


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68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania
Telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93
E-mail: cssas@unap.ro; Web address: <http://cssas.unap.ro>

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CONTENTS

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

The Middle East, the Near East. Landmarks for a possible solution

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD, Doina FILOTE5

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

Unité et diversité des cultures stratégiques en Europe

Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, PhD.....10

New topics within the Black Sea geopolitics by the end of 2006

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD.....15

NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, AND ACTIONS

Identité nationale et identité européenne

Petre DUȚU, PhD20

The European security environment: coordination, cooperation, competition

Pascu FURNICĂ.....26

EU professional development concept in the field of ESDP. Consequences for the Romanian policemen and gendarmes' education and training

Marius MILITARU, Ion DRAGOMAN, PhD34

The Acquis of Justice and Home Affairs

Victor AELENEI, PhD.....39

Equality of chances in the European Union

Mirela ATANASIU.....41

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Air Power misapplication and its effects at strategic level

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD.....45

Security strategies on the early XXIst century

Sorin MOISE, PhD.....48

The manoeuvrist approach to the Long War

Alin BODESCU56

***ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS******Middle East: peace or confrontation?***

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD.....65

US and National Missile Defence. Perspectives on two decades of debate

Manuela BĂDĂLUȚĂ73

STRATEGIC EVENT***The security impact on Romania's accession to EU***

Vasile POPA.....78

INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY. PEACE AND WAR***On the war's traps***

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD.....81

Crisis and war

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD85

TERRORISM. THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM***Elements of the global war on terrorism***

Gheorghe MINCULETE, PhD, Romică CERNAT91

Suicidal terrorism - a global threat

Ionel STOICA96

Self terrorism

Cristian DELCEA103

CDSSS' AGENDA***The activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, October-December 2006***

Irina CUCU.....105



THE MIDDLE EAST, THE NEAR EAST. LANDMARKS FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD

Doina FILOTE

The world we live in is an interdependent one. Within this dimension of interdependency, the world progressed significantly and technology allowed the achievement of outstanding performances that bring us closer to the type of society we have always hoped for; one of free circulation of information, a powerful, integrated society characterized by knowledge in which man is the supreme being.

Unfortunately, this perspective does not automatically solve the problems of the world, it does not bring the much hoped for peace, and it does not eliminate poverty, injustice, differences in development and conflicts.

In our world that has an ultramodern component, around 45 million people die annually of hunger and malnutrition, while millions of others are forced to leave their homes and seek refuge and suffer because of wars, conflicts and calamities of all kinds.

One of the hottest areas of the world is the Middle East. Unfortunately, this area, hosting a great civilisation and a great culture, it is one of the most tormented. For the time being, almost the whole Middle East is a crisis and conflicts hotbed, a space in which crises and conflicts come one after another. . *Is the Middle East responsible for such a state of things?* The answer is very complex and very complicated. It would be hard to blame the countries themselves for these conflicts. It would be hard, unjust and untrue. In our opinion, the victims of these conflicts can not be held responsible for conflicts with very complex causes, some going back hundreds of years and with numerous implications.

The implications are so numerous, we feel them everywhere, from the huge oil prices, to the *war effect* that continues to surround and frighten the globe.

The conflicts in this area are characterized by a number of factors that make them different from

any others. First of all, the tensions and conflicts within this area have at least two complementary dimensions:

a) *An internal dimension* that consists of a number of unsolved problems, like those that continuously feed the long and open conflict between Palestinians and Israel, in which the Hezbollah militia takes active part, the tensions in the area inhabited by the Kurds, the conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi'as, the uncertainty, the state of belligerence, the problem of water supplies, resources, the way of life specific to this region and not fully understood by the rest of the world, and many others;

b) *An external dimension* consisting mainly in the interest that many countries and centres of power have not only for the energetic resources of the region, but also for the dominance or stabilization of the area. This interest has manifested for centuries and continues to manifest under different forms, including pressures or stratagems, which generate extremely complex effects, ranging from hostility, adversity and intolerance, to a rational, wise and constructive attitude like the one promoted by your country.

These two dimensions are interdependent. After all, the whole world is interdependent, and this characteristic is present both in its harmony and in its conflictuality.

The internal determinations are entirely by realities inherent to this area, while the external ones are built not only on the internal vulnerabilities of this area, but also on the dangers that, directly or indirectly, the Middle East can generate.

A long and intense conflict in the Middle East can anytime generate a large scale conflict that can include other regions and can be transform itself into a disaster.

Of course, a viable solution can only come in time and after great and sustained efforts of the countries of the area and the entire international community.



Realities and significances

The Arabs and the Muslims represent a fourth of the globe's population. The potential of this population is immense and its values of great profoundness. The Arab world has brought remarkable contributions to the development of mathematics, medicine, astronomy and in other domains. In the same time, it has preserved and continues to preserve its values, traditions, customs, faith and respect unchanged. Like other great civilizations – Chinese, Hindu, Asian, European, African -, the Arab civilization (or Islamic, as Huntington calls it), constitutes one of the great pillars of universal civilization. The system of values of this world, beautiful and respectable in its essence, spirit and realities, gives it force, moral resources, dignity and consistency.

