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

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BLACK SEA REGION - EUROPEAN AND EURO- ATLANTIC SECURITY SPACE

Mircea MUREŞAN, PhD

The appearance, on January 1st, 2007, of the common border of NATO and EU at the Black Sea represents a step forward to a new dimension of this region in the sphere of security. Even if the risks, the dangers and the threats still exist, the Black Sea area offers wide opportunities in the development of the process of building a space of peace, security and prosperity. Through the development of regional military cooperation, and lately through UE effort to widen the cooperation between riparian countries from the Black Sea region, Romania, as a member of both NATO and EU, has a very active role in the wider region of the Black Sea.

This region will become a pillar of stability, security and lasting development, a confluence zone based on economic, political and military components. These components will irradiate security in the Middle East and Central Asia. The risks caused by the regional frozen conflicts, by the secessionist countries, by the illegal traffic of drugs, persons and weapons, by the corruption by the clandestine migration and over border organized crime will be better managed through more dialogue, trust and the diminishing of tensions.

1. The geostrategic importance of the Black Sea Region

In spite of the numerous risks and threats that are addressed to Europe, in the future, this continent is envisioned as a space of peace and prosperity, built on a climate of stability and security. The Black Sea area, as a interface zone with the Central Asia (and from here, the whole Asian continent. The previsions consider that Asia is on its way towards an economic expansion in this century) and the Middle East will play a very important role.

At the new frontiers of an enlarged Europe, the Black Sea justifies more and more its definition, given by the well-known Romanian historian Gheorghe Brătianu, as "an European and Romanian space of security". The American president George W. Bush refers to this region as to "a frontier of Euro-Atlantic security in Europe."

The approaches of the specialists mention more and more the geostrategic and economic importance of the Black Sea area. It is considered to be a way of access towards Caucasus, Central Asia and the core of the ex Soviet empire.

According to Gregory Connor[1], the director of the Centre of transborder Cooperation, from East West Institute, Bruxelles, the challenges that the Black Sea region has to face are:

- nationalism and conflicts;
- security;
- natural resources management;
- economic differences;
- youth problems, like unemployment and radicalization;
- development of civil society and mass media;
- frontier problems, secessionist republics and inter-states relations;
- illegal traffic, crime and corruption.

Our opinion is that if we seriously analyze, we can conclude that the proliferation of asymmetric threats, coming from non-state actors, in the Black Sea region and the need for a regional and global crisis and conflicts management offers the region that has become one of major interest for world security, important virtues, and a unique geopolitic and geostrategic ascendant.

The security of the states from the Black Sea region mostly depends on its characteristics, which are extremely important:

- being placed at the Eastern frontier of NATO and EU, it has a vital importance in the relations between the two organizations and the close vicinity;

- the closeness to the Islamic and Caucasus fault only adds the geostrategic importance of the region. The Black sea area is a zone of confluence between West, East, Central Asia and Islam;

- the level of regional integration is good. There is a feeling of affiliation to this region together with the development of multilateral institutions is underlined.

- although in this region the cooperation and integration are present, there are some latent and opened conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno- Karabah);

- there is also a growth in the military integration in the region;

- the foreign military presence in the region only supports the threat of some conflicts that may lead to war;

- there are some fragile democracies in the region, some states with weak administrations, a lot of poverty, corruption and organized crime. These can endanger the region, its stability and the national and zone security;

- the persistence of some internal crises in some states in the region, only increases the threat on security;

- it is a zone that is preferred by the drug dealers and organized crime, and also by the terrorists;

- there is a certain economic asymmetry between the states in the region, caused by parallel evolution, for decades, in the ex-communist and Western (Turkey) space of influence, which has maintained and deepened the economic and social differences;

- sub-regional differences regarding security are accompanied by political differences between states;

- there is a lot of political, economic and social instability in the ex-Soviet states from the region;

- the region includes a wide corridor to transport the energy resources from the Eastern part of the continent to its Western part;

- the Black Sea zone is, at the same time, a territory with enough energy resources that are still not researched enough and are insufficiently exploited;

- because of the economic, political and civilization differences between the Arab Islamic world and the non-Arab one, the region is a territory full of contradictions and contradictory mentalities. The region is also the place where the terrorist offensive of the Islamic fundamentalism against Western civilization often manifests itself;

- the region is part of Baltic-Pontic-Adriatic space, having a surface of approximately two million square kilometres. In the last decades, a lot of armed conflicts took place, most of them having as result the creation or the destruction of national states, changes in frontiers, and population deportation[2];

- the Black Sea zone is still tensioned by nationalist movements, ethnical and territorial debates, by the problems raised by national minorities, by the rivalries created by the ex-Soviet power, through regrouping populations, creating artificial territories (implants, transplants, fusions or enclaves);

- from a political and military point of view, the region is controlled in South and West by NATO, and in North by CSI;

- the Caucasus, a space that belongs to the Black Sea area, is the object of a fight for influence between Russia, Turkey and Iran, in order to obtain the main corridor to transport oil. The Caucasus is also the region where a lot of conflicts exists, some of them having an ethnical and religious origin;

- the Black Sea zone is marked by the geoeconomic war for the oil extracted from the Caspian Sea between the Americans and the Russians. It is a zone of political and economical rivalry of all centres of power;

- it is worth to mention the efforts for economic cooperation of the ex Soviet countries, that are part of GUAM. The organization for democracy and economic development offers a different regional orientation from that of Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova are the members of GUAM;

- the existence of two black holes, Transnistria and Abkhazia, induces many tensions and raises many security issues in the region. There are also problems of national and regional stability that have to be solved out by doing away with the separatist regimes and the territorial dismemberment of Moldova and Georgia;

- the geostrategists[3] appreciate that the Black Sea is a turning point of the international geoeconomic relations. The states from this region are strongly influenced by their vicinity to Asia and Europe;

- same authors[4] reveal the development of the geostrategic value of this space from a regional/ zone one to a continental/intercontinental one. It

has gained new major geopolitical interfaces. It plays the role of a "vital artery". Some underdeveloped states are connected to it and through it, and in this space the relations between the East and the West, as well as the North and the South of Europe are intensified. It is connected to the most important intercontinental spaces;

- all these facts lead us to the conclusion that the Black Sea is a buffer zone between civilizations, religions, and mentalities and a possible strategic connection between the neighbouring states.

During the NATO Summit in Istanbul, in 2004 the following was underlined:" We like to mention the importance of the Black Sea region for the Euro-Atlantic security. The states from the region, the allies and the partners cooperate to strengthen the regional security and stability. The Alliance is ready to identify new means to help these efforts, having as a starting point the present regional cooperation."[5]

2. The Black Sea region, the sphere of interest of the international and regional actors

The security environment of the Black Sea region is reshaping itself, influenced by an extended Alliance and European Union, with new borders reaching the Prut River and the Black Sea. The centres of power are rearranging themselves based on strategic partnerships and the battle for resources. The confrontations between the great powers, the new centres of power and the external factors with interests in this region make room for new collaborations between Russian Federation, EU, USA and China.

NATO wants to have the strategic control of the situation in the space between the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. The Alliance wants to prevent the asymmetric threats and the major conflicts in order to protect the Euro-Atlantic and European interests. The European Union is interested in having more influence in the Caucasus region, to gain access to the resources and to use this corridor to further develop the relations with China and South East Asia.

NATO and EU have the following goals in this region: to maintain its stability, to have active relations with the regional actors. These are means for EU to do away with the economic discrepancies, to accomplish a regional unity so that the under-developed countries from the region to be able to develop. EU also has as goals a better borders' security, to fight pollution for a better environment.[6] EU wants to be an efficient actor in this part of the world. This is a necessity because the region had a great demographic potential.

Country	Population
Bulgaria	7,450,349
Romania	22,329,977
Republic of Moldova	4,455,421
Ukraine	47,425,336
Russian Federation	143,420,309
Georgia	4,677,401
Azerbaijan	7,911,974
Armenia	2,982,904
Turkey	69,660,559
Total	**310,314,230**

Chart 1: Population of the countries in the Black Sea region
Source: SAR Report (June, 5, 2006): *Black Sea Dilemmas*

The Black Sea region is getting new strategic values thus becoming a space wanted both by the West as well as by the Russian Federation. This shows us that the Black Sea region is a space of strategic interest for the Russians. F. Stephen Larrabee considers that Putin regime has a strong interest in the opportunities offered by the South European space, he "wants to play a bigger role as an important regional and international actor", using "economical instruments - especially exports of energy- to extent the Russian power in this space"[7] as well as its influence in Eastern Europe.

Ukraine and Turkey also want to affirm themselves as regional leaders. Turkey is NATO outpost in the SE part of Europe. Romania has, as a NATO member, as well as a EU member, its own interests, and it plays an important role in strengthening the regional security, and in helping other countries to become democratic.

In the Black Sea file, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Republic of Moldova (GUAM states) are also willing to transform the region in a space of democracy. But their way to Europe – an accomplishment that will ensure their way

to prosperity and real security- is still a wish hard to accomplish, because of conflicts, that are intentionally kept in this region (we can mention here the Russian military presence in Tiraspol). The fact that there are neighbours to the Black Sea and that they are artificially created states, once part of the Russian empire, has influenced their strategic orientations and political visions. They have united themselves in an internal and international action to fight against the risks and the threats on their security.

3. EU and the regional cooperation for strengthening the security of the riparian countries in the Black Sea region

National and regional cooperation and security in the Black Sea region have a lot to gain as it is situated in "the epicentre of Western efforts to project their interests in the Caucasus and Middle East."[8]

Cooperation and security in the Black Sea region is the main concern of the regional diplomacy. The states from this region, Romania included, make huge efforts to transform the Black Sea into an international one, and to include it in EU development projects, and in NATO strategic ones[9]. This concern is based on Romania and Bulgaria being EU member states. The region has thus become and a common sea space, and also a transcontinental space due to the fact that Danube links an important part of Europe.

The necessity to have a good regional cooperation in the Black Sea space derives from the need to ensure its security, based on the multiple interdependences that appear here. The cooperation for regional security has to be based on preventing, and controlling the terrorist movements, on counter terrorist actions, on combined, complex measures - military, political and economic. It is a mean to improve the standard of life and to offer equal chances. The responsibility of the states from this region is to be found in the field of common security, as a solution and efficient way to consolidate stability, and regional security, to improve the active cooperation relations between members.

In the Black Sea region there are modern structures to promote security, stability, and peace. We can mention here the partnerships of NATO and USA with Ukraine and the Russian Federation. These partnerships are elements that improve the processes of globalization, and democracy. They have a preventive character against threats and present challenges.

A serious analysis takes into consideration some strategic antagonisms that mark the regional framework, in the context of NATO enlargement up to the Black Sea. A strong, transformed Alliance is perceived by Russia as a threat, although, the two actors are part of a strategic partnership of cooperation. The new military doctrine of the Russian Federation sets NATO and the West amongst the main threats on its security. On the other hand, USA decision to place in Poland and the Czech Republic elements of anti-ballistic missile system, to counteract possible nuclear attack from Iran and North Korea, according to Bush Administration, is considered by the Russian officialdom as an expansion in the ex-Soviet space. President Putin has declared that he considers that the real target of this system is the military arsenal of the Russian Federation.

Based on military, strategic, geopolitic and geoeconomic reasons, Russia has been developing its industrial military complex. It also has improved its military cooperation with China, Iran, and other important regional and international actors. Kremlin has never accepted the military inferiority of Russia in front of USA and NATO. It will never accept their control over the Black Sea region and the Danube Delta.

Cooperation and security in the Black Sea region may be influenced to a certain extend by the environmental conflicts, which affect individual and general security. They become more vulnerable and the political tensions grow. The case of Bystroye Channel is such an example. It has created a lot of political tensions between Romania and Ukraine. There is also the problem of Serpent Island, where Ukraine has already decided to build a modern settlement, in order to declare it an inhabited territory. The reason is to extent its territorial waters.

In our opinion, the factors that contribute to cooperation are the following:

- the importance of the Black Sea region in the new politics of energy resources;
- NATO and EU enlargement up to this region;
- regional politics of cooperation, which ensures a concentration of all efforts of the states from this

region to reinforce zone security and stability;

- broad interdependence achieved through military, economic, political, cultural, and scientific exchanges between the neighbouring countries;

- the existence of a regional vision on cooperation development for security;

- new structures of cooperation have been created in the last few years. They have an important role in improving the relations between countries;

- a new climate of trust in the region, based on bilateral and multilateral dialogue, on reunions and talks on security, development, peace and stability;

- efficient strategies adopted by the states in the region to defence security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to fight against international organized crime and terrorism;

- the accent is on economic security that, in its turn, influences social security and justice. All of them are based on economic cooperation.

The new context created by the war on terror, the cooperation in the Black Sea region has as main preoccupation war on radical Islamism. Its adepts have not forgotten the goal established in the 90s to create an Islamic state in the region between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea.[10] The Wahhabis have succeeded in persuading a lot of Caucasus ethnic groups to join their terrorist actions. After 2001, the Western world has put a lot of pressure on the Muslim world; the Russian Federation has taken a lot of measures that, in the end, led to the abolition of the most Wahhabi communities. Unfortunately the Federation was not able to permanently block the activity of radical Islamists. The continued their actions influenced by the Chechnya conflict, the poverty of the region and by religious fanatics, that generate and maintain a permanent instability in the Southern part of Russia, as well as at the North-East and East borders of the Black Sea. Cooperation in the Black Sea region calls for new paradigm and strategic decisions. There is a need for ad-hoc alliances that are extremely effective.

These alliances have to act together with the traditional powerful alliances in fight against terrorism, and proliferation of WMD. NATO and EU enlargement will bring about new forms of global irredentist terrorism, especially in the fault zones or at the extended frontiers of the Alliance and on the European continent.

The differences in ideology are not an obstacle for the efforts for a regional stability. None of the state or non-state actors cannot control on their own the complex processes that take place in this region. The numerous and diverse dynamics in the Black Sea region and in its neighbouring spaces – the Mediterranean Sea, the Greater Middle East and Central Asia- cannot be supervised or foreseen. The states need new solutions and actions that can be generated only through cooperation and talks. The fact that the Black Sea region is closed to the perturbator lobby of the Euro-Asian space, underlines all the problems created by the existence of diverse peoples, regions and tribes.[11]

The impact of the regional cooperation initiatives of the states in the region is overwhelming. We can mention here Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Black Sea Basin Euroregion, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe, GUAM. The regional actors are more and more aware that in order to ensure a lasting development and the stability of this space the improvement of regional cooperation forms is needed.

Our country needs to develop the relations with our neighbours, in the South-East and the Black Sea region.[12] Here are some directions to be followed:

- promoting the relations of good vicinity and cooperation of the South-Eastern Europe through a Pact of Stability, in order to ensure peace, to consolidate democracy, to observe the human rights and for economic prosperity;

- protecting Romania and EU interests in South-Eastern Europe, solving the current divergences with Ukraine in a coherent and offensive manner, based on norms of international public law;

- promoting the relations with the Republic of Moldova, based on observing the human rights, consolidating the democratic framework and economic reforms, and also by promoting a Romanian culture;

- a better cooperation within South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) to promote the stabilization and association process initiated by EU for the states in the Western Balkans region and to establish a structural connection between EU and SEECP;

- to take a better opportunity of the mechanisms and the resources of the Southeast European

Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Centre to fight against the organized crime, to promote a coherent politicy to fight unconventional risks on regional security;

- to use the infrastructure and the Romanian specialists as an advantage to offer Romania a greater implication in energy security policy from the region: transport, storage, processing and commercialization of electrical energy, oil and natural gas;

- a better cooperation within the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) to further develop the existing projects (energy, economic and banking system, transport and tourism) in order to have a more effective activity in our national economy and to promote the interests of the Romanian businessmen.

We have to mention that one of the subjects at BSEC Organization in Belgrade, April, 2007, the Romanian and the Russian ministries of Foreign Affairs have agreed upon giving a new, pragmatic dimension to the bilateral relationships. Bilateral economic relations should be encouraged by direct exchanges. A Romanian cultural centre will be opened in Moscow and a Russian cultural centre in Bucharest.

The European Commission has presented, at the beginning of April 2007, a report regarding a Community project for a strategy to develop cooperation between the countries in the Black Sea region - Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine. These countries will have common projects with EU.

The region is presented as a developing market, with a great potential, a vital point for energy and transport projects. The same report has mentioned the fact that these projects will not be sustained by European funds, but by regional ones.

At Romanian and Bulgarian initiative, the European Commission has underlined that the projects for frontiers' security, transports and energy may contribute to the economic development and to diminish the existent tensions.

The High European Commissioner for foreign affairs was optimistic regarding the Black Sea region cooperation. It will contribute to a better environment and to solving out the latent conflicts.

4. Short conclusions

The latest developments in the European space confirm the fact that time has come to cooperate and to give a greater importance to the Black Sea region. This area is very important for the itineraries that have to be followed to transport oil and natural gas to Europe. It is a more stable region compared with the instable ones from the Caucasus and the Middle East. EU and NATO contribute to a faster integration of the states from the West Balkans region. This integration will bring about better strategies to prevent and fight against new regional risks, dangers and threats.

The new European Neighbourhood Policy for the states in the Black Sea region offers a more solid ground for economic and political relations on European and Euro-Atlantic level, focusing the interest of international community on a vital zone of the continent and of the globe. New fundaments for a more active strategy are laid for the Black Sea region. Thus the regional and international security will be guaranteed. It is obvious that the more conscious the international, regional and global actors will be, the bigger the strategic value of this region will be.

NOTES:

[1] See *Promovarea în UE a regiunii Mării Negre - şansa afirmării României*, in www.euractiv.ro.

[2] Vasile MARIN, *Modalităţi de agregare a actorilor geopolitici în lumea contemporană*, Geopolitica, Anul II, nr.9-10, p.41.

[3] C. ONIŞOR, M. Vasile OZUNU, Poziţia geostrategică a României la Marea Neagră, în Geopolitica, Anul II, nr. 6, p. 38. *The Geostrategic Position of Romania in the Black Sea Region,* Geopolitica, Anul II, no. 6,p. 83

[4] Ibidem, p. 40

[5] Istanbul Summit Communique, pct 41.

[6] Jose Manuel BARROSO, *Europe Must Open up a Globalized World,* in International Herald Tribune, www.jang.com.pk

[7] F. Stephen LARRABEE, *Danger of Opportunity in Eastern Europe,* Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006, p. 127

[8] Costin IONESCU, *Marea Neagră – un pivot geopolitic în dispută?*, Geopolitica, Anul IV, nr. 1(5)/2005, www.geopolitica.ro/revista/5/rev_05_005.pdf

[9] Press communiqué on the meeting between the Romanian ex-ministry of Foreign Affairs, Răzvan Ungureanu, and the general secretary of OCEM, Tedo Japaridze, MAE, Bucharest, www.mae.ro./index.php?umde+doc&id

[10] Alexey MALASHENKO, *Islamic Factor in the Northern Caucasus,* New Europe Review, www.neweuropereview.com/Romanian/Romanian-Malashenko.cfm

[11] Hosham DAWOD has referred to this problem during a debate organized by IFRI, *Iran, Irak, EtaTS-Unis:vers un nouvel axe regional au Moyen-Orient?,* in Policy Paper no.14, p.20, mars 2005, http://orfi.org/files/policy-briefs/PP-14-Irak.pdf

[12] http://www.ue.mae.ro

General Professor Mircea MUREŞAN, PhD (muresan@unap.ro), is the Commandant (Rector) of National Defence University "Carol I" In valuable scientific works as „Strategia de parteneriat, parteneriatul strategic"(2005), „Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului"(2004) or in articles published in Strategic Impact magazine, papers presented at prestigious scientific reunions on security and defence, the author has exclusively analyzed the complex region of the Black Sea, underlining the need to enhance the regional cooperation between the riparian states. He also has stressed out the fact that the international organizations should play a more important role in regional security and stability.

ASPECTS ON SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AREA

Leonida MOISE, PhD

Any approach on issues regarding the international security requires an analysis on all aspects concerned with the matter within the various regional centres of power. As such, outlining the main trends on the with future evolutions of security in the Asia-Pacific area stands for a scientific attempt that is both welcome and useful in understanding links between national and international vectors.

The Asia-Pacific area is as important as it is economically complex, having both long and short term implications on security, not only on Asian soil but also on the global scale. The economic turnaround Japan accomplished following World War II been emulated by four smaller countries – Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore – known as 'the Asian Tigers', only to have nowadays spread across the whole of Asia, with the technological and industrial momentum reaching the four corners of the Far East. An analysis of how the world's economy develops would highlight some interesting trends taking shape within the current international context. The unprecedented dynamics of the Asian economic growth is also illustrated by the ever-shortening spans of time needed to the economical and social goals. While Great Britain and the USA needed some 50 years to pull up the gross domestic produce per capita, Japan achieved it in 33 years, Indonesia in 17 years, South Korea needed 11 years and China 10.[1] It is widely expected that over the following years, in spite of bouts of temporary crisis or unease (as in 1997), Asian countries are bound to achieve the highest growth rates in the world, so much so that they would ultimately account for some 40 % of the world's economy[2]. Undoubtedly, the Asian economic boom is being focused on by economists and politicians alike, as facts concerning the region are met with interest and answers to problems they entail are sought for. An explanation as to why this phenomenon occurs can be found in the way Asian societies are organized and the way they work. Most Asian people claim the superiority of their culture over that of the Western world by emphasizing on both the cultural identity of each and every Asian country and the elements they share which set them apart from other cultures. As one Western diplomat remarked, '*a cultural renaissance spreads across Asia*'.[3]

The Meiji restoration played a pivotal role in Japan's tuning in to the Western model. The techniques and the practice of the European institutions have been adapted to Japan's particular society, while safeguarding traditional cultural cues. Materially and morally ravaged after WWII, Japan felt particularly akin to everything America stood for, as the Japanese took up the challenge of rebuilding their country by tenacious, responsible hard work which impressed the world over the following decades.[4] In China, the national element was also prevalent. Having failed to generate economic growth through communism, the Beijing authorities began to seek alternative solutions to revive the country's economy. Subsequently, they opted for a mixture of political authoritarianism, market economy and the resort to Chinese nationalism as the main source of legitimacy. Early 1990s, China saw a return to everything that was traditionally and genuinely Chinese, which led to an active involvement of the Chinese from both inside and outside the country's borders in China's progress[5]. As such, Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore contributed with substantial funding to China's economic growth, with the Philippines, Indonesian and Thai business environments being significantly influenced by the respective Chinese communities. Malaysia-based Chinese also have a dominant grip on the country's economy even though they only account for one third of the population.[6] One Hong Kong official stated with regard to what bonded the Chinese: *"We, as Chinese, now*

feel as one nation, which we previously had not. We are Chinese and we're proud of it".[7] Thus, the spiritual unity displayed by the Chinese from all over the world has proved to be a stimulating factor and has generated progress by the force of emulation. Though apparently a paradox, while early 1900s China saw Confucianism – its defining philosophy – being deemed as the main cause behind the country's underdevelopment, late 20th century Chinese rulers felt it was the very cornerstone of China's progress. As the Chinese government promoted the idea people should all join hands in serving the Great China, Confucianism was seen as the mainstream of the Chinese culture. This paradigm is a common with the whole of Asia as most people there believe they owe their economic success to their culture's being inherently superior to the Western one. Singaporean leaders – and one of Confucianism's finest representatives Lee Kuar Yew in particular – claim Asia mainly owes its rise to the moderation the cultural offensive promoted as opposed to the Western culture they regard as promoting egocentricity, complacency, disregard and inferior education, such that they presume to suggest Americans that the US "*need to question the very basis of social and political regulations and hence learn a thing or two from East Asian societies*."[8]

Many Asians regard their region's success as deriving from their having prioritized traditional Asian virtues and group over individual interests in order for them to close in on the Western countries. According to one Malayan official, *the ethics of labour as practiced by the Japanese and the Koreans, bringing about discipline, loyalty and hard work, served as the driving force behind their countries' economical and social development. This ethics of labour came about from the idea group and country outweighed individual interests*.'[9]

As far as matters of security, the multitudes of specific features entail a close-up analysis of possible implications and consequences concerning the economic development. It has to be said that in spite of the obvious cultural affinities, success and prosperity themselves hide vulnerabilities mostly linked with national vanity. Unlike Europe, where NATO and the EU regulate inter-European relations and instate stability and security, Asia has no multilateral structures of cooperation to absorb or quench any conflicts arising from persistent ethnic, national or territorial disputes. SEATO (The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), the only security-oriented organization in the area was disbanded and replaced by the ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations), whose attributes have more to do with the political and economical cooperation and less with matters of security. The two other regional organizations in the area, the ARF (The ASEAN Regional Forum) and the APEC (The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Group) don't match the European system of multilateral cooperation. Europe's security is conceived and structured around the North Atlantic cooperation, as Europe and the US have devised mechanisms and structures that ensured an integrated military command. There are no such institutions in Asia, the US-Japan Security Treaty is a one-sided security guarantee rather than a full-fledged Asian strategy. Though most Asian nations take shelter under America's protection of the global balance, many of them in fact favour a non-compliant policy by keeping clear of any formal ties with the US.

Admittedly, the European model of security came about as a reaction to the threat posed by the Soviet Union's aggressive intentions. There are no political and strategic circumstances in Asia that would group all the countries in the region in one block unless China constituted a genuine security threat.

Under these circumstances, the Cold War scenario is unlikely to repeat. After WWII, the Soviet Union was as a threat to the whole of Europe, whereas in nowadays Asia it is improbable that a nation stood for genuine danger to all of its neighbours, China included.[10]

As a matter of fact, all major powers in the area seem concerned with how to prevent their neighbours from forging alliances against them more than they do to invade them. The Taiwan standoff in early 1996 is evocative of the way countries in the area act. The aerial and maritime encirclement of an area off Taiwan by the Chinese troops has prompted the United States to react by a display of naval might. Thailand approved of China's intervention, Indonesia insisted on the fact the matter was exclusively of China's concern, while both Malaysia and the Philippines chose neutrality.[11]

The weapons' race most Asian nations have entered is a major security risk in the region. According to recent data, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Asia has become the

world's number one arms buyer, ahead of Europe and the Middle East.

Insecurity in the region also comes from the numerous territorial feuds that have gradually built up and are yet to be solved. For instance, the islands of Paracel and Spratly could lead to conflicts between China and several of the Southeast Asian states, because of both the energy resources lying on the seabed and China's claims the two islands in the South China Sea pertained to their area of claim. The Senkaku Islands sparked a similar feud among Japan and China, symbolically illustrating the two countries' historical rivalry on issues of regional hegemony. Underlying instability in the Korean Peninsula following North Korea's resolve to producing nuclear warfare may add further tension as neither Japan nor China could overlook the contingency of a war. There are also several latent territorial disputes, most of which concerning China's proximity to Russia, India and Vietnam and the Japanese – Korean vicinity. Two strategic lines of confrontation play the decisive role in shaping the region's level of security: in Northeast Asia - China, Japan, the Russian Federation and the US face a potential conflict located in the Korean Peninsula while in Southeast Asia various interests belonging to China, Japan, Indonesia and the US must coexist with those ones of Vietnam, Thailand, Australia and the Philippines. As such, the uneven pattern of power distribution in the area prompts the above-mentioned countries to each have their own views on regional security. China's status as the most significant military power in the area has ensued a strategic doctrine stating their Navy should set up a *proactive offshore defence system* that would enable control on the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Though the Japanese envisage an upgrade to their military capabilities, the presence of the American troops prevents their army from playing a significantly influencing their foreign affairs for the time being.[12] The lack of a balance of power ultimately triggers reconfigurations as to both prevent a rise in Chinese influence in the area and to bring down the American presence. Once conflicting, Australia and Indonesia have lately started to cooperate on their military activity, in order to forge a mutual stand on security issues alongside Singapore. Predominantly Muslim Indonesia substantiates its close ties with Iran, Iraq and Libya, all under US embargo as being beneficial to its foreign policy. The US Army's presence in the Asia-Pacific area is of paramount importance to security in the region, yet as Japan, China and India are increasingly intent on having their say on matters of security, structural modifications in the power structure become more likely.

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POSITION, INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR CHINA IN THE XXIst CENTURY

Marina MUSCAN

The state with the most impressive evolution from the Asia – Pacific region is, obviously, China. China's economic evolution during the last years was so spectacular, that it activated and it brought to attention of the entire world the geopolitical possibilities of China that were latent in the near past. It is about, lengthiness and riches – China is the third biggest country in the world, after Russia and Canada, and it possesses a considerable amount of natural resources; regarding the population, China is the most populated country in the world; regarding the geographic position – by its position, China dominates the most important commercial routes in Pacific; regarding the military power – China has one of the biggest army in the world, which can bring value to the geostrategic position of the state and which can protect its interests.

A prosperous China, from the economical point of view, represents, from far, the largest market in the world. And a market with these dimensions represents an extremely important advantage, taking into account the world supra-production. China, India and Japan contribute 62 per cent of GDP of the region. The economic growth of China, in the second quarter of 2006, stood at an annualized 11.3 per cent. Although the Chinese Government tried to take measures, as the limitation of property investments and the reduction export incentives, in order to slow its economic expansion, these measures had not significantly affected the economy and that continued to grow, therefore the Chinese Yuan grew with 1.8 per cent by the end of August 2006. In April, China became the world's largest reserves holder, these reserves reached US$ 897 billion, US$ 53 billion more than those of Japan.

The specialized studies insist on the geopolitical advantages of China. These advantages cannot be brought in question in any way. They mention little or not at all a very important aspect represented by the strategic vision that guides the present development of China, regardless of leaders or particular contexts. We must take into consideration that this strategy is the main explanation for China's present development and geopolitical ascension.

At the end of this century China gave the world a lesson of wisdom. A series of dramatic processes took place within the socialist system. After the invasion in Czechoslovakia, in 1968 that marked the refusal of the first socialist state, USSR, to reform from within – exactly what Czechoslovakian experience proposed – China took a ten year long pause in order to meditate on its own destiny and on the political system that was adopted many decades ago. At the plenary congress of CC and PC, in December 1978, China chose to reform its economic system by freeing the private business initiatives. The reform started in agriculture triggered a spectacular production growth in this vital sector. Although, China holds only 7 per cent of arable surface in the world, it produces almost 500 billions tones of cereals per year, being the first world cereals producer.

After the end of Cold War, the situation in the Asia – Pacific region is special. Two great economic actors, China and Japan, rise in the region. Asia has to face the rise of two super-powers.

The power vectors of China are:

• Territory – China has a vast territory with many natural resources. China is the twelfth largest oil reserves holder in the world, it is the first world coal producer and it is the third largest coal reserves holder in the world.

• Population – China is the most populated country in the world.

• Economic power – China has the sixth largest GDI (Gross Domestic Income) per habitant in the world, it has the second acquisition level in the world after US.

• Military power – China has the largest army in the world from the human resources point of view, it occupies the third place in the world

regarding the tanks number and it has the second largest number of fighting ships in the world.

On the other hand, China has become an export platform for other Asian states that strengthened their commercial bounds with China[1].

China is a developing maritime power which must face the US maritime power on the maritime communication lines that bound China to its vital resources in Middle East and Africa.

Although it holds 14 percent of the entire world power, China is not capable, for now, to generate a world culture that can be equal to the U.S. one, but, it starts generating a regional culture.

The goal of China's geopolitical strategy is to establish diplomatic links that can allow the Chinese state to have access to many harbours, so it can increase its military power in order to develop its influence starting from the Chinese Sea, passing through the Indian Ocean and reaching the Persian Gulf. This strategy can be compared with the gathering of a "string of pearls"[2].

The question rising as following this direction in China's development is whether the state would follow "the line of peaceful development" established, for now, by Beijing, or, someday, China will decide to claim the supremacy in the region.

This strategic situation is very complex and can determine, both, the character of U.S. – China relations and China's position in the post-Cold War world security environment.

The China's military strategy is not defined in a single document that can be accessed by the public; therefore, it is necessary to analyze more documents in order to establish the principles of the military strategy that rules the Chinese war doctrine. The main principle that rules the Chinese military strategy the principle of active defence which establish that the Chinese armed forces does not start a war to achieve strategic means. The active defence is seen as being linked to the informationalization of the military forces in order to be able to control a high-tech conflict.[3]

On the other hand, this principle of active defence was perceived by the Chinese strategists, at first, as being related to the state sovereignty, but, starting from 2006, they begin using the term at a larger scale. China begins thinking at regional level, and the principle of active defence is, now, being viewed as a mean to maintain order at a regional level.

Therefore, this principle of active defence is now perceived as a possibility to legitimate an intervention in Taiwan.

China's strategy regarding the improvement of the technological defence capacities is based on three main elements which are closely related to the principle of active defence above mentioned:

1. *Selective modernization* – the Chinese leaders realize that it would be too costly to attempt to acquire the capability to produce advanced weapon systems in every possible category of weapon system. Therefore, they focused on making breakthroughs in certain key areas of weapons capabilities that needed to be modernized like the naval and aero-space industry;

2. *Civil-military integration* – China's leaders believe that new means of integrating civilian and military production are the key to developing an advanced defence-industrial base;

3. *Acquiring advanced foreign weapons equipment, materials, and technologies* – Given that China's defence industry is behind those ones of the advanced nations of the world, the best way to rapidly achieve this goal is seen as involving the importation of technology and technical expertise for the production of state-of-the-art military equipment. As two Chinese military officers involved in defence production stated, China should "obtain jade from the rocks of other mountains" (ta shan zhi shi keyi gong yu 他山之石可以攻玉), meaning that China should "learn or buy anything we can from foreigners" and "study and buy things by hook and by crook.[4]

Today, a rising China makes palpable steps toward improving its naval power, outside its traditional influence area. This rising means a complex challenge for U.S., both at regional level and worldwide level. The geopolitical strategy of China was compared with a "string of pearls" that can cause U.S serious regional problems.

Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a "pearl." An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a "pearl." A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a "pearl." Construction of a deep water port in Myanmar is a "pearl," as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. The "pearls" extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea,

the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.

China started the process of military modernization and it passed from a military doctrine of an army impressive by its number to a smaller, more professional and sophisticated military force from a technological point of view. From 1994 to 2006, the Chinese military expenditures augmented from US$ 7.3 billions to US$ 35 billions[5], expenditures directed to the acquisition of high-tech gears. The annual average growth rates of China's defence budget are over 14%. Therefore, many concluded that China uses its economic boom for **financing a great military development**. The reasons that represent the base of this policy are: the desire to guarantee its own internal stability and the security of its borders, to support the efforts for the exploration of the mineral resources on the seaboard. However, the massive military investment and modernization serve the purpose of sending a clear message to the southern neighbours, that Beijing is as stern as ever regarding its territorial claims over the islands in the South China Sea and over some islands in East China Sea.

Interesting to follow is the direction towards this military expenditure is directed as it foreshadows a new naval strategy for China. During the last years, China purchased the necessary technology for the development of its air force and navy weapon systems, which reflects the fact that the state wants to develop its naval capabilities that can be used on the deep-sea not only on the seaboard. In 2006, China held 14 Chinese-made submarines and 3 Russian-made submarines, 3 Chinese-made destroyers and 3 Russian-made destroyers, 12 Chinese-made frigates, 17 Chinese-made naval aircrafts and 48 Russian-made naval aircrafts. At the end of 2007, China also held 62 Chinese-made advanced air force weapon systems and 189 air force weapon systems made by the Russians. The primary strategic objective of a naval force is to protect the shores. But, as the stake of the strategic and economic interests rises for all the actors in the region, the part played by the naval forces expands becoming a state capacity for power projection. During the second half of the '90s, China began to be preoccupied by the preparation of a more flexible and more balanced army capable of conducting operations outside the Chinese territorial waters. The new war doctrine is based on power acquisition and on power projection rather than defence. Some of the reasons that caused this change are: the insecure environment of the region, the economic fluctuations, the foggy image of the U.S. position and the insecurity caused by Japan's influence. Other cause for this change is determined by China' s desire to be sure of its access to the energy resources, and, therefore, it is necessary for the state to control the access routes to these resources. China needs to project an image of power at a regional level, in order to be able to bear sway over the neighbouring states.

Many analysts talk about a series of Chinese territorial claims. They have in mind the group of islands from the Chinese Seas. These islands have a strategic and economic importance, as they are rich in oil and natural gas. For example, the strategic importance of Spratly Islands is given by the fact that this location offers access to the South China Sea that is considered by some specialists to be the most important sea in the world. The country that controls the access to this sea can threaten the free commerce towards North-East Asia. For a country as Japan, that imports almost 80% of its energetic resources, this could represent a strong warning signal.

At the end of 1980s, China began **the conversion of its economic resources into military power and political influence**, the most visible sign of this change was the stern opposition manifested towards the U.S. presence in the region. Even more evident for this power shift is represented by the fact that China holds nuclear weapons. China also has border quarrels with a part of its neighbours and by developing its military capabilities it can solve these "disagreements" in its own advantage.

The tendency of China towards the transformation of the economic and military power into political influence shows processes that spread throughout all Asia. The economical rise, together with the military investments, show that China turns to a self-image of power in which all the economic, politic and military aspects coexist; this is the self-image of a more stable power that cannot be overwhelmed by economic dysfunctions. Of course, the economic dimension comes first, offering the premises for China to keep its status of power, but the economy cannot be perceived as the unique basis of the Chinese power, anymore. The Chinese crisis transmitted this severe warning regarding the

excessive dependence of the Asian states on their own economy as a source of power. Before the crisis that took place in 1997, there were evaluations that stated that Asia exceeded U.S. economically; therefore, the main opinion was that the power, on the international scene, had acquired a new meaning and the political and military vectors of power were outdated and old-fashioned. From this point of view, the crisis caused the region to return to a more balanced and normal status, and its power has, now, gained multiple dimensions.

Another method that can be used by China to settle its border disputes is the demography. A possible border conflict with Russia was taken into account, in terms that suggested the Chinese demographic superiority: "China invades Russia not with tanks but with luggage"[6]. The rise of Chinese emigration rate towards the Far-East marks an intensifying Chinese influence in a region that once belonged to China.

The phenomenon is, mostly, of a demographic nature. In the Far-East region that belongs to Russia only 7.4 billions of Russians live, while in North-East of China live over 70 billions of Chinese people. On the other hand, the Russian population decreased with 8% in 1989, while the Chinese population grew with 13% during the same period.

The stake of the Far-East region, from the economic point of view, is given by the presence of rich natural resources like: oil, gas, timber that represent some of the most necessary resources for China.

The phenomenon regarding the rising of Chinese influence in the Far-East is supported by the low cost of goods shipment and goods commerce with China, while the Russian goods are expensive. The Russian workforce is more and more scarce, and the emptiness on the labour market is to be filled by the young Chinese generation.

There are strategic reasons that determine China to let the process continue on its own. The territory mentioned offers access to the Pacific Ocean for Russia. Here are the most important Russian harbours, Vladivostok and Nicolayevsk which sustain the transfer of goods to and from Siberia. If Beijing could control the area, and especially the two harbours, Russia should loose both the capacity exporting goods through Siberia and the capacity of raising a strong fleet in Pacific. This will trigger a short term conflict with Russia. At the same time, if China can establish military bases in the region, then it will come face to face with some sort of confrontation with its main rival in the region, Japan.

The Russian authorities responded to this challenge, called "the silent Chinese occupation of the Far-East"[7], with more or less appropriated measures or proposals. One of these proposals was the population transfer from the European part of Russia to the Far-East in order to equilibrate the demographic balance. This proposal is hard to achieve, taking into account the demographic crisis that takes place in the Russia. And even if this plan is accomplished, the ratio between the two populations will be 6 to 1 in Chinese favour. Another answer to the Chinese challenge was the increase of the xenophobic discourse of the Russian authorities and the intensifications of border controls. Both are short term solutions.

The Chinese let the process to evolve naturally. The demographic factors are left to speak the word. China prefers to take advantage of the situation at the right time. China appreciates the strategies and stratagems when it comes to diplomacy and strategic positioning.

In the common perception, China is a continental country, a vast, massive continental block. The political, economic and cultural reality is different in many ways. When we talk about the continental China we must represent adequately the demographic and political reality from within. The continental China is built around its main core represented by the China, from the Chan Dynasty that was built during centuries and that now encompasses the actual China. The nowadays China inherited its official language from the Chan Dynasty. Within China, there are territories like Tibet and Xingjian where non-Chinese population lives. On the other hand, the contemporary Sino civilization has the main core located in the continental China, but it is also located in other places like (Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Singapore).

Hong-Kong is an island next to China where almost 6 billions of inhabitants live. During more then 100 years it was under Great Britain's domination, but, during the last decades, Hong-Kong became symbol of dynamism and prosperity. If China could reach the production level of Hong-Kong it would produce as much as U.S. and E.U. together. The late Chinese development made possible to comply with the stipulations of the

Treaty of Retrogression of Hong-Kong, which predetermined that the Great Britain's rights over this island ceased in 1997. It is notable China's wisdom, which promoted the idea "one country, two systems", in order to diminish the impact of Hong-Kong's regression under Chinese authority. This approach represents China's will to respect Hong-Kong's right to autonomy. The regression of Macau Island to China took place on December 20th, 1999. In the Treaty of Regression of Macau Island stipulated that the social, political, economic and cultural system would remain unchanged during the next 50 years.

The relationship with Taiwan is more complicated and more sinuous. Taiwan is also an island on which more than 30 billions of inhabitants live. If we take into consideration the dynamism and the economic performance of Taiwan we realize that we do not have to do with a mere island but with a real state that is one of the most prosperous countries in the world. It parted from China after Chinese Liberation Revolution and it became a state ruled by Chiang Kai-Shek, a revolutionary leader and Mao Tze Tung's brother-in-law. Unlike Mao, who followed an international vision, Chiang Kai-Shek followed a national one. The relation between the two states was tensed for a long period of time as it was refilled by the personal rivalry between the two political leaders. This tension is properly illustrated by "*the 3 NOs policy: No contact, No negotiation, No compromise with the continent*".[8]

The mainland Chinese believe the United States has been used Taiwan as a power projection platform throughout the years, against China from time to time. In China's opinion, Taiwan is only a pawn on the U.S. chessboard that can be used by the Americans in order to earn various advantages. However, Taiwan has also been a liability for the United States as it carries the risk of involving the United States in an armed conflict with mainland China over the interests of Taiwan, if the U.S. decides to protect Taiwan's interests against China. For now, the situation remains uncertain, as long as the two players do not make any decisive move.

Recovering Taiwan is China's historical mission. China's objective is to take Taiwan whole and intact without using an unnecessary force; therefore, China has also attracted a large amount of capital investment from Taiwan. This way, 44.53 percent of Taiwan's total foreign investment is directed to China, and many Taiwan people, most of them valuable people, have relocated to the mainland. Shanghai alone has housed over 50,000 business executives, high-tech specialists, and people with high-demand skills. China has become a "giant sucking ground" for Taiwan's business, capital, and talented people.[9]

On the military front, China has gradually built up several rings of missiles along its eastern seaboard since the early 1990s. These missiles pose a credible threat to Taiwan. In addition, China has also strengthened its overall air and naval capabilities.

The Chinese Air Forces' position[10]

The fast development and modernization of continental China have a considerable impact on its relationship with Taiwan. From the beginning, Taiwan evolved under U.S. umbrella, and the most important market for this prosperous island was U.S. itself. Even if the political relations between China and Taiwan are not passing through the most auspicious period, we can establish the fact that when the economic ties, between them, are strengthening the two of them are starting to relax. This relaxation leaves its mark on the relations between the two countries. And, from the economic point of view, the relations between the continental China and Taiwan are intense, that can signify that on the long term the political relations will improve. On the other hand, U.S. appreciates more and more the diplomatic ties with China, and it is not so interested in creating tensions regarding Taiwan.

Before 1980, Singapore, a country with a rapid economic development, looked with plain disdain towards the continent, observing its behind handing and the stiffness of its policy. After the process of economic development was started in China, Singapore's policy towards China changed as did the policies of other countries in the region. In the '90s, Singapore invested billions of dollars in China contributing to the acceleration of the modernization of this country. Many leaders from Singapore became adepts and enthusiastic supporters of China and its chances of development. Obviously for the new orientation is the fact that almost half of foreign cooperation projects supported by the Singapore's government are directed to China. The investments originated in Singapore which recently were sent to Malaysia and Indonesia are, now, directed to the continent, because, as an observer stated, "China is where action takes place".[11]

It is clear today, when we talk about China, that we cannot take into account only the Chinese state, but, what the specialists call **The Large China**, a much wider space inhabited by Chinese or, mostly by Chinese, a space under the Chinese influence. From the Asian tigers three are Chinese: Hong-Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. The Chinese people in these territories gave China the necessary capital for its economic growth during the '90s.

It is necessary to mention that this Chinese main gravity circle is continued by another, which is defined by the influence that is not based on population but on economy. The Chinese represent approximately 1% of the population in Philippines, but they ensure 35% of the income of the companies from this country. In Indonesia the Chinese represent 2% - 3% of the local population, but they hold 70% of the private investments. Chinese represent almost 10% of the population in Thailand, but they contribute with 50% to the GDP for this country. Although the Chinese represent only one third of the population in Malaysia they dominate the economy of this country. Therefore, China is a dominant presence in all South-East Asia and, as Samuel Huntington said, "*the Asian economy is a Chinese economy*".[12]

In spite of the current Japanese domination of the region, the economy based on the Chinese populated Asia starts revealing itself as a *new epicentre of industry, commerce and finance. This strategic region contains: substantial technological and manufacturing capacities in Taiwan; remarkable business responsibility in marketing and services in Hong-Kong; an exceptional communication net in Singapore; an extremely wealthily financial capital in all the three regions and large amount of land and workforce in the continental China"*.[13] Therefore the third concentric Chinese circle is equivalent of China that dominates the entire Asia forming the so-called "the sphere of co-prosperity of the Large China". There is evident data that supports the claims regarding the existence of these concentric circles.

This fact begins to influence the opinion of the inhabitants in the area regarding the new power configuration in the region. Questioned about which country will have the most influent presence in Asia in the next century, the Japanese responded: 4?% - China, 30% - U.S. and 16% - Japan.[14]

Each one of these evolutions configures a special type of common market, a sphere of co-prosperity which, because of its economic force, its population and the intensity of its commerce, is not far behind from the other two world economic regions (America and Europe).

The trepid processes in the region developed two tendencies: obviously, the continental China became the core-state of a Chinese civilization oriented to the continent. On the other hand, the economy in East Asia is more centred on the continental China and it is dominated by the Chinese population.

China is developing strategic alliances that allow it to become a permanent military and economic presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East and Africa.

China's development of these strategic geopolitical "pearls" has been non-confrontational. The right to be present in Gwadar was gained by China which negotiated with Pakistan.

The port facility at Gwadar, for example, is a win-win prospect both for China and Pakistan. The port currently handles 90 percent of Pakistan's sea-borne trade, but because of its proximity to India, it is extremely vulnerable to blockade. Pakistan identified the potential of this port location in 1964 but lacked the means to develop it. China is facilitating the development of Gwadar by funding a majority of the $1.2 billion project and providing the technical expertise of engineers. Pakistan gained a favourable strategic position on

the seashore against India, and China strengthened its position in the region, being now at 240-mile distance from the Strait of Hormuz.

In November 2003, China signed an agreement with Cambodia in order to provide military equipment and training in exchange for the right of way to build a rail line from southern China to the Gulf of Thailand. China also has a proposal to build a canal across Thailand's Isthmus which would enable ships to bypass the chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca.



Sea Lines of Communication[15]

According to the Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China – 2006 released to the public by the Office of the Secretary of Defence, the Chinese strategy and policy are based on the desire to secure passage towards energy resources in the area, as oil and gas. These interests will dictate the policy and the defence strategy of China towards Angola, Central Asia, Indonesia, the Middle East (including Iran), Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela.

Momentarily, China's military power is small compared to the U.S. one, but the Chinese power projection strategy is well-defined and its goal is to establish the reputation of China as an international responsible actor in the region.

Since 1998, China stated its desire to be part of a multi-polar world and it defined its defence strategy according to this vision. 17.4% of its Gross Domestic Product was constantly directed to the army in order to modernize it and make it more competitive.

We can perceive tensed relations between U.S. and China, while the Chinese influence grows, but, for now, no open conflict erupted between them, although China wants the end of U.S. position as the single world super-power.

Taking into consideration the history of Sino-American relations, the present situation between the two countries is stable and satisfying for the two governments, which determined the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider China not as an enemy but as a strategic partner. Many disagreements in many domains still remain. The most important is the Taiwan problem, which can generate a conflict between U.S. and the continental China.

The strategic competition between U.S. and China is obvious, even in areas where the two giants have a common interest as the War on Terror. Even the economic relations are tensed, especially when the U.S. complains about the lack of protection regarding the intellectual property and by the low value of the Yuan.

This criticism determined the Chinese government to introduce in the Chinese National Strategy a plan regarding the protection of the intellectual property.

China's relation with ASEAN improved starting 1990, and the partnership formed between them permitted the development of a tight economic and secure relations based on the "Asian cultural inheritance".

Slowly, China gained the international respect, and the General Peter Peace declared on March,

21st, 2007, at Tokyo, that he is looking for ways to respect China as a nation that deserves respect.[16]

The relations between China and Japan have suffered many shifts during the passage of time, knowing peaceful and tensed periods. Many analysts believe that the relations between Japan and China will worsen in time. Japan does not want China to become a notable power in the region because it is afraid that its action space will be restricted.

The dispute between China and Japan over Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, now controlled by Japan, is the centre of many frictions between China and Japan. The two governments claim the resources in the area (fish, gas and oil).

The territorial disputes between the two countries are dangerous, because they can trigger national conflicts which can have severe consequences comparing to the dimension of the material disagreements that started the conflict.

Passing over the territorial quarrels, the economic relations between these two countries are good, taking into account that Japan is China's most important business partner.

The commercial exchanges between them reached over US$ 100 billions in 2000, and now Japan imports more from China than from U.S.

However, at the economic level a series of problems still exist, they are generated by China's desire to have more access to the Japanese market. Therefore, many Japanese are afraid that their economy will be decimated by China's power, which already eliminated some of the local producers.

Conclusions

China, the most populated country in the world, experienced a very rapid economic growth during the last twenty years, which determined the Gross Domestic Product to rise at 935 €/ per capita in 2000. Now, China is the second country in the world regarding the acquisition power.

The defence industry made a gradual progress, becoming more efficient. The defence systems made in China with foreign assistance – especially Russian – became more sophisticated and professional. They transform the Chinese army into an efficient force on long-term.

Therefore, the Chinese military power vector grows gradually, allowing China to re-evaluate its national strategy in order to be able to apply it at a regional level.

Momentarily, the military power of China is small compared with the U.S. one, but the Chinese power projection strategy is well defined and its goal is to establish the reputation of China as an international responsible actor in the region.

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NOTES:

[1] Companies in the region are tied to supply chains with the Chinese production hub. Inputs are being sourced from abroad for further processing with China as the final export platform. Chinese imports from Asia were up to 20 per cent in 2005, to US$ 440 billion, and accounted for 67 per cent of its total imports. (U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific – *Key Economic Developments Prospects in Asia – Pacific Region 2007*), p.18.

[2] Christopher J. Pehrson, **String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral**, *Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Pennsylvania, July 2006, p.3,*

[3] *China National Defense in 2006 – White Paper,* http://english.gov.cn/links/whitepapers.htm.

[4] Evan S. MEDEIROS, Roger ClLIFF, Keith CRANE, James C. MULVENON, *A New Direction for China's Defense Industry*" pp. 54-55.

[5] Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006. Annual Report to Congress*, Washington, D.C.

[6] Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BÂRGĂOANU, **Geopolitica**, Facultatea de Comunicare şi Relaţii Publice David Ogilvy – SNSPA, Bucureşti, 2001.

[7] Ibidem, p. 183.

[8] Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, **Ciocnirea civilizaţiilor şi refacerea ordinii mondiale,** Ed. Antet, Bucureşti 1997, p. 252.

[9] David LAI, *Learning From The Stones: A Go Approach To Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi,* May 2004, p. 24.

[10] Source: Office of the Secretary of Defence, *Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China – 200*6, p. 47.

[11] Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, **op. cit.,** p.252.

[12] Ibidem.

[13] Murray L. WEIDENBAUM, *Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?,* apud Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, **op. cit.,** p. 251.

[14] Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, **op. cit.,** p. 251.

[15] Christopher J. Pehrson, **op. cit.,** *p. 3.*

[16] *I'm looking for ways to respect China as a nation that deserves respect."* (Jim Garamone - *Joint Chiefs Chairman Optimistic About Relations With China* - American Forces Press Service, 21st of March, 2007).

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EMERGING WORLD ORDER. AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

Vijay OBEROI

The security environment in Asia is influenced by historical disputes; nuclearisation; energy sources; the growing potential of China; the war on terrorism; the spread of fundamentalism; and the social upheavals in many countries due to the rising expectations of their people. There is also the impact of the unilateralism of the sole super power-USA. All of them in an environment of increased economic activity, effects of globalization and the increasing impact of the information revolution.

The 21st century has been called the Century of Asia, for good reasons. While China casts its dominating shadow over, practically, the whole of Asia, there are other players, too, who have a significant say in shaping the future of Asia and indeed the entire world. Reasons for Asia being touted as the centre of gravity of the 21st century include the largest concentration of international economic power; maximum number of countries possessing nuclear capabilities; most threatening sources of global terrorism; largest sources of energy, as well as large emerging consumers like China, Japan, Russia and India; and the most populous regions of the world, with a preponderance of young and enterprising people.

The polycentric power structure of Asia has China, India, Japan, and to, an extent, Russia, as its power centres. Regional groupings, like ASEAN, also exert their influence. East, South and West Asia, are conflict-prone areas. The United States, besides being the sole super power, is also an Asian power on account of its major military presence in many parts of Asia. In addition to its political, economic and oil-related interests, it has substantial number of troops in Diego Garcia, a number of countries in West Asia - the strength in Iraq being the maximum, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian Republics, South Korea and Japan.

The 21st Century had opened with the global and regional environment focused more on economic issues and multilateral and bilateral cooperation amongst nations. However, following 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and subsequent violent terrorist-related incidents, security issues now top the agenda of most nations. In addition, many parts of Asia continue to be plagued with conventional military threats, internal turmoil and non-military threats.

In the nuclear arena, it is proliferation that is a serious concern, particularly when the countries involved are those ones known to sponsor fundamentalism, either as state policy, or by ignoring its rise. Even more disturbing is the glossing over of acts of major proliferation, by the major powers, on account of their short-term gains. On the conventional plan, while limited conventional conflicts are still likely to occur, they are gradually giving way to conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

Conflicts and conflict-like situations have continued in West Asia, the Central Asian Republics (CAR's), East Asia and South Asia, in varying intensities. The notable conflicts in West Asia are the Arab-Israel confrontation, internal upheavals in practically all countries, especially in Lebanon after the Israeli invasion, the daily blood-letting in Iraq, and the nuclear-related crisis in Iran. The CAR's are facing the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated with the re-emergence of the Taliban. Internal conflicts of ethnic or religious nature in many countries of these regions are other issues which affect the security situation of Asia.

In East Asia, Japan may well be on the verge of a major strategic level change. Some analysts feel that it is likely to adopt a more hard-headed security posture. There has been considerable speculation about the nuclear question. Although Japan has the technological capability to make nuclear weapons, the broad view is that Japan is unlikely to go nuclear. The most serious issue in East Asia is the rising Sino-Japanese tensions.

On the Korean Peninsula, the nuclearisation of North Korea is the most potent issue needing early resolution. The other disputes in East Asia are the China-Taiwan stand-off and the disputed islands of the South China Sea.

Presently, China is pursuing its long-term political goal of developing its Comprehensive National Power. Its need to secure the Sea Lanes of Communications (SL'sOC) through the Indian Ocean is related to import of oil and other commodities. The modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is continuing, so it is about the defence cooperation programmes with many countries of Asia. The current strategy of PLA aims at gradual transformation through up-gradation of conventional platforms.

The security-related issues of the South Asian region have both external and internal dimensions. There are major internal conflicts generated by a section of the people, like the LTTE problem in Sri Lanka, the Maoists in Nepal who are now joining the political process, the state-abetted fundamentalism in Bangladesh, the state-sponsored terrorism and fundamentalism in Pakistan, and the plethora of insurgencies in India.

Practically, all countries of South Asia face major internal threats that need to be tackled by their armed forces. All countries of South Asia suffer from almost identical problems of poverty, illiteracy, inadequate health care and backwardness. They need stability and peace for the lives of their people.

The internal security situation in Pakistan is not encouraging at all. Insurgency in Balochistan is continuing. Taliban and Al Qaeda presence in the area of Waziristan remains high. It is well known that Pakistan has fostered militancy and terrorism, both within the country and outside, for decades. It is under great pressure to rein-in and subsequently eliminate these activities, including from the United States, but has so far not done so.

The Northern Indian Ocean region is also an important area in the security calculus of the region. Major sea-lanes of the world pass through the Indian Ocean and keeping them open is a major concern of the world. The exploitation of resources in the Indian Ocean is steadily increasing, and needs to be safeguarded.

Concluding, the issues highlighted above suggest that security-related factors as well as economics will continue to influence both regional and Asian dynamics. The contribution and influence of Asia will play an important part in shaping a future global order.

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ROMANIA'S GEOPOLITICS IN THE CONFLICT AREAS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Gheorghe VLĂSCEANU, PhD
Liviu Bogdan VLAD, PhD

In this article, the authors highlight the fact that Romania has participated and actively participates to the war against international terrorism, through its implication in the conflicts from Afghanistan and Iraq, where our military presence has amplified, along with the NATO driven ISAF mission. The study aims to show Romania's presence in the conflict areas as a mean of objectifying the role that our country plays as a NATO member state.

Conflict areas – geopolitical connotations

"The conflicting state is the essence of geopolitics and its endless horizon". Despite the form and intensity of the conflict, where it arises, there is a substance for a geopolitical analysis.

Conversely, where there is room for geopolitical analysis, there is a conflict, because the geopolitical images, regarding people, as well as governments, are intrinsically conflicting".[1]

Due to the fact that the term of conflict is in the centre of the problems related to solving crisis situations, equal attention must be given to the concept-notions surrounding the main matter. The conflict, as a specialty term, is a notion which oppositely foremost counterbalances the concept of security,.

The relation conflict versus security, which may be extended in the general theory of conflicts, to war vs. peace, has been equally approached by the realists' (Susan Strange, Hans J. Morgenthau, Raymond Aaron) and idealists' (Francis Fukuyama, Stanley Hoffman)[2] schools. The theorists of these schools have stated, from opposite positions: the realists, the need to gain more power, and the idealists, the need to assert an "eternal peace", under the circumstances in which the evolution of the security concept has known many nuances and explanations. Maybe one of the relatively neutral theoretical positions was that one of P.J. Katzenstein (1996), who asserted that there are "two sufficiently known determinants of the national security policy: the policy's cultural-institutional context, on the one hand, and the built identity of the state, governments and other political actors, on the other."[3]

Another approach of the conflict may be found in the general theory of peace through the "peaceful means", where the "conflict, visible, through its violence, represents more than what appears to the eye; one must take into consideration also the violence within the structures and the culture that defends violence."[4] In order to change a conflict between numerous actors, there is the need to have a new architecture for the relations between them. These parties must change their opinions, so that that the conflict ends and never repeats itself.

Regarding the general theory of conflicts, S. Neguț (2006) asserted that the existence of a strategy starting from some observable similarities, own to some varied conflicting situations and processes, reveals, in a generalized manner, the main formal types and schemes of their evolution, therefore allowing to foresee results and, thus, to see the way out of a crisis situation.

We believe that this security – conflict binomial structure represents, from a geopolitical point of view, a *shut system*, which defends itself against internal events and external interventions from other states or military/non-military or political organisms, of a certain opacity and blindness; and concomitantly, it is a generative *open system*, in time, through the challenges, confrontations and rejections from the critical dialogue with the aimed reality.

Romania, the road towards affirmation

Internationally, the world goes through a situation without precedent, profoundly marked by the irrational actions of some forces promoting terrorism as a mean to divide the international

community and to weaken world stability in general. As we have highlighted many times[5], the global character of the war against terrorism has become a necessary component, yet an unexpected and unwanted one of the globalisation phenomenon, already constituting a fight and attitude imperative of all democracies to which Romania associates without hesitation.

History will write many pages with the road the Romania has stepped towards the European and the euro-atlantic integration, a road that has been neither straight, nor without obstacles. A comparison between the events of the 1989s and even the 1990s, with the ones from other former communist countries cannot be made, given the size and tragedy of what happened in Romania and the blood shed. The events rapidly gained the attention of the West, attention that some said that it may have been sympathy, which we could call pity, because it turned too quickly into adversity and indifference when the TV show lost consistency, entering into commonness. Re-entering normality took a very long time for us, as well as the reform that seemed endless, covering generations that have lost their hope.

We are proud to define the region that we occupy on the continent, a "Latinity isle", meant to justify the incandescent events that we are living. How else could we explain that we have been the last in Europe to receive clause from the USA Congress, only in 1993; why we have joined the Europe Council still in 1993, following countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, the latter, a direct participant to the war between the former Yugoslavian countries.

Frustration continued: the Visegrad group, established in 1990, by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, refused our request to join them; .foreign investments came very shyly and in symbolic dimensions; the Romanians' freedom of movement has been a dream until January 1st 2003. These are some of the frustrations, as the inventory is much larger.

The way towards NATO that we wanted to run on, hit the organisations' refusal in 1997 in Madrid, although Romania reminded everyone, along with other advantages, that it had been the first country from the Central and Eastern and Europe to sign the Partnership for Peace, in Brussels, on the 26th of January 1994 along with the participation to many common actions of UN and NATO.

We must admit that sometimes we behave like Cronos, from the mythology, who devoured his children; we had mineriads, we are lead by a yet not mature political class, we have had and still have presidents that we contest, although they have been democratically chosen, we have parliamentarians, who, once having occupied a seat, they are no loner wanted by us, although they have not been chosen by themselves, and the uninominal vote will not change our attitude very soon, for sure.

We believe that a people produce and show what it is and not what it would want to be, and it cannot get rid of its own history, that it creates, to which it participates, which endows it with its configuration and structure and along which it cannot walk parallel. That is why we are what we are and we will be in a different manner when we will truly want this. The tragic events from September 11, 2001 have marked the beginning of a new history at worldwide level, the beginning of the Third World War, the antiterrorist war. If at Madrid we received a refusal, at Prague, in 2002, we received an invitation that we honoured on March 29th 2004, when Romania becomes a fully NATO member, and in the same year, the negotiations for joining EU have been completed, and we have become a member on January 1st 2007.

