


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PRESENT AND FUTURE DIMENSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD

Regions with a strategic importance, such as the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia are supported by UE in the field of security and development. To these regions another one was added, the Black Sea one. This happened also because Romania has become an UE member on January 1, 2007. The European Council has dedicated a special chapter to the Black Sea region in its strategy for Central Asia. The active presence of EU in these regions, especially in the first semester of 2007, when the Union's presidency belonged to Germany, reveals a development of the role of the organization in establishing, developing and offering a better security to these strategic regions.

For the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), designed under the German presidency, EU tries to develop cooperation on multiple levels, especially on economic level. Even if the specialists' analysis foresee many unexplored elements, our opinions lead to the conclusion that the so-called ENP Plus concept includes a more decisive attitude, extremely favourable, but also visionary, at the Eastern border; without excluding the EU southern border, for a better security, stability and a better government beyond its geographical borders.

1. A political project for the adaptation to the new global requests

Launched at the beginning of 2000, as an initiative for the “new neighbours”, and transformed afterwards, taking into account the new situation in December 2003, in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), this policy took into consideration the states in the Mediterranean region, the project, called ENP that was needed as the European space extended with ten more states, wanted to avoid new demarcation lines in a political and economic integration in Europe. It is intended to create a zone of high level of cooperation, which will promote stability, security and prosperity within the Union

and at its frontiers, making out of its neighbours future allies.

Between the moment of launching the Mediterranean Initiative and the acceptance of new members for South-East Europe, ENP defines, in its political coordinates, beyond the eastern frontiers and its sea limits, reshaping the European policy to the new global requests. It is about the security of the eastern frontier and the needs for development and stability of its neighbours from Northern Africa and the Middle East. This will be made through a new cooperation and a more advanced partnership with these neighbours.

The new initiative proposes to the neighbouring states an enlarged Europe, the global objective being to “have an identical level with the countries within the Union, with the exception of financial obligations and the participation in the European institutions. Here the internmarket, the environment, the Trans-European Networks of transportation, the telecommunications and energy, the cooperation for security and dealing with conflicts will be included. A more serious dialogue on government and cultures is needed.”¹ The two main objectives of ENP in 2004 were: to avoid the emergency of the new separation lines between an enlarged Europe and its neighbours in Eastern Europe and from the southern Mediterranean region and more prosperity, stability and security for everybody. Today, with the help of Partnership and Co-operation Agreements with the eastern neighbours, and with Association Agreements with those from the South, the initiative has been accepted by 16 states (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Republic of Moldavia, Morocco, The Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunis, and Ukraine). Russia has a specific strategic partnership with EU, but it is not associated with ENP.

This important step ahead is different from the relation established in the 90's, when the European Association Agreements (they had as an objective



the creation of a customs union between the already mentioned states and EU, in order to prepare them to become members), these agreements were followed by the Mediterranean association agreements that had as an objective the creation of a free exchange zone in the Euro- Mediterranean space by the end of 2010.

In the new geopolitical and geostrategic context, the Union has bilateral negotiations with each partner, thus establishing a mutual agreement for an Action Plan in all the domains for a period from 3 to 5 years. This addresses to the efforts of the respective state for a better integration of economic, social and scientific structures in those ones belonging to EU. The legislation will be synchronized and the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs on migration, frontiers administration, fight against organized crime, drugs trafficking, money laundering, economic and financial crime, for a better government², and so on. The Association Agreement structures will put into life these plans, and periodical verifications will take place. The rhythm of deepening the relations with each EU neighbour depends on its capacity to respond to its priorities of external affairs included in the action plan.

The European neighbouring agreements may create, finally, an economic European-Mediterranean space between EU and its neighbours, similar to the one between EU and AELS/SEE Countries. The new statute of the relation between EU and the states from the South-Mediterranean region can be named a "strengthened association", on condition these particular states will further develop the new neighbouring policy, and solve the problems connected to government, human rights, security, justice and promoting the rule of law³. The specialists in this particular zone consider that the European neighbouring agreements would be better called "Euro-Med Agreements of Good Neighbouring and Partnership". This will underline the mutual character of the action. The countries in the Southern Mediterranean region may decide, using a "community acquis", to totally integrate the European norms and standards in all domains of activity, if EU would agree to approve the same resources, mechanisms and financial instruments, which, in their turn, would permit these countries to bring their economies to an integrated level.

According to the documentation in this field, between 2000 and 2006, EU has financed the new

neighbouring policy with 8.5 billion Euros. In 2007, 1.4 billion Euros will be spent. Until December 2006, the financing was made according to TACIS Program for the associated countries from the East and Russia, and MEDA Programme for the countries in Southern Mediterranean region. There were also thematic programs like EIDHR program (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights). After 2007, an instrument of financing specific to the new ENP will replace MEDA and TACIS (ENPI- European Neighbouring and Partnership Instrument). This instrument will be more flexible and will enlarge the intervention field through trans- frontier cooperation (both on land and maritime). For the period between 2007 and 2013, 12 billion Euros will be allocated for the new ENP to be shared with all the beneficiary countries.

2. Future of the New European Neighbouring Policy

The continuation, and, why not, the remodelling, of a new community policy, beneficial for both EU and its neighbours, on more effective coordinates is a subject of interest for researchers and analysts. There is a very clear vision on the future neighbouring policy among the European specialists⁴. This policy has to be a privileged one, able to ensure the sharing of the European prosperity with its direct neighbours (Belarus, Ukraine, the states from the Caucasus, the Near East and from the Northern Africa).

2.1. The South- a space of prosperity and stability built on common values

Beyond its Southern Frontier, EU develops a policy of great amplitude, which offers a real chance, both economic and political, to its neighbouring states. There is no doubt that the Union may offer an even more consistent help, not only an economic one, but also one that may help the rebirth of a political, pluralistic culture on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. As an analyst of this region has underlined, "Europe offers a chance to the Arab world, but, at the same time, it offers a chance to itself"⁵. The Arab world needs its European neighbours to help it to rebuild its policy, a policy, which, in its turn, will make possible a lasting and mutual cooperation. The political homogeneity of the Arab world may



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be a stability factor in the Middle East. This is a very difficult goal, but not impossible. There is a need for common linguistic, historical and social basis. They can be attached to political pluralism, to observing the human rights, through a real democratic practice. More efforts must be put in the regions of conflict turbulences, with repeated major social problems. There are still totalitarian regimes that have an absolute power and use methods of mass oppression. If we add to this the critical economic poverty, lack of education, we have a less than optimistic image of the future. Strange as it may seem, not the economic support is a solution for the evolution of a society to democracy, but its democratic aspects. This is the opinion of most specialists that research the phenomenon. The deep corruption, the unequal distribution of incomes stop the education sector, and the democratic practice. The Arab world is still in trouble, if it does not succeed to eradicate religious fanaticism and extremism⁶.

The annalists of the Islamic civilization see as a real solution of a democratic practice for the world in which they live a stable social zone, which will permit a free political debate, without conflicts and dictatorship. They follow in this respect Merkel's conception regarding the new ENP. This conception refers to the building up, within a renewed initiative, of a space of prosperity and stability, based on common values. It refers to cooperation in the sphere of mutual security, immigration control, respect for different cultures, development convergence, harmonization of the regulations on environment, and of legislation. We have to mention the fact that the German options for ENP make a distinction between "Europe's neighbours", comprising the Eastern states, but also those from the South and the ex soviet countries. The German initiative is orientated to the Caucasus. It underlines the necessity that states as Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus to be better integrated in the European structures⁷.

It is likely that this initiative will generate, as a confirmation of the hopes of the German media in 2006, a partnership of modernization between EU and the countries from the East. This partnership will offer funds for a real, deep structural transformation. In the end, it is believed that another Barcelona Process will be created for Eastern Europe. Barcelona Process is a name given to the Euro-Med Partnership, through Barcelona

Declaration, November 1995. The members of this partnership are the 15 EU members and 12 states from the Mediterranean region. Among the objectives of this partnership, we can mention a political cooperation in the field of security in order to create a common zone of peace and stability, an economic partnership and a financial one, meant to establish a common zone of prosperity. There is also a social, cultural and financial partnership meant to develop exchanges between the civil societies and the partner countries. By 2010, a zone of free exchange will be created. Some analysts do not agree with this, because they affirm there is a great discrepancy between the members. Belgium, for example, has GDP higher than those of all the countries from the Southern Mediterranean region together.

ENP concept shows the great force of EU to develop an innovatory international policy with its close neighbours. We do not include here Turkey and Russia, powers that are to become strategic partners for EU. This initiative will exist as long as EU will cooperate positively with its neighbours in areas as economy, politics, commerce and so on.

New elements are added to ENP. The new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has proposed new changes in the development of cooperation between member states. The idea of a Mediterranean Union refers to an association between Southern Europe and the countries from the other shore. He refers here to the Central-European Initiative, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The French president considers that Turkey should be a member of this future Union, thus excluding it from the future members of EU. The Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that this cooperation of his country in such a Union and its desire to be an EU member are two different things. Europe remains very interested in Turkey, as it is an important regional power, having special relations with the states from Central Asia. Turkey promotes regional initiatives with a great impact on European and global stability and security. The transformation of the Turkish foreign affairs (now extremely comprehensive and flexible⁸) has a positive impact for its desire to become an EU member.

The Portuguese presidency of the European Council takes a further step ahead and shows interest - besides for the delicate aspects of the



project for the new European treaty, for the negotiations with Turkey, for the final status of Kosovo, or for the final agreement for a strategic partnership with Russia - for a relation with the African states. Portuguese presidency wants to organize in December an important EU - Africa summit, meant to get closer together Europe and the 53 countries from Africa. On the other hand, Portugal proposes a stronger economic integration of EU and USA, more powerful relations with the countries from Latin America (an Association Agreement with MERCOSUR and organizing an EU summit with Brazil)⁹.

Following the neighbouring policy, EU intensifies its measures of controlling its frontiers, and the access of the immigrants from the Southern part of the continent. According to the Global Approach of Migration, the European Council has drawn the Integrated Model to improve EU capability of managing its external maritime frontiers. The European Commission proposed the model in December 2005. It estimates that this is the only way to put an end to the migration from Africa¹⁰. At the beginning of July, the European Commission has invited Tunis, Alger and Morocco to take part in the patrols of the Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) with aircrafts and ships, as well as with information, and to fight against the flow of illegal immigrants.

2.2 A new strategy for Central Asia

Observing our neighbouring states from the Western part of the continent, we notice the conclusion reached by the officials of the European Council. These states did not get many help from the organization. EU presence in these regions is weak, although ENP wants to make out of the Union a very important actor. There should be closer relations with these countries following ENP, in economic, political, and institutional fields, by deepening the common values. This is a difficult thing to accomplish as some difficulties are ignored like the situation of frozen conflicts, endemic internal situations, which paralyze the development of those states. This is the conclusion the analysts have reached¹¹.

Taking into consideration the real threats represented by the regional conflicts and the potential of the market offered by the expansion

of the European economy, the organization takes measures to develop cooperation and the regional security at the periphery of Europe towards Eastern Caucasus and Asia. This is accomplished through solving out the internal problems connected to the insufficient development, weak institutions, corruption, and lack of democracy, human rights, and the lack of a just state. At the same time, the frozen conflicts in this region must be dealt with, because they can reappear, and the people in power are not able to solve them out, when they appear unexpectedly. EU is concerned with the control of low intensity threats on security, as well as with the prevention of dissemination and with preventing the use of nuclear weapons in this region. The international delinquency must be reduced, and the weapons, drugs and human trafficking. The access to natural resources must be free so that all the member states of the organization should use them.

The future importance of the Asian space only strengthens the present interest of EU for the great regional economies and powers that are in a permanent development. From the perspective of global changes, David Shambaugh¹² suggests organizing an annual summit EU- China - USA, which should consolidate the world's stability through a dialogue that will coordinate the policies and the cooperation. Thus, Europe will step further to its global neighbours, ensuring the world security and prosperity.

EU is already concerned to establish strategic partnerships with China and Russia - great powers having an influence that might affect its interests. These partnerships should combine cooperation in multiple sectors and domains like security, human resources, energy, technology and commerce. A real development would take place in Eastern Asia, from neighbouring policy up to a global one, that address not to parts, but to the whole.

On short and medium term, the importance of oil and natural gases from the Caspian Sea, in the context of present problems Russia has, forces EU, which, in its, turn, is a great energy consumer, to prospect a diversity of transit channels from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to Europe. EU and the three Caucasus states take into account the existence in this space of international networks of transport of energy. There is a need to ensure the functioning of the oil pipe Baku – Tbilisi - Ceyhan and the finalization of the projects that are



developed of the gas pipe Erzurum - Tbilisi- Baku. The railway Erzurum – Akhalkalaki - Tbilisi- Baku should also be finished. The growing interests of EU in this region have to face the persistence of regional conflicts that generates instability and tension. They present a real potential threat, and the intransigent position of Russia, which defends its own economic and political interests, only worsens the situation.

South Caucasus remains a space where the role of EU has to be further developed, for geostrategic reasons. US also defend their growing interests for this region. That is why EU is preoccupied by the strengthening of cooperation with the countries from Southern Caucasus and with Turkey, which aspires to become an EU member. The nuclear crisis from Iran must be solved out by all means because it affects negatively the development, security and stability of the region. The specialists¹³ talk about a general interest of EU, “namely its capability to harmonize the internal instability and to consolidate a strong administration, but also its support from a strategic point of view, the viability of the Muslim moderate states, in order to stop the pressing of Jihadism, and to obtain an adverse public reaction”.

According to EU Special representative for Southern Caucasus¹⁴, this territory is a divided region that can be mended in a larger framework. The affirmation of its own identity needs the replacement of the Soviet failed identity, as well as of ethnic nationalism with a new identity, based of real values. EU is able to help them to discover such an identity. It is capable to take part in the fundamental problems as a neutral actor. The values that represent the fundament of the European identity are, probably, the most powerful instruments that are available to promote a real change.

We can notice that in 2007, the dialogue between EU and Russia was less productive, because of different interests. EU has decided new options in its relation with Central Asia, but it cannot avoid the confrontation with Eurasian strategies. At the Economic Forum from Sankt Petersburg, Putin has proposed “a new architecture of the international relations”¹⁵, taking into account the fact that 60% of GDP of the world is obtained outside of the Group of 8 (USA, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Canada). We have to mention that these are not among the most important states in EU. The EU

Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, has appreciated that the transit of energy pipes calls for clear rules. He also mentioned that globalization does not observe the spheres of influence (a direct allusion to the Russian hegemony in Central Asia)¹⁶.

The revision of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and EU, and a strategy for Central Asia, proposed by Germany, will be hard to accomplish, because of some divergences between Russia and some European states, on economic matters, as well as on military ones (the US Antimissile shield). This only demonstrates that some EU members put their national interests ahead the Union’s ones. We would like to mention here the declared Russian interests in the Black Sea region and in the Balkans, during the OCEMN summit, June 2007. Russia has launched South Stream project, to transport the Russian natural gas to Europe, crossing the Black Sea, but avoiding Romania and Turkey, thus hindering the EU initiatives. Russia still makes use of long-term contracts for providing energy, and creates new insurance designs.

The relation connected to the European energy security, between the East of the Continent and EU, is already established through a strategy that has been accepted by all the members of the organization. It is time that the new strategy for Central Asia, approved by the European Council, to be put into practice and to start to take the actions that will lead the region to a new era of stability, security and prosperity. At the end of last year, the chargé d’affaires with foreign affairs and ENP of the European Commission¹⁷ named some interesting proposals, what were applied in the first half of 2007, under the German presidency of this institution:

- ENP partners (from the east and the South) are offered a clear perspective of a real economic and commercial integration in EU, starting with the free exchange of goods and services, up to a total convergence over the plan;
- To improve the visa procedures for some categories of visitors;
- To have punctual and regular reunions with ENP partners, at ministry level and between experts on matters like energy, transports, environment and public health.
- To develop the political cooperation, to permanently associate ENP partners to EU



initiatives (foreign policy declarations, same points of view at international reunions and partnerships in key programs and in the European agencies);

- To play a more active role in the efforts of solving out the region's conflicts;
- To consolidate the regional cooperation in the East, especially in the Black Sea basin.

A significant development must operate in this field. In this direction, the European Council, from 21-22 June 2007, has approved EU Strategy for Central Asia and has adopted the Progress Report regarding the European Neighbouring Policy, elaborated by the German presidency of the Council. The chapter that refers to the "Black Sea Synergy", from the Strategy for Central Asia, is the result of the Romanian efforts to draw EU interest to the Wider Black Sea Area, in a new strategy. The region is considered a "distinctive zone, rich in natural resources, with an important strategic position at the intersection of Europe with Central Asia and the Middle East". It is also a "developing market with a high potential", a "turning point for the energy and transport fluxes". It is very important the fact that the new strategy of regional cooperation is included in EU general policy, being considered as a whole together with the policy of Turkey adhesion to EU, ENP, and the strategic partnership with Russia. The ENP present dimension nominates Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. At the same time, part of the strategy is the EU troika, which offers a greater importance to ENP new dimension.

The strategy for Central Asia cannot ignore one of the most important problems, which preoccupies the organization: EU energy security, the projects to obtain and transport the natural gas and oil from the Caspian Sea, through the Black Sea, by creating a new energy corridor. The strategy takes into account objectives like promoting human rights, democracy and a better administration, preventing illegal immigration, human trafficking and smuggling, development of transports (using the Danube) and commerce.

The "frozen" conflicts from this region should have a more important place within this strategy. They are treated as a whole, with no differences or special mentions to the conflicts from Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia).

The new coordinates of ENP, ENP Plus, based on the present EU strategy, will further develop the impact of these policies on the neighbouring regions of the organization, especially in the East, reinforcing stability, security and prosperity in the region.

3. Conclusions

ENP has still a lot to offer, firstly, in the Eastern neighbouring space of the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and especially Central Asia. This is a region that interests more and more people for its strategic importance. That is why there is a need for a new strategy for Central Asia.

EU has also interests in the Southern part of the continent, because this is a place where terrorism and insecurity reside. The European Council treats with great care the Arab world, and in the future will focus more on Africa.

The modernization of its policies and the acceleration of the evolution of the relations on multiple levels with its neighbours prove to be beneficial for both sides, no matter where the efforts are oriented.

Stability and security, Europe prosperity as well as that of its neighbours reside in a strong cooperation in solving out all the problems, which enable the access to a unique market, the development, research and education, stronger cultural and social relations, surpassing old ideologies and mentalities. It will promote good neighbourhood, tolerance, the acceptance of the others through mutual respect for a better life, in a safer world.

Translated by Alexandrina VLAD

NOTES:

¹ Appreciation of Romano Prodi, the ex-president of the European Commission.

² Abderrazak ATTIA, *Politique de voisinage de l'EU: ses tenants et ses aboutissants*, <http://www.realites.com.tn/index1.php?mag=1&cat=5ECONOMIE/1Congr%C3%A8%20de%C.O.E.C&art=17318&a=de tail>

³ Ibidem.

⁴ *Newropeans: Objectifs de la politique internationale de l' UE*, Monday, 04 June, 2007, <http://newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=bl>



ogcategory&id=67&Itemid=84

⁵ Mohamed Abdel AZIM, *L'Europe et le monde arabe: ou est la démocratie?*, <http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?option=com-content=View&id=5240&Itemid=86>

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ Lili di PUPPO, *La Nouvelle initiative de l'Allemagne répondra-t-elle aux aspirations de ses "voisins européens"?*, <http://www.caucasus.com/home/breve-contenu.php?id=385&PHPSESSID=6b08e66d41a2a3046767499bf9>

⁸ Gulnur AYBET, *Turkey and the EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External policy Challenges*, Security Dialogue, vol. 37, No.4, December 2006, p.541 and the following.

⁹ Portuguese Presidency of EU Council, <http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/vFR>.

¹⁰ Subchapter "Migration" from Communication of European Communities Commission for the European Parliament, Council, Economic Committee and Regions Committee - *Political Accomplishments in 2006*, 28.02.2007, COM(2007) final, at <http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:6vFRuUOLgbEJ:eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do%3Furi%DCOM:2007:0067:FIN:RO:PDF>

¹¹ Navidad Fernandez SOLA, *La union Europea en le Caucaso Sur y Asia Central: las limitaciones de la Politica de Vecinidad*, ARI, no.43/2007, 11/04/2007, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/>

rielcano/contenido?WEM-GLOBAL-CONTEXT=/Eleanores/Zonas-es/ARI+43-2007

¹² David SHAMBAUGH, *The New Strategic Triangle: US and European Reactions to China's Rise*, in *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2005, <http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer-shambaugh.pdf>

¹³ Ibidem, p.2.

¹⁴ Peter SEMNEBY, *The Role of the EU in the Resolution of Conflicts in the South Caucasus*, Turkish Policy Quarterly, summer, 2006, <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/default.asp?show=summer-2006-semneby>

¹⁵ Andrew E.KRAMER, *Putin wants new economic "architecture"*, International Herald Tribune, 10.06.2007.

¹⁶ Augusto SOTO, in *Asia Central en el fluido horizonte goestrategico de la UE*, DT no.29, 21.06.2007 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_es/Zonas_es/DT+29-2007.

¹⁷ Benita FERRERO-WALDNER, member of the European Commission, *Renforcer la politique européenne de la voisinage*, proposals mentioned in the reports on ENP partners whose action plans have been approved in 2005, proposals meant to enforce and develop ENP, December 4, Bruxelles, <http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1676&format=HTML&aged=1&language=FR&guiLanguage=en>

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RISKS CATEGORIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER THE HUMAN RESOURCES

Sanda IORDACHE

Focusing over the geopolitical and geo-strategic interest areas (with a special regard on Romania's areas of interest), the author underlines that they do not have a separate existence from the human environment. The human environment from our country's areas of interest, strongly influenced by different categories of risks, bears significant changes. In this dynamic, complex, unpredictable environment's reality, man assumes resulting risks, direct or indirect inter-relating with a variety of systems and processes that can constitute challenges, dangers and threats trying to diminish, to manage or, in any case, to adapt to its requests and exigencies. The author's analysis stresses out the risks' policies impact over human resources and the impact of the political-military transformation within the Euro-Atlantic space over them.

An approach to the human factor role in the geopolitical and geo-strategic zones of interest dynamics, at first sight, would seem a tautology because it is understood that there are not and there cannot be such zones of interest outside the human environment. Only people are capable to create and promote interests. But, unfortunately (some could say "happily"), man is not alone anymore facing natural environment and isn't anymore just environment's products, he becomes more. Man created his own environment – the human one – being also natural, real, abstract and virtual. Even if the human environment is a component of natural environment (it can't be other way because each creature is part of the nature), human nature wants to be a special one.

Human environment's natural component is expressed in the so-called *human nature* and the real component consists in a *dynamic reality*, a system of specific elements, structure and functions meeting only in human environment. The abstract

dimension and the virtual one complete this specific human reality built on *languages* and *symbols* on different levels of diffusion.

Human environment cannot lie outside the natural environment. This environment is just a particular form, a specific form of the natural one, ennobled and also polluted, mingled by humanity. Nature does not correspond to the entire human needs. Then, man must modify, accelerate or slow down the opposite phenomena, to protect against their effects or even to act effectively against those effects.

Man modifies, at his wish and necessities – real or virtual -, almost everything he touches, that exist, including the space, time and movement. He adds to the universal determinism, generated by the Universe's laws, a specific, dynamic and complex determinism for the human condition.

Peoples do not act unitary, as a single person but, many times, sectary, with regard to the individual and group interests, contradictory and even conflictual. Conflictuality is not specific to the humans. Nature itself is conflictual. The human conflictuality has, at least in regard with our knowledge, a certain specific: it is, first of all, thought. Man transforms everything after his or his group's interest. Therefore, the geographic space – the area – became not only a support of productive human activity, but also possession-space, city-space, vital or considered vital. The battle for the vital space is one of the greatest battles of the human history, it is the humans' fundamental battle, the continuous one.

Europe does not feel threatened. After all predictions, a wide military confrontation, as the world wars that shook, at first, the European continent (where there were fought most of the conflicts), is less probable on middle and long term and even impossible on short term. Even a stressed situation, as the Cold War, is hardly to



presume will take place, at least on short term, on the European continent. Europe is very attentive to its present and future. Crises and conflicts' hotbeds are not all disarmed and they cannot be, as the resources tensions' generators are still active and their annihilation can be realized just in time by successive and complex policies, very well elaborated, with long-term objectives and adequate measures.

For the time being, the states' interests are contradictory. Some really aim to analyze and distance conflict causes and to accomplish a security environment propitious to live and develop freely. Others are built and manifest continuously in competition terms and even confrontation ones, in an ongoing battle for markets and resources, power and influence. Power and influence still generate statutes, in fact the great power statute, and this reality will always lead to a huge conflict of interests. First of all, alliances, coalitions and even strategic partnerships regard to amplify power and influence for the already strong ones, and, in this concern, to assure a convenient configuration for the security environment.

The great powers, alliances and coalitions aren't sole settling zones of strategic interest but also other countries follow certain boundaries. For all of them, these areas are, mainly, strategic safety zones. Each of these structures (states, alliances, coalitions) manage and influence as much as possible. The core of all policies and strategies is to reduce these areas' vulnerabilities and to create some systems to assure dangers' and threats' counter-action and, respectively, their assumed, imposed or induced risks.

Challenges, dangers and threats regarding Romania's areas of interests

Challenges, dangers and threats regarding Romania's areas of interest are at least from five categories:

- general;
- regarding the political, economic, social, etc. structures from those areas;
- affecting directly or indirectly Romania's interests;
- affecting the European Union's and NATO's interests;
- affecting Romania's partners interests.

As general *challenges, dangers and threats*

there are the ones that concern, practically, the entire world. They are directly proportioned with all countries, humankind's general vulnerabilities and evolve with science and technology progresses. Of course, science and technology reduce much vulnerability and assures the diminution of many dangers and threats or their elimination by developing the knowledge capacity and means of action and reaction but favours some new ones, different, especially dissymmetric (disproportioned) and asymmetric (that use other's vulnerabilities and even creates, entertain and maintain such vulnerabilities). Among the important ones there are:

- WMD and policies and strategies to discourage or menace proliferation;
- terrorism;
- organized crime and drugs, weapons and human beings smuggling;
- hard impoverishment in a significant part of population;
- AIDS, stress diseases and malnutrition proliferation¹;
- illegal migration.

There are added natural dangers created for human environment owed to the geophysical, meteorological and cosmic phenomena evolutions. We must specify that these dangers are also part from two wide categories:

- made by nature;
- made by human nature.

From the ones "*made by nature*" there are:

- earthquakes;
- deployment or chaotic deployment underlining of the continental platforms and generation of some tectonic and geophysical phenomena that are very dangerous for human civilization, especially for critical infrastructures;
- floods;
- hurricanes;
- meteorite falls;
- possible Earth crush with asteroids or other celestial objects;
- planet heating, glacier melting and, therefore, polar fauna destruction, intensification of alluvial regime and some extended territories invasion;
- desertification;
- potable water and energetic resources diminishing;
- other unpredictable or hardly to control natural phenomena.



From the ones “*made by human nature*” there are:

- environment's pollution;
- destruction or grave deterioration of ionosphere and other planet's and Earth living protective layers;
- artificially production of geophysical² and meteorological phenomena as horrible weapons that can overtake all is known today as armament used in wars and armed confrontations³;
- some weapons creation based upon nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, info-technology.

It is remarkable that, although not recognized, certain weapons exist and they are in different phases. Some are already perfected and, in concordance with some data, even used in the confrontation for power, resources, markets and informational dominance (meteorological weapon), others are on the way to experiment (weapons based on waves' amplification, nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, high-tech, info-tech, etc.). It is likely some of these weapons, especially the ones based on genetic alterations, molecular technologies or strange psychological and telepathic effects, not even to be expected. Unfortunately, human intelligence works relentlessly in the field of creating some means to destruct and influence.

Challenges, dangers and even threats regarding political, economic, social, etc. structure are also numerous in those areas. There exist (and will always exist) some specific ones for every circle, every area and even every country besides the general ones.

In fact, each kind of challenges, dangers and threats affects, first of all, the human being and its surrounding and developing environment. Or, by all means, man firstly keeps in mind those challenges, dangers and threats that affect him directly or attack his life's environment.

Specific risks

Challenges, dangers and threats do not have a self existence but a relational dynamical one, therefore in movement, regarding systems, actions, infrastructures and human environment structures. Even earthquakes, hurricanes, floods or meteorite falls – normal in universe's dynamic – become or could become threats against human being, when, and only when, affect man and his interests. The

Krakatua volcano eruption, for example, is a direct threat for Indochinese Peninsula because they are the ones directly affected, but it isn't for Earth's geophysical dynamics because these eruptions equilibrate their energy and Earth's alignment to the cosmic determinations.

So, to live in this dynamic and complex, chaotic and also unpredictable environment, man must assume his risks and whatever results from here, to enter into a direct or mediate relation with these systems and processes which may constitute challenges, dangers and threats, to try to diminish, manage or, at any case, adapt to its conflictual requests and exigencies.

Risks assumed by man and human community, human entity in general – political (state), economic, social, cultural, informational, etc. – are part of the human nature, represent and will always represent a *modus vivendi* for people and human environment. This *modus vivendi* is strictly conditioned by a *modus cognoscendi*. Therefore, risks assumption (associated, imposed or aleatory) should be done consciously and, also, reasonable. For example, the conflictual Transdniestrian situation directly affects Soviet Union breaking-up. Before assuming risks resulting from the Transdniestrian situation deterioration and the conflictuality persistence in this area, Romania's responsible factors should, by our opinion, keep in mind the very special situation of the county where, today the Republic of Moldova is constituted, with all the points of view, including theirs.

The specific risks put on the following forms:

- assumed risks (imposed) regarding the challenges, dangers and even threats solving related with the internal situation;
- assumed risks regarding the challenges, dangers and threats solving that are related with the Romanian area;
- assumed risks regarding the challenges, dangers and threats solving at regional and international scale.

Risks' influence over the human resources

To assume risks for some actions, measures, etc. for counteracting challenges, dangers and threats and reducing or eliminating some vulnerability supposes, at first, to know the causal chain of these acts' determinations and consequences. The risks assuming must be done in a conscience way after



a thorough analysis of the possible results and consequences.

Risks, directly or indirectly, alter human resources because processes launched in these situations concern utmost peoples. It is an everlasting true. Everything lies on a certain freedom, exactly, a certain way to understand and shape the concept of freedom.

There is no freedom in itself, a freedom of form without any content, because human is a social creature with complex determinations and indestructible ties. He is born in a family, gets an education, develops himself in a system of values, and has rights and obligations against the habitual environment he participates to build by all his actions. Man produces for himself as well as for the others, for present, but also for future. On this account, human liberty has complex determination and can't be reduced to a single collocation "I do whatever I want just because I'm a free man". Human liberty is conditioned by human environment, characteristics and force of community, the human entity the individual pertains from.

The environment (cosmic, geophysical, geographical, social, intellectual, cultural, informational, etc.) man leaves is fluid, unpredictable, complicated, complex, in a continuous transformation, creating, also, facilities, liberties but also many constraints. The terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001 against World Trade Centre – the symbol of the American's economic-financial power civilization – pointed out that we don't live in a very safe world today or tomorrow, where all people are charmed by the technological civilization, power of democracy and liberty's mirage.

Against a cruel reality with intricate determinations that can't be reduced just to some extremists madness, people had to remember they also have debts and they aren't only beneficiary of the civilization they live in, where everybody takes all as an unalienable right, but they also have very big obligations to protect their civilization and values even with their life.

This is worthy not only for the Western people aggressed by terrorism but also for all the people and all the human entities on the Earth. This is how it was and will always be.

Moreover, people should assure individual risks (the one to plunge into a whirling of waters or a cyberspace) as well as the risks your community is

obliged to assume, the entity individualizing you, expressing your interest and giving sense to your life.

The risks we mention affect all the structures of a political, economic, social, cultural, informational, etc. entity but especially the human resource because humans are always the ones bearing all the effects.

The means the risks affecting human resources are different. Most of them are direct, based on a cause-effect relation. There are also indirect means passing through economic, social, informational, military, etc. transformations that, at their turn, damage the human resources. For example, the effective destruction and without discernment of the Romanian socialist type economy affected gravely country's inhabitants, in many aspects, starting with economic and social security and safety of citizens and from here, birth rate, morality, stability, professional qualification, education. After 1989, the country's population receded numerically and the demographic situation is alarming.

The characteristics of the human resources from Romania's areas of interest

The demographical situation from Romania's areas of interest is very similar with our country's one. All the countries around us suffered radical transformations, true political and socio-economic mutations which unsettles serious the precarious and stressing balance achieved in socialist relations times dominated by totalitarianism and the drastic restraining of rights and liberties also affected the demographical potential. There are noticeable many parameters regarding birth rate, death rate, migration, population growth, etc. that are in difficulty. It is true, certain tendencies manifest also in other geographical areas but the small variances concerning the demographical dynamic in countries from the first circle of Romania's areas of interest point out the fact that our neighbours confront with the same demographic problems.

Thus, among the main characteristics of the human resources from Romania's direct areas of interest, the neighbouring countries can be as follows:

- low birth rate;
- high infantile death rate;
- very low population natural growth;
- high death rate coefficient;



• almost all countries have ethnical groups, some very hostile, but states' policy against them (maybe excepting the modern Romanian state) was intolerance, denationalization and unacceptability.

The risk policies' impact over the human resources

The risks policies are risky, at first, for the human factor. People are always the ones creating but also bearing the policy's ins and outs. Generally, risk policies mean to assume some actions with doubtful end because numerous disturbing factors are interfering in the activity or the complexity of situations.

There are not and cannot be one hundred percent safe policies because almost all the scenarios and, consequently, all the political decisions are developing with great uncertainty.

Governments, parliaments, international organizations and bodies build policies on "moving horizons" because the situations developments follow probabilistic trajectories.

The Cold War end didn't materialize in a clearance of the situation but, on the contrary, there was created a chaos state with hard predictable and even unpredictable developments.

Political decisions of the involved leadership countries were always taken in risk situations and risk mainly affected the human factor. Bipolarity break consequences and the rush destruction of the centralized socialist economies were numerous. They produced great disturbances in people's economic and social security and safety by:

- economic enterprises and objectives destruction and letting people homeless with an economic and social support under the survival limit determining a desperate and uncontrolled movement of populations in search of a job as well as numerous underworld alternative;
- infrastructures' destruction, including some critical one and the creation of a chaos state in all the existent networks;
- destruction of the irrigation systems and other infrastructure from agriculture and return to the plough with horses and hoe;
- illegal privatizations and the in-between in the Romanian economy of some burglars or even financiers of the terrorist networks;
- educational system's never-ending reforms and the destruction of graduates' professional

expectance horizon;

- mafia's networks rapid development of drug, weapons and human trafficking;
- the very growth of drugs' consumption;
- corruption, crime rate, organized crime development.

All these damaged seriously the human resources. Country's population lowered, the natural growth diminished, social anomy grew and the human condition significantly decayed. Among the serious consequences of the lack of good established policy in regard with the human resources there are as it follows:

- population migration growth, especially the young ones from all areas to the Western countries, mainly, in search of a job;
- migration and crime rate intensification in West because of the Romanian gypsies or burglars;
- mafia's network development especially drug, human beings and prohibited materials traffickers;
- instability and social anomy increase;
- stress amplification and, consequently, unprecedented extension of the cardiovascular disease (Romania holds the top place in Europe regarding this type of disease), cancer, infectious hepatitis and other diseases specific to tensioned and social instability times;
- apparition and rapid development of a psychology specific to harassment and terrorism situations where human being is surrounded by aggression.

In these conditions, country's demo-military potential dramatically declined and significantly decayed.

At one hand, the teenagers able to be recruited for the military profession choose rather an unqualified job (even a job on the black market) than a non-commissioned officer and, on the other hand, the over limit psychology of an archaic freedom without any responsibility damages the ownership feeling to a community, a value system and the effect consists in the dramatic emphasis of the alienation.

The departure abroad offers many advantages for Romanians retained years from leaving the country but to aspire and hope just with numerous approvals and in special situations. Until they will be convinced that there are no miracles, there will pass many years, while the national human factor will continue to decay.



The impact of the Euro-Atlantic politico-military transformations over the human resources, the Alliance effect

Our adhesion to the European Union and its full membership will ease communication and access to the European job market, diminishing some kinds of frustration and humiliation but wouldn't solve out the complex problem of human factor as resource for the military environment but, on the contrary, will intricate more the actual situation. It is expected the European integration and job market extension conditions, teenagers to try to find jobs, some better remunerated, in the European space, and not to crowd to the barracks' gates. This tendency will be major until the European market will glut.

The respect for the military profession will significantly diminish. The lack of perspective for short, or even middle and long term of a border war blurs the duty feeling over the country's defence specific to the nations build and strengthen era in favour of pragmatic and conjectural cosmopolitanism.

There are fewer countries maintaining the conscripts system. They probably have – as Germany – serious reasons or just don't rush to ally to the new trend because the armies' specialization can diminish under the critical bridge the national responsibility sentiment over country's security and defence. These states maybe understand they should replace the conscripts system with something else.

Using the paid military system based on volunteers, the armies become ordinary institutions, compete with other structures and entities to draw employees and therefore should offer better payments and other attractive facilities.

Europe is integrating. It disposes, on one hand, of a special relation with North America, constituted in the North-Atlantic Alliance – expression of the Euro-Atlantic space unity - and, on the other hand, its own security and defence policy (ESDP) which shapes its individuality and personality, including the security and defence field.

The changes within this area are very big and are rapidly developing. Among them, the most important ones, with direct impact over human factor are as it follows:

- NATO transformation to the headquarters and force structures level;

- NRF appearance (NATO Response Force) representing a pattern of the force structure the Alliance wants to develop;

- European Security and Defence Policy appearance and implementation;

- the accomplishment of some structures (Military Committee, EU General Staff) meant to put ESDP into shape and lead the EU assumed operations (Althea, Concordia, Artemis);

- the accomplishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) shaped in the 13th battle groups;

- the accomplishment of some regional and bilateral military structures amplifying security and defence's regional, international and collective dimension.

These changes and many others firstly aim the human element. Headquarters structures are international, forces' and means' preparing in each state's responsibility, still gets a marked international dimension.

The human factor is not and cannot be the same with the energetic one or with other resources the human society and earth life depend on. It can't be just a *resource* although we always easily use such term. Human factor is a *demiurgic* one. It puts into form *the thought*, accomplishes and configures long term, middle term or short term projects. Therefore, man can't be seen as a simple resource. He is the first and the final beneficiary of all the humankind does for him and sideways. He is in the big picture a creator of his own condition.

Of course, human factor must be understood as a complex dynamic system where each human or entity has something to do and does effectively – not as it happens, but in an organized way – to manage the conflict and protect human values, create that safe and stable environment humankind needs for its own existence.

Therefore, human factor isn't an ordinary one among the others, starting with the cosmic ones and continuing with the geophysical, but it is an effective factotum.

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NOTES:

¹ According to the *European Security Strategy*, every year, over 45 million people die of famish or malnutrition.

² Colonel dr. Emil STRĂINU, **Războiul geofizic**, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2005.

³ General dr. Mircea MUREȘAN, gl. bg. (r) dr. Gheorghe VĂDUVA, **Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului**, ediția a II-a, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2006, pp. 501-503.

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THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL CONTINUE TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS, COALITION, TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF IRAQ

In the previous issue of our magazine, in this column, there has been published an article signed by Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, PhD and Liviu Bogdan Vlad, PhD, from the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, "Romania's geopolitics in the conflict areas from Afghanistan and Iraq", that was stressing out Romania's contribution, as a NATO member, in these two theatres of operations. On approaching Iraq issue, the authors had as a background the almost unanimous international mass-media opinion, that, at the moment the material was prepared, were largely commenting on the "reduction of forces" foreseen by Tony Blair's Cabinet and mentioned by the Prime Minister in the statement to the UK Parliament on February, 21st.

They showed that, on the wider background of the process of the partial or complete forces' withdrawal of forces belonging to some states that are member of the anti-Iraqi coalition, that "Great Britain announced on 21 February 2007 a calendar for retreat which would start in April 2007 and end by August 2008".

In a letter sent by Colonel Nigel Moore, from the Defence Attaché Office, the British Embassy in Bucharest, to the President of the Strategic Impact Editorial Board, it is shown that the former British Prime Minister spoke in that statement about the fact that "The actual reduction in forces will be from the present 7100... to roughly 5500" and that "Over time, and depending naturally on the progress and capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), we will be able to draw down further, possibly to below 5000 once the Basrah Palace site has been transferred to the Iraqis in late summer. The UK military presence will continue into 2008, for

as long as we are wanted and have a job to do". "At no point", the British diplomat stresses out, "did Mr. Blair announce a 'calendar for retreat', neither did he use the word 'retreat'.

He did not say that the UK's military forces would be withdrawn by August 2008 and indeed no mention was made of a date for the final withdrawal of UK forces. It has always been the UK's position that our forces will remain in Iraq until the Iraqi Government is confident that the ISF are capable of providing security. Our policy, at the time the article was written, now and in the future, will be to meet our commitments to the Iraqi people and our allies, with decisions on troop deployments being made according to our operational objectives not political timetables".

In order to keep ourselves in the limits of the truth, we mention that the authors, tributary to the terminology intensively used by media and even by officials from the states comprising the coalition on approaching this topic, have used in their article the term "withdrawal" considering it similar with "reduction", that is not the same thing.

Besides the terminology aspect, the two authors did not and do not doubt in any way the United Kingdom's commitment to operations in Iraq, as this is the most consistent within the coalition, after the United States' one. Moreover, the enumeration of the states that took the decision to reduce or withdraw their forces from Iraq does not annul and does not try to minimize in any way their efforts and sacrifices during the time they have acted in the theatre. As coalition partners, the Romanian forces, from soldier to general, had in the British ones an example of commitment and professionalism, of a perfect collaboration and



cooperation, that they have praised whenever they had the chance.

The British diplomat reproaches the article's authors the fact that the mentioned figures on Romania's contribution to coalition operations in Iraq are incorrect.

We make the adequate rectification, showing that the figure of the forces employed in the theatre has varied in time, according to the data offered by the Ministry of Defence, at a moment being up to a maximum level of 865 people, in 2004, and at the time the article was published, there were 500.

The authors' interpretations regarding a possible second position held by Romania within the coalition, after finalising the forces' reductions announced by some states, are simple speculations. Never, the Romanian contribution to multinational coalitions was mentioned in competition terms, but competence and responsibility.

Often, Romania's merits on sustaining the efforts for stabilization and reconstruction, for combating the international terrorism, dangers and threats have been officially acknowledged.

Also, Mr. Moore mentions, in his message addressed to the President of the Editorial Board, the letter dated 27 August 2007 from Prime Minister Gordon Brown to the British Liberal Democrat leader (at that time, our publication had been published for two months), reiterating the Government's position, saying that he is determined that the UK will fulfil its obligations to the Government of Iraq, as set out in the United Nations Resolutions, and rejects calls a pre-determined timetable for withdrawal. (In order to inform our readers, we reproduce extracts from the letter).

EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN TO LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADER, SIR MENZIES CAMPBELL

"UK forces, along with their coalition partners, continue to have an important job to do in Iraq, assisting the Iraqi Government and its security forces in delivering security and helping build their capabilities – military and civilian – so that they can take full responsibility for the security of their own country".

"We continue to have clear obligations to discharge. We are there at the expense invitation of the Iraqi Government implementing a UN mandate renewed last November in UNSCR 1723. We, together with the rest of the international community, have undertaken to support the country's political and economic developments through the UN-led International Compact for Iraq. These are commitments it is not in our interests simply to abandon".

"Decisions on UK force levels and posture in Iraq are dictated by conditions on the ground. In the three provinces handed over to Iraqi control in Multi-National Division (South-East), the Iraqi authorities have proved themselves sufficiently capable of dealing with outbreaks of violence using a combination of security and political responses. The situation remains challenging. Our aim is that the Iraqi Security Forces will be capable of delivering security across the South and we will be able to draw down our forces".

"UK forces in Iraq ... continue to work with the Iraqi authorities and security forces to get them to the point where they can assume full responsibility for security. We will support them in this endeavour, but it is for Iraqi leaders to make the political decisions and compromises which are essential to the future of Basra and their country".

"Our approach to Iraq should be based on the principle that we will fulfil our obligations to the Government and people of Iraq and the United Nations. These obligations are set out in United Nations Resolutions. That is why I reject... a pre-determined exit timetable that would undermine our international obligations, as well as hindering the task of our armed forces and increasing the risks they face, and therefore would not serve our national interest".

"Decisions on the ground will be made on the basis of advice from our military and other experts, taking fully into consideration the safety of our armed forces... We will continue to work closely with the Americans and our other coalition partners to ensure security and then to fulfil the key overwatch functions - training/mentoring: protection of supply routes: and maintenance of a re-intervention capability".

Editorial Staff



MISSION ISAF, A-T-ELLE UNE CHANCE DE REUSSIR?

Jan EICHLER, PhD

Le déroulement des événements de l'Afghanistan préoccupe la communauté internationale. Voilà pourquoi celle-ci s'implique active et responsable dans la solution des problèmes de ce pays. La mission ISAF constitue la modalité concrète par laquelle s'agit en Afghanistan pour stabiliser de la situation et instaurer la paix. Son succès dépend de beaucoup de variables et des facteurs intérieurs et étrangers.

Le sommet de l'OTAN qui s'est réuni à Riga en novembre dernier a approuvé une Directive politique globale d'après laquelle "contribuer à la paix et à la stabilité en Afghanistan est la priorité essentielle de l'OTAN". Et la Déclaration finale a souligné la détermination de "fonder une société stable, démocratique et prospère, libérée du terrorisme, des stupéfiants et de la peur." L'Alliance s'est, donc, fixé une grande ambition, mais sa mise en œuvre ne sera pas facile à cause de la complexité des facteurs historiques, géopolitiques et, notamment, militaires.

Facteurs historiques de la mission ISAF

Chacun qui veut changer l'Afghanistan, doit prendre en considération le fait qu'au cours des deux derniers siècles, ce pays très spécifique s'est chaque fois opposé, avec détermination et acharnement, à n'importe quelle intervention militaire. Ce fut le cas des trois guerres anglo-afghanes (1838-1842, 1878-1880 et, notamment en 1919 quand les Anglais voulaient créer un Empire au Moyen-Orient, une chaîne d'Etats vassaux s'étendant sur un territoire très étendu entre le Nil et l'Hindou Kouch - un projet qui avait presque les mêmes contours comme le Greater Middle East de George W. Bush au début du 21^{ème} siècle). Et pour conclure la présentation des facteurs historiques il faut rappeler que les tribus afghanes n'ont pas hésité à s'opposer à l'Armée soviétique envoyée suite à une décision fatale et

regrettable d'une équipe d'octogénaires à la fin des années 1970.

Et la résistance contre l'occupation soviétique avait encore une autre conséquence importante - elle a marqué le début d'une tendance à la fragmentation politique qui continue à peser lourdement sur l'Afghanistan contemporain. Du fait que les milices locales ont constitué, pendant presque deux décennies, la colonne vertébrale de la résistance, les chefs et les commandants locaux ont renforcé leur pouvoir au détriment de Kaboul.

Le premier champ de bataille de la Guerre globale contre le terrorisme

En 2001, l'Afghanistan a été / fut choisi pour le déclenchement de la Guerre globale contre le terrorisme (Global War on Terror - GWOT) de l'administration de G.W. Bush. Les combats de l'opération *Liberté Immuable* ont connu deux phases très différentes. La première étape se solda par un succès extraordinaire des bombardements des forces aériennes de l'OTAN ainsi que par la réussite surprenante de l'offensive de l'Alliance du Nord. Par contre, la seconde étape révéla l'existence de deux réalités distinctes: l'étendue du pouvoir du gouvernement installé après cette opération se limitant à la capitale, tandis que le reste du pays était de nouveau contrôlé par les chefs omnipotents des tribus afghanes (aujourd'hui appelés seigneurs de guerre), dont chacun possède sa propre armée composée des combattants absolument dévoués à leurs commandants.

Les insurgés profitent au maximum du désenchantement total dans lequel le président Hamid Karzai est accusé d'être "un simple relais de l'ambassade américaine" et le Parlement n'est pas respecté comme il devrait l'être. Ces constats regrettables témoignent du fait que l'OTAN est très loin d'avoir en Afghanistan des alliés fiables et influents sur lesquels il puisse compter sérieusement.



Facteurs géopolitiques

Les complications après l'opération *Liberté Immuable* se manifestent aussi sur la scène internationale: les anciens alliés sont perçus comme des occupants, les ennemis d'hier deviennent des alliés d'aujourd'hui. Cette tradition est tellement enracinée en Afghanistan qu'elle constitue un paradigme de comportement des chefs des tribus afghanes. Ces chefs peuvent compter sur la dévotion quasi-absolue de la majorité écrasante de leurs assujettis et, en cas de besoin, de djāinismes déterminés venus des communautés musulmanes du monde entier pour se venger aux dépens des soldats étrangers de ce qu'ils perçoivent comme l'humiliation inacceptable d'un pays islamique. Si dans le passé récent (les années 1980), les djihadistes venaient en Afghanistan pour "tuer son Russe", au début du 21-ème siècle, ils y vont pour "tuer son Américain ou son incroyant occidental", perçu comme un occupant. Ça nous donne un avertissement grave: chaque pays qui y envoie des soldats court un risque important, puisque chacun de ces soldats est menacé à tout moment.

En ce qui concerne la mission ISAF, ce risque est d'autant plus grand qu'elle est dès son début présentée comme une opération de l'OTAN dans le cadre de la GWOT. Cette perception reste ancrée dans l'esprit des grands chefs de tribus afghans, notamment Pachtouns. C'est de là que provient leur détermination à résister et le caractère impitoyable de leurs actions contre tous les soldats étrangers. Barrent R. Rubin, un grand expert américain, à entièrement raison quand il nous avertit que «la présence internationale en Afghanistan sera perçue comme une occupation étrangère et à cause de ça, elle sera catégoriquement refusée par les Afghans.»

Il ne sera pas facile de faire comprendre les Afghans qu'il y a une différence importante entre l'engagement de l'OTAN en Afghanistan et la stratégie américaine de la guerre globale contre le terrorisme. Du fait que les insurgés en Afghanistan et en Irak font partie de vases communicants d'une même guerre islamiste, les soldats de l'OTAN courent le risque d'être perçus comme des occupants occidentaux. Leur ennemi principal réside en la personne de combattants déterminés à résister et très expérimentés dans le domaine des guerres asymétriques. A cause de ça, non seulement les soldats occidentaux, mais

aussi les experts civils de l'ISAF auront beaucoup d'ennemis et risquent de devenir les cibles plus ou moins vulnérables d'attaques insidieuses.

Facteurs militaires

En Afghanistan, la suprématie, qualitative ou quantitative, ne donne jamais de garanties du succès de l'intervention militaire. En 1919, les Anglais, avec un effectif de 340000 soldats soutenus par des avions de combat, se sont inclinés face à 40000 combattants équipés d'un armement incomparablement plus modeste, sinon obsolète. Dans les années 1980, les commandants des tribus afghanes ont réussi à mener une guerre d'usure de très longue durée contre un Corps de demi million de soldats russes très lourdement armés.

Environnement très difficile

Le paysage montagneux de l'Afghanistan est extrêmement défavorable aux armées robustes: il leur empêche de mener des grandes offensives sur front large, offensives conçues pour écraser une fois pour toutes les forces de résistance beaucoup plus faibles, tant au niveau qualitatif qu'au niveau quantitatif. Au lieu d'une victoire nette lors d'une bataille décisive, les armées modernes des pays occidentaux sont obligées de s'accommoder à une longue guerre d'usure qui se caractérise par des pertes permanentes qui affaiblissent leur moral.

Du côté des tribus afghanes, les hautes montagnes et les profondes vallées constituent un terrain idéal pour les besoins de la guerre asymétrique, qui consiste en embûches, en raids éclairs, suivis par le dispersement rapide des attaquants. Les conditions géographiques offrent un grand éventail de possibilités d'attaque de l'armée étrangère pour tuer ses soldats, saper leur moral et leur détermination à poursuivre des activités militaires dans ce pays éloigné.

Depuis 2001, le caractère insidieux de la guerre asymétrique en Afghanistan se manifeste de manière de plus en plus dramatique et inquiétante en réaction au fait que la GWOT de l'Administration Bush se révèle comme une «conception agressive des vertus de la démocratie, comme une approche qui manque de patience sans laquelle on ne peut pas comprendre le monde contemporain dans toute sa complexité» pour reprendre la caractéristique de Jack Snyder, un grand expert américain.



Irakisation de l'Afghanistan

De plus, au tournant des années 2003 et 2004, quant au succès incontestable de l'opération Liberté irakienne succéda le cauchemar de la guerre asymétrique, est apparue une influence extérieure importante. Les combats se sont intensifiés en Afghanistan, où les chefs claniques ont créé une alliance contre les forces de la coalition étrangère, un groupement appelé Anti-Coalition Militants (ACM), qui engage quatre catégories des combattants: insurgés militaires, volontaires civils, déserteurs de l'Armée nationale afghane (Afghan National Army - ANAF) et de la police nationale (Afghan National Security Forces - ANSF). Tous ces insurgés utilisent massivement des points d'appui dont ils disposent au Nord du Pakistan - Barnett R. Rubin parle de la "résistance très dangereuse, basée au Pakistan et dirigée par les Talibans".

Sous l'influence irakienne, les insurgés afghans utilisent trois nouvelles méthodes jamais connues auparavant dans leur pays: matières explosives, attentats - suicides (la méthode la plus mortelle et la plus insidieuse de leur combat) et décapitations. Ils s'attaquent non seulement à tous les soldats étrangers, mais aussi aux humanitaires des différentes ONG et aux Afghans soupçonnés de la "collaboration avec les occupants".

La force, la brutalité, l'efficacité et la détermination des insurgés sont en grand contraste avec la puissance très limitée de l'Armée afghane (ANSF) et de la Police nationale (Afghan National Security Forces - ANSF) qui sont mal entraînées, peu motivées et rongées par la corruption. Leur situation est tellement déplorable, que Frank Rich, commentateur apprécié de *The New York Times*, parle de forces de sécurité "incapables, mal équipées et infiltrées par les milices." Le résultat est très lamentable: la criminalité quotidienne augmente considérablement. Dans cet environnement explosif, l'ANSF n'est pas du tout capable d'opérer seule. Ça signifie qu'à court terme, les soldats de l'ISAF ne peuvent pas beaucoup compter sur elle, ils sont obligés de compter tout d'abord sur eux-mêmes.

Les méthodes insidieuses des ACM

Dans leurs actions contre les forces de la coalition, les combattants de l'ACM mettent en œuvre plusieurs tactiques. La première est celle du *sabotage*: il s'agit d'attaques contre

des établissements publics et des infrastructures sensibles, attaques destinées à perturber le pays. La deuxième consiste à provoquer des *incidents* afin de créer la panique et de déstabiliser l'ordre public. La troisième tactique est dirigée directement contre les forces armées étrangères: il s'agit de raids rapides, d'embûches contre les bases militaires des pays de l'OTAN, contre leurs convois, stocks et patrouilles. En ce qui concerne les embuscades, ils utilisent des matières explosives activées à distance: les IED (Independently Explosive Devices). Le but de ces actions insidieuses est simple: il s'agit de tuer ou de mutiler le maximum de soldats étrangers et de saper au maximum leur détermination psychologique.

Pendant la préparation des attaques contre les bases des forces armées de l'OTAN, les combattants de l'ACM se dispersent parmi la population civile aux alentours des bases. À un moment choisi, ils déclenchent des attaques rapides et de surprise. Une fois les attaques terminées, ils se dispersent le plus vite possible pour se mélanger à nouveau à la population civile, sachant bien que les soldats européens ne courent pas le risque de tuer ou blesser plus de civils que de terroristes. Les effets de ces tactiques sont considérablement renforcés par la quatrième tactique qui consiste en des *actes terroristes* organisés contre trois cibles principales: le pouvoir politique, la population locale et les unités militaires étrangères. Les attaques contre les cibles civiles prennent la forme de torture, d'assassinats ou d'exécutions rituelles d'individus soupçonnés par l'ACM de collaborer avec le gouvernement de Kaboul ou, pire encore, avec les "forces occupantes".

Les attaques terroristes contre les soldats (les explosions dans des lieux de concentration de soldats ne menant aucune activité combattante, par exemple,) ont pour but de provoquer la peur dans les pays qui participent à ces opérations. Le message est clair: "n'envoyez plus vos soldats en Afghanistan si vous ne voulez pas qu'ils reviennent dans des cercueils. Oubliez notre pays et laissez-nous régler nos comptes en interne".

Défi ou piège? On verra

La mission ISAF est, donc, liée avec beaucoup de risques graves. Pour les réduire au minimum, la mission de l'OTAN en Afghanistan devrait avoir un caractère politico-militaire, la force militaire



étant limitée au soutien d'une grande initiative politique de changement fondamental de cette partie explosive du monde musulman.

À niveau politique, la reconstruction de ce pays éloigné représente un défi. Sa réussite pourrait être bénéfique non seulement au peuple afghan, mais aussi au monde musulman dans son ensemble, déchiré par de nombreuses tensions extérieures comme intérieures. L'engagement de l'OTAN est déjà couronné de succès dans le domaine de la scolarisation des jeunes Afghans, par la construction d'écoles, d'infrastructures, d'hôpitaux, etc. Mais tous ces succès, bien que non négligeables, risquent d'être discrédités par le conflit militaire, asymétrique et partisan, typique pour de ce pays montagneux. N'oublions jamais l'histoire, qui nous rappelle que l'originalité de l'Afghanistan du fait de l'impossibilité d'y concilier la domination des chefs des tribus et les coutumes sociales et politiques importées par des forces armées étrangères.

À niveau militaire, la situation est tellement dangereuse que l'Afghanistan risque de devenir *un piège*. Personne ne peut garantir que l'engagement de l'OTAN ne se transforme en enlèvement générateur de nombreuses victimes. Pour renouer avec l'hyperbole utilisée en introduction de cette analyse, l'on peut dire que l'attribution du Prix

Nobel de la Paix à l'OTAN est aujourd'hui bien loin d'être dans du domaine du possible. Les efforts de l'Alliance peuvent être couronnés d'un certain succès au niveau des activités civiles, y compris de la formation de la police afghane. Mais ceux-ci peuvent être à n'importe quel moment discrédités par des affrontements militaires ou, pire encore, par des attentats terroristes.

Quels critères pour pouvoir parler du succès de l'ISAF?

D'après quels critères faut-il évaluer l'engagement de l'OTAN en Afghanistan? Selon des critères politiques ou militaires? En fait, il est impossible de séparer ces deux aspects, puisqu'il s'agit de vases communicants. Dans tous les cas, l'on peut s'inspirer de la recommandation de Robert Mandel, qui préfère les critères politiques qui sont positifs aux critères militaires qui sont négatifs. Si l'on applique cette recommandation en Afghanistan, cela signifie qu'il faut préférer le renouveau de ce pays, et si possible la création d'un régime démocratique, à l'écrasement total d'Al-Qaeda. Mais le renouveau de l'Afghanistan est-il possible sans l'anéantissement d'Al-Qaeda? Les mois et les années à venir nous en donneront la réponse.

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ESDP AND THE EU MEMBER STATES' SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

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European Union, a significant economical actor, is building its both political and military role. In this frame, EU has a profound interest in crises and conflicts management in Europe and all over the world. In this purpose, EU is developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a military component – European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). ESDP seems to have a powerful impact over national defence and security policies of the EU member states.

1. European Union - an important international actor

Nowadays, the European Union, with its 27 member states, covers a significant part of Europe and its population reaches almost 500 million people, which represents more than both USA and Russian Federation put together. That is why EU is an entity that must be taken into account. Meanwhile, as an international organization, EU is promoting a democratic society within its borders and is having an active and responsible role outside of its area.

The substantially progress in the economic field with a high increase of commercial relationships in the nineties, represents the framework for the next relationships in enduring development, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction help. The real base for these hopes are progresses in the economical field, which had permitted EU to develop a high level of integration and strongly commercial relationships with many country and regions, in terms of cooperation for development, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction help. Indeed, EU and its member states offer today more than half of international assistance for development funds and more than 50% of humanitarian assistance in the world. The EU finances one third of world help in Middle East (50% for Palestinian

territories, almost 60% in independent community states and 40% of reconstruction effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹

The EU market offers to its citizens the opportunity to benefit, through the free circulation of persons, goods and services, of better jobs and qualifications. In addition, in partnership with its close neighbours, EU is acting to increase the wealth and democracy beyond its borders.

That is why EU is a success, from the economical point of view. Over its 50 years of existence, it succeeded in achieving a high standard of life for its citizens. EU has a free market without borders among its member states and a unique currency, the Euro. In fact, EU represents a high economical power and the world's leader for aid in development. It develops very good relationships with its neighbouring states.²

All EU member states, whether rich, poor, or diverse, are committed in promoting common values as peace, democracy, law enforcement and human rights. All of them act for sharing these values all over the world, in order to develop prosperity and an efficient influence, as well. The 500 millions of citizens live together in very well-organized and democratically leading system. In fact, the EU has created all necessary conditions for the people to know each other and to take the opportunity to develop the feeling of having EU citizenship. Many of its citizens study and work on other member's state territory, and they even spend their vacations wherever they want; they take the advantages given by the free circulation of persons.

The EU, a significant economical and demographical force, intend to develop a military component in order to enhance its active role in the international environment, especially regarding the crises and conflict prevention, peace and stability insurance on the continent and the world. For that



matter, it has to develop some pillars as: *adopting the Constitutional project; the clarification of the relationship between EU and USA; strengthening the strategic dimension of CFSP; developing the institutional system, strengthening the military capacity and the political will*³.

Actually, EU is working to build a CFSP that will comprise a military dimension – The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Nowadays, as internal and especially, external, conditions have radically changed, the EU is building its own political military asset - efficient and adequate to the proposed aim, to play an important role on present and future world stage.

The necessity of an adequate EU asset in order to activate the high economic level it detains in the world arena resides in *the modification of European and world geopolitical landscape* that has led to the modification of strategic interests; *the acute decrease of a massive armed attack danger in Europe* after the USSR disintegration and Warsaw Pact abrogation; *the possible outbreak of interstate conflicts*, as those ones from the former Yugoslavia that made the politicians and public opinion aware of the possibility of such a conflict on the European continent; *the amplification of security risks and threats*, especially asymmetrical.

Consequently, the defence requirements have changed, and the EU, as an international actor, decided to assume a more active role in the defence and security field. Under these circumstances, the Union decided that it must be capable to act independently in crisis management and to intervene to prevent conflicts – trying to attack causes and contribute to reconstruction and stabilization – a field where the community and member states are already performing similar actions.

At the same time, the fight against terrorism is more than never a Union's major political objective: a large number of legislative and operational measures have been conceived, especially to stop terrorism financing and to react to the use of biological arms threats.

2. Current Power Mechanisms of ESDP's Missions and Objectives

The European Security and Defence Policy, the CFSP military component – one of EU pillars, is intended to allow the EU to develop its civil and

military capabilities of crisis management and conflict prevention at international level. Thus, its contribution to peacekeeping and international security, according to the UN Charter, would increase considerably, similar to its economic and demographic force.

Whatever difficult the ESDP's beginning may be, the latter will remain rather fragile since it is *collective* and constitutes a *process* before being an *accomplished fact*. It is *collective* since ESDP's concrete content was decided in common. Actually, ESDP is the result of the agreements signed by the member states in time. Then, it is a *process* because from now on, the European capabilities, since the adoption of the *headline goal*, represent the main part of the European defence project. To overcome these challenges and provide a proper transition of the traditional military structures towards the new European defence and security structures, and to accomplish the new stage of ESDP rise to power, national structures and cooperation procedures must be modified, based on bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Nowadays, ESDP is characterized by some essential features. One of them is that *it does not involve the creation of a European army*, but it evolves in a manner compatible and coordinated with the North-Atlantic Alliance. Actually, each member state contributes willingly, responsibly, actively and consciously to the formation of the military structures that are acting and will act in the name of and under the EU command in order to prevent crises and conflicts.

A second feature is the idea that *ESDP might mean a specialization on military capabilities⁴ of the member states*. The specialization consists in placing each Union state, willing to, in the field of its main military technology or skill. The advantage of such architecture will be, from a military point of view, the avoidance of assets waste and dilution. This idea needs to mature and the European states are still at different levels of reflection. In other words, there is no consensus about this matter. Under these circumstances, ESDP should be the object of a strong cooperation between the EU member states and NATO as well. However, there will be situations when all member states will agree to participate in cooperation, but some of them may not be able to fulfil their obligations. In the latter case, those countries may use the instrument of strong cooperation for ESDP.



The third feature indicates that *ESDP excludes any form of territorial defence*⁵. This is national states and NATO's exclusive competence. The Constitution for Europe included a clause of solidarity in case of armed aggression but it will not come to force unless this document is ratified by the member states.

Finally, the creation of ESDP imposed the necessity to *identify the civil and military assets the EU will apply when it starts a mission of crisis and conflict management*. ESDP's objectives are fulfilled by the use of military and civil assets at its disposal⁶.

The process of identification and availability of ESDP's military capabilities represents a major challenge for EU. When ESDP was founded in 1999, the European Committee had established a military capabilities objective it engaged to fulfil in 2003: *the Headline Goal from Helsinki*. The EU "Headline Goal" consisted in making operational, by the end of 2003, a force of 50,000-60,000 people supplied by the member states (respectively, an army corps), deployable within 60 days and for a year in a distant theatre (in reality, the necessary number to fulfil this objective is of 180,000 if three rotations per year are considered)⁷. According to the Headline Goal, these forces must be sustainable and capable to execute the Petersberg tasks. They can be supported by necessary air and maritime combat support assets. However, *the Headline Goal does not form a European army*. It is more about national units that the European Committee can resort to, if it is a unanimous decision, to intervene in a world's region.

"*Headline Goal 2010*" and the tasks groups represent the second mission of ESDP military capabilities. While EU was developing the Headline Goal from Helsinki, new non-traditional threats came up with new military capabilities requirements. Most of European armies are still structured as during the Cold War, that is, to defend the European territory against a possible armed invasion. The Headline Goal defined at Helsinki in 1999, which has not been accomplished in reality, was inspired by the Kosovo War, which was rather a classic conflict and closer to the European territory. EU is still unable to execute highly specialized missions at a large distance. If member states count 1.8 million soldiers, only 12% of them can be deployed abroad⁸. In spite of its efforts, ESDP does not always possess sufficient assets

for troops' mobility and combat support at a long distance.

It is highly important that ESDP possess rapid reaction forces, highly specialized and very mobile, capable to intervene in distant theatres. This capability, explicitly evoked in the European Strategy for Collective Security adopted in December 2003 was introduced in the new EU military objective the "*Headline Goal 2010*". "Headline Goal 2010" aims at making a series of improvements to fill in the blanks of the Helsinki objective. At the same time it introduces the concept of "battle groups" inspired from the initiative of France, Germany and the Great Britain adopted in April 2003. The aim of this initiative is to provide ESDP with a series of forces composed of 1,500 people each, deployable within 15 days in distant and difficult areas. These battle groups must be endowed with all support assets necessary to the fulfilment of their mission, means of strategic transportation included. They must also be able to execute autonomous missions as well as actions to prepare larger interventions. The calendar fixed by "Headline Goal 2010" specified that the 30 first battalions will be created in the first semester of 2006. From an organizational point of view, the battle groups may be composed from one or more member states' military structure that provides the troops or the assets.

Finally, a *last initiative* was adopted in the military field, in December 2004. An informal committee of defence ministers from France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Netherlands proposed the formation of a *European Force of Gendarmerie* of 3,000 men and women deployable abroad in 30 days⁹. This force should be distinctive from other military initiatives due to its hybrid civil-military feature. It responds to a greater need of international community to integrate a civil dimension (especially in the field of police and law enforcement) in the military missions of crisis management. The gendarmerie force that should have been able to intervene in 2006, will be provided for ESDP, OSCE, NATO and UN.

After they initiated the process to create ESDP in 1999, the member states realized that crisis management could be more than military. Law enforcement, especially the creation of an honest police and an efficient legal system begins to be perceived as an essential component of any peace enforcement action. The civil management



missions were integrated in ESDP in 2000, during the European Council at Feira. It involved four sectors: police, law enforcement, civil administration and civil protection.

The member states commit themselves to provide ESDP civil missions with a reserve of 5,000 policemen, 200 judges, more than 2,000 experts in several civil fields and a team of estimators, deployable as quickly as possible. The identification and provision of ESDP with the civil capabilities were rather rapid. EU gained quite an experience in the field due to its intervention in many countries (the Balkans, Georgia, Congo, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan). However, there are some blanks in the civil sector, as far as capabilities are concerned (especially within the justice department, the financial and logistics field). Besides the military field, a “Civil Global Headline” was identified to strengthen the civil capabilities in 2008.

ESDP civil missions raise a coordination issue with the policy of development coordination, managed by the European Committee within the EU super-national and community capabilities (the first pillar). The European cooperation policy comprises many programs that intervene in the legal field, in the democracy and post-conflict reconstruction. The development aid is perceived as a precious tool that can influence the social and structural tensions of the Southern countries. It is considered a tool that can prevent the conflict. In the civil world, when it deals with conflicts, EU’s intervention is based on two distinct and separate policies: ESDP and development cooperation (that also comprises the humanitarian aid, a prerogative of the Committee and of the first pillar). There are many coordination and coherence issues between the two fields of action.

Formally, ESDP missions are defined by the three Petersberg tasks adopted in 1992 by the WEU and introduced in the EU Treaty. These are: *humanitarian and citizens’ evacuation missions, peacekeeping missions, combat missions for crisis management and/or peace reinforcement operations.*

This formula allows a large interpretation of the missions EU can execute. Over the years, ESDP missions were better defined. In 2002, a European Council declaration clearly affirmed that the fight against terrorism was included in ESDP objectives. Ever since, the European defence policy is no longer an external projection but acquired an

internal dimension – the protection of the citizens living in Europe.

In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy that clarified ESDP objectives and role¹⁰. This document is an EU external policy doctrine that does not exclude the use of force for extreme cases but is ambiguous as far as the preventive action notion is concerned.

The Petersberg tasks were better defined in the constitutional treaty. Thus, the Constitution announces that ESDP must provide the “peacekeeping, conflict prevention and international security enforcement”¹¹. Consequently, the Constitution adds four tasks to the Petersberg tasks already announced in the current treaty that must not be interpreted as new competences but as a specification of Petersberg tasks. Thus, ESDP includes the following seven fields: humanitarian and evacuation missions; peacekeeping missions; combat forces missions for crisis management; *disarmament missions (C); consultancy and military assistance missions (C); conflict prevention missions (C); post-conflict stabilization missions (C).*

Finally, the Constitutional Treaty specifies that all the missions can contribute to the fight against terrorism.

However, ESDP’s objectives cannot be defined based only on the European treaties articles that refer to them directly. They can be derived from the general principles the EU adopted as an organization, on one hand, and from CFSP global purposes, on the other hand. Thus, the articles of the EU Treaty referring to CFSP (ESDP included) specify that EU external action, besides defending the European interests and values, *support human rights, international cooperation, worldwide development and democracy.* Consequently, ESDP missions must always be performed from this perspective. This aspect must not be considered a mere formality since in most cases, as specified in national constitutions, states do not explicitly link their foreign policy to the worldwide promotion of such values.

Finally, the issue of ESDP missions mandate versus UN must be addressed. Hence, the dilemma: EU military missions must always be validated by the UN Security Council but there can be exceptions. Of course, many member states desire a strong connection between any ESDP



action and UN. For instance, the crisis in Kosovo answered to this question: EU military actions can be performed without any subordination to the Security Council? In its vague formula, the European Security Strategy leaves an open door to some possible prevention missions, without specifying their relation to UN.

3. ESDP Impact on EU Member States' Defence and Security Policies

ESDP has a **significant** and **multidimensional** impact on EU member states' defence and security policies. The significant feature indicates ESDP has a tremendous influence on the content of EU member states' national defence and security policies.

This intensity is very strong since it concerns both the national security strategy, and the capabilities offer of each member state to EU. As for the national security strategy, this must be harmonized with the EU one. At the same time, each state's capabilities offer, though voluntary, must be firm, available and at the Union competent forums' standards.

The *multidimensional* impact aspect refers to:

- *the human dimension of each member state's force offer. It concerns both military and civil personnel quality, and their number. A central variable of this dimension consists in the harmonization of professional, military and civil formation, development and improvement process of the forces offered. The common execution of different EU member states' military structures of crisis and conflict management missions imposes the necessity of a good cooperation and compatibility between them;*

- *the material dimension – the rhythmic, operational and opportune provision of all assets that guarantee a good life and activity of the force offered. It is also very important that member states agree in the field of combat assets production for all member states armed forces. In this context, each state may bring in its contributions its experience in the field;*

- *the psycho-social dimension – social cohesion, national consensus, adequate working climate within the force offered. Similar psycho-social features must be developed in EU civil environment as well, after all, member states citizens are also citizens of this intergovernmental organization;*

- *the volitional component, with its double meaning, the political will of the member state to actively and responsibly participate to the formation of military and civil forces for EU crisis and conflict prevention and management, and the combatants' will to fight for a cause that is not necessarily a national one;*

- *informational dimension – perceived both as an own system of information gathering, processing and distribution, and as its possibility to harmonize with the requirements imposed by the similar EU system. On the other hand, this dimension also has in view the implementation of information and communication technologies in order to conduct people and activities for EU crisis and conflict prevention and management;*

- *the temporal dimension – national policies of security and defence must be elaborated and applied in coordination with the EU deadlines, on short, medium and long term.*

Practically, a state's EU membership forces it to harmonize its security and defence legislation, strategies, doctrines and concepts to those ones of EU.

This is the only way to provide efficient cooperation between each participant state's forces offered for an EU-led crisis and conflict prevention or management mission. To this end, EU created the ESDP civil and military capabilities necessary to fulfil the objectives proposed.

Member states' participation to EU crisis and conflict prevention and management is voluntary, responsible and conscious.

However, the states' active involvement in these EU-led missions is done according to the national interests of each member state, on one hand, and of EU, as an entity, on the other hand.

In other words, ESDP's impact on the national policies of security and defence does not interfere, in any way, with the national interests, but, on the contrary, it contributes to their fulfilment.

4. Conclusions

ESDP represents the military instrument used by EU to amplify the political-military role at regional and international level.

This is a responsible, voluntary and conscious construction of all EU member states achieved based on the European Security Strategy. ESDP's objectives and missions are performed by the EU



member states' common effort at the Union's decision and under its competent structures' command.

ESDP has the following essential features:

- it does not imply the creation of a European army;
- it may mean a member states' specialization on military capabilities;
- it excludes any form of territorial defence; it is provided with civil and military capabilities by the member states in order to execute missions of crisis and conflict management;
- it cooperates with NATO in the execution of missions of crisis and conflict management, especially in the field of infrastructure and logistics.

ESDP includes the following seven fields of activity: humanitarian and evacuation missions; peacekeeping missions; combat forces missions for crisis management; disarmament missions; counselling and military assistance missions; conflict prevention missions; post-conflict stabilization operations.

ESDP has a significant and multidimensional impact on EU member states' policies of security and defence.

NOTES:

¹ *Politique étrangère et de Sécurité commune (PESC). Politique européenne de Sécurité et de Défense (PESD). Notions de base* (Source : Conseil de l'Union européenne, <http://ue.eu.int/pesc>), p.4.

² See *Présentation de l'Union européenne*, in http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL).

³ Fabien TERPAN, *Politique étrangère, sécurité, défense: la lente progression de l'Europe politique*, in <http://www.euractiv.com/fr/securite/politique-europeenne-securite-defense-pesd/article-120304>, p.1.

⁴ Yves BOYER, *La politique de sécurité et de défense de l'Union européenne; bilan d'étape*, in http://www.afri-ct.org/article.php3?id_article=468, p. 7.

⁵ See Federico SANTOPINTO (researcher within GRI), *La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense: enjeux et réalités*, in <http://www.grip.org/bdg/g4592.html>, p.2.

⁶ Petre DUȚU, Mihai-Ștefan DINU, **Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare – cadrul de manifestare și dezvoltare a intereselor de securitate națională**, București, Editura UNAp „Carol I”, 2007, pp.21-25.

⁷ Federico SANTOPINTO, *op.cit*, p.3.

⁸ Ibidem, p.4.

⁹ Ibidem, p.4.

¹⁰ Federico SANTOPINTO, *op.cit*, p.2.

¹¹ See *Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe*, in <http://europa.eu.int/constitution/download/print-fr.pdf>, art.I-16, I-17 and I-18.

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THE ORIGINALITY OF THE EU POLITICAL SYSTEM COMPARING TO AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF INTEGRATION

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU

European Union is an original type of political system, despite certain similarities with a specific subject of international law: the international organization of integration. This article is in fact, a legal approach on the true nature of EU, by using a comparison between this entity and the organizations of integration existing at this time in different regions of the world. Starting with a definition of the international organization of integration in the international law, and defining also, the term of “supranational”, the article is trying to compare EU with this new type of legal subjects, from many perspectives: the constitutive act; the relations established between the member states and the organization as such; the existence of the real transfer of sovereign rights from the member states to the organization; the legislative powers of the political institutions belonging to the organization and those belonging to the EU; the supranational character of the organizational law; the legal regime of dissolution; the existence of a supranational citizenship; the institutional autonomy of the organization in relation with the member states, etc.

Also called “supranational organizations”¹, the international organizations of integration represent the *second big legal category of the intergovernmental international organizations*², characteristic to the globalization era. One of these organizations has as goal the **creation of a new political entity**³, or even of a States’ federation from a certain region⁴, while others limit to an economic integration⁵ (economic and monetary union). The phenomenon of (economic and/or political) integration⁶ does not reach the same levels and neither does it put on the same form of political organization, the same institutional

structure, registering different forms⁷ and adopting various institutional schemes according to each international organization of integration.

Some of these organizations have as basis a customs union⁸, others have a free trade area⁹ (a less evolved form of economic integration), and others have already formed an economic and monetary union¹⁰ (the process of economic integration is advanced to a specific stage) preparing to initiate a political integration.

As far as the **political integration** is concerned, **some international organizations of integration are already included in a supranational ensemble** (The European Communities forming the first support of the European Union in the “Maastricht-Nice stage”), while **other organizations of this type remain “international organizations of integration”**¹¹ (the political union being a goal they did not reach)¹² and **others evolve and transform in an original political system** (the new “European Union” from the “European Constitution stage”, which will be formed after the disappearance of the European Communities and of the “old EU”).

The economic integration process (giving birth to the so-called “regional economic international organizations”¹³, specialized on an economic-based integration among the Member States, these transferring the competences in the economic field to the new entity created as such) as well as the **political integration process** (by which “the international organizations of integration” are created, as well as the complex and original political systems as the European Union) differ from region to region, according to the objectives the Member States propose to reach.

Some authors interpret this integration process to be a **form of manifestation of the States’**



sovereignty¹⁴ (the integration is not possible without the free and sovereign agreement of the Member States), while another part of the doctrine sees in this process a direct threat to the sovereignty, by affecting its legal characteristics (indivisibility, inalienability, exclusivity, plenitude)¹⁵.

In our opinion, there is a direct connection between the sovereignty divisibility theory and the proliferation of these forms of international organizations. The legal fundamental difference between the “**classic**” (or “cooperation”) international organizations and those ones of “**integration**” consists in more elements: the purpose of an integration organization is that of establishing a federation form (while the cooperation organization have as purpose the promotion of the cooperation among the Member States); the existence of a competence transfer¹⁶ from the Member States (in case of the organizations of integration) in certain fields (since the cooperation modality, in case of the other type of organizations, there is a intergovernmental, classical one, not allowing the State competence transfer); the compulsory character of the decisions taken by the bodies within the international organization of **integration**, decisions that are imperative in a prior and direct way¹⁷ in the internal legal order of the Member States (since the cooperation organization cannot impose its decision if the States are not willing to comply with those decisions); vote modality, which aims at imposing the majority vote¹⁸ (which means a State cannot block the decisional process in the organization by its own will), while in case of the cooperation organizations, they use the unanimous vote (which expresses the intergovernmental cooperation method).

We assert that the notion of “supranational” involves the transfer of the decisional authority towards a “central body”, in certain fields established by the Member States, by mutual agreement. What is characteristic to such an organization is that the States have but the alternative of either accepting the decisions of the supranational institutions, or withdrawing from this organization¹⁹.

Taking into account this legal classification of the international organizations, most of the authors classify the European Communities as “international organizations of integration”²⁰. As regards the European Union (which during

the “Maastricht-Nice stage” does not have an express legal personality, so it cannot have the capacity of a subject of international law, like an intergovernmental international organizations), this political entity is an original political system, which includes the European Communities (in the “Maastricht-Nice stage”), without becoming itself such an international organization²¹.

The second element that points out we are in the presence of an integrationist political system is the fact that, in the community and modifying treaties, also **due to the unlimited duration for which they were concluded** (except CECO), **there is no express mention regarding the right of voluntarily withdrawal of the Member State from the Communities (and neither from the Union**, according to the treaties from Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice). Only in the stage of the European Constitution (art. I-60), this withdrawal right is expressly acknowledged in favour of the Member States (to demonstrate these did not lose the sovereignty by adhering to the Union). We must mention that, in the European constitutional stage, there is no more the European Community (so, an international organization of integration disappears), the EU remaining thus an original political system, which does not transform itself in such an international organization²².

A judicial comparison between the European Union and the international organization of integration shows more aspects:

a) during the “Maastricht-Nice” stage, the European Union does not represent but “a new stage in forming a continuously tighter union²³ between the people of Europe” (a vague formulation which defines neither the legal nature of the Union nor its legal characteristics, comparing to an international organization of integration).

In the European Constitution, the Union is defined by the way of its main purposes mentioned in the article I-1. Although in the Constitution there is a clear mention regarding “**assigning**” abilities to the EU and not the “transfer”, in fact, **the Union resembles the international organization of integration as it is based, in practice, on a transfer of competences from the Member States**²⁴. For that matter, the expression “transfer of competences” cannot be found either in the community treaties (as regards the Communities), nor in the treaties regarding the Union (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice). In these cases, **the legal nature**



of “international organizations of integration” (for the Communities) or the **legal elements specific** to this type of organization (for the Union) are implicitly obvious, taking into account the analysis of the EC, respectively EU, competences, regarding the Member States, of the institutional structure, of its own objects and of the integrationist methods.

b) **on the vote modality in the decisional process of the organization**, both the Communities and the Union (in the “Maastricht-Nice” stage, but also in the stage of the European Constitution) assume the decisional process for which they use the majority vote²⁵ (as the process of European integration evolves, one finds both an extension of the fields in which the decision are adopted by the EU institution with qualified majority and a limitation of the execution scope of the unanimity rule). This allows us to see a **similarity** (as legal nature) **between the Union and the category of the international organization of integration**²⁶, without allowing us to put the Union in the legal category (because there are elements specific to a State, to a confederation, to a federation, which can be also met in the EU and which contribute to the creation of a joint legal nature of this entity). In a similar way, the European Union from the stage of the European Constitution is a political system whose political institutions adopt the decisions in some fields by majority of votes (simple or qualified), without eliminating the unanimity (from this perspective, a wavering of the **Union between the intergovernmental organization of cooperation and one of integration**, without the Union being assimilated by any of the models.)

c) **on the relation with the Member State, the supranational (or integration) organization has a superior, even dominant**²⁷ **position** (unlike the cooperation organizations in which the Member States take the decisions within the organization, its activity being limited to the fulfilment of the objectives set up by the States by means of the constitutive act²⁸; at the most, we can speak about a certain “autonomy”²⁹ of the cooperation organization, as regards the Member States that keep their capacity of sovereign States). **The Supremacy of the integration organization towards the Member States appears also in the case of Communities (and of the Union**, in the European Constitution stage, in which the “right of Union” is mentioned in the art. I-6) concerning the **legal nature of the Community Law** (direct,

immediate and prior enforcement, compared to the national law of the Member States). The fact that both the Communities, and the Union have a superior³⁰ position **on the legal level** comparing to the Member States, is based both on the **superiority of the European law** comparing to the Member State Law, and on the existence of a **competences transfer**³¹ from the Member States to these political entities.

d) the closeness between the Communities and the Union, on one side, and the international organization of integration can be achieved also as it follows: **in both cases, certain legislative responsibilities**³² **are exercised by political institutions representing the “Member States’ people”, independent**³³ **institutions which cannot be subject to the government of the Member States or to the institutions representing the interests of these States**. Such an institution with legislative role (although a partial one, as it divides this role with an institution representing the interests of the Member States, the EU Council), both within the EU from “Maastricht-Nice period”, and during the European Constitutional stage, is the European Parliament (with an original legal nature, which does not allow it either the assimilation with a federal or national parliament or the “deliberative gathering” within an international organization).

e) **the supranational organizations** are capable of deciding the extension of its own competences without the need of all Member States’ consent, so **by majority decision**³⁴; taking into account this facts, we must notice that in the EU political system, **the Communities and the European Union as such dispose of competences** (its own competences or divided with the Member States) **according to the principle of their consignment**³⁵ **by express dispositions from the Community and modifying treaties** (respectively, by the European Constitution). This must not be interpreted *stricto sensu*, as the integration process must continue (which determined the Community jurisprudence to admit the “implicit competences theory” of the Community and of the Union, **as these competences are considered necessary for the fulfilment of the treaties objectives**)³⁶. From the moment of their creation and until now, both the Communities and the Union **progressively expanded**³⁷ **their competences** (a diversity of competences was established, from the normative ones, to the executive, control or jurisdictional ones)³⁸.



The CJCE jurisprudence (“Kramer” decision/ July 14th 1976) established a global, extensive interpretation of the conventional dispositions regarding the competences acknowledged to the Community and to the Union (when there are provided provable enumerations of fields given for the competences of the Communities or of the Unions, other fields being strictly forbidden), in the CJCE “Cassagrande” decision from July, 3rd, 1974 or in the “Garnier” decision from February, 13th, 1959³⁹.

f) **the European Union approaches (regarding the method used for the fulfilment of its objectives) the integration organization method: the community method**⁴⁰ (art. I-1/ European Constitution) gives implicitly the Union a dimension specific to an integration organization (as the European Community was, which disappears from the structure of the “new EU”). The Community method deals with the monopole of the initiative right of the Commission, the jurisdictional control exercised by the Court of Justice and the ordinary legislative proceedings, based on the co-decision of the European Parliament and of the EU Council, as well as on the qualified majority vote within the EU Council. According to the European Constitution, this method is put into practice in most of the fields, although, by Community disappearance, the term “Community” has no more sense, from the point of view of the European Constitution.

Nevertheless, within the Union, **the intergovernmental method is also used** (art. I-1/ Constitution provides the Union’s coordination of the Member States’ policies, which have as a purpose the meeting of the joint objectives). Thus, the Union remains an original political system and, from this point of view, by combining a method specific to a cooperation organization with a method characteristic to an integration organization.

g) **taking into account the European citizenship** issue, we must mention that the European Union clearly stands out from an international organization (even from the Communities which are integration organizations), because no international organization has its own “citizens”⁴¹. By the Maastricht Treaty/1993, a Union (not of Communities) citizenship is created, which is also mentioned in the article I-10/ European Constitution). The “Gatherings” from the international organizations of cooperation⁴² and integration do not have

the power of representing the citizens of the Member States, as the European Parliament does. Also, as regards the normative competence, the “Gatherings” do not have normative prerogatives that can be compared to those ones of the European Parliament, which is a supranational lawmaker, these generally having a simple advisory role.

h) from the institutions’ point of view, we mention that the distinct and the autonomous legal status⁴³ of all the EU institutions (both in the “Maastricht-Nice stage” as well as during the European Constitutions period) marks the difference between the Union and the international organizations (where its bodies do not have a genuine decisional power as the EU institutions do, since they are but forums within which there are the Member States which decide). Thus, their **institution regulations, as well as the EU institutions budget** are established by **their** decision, not by the Member States’ decision⁴⁴, which mirrors a functional autonomy. By their activity on the European level, the EU institutions cannot be reduced to “general backgrounds” by means of which the States take decisions (European Parliament, Court of Justice, the Audit Office, European Commission). Even if two of the EU institutions (The European Council and the EU Council) have an intergovernmental character, this cannot prejudice or affect in any way their European character (of political institution belonging to the institutional background of the Union, as original legal-political system and not as an international organization), and neither can they affect the specific nature of the roles they have (that are distributed according to a federal logics, **exceeding the “tripartite” scheme of roles distribution in an international organization of cooperation**).

i) we must mention that in **no international organization can we speak about a “distribution of powers”**⁴⁵ (this can be admitted only for a State). The international organization does not exercise the “political power”⁴⁶ as a State does; its bodies are meant to carry out the objectives established by the Member States in the constitutive act, and they do not have the power of representing the peoples of these States. In contrast to this situation, the Communities, as well as the European Union are structures, in which a “original power distribution” has been carried out (State⁴⁷ and European powers), which goes beyond the State model of power distribution.



This thing is possible because both the Communities and the Union are political entities and, in our opinion, they are based on the competence transfer⁴⁸ from the Member States, which endows them, although partially, with State elements (including the organization and the operation of the European institutions). Because of their integrationist character, the Communities and the Union take into account at least a partial and area unification of the territories and of the population of the States they are made of, having also special roles (legislative, executive, jurisdictional) that it directly exercises on the private persons of the Member States, instead of the State bodies and in the Member States territories⁴⁹.

j) **the penalizing or the dissolving or an international organization of integration cannot be made without the consent of the supranational bodies**⁵⁰. In the case of Communities as well as of the European Union (both in Maastricht-Nice period and in the European Union stage), neither the community nor the modifying treaties, nor the Constitution do not expressly provide the cases of dissolving of the Communities or the Union⁵¹. One can notice in the drawing up of the Maastricht Treaty (article 1) the character of “process” of the Union which represents “a stage”⁵² (the EU Treaty being concluded on undetermined period of time) and not an international organization. The disappearance of the “old EU” and of the European Community is implicitly provided in the European Constitution (by abrogation of treaties on the European Union and of the European Community Treaty).

The revision⁵³ of the European Constitution (by article IV-444 - the simplified proceedings of revision; by article IV-445 - the simplified proceedings regarding the policies and the internal actions of the Union) is carried out, in these two cases, **exclusively by the means of the EU’s institutions** (the supranational side of the EU), but by the ordinary proceedings of revision (art. IV-443), **the Conference of the Member States Governments Representatives can adopt**, by mutual agreement, the amendments to Constitution (the intergovernmental side of the EU, which approaches it by an international organization of cooperation).

On the other side, the proceedings of the article IV-443 as well as the simplified proceedings of revision (article IV-444; article IV-445) deal with

the modification of the Constitution and not an extension of competences of the Member States or of the EU institutions, meaning to resort to these proceedings to eliminate the European Union (which would contravene to the article IV-446, according to which the treaty setting up a European Constitution is concluded on undetermined period of time). The same is also valid for the revision proceedings that can be put into practice as regards the treaties of the Community and the Union **during the “Maastricht-Nice” period** (as there are no **express** dispositions regarding the dissolving of these entities having integrationist elements; in our opinion, the revision object can be the amendments to the treaties, which should not affect or refer to the legal or political existence itself of the Union or the Communities, these being only “stages” of an European integration process; secondly, we think that nothing hinders the **States** to conclude distinct international treaties by which they abrogate the community and modify treaties (implicitly determining the EU and communities dissolution).

k) **the subsidiary principle**⁵⁴ (considered to have a **federal** legal nature), encountered both in the case of Union from the “Maastricht-Nice stage” as well as in the European Constitution, allows the Union to intervene, in certain conditions, in the fields of competence of the Member States, for them. Thus, the subsidiary makes the distinction between a complex political system, as the one of the European Union and an international organization of integration, in which the Member States remain sovereign and do not have competences in all fields⁵⁵, without allowing an interference of the organization as such, at the national level in their fields. Secondly, although the subsidiary functions also for the federations as well as for the integration organizations (as the Communities), the European Union is different from the integration organization, even if it admits the subsidiary, because it is a political system which combines federal elements and elements specific to the integration organizations, without being reduced to these.

l) **unlike some “constitutive acts” of the integration organizations** (which are international treaties)⁵⁶, the treaty establishing an European constitution has a joint legal nature (constitutional content and international treaty form). In the same way there can be considered



also **the constitutive treaties of the Communities and of the European Union (“treaties having the value of constitutional books”)** from the “Maastricht-Nice period”, as, in our opinion, they are based on the “transfer of competences”⁵⁷ of the Member States in various fields (economic, political). Unlike the “constitutive acts” of the international organizations of integration (most of them specialized on economic integration), which cannot be compared to a national Constitution, **the Community and modifying treaties add, by this distinct legal nature that CJCE acknowledge in its jurisprudence**, State-type elements to the Union structure (as form of political integration), thus the EU is different from the integration organization.⁵⁸

Taking into account the above-mentioned issues, we may assert the Union remains an original political system and not an international organization of integration.

NOTES:

¹ Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, **Organizații internaționale interguvernamentale**, Ed. All Beck, București, 2000, p. 16.

² Thomas BUERGENTHAL, Harold G. MAIER, **Public International Law in a Nutshell**, St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co, 1990, USA, pp. 47-48 (comparing to the cooperation international organizations of universal vocation such as the United Nations, these authors mention the legal category of the “regional organizations” created by international agreements). Although one admits **a certain similarity with the classic IO** (from the institutional and legal background), the regional organizations are defined by the fact that “their mandate is to regulate the regional problems in general, or the specific political, military and economic matters. Not all the regional organizations are also supranational (for instance, NATO, the Council of Europe, The Organization of American States, which are cooperation organizations). According to other authors (Pierre PACTET, *Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel*, Armand COLIN, DALLOZ, en collaboration avec Ferdinand MÉLINSOUCRAMANIEN, 2002, pp. 60-61), it is about organizations in which the “States integrate” (unlike the classic IO, where the States “participate”, as sovereign entities”).

³ For instance, by the European Constitutional Treaty signed in 2004, one proposes the creation of a

“new European Union”, as original legal and political entity, with an integrationist character, set up after the disappearance of the European Community and of the European Union established by the Treaty from Maastricht.

⁴ According to some authors (François PRIOLAUD, David SIRITZKY, **La Constitution européenne. Texte et commentaires**, La Documentation Française, Paris, 2005, pp. 34-35), the EU is called “**a federation of States and citizens**”, because “it has all the political and legal **advantages of a federal state**, yet **conserving the full sovereignty of the States-nation**” (see Charles LEBEN, *Fédération d’Etats-nations ou Etat fédéral?*”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, nr. 7/2000).

⁵ For instance, the Arab Maghreb Union, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.

⁶ The “**integration**” notion comes from the French term “**intégration**”, from the Latin term “**integro**”, - are” (to re-establish, to complete) and it denotes, in fact, a complex process centred on the enhancement of states’ interdependency, on building-up some **supranational organizations**, on the elimination of **some discriminatory barriers in respect of the third countries** (see Ovidiu TRĂSNEA (coord.), *Mică Enciclopedie de Politologie*, Ed. Științifică și Pedagogică, București, 1977, p. 244. According to other authors, an “**integrated community**” has some structural characteristics: a tendency to direct the decisional process **towards the supranational type**, that is to renounce the unanimous vote and to adopt the majority vote, a taking over of the responsibilities and mandates regarding the representation of citizens and of States **by the central institutions** – a phenomenon called “**expansion of the organizational task**”; the elaboration of **intra-states policies** instead of the interstates ones (see Graham EVANS, Jeffrey NEWNHAM, **Dicționar de relații internaționale**, translated by Anca Irina IONESCU, Ed. Universal Dalsi, 2001, p. 264). According to other authors, the “**European integration**” concept is strictly connected to the central role given to some **political institution of supranational type**, as “integration agents” [Haas, 1958], signifying a “transfer of authority-lawfulness” at the European level. The integration is characterized by the “spill-over” effect (representing the convergence between the expectations and the interests of the national elites, as an answer to the activities of the supranational institutions) - see Laura CRAM, *Integration theory and the study of the European policy process. Towards a synthesis of approaches*, in Jeremy RICHARDSON (ed.), **European Union. Power and policy-making**, Routledge, London and New York, 2001, pp. 56-58.

⁷ According to an opinion, one believes that “a breach was made between the new regionalism and the European model regionalism, a breach that also implies



an institutional dimension". Since 1990, together with the proliferation of the free trade areas, "the dense institutionalizing" which characterizes these schemes has registered a return in favour of some "flexible mechanism with intergovernmental character", and in these circumstances the "customs unions tacitly disconnect from the supranational objectives and they do not propose any more to advance towards new integration stages" – NAFTA being an example. See German de la REZA, *The New Regionalism in Latin America: Is There a Case for an Emergent Paradigm of Integration?* in *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, vol. 5, no. 2, 2005.

⁸ According to the "**Balassa stages**" of the economic integration, the customs union is a more emphasized form of integration than a free trade area, which is characterized by the elimination of discrimination as regards the Member States in the goods markets, rates equalization (without quotas or with **common** quotas) in the trade with third parties. See Jacques PELKMANS, *Integrarea Europeană. Metode și analiză economică*, translated by Filip GĂDIUȚĂ, Ed. Institutul European, 2003, p. 8.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 8 (**free trade area** is characterized only by cancelling the tariffs and the quotas for the imports from the Member States, but these keep their **national** tariffs and quotas towards the **third countries**).

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 8 (**the economic union** is a more evolved economic integration step comparing to the **common market** and less evolved comparing to the "**total economic integration**"). The economic union is a **common market**, characterized by the free movement of the production factors, but also by harmonization of the national economic politics).

¹¹ Organizations that have an integrationist purpose of economic type. They have the necessary competences given by the States, but without believing that there is a "transfer of sovereign right" towards the institutions of the organization, as in the case of the European Communities.

¹² The African Union is **already** a union of States, of an **integrationist** political nature (by the express provisions of its constitutive act).

¹³ Not all the regional international organizations have as purpose an **economic integration** (for instance, NATO, the Council of Europe, The Organization of American States established by the Treaty from Rio de Janeiro from 1947 and the Agreement from Bogota of 1948, modified by the Protocol from Buenos Aires from 1967). See Alexandru BOLINTINEANU, Adrian NĂSTASE, *Drept internațional contemporan*, Institutul Român de Studii Internaționale, Regia Autonomă Monitorul Oficial, București, 1995, pp. 60-63.

¹⁴ "The Member States agreed that, initially the European Communities and then the European

Union, should absorb a significant part of the State power functions". Therefore, their existence as State is not meant to be endangered, see Iordan Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU, *Uniunea Europeană. Aprofundare și extindere. Cartea I. De la Comunitățile Europene la Uniunea Europeană*, Ed. Trei, București, 2001, pp. 84-85.

¹⁵ Nicolae ECOBESCU, *Suveranitatea și independența națională – principiu cardinal al relațiilor internaționale contemporane*, în Nicolae ECOBESCU (coord.), *Suveranitatea și progresul*, Ed. Politică, București, 1977, p. 19.

¹⁶ The syntagms "competence limitation" or "power transfer from States to Community" appear in the decisions of CJCE *Costa c/ENEL* from 1964 and in *Van Gend & Loos/1963* or in the case of *Commission c. French Republic /December 14th 1971*. Also, the existence of the "**sovereign rights transfer from the Member States to the Community**" is confirmed also by the decision of the German Constitutional Tribunal from October 18th 1967, which described the legal nature of the Commission **regulations** and of the Council from TCE as being "documents of some **supranational public authorities of specific nature**, created by the Treaty and in a clear manner, **different from the public authority of the Member States**". The tribunal admitted that the "CEE institutions **exercise sovereign rights that the Member States have given up in favor of the Community they created**". See Pierre PESCATORE, *Law of the integration*, A.W. Sijthoff-Leiden, trad. de Cristopher DAWYER, 1974, pp. 34-35.

¹⁷ Pierre PACTET, *op. cit.*, p. 61, Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op.cit.*, p. 17. According to other authors, the supranational order is the "order of the **sovereignities that are according to the law**, which aims at a decision that signifies an **autonomous will**". Also, we should not make confusions between the international organizations of integration (or the "supranational communities") and the "**suprastates**" because only the State is considered mainly a "**power**" and secondly, a "**function**" (only the **politics** make a body "suprastate"). Thus, "**the States did not abandon their legal sovereignty, they just excluded some competences** over which they keep an active surveillance right". See Francis ROSENSTIEL, *Le principe de supranationalité. Essai sur les rapports de la politique et du droit*, Ed. Pédone, Paris, 1962, pp. 58, 60.

¹⁸ **The majority vote** in the EU Council is regarded as being a "true symbol of **supranationality**", see Augustin FUEREA, *Instituțiile Uniunii Europene*, Universul Juridic, București, 2002, p. 58.

¹⁹ Ioan VOICU, *Suveranitatea și organizațiile supranaționale*, în Nicolae ECOBESCU (coord.), *op.cit.*, p. 369.

²⁰ As they have some **basic characteristics of a**



classic IO (Member States; international relations development; the **volunteer** nature of the legal reports they establish; the existence within them of **some multitude of sovereign and independent States**; the consciousness of the existence of **some institutional means and bodies** that should organize and regulate the States' collective activities). The EC are **regional organizations of peculiar nature**, as they **cannot be found in the canons of the international law** from the perspective of the structure, of the functions, of the means, of their objectives (see Iordan Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU, *op.cit.*, pp. 86-87). Other authors consider the **legal nature of the European Commission** to be one **characteristic to the "open regional international organizations, of specialized nature"** (without bringing forward their integrationist nature), see Nicoleta DIACONU, *op.cit.*, p. 5. According to other authors, the European Communities were considered **"suprastatal international organizations"**, by which **"the States sovereignty is replaced or limited"** (see Gheorghe MOCA, *Suveranitatea de stat și dreptul internațional contemporan*, Ed. Științifică, București, 1970, pp. 163-164). On the contrary, other authors think that although they are the organization that have the **higher level of integration, the EC cannot be seen as supranational organizations**, as their operation depends on the **cooperation among the governments of the Member States**, see Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op.cit.*, p. 18. Other authors consider the Communities to be **"organizations of new type"**, as their **constitutive acts have a "constitutional structure"**, to which the unlimited duration is added – for the EEC, EURATOM; internal revision proceedings, the absence of the withdrawal right, distribution of some legislative, administrative, jurisdictional functions, among more bodies forming a political system, see Jean Claude GAUTRON, *Organisations Européennes*, Dalloz, Paris, 1976, p. 52. Other authors consider the **European communities** (when making the distinction between "cooperation" and "integration", as regards the IO) as **"integration organizations"** that have a **"true power"**, as they can ask their participants **to delegate a part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority**, see Pierre GERBET, *Les Organisations internationales*, PUF, 1979, Paris, p. 38. Other authors define the European Community (as **"integration organization"** or **"autonomous interstate organization"**, the definition given by the CJCE) by opposing it to the "classic international organizations" (UN, NATO, ECDE, OMS, OIT) which are "organizations of **simple interstate cooperation**", because, in case of the EC, **the Member States "have given up their sovereignty in certain fields, to the benefit of the EC institutions"**, see Jean Marc FAVRET, *Droit et pratique de l'Union Européenne*, Gualino, Paris, 2001, pp. 26-27.

²¹ On the contrary, some authors believe that the

EU represents a **"kind of international organization** which tends to make a **political and economical integration** of the Member States", see Ion DIACONU, *Tratat de drept internațional public*, vol. I, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2002, p. 462, the Union **ensuring the "integrated, institutionalized exercise of the attributions assigned by the Member States"**. For other authors (Daniel DORMOY, *Droit des organisations internationales*, Dalloz, Paris, 1995, pp. 6-7), , unlike the **cooperation** organizations (interested in the **facilitation of cooperation among the States**, in the **coordination** of their action, that do not have but **exceptionally** the ability of elaborating compulsory norms, the **effective** enforcement of these norms in the internal legal regulations of the States depending only on the **States** choice), the **integration** organizations assume other characteristics. Thus, they are based on **"ability transfer" for the benefit of the organization**; the new legal order of the organization **superposes** on the legal orders of the Member States, a "process of progressive fusion of the Member States" takes place, they can elaborate norms **directly enforceable** in the territory of the Member States having a **direct and immediate effect**). Such organizations are considered the **European Communities**. According to other authors, the **European dynamics** entails a **"reduction of the sovereignty**, for the benefit of the **supranational courts of the EU**, for instance which could "have the power of creating rules **superior** to the national ones, **irrespective of their level"**, see Frédéric ROUVILLOIS, *Droit constitutionnel. La V République*, Champs Université, Flammarion, 2004, Paris, p.109. As for the denying that **the EU would be an international organization**, see Philippe MANIN, *Droit constitutionnel de l'Union Européenne*, Pédone, Paris, 2004, p. 68.

²² Because the EU has a **joint legal nature and a double legal-political ground** (States and citizens), it would rather be a **"federation of sovereign States"** (which must not be taken for a "federal State"), see François PRIOLLAUD, David SIRITZKY, *op. cit.*, pp.34-35.

²³ The Constitutional Law in France of June 25th, 1992, which added to the French Constitution the title XIV, refers to the EU as being a "group of states" as a result of their free will. In a similar way, the Constitutional Tribunal from Germany, in its decision from October 12th 1993, mentioned that the Union is a **"group of States"**, "the Member States remaining **sovereign**", while **this new community** was admitted the capacity of **"exercising its sovereignty"**, see Philippe MANIN, *op.cit.*, p.69.

²⁴ See Ion ANGHEL, *Subiectele de drept internațional*, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2002, pp.153-157, that considers that "one of the most important consequences of the **community integration**,



in the law field, is **the transfer of sovereignty competences' from the Participating States to the European Union**). Thus, "the process of passing the sovereignty competences from the States to the European Union represents an inevitable and compulsory phenomenon".

²⁵ According to some authors (Pierre PACTET, *op. cit.*, pp.60-61), the European Union is taken as model for the "supranational organizations" category, in which the "executive body" (The EU Council) has the ability of elaborating norms and decisions in certain sectors established by the constitutive act. This "competence" can be exercised both by **solid votes** as well as by **simple and qualified majority of votes** (so, the majority vote criterion is **not exclusive** to consider the EU as being a supranational entity). According to other opinions (Olivier DUHAMEL, Yves MENY, *Dictionnaire constitutionnel*, PUF, Paris, 1992, pp. 687-688), the **unanimity-based systems** are characteristic to the classic IO, protecting the States' sovereignty, giving them the right to veto; on the other hand, the **majority-based systems** assume their own vote alternatives for each deliberative body (from simple majority, to absolute majority or to qualified majority) being found in the IO with economic or financial nature, where the votes of each State are affected by a **coefficient proportional to the part of capital owned** (FMI, IBRD) or calculated in combination **with other factors** (CEE).

²⁶ By placing the EU in the category of the "supranational organizations", some authors believed that the sovereignty of the Member States is necessarily affected, as they are subject to the Community norms and do not have a total control on their national norms, which are in competition with subject to the Community legal norms. See Pierre PACTET, *op.cit.*, p. 61.

²⁷ Some authors believe that a distinction should be made between the "suprastate" (which "signifies the power of coercion of the suprastate sovereign entity" over the "State powers") and the "supranational" (which involves "a coercion operated by the States over the sovereign"). Furthermore, the "supranational communities" are a "difficult organism", an original form of international organizations", but they do not have "public powers", (see Francis ROSENSTIEL, *op.cit.*, pp. 40, 48-49), as "it is difficult to find for the sovereign power another legal origin than a constitution, which at the same time is a source of sovereign power as well as legal effect of the political sovereignty".

²⁸ Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-17.

²⁹ It is about **functional-type autonomy**, because the IOs cannot act but on the basis of the competences **assigned by the States in an express way**, according to the constitutive act. During their operation, the IOs remain **dependent on the will of the Member States** (as the States are the only subjects of international law having a full legal personality). Very rarely, **the IOs**

receive competencies of governmental type from the States; generally, the IO do not have the ability of acting **beyond the will of the Member States** as expressed by the constitutive acts of the IOs (see Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op. cit.*, p.16).

³⁰ From the legal point of view, as regards **the superiority of the Community legal order comparing to the internal law order** of the Member States, also mirrored in the CJCE jurisprudence (Costa c/ENEL from 1964). See Augustin FUEREA, *Drept comunitar european*, Partea generală, Ed. All Beck, București, 2003, p.44.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p.31 (regarding the thesis of the **EC specificity** as against the classic international organizations: the fact that the Community institutions are **independent** compared to the States; **the direct relations with the private persons**, by the **direct effect** of the Community normative act; the **institutionalizing** of the **law** creation and enforcement). According to other authors (Francis ROSENSTIEL, *op. cit.*, p. 53), "the vocation of the international organization is a **conciliatory** one, while the vocation of the supranational organization is a **governmental** one"; secondly, some authors believe the "transfer of competences **does not mean their abandonment**" (see Reuter; Kunz; Oppenheim; Lauterpacht, quoted by Francis ROSENSTIEL, *op. cit.*, p. 56). Thus, the "transfer of competences" is **one of the main criteria of the "supranationalism"** (together with the body independence to the national governments or to the direct reports between the organization and the private persons), but this is only a **technical aspect** of the "State not-noticing" and **not a political consequence**. From this perspective, the European Council of Ministers is regarded as a "**sovereignty college**" of the **Member States**. On the contrary, other authors (Ion ANGHEL, *op. cit.*, pp.154-155) assert that, in fact, it is about the "taking over of the **command force** from the States and its passing to the EU". These authors believe that "by creating and by entering a European Community, a **transfer of sovereign responsibilities** from States to Communities ... involving a **State-type fusion** and a redistribution of competences, thus the consequences upon the sovereignty of the Member States".

³² According to other authors, the community competences "are not **simple sums** of the ex-State competences **resulting from transfer**", as **there is also a "ex nihilo creation of new competences, assigned to the EC"** (see Olivier DUBOS, *Adaptation européenne des législations nationales et système juridique étatique: quelle alchimie?*, in **Uniunea Europeană între reformă și extindere - comparație între abordarea unui stat membru și viziunea unui stat candidat**; Actele Colocviului din 11-12 sept. 2003, București, Colegiul Juridic Franco-Român de Studii Europene, Ed. All Beck, București, 2003, p. 92 (quoting Vlad



CONSTANTINESCO, *Competences et pouvoirs dans les Communauté Européennes*, Paris, LGDJ, 1974).

³³ Augustin FUEREA, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

³⁴ Nicolae ECOBESCU, Critica concepțiilor nihiliste referitoare la suveranitatea și independența națională, in Nicolae ECOBESCU (coord.), *op.cit.*, p. 416.

³⁵ According to some authors of international law, there is a distinction between the IOs (which have **only** limited, specific or “affected” competences) and **States** (that benefit from full competences). Thus, it is considered that the “EC development in a true economic and monetary Union, as that provided in the Maastricht Treaty, will make out of this a kind of “**suprastate**” due to the acquisition of competences that are **unusual, rare for an international organization**” (see Dominique CARREAU, *Droit international*, Pédone, Paris, 1999, p.386).

³⁶ In fact, not only **on the Community plan** (by the innovator effect of the CJCE jurisprudence) as well as **on the international level**, the idea of the “**evolutionary competences**” or “**the implicit powers**”: the advisory opinions of the CPJI in order to value the competences of the Labor International Organization (the advisory notes from July, 23rd, 1926) or regarding the competences of the Danube European Commission (approval no. 14 from December, 8th, 1927). The thesis was also approached by the CIJ in the “Bernadotte affair” from 1949, in the advisory note from July, 11th, 1950 (regarding the “African South-West”), in the advisory note from July, 13th, 1954 regarding the effects of the decisions of the administrative tribunal of the UN), in the advisory note from July, 20th, 1962 regarding certain expenses of the UN, in the advisory note from June, 21st, 1971 regarding Namibia. As far as the Community law is concerned, this conception was **formally legalized by the EC Treaty** (art. 235) and used for the **extension of the European institution competences** in monetary, environment matters and in matters regarding the research, development or the help offered to the disfavoured regions, see Dominique CARREAU, *op. cit.*, pp.387-388.

³⁷ According to the CJCE (case “Rewe Zentrale”, decision from February, 29th, 1984). Thus, CJCE considered that an entity as the Community benefits from “**powers coming wither from a competences limitation or from a transfer of responsibilities of the Member States**”, but that “the competences limitation of the States **does not necessarily determine the enhancement of the Community competences**”, see Ion JINGA, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

³⁸ Viorel MARCU, *Drept instituțional comunitar*, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2001, p. 151. Still, the author believes the **extension of the EC competences** regarding those provided in the **treaties** must respect the **limitations** found in these treaties, and any exceeding must be subject to cancellation). In another

case (Commission c/République française, 14 dec. 1971), CJCE established the **irreversible** nature which is not subject to nullity, of **the competences assigned to the Community** (see Jean Claude GAUTRON, *Droit européen*, Dalloz, Paris, 1999, p. 116). Thus, the **definitive nature of the competences assignment** is implicitly established and this can be interpreted as a consequence on the sovereignty of the States (which cannot recover the competences assigned to the CE anymore).

³⁹ For instance, if the EC has the task of carrying out some **internal** objectives, the competence of these objectives can be extended also in the **external** field, for those measures necessary for a better carrying out of the tasks on internal level. See Viorel MARCU, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁴⁰ François PRIOLLAUD, David SIRITZKY, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁴¹ Philippe MANIN, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁴² For instance, the General Assembly of the United Nations (in which the Member **States** and not their citizens are represented), see Grigore GEAMĂNU, *Drept internațional public*, Ed. Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1981, vol.II, pp.237, 270. Also, the General conference within the OIM (body made up of delegates named by the Member States).

⁴³ Although the European institutions within the EU political system **do not have a legal personality** (only the **European Communities** have such a personality, thus the institution acts **in the name of the EC and for these**), one considers that, according to the **autonomy of will**, these political institutions have the right to name its own officials and to elaborate its own regulations. See Augustin FUEREA, *Instituțiile Uniunii Europene*, pp.38-39.

⁴⁴ In the international organizations of cooperation, **the budget is approved**, as a rule, by **the plenary body**, in which **all the members** are represented (for instance, within the UN, this responsibility is held by the **General Assembly**), because **all the States** take part in bearing the expenses of the organization (see Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op.cit.*, pp. 142-143). However, we must not make confusion between the organization budget as such and the budgets of each body/institution, which, according to the autonomy principle, are adopted by each body/institution, considering to the internal institution regulations.

⁴⁵ In case of the EU, this being connected with **the theory of “Union’s double lawfulness”** (intergovernmental and democratic) as the Union is, in fact, “a federation of the European States and citizens”). See François PRIOLLAUD, David SIRITZKY, *op.cit.*, pp. 32-33.

⁴⁶ The State, defined as “the State organization of the **people’s power**”, as “the **institutionalization** of this power”. On the other hand, the “**political power**”



recalls the idea of “**people’s power**”, which has a **wider significance than the State power**. See Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TĂNĂSESCU, **Drept constituțional și instituții publice**, vol. II, Ed. All Beck, București, 2004, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁷ The notion of “**power**” recalls, in some authors’ view, the notion of “**sovereignty**” (Francis Rosenstiel – *op.cit.*, pag. 31-32), the sovereignty being defined as “the biggest power, which **comes from and depends on nobody**, the symbiosis between the actual supreme power and the lawful **supreme power**”. In these conditions, the “power” would not be conceived **but in relation with the State, not with the international organization**. For others (G. JELLINECK, 1929), a distinction should be made between the **sovereignty** and the **State power** (this does not have a value but for only one era and for a State). Thus, a “**partition of the sovereignty and of the State power, between the State and the supranational community**” can take place, as the legal grounds remain distinct” (see Francis ROSENSTIEL, *op.cit.*, p. 3).

⁴⁸ Some authors (Ioan ANGHEL, *op.cit.*, pp. 155-157) believe that the “**reduction of the sovereignty, as well as the integration signifies an evolving process, that takes place as the time passes by and with a variable intensity**”. “**The sovereignty transfer from the Member States to the European Union**” signifies, from this point of view, “a process with a general action of **taking over the sovereignty responsibilities**, meaning that it tends, according to the level of integration reached, to include **most of the States’ competences, if not to take over all of them**”. The **power transfer to the Community institution is believed to be irreversible, as these cannot be restored to the Member States**” (even if the relative State withdraws from the EU, this does not determine a **diminishing or a withdrawal of the exclusive or parted competences of the EU, already assigned by the Member States**).

⁴⁹ Augustin FUEREA, **Drept comunitar european**, p. 32. The Constitutional Council in France (Pierre PACTET, *op.cit.*, p. 370) examined the provisions of the Treaty from Amsterdam, considered to “authorize the EU institutions to take decisions that **bring forward the exercise of the national sovereignty of the Member States** (asylum, visas, immigration, EU border passage). **Not the “transfer” as such is declared to be against the constitution but the transfer proceedings, when it provides the qualified majority**. According to other opinions, even if the EU resembles as a classic IO (as it is a **voluntarily State association**, in which its institutions are considered to have **little independence**, their main task being **to carry out the objectives elaborated by the Member States**), however they are **not so similar** (as the EU institutions have “the power to make laws and policies obligatory for the States”, in the competence fields of the EU, the Union right of pre-

eminence, compared to the national one) – see John Mc CORMICK, **Understanding the European Union. A Concise Introduction**, Palgrave, G.B., 2002, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

⁵¹ Some authors (Charles ZORGBIBE, **Construcția europeană**, Ed. Trei, București, translated by Speranța DUMITRU, 1998, p. 134) believe that, in fact, the **Communities were not set up according to the international law principles** but according to the **internal law principles**. Furthermore, the **carrying out of the treaties is not let to be dealt with by the States** (as in the international law), but it is given to some “**true powers**”. From the action of these “**powers**” a “**normative limitation of the sovereignty of the Member States**” results.

⁵² Ami BARAV, Christian PHILIP, **Dictionnaire juridique des Communautés Européennes**, PUF, ADAGP, Paris, 1993, p. 1140.

⁵³ According to some opinions, the **amending** is not the same thing with the **revision** of the constitutive act of the IO, each representing a **different proceeding** and appearing in **different circumstances**. See Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

⁵⁴ Ami BARAV, Christian PHILIP, *op.cit.*, p. 1023 (the common law competence belongs to the **national authorities** and the Communities have only the fields in which a community intervention has been provided in an **express manner or for which such an intervention was required**). However, these authors underline the **ambiguous** character of this principle, which **wavers** between the will of the Member States **to limit an extension of the Community competences** and the EC will of legitimate the **enhancement of its competences**.

⁵⁵ The IOs of cooperation are based on legal and political relations with the Member States, which do not imply the “**competence assignment**” to the bodies of the organization, even if for certain fields. The States **keep the right of considering their own commitments and their consequences, in an exclusive and discretionary manner**; the governments of the Member States **cannot be obliged against their will** (see Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, *op.cit.*, p. 17).

⁵⁶ For instance, the Montevideo Agreement/1980, by which ALADI (Latin-American Association of Integration) was created, the African Union (created by the “Constitutive Act” signed by the Member States at Lomé, Togo, 2000).

⁵⁷ Some authors (Charles ZORGBIBE, *op.cit.*, p. 135) believe that the **community treaties** seem a “**Constitution of Communities**”, as “they define the organization and the competences of the **community public powers**”.

⁵⁸ Because EU has a **joint** political-legal nature. According to some authors, the Union has a **federal** vocation, but it **exceeds the concept of State**, being



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a **hybrid** construction (as “some sectors are **very integrated** – money, agriculture – while others are **little integrated** – ESDP, CFSP – and it **does not involve a sovereignty transfer** to the benefit of a certain “Eu-

ropean central power”). It is rather about a “**cooperative federalism**” (M. CROISAT, J.L. QUERMONNE, 1996), different from the existent federal systems (see Jean Marc FAVRET, **op.cit.**, pp. 38-39).

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EUROREGIONS – PATH TO ENSURE THE UNITY AND THE DIVERSITY OF EUROPE

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A Europe of regions may be seen and construed in a myriad of ways. This paper aims to demonstrate that Euroregions, this particular type of cross-border regions, stand for one of the effective means of supporting the European edifice. Regionalism is viewed not in the sense of fragmentation (“fragments of Europe”, as some authors state) but in an opposite manner, that of “gathering” the regions (in the sense of diminishing the various discrepancies) in order to smooth the way towards European integration. The authors lay emphasis on the elements that highlight the importance of Euroregions in the view of the European completion: a) they contribute to the diminishing of tensions and preservation of area stability; b) they play a role in the surpassing the negative historical heritage; c) they play a part in the surpassing of economic difficulties; d) they lead to the training of those countries aspiring to unite their destiny with the future of Europe, the European Union respectively.

Region, regionalizing, continuously changing concepts

“Geography is the only domain within which the region is considered a central concept”, stated the French geographers, while emphasizing the importance of delimiting, characterizing and categorizing the regions as spatial forms of organization, territorial subdivisions or structures of the national states (Paul Claval, Etienne Juillard, 1967). The complexity of the regional entities imposes interdisciplinary approaches; therefore, the geographic or economic vision is insufficient in order to provide a complete understanding basis of the regions. Within this context, *regional sciences* develop, which in the beginning, came into view from the interaction of the regional, urban and

spatial economy and of the economic and urban geography. Afterwards, other disciplines added the analysis perspectives bringing their contribution to the completion of the regional sciences through the urban scientists’, sociologists’, political scientists’, anthropologists’, engineers’ contribution.

Originally, **the region** had exclusively a physical-geographic meaning. The natural region reflected the combination of the geomorphologic, climatic, hydrological, pedologic, flora and fauna elements. This delimitation was not an arbitrary one but involved the existence of an idiosyncratic area in comparison with the bordering one due to the homogeneity of its characteristics. Therefore, the natural region was conceived as a contiguous, unique, *homogeneous region*. However, the 90’s, marked by the European initiative to become an integrated economic space, imposed a new type of region: *the development region*.

“According to the annalists¹, this one is related to the regional development policy and represents the implementation space of the strategies meant to diminish the social and economic disproportions. The purpose of the development region delimitation consists in establishing the institutional frame in order to implement the structural funds (as far as the candidate states are concerned) or the community ones (as far as the member states are concerned).”

The process of regionalising consists in two stages: the first one is represented by the selection of the criteria depending on its objectives while the second one corresponds to the implementation of the criteria for the spatial units, the classification of the individual spatial units according to the defined criteria.

Therefore, the region creation is a form of taxonomy, of structuring the defined information, the primary knowledge, of modelling these ones in



view of achieving certain generalizations based on essential characteristics.

The regional geography studies emphasized the fact that the regions, as economic spaces, are defined through their own “alchemy” resulted from the nature of its components, the ranking by degrees of intensity, the particular manner these ones combine and condition each other.

The uniqueness and functionality of a region imply the existence of certain factors that generate or are opposed to the regional development, of certain endogenous or exogenous forces that adjust the economic growth process, of some mechanisms that transform any regional space into an entity characterized by a structural and functional personality.

The concept of Euroregions

Euroregions represent a distinct type of cross-border regions and this is not due to the great number of regions within our continent, as some researchers state, but to the essence of their foundation: they were and they are established by the collective will of the local and national government from two or more states, serve due to consensus adopted statute and are coordinated by especially powered bodies.

For example, out of Europe, the cross-border regions were established due to an imperative cross-border cooperation, frequently an economic cooperation (or not necessary cooperation, but simply the necessity of commercial trading – caused by complementary reasons), but in most cases with the lack of a legal frame and even without an official agreement (as the tacit agreement was present!) of the states whose participants were involved.

A typical case, relevant for the latter idea, is the one of the Rio Grande region that operates without an official statute for over several decades².

Euroregions represent – as a member of the European Commission Delegation stated (dr. Sabathil) within the 1998 Prague meeting on the matter of regional cooperation formulas in the Central and South-East Europe – *the most traditional and efficient form of cooperation within the cross-border regions and stands for a relatively flexible instrument of the collaboration in these border areas.*”

Euroregions and the European completion

Aside from the fact that they motivate human energies and physical resources that otherwise would not have been developed in accordance to their true value, the *Euroregions are important in the light of the European evolution.*

Therefore, we are trying to draw some elements that sustain this assertion:

a) Firstly, and this is a truly essential point, the Euroregions *have a contribution to the diminishing the tensions and the preservation of the area's stability.* As far as the diminishing of tension is concerned, there should be mentioned the newer Euroregions (established after 1990) within the Oder-Neisse space which, initially regarded with hostility, represent, nowadays, an organization and efficacy model. In relation with the preservation of the area stability, there should be reminded that this one was greatly encouraged by the Polish and Czech mass-media, that suggested the dominator past of Germany, insinuating a new form of “Germanizing”, through economic means, the Eastern territories from Oder; afterwards, the same mass-media emphasized the accomplishments.

b) The Euroregions *contribute to the surpassing of the negative historical heritage.* One should not forget, for example, that in contrast with the cross-border regions within the Western Europe, the new cross-border regions within the Central and Eastern Europe present some characteristics that are quite different, and this due to the fact that, by virtue of the historical vicissitudes, the borders have been moving towards east or towards west, profoundly marking the demographic, social and economic structures. As a result of this border changes, each country from this part of Europe has minorities on the territories of the neighbouring states that are not always congruent with the majority national state.

c) Euroregions *lead to the surpassing of economic difficulties,* even of the economic uncertainties, one may state, having a contribution to the mitigation of the economic regional disparities. As a matter of fact, the initial projects are mostly within the economic field and regard the diminishing or even the easement of the above mentioned discrepancies.

d) *The European integration passes,* obviously, *through the regional cooperation and consequently the cross-border regions contribute to the training*



of those countries aspiring to unite their destiny with the future of Europe, the European Union, respectively. Therefore, we are rhetorically asking what represented, some decades ago, the small parts, areas that were meant to become components of Euroregions from the Superior Rhine and what are they nowadays.

Positive premises. The solving on a local/regional dimension of the mentioned aspects – the diminishing of tensions, the preservation of stability as well as the well functioning of economic and diverse cooperation – stands for *sine qua non* conditions of the success of Euroregions. We should not forget that as far as the first aspect is concerned (tensions) even some cross-border Western European regions, like Strasbourg-Karlsruhe, there were established within areas with mostly historically motivated tensions. And nowadays, they succeeded in passing this nationalist obstacle. In essence, the cross-border collaboration “aimed to help balance the development discrepancies within the border territories, to gradually overcome, the precarious state of these territories and to improve the living standard of the people inhabiting these territories ” (M.S. Sucha, 1998). Or, as stipulated in the Elba Euroregion establishing Declaration (Elbe in German, Labe in Czech), “through this, the inclusion of all domains: cultural, social, economic and infrastructure of the every day life is desired”. And still related to this Euroregion, but with general regard: “few grandiose objectives but numerous individual measures that totalize a very useful entirety”. Therefore, the action should not be focused on the realization of a special and costly project that would imply a great financial effort towards a single direction, but the motivation of as many as possible social and economic elements and mainly of the infrastructure that facilitates the necessary connections for a good cooperation. For example, within the mentioned region (Elba) they started with the improvement of the transportation infrastructure, acting, among other things, for the easing of the congestion of a European road (E 55), through alternative perspectives like the re-implementing the ferry connections between Schöna/Reinhardtsdorf (Germany) and Hrensko (the Czech Republic), the synchronization of the public transport schedules (German and Czech), at the beginning for the small distance one, etc.

A key-element: the common language. Cooperation within Euroregions stands, among other things, for finding a *common language*, expressed in coherent economic, tourism, cultural, artistic, etc. programs. Therefore, one should notice the success of the Bayerische Wald Euroregion (the Bavarian forest)/ Šumava, also a German-Czech region, that focused on the re-evaluation of the region’s advantages: the extremely beautiful landscape that includes the greatest compact forested area within the Central Europe, the traditional activities (glass processing), etc. Therefore, the adopted measures aimed, among other things, the establishment of common roads for bikers’ use and of paths for hiking, the transformation of the old hey sheds in “hey hotels” (for tourists and bikers), the launch of “The Green Roof of Europe” project, with measures regarding the preservation of nature and tourism development through the common offer (the same pavilion) within the specific international fairs as well as the launch of the “Glass without borders” project, in order to renew this old traditional art, the printing of a bilingual guide regarding the history of glass art within the area. We insisted on these aspects as we consider that the common language is an essential element of the international collaboration and cooperation in general and for Euroregions, in particular. Furthermore, where the language is missing, the results are obvious. Unfortunately, the regions from the Eastern part of Romania are in difficulty due to the absence of the common language (not the common speech – that is the Romanian one!). Basically, the main objective of Euroregions consists of *encouraging trust and collaboration* between the inhabitants of the border areas. This fact is not easily attainable, taking into account the fact that, in most cases, the common infrastructure is missing in order to collaborate. Furthermore, from one case to another, the numerous legislative, juridical obstacles, the discrepancies between the financial systems and the psychological and mentality aspects are hard to modify. There should be reminded that in Romania, due to a long time lack of the necessary information and to the almost total absence of the subject within the mass-media, the Euroregions were perceived of some citizens – and some still do! – as “the Hungarians take our Transylvania!”. It is still true that to the creation of this reaction had a contribution, aside from the lack of knowledge, the uninspired manner of establishment and



presentation of some cross-border regions (with reference to Carpathian Euroregion)³. Or in the case of the less younger people, the announcement of the Valev soviet model from the '60s that did not tried, as ascertained, the simulation of economic development and cooperation, but the gradually and secretly inclusion in the Soviet Union according to the geographic proximity principle and economic specialization.

integration within a certain area. But, in contrast with the global one, *the regional policy* is not meant for *time*, but for *space*. And a “space” is formed by the social relations of a population during a long period of time, by the physical characteristic of the environment, by the common history and the experience of common life of the region. Therefore, Europe is divided in a multitude of such “spaces” and the European particularity consists in the intersection of different “places”

Romanian Participation within Euroregions

Name	Year of Foundation	Partner countries
I. “Carpatica” Euroregion	1993	Hungary, Poland, Ukraine; some Romanian administrative units participate (1997, 2000), and some Slovakian administrative units participate (1999)
II. “Dunăre-Criș-Mureș-Tisa” Euroregion	1997	Hungary, Romania, Serbia
III. “Dunărea de Jos” Euroregion	1997	Republic of Moldova, Romania, Ukraine
IV. “Prutul de Sus” Euroregion	1997	Romania, Ukraine
V. “Giurgiu-Ruse” Euroregion	2001	Bulgaria, Romania
VI. “Dunărea de Sud” Euroregion	2001	Bulgaria, Romania
VII. “Dunărea Inferioară” Euroregion	2001	Bulgaria, Romania
VIII. “Dunărea 21” Euroregion	2002	Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia
IX. “Danubius” Euroregion	2002	Bulgaria, Romania
X. “Siret-Prut-Nistru” Euroregion	2002	Republic of Moldova, Romania
XI. “Dunărea de Mijloc - Porțile de Fier” Euroregion	2005	Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia

The regional policy

Nowadays, obviously, the power is no more exclusively based on the military potential and on the control of a certain territory, but on the ability and capacity of integration in the global economy. An annalist stated that after the First World War the planet was divided in two distinct entities: on one side “*military-political-territorial world*”, based on the principle of state sovereignty maximization and of increase of the degree of autarchy (*the Soviet model*) and on the other side, *the trading world*, based on the reciprocal growth of the trading benefices and on the integration in a global, free market (*the Occidental model*). On the second half of the XXth century, the number of the latter category grew rapidly while the former ones were condemned to fail (Richard Rosecrance, cited by Klaus-Achiner Boesler).

The process of economy globalization represents the main impulse for the regional

depending on the analyzed dimension: political, economical and cultural. In accordance with certain theoreticians, the area of “spaces” meeting may be called *region* and the relations between the states that form a region can be analyzed depending on a series of relevant indicators like the multiplicity of the interaction dimension, the consistency of the interaction, the compatibility of the basis values, the importance, fidelity and speed of contacts. Therefore, we can identify easily the manner the Eastern and Central Europe was restructured after 1989 from a regional point of view. Firstly, it must be stressed that the 45 years of communist domination could not cancel the cultural dimension of the historical regions. For example, the definition of Central Europe given by the Czech writer Milan Kundera (**The Tragedy of Central Europe**, 1983): during the communist period, Central Europe was, from a *geographic perspective, in the centre, culturally it continued to*



join the West side, but from a political perspective, it was subordinated to the East. Therefore, a first conclusion: the Soviet bloc was a political region but did not succeed in becoming a cultural one. The second one: the identity of the Soviet bloc was closer to the one of the empire than to the identity of a civilization.

In time, if the two regions become closer and closer from a cultural, communicative, social, economic perspective and even from military and security perspectives, then they will become component parts of a common region – this is the way of joining the European Union. As far as the process of regionalizing, some annalists appreciate that, in transitional terms, the Central-European transition model is the only one considered relevant within the long range of East-European transitions. For the rest of the ex-communist East-Europe, the transition is, still, for some countries a great uncertainty. This is where the point of view that Central Europe is the antechamber of the EU integration comes from. Therefore, the ones who entered Central Europe, entered Europe (Ionel Nicu Sava, 2000, p. 5).

Returning to the regions theme, Euroregions - the means to ensure the unity and the diversity of Europe – must be reminded that some forms of regional cooperation in Europe have their origins in cross-border cooperation. For example, the Central Europe Initiative has its roots in a cross-border cooperation experiment developed within the Cold War, that involved in the beginning (1978) the North of Italy, Austria, Bavaria and the northern administrative departments of Hungary, therefore a sub national cooperation. It is also true that it was not successful and consequently, on the Italian initiative it was passed to a national cooperation (1989) within the so-called *Quadrilateral* that included a member state of AELS, Austria, a member state of NATO and CEE (EU), Italy, a neutral country, Yugoslavia, and a member state of the Warsaw Treaty, Hungary. Then, in the context of the Central and Eastern Europe events, Czechoslovakia (1990) and Poland (1991) became members. “The initiation of the Yugoslavian crisis – outlined an annalist – represented, at the same time, a strike and a new start for this group. By changing its name (December 1991) into the Central European Initiative it substituted the elimination of the former Yugoslavian Federation through the inclusion of some of its former member

states, enlarging twice (June and November 1996) towards new Eastern and South-Eastern Europe” (Adrian Pop, 1998).

In conclusion, on the basis of the arguments provided within this paper we state – and have the faith that we do not make a mistake – that this local multilateral cross-border cooperation represents, to an equal extent, the means of European integration, a natural and necessary step for the European Union integration, therefore for the European unity, but also for preserving the diversity of the old continent. And one should not forget that the future of Europe is the European Union and the one who does not join this regional bloc, obviously, has no future.

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¹ Claudia POPESCU, *Regionarea economico-geografică*, in vol. Silviu NEGUȚ (coord.) **Geografie economică mondială**, Editura Meteor Press, București, 2006, p. 261.

² Basically, everyday, numerous Mexicans, the so-called *maquiladores* (according to certain sources they count for one million) cross the USA border where they work, receiving instead smaller wages than the Americans, the latter ones crossing the Mexican border in order to shop in Mexico, where the prices are lower.

³ The Carpathian Euroregion was established in February 1993 with the participation of Hungary, Poland, Ukraine and without the invitation (and implicitly participation) of Romania and Slovakia, Carpathian countries, obviously.

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THE INTELLIGENCE FLOW DESIGN

Victor BOBOC

The article is trying to present some key aspects related to the way in which the flow of information is seen today within a military intelligence structure. Starting from the Informative Cycle, the article is focusing on a J2 typical functional cycle and is stressing more on the way in which this informational flow could influence the performances of the respective structures.

From the research perspective, the article is also focusing upon some new concepts designed in such a manner to allow the informational flow's optimization and also to improve the structural functionality of the respective J2 structure. Beside the respective algorithms that could be applied in order to improve the informational flow, the article points out how this flow can influence the J2 structure content.

The typical intelligence cycle for a J2 structure, as it is stressed in almost all the publications related to this subject, presumes the existence of four fundamental¹ steps as follows:

- Orientation
- Collection
- Analyze and Intelligence Production
- Dissemination of the Intelligence products.

It is important to stress here that each of these steps are themselves constituted from some specific flows of information that are concurring to the functionality of the cycle mentioned above (Figure 1). These flows are created between the component elements of the J2 structures and also in the same time between J2 and other components of the Headquarter, or other subordinated structures, or others with which specific cooperation plans regarding the Intelligence Production are established.

In fact, as we will see, those informational flows, characteristic to the J2 structures functional cycle, are determinant for the intrinsic characteristics of each step and, even more are determinant for the efficiency of each step itself.




Fig 1

According to many researches of the phenomena on the functional cycle of the intelligence structures, civilian or military, as bigger as will be the information quantity given for knowledge to the ones involved in the functionality of those structures as greater will be the knowledge level for their decisions and conclusions. In the same time, the existence of a too big volume of information could block the respective system, generating wrong conclusions and decisions. As a result, designing the informational flow for each step of the functional cycle of the intelligence structures and of course also for the J2 structure is an essential issue and in the same time very important for its functionality.

Before presenting some issues regarding these informational flows, we must mention some characteristics of the J2 structure which make the difference between itself and a classical civilian intelligence structure, in which due to the organizational aspects there are included the coordinative component and also the executive one.

The J2 structure will be specifically created in order to answer the Commander Critical Questions and to coordinate, due to a specific delegated authority the subordinate intelligence collecting capabilities. This situation emphasizes its coordinative and management component

regarding the collecting capabilities operations. The contact between the coordinative component and the executive one will be characterized as being much more formal. As a result, the communication between the coordinative element and the executive one has to be carefully defined. The exchanged informational flow between the two elements has to be very well defined and also monitored so that critical situation that could block any of these elements cannot be reached. On the other hand, the J2 structure works as a coordinative structure due to a delegated specific competence forwarded to it on Commander's behalf. Meantime, it has to be taken into account that, in its functional behaviour, J2 has to deal also with structures related to itself either only through a cooperative status or even more only through a reciprocal supporting, created due to an already existing mandate, which from the starting point excludes any controlling, checking issues or even more any application of some criteria related to the reciprocal intelligence support efficiency between the respective two structures.

Starting from the first step of the J2 structures specific functional cycle – Orientation or Direction, fig. 1 – it is easily seen that we are dealing with an initial informational flow (fig.2), designated, at least in the beginning, for the Commander Critical Intelligence Requirements² establishment – CCIR in the specific literature.

The fact that in the beginning the Commander communicates to his personnel, his intentions based on the received mission, determine a primary informational flow between his personnel belonging to different sections. Precise establishment of the communications channels, of the points of contact and of each section specific

responsibilities in this primary informational flow, is not only crucial but also decisive for obtaining the first products related to the planning for the information's collection that are the Prioritized Intelligence Requirements – PIR in the specific literature. Without a good product in this moment of the Operational Planning, the J2 functionality will be not only inefficient but also incapable to give a real answer to Commander's intelligence requirements. Without developing furthermore, it is important to point out some characteristics of this primary initial Flow of Information:

- ♦ **Implies the cooperation between all the compartments of the respective Headquarter³:** the issues communicated by the Commander have to be undertaken, interpreted and the results of this primary analysis transformed into intelligence requirements. The primary information which is input in this flow came from all the sections and by this, in a way or another, contains all the Headquarter compartments' contribution. The Commander's mission, his intentions regarding the accomplishment of the Desired End of State for his mission are converted by each section in intelligence requirements for accomplishing the partial objectives for each operational stage and by this the entire received mission. During this period – Orientation - of the informational cycle, the received informational flow is big and diversified and by this it requires a timely, precise establishment of the responsible sections for centralizing and concentrating all the requirements into a unique coherent product, needed for projecting and performing the respective specific military operations regarding the received mission. Sections J2 and J3 will be those sections, due to the need to achieve the intelligence requirements




Fig. 2



regarding the Opposing Forces and also the requirements referring to Own and Friendly Forces' point of view, due to the fact that also their operations have to be protected in the same way. It is very important the fact that this cycle could be reiterated anytime when it is assessed that what was initially established for the respective operation has become inefficient due to its content or due to some major changes occurred in the operational environment where the respective mission is ongoing.

That is why the establishment of those Prioritized Intelligence Requirements for Commander become a key phase for having a better J2 compartment functionality from the starting point of the military operations. Permanently adapting this product to the Area of Responsibility realities has to be a permanent goal for the J2, J3 specialized points of contacts on the issue. So the permanent quantification of these changes has to be permanently considered as a criterion for evaluating the initial projecting quality of this product. In case the changes that have to be done are essential, there could be considered that this product has been projected in a defective way, appreciating that the Commander's mission or his intentions regarding the accomplishment of the Desired End of State were not well understood or even if they were well understood, the subsequent processes did not take into account the real Commander's intelligence requirements.

The risks in such conditions are that the decisions taken during performing the military operations, could be wrong or even more could be improper for the respective operational environment.

The obvious conclusion is that this product, seen in the majority specific publications as an important primary product of the Operational Planning Process, contains beside the classical issues related to its development also the correct problematic regarding a proper determination of the informational flow beneath the respective Headquarter, created in such a way that by itself will be able to answer to Commanders' Intelligence Requirements and also the subsequent input correction will not change dramatically its content.

♦ **Supposes identifying, analyzing and establishes the "key questions" to which an answer has to be given:** in other words, the Commander's mission and his intentions "have to

be translated"⁷⁴ in a real manner into operational requirements and after inside those operational requirements have to be identified the elements which by their content are determinant for the operations themselves accomplishment. Excepting the things that have been mentioned, regarding the existence of a specific informational flow for this moment, in the Operational Planning Process frame there has to be specified that from this point of view the acquirement of this product is depending not only on the existence of an informational flow well-tailored before, but also on the existence of a well-trained personnel, able to handle the specific information of this stage in a proper way.

Transforming the Commander's Intents in Intelligence Requirements and then the Prioritization of those it's not only a problem to "cut in pieces" or to "give details" regarding something specific communicated, but it is a challenge related to:

- o Corroborate, from an intelligence point of view, the requirements of all the Headquarters' components;

- o Identify the convergence level of these criteria and eliminate the useless issues or insufficient defined;

- o Identify the logical normal order of the operational stages and input this order in stating the Commander's Intelligence Priorities;

- o Have a permanent timely awareness of any changes that have to be included into this product, in the proper specific qualitative and timely parameters' frame.

As a result, the Commander's Intelligence Requirements, before being forwarded for his approval, have to be "created" by "translating" in proper way his intentions and his mission. This specific way to deal with the issues of this stage stresses out again the importance of the informational flow that has to be established.

♦ **Supposes a permanent control of the Commander's Intelligence Requirements' accomplishment level, in a manner that any correction could be timely input in the respective product:** beside the interdisciplinary content of the informational flow in this stage – between the Headquarter different sections and the J2, J3 points of contacts – there is also an internal J2 component which plays the feedback role for this informational flow.



Obtaining the indicators related to the accomplishment of the Commander's Intelligence Requirements by direct cooperation, opened for this reason inside J2, it is not only an internal J2 issue but at an equal level a challenge that implies the evaluation of the Operational Planning Process itself.

Not satisfying the Prioritized Intelligence Requirements could be an alarm signal not only from the perspective regarding the inefficiency of the next step of the J2 functional cycle (fig.1) but also in the same level, there could be an alarm signal regarding the way the Operational Planning Process in itself took part or will take part, when there were identified and put into an order the Commander's Intelligence Requirements.

The first stage of the J2 functional cycle has supposed already the existence of an informational flow. The second one – **Collection**⁵ – is standing as a decisive moment from this point of view because now, besides the internal issues related to the information's flow, within the respective Headquarter or within J2 – the information exchange with the J2 compartments – shows up the information exchange with the collecting capabilities available for each Headquarter.

In this moment, the flow of information get some externalization connotations due to the fact that the right establishment of the collecting responsibilities might suppose not only to forward the respective collecting orders but also forward request for information to the superior echelons, to the Forces with which cooperative relations regarding the information exchange were established or to some national specialized entities


deployed in support of the Headquarter in the respective Area of Operations.

Once the intelligence requirements list is obtained, within J2, it will be passed to the Request of Information and Collecting Plan development. The Flow of Information created by this process, as stressed before, has a tight connexion with the formations under the direct operational control of J2 and also with other superior echelons or other categories of Forces deployed in the Area of Operations. More even the J2 internal flow of information will engage all its components in order to establish the most appropriate capability that will collect the requested information (fig. 3).

Similarly, during the analytical production and the intelligence products dissemination processes⁶ we will have mostly the same diagram (fig.4). It is essential that the second component of the information flow, in the analytical and production processes position, is not closing through the J2 specialized component but through the collecting one, due to the fact that within the analytical and production compartment we will not find out the specialized elements that deal with the collecting process.

From the analysis of these J2 functional phases it is relevant that in all the steps there are informational flows necessary for a good performance of J2 and also of the respective Headquarter.

From this point of view, we can easily appreciate that in fact J2 and the other Headquarter components are created from a network of points and the existing links between them. Each of these points could be evaluated as a decisive one, with a specific, well-defined authority and competence




level and that has a particularly specialization for a specific function within J2 or even for a specific component of the respective function. All these points are connected through functional links and together, in fact, they are constituted into a functional network specialized or not on a specific issue.

This description lead us to the conclusions resulted by using a modern designing and simulation method for the intelligence structures that is the Dynamic Information Flow Simulation⁷, DIFS.

Nowadays, the ones that plan and concur to the decisional processes have to face the problematic related to the way in which the intelligence products are supporting the improvement efforts of the command and control process⁸. This situation is greatly a result of the difficulties linked with the possibility of comparing the structures of the organizations for intelligence support⁹.

This difficulty has its origin in the context of the beneficiary dependence upon the intelligence nature¹⁰, in the need to protect the sources and the methods used and also in the uncertainty



regarding the intelligence validation by the Area of Operations future reality. DIFS tries to eliminate the subjective character of some factors presented before and ensure an objective point of view, for evaluating an intelligence supportive organization through a dynamic, discreet, multi-agent, networked manner.

The DIFS model defines the supporting intelligence organizations as a sum of agencies, departments formed from a collection of entities – **knots** and the communication – **links**, within each agency, that support from an intelligence perspective a specified number of decision makers within each agency and as a result that are also a part of it¹¹.

In order to succeed in doing this simulation, the DIFS method use the following knots types:

- **Decision makers** – responsible for tasking the agency’s capabilities for collecting information; these can be considered also as intelligence products consumers due to the fact that they get the final intelligence products belonging to the respective agency;

- **Collectors** – represent the way by which the information is acquired within the agency and implicitly within the organization; the collectors’ reports, with the acquired information, are

distributed inside according to the organization’s pre-established internal rules;

- **Processors** – they are the analytical capabilities of the organization; within the DIFS model, those are considered to be the ones that accumulate many reports of the collectors in one report that therefore becomes more valuable and more important for the decision-makers;

- **Databases** – they are considered the knots in which the information is stocked; also, decision makers and the processors can asked these knots to provide the already acquired information;

- **Actors** – they are knots defined within DIFS method for evaluating the decision makers’ efficiency belonging to each agency and within the organization; the decision makers can generate tasks for the actors, if there is enough information and, by this, the organization’s efficiency can be simulated in terms related to the number of tasks accomplished by actors within the organization, based on the collected information.

Also, within DIFS method there are defined the following types of links:

- Internal tasking
- Interagency tasking
- Internal reporting
- Interagency reporting




Fig. 5

A possible network for analyzing the informational flow within an organization could be defined according to figure 5.

Analyzing the way in which DIFS could evaluate the efficiency of a supportive intelligence structure is resulting that, besides the results regarding the efficiency of an already established structure, there could be done some comments regarding the structure of an organization in a project phase.

Moreover, by successive simulations could experiment or optimize either concept for intelligence supportive structures created for a specific reason – specialized – or for a specific mission, or for a specific type of information or even for specific decision makers' categories.

Far from supporting the perfection of the method, the on subject specialists appreciate that, together with some other methods or even in combination with them, this could be the way to make efficient projects for creating supportive intelligence structures also in case of ones that activates on a permanent base or in the case of those created for a specific reason.

As given the present requirements in the intelligence supporting area, the existence of such methods allows projecting and adapting the intelligence support according to the decision makers' requirements or according to the characteristics of the actions that are to be supported from an intelligence point of view.

As the specialists on the area of evaluating and simulating the intelligence¹² supportive structures are stressing, these methods “will allow raising the speed by which the intelligence structures are

adapting to the users' demands and will eliminate great part of the decisions' subjectivity related to the operational efficiency of such structures”.¹³

NOTES:

¹ Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations – November 1996, pg. III-2.

² Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, October 2004, pg. III-3.

³ Ibidem, pg. III-4-5.

⁴ Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, October 2004, pg. III-4.

⁵ Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, October 2004, pg. III-11.

⁶ Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, October 2004, pg. III-28-57.

⁷ Robert BEHRMAN, Kathleen M. CARLEY, “Modelling the Structure and Effectiveness of Intelligence Organizations: Dynamic Information Flow Simulation”, in *Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Conference held at the National Defense War College, Washington DC. Evidence Based Research, Vienna, VA, 2003.*

⁸ BERKOWITZ, Bruce D., GOODMAN, Allan E., **Strategic Intelligence for American National Security**, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989.

⁹ BERKOWITZ, Bruce D., GOODMAN, Allan E., **Best Truth: Intelligence In The Information Age**, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 2000.

¹⁰ Kent, SHERMAN, **Strategic Intelligence**



for **American World Policy**, *Princeton University Press*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1951. op. cit.
¹² Ibidem.
¹¹ Robert BEHRMAN, Kathleen M. CARLEY, ¹³ Ibidem.

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KNOWLEDGE-BASED WARFARE (COGNITIVE WARFARE)

Eugen SITEANU, PhD

Following the more recent interest shown by the American University scientific research environment for the expression “knowledge-based warfare”, this paper stresses out the decisive role of knowledge and its development in military and political strategic context, in view of networking leading to the development of thinking in operations and battles by using several intellectual tools that ensure winning and maintaining the cognitive superiority.

Warfare can be symmetric, dissymmetric (non-symmetric) and/or asymmetric. In a symmetric warfare, the two parties are almost equal, compatible and face each other so that they can act against each other. In non-symmetric warfare, the two parties are completely different, disproportionate, incompatible, facing each other but only one of them can act against the other one. In asymmetric warfare, the two parties are completely different, disproportionate, and incompatible and act in an asymmetric and efficient way against each other.

Consequently, symmetry and/or dissymmetry (non-symmetry) are disproportional and predictable. As for asymmetry, there is an adaptive qualitative incongruity that implacably leads to unpredictability as is the case of the war against terror.

Incongruity has certain implications which, according to the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, embody: stressing out preemptive and preventive actions; developing the asymmetries of reaction and accomplished fact: “chaotic” balance.

In a scientific paper presented at “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy in Sibiu in July 2007, Gheorghe Văduva, PhD, stated that the asymmetric warfare is disproportionate, in mosaic, chaotic, unpredictable, cognitive (intelligent) and stratagemic (skilful) and the cognitive warfare belongs to concepts, economic, political, social and informational entities for the development of

action and reaction within concepts and it is also a warfare of intelligences. The same author believes – and we agree – that the cognitive warfare objectives are the following: rethinking the warfare philosophy and physiognomy, shifting from type A Clausewitzian warfare to type B dynamic and complex warfare, a flexible warfare shaped by the theory of chaos (the concept of chaotic warfare) and the epistemological dominance. In his opinion, the cognitive warfare has the following effects: gaining advantageous strategic positions, achieving strategic security, obtaining the access to the markets and resources and security systems, reducing the own vulnerabilities, developing certain capabilities of action and reaction to crises and conflicts.

An article in a former issue of this magazine¹ stresses out that the cognitive warfare or knowledge-based warfare is a means to use knowledge in a conflict purpose. Thus, KBW is “a warfare carried in the knowledge realm using knowledge as a weapon. It has a common cognitive dimension and another one more complex, epistemic”². Although warfare has always relied on information that is knowledge, it wasn’t based on information technology that transformed information into a weapon and the process of knowledge as a strategy even in its scientific dimension, that is in fact “the manipulation of knowledge and its inclusion within a conflict system”³.

In this century, warfare moves to “the realm of knowledge, the philosophic and economic realm of knowledge”⁴.

The American researchers conduct thorough studies in the field of informational security and capitalizing the diplomatic, economical, scientific and cultural preponderance. They define “perception management” as “consistent action”⁵.

Of all KBW offensive strategies, “the most useful now is deterrence through information and knowledge”⁶ which is not only offensive but also defensive.



The information and the cognitive realm security is more and more necessary in order to ensure the stability and protection of information, knowledge and cybernetic space.

KBW is conducted particularly in the philosophical, political, economical, cultural and informational space and permeates the military domain.

According to General Gh. Văduva's opinion, the terrorist warfare is a mosaic, chaotic and unpredictable warfare and the war against terrorism is warfare without a theatre of operations, with a very wide spectrum of action and which has left the ethics of "civilized" warfare.

The 21st century fundamental warfare is the economic one, representing a cognitive warfare of markets and resources, warfare of globalization between the globalization supporters and those of maintaining entities, warfare of economic, technological and informational centres.

In the informational society, which is a society of knowledge, military organizations, like any organization, can reach its maturity if based on knowledge. That is why, for the good development of modern military organizations, we must focus on new knowledge, collecting, processing and ongoing dissemination of tactical and strategic information and also the commanders' and soldiers' ability to take correct and rapid decisions. Starting with the team and group, platoon, company and finally strategic organizations, there must be a convergence between knowledge and organizing and planning in order to reach high performances in military actions.

This concept, of knowledge-based organization, is based on a determinist approach starting with the technological and organizational factors. Two decades ago, the knowledge-based organization was defined as a collectivity whose members had a conception work and was interconnected through a computerized infrastructure⁷. Such an organization with information technology communication channels and knowledge collections uses also artificial intelligence. In 1988, however, Drucker defined the knowledge-based organization as a 21st century organizational model with professionals and a small number of intermediate levels of hierarchic leadership and where the coordination is achieved through non-authoritative ways.

The different approaches have lead to a diversified technology: memory-focused

organization, intelligent organization, brain organization. At the end of the last century appeared the convergence between the technological and the managerial perspective through the merging of the organization's necessities and the information technology⁸.

Thus, a new constructive paradigm of knowledge-based organization appeared, superior to the positivist paradigm of the organization based on control and authority.

The members of such an organization are aware of the relationships between goals/objectives, means and results and also those ones between organization and environment. They communicate in order to interact in a coordinate manner, establishing their own behaviour depending on common norms and values in order to ensure the organization's integrity, viability and coherence in terms of structure, strategy and action. The 21st century organizations have become some net-based non-hierarchy structured forms, respectively 5th generation organizations.

The managers/commanders need new competences, now that knowledge as a resource and organizational process needs a type of dedicated managerial intervention which has to be turned into official and professionalized, the excellence being reserved to the best ones.

In the organizational environment, knowledge derives from information transformed by those ones having them as efficient action, through assimilation and integrative understanding followed by effectiveness in given contexts⁹.

The knowledge-based concept is used in an extended understanding for organizations and it integrates the knowledge personalized dimension of the individuals and groups and also its artificial dimension of intelligent information systems.

In this context, the knowledge base has the attributes of an extended organizational memory meant to cognitively support the specific autonomous projects and cumulatively benefit by their results¹⁰.

From all these result the strategic valences which trigger the organizational actors in synergic behaviours of co-elaboration (interactive generation of new knowledge) and of co-learning of capitalized knowledge. They refer to organizational knowledge as a resource and also as a process and triggering the actors in a common environment; here the dominant relations are those horizontal



(non-hierarchic) of interaction between counterparts thus resulting systemic effects of their co-evolution in a cognitive plan¹¹.

Knowledge has also an interorganizational dimension because in contemporary society, organizations assess one another by analyzing their environment, watch the domain leaders, learn from each other, imitate, confront each other or become allies in order to create and utilize new ideas. *“In such conditions, the extraorganizational environment acquires new knowledge resulting in possible development and learning alternatives and also in exigent performance standards in an ongoing evolution^{12”}.*

The military organizations can learn from the civilian ones the way to integrate intuition and reasoning – key of knowledge – in preparing and conducting the network warfare. We have to use knowledge so that to improve the power of thinking during combat. However, knowledge in combat/operation and the combat knowledge must be examined and studied in a strategic and political context¹³.

Today, commanders seek to be wise conducting troops at the tactical, operational and strategic level by acquiring information (with the help of sophisticated technology) in time and achieving superiority in NCW. For this, during the last years, forces of wisdom in battle have been created by strengthening the cooperation between information technology and brain’s capabilities.

These vanguard ideas can be found in **Battle-wise. Seeking Time – Information Superiority in Networked Warfare**, by David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow and Justin Perkins and published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University Press, 2006, in Washington.

In this paper the authors have shown that the modern ways to extract, process and rapidly disseminate tactical information as well as the ability to elaborate and choose from a multitude of tactical options during the operation/combat will improve the American soldiers’ capacity to win against any enemy, even terrorists acting in a crowded city and hidden among peaceful people of that city. This is the essence of wisdom in battle; its result will be the amazing ability of platoon or company commanders to take decisions the battalion used to take and the battalion commander will be able to take decisions a brigade used to take and so on.

That’s why big changes in education are necessary and also in military training in accordance with the big geopolitical transformations of the 21st century which have produced fundamental changes in conducting wars/armed conflicts. The war in Iraq (Desert Shield and Desert Storm) lacked the technical capacity to update, collect and rapidly process the information and also to analyze them so that to maintain the technical advantage during operations/battles behind enemy lines. All these had to occur while absorbing an ongoing flux of information. Such abilities/skills can be achieved only through intense training giving the military fighter the possibility to link the use of his instinct with real-time information, not available once.

The commanders’ and soldiers’ wisdom in battle/operation must be analyzed in their working and fighting conditions in the new global security environment in which act the Al-Qaeda terrorist groups as non-state threats.

It’s also necessary to use battle experience of the coalition in Iraq which faces terrorists also working in the network together with their allies. In this context, it’s necessary to identify the mental abilities such as anticipation and rapid adaptation so that they can be used in the methods of recruiting, learning, training, development and organization.

Working in the network allows the subunits and dispersed units to collaborate through the exchange of information. The sensors and high-tech weapons together with the communication networks transform the power of information into military power. In this paper, networks comprise the information processing systems, communication links, sensors, battle platforms, command centres and the respective force¹⁴. Networks allow for the exchange of information, increase the knowledge (information) sharing, ensure a good collaboration and the high-speed of information and decision making, all these leading to a much better efficiency of military actions. The military expenses change from mechanized platforms and weaponry to information technology. But now, at strategic level, the most important element we must focus on is the soldier’s mind as the knowledge capabilities are the most important in decision making during NCW. It’s very important to focus on improving the quality and the speed of decision making (operational reasoning)¹⁵, in the conditions of the operations conducted during the current security environment, informational


and geopolitical revolution, enemy access to information and network technology, strategic and operational disorder and the increase of the amount of information.

For decades, the American soldiers have had the best weapon systems the US can produce but time has come to add certain intellectual tools to those systems and the current use of working within the information network, tools which enable them to gain and maintain the cognitive superiority¹⁶. Only with wise soldiers we will be able to avoid the failure of our soldiers' first attack. Consequently, there will be a better operational thinking and ability to make right decisions by soldiers, teams and subunits/units and even forces. Working within the information network improves the cognitive efficiency in operation/battle. But unlike civilian network, the military ones have several levels: 1. level borrowed from the civilian environment (media) which has communication means, computer systems, etc.; 2. technical systems, weapons, weapon systems, weapon platforms, sensors, command centres, etc., all linked by means of data communications and processing belonging to the first level; 3. the third level represents the link between echelons (platoons, companies, battalions, brigades) and between armed forces and services – vertically, horizontally, diagonally. But the most important thing is the fact that the network links/connects people not only to communicate but also to think, reason, feel, create, solve problems and make decisions together¹⁷. But in order to do this, the network must ensure the same image to those ones who communicate and are connected the same way as the chessboard gives the same image to those one who look at it. Thus, knowing in real time the disposing of forces and own means and also the enemy ones, those who communicate within the network can understand and help each other, make decisions together as if in the same room.

Increasing the time and amount of information introduces reason in decision-making process, improves cognition and the quality of decisions. Little time and information lead to poor decisions and increasing the values of the time-information variable leads to increasing the quality of decisions up to a certain limit of the amount of information when the huge amount of information doesn't allow people to assimilate it in order to improve the quality of decisions.

In figure 1 is shown the way in which increasing the time and amount of information introduces reason in the decision process, improves cognition and increases the quality of decision. Little time and information determines poor decisions (area A, fig. no.1) and increasing the quality of decisions up to a certain limit of the amount of information when the huge amount of information doesn't allow people to assimilate it in order to improve the quality of decisions.

Figure 1: Improving Cognition by Enhancing Time-Information



Source: David C. GOMPERT, Irving LACHOW, and Justin PERKINS, **Battle-Wise– Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare**, published for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy by National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 25

Starting from fig. no.1 for the modern battle space when the time to make a decision is very short, we can draw the curb in fig. no.2, showing the growth of decision quality according to the amount of information a commander receives.

The analysis of the curb in fig. no. 2 shows that a better understanding of the tactical, operational or strategic situation leads to increasing the quality of decisions to the point where because of the huge amount of information, the commanders don't have enough time to process and interpret information and that's why they can't improve the quality of their decisions.




Figure 2: Quality of decisions depending upon volume of information, when time is very short

Knowing the Latin saying “Totum est prius partibus”, the whole is prior to the parts, research can be made by splitting the whole in parts, classes or groups.

That is what the academician Octav Onicescu did suggesting “the informational energy” as an indicator¹⁸.

He demonstrated mathematically that the informational energy increases with the concentration degree and decreases with the increase of diversification. Another indicator used in the informational statistics (information theory) is the Shannon-Wiener entropy which also has a mathematical relationship.

We consider that the information theory can be used in order to increase the quality of decisions now that there is little time for the commanders to make decisions.

Today it’s necessary to create a room of reason, thinking wisdom to defeat the enemies working within the network. Creating this room is part of the strategy to improve the military decision making process. But in order to establish this strategy, to increase the quality of short time decisions, we must take into account the following: knowing the objective reality; identifying the complex problems as complexity is the problem of nowadays information era¹⁹; ability to know the sort of information needed; the ability to make the difference between true and false information; explaining the others’ behaviour; anticipating the others’ reactions; understanding the enemy’s way of thinking and feeling; setting objectives that can be achieved; establishing priorities; imagining realistic ways to achieve the goals; perceiving the opportunities in due time; finding/assessing

consequences and different courses of action; analyzing the costs and benefits of multiple options; understanding and managing the risks, rethinking the goals and adapting the strategies.

These are some of the skills of the soldiers that take part in the decision making process.

Working within the network allows the battle platforms to focus the attacks on the most dangerous enemy targets due to mutual informing and rapidity in decision making.

The commanders will have the possibility to choose from a larger variety of alternatives and make decisions that are dangerous for any enemy. The increased quality and quantity of the interactions between platforms and commanders at all levels will generate certain useful information regarding the extended battle space, information which will be better used and spread for the successful operations.

Increasing the level of learning will help the subunits, units and greater units to increase their efficiency in battle/operation. Consequently, they will have a greater warfare experience by the ongoing exploration of options and their variables and improvement. Thus, experiencing new ideas, the knowledge level will increase, the soldiers will learn more and faster and in the end they will be wiser in battle and in knowledge-based warfare.

The quick changes in the military field will provide information helping the commanders to orientate the planning of their operations in an unsafe world starting with generalities and essential determinations, developing as many scenarios as possible and dealing with the possible future variables in the same way.

Adapting progressively to the general objectives of knowledge-based warfare, the commanders can analyze information and establish the best ways to achieve the set objectives.

From the strategic point of view, in order to get advantages from the network-based warfare, working in the network must be organized on three directions: dissemination the information to the individuals; mobilization of individuals and the coordination of a collective thinking. That’s why, in order to increase the contribution of knowledge in successfully accomplishing the missions, it’s necessary to focus on: improving the military abilities to use information in thinking and decision making; delegating several military men to make decisions at the same time with sending



(receiving) information through the network; sustaining and using the power of awareness and of shared thinking.

NOTES:

¹ Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Războiul cognitiv?*, in Impact Strategic nr. 2/2007, p. 70.

² Ibidem, p. 70.

³ Ibidem, p. 70.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 72.

⁵ Didier LUCAS, Alain TIFFREAU, *Guerre economique et information: les strategies de subversion*, Paris, Elipse, 2001, p. 204.

⁶ Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *art. cit.*, p. 72.

⁷ Armenia ANDRONICEANU, Mihai ANDRONICEANU, *Dezvoltarea culturii antreprenoriale în organizațiile inteligente bazate pe cunoaștere*, Simpozionul internațional Dezvoltarea culturii antreprenoriale pentru un management performant bazat pe investiții și cunoaștere, a VIII-a Sesiune de comunicări științifice, Academia Comercială Satu Mare, iunie 2006.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 236.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 237.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 238.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 238.

¹² Ibidem, p. 238.

¹³ Eugen SITEANU, Benone ANDRONIC, *Războiul bazat pe cunoaștere (RBC) și înțelepciunea în luptă/operație*, Sesiunea de comunicări științifice din Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”- aprilie 2007.

¹⁴ David C. GOMPert, Irving LACHOW, Justin PERKINS, *Battle-wise. Seeking Time – Information Superiority in Networked Warfare*, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University (NDU) Press, Washington, 2006.

¹⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Network-Centric Warfare*.

¹⁶ David C. GOMPert, Irving LACHOW, Justin PERKINS, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 150.

¹⁸ Octav ONICESCU, V. ȘTEFĂNESCU, *Elemente de statistică informațională cu aplicații*, Editura Tehnică, București, 1979.

¹⁹ Ion ANGHELOIU, Ion MINCU, Eugen GYORFI, Alexandru GHIȚĂ, *Introducere în sisteme tehnice mari*, Editura Militară, București, 1980.

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US STRATEGIC DEFENCE STRATEGY AND THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN USSR

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In November 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president and initiated an aggressive foreign policy, proving the indisputable supremacy and invulnerability of the USA. During a speech, on the 8th of March 1983, he denounced the Soviet empire, considering it "an empire of evil" whose end was imminent, and on the 23rd of March he announced the intention to develop a strategic defence against the Soviet rockets. The USSR had become too weak to challenge this potential vulnerability. Thus, the military policy of the American president and his arming programme forced the Soviet Union to suffocate, the Soviets admitting the economic failure and the incapacity to compete with the U.S.A.

The Cold War began in a moment when the United States anticipated an era of peace and ended in one in which it prepared for a new era of prolonged conflict¹. In November 1980, the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan was elected president of the US with 51% of votes cast, defeating the incumbent president, Jimmy Carter (41%) and an independent candidate Anderson (7%)². Reagan was born in California in 1911. In the 1930s, he made a career as an actor in Hollywood, and in 1967 he joined the Republican Party³. In the American system of government, in which the president is the only official elected at national level, coherence in foreign affairs, should it exist, results from the President's declarations. This represents the most efficient directive for the omnipotent bureaucracy and provides the criteria for Congress or public debates.

President Ronald Reagan promoted a foreign affairs doctrine of remarkable coherence and great intellectual strength⁴. The appointment of George Schultz as State Secretary, in June 1982, announced a more pragmatic approach to the relations with the USSR⁵.

Beginning with 1981, the anti-Communist fight was raised from dust by Reagan, and, during his first term of office, he engaged the US in the most

menacing arms race in all of the Cold War era⁶. A decade earlier, his rhetoric would have caused disorder in the US and could have led to a confrontation with the Soviet Union, which was still confident in its own forces; a decade later, it would have seemed obsolete. In the context of the 1980s, it laid the foundation of a period of unprecedented East-West dialogue⁷.

Reagan governed in a time of extraordinary development of the American military-industrial complex. Though 1981 was not a good year from an economic standpoint, in 1982 the military expenses increased by 13% and by 8% in the following years⁸. During his first administration, the US defence budget increased by 10% - a number two times higher than he had promised in his electoral campaign⁹. The CIA budget increased even more.

The US Army began believing that it could initiate and win a nuclear war. The new weapons were much more precise and could hit Russian military and political targets with "surgical hits". Communications had been upgraded so as to function on the United States territory even after a Russian nuclear strike¹⁰. In the USSR's research efforts and those of the "communist world" in general, the US intelligence agencies concentrated their forces and instruments as it follows: 51% for military espionage, 15 % for technical - military espionage, 31% for political espionage and 3% for economic espionage¹¹.

The US's objective was no longer reducing tensions, but crusade and conversion. Reagan had been elected based on promises of a militant anticommunism and he kept true to his word. Even at his first press conference, he characterized the USSR as a lawless empire, ready "to commit any crime, to lie, to deceive" with the purpose of achieving its goals¹². Then, in a discourse held on the 8th of March, he denounced the Soviet Empire, characterizing it as "an Empire of Evil" whose end was near: "I believe that communism is another



sad and absurd chapter in history, whose last pages are being written now”¹³. The diplomat Henry Kissinger considers that this was “a direct moral provocation from which any of his predecessors would have refrained. Reagan ignored the conventional diplomatic wisdom and “over simplified” America’s virtues in pursuing a self-assumed mission, in order to convince the American people of the importance of the East-West ideological conflict and to show them that in certain international battles it is about the winners and losers, not about staying in power or about diplomacy”¹⁴.

Historian Eric Hobsbawm believes that for the historians of the 21st century it will be difficult to comprehend the apparent madness of this military fever outburst of apocalyptic rhetoric and of an often bizarre conduct of the US administrations at the international level, in particular in the first years of President Reagan’s one. They would have to appreciate the depth the subjective traumas of defeat that culminated with the episode of the American diplomats held hostages in Iran, with the “Red Revolution” from two small states in Central America and a second oil crisis¹⁵.

A sketchy estimation of the military potential of the first three nuclear powers, from the middle of the eighth decade, showed that the USSR disposed of 54 submarines carrying 6000 ballistic missiles, the US – 41 with approximately 5000 and France 4 with 100 missiles¹⁶. By the end of 1988, a year considered the climax of strategic nuclear arms race, the ratio of forces between the USSR and US was: USSR-1398 intercontinental ballistic missiles in underground fixed installations as compared to 1014 of the US; USSR-981 intercontinental ballistic missiles aboard nuclear submarines compared to 648 of the US; USSR-750 long range bombardment planes as compared to 327 for the US¹⁷.

Ronald Reagan’s policy can be understood only as an attempt to erase humility, by demonstrating the indisputable supremacy and the invulnerability of the US. The fundamental challenge that Reagan directed to the Soviets proved to be his strengthening of the American military capability. During the entire electoral campaign, he had deplored the inadequate condition of US defence and had warned about the imminent Soviet superiority. The first dramatic sign of Reagan’s seriousness regarding nuclear disarmaments was visible on the 23rd of March 1983, only two weeks apart from the

depiction of the USSR as the “Empire of Evil”, when he announced his intention to develop a strategic defence system against Soviet missiles. “I make an appeal to the scientific community of our country, the one that provided us with nuclear weapons, to put its vast talent to the service of humanity’s cause and world peace: to help us render these weapons powerless and overdue”¹⁸.

In other words, Reagan announced the inauguration of a research programme destined to establish the theoretic possibilities of maintaining the discouragement strategy, by eliminating its component of threat or risk of destruction.

A series of executory measures were to be decided upon later, by taking into account the results of this research. The danger of total destruction came from the possible use of strategic weapons, each of the two superpowers having over ten thousand units, capable of destroying multiple times the totality of demographic, political, economic and cultural objectives on the entire planet. This was known as the capacity to “overkill”.

What Reagan asked the American scientists and technicians, while also offering a series of partial collaborations to the allies, was to determine whether scientific and technical accomplishments, mainly non-nuclear, some elements being permanently placed in outer space, provided the possibility of interception and destruction of flying ballistic missiles, before they reached the proposed objectives¹⁹. What Reagan called the “Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)”²⁰, the press nicknamed it “Star Wars”, thus reflecting the opinion of various technical experts who considered this idea belonging to the science-fiction realm²¹. Despite the fact that it had been called “defensive”, it provided the shield behind which the US Army could launch a first nuclear strike²².

Henry Kissinger believes that the “Strategic Defence Initiative” alarmed the Kremlin. The Soviet nuclear arsenal was the fundamental element of the structure of USSR’s superpower. During the twenty years that Brezhnev governed, reaching a strategic parity with the US had been the Soviets’ main goal. Then, by a single technological strike, Reagan intended to destroy everything that the USSR had tried to accomplish, with the risk of ruination. If Reagan’s aspiration in regard to a 100% efficient defence was at least coming near to an achievement, US strategic superiority was becoming a reality. A first strike from the US



could have succeeded at that moment, because the defence system would have had the capacity to stop the relatively small and disorganized force of Soviet missiles that would have “survived”. Reagan’s announcement regarding the SDI attracted the Soviet leadership’s attention on the fact that the engagement in the arms race, which they had begun in the 1960s, would exhaust their resources and would lead to a US major strategic advance²³. The Soviet Army did not want to allocate resources to this measure, but if the United States got involved, they would have to do it as well²⁴.

During 1983, NATO and, in the end, the ministers of defence, with the exception of the French one, approved the American project, estimating that its goal was to strengthen stability and to discourage, at low levels, the nuclear offensive forces, thus being included in its security mission²⁵. Florian Gârz shows that the programme that Reagan had proposed also had negative effects on US’s allies within NATO, because it stipulated exclusive protection of the United States, leaving Western Europe open to any possible Russian strikes; and this was one of the main causes that led to the reactivation of the Western European Union²⁶.

Ronald Reagan publicly declared, while still in the electoral campaign, that it would attract the USSR into an arms race that would suffocate it from an economic stand point²⁷; when he launched the Strategic Defence Strategy he was as passionate in words as the strategy was unorthodox²⁸. Fortunately, the Soviets had become too weak to test this potential vulnerability²⁹ and the US President’s military policy and its arming programme forced the USSR to enter into decline. As a result, the Reagan administration forced the USSR to recognize its economic bankruptcy and the Russian’s inability to compete with the US in regard to the development of such an ultramodern system.

In the 1960s, the USSR had wanted to develop an antimissile defence system, but the US was opposed. Now, the US began developing a strategic antimissile system, but the USSR was opposed. Between 1983 and 1989, SDI represented the centre of concern in the relations between the US and USSR and, until the end of the Cold War, it remained the most controversial problem at the military level in the relations between East and West, representing a true “Reagan doctrine”.

The SDI principle had to comprise three fundamental components: 1. the component of

destruction, made up of terrestrial installations or battle satellites from which antimissile means would be launched; orbital battle stations, laser satellites and particle fascicles with directed-energy satellites, electromagnetic cannons and other technologies, all non-nuclear; 2. tracking and targeting components, positioned on land, in the atmosphere and in outer space (radar and optics); 3. command, control and intelligence systems. This component was aimed at the use of the most modern conquests in the field of electronics.

While elaborating the SDI programme, it was revealed that the time of detection, pursuit and destruction of nuclear attack means was so brief, that it excluded the human decision of a process. Everything was left to the calculation and reaction capacity of supercomputers. Between 1985 and 1988, \$ 26 billion were spent within the SDI. The whole programme, if accomplished by 2000, would have cost over a trillion dollars.

The interception and destruction of the strategic means of nuclear attack was predicted to be accomplished in three consecutive stages: 1. on the active portion of the missile’s trajectory, when the emanation of heat was enormous and before launching the space vehicle carrying nuclear components of multiple strikes directed independently (MJRV), 2. in outer space, before the nuclear battle components re-entered the atmosphere, 3. in the final part of the trajectory, after the MJRV components had entered the atmosphere, with the means positioned in the zone of the objectives that had to be defended. All these asked for enormous investments, and the Soviet leaders had already reached the conclusion that the USSR’s economy was at strength’s end and could not deal with the new American provocation³⁰.

Taking advantage of this, Reagan reiterated its commitment to the Strategic Defence Strategy at the meeting in Geneva³¹, and at the one in Reykjavik he accepted Gorbachev’s desire to eliminate nuclear weapons, but refused to limit SDI testing to the laboratory³².

Both powers disfigured their economies through a huge and costly arms race, but the world capitalist system absorbed the \$3 billion in debts - mainly for military expenses - in which the US, until then the biggest creditor - state in the world, had thrown itself in the 80s³³. The pressure of Soviet military expenses, which accounted for between 25 and 40% of the budget³⁴, and moreover



the Chernobyl disaster of 25th of April 1986, quickly demonstrated the lack of reliability and the poor scientific and technical management of an activity thought to belong to the top industries of the USSR³⁵. During all this time, the annual cost of the external subsidies (allocated to Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and others) was estimated at \$40 billion. Furthermore, all East-European states registered high debts toward the USSR.

In these conditions, the Reagan administration continued to fight against the USSR's friends in the rest of the world. In Nicaragua, the Contras movement had been continuously helped, its troops being trained by the CIA. The Mujahedeens were supported in Afghanistan, and other movements that opposed pro-Soviet regimes in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique etc. were encouraged³⁶. The meetings between M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, from the 19th to 21st of November 1985 in Geneva and from 11th to 12th of October 1986 in Reykjavik, deepened USSR's position losses. This culminated with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan^{37*}, finalized on the 15th of February 1989. From that point onwards, the rule for the Russian troops would be retreat³⁸.

At the beginning of the 80s, for the first time, Moscow felt that the burden of the fact that its empire was becoming too heavy. At the external level, its isolation was almost absolute³⁹. At the internal level, it entered the final phase of its prolonged agony, as a result of a crisis in leadership management, after Leonid Brezhnev, the "master" of Soviet economic stagnation, had stepped down⁴⁰. Zbigniew Brzezinski^{41**} believes that, starting from the 70s, the Soviet economy began to show serious signs of weakness, its rhythm falling to a genuine atrophy. In 1985, the Soviet gross national product decreased by 14.7% in comparison to the world's gross national product and by 28.5% in comparison to the US one. These findings shocked the leaders from Kremlin. Soon, the second place that the USSR held from an economic point of view would have been assumed by Japan, to the Russian's stupefaction⁴².

The economic factor, and not the military, was the one to undermine the ratio of forces between West and East, by destroying the old political order that had been fixed after World War II. In this context, a battle for the redistribution of the spheres of influence broke out, having Central Europe as the main scene⁴³. During all this period, Rea-

gan received more poor reports about the Soviet economy, part of them provided by the CIA. In his memoirs, Reagan claims that the evidence of the Soviet economic collapse convinced him that Gorbachev would accept an agreement to reduce nuclear arms, which would have been advantageous for both parts⁴⁴.

Devitalized by the expenses for developing and maintaining its huge military apparatus, the USSR could not continue in the race for supremacy in Europe and in the world, alongside the US. The burden was so huge, that the USSR succumbed and then disintegrated. The causes of the Soviet system's decline - various manifestations of internal stagnation and of powerlessness on the international scene, characteristic to the decline of many empires, including those that gave birth to the great classic revolutions, had as a typical element the existence of arms race. If this had not existed, the USSR could have been a communist state up to this day; however, it would have had to contribute approximately two thirds of its scientific research and one third of its economy to military efforts⁴⁵.

Historian Jean- François Soulet also identifies four major causes of the Soviet collapse: the resistance of satellite countries to integration, pressure from the civil society, the degradation of the socio-economic situation and the regimes' failure to self-reform. The signs of a serious illness were thus tangible, even if, for various reasons, many would not see them. In other words, if the agony of the "Empire" was unexpectedly brief, the disease had been present for decades, maybe even from its origins⁴⁶.

The crisis of the communist system in general and of the Soviet one in particular, was influenced by the decision of Western banking institutions, between 1979 – 1980, not to lend any more money to socialist countries, throwing them into total chaos⁴⁷. This had consequences on the state of the society. The Soviets, citizens of a superpower, knew the everyday problems of supply and living. The alcoholism, which reached 40 million people, wreaked havoc. The average life expectancy decreased from 67 years in 1970 to 61 years in 1980^{48v}. The regime was at strength's end, the party was confronted with corruption and laziness was everywhere. General collapse induced by the party's own downfall represents the characteristic vulnerability of a single-party system that dominates the society completely⁴⁸.

**NOTES:**

¹ Henry KISSINGER, **Diplomația**, București, Editura ALL, 1998, p. 689.

² Pierre MILZA, Serge BERSTEIN, **Istoria secolului XX, vol. 3, În căutarea unei noi lumi (1973 până în zilele noastre)**, București, Editura ALL, 1998, p. 78.

³ Ibidem, p. 78.

⁴ Henry KISSINGER, **op.cit.**, p. 692.

⁵ Martin Mc CAULEY, **Rusia, America și războiul rece, 1949-1991**, Iași, Editura Polirom, 1999, p. 102.

⁶ Florian GÂRZ, **CIA contra KGB. Secretele serviciilor secrete**, Craiova, Editura Obiectiv, 1999, p. 120.

⁷ Henry KISSINGER, **op.cit.**, p. 693.

⁸ Martin Mc CAULEY, **op.cit.**, p. 97.

⁹ Christopher ANDREW, **CIA și Casa Albă. Serviciul secret și președinția americană de la George Washington la George Bush**, București, Editura ALL, 1988, p. 414.

¹⁰ Martin Mc CAULEY, **op.cit.**, p. 97.

¹¹ Florian GÂRZ, **op.cit.**, p. 121.

¹² Henry KISSINGER, **op.cit.**, p. 694.

¹³ Christopher ANDREW, **op.cit.**, p. 421.

¹⁴ Henry KISSINGER, **op.cit.**, p. 694.

¹⁵ Eric HOBBSAWM, **Secolul extremelor**, București, Editura Lider, 1994, p. 291.

¹⁶ Titu GEORGESCU, **România în istoria Europei**, București, Editura Holding Reporter, 1997, pp. 281-282.

¹⁷ Florian GÂRZ, **NATO: globalizare sau dispariție. De la Războiul Rece la pacea pierdută**, București, Casa Editorială Odeon, 1995, p. 54.

¹⁸ Henry KISSINGER, **op.cit.**, p. 703, apud, Reagan Proposes U.S. Seek New Way to Block Missiles, The New York Times, March, 24, 1983, p. 20.

¹⁹ François de ROSE, **Al treilea război mondial nu a avut loc. NATO și pacea**, București, Editura Nemira, 1998, p. 41.

²⁰ Christopher ANDREW, **op.cit.**, p. 421.

²¹ Michael R. BESCHLOSS, Strobe TALBOT, **La cele mai înalte niveluri. Relatare din culisele puterii referitoare la sfârșitul Războiului Rece**, Iași, Editura Elit, 1992, p. 147.

²² Martin Mc CAULEY, **op.cit.**, p. 100.

²³ Henry KISSINGER, **op.cit.**, pp. 703-704.

²⁴ Martin Mc CAULEY, **op.cit.**, p. 100.

²⁵ François de ROSE, **op.cit.**, p. 42.

²⁶ Florian GÂRZ, **CIA contra KGB. Secretele serviciilor secrete**, Craiova, Editura Obiectiv, 1999, p. 120.

²⁷ Idem, **Renășterea Europei. De la Atlantic la Urali**, București, Casa Editorială Odeon, 1999, p. 94.

²⁸ Henry KISSINGER, **op.cit.**, p. 707.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 707.

³⁰ Florian GÂRZ, **NATO: globalizare sau dispoziție? De la Războiul Rece la pacea pierdută**, București, Casa Editorială Odeon, 1995, pp. 148-149.

³¹ Martin Mc CAULEY, **op.cit.**, p. 108.

³² Ibidem, p. 110.

³³ Eric HOBBSAWM, **op.cit.**, p. 294.

³⁴ François de ROSE, **op.cit.**, p. 51.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 88; see also Jean-François SOULET, **Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste din 1945 până în zilele noastre**, Iași, Editura Polirom, 1998, p. 289.

³⁶ Martin Mc CAULEY, **op.cit.**, p. 106.

* The entry of the Soviet army in Afghanistan had taken place on the 25th of December 1979.

³⁷ Florian GÂRZ, **NATO: globalizare sau dispariție? De la Războiul Rece la pacea pierdută**, București, Casa Editorială Odeon, 1995, pp. 98-99.

³⁸ Pascal, BONIFACE, **Relațiile Est – Vest 1945-1991**, Iași, Institutul European, 1998, p. 58.

³⁹ Florian GÂRZ, **NATO: globalizare sau dispariție? De la Războiul Rece la pacea pierdută**, București, Casa Editorială Odeon, 1995, p. 115.

** Zbigniew Brzezinski, former presidential advisor and director of the US National Security Council during the Jimmy Carter's administration.

⁴⁰ Idem, **Renășterea Europei de la Atlantic la Urali**, București, Casa Editorială Odeon, 1999, p. 114.

⁴¹ Ibidem, pp. 114-115.

⁴² Christopher ANDREW, **op.cit.**, p. 441.

⁴³ Martin Mc CAULEY, **op.cit.**, p. 147.

⁴⁴ Jean-François SOULET, **op.cit.**, p. 287.

⁴⁵ Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, **Revoluțiile din 1989. Între trecut și viitor**, Iași, Editura Polirom, 1999, p. 90.

⁴⁶ Pascal Boniface, **op.cit.**, p. 60.

⁴⁷ François FURET, **Teatrul unei iluzii. Eseu despre ideea comunistă în secolul XX**, București, Editura Humanitas, 1996, p. 523.

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POWER INDICATORS AND STRATEGIC INTENTIONS OF NORTH KOREA

Marina MUSCAN

Another country that has a surprising evolution in the Asia-Pacific region is North Korea as it survived to major challenges coming both from interior and from exterior (the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union the end of the Cold War, spreading famine, natural disasters, and the death of Kim Il Sung) and, with its nuclear and missile brinkmanship programme it has drawn the attention of the entire international community upon itself. Although the country was confronted with famine during the 90s and although it has faced a constant economic deficit for the last ten years, although its natural resources are diminishing and it has serious agriculture problems, North Korea has managed to contradict all the predictions regarding its dissolution, for now. Using its nuclear policy, it has become a focus of regional and global prime-time coverage, posing security risks to its neighbours. Therefore, no one of these neighbours presumes that, during an intervention, North Korea would surrender quietly without provoking a huge mess, a mess that no outside neighbouring power would be willing to clean up.

North Korea survives in a region with powerful neighbours by cultivating an image of power and irrationality at the international level, as a result of its own military power indicator and its own nuclear policy.

The power as an attribute of an international actor represents the capability of a country to influence the behaviour of other actors according to its own interests. At the international level, this intercourse can be described as a relation between two countries "A" and "B" where "A" tries to influence "B" in order for B to act in A's favour by using "x" means. For many the influence is an instrument that can be used to achieve one's goal.

The power can be evaluated in a specific context and it can be measured by analyzing all the elements of power of one international actor and

by comparing the results with the power indicators of other actors. The power indicators must be related to a specific international context when the power can be used. If we analyze North Korea we shall see that we face a paradox regarding its power indicators.

If we apply Ray S. Cline's equation regarding one country's power **Power = [Critical Mass (Population and Territory) + Economic Power + Military Power] x [Coherent Planning of the National Strategy + Will]** to North Korea we shall raise more question marks over its power indicators according to the observations made further on in this paper.

North Korea is probably the most mysterious and inaccessible country in the world today. Palpable data on this state is missing starting from 1990, and some present information is based on evaluations. Officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the country is ruled by Workers' Party of Korea, which holds the power since 1948. Kim Jong Il is the General Secretary of the party, and the supreme leader of the country.

The location is closely related to the climate and they have significant effect on the power of one country. North Korea's locations raise many geostrategic problems as it is caught between many powerful neighbours.

North Korea is located in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, which extends southward from the north-eastern part of the Asian continent. North Korea is bordered by South Korea (a 238-kilometer border), to the north, China (a 1,416-kilometer border), and to the northeast, Russia (a 19-kilometer border). The border with South Korea is marked by a 4-kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The DMZ extends 238 kilometres over land and 3 kilometres over the sea¹.

China claims a 33 kilometre wide area from its border with North Korea in the mountain area of Paektu-san.

North Korea occupies about 55 percent of the total land area of the Korean Peninsula, or approximately 120,410 square kilometres of land area and 130 square kilometres of water area. The total coastline measures 2,495 kilometres. North Korea claims a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles. It also has established a military boundary line of 50 nautical miles from its coast on the Sea of Japan (East Sea) side of the peninsula and the exclusive economic zone limit in the Yellow Sea (West Sea) in which all foreign ships and aircraft without permission from the North Korean government are banned. Approximately 80 percent of the land area is made up of mountain ranges that are higher than 2,000 meters above sea level. The highest peak, on the northern border with China, is Paektu-san at 2,744 meters above sea level.


North Korea's longest river is the Amnok (Yalu) River (790 kilometres), which flows west into the northern part of West Korea Bay. It is navigable for 678 kilometres. The Tuman (Tumen) is the second longest (521 kilometres), it flows into the East Korea Bay, but it is navigable for only 81 kilometres. Therefore, it is not used at its entire capacity. Both the Amnok and Tuman rivers form part of the boundary between North Korea and China. The third longest river is the Taedong (397 kilometres and navigable for 245 kilometres).

Regarding the climate, North Korea has long, cold, dry winters and short, hot, humid summers. The temperatures range between -8°C in December and 27°C in August. Approximately 60 percent of the annual rainfall occurs between June and September; August is the wettest month with an average rainfall of 317 millimetres.

Regarding the land use ratio, there are many opinions due to the lack of new data. According to US Government estimates, in 2007, only 22.4 percent of the land is arable and only 1.6 percent is in permanent crops. Based on 2002 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates, 20.7 percent of the land, or 25,000 square kilometres, is arable. Of this arable land, about 8 percent is in permanent crops. According to a 1998 US government estimate, North Korea had about 14,600 square kilometres of irrigated land. North Korea is facing chronic agricultural problems taking into account that the arable land surface is diminishing. We may assume that the country will face food problems in the future and it will need

international aid. Also, the natural resources of North Korea are diminishing. North Korea's major natural resources include coal, copper, fluorspar, salt, pyrites, and gold.

The demographic indicator represents an important aspect of a state's power. A numerous population represents the base for the demographic power indicator but automatically does not ensure the power. North Korea's population was estimated in July 2006 at 23,113,019. The annual population growth rate for the same year was 0.8 percent. United Nations (UN) estimates for 2007 indicate that North Korea's population density stands at 188 persons per square kilometre, 40 percent of the population lives in rural and 60 percent in urban areas. According to the estimates made by the US Government, the structure of the North Korea's age structure is the following:



Source: Library of Congress – Federal Research Division – Country Profile: North Korea, July 2007

Estimates made in 2006, by the US, indicate a birth-rate of nearly 15.5 births per 1,000 population and a death rate of just over 7.1 deaths per 1,000. In 2006, life expectancy was estimated at 74.5 years for women and 68.9 for men, or nearly 71.6 years total. Other projections are much lower for both women and men. Life expectancy is not expected to improve as the first decade of the twenty-first century proceeds. The infant mortality rate was estimated at nearly 22.3 per 1,000 live births in 2006. The total fertility rate for 2006 has been estimated at 2.1 children per woman. Although North Korea's population can be considered an



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active one, as the percent represented by the old persons is relatively small, North Korea faces other problems regarding its population, therefore, the human factor does not represent an important power indicator for this country. First of all, the authorities show no interest in projecting this power indicator outside the country's borders, as China does, basing a part of its influence on the pressure made by its demographic power indicator. North Korea does not encourage this kind of pressure coming from its own population on other countries. There is no legal migration from North Korea to other countries or regions, and after the Korean War (1950–53) only 5,000 North Koreans successfully reached South Korea until the turn of the century.

However, in 2003 and 2004 unprecedented numbers of North Koreans - estimates range between 140,000 and 300,000 - fled to China with hopes of reaching South Korea. Only a relative few did reach South Korea but, according to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, as of February 2007, more than 10,000 North Koreans were living in the South. This number is relatively high, taking into account that only nine were living there in 1990, 41 in 1995, and 312 in 2000.

The national literacy rate for citizens 15 years of age and older is 99 percent². According to North Korean-supplied figures provided in 2000, there were 1.5 million children in 27,017 nursery schools, 748,416 children in 14,167 kindergartens, 1.6 million students in 4,886 four-year primary schools, and 2.1 million students in 4,772 six-year secondary schools. Nearly 1.9 million students attended more than 300 colleges and universities. Data on teachers are much older. In 1988, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) reported that North Korea had 35,000 pre-primary, 59,000 primary, 111,000 secondary, 23,000 college and university, and 4,000 other postsecondary teachers.

North Korea has a national medical service and health insurance system. As of 2000, some 99 percent of the population had access to sanitation, and 100 percent had access to water, but water was not always potable. Medical treatment is free. In the past, there reportedly has been one doctor for every 700 inhabitants and one hospital bed for every 350 inhabitants. Health expenditures in 2001 were 2.5 percent of gross domestic product, and 73 percent of health expenditures were made

in the public sector. There were no reported human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) cases as of 2007. However, it is estimated that between 500,000 and 3 million people died from famine in the 1990s, and a 1998 United Nations (UN) World Food Program report revealed that 60 percent of children suffered from malnutrition, and 16 percent were acutely malnourished. UN statistics for 1999–2001 reveal that North Korea's daily per capita food supply was one of the lowest in Asia, exceeding only that of Cambodia, Laos, and Tajikistan, and one of the lowest worldwide.

Natural disasters in the 1990s determined 300,000 North Koreans to flee to China in search of food. According to United Nations data, 27 percent of North Korea's population is at or below the absolute poverty level, living on less than US\$1 per day.

North Korea has a centrally planned economy. The means of production, which are largely obsolete, are owned by the state. Traditionally, poor domestic economic performance was offset with infusions of Soviet aid. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the aid stopped and the economy was adversely affected.

From 1995 to 2007, the government applied severe food shortages which, together with the natural disasters from the 1990s, affected the population severely. North Korea experiences a progressive shortage of arable land. In addition, large-scale military expenditures consume resources needed in the civilian sector.

In 2002, the North Korea's government allowed the salaries of those ones working in factories to increase and prices of various products to rise. The state rationing system also was abolished, foreign-exchange rates were adjusted, free currency exchange was allowed to strengthen popular consumption.

In 2003, changes were made in the agriculture. Restrictions also were relaxed on farmers' market activities and agricultural products were allowed to be brought to market using self-managed distribution systems. According to data, the crop production of 2002 was about 3.84 million tons, which was about 2-2.5 million tons less than the estimated need of 6-6.5 million tons.

If we analyze the economic growth of North Korea between 1990-2002 and then we compare it to that of South Korea we shall have the following



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Year	North Korea	South Korea
1990	- 3,7	+ 9,0
1991	- 3,5	+ 9,2
1992	- 6,0	+ 5,4
1993	- 4,2	+ 5,5
1994	- 2,1	+ 8,3
1995	- 4,1	+ 8,9
1996	- 3,6	+ 6,8
1997	- 6,3	+ 5,0
1998	- 1,1	- 6,7
1999	+ 6,2	+ 10,9
2000	+ 1,3	+ 9,3
2001	+ 3,7	+ 3,1
2002	+ 1,2	+ 6,3
Cumulative growth, 1990–2002	- 22,2	+ 81,0
Average GDP growth rate, 1990–2002, %/yr	- 1,7	+ 6,2

Source: WOLF Charles, AKRAMOV Kamil, *North Korean Paradoxes – Circumstances, Costs and Consequences of Korean Unification*, prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense by RAND – National Defense Research Institute, 2005, p. 11.

table:


According to the estimates made by the US Government, the GDP growth rate was 1 percent per annum in 2006. Based on 2006 estimates, North Korea's purchasing parity power was US\$40 billion. The service sector produced 36 percent of gross domestic product in 2002. The agriculture produces approximately 30 percent of gross domestic product. Industry produced 34 percent of gross domestic product.

The major industries are machine building, armaments, electric power, chemicals, metallurgy, textiles, and food processing. Mining contributes 7.8 percent of gross domestic product. The predominant domestic sources of commercial energy in North Korea are coal and hydroelectric power. In 2001, hydroelectric power plants generated about 69 percent of North Korea's electricity, and coal-fired thermal plants produced about 31 percent.

Slowly, North Korea started to consume energy generated by coal. In 2003, about 82 percent of North Korea's primary energy consumption was coal. Electricity consumption in 2003 was lower with 55 percent of the previous year's total. About 6 percent of North Korea's primary energy consumption is from oil. In 2005, North Korea consumed about 25,000 barrels of oil per day and

produced only 138 barrels per day.

The labour force was estimated by the US Government at about 9.6 million workers in 2007, approximately 36 percent of whom worked in agriculture, 64 percent in industry and services. Based on 2005 figures, North Korea's major foreign commerce partners are China, South Korea, Russia, Thailand and Japan.



North Korea's Exports and Imports in 2005

Source: Library of Congress – Federal Research Division – Country Profile: North Korea, July 2007

In 2005, the imports totalled US\$2.6 billion while exports were only US\$1.4 billion.

As of 1996, North Korea had an estimated US\$12 billion in external debts. 62 percent of this



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debt is mostly owed to Russia and China and 38 percent is owed to France, Germany, Sweden, Austria, and Japan. North Korea has a limited ability to attract foreign investments because of the amount of debt that is owed to so many different countries. The nuclear proliferation issue also has had a negative impact on foreign investment. In order to encourage the foreign commercial relations, North Korea established its first special economic, or free-trade, zone at Najin-Sonbong. This zone is accessible to Russia by railroad and to China by road but to the rest of North Korea only by helicopter. The Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, located on the western end of the border with China, is a self-managed entity aimed at fostering bilateral trade. Two other economic zones are Kumgang and the Kaesong. The economic power of North Korea is low compared with the economic power of its neighbours, therefore, taking into account that the economic power indicator is negative, this factor does not count in the power equation of this country.

Many times, the military power was assimilated with the national power of one nation. The morale, the discipline and the leadership are still the main indicators of the military power. But the first Gulf War has proven the importance of power projection capacity and durability for efficiency of the military actions. North Korea is a militarized state with the fourth largest population under arms, after China, the United States, and India. North Korea's armed forces, known collectively as the Korean People's Army (KPA), totalled about 1,170,000 personnel in 2006. Approximately 1 million people are in the army, 60,000 are in the navy, 110,000 are in the air force. There also are paramilitary security troops, who number around 189,000 people.

If we compare the military power of North Korea with the military power of other countries in the region, we shall see that this country can be considered the third military power in the Asia-Pacific region.

North Korea has military advisers in 12 African nations. North Korea has projection capability for its military power through its warheads, naval

Country	Numbers						
	Battle Tanks	Armoured Fighting Vehicles	Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft	Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft	Naval Combat Ships ³	Manpower	Nuclear Capability (Warheads)
North Korea	3500	6560	590	306	412	1350000	750 ⁴
China	7180	12080	2775	478	221	2265000 ⁵	1101 ⁶
Japan	1020	1880	380	616	136	302000	0
India	3978	6795	886	567	117 ⁷	1325000	0
Vietnam	1315	3715	221	75	72	484000	0
Pakistan	2461	3725	455	153	27	619000	0
Thailand	333	1830	276	278	210	306000	0
Taiwan	926	3006	370	275	450	290000	0
Indonesia	0	2689	153	126	137	302000	0
South Korea	2330	4850	556	487	131	687000	0

Sources: United State Department of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense – *Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of People's Republic of China – 2007*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies - *The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Total and Sub-Regional Balances: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

combat ships, fixed wing combat aircrafts and rotary wing combat aircrafts. It is a military power capable to face regional challenges. Strategically, the Pyongyang regime can be understand only by comparison to other countries in the region, as palpable information from the North Korea's officials are missing.

Therefore, it is prudent to assume that, although the North Korean regime seems to be irrational and paranoid, there is an internal logic to its words and deeds, and many analysts argue that Pyongyang


deliberately depicts itself as dangerous to deter the enemy, cultivating an image of irrationality, at the same time and with the same purpose. The Pyongyang regime also believes that it faces a very real threat from the United States' armed forces, therefore, North Korea's leadership display a heightened sense of insecurity and they try to create a dangerous and unpredictable self-image at the international level.

Taking into account the general internal and external situation faced by North Korea today, its

strategic intentions can be estimated, according to Andrew Scobell, on three levels: modest/security, ambitious/benevolent, or ambitious/malevolent. These could be the three levels of the North Korean strategic thinking together with their specific objectives:

If we follow some of North Korea's actions related both with its interior and foreign policy we can find some of the strategic objectives mentioned above such as: secure defences for the country, reform and opening of the system, economic recovery⁹ and "build up/ buying WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)".

Graphic regarding North Korean possible strategic intentions⁸



North Korea's foreign relations are a blend of contradiction and complexity. Although North Korea has been seen by many as a state on the verge of explosion or implosion, it survived to major challenges coming both from interior and from exterior (the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union the end of the Cold War, spreading famine, natural disasters, and the death of Kim Il Sung) and, with its nuclear and missile brinkmanship programme it has drawn the attention of the entire international community upon itself. Although, economically, North Korea can be considered one of the weakest country in the Asia – Pacific region, through its military force it became one of the strongest actors on the regional geopolitical scene, following its goals relentlessly and successfully playing the "nuclear power" card. Consequently, a paradox is born, taking into

account that, although economically weak, North Korea is fighting for the survival of its regime and it can pose security risks to its neighbours. By taking into account this need for survival, the three levels of strategic intention of North Korea were born.

From the North Korean's point of view, North Korea is tightly surrounded and squeezed by the "Big Four plus One" countries that have interests in the region (Russia, China, Japan, SUA¹⁰ and South Korea). This situation together with the internal problems determined the Pyongyang regime to make a real slalom through various goals and strategic interests starting with the benevolent ones (reform and opening of the system, economic recovery) and finishing with the malevolent ones (build up/ buying WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction))¹¹.



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North Korea's distrust towards its neighbours began in 1990s when the "collapse" scenario was a big success on the international scene. This scenario stated that in the wake of Kim Il Sung's death North Korea would collapse, and within three years, Korea would have a German-style reunification by absorption. South Korean President supported the collapse scenario when he depicted North Korea as a "broken airplane" headed for a crash landing that would be followed by a quick Korean reunification. The spectre of collapse has even prompted behind-the-scenes efforts by the US Department of Defense (DoD) to coordinate contingency planning with South Korean and Japanese allies.

Although at the turn of the new millennium, which many predicted North Korea would not survive to see, not only does the Pyongyang regime still exist through its military force, if not through its economic power. The new consensus in South Korean and American intelligence communities in 2000 was that North Korea would survive at least until 2015¹².

We can say that the national strategy centred on the survival of the Pyongyang system was correct and coherent as it ensured the survival its „dissolution” of the North Korean state more than the estimations made by South Korean and American intelligence communities.

Being saved from famine with the international aid in 1990s, North Korea survived by using its nuclear policy and it became the third military power in the region.

First, the region is the "strategic home" of three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which are also three of the five original nuclear weapon states. Second, Japan, China, and South Korea alone accounted for about 25 percent of the world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000. And, in 2006, China, India and Japan alone accounted for about 62 percent of the world gross domestic product (GDP). As of mid-2005, Asia-Pacific region is home to the world's four largest holders of foreign exchange reserves. According to data from 2005 – 2006, Japan holds \$834 billion, China holds \$821 billion, South Korea holds \$205.7 billion and Taiwan holds \$253.6 billion of foreign exchange reserves¹³.

Taking into account that North Korea is caught between these powerful neighbours, its reactions

can be considered as a response to the fact that Pyongyang regime considers itself to be threatened by these states. At the same time, the North Korean regime sees the presence of the American forces in South Korea like a military occupation of a territory that legitimately belongs to it. Therefore, it sees these troops as a military threat to its security. Consequently, on one hand, North Korea tries to attract the economic force of China and Japan by creating special economic or free-trade zones, and, on the other hand, it maintains its status as a militarized country in order to avoid its own dissolution. Therefore, the actual situation can be considered as a consequence of the security paradox. And the strategic interests of North Korea will remain unpredictable until this paradox will cease to exist.

Nowadays, the Pyongyang regime is a hermit system, concentrated to itself and preoccupied by its own survival. Therefore, the will to survive is strong and it allowed North Korea's to become the forth world military power and the third military power in Asia-Pacific region.

North Korea's military structure combines elements of those of China and the former Soviet Union, with the General Staff organizationally under the command of Military Prosecution Bureau, which is under the command of National Defence Commission Chairman.

It remains to be seen if the military power indicator will help North Korea to survive on the international scene, as a state, more than estimations made by South Korean and American intelligence communities.

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¹ Library of Congress – Federal Research Division – Country Profile: North Korea, July 2007, p. 5.

² Quoted paper, p.7

³ Within the category “Naval Combat Ships” there are included submarines and carriers (a. n.).

⁴ The number is not confirmed by North Korea's officials – it is the result of the estimations made by Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) – www.nti.org.

⁵ China active manpower, in 2007– without reserves, militia, military police and auxiliary non-fighting personnel. According to the data, in 2006, the Chinese manpower was 3005000 – without military police (1500000), militia (12000000) and reserves.(a.n)

⁶ According to Annual report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China – 2007, Office of the Secretary of Defense the number of the nuclear warheads hold by China is between 975 and 1101. According to data, in 2006, China hold approximately 970 nuclear warheads (a.n)

⁷ India is the only country in the Asia – Pacific region which has a carrier (a.n.)

⁸ Andrew SCOBELL – **North Korea's Strategic Intentions**, Department of the Army, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244, July 2005, p. 10.

⁹ Regarding the goals “**reform and opening of the system**” and “**economic recovery**”, note that in order to encourage the foreign commercial relations North Korea established special economic or free-trade zones. Also, the restrictions were relaxed on farmers' market activities, and the government allowed the salaries of the ones working in factories to increase (a.n.).

¹⁰ Between the North Korea's neighbours US is mentioned as it deploys some 100,000 troops in the Asia- Pacific region, concentrated mostly in Japan and South Korea. US has also 12 carriers that patrol in the region by rotation and 80 submarines that are affecting the military balance of power in the Asia – Pacific region. The US interest in the falling of the Pyongyang regime was also taken into account, together with contingency planning made by US with South Korean and Japanese allies, as a response to such an event (a.n.).

¹¹ Regarding the goal of “**build up/ buying WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)**”, please note the nuclear warheads held by North Korea and its declared intentions of pursuing the development of its nuclear program (a.n.).

¹² Samuel S. KIM, **North Korean Foreign Relations in The Post-Cold War World**, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244, April 2007, p.2.

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NEW INITIATIVES OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION (BSEC)

Vasile POPA

After 15 years from its birth, BSEC, which assumed at its launching, in 1992, the objective to accelerate the economic and social development of the member-states for accomplishing a superior degree of integration in the European and global economy, by multilateral cooperation intensification and the use of advantages running from the geographical proximity and the national economies complementarities, has an extraordinary records of success in the field's cooperation plan and, until 2002, in the actions related to the regional security and stability, cooperation with EU, collaboration with other initiatives and regional structures.

Counting among its members 12 states and as observers 13 states and, recently, the European Commission, and also the Energy Chart Conference, Black Sea Commission, International Black Sea Club (with an older status) and being held up in its activities by international organizations and institutions as: EU, OSCE, the Council of Europe, OECD, ECE/UN, UNDP, ONIDO, FAO, WTO, IOM, EBRD, EIB and World Bank, BSEC is an organization with a remarkable force, with a potential market about 350 million consumers and an area of 2.2 million square kilometres, owning oil and natural gases resources, being placed on the second place after the Middle East.

The space covered by the organization got, after 2001, a special strategic importance because of the Wider Black Sea area reaching in the interest sphere of the terrorist networks as well as in the migration and trans-border organized crime traces and also in regard with the global energetic interests reorientations to the Caucasus and Central-Asian area.

Sources from the Turkish organization's presidency, quoted by mass-media, pointed out

that BSEC great economic potential permitted it to reach a remarkable growth and economic development level. After 2000, the BSEC region registered the fastest growth in the world (a GDP annual growth of 6 percent, twice bigger than the global economic growth in the same period of time, and a growth rhythm 3.5 times faster than the Euro zone one). The BSEC countries' GDP were, in 2005, about 3.4 billion US dollars, which represented 7.6 percent from the world's economy. The direct foreign investments into the region reached 72 billion US dollars in 2006, over-throwing the record of 47 billion US dollars obtained in 2005 and overtaking about 9 times the one of 8 billion US dollars from 2000, when the growth started highly. The BSEC countries' quota in the world's economy is in continuous progress.

The mentioned evolution projected the BSEC region among the notable international and regional organizations. Romania has a substantial contribution to these accomplishments. Its share to the BSEC activity comprises: to sustain strength the collaboration relations with EU, conform with the BSEC passing to the operational phase and the new ENP; to initiate the BSEC involvement process in the security and defence dimension into the Black Sea region and the contribution to a viable concept elaboration in this regard, as well as to identify the means to grow the organization's contribution into the field; to launch the BSEC reform and rebuilding process – with the decisions implementation surveillance, structures' reformation, the growth of the observer states' contributions to the organization's activities; to support an Additional Protocol signing to BSEC Agreement regarding the cooperation on combating the organized crime, with an accent on combating



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terrorism, and, also, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between BSEC and SECI from Bucharest, to transfer its personal experience in the Black Sea area; to promote, as a NATO and EU member state, the BSEC objectives in the framework of the international forums and to sustain the organization's visibility growth.

When it held the organization's presidency, Romania developed a partnership relation between BSEC and EU, also from its rebuilding perspective, strengthened the BSEC security and stability dimension, supported the Eastern European and Caucasus states' efforts in consolidating the democratic processes and the reforms imposed by the transition to the market economy, for creating a safe and attractive business field and, also, led the member-states to elaborate and implement some consistent development projects, in the trade development between the Black Sea basin states, in the extension of the BSEC collaboration with other regional and international organizations.

The actual anniversary reunion traced as an organizations' objective to enlarge the promotion cooperation bases in the energy, commerce and transport fields.

The favourable economic perspectives allow BSEC to fix more ambitious tasks, to elaborate wide regional strategic projects and to accomplish them efficaciously. The member-states' Foreign Affairs Ministers were invited to elaborate new international juridical documents in the main fields (energy, trade, transport), without prejudicing other international engagements of the organization's members. The participants to the summit proposed to the Foreign Affairs Ministers Council to modify the BSEC economic objectives in regard that, in the last five years, the Black Sea riparian countries encountered a very fast economic development, among the fastest in the world, and reached a high level of macro-economic stability and responsibility in the financial administration.

The main issue debated in the actual BSEC high level reunion was the transport ranges of natural gases and oil to the European market. The dispute was among the two main gas-lines: Nabucco, financed by the European Union, will be transporting natural gases from the Caspian area, via Turkey, toward Austria, and, consequently, Gazprom project, a Russian company that proposes the Blue Stream pipe extension. The Nabucco project is a solution to put into practice the EU

strategy to diversify the gas-lines directions to the Western continent, will be transporting gas from Iran, Iraq, Caspian region and, eventually, Russia, through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary toward Austria, weakening the Russia's monopole in the gases export field of the region. The South Stream gasoduct which will transport the Russian natural gases to the Western Europe will have a length of 900 km and a capacity of 30 billion cubic metres. This will be built by the Russian Gazprom and the Italian Eni companies, expecting offers of participation and construction enterprises from other countries, will transit the Black Sea turning about Turkey, will exit to surface in Bulgaria, where will ramify to Austria and Slovenia, respectively, the South of Italy.

The European Commission doesn't regard the South Stream project as a rival for Nabucco and appreciates each new infrastructure is useful to assure the provision with energy of the 27 Union's member-states.

Although the president Putin considers, in the same context, that the Gazprom project will bring an improvement to the Europe's energy provision, is obvious that each project protects certain economic interests: Russia's (South Stream), EU states and Turkey's (Nabucco). Even Gazprom will continue to work with Turkey (according to the enterprise's spokesman declaration) to the gas' delivery plan through Turkey, toward Israel, by the Blue Stream pipe. The idea to extend the Blue Stream to the South-Eastern Europe introduces new, unpredictable elements in fuel provisioning.

In regard with the same energy problem, the Romanian appreciation was that there will be necessary a deepening of the field's cooperation, activity that still remains desiderate.

Romania sustains a balanced approach in this sector bringing benefits to all the region states in equal conditions but also for the energy investments to take into account many factors – the assurance of a modern infrastructure, the attraction of the investments in the new technologies, the improvement of the investment climate by adopting structural reforms consequently with the corporate responsibility level growth, also for the environmental protection.

Reminding the cooperation importance in the energy field to the Black Sea, the Russian Federation, which reaffirmed to the summit its return in the region, when its geo-strategic interests



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never died, underlined the fact that BSEC, despite its evident successes, is far from demonstrating all its potential and that is necessary a growth of stability on Black Sea energy markets inclusive by the enlargement of the long-term contracts practice. Russia wants to diversify the range of energy supply, to create new energy schemes for ensuring and sharing the financial risks between the partners through the active exchanges. Turkey, which got the BSEC presidency, asked for a consolidated cooperation in the transports, energy, environment and fight against organized crime fields.

A very generous mega-project is the Black Sea highway that will connect Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria, on 7.250 kilometres length.

This project demarche, which will be integrated in sea's highways network, was made by the Foreign Ministers of the BSEC member-states, to the ministerial conference from Belgrade, April, where they signed a MOU. The initiative, introduced by some Romanian experts when we held the organization's presidency, was advanced on the Istanbul summit agenda by the Russian Federation, which, among May – October 2006, when it was to the BSEC presidency, continued the priorities settled by the Romanian presidency that preceded it regarding the BSEC reform and the consolidation of the relation with EU, but also proposed the building of a circular highway around the Black Sea. The transport infrastructure improvement of the countries situated around the Black Sea has a remarkable economic impact because will promote the trade and tourism, substantially helping the intraregional cooperation.

The second project regards the maritime transport development in the Black Sea region by the construction of "Roll on-Roll off" terminals with charge/discharge.

It is noticeable that one of the Bucharest's proposals from the organization's Romanian presidency period was referring to renew some ferryboat lines on the Black Sea, a re-edition on a larger scale of the old line existent between Constanța and Istanbul in the interwar period.

Romania pointed out, in the summit frameworks, its idea which strongly fought when owned the BSEC presidency: the one that the organization can't function as a close structure, isolated from the Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia or Middle East's political, economic or security evolutions,

the Black Sea region benefits some advantages that transcend the economic dimension. Therefore, there was underlined that "we need to ensure a platform to express beyond the narrow limits of this sectorial perspective".

Although Turkey strongly sustains, from its desire to join the EU, at least Romania's proposal to intensify the organization's relations with the European community, which could give assistance BSEC to some major projects implementation, contributing to the regional stability, still, on its presidency period, doesn't seem willing to overcome the sectorial approach of the vision oriented toward projects, adopted by BSEC, so that gives priority to developments from the trade and investments, transport, energy, environment and organized crime combating fields.

Or, the Romanian initiative called the Forum for Dialogue and Partnership regards "a reunion of the citizens' interests beyond the geopolitical constraints".

Unfortunately, as it was expected, such initiative pursuing to create a platform to identify a set of values and fields being able to facilitate the reach of some larger objectives, shared by everyone: understanding, dialogue, trust and tolerance, cooperation, efficiency, solidarity, is ignored by the states as Russia that wants the organization to remain into the actual stage of the unsolved problematic for a long time.

Romania still hopes to make itself understandable in its demarche to accomplish this certain forum complementary BSEC, which will offer "the necessary frame for the relation development between the decision factors and non-governmental actors, inclusive extra-regional, interested in our region".

That is why we stressed out that "the absence of some institutional constraints, which doesn't need political consent, as well as the indispensable projects' accomplishment platform, inclusive political, in public-private partnership, are advantages that confer to the Forum a certain place" in the regional Black Sea area.

In the same context there was also launched the Romanian proposal to draw a consulting mechanism among BSEC and the other regional initiatives, on common agenda themes, of "encouraging by concrete demarches the synergy between the Black Sea existing formats and the promoted cooperation projects".



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We may state that the 15th BSEC anniversary represented, in regard with the former summits, the moment to demarche some new important projects for the Wider Black Sea Area, but also, to emphasize some facts which could redirect the organization activity on wider coordinates in the future, for the use of regional countries stability, security and prosperity and not only.

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POLICY AND STRATEGY OF THE STATE

Jaroslav GRYZ, PhD

The article concentrates on the states possibility to conduct policy and strategy in the social environment, through shaping it basing on a vision, mission and task – aims that define the structures of the state authorities, and finally through the ability or its lack to counter threats, face challenges, take advantage of existing and potential opportunities. The range of the undertaken activities, their scope in time and space decide if the state is capable or incapable of: accomplishing its mission which is to ensure the existence and development of the society; pursuing a defined vision of the state and society, thus shaping a desired existence and development; creating and achieving defined tasks that aim at ensuring the existence and development.

The state as a political power entity is an imperative of an immediate and long-term policy and strategy of those ones who influence its shape and character.

Therefore, the way to ensure the existence and development of the state in changeable social and political conditions depends largely on the ability to create and implement the strategy as a form of carrying out a long-term policy which is deeply rooted in values, needs, interests and aims that basically should be the derivative of the society's aspirations.

This article reflects on the role of policy and strategy in shaping the state. It refers to the theory of the problem showing the ways – methods to shape the policy and strategy of the state.

The viewpoints presented in the article concentrate on: the state, its policy and strategy, the role of strategic review in their carrying out; the importance of policy and strategy for the state; the issue of policy and strategy establishing (formulating); conclusions for Poland resulting from the undertaken considerations.

The result of the considerations is to show a relatively complex image of policy and strategy formulating and their role in shaping the state.

The state versus policy and strategy, a strategic review

The state, as an independent entity, in G. Jellinek's classical approach, defined as a territory, population and power, is both the effect and result of a policy. This policy is understood as a drive to exercise power, to hold it, ensure existence and development basing on it as well as access to goods and their distribution by the society. The tie between the policy and strategy, i.e. the long-term concept of political activity in time and space using available, potential and generated means and assets, is the basic factor to shape the existence and the development of the state.

Numerous approaches to strategy as a concept and at the same time a tool to shape defined states of reality and/or consciousness are expressed in the literature on the subject in different fields of study. They all emphasise various aspects of peculiarly understood (political, economic, social, cultural and military) strategy. However, all of them stress out one value – the concept of organisational activities conducted using different methods and tools in a social environment. On this background, the state becomes one of the imperatives of both policy and strategy as well.

Shaping the state, its social and political structures, organisational and normative forms is such a vast area of interest that it is not possible here to avoid characterising opinions, standpoints and evaluations that have been formed in history. From the politological perspective, the most essential was the connection between the power (authority) and society, either within the ancient *polis*, the Republic of the Roman times, medieval cities-states, or finally modern states and contemporary international communities representing them.

It is not an accident that the concept of action – strategy – and the effectiveness of its pursuance have become more and more vital for the human societies. Consciousness that was shaped during



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the course of social evolution made the greatest change in this matter. That change is expressed in the departure from the interpretation of social reality as a result of acting unknown nature forces personified as gods or a demiurge – creator to understanding that the social world surrounding us derives from human activity or its lack, the ability to wield power or not holding it, the skill (or its lack) of conceptual linking all resources in order to achieve desired results.¹

According to R. S. Cline's classic approach to a strategic meaning of the state, it makes the sum of power, critical mass in the sense of population and territory, economic and military potential, strategy and the will to pursue it.² In this formula, strategy and the will to pursue it are the most essential to ensure power (authority) and influence. The other components may be more or less precise measures, but strategy and the will to pursue it are the most decisive about policy, striving for power and its wielding, ensuring the existence and development of an entity, access to goods and their distribution by the state.

Policy and strategy define the existence and development of the state. This truism allows stating that it happens due to the ability to ensure it in relation to values, needs, interests, aims that condition the pursuance of policy and strategy of the state in the short-, medium- and long-term perspective. Thanks to these abilities or their lack, the state generates in time and space its strength, power, and influence that it exercises upon other entities: states and their organisations, communities and society, the nation. Policy and strategy are conditioned by challenges, threats, opportunities for the entity to exist and develop, i.e. its vision, mission and tasks which it undertakes or carries out.

Another truism is a statement that a skilful combination of policy and strategy determines the success of activities in all (social, cultural, economic and security) areas of the state. Policy and strategy are usually changeable and constantly updated (generally within the so-called strategic review, which periodically verifies the strategy assumptions).

The role of the strategic review as a tool to analyse the strategy of the state in the internal and external dimensions, recognising strengths and weaknesses, verifying the potential (of realistic possibilities), forming basis for future strategic

(political, economic, social, cultural and military) activities is of utmost importance.³ It allows correcting policy and strategy, making them the two mutually complementary elements. Due to this, the chosen direction of policy and strategy, expressed as aims deriving from interests, needs and values of a society – nation is constantly maintained, although the forms and ways of its pursuing might change.⁴ Moreover, taking advantage of the strategic review as a tool to verify assumptions, ways of pursuing policy allows conducting:

- a) constant strategy analysis in the internal and external dimension of the entity;
- b) recognising its strengths and weaknesses;
- c) verifying its potential (real possibilities);
- d) verifying the basis of future strategic activities.⁵

Therefore, the statement that using the strategic review in formulating policy and strategy of the state plays an essential role to ensure successfully or unsuccessfully its existence and development is just a truism.

The importance of policy and strategy for the state

Considering the problem of policy and strategy importance for shaping the political power, the existence and development of the state, there must be stressed out the necessity of appearing (or its lack) several factors that decide about that significance. They are:

- knowledge, skills and abilities of a society-nation and how they are used;
- conceptual and intellectual ability of social adaptations to changing conditions;
- organisational culture appearing in political power structures and in social structures (ability to mobilise, organise and accomplish undertaken activities);
- means and assets – possessed or potential.

These factors decide about pursuing policy and strategy, wielding power and basing it on ensuring existence and development, access to goods and their distribution by the state.

The requirement of complexity that appears in a mutual relationship between policy and strategy makes one wonder about the way of their shaping. Using the theoretical approach, a few complementary levels may be distinguished on which they emerge and intermingle. These are:



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-the level of general policy and strategy on which general aims, interests, needs and values of the state which decide on its future vision and mission are defined;

-the level of policy and strategy in specific fields concentrating on selected areas of the state (social, cultural, economic and security) activity;

-the level of sector policy and strategy relating to selected sectors of social, cultural, micro- and macro-economic, defence or military development (see Fig. 1).

This type of approach basically refers to the internal dimension of policy and strategy. The external dimension will be, first of all, conditioned by pursuing policy and strategy of an entity.

internal policy penetrates the external one and there also appears the correlation between community and state strategy. On this background, there also takes place the correlation of aims, interests and needs and consequently disseminating common values between countries which create international institutions, organisations and communities.

Relating to the policy and strategy of the state importance in the context of formulating them, first of all, the categories of scientific recognition which determine the mutual connection must be presented. They include the mentioned above challenges, threats, opportunities that fulfil the functions of evaluation criteria referring to the essence, range, character of the policy and strategy of the state, both in internal and external dimensions. These criteria, in the context of the policy and strategy of

Policy of the state / Strategy of the state

General politics and strategy

Social and cultural policy / Social and cultural strategy

Economic policy / Economic strategy

Security policy / Security strategy

Policies and strategies of specific fields

Social policy /

Social strategy

Cultural policy /

Cultural strategy

Macro-economic policy/

Macro-economic strategy

Micro-economic policy /

Micro-economic strategy

Defence policy /

Defence strategy

Military policy /

Military strategy

Sector policies and strategies

Fig. 1: Policy and strategy of the state

Source: the author's own elaboration

Referring to the policy and strategy of the state conducted in the external dimension, they will be the effect of mutual interactions between the entity and its environment in the context of existing and potential opportunities, challenges and threats.⁶ This causes that states, in case of a growing complexity of interaction deriving from globalisation processes, to a greater extent cede their policy and strategy pursuance to international communities created by these states.⁷ In effect,

the state, do not appear intrinsically but are usually related to the vision, mission and aim of the entity. It must be also stressed out that:

- the vision of the entity usually expresses a conceptual readiness to meet challenges, threats and opportunities that usually determine its activities to ensure existence and development in a medium and long-term perspective;

- the mission of the entity defines the way of its current activities to ensure existence and development in relation to existing (recognised) challenges, threats and opportunities;

- the aims of the entity establish the direction of activities (conducted or undertaken) in relation to existing (recognised) and forecasted challenges, threats and opportunities.⁸

The vision, mission and aims of the entity are at all times connected with challenges, threats and opportunities which are recognised basing on international (global, supra-regional, regional, sub-regional and local) security paradigm.⁹ It has to be stressed out that aims derive from interests, needs and values to which the entity security is related to. All in all, they (i.e. vision, mission, and aims of the entity, challenges, threats and opportunities) make a set of nine security components of the entity which are described on the paradigm of international (global, regional, sub-regional and local) security.

It is relatively easy to subordinate these nine components as “obverse” and “reverse” of this set which decides on the existence and development of the state, its policy and strategy. In the cognitive approach they look as in Figure 2:

- a) vision of the entity – challenges, threats, opportunities;
- b) mission of the entity – challenges, threats, opportunities;
- c) aims of the entity – challenges, threats, and opportunities.

Whereas the vision, mission and aim – aims of the state remain basically stable, the way of carrying them out, this concept of activity in time and space, i.e. strategy, is subject to permanent influence of challenges, threats and opportunities. It is worth emphasizing that the mentioned above components determine:

- the abilities of the state to face the challenges of existence and development;
- the sensitivity of the state to threats to existence and development and ability to counteract them;
- ability of the state to create and take advantage of opportunities, in order to ensure the existence and the development.

The mentioned above solutions are usually applied in political, military, economic, social and cultural security policy and strategy in national and supranational dimensions formulated by the entity.

Taking into considerations the criteria defining the policy and strategy of the state such as challenges, threats and opportunities for the mission, vision and aims of the entity’s activities, one must underline their specific functions of their formulating. The mentioned criteria are an immanent feature of a social environment and as such they define it. Thus, they define the perception of existence and development of a community, society, nation or state.




Fig.2: Policy and strategy of the state
Source: the author’s own elaboration

In relation to challenges, threats and opportunities, there is usually formulated an

evaluation of the state condition, whereas the category of threats plays a vital role in this evaluation. It is worth stressing out that threats and challenges play a “catalyst” role of scientific recognition, whereas opportunities are frequently neglected, which might result from cognitive relativity, what is “an opportunity” for one entity and what is not. Nevertheless, while defining their importance in formulating the policy and strategy of the state, it may be assumed that they are permanent cognitive catalysts. As a result, one might and should attempt describing the challenges, threats and opportunities in the context of their importance for the policy and strategy of the state. They will include:

- challenges, understood as a set of factors, the selection of which defines the entity’s negative or positive state of existence and development and its security¹⁰;
- threats, understood as a set of factors that react in a negative way to the entity’s existence and development¹¹;
- opportunities, understood as a set of factors that react in a positive way to the entity’s existence and development.¹²

The approach which has been adopted enables both showing the complexity of the policy and strategy of the state and primary variables that define them. Moreover, it shows the importance of policy and strategy to ensure the existence and development of the state, political power and its condition.

Formulating the policy and strategy of the state

The state’s formulating and pursuing of policy basing on strategy becomes one of the main and at the same time most difficult contemporary issues we face in Polish political reality. The essential issues are the organisation of power in the state, legal and organisational norms that play a key role in effective or ineffective pursuance of policy and strategy.

In relation to Polish political and social reality, it has to be stressed out that it remains in *statu crescendi*. This results from political and social transformations that have been taking place since 1989 and their consequences. This situation exerts an influence upon formulating and pursuing the policy and strategy of the state in a similar way

as preparing political elites to hold power in the country. The historical context is also crucial because it influences the abilities to formulate and pursue the policy and strategy of the state.¹³

In connection with the above mentioned arguments, one is authorised to make a conclusion that the real need of the state is to undertake actions which would consequently contribute to creating a system of making modifications, implementations of strategy as well as other related documents. The above conclusion results in a number of implications, first of all of organisational nature (Fig.3).




Fig.3: Basic categories of political decision theories

Source: PIETRAŚ Z. J., **Decydowanie polityczne** (Political Decision Making), Warszawa-Kraków 1998, p. 46.

It is assumed that staying currently in an undesirable decision-making situation one should first of all undertake activities to change it in order to:

- give an explicit answer what strategy as a form of pursuing politics is to be like;
- create legal norms that precisely define the role and importance of strategy;
- create a system of organisational connections (ties) due to which the participation of the institution of state in strategy working out and modification will be based on uniform criteria.

In the current situation, strategies are received and issued with a great deal of arbitrariness. Nevertheless, even not taking this important aspect into account, it is vital that Polish strategies, except one – National Integration Strategy – do not have legal norms that would be binding for all state bodies.¹⁴

Furthermore, the lack of complex norms in the area of policy and strategy formulating in Poland causes that there is not an explicit strategy location in the context of formulating and pursuing the

policy of the state. In effect, there are no solutions that could contribute to:

- shaping organisational culture in which policy and strategy could be closely connected;
- rationalisation and operationalisation of the state activities in all (political, economic, social, cultural, security) areas of the policy of the state;
- creating possibly most effective means (tool) of the policy of the state.

Here one has to refer to the changes in the conditions of strategy shaping and implementing as a tool of the policy of the state to create a social and political reality. These changes should be connected with the process of researching the strategy surrounding, building and improving.

The example in this area might be the drive for creating mutually complementing procedures of researching the surrounding, strategy building and improving process, as well as the process of strategy implementation in the state (Figure 4).

This research, through determining the state of the surrounding where the policy and strategy of the state are pursued, makes up a basic element of strategy shaping and improvement.¹⁵ Due to applying the mentioned above procedures, there will be possible:

- identification, monitoring, forecast, as well as individual and group evaluation of processes, phenomena and events in the context of their implications for the existence and development of the state in the internal and external dimensions;
- the analysis of internal and external surroundings and formulating, in relation to them, strategic options, the choice of short, long or medium-term strategy;
- adjusting the organisational structure, personnel policy, creating an appropriate organisational culture in the state.

Taking into consideration the issue of using the research on surrounding in formulating




Fig. 4: The research of surrounding in the process of strategic management

Source: BEDNARCZYK M. (2001), **Organizacje publiczne. Zarządzanie konkurencyjnością** (Public Organisations. Management of competitiveness), Warszawa – Kraków, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, pp. 74-75, with the author's change in the table of organisational culture instead of initial culture harmonisation.

the policy and strategy of the state, it has to be stressed out that it is necessary for the state to have its own vision, mission and aim – aims of activity to ensure existence and development, access to goods and their distribution, method of wielding power. The vision, mission and aim of the state provide the basis to any activities, the

success of which is determined by political will and conceptual readiness to meet challenges, face threats and taking advantage of opportunities. In this context, the existing normative developments either created or lifted, and human actions deeply rooted in the culture of a social organisation, are also of vital importance. The prosperity of the state (or its lack) in the social reality of the 21st century is connected with the ability to ensure it in relation to values, needs, interests and aims that condition pursuing the policy and strategy in the short, medium and long-term perspective.¹⁶ The strategic review plays an essential role as it verifies periodically the assumptions of (global, area and sector¹⁷) strategies in relation to changes in social and political reality.

Conclusions for Poland?

Drawing conclusions for Poland basing on the presented opinions and viewpoints it has to be stated that developments existing in Poland relating to formulating policy and strategy, their pursuance and modifications are not permanent and undergo changes.

This situation results from Poland's political system transformations and not completely shaped mechanisms of pursuing the policy and strategy of the state. It derives from the situation in which the development of science in Poland after the Second World War was for many dozens of years conditioned by ideological and political factors which determined the scope and subject of the research. Hence many areas of social studies, first of all, modern history, suffered limitations. Such a situation also influenced research in the fields of management, strategy or security.

Therefore, in many fields of social studies, particularly the study of politics, one can notice a relatively late development. This exerted a negative influence on the achievements of Polish research.¹⁸

It is a truism to say that the prosperity of the state, its existence and development depend on the abilities of the authorities' representatives (in the Polish legal system – the Prime Minister and President).

The sum of their activities determines the abilities of social structures to counteract threats, face challenges and take advantage of opportunities. Therefore, the further considerations

should begin with the reflection that in those states that have stable mechanisms of wielding power the policy of the state is usually expressed through its short, medium and long-term strategy. Its role, which is to achieve the aims of the state, pursue its interests, ensure needs, introduces an extraordinarily stable mechanism, thanks to which changing governments carry out in fact the same political "scenario". Hence in countries enjoying long traditions of pursuing policy through strategy, the strategy of the state as a derivative of general strategy and area strategies performs the function of a creator of all activities which are to ensure the existence and development of the state and it also conditions the shape and character of sector strategies. In connection with this, relating to the ways of formulating strategies, both in Poland and in other countries, three criteria have to be stressed out which decide on the strategy importance:

- normalisation in the legal system;
- the necessity to accomplish tasks imposed by strategy in internal and external dimensions through so called strategic management;
- obligatory necessity of verification.

Thus, an assumption can be made, as a reference point for further considerations that the lack of comprehensive developments in Poland's policy causes that our strategy shapes its prosperity in a conventional (stipulated) and at the same time limited way. This situation results from:

- the lack of vision relating to the role and significance of strategy in the context of legal and organisational norms binding in Poland;
- insufficient basis in the form of legal and organisational norms allowing applying such a tool of the policy of the state as its strategy is;
- lack of systemic solutions connected with working out and implementing strategy in national and supra-national dimensions.

These lacks explicitly allow stating that the present stage of working out conceptual developments in the area of applying strategy in the policy of the state in internal and external dimensions may exert influence:

- in the short-term perspective, on defining strategy as a tool of the policy of the state;
- medium-term perspective, on applying strategy as a tool of the policy of the state;
- long-term perspective, on the way to ensure the existence and development of the state using strategy as a tool of the policy of the state.

Accompanying developments of legislative and organisational nature will determine the conceptual abilities to meet challenges, threats and opportunities which appear in the social reality in national and supranational dimensions at the threshold of the 21st century.¹⁹ From the Polish legislature perspective, this creates a context for two fundamental matters:

1. the legal importance of a document or documents in the form of strategy;

2. applying a document or documents in the form of strategy in the Polish legal system and in the state.

Taking into account the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland defining democratic rule of law (Art. 2), these issues gain additional importance in the political system context in which the *Sejm* (Parliament) makes law, the government applies it and courts safeguard it. Moreover, these matters necessitate asking questions:

- what force and effect have any of Polish strategies adopted after 1997 (National Integration Strategy);

- how the role and importance of strategy should be normalised in the Polish legal system;

- how important security strategy is for the legislative, executive or judicial power bodies.

These problems only apparently have their mere legislative context because in a significant way they determine the shape of organisational developments and activities undertaken by the state. On this background one may ask questions concerning the effectiveness of conducting “National Integration Strategy” or “National Plan of Development” (the Bill of 20th of April 2004). In spite of the fact that both of them refer to different stages of Poland’s integration with the European Union, they essentially imply both Poland’s preparation for membership in the EU and its functioning in the first stage after becoming a Member State.

Taking into account statistics showing using the funds in 2004-2006, as an element of real verification and not of declared readiness of Poland’s functioning in the EU, in the context of taking advantage of the EU funds, the evaluation of preparing to the membership and the initial period of Poland’s presence forces giving a very low mark. Both the state of internal preparation and existing in external (EU) reality prove that conceptual work,

intellectual readiness to meet the requirements of the great European project and responsibility for our own country are not sufficient, not to say – slender among political and social elites.²⁰ This situation has resulted in missing opportunities and, therefore, not meeting challenges and existing threats, e.g. social ones (pathologies, breaking social ties, family disintegration, young Polish people’s emigration). The example discussed here shows explicitly that the state, as an imperative of policy and strategy, is an entity requiring a complex approach which may be ensured by general, field (area) and sector strategies.

The lack of legal norms leads to the situation in which strategy, i.e. long-term policy concept, is situated in a legislative “vacuum”. That is why it is currently difficult to evaluate explicitly the importance of a document or documents which are adopted in Poland as strategies. Do they apply only to the present policy? Do they really shape the state, its society in accordance with its long-term needs, interests and aims? Is there anything that could replace strategy as a concept uniting the vision, mission and aims of the state? There are no straightforward answers because there is no explicit answer to the question what strategy should be for the Republic of Poland – a normative document or a political manifesto, an expression of the will of executive power bodies or a legislative basis of work concerning the development of the state. And finally what importance should be given to the document called strategy.

In spite of the arguments mentioned above, referring to the issue how the strategy role and importance should be normalised in the Polish legal system, one has to try to give at least partial answers. Based on the analysis of binding legal developments in Poland, one may think that the strategy of the state and its derivatives in the Polish social reality should have the character of the bill or the effect of a decree issued by the government (e.g. based on the bill on the strategy [strategies] of the state). The importance of the Bill defining the essence of strategy for the state’s policy is a fundamental issue in the context of undertaking activities. In the current situation, the existing developments are unclear and require precise definition.

Relating to the matter of the importance of strategy for the legislative, executive and judiciary power bodies, one has to take into consideration the

insufficiency of normative developments. Hence a conclusion can be drawn that current strategies are merely the expression of drives towards shaping the social reality in a situation where there are no skills to create strategy and in the same way to use it as a tool to pursue the policy of the state. In Poland, this judgement results from several premises, mainly due to the lack of:

- legal norms which would explicitly locate strategy as a document of normative, and whole-state character;
- systemic solutions (developments) which would clearly connect the policy with the strategy of the state in general, field (area) and sector dimensions;
- ties between security policy – security strategy and social, cultural and economic policies – strategies;
- correlation between sector (social, cultural, macro- and micro-economic) strategies and defence and military strategies.

The above opinion forces reflection that in Poland there should be created capabilities to overview the social reality in a complex way in supranational and national dimensions both in time and space.²¹ Again, this reflection draws attention to another crucial problem mentioned earlier, connected with strategy (strategies) of the state, namely the lack of organisational norms in its/ their construction, review and pursuing.

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ZIĘBA R. (2004), **Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego** (European Security Institutionalisation), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, edition IV.

NOTES:

¹ Regarding the matter of shaping social consciousness in the area of the existence and development of the state, C. Rutkowski's statement can be quoted that "[...] The current state of knowledge and the level of theory order and its inclusion in the service of practice do not allow, unfortunately, formulating explicit and ready practical activity directives. What we can do (...) is to shape the consciousness of changes, the feeling of new, different approach, to show and explain directions and trends of transformations and to call for a general character of desired actions and necessary skills." C. RUTKOWSKI (2004), **Zarządzanie strategiczne na drodze ku nowej filozofii i nowym paradygmatom** (Strategic Management on the Road to New Philosophy and New Paradigms), Warszawa, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, p. 60.

² $P = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$ where, P means Power, C – Critical Mass (i.e. population and territory), E – Economic Potential, M – Military Potential, S – Strategy, W – Will to pursue strategy. CLINE R. S. (1975), **World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift**, Westview Press, Boulder, p. 11.

³ More in C. RUTKOWSKI, **Przegląd strategiczny jako narzędzie polityki** (Strategic Management as a Tool of Politics), Warszawa, 2003.

⁴ An example in the area of achieving the aim of policy which was Poland's drive for the EU membership are the provisions included in the introduction to the document called **Narodowa strategia integracji** (National Integration Strategy): "*Membership in the European Union is Poland's strategic aim. The integration with the European Union serves the acceleration of its economic development, modernisation of economy and legal system, bridging the development gap between Poland and other European countries. Polish strives to be an EU member results from the best understood national interests. In the general balance of accession's advantages and costs, positive effects explicitly outweigh. It is undoubtedly proven by experiences of countries which joined the European Economic Community and then the European Union. This mainly refers to the experiences of these states whose economic level differed from the EU countries' economies. Then the EU membership appeared to be stimulating for the development and prosperity. Poland will also follow this way*". **Narodowa Strategia Integracji** (National Integration Strategy), Komitet Integracji Europejskiej (Committee for European Integration), Warszawa, 1997, p. 1, see

also Part I, pp. 7-9.

⁵ RUTKOWSKI C., **op.cit.**, p. 37 and the following.

⁶ As S.P. Sałajczyk stresses out, "[...] *In case of political strategy – directed to social surroundings – it basically means the necessity to act on entities (states, institutions, social groups, individuals) whom the chances of policy success depend on*". Establishing the existing state of facts nowadays in the situation of the lack of complex approach towards the policy and strategy of the state, the possibility to exert influence upon states, institutions, social groups and individuals becomes more and more limited. One reason for this is not well coordinated political, economic, social and cultural activities of the state. S.P. SAŁAJCZYK, *Strategia w polityce współczesnych państw. Aspekty teoretyczne* (Strategy in the Policy of Contemporary States. Theoretical Aspects), in KUŹNIAR R. (ed.) (2004), **Między polityką a strategią** (Between Policy and Strategy), Warszawa, Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, p. 20.

⁷ The example of ceding policy and strategy to an international community is the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union, included in Title I and Art. A, "*This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples*". It is also worth paying attention to Art.C, which states that "*The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the <acquis communautaire>. The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies*", The Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union, 07.02.1992.

⁸ GRYZ J. (2004), *Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* – rola i znaczenie w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa państwa (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland – Role and Importance in Shaping the Security of the State), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa, no. 4, p. 56 and the following.

⁹ GRYZ J. (2005), *Paradygmat bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego pierwszej dekady XXI wieku* (International Security Paradigm in the First Decade of the 21st century), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa, no. 4, pp. 57-59.

¹⁰ As R. Zięba points out, threats are frequently

presented as a too broadly expressed set of negative phenomena which include challenges for the security policy of the entity. Due to the fact that they seem difficult to overcome, they are included in the category of dangers which are perceived as threats. ZIĘBA R. (2004), **Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego** (European Security Institutionalisation), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Edition IV, p. 29.

¹¹ As R. Zięba claims the perception of external threats by a given entity may reflect a real state of facts (real or potential threat) or might be false. This aspect as well as great changeability in time and space of elements involved in security cause troubles in the process of their recognition. Ibidem, p. 28.

¹² According to the author, opportunities are connected with the conceptual and intellectual readiness of various countries' leaders to use the resources they possess to pursue policy in changing international conditions so as to ensure existence and development. This results in the necessity to have common vision, mission and aim and also the subordination of means and assets to these three criteria. This poses both a challenge and opportunity enabling together with other countries to ensure needs, pursue interests, achieve aims in all (political, security, economic, social and cultural) areas of the state activity in all (global, regional, sub-regional) dimensions in normative and organisational levels. GRYZ J. (2004), **Proces instytucjonalizacji stosunków transatlantyckich** (The Process of Transatlantic Relations Institutionalisation), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, p. 226.

¹³ GRYZ J., *Badania nad strategicznym zarządzaniem bezpieczeństwem* (Research on Security Strategic Management), in DAWIDCZYK A., GRYZ J., KOZIEJ S. (2006), **Zarządzanie strategiczne bezpieczeństwem. Teoria – praktyka – dydaktyka** (Security Strategic Management. Theory – Practice – Didactics), Łódź, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Humanistyczno – Ekonomicznej, pp. 44-48.

¹⁴ According to the Bill of 29.08.2002 r. on martial law and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and principles of his subordination to constitutional bodies of the Republic of Poland (Dz.U.2002 No 156 Clause 1301) Chapter VI, Art. 35, "*The President of the Republic of Poland safeguarding the sovereignty and security of the state, the inviolability and integrity of its territory, in particular shall: 1. approve, on request of the Prime Minister, the national security strategy; 2. issue, on request of the Prime Minister, in the way of regulation, Political-Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland and other executive documents for the national security strategy.*" The way of approving the document and its publication explicitly results from these regulations only in the scope of security strategy. Due to the hierarchy of sources of law in

Poland, after the Constitution of 1997 came into force, this strategy as well as many similar ones is not in fact legally normalised and thus binding for all bodies. For more about the sources of law in Poland, CIEŚLAK Z., JASIELSKI J., LANG J., SZUBIAKOWSKI M., WIERZBOWSKI M., WIKTOROWSKA A. (1999), **Prawo administracyjne** (Administrative Law), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 31 and following.

¹⁵ As M. Bednarczyk underlines in the adopted Harvard's model of researching the surrounding, the results of this research and internal analysis of an institution enable formulating strategic options and making a choice of strategies on different levels and ranges including the whole organisation (...) and functional areas. Indeed, the level (...) and range (functional areas) of strategy building determine the course of the researching the surrounding process. BEDNARCZYK M. (2001), **op. cit.**, p. 75.

¹⁶ S.P. SAŁAJCZYK, *Strategia w polityce współczesnych państw. Aspekty teoretyczne* (Strategy in the Policy of Contemporary States. Theoretical Aspects), in R. KUŹNIAR (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 20.

¹⁷ C. RUTKOWSKI, **Przegląd strategiczny jako narzędzie polityki** (Strategic Management as a Tool of Politics), Warszawa, 2003.

¹⁸ Taking into consideration the above mentioned weaknesses of Polish research, there has to be noticed their substantial differentiation in relation to three basic areas of security strategic management, i.e. strategy, management and security. In case of strategy, J. Kukułka holds an exceptional position in research. He is the first post-war scholar who, in a complex and innovatory way, greatly contributed to research in this field. KUKUŁKA J. (1978), **Problemy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych** (Problems of International Relations Theory), Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, pp. 118-156, J. GRYZ, *Badania nad strategicznym zarządzaniem bezpieczeństwem* (Research on Security Strategic Management), in DAWIDCZYK A., **op. cit.**, pp. 44-48.

¹⁹ As R. Kuźniar states, "[...] *The breaking line separates knowledge about our external surrounding, activities directed towards us, existential interests of the state and directions of their pursuance from conditions necessary to work out a strategy (fulfilling strategic plan rigours) and its long-term pursuing. However, it must be made clear that the statement mentioned above does not mean the helplessness of the state in the light of internal and external challenges; it merely means its significantly smaller effectiveness in comparison with the situation when the state could operate on a broad strategic basis.*" R. KUŹNIAR, **op. cit.**, p. 174.

²⁰ The example of pursuing policy and strategy is the use of €12.8 billion granted to Poland by the European Commission to conduct operational programmes within



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National Development Plan (€8.6 billion within the framework of Structural Funds and €4.2 billion within Cohesion Fund).

²¹ This point of view is explained by the former Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Defence, A. Karkoszka. He states that: “[...] *As it could be possible to start a march on the way of transformation (...) without an overall plan, but the next stages of these changes, much more detailed, complicated and requiring analysis and synthesis free of the influence*


of current party policy were significantly made difficult (or even lost) because of the inability or impossibility (underlined by the author) of developing a complete, balanced and internally coherent long-term policy”.

KARKOSZKA A. (2001), Refleksje o obronie Polski końca XX wieku (Reflections on Poland's Defence at the End of the 20th Century), in R. KUŹNIAR (ed.), **Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989-2000** (Polish Security Policy 1989-2000), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, p. 588.

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VULNERABILITY, RISK, THREAT.

Security as a psycho-social representation



The world is now at the beginning of a Century whose new risks and threats to security induce the need to reconsider human values that link together states and nations. Thus, one of the 2007 suggestions for reflection and debate of the Military Publishing House is the book **Vulnerability, Risk, Threat. Security as a psycho-social representation** (*Vulnerabilitate, risc, amenințare. Securitatea ca reprezentare psihosocială*) published in the Polemos Collection and under the auspices of the National Authority for Scientific Research. The author, **Alexandra SARCINSCHI**, Ph.D., Researcher (Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, from the National Defence University “Carol I”) analyses, during book’s 212 pages, the manner in which *the individual*, as a creator of meanings, construe the world and represents the state of security to himself/herself.

The book enters upon theories of security and, simultaneously, offers for debate a methodology for security analysis that combines the existing elements with those proposed by the author – *the theory of psycho-social representation of security* –, the ones belonging to politology with those of sociology and social psychology.

The first Chapter, “The Evolution of a Controversial Concept”, is dedicated to critical analysis of security definitions: from world’s dictionaries and encyclopedias, that are the

interface for common knowledge, to international theories and school of thoughts. The author notices that the mutations inside the international security environment caused transformation of the various dimensions of security and, accordingly, the transformation of the scientific definitions and theories regarding security. The direction of transformation was from a traditional concept, typical to Cold War period and focused on military threats, to a broader one that emphasizes nonmilitary aspects of security and their impact upon security of individuals and even states. There are analyzed issues considered to be the most contemporary methodological trends such as: the broadening of security field, insecurity matrix, and globalization of insecurity.

The next step is the analysis of the newest security concepts (“New Concepts in Security Analysis”) such as human security, homeland security and privatization of security. Also, this chapter focuses on national and international security politics and strategies. It is interesting the fact that the author is using scientific criteria in choosing state and non-state entities for analyzing. The result is a group of states with prominent role in international security: USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, Germany, Turkey, PR China, Japan, and India. The same procedure is used regarding the most important security organizations: UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE. The Chapter’s conclusion is that all of the analyzed cases mirror an alternate security design characterized by most of experts as the main solution for restoring and maintaining security, for creating strong post-bipolar world security partners.

The 3rd Chapter (“Security Dimensions – Between Military and Nonmilitary, Between Tradition and Change”) defines the frontiers of security dimensions. In this approach, the author falls outside the scope of tradition and deepens the analysis by adding a new security dimension, the psycho-social one that transcends the classical dimensions (politic, military, economic, social, and environmental) and offers another perspective



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on security. The analysis of these dimensions is focused on specific issues. The political dimension is explained by issue of good and bad government. The military dimension is analyzed at state and non-state level. The economic dimension is reflected in the issue of poverty. The societal dimension is divided for operational reasons in two: keeping the collocation “societal security” to designate the objective part of society and using “cultural dimension” to explain the various aspects of human values. The importance of environmental dimension is exemplified by global warming. Finally, the new psycho-social dimension of security is explained by a comparative analysis between quality of life and mental representation of security in both Romania and EU. The psycho-social dimension expounds the manner in which some of the most important security vulnerabilities, risks, threats, and dangers – such as international terrorism, states’ failure, and organized crime – are caused by individual’s sense of insecurity as a result of degradation of human condition, developmental gaps, fight for power, divergences between individual and group interest, etc.

The 4th Chapter, “Towards a Potential Methodology for Security Analysis”, is the most important part of this book. The author argues that, at this moment, there is no coherent public scientific methodology, and suggests a pattern for security analysis. The distinctive side of this methodology gravitates around the notion of “human” as a creator of meanings, around the desire to understand the way in which humans construe the world in which they are living. It is based on the following convention: *if we agree that human actions gain meaning for us through understanding the fact that all of these meanings are built on definitions resulted from individuals’ perceptive experience, then we may use in security analyses the theory of psycho-social representation.* Accordingly, people react both on objective and subjective conditions of an event. Since the meaning has

been assigned, the behavior is governed by the designated meaning. Also, the author uses in this scientific framework Thomas Theorem (William Isaac Thomas and Dorothy Swain Thomas, 1928): *“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequence”*. Thus, the author argues that vulnerabilities and security risks, dangers, and threats are mostly subjective defined, beyond their subjective existence.

The author focuses on the theoretical framework of psycho-social representations and proves that *the theory of psycho-social representation of security*, as an interdisciplinary approach, reflects best the complexity of analyzed concept: *multidimensional, multilevel, and defined both objective and subjective.*

The pattern for security analysis is based on convention and anatomizes six dimensions of social life that have a direct impact upon national or international security. On one hand, there are five “classical” dimensions of security – political, military, economic, social, and environmental – that are analyzed by objective indicators, and, on the other hand, there is the 6th dimension, the psycho-social one that transcends the others and reflects the process of security’s subjective defining. The pattern’s indicators are absolute or relative, one-dimensional or multidimensional, state or evaluation, objective or subjective. Their complexity induces the analysis’s degree of complexity. Of course, they are selected on the basis of some work hypotheses that are presented by the author.

Therefore, this book points out the depth and the importance of individual and social construing of security. Our projections and expectations are intersecting today the need to prevent threats posed by international terrorism and climate change and the ones against moral and spiritual values. This book is whole about a universal need that is conveyed in an old concept, but more complex today than ever – *security of tomorrow.* **(A.B.)**

SPACE AND THE FUTURE OF WAR



In its intention to come into focus with significant works of scholars from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, the Strategic Studies of Security and Defence series proposes the recently issued 4th volume, **Space and the future of war**, whose author is Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD. The study presented in this book reveals the author's vision about space's role in the evolution of war.

The study is structured on 10 chapters: Introduction; *Megaconflictuality*; *Operational space*; *Battle and space*; *The essence of war*; *Romanian Forces and the space*; *Space and information*; *Tools for managing war space*; *High level asymmetry*; *Globalization and the war space*.

According to the author, the space with all its elements and characteristics generates the reasons for geopolitical and geostrategic "games" used to increase the advantages and to minimize the effect of disadvantages. The space can be easily transformed into a confrontational arena, because it holds resources and the access corridors needed to control them, influence areas, theatre for spreading the relations of power, a medium for promoting interests and accomplishing politico-military architectures, for alliances and coalitions.

One of the major aspects of this relation is, in N. Dolghin's appreciation, the armed forces metamorphosis. And there are two reasons for this metamorphosis. On one hand, there is the

high level of confrontational complexity, the increasing level of joint actions and obviously, of more simultaneous spaces used for these (the classical land, maritime, air and the newly added the cosmic space); that's why the modern military thinking, especially for alliances, calls it the integrated battle space. On the other hand, there is the diversification of the armed force's role that brings that metamorphosis. The author of the study notices that this role diversification leads to the transformation of the so-called *defence armed forces*, representative for the Cold War Era, into *security armed forces*, which are accomplishing their missions in a very broad space, at significant distance away from their national territory.

The establishment of war in a broad space will provoke a spatial-temporal dispersion of the information, a trait that emphasizes the nonlinearity of the war in an environment when taking efficient decision in real time is more than a necessity. Taking into account the increasing multidimensionality, in order to make the efficient decisions, it is fundamental for every commander to be able to take full advantage by the tools needed to manage the space of war.

The author of the study identifies these tools as it follows: **the interoperability, joint actions, long range precision fire, technical and intellectual tools, and conditional tools** (because the space of war is influenced by some *indirect circumstantial*: *political, economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, geographic and media ones*).

All these characteristics must be taken into account when the armed forces transformation process is brought in the discussion. Nevertheless, there are some traits that must be maintained and developed, as this is the case of the armed forces' **credibility**, because, as stated in the National Security Strategy, this credibility is, on one hand, a guarantee for the national territory defence, and, on the other, as the author emphasizes, is the trait that provides a maximum of efficiency for the alliances.

By the issues analyzed and the manner of approaching them, we consider that Nicolae



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Dolghin's study about the space and the future of war can come into focus not only as a theoretical work but as a necessary tool for the current and future training of every commander, the more so as the Romanian Armed Forces are actively engaged in theatres of operations with a great importance for the international security trend. **(M.D.)**



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JULY-SEPTEMBER 2007

Within this period there have been published: the bilingual volume “ESDP exigencies on Romania’s security and defence that comprises the papers presented and the debates generated during the Seminar organised by The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, on May, 24th, the volume no. 4 from *Security and Defence Studies* Series on **Space and the future of war** (author Nicolae Dolghin, PhD) and the studies: **Asymmetric warfare and the new physiognomy of the armed conflicts** (author Gheorghe Văduva, PhD) and **The military leader in Romania** (authors Constantin Moștoflei, PhD and Petre Duțu, PhD).

Following a good partnership and the Memorandum of Collaboration between The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” and the Regional Delegation for Central Europe of the International Committee of the Red Cross there will be organised the international seminar on “*Fostering the International Humanitarian Law*”. The event will take place on October, 18, on the National Defence University’s premises, on two sections: “*The norms of the international humanitarian law – reality of the military conflicts*” and “*Shaping the military conduct on supporting the humanitarian law*”. Representatives from Romanian and international institutions having responsibilities within this field will give lectures. The presented papers will be published in a volume.

The most important scientific event organised by the Centre this year is the International Annual Scientific Session on “*The dynamics of the European security environment*”, November, 22-23. Details on this event may be found on <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

Irina CUCU



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine.

The paper sent to be published should not have been published (print or online) or simultaneously submitted to another publication. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written both in Romanian and other foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, name and have to end with a short curriculum vitae, 60 words maximum, specifying the professional qualification, the institution he comes from and other information considered necessary, including the e-mail address.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

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After six years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Ministry of Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state’s organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies, etc.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, Romanian and English, and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.



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