The values of the Islamic world are not in contradiction with the ones of other civilizations, but are in perfect harmony. For example, the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Koran are writings which form the basis of the world's faith, promoting harmony, respect, kindness and hope. All the achievements of the Arab world are part of the universal patrimony. The unity of the world is achieved through the diversity of its values, and not through the opposition or conflictuality of its interests. But, if values can be harmonized, interests can also be harmonized through an effort of will, in order to place under control the conflictuality and to properly use its huge potential for partnerships and cooperation.

Everything that has been achieved in the Arab world is based on talent, effort, work, wisdom and faith, and this thing has to be known, understood, admired and, above all, respected.

That is why everything that happens today in this space of great old civilizations seems hard to understand. In our opinion, it is not the people of this region that are responsible for what happens here, but the very complicated transformations and destabilizing effects of the Second World War and of the Cold War, the way in which the great problems with political, economic, strategic and even cultural impact have been analyzed, understood and solved, and the traces left behind by empires, wars, countless disasters and the way in which history has been written, transmitted and understood.

We in Romania understand very well the problems of the Arab world, because along the years

we have had very tight relations with almost all the countries in this area. Many people from these countries studied in Romania, many Romanian firms – especially the ones in the oil drilling and construction fields – worked and still work in countries like Iraq, Iran or Kuwait, and diplomatic relations have always been very good. We have excellent relations with Turkey, within NATO and the regional concept of the Black Sea, with the Arab Republic of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and all the other countries in this area. We also take part in stabilization missions in Afghanistan; we are present with a substantial effort – military, economic, political and diplomatic – in the stabilization of Iraq and in other activities that envisage this region.

Obviously, we are interested to see a stable and prosperous Middle East, because the stability and prosperity of the entire world will depend on the prosperity and stability of this part of the world.

Unfortunately, at the moment, the Middle East is far from being stable and prosperous, and the future – at least the near one – will not bring about, in our opinion, essential changes.

Characteristics

Among the most important characteristics of this area we could include the following:

1. The dimension of the Middle East problematic is very complex, unjust and dangerous. Some of them go a long way back in history, while others are effects of more recent confrontations, but most of them are related to *the very sophisticated, complicated and complex dynamic of current and future interests of all bigger or smaller actors involved under one form or another in the problematic of the area.*

The complexity of these problems consists in their diversity, in the multiple causes which generate or re-generate them on various levels – from frontier ones to oil interests, from the legitimate desire to re-establish political, economic and social relations according to the new stage of development, to the struggle for power and influence -, in the way in which the powerful countries of the world, G8, and especially countries from the European Union, the United States, Russia, Japan and China, United Nations and the Arab League place themselves in the complex dynamic of this region, in its conflictuality, with its roots and effects.



The injustice of the Middle East problematic refers to the fact that the disastrous effects of interest confrontations, of realities with complex causes and even phantoms of history are suffered mainly directly by the inhabitants of this region, by cities thousands of years old, by values of a patrimony in front of which we must all feel respect, humbleness and wisdom.

The danger lies in the possibility to extend the conflict to the entire Middle East area, but even outside it, to Central Asia, to Africa, a continent divided itself by a specific conflictuality, or even to some area on the European continent. The world is more and more interdependent. The network physiognomy and philosophy make it a powerful entity, but also a vulnerable one vibrating at every change.

2. The Middle East is confronted today with all the types of dangers and threats existing in the world, from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to chemical, biologic, radiological and nuclear capabilities, continuing with terrorist ones, up to conflicts generated by political and religious extremism and great economic disparities.

There is already a certain fact: India, Pakistan and Israel have nuclear weapons, while Iran has a nuclear program that creates a big problem. When everybody thought that nuclear arms are under control and the world understood very well their immense threat, and the United States, China Russia, the United Kingdom and France came to manage this domain, North Korea and Iran – countries that president Bush included in the so-called “axis of evil” – develop a nuclear program which is considered to be dangerous. This causes concern, although Iran assures the international community that its nuclear program has only peaceful, energetic purposes. But, Iran disposes of huge reserves of oil and gas which allow a rapid energetic development of the country, without having to elaborate and put into practice a nuclear program in order to obtain electric energy.

In spite all these, in September 2007, the first Iranian nuclear power plant in Buchehr will be inaugurated, following a one billion USD contract signed with Russia in 1995.

The fact that one of the richest countries of the world in oil makes appeal to nuclear technology in order to obtain electric energy seems a paradox. But today’s world is full of paradoxes that have

to be accepted and solved. But this nuclear program complicates things very much. There are, of course, points of view according to which all countries of the world have the right to a nuclear program to obtain energy if that is their desire, but other points of view suggest that such programs create certain starting points for the obtaining of nuclear weapons.

Under these circumstances, assuming that the Iranian nuclear program has as a final objective the obtaining of nuclear weapons, who would feel threatened, if we take into consideration the fact that Iran has never attacked anyone? Such questions exist. But they do not justify nuclear armament in an era in which the world should immediately start nuclear disarmament. But this thing is not possible either.

Of course, any additional nuclear weapon means an additional danger, especially in an area extremely sensitive to geopolitical and geostrategic variations, such as the Middle East. But the solution to such a problem is neither simple, nor at hand. The will of the Arab world and of the international community must be considered. In the end, a viable solution can only be dialogue.

3. The intervention of US led coalition forces in Iraq overthrew the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein and created the premises for the normalization of the situation in this country, but things are a lot more complicated. The highly technological war – the centric network warfare, as we call it – is over, but peace is late because a guerrilla war, a war of attrition began, which generate other problems such as: the conflict between Sunni and Shi’a, the launching of the Jihad, the state of uncertainty in which the population lives, the destruction of the country’s economy, etc.

In our opinion, although the tensions and the network based effects of an acute state of conflict existing in Iraq will continue, and unfortunately maybe they will continue for a long time, there are premises for the normalization of the situation, among which the most important are:

- the desire and will of Iraqi population to put an end to hostile activities;
- the interest of the Arab world to reduce the conflict state, to prevent its development and to normalize the situation in the area;
- the interest of the United States of America and of the European Union to reduce the conflict



in the Middle East and to have normal access to the exceptional energetic resources of this part of the world;

- the interest of the international community to see the values of the Arab world being respected and to ensure the stabilization of the area;

- the interest of the Arab League to solve the grave problems that generate conflicts and to set up a system of normal relations between the countries of the region and the rest of the world;

- the necessity to protect the system of values specific to the unique Arab civilization, value that give strength and consistency to the universal civilization;

- the interest of every country within or outside this area to participate in conflict prevention and in the creation of conditions for its own development.

4. There are numerous points of view according to which *the entire problem in the Middle East resides in the Palestinian issue*. If we analyze the grave events in the Middle East very attentively – the attempts to found the Palestinian state, the application of the Road Map, the attacks of all sorts against the population of Israel, the recent Israeli attack against Hezbollah militia in southern Lebanon with painful consequences for this country – we come to the conclusion that events in this space, even though the most dynamic and inflammatory in the geopolitics of the area, are part of a number of more complex situations with roots, causes, effects and interests, some going back hundreds of years, others of a more recent date.

But there are also a number of encouraging factors: a lasting peace between Israel and Jordan, the negotiations for better border security between Egypt and the Palestinian Authority against illegal weapon trafficking along the “Philadelphia” Line as it is appreciated by Israel, positive evolutions in the process of democratisation of Lebanese society etc.

Besides the Palestinian problem and the hostile attitude of a part of the Arab world toward Israel – some, including the leadership of Iran, do not even pronounce the word “Israel”, but only the “Jewish state” -, there are a lot more problems that generate conflicts: the problem of water, the problems generated by the actions of a number of Kurdish organizations especially in Iraq and Turkey, the

problem of religious fundamentalism, economic discrepancies, adding to the problems of the entire world: global warming, the gap between the rich and the poor, between the North and the South which risk to transform into strategic faults, the development without precedent of terrorism which in our opinion becomes, together with the danger of weapons of mass destruction, the most complex threat to the world peace and security.

All these require a very flexible and elaborated political concept based on detailed knowledge of the situation and its causes and, starting from here, negotiation, partnership and realism.

This political concept has to be put into practice by a multinational strategy, first of all at the level of the Arab League as an entity in diversity and in consonance with the level of NATO, EU, G 8 and other international organizations and organisms under the auspices of UNO. The fact that must be considered is that every country understands very differently the strategic situation, the realities and the events, and it is very difficult to find common attitudes and acceptable ways to solve differences and conflicts. But these ways have to be found because the alternative would be extremely dangerous, and consequently unacceptable.

In our opinion, many concrete solutions to these problems depend on the way in which the attitude of the president of the Palestinian Authority toward Hamas, that of Lebanon toward Hezbollah and that of Israel toward the Road Map conjugate, with the evolution of the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, but also the way in which the realities and the will of the countries in the area harmonize with the attitude of the European Union, the United States, the G 8 and the Arab League toward the general and specific issue of the Middle East. The solutions to these problems, although have to bare the mark of the countries in the region, have a global impact, concerning the entire world.

In conclusion, we think and hope that a major conflict will not take place in the future in the Middle East, but instead a significant development toward reconciliation and a long term solution to these conflicts that have been lasting for so long. But, as the Middle East is one of the areas with the highest level of instability and with the most reduced probability of foreseen events to actually occur, anything is possible. But we hope that the hardest part is over and dialogue will prevail over



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

bloody conflict. The important countries in this area, among which we mention Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, etc., indisputably occupy a significant place and play a significant role in solving this atypical and asymmetrical conflictuality which, in certain conditions, might become extremely dangerous.

Translated by Octavian CHIRIAC

General Professor Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD is the commandant (rector) of National Defence University “Carol I” and has published numerous papