dispute between Serbia and Croatia, the issues of missing persons, minorities and their rights. Even if they tried to solve their disputes at the International Court of Justice, the two countries consider that extra-judicial solution is the most convenient. Croatia's EU accession in 2012 can also be used by Serbia; Croatia may become, from a rival, supporter of Serbia's accession to the EU.

Croatia's Europeanization is in the interest of all the Balkan countries. This spirit of mutual support in the EU accession process is the new regional policy. On January 19, 2011, the European Parliament approved the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia. It marks the European Union free trade with Belgrade. To take effect, the agreement should be ratified by each EU member state. As a condition for EU



accession, the agreement emphasizes the need for Serbian authorities' cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Belgrade signed the beginning of the EU association process in April 2008 and, so far, only 11 Member States initiated the process of ratification of the SAA, which began in 2010.

The European representatives also requested Belgrade to start dialogue with Kosovo, under the supervision of the EU, because the commitment and willingness to reach an understanding between the two sides will lead to increased stability in the region. European Parliament (EP) urges Belgrade to dismantle the parallel structures of the Serbian province of Kosovo, which “undermines the process of decentralization” and “prevent the full integration of ethnic Serbs” in Kosovo institutions. Regarding the liberalization of visas for Serbian citizens, the European Parliament suggested the Belgrade authorities to take appropriate measures to limit violations of the law relating to identity documents.

Thus, the Serbs must be informed that following the grant of visa-free travel regime, they will have not only rights but also obligations. According to reports, Serbia is the country with the largest number of refugees and displaced persons in Europe. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on Serbia's European integration process and asked the adopted legislative measures to combat discrimination. The new measures will ensure equal treatment of all citizens of Serbia, regardless of ethnicity. In this context, the main objective for Serbia in 2011 is to obtain candidate status for EU membership, stressing that they hoped the negotiations to begin in spring 2012.

At the end of February 2011, in Brussels, took place the works of Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC). An important topic on the agenda of this Council was the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The objective of the discussions was to formulate new strategic directions for the EU to ensure the implementation of the state transition from post-Dayton phase to the preparatory stage for EU accession negotiations begin. The main elements upon which the discussions were focused were to identify the prospect of ending the mandate of the Office of High Representative (OHR) and the adoption of a set of restrictive measures (the regime of movement and personal wealth), which can be applied to individuals BiH which would

undermine the application of Dayton Agreement.

Romanian Foreign Minister supported the effective coordination of EU Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in order to create a common approach according to which the decoupling of the mandates of the EU Special Representative/ High Representative (EUSR/HR) is a preliminary phase in a process which ends with the closure of the OHR. Also, the future EU Strategy for BiH should include a wider range of economic issues, political and legal integration, addressed in an integrated manner, allowing this country to reach the stage where it is invited to start EU accession negotiations in the shortest possible time.

Countries with greater financial and economic integration began to suffer from aversion to global risks and the lack of cash flow, because of the economic slowdown at EU's level. In the last quarter of 2009, the global crisis has affected the Western Balkans in the financial and economic area, mainly because of the reduction of external demand, lowering of foreign direct investment and capital inflows and slower growth. Notwithstanding the prospects for a slight recovery in 2010 and 2011, the crisis' effects are visible on long-term and will be evident in the near future; the access to foreign capital and foreign direct investment could remain limited for some time in the Western Balkans. Even though foreign direct investment may resume once the crisis is overcome, international flows of remittances may slow down in the meantime, foreign capital is unlikely to be available, thus having higher rates. This will require an adjustment of external imbalances, supported by a more prudent policy mix.

The passage of time has shown that, especially in former communist countries, the transition to market economy has long prevented a rapid alignment to the EU requirements, although the common purpose was – the integration into the European Union. For each country in the former Yugoslav Federal Republic, the major changes resulted from the creation of new legal regulations and from the foster of competitive markets having replaced the previous monopoly, had different results. Due to political and armed conflicts, the crisis has affected economies during the reform process and hence the domestic market.

The economic crisis has affected all the countries involved in the accession process. The



impact of the crisis was different, depending on the economic structure. Albania, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were the least affected, because their economy depends on a lesser extent by exports and domestic markets faced their crisis. Croatia, Serbia and Turkey, which have a more integrated global market, have been badly affected. Because of its dependence on external financing and having a small number of active sectors, Montenegro has received a heavy blow. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the impact was exacerbated by pro-cyclical fiscal policies, with a budget with a high percentage of subsidies and social transfers in the budget.

During 2010, in the Western Balkan countries have been weak signs of recovery. Now, domestic demand remains low, reflecting tighter lending conditions and persisting unemployment. EU, together with international financial institutions, provided support for the attenuation of the crisis' impact. Achieving sustainable growth rates and real convergence will require further structural reforms and prudent fiscal policies. Internal sources of growth should be exploited more effectively in order to improve production capacity and create jobs.

An acceleration of structural reforms in labor and product markets and improving the quality of public spending would increase the capacity of Western Balkan economies to compete with other emerging markets in attracting foreign investment in the recovery phase, which remains the key factor for economic growth region. In such a framework, given the overlapping of the economic crisis with the political difficulties, which were faced in the process of regional cooperation regarding Kosovo's independence and by some countries in the region, the European Commission stressed the need for the Western Balkans to remain engaged in regional cooperation.

Regional trans-border cooperation

The development of regional cooperation is in the interests of all Western Balkan countries. This is a key factor in establishing a stable political climate, security and economic prosperity. Regional cooperation is also a necessary requirement of stabilization and association agreements, which are already underway in the region. In this context, regional cooperation is a

cornerstone of EU policy in the Western Balkans – the Stabilization and Association Process, which gives the countries in the region the right to become EU members. Western Balkan countries have realized that they have certain responsibilities to each other and that they share many challenges, some regarding trans-border cooperation. They see now the considerable benefits of regional cooperation – political understanding, economic and social prosperity.

This approach to resolve certain issues through cooperation clearly reflected in concrete progress achieved on the ground. It is very encouraging that the areas of trade, energy and transport are among the ones in which regional cooperation is most visible. Economic development in the region is crucial to produce the necessary jobs. Further efforts are needed to increase trust and cooperation among peoples and countries. In the field of justice and home affairs, countries should make increased efforts to enhance regional cooperation and achieve results. Expanding regional cooperation in Southeast Europe is essential, regardless of the different stages of Euro-Atlantic integration, of each country. It is also an important criterion for the European course of the Western Balkan countries. Stability, prosperity and security in the region are of great interest to the EU. The European Union will continue to encourage all efforts to promote regional cooperation.

Many of the challenges faced by the Western Balkan countries are not only common, but they also have a regional dimension and involve regional neighbors. From the enlargement on 1st May 2004, the EU and the Western Balkans have become closer, as the situation in Western Balkan countries, their progress towards European integration and future relations with the EU are indeed of immediate interest for the European Union. Since Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, the entire region is surrounded by EU Member States. This has important repercussions for both countries in the region and the EU in several areas, notably the free movement of goods, services and people. These challenges must be addressed in the broader region of southeast Europe. The political, economic and security reasons for which regional cooperation is essential in the Western Balkans are closely interlinked – so, regional stability and security are necessary for economic development, and this, in turn, promotes stability and security in region.



CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL COOPERATION

Regional cooperation has an essential role in addressing security challenges, because more urgent problems, such as organized crime and corruption, or the integrated management of borders line and illegal migration, can be efficiently solved only by a trans-border approach. Regional cooperation can lead to tangible results in security and justice, for the freedom of people living in the region. Efforts to address the factors which could disturb the regional stabilization and development, as well as EU security threats will be a success if the Western Balkan countries and the EU work together to combat these threats hindering legitimate economic growth and undermining the rule of law, democracy and stability in the region.

Combating organized crime and corruption is a key priority for governments in the region. Special emphasis is placed on the fight against all forms of illegal trafficking (in particular, of human beings, drugs and weapons, and contraband goods). Strengthening operational cooperation of regional police and prosecutors is essential. Regional cooperation contributes to reconciliation, to preserving good neighborly relations and a proper climate for addressing outstanding bilateral issues.

On their European way, with EU's support, the countries in the region – even with the existing differences of status, in terms of European integration – continue developing. Regional cooperation is essential to record progress towards accession. Commission's programs support Kosovo's participation in the IPA CBC Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. In 2011, support will also include programs with Montenegro.

Regional and cross border cooperation in the Western Balkans is one of the key areas of intervention of international multilateral institutions like the European Union, World Bank, UNDP, Council of Europe and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). To illustrate this fact and to strengthen cooperation with countries bordering the European Union, the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) includes a specific component of cross-border cooperation (CBC). There are 15 cross-border cooperation programs (9 land borders, three sea crossings and 3 sea basin programs). They were established along the eastern and southern external borders of the European Union, with a

total funding of € 1.2 billion for 2007-2013. CBC regions lies on the both sides of the EU borders and have a total population of approximately 257.5 million people – of which 45% live in the northern and eastern borders and 55% in southern border areas – 49% EU border regions and 51% in the partner countries' border regions.

The nature of funding allocated by the CBC program emphasizes long-term objectives and sustainability. This multi-level involvement and commitment of the international community is a key factor for regional and trans-boundary cooperation in the Western Balkans. Gradual progress is being made. Even if they are at a fairly low level, there should be considered wars and ethnic conflicts of the 1990s.

Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), established in 2008 and located in Sarajevo, is the most visible sign of new institutional capacity to advance regional and local ownership of the political process. The hope is that such regional cooperation in the Balkans can also be carried out by those who are expected to benefit from it. CRC promotes mutual cooperation and European and Euro-Atlantic integration in Southeastern Europe. It focuses on six priority areas: economic and social development, energy, justice, infrastructure and home affairs, security cooperation, building human capital and parliamentary cooperation. In operational terms, the Heads of State and Government of the South-East Europe (within the South-East European Cooperation Process – SEECPP), (including Greece, Turkey, Eastern and Western Balkans and Black Sea Area) ensure political support for the CRC's annual work program, while the European Commission offers most of the financing. The key objective is to generate and coordinate development projects and create a political climate for implementing projects of a large, regional nature, good for each member.

Regional and cross-border cooperation in the EU context uses an approach modeled largely on the principles of structural funds, such as multi-year programming, partnerships and co-financing tailored to take into account the specific external rules and regulations of the European Commission. A major innovation of the ENPI CBC can be seen in the fact that programs involving regions on both sides of the EU border have a single budget, joint management structures and a legal framework



CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL COOPERATION

(mil. euro)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Croatia	9,7	14,7	15,9	15,6	15,8	16,1	16,7
FYROM	4,1	4,0	4,3	5,0	5,1	5,2	5,2
Turkey	2,1	2,8	3,4	9,5	9,7	9,9	10,1
Albania	6,6	8,5	9,8	9,9	10,1	10,2	10,6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,9	4,9	5,2	4,7	4,7	4,8	4,9
Montenegro	3,9	4,5	4,6	4,2	4,3	4,3	4,4
Serbia	8,2	11,4	12,2	11,7	11,9	12,1	11,6
Kosovo	0	0	0	2,8	2,8	2,9	2,9

*Chart 1: The CBC Assistance granted by the EU in the IPA programs in 2007-2013
Source: COM (2009) 543*

and rules for joint implementation, contributing at balancing partnerships between participating countries. The European Commission also promotes cross-border cooperation and bilateral development in the Western Balkans through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), an instrument of financial assistance. This instrument has been operational since 2008 and currently applies to all countries in South-Eastern Europe that want the EU accession. Annual programs are implemented in cooperation with the international donor community and co-managed with local representatives of beneficiary countries.

To illustrate the operation of the IPA, it is taken into account the 2009/2010 Annual Program on cooperation for Montenegro. Under priority axis 2, the so-called economic criteria, the EU Delegation in Podgorica has granted five million euros for the rehabilitation of railway lines – Bar-Vrbnica, on the border with Serbia. Beneficiaries of this project are the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, in both countries and companies of the respective railways. Since such investments for transport infrastructure requires substantial financial resources which the beneficiary countries do not have, the project is co-funded with additional loans from the European Investment Bank and EBRD, totaling 10 million euros.

Commission's cycle of IPA programming for 2009/2010 refers to joint trans-border programs between Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo in the Kukes region. Rehabilitation and improvement of border crossing infrastructure in Morin, Kukes

region, which lies at the border between Albania and Kosovo, has a total budget of 0.46 million in 2009/2010. Compared with the previous example, the amounts are small, largely because many implementing regulations are absent in Kosovo. Currently, the EU CBC programming involving cooperation with neighboring Kosovo is affected by limitations in the ongoing process of international recognition. These limitations suggest that regional disparities may actually be strengthened despite the cross-border cooperation that seeks to reduce these differences.

Another example highlighting the importance and challenges for regional development and cross-border cooperation are the rights of minorities in the Western Balkans. Most countries in the region continue to have refugees and displaced persons following the 1990 war. In Montenegro, for example, the Podgorica authorities must still resolve the status of some 16,200 refugees from Kosovo. Cross-border cooperation between Montenegro and Kosovo, a delicate area, must address issues such as:

- The legal status of refugees and displaced persons (for example, as regards access to employment of foreigners);
- Construction of residential facilities for Roma refugees from Kosovo;
- Create legal conditions for the integration of these refugees and displaced persons who wish to remain in Montenegro and to acquire citizenship by naturalization;
- The ability to absorb and re-integrate refugees. Providing housing, labor market participation and



addressing the educational infrastructure. While Montenegro and Kosovo are trying to jointly solve some of these challenges, there remain unresolved issues with neighboring states. Serbia can block such bilateral initiatives.

The defense cooperation and joint training of border police are very important too. They take place between countries that one decade ago were at war. Negotiations on agreements on social security are ongoing between the various countries of Western Balkans.

The biggest challenge for cross-border cooperation in the Western Balkans refers to political and institutional arrangements between Serbia and Kosovo. Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state and, therefore, does not recognize the legitimacy of its borders. Meanwhile, the latter is struggling to convince its own ethnic Albanian population regarding the trans-border cooperation with Serbia, which could be of self-interest, in order to advance the international recognition for Kosovo.

Cross-border cooperation also requires the achievement of economic progress in trade and public-private investment of the EU, EBRD and World Bank. However, it seems that business initiatives lead, first of all, to this kind of regional cooperation. Policy and implementation capacity are supported by specific policies of the European Union, the Regional Cooperation Council and other international organizations.

Prospects for the Euro-Atlantic integration

The Western Balkans region is bordering the EU member states. Construction of trans-European transport corridors, energy diversification, climate change mitigation and adaptation, reducing trans-boundary air pollution and water are among the EU's objectives to be met, whose full completion is conditioned by the complete commitment of the countries involved in the accession process. In turn, they generate benefits from progress in these areas; the prospect of adherence encourages them to give priority to the objectives shared with EU. Grants awarded through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and loans from the European Investment Bank and other international financial institutions provide practical support.

The experience of the liberalization of visas for the Western Balkan countries shows how much can

be accomplished by combining the imposition of stringent conditions with offering benefits related to progress towards EU accession. The process of accession of Western Balkan countries and the EU influence increase its attractiveness in the Mediterranean and Black Seas and in the Danube River Basin. EU institutions and Member States should cooperate to strengthen understanding and support for the enlargement process and to explain how this policy can contribute to the accomplishment of common objectives. Regarding the EU single market, the Commission will seek to remove several persisting blockings and generate a new potential for growth. By extension, the countries involved in the accession process will gradually adopt the *acquis communautaire*, enlarging the space in which they apply a single set of standards. This should spur new investment, innovation and social cohesion, while enhancing the attractiveness of the EU regulatory model among neighboring countries and also internationally.

NATO enlargement has contributed substantially to Allies' security, the perspective of the next enlargement and the spirit for cooperation in security offered a broader definition of stability in Europe. The idea of Europe as a whole, free and prosperous can only be achieved by sharing common values, and would be better served by an eventual integration of all European countries who wish to be included in the Euro-Atlantic structures. The door to NATO remains open to European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, who are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership and whose inclusion could contribute to the common values of security and stability.

Cooperation between NATO and the EU in the Balkans provided the best example of what can be done by these two organizations. Collaboration between them in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had a direct positive impact on regional stability and security. The successful experience of NATO-EU cooperation in the Western Balkans demonstrates that both organizations are indispensable partners in strengthening Euro-Atlantic and international security. Romania, as a NATO and EU member, supports democratic reforms and the integration of Western Balkans and participates in programs to counter global challenges such as terrorism,



proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or human trafficking. There is a huge potential for cooperation, by whose materialization NATO and the EU may have, together, an important impact on regional security. Accession will take place after the consolidation of internal reforms. Euro-Atlantic integration is particularly important because both organizations can provide stability and security in the region.

The European Commission will continue to make full use of its instruments of accession and economic surveillance mechanism to monitor the economic and fiscal performance of Western Balkan countries. The Union has a regular dialogue with its candidate countries, familiarizing them with the coordination and surveillance of economic policies within the EU. A similar process has been created with the potential candidate countries. Economic dialogues between the Commission and the states involved in the accession process in the framework of adhesion are used for surveillance of economic policies. In addition to dialogue and surveillance, the EU actively supports the efforts of economic recovery, of macroeconomic stabilization and consolidation of the countries involved in the accession process. Enlargement contributes to the accomplishment of the Strategy Europe 2020, by extending the area in which EU regulatory framework is applied and by creating new trade opportunities.

As for starting the integration process, numerous political and armed conflicts of the '90s, which were a key factor in creating a prolonged economic blockade, led to Serbia's rejection by the European Union. Currently, the position of Serbia towards Kosovo is another major impediment in this regard. In the last decade, Western Balkan countries have made substantial progress in terms of stability and regional cooperation.

However, a number of problems arising from conflicts in the region remain unresolved and affect both the internal workings of states and the relations between them. As for **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the US long-term objective is to become a stable and prosperous country with a strong and effective state authority, which is directed towards the European Union. On long term perspective, the BiH government, the US and the EU have similar views on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the region at the same time.

Croatia has made good progress towards meeting the accession criteria and negotiations have reached the final stage. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues to meet the political criteria sufficiently. There has been further progress in the key areas of reform, albeit in an uneven pace. Efforts are needed especially in regard to judicial reform and public administration. In its opinion, the Commission recommends opening accession negotiations with Montenegro and Albania when they will have reached the required degree of compliance with membership criteria set by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. The two countries must meet specific key priorities under each opinion. Serbia has submitted its application for EU membership in December 2009 and, in October 2010, the Council invited the Commission to submit an opinion on this application. Accession negotiations could be completed in early 2011, with the condition that Zagreb continues the reforms already initiated.

Serbia has continued to implement the political reform agenda and achieved positive results in the application of the Interim Agreement. In terms of meeting the requirements of the SAA, it is on track and has taken important steps in the reconciliation in the region. Further efforts are needed in judicial reform and public administration and in the fight against organized crime and corruption. Serbia must show that it has a more constructive attitude towards Kosovo's participation in trade and regional cooperation.

Also, cooperation must be strengthened to support the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in the northern region of **Kosovo**. Following the opinion expressed in July 2010 by the International Court of Justice on the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence, Kosovo and Serbia face a number of significant obstacles towards finding a viable compromise. Diplomatic recognition of Kosovo's statehood is the current bilateral impasse. This is the reason why EU's presence and active involvement in finding a solution beneficial to both parties is vital for maintaining a favorable context. To facilitate a rapprochement between Kosovo and Serbia is a major challenge for a heterogeneous European Union. The decentralization process in Kosovo has advanced significantly and has increased cooperation with EULEX. Government has



improved its ability to implement the European agenda and reform policy in Kosovo.

However, there are still significant challenges in terms of rule of law, including reform of public administration and judiciary and to combat corruption, organized crime and money laundering. Dialogue and reconciliation between communities and the protection and integration of minorities, particularly the Serbs in Kosovo, continue to be acute problems in the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina must form a government to commit to future EU efforts and intensify the pace of relevant reforms. The country should first take emergency measures to align its constitution to the European Convention on Human Rights and should improve the functioning of the institutions in the region.

Since 1999, the UN representatives attempt to reach an agreement between the two neighbors – Greece and **FYROM**. On February 9, 2011, at the UN headquarters, took place a meeting with the envoy, Matthew Nimetz, and the UN ambassadors of both countries, in order to find a solution for FYROM's name, whose international recognition under that name is blocked by Greece since 1991. In late March 2011, the ICJ analyzed the dispute that opposes the two countries. Athens accuses Skopje that it prevented its NATO accession.

About 20,000 Romanian speakers – Aromanian/Vlach and Megleno-Romanian – live in this country. Because of the communist policies of forced assimilation and integration of national minorities, currently, there is a deep division of the Aromanian community. For both countries, minority rights are a particularly important segment. On February 23, 2011, a memorandum of cooperation for the Euro-Atlantic integration was signed between the Foreign Ministries of both countries. FYROM made constructive efforts to make a better inter-ethnic climate. Romania will continue to act to complete EU and NATO enlargement with the Western Balkan countries.

Conclusions

The Euro-Atlantic integration process is progressing at a rate that depends largely on the capacity of the candidate countries to assume the obligations of membership. This requires sustainable reforms, legislative and institutional adjustments which shall be credible and convincing.

When the regarded countries will meet the standards, including those related to democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, EU and NATO will cooperate to move to the next stages of the process.

Western Balkan region is artificially created in order to serve the EU strategy and wider geopolitical considerations of the international actors. Regional cooperation is situated within a broader framework of South-East European space. Regional cooperation process is seriously affected by the competitive nature of the EU and NATO integration. The transformation into a prosperous part of Europe does not depend mainly on the insistence of regional cooperation, nor on its implementation in the integration process, but on the ability of states in the region to collect all the implications and importance of both regional cooperation and integration of Euro-Atlantic structures and to adapt their actions accordingly. With the creation and definition of priorities of the Regional Cooperation Council, the region has entered a decisive stage three of transformation. It is still a transitional stage, because the leverage of international institutions at this starting point is more powerful than the one of the countries in the region. The support offered by the political elites of the countries concerned in this unique regional institution and also the extent to which it reflects and articulates the interests of the region and will be crucial for the perspectives of regional cooperation.

The process of integration in the European Union and NATO is the key driver for the security, political and economic transformation of the region. These processes of integration are key factors in promoting regional cooperation. It is essential to keep the pace of reforms to provide clear incentives for local political actors to engage in regional cooperation. EU membership is not only the best hope for stabilizing and transforming the region but also to develop regional cooperation well. Taking into account that the clear prospect of accession to the EU is the strategic goal of all Western Balkan countries, as this provides motivation for the local political elite's commitment to the reforms necessary for a clear transformation of the region, developing a comprehensive strategy for enlargement should be top priority for the region.

All the states in the region should achieve the same status of candidate countries. In this way,



it will be easier to harmonize multilateral ASA processes with the CRC bilateral program. The first visible sign of commitment to the region concerning the prospect of membership is the full liberalization of visas for all countries. Regional cooperation faces obstacles to its development. The major ones are:

- The effect of the independence of Kosovo on regional stability and cooperation;
- Serbia's foreign policy dilemma;
- The problems of state reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
- The problems of internal cohesion in many countries;
- Weak state structures in Albania.

Despite the potential negative effects of these barriers, it is recommended to continue building networks and bridges between the networks of non-state actors. Based on the experience of other regions, it is expected for such regional cooperation to develop after the EU and NATO accession, when countries in the region will have established and promoted common interests in a specific broader Euro-Atlantic area.

The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) analyzed the impact of global economic crisis on Western Balkan countries and assessed various policy actions taken, and ways to better achieve the region's competitive position in the global economy. The key problem that appeared is strengthening the capacity to develop and implement appropriate policy options and appropriate use of available resources so as to overcome the crisis and, on long-term, to achieve economic growth, stable knowledge-based competitive advantages in the region.

There were three key areas where other activities will be planned in the region:

- With regard to human resources in the region as a key prerequisite for long-term competitiveness (education, research and development, innovation capacities);
- Creating conditions to stimulate knowledge development (the role of institutions, businesses, international networks, improving regional cooperation and integration in the EU);
- Set up mechanisms for broader cooperation, which would provide for synchronized activities over 40 regional organizations and initiatives already operating in different fields and contribute

to a more harmonized approach in addressing the region's many challenges – from trade, investment, health research and development, to combating organized crime and natural disasters.

It is in discussion to develop a regional platform that would facilitate long-term strategic policy options focused on overcoming the crisis and the accession to the EU – the launching 2020 Western Balkans Futures Project, designed in accordance with the long-term projections of the EU 2020 Strategy, as a continuation of Lisbon Strategy, which was developed for the period comprised between 2000 and 2010.

The data from the EU Member States in the region, the European Commission, international financial institutions, OECD, CEFTA Secretariat and other regional initiatives, as well as from businessmen in the region have indicated the main problems faced by the region in economic and social development. A common formula for all the intended directions is: good governance and ways to achieve this. Additional measures are needed in the development of resources and improving the competitive potential. The Commission will continue to make full use of its instruments of accession and economic surveillance mechanism to monitor economic and fiscal performance of Western Balkan countries.

The European Union has a regular dialogue with candidate countries, familiarizing them with the coordination and surveillance of economic policies within the EU. A similar process has been created for potential candidates too. Economic dialogues between the Commission and the countries involved in the accession process in the framework of association are used for surveillance of economic policies. In addition to dialogue and surveillance, the EU actively supports economic recovery efforts, macroeconomic stabilization and consolidation of the countries involved in the accession process. The enlargement process contributes to the accomplishment of the objectives of Europe 2020 Strategy, by expanding the area in which EU regulatory framework is applied and by creating new trade opportunities.

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TECHNOLOGICAL GAP. FORMS AND INFLUENCES ON ECONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY MILITARY PHENOMENON

*Virgil BĂLĂCEANU, PhD**

Military technology is the amount of equipment, vehicles, structures and communication systems that are designed for use in warfare. It comprises the kinds of technology that are distinctly military in nature and not civilian in application, usually because they are impractical in civilian application or dangerous to use without appropriate military training.

For military technology it is common to have been researched and developed by scientists and engineers specifically for being used by the armed forces. This process involves the design, development, testing and lifecycle management of military weapons and systems. It draws on the knowledge of several traditional engineering disciplines, including mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, mechatronics, electro-optics, aerospace engineering, materials engineering, and chemical engineering.

Sometimes, the border between military and civilian technology is not further away. There are a significant number of military inventions that are technologies originally developed and designed for military purposes, and which are now used by

civilians with sometimes minor or no modifications at all.

Key-words: disparity; discontent; evolutionary change; revolutionary change; discriminator element; technological edge.

In Merriam-Webster Dictionary, technology is defined as the practical application of knowledge in a domain, and also “the ability” conferred by the practical application of knowledge.

In his writing “La technique et le temps, 1: La faute d’Epimethee”, French philosopher Bernard Stiegler defined technology in two ways: “research of life using other methods than life” and “inorganic organized matter”.

The term “technology” has a vast meaning, starting from simple material tools (a bar used as a lever) to contemporary immaterial complex tools like an IT soft or the know-how and the methods implemented in a domain. It is more and more accepted the opinion, according to which technology is more than an exterior support, as it also represents an interior human conscience transformation, as new technologies bring also

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changes in the way of individual's thinking. This perception of technology gets new meanings and applications, comprising all methods which expand individual's knowledge and the perception of the world¹.

A. Technological gap. Concepts, manifestation and influences on economical development

There is a symbiotic and interdependent relation between technology and society. They have influenced each other determining reciprocal major modifications.

On cultural and civilization's evolution plans, technology has brought different bases and modalities of writing, printing machine, musical instruments, road and city infrastructure, the ability to sail which extends the knowledge horizon, theories of the Universe, scientific discoveries and inventions which have radically changed the society in different points of its existence.

This dynamic and very complex process got a special boom with the Industrial Revolution, when humans, using the available technologies, made their work much easier. Their work productivity and quality were improved. Going further, the modern age meant the facilitation of humans' circulation (train, automobile, airplane), of the possibility to communicate (telephone, radio, TV, computer, internet), and the improvement of life conditions (electricity, medicine and food industry development). On the other hand, in this period, some ideas manifested against an excessive technology. It was taken into discussion the matter of restraining the individual's spiritual development favoring technological, material development.

Martin Heidegger considered that technology, at a certain moment, encumbers us to find the absolute truth, limits us and alters our real nature and rationale².

This philosophical perception of technology is part of technology's philosophy, a domain that existed through the history, from Plato and Aristotle to Karl Marx, Heidegger or Michel Foucault.

I will further sustain that technological process has never been uniform and concomitant in the world. Its dynamics was conditioned by different factors: individuals' way of thinking and

their behavior in a community, the availability of resources, various armed conflicts, other social, economic elements and the evolution of civilizations. Some technologies were spread relatively rapid and easy (fire, wheel) while other technologies were implemented or used by a community or region after a long period of time (use of different machines in agriculture, a domain with a significant advance in some countries).

This process determined an unequal development of human activities in different domains. From a military point of view, if, at the beginning, a conflict was won by the side which had more strong fighters, after that, the focus was on their equipment, their protection by different types of armors and shields and their training. Therefore, a community with limited possibilities for trading and working metals was inferior.

These technological gaps determined economical gaps and established a hierarchy between regions or countries, a phenomenon which also exists today.

Manifestation and influences on the economical development. The correlation between technological and economical gap

Nowadays, technological gap refers to the differences between those who have access effectively to technology and use it and those who don't, between those who innovate in technology and produce it and those who don't³. Figures presented by the UN speak by themselves: there are 861 patented inventions to 1 million inhabitants in Japan, while, in many developing countries, this figure is 0; 84% of published articles are from developed countries; tuition period in USA is 12.1 years while under 1 year in Guinea Bissau; 27.3 % of people enrolled to a university in Finland choose a scientific profile while in Chad the percent is 0.1. Research domain contributes significantly to diminishing these gaps by developing, accessing and absorbing new technologies. One of the methods proposed to reduce the technological gap is the improvement of this domain.

Technological gap theory, stated by the Dutch economist Arnold Heertje⁴, stipulates that changes produced in international exchanges are imposed by the relative "technological complexity" degree of countries. Developing regions use only a quarter of the technology used by highly



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developed countries. In the meantime, according to the World Bank, there are important gaps even inside a country. The main cities and basic domains use more technology than others. An example is India, where last generation IT services are, in urban regions, contrasting with the ones in rural zones, where less than 10% of the population have telephone services.

The apparition and evolution of these gaps are strictly related to the government's involvement and the development of private sector. The old technologies for road infrastructure, railway, telephone services etc. are usually provided by the government and have public financing; if the government fails, all these will fail. On the other hand, new technologies, mobile phones, internet, computers are provided by a sector encouraging the private domain and internal or external challenge.

Thinking of productivity, we can say that there is a major difference between using and not using technology. The estimated productivity in agriculture was four times bigger than in processing industry because of new technologies.

Technology is a critical and decisive factor of the income, but also an obvious consequence of it. The relative efficiency of an economy is represented by the productivity. According to the World Bank reports⁵, in 2005, the productivity of developing countries was about 5% of the USA productivity. On regional plan, these discrepancies have deepened. The countries with medium economies have come closer to the developed economies (Hungary or Poland have grown their technological degree by 125% after 1990). But there still is a huge gap between developed and developing countries.

Poverty, corruption, internal and international conflicts encumber the access and implementation of technologies, even to those related to food, hygiene or individual security. Around 25,000 people die every day because of starvation, meaning one person every 3.5 seconds (according to the UN).

Technological gaps generate economical gaps. The economy is behind the times and absolutely inefficient without appropriate production methods, business know-how, own resources and the ability to have constant trading relations.

Even the simplest technologies have a strong impact on the development of a region. The

solutions for simple recycling, the utilization of rain water, the technologies to conserve the food in regions without electricity, the refrigerating technologies considerably contribute to improving the life conditions. A UN report shows that, in Rwanda, a system for rain water collection cannot be realized due to the absence of qualified workers and engineers. In present, this country is trying to implement simple technologies in health domain, transport, water, constructions, and alternative power sources.

There is a strong relation between innovation's intensity and per capita income. In China, the number of inventions has grown from 1.5 in '80s to 10% in 2004.

The technological innovations of the last two centuries are available in almost all the countries. Nevertheless, there are some problems due to their unequal spreading inside a country. This is the reason for a faint economical development of many states in Latin America based on resources.

These regional economic discrepancies practically determine important financial differences between countries or regions of the same country, which encumber the access to the basic needs. At the same time, this kind of disparities affects global or regional projects; in Europe, they affect the economical development of the community and EU is focusing on this phenomenon.

One method to calculate the economical disparities is Gini coefficient, coming from the Italian inventor of the method, Corrado Gini. His formula is based on the income average in every country. One example is the income average in Denmark, with a coefficient of 0.247, compared with the coefficient of a country like Namibia, which is 0.707. Europe and Canada have a coefficient between 24 and 36, US and Mexico over 40, which shows a high degree of economical disparity.

Coming back to technological gap, as a cause of economical disparities, let's talk a little bit about the situation in Europe.

Taking into account unemployment and productivity rates, we can speak about countries with a low unemployment and productivity rate (Slovenia, Portugal), countries with a high rate (Germany) and countries with low unemployment rate and high productivity rate (Britain, Netherlands, Denmark).




Figure 1. Number of Internet users in several European countries and USA (%)

Europe is, after USA, in a world hierarchy, mainly due to an unequal implementation of ICT, a term which will be discussed.

Digital divide concept represents the difference between persons who have direct access to digital and information technology and those who have a limited or no access to these technologies. In other words, the absence of access to information means the absence of knowledge with all its consequences. In present, Digital divide refers to technologies like radio, television, computer, internet and mobile telephony.

The importance of this phenomenon consists in the access to information and education and the amplification of gaps by not using these technologies.

A study led by Computer Aid International, a non-profit organization from Britain, focused on the mitigation of these differences at regional scale, shows that developed countries represent now about 15% of world population and 88% of internet users in the world⁶. The study shows that 585 of 1000 US persons have a computer, while 4 out of 1000 Asian persons can say the same thing.

ICT concept – Information Communications Technology – refers to any device which receives, stocks, manipulates and transmits information, electronically and digitally. We are talking about computers, digital television, e-mail etc. In business domain, ICT has two aspects: traditional technologies related to the use of computers (meaning usual things done with a personal computer: editing documents or creating a data base), and new digital communication technologies which enable the companies to communicate and exchange information.

The experts appreciate that, in present, we witness a real ICT revolution which, in concordance with globalization, are major social and economical changes. One of the implications is related to the labor market, a domain where the facilitation of rapid international communications allowed the companies to subcontract various activities to other companies. This way, a significant reduction of the production costs can be realized, but, at the same time, proper conditions for abuses related to work contracts are created, inadequate salary and work conditions, all these generated by the fact that cheap




Figure 2. The number of servers in the U.S. compared with Europe (per 1,000 inhabitants)



labor markets, without payment restrictions, become more and more attractive. Global ICT expansion is not uniform, due to the absence of adequate technologies. This way, regional disparities become deeper, and the countries unable to produce and use this kind of technology leg behind.

Also, the social implications of ICT are profound. On the one hand, those sustaining the phenomenon consider it revolutionary, conducting professional training to a higher level. On the other hand, the opponents reproach the negative influence on labor, technology replacing partially or totally the worker. The unequal spreading within a society, institution or state has negative consequences and can be amplified by causes which are not economical or related to the access to technologies. For example, English language is understood by 10% of the world population; nevertheless, more than 80% of the websites are in English.

Danish assistant for internet and web services Jakob Nelsen⁷ talks about the idea of digital divide and ICT focusing on three important elements:

1) *Economic divide* – considered the simplest form of the difference between those who have access and use digital technology and those who don't; it resides in the fact that some people do not have financial resources necessary to purchase a computer.

2) *Usability divide* – more than 40% of the population has a poor training; very few websites take into account this fact; old agers have difficulties in accessing these technologies, an aspect ignored by most of the websites.

3) *Empowerment divide* – refers to the absence of individual involvement in this kind of activities; even if internet and computers can be used easily, not all the people will exploit the opportunities offered by this technology.

Like other experts, Nelsen considers ICT a very powerful instrument for transformation and facilitation of daily life, but also, as one for manipulation which can deceive people and remove them from the phenomenon.

International institutions for global development consider ICT concept very important for poor countries, its implementation being necessary to offer opportunities on international market and integration in global economy.

U.N. has organized a veritable task force, "UN ICT Task Force"⁸, whose mission is the

limitation of these gaps related to the access and use of technology. G8 forum has a structure with a similar goal, named DOT – Digital Opportunity Task Force.

B. Technological gap implication on contemporary military phenomenon

The Military domain represents an important direction of science applications, states' capacity of defence being connected and determined by science development. There is no field within the military phenomenon, without influences of modern science.

In the last years, the military technology has advanced immensely. Modern armament systems allow targets' hitting with extreme accuracy; reconnaissance and surveillance systems provide detailed information about the structure and location of the enemy; combined data analyses and dissemination systems allow a rapid exploitation of information.

The directions of military technologies development can be classified in different ways, but all have similar assessment methods. Some of them are:

- increased lethal effect;
- increased fire power and accuracy;
- implementation of armament systems which provide increased efficiency and effect;
- increased capacity of small units to establish decisive results;
- increased deceiving capacity⁹.

There are specific elements of the intelligent armament generation, C4I systems, electronic surveillance systems, reconnaissance and hitting systems, psychological and informational war techniques and technologies; all these will be used in the future military operations.

New technological discoveries request future military actions with: extended proportions in space and time, specialized forces and equipment, joint forces, increased intensity and complexity, unexpected changes of situation, fighting in all environments, very maneuverable forces, various tactical procedures, rapid actions in various terrain, time and weather conditions. We should emphasize the importance of command's cosmic components and the operation goals, the intensification of confrontation's decisive character, the synchronization and integration of



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fighting actions. The armed conflicts, influenced by the technologies of this century, will show in the near future a big complexity of the theatre of operations, a mixture of civil and military environment, guerilla's extension – especially the urban guerilla –, the use of lethal and non-lethal armaments, explosives, and possibly the next generation of nuclear arms and plasma armament.

Long distance accurate hitting systems, informational war, space war represent new elements in the military domain. Each of them is the result of the technological evolution.

Accurate hitting systems were developed at the beginning of the '70s and a rapid progress is under progress. The existing systems include long range missiles and accurate munitions. An efficient identification of a target corroborated with a rapid dissemination of information allows a coordinated attack on the enemy's targets with minimum damages and collateral victims, and limited possibilities for an enemy counterattack.

Although the critical value of information was discussed from old times, the modern wars depend on information systems. There are reconnaissance and early warning satellites, a large range of manned and unmanned air systems etc. which provide a huge data amount.

Some analysts considered the informational war as a fourth dimension of war along with the traditional dimensions: ground, air and maritime.

Space war is also considered another field of war. Even if the military importance of space was big enough in the last decades, recent technological developments allowed assigning it a role which makes a military operation almost impossible without space involvement. Certainly, the insurance of space superiority will be a critical advantage.

The ongoing improvement of military technology influences the armed forces' development and structure, their training, and determines changes in the procedures for conducting military actions.

The armed forces of all developed countries have ample and long-lasting structural changes, requested by the dynamics and modifications of the armament systems and military technology.

The multitude of technological research applications in military domain includes: unmanned aircraft, cruiser missiles, "intelligent" arms, reactive munitions, hovercraft, vertical take-

off aircraft, accurate guided munitions, command, control and space communications technologies, infrared guided arms etc¹⁰.

Information based armament is replacing more and more the fire power, and the targets of the military actions are becoming more and more precisely determined. Thus, the mass armies, specific to the two World Wars, have become anachronic and inefficient. The transition from mass armies to modern operational structures should be considered a logical requirement, imposed by economical constraints of a future war.

Military experts express different opinions regarding the priority between military organizational structure, technology and operational concepts. Some opinions sustain the technology priority. Other opinions support the operational concept as primary. There are also opinions that emphasize the stimulant role of technology and the influence of operational concepts.

C. Military technological gaps between USA and the other NATO member states

The US has the hegemony in the world, like we have never seen from the Roman Empire. The Gulf War, the interventions in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan proved statistically an 80% US presence in these actions, the US armament and logistic used were so costly and sophisticated that the allies cannot afford it.

Aware of its unique power in the world, the US realizes that, anyway, it cannot act alone without risking arousing dissatisfaction of other countries.

The experience demonstrated that the development of general capabilities for defense depends on: political leaders' options, economical power of a state, the correct perception of technological evolution which changes the approach and finality of the military conflicts.

NATO member states, except the USA, are characterized by modest military capabilities, relatively numerous armed forces, but too small engagement of forces and obsolete equipment. Their forces deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Western Balkans had difficulties in logistical support and troops command, and the US has often provided them support, a situation with political, military and moral effects.

The existing gaps between the two parts (US and the others) are generated mainly by the amount of money allocated to the defense domain.

Although the technological gap was reduced in the last period, even the pro-Atlantic allies cannot keep the rhythm with the US progress in development and transformation of its forces.

The fear that Europe will be again in the same situation as in the period immediately after the Second World War, with an economy lagged behind and dependant on the US key technologies, determined the European leaders, traditional allies, to be skeptical regarding the US opening to the military technology in the last two decades.

Conclusions

The technological gap phenomenon represents a critical problem for the developing countries, with long lasting and profound economical consequences and the incapacity of evolution.

From an economic point of view, the nucleus of this problem is the poverty, the lack of resources necessary for acquisition, development or improvement of new technologies, the absence or the bad quality of the communication infrastructure, and a reduced government implication in some cases.

From a military point of view, it is less possible to eliminate the existing technological gaps on short or medium term. The future military technologies will have a remarkable influence on the conflicts. The war of 21st century will be the space of more complex military systems, involving new technologies, and super-specialized soldiers, complex actions conducted according to different tactical and strategic procedures.

The enemy will be invisible and unpredictable. The goal of the technological innovation is to increase the force capability. And the modern war capabilities are influenced by a relative technological balance of the great powers. The war of the future will request: continuous and sufficient sustainability, good maintenance, maximum mobility, maneuver capabilities, proper logistical support, and technological superiority. Lessons learned from the recent wars are shaping the capabilities of the future wars.

The writer Alvin Toffler wrote that¹¹, in the future, the science and technology will be so developed that most of the people would not be

able to “digest” this amount of information and they will be tempted to be “disconnected” from the too fast-moving rhythm of life.

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LIBYA AND NATO'S OPERATIONS: THE RETURN FROM VOLUNTARISM TO THE CLASSICAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

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*The events in Libya erupted abruptly, along with the impact of the **influence through cross-border contamination and osmosis** of the changes given by the Arab revolutions from the neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, which were expected to have an impact on the situation in this country. As a matter of fact, it has become a common place the assertion that if Hosni Mubarak has been unscathed in Egypt, no other Arab leader can be sure of his position, in this Arab spring announced by the visit of the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the Middle East and the reunion in Doha, on 30 January 2011, when Mrs. Secretary of State announced that the system of the secular autocrats on Western money can no longer continue.*

*It is far from our intention to formulate a **conspiracy theory** regarding the fall of the Arab regimes in a domino system, much less of passing a retractable America which is turned to its domestic issues, fully de-committed from its external responsibilities, the blame of the fall of the Arab regimes. Except that, then, Hillary Clinton announced the acknowledgements and the will of the United States of being no more the piggy-bank of the Arab nationalist, secular, authoritarian regimes, paying money for their arming, development aids – allocated without*

being able to compensate the corruption and the lack of economic and inclusive solutions for the population – so that subsequently again the United States to take over the costs of its association with these regimes and to be the target of the Islamist radicals, displeased with the isolation and the repercussions against political Islam in these societies.

Key-words: voluntarism; humanitarian war; responsibility to protect; interventionism; legitimacy; civil war.

Theoretical Instruments, methodology and visited schools of thought

To describe the phenomenon of the Arab crisis, I used a **cognitive-institutional approach, of liberal essence**, in which two currents of strict actuality and with a major impact in a media era overlap: **neo-institutionalism** – the level of institutionalisation, real functioning of these institutions, the degree of coverage in relation with the community and the administrative capacity, of transposing in life, of the plans elaborated and the **cognitive revolution in psychology** – respectively the new 'religion' of the world in which the perception takes over the leading role, not rarely replacing the reality and, in any case, influencing

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regimes and decisions in the democratic world and more and more in the Arab world.

For if it is not a democracy in the Western acceptance – except maybe in a few states that have entered such a course, the most likely to come close to it being Morocco and Jordan, an **electoral democracy**, as well as an imposition of the will of the majority and a trend of inclusion of all the currents and influences in the political life will surely dominate the MENA region, as will the relevance of the public perception formed through free media, internet and socializing networks do, generated by the **growth of the virtual community's role** in the entire world.

But maybe more important than the real course of the events is becoming **their impact and signification in the course of contemporary international relations**, of the evolution tendencies of the international relations' nature, in an era of turbulences and excessive contemporary tectonicity. For the war in Libya, NATO's operations and others associated to them have made a reference to some fundamental themes and concepts which are very popular in the contemporary international relations, ranging from **R2P – „responsibility to protect”**, a retrieved fundamental principle of the UN, although formulated in an era in which the resources and the will for such interventions are missing more and more – to **humanitarian interventions**, the concept to which the international community appealed when it started to discuss the situation in Libya.

Naturally, in the theoretical discussion and in the calming of the fears of **interventionism's rivals** of any kind – especially the Russian Federation, China, but also Germany, this time, not to mention the more supportive conglomerate of the BRIC/BRICS countries – entered the famous question why Libya, with the reinstatement in the foreground of the resource war, for oil respectively. But if here the answers and the dispute are classical – we are not interested in oil, we had the majority of the contracts, it was easier to do business with a well-known Gaddafi than with an instable and unpredictable democratic regime contrary to some arguments of the type - blow the oil prices, it is fine with us because we are the producers, undermine the global economic growth especially in your part of the world, reproaches and arguments coming especially from Moscow and Beijing – of major interest for us become

especially the discussions of principle and the gestures and solutions implications embraced here by the international community upon the fabric of the international relations in the future.

Hence, we have to consider concomitantly the three levels of the Hanoi towers relative to the fabric of the contemporary international relations: the normative base, political fundamentals and the field application of the theoretical concepts, of humanitarian war in this case. From this point of view, our analysis reveals a rather unique solution, respectively **the rebound from voluntarism to the classical rules of international law**, i.e. a transition from Bush Jr.'s neo-conservatism, through Obama's internationalist liberalism to political conformist neo-realism in the US and from the manifest revengeful authoritarianism of August 2008 and the Russian revisionism of the new European security plans and implementation of the euro-asiatism to an apparent volunteer conformism in Moscow's case.

As for the European Union, the post-modernism characteristic to the institutional construction was balanced with a **value-based neo-realistic utilitarianism**—resulting from the need to readjust the financial crises, from the budgetary deficits but also from the detection of the real hard power's limits which hasn't doubled for a long time now the impression of the soft power professed by Brussels, even when it is about a revival of the promotion of the fundamental values of the Union, at least outside the relation with the Russian Federation or its space of interests –but which denotes itself amendable immediately after the Libya episode again in terms of conformist neo-realism, when it discovers, in reality, the lack of European capabilities to face a 'long war', even in its neighbourhood.

1. Libya in the protests' sign. From peaceful demonstrations to repression, civil war and international military intervention

1.1. Situation on the ground

In order to be able to enter the concrete analysis' sign of the events in Libya, we must notice more and more the **impossibility of simplification**, process that is so useful for the polarisation and support of a conflict by the modern societies, because of the inherent complexity associated with such a conflict. The complexity becomes



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more and more from corollary of crisis situations, an attribute harder to ignore in a ultra-publicised, perception-based world.

So, if at a global level, the great experts of the world amend today the economic models with feed-back mechanisms and tinting based on the **public's perception** – that can determine major falls in confidence, changes in consumer behaviour, terrible crashes or, on the contrary, profit increases of some companies or others – and in the domain of international crisis, of violent conflicts, **perception comes to amend** the same realities and to affect a logical determinism or a decision obtained on an optimal causal chain.

This has affected, as such, the decision in the case of Libya, as well, as some states, including Romania, stayed on hold, considering more attentively one segment or another of the responses from the field to shape the reality, the definition of the problem and, obviously, shaping the optimal solution.

This because in Libya we dealt with **overlapping events' typologies with extremely fine demarcation lines** and which required arsenals of instruments and approaches of distinct political and military nature, some of them radically different; hence the difficulty of positioning. So, in Libya, before the detaching of street protests influenced by the situation in the neighbouring countries and the lack of horizon of the 42 year immovable governance, we had to deal with a **secessionist movement** in the Eastern zone, in Cyrenaica, unto Tripolitania, the Western zone. It was determined by the historical memory of col. Muammar Gaddafi's coup against the former king, originating from this region.

However, the secessionism was not perfect, as there existed other regions as well having problems in relation to Muammar Gaddafi, given especially by the **formulas of tribal alliances**, between his tribe and other tribes, which left outside or at the periphery of the power other tribes situated in other regions, some of them even at the frontier with Tunisia, others situated fundamentally in the Western zone of Libya, such as Misrata/Misurata. In this secessionist geography, the location of the oil reserves played an important role as well, although the major zone of processing was placed by the Libyan leader in the West, although the majority of the resources are rather in the East, the majority being still under his control.

Also before the protest movements' outbreak, Muammar Gaddafi was a good ally of the Wets, of the US especially, but of France as well, in **combating international terrorism**, more precisely of the Al Qaeda franchises, this time Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This constant fight, with relevance in Algeria, the South of Morocco, Western Sahara, Mali and Mauritania, has permitted the leadership in Tripoli to improve its file tarnished by the support offered to global terrorist movements, the fostering of various groups training on Libyan territory and by the Lockerbie episode, as well as by the attack on the American soldiers in a disco in Berlin.

What is more, at his positive file appeared the disclosure of his own nuclear program, the drop out from the attainment of the nuclear weapon and the exposure of Iran's nuclear programs and of the private network of A. Q. Khan, the famous father of the Pakistani nuclear weapon. This role in combating the global nuclear proliferation brought him additional positive points and contributed as well to Gaddafi's posture of frequentable leader in the past years, as well as with his arming with weapons, especially French.

From now on we enter the overlapping realities proposed by the current situation in Libya, which started with **peaceful street protests**, of democratic essence, with a major impact and that were threatening to peacefully overthrow the regime. The reaction was tough and it determined armed reactions as well as summoning the mercenaries¹ because of the **regime breach**². Some categories of armed forces got out of control, some ministers abandoned the ship and have chosen the formula of the National Transition Committee (NTC) in Benghazi, others deserted in different capitals where they were accredited, and this regime breach gave the most important impetus to the riots and their potential success. This phenomenon also generated the appeal to the mercenaries especially from the neighbouring Chad, and triggered the violent repression in the street.

Overall, the violent reaction of the regime has determined two phenomena: the repression and the withdrawal of the demonstrators from the street and the attack on the arms' deposits, especially in the areas already declared as associated to the rebel movement, in the Eastern area. Here, paradoxically, an important role has been played by the institutional structure of Libya, constructed



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under Gaddafi, **Jamahiria – the society without a state**, where Gaddafi is playing the role of “spiritual leader and guide”, and he has no formal posture, no state position. So, the local councils of the big cities – separated by hundreds and thousands of straight highway, through the desert, in the open field – could overtake the complete control and arm the civilians.

And so, in a confirmation of Mckinder’s classical geopolitics, we find ourselves in a **fatality of the geography which has imposed the political structure of the state** where the mistaken idea of a leader has already diminished the force of a state in favour of the local administrations, thing also favoured by the tribal organisation and by the lack of the statal bond in Libya. Worse, the same geography has permitted the access to resources, including military ones, and to the arming of the civilians, moment from which we could speak of a **civil war** in Libya.

Unfortunately, all these phenomena and events overlap. Protest demonstrations and repressions went on occurring, there were fights between authorities and rebels, and there still are separatist tendencies, of at least one part of the Benghazi Council, as the situation has passed to **intervention formulas** quantified by the UN. The overlapping of these events also gave rise to different reactions – enhanced by particular experiences – of some countries, of international institutions and their overlapping continues to affect the unity of thought, as well as that of action of the international community.

1.2. The normative base and the manifest political will

If we are to enter now the normative base and political reactions’ area, we could approach the tensions between the two levels of manifestation. We had, therefore, the **Resolution 1970**, whose effect was the prohibition of the arms’ delivery – an embargo – but also the prohibition of mercenaries’ entrance in Libya, the aim being to limit the repression. A month later, the UN Security Council **Resolution 1973** - voted with the abstention of Russia – based on its own games³, of China – out of principle, and of Germany – to cap opinion differences at European level⁴, not only the usual differences - marked both the need of introducing an area of flight exclusion – “no flight zone”, to protect civilians from the repressive

military attacks of the regime, and “to protect civilians” by “all necessary measures” – article 4 of the resolution – as well as the interdiction “of an occupation through the troops entering on the ground”.

The normative base was, therefore, established: we find ourselves in the classical framework of the concept of the **responsibility to protect** the civilians in the war zone, the protection towards the repressions of an abusive regime, but also towards **an intervention with a profound humanitarian character**, drawn from the related doctrine. This level of the international relations Hanoi tower was complete, although, after explaining the political level, we shall see that it was not fully complete.

At the level of the **decision and manifest political will**, it is evident to include concrete elements of Libya’s bi and multi-lateral relations with the international community and with third states⁵. Therefore, the decision upon the fact that Gaddafi had to leave became evident on two levels: on the one hand, the context of the changes in the Arab world, which claim the need of relaunching hope, of inclusion in the power structures and some democratic forms transferred and adapted to the best to the specific horizon of these states, and on the other hand the need to respect the Security Council’s Resolutions, in their letter and spirit.

The authorisation of the international community’s operations gave rise to numerous variants of action. First came to the fore the **unilateral voluntarism**, especially of France⁶, followed immediately by that of Great Britain. The explanations are diverse and reside in the historic memory, in the complexity of the relations Paris-Tripoli – from the liberation of the Pakistani doctor and the Bulgarian nurses accused of infecting Libyan children with AIDS and condemned to death, by the former Madame Sarkozy, in the first year of presidential mandate, with the respective non-public costs assumed by France, the luxurious visit and the emplacement of Gaddafi’s tent on Champs Elisées, the weapons supply, technique and know how, probably in the same price, so that the subsequent claims from Paris to be ignored by Gaddafi when it came to giving up his position.

The immediate attacks of France, after the adoption of the Resolution 1973 demonstrated the **voluntarist approach** of Paris, beginning



from the „civilians’ protection” in Misrata and the rebels’ fiefs, directly involvement in a civil war, on the rebels’ side, after the unilateral recognition of the Benghazi Council as the “single representative of the Libyan people”. Then, the attacks upon the command centres in or about the residencies of the Libyan leader have permitted the interpretations of the actions as the will to hunt Gaddafi. These reactions had nothing to do with the spirit of the Resolutions and were betraying the political will contrary to international law, which determined the distance of some of the European states and NATO members, but especially the reactions of the Arab states, of the Arab League and the African Union. The gesture and intervention of France allowed, however, the blocking of the rebel troops’ defeat by Gaddafi and decimating the opposition, but with a high cost, unilaterally assumed.

Great Britain joined France as a political will, from national reasons, the Lockerbie affair having left deep unhealed wounds, but with more nuanced interpretations of the rules normatively proposed by the Security Council’s resolutions. Great Britain officially saw article 4 of the Resolution 1973 as allowing the delivery of equipment others than weapons, even defensive weapons for rebels, not being contrary – because of the succession – to the weapon delivery interdiction advanced by Resolution 1970. Moreover, this last resolution does not forbid the presence of ground troops, but only occupation, so special forces groups ensuring military and technical guidance, as well as organising of the rebels, can be sent, in virtue of this interpretation.

Even if it accepts the two interpretations in the light of open options, Great Britain does not appeal to them, so it does not deliver weapons, it has not sent troops to assist the rebels⁷, it does not formally recognize but it dialogues with the National Transition Council (NTC) and it supports it through guidance, telecommunications and annex material. **The political will of removing Gaddafi** is present, but its manifestation is within the limits of Resolution 1973.

Ultimately, the most expected position was that of the United States. In the same terms – although president Barack Obama has discussed armament delivery, guidance and even the possibility of the intervention on the ground – he rejected the alternatives, for the moment, sticking to direct intervention and solving the radar problems, anti-

aircraft defence, aerodromes and the NFZ, lately authorizing even armed drones in Libya⁸, however passing the primordial responsibility to Europeans and marching on the command transfer to NATO.

1.3. Political problems of the intervention in Libya

There are three **intercurrent problems at political level**: one residing in the relations between different actors, especially the US and European actors, and sharing responsibilities, the second residing in the legitimate commandment of the operations and the strict framing in the limits of the Security Council’s resolutions, and the third is an internal affair which rises problems concerning the potential armament deliveries to rebalance the relation of forces. Hence, the US has been retractile and indecisive at first, refusing a new interventionist episode required by the Europeans – especially by France. Then they intervened forcefully, rapidly solving the major problems, passing subsequently, at a later moment, the responsibility and the command to the Europeans.

The US has learned from the lessons of Irak and Afghanistan, but also from those of the crisis. It is good to be moralist and well-seen in the world, as a defender of the values, when, if something happens in the world, you call out for the US to intervene militarily, but you accuse them of unilateralism or imperatively ask them to consult you when you have no contribution on the field or the theme addressed does not suit you. The US do not want this role anymore, having supplementary costs, they have not declined, eventually, their global responsibilities, but they have passed the command of operation to the Europeans⁹. This gesture’s relevance and effects were the **major implication of the Europeans** in the operations, the sharing of the expenses, the acknowledging of these costs and the objective ascertaining the lack of capabilities, reason for the US to claim the abidance by the informal commitment amidst NATO of allocating 2% of the GDP for the military domain.

Passing of the operations’ command towards NATO¹⁰ was a consistent political gesture, but with many problems, of two types: France desired the independence of the operations and the preservation of its unilateral voluntarist plan, not the subordination to the NAC decision,



and the adherence to the rules of the Resolution 1973, while Turkey had major reserves regarding the implication in the intervention in Libya – surpassed immediately after it has been offered a role and a commandment, with a major relevance for the impact and legitimacy of the action¹¹, especially through the joining in the effort of a number of four Arab states. Romania has fought for this payoff that allowed the re-entrance in an area of normality at political level. This gesture of assumption of the individual states' operations under NATO canopy and command, with the strict adherence to the Security Council's Resolutions has represented, in fact, the quintessence of the **come-back from the temptation of voluntarism to the conformation to the international law rules, and respectively to the conformist neo-realism.**

The third problem of political nature, related to the internal security and the evolutions in Libya after the protests, refers to **armament delivery**¹². It has become clear that Al Qaeda from the Islamic Maghreb has taken advantage of the anarchy created by the protests, and by the striking of the civil war and has managed to acquire important quantities of weapons¹³, which were deposited, according to the statements, especially in the Western Sahara^{14,15}. Here can be found also ground-to-air missiles which can affect the air traffic in the region of the Mediterranean Sea¹⁶ and the costs of such an imprudence - of providing Libya with this kind of capabilities, then losing them by attacking the armament deposits^{17,17} - may cost in time.

As a matter of fact it has been rumoured that beside the rebels, there are operative Al Qaeda fighters, which was denied by the Benghazi Council^{19,18}. What is sure is that the arming of the rebel forces creates this major problem of the possibility to control the final user and of spreading the weapons to civilians, from where resides the diffidence of political nature, not only normative, of the international community, in the cases where an interpretation of the matters already exists.

If, normatively, the bases for open options in support of the Libyan rebels are insured and politically the problematic of complex nature can be nuanced and interpreted, maybe the most relevant argument is given by the third level of the Hanoi Tower, the fabric of the international relations, respectively the practical application

of the theoretical precepts and the transposition in reality of the manifest political will. This gives the **substantial limits of an "immaculate intervention"**, in strict conformity with the concept and the theoretical limits of the intervention, even in the case of a humanitarian war.

2. Crimes against humanity as a motivation for war, from the concept to the practical application: the mandate and the temptation of voluntarism

Crimes against humanity and the **humanitarian wars** are not a new category. Although we were accustomed to wars determined by **interests** – authority, resources, or **ideology** – religious or secular, the "good" described for one society or another in order to direct and coagulate wishes and to polarize the wills, the **humanitarian wars** have their relevance and the constant presence in the international law, but especially in the recent practice. Obviously the purity of a motivation/cause of the war is arguable –referring to resources – especially because there are numerous similar situations where there is no intervention.

The motivation of the lack of resources for an intervention, of the major costs in crisis or of the absence of the interest of the strong states' community, with capabilities, is hard to defend, no matter how real, because it fundamentally attacks both the principle of human solidarity and that of equal treatment of the states. The contemporary neo-realist approach show, cynically though, the reality of these motivations.

2.1. Humanitarian interventions in the past

The genocide and the crimes against humanity, as a moral motivation of the military intervention, appear as far back as Kosovo, when the desire was to **suppressing and preventing new human sufferings** caused by legitimately established leadership of a state. The arrest of a government, of an authority, from committing mass crimes is a precept sanctioned by the UN and encompassed in the short list of the **motivations for the international community's interventions**, as it is the case in Libya. A classical case is the intervention of the American military troops in the organisation of the Haiti airport and of the humanitarian help arrived by air to Haiti, after the last devastating earthquake.



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We also enlisted a smooth sliding of the system, of relations and of the international law, from shared, but broken rules, to voluntarism, rules forcing and even the temptation of the normative revisionism. Hence, we can talk about **different degrees of voluntarism**, even **guilty voluntarism and revisionist politics**, actually, in cases such as the '90s intervention in Somalia, to prevent the famine and the convoy of humanitarian aids, or that in Haiti, to eliminate a repressive and corrupt regime which was creating sufferings to its own population, down to the second category, with the intervention of the Russian Federation in the Russo-Georgian war, in August 2008, on a pseudo-intervention to an ethnical genocide, built on the Kosovo model, to resolve a **problem of ambition and interventionist, revisionist politics**, in relation to the borders consented by the OSCE.

The clear distinction which imposes itself is that between intervention on humanitarian grounds of a third party and peace-keeping missions. In the second case it is about observing and keeping of an agreement between the two parties, pre-existing and supervised by force of arms, first the **neutrality and protection of the civilians and victims**; hence the complexity of practice at this level.

Thus, we already have a very thin line, in the case of the war in Libya, between the peaceful protests, repression and the rights of the attacked civilians to defend themselves, including by attacking the deposits and weapons procurement, but from here to civil war there is a very small step, as there is a very fine balance between **protecting the civilians** or the oppressed and **intervention in favour of one party, in a civil war**. The complexity has, still, a procedural explanation, as well as one arising from past experiences and sequelae of the past that we carry on even to this day and which alter our judgment in the case of these "border" events.

Hence, crimes against humanity and the most famous genocides confess, in practice, the adverse experiences of opportune and in time non-intervention, from the Holocaust in the Second World War to the genocide in Rwanda or at Srebrenica, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nobody intervened to **prevent or stop the atrocities**, fact assumed by the international community as a **moral failure**. There from appeared the **humanitarian interventionism** in order to prevent such carnage.

2.2. The doctrine and the conceptual limitations of the "immaculate intervention"

In Sudan, for example, at Darfur, we deal with a president already condemned for genocide, who avoids the punishment decided by a Court of the international community **because he does not recognize this International Criminal Court** - a gesture of national sovereignty; hence the practical difficulties of applying these provisions. Usually, the massacre or the genocide, repression is directed against a minority that opposes the majority that gives legitimacy to the presidential election – or to the toleration of the regime. Preventing the minority slaughtering by the legitimate authority implies the **contraposition of the sovereignty principle to that of the right of humanitarian intervention**, hence the difficulty to determine, theoretically, but especially practically, the clear, certain demarcation lines.

The **"immaculate intervention"**²⁰, claimed by respecting in letter and spirit the rules and the provisions of the normative documents that authorize the humanitarian intervention, doesn't exist in reality. This is also the current case, in which France made a **great show of zeal and excessive voluntarism**, having particular interests to force Gaddafi's discharging, in the framework of protecting the civil society, even armed and engaged in a civil war, but its intervention protected the opposition in the rebel cities from being slaughtered, while the cease fire claimed by Gaddafi was a cover to continue the attacks and fights inside the cities, sheltered by the human shields of various civilians involved in the confrontations. Furthermore, if the attack and elimination of Gaddafi intervened, the conviction would not have been made for hunting the Libyan leader, as it appears today, when this operation failed.

In this context, **the NATO operations' limits** are worth mentioning, from the maritime limit of applying the Resolution 1970, of blocking the armament traffic and mercenaries, to that of applying Resolution 1973, introducing the flight interdiction and protecting the civilians by any measures. Obviously the intervention is even more restrictive in the context of the last documents adopted at the Lisbon NATO summit in 2010, where in the New Strategic Concept and in the final Document of the NATO-Russia Summit is reaffirmed the North Atlantic Treaty principle marking the **pre-eminence of the UN**



Resolutions and of the United Nations as an organization required to take responsibility for the situation of the international interventions, **except the notable case of common defence**, of article 5, where the Alliance reserves its right to react immediately, also based on the UN Charter, but in self-defence or against an external aggressor.

Reaffirming these principles in 2010, in the context of the reset and revival of the relations with the Russian Federation – the motto of this summit – underlines the Alliance’s interest in respecting – in letter and spirit – the international provisions regarding interventionism, but also the mandates formulated and assumed by the international community. NATO’s command taking of the Libya operations represents, as highlighted above, an inclination to neorealist conformism, but it **cannot limit the actions of the Alliance on the level of “immaculate intervention”**.

The clearest motivation and reasoning for this is given by the situation on the ground. Thus, we deal with an almost clear case of flight ban, a formula to protect the rebel civilian areas against the heavy weapon military intervention, but this **does not protect the cities where urban guerrilla fighting takes place**²¹ – where the intervention involves collateral civilian casualties – nor from direct interventions of Gaddafi’s loyal troops, possibly an irregular army, militia and pro-Gaddafi civilians armed with light weapons. The tendency to intervene in these cases has led to attacks on insurgents in tanks or armoured cars or attacks on happy civilians, who were greeting the Alliance’s air planes with gunshots in the air.

In these circumstances, NATO is in a position of choosing between **passively assisting at the attacks** in Misrata/Misurata, inside the city²², at repressions on peaceful demonstrations in Tripoli and other towns, or at conquering, step by step, the rebel cities by Gaddafi’s troops and loyal militias – armed and well prepared – and to **intervene on one side in a civil war**, fighting against Gaddafi directly, or by introducing ground troops²³. And this because the maximum that NATO can expect today from the developments on ground in Libya is a split of Libya in two, the Eastern rebel zone and the Western loyalist²⁴ zone, but here the financial sustainability of such a partition and ensuring the security of the separatist region creates major problems as the oil wells²⁵ are still placed under the control of Gaddafi’s Libyan authorities.

3. Libya’s Perspective: a way out

The perspectives in Libya are not necessarily simple to distinguish today, because the intervention is at the beginning and negotiations that exclude the maintenance of Gaddafi and his family or guarantees for them have been doubled by the inclusion at the contact group meeting in Doha of representatives of the National Transitional Council (TNC) from Benghazi. But some lessons learned by the international community play an important role in the evolution.

Thus, cases of **premature withdrawal and failure** almost universally recognised in Somalia, the Iraq 1 case of **“unfinished businesses”** that later claimed for a new intervention against Saddam Hussein, but also the Iraq 2 and Afghanistan cases, when international intervention has fallen into a **“long war”** with a **“nation building”** or at least a **“state building”** component have marked any further intervention of the international community.

The options are fairly predictable: either there is a change in the **nature and course of the war** or there is a negotiated withdrawal of the current authorities without any engaged direct guarantees, or there is a **stand-off recorded** as soon as possible in order to avoid wasting resources. The alternative is the **long war**, which the US rejected when it handed over the initiative and that Europe cannot afford because it has no capabilities of carrying it. These alternatives were claimed because the rebels appear to have neither the resources, will, knowledge, ideology nor the leaders to carry out their own war²⁶ and to **remove Gaddafi and his clan**, and that is why they require more and more vigorous interventions of the international community, even the land intervention which they originally vehemently rejected²⁷, in the absence of opportunities to defeat Gaddafi, on the short and even medium term.

Under these conditions, the formulas that the international community disposes range from the **gradual escalation** of the intervention – with the introduction of new and new items, special operations, training and state-building at the rebels level – to **humanitarian intervention and corridors**, allowing either the presence of troops on the ground, including with their engagement in the separation of the parties and



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the defence of a “civil”, “suppressed”²⁸ party, or an **intervention with absolute powers**, meaning a direct intervention, with full force and the rapid elimination of the Gaddafi regime.

The lessons learned in the past show that the first variant is unlikely to be accomplished, after the **non-interventionism and the abstinence** marked by the US, and even the rejection of the arms’ deliveries and of other land operations on behalf of Barack Obama, who will soon enter an electoral year. The second one would require, in the current context of the conformist neo-realism, **a new resolution of the Security Council** stating that Gaddafi did not cease fire, but has continued the attacks and repressions on the civilians²⁹ and he must be eliminated, respectively condemned for crimes against humanity. Unfortunately, even this solution has a **minimum probability** of being obtained, so there should be someone fast enough and with sufficiently large resources to intervene abruptly, shortly, assuming the voluntarist gestures’ costs, but the effect is hardly predictable; what is more, it would involve an actual breaking off between the population and Gaddafi, fact that appears to be less obvious in the last weeks. We are not excluding de plano and obviously, nor the outcome of some negotiations³⁰ which would mark the withdrawal of the leader and his family, in acceptable conditions.

Unfortunately, not even such a relatively quick result guarantees a **strong and clear succession** to the leadership of the country. Things can very quickly fall into anarchy and lack of leadership, and a **democratic construction** may last, although it is the only one that can claim full legitimacy. Reality flows in any case, if not necessarily in the direction of a “long war”, towards the assumption of the task of **post-conflict reconstruction and state-building in Libya**, fact that recomposes the Golgotha path made in Irak, at least, that is a long foreign presence in the field, in one form or another, and a costly assistance for the reforms.

This version seems to be the **best, most credible and feasible**, since Libya has enough oil resources to sustain such an enterprise. More than that, it should be retained that, since the “**hypocrisy of altruism**” that launched this campaign, based on different interests and personal motivations, the international community has to redirect its efforts towards the **task of maintaining international**

motivation for intervention. Once this step is done, we can enter the classical diagram of post-conflict reconstruction and of a democratic fabric in Libya.

To conclude, whether we are in the wake of a “**long war**”, resource-consuming, or just of the **post-conflict reconstruction**, those who entered Libya did it to stay, and the intervention on the ground is indispensable, with a Security Council resolution or the interpretation and use of existing ones. Anyway, this pudicity unparalleled in the international relations in the last decade, which requires an international normative sanction before any other gesture, clearly shows the return from voluntarism to the classical rules of international law, with the major effects on how the future international relations will be drawn, between power politics and the formal observance of the international law rules, but also the temptation and revisionist tendency to change and adapt them to own ideals, intention doomed to fail in the predictable future.

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from Gaddafi's regime is good news for the rebels and good news for us', stated Rogers. But it is not sufficient for supplying arms to the Libyan Opposition, he also said. (...)"

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by Libyan rebels since the country's uprising began two months ago. 'We are calling for foreign forces to protect our citizens', stated on April 19, 2011, Nouri Abdallah Abdel Aati, a member of Misrata's leadership committee. 'We want the UN or NATO on the ground. This is not a Western occupation or colonialism. This is needed to protect our people', he added. (...)", Charles LEVINSON, **Rebels in Misrata call for foreign troops**, The Wall Street Journal (USA), April 20, 2011.

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BARACK H. OBAMA'S VIEW ON GLOBAL SECURITY: A SHIFT IN THE US FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY?

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The aim of this article is to analyze the extent to which US foreign and security policy has shifted under the presidency of Barack H. Obama. When elaborating on this issue, authors have analyzed National Security Strategy of the United States of America from 2010, which materializes President Obama's foreign and security policy. The first part of the article focuses its attention to President Obama's perception of the current strategic environment, which serves as a launching platform for setting the US strategic interests. In the second part, the article elaborates on President Obama's security pillars on which he builds the strategy to face current security environment.

Key-words: National Security Strategy 2010; Strategic Environment; Security; Al-Qa'ida; Nuclear and Biological weapons; Middle East; Secure Cyberspace.

1. Introduction

The aim of this article is to analyze the extent to which the United States (US) foreign and security

policy of President Obama administration has shifted when compared to his predecessor, George W. Bush. US foreign and security policy of the first decade of the 21st century carried out by President George W. Bush is considered by many as one of the most controversial periods of the US history. It was marked by neoconservative perception of US foreign and security policy, which eventually led the US into its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and which greatly shattered the US reputation even among its closest allies and partners.

With arrival of Barack H. Obama into office in 2008 many expected a change in US foreign and security policy. President Obama's principles on foreign and security policy have been materialized in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America from 2010 (NSS 2010). By studying NSS 2010, one can identify that President Obama's perception of US foreign and security policy, especially his approaches for dealing with existing challenges are significantly different from his predecessor George W. Bush.

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In order to prove this argument, the article will analyze President Obama's perception of current strategic environment, which serves as a launching platform for setting US strategic interests. In its second part, the article will elaborate on the security threats and challenges that arise from the global security environment, which can be described as highly asymmetrical.

1.1. Obama's perception of strategic environment

In characterizing current global security environment, NSS 2010 goes in line with NSS of George W. Bush from 2002 and 2006. Generally said, it recognizes the fact that the development of past 20 years has changed the world dramatically in both positive and negative terms. The number of democracies has expanded significantly. The chance of a massive nuclear exchange has lowered significantly, yet it has not disappeared completely. Historically, it is the era when major powers coexist in peace. Economically speaking, the global economy and commerce have grown and attached the world together. Consequently, as NSS 2010 points out, these developments enabled greater amount of people to grasp responsibility for their own destiny. Naturally, these positive trends have been accompanied by negative ones. In the past two decades, the war of ideologies has been replaced by wars of religious, tribal, and ethnic identity. As already mentioned above, nuclear proliferation has persisted. In terms of economical affairs, social inequality and economic instability has intensified enormously. At the same time, we have come to pay a closer attention to new trends such as environmental and food security, including issues related to the threats to public health.

Analogously to Bush's administration, President Obama has declared the main goal of the US National Security Strategy to assure American leadership in the 21st Century. In order to meet this aim, the US possesses all the necessary attributes such as well-built alliances, an unmatched military, the world's largest economy, a strong and evolving democracy, and a dynamic citizenry. These attributes have defined its four top national interests, which are: security of the US, its citizens, as well as its allies and partners; a strong, innovative, growing economy in an open international economic system promoting opportunity and prosperity; respect for

universal values at home and around the world; an international order advanced by US leadership promoting peace, security and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

However, when comparing NSS 2010 to those from 2002 and 2006, the novelty of the current administration is its strategic approach on achieving these goals. President Obama has refused Bush doctrine, established on four neoconservative pillars aimed against existing and potential threats abroad, which included promotion of democracy by all available tools, right for launching pre-emptive strikes, waging the War on Terror and carrying out flexible deterrence. Instead, President Obama recognizes the importance of reshaping US foundation at home, pursuing comprehensive engagement with allies and partners abroad and promoting a just and sustainable order as a universal solution to meet existing threats and challenges.

Under the term reshaping US foundation, President Obama underlines the importance of a strong and healthy economy. It is the source of its military power, the core of diplomatic and development efforts and it serves as a leading source of its global influence. Additionally, the strong economy supports American jobs, forges links among nations, spurs global development, and as such, it contributes to a stable and peaceful political and economic development of global economy. These factors are currently essential especially when, as the NSS 2010 recognizes, the notion of security is moving beyond traditional distinctions between homeland and national security. National security draws on the strength and resilience of the citizens, communities, and economy. In President Obama's philosophy, this includes a determination to prevent terrorist threat by fully coordinated actions taken abroad with precautions taken at home.

The solid foundation of the US leads to the next principle, which is pursuing comprehensive engagement. As it is stated by NSS 2010, isolationism, or unilateral approach in US foreign relations, never succeeded. On the other hand, engagement, as an active participation of the US in relationship beyond its borders, did. Engagement begins with US closest Allies, continues by cooperating with other centres of influence such as China, India, and Russia, and it ends with pursuing of partnership with those who wish to do



so. Another benefit of engagement is sending the message to adversarial governments. Principally, it is the message of choice. It is either to accept international norms and to achieve greater integration, or to continue in its original pathway and, consequently, to remain in isolation from the rest of international community. Furthermore, NSS 2010 states that an active engagement will not limit itself only to other governments, but it will also involve people around the world. The benefit of engagement of people is such that it will help the US to thrive a global economy, while building the goodwill and relationships that are invaluable to sustain the US leadership.

President Obama correctly recognizes that a comprehensive engagement will be successful only when clear rules equal for everyone are put in place. In other words, these clear rules mean a promotion of just and sustainable international order. The reason for just order is because it advances mutual interests, protects the rights of all, and holds accountable those who refuse to meet their responsibilities. The reason for sustainable order is because it is based on broadly shared norms and fosters collective action to address common challenges. That is the reason why international law should be strengthened and international institutions should be modernized. Furthermore, international order must recognize the increasing influence of an individual in contemporary world.

In order to achieve the desired state of the world, the US must apply its strategic approach in pursuit of four enduring national interests. The first and foremost national interest is security: not only of the US and its citizens, but also of its allies and partners. The three other interests, which do not only derive from security, but which are also mutually interconnected to security include prosperity based on strong, innovative and growing economy in an open international economic system; interest in values, which guarantees a respect for universal values at home and around the world and an international order advanced by the US leadership, which will promote peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. The rest of the article will be dedicated to the first US national interest – security.

2. Security

At the beginning of this article, we have summarized the state of play of global security environment as it is perceived by the Administration of President Obama. Its general idea is that at the beginning of the 21st century the security environment has changed dramatically. Even by ignoring detailed listing of all kind of possible threats to the US security, the general evaluation is such that borders between external and domestic threats, so clear over past 100 years, has disappeared. Under such conditions, President Obama declared protecting the American people to be his greatest responsibility. Furthermore, he embraces US unique responsibility to promote international security that will be based on close cooperation with US allies and partners either on bilateral or multilateral levels. To achieve these goals, Obama's strategy lays on the following pillars for sustaining security.

2.1. Strengthening Security and Resilience at Home

Within its domestic territory, the US must pursue a strategy capable of meeting the full range of threats and hazards to its communities, such as terrorism, natural disasters, large-scale cyber attacks and pandemics. In order to be able meet these threats effectively, NSS introduces five methods to be implemented.

The first method is to enhance security at home, which relies on shared efforts to prevent and deter attacks by identifying and interdicting the threats, prevent hostile actors from carrying out their activities within national territory, protecting critical infrastructure, key resources and securing cyberspace.

The second method is effective management of emergencies. This requires building of capabilities that will reduce or eliminate long-term effects of large scale of disasters on people and their property.

The third method is empowering communities to counter radicalisation. Prevention of radicalization will require implementation of a large variety of different tools starting from working with communities, by implementation of different social and development programs and ending by conducting intelligence and empowering law enforcement agencies.



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The fourth method is flexibility through increased public-private partnership that will strengthen the critical infrastructure for case of general emergency and critical accident. This will require cooperation not only in post-accident stage, but also in pre-accident stage when major infrastructure is being designed and constructed.

The fifth method is engaging with communities and citizens in order to provide them with clear and reliable risk and emergency information.

2.2. Disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qa'ida and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world

In US efforts to wage a global campaign against Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, President Obama lists a range of methods to do so. These methods are of both domestic and foreign nature. It is to prevent attack on US territory by enlisting all its intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities.

Secondly, it will require continuous strengthening of aviation security at home and abroad.

Denying terrorists weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requires taking actions to safeguard knowledge and capabilities in the life and chemical sciences that could be vulnerable to misuse.

The fourth method is denying Al-Qa'ida the ability to threaten the US and its allies and partners. President Obama introduces three components necessary to be applied in exercising this method. These are: the US military as well as ISAF partners targeting the insurgency, working to secure key population centres and increasing efforts to train Afghan National Army; working with the United Nations and Afghan Government to improve accountable and effective governance, which include US assistance to Afghan population in form of support of human rights and development assistance; fostering relationship with Pakistan founded upon mutual interest and mutual respect.

The fifth method is denying safe havens and strengthening at risk states. This will not only prevent terrorists from establishing their safe havens in failing states, but also the US readiness to get establishing own networks of cooperation in these kind of states.

The sixth method is the most crucial one. It refers to establishing durable legal approaches consistent with US security as well as its values.

The US declares its will to leverage all available information and intelligence to disrupt attacks and dismantle Al-Qa'ida, bringing terrorists to justice, and acting in line with the rule of law.

2.3. Reverse the spread of Nuclear and Biological weapons and secure nuclear materials

NSS 2010 points out that with a rapid development of technologies in the globalised world, the US faces no gravest danger than terrorists attack with a nuclear weapon. Moreover, international peace and security is threatened by proliferation that could lead to nuclear exchange. The US efforts to contain these dangers are centred in a global non-proliferation regime that has frayed, as more people and nations break the rules. This is the reason for why reversing the spread of nuclear weapons is a top priority for Obama's administration. In order to face this priority effectively, NSS 2010 suggests several methods to be applied.

The US must pursue a world without nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that President Obama admits this goal to be rather ambitious, which will not be achieved during his administration, launching this effort will increase global security from a long run. Moreover, the US keeps its commitment under Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), builds its cooperation with Russia and the other states, and it will increase the US credibility to hold other accountable for their obligations.

By strengthening the NPT, the US will seek to provide more resources and authority for international inspections. Strengthening the NPT will require developing a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation in order to insist that all nations meet their obligations. Those who fail to meet their obligations under NPT must face meaningful consequences.

Besides these two methods, NSS 2010 intends to secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and material, support peaceful nuclear energy and counter biological threats.

2.4. Advance peace, security and opportunity in the Greater Middle East

NSS 2010 declares the region of Middle East to be a key region for US interests. In the region, the US has both its closest allies as well as its most harmful adversaries. Moreover, it is a central



region in which a struggle against terrorism is fought. Thus, President Obama could not omit it in his NSS 2010. Obama's strategy toward this region is based on three methods.

The first one is ending the combat operations in Iraq and completing a responsible transition, which will enable Iraq to become sovereign, stable, and self-reliant state. In order to achieve this goal, the US will pass responsibility for Iraqi security to Iraqis; foster and deepen US civilian engagement in order to overcome the disturbance of war by providing assistance in a large variety of fields including defence and security cooperation, diplomatic and political cooperation, rule of law, science, health, education and economics; pursue of comprehensive engagement across the region to ensure US drawdown in Iraq will contribute to advancing of security and sustainable development in the region.

Pursuing Arab-Israeli Peace is the second method of the strategy toward the Middle East; the desire of the US is to have Israel and Palestine to live side by side in peace and security. For this purpose the US will use not only its own political, economic and military resources, but also international support. According to the US, any Arab-Israeli peace will only be lasting if harmful regional interference ends and constructive regional support deepens.

The third method is to promote a responsible Iran; this is in both its regional and nuclear ambitions. US interest is for Iran to be a state that meets its international responsibilities, takes its rightful place in the community of nations and enjoys the political and economic opportunities that its people deserve.

2.5. Invest in the Capacity of Strong and Capable Partners

In order to advance common security, the US will address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalisation and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be the US partners in addressing common challenges.

Such common security can be addressed by pursuing sustainable and responsible security in at risk states. This can be achieved by improving US capability to strengthen the security of state at-risk of conflict and violence, which includes

strengthening of capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, protect from external threats, as well as strengthening the administrative and oversight capability of civilian security sector institutions.

Prevention of emergence of conflict, which helps diminish military risk, act before crises and conflict erupt is another method of addressing common security. This will require investing now in the capable partners of the future, building capacity to strengthen the foundation of common security and modernizing capabilities in order to be agile in the face of change.

2.6. Secure Cyberspace

Security of cyberspace is not a completely new threat to which attention is being given by the presidential administration. However, it is a first time when it has been given a separate chapter. President Obama correctly points out that cyber-security threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety and economic challenges the US faces. The threat that the US faces in the field of cyberspace ranges from individual criminal hackers to organized criminal groups, from terrorist networks to advanced nations states. Defending against these threats requires networks that are secure, trustworthy, and resilient. The US is prepared to deter, prevent, defend against and quickly recover from cyber intrusions and attacks by investing in people and technology and by strengthening partnerships.

To meet the former, the US must work across the government and with private sector to design more secure technology that gives us the ability to better protect and to improve the resilience of critical government and industry systems and networks. Moreover, the US has already launched a comprehensive national campaign to promote cyber security awareness and digital literacy in order to build a digital workforce for the 21st Century.

In terms of the latter, the US recognizes that neither government nor the private sector or individual citizens can meet this challenge alone. Therefore, the US calls, and it will continue to call, for strengthening its international partnerships on a range of issues, including the development of norms for acceptable conduct in cyberspace, laws concerning cyber-crime, data preservation, protection, and privacy, and approaches for



network defence and response to cyber attacks. Therefore this cooperation will include all the key players from government and private sector, both nationally and internationally.

Conclusion

The aim of the article was to identify the magnitude of change in Barack H. Obama's perception of foreign and security policy of the US when compared to George W. Bush. It can be argued that while both administrations have, or had, perceived the current global security environment through the same lenses, what is materialized in their strategic interests, there has or had been a significant differences in meeting these strategic objectives, especially in the field of security.

From purely security point of view, both presidencies perceived the current global security environment as highly asymmetrical one. On one hand, unprecedented globalization, development of technologies, expansion of democracies, and the absence of symmetric conflict among major powers have improved quality of life for many. On the other hand, new asymmetric threats such as conflict over religious, tribal, and ethnic identity combined with widening of economic discrepancies have created highly unpredictable global security environment, which lacks of easily identified adversary and where borders between domestic and foreign threats have completely disappeared.

In such security environment, the US is the only remaining military and economic superpower, which bears responsibility for its own security, as well as for security and stability of the World. Such task, however, cannot be fulfilled only by the US alone. NSS 2010 recognizes the importance of pursuing a comprehensive engagement with international community based on clear rules for everyone having in place. Moreover, NSS 2010 emphasizes on the importance of economic economy, which is a prerequisite for being able to defend US interest abroad.

In facing the exiting threats, unlike Bush's administration, President Obama proposes asymmetric solutions to asymmetric problems. This is related to all challenges whether it requires taking action at home or abroad. This philosophy is based on six pillars, which include strengthening domestic security, facing terrorism, dealing with

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advancing peace in the Middle East, or dealing with a new space - cyberspace. In dealing with all of these issues, Obama's administration calls for cooperation with international community, where clear rules and norms are put in place.

It can be stated without any hesitation that when comparing foreign and security policy of President Obama with that of his predecessor, there can be seen significant changes. It is reasonable to expect that if the US will stick to this approach, there is a chance that global security environment will improve at least a little bit and the world will become more secure. However, one must keep in mind that it will take a longer period of time and the fruits of this approach will not be visible immediately.

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NATO'S ENERGY SECURITY: POST-LISBON CHALLENGES

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Within an extended approach on national security - where the energy turns out to be an essential topic - NATO's relevance for the energy security domain is becoming controversial and caught between two debates – a political one, centred on the Alliance's role in countering the policies of some states in this field, and a military one, focused on critical infrastructures protection. On the other hand, NATO's strategic and institutional transformation – the political-military consultations and intelligence sharing network, crisis management instruments, international and regional cooperation – represent a few substantiations converging towards supporting NATO's relevance for the energy security domain. Meanwhile, the recent turmoil from Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as the development of Stuxnet-like applications – able to sabotage industrial systems - are emphasizing the NATO's comparative advantages within the network of international organisations sharing concerns regarding energy security domain.

Key-words: energy security; NATO; EU; energy infrastructure; military capabilities; early warning; intelligence fusion; cyber attacks.

The “energy security” syntagm prevails in the current security discourses due to recent developments, and its apologists try to delimit and impose it as a freestanding dimension of the security concept¹.

However, this topic is not completely new, as energy supply problems also occurred in the past. Thus, following the 1973 – 1974 oil crisis, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was established as an autonomous organisation comprising several member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. While the agency's initial role was to coordinate the measures taken during the crisis situations in the oil delivery field, the changes occurred in the energy market development triggered the reconfiguration of its mandate on three dimensions: energy security, economic development and environment

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protection. The Agency defines energy security as “the uninterrupted physical availability [of resources] at an affordable price, while observing environment concerns”².

As a matter of fact, the importance of energy and the effects of the supply disruption have drawn the attention of several UN officials³, who call for a global energy agency with a comprehensive mandate concerning all energy types, as the organisations currently working in the field approach the issue from different points of view – the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) from the perspective of producers, IEA from that of consumers, the Treaty on the Energy Charter approaches only the trade, transit and dispute settlement and the UN Energy coordinating mechanism is divided, has no budget and serves mainly as a debate and information sharing forum.

Considering that only approximately 70% of the IEA countries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and /or the European Union (EU)⁴, and the UN efforts are insufficient in this field, we will not use the efforts undertaken by the International Energy Agency in the field as a starting point in our endeavour to identify the main trends in approaching the “energy security” topic within the allied context, but the distinctive elements highlighted by the US and the EU⁵, the dominant players in NATO, as well as the official positions of the allies on this issue. In order to make the language more clear, one should first identify the strategic documents governing the energy policies of the US, the EU and NATO, respectively their understanding of the “energy security” syntagm.

Mars, Venus⁶ and Energy Security

In the case of the US, the worrying statistics regarding the correlation of oil consumption and import costs with the trade deficit⁷ highlighted the need to promote **a coherent energy strategy focused on reducing dependence on foreign resources**. While a consensus on promoting an energy strategy emerges at the political level⁸, there is also a powerful trend connecting energy field to national security. Thus, the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy 2006 contains a chapter dedicated to economic growth through free markets and free trade which puts priority on reducing the US reliance on foreign energy

sources by opening, respectively integrating and diversifying the energy markets⁹. Although the Obama Administration’s Security Strategy (2010) is strongly oriented towards renewable energy sources (bio-fuels, nuclear energy) and energy efficiency (investments in different activity sectors aimed at reducing consumption)¹⁰, the energy security syntagm being mentioned only four times in the document, one can identify general guidelines, also seen in the National Security Strategy 2006, and notice a certain continuity.

Nevertheless, the above-mentioned efforts do not offer a clear definition of the “energy security” concept. Thus, we will turn to the vision of the US Defence Department, which has proposed a working definition encompassing three constitutive dimensions, namely sufficiency, surety, sustainability. Sufficiency means having adequate power to conduct critical missions for the duration of that mission. Surety, which directly influences sufficiency, consists in ensuring resilient and redundant energy supplies that are accessible when needed. Finally, sustainability highlights the fact that the energy supplies must present the lowest life cycle cost, while considering all the other requirements (impact to mission, community, and environment)¹¹. This “militaristic” vision in terms of relating energy to the missions of the American military “complex” highlights four features that can be translated into a general definition of energy security – **sufficient energy, at an affordable price from sources located in stable regions around the globe, observing the environmental norms**.

While ensuring energy resources is an important security issue for the US due to the interconnection between the economic and military complexes, **in the EU case one can notice a more political and/ or diplomatic approach**. Thus, while the EU Security Strategy 2003 did not contain the “energy security” syntagm or references to such threats, later, against the background of the gas crisis in early 2006¹², the European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy¹³, emphasised, during the same year, the need for a coherent EU energy policy offering “clear European framework for national decisions on the energy mix”, its strategic goal being that of balancing, at the same time, the goals of sustainable energy use, competitiveness and security of supply¹⁴. Thus, at least terminologically, energy security is assimi-



lated to the “security of supply” syntagm, defined as “uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market at an affordable price for all (private and industrial) consumers, observing the environmental protection norms and supporting sustainable development”¹⁵. At the same time, the security of supply has two key components – technical (physical access to resources and uninterrupted supply) and commercial (affordable prices). Within this context, the ‘energy security’ syntagm is distinctly used in the EU vocabulary, meaning mainly the technical safety of energy infrastructure¹⁶.

The EU Strategic Energy Review represents the instrument designated through the above-mentioned strategy in order to establish the communitarian framework in the energy field. The Energy Policy for Europe, promoted by the European Commission in 2007, was the first strategic analysis highlighting that a European energy policy should rely on three elements: combating climate change, limiting the EU’s external vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons and promoting growth and jobs, thereby providing secure and affordable energy to consumers. Within this context, one may consider that the EU’s actions for the elaboration and implementation of a coherent energy policy reflect the similar efforts undertaken by the US in the field.

A second strategic review, respectively the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, presented in 2008, highlights the following key fields in the European energy policy: issues related to infrastructure and diversification of energy supplies, improved gas and oil stocks and the creation of energy crisis response mechanisms, energy efficiency as well as making use of EU’s indigenous energy resources.

As noticed, although at the political level the importance of investments and research-development increased to diversify the energy sources, the security of the traditional energy routes is an important element. Thus, in parallel to the political developments, energy security has emerged as a major concern for the EU security sector, especially as a result of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, adequately covered in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Beyond highlighting the fact that the EU will import more than 75% of the necessary gas and oil supplies until 2030, from

a limited number of states, most of them facing instability, the document approaches the energy security on two dimensions – internal and external. At the internal level, a more unified energy market, with greater interconnection, especially with the most isolated countries, as well as crisis mechanisms to deal with the temporary supply disruptions are needed. At the external level, it is about both promotion of good governance, the observance of law and investments in the source countries (Russia, Central Asia, Caucasus and Africa) or the transit-countries (Turkey and Ukraine), and partnerships (especially with China, India, Japan and the US) on renewable energy, low-level carbon technologies and energy efficiency, as well as transparent and well-regulated global markets.

Beyond the US and EU distinct efforts in the energy field, some American politicians support **a trans-Atlantic energy security strategy**¹⁷. Starting from the premise that Russia will be the main energy supplier for the next years, Senator Dick Lugar proposed, within the US-Ukraine Energy Dialogue Group, a trans-Atlantic energy strategy, aiming at diversifying energy sources for Europe, establishing a collective framework to work with Russia, as well as banning the use of energy as a coercive instrument. Senator Lugar was the one who stressed the importance of debating the energy security within NATO during the 2006 Riga Summit.

While Senator Lugar believes that NATO plays a central role in promoting such a strategy, the experts of the Atlantic Council and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies¹⁸ consider that the EU is the appropriate forum for a US – Europe dialogue on the energy security. At the same time, they outlined recommendations for the transatlantic community to maximize “common, compatible and complementary” efforts in order to develop some energy strategies, standards and regulations, research and development, markets, institutions, infrastructure protection and the response to supply disruption, proposing as a working instrument a Transatlantic Forum on Energy Cooperation, that would include the US, the EU, NATO, as well as the International Energy Agency. The same experts plead for the development of a substantiated NATO-EU dialogue on energy security, establishing clear roles for the two organizations.



NATO Energy Security, from Riga to Lisbon

There is a series of arguments supporting NATO's consolidated role in energy security. For a clearer perspective, we could group them into two categories – the first being related to the evolution of the security environment and its reflection in security studies throughout time (widening the concept), while the second category focuses on the Alliance evolution (including at the institutional level) in relation to the energy security issue.

In the first category, the evolution of the security environment highlighted an **increasing interdependence of threats – in the energy sector – against the allied states**. Thus, the current scenario should take into account a series of factors with an impact on the Alliance energy security, such as: the economic and financial global crisis, increased dependence on the energy imports from unstable regions or the use of energy as political leverage, with effect over the energy price volatility, respectively climate changes, terrorist threats, piracy or cyber-attacks, with consequences on the energy resources extraction, the energy infrastructure or energy supply under safe conditions¹⁹.

The factor changing the energy issue into a threat against security is **NATO states dependence on energy resource imports**. Taking into account only oil and gas, we have the following situation:

– NATO states account together for 6% of the discovered oil fields, and the oil production capacity on their territory is very low, representing almost 18% of the global production. Meanwhile, the necessary consumption for NATO states represents almost 39% of the global consumption, so there is a quite significant dependence on the oil imports from non-NATO Member States;

– NATO states account for 7% of the global gas reserves, with a 34% global production capacity (superior to the oil production capacity), and the necessary consumption is around 50% of the global consumption.²⁰

Thus, also the current developments on shale gas extraction and alternative energy sources could change the statistics, for the moment, it is obvious that NATO states need a strong energy infrastructure to ensure a safe and constant access to the energy resources.

A second category of arguments is of conceptual nature. We could refer here to broader

security concept and - implicitly – to the inclusion of the energy issue on the security agenda of every member state and of the Alliance, as well. To that end, it is increasingly clear that the energy emerged as an essential component of the national security strategy of the NATO Member States, and NATO is no longer an exclusively military, collective defence organisation, the Alliance turning into a security organisation. At the same time, we should remember that - today - the NATO mission is to ensure the security for 28 states, whose combined population amounts to almost 900 de millions²¹, and since the energy became a key security element, the energy security should obviously be one of the Alliance's concerns.

As the matter of fact, the energy security - narrowly speaking - **does not represent a new concern for the Alliance**, as it has been managing its own energy supplying system even since the Cold War period (it is practically an 11,500 km grid in 12 states, consisting of warehouses, air bases, civil airports, fuel stations, refinery, and entrance points).

Another category of arguments is related to the progress made within the Alliance's strategic and institutional transformation. Thus, all strategic documents – starting with the 1999 Strategic Concept that warns over the possibility that the NATO states' security interests be affected by banning the access to the critical resources - promote NATO's role in ensuring the energy security of its Member States.

However, the energy security issue became increasingly relevant only during the 2006 Riga Summit. Besides Senator Richard Lugar's speech - during the above-mentioned summit – who supported the inclusion of energy security issue under the scope of Article 5, referring especially to the threat of terrorist attacks against critical infrastructures, respectively to energy as a potential conflict source in Europe²², the statement adopted during the Summit announced for the first time that the energy security emerged as a concern for the Alliance which should analyse the way in which it protected the Member States' interests or supported the national and international efforts in that field²³.

Subsequently, the 2008 Bucharest Summit detailed how NATO should contribute to ensuring energy security for its Member States – information and intelligence sharing/fusion, projection of



stability, the promotion of the regional and international cooperation, support for consequence management and support for critical infrastructure protection – and the 2010 Lisbon Summit’s statement offered the first definition of the NATO energy security, comprising three key elements: safe and constant access to energy supplies, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, respectively the inter-connection of the energy grids (a key topic also on the EU agenda on energy security as a result of the 2009 gas crisis).

At the same time, further efforts to implement the Bucharest Summit guideline on including the energy security in NATO policies and activities, the new Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 mentions the interest in developing the capacity to contribute to the energy security, including through the protection of the critical energy infrastructure and the transit regions, respectively contingency planning.

Besides being highlighted within the programmatic documents, **the energy security has also practical implications**, the issue being linked to both the change of the military capacities - NATO Reaction Force (NRF) – or civil capacities, the change of structures (the decrease in the number of committees, the flexibilisation of the decision-making process, a new Division managing the emerging security challenges) and NATO intelligence reform (ensuring a more efficient consultation and information process at NATO level by integrating the military and civil intelligence)²⁴.

Therefore, apart from using NATO as a dialogue and cooperation forum for the allies and partners (the energy security issue has already been included in individual cooperation programs with partner states) - practically gathering producers, consumers and transit countries - or as a forum for sharing information and best practices on the response to energy risks and threats²⁵ (regular conferences and workshops), there are also other aspects of the Alliance’s practical involvement in ensuring the Member States’ energy security.

To that end, NATO can ensure support for the allies’ critical infrastructure protection through the aviation and maritime communication and surveillance systems (such as the marine monitoring program - Maritime Situational Awareness - or the AWACS fleet), which can supplement the national capabilities, including intelligence, or it can use

its complex mechanism to respond to natural disasters, having as central element the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)²⁶. As a matter of fact, the complex crisis management system, with procedures tested every year through drills including different scenarios, as well as unconventional threats and a crisis response handbook with clear procedures for different situations, can represent a framework to approach the energy security crises.

An important role is also played by the instruments with a direct impact in ensuring the energy security, namely **the military operations**²⁷ (anti-piracy missions carried out along the Somali coastline, the Mediterranean Sea patrol missions carried out within the counterterrorist operations with an energy security dimension) or the capabilities needed to tackle the current challenges in the field, such as the cyber defence threats amid the development of software applications which affect the functionality of certain types of automated industrial data control and acquisition systems (also used in the nuclear plant construction).

Last but not least, one should mention certain research projects, financed through the Science for Peace and Security Programme, which focus on the development of technologies for renewable energy production from wind turbines (Sahara Trade Winds to Hydrogen, a cooperation project between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, including Morocco and Mauritania) or the assessment of seismic risks along the allies’ energy supply lines (Seismic Hazard and Risk Assessment for Southern Caucasus-Eastern Turkey Energy Corridors, a project where scientists from Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan assess the seismic risk along the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum natural gas pipeline).

Energy Security Challenges after Lisbon

A first challenge refers to the **“legacy” of the current controversy on NATO’s role in the energy security field**. Most experts reject NATO’s involvement in the energy security field, starting from the simplification of the organisation’s potential role, reduced to the exclusive use of military means, or from the reference to other organisations – for example the EU – and, under the pretext of avoiding duplication, they plead for a unilateral management – either NATO or the EU – of the energy security issues.



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The above-mentioned controversy has generated debates on NATO's political role in the energy security and military fields. Therefore, on the political dimension, some experts claim that the impact of the energy threats against world states involves NATO's political role; on the other hand, critics argue that NATO's political involvement is difficult due to the countries' divergent interests, a fact which could block the Alliance's decision-making process, undermining thus its role (an alliance which cannot make decisions, cannot intervene, therefore it manifests like an alliance which does not exist). However, we cannot challenge that the energy security enters the scope of Article IV of the Washington Treaty, which encourages discussions and consultations among allies on security issues of major interest. At the same time, the discussions do not imply an automatic consensus on NATO's intervention or the Alliance's decision to adopt a prominent role in coordinating a response to a crisis situation, but they do not rule out either the possibility for NATO to assume a limited, but complementary role to other actors or organisations²⁸. As far as the military dimension is concerned, the dilemma takes into account the use of NATO's consecrated instruments in the field (naval surveillance and escort capabilities, the military protection of infrastructure) versus the avoidance of militarising an economic and political problem²⁹.

There is also a series of **impediments which are linked to the diversity of the NATO Member States**, starting from the fact that the critical infrastructure protection is an exclusively national responsibility or from some governments' reluctance to share information on sensitive energy security issues, to the allies' different views on that issue. As a matter of fact, we should not forget that there are inherent disagreements within the Alliance, triggered either by the status of providers/ consumers/ transit countries or by the zones of interest (US - Middle East, Europe - former Soviet Union), respectively by the different approaches/ strategies. For instance, following the repeated gas conflicts between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, several perceptions have consolidated in approaching the energy relations with Russia - the Western European powers want to maintain the status-quo, the Eastern European states, depending in a great extent on the Russian supplies, see NATO as a potential energy "broker"

during the crisis situations, while other NATO member countries "dream" about a consolidated organization which should respond to Russia's "soft power" actions through allied interventions of the same nature.

Although it has been obvious so far that NATO could not play a leading role on that dimension, ensuring the complementary support for the efforts undertaken by the states or other international organisations, **there are currently certain evolutions which tend to substantiate the Alliance's actions in this domain.**

We will stop only on two evolutions to that end. First of all, the recent tensions in the Middle East and North Africa have completed the "arc of instability" at the NATO's periphery - caused by the perpetuation of piracy in the Aden Gulf, the tense relations with the Russian Federation - with a direct impact on the Alliance's energy supplies. Coupled with the emergence - in the vicinity of the allied territory - of incidents similar to the Fukushima, which might question the safety of exploiting nuclear energy and generate decisions/policies similar to those adopted by Germany in the above-mentioned situation³⁰, the instability could create major disruptions in the allies' energy supply flows. Secondly, the development of a Stuxnet-type application, able to undermine industrial systems, opens a Pandora's Box in the energy field - planting and propagating such a "weapon" in the energy infrastructure of one or several allied states can lead to the same disruptions in the supply flows, as mentioned above.

Therefore, at least from the perspective of these two evolutions, NATO should develop new types of capabilities focused on providing early warning or rapid intervention in case of complex attacks against the allied energy infrastructures.

The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre³¹ could play an important role in the early warning component, as it could provide a system to monitor in real-time the parameters of the energy flows on the allied territory as well as consolidated capabilities to analyse the potential implications of such crisis. At the same time, the energy security issue - monitored by the Centre - can be defined as a warning problem within NATO Intelligence Warning System and connected thus to the Allied Crisis Management Process³².

As for the rapid intervention, deemed as absolutely necessary due to the diversification of



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the methods of attack against energy infrastructures (especially in the cyber domain), a potential intervention unit should take the NATO Task Force as a model, or even be established as a “module” within the latter (with connections – in case of cyber threats, for instance - with NATO Computer Incident Response Capability³³).

The lack of consensus in overcoming the current approaches (the limitation to the critical energy infrastructure protection against “classical” threats) or using NATO as a “broker” on the energy market, especially in crisis situations (such as the 2009 gas crisis or the Georgian war), as well as the reduced support for the implementation of concrete risk management solutions in the energy field (elaborating a common policy, diversifying sources, jointly assessing and exploiting alternative energy sources, approaching new challenges in the energy infrastructure protection) are likely to turn the energy security in a “apple of discord” in the Euro-Asia area.

NOTES:

1 In his work, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda For International Security Studies in The Post-Cold War Era*, first published in 1983, Barry BUZAN identified, besides the military dimension of security, a non-military one focusing on the following levels: political (organisational stability of states, systems of government and their legitimating ideologies), economic (access to resources, finance and markets needed to maintain an appropriate level of welfare and power), social (the maintenance of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs) and environmental (maintenance of the planetary biosphere as the essential support system of human existence). Subsequently, although the ‘energy security’ syntagm was not used, the energy implications in the security field were analysed particularly in terms of the drop in quantities and access to that type of resources, in the moves of the Copenhagen School representatives, especially Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE (efforts broadly approached by the three authors in their paper *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, published in 1997).

2 AIE website, <http://www.iea.org/>, accessed on May 20, 2011.

3 ElBaradei, Mohamed, *A Global Agency Needed for Energy Crisis*, OpEd, Financial Times, 24 July 2008, <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/transcripts/2008/ft240708.html>, accessed on May 20 2011.

4 The European Commission also participates as separate entity in the Agency’s activities.

5 The EU influence originates in the number of members attending both organisations (NATO and EU).

6 Mars-Venus binomial is often used to describe the US-European relations, being promoted by Robert KAGAN’s *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (Vintage Books, New York, 2004).

7 For instance, over 2007, the American nation consumed more than 7.5 billion barrels of oil at a total cost of approximately 550 billion US dollars. 60% of this petroleum was imported, at a cost of nearly 300 billion US dollars, representing about 40% of the total US trade deficit. (Source: *A National Strategy for Energy Security*, http://www.secureenergy.org/sites/default/files/936_A_National_Strategy_for_Energy_Security.pdf).

8 The 2005 Energy Policy Act was the first important energy law which focused on granting significant fiscal incentives and loan guarantees for energy production. In less than two years, it became obvious that those provisions would not solve the energy problem. Therefore, the Energy and Security Act 2007 - providing for improved energy security through an efficient resource management, research and development in the field of renewable energy sources and international energy programs - was adopted. The 2009 change in the US Administration did not significantly change those action directions, linking, however, the energy issues to the environmental ones.

9 National Security Strategy, March 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>, accessed on May 20, 2011.

10 National Security Strategy, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed on May 20 2011.

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12 Tensions between Ukraine and Russia in the context of gas prices alteration.

13 Green Paper aimed at fostering energy debates within the EU.

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24 RÜHLE, Michael, *op. cit.*

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26 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, *Energy Security and NATO Policy*, Research paper prepared for NATO Allied Command Transformation, London, 2008, <http://www.rusi.org/>

[downloads/assets/Energy_Security_PP_13_Feb_2008.pdf](http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Energy_Security_PP_13_Feb_2008.pdf), accessed on May 20, 2011.

27 As a matter of fact, the Alliance also carried out such missions in the past. To that end, we could recall the Earnest Will Operation (1980), which included missions aimed at protecting and escorting the Gulf oil tankers during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988).

28 SHEA, Jamie, "Energy Security: NATO's Potential Role", NATO Review, No. 3, Autumn 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/special1.html>, accessed on May 20 2011.

29 RÜHLE, Michael, *op. cit.*

30 Following the disaster in Japan, Angela Merkel ordered the shut down for three months of country's reactors built before 1980, being expected to decide later if they would receive again the functioning authorisation or if they would be closed.

31 The Center's current mission aims at providing integrated intelligence products in support of planning and execution of NATO operations (see Mixon, Laurence, *Requirements and Challenges facing the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center*, US Air University, <https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&mode=user&action=researchproject&objectid=9a47b0f3-9dcb-41d3-b677-79544cdd6921>, accessed on May 20, 2011).

32 KRIENDLER, John, *NATO Intelligence and Early Warning*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2006, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=39988&lng=en>, accessed on May 20, 2011.

33 Which ensures centralized cyber incident services, facilitating both prevention (information products, updates to applications), and response or investigations after the incidents.



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

APRIL - JUNE 2011

On 14th and 15th of April, “Carol I” National Defence University organised the **Annual Scientific Session with International participation STRATEGIES XXI**, whose theme was “**The Universe of Military Science**”. The activity, having 11 panels, gathered officials from the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sport, Ministry of Interior, rectors of military and civilian higher education institutions, as well as representatives of the scientific community. CDSSS was in charge with the “Security and Defence” Panel.

On this occasion were granted the awards offered by “**General Ștefan Gușă**” Foundation for the best book and the best article published in 2010 in “**Carol I**” National Defence University. The award for the best book was received by lieutenant-colonel lecturer Ion CĂLIN, PhD, author of “**Information management of the force groups with operative role in joint operations**”. The commission of evaluation awarded the best article entitled “**Progresses and obstacles in the process of European integration of the Western Balkan states**”, published in *Strategic Impact* magazine no. 1/2010 by scientific research assistant Cristina BOGZEANU.

On 17th of May, CDSSS held the **Seminary on “Cross-border regional cooperation – instrument of enhancing European security”**. In the event, there were presented interesting papers by representatives of the Ministry of National Defence, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romanian Scientists Academy, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, the Centre of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, and the European Institute of Romania.

The most important CDSSS activity to come is the **Annual Scientific Session with International participation**, which will take place in November, on 17th and 18th, whose theme is “**The balance of power and the security environment**”. Information on participation conditions will be found in due time on our web-site, <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

Irina TĂTARU



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles, the following criteria are taken into consideration: the theme of the article must comply with the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, and be of current interest, the articles's novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and electronically, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and in English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, the institution he comes from and have to end with a curriculum vitae, which should include the following elements: a short biography, a list of personal papers, birthyear, birthplace, address, city, postal code, country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, photo in jpeg format.

Bibliographic references will be included at the end of the article and have to respect international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy-to-follow structure, using titles (subtitles). Abbreviations will be explicit at their first mentioning on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

Everyone interested in publishing articles in STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is welcomed. Materials have to comply with the conditions mentioned above and to be of interest for the international scientific community. Thus, it is necessary that documentation resources used in the elaboration of the articles have in their composition prestigious paperworks or publications widely recognized at national or international level.

Our address is: "Carol I" National Defence University, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93, e-mail: cssas@unap.ro, web address: <http://cssas.unap.ro>, <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>



After nine years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from “Carol I” National Defence University is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics: the political-military topicality, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT collaborates with Romanian and foreign important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and the civilian and military academia from the Ministry of National Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state organisations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies. Also, the magazine is included in international databases: CEEOL - Central and Eastern European Online Library (Germany), IndexCopernicus International (Poland).

The magazine is accredited by the National Council for Scientific Research in Higher Education and acknowledged as a B+ magazine, proving its potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the national and international scientific and academic community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, Romanian and English, and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.



Issue organizer: Cristina BOGZEANU
Designer: George RĂDUICĂ
Masterproof: Cristina BOGZEANU, Daniela RĂPAN
“Carol I” National Defence University Printing House