The conflict in Afghanistan - beginnings, implications and perspectives

In the first months of 2002, the Coalition led by the USA attacks Afghanistan, removing the Taliban government that had protected and supported the terrorist organisation of Al-Qaeda, responsible for killing 2973 people from 90 countries in one single day, on September 11th, 2001, through the attack on the two Twin Towers from New York. Romania, without being a NATO member at that point, installed the first military battalion in Afghanistan since July 2002, participating along with the Coalition to the *Enduring Freedom* operation.

Our country's full NATO membership changed the situation from the operation theatre in Afghanistan, our military presence was amplified through the presence to the NATO'S mission, ISAF.

The ISAF mission gradually took over power, starting with the end of July- the beginning of August 2006, the area from the south of Afghanistan, occupied to that time by the 600 British militaries.

The Afghan South presents some characteristics related firstly to the Taliban threat, extremely active here, but also to the presence in this part of the country of the main poppy seed cultures that the inhabitants cultivate. The NATO troops benefit from the goodwill of the locals, but their mission is also to destroy the poppy seed cultures, the primary source of income for the Afghan village people. 2006 was considered an extremely fruitful year as the poppy seed cultures offered their largest opium production from the history of the country; its destruction was wanted both by UN as well as the USA.

World statistics confirm that 87% of world's opium originates in the Afghan lands, to which the origin of 90% of the heroin sold worldly may be added. The American aviation destroyed large parts of the cultures using substances derived from the well known *Orange Agent*, a defoliant with very severe consequences, which had transformed to desert large surfaces of the luxurious forests of Vietnam.

The matter is not at all simple: the destruction of the poppy seed cultures leaves the locals without any income, and their only alternative is to enrol in the Taliban forces in order to receive salary, to which the increasing hostilities towards NATO presence is added. On the other hand, it is still the poppy seed cultures that form the income sources of the Taliban rebels, who can therefore, afford to hire voluntaries from the 2,5 million Afghan refugees from Pakistan who have no possibilities.

If in the first two years, NATO only had to maintain order, now joins the fight, in order to reject the Talibans and to protect the civilians.

In ISAF, 72 Romanian soldiers are present and in *Enduring Freedom* there are 272 militaries having objectives in the South of Afghanistan. Romania also participates with 12 officers from the Protection and Security Service under the command of the UN for ensuring the protection and security of UN dignitaries, their residences', as in 2006, six UN employees were killed.

The situation in Afghanistan is far from being stable. The country is very difficult to conquer, as well as it is much more difficult to maintain law and order, where the communication means are precarious, where the terrain makes the country look like a fortress, etc. Russia had to leave after ten years of fighting without fronts and the USA has fought with the most modern military techniques against an organisation whose heads had left without hesitation and who are still wanted over five years. The barefooted and illiterate Talibans, with the gun on their shoulder continuously harass the NATO troops for years, without being stopped, as entire generations, after almost 30 years of war, don't know anything else but warfighting.

Few expect that the 35000 soldiers present in Afghanistan, troops recently enforced by American and British forces, to be defeated in the next months although it is highly unlikely that President Hamid Karzai's government collapses. It remains however weak, and this is a problem as



Source: www.icasualties.org

big as Taliban power. In a society that has been destroyed by conflict, poverty and illiterate, the governments lacks human resources to help him leading the country, which explains why in the last years it has not been able to use but half of its budget. The Afghans are disillusioned by the lack of jobs and by the proliferation of corruption, by the chronic poverty, by the continuous conflicting state. As to instating democracy in a world of tribal presence and traditional ethnic conflicts, there is no way. After the collapse of the Talibans, large parts of the country have been involved into the increasing commerce with opium. The source of 90% of the world heroine, Afghanistan is one step back from becoming a drug state.

The head of NATO troops, general David Richards, is convinced that the insurgent threat in Afghanistan has been removed, and claims, as well as Tony Blair, that the war can be won. However, between 2002 and 2006, in the war in Afghanistan, 4541-5308 civilians as well as 385 militaries lost their lives. The exact numbers are difficult to be established. The Romanian forces lost six militaries, starting November 2003.

The conflict in Iraq

In March 2003, the war flame is lit in Iraq, under the official supposition that this country would hold weapons of mass destruction, that have never been found because they've never existed. If once with the war launch, the USA counted on the support of 49 countries, afterwards, only 39, including Romania, would offer troops or logistic, technical or medical support. We must say that Romania engaged in this war since 2003, when we were trying to join both NATO and EU. If for a future NATO member, that was a long term investment, for the European Union, for certain, we were swimming against an non-interventionist tide, intransigently supported by Germany and France, as we received from the latter through the voice of president Chirac a warning: "Romania has lost a good opportunity to shut up!"

Iraq was conquered rapidly, in less than a month, and the war seemed that it had just started. Romania participates to this war for more than three years with 890 militaries, a figure that is decreasing, as in the June 2007 there were 500 militaries in the Nassyria military base, out of which some are placed under the command of the UN assistance mission, and several dozens participate to the training of the Iraqi army. The participation costs rise to several hundred million dollars, and there have been three deaths and four people were wounded.

Time, as well as especially the fighting conditions in Iraq, has diminished the Coalition, which presently benefits from combating troops and forces from only eight countries: Great Britain, South Korea, Poland, Romania, Georgia, Denmark, Australia and El Salvador. In more than three years of fighting without fronts, 18 countries left Iraq: Spain, Ukraine, Honduras, Norway, The Dominican Republic, Thailand, Hungary, New Zeeland, Portugal, Singapore, The Netherlands, the Republic of Moldova, Tonga, Island, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, the Philippines and Nicaragua.

Since March 20th 2003, 568 American militaries have died in the war in Iraq, out of which 430 ended tragically after May 1st 2003, when Bush declared



Source: www.icasualties.org

that the war was over. Over 10 000 civilian Iraqis shared the same destiny.

Great Britain announced on February 21st 2007 a calendar for retreat which would start in April 2007 and would end by the end of 2008. Denmark will also retreat, concomitantly with the British, the 460 militaries being replaced with 50 militaries and four helicopters. The same measure will be adopted by South Korea which initially counted 2300 militaries by the end of 2007 to leave the operation theatre. Poland has a different way of approaching geopolitically the situation from the Iraqi theatre of operations, where there are deployed 900 militaries, that will not leave the area, according to the declaration issued by their Defence Ministry, Aleksander Szczyglo.

Regarding Romania, the problem of the Romanian troops' withdrawal from Iraq was first set in June 2006, by the Liberal Party, without however having a large political support from other political forces. The withdrawal from this country is not simple, despite the obvious general course, and of the human and material loss.

Internally, the divergent opinions between the President and the Prime Minister cannot lead to a solution; on the other hand, the Law no. 42/2004 regarding the participation of the armed forces to missions abroad does not have an exact stipulation regarding the retreat of troops. The law stipulates that under the proposal of the Ministry of Defence, CSAT decides before the 30th of June, each year, the forces and means Romania participates with to international military missions. The troops are approved, as a consequence of the Prime Minister's proposal, by the President, after consulting CSAT, and the latter informs the Parliament within five days from the decisions.

The directions that this country will follow are difficult to anticipate under the circumstances in which the administration from Washington finds fewer and fewer resources and material and financial support to continue this war.

The American population is highly divided, when it comes to their opinions about this war, and the extremely large number of victims among the American militaries that appears every day only increases the distrust in George W. Bush's policy.

Externally, the Romanian troops' withdrawal from Iraq will generate high costs, especially in the relations with the USA, costs that Romania shouldn't assume now.

The war against terrorism

At the beginning we said that the actual war's breeding grounds are part of the campaign of the Third World War declared against a perfidious uniform less enemy, terrorism. Since 2001, since that black September, this war has killed 62007 persons, and has determined the refuge of 4,5 million people. A statistics drawn by the Independent on Sunday shows that in Afghanistan, between 4541 and 5308 civilians and 385 militaries were killed, 50100 civilians and 2899 militaries were killed in Iraq, as well as 4081 people in the rest of the world.

The costs of this war cannot be exactly estimated but the above-mentioned publication asserts that in July 2006, the US Congress approved the allocation of 437 billion dollars to be used in the antiterrorist war. The sum represents much more than the costs of the wars in Vietnam and Korea but hopefully a long and medium term investment on a "royal peace".

It is a war whose battle fields are not seen, whose parties search for each other, whose stake cannot be quantified instantly, and, what is most severe, it is a world whose peace is impossible in a near future.

The Romanian military force is present in other countries, such as Bosnia, Serbia (Kosovo), Sudan, Angola, and, according to the geopolitical context, we will be present or not in other conflict areas. This will stress pout the role Romania plays, as a NATO member, in the process for solving out crisis and conflicts, for strengthening the regional and global security.

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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS - MEANS OF DISCOURAGING THE USE OF FORCE

Petre-Ciprian CONSTANTINESCU

Economic sanctions underline the justification and necessity to observe thm in the context of précising the proximal genre of the definition, i.e. an economic sanction is any restriction imposed in the international trade, by a country (originator) to another one (target), in order to persuade the government of the target country to change its politics.

The sanction must be considered as an episode that can be placed in time, with a beginning, a content and an end, corresponding to the decision-making, the management and the lift. If it is rather easy to make a decision and impose a sanction, more it is more difficult to choose the moment and the conditions, whose evolution might, many times, become dangerous.

The justification of the sanction, i.e. to announce the targeted objectives and the determinant reasons, is a key-moment that should not be "missed" by the ones that lead: the support of the population, as a wider consequence, depends on it. The exercise is even more delicate when the sanctions imply food supplies. During the Gulf crisis, the Iraqi government attempted to use this dilemma, which led to a large number of newborns and children ending dead because of the lack of milk, determining the Coalition to adopt the principle of "humanitarian" aid (the Resolution 666 of the Security Council).

Internationally, co-operation is difficult to acquire and maintain. If it is not reached from the very beginning, or at least partially, it is easy to predict that the external support will go to wreck quickly, and the co-operant countries will end selling the due markets before those ones that are not part of the embargo.

Besides voluntary adhesion, in order to ensure the efficiency and the observance of sanctions, a control mechanism must be established to benefit from the legal means to punish the offenders, such as the Sanctions Committee during the Gulf crisis.

1. Economical sanctions – means of coercion

The great powers use a range of "tools" in order to influence the politics of other governments from public appeals and diplomatic persuasion to non-economical sanction, economical sanctions arriving even to military actions.

These measures can be either unilateral or conjugated, together with other countries through United Nations or other international organizations.

An economical sanction can be generically defined as a restriction imposed by a country (imposer) within the international commerce with another country (a target) with the aim of convincing the target country to change its commercial policies.

The sanction must be considered as an episode that could be defined in time, with a beginning, content and an end, and this corresponds to the action of taking a decision, of management and of taking off the sanction. If it's rather easy to take a decision and to apply a sanction, it is more difficult to choose the right moment and conditions, the evolution of which is mostly dangerous.

1.1. Taking the decision and applying the sanction

The power to decide over economical sanctions represents, in most cases, an executive discretionary competence, without the legislative interventions.

For example, in the United States of America, the law that regulates the exports – *Export Administration Act* – made always the distinction between *national security controls and foreign policy controls* that represents the powers of the sanction. In spite of successive amendments that envisaged the limitation of the American president powers (obligation of filling reports for the Congress every six months during sanction period and also the obligation of consulting the industrial victims of the sanction), these powers remain still great, taking into account the fact that the president

can any time decide on other law – *International Economic Emergency Powers Act* – that provides him all the freedom in the respective field.

The president shares this power with the Parliament in a small proportion, rather taking into account the public opinion to which he has to present the interest and necessity of the sanctions. The popular support is mostly necessary in order to continue her/his policy, especially if you consider the fact that the sanctions mean loss on market for certain parties from the local economical bodies.

If the decision can be taken right away, especially when it's about an answer towards an aggression judged in an unaccepted way, the rapidness could be also represented through the immediate put into practice of the sanction. For example, the freezing of the assets of Kuwait and Iraqi people was decided on 3rd of August, 1990, the second day after the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

1.2. Sanctions management

According to the sanctions' theory, after punishing a behaviour judged in an unacceptable manner (such as abuses on human rights or invasion over a sovereign state) or establishing a policy considered unacceptable (i.e. apartheid), the sanctions are not going to be generated in the same manner.

Also, there will not be generated the same types of bilateral or multi-lateral sanctions. Cooperation tends to be less secure as time passes because the international support represents most of the time a weak link of an embargo or of a sanction.

The justification of the sanction through announcing the objectives aimed and the determined reasons represents a key moment that must not be "failed" of those who lead this action: it conditions, as further consequence, the support of the population.

The exercise is a more delicate one when the sanctions are targeting food issues. In this case, the power side exposes itself to the risk of being reproached the will of starving the innocent population. Once with the Gulf crisis, the Iraqi regime tried to use this dilemma and it led to the existence of a great number of newborn children and dead born children because of milk lack which determined the coalition to adopt the principle of "humanitarian aid" (Resolution 666 of Security Council).

Even if the sanctions are not exclusively food connected, their justifications must be presented with much ability. The sanctions imposed after the Afghanistan invasion, presented by Jimmy Carter as being "the most severe threat after the second world war", were primarily supported by the public opinion itself. On the other hand, the Bush administration confused and amazed by presenting its objectives in the Gulf crisis as protection of the violated international right! Of course, but where isn't it? Protecting the petrol resources? Definitely, but they couldn't present the Gulf war as a petrol war.

1.3. After being justified, the economical sanctions must be respected

1.3.1. Internally, the main problem is determined by the category of sanction's victims: such as farmers in case of grain embargo; investors, if the investments will be prohibited; industrials from the hi-tech field.

The French system of COFACE (French insurance company in the foreign trade field) stipulated a warranty against political risks, which the American system is not aware of. Besides pressures, industrials' lobby actions aiming the guarantee of the contract inviolation, these contracts are not actually secure for the American farmers whose contracts with SSRU were *embargo proof*. As a result, two days after 1980 grain embargo notice, *Commodity Credit Corporation* purchases the farmers' cereals that they re-sold progressively on the international market, a guarantee of the so-called "farmers" come back. Komatsu, a Japanese company, without any compensation, replaced the Caterpillar, an American corporation, and a victim of technological sanctions in 1980.

As a result, we can come to a principle and that is sanctions will be more supported if the categories of populations direct victims will be compensated. The lack of these compensations will lead the populations right away into changing the direction of the embargo.

1.3.2. Internationally, the cooperation is difficult to get and keep. If this cooperation is not achieved from the very beginning, or it is partially achieved, it is easily understandable that the external support will tear apart rapidly, leading to the fact that cooperant countries would sell due markets to those ones that are not under embargo. So, the grain embargo from 1980s suffered from

the very beginning certain dysfunctions in Argentina where it was quite visible the fact that Carter administration underestimated its importance taking into account that this country was the second world's secondary cereals producer (that is other cereals, besides grain) from that area.

Supposing that the international support is obtained, this has to be preserved, maintained, taking into account that the elements that interfere will act in order to dissociate the solidarity. The countries initiating the sanctions can be a negative example as well, i.e. United States that authorized, in June 1980, the American cereal countries to sell Russia grain that was not American.

We cannot neglect the fact that those categories of population, victims of embargo, can protest. It is possible that the public opinion would not support the sanctions. The embargo changes and a change of embargo are comparable with fiscal evasion. It is unavoidable and it is not possible to re-discuss the reason of the measure as long as it is not in an acceptable limit and it was never taken into account.

Besides a volunteer adhesion to secure the efficiency and their completion, there must be a control mechanism of respecting the sanctions that will use juridical means to punish the felonies, as established by the Sanction Committee during the Gulf crises.

1.4. Sanction suspension

Once decided on sanction, the problem is to know whether when and in what condition it will be suspended.

Obviously, there is the question if the sanction is suspended once the event that provoked the crises disappeared. Should they have waited for the eviction of Afghanistan by the Red Army, the repealing of martial law in Poland, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the changing of Saddam Hussein, not to remind more than this examples, or could we introduce, realistically speaking, a gradation in the middle of a situation toward which it tends to get, putting an accent on this gradation towards a greater liberalization, towards a moderation? Or is it admitted the idea that coming back to "statu quo ante" cannot be discussed, reasoning this through a progressive "step by step" suspension of the sanction?

This extrem12ely difficult exercise requests a total art in taking the decision by the state that applies the sanction. The examples that succeeded in this direction are scarce. Coming back to the examples given above, the cereal embargo from 1980 was suspended in April 1981 by Ronald Reagan, in order to keep a promise made in presidential campaign, just because the crop from 1981 was announced as over-abundant, although there was no change in Afghanistan, although Soviets intensified their pressures over Solidarity in Poland. Denounced violently by State Secretary Alexander Haig, the suspension of the cereal embargo is an example of what it shouldn't have been done. The opposite model was that of progressive suspension of American sanctions against Poland – decided after a force attack from December 13, 1981, that took place between 1982 and 1987.

2. Ways of economical sanctions and their definition

As a reply to an internal and/or external political action considered as unacceptable, a state can exercise its disapproval through an economical sanction.

We can divide sanctions in unilateral decided by a state against another within bilateral relationships, i.e. the numerous American sanctions against Russia or the People's Republic of China, and multilateral - adopted by a number of states, generally the ones that control the goods' offer the selling of this being suspended. Getting a multilateral support is often indispensable in order to provide credibility to the sanctions without which the target countries would get supplies from other places where they can find surrogate products.

This economical sanction could be defined as "an interruption or threat of interruption of current financial or commercial relationship with a target country, an action decided deliberately at governmental level".

In order to reach the aim of the sanction, this must represent a disadvantage for the target country under two possibilities:

- either loss of an advantage the country has, i.e. reducing or suppressing the credits it could reach, the limitation of the sales towards countries that apply the sanction, reducing or surprising the sales of "sensitive" products towards target countries;

- or a deterioration of its situation creating, for example, within American – Soviet relations

an enforcement of the American military budget, supporting the army fights against communist regimes in the third world, the American military presence in the sensible spots the two superpower confront each other.

Sanctions can be of two kinds – commercial or financial – and they can aim different objectives. Their efficiency depends a lot on the way the means are proportioned with the objectives.

2.1. Defining the embargo and boycott

The economical sanctions fit into two types of decisions:

- embargo, representing simply said the *export suspension*;
- boycott, that supposes *import suspension*.

The classical definition of embargo sets this notion in the strict field of maritime law, where embargo means sequester of foreign ships in order to put pressure over states that own them. It is generally accepted, in the maritime law and in the international agreements, that this measure has a limited period.

Since the end of XIX century, when the old definition developed, there appeared two versions: one extended and one restrained. Both refer to exports to certain countries but the extended version included also imports. We will refer to the more restrained version of the term – suspension of exports. The suspension of exports refers or replaces actually the boycott.

As Louis Dubouis made the remark, "Boycott, in its more extended definition, represents the refuse of having commercial relationships with the target states."

In this sense, the embargo doesn't represent more than a part of the boycott measures. On the other hand, the more restrained definition of boycott, the one limited to the interdiction of import, corresponds to practice: in the relation between two states the measures considered relevant for boycott are actually the exclusive interdiction of imports.

From the point of view of the present analysis, the strategic embargo is of high interest.

Its theoretical fundament is the national security. Its objective is avoiding selling to potential adversary susceptible goods that could help directly or indirectly to strengthen its military potential and as a result to weaken the security of the country or countries that apply the sanction.

The strategic embargo has the following characteristics:

- its objective is defensive and consists in avoiding the strengthening the enemy's capacity by maintaining a technological advance in the military potential of the countries that apply the sanction;
- it aims nothing more than the military potential and not the global economical potential of the target countries;
- it is selective: there are limited only the flows that concern the goods and strategic technologies.

The characteristic form of strategic embargo is COCOM (Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls), created in 1949 by the United States, comprising NATO member states (excepting Iceland), that Japan joined together with Australia in 1989. COCOM's purpose was to control the purchasing of goods and Western technologies by the Warsaw Pact the member states.

2.2. Defining blockade

"The blockade consists classically of *communication interception and their surveillance.* It doesn't have to be more that a mean to ensure the embargo's efficiency. Taking into account the meaning often given in the last two wars, the blockade includes more general and constraining measures than the embargo.

The economical blockade assigns larger sanctions than the embargo just because it aims the interruption of all economical and financial relations."[1]

In the current language, the blockade represents *the use of force to impose respecting the embargo*.

Such as in an army fight between two states or powers, fighting tactics are used, attacks are organized and arms are used, these coercion means, regarding their aim, represent arms of the economical warfare.

2.3. Economical warfare

Between the simple economical competition and war from all points of view, the economical war represents *the policy of a state that tries to diminish its enemy's potential.* We could talk either of a global diminish in order to make it change external policy or to change the regime, or to provoke the collapse of the enemy state.

This policy was used in other occasions by famous Western "eagles" against Russia that was perceived as an ideological and expanding power with which making commerce was an absurdity; this policy was applied during Cold War and took place in the first years of Ronald Reagan's presidency.

2.4. Defining linkage

Linkage is *a strategy that consists in relating economical policy of a certain state with another one in order to facilitate political or economical concession by that state*.

We must make the distinction between positive linkage and negative linkage.

The positive linkage is often named as "bate" as opposed to "barrier" that symbolizes the negative linkage.

The hope for commercial or financial advantage must determine the target state to moderate its behaviour within the external and/or internal politics.

This linkage can be "specific" (a certain advantage reflects a certain decision) or "diffuse" (a general climate of situation improvement determines the state applying the sanction to initiate cooperation).

The negative linkage is often named "flopping stick". It is a punctual "embargo sanction", totally different from the long-term strategic embargo defined above.

Similar to the positive linkage, the negative one can be either "specific" or "diffuse".

If this distinction deserves clarification, it should be mentioned that in every positive linkage there is a dose of negative linkage: the moment in which bait is used.

The other way around is also applicable that is in every negative linkage there is a positive linkage: the moment in which the sanction is suspended.

It is difficult to make a distinction between the bait's withdrawal and flopping the stick.

The refuse to give a carrot to a carrot consumer, whether it is over a sufficiently long period, could prove to be even worse for his/her health than applying a soft correction with a stick.

3. The objectives, means and objects' typology, conditions and ways of applying economical sanctions

3.1. The objectives' typology

The state that applies the sanction could try to achieve only one objective or simultaneously, more.

Moreover, if the respective state acts within a global policy, each objective could be considered as priority or secondary.

This objective could be "rigid", it could represent a prior precisely fixed target and could be entirely aimed (i.e. suppression of any restriction in Russia concerning the Soviet Jews emigration). On the other hand, the objective could be "thin": the state that imposed the sanction tries to obtain subsequently only a progress in a certain determined direction, an improvement of the existent situation without actually establishing a precise and imperative target.

Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott propose in their work **Re-evaluated economical sanctions** five objectives of the foreign policy:

1. Obtaining a limited change in the policy of the target country.

2. Destabilizing the government of the target country.

3. Interruption of a small-sized military adventure.

4. Weakening the military potential of the target country.

5. Obtaining certain important changes in the policy of the target country.

This typology, even if it's insufficiently coherent, presents without doubt the advantage that constitutes a hierarchy of the aimed political changes.

3.2. Means' typology

Especially David Baldwin studied the means used within the economical sanctions. He recognizes two types of sanctions: the commercial and economical ones.

• According to him, some of the commercial sanctions are mentioned:

- *Embargo* in the restrained sense – interdiction of exports to target countries.

- *Boycott* – interdiction of imports from target countries.

- *Price discrimination* – the imports from target

countries are feed much more than the ones from other countries.

- *Withdrawal of the most favourite nation clause* – the imports from target countries cease to be favourably treated as it happens in other countries that benefit of this clause.

- *"Black list" subscription* – suspending the commercial relationships with companies that trade with target countries.

- *Scoring imposing* – quantitative restriction over certain exports and imports.

- *Refuse to license granting* – refuse to authorize import or export of certain goods.

• Some of the financial sanctions are listed below:

- *Assets or fortune freezing* – sequester over fortunes or interdiction over withdrawal of bank deposits or other kind of financial fortunes that belong to target countries.

- *Control over capital exports or imports* – restrictions concerning the person that could transfer capital, the total amount of capital, reasons for which this is decided either at entering or leaving the target country.

- *Suspension of aids* – reducing, suspension of aids granted to target countries.

- *Expropriation* – confiscating property of goods that belong to target countries.

- *Discriminatory fees* for belongings of target countries.

- *Failure or delay to pay the dues t*o international organizations.

3.3. The objects' typology

If we refer to commercial sanctions, we could denominate three large fields:

- raw material;

- technologies;

- commercial conditions (essentially the clause of the most favourite nation).

• From raw materials we have to make the distinction between *the energy, mineral and food products*.

The petrol example from all the energy products comes often into discussion. We could mention here a less known sanction than the embargo from 1973 imposed by the OEP member countries (Organization of Petrol Exporters from Arab countries), in order to show that these sanctions are not the privilege of the petrol state from Middle West.

Generally, the use of this object is reserved to countries that are petrol exporters. Besides the energy products, we have to mention the mineral, especially the rare ones.

Within the sanctions against nuclear policy of a target state, the sanction imposing state can eventually aim to not supply with uranium the proliferating country.

The last from the relevant objects from raw materials refers to cereals. For USA, these constitute a privileged good in what concerns the sanctions applied to soviets that are the greater requesters. Americans used to control a great part of the world production of cereals and dominated the Soviet market due to price and quality of their products; their lots of fodder (combination of corn-soya) for cattle feeding were and still are up to present unequalled in the whole world.

• If we analyze the technologies, the spectrum of products types is very wide. Undoubtedly, we can quote certain technologies that constitute privileged objects of the economical sanctions such as the drilling materials. For Russia, willing to exploit its immense mineral resources – especially in Siberia – without owning the advanced technology, this material is of high importance. Since 1973 from OEP embargo, USA tried to diversify the energy providers and oriented towards Russia, from here resulting a certain control relaxation over energy exports. But in 1978, as an answer to the Charanski dissident process, the drilling material was subscribed on the American list of controlled goods; then, as an answer to the invasion of Afghanistan, all export licenses were suspended and no new ones were granted. Moreover, as an answer to imposing the martial law in Poland, US stopped all the export licenses towards Russia, not only for drilling materials, but also for refining and transport equipments. On this occasion, "the gas kings' dispute" appeared that opposed Europeans to Americans from 1981 up to 1982 and reached the paroxysm in June 1982, when president Reagan extended the embargo over companies that worked under American license. The European opposition towards the extra-territorial extension of the American law determined Ronald Reagan, in November 1982, to suspend the American control imposed in the end of 1981. But US tried to re-introduce via COCOM the control concerning energy (February 1983), especially to subscribe on COCOM lists the submersible pumps. Americans

confronted with the refusal of the other members of the organization that reasonably estimated they didn't have a strategic character.

Besides the drilling material, we can add the high-technology such as electronic equipments and super-computers. In this sector, USA has been situated on an undisputable superior level for a long time as opposed with the other European Western countries. The economical sanctions applied by the American administration then had certain efficiency due to a low external offer. But in the 1970s this situation changed, due to the set-up of the new technology (Western Europe, Japan, South-East Asia countries).

As a result, there was necessary a more extended international cooperation if sanctions were applied on high-tech products.

At present, the high-tech interferes often in the fabrication of a product type that is currently aimed by embargo – armament. This sanction object is often connected to a conflictual situation (tensions or declared war), at national or international level. In this sense, this object could be linked with objectives such as stopping the repressing internal policy of a target country, trying to stop a civil war, but also could refer to the participation of a target state to war or aggressive action a certain country from the third world.

• In order to end this review of sanctions' objects, we have to mention, besides the commercial and custom sanctions (that is the clause of most favourite country), clear financial sanctions that would freeze the credits of a target country or refuse to grant credits/credit lines.

As a conclusion, we have to remember that choosing an object can play an extremely important role in the sanction success. As a result, there has to be a majority control over the aimed object offer (i.e. technologies), but there also have to be chosen an object that could "affect" the target state less on short term and more on long term.

3.4. The conditions to use the economical weapon

Three conditions have to be fulfilled simultaneously in order to act within the economical diplomacy:

3.4.1. Inequity of partners over the economical gains

In order to illustrate the first condition, let's concentrate on the example of American sanctions over Russia. These wouldn't have been applied if the American – Soviet commercial relations didn't represent for Russia a superior advantage against the American gain.

The notion of "American gain" was then evidently vague and mistaken because there couldn't be noticed the gain for the American companies that exported to Russia, neither the win for the entire American economy that could be little, null or in some cases with minus, if the selling of the American company had recovery clauses that could easily compete with the American production from other sectors. In this case, the establishment of American – Soviet exchanges was due to the pressure of the American exporters over administration, in order to impose an exchange that converged in more inconveniences than advantages for the American economy. So, in 1977, Russia didn't export ammonia to USA anymore. After signing an agreement in 1978 with Western Petroleum, Russia became the second provider of ammonia to USA, and its negative consequence was closing numerous American units, lowering the price of ammonia and damaging the ammonia anhydrous market.

"The American gain" was defined as the win of the entire American economy and not only for the company itself and it was understood as the impossibility of linkage, only if the Soviet gain was perceived by the Americans as superior that the American one.

This Soviet gain could be economical or political. The purchase of Western technology by Russia was a good example of economical gain, that allowed Russia to avoid research and development costs that were supported by Western countries, and also permitted to recover greatly from the technological delay against Western world. So the cereal imports permitted Russia to feed the population and animals without reforming the beaurocratic agricultural structures that were heavy, paralyzing and unmotivating and also without developing the private property that would have been indispensable for the stimulation of production but also against the collectivism dogma.

This profit was variable according with situations. In the period of cereal world surplus, the USA position, a cereal exporter, was weaker than in case of scarcity. Similarly, during energy lack, the drilling material for petrol and gas was extremely important for Russia.

3.4.2. Availability to practice linkage

This availability could cease to exist. The policy and commerce can have their own development without any linkage between them even if the respective form of commerce is politically linked. So a country doesn't subordinate its economical exchanges with other country's policy. Actually, the linkage deforms the commercial transaction adding a political request that conditions the performance of the respective transaction; the exchange becomes then a political-commercial operation. This request or political requests in general, are susceptible over either reducing the price or volume of exchanges, or the operation's failure.

3.4.3. Capacity of applying the sanctions

It is not enough to wish to have a linkage; it should be also possible which was not the case of Ford administration negotiations meant for ending the American-Soviet agreement from 1975 concerning cereals. H. Kissinger, who wished to get a compensation agreement between the American cereals and Soviet petrol (so a moderation of the Soviet behaviour in the Middle East), hit with the opposition of administration and also of farmers, a double hostility that, being known by Moscow, weaken gradually and irreversibly Kissinger's position that was forced to withdraw. We can understand from this example that it is always convenient to introduce the "time" variable that can modify the linkage result through the evolution of force report between adversaries.

Should there intervene the notion of the allies' cooperation taking into account that this is necessary to apply a linkage? It seems that it shouldn't. For US particularly, the allies' cooperation is not necessary to decide over a linkage and doesn't increase the efficiency of the American linkage, only in the case of negative one, respectively that of sanctions.

4. Conclusions

The economical sanctions were used for discouraging the use of force, but also for political aims at international level, considering the access to other state resources or getting competitive advantages.

When the tendency of conflict nature change widens the range of methods to fight, the economical sanctions outline in the near future as a genuine economical weapon, by itself, a valuable ally of diplomacy for the strong ones.

Nevertheless, in the conditions of market globalization and expansion of multinational businesses, the political and institutional framework should adapt to the diversification tendency of the economical sanction notion.

The economical sanctions are not nowadays an exclusive attribute to state and supra-state organizations. They have a strong tendency to escape law control and attract as a magnet the economical criminal organizations, funding source for organized criminal organisms.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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The European Union's Intergovernmental Conference on the CFSP opened its sessions on the 14th of December 1990 and managed to bring closer the different points of view sustained by the communitary states. It has been established that the CFSP was going to be a gradual process, which allowed the appearance of a fifth Title within the European Union Treaty, signed at Maastricht on the 7th of February 1992 and came into effect on the 1st of January 1993.

After the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, the European Union strengthened its position on the international scene; also, its foreign policy functioning manner has been reformed through the Amsterdam Treaty on 16 and 17 July 1997 which came into effect in 1999. Through this Treaty a new foreign policy instrument named "common strategy" has also been instituted. The Treaty also stipulated the integration of the Western Europe Union into the European Union, fact which allowed the use of the armed capacities of the WEU by the European Union. Following the coming into effect of the Treaty, a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been set up. The Treaty of Nice (December 2000) strengthens some of the aspects of the foreign policy, such as the role played by the Political and Security Committee within the crisis management field.

1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

"The political union has always been the long-term perspective of the European construction, the purpose of the efforts made after the Treaty of Rome"[1]; however, as far as the European Union Treaty is concerned, it has also been the part that has brought the major difficulties. The negotiations carried on within the intergovernmental conference, that preceded the European Summit in Maastricht, represented a high-spirited struggle between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists (for and against the attachment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Community) on one hand, and on the other hand, between the Europenists and the Atlanticists (regarding the introduction of a common defence introduced in the EUT). The outcome of the debates represented an inevitable compromise of the two so divergent positions, a compromise accomplished due to the fact that all the communitary states wanted a vigorous return to the international relations.

The procedure began on the 21st of March, 1990, when a Belgian memorandum drew the attention to the fact that "in international affairs, a true common foreign policy is more urgent than ever before", and the Community "should participate as a political entity when discussing these affairs".[2] The Belgian proposal was received with utmost interest at the European Council in Dublin in April 1990 and received the importance it deserved the same month, through a letter signed by Kohl and Mitterrand addressed to the Irish Presidency. The two leaders argued in favour of defining and implementing a CFSP and convening an Intergovernmental Conference on the CFSP in parallel with the one on the Monetary Union; the above mentioned are requests that were materialised through the decision of the European Council on the 25th and 26th of June 1990. The Intergovernmental Conference on the CFSP began on the 14th of December 1990 and managed to become accustomed with both different points of view sustained by the communitary states.

In 1991, the two Presidencies, the Luxembourgish and the Dutch one, each presented a treaty project for the future Union in accordance with their own visions. Thus, in April, the Luxembourgish Presidency put forward a treaty project which approached the Union from the perspective of a structure based on pillars, having equal status with the CFSP as one of them, which basically represented an intergovernmentalist vision. The protests of the federalist states

determined the reviewing of the project in July in a manner that made the pillar represented by the Community a priority, but changed very little the intergovernmental character scheduled for the CFSP.

Being considered too ambitious by the states opposing a pronounced Europenisation (especially Great Britain), the project was finally abandoned, and therefore the Dutch Presidency had the task to elaborate a new one. Remaining devoted to its federalist vision, the Netherlands put forward a project built up on exclusively federalist grounds, even for the CFSP (a Union without distinct pillars, using the qualified majority vote in all the major decisions within the CFSP, a more important role for the Commission in drawing up the CFSP); the proposition was immediately disavowed by the majority of the other communitary states.

The advocates of the federalisation accused this prompt rejection and considered this decision to be "the suicide from the Hague" or Europe's "Black Monday".[3] Thus, they returned to what in July was thought to be only the basis for negotiations, namely the pillar type structure belonging to the Luxembourgish project. By the end of 1991, the debate concerning the Union had been carried out mainly around the CFSP and its critical points: the connection between the EU and the WEU, the use of the qualified majority vote, the links with the first pillar, adding the mention of a common defence in the text of the Treaty. Finally, they have succeeded in finding a compromise and it has been established that the CFSP was going to be a gradual process, which allowed the appearance of the 5th Title within the European Union Treaty.

The 5th Title of the EUT does neither represent a victory belonging to the federalists, nor is it one for the intergovernmentalists; it simply represents a compromise and, inherently to such a document drawn up with difficulty, it contains not only significant successes, but also inadvertences. That is why it has been criticised by the advocates of both sides, some of them sustaining that it is too federalist and the others considering it a failure. Nevertheless, it represents an obvious success, managing to overcome an important phase in the European construction, though it may be considered too hesitating.

Officially declared at Lisbon, in 1992, the successor of the EPC, the CFSP has been seen as a mean of ensuring that the external actions of the Union were being more actively related to the reactive nature of the Political Cooperation. In essence, the EUT set up a CFSP on intergovernmentalist grounds, being itself included in a pillar that functions according to its own logic, different from the Communitary one, and having in its centre as a main decision making mechanism the EU Council, which decides by unanimity in all important matters, and the communitary institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, playing a minor part in this matter. Also, the CFSP defalcates itself from any possible control from the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the second pillar was conceived strongly connected to the first one, without which it could not function; within the 5th Title, communitary approaches to the CFSP can also be found. This co-existence of a communitary vicinity with an intergovernmental one within the same Title brought forth critical comments as far as the CFSP is concerned; they blame its "schizophrenic character"[4], assimilating it to a handicapped system for the ones on the inside and confusing for the ones on the outside[5], or stating, as Jacques Delors did, that "Europe is an unidentified political object".[6]

Not taking into consideration the "High Contracting Parties" formula, present in the Single European Act, and using one that is much closer to the communitary spirit, namely "the Member States of the European Union", the EUT sets out to establish the CFSP, whose objectives are for the first time stated and which covers "all the foreign policy and security fields" (Art.J.1)[7]. These objectives of the CFSP are: safeguarding the common values, the fundamental interests and the independence of the Union; strengthening all forms of security in the Union and the Member States; maintaining peace and strengthening the international security…; promoting the international cooperation; developing and strengthening the democracy and the lawful state, as well as the human rights and fundamental liberties observance" (Art.J.1)[8]. In order to put these objectives into practice, the Treaty establishes two legal instruments, namely the joint actions and the common positions.

Although it represented a significant step forward, compared to the EPC, mentioning the objectives of the CFSP has a flaw, especially because of their generality, leaving space for different interpretations, due to the lack of concrete data. The assertion of the global character of the

CFSP at the beginning of Article J.1 underlines the ambitions of the new Union, but at the same time increases the confusion, as the five objectives do not manage to cover an area so wide, despite their generality, and the EUT does not endow the CFSP with the necessary instruments in order to address to all "the foreign and security policy" fields. The presence of some imprecise terms in the Title, referring to the CFSP, such as "common values", reflects, together with the previous findings, its weaknesses.

However, the CFSP represents also a gain from many points of view, despite the lack of identity which it has been accused of, because, for the first time, the common defence policy issue is again seriously focussed on the presence of such a reference in the Treaty and also through the connection of the WEU to the EU. Also, the Treaty introduces the possibility of decision-making through the qualified majority for certain aspects within the implementation process of a common action; though a small step, it is one that brings closer the CFSP to the communitary domain. Finally, perhaps the most important gain of the 5th Title, it is the exact definition of the means used by the CFSP in order to reach its goal, namely the joint actions and the common positions. All of them have been sufficient in order to inspire optimism regarding the future of the European Union.

After the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, the European Union consolidated its position on the international scene through a more active support of the peace and democratisation process in the Middle East; by sending observers during the elections in countries as Russia and South Africa; by sending representatives in the crisis areas (Marc Otte has been sent in the Middle East); through diplomatic initiatives of prevention[9]. However, these actions have been insufficient and the mechanisms instituted by the CFSP have proved their inefficiency toward the new international challenges, such as the War in Bosnia. In order to increase the role of the foreign policy of the EU on the international scene, its functioning manner has been reformed through the Amsterdam Treaty.

The Treaty of Maastricht stipulated holding a new Intergovernmental Conference in order to bring some changes to the EUT if needed. As far as the CFSP is concerned, some important changes were indeed needed, as it had proven its incapacity of efficiently addressing the Yugoslavian conflict. Consequently, Commissioner Van der Broeck asked a group of experts to draw up a Yugoslavian report on the CFSP, in order to inform the intergovernmental conference scheduled for 1996. On the 19th of December 1994, the report was forwarded to the officials of the European Union, with an obvious and sad conclusion: the inexistence of the CFSP[10]. It recommended, in order to improve the flaws, to operate in three directions, namely the endowment of the Union with a capacity of analysis and permanent evaluation which can cover all the fields of the CFSP and setting out the common strategies for the European Council; the use of qualified majority vote in most of the cases; the absorption of the WEU.

Taking all these into consideration, the second Intergovernmental Conference began on the 29th of March 1996, with a European Council at Turin, and culminated on the 16th and 17th July at Amsterdam. Practically, the main problem of all these negotiations consisted in reforming the CFSP. Four major issues generated arguments: setting up the internal structures, including the creation of a High Representative position for the CFSP and also a cell of analysis and planning; use of qualified majority; status of the WEU toward the EU; common defence[11]. Signed within the Amsterdam summit, the Treaty modifying the EUT came into effect in 1999.

Once again, the intergovernmentalists and the federalists argued, and this time the former managed to obstruct almost everything, especially due to the strong position of Great Britain that is reluctant to any step regarding the Europenisation of the CFSP. If after Maastricht the predominant feeling was optimism, after Amsterdam there could be noticed a total disappointment, as the changes brought to the 5th Title were minor compared to what has been expected from that summit. The Amsterdam Treaty seemed to represent the perpetuation and not the changing of the CFSP process. The adjectives which described the accomplishments in Amsterdam were limited to "disappointing", "modest", and Jacques Delors qualified the events as "a catastrophic outcome for Europe"[12].

Thus, the transformations undergone by the CFSP consisted in the introduction of a High Representative who was to confer continuity to its actions and established a connection between the Secretariat of the EU Council and the one of the UEO, setting up a Planning and Alert Unit

which analyses the foreign evolutions and warns in case of any EU security threatening situations, offering an explicit strategic role for the European Council (defining some Common Strategies) and introducing the "constructive abstaining" principle, by which the member states can abstain from voting an issue concerning the CFSP.

Through this treaty there has also been established a new foreign policy tool called "the common strategy"; such a common strategy has been carried on in Russia, Ukraine and in the Mediterranean area*[13]. All these measures have the purpose to facilitate the development of the common foreign policy standards. The Treaty stipulated also the integration of the Western Europe Union** in the EU, which allowed EU to use of the armed capabilities belonging to the WEU. The Union can undertake missions such as the Petersberg tasks***, in order to give humanitarian aid and peacekeeping. Besides, the CFSP's objectives remained unchanged and equally vague, the common defence issue was omitted and the CFSP remained, in essence, an intergovernmental process. Thus, the Treaty brought multiple changes concerning the functioning manner of the CFSP, but still without changing the intergovernmental decisional system. Following the coming into effect of the Treaty, a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was also established.

Despite the failures from Amsterdam, what happened can not be qualified as "a catastrophe for Europe", because the changes managed to keep an open door to the future, so it was necessary that the CFSP process to go on and not be turned into something indecisive. This has been seen later on, when, at the Cologne European Council (June 1999) and then at Helsinki (December 1999), it has been decided to start off an authentic military dimension of the CFSP by setting up an armed force of the European Union. Though the European Council of Nice (December 2000) has not brought any further steps concerning the CFSP, the process continues.

The Treaty of Nice strengthens some of the aspects of the foreign policy, such as the role of the Political and Security Committee within the crisis management field. New reforms will be undertaken after the coming into effect of the Treaty instituting a Constitution for Europe.

In 2004, the main objectives established within the CFSP were: multilateralism developed around the UN, the fight against terrorism, a strategy concerning the Middle East and a global policy regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina[14].

The CFSP includes all the matters regarding the security of the European Union, and the first political objective of the Union is to actively participate in administrating the entire world.[15]

2.The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

The new international crisis outlined the fact that a foreign policy also needs a military force. As a response, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been consolidated as a constitutive part of the CFSP. Initially, the issue of a common defence policy was approached in the Maastricht Treaty, but the concept began its consolidation only after the British-French summit meeting from Saint-Malo in December 1998. This meeting ended with the common Declaration over the European Defence which stipulated that "the Union must have an autonomous capacity of action, supported by credible military forces, the means to establish their use, the decision and determination to use them with the purpose of responding to the international crises"[16]. The consolidation of the ESDP continued during the meeting of the European Council from Köln (June 1999) and with the Helsinki summit (December 1999), where ESDP's main objective has been established, namely the capacity of the member states to mobilise within sixty days and for a period of a year, a rapid reaction force of 60,000 soldiers to carry out the Petersberg tasks[17]. The European Council from Santa-Maria de Feira (1999) also established setting up a civil force of rapid reaction for the crisis management in fields such as police activities, humanitarian aid, supervision of the elections, observing human rights[18].

For unfolding an efficient activity, at the Nice reunion, the founding of permanent political and military organisms has been decided, as well as the Political and Security Committee (PSCO), the Military Committee and the General Staff. Thus, starting 2003, the ESDP possesses permanent and complete decision and mission leading structures. EU's first military mission was launched in Macedonia on the 31st of March 2003, and in 2005 Eujust lex was also launched, an integrated mission for establishing the lawful state in Irak[19]*.

Although six years ago the concept of the European security was taboo, the ESDP managed to define a security strategy based on intergovernmental cooperation among the 25 states[20]. The progress in the ESDP field will continue through the European Constitutional Treaty, which will create the Foreign Affairs Minister position; he will be responsible for running the CFSP and the ESDP, representing thus a unique voice for the European Union in international matters. Also, through the Constitutional Treaty some other changes will occur, such as the expansion of the Petersberg tasks; introducing a solidarity clause in case of terrorist attacks, natural disasters or those ones caused by man; founding a European Armaments Agency concerning armament, research and military capacities, as well as a closer cooperation, taking into consideration mutual defence and structural cooperation[21]. The European Armament Agency has already begun its activity; the other changes will be instituted only after the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty.

A far-reaching aggression against the EU states is practically impossible at this moment, but there are instead a series of new types of threats, much less predictable, such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts (the Middle East conflicts have a notable impact on the European interests), the weak state structures (within poverty, corruption and civil wars are spreading) and organised crime[22]. In order to fight against these threats, the European Union set the following three strategic objectives: ensuring the stability and an efficient governing in the immediate vicinity, developing an international order based on an efficient multilateralism, preparing an answer to the new type of threats. These objectives have been stipulated in the document "A secure Europe in a better world", presented by Javier Solana at Salonic in June 2003.

Javier Solana suggests that the European Union must ensure the global security together with the USA, considering its world importance, demographically and economically (25% of the world's PNB)[23]. Within ensuring the European security and defence, the European Union developed a complementary relationship with NATO, launching autonomous operations of crisis management only where NATO does not want direct involvement[24]. The EU and the NATO develop relations based on effective consultations in order to cooperate in efficient crisis management.

In 2004, a new global objective (Headline Goal 2010) has been adopted; it stipulates that the member states have to be ready until 2010 to quickly proceed within the total amount of management crisis operations, such as humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, fighting missions in situations involving crisis management, including the ones for establishing the peace, joint disarming operations, supporting the third parties in the fight against terrorism and for the reform of the security system[25].

NOTES:

[1] Octav BIBERE, **Uniunea Europeană între real şi virtual**, Editura All, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 56.

[2] lfriede REGELSBERGER (coord.), **Foreign policy of the European Union: from EPC to CFSP and beyond**, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1997, p. 43.

[3] **Ibidem**, p. 58.

[4] Simon DUKE, **The elusive quest for european security: From EDC to CFSP**, MacMillan Press LTD, London, 2000, p. 100.

[5] David BUCHAN, **Europe: The Strange Superpower**, Darmouth Publishing Company Limited, London, 1993, p. 44.

[6] Andre DUMOULIN, *Les ambitions de l'Europe: de l'après Kosovo aux indicateurs de cohérence*, in Politique Etrangere, no. 2/2000, L'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, p. 485.

[7] *** **Tratatul Uniunii Europene**, Editura Lucretius, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 190.

[8] **Ibidem**, p. 190.

[9] Corneliu C. POPETI, **Spre o nouă arhitectură europeană**, Editura Mirton, Timişoara, p. 61.

[10] Simon DUKE, **op.cit.**, p. 100.

[11] Pascal BONIFACE (coord.), *L'année stratégique 1997*, L'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, Paris, 1997, pp. 31-32.

[12] John PETERSON (coord.), **A Common Foreign policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP**, Routledge, London, 1998, pp. 68-69.

[13] Michelle CINI, **European Union Politics**, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 237.

* The common strategy 2000/458/CFSP for the Mediterranean area was adopted for four years and later on it was delayed until January 2006. The strategy included all the relations between the EU and its partners from the Barcelona process, including Libya.

** *The Western Europe Union (WEU) was established*

in 1948 by the Treaty of Bruxelles and it represents an organisation created in order to cooperate in defence and security matters

*** The Petersberg tasks represent humanitarian and evacuation missions, peacekeeping missions and battle forces for the crisis management, including peace re-establishing missions.

14 *Conseil Européen Rapport général 2004 - Chapitre XVIII: Relations extérieures générales - Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune,* http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/rg/fr/2004/pt0534.htm#anch015.

[15] Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU, **UE de la național la federal**, Editura Tritonic, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 248.

[16] *Joint Declaration on European Defence*, Saint-Malo, 3-4 decembre 1998, Chaillot paper 47, Edition Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2001, http://iss-eu.org.

[17] *La politique étrangère et de sécurité commune,* http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/fr/lvb/r00001.htm#a19004.

[18] Liviu MUREŞAN, Adrian POP, Florin BONCIU, **Politica europeană de securitate şi apărare - element de influenţare a acţiunilor României în domeniul politicii de securitate şi apărare**, Editura Institutul European, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 21.

[19] Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, **Puterea militară în secolul XXI**, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 22.

[20] Nicole GNESOTTO, *La politique de sécurité et de défense de l'UE*, Edition de L'Institut Européen pour les Études de Securité, Paris, 2004, p. 4, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Politique%20securite%20et%20defense%20UE-les%205%20premieres%20annees.pdf .

[21] Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU, **op. cit.**, pp. 398-399.

[22] Nicole GNESOTTO, **op. cit.**, p.4.

[23] Vasile PUŞCAŞ, Liviu IVAN, **Regiune şi Regionalizare în UE**, Editura Institutul Cultural Român, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, p. 66.

[24] Adrian NĂSTASE, **Organizarea internațională**, Editura Universitatea Valahia, Târgovişte, 2001, p. 308.

[25] Cristian BAHNĂREANU, **op. cit.**, p. 24.

* Within the meeting that took place on the 22nd of February 2005, the Council gave its political approval for launching a mission of police instruction, civil administration and establishment of the lawful state in Irak.

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THE SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Elemir NECEJ

In the previous decade, Slovakia concentrated on the attainment of two strategic objectives - to become a full-value member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of the EU. Both objectives have been attained due to the transparent security policy of the Slovak Republic. By the accession to NATO, the Slovak Republic has become a part of the collective defence and security system as a pillar of the Trans-Atlantic security and stability and by the admission to the European Union Slovakia has won guarantees of political and economic stability, as well as the possibility to actively participate in the formulation, implementation and strengthening of the European security and defence policy.

The Slovak Republic reacted to these changes by the preparation of new strategic documents - the Security and Defence strategy.

1. Slovak position to the European Security Strategy

The **Security strategy of the SR 2005** takes into account the essential changes of security environment and new commitments of the Slovak Republic after the accession to the NATO and the EU. In comparison with the Security Strategy of the SR 2001, this shift is visible in the defined interests of the SR. The support of the transatlantic alliance and the support for extension of the NATO and the EU remains the basic matter.[1] The position in the security environment is understood in connection with the Euro-Atlantic space, where as the part of the collective system of the NATO, the safety and stability of the SR is guaranteed by the allied commitments. With its entry to the EU, the SR is acquiring the guarantees of political and economic stabilization and the possibility of a share on the European security and defence policy.[2] In comparison with the Security Strategy SR 2001, active attitudes of security policy against the NATO and the EU are formulated in a more concrete terms. For the SR, NATO remains the main platform for development of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic space, and the Strategy underlines the need to preserve its internal unity, and the need of transformation and adaptation to new security threats. Meantime, the Strategy expresses an active approach to further development in the NATO.[3] In the relation to the EU, there is expressed an active attitude to the joint creation and implementation of **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and the building of capacities of the European Security and Defence Policy, while maintaining the complementarity with the NATO.[4]

The **Defence Strategy of the SR 2005.** From the view of the access to NATO and the EU, it elaborates the conclusions of DS SR to issues of the defence. According to Article 12, it will implement the basic objective of the defence policy of the SR from the position of the Euro-Atlantic orientation. NATO and EU membership are regarded as decisive to guarantee its security and striking power. It agrees with primary objectives and functions that result from the NATO's Strategic Concept and from the European Security Strategy. This orientation gives rise to two out of four primary objectives of the defence policy[5]: to fulfil all commitments of the NATO member; to fulfil commitments of the EU member in the framework of the ESDP.

The building of capabilities respects the order of priority of the commitments to NATO[6] and the increase of the level of applicability and operational readiness of the armed forces will be achieved through the Defence Planning harmonised with the Defence Planning of NATO. These priorities are also respected in the plan of the utilisation of the armed forces. According to the Defence Strategy, these should be used[7] within full scope in: high-intensity operations for the defence of the Slovak Republic, within very large scope by the provi-

sion of forces up to the size of a brigade group in operations for the collective defence in NATO, within a large scope - forces in the size of a battalion group with CS, CSS in common operations conducted without geographical limitation under NATO command, within a medium scope in the size of a mechanised battalion in operations for the support of peace under NATO or EU command, within a small scope in operations for the support of peace and humanitarian operations under UN, EU or other international coalition command in the form of a long-term contribution in the size of a company.

2. The comparison of structure of Security Strategy of the SR and the ESS

In 2005, The Directorate General for Security Policy of Austrian MOD, Institute for Security and Defence Studies of MOD of SR, the Centre for Strategic Studies of Zrínyi Miklós NDU in Budapest and the Institute for Strategic Studies of Defence University in Brno prepared a study oriented on the comparison of the national security concepts (or strategies) with the European Security Strategy - **The Security Strategies of the Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the Context of the European Security Strategy.**[8]

The comparison is extracted from this study.

2. 1. Introduction

In the introduction, the European Security Strategy creates the starting point for further text with the aim to prepare the EU to a share on responsibility for the global security - Europe as a global player. Further to previous strategic documents, the introduction to Security Strategy of the SR characterises the SR as the sovereign state respecting the political independence and territorial integrity of all states. It underlines the changes in the security environment and new commitments of the SR.

2.2. Interests

Interests are not explicitly stated in the ESS. The interests of SR are based on the principle of guaranteeing the security of citizen in accordance with international legal standards and the constitution and on the values of freedom, peace, democracy, rule of law, justice, plurality, prosperity, solidarity, respect for human rights and freedoms.[9]

The quoted values are comparable with the values stated in the proposal of the constitutional agreement and which shall be also valid in the case of its non-adoption.[10] The security interests resulting from these values are:

European Security Strategy	Security Strategy of the SR
Introduction	Introduction
	I. Security interests of the SR
I. Security environment: global challenges and key threats	II. Security environment of the SR
II. Strategic aims II.1. *Facing the threats* II.2. *Building of security in neighbourhood* II.3. *International order on the base of an effective multilateralism*	II. Security policy of the SR III.1. *Security and defence of state (it solves the facing to threats)* III.2. *Stability and predictability of security environment*
III. Policy implications for Europe III.1. *More active (wide spectrum of instruments+preventive engagement)* III.2. *More capable (transformation of the armed forces, civilian crisis management, EU-NATO, Berlin+)* III.3. *More coherent (utilisation of more instuments and capabilities)* III.4. *Cooperation with partners (common threats, irreplacable nature of the transatalantic relations)*	- no special chapter exists, implications are the part of chapter III
Conclusion	Conclusion

1. to guarantee the security and protect basic human rights and freedoms of citizens;

2. to guarantee the territorial integrity, sovereignty, inviolability of borders, political independence and identity;

3. to develop the democratic state regime, rule of law and market economy;

4. to create preconditions for permanently sustainable economic, social, environmental and cultural development of society;

5. to strengthen the transatlantic strategic partnership, to be the co-guarantor of security of the allies;

6. to strengthen the efficiency of international organisations, where SR is a member, and to support the NATO and the EU enlargement;

7. to develop good partnership relations and to develop all forms of mutually advantageous cooperation with countries, with which we share common interests;

8. to contribute to the strengthening and dissemination of freedom and democracy, observance of human rights, rule of law, international order, peace and stability in the world.

The mentioned interests are comparable with interests, which are defined by the Central-European states in their security strategies.

2.3. Challenge and threats

The European Security Strategy divides the problems EU faces into two groups:

1) Global challenges, which have not an immediate influence, but they influence the vulnerability of the EU because they are interdependent. The chapter characterizes the contradictions in understanding of:

- globalisation;
- growth of space for non-state groups;
- poverty, diseases;
- economic and political failures;
- energetic dependence;

2) Key threats:

- terrorism;
- proliferation of WMD;
- regional conflicts;
- failed states;
- organised crime.

The SS of SR characterizes the challenges and threats, even when they are not strictly divided. Prior the characterisation of challenges and threats, it states the tendencies of development of the security environment. As the basic tendency there is understood the tendency of deepening the instability, uncertainty and unpredictability. Then there are stated the globalisation, internal conflicts.

1) It is possible to include among the challenges the following[11]:

- globalisation;
- growth of influence of non-state factors;
- economic imbalance in the world;
- dependence of vital resources;
- unbalanced demographic development and spreading of diseases;
- vulnerability of information and communication systems.

2) Defined threats:

- terrorism;
- proliferation of WMD;
- regional conflicts;
- failed states;
- organised crime;
- illegal and uncontrollable migration;
- activities of foreign intelligence services;
- radical nationalism and intolerance;
- natural disasters, breakdowns and catastrophes.

2.4. Aims and tasks

On defence of security and the support of values, the ESS stipulates three strategic aims:

- facing the threats (with an accent to concrete measures against threats analysed in chapter II);
- building security in neighbourhood (it quotes three regions - Balkans, Middle East and Mediterranean area);
- international order based on an effective multilateralism (it underlines an effective multilateral system on the base of international law, the place of key institutions of this system and individual policies).

The aims and tasks in the SS of SR are defined in chapter III, “Security policy of the Slovak Republic”, which is divided into sub-chapters:

1) Security of citizen and state (it responds to threats, it is comparable with the first strategic aim of the ESS);

2) Stability and predictability of security environment, where there are mentioned principles and aims of security policy of the SR, which can be divided according to the contents to:

- membership of the SR in international and regional organisations and its policy within them (this part of the SS of SR can be only compared with the strategic aim of the ESS – "international order" in fact, which organisations are included in the SS of SR. From the view of contents, it is not possible to define that the SS of SR would get closer to the characteristics of an effective multilateralism of the ESS, the problem shall be discussed in details in "Comparison of contents");
- the attitude against selected regions and states (contents of this part is comparable with the strategic aim of the ESS, "building security in neighbourhood". In the SS of SR there are included the problems of West Balkans, Mediterranean Sea and the Near and Middle East. Additionally, it defines the attitudes to the USA, Ukraine, the CIS, Russia).

2.5. Political implications for Europe

From the view of the fact that the SS of SR is the „national strategy", even when it takes into account the commitments from membership in the NATO and the EU, the political implications for Europe characterised in the ESS can be compared from the context. However, they are not a specific part of the SS of SR. From the view of a response to higher activity, the overall philosophy of the SS of SR assumes a higher involvement of the SR and a share in wide spectrum of instruments of the crisis management, understandably not only the EU, but also the NATO. If we want to compare the problems of strengthening the capabilities, the SR shall contribute to the development of required capabilities of the NATO[12], and towards the EU it assumes the strengthening of capacities of the crisis management, with the aim to contribute to the operations and missions led by the EU[13]. At the application of coherence and cooperation with partners, it is necessary to see the coherence of own means[14] and the approach to the coherence within the framework of the EU, which is defined rather secondarily. Differences can be found in the evaluation of partnership with the USA, which is in the Slovak Security Strategy understood rather as a strategic partnership, as opposed to the „balanced partnership in the ESS". However, the Manifesto of new government (August 2006) is in this area more careful. According the Manifesto, *"The Government considers NATO to be the main guarantor of the EA security and it shall respect and fulfil obligations following from Slovakia's membership in NATO. It shall continue in strengthening the transatlantic links and partnership between the member states of the Alliance, and to develop its relations with the U.S.A."*[15]

3. Comparison of contents of problems

3.1. Challenges and threats

As it was shown in previous chapter the comparison of challenges and threats is stated in following table.

From the view of comparison, it is more important to pay attention to the assessment of substance of these phenomena.

In the preparation of the security strategy of the SR, the authors have proceeded from relatively wide discussion on the problems of challenges and threats, which has already taken place during the preparation of strategic security documents in 2001. If, for instance, in NATO's Strategic Concept, the security challenges are understood rather as approaching the threats, in the preparation of Slovak documents it concerned rather the understanding of a challenge in accordance with the fact that the coping with it (its grasp) can bring positive results, and the failure of coping with it can have a negative impact (globalisation, informatisation).

Therefore, among the challenges there were included rather global and more general matters, and among the threats more concrete phenomena, whereby the SS of SR is approaching the understanding of the ESS. In the ESS, the response is aimed more to the threats than to the challenges.

Challenges

The SS of SR is aiming in its response first of all to first four defined challenges. Regarding the globalisation, it wants to utilise its developmental potential and to minimise its negative consequences[16]. Towards the non-

state factors, it sees the possibilities of an active cooperation with non-governmental organisations and private sector at the solution of problems of failed states, conflicts, creation and distribution of humanitarian and developmental assistance[17]. The SR sees its participation at the stopping of the deepening economic imbalance in the world by the contribution to liberalisation of world trade, the engagement of less developed countries to the international work division. Equally, it shall engage into the provision of developmental assistance. In the response to the dependence on vital resources, there are mentioned two directions. One – external - is the share of the SR on the increase of security and stability of regions with their extraction and transport. Second – internal - is the minimisation of failure of the SR economy, the fulfilment of requirements of the NATO and the EU to the energetic and crude-oil safety.[18] The SS of SR also responds to the problems of own negative demographic development, with which there shall be also connected a possible modification of controlled migration policy.[19]

Threats

The defined threats have points of contact and are interconnected. Therefore, in the SS of SR – similarly as in the ESS – also in the response to individual threats, it is seen the interconnection of response to the interconnected threats. Regarding the general aim of such a document, as the SS of SR, it was not possible to specify in details the interconnection of responses to threats. However, they are clear from the context.

In the response to terrorism, in addition to the development of complex internal measures, the emphasis is put to the cooperation with foreign authorities and institutions, including participation of the SR at the "active preventive disarmament", especially if terrorism acquires the weapons of mass destruction.[20] Meantime, SR states its support for the EU's solidarity clause.

As a response to proliferation, it shall concern the share in the active policy of the global control of armament and disarmament, with the priority to proliferation of WMD. In addition to the policy of control and prevention, in co-operation with the NATO and the EU, the SR wants to engage itself to the measures for minimising the consequences of the WMD use against the SR citizens, against the armed forces in operations abroad and against the allies. In comparison with the ESS, the SS of SR also states the engagement to the systems and programs of anti-ballistic defence.

The concreteness of response to regional conflicts and failed states seems to be problem both in the ESS, as well as in the SS of SR. The SS of SR states in general an active assistance at

European Security Strategy	**Security Strategy of the SR**
Challenges	**Challenges**
Globalisation	Globalisation
Growth of space for non-state groups	Growth of space for non-state factors
Poverty, diseases	Unbalanced demographic development, diseases
Economical and political failures	World's economic imbalance
Energetic dependence	Dependence on vital resources Vulnerability of communication and information systems
Threats	**Threats**
Terrorism	Terrorism
Proliferation of WMD	Proliferation of WMD
Regional conflicts	Regional conflicts
Failed states	Failed states
Organised crime	Organised crime
-	Illegal and uncontrollable migration Activities of foreign intelligence services Radical nationalism and intolerance Natural disasters, breakdowns and catastrophes

the renewal of basic functions of failed states at the application of policy of assistance and sanctions of international organisations. Similarly, there is defined an active contribution to the prevention of regional conflicts and the share on post-conflict renewal. At the same time, it expresses the contribution to military and civil means in the international crisis management. Though it is quoted that these contributions shall be proportional to the possibilities, interests, commitments and priorities, the SS of SR lacks the determination of priorities, first of all what concerns the military-political ambitions.

In the response to the threat of organized crime, the SS of SR assumes internal measures for its prevention and elimination, concurrently with the support of international cooperation and an increase of efficiency of its structures.

Similarly, facing further threats is worked out in the measures. According to the contents, a big importance is given to the measures for limitation of vulnerability of critical infrastructure, with an accent to information and communication systems (especially to those, which are necessary for the performance of basic functions of the state). In comparison with the ESS, a bigger emphasis is put on the problems of environment, and also to the nuclear safety (safety of own nuclear facilities of the SR), and equally to the crisis management at natural disasters, breakdowns and catastrophes[21]. Also, when defining the radical nationalism, intolerance and religious extremism are not directly stated among the threats (it is possible to classify them as challenges), concrete internal measures in the disclosure and comprehension of their manifestations, including preventive measures in social care, education and in forming the public opinion point out rather to a possible threat. In the relation with external dimension, it is possible to connect it also with the analysis of terrorism.[22]

3.2. Regional dimension

The regional dimension of "Building security in neighbourhood" is, in the ESS, the part of strategic aims. The Security Strategy of the SR solves this dimension in sub-chapter "Stability and predictability of security environment"of chapter III, "Security Policy of the Slovak Republic". However, similarly as for instance in the strategies of the Czech Republic and Hungary, also in the Slovak Security Strategy there is the coverage of regions, which are analysed and against which are directed the aims of security policy. It concerns the West Balkans, Middle East and Mediterranean area.

Regarding the West Balkans, the SR wants to promote their European and Euro-Atlantic integration and to help at the building of multiethnic societies and functional governments. In the document (similarly as in the ESS) there are not any concrete standpoints to the solution of problems, which shall be in the limelight of the NATO and also the EU in the period of realisation of the strategy (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina).

More general standpoints to the problems of regions Mediterranean Sea and the Near and Middle East are taken in comparison with the ESS, with the accent to stabilisation of situation, overcoming the economic stagnation and measures against the spreading of illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism. The solution of the Israel-Arab conflict through peaceful means is considered as the strategic priority. (In comparison with the ESS, no standpoint is taken to the Barcelona process.)

For understandable reasons (similarly as at the other Central-European states), the Central-European space is defined in the SS of SR as an important space for the security policy.[23] Therefore, among the measures there are included, besides the utilisation of potential of the European Council and the OECD, the Central-European Initiative and the extraordinary position of V 4.

In comparison with previous strategic documents, it formulates more concrete attitudes to Ukraine, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russia. In the relation to Ukraine, the SS of SR responds to current changes, it expresses the support for pluralistic democracy, political and economic stability as the precondition of regional security, and also security of the SR.

In comparison with the ESS, it expresses the interest that Ukraine, following the fulfilment of criteria, should become the member of the NATO and the EU. In the relation to the countries of the CIS, the SS of SR considers as important their wider involvement in the cooperation with transatlantic and European structures, the solution of crises in Transcaucasian and Middle-Asia regions and the strengthening of democracy and rule of law in Belorussia and Moldova. Russia is evaluated as an important subject, which shall influence the security situation in the Euro-Asia region. Slovakia in-

tends to support the development of strategic partnership of Russia with the NATO and the EU.[24]

3.3. International order

Similarly as the security documents of compared Central-European states, also the SS of SR does not contain the term of "effective multilateralism". The ESS underlines the commitment to the protection and development of international law, with the accent to the UN Charter and the primary responsibility of the Security Council. As priority there are stated strengthening the UN and its ability to act effectively. In comparison with the SS of SR, NATO is mentioned only as an important expression of transatlantic relations, which are the key element of international system. As the part of quoted multilateral system, there are stated further organisations – World Trade Organisation, regional organisations (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, African Union). The Manifesto of new Slovak government includes the formula of "multilateralism".[25]

The approach of the SS of SR to the problems of international order is unreeling already from the assessment of security environment. By its membership in the UN, OSCE and other regional organisations, the SR contributes to the overall endeavour of international community. At the same time, it underlines the importance of our accession to the NATO as the pillar of transatlantic stability and security and to the EU, first of all with the meaning of political and economic stabilisation.

The SS of SR understands the membership in international and regional organisations as the possibility of realisation of its security interests, it appreciates the importance of international institutions, starting with the UN. As a certain response to the change of security environment, the document states, however, that the forms of security institutions and international law have to reflect the changes in the character of security threats, and it shall also support the adoption of new international standards, where it is desirable.[26] The SR assumes the guarantee of its security and the possibility to actively form the security environment primarily within the framework of membership in the NATO and the EU. Also, when it is possible to discuss, whether this approach reflects also the order of attitudes to the organisations, in the document they are put in the order - the NATO, the EU, the UN (articles 68-70). Therefore, NATO membership represents the guaranteed security, and the SR considers it important, that it should remain the main platform in the development of cooperation in security and military fields in the Euro-Atlantic space. Meantime, the SR assumes an active implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy of the EU. Regarding UN, it expresses the support for its reform, which is to increase its readiness for action (the reform is not explicitly mentioned in the ESS), including the adoption of universal international standards especially in the field of fight against defined threats and challenges. On the attempt to make the cooperation with the UN and regional organisations more effective, there is mentioned first of all the cooperation with the NATO and the EU.

NOTES:

[1] **Security strategy of the SR 2005**, *chapter 1, point 5 states among the interests: "to strengthen the transatlantic strategic partnership, to be a joint guarantor of security of the allies; to improve the efficiency of international organisations, member of which is the SR, and to support the extension of NATO and EU", http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/eng/sk-security-strategy-2005.pdf*

[2] Ibidem, articles 10 and 11.

[3] Ibidem, article 68:"SR shall support transformation and adaptation of the NATO to new kinds of threats and challenges. It shall reform and build its security system in such a way, which enable the SR to contribute to the development of required capabilities of the NATO, including the participation in the missions and operations of the Alliance outside the territory. The SR shall also consider in the future the extension of NATO as the way of strengthening of the zone of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space. The SR shall develop the cooperation with countries involved in the Euro-Atlantic partner structures and the countries of the Mediterranean-Sea Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The SR shall support common meetings of the NATO and the EU . . . as the expression of their key strategic partnership. It shall support the development of an effective dialogue and cooperation of the NATO with further international institutions.

[4] Ibidem, article 69: "SR shall actively jointly form and implement CFSP. The SR shall contribute to the realisation of aims of European integration and the creation of civilisation, civil, legal, internal-security and economic space… The SR shall enforce the fulfilment of aims stipulated in the ESS and it shall

strengthen the capacities of crisis management with the aim to contribute to the operations and missions led by the EU. It shall support the building of operating capacities of ESDP, so that they were complementary to the capacities of the NATO. In accordance with the clause of solidarity of the EU, the SR shall help the countries attacked or threatened by terrorist attacks and hit by natural disasters. The SR shall support the development of activities of the EDA.

[5] *The Defence Strategy 2005, Article 18*, http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/eng/sk-defence-strategy-2005.pdf.

[6] Before the end of 2010 to adequately contribute to the defence capabilities of the collective defence of NATO and to military capabilities of the EU, by 2015 to increase the ability to make full-value contributions within NATO and the EU to the prevention of conflicts and the solution of global crises, after 2015 to achieve the level of applicability 1 to the wide range of operations of NATO and other international organisations, according to **The Defence Strategy of the SR 2005***, Art. 21.*

[7] The Defence Strategy of the SR 2005, Article 25.

[8] http://www.bmlv.gv.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen/publikation.php?id=245.

[9] Ibidem, article 4,5.

[10] For details, see Draft of Constitutional agreement, article I-2 (respect to human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights of persons belonging to minorities).

[11] **Security Strategy of the SR 2005**, art. 26, 27,28,30,32.

[12] Ibidem, article 68.

[13] Ibidem, article 69.The article expresses further the support for building of operating capacities of the EU, the development of activities of the European Defence Agency.

[14] Ibidem, article 37, Security system of the SR as a decisive mean of security policy as a multidimensional complex consisting of foreign policy, economic, defence, internal-security, social and further instruments and ties among them.

[15] There is not mentioned a "strategic partnership". The Manifesto states "utmost attention to its relations with neighbouring countries, especially V-4 and ascribes specific significance to the strategic partnership with the Czech Rep ublic and to its implementation in the form of multi-faceted specific cooperation. (Manifesto CH 9), *The Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic,* http://www8.vlada.gov.sk/index.php?ID=1672.

[16] **The SS of SR 2005**, article 52. First of all, damaging the environment, an excessive extraction of non-renewable resources and the irregular economic and social development of regions.

[17] Ibidem, article 53 (additionally, it also quotes the share at the elimination of structures, the aim of which is to weaken legitimate and legal governments).

[18] Ibidem, article 56.

[19] Ibidem, article 59. "Following the stabilisation of economic situation, the SR shall adapt its policy of migration control". Note of author: The SR has not, in the present economic situation, the need to cover the labour force by migration, however, it is a part of European trends, and this problem shall have to be solved in the future.

[20] Ibidem, article 44.

[21] In the EU, this problem is in the proposed clause of solidarity, article I-43 b) of the draft constitutional agreement.

[22] BSSR article 18. "Terrorism utilises ideologies supporting the racial, ethnic, or religious hatred ...".

[23] Geopolitical position of the SR in the Central Europe determines the security policy of the SR. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are NATO and EU members, Austria is an EU member. Ukraine, our biggest neighbour, declares its Euro-Atlantic orientation with the aim to achieve the membership in the EU and the NATO.

[24] The relations with Russia shall be built on the principle of mutual advantageousness of the economic cooperation. As a NATO and EU member, the SR shall support the development of strategic partnership of these organisations with Russia, including an open dialogue on the resources of instability and potential security threats. The SR shall contribute to the continuation of political transformation, consolidation of democracy and economic reforms in Russia, article 77 of the SS of SR.

[25] The Government shall promote efficient multilateralism. It will support strengthening the status of international organisations of universal character, first of all of the UN as an irreplaceable organisation with global responsibility for world peace and security. As an elected member of the UN Security Council for 2006-2007, the Slovak Republic will actively contribute to solving global and regional problems, (Manifesto CH 9), *The Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic*, http://www8.vlada.gov.sk/index.php?ID=1672.

[26] SS of SR, article 64.

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HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCES IN PEACE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Tibor KOVÁCS,
István TALIÁN

"Peacekeeping is not a military task but only soldiers can do it" (*Dag HAMMARSKJÖLD)*

After the political changes at the beginning of the '90 (changing the political system, eliminating the Warsaw pact, and withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army from Hungary), the role and position of the armed forces were also re-evaluated. This meant that some new challenges appeared, mostly related to Hungary's integration strive. The most important ones were participation in crisis management operations and peace support operations as well as participation in the PfP programmes.

In this article we try to give a short picture of the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF), their participation in the different peace support missions and to present the tendencies which transformed the organisation, equipment and employment rules of the HDF troops participating in such Allied missions. The basis for this presentation is the "Hungarian Engineer Contingent" (an engineer battalion task force), which meant the Hungarian contribution to the IFOR and SFOR missions. The activities and experiences of this unit had the most important impacts on the transformation process of the HDF.

Hungary's Participation in the IFOR-SFOR tasks and the lessons learned

In order to form the base for the above operations, NATO elaborated a so-called "O" concept, which was aimed to help solve the Southern-Slavic conflict and which also calculated the participation of the non-NATO member countries from the close regions. The North Atlantic Council approved the mission concept on 11th October 1995. Upon this, it became clear what kind of needs NATO has and upon which it became clear the expectations towards Hungary. These demands involved not only sending troops but a lot of new elements, e.g., permission for the Allied and partner troops to use Hungary's air and land space as well as its waterways when executing tasks related to the execution of the NATO mission. Moreover, the Allied troops were allowed to be stationed temporarily on the territory of Hungary related to this mission. This was a sudden and grand change compared to the times before 1989, when there were also "allied" troops stationed in Hungary (the Soviet Red Army) and those were just short time before the withdrawal upon request of the Hungarian government.

Hungary's troop contribution was an engineer contingent of not more than 500 soldiers. Being a neighbour of nearly all parties involved, Hungary wanted to demonstrate its stance and resolve by sending a combat support unit. When setting up the engineer contingent, the senior leadership of the HDF faced quite many difficulties as the task had no precedents and the personnel involved had no experiences in these kinds of mission at all. The goals of the formation of the engineer battalion task force were mixed, partly of military, partly of political nature. The HDF General Staff and the higher political leadership wanted that:

- The Hungarian Engineer Contingent's (HEC) organisation, equipment and capabilities meet NATO requirements for such missions;
- The output of the soldiers of HEC prove the resolve, readiness and preparedness of the HDF to participate in such missions;
- The HEC represent the HDF's current capabilities and possibilities both materially and technically;
- HEC prove that the Hungarian soldiers' combat preparedness and equipment is not worse than the Allied nations' soldiers.

Keeping the above requirements in mind, the HDF General Staff formulated the engineer battalion task force with a 27-men staff and command, one headquarters company (78 persons), 1 sapper platoon (25 persons), 1 pontoon bridge company (123 persons), 1 road- and bridge building company (92 persons) and 1 logistics company (66 persons). The main task of the HEC was to support the manoeuvres and ensure freedom of movement of the IFOR and SFOR mission's higher units, alas the whole corps-size mission and the three divisions (American, British and Franco-German).

Although the HEC and its leadership could finally overcome practically all problems it faced, the complete lack of experiences in participation in armed peace support operations brought along many problems which can be divided in three groups:

a) Liaison, command and control, communication;

b) Equipment;

c) Security and force protection.

a) Liaison, command and control, communication

The most problematic area was the task of liaison as well as *command and control*. Once deployed with a clear mission, under a clear command and control, any well-trained unit in the world – be it Warsaw Pact type or NATO type – must be able to execute the task. But in these times there was not a single officer in the HEC command who knew *in practice* the command and staff work of NATO units. The officers and NCOs were trained for Warsaw Pact type staff work, what's more the companies too were organized according to the WP standards and they were all equipped solely with Soviet made technical means. All these set two big problem groups: the first one was to get to know in practice the NATO standard staff organisation and work and the related terminology and meantime to employ the troops according to NATO standards and expectations.

As the difficulties deriving from the ignorance of NATO standard staff work came to light, the staff was reorganized and new officers got involved, those one who were already trained at the military academies and schools of different NATO countries (mainly the United States and Germany). This helped a lot and this is how the initial communications (language and terminology) problems between the higher IFOR staff and HEC staff could be solved out.

One important change that derived from the IFOR-SFOR experiences was the change in the staff structure. At the beginning, the NATO type S1-S5 sub-unit level staff organisation did not exist, which caused quite many problems for the higher echelon (the mission command itself) to understand and to cooperate with the subordinated Hungarian unit. The misunderstandings and inability to normally cooperate were so substantial that the structure (and the table of organisation and equipment) had to be changed accordingly.

Another problem was *liaison* during the different tasks on the battlefield. When preparing for a mission, the focus was to find the most appropriate ratio of the engineer, combat support and combat service support personnel within the so-called "working groups" (as the different engineer combat teams were called). All working groups needed interpreters too, one who spoke English and another one who spoke Serbo-Croatian. As there were no regulations for using civilian personnel for this purpose in peacetime, the HDF used English-speaking officers and NCOs for this purpose.

Part of the command and control problem was the enormous difference in the so-called *communications equipment*. At the beginning, the HEC did not have one single NATO compatible radio, fax or transmitter. It was the US Army that came to help by donating tactical level radios and a SOF team equipped with all the necessary equipment necessary for transmitting NATO classified documents. The *medical evacuation* was part of this problem because the old Warsaw Pact radios could not communicate with the NATO MEDEVAC helicopters (be it American, British, French or German). At the beginning, this problem was overcome by using the supporting US SOF teams' communications gear until the necessary communications equipment could be purchased.

Due to the slow purchase process, originating from the good old peaceful days, there was a short period, right after the withdrawal of the US SOF team, when some NATO compatible communications gear (namely, the classified fax machine) was still to be purchased that the HEC remained completely without classified SFOR information. As such, the reconnaissance section (there was no S1-S5 type independent sub-unit

staff organisation at this time) of the staff could not inform the outgoing working groups about the respective situation at the working sites and so the security of the troops was at high risk. Realizing this, not only were the necessary equipment out of normal procedures purchased, but also some paragraphs regulating the purchase process were changed accordingly in order to allow faster supply and fielding.

b) Equipment

Before sending the troops to the IFOR mission, nobody realized in the HDF that there was one enormous difference between the old Warsaw Pact and NATO equipment. NATO vehicles had exclusively Diesel engines consuming oil. Older Warsaw Pact vehicles (like the majority of the engineering equipment) were nearly all running on gasoline, meaning the supply far from the base camp was another task to organize. Therefore, within a short period of time, all the vehicles were changed with Diesel engine ones.

Another problem deriving from the differences between the Warsaw Pact and NATO equipment was the difference in the so-called "Military Load Standards", e.g., the pontoon equipment was designed to support Warsaw Pact tanks (weighing roughly 40-45 metric tonnes) while modern NATO tanks used in the IFOR-SFOR missions are between 55-70 tonnes. This problem was overcome by making some variations in the basic equipment and by developing new ways for their employment.

c) Security and force protection

Although participating in a NATO mission and "bringing all soldiers live home" were equally emphasized requirements before the mission, nobody in the HDF had any experience in how to ensure the life and *physical security* of a battalion or company-size formation in hostile environment, where sniping activities, hostile civilian population and many other unknown threats were lurking. Everybody understood the importance of *intelligence* and security but due to the fact that the former Yugoslavia – like Hungary - was a socialist country, there was very little information on the situation on ground available. At the beginning, it was even hard to get *maps* on the Bosnian territory, which could be used for military purposes. The problem of the maps was solved in Bosnia as NATO supplied all participating units – with UTM grid maps. As the HEC had to send daily reports back to the Army HQ about its activities, initially there were quite many misunderstanding deriving from the difference in the UTM maps used by the HEC on the battlefield and the old Soviet grid maps used at the Army HQ. When it came to light, the Army HQ was supplied with UTM grid maps, too, "to be on the same sheet".

Related to physical security and also to the problem of the equipment, upon setting up the base camp, it came to the light that the Hungarian Army had no appropriate engineer equipment to ensure the perimeter of the camp. As the Warsaw Pact Armies were trained and equipped first and foremost for waging mobile warfare, notably to attack, the engineering equipment was designed for that and proved to be nearly completely useless in peace support operations. Instead of *concertina wire*, the HEC got originally old-fashioned barbed wire, there were no *plastic sandbags* (which can resist weather for longer periods of time, if needed, years), only old fashioned cotton bags, large size, which could not be used, for example, for building quickly individual firing positions.

In order to overcome this, very soon the concertina wire was fielded and new type of "fortification materiel" was ordered in order to support the HEC camp building and other activities. One of this new type equipment is the so-called *HESCO bastion*, which was not only used to give a close protection around the base camp and the camps of the deployed working groups in different areas of Bosnia, but also during the construction works on roads, bridges and other works.

A soldier always fights whatever he has at hand on the battlefield and protects himself with what he finds. The HEC, its commanders and soldiers experienced this in practice, especially when the risk of *sniping activities* grew high (normally, after different political decisions of the international community, where a general rule was that there was always at least one warring party that did not like or accept the decision). As the HEC did not have the covering blankets (foil) on the perimeter fence in order to block snipers' sight into the camp, in these times the big pontoon trucks were lined around the living areas to give enhanced protection to the personnel inside the camp.

On the *practical and organisational side*, the so-called *Force Protection* system did not exist in

the HDF. Protection of the troops was a divided responsibility of the security officers and the troops (these latter being responsible for defending themselves at all times). This resulted in some misunderstandings, as the Force Protection system of NATO was functioning and the IFOR-SFOR Force Protection officers coming to the HEC simply did not find their counterparts. Finally, ordering the S2 section to deal with Force Protection matters solved the problem.

Part of the security and force protection problem is the ability of the soldiers and sub-units to defend themselves in combat. As the Warsaw Pact armies were trained for activities *en masse*, there was little attention paid to train the soldier to fight individually (other than the basic shooting drills). Both the soldiers and the sub-units had to be re-trained to operate alone, independently yet effectively in hostile environment. This requirement resulted in setting up a *new form of individual shooting drill* (the so-called "peacekeeping drill"), which is obligatory now for all soldiers and officers going to peace support operations, a new kind of *mine awareness training* and a new kind of *squad (or armoured vehicle crew-size) level tactical training,* mostly to train the crew to react to sudden attacks when on the march or to react to protesting crowd and to protect road columns bringing and distributing humanitarian aid. The development and elaboration of these sub-unit level drills were mostly done with the guidance and initial supervision of the US SOF teams supporting the Hungarian Engineer Contingent.

Conclusion

As we have seen, there were quite many lessons learned during the IFOR-SFOR missions in Bosnia. Many of them resulted in changes in the equipment, organisation and internal command and control procedures. These changes contributed to a great extent to the overall NATO compatibility of the Hungarian Defence Forces today.

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CHALLENGES FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AREA

Jarosław GRYZ, PhD

Challenges for the transatlantic development in the international security area are mainly connected with crisis management and, on this background, the coordination of cooperation between the European Union and NATO. The article focuses on challenges: for crisis management capabilities undertaking by NATO and the EU; in the area of cooperation between the European Union and NATO. The purpose of the article is to find the main background of the present transatlantic debates on future relations in the security sphere by identification of unsolved issues. The thesis is that transatlantic partners require common vision of their activities based on common needs, interests and long-term goals.

The talks held on April, 30, April 2007 in Washington, between European Council President, Chancellor Angela Merkel, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and the United States President George W. Bush prompt reflection.

Among the raised issues, the crisis concerning the development of Iranian nuclear programme and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapon as a threat to regional and world security was discussed.

Taking into consideration the fact that this problem was one that many brought up, it is worth relating it more broadly to the challenges we face in transatlantic relations in the international security area.

There are no contradictions in the basic postulates that the United States and European Union states use guidelines in the international policy. They include:

• developing and strengthening democracy and the rule of law, as well as respecting human rights and basic liberties;

• protecting common values in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

• strengthening regional and world security and peace;

• promoting economic development and international cooperation.[1]

As far as common actions that would lead to carry out the mentioned above postulates, the agreements have not been reached. This results from different, sometimes even opposing political, economic and sometime security interests.

Challenges for the transatlantic development in the international security area are mainly connected with crisis management and, on this background, the coordination of cooperation between the European Union and NATO.

Challenges for crisis management capabilities

Undertaking the challenge by NATO and the EU to co-create crisis management capabilities in places far away from Europe put in the agenda not only the method of organising cooperation but first of all the issues how to shape international security, what means to use and with whom it should be provided. These trivial but fundamental for transatlantic relations questions are connected with the situation when the alliance got weaker due to the US withdrawal and creating "the coalition of will" under its auspices. Moreover, in spite of the US absence in allied operations, the US, supported by Great Britain and several other countries, exerts a profound influence on NATO decision making process. A similar situation takes place within the European Union, which after the fiasco of approving the constitutional treaty, has become weaker as an organisation. Furthermore, it has not solved the problem to what extent the EU international operations should be conducted – whether including fully not only engagement but stabilisation and peace enforcement or not. Due to the mentioned above reasons, both organisations seem currently to be capable only to undertake "low intensity"

operations such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, training and reconstruction. This raises questions related both to the effectiveness of operations and real ability to shape the international security environment not only on the European continent, but outside, where real security threats to transatlantic community states appear.[2]

Nowadays, the border between what is important and essential and connected with transatlantic community security fades gradually. In the perception of societies, especially European ones, operations on the frontier of Europe and Asia, Africa, Far East, in spite of being justified, may appear incomprehensible and raise doubts about their consequences. On this background, processes initiated by the Alliance: stabilisation of the European continent after the end of the Cold War period; successive enlargement of the organisation to include democratic countries based on the rule of law, cooperation with other countries which remain beyond the main stream of European integration were understandable and clear as they ensured security and welfare and strengthened the feeling of social ties in international relations. Now NATO and the EU do not have such a strong legitimisation of their operations as during the European continent transformation after the end of the Cold War. Mentally, the community of values, needs, interests and goals needs refreshing and, possibly, redefinition.[3] There is no doubt that only mutual American-European cooperation can:

• reconcile often contradictory interests emerging among democratic states;

• prevent negative phenomena and tendencies appearing in the international environment;

• influence the course of events in transatlantic relations not only on the European continent but in processes generating contemporary reality.

It is crucial for countries which require having common structure to implement cooperation of:

- reconstructing the existing transatlantic security architecture. It would mean, among others:

▪ the United States respecting the will of European Union's countries to conduct a particular operation, and the EU support for operations with NATO participation in which the US would play a leading role;

▪ the US readiness to designate its armed forces for NATO and EU operations if the operation complied with American security interests;

▪ European countries' active participation in reconstructing NATO structures, their functioning in order to make the alliance as useful as possible. Instead, the US should accept the EU sovereign role as a political and military entity.[4]

- common understanding of the present and future security environment. In this area, answers permanently given should concern the following questions:

▪ Is NATO cooperation with the EU justifiable?

▪ Is there a deadlock in NATO – the EU relations?

▪ Does the dialogue concerning strategic issues between NATO and the EU take place?[5]

- defining roles that NATO and the EU will play in the security area in Europe and the world.[6]

The mentioned above issues point to a political-military relations complexity in the security area in the USA – NATO – EU as well as NATO – EU relations. This results from implementing common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which aims at achieving the position of "a global player". This aim was defined in the strategy of December 2003, "A Safer Europe in a Better World", and results from the conviction that the EU does not have another alternative in the 21st century if it wants to remain an eminent entity in international relations. Apparently, this assumption did not appear in transatlantic relations as an absolute point of reference for setting American-European political and military relations based on principles of partnership. So far, they have been considered only in the context of supporting NATO by the EU and undertaking independent actions only if NATO does not want to take them. Thus, in the way of thinking of political and military relations, the model emerging in the first half of the 1990s, in the EU – WEU – NATO relations, was copied.[7]

In connection with the above mentioned issues, the basic challenge which embraces cooperation for security in transatlantic relations is to introduce functional changes that would:

- create effective mechanisms allowing strengthening the ideals of individual freedom, democracy as a political system, free market economy as a form to fulfil individual and social needs on the European continent, areas around Europe and in other regions of the world in accordance with the conviction that democracy and freedom are identical in most societies of our planet;[8]

- implement the re-evaluation of mutual commitments so that they would be complementary and, respecting the partnership principle, would share responsibilities, particularly in order to ensure the needs of safe and secure life and development in the 21st century. Declarations that this actually takes place does not change the point that the coordination of activities not only in the security area but also outside it becomes gradually fictitious;

- coordinate, based on the previously approved agreements, interests in the area of generally understood security, not only military one, but first of all in the social area (fighting the phenomenon of political terrorism which derives from activities of both social groups and countries as well[9]) and in the economic one (in the context of anticipated re-evaluation of global balance of power);[10]

- create a group of strategic aims in reference to values, needs and interests that would, in the operational area, take form of concepts and methods of operation in the shape of a transatlantic security strategy accomplished in a long-term period in a forecast, changeable international security environment.[11] In the area of aims, the existence of such a document would put in order priorities of activities, thus eliminating significantly the situation we are facing now – lack of agreement and mutual understanding between the United States and the European Union on methods and forms of operation.

Putting in order the military-political cooperation within the US – EU – NATO triumvirate would enable creating effective mechanisms of influence on international security not only within the transatlantic relations framework, but also beyond them, for instance, within the United Nations. In the new formula of cooperation, NATO could become *de facto* the only effective instrument of the US and EU political – military cooperation on a global scale.[12]

Nonetheless, it would require:

• enlarging the organisation of a further group of countries, this time outside the European continent – probably South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand[13];

• withdrawing from the Washington Treaty, mainly from Article 5 in the new, not transatlantic any more, but global formula of "Global NATO";

• giving up defence planning, which is currently sustained mostly due to Poland's request.

However, this type of activities is not possible without the agreement of NATO Member States and they, particularly the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and the newly admitted (Bulgaria and Romania), as well as those ones that joined it in 1999 (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) seek for tough guarantees of their security and see no reason to change anything.

The new *modus vivendi* within NATO and organizations in the international security environment is not certain, not to say, that for many countries undesirable. However, it means that NATO, known in the past as an organisation ensuring security and protection for the European continent, assisting essentially in its transformation after the end of the Cold War, as an instrument of policy of the 21st century countries, loses its sense. In the nearest foreseeable future, the risk for the European countries to be attacked with the use of conventional weapons in an armed conflict, similar to the one during the Cold War is illusory, a nuclear conflict is doubtful for the European members of the organisation. On this background, most European NATO members set priorities in the following areas:

• ensuring internal security (protection against terrorism, e.g. Islamic or ethnic in some Western European countries);

• stabilising conflicts whose implications for European countries are undesirable, taking into account public opinion, or may have negative consequences;

• controlling transportation (mostly shipping) routes ensuring access to energy resources (crude oil, natural gas) regions;

• building foreseeable security environment on the European continent and adjacent regions using peaceful means.

These are not all priorities, they are not even the most essential from the point of view of some countries – members of the organisation, therefore there are striking interest discrepancies determining the condition of the alliance.[14] On this background, there can be differentiated a group of American security interests which do not appear within NATO framework. They include:

• crisis connected with nuclear armament programme on the Korean Peninsula, potentially threatening North Eastern Asia's stability, therefore the countries, as Japan, China, the Russian Federation, the United States has its vital interests;

• Iranian – American conflict, where the United States recognises Iran's threat for its economic interests (crude oil, its excavation and supplies from the Persian Gulf region) and political ones (Palestinian – Israeli conflict, Muslim community hostility towards the USA);

• wars in the world of Islam, in Afghanistan under NATO and the UN auspices and in Iraq with the participation of "the coalition of will", which generate uncertainty not only about the future of the Persian Gulf and Asia Minor regions but they also question American presence in this part of the world.

These are neither all interests nor they belong to their most representative part, however, they demonstrate where there are differences in the way of understanding the international security environment, threats emerging in it and their classification as far as actions are undertaken.

In connection with this, we are currently facing a situation in which NATO and the EU activities are incoherent. It shows, among others, the lack of coordinated actions towards European countries in Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) aspiring to membership in both NATO and EU. On this background, the complex issue of Caucasus security is in fact absent from transatlantic relations, whereas it determines such matters as:

• energy security of some European countries which may be ensured due to the new energy connections in Central Asia, independent from Russian transport routes. However, it is closely connected with geo-political location of such countries as Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and solving conflicts in Transnistria and Moldova, Georgia and Abkhasia, Nagorny-Karabakh[15];

• political confrontation with the Russian Federation in the context of Ukraine's and three Caucasian countries' potential joining NATO and EU[16];

• political-military activities of the transatlantic community countries for security in the Central Asia region.[17]

The issues discussed above, closely connected with the security of the Caucasus countries, South Eastern Europe and even Turkey, the Middle East and Asia Minor, show both potential dilemmas appearing in transatlantic cooperation and its regional, in fact global, context as well. However, taking up new challenges in political-military cooperation in transatlantic relations requires drawing its vision, as it happened at the threshold of the 90s in the 20th century, in case of the Transatlantic Declaration. Is it still possible? It cannot be excluded that yes. Nonetheless, the transformation direction of cooperation for security in transatlantic relations is not prejudged now, and the complexity of transatlantic ties determines also multisided actions, diplomatic activities, and finally agreements concerning security, existence and development of countries belonging both to NATO and the EU, in majority of cases, the same international relations entities.

Challenges in the area of cooperation between the European Union and NATO

Referring to the issue of looking for the way to harmonise the cooperation between the European Union and NATO at the beginning of the 21st century, it must be stressed out that the breakthrough for mutual EU – NATO relations was to approve a set of documents essential for both organisations' cooperation, called Berlin Plus[18] arrangements on 17th March 2003. They derived from decisions made one year before, at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Prague on November, 21-22, 2002, and concerning the development of the alliance operational capabilities (NATO Response Force).[19]

Also, in this area, the European Union took on obligations at the defence ministers' meeting in Brussels, in May 2004, and agreed to create "battle groups", which may be treated as complementary forces to NATO Response Force.

The decisions taken by the EU and NATO caused that hypothetically they not only have a common activity platform but also common forces to provide this activity.[20]

In connection with this, we currently deal with the situation in which:

• Decisions to launch or terminate activities belonging both to NATO countries and, in most cases, those which are also EU Member States. There appears the requirement of the EU participation in NATO decision making process, and also, probably, in military operations themselves. This poses a challenge for the USA, as it introduces the necessity of consensus both in the EU and NATO bodies[21];

• Arrangements worked out in the Berlin Plus package in the context of failure of EU and NATO

joint political-military activities planned in Darfur are not sufficient[22], and the approved way of taking action between the organisations seems to lead to making decisions only in "secondary" issues, the main ones left unsolved (aims, assets, methods, as well as where and when);[23]

• There is a lack of arrangements which basing on American and European strategy of operation would identify common aims and methods of action allowing drawing a new, transatlantic agreement in this area. Its aim should be to protect American and European countries' space both within their borders and outside them – at conflict and crises sources.[24]

Due to this, NATO and the EU should develop elementary mechanisms of cooperation which would enable taking actions in case of crisis situations which would create the basis of new transatlantic security architecture. Assumingly, only in the situation when such a mechanism appears, the EU – NATO cooperation would be possible and guarantee applying a wide spectrum of political, military and economic solutions. The example of binding, in fact inadequate solutions might be the negotiations concerning the EU taking over NATO mission in Bosnia, which, in spite of appropriate Berlin Plus arrangements, lasted many months and sometimes proved to be very difficult[25]. In case of emerging necessity to conduct an operation of a different character with the use of different assets, there may rise difficulties which merely multiply the negative phenomenon of the lack of cooperation between the European Union and NATO.[26] Such elements as: joint planning (being held basing on earlier identified scenarios of operation assuming various choice of forces – from military to civil ones); generating forces (using eventuality planning) basing on the mechanism of creating joint forces; joining works of military structures; common political approach, are on the present stage of development deciding about the future of political-military cooperation between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The discrepancies emerging currently in transatlantic relations are in fact the consequence of incomprehension that the security environment not necessarily on the European continent, but in other regions of the world changed dynamically and suddenly and methods applied so far to stabilise and make peace have become archaic. Moreover, the lack of transatlantic relations' vision in the international security environment results in today's misunderstandings between the USA and its main European allies from the Cold War period. NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, still in force in spite of the decade passed, can prove it as it has not been changed probably because of fear of facing the problem of radical transformation in transatlantic relations including, among others, the role of NATO and the US position in Europe's security in the 21st century.

The carried out diagnosis concerning transatlantic relations security shows that these relations may be the basis of joint activities for countries creating the transatlantic community only when there is an interest correlation of entities that generate them, states and organisations. Unilateral actions undertaken now by the USA, e.g. in the context of missile defence shield, may merely lead to the break-up of transatlantic ties, not economic or social but political and psychological ones. Then, the transatlantic relations, which contain innumerable contents and refer to all areas of human activity, will be reduced to an official language of symbols and gestures, not representing any deeper meaning.

In the actual and future international realities, there is no place for discussions and arguments concerning the crux of common American – European activities as they lead to diminishing its importance, weakening the position of countries and their organisation in international relations (NATO, EU), lack of effective opportunity to shape the international security environment. These discussions should be reduced as far as methods and forecast or achieved political and military aims are concerned. Maybe, the new transatlantic relations formula based on an international treaty as important as the Washington Treaty signed almost 60 years ago, would be more advisable.

Nowadays, there is a need to create a long-term vision of common activities, the strategy of operation including, which in its crux will be the reflection of thinking about existence and development not only in the 5 – 10 years time span or a decade, but a quarter or half of a century. Without the vision, the past and present transatlantic relations will become another episode expressed on the dusted charts of humanity history. Such fears are not unjustifiable. The lack of actions, even wrong ones, is sometimes more destructive than taking them. Especially that there

are common values which, so far, determined the shape of American – European cooperation and which have a chance to do it in the future.

NOTES:

[1] *The European Union and the United States. Global partners, global responsibilities, European Commission's brochure*, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/library/publications/23_us_infopack_2006.pdf, accessed on May, 8, 2007.

[2] According to the authors of the report concerning long-term vision of European needs in the area of defence capabilities, fundamental challenges in the security area will include increasing communication problems in many areas of social life that result from deepening globalisation process; the change in current state of economic power, consequently social one; demographic asymmetry between different regions of the world, scientific and technological progress eliminating present research disproportions in such fields as Information Technology, Biotechnology, Nanotechnology – cognitive sciences; competition for energy resources. This will cause, among others, the increase in social tensions, population migrations, wars and conflicts. *An initial long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, LTV* –October, 3, 2006 – SB MoDs Levi, pp. 6-7.

[3] "Western values" – the term commonly referring to democracy, free market, civic liberties does not evoke such emotions when their importance on the European continent is concerned. However, it is an essential source of controversy taking into account the cultural and civilisation comparison with other societies. Therefore, a question appears how and if it is right to promote them in the modern world and to what degree they are the part of European and American communities' security. T. BLAIR, *A Battle for Global Values*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007, Vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 2-3 (Internet subscription).

[4] F.G. BURWELL, D. C. GOMPERT, L. S. LEBL, J. M. LODAL, W. B. SLOCOMBLE, *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO – EU Security Architecture*, p. 21.

[5] According to the Polish Ambassador to NATO, the above questions imply a factual state of cooperation between NATO and the EU, and answers to them allow defining roles which will be designated to the Alliance and the Union. J. GRYZ, *Sprawozdanie z 23 warsztatów nt. bezpieczeństwa światowego* (Report from 23rd workshop on world security), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2006, no. 3 (64), p. 302.

[6] Ibidem, I. DAALDER, J. GOLDGEIER, *Global NATO*, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, Vol. 85, no. 5, pp. 1-2, 5 (Internet subscription), B. RATHBUN, *Continental Divide? The Transience of Transatlantic Troubles*, in N. JABKO, C. PARSONS (ed.), **With US or Against US? European Trends in American Perspective, The State of the European Union**, Vol. 7, Oxford University Press, 2005.

[7] One of the conditions that the EU must meet in order to become "a global player" is to search platforms of cooperation with NATO. Both EU and NATO should remain complementary to each other, although there is no final answer in this respect. On this background, Lt. Gen. Jean-Paul Perruche, Director General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) stressed that both the EU and NATO do not have enough "flexibility" to perform new kind of tasks resulting from evolution of international security environment. These tasks concern mainly compiling military – civilian elements which will emerge in missions on areas remote from Europe. J. GRYZ, *op. cit.,* p. 303.

[8] As Victoria Nuland, the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization stated, the processes which were initiated by NATO, i.e. the stabilisation of the European continent after the Cold War, successive enlargement of the organisation of democratic countries with the rule of law, cooperation with countries remaining outside the main stream of the European integration, require from the transatlantic communities countries to have a common structure to implement the cooperation. NATO tasks such as ensuring security, welfare, strengthening in international relations the cooperation with countries and entities outside NATO create from the organisation the basic transatlantic relations component where we can find the community of values. Ibidem, p. 301.

[9] J. GRYZ, *Źródła terroryzmu międzynarodowego* (Sources of International Terrorism), in E. HALIŻAK, W. LIZAK, L. ŁUKASZUK, E. ŚLIWKA (ed.), **Terroryzm w świecie współczesnym** (Terrorism in Contemporary World), Warszawa – Pieniężno 2004, pp. 31-43.

[10] According to the authors of the report on long-term vision of European needs in the area of defence capabilities, the progressing process of globalisation will result in the fact that the forecast future will be connected with bigger than so far disproportions. Probably China will become the second, after the United States, economic power and together with India they will create a new geo-strategic and geo-economic centre of our planet. On this background, the European Community will lose much of its present advantage; however, it will still remain the main area of welfare in the world. An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, European Defence Agency, 3 October 2006, s. 6.

[11] Currently binding NATO Strategic Concept of 1999 does not reflect the idea of changes that have taken

place in the security area within transatlantic relations. Its clauses do not take into consideration the EU new position and do not divide the responsibilities. Moreover, the deadlock in the organisation transformation which resulted in the lack of essential agreements at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Riga in November 2006 shows that a new strategic concept, deriving from new arrangements between countries forming transatlantic community, should be approved when there are put forward binding arrangements between the USA, the EU and NATO. In these circumstances, the US Defense Department prepared a document of conceptual character including the core of changes. Nonetheless, it was not the basis for wider transatlantic policy but declarative, one-sided American document. See *Strengthening Transatlantic Security. A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century*, US Department of Defense, December 1, 2000.

[12] See Gen. James L. Jones's speech presented in J. GRYZ, *Sprawozdanie z 23 warsztatów nt. bezpieczeństwa światowego* (Report from 23rd workshop on world security), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2006, no. 3 (64), pp. 297-298.

[13] Ibidem.

[14] Considering, for example, the issue what connects Lithuania with France or Spain in the matter of fighting Islamic terrorism? The answer: nothing or little is both true and false in the context of demographic changes in the European Union and the growth in Muslim population, involving its radical elements contesting the European order. There are much more problems like that. In the situation of NATO countries' political disintegration and the lack of coherent vision how to solve the problems, they may seem to increase and deepen the existent differences.

[15] Borys Tarasiuk, Ukraine's Foreign Minister stated that in case of the Balkans, the international community undertook active measures for stability and security, whereas its efforts in the Black Sea area are not sufficient. It may result from two classes of conflicts. The first, the Balkans, the international community countries and international organisations put forth effort to solve the problem. Consequently, it was stabilised and currently it is being finished with the EU and NATO participation. The second, the Black Sea region, conflicts appearing there are left unattended, as no appropriate action is taken to solve them (Transnistria and Moldova, Georgia and Abkhasia, Nagorny-Karabakh). It can be noticed that the Balkan region was included in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes, whereas in the Black Sea region there are no such perspectives. In consequence, natural transportation routes for energy resources (crude oil, natural gas) running in the Black Sea region are not appropriately used and appears the security deficit.

[16] Here it is worth quoting Gen. Col. Anatoly I. Mazurkevich, Chief of the Main Department for Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, who stated that the Black Sea security problem does not exist. Challenges for security in these areas are only Western countries' and their organisations' *idée fixe*. As far as problems are concerned, they are only caused by unconsidered activities of countries, e.g. Georgia's. Moreover, getting rid of stabilisation factor, as the Russian troops are, additionally complicates local security matters, not regional ones. Without their engagement, a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny-Karabakh may develop. From the Russian Federation's point of view, only the port in Sevastopol, in fact its future, requires resolving.

[17] In the context of Central Asia security, there must be quoted the words of Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, who, referring to NATO presence in this region, stated that it is positive. However, the lack of the UN is visible. According to Akram, due to the cooperation between the countries of that region and organisations such as NATO and the UN, there is a possibility to create cooperative security in Central Asia, similar to the one in Europe. NATO may here launch initiatives to institutionalise security in Central Asia and consequently create one homogeneous region of cooperation, due to which it will be possible to excavate natural resources (crude oil, natural gas) from the North (Kazakhstan, Uzbekhistan, Turkmenistan) and transport into the South (the Arabian Sea – the Indian Ocean). Also, the Ambassador defined three conditions of success: 1. The process of Afghanistan's rebuilding and Central Asia region reconstruction. It requires a complex, multisided approach with individual solutions without copying old schemes. The three basic instruments contributing to creating this process should be: defence, deterrence, and diplomacy. 2.The cooperation and activities of the regional "actors" not only in current (operational) issues but mostly for creating economic complementarity of the countries in that region – connecting Central Asia's North and South. 3. International cooperation assuming leaving international community in Afghanistan for at least a decade and in this way confirming the engagement in Asian "Marshall Plan" – achieving success "in the hearts and minds of the Afghans".

[18] Berlin Plus arrangements base on the assumption that both NATO and EU countries take advantage of limited resources of Member States. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary doubling of assets, the EU access to NATO operational planning was established. It was also agreed that the NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will be the operational commander of EU-led missions. These arrangements, along with earlier arrangements from Berlin 1996 concerning exchange of classified information, allow the EU to take over NATO's responsibilities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

For more information see: F.G. BURWELL, *op. cit.* pp. 13-14.

[19] M. SZKODZIŃSKA, Z. PĘKALA, **Od Pragi do Stambułu – implementacja założeń wojskowego wymiaru transformacji NATO** (From Prague to Istanbul – The Implementation of Assumptions of NATO Military Transformation Dimension), DPO MON, Warszawa, 2006, pp. 14-17; M. RUTTEN (comp.), *From Nice to Laeken, European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Papers no. 51, Paris, April 2002, J-Y. HAINE (comp.), *From Laeken to Copenhagen European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Papers no. 57, February 2003.

[20] A. MISSIROLI (comp.), *From Copenhagen to Brussels — European defence: Core documents*, Volume IV, Chaillot Papers no. 67, December 2003, *EU security and defence – Core documents 2004*, Volume V, Chaillot Papers no. 75, February 2005.

[21] F.G. BURWELL, *op.cit.*, p.15.

[22] The conflict which took place since July 2003 in the Sudanese province Darfur, between Muslims sponsored by Sudan and local ethnic Muslim communities, took a heavy toll of about 400,000 and around 2,500,000 were forced to leave their homes. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005.

[23] F.G. BURWELL, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-16.

[24] Ibidem.

[25] Ibidem.

[26] According to General James L. Jones, the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of the United States European Command (CDR USEUCOM), the lack of appropriate approach to the cooperation of the EU countries, the USA and Canada causes that its framework is unknown. Consequently, the direction of the organisation transformation is not defined, and thus so is its place and role in the European and world security architecture. For more information, see J. GRYZ, *Sprawozdanie z 23 warsztatów nt. bezpieczeństwa światowego* (Report from 23rd workshop on world security), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2006, no. 3 (64), pp. 297-298.

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COGNITIVE WAR?

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

The economic intelligence – underlined in a study[1] made at the beginning of this decade – imposed rapidly, less than a decade-time, as a new paradigm of the rivalry interaction. Economic intelligence doesn't exist without information. Information implies three types of attitudes of the enterprise (economic unit): indifference, defensive and offensive. The offensive attitude is generated by the competition space, the need to earn markets, resources, networks, relations. The defensive attitude is related with the offensive one and can't be treated individually. The indifferent attitude, specific for small enterprises addicted by another, bigger or state-owned, which is more and more restricted because of their lack of activity, nerve or competition determines them to disappear from the market. The armed conflict philosophy, the cruel conflict, reaches to the bones of the economic world. The network doesn't alter the competition, but, on the contrary, emphasizes it, transforms it in a real war, namely, the economic war.

The economic war - if we admit this name for this fierce economic and financial competition which always leads, but particularly in this network, globalisation era - is, in first, an informational war, a knowledge war.

The cognitive war (knowledge-based war) is understood as a way to use the knowledge for a conflictual goal[2]. The cognitive war is, consequently, a war in the knowledge space, having knowledge as a weapon. It has a common cognitive dimension and a complex, epistemological one.

War was always based on information and, therefore, on knowledge. Still, it hadn't always had information and knowledge as weapon, and knowledge as strategy, including its scientific dimension. This means knowledge manipulation, its enclosure in a conflictual system. It seems there isn't any novelty. Essentially, knowledge was always put into a dynamic system of categories and actions. The one, who knows what it is about, knows the respective phenomenon or process is more powerful than the one who doesn't.

At present, the global economy passes through a wide process, dominated by all kind of grouping and regrouping. Of course, the enterprise remains the key-unit, the basic one, but the systems and the meta-systems, which manoeuvre and relate it, evolve themselves dynamically and complex, with a deep unpredictable or even chaotic component. As a result, on finances and economy, although there are strict laws in place, everything is possible.

In this world's huge economic and financial construction and reconstruction, the American economy plays the pattern role in the globalization of the economic exchanges. But not everybody accepts this reality. And, from here, rises the conflict. It's one of them. Although it is time for strategic partnerships and their main dimension is the economic and financial support, the conflict doesn't disappear, but it forks, taking less obvious forms, disguised or shaped of complex, non-linear equations. No matter how powerful the partnerships would be, they can't shut out the competition, the battle for markets and resources, the world's economic-financial dynamism. "Even if we are brothers, cheese still costs money" is a Romanian saying proving that the market's philosophy isn't quite new. The novelty consists just in generalization, in globalization, in the confrontation enlargement to the economic and financial global level. In the globalization era, the economic and financial confrontation has two essential dimensions: the powerful against the powerful and from the weak to the powerful. The other dimensions which can be added – the powerful against the weak and from the weak to the weak – don't have sense because this type of confrontation doesn't really exist.

Into a symmetric confrontation (from the powerful to the powerful), the American economy has no equivalent. So, the confrontation from the powerful to the powerful becomes a non-sense.

Of course, the European Union, as a political, economic and military entity, could compare, economically and financially, with the United States, especially after euro has come out. And it really confronts with it. The complementary and the constructive dimensions are more important than the confrontational one. Moreover, the European economy, as a continental entity, it is still in a building process. And, anyway, the European Union isn't the United States' enemy.

The United States' enemies are reduced to this confrontation's second dimension: the weak against the powerful. In this case, a new strategic reflection is needed and, therefore, a new strategy for the Americans regarding this situation. Until now, this kind of confrontation hadn't sense because we couldn't speak about confrontation but domination. Consequently, we also speak about a domination strategy but not by economic, cultural and military and, especially, nuclear threat, but a knowledge one. Therefore, the actual strategy from the economic confrontation space goes to the knowledge universe and influence through knowledge in all possible dimensions.

As all the strategies, this has the three classical components:

- *forces' strategy* (centres for strategic studies, think-tanks, other structures engaged in research and process' and economic and financial phenomena knowledge);
- *means' strategy* (networks, infrastructures, enterprises, etc.);
- *economic actions and operations' strategy* (concepts, action systems, programs, plans, projects, etc.).

The strategy of diplomat-economic seduction (*soft strategy*) is part of these operational strategies that use infrastructures and structures existing into this field.

It seems that the dangerous threat for the United States isn't either the nuclear war, or the terrorist attacks, or the bad governed states or the ones that support terrorism, but the *economic and monetary threat*. This is considered to come from the unified Europe and, also, from the Eastern Asia, mainly China. Still, America is the Western Europe's ally. But the development of the informational society, the information and economic trades' mondialization, also, the economic production substantially change the matter. Even between allies and partners there are not only collaborations, partnership relations, some vying reports which tend to slip to conflict state.

The most important part of the economic war, as knowledge asymmetric war isn't the competition between markets and resources but the confrontation from the knowledge space, the informational, knowledge assimilation and their use for outrunning the competitors, for creating the accomplished fact or an opportune accomplishment of the aimed goal.

John Arquila and David Rundfeldt, the creators of the Network Centric Warfare concept affirmed that, in the future war, it wouldn't be the winner the one with the strongest bomb but the one who will have the most persuasive speech. Therefore, in 1997, the Americans invented the informational dominance concept defined as a deployment into a space which grants the efficient use of the meta-control, prevention, pre-emption and coercive means.

In this spectre, it seems that a confrontation will silently take place between the United States and European Union, whose economic power is growing. Still, it is very well known the fact that there is a strategic partnership between EU and USA.

One of the confrontation forms among the two economic super-powers consists of *fast food aggression*, the norms which Anglo-Saxons want to impose in the food industry and the agro-alimentary realities practiced and strengthened by the European Union. There is a European offensive against the ones that try the genetic modification of the organisms.

The American researchers specialized in asymmetric conflict or in cognitive wars have many difficulties in analyzing the informational guerrilla content from the economic space. The difficulty goes from the axiom where the American system is taken as pattern. Everything out of the pattern is hard to understand because they don't have the required means and instruments to evaluate and analyze. A researcher from the Monsanto Society, for example, will hardly understand why a farmer is boycotting a conceived seed for not being able to be used again. This innovation (one-use seed) is for the American agro-chemical industry a profit and supplementary activities source, but for some farmers it is unacceptable. The Europeans don't want to hear about it. The cognitive war lead by Monsanto consists in using all the possible psy-

chological means for convincing the customers to accept their artificial realities. They use, for this, *psyops* techniques (psychological operations), used by the American army as a mode of operation in the *intelligence marketing*. The ripostes are huge. But still they are from the weak to the powerful.

In a geo-strategic perspective, EU can't loose a collective reflection concerning this type of cognitive war. The militaries' acquired experience is spread in the political, economic, social and cultural confrontation space.

For the time being, Europe doesn't deal sufficiently with this issue. It remains for the future.

In the actual conditions, the offensive strategies are renewed and they are always renewing. The important fact is for the entities to have the capability to manage the information in a hostile environment. In the future architectures of the geo-economic environment, the information management with subversive economic goals becomes a priority. War is moving further into the knowledge space, more exactly, in the philosophical and economic knowledge space.

The United States of America cherishes this type of confrontation, this type of war. For example, it is known that the Americans gain more from the culture and knowledge export than from commerce with weapons. They know better than everyone to respect knowledge. At the beginning of this century, in the international reports' configuration, they give a special attention to informational security. This is one of the reasons that the entire American scientific world worked many years to secure their country's informational architecture.

Another direction of these researches consisted in the *perception management*[3] regarding the valuation of the diplomatic, economic, scientific and cultural preponderance. These are indirect strategies put into value by informational means. We speak about *knowledge manipulation*, not just about the information one.

The offensive use of information and, consequently, knowledge generates some important questions. Which is the liberty degree of the economic competition? The lack of morality doesn't endanger the economic institutions philosophy regarding business ethics? Imposing the Anglo-Saxon economic pattern doesn't create instability in the competition space?

Alain-Charles Martinet[4] speaks about a "strategy with positive goal" (advantageous position) and also a "strategy with negative goal" (disadvantageous position for the competitor). Both types are, in a way, responses for the above questions but also a way to analyze and understand the knowledge war in the economic space.

The offensive strategies from the economic war space, of knowledge war, are numerous. The most frequent are monopolization, imposition, offensive regroup, financial strike and discouragement. Today, the most useful is the *discouragement strategy by information, by knowledge.*

The discouragement strategy by information isn't just offensive but also defensive. As a defensive strategy (or hybrid one), it represents the will and capacity of an organization to escape from the obedience and vulnerabilities. At aggression, it uses subversive techniques against the aggressor competitor or instigator.

In a generalized offensive framework, the enterprise shouldn't be pleased with the understanding and anticipation of the concurrent strategies. It must be ready for attack in order to protect its informational patrimony and vital interests. Also, in the economic competition, the best and efficient form to protect and defence remains attack. In this attacks' outposts there are usually sent … financial battalions.

Strategic risks management doesn't reduce itself to the financial aspects. It must be extended to the information, knowledge management. Enterprises are compelled to admit the *informational risk* concept which has two aspects:

- informational accident;
- crisis determined by a destabilization produced by an opponent.

From this perspective, it must be seen the extremely complex issue of informational security and also the cognitive space one. Even if it seems paradoxically, because the knowledge means opening, namely assimilation and adaptation, the cognitive space security represents a more and more imposing concept because it assures stability and protection to a field which it presents to be, by excellence, fluid and very dynamic. Therefore, the Cyber Security Task Force, concept assimilated and launched as a project, in 2002, by the European Commission and put into operation in steps, sort of after the American pattern, on our continent.

Of course, the cognitive protection measures taken over the continent are part from the modern strategies of safety and protection. A true economic security for the continent can't be achieved just in Euro-Atlantic and, also, Euro-Asiatic dimension because the first offers the high-tech and information technology and the latter offers the much needed energetic resources.

If the knowledge war is led in the philosophical, political, economic, cultural and informational space, what's the use of armies? Are they just a simple holder for these epistemological strategies? It's hard to tell but not impossible. Maybe in short time the knowledge war will also penetrate the military field, for now, shaping new operations' theatre, cyberspace and info space.

The new type of war – which, in fact, is stale – will also impose to the militaries a new type of strategic reflection. We will be bind over to extract from the dusted shelves the Aristotel's *Organon* and also many other lectures and treaties beginning with the Applied Mathematics, the information theory and epistemology for being able to use not only the high-precision systems, laser-based weapons, waves' amplifying and nanotechnologies but also word-based weapons.

NOTES:

[1] Christian HARBULOT, Nicolas MOINET, Didier LUCAS, *La guerre cognitive: a la recherche de suprematie strategique* The sixth forum for economic intelligence of the French Aeronautic and Astronautic Association, Menton, 25 September 2002.

[2] Christian HARBULOT, Nicolas Moinet, Didier Lucas, *Ibidem*.

[3] Didier LUCAS and Alain TIFFREAU, *Guerre economique et information: les strategies de subversion*, Paris, Elipse, 2001, p. 204. „Consistent action to provide or camouflage selected information and some clues regarding the external audiences, so that to influence emotions, motivation and objective reasons. Action for the information bodies and all levels' decision-makers, these actions consist in influencing the official evaluations to finally succeed to configure in a favourable dimension the transmitter's objectives, the extern official behaviours and actions. Many times, perception management combines the authentic information share with security, dissimulation, intoxication and psychological operations" (Quote after the above-mentioned paper).

[4] Alain-Charles MARTINET, *Epistemologie et Science de Gestion*, Paris, Economica, 1999, p. 221.

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A NEW STRATEGY FOR IRAQ AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

Immediately after the 9/11 events, the whole world was on America's side in its anti-terrorism campaign but in more than five years after the event this unity was abraded.

In March 2003, USA started the Iraqi war which – although seemed to end very quickly – today is a true cask with powder. There is no day without killings and the tensions between Shi'a and Sunni turn to a civil war. The El Pais newspaper wrote that the continuity of the USA's participation to this long and bloody fight probably will make that its end to be a "frontal encounter with Iran and with a great part of the Islamic world"[1].

In the same time, USA has a new engagement in Afghanistan where the intensification of the Talibans' attacks forced Washington to think of the troops' supplementation in the theatre, despite a more stressed opposition of the democrats and the American population.

The White house Administration now tries to redefine its preventive action conception and will continue its plans regarding the emplacement the antimissile shield[2] *on Czech and Poland territories, "no matter if the NATO allies agree or not" - as general Henry Obring, the head of the Antimissile Defence Agency, stated*[3]*. President Bush motivated that "our nation depends on foreign oil and this dependence makes us more vulnerable to hostile regimes, to terrorists. Furthermore, brings us more prejudices to our economy".*

References to the new American strategy for Iraq and to the continuation of the war against the terrorism try to clarify this hot subject that some analysts watch with concern and appreciate as an indirect contribution of USA to the terrorism dissemination.

1. Preliminary. According to the *New York Times*, the American president George W. Bush intended to impose a new series of "objectives" to the Baghdad government. Subsequently, on January 11th, in a speech regarding the new American strategy in Iraq – intensively criticised by the American legislative led by democrats – the White house leader admitted that he made mistakes regarding the approach of the situation in this country.

The commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq, the American general Raymond Odierno, will also admit the situation in this country is difficult. A situation which - as London will understand later – can not be solved through military ways but only by diplomacy or through political means.

On March 23rd, President George W. Bush gave - in front of a sceptic Congress and with the lowest rate in poll[4] for the last 30 years – his sixth annual national address, when he appreciated the American troops' supplying in Iraq as "the best way to obtain a success" – one of the essential challenges for USA being the carrying on a war on enemy territory.

The American President asked the Congress to offer a chance to his plan for Iraq and he appreciates the Iraqi government must be helped so that the country to not became a Paradise for terrorists[5]. Without the US – President Bush said – Iraq could quickly become "the terrorists' sanctuary", still sustained by Syria and Iran and he promised to act firmly in order to end this cooperation.[6]

In the same time, the President Bush insisted on the intensification of the fight against terrorism. The war against terrorism is, in his vision, the war of the whole generation. As the world terrorism is far from being defeated and the conflict focuses are multiplied, he proposed the increasing of marines and military personnel with 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 marines during the next five years.[7] "For all the ones present here – President Bush stated – there is not a bigger responsibility than to defend the people from this country from danger".

In Congress, most of Democrats consider that "the White House strategy aims America to a wrong direction" and they could not stop President Bush[8] to act in such manner. Even UK, the main ally of

US, received "coldness" the President Bush plan, stating "its own strategy".[9] So, the only support proved to be the Baghdad government.

2. A signal for changing the strategy for Iraq and USA reorientation to a centre policy? The result of the partial legislative election[10] for Congress shows, according to the British press, "the rejection of the George W. Bush policy", "a signal for changing the strategy for Iraq", as it is sustained by the former editor of the Conservative magazine *National Review*, but also the future reorientation of USA to a "centre policy", as it was mentioned in the German press since last November. Democrats, and even some Republicans, heavily criticized the Donald Rumsfeld's strategy in the Iraqi war, considered to be a "failure of large proportions". Moreover, the legislative elections were transformed by Democrats in a "true referendum" over the Iraqi war – partial suffrage since last year, on November, 7th, intended to be a demonstration of the "dissatisfaction" of the large majority of American electorate regarding this war.

As a consequence, the first victim of the defeat suffered by the Republicans in Congress is Donald Rumsfeld[11], the State Secretary for Defence and the Head of Pentagon since 2001, who resigned at the Democrats request[12] in order to materialize the "reorientation" of the American policy regarding Iraq. The announcement was made by the Republican President George W. Bush himself in a press conference organised at the White House shortly after the discussions with Democrats. In other words, the Republican President George W. Bush, who recognizes and assumes a large part from the defeat suffered by Republicans, is forced to cooperate[13] with opposition. By nominating Robert Gates[14] as the future head of Pentagon, the President Bush hopes that "his leadership spirit and his abilities will help our country to fulfil its military objectives and to prepare for the threats expected in the 21st century".[15]

Even the report of the Iraq Study Group supposed to be "a hard evaluation" of the situation, President Bush said that each conclusion will be "carefully analysed" in order to be taken adequate measures agreed by Congress.[16] Moreover, the White House advisor for the national security, Steven Hadley, declared that also President George W. Bush will request changes in the Iraqi policy but calls attention that "the recommendations of Baker Committee constitute only a proposal among many others". This explains why some of the key – recommendations of the Iraq Study Group were rejected by President Bush.

As it was expected, the new strategy of the White House regarding Iraq was intensively criticized by the American legislative, dominated now by Democrats, but in the public opinion line the opinions are shared and Iraqi population seems to be pessimistic that the new strategy will work.

3. The President George W. Bush's strategy for Iraq and the continuation of the war against the terrorism. The strategy announced by the American President George W. Bush did not enjoy a too warm welcoming being "hardly" criticized by Democrats. The American senators oppose[17] to the troops supplementation in Iraq, as published in the *New York Times*. Subsequently, after the visit in Iraq, the Republican senator Suzane Colins, although convinced that the development of more troops in Baghdad "will be a mistake", later on will point out that there are still "needed more soldiers in some provinces" where the violence are connected with the terrorism than the sectarian hate.

But the House of Representatives from the American Congress adopt a resolution which disapproved the sending away new troops in the region. The veto votes – gesture of disapproving the White House policy in this direction – came from democrats and also from 17 republicans.[18]

The draft of budget for the Iraqi war, approved by the American Senate, was accompanied by a withdrawal calendar of most of the combat troops till March 2008.

In order to become a law, the draft must be presented to the President George W. Bush who must approve it. Or, the President Bush stated, in many times, that he opposes to "establish a calendar for troops' withdrawal" from Iraq. Moreover, he will oppose by veto to the project of the democrats within the House of Representatives[19] to connect the finance of Iraqi operations with a date of the military withdrawal from this country. This think has happened.

The law was rejected by the President George W. Bush and the House of Representatives did not succeed to congregate the necessary 2/3 in order to reject the president Bush veto regarding the Iraq War Financing Bill.

Still, both sides showed their "availability to collaborate" despite the fact that "the solution was not find" for the case in which the Baghdad authorities proved "incapable to maintain the situation under the control".[20] What it is certain is the fact that the rejection of the law represents a "new occasion" for Administration and Congress to show that they firmly maintain their positions regarding the war in Iraq. And not only that.

4. The USA policy in Afghanistan. USA – which already has in this country aver 20,000 military personnel under NATO command and other 8,000 who assure the training of the Afghan troops and antiterrorists operations around the mountain area from the Pakistani border – consulting, together with UK[21], the deployment of more troops in Afghanistan[22] considering the fact that "other NATO member states refused to send troops in Afghanistan".[23]

The NATO forces – who took over the control of the military operations in the South Afghanistan from the international coalition lead by USA – also need now more money and more troops in order to win in Afghanistan[24], especially in the South of Afghanistan, where the Taliban attacks are stronger and stronger. A point of view sustained and argued before also by the British Chief of NATO Forces in Afghanistan, General David Richard, quoted by the British *The Times*: "We must and can win in Afghanistan but we need a military sustained effort. We must act more energetic for one more year in Afghanistan".[25]

The American commanders requested Pentagon more troops and the new Secretary for Defence, Roberts Gates, sustains their requests.

5. George Bush pays a huge price in popularity because of Iraqi war. He must rule, since now, with a majority in Congress controlled by the democratic opposition and with the public opinion profoundly discontent by the presence of militaries far from homes. The popularity rate of President George W. Bush is only 30%, according to *Newsweek*[26], and 58% of American consider that the Bush presidency is over. Moreover, in big cities as Washington, Los Angeles and San Francisco, thousands of people protested on the streets and asked Congress and President Bush to stop financing the operations in Iraq and to withdraw the troops from this country.

Although the White House leader did not change his mind on setting the troops' withdrawal calendar and, as he stated, "he will oppose to any calendar for returning of the troops from the Iraqi front in the country. This is confirmed by resorting to the right to reject, through veto, the project regarding Iraq War Financing Bill". Because, according to the chief of the American Executive, "the main weak point" is the fact that the "departure of the American troops from the most important Iraqi cities is arose in connection with the funds supplementation designed to the antiterrorism war".

The sympathy for USA started to be transformed in suspicion or hostility and - in some countries – the feelings were dredged by the scandals of the abuses from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the problem of the prisoners detained without lawsuit at Guantanamo or the scandals of the CIA's secret prisons. Moreover, short after the Donald Rumsfeld's resignation, an international lawyers group accused the former chief of Pentagon by "war crimes and abuses" committed at Abu Ghraib prisons, in Iraq, and Guantanamo, in Cuba - a action started in Germany[27], in the name of a group of 12 victims of tortures from the mentioned prisons jails, and the "key-witness" who decided to testify in the favour of this complaint is former commander of military jails from Iraq, Janis Karpinski[28], but also the only superior officer sanctioned by the military hierarchy in the case of the scandal from Abu Ghraib jail.

The confrontations between the American President and the hostile manifestations are pointed out in Latin America, with the occasion of a tour visit in Brazil[29], Uruguay, Guatemala, Columbia and Mexico.

In other words, the American president "pays now a huge price in popularity", due to the Iraqi war.

A war that the new commander of the American forces in this country, General David Petraeus[30], an expert in operations against insurgents and a strong supporter of President George W. Bush, considers "it must be hard before it will be easy". Because, as General Petraeus states, there are undergoing operations in "new areas" and "they are confronting with other elements there", and "the effort to defeat the terrorists will be harder till will be easy". Of course, this statement is on the background of the Congress approval of the

withdrawal plan of the American soldiers, starting with October 1st.

One may think become more and more doubtless: after four years after the Iraq invasion, the Iraqi people are more and more pessimist[31]. The presence of the foreign soldiers makes nothing than aggravate the situation[32] and, according to the locals, they are supposed to be the main cause of disruption.

The attempts with car-bombs produced in the Shiite enclaves of Baghdad continue to make new and important victims, reason for which the radical Shiite movement lead by the ecclesiastic Moqtada al Sadr announce their backing from government.[33] More than that, few hours after the Shiite Prime minister Nuri al Maliki announced that, till the end of this year, Iraq will take over the security control on whole territory of the country, another five attempts took place, three of them were with car-bomb and ended with at least 170 civilians ad over 200 were wounded.[34].

The Iraq war – as the Spanish newspaper *El Pais* wrote, "it is a strategic and moral calamity with historic dimension, started with false hypothesis / …. / Conflict harms the US legitimacy in the world and the civil collateral damages and some abuses pollute their moral prestige. Excepting the new Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, there are some persons who participate from the beginning to this adventure, who took the initial decision to start the war with Iraq and who use false excuses / … / If USA continues to participate to this bloody and long fight in Iraq – stated the same newspaper – it is very probable that its end to be a frontal collision with Iran and with a great part of Islamic world".[35]

After World War II – wrote *El Pais* – USA succeeded to impose the defence of democracy in Europe because they succeeded to establish a political strategy with great amplitude consisting on unification of their friends and the partitioning of their enemies. In the Middle East it is discussed the US position as a world leader. We urgently need the same prudent strategy which should include a political compromise truly constructive".

For the time being, the press agencies report that the American Army builds a wall[36] around a Sunni area from Baghdad, with almost 5 km length, and mention Robert Gates in connections with a possible cut down of the American troops in Iraq till the end of 2007.

Conclusion. The wars from Iraq and Afghanistan are commonly perceived as the first actions of the fight against the international terrorism started by USA after the 9/ 11. Between these two wars, from Afghanistan and Iraq, the Iraq one is "the most problematic one", as Lawrence Freedman argues, a professor at the London Royal College. A war which came "on the time and place choose by the American government", but "the cause it was based on (….) proved to be false. Saddam Hussein has no connections with Al-Qaeda and there were missing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons"[37] – conclusion confirmed, for the first time, by the Committee for secret services from American Senate. Furthermore, "in defensive terms of protecting the liberal society", as Lawrence Freedman underlined, "this war was not necessary" and "in offensive terms of extension the liberal society was a failure" – big human prices, especially in Iraqi lives buy also in Coalition forces, leading to a "rapid decrease of the public support (population)".[38]

The consequences of a failure in Iraq will be severe[39] and for long term. The whole Middle East would be destabilised – an unacceptable perspective. The Iraqi forces still need help and the American troops will provide the logistic necessary for fulfilling their missions.

On the other hand, USA should restate that do not wish the control over the Iraqi oil. According to most complex independent study regarding the natural resources of Iraq realised by HIS, the reserves of this country could be, as the *Financial Times* states, two times bigger than it was estimated before and the present oil production could rise till 4 billions barrels a day.[40]

Or, if this estimation will be confirmed, Iraq could become the second largest producer, after Saudi Arabia with 116 billions barrels per year, surpassing Iran.

In his annual address to the nation, on January 23rd, President Bush asked the Congress to double the oil reserve from 726 millions barrels to 1.5 millions till 2027.

Supplementation of the investment funds in an Iraq "divided and torn apart" by bloody conflicts could remain, as some specialists[41] in Middle East sustain, "a simple illusion".

There can not be made investments in such a country. A solution could be "disarming the Shiite and Sunni militias" and, simultaneously,

"establishing a security force that must be controlled by the Iraqi state".

The White House Administration strategy for Iraq is watched with some scepticism not only in USA, but also in Romania, where George W. Bush has more supporters than in America. Analysts do not give big chances to the new strategy.

A supplementation of American troops in Iraq "would not be a solution for the Iraqi crisis". It could be a "temporary solution for solving some problems in a limited area"[42] and will not lead to the violence's decrease but, on the contrary, it will make the insurgents to better arm. It is proved by numerous attacks and attempts from the Iraqi capital – attacks which, in a way or in other, decreased the habitants' trust in the securing plan[43] officially launched on February 14th.

However, the Iraqi government continues to state that the American troops' supplementation in this country would be in Iraqi "interest".

The regional conference from Baghdad[44] - a rare occasion to bring at the same table USA and its two enemies – was a key-meeting for the Iraq's future, with a "huge punt"[45]. Even some experts - who comment the event – sustain that the reunion will have no result due to the "interest frictions" of the participants.

Similarly, the recent international conference from Egypt regarding the Iraq reconstruction that approved, on the first day, an "ambitious plan for five years for development and security" which proposes "strengthening the international community role in Iraq stabilisation".[46] A plan supported now by USA who could go on their efforts to bring peace in Middle East.

So, a larger opening to dialog[47] of USA does not mean "abdication" from its policy in the region. Even if the democrats, as majority in American Congress, do not undergoes to political action which contest the authority of the president.[48]

Besides, the President George W. Bush himself affirms that it is necessary a new approach regarding Iraq, but Iran and Syria[49] must renounce to support terrorism and to sustain the Iraqi government. America must keep its dominant policy in the world.

NOTES:

[1] From international news broadcasted by "Antena 1" TV Channel.

[2] Russia does not hide its concern and sees no point of the antimissile shield placed especially near by its borders, although Russia received assurances that the system was conceived to protect the continent against a possible attack from Iran and the USA is willing to cooperate with Moscow on the line of the intelligence exchange regarding the "concrete threats" or even "could allow to the Russian military officials to inspect the future antimissile bases".

[3] At the EU Meeting of EU Defence Ministers, organised on Wiesbaden, the German minister of defence restated the position of his country regarding the emplacement of the antimissile shield: (1) development of such defence system within NATO; (2) calls within the NATO-Russia Council and (3) a development partnership with Russia, because we have a common security interest („Antena 3" News, March 3rd, 2007).

[4] According to *Newsweek*, quoted by "Realitatea TV" TV Channel, on January 29th, 2007, the President George W. Bush's "popularity rate" is 30 %, and 58% of Americans consider that Bush's presidency is over.

[5] Al-Qaeda is "fuelled" with human resources from the line of young Sunni extremists. According to the American President statement, there will be 14.000 marines whose main mission is to find and annihilate them.

[6] Iran is accused by USA for supplying arms to the Shiite militias while, according to the Iraqi authorities, terrorists coming Syria are constantly joining the Sunni insurrection.

[7] President Bush also requested from Congress a reserves corps which will take over some the tasks of the active troops.

[8] *Reactions to strategy,* " Journal", TVR TV Channel, January 11th, 2007, editor Loara Ştefănescu.

[9] London announced that it will not supplement its troops in the region and, during the first stage, will reduce the troops with almost 3,000 military personnel.

[10] For the first time in 12 years, the democrats took over the control in the House of Representatives (228 seats given 196 places held so far by the Republicans), in Senate and they hold on the majority of the Governor positions.

[11] Donald Rumsfeld was sacrificed as a result of the appeal to resignation made by the future speaker of the House of Representatives, Democrat Nancy Pelosi – the partial suffrage on November 7th proved o "dissatisfaction" wishing to be a demonstration of the "dissatisfaction" of the large majority of American electorate regarding the war in Iraq. Due to the lack of progress in Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld presented his resignation few times before, being under a huge pressure on behalf of public opinion, but President George W. Bush rejected it each time. Being at the Pentagon leadership since 2001, Donald Rumsfeld led USA in two wars and an extremely dis-

puted occupation of Iraq.

[12] The American commentators saw, then, in the Donald Rumsfeld's resignation a gesture of "capitulation" of the Administration led by George W. Bush in the front of its adversaries.

[13] In the Official Report sent for publication on December 6th, 2006, the Study Group for Iraq refers to the withdrawal of the largest part of the combat troops from Iraq till the first semester of 2008, "taking into consideration the field security situation", and recommend to the administration Bush to "increase as quickly as possible the number of the forces integrated in the Iraqi units as trainers", and the American troops to limit, progressively, their actions to assisting the new Iraqi Army.

[14] According to Robert Gates, USA is not winning the war in Iraq, and in the next two years, the American presence in the region will bring either a stabilisation of the Middle East, either a conflict of international proportions.

[15] Communiqué took over by the TVR TV Channel, Foreign News, December 7th, 2006. His group – a working group for Iraq, led by former State Secretary James Baker, was to present, by the end of the year, an "alternative approach" of the conflict in Iraq, anticipated, then, by many political analysts over the Ocean, as "a major step" through the end of a three and a half years a military unpopular campaign, during which over 2,900 Americans died.

[16] According to the American President statement, after George W. Bush received the conclusions of the Baker Report regarding Iraq.

[17] One of the opponents, the Republican senator John W. Waren, made the specification that "this measure is not one of confrontation", but it represents "an acceptance" of the invitation made by President Bush to come, continuously, with "alternative plans" regarding the situation in Iraq (*The New York Times*, January 24th 2007).

[18] TVR TV Channel, Foreign News,"Veto for the President", February 17th, 2007.

[19] Ignoring the warning of the presidential veto, The House of Representatives, extremely divided, voted with 218 de votes "yes" and 212 „no" the bill which foreseen a budget of 124 billions dollars till the end of the year for the wars from Iraq and Afghanistan, but demands that the fighting troops to be withdrawn before September next year or even earlier if the Iraqi government does not fulfil its obligations (TVR TV Channel, Foreign News, March 24th, 2007). According to the Iraqi Vice-president, Tareq Al-Hasini, the USA troops could be withdrawn from Iraq after a year and a half.

[20] While the President George W. Bush sustains that an exact calendar of withdrawal means only „the acceptance of defeat and easy surrender of Iraq by insurgents and terrorists", democrats do not want to offer a blank cheque for the Administration. Still, they remain "inclined to negotiate a compromise" – the new outlined project of law "do not foreseen the precise date of withdrawal but clear stages and criteria" the Iraqi government must fulfil "in order to prove that it is capable to control its own country" (Nicolae Melinescu, Washington, for "Journal", TVR TV Channel, May 2nd, 2007).

[21] *The Guardian* states that the British General Staff made pressures for increasing the troops in Afghanistan because "the war here has more chances for victory than in Iraq".

[22] In September 2006, the former SACEUR, the American General James L. Jones, asked the 26 members of Alliance to send 2,500 soldiers in the Southern turmoil area, due to the increased resistance of Taliban insurgents.

[23] According to the British magazine *Financial Times* "only Poland announced the supplementation of the troops with 1,000 personnel. Few other countries showed their availability in order to help at the air transportation, as France, or to send companies of each 100 soldiers, as Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM"(The international press magazine, "Antena 3" TV Channel, January 19th, 2007).

[24] According to the Alliance speaker, Afghanistan is the most difficult mission since the end of Cold War.

[25] *A year to win in Afghanistan*, *The Times*, January 23rd, 2007 – International Press Magazine, clumps realized by "Antena 3" TV Channel, January 24th, 2007.

[26] *Newsweek*, quoted by "Realitatea" TV Channel, January 29th, 2007.

[27] Germany is the country which allows the trial of the war crimes, no matter where there were committed.

[28] Janis Karpinski stated that Donald Rumsfeld ordered the abuses committed in detention centres from Iraq. All started in September 2003, with the visit in Iraq of the supreme commander of the prison from Guantanamo, General Geoffrey Miller, and sent by the former chief of Pentagon in order to teach them and the members of the military intelligence services from Iraq the toughest interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo. Among the methods mentioned there were: not respecting meals hours, forcing some prisoners to stand up and listen to loud music, sleep privation. In order to back up his statements, he makes a reference to a memorandum with a resolution written by the hand of the former chief of Pentagon on the document's margins: "Be sure that the methods will be used".

[29] The French newspaper *Le Monde*, quoted by "Antena 3" TV Channel, on March 10th, wrote that in Brazil there were organised more anti-American protests, even before the arrival of President George W. Bush. Further, the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, acknowledged as Washington's main enemy in the region, requested "boycotting the visit of the President Bush in the neighbouring Uruguay, by the organisation of large demonstration in Buenos Aires.

[30] In his opinion, if the offensive launched at Baghdad against the insurgents fails, Iraq will be doomed to violence.

[31] A recent pollster shows that only 18% Iraqi people still have faith in the Coalition troops, vis-à-vis the recent similar poll dated 2005, when the majority of the people

who answered stated to be optimistic regarding the future of their country (TVR TV Channel, Foreign News, March 19th, 2007).

[32] The attempt from the Iraqi Parliament, claimed by a Shiite group supported by Al-Qaeda, was produced while USA started – within the framework of plan of making secure Baghdad – the deployment of a more 30,000 military personnel till June. These personnel will join the 80,000 American and Iraqi soldiers already present in the Iraqi capital.

[33] Speaking about this intention, the international press agencies appreciated that the withdrawal of those six ministers belonging to this movement as a new form of protest against the "refusal" of the Iraqi Premier to establish a withdrawal calendar of the American soldiers from this country.

[34] The press agencies speak about a true "massacre". Attempts with car-bombs took place in the Iraqi capital Baghdad and with victims as it follows: in a market from Shiite ward Sadriya, with 118 deaths and 139 wounded; in Sadr City, a suburb of the capital, with 28 deaths and over 45 wounded, and in the capital's centre, with at least 11 deaths (TVR TV Channel, Foreign News, April 18th, 2007).

[35] From the international news collage done by "Antena 3" TV Channel, on March 2nd, 2007.

[36] According to the authorities, the wall will have a double role: to protect the locals against Shiite militias and also to prevent the Sunni insurgents to flee in the ward. However, the locals have different opinion. Same different opinions have some political leaders, who complained that such a wall will isolate the communities and do nothing but to dredge the sectarian tensions. How much more so neither the governmental residences from Green Area, which are also surrounded by walls, were set away in shelter from the terrorists attacks. Besides, the Iraqi Premier Nuri al Maliki himself requests the works cessation to this wall, insisting on searching other methods for the citizens safety from Iraqi capital. On the other hand, for so called Islamic Iraqi state, controlled by Al-Qaeda, the construction of the wall will prove the „failure of all security plans of the Americans" (News on "Antena 3" TV Channel, on April 22nd, 2007; TVR TV Channel, Foreign News, April 23rd, 2007).

[37] Lawrence FREEDMAN*, Iraq, Liberal Wars and Illiberal Containment*, in Survival, The IISS Quarterly, Volume 48, Number 4, Winter 2006-07, p. 53.

[38] Ibidem.

[39] Among the consequences of this fiasco, Lawrence Freedman made a reference to the appearance of a syndrome – "Iraq syndrome, comparable with the Vietnam one". For details, see L. FREEDMAN, *op. cit.,* p. 53; 63-64. The topics regarding "Iraq syndrome" is detailed by other authors. To see: Robert BRIGHAM, *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006); John MUELLER, *The Iraq Syndrome,* Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 6, November-December 2005, pp. 44-54.

[40] The above mentioned study is about the existence of almost 100 billions oil barrels in a desert area from the Western part of Iraq. According to the quoted source, this study was done after the Iraq invasion, in March 2003.

[41] Laura Sitaru, specialist in Middle East, University Bucharest, interview, TVR Journal, January 11thl, 2007.

[42] Gl. (r.) Corneliu Pivariu, specialist in military intelligence, interview, TVR Journal, January 11th, 2007.

[43] According to this plan, Baghdad is divided in ten perimeters, controlled by 90,000 people, Americans and Iraqi.

[44]Although, initially, such an idea was rejected, USA had, still, to confirm the participation to the regional conference regarding Iraq future that took part in Baghdad, in March. In the same way, "the two enemies of America"- Iran and Syria, both accused Washington Administration that support terrorism and fuels the confessional tensions from Iraq. Further, it is sustained that Teheran could produce the "atomic weapon" and that, in the next eight years, it could obtain a long range missile, that which could be launched over USA or Europe

[45] Invitation was addressed to all permanent members of UN Security Council and to all neighbours. Or, to this conference – a high reunion at ambassadors level - participated delegations from neighbouring countries of Iraq, from permanent members states of the UN Security Council and from Arab League. There were positive debates, according the Iraqi minister of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, so there were created three working committees for cooperation regarding the security, refugees, energy and oil.

[46] Italian newspaper *Corriere dela Serra*, May 4th, 2007, mentioned on news, on "Antena 1" TV Channel.

[47] The Iraqi Study Group, led by the former State Secretary James Baker, whose report was published on December 6th, 2006, recommends a direct contact with Syria and Iran.

[48] For the first time, the democrats are on the way to use their clear majority in Congress (TVR TV Channel, Foreign News, February 16th).

[49] Syria blames USA for using double standards in the Middle East.

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NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS - LANDMARKS FOR A EUROPEAN AND EURO-ATLANTIC ROMANIA

Vasile POPA

Romanian National Security Strategy (SSNR) which has been written about, last year, in this column, and the National Security Laws debated in Parliament are perceived as main importance landmarks for a European and Euro-Atlantic Romania, at the beginning of this century, announcing deep transformations in the proactive, dynamic and stressed international security environment where the growth of state's and global community anticipation and proactive action capability is a pre-condition of their security.

There are tendencies of multiple evolutions in globalization, that should be known by each state, thoroughly, in order to act firmly for reducing the economic and social vulnerabilities, but also the political, military, environmental ones, derived from this process, for growing the access to its opportunities, to protect its legitimate interests, to promote, protect and defence democracy and fundamental human rights.

In this respect, although they also generated diverse discussions and opinions, even some critical emphasis in the local media, in the project stage, the mentioned documents, especially the Romanian National Security Strategy, are special as they elaborate and integrate conceptually the new tendencies, present the fundamental ways which assure the international environment's grave risks' prevention and counteraction, ensure the internal security state, personal safety and energetic, food, transports and infrastructures, cultural and environmental communities' security, harmonize the national efforts with the relations' dynamic from the European and Euro-Atlantic security and defence area.

The new strategy underlines that the present integrative context permits the national security to be ensured by own forces, in cooperation with the allies and partners, based on own strategies and legislation, Alliance's strategic concepts and European Union's Security Strategy in order to facilitate the harmonization of the internal efforts with international commitments, to identify some prevention ways and convenient threats counteraction, to promote democracy, peace and stability in the region and another zones of strategic interests, to diminish vulnerabilities, to create adequate national capabilities, to transform the security institutions.

In the wider approach of elaborating Romania's participation priorities to achieving the international security, to build a new European and Euro-Atlantic identity for Romania, to strengthen regional security and stability, the National Security Strategy succeeds to design our country as a dynamic vector of security and prosperity in the Black Sea area, in the conditions of a good governance, competition and economy's performing aspect growth, modernization of the institutions having responsibilities in the security field, the development of the infrastructure's protection degree, efficiency of the resources distribution and use, increasing responsibilities.

For ensuring the national security, SSNR regards harmonized, active measures: political, economic, diplomatic, social, legal, administrative and military, in intelligence, counter-intelligence and security activity as well in an efficient crises management according to the Euro-Atlantic community behaviour norms.

The present double condition of the Romanian state, as a North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union member, allows us to act in a security area, based on common values, interests

and objectives, on democracy's, law state and market economy norms and principles, to have favourable conditions for long-lasting economical and social development, active participation to peace and security maintenance in regional and global plan, for the efficient counteraction of actual and future risks and threats.

The National Security Strategy follows up to promote, protect and defence the national interests and values, whose entire specification into this document consists their guarantee to be respected *in corpore* in building the Romania's security and prosperity. Their accentuation means their identification as a guarantor for national existence and identity, their full integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic community as a cohesion factor and catalytic of their efforts to progress and modernization, binder for a harmonized relation between the individual and national interests, respect for national sovereignty and independence, state's national, unitary and indivisible nature.

The attentive investigation of the present security environment offers Strategy's authors conclusions which underline the idea that the new risks' and threats' proliferation amplify the global environment insecurity elements and, in the next 10-15 years, the global order will be rebuilt and there will be created a new international equilibrium by freedom and democracy expansion and strengthen and also the security environment will be characterized by major tendencies as: the globalization processes and regional integration acceleration, the perpetuation of the attempts to break up the state, the unification of the efforts to accomplish a new security architecture, the accentuation of the anarchy tendencies in some regions, to strengthen the states' steps to grow their influence in the international life, the multiplication of forms and the growth of the non-state actors' intervention into the international relations dynamic.

Our studies confirm that, in this complex, conflictual world there is maintained the aggression of the terrorism organized in trans-border networks against democratic states and reasonable political forces from the states engaged in the democratization process. The main tendencies of the global evolution in the 21st century worries, generates challenges, offers opportunities and presents risks regarding to national interests, which ask a growth of the states' capability to exploit them in their own interests.

In the Central and South-Eastern European area, therefore, for Romania, too, the new risks and threats didn't stop the affirmation of strategic opportunities offered by the old political regime disappearance and democracy instauration, by the NATO's and EU's enlargements, by the multiple plans exchange, by technological development. As for our country, these elements were intensified by the benefits obtained from the accession into both organizations, from the establishment of a strategic partnership with USA as well from the promotion of a wide regional cooperation in the Balkans and Black Sea area.

In the document we refer to, there are structured, with realism and objectivity, conferred by the analytic specialists' participation, the present and future risks and threats palette which concern our country. This places, at first, the terrorism threat, expressed by the development of some terrorist networks on the national territory. This is imminent for the world, intrinsic and possible for Romania, nevertheless considered less probable for Romania, because of the special relations of Romanians with the Arab world through the years, the before mentioned threat can't be excluded either for a moment from the strategist, decision-makers calculations as long as we stand in the first line fight against the international terrorism, we have an effective military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and we accepted the establishment of military facilities for the American army on our national territory.

The threat of the WMD proliferation is on a second place in the strategic analysis, taken as a permanent but not imminent threat. In the second decade of the XXIst century, according to some CIA estimations, it is foreseen the possibility for the terrorists to achieve biological agents or, less probable, a nuclear device causing, if used, masses of victims.

There are enough reasons to confer this threat a maximum attention by taking the hardest measures to consolidate the national security, by combating the proliferation and use of WMD on the Romanian territory and into other areas.

On the next place is situated the development of the organized crime networks on the Romanian territory, an asymmetrical threat owed to the big vulnerabilities Romania have and the fact that this harms the political, legal, economic, financial, social fields. In the Romania of 2007,

the organized crime evolved from the smuggling actions, tax escape, corruption and luxurious car stealing, drugs, human beings, guns, stolen cars, false currency, travel cheques, credit/debit cards trafficking, the traffic with strategic and nuclear materials.

If we look attentively, we will see that this division of threats against our state security is in part overlapping the threats identified into the European Security Strategy, even the Europeans place terrorism on the third place in this evil top which hang over the Union's states.

The weapons of mass destruction proliferation (WMD) organically associated with the extension on the national territory of the terrorist networks obviously remains a real threat because it is preferred by the terrorists for its high capacity to destroy and have a mass psychological impact. Therefore, they must urge the Romanian state to adopt some complete and effective non-proliferation strategies to stop the transit of illicit guns, technology and fusible material, guns or CBR materials on the national territory, to make some steps to guarantee the security of nuclear and radiological substances and to stop the terrorist actions in this field.

We can't make exception from the risks regarding the frontiers security and defence in the actual conditions when Romania is part of the both organizations. Consequently, we take into account a series of new military and non-military, asymmetrical threats including those ones manifesting as IT or informational aggressions, mostly generated by the international environment, but in a lower extent, by the internal one.

A year after the document's launching, there are still local conflicts in the region, with serious implications for the regional and European peace and security, despite the big efforts made by the international community for keeping them under control. Aside some stressed situations, separatist tendencies, territory disputes and instability situations in the Romania's vicinity, they generate uncertainty, waste resources and feed the poverty. However, they nourish new violence and criminality forms and favour terrorism.

As for the chapter we refer to, the perenniality of some strategic estimations stands in the fact that, further on, the trans-national criminality remains the expression of some negative phenomena proliferation which are amplifying in the globalization conditions, even the efficiency of deep political, economic and social changes management which produced in Central, East and South-Eastern European in the process of disappearance of the communist regimes is very high at present.

The document also develops other elements which endanger the national security as: geophysical, climatic or associated phenomena derived from the environment or reflecting its degradation, as a consequence of some dangerous, noxious or irresponsible human activities (natural disasters, earthquakes, flows, global warming, some vital resources exhaustion, industrial or ecological catastrophes, raised pollution or the possibility to produce some pandemics).

Even we do not agree with the idea of showing the area of vulnerabilities and dysfunctions that have the capability to magnify risks and threats against national security, we admit that they exist and their passing-by means practically to neglect some aspects having a significant impact on security.

The National Security Strategy is allowed to adequately identify and to concretely propose the proactive counteraction of risks and threats, conflicts prevention and efficient risks management, crises situations and their consequences, active participation in democracy promotion and security and prosperity building in Romania's vicinity and other strategic interest zones, the institutions' reform and national capabilities improvement.

The performance of some strategic steps is, undoubtedly, internally conditioned, by the political stability – marked, in the last year, by misunderstandings between the president and prime-minister, it has expanded to the entire political class -, by whole affirmation of the democratic rights and liberties but also by the civic activism and social harmony, the critical infrastructure modernization, the financial-banking system and capital market stability, the defence of the natural resources and environment. Externally, the process is underlined by the level of the trans-atlantic cooperation, strategic partnership relations, peace and stability in the strategic interest zones, the support for the Romanians abroad for maintaining their national and cultural identity.

Romania's future is based on the action capabilities of the security institutions, their role consolidation into NATO and EU, including the

one of dynamic vector of European and Euro-Atlantic security, as well on the firm economic development, the access to vital resources, the international terrorism prevention and efficient counteraction, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and trans-border criminality, etc.

This structure of the National Security Strategy has proved to be a realistic evaluation of risks and threats, a correct identification of fundamental values and interests needed to be promoted and protected, a good establishment of the objectives and their doing, ways to mobilize resources for the accomplishment of an active participation in international security realization, building a new European and Euro-Atlantic identity for Romania, regional security and stability in the new paradigm context, the assumption of the role of dynamic vector of security in the West Balkans and Black Sea region, the comprehensive approach of the intern security issue, good governance, competitive and performing economy, the transformation of the institutions having responsibilities in the national security field, development and active protection of the strategic infrastructure.

After its discussion and approval in the Parliament, the package of National Security Law which materializes, in fact, the National Security Strategy issues and we will firmly pass to its prescriptions' practice, Romania as *a facto* and *jure* member, starting this year, of the European community, and since 2004 from the Euro-Atlantic one, will be able to contribute actively to the international and regional peace and security, affirming itself more and more as a modern, safe and prosper country, an active component of the global community.

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TERRORISM – AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT?*

Anton DENGG

When we speak of terrorism, the question is: Is Terrorism really an asymmetric threat? What are the threats, risks, challenges and chances for the 21st Century? To talk about asymmetry requires one should first ask: what is the definition of asymmetry? If we look it up in the Oxford Dictionary, we find the following explanation: Asymmetry is a "lack of equality or equivalence between parts or aspects of something; a lack of symmetry." But how does this fit into the concept of terrorism?

It is very popular to combine terrorism with asymmetry – terrorism is described as an asymmetric warfare. So, if we say that terrorism is asymmetry – is that a benefit to the problems of terrorism? Is it any help for the research in the field of terrorism? Is the fact of asymmetric warfare any help in counterterrorism affairs and what is the understanding of asymmetric warfare? Is the fight of the terrorists perceived as asymmetric because we do not have the adequate means to react or are the means available to a superpower inadequate making the population feel helpless?

Asymmetry or symmetry has to do with superiority of a state acting or any person involved. But superiority is deeply connected with inferiority. And superiority and inferiority includes heterogeneity. Superiority, inferiority and heterogeneity are linked to *power* and *power* can produce asymmetry in:

- Politics
- Economics
- Military
- Education and intellectual asymmetry
- Media

Politics

If people have no chance to take part in the daily political decision making process do they have the right to draw attention to their problem by terrorist means and to kill innocent people? But there is a need to set limits between guerrilla and terrorism tactics!

Economics

Let us take a look at the terrorists' motives. Experts often say that terrorists fight because of poverty and the feeling of being overwhelmed by the Western economic system which also gives the feeling of humiliation and hopelessness – could that be a problem of asymmetry? Let us have a look into the ranking list of states creditworthiness.

Within the first 25 states there is no state with a Muslim majority or a Muslim state! Why? Is maybe the motive of poverty correct? Is the fight against poverty (as a problem of asymmetry) a key for solution and therefore a challenge and chance in the fight against terrorism?

Military

You can have a quantitative and a qualitative asymmetry in military. That means, on one hand, more troops and on the other hand better trained soldiers or higher technical standards of weapons.

Creditworthiness of States:

1. Switzerland	6. France	11. Canada	16. Japan	21. Australia
2. Luxemburg	7. USA	12. Ireland	17. Spain	22. New Zealand
3. Germany	8. Norway	13. Belgium	18. Italy	23. Chile
4. Netherlands	9. Austria	14. Sweden	19. Singapore	24. Rep. China (Taiwan)
5. Great Britain	10. Denmark	15. Finland	20. Portugal	25. Island

Source: Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2003, Frankfurt am Main, Okt. 2002, seiten 1089

Education and intellectual asymmetry

There is also the possibility of an intellectual asymmetry which means a higher amount of the population consisting of well-educated people.

Media

The media is especially good as an example for asymmetry in terrorism. It depends on who uses the media and how it is possible to influence people through media. Who fixes, at what time, how and in which manner the headlines of the media? Think about the statement: "Bad news is good news!"

Terrorist organizations

One trend in terrorism is that terrorist organizations have changed the type of their structure. Several circumstances are responsible for this trend. Firstly, organizations have changed their size – and this is different to former terrorist groups – from relatively big organized groups into small cells. And from a strictly structured group to a loose combined connection – like a franchising model. Secondly, currently, cells are more and more decentralized. This has a special impact for the fight against terrorism. In principle: the smaller a cell is, the more difficult it can be detected. Also, decentralizing means more freedom of action. But it also means that there is no need for communication between members, which is also a disadvantage for counterterrorism. This is a kind of asymmetry but to whose advantage or disadvantage? Satellite TV gives the possibility to be updated with news and also gives the chance to listen to channels in one's mother tongue which is very important for a kind of community feeling. But TV as a source of information especially can produce a special asymmetry. The news from TV globally broadcasted in a one-sided manner can influence a huge number of people. This can give a feeling of asymmetry to human beings, particularly incited by fundamental radicals. Most of the technical revolution of the 20th century can be used by nearly everybody. Even terrorists use the technical achievements – especially the Internet – although radical fundamentalists reject Western values and achievements. But the use of technical achievements is a natural sequence of each technical age. One side always limps behind the other one which does not have the latest achievements – what implies asymmetry.

Finally, smaller cells could also be a result of a better counterterrorism strategy.

Home-grown terrorists

A special problem that seems to be a new trend is home-grown terrorists. It would be appear that we see more and more this type of terrorists in Europe. Strangely enough, we hear from home-grown terrorists in the EU but hardly of homegrown terrorists in the USA!

Let us take a look at the explanation of the countries involved. 298 million people live in the USA and 450 million in the EU. The land mass of the USA is two times greater than that of the EU. Three times as many Muslims live in the EU as in the USA. This means that the population density in the EU is higher than in the USA, and this could be an explanation for the lack of feeling of home-grown terrorists. Or is there another explanation for the differentiated understanding of home-grown terrorists? What about rights? Is there a difference in the way of life – in the practical interpersonal relationship? Or, is it possible that there is another reason? Maybe the USA does not describe terrorists who are US citizen (even when they are islamic fundamentalists) as home-grown terrorists? Nevertheless, in the USA, "26% of American Muslims between the ages of 18 to 29 believe that suicide attacks in the name of their religion are legitimate in some cases."[1]

Is there an asymmetry in the acceptance of people from/with different religion and in the view of legitimacy?

So, the participation of Muslim people in our society will be a special challenge for each EU member state and the EU as a whole.

Internet as a platform for terrorism

One of the biggest challenges we are facing at is the spread of radical fundamentalist ideology and its consequences.

Radicalization

This data shows the increase of websites with radical content:

- In 2000, 20 Jihadist websites were identified.
- By 2005, Jihadist websites had increased up to 4000.[2]

Such data proves the importance of the Internet. But it also shows that radicalization via Internet becomes more and more important and it is a threat and a challenge for the future. Especially ideology and propaganda material

from radical organizations can be found in the Internet. Do radical organizations use the Internet in an asymmetrical way? Why is it not possible to use the Internet in a similar way as terrorists do – to convince people that terrorism is a bad thing? Why not use it as a counter-terrorism-measure? So, one of the key priorities for 'Prevention' in the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to "develop common approaches to spot and tackle problem behaviour, in particular the misuse of the Internet."[3]

Training

But the Internet is not only an excellent platform for radicalizing sympathizers, but it is also used to train new attackers in the tactics of terrorism. So-called *Training Manuals* also involve goals of terrorist groups. These manuals instruct how to spread ideology and propaganda, how to produce bombs and the best way to use them. Therefore, in its Counter-Terrorism Strategy also the European Union tackles this problem: "They must also be deprived as far as possible of the opportunities offered by the Internet to communicate and spread technical expertise related to terrorism."[4]

Internet has also the advantage – if it is needed – to communicate in different ways. In addition, free decryption software like Steganographie makes it very easy to do so. Do terrorists invert our advantage of the Internet to their advantage? Is this an asymmetry in favour of terrorists? Preventing the use of the Internet – as a playing ground for terrorism – will be a task for all nation states and international organizations for the next years – particularly in the context with civil rights.

Terrorist Attacks

Another trend is the increase of terrorist incidents. Since 2001, not only terrorist incidents have increased but also injuries and fatalities.

Comparing between 2005 and 2006, there is a rise of 20.1% in incidents, a 37.4% increase in fatalities and a rise of 25.9% in injuries.

The importance of religion

In 1980, there were 122 international attacks – only 0.8% were religious motivated. In 1995, the increase of religious motivated international attacks was 28.2% and by 2005 we find an increase of 47.9%.

But is religion really so dangerous and why?

Religion has an exceptional power of motivation and sometimes it works with doomsday scenarios. Through religion, leaders of radical organizations excuse cruel attacks with words like: "It is the will of God!" or "In the name of God!" Is the misuse of religion a kind of asymmetric warfare and for whom is it asymmetric?

Media aspects

Media has a special importance for terrorism, because terrorism is a strategy and – as the expert in terrorism study Peter Waldmann said – a strategy of communication.[5] Without media, especially transnational terrorism is useless.

Therefore media, that means, newspapers, TV and Internet is the most effective platform for terrorist groups and cells. Even small groups can get worldwide attention very easily. Either they

Source: data from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://tkb.org, updated at 18.1.2007

put their activities or attacks on the Internet or they assassinate people as cruel as possible. Everybody recalls the extreme effect the terrorist attacks, like the ones from New York and Washington 2001, Madrid - 2004 and London - 2005 – had for the Media?

If we link media with asymmetry, there is the following question: Do terrorists determine the headlines of media or is it the other way round? Thus this will be a big challenge for media experts – not to be misused by terrorist organizations.



Conclusion

So, if something like asymmetry exists in terrorism and you put it on a pair of scales the question would be: Is the pair of scales in balance or does terrorism weigh more than counterterrorism which means we can not react in the same way? And what input can the theory of asymmetry give to a theoretical or practical solution to the problem of terrorism and appropriate counter measures?

NOTES:

[1] *1 in 4 U.S. Muslims approve of suicide attacks*, http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/,download 28.5.2007.

[2] ATRAN, Scott, *New Trends in Suicide Terrorism*, http://www.stimson.org/newcentury/ppt/Atran_Senate.ppt, download 21.4.2007.

[3] Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 14469/05 REV 4, Brussels, 30.11.2007, p. 9.

[4] Ibidem, p. 13

[5] WALDMANN, Peter, **Terrorismus Provokation der Macht**, Gerling Akademie Verlag, München, 2001, p. 13.

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TERRORISM AS A FORM OF ASYMMETRIC ACTIVITIES. STRATEGIC ASYMMETRY BETWEEN TWO ENTITIES (STATE AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS)*

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD
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An asymmetric war, in its most measurable form – terrorist war and, obviously, war against terrorism – became very dangerous, due to its varied and sophisticated forms and its distribution across all the environments, from terrestrial ones to the cosmic, biological, nano-technological, and cybernetic ones.

1. Asymmetry- success condition of conflict

From the very beginning, from fundamental mythical description of human evolution - David and Goliath - and till now, we understand that asymmetry is not only a characteristic of war fighting, but a condition. Always warriors try to fight in other way than enemy expected.

Building a desired and managed asymmetry in conflict represented and represents one of the main objectives for all the components of the military art.

In any confrontation, especially in military fight, there is the tendency and practice to create or avoid the disproportions. Staff officers call them "force ratio". Almost the entire modern military science was built up around this principle of force ratio, hoping to find out a value which expresses a certain degree of predictability of the future image of fight.

Of course, it is still valuable, but the disproportions in quality area, heavy to be evaluated in short time, are too large that force ratio is not a tough argument in decision making.

Concerning the armed conflict and the war, it has been looked, tried and even forced the exit from symmetry in order to achieve superiority. In this way, in time of hi-tech and IT, it comes to a huge qualitative disproportion, in condition of maintaining the quantitative disproportion. Step by step, the quantity gives place to quality.

No matter the number of forces, it is important its power, its efficiency in solving out all the problems raised in the theatre, not only in the direct fight.

One of the most important conditions of success is to outrun the enemy, especially technologically and operationally, in order not to efficiently retort.

The massive war, a world one, between two huge symmetric entities, is unreasonable. It becomes very dangerous for both adversaries and from this perspective it does not have rational goals and objectives.

The war becomes more and more a business, or a part of a big business, namely an instrument in political and economical hands, the fist that threatens, imposes or warns. This was and probably still is the judgment that leads to significant investments in military programs, creating new weapons, vying with each other more sophisticated, more precise and more expensive.

Humankind is obliged to accept this kind of reality. It is a cruel one, where confliction symmetries are broken and dissymmetry and asymmetries are built up. The main way to achieve this terrible unfold of forces is a technological and conceptual disproportion. It received a large number of answers by all kind of means, from super technology to primitive ones, from guerrilla to terrorism, from strong economy to black market and corruption and so on and so for others forms and formulas we can call asymmetrical reaction.

2. Terrorism – a form of asymmetrical actions

The terrorist war and, respectively, the war against terrorism are representative types of asymmetrical wars. Both are with unforeseeable courses of actions, from great scale actions such as the bombing of Afghanistan with strategic aviation, due to the fact that is was considered to be a terrorist base, to the Iraqi guerrilla or the suicidal actions of Palestinians and Islamic fundamentalists. Still, these considerations are true only if we consider that both are genuine wars and not confrontations in the realm of criminality, revenge, cruel battles for power and influence, etc.

The terrorist war and the war against terrorism will certainly require more and more new forces, new means and new types of action. Some of them will inevitably lead to the fragmentation of strategic actions and forces and others, on the contrary, will amplify them and, perhaps, will unify them. This brings on a difficult question: will the world coalition against terrorism see the stage of fighting against terrorist phenomenon by its entire means or will it waste it in small actions that will continue to produce terrorism?

Terrorist attacks are always asymmetrical actions by their final scope. They are complex rebuffs, with long term effects – some of them calculated, planned, and others improvised and surely induced -, indirectly directed against political state's and modern society's institutions and values. The terrorists attack the man, namely the human being, and his institutions. But this is a way to attack directly the state. Targets are especially critical infrastructures in transportation, communications, and public services related to security and security forces, in order to fulfil some direct goals in the confrontation area - to dampen and to induce fear – or some indirect goals – to achieve conditions for underground economy's proliferation and illegal financial interests.

Still, such targets can be achieved only by eroding the authority of state, protection and security institutions, propriety and law and by directly or indirectly controlling, with all of the possible means – from terrorism to corruption -, some key-zones that are sabotaged, pillaged, and used in illegal and dangerous purposes.

The asymmetrical war is not asymmetrical for some and disproportioned or normal for others. It is similar for everyone. On one side of the axis is high technology, information technology, politics, doctrines, and strategies that underline the network centric warfare, the preemptive warfare, the preventive warfare, targeting the enemy's vital centres of will, achieving alliances and coalitions, the control of markets and resources by creating a favourable environment. On the other side, there are politics, doctrines, and strategies for adequate rebuff, in fact a stratagemic one, by using at command or procurement means and the vulnerabilities of a high-tech society. There is also the self-sacrifice as a generalized form of fighting, based on irrational, due to the fact that it is hard to fight against it in a civilized world, built around human as a fundamental value.

This type of emphatic asymmetrical confrontation is dramatic. It induces everywhere insecurity, unrest, revolt, aggressiveness, violence, and even terrorism.

Such an asymmetric war, in its most measurable form – terrorist war and, obviously, war against terrorism – became very dangerous, due to its varied and sophisticated forms and its distribution across all the environments, from terrestrial ones to the cosmic, biological, nano-technological, and cybernetic ones.

3. The strategic asymmetry between state and terrorist organizations

The Revolution in Military Affairs - as a high-scale policy and strategy, based on essential and radical transformations in information, technology, and doctrine – hallmarks an important step in breaking symmetry, creating huge disproportions. High precision weapons systems, laser and waves weapons, the developed sensors and the military nano-technology and bio-technology, revolutionizing of concepts, the emergence and experimentation of the network centric warfare and all of its implications, the amplification of operations based on effects, etc. have created both disproportionality (since few countries are able to achieve such things) and asymmetry (since all the countries want adequate answers to such challenges).

These are generally asymmetrical threats. Thus, the Moscow officials argued that Russia will find an adequate asymmetrical response to the issue of antimissile shield that will be installed in some Central European countries. This proves the

fact that the security environment will continue to be dynamic, complex and the challenges and responses will cover all the known or unknown forms and formulas.

It is the time for direct strategies, but also for stratagems. In their fight for advantageous geo-strategic positioning and access to resources and markets, the states are regrouping and converging to alliances, coalitions, international and regional organizations and bodies. The forces that are hostile to modernization oppose to them and, even if they are not regrouping, they are reinforcing, reorganizing and seeking for new forms of actions. The terrorist phenomenon is representative for them.

On the 1st of June, 2002, George W. Bush presented at West Point the new American Security Strategy of that time. During the Cold War, the American Policy was focused especially on stemming and dampening the enemies of the United States. Then, the American President asserted that this type of policy is concluded.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 lead to the permanent turnover of the leaf of enclosure and dampening due to the emergence of a new threat, a different one, that requires an adequate response, in fact, another kind of response. That was a fundamental change of political and geo-strategic paradigm: from stemming to enlargement, from rejection to strategic coalition against a common threat – terrorism. On that occasion, there was declared the *War against Terrorism*.

After more than five years since the release of those two types of asymmetrical wars – terrorist war and war against terrorism – the balance is not that clear. Of course, another reason is the fact that such a large scale confrontation, also asymmetrical, can not be evaluated from one day to another, even from one year to another. It needs time.

What has it been done so far? The danger of continuous terrorist attacks had diminished by massive, rapid and categorical attacks of the terrorist networks. The United States of America managed to significantly banish the terrorist attacks from their vast territory. The efficiency of the taken measures and all the criticism of the high costs and the enclosure of civil rights were remarkable. Even the terrorist groups declare that USA is their main enemy and the favourite target, since 9/11 there has been no terrorist attack on American territory.

Even if such asymmetrical attacks have been followed up by the ones in Madrid, Istanbul, Beslan, and London, etc., the war against terrorism counted both its early victories and its numerous victims. That is why, still, the war against terrorism has its own limits.

From this perspective, it's obvious that we must find the necessary methods, proceedings and procedures to regulate the irrational. As a result of numerous casualties on the anti-terrorist fronts, it has been proved that the armed forces and their doctrine, organization, endowment and classical training are not sufficient, very efficient and, we must recognize, very-very useful.

The armed forces, lacking other instruments available to states, had to adapt very quickly to the new missions. They were the only forces able to hit the vital centres of terrorism, to destroy its critical infrastructure and generative and regenerative systems of combat potential, by dampening such entities that are terrorism and crises bearers or generators. This reality released vast debates in the political world on the future of the armed forces and their profile.

The transformation of the military body is between the necessity of maintaining and consolidating some flexible, but complex and well-integrated structures capable to act in any strategic situation and to efficiently react to the entire scale of challenges, dangers and threats at the beginning of the millennium, and the trend of fragment those armed forces in small modules and all manner of entities-of-all-trades.

In conclusion, the war is on the way of deep transformation, paradoxically, in a peaceful instrument. Thus, it becomes a kind of small war which must prevent a bigger, catastrophic one.

Strategy, in its essence, is about the consequences of the use of force and the threat of its use, and not about such use in itself, thus strategy works identically for regular and irregular belligerents, and in symmetric and asymmetric warfare.

The characteristics of different forms of war and styles in warfare will vary widely, but there is a common idea in strategic effect, no matter how that effect is generated. We can appreciate that tactical, even operational, excellence, in waging the asymmetric war must be a great disappointment if it is not directed by a constant concern for its strategic effect upon the course of political events.

It is important for the army to understand the links and interdependencies among strategy,

operations, and tactics, especially in asymmetric war. The last years' experience proved that deposited some new values in the conception of fighting against terrorists. The small units, even the soldiers can have a strategic effect.

Thus, the warrior becomes close with the politician. Since that tactical effect has political consequences, soldiers should appreciate that their tactical behaviour is permeated with political meaning. The small units, even the soldier's training include political requirements.

So, in the nowadays conditions, the question is: can we maintain army outside of political sphere? Or how much it can be congruent?

** Paper presented during the conference organised by the Chair of Strategy from the National Defence University, Poland, April, 23.*

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He graduated a number of courses organized by Euro-Atlantic educational institutions and participated in stability and support operations.

Brigadier General (ret.) Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD (vaduvageorge@yahoo.fr), is a fellow researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I". He wrote numerous strategy papers, among which we mention "The Rapid Actions Strategy", AISM Publishing House, 2003, "Military Strategy for the Future", Paideia Publishing House, 2003, "Military Art During Millenia", CTEA Publishing House, 2004, co-author of "The Future's War, the War's Future", NDU Publishing House, 2004, "Essay on Strategic Art", Military Publishing House, 2005, "Partnership Strategy, the Strategic Partnership", NDU Publishing House, 2006. He also wrote studies, article, essays on the military art and the strategic culture, issued by the NDU Publishing House and by specialty papers.

THE 2006 NATIONAL AWARDS OF THE GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ JOURNAL THE NINTH EDITION – May 9th, 2007

Gândirea Militară Românească is the continuation of ***"România Militară"*** magazine, firstly issued in 1864, in Bucharest, and is the only military theory and science publication in Romania. Since its foundation, the journal has provided its readers with debates related to both the fundamental issues regarding the national military construction and the main theses and doctrines affirmed in the international military thinking.

On February 15, 2004, when the journal reached the age of 140, it was bestowed *"Ordinul Meritul Cultural în grad de Cavaler, categoria F, Promovarea culturii"*. Currently, the publication is consistently engaged in the process of the military body transformation, as the most important theses, ideas and concepts that provide the new National Military Establishment with direction and substance find room in its pages. ***Gândirea Militară Românească*** is meant to serve not only the officers' corps but also the governmental and non-governmental institutions whose calling asks for the deep knowledge of the problems that are specific to the National Military Establishment.

The journal is acknowledged by the National University Research Council and included in *"B+"* category.

Since 2005 the journal has had an English edition – ***Romanian Military Thinking***.

Every year, the ***National Prizes of the Gândirea Militară Românească Journal*** are awarded. The most valuable conceptual works in the field of military theory and science are awarded a prize. The prizes bear the names of representative personalities who made outstanding contributions to military literature, as follows: *"Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu", "Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu", "Marshal Alexandru Averescu", "Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu"* and *"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu"*.

Also, this year, among the national prizes' winners and nominees there were professors and researchers from the National Defence University "Carol I". We congratulate them, for the acknowledgemnt of their works' scientific value and we hope we will have them again among the winners!

THE 2006 NATIONAL AWARDS OF THE *GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ* JOURNAL THE NINTH EDITION – May 9th, 2007

The prize **"Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu"** *was awarded to* **Ion CÎNDEA**, *for* ***"Războiul şi pacea. Înnoiri conceptuale în relaţiile internaţionale contemporane (War and Peace. Conceptual Innovations in the Contemporary International Relations)"***.

The prize **"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"** *was awarded to* **Colonel Professor Dr. Mircea COSMA**, *for* ***"Cercetarea în ştiinţa militară. O perspectivă istorică şi metodologică (Research in Military Science. A Historical and Methodological Perspective)"***.



The prize **"Marshal Alexandru Averescu"** *was awarded to* **Lieutenant General Professor Dr. Teodor FRUNZETI**, *for* ***"Globalizarea securității (The Globalisation of Security)"***.

The prize **"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu"** *was awarded to* **Colonel Professor Dr. Gheorghe UDEANU**, *for* ***"Elemente de strategie militară contemporană (Elements of Contemporary Military Strategy)"***.

The prize **"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu"** *was awarded to* **Colonel Professor Dr. Traian ANASTASIEI**, *for* ***"Elemente de artă militară. Crestomație (Elements of Military Art. Chrestomathy)"***.

Other nominees for the National Awards *of the Gândirea Militară Românească Journal:*

"Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu" *Prize nominees:* ***"Informațiile militare în contextual de securitate actual (Military Intelligence in the Current Security Context)"*** *coordinated by* **General (r.) Dr. Sergiu T. MEDAR** *and* ***"Jandarmeria – de la peacekeeping la peacebuilding (The Gendarmerie – From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding)"***, *author* **Brigadier General Dr. Olimpiodor ANTONESCU**.

"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu" *Prize nominees:* ***"Istoria militară a lumii ~ campanii, bătălii, lupte, asedii (The World's Military History ~ Campaigns, Battles, Fights, Sieges)"***, *co-authors* **Brigadier General (r.) Dr. Vasile I. MOCANU, Colonel (r.) Dr. Ion EMIL** *and* ***"Spionajul psihotronic şi câmpul de luptă mental (The Psychotronic Espionage and the Mental Battlefield)"***, *author* **Colonel Dr. Emil Străinu**.

"Marshal Alexandru Averescu" *Prize nominees:* ***"Parlamentul şi securitatea națională (The Parliament and the National Security)"***, *author* **Constantin MONAC** *and* ***"Îmbrățișarea Anacondei. Politica militară a României în perioada 1 septembrie 1939 – 22 iunie 1941 (Anaconda's Embrace. Romania's Military Policy between September 1, 1939 and June 22, 1941)"***, *author* **Petre OTU**.

"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu" *Prize nominees:* ***"Tendințe în evoluția teoriei şi practicii războiului (Tendencies in the Evolution of the Theory and Practice of War)"***, *co-authors* **General Professor Dr. Mircea MUREŞAN, Colonel (r.) Professor Dr. Lucian STĂNCILĂ, Lieutenant Colonel Doru ENACHE**, *and* ***"Securitatea militară a României în epoca globalizării (Romania's Military Security in the Age of Globalisation)"***, *author* **Dr. lawyer Ion GHEORGHE**.

"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu" *Prize nominees:* ***"Forțele Navale. Element esențial al puterii maritime în Marea Neagră (The Naval Forces. Essential Element of the Maritime Power in the Black Sea)"***, *co-authors* **Fleet Rear-Admiral (r.) Professor Dr. Marius HANGANU, Captain Professor Niculae VÂLSAN**, *and* ***"Securitatea națională din perspectiva noilor arhitecturi de securitate ale începutului de secol. Incertitudini, realități, perspective (The National Security from the Perspective of the New Security Architectures of the Beginning of this Century. Uncertainties, Realities, Perspectives)"***, *author* **Brigadier General Professor Dr. Gheorghe TOMA**.

The Certificates of Excellence of the Gândirea Militară Românească Journal were bestowed on the former Chiefs of the General Staff for their outstanding contribution paid to the national military construction.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

APRIL-JUNE 2007

The second term of this year was a very dense one. It has started with the scientific session organised by the National Defence University "Carol I", STRATEGIES XXI (April, 12-13) that dealt with the "South-Eastern space in the globalisation context". Split into 12 section, there were more than 850 participants. There were invited personalities from the Romanian Government, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Research and Youth, state secretaries from the Ministry of Education, Research and Youth, and Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, rectors from military and civilian universities, other important figures from the Romanian scientific community.

On this occasion there was also organised a workshop where there were debated the contributions made by the military education and scientific research on integrating the Romanian education and scientific research in the unique European space. Also, within NDU, there was organised an exhibition of military displays, where there were presented 16 companies and factories.

The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies organised the section called "Security and defence". Together with the Romanian personalities, there were guests from Italy, Greece, Poland, Slovakia, therefore, strengthening the good partnership relations established between the Centre and similar institutions from abroad. The papers presented at this event were published in two volumes, and they can be freely accessed from the Centre's web site.

Two researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, within the National Defence University "Carol I", dr. Grigore Alexandrescu and dr. Gheorghe Văduva participated, in April, 22-25, to an international activity organised by the National Defence University from Warsaw, Poland, on terrorism – "Terrorism – as a form of asymmetric activities, strategic asymmetry of two entities (state and terrorist organisation)".

There were also present researchers from Slovakia and Austria, professors and trainees from the National Defence University, Warsaw. The papers presented by the Centre's representatives were very well-received and there were followed by questions and debates on the main aspects of the international terrorism, as a challenge of this new century, the evolution of the war on terror and the main risks and threats.

A traditional event, the CDSSS' seminar focused this year on "ESDP exigencies on Romania's security and defence". It was held on May, 24, and there were leading figures of the Romanian Army, scientific researchers, military and civilian professors, NGOs' representatives. The works that have been presented and the debates are to be published in a bilingual volume.

Professor dr. Jaroslaw GRYZ, from the National Defence University – Warsaw, Poland – visited our Centre, from 22nd to 25th of May. There were held discussions with the Centre's researchers on "The role of the military power on solving out the issues of the 21st century". Also, Mr. Gryz presented a paper during the CDSSS's seminar, on "Challenges in the transatlantic relations in the sphere of security and defence".

On the request of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies from Oslo, Norway, a delegation comprising three researchers, Bjorn INNSET, Michael MAYER, Lene KRISTOFFERSEN, visited the Centre, in June, 4-7. The discussions were focused on certain major issues related with the security environment, especially on the role played by the United States in the actual world. There were made proposals for signing a memorandum of collaboration between our institutions, on participating to the partner's scientific activities, working on common scientific research projects, publishing articles in our publications.

Following the invitation made by the Commandant of the University of Defence from Brno, the Czech Republic, the director of CDSSS, dr. Constantin Moştoflei and two researchers – dr. Petre Duțu and. dr. Alexandra Sarcinschi participated on the international seminar: "Defence and security agenda of the EU", organised in Prague, on June, 13-15, where dr. Alexandra Sarcinschi presented a paper, "ESDP and Romania's security". During the visit, the Centre's delegation had discussions on the future scientific cooperation with the Institute for Strategic Studies within the University of Defence, the Czech Republic, and with representatives of the research and education institutions invited to this event.

*There were published the following titles: "***2006: strategic evaluation", "European Security and Defence Policy: the framework for manifesting and developing the interests related with the national security", "Perspectives in the evolution of the international security organizations", the "The ethnical-religious dimension of security".**

The most important scientific event organised by the Centre this year is the Annual International Scientific Session on "The dynamics of the European security environment", organised in November, 22-23. By accessing http//cssas.unap.ro., there can be obtained details on the participation conditions.

Irina CUCU

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine.

The paper sent to be published should not have been published (print or online) or simultaneously submitted to another publication. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written both in Romanian and other foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, name and have to end with a short curriculum vitae, 60 words maximum, specifying the professional qualification, the institution he comes from and other information considered neccessary, including the e-mail address.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

Our address is: National Defence University "Carol I", the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93, e-mail: cssas@unap.ro, web address: http://cssas.unap.ro, http://impactstrategic.unap.ro

After six years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I" is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column "Strategic Event" that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Romanian Ministry of Defence, General Staff, services' staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state's organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine's quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies, etc.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, Romanian and English, and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.

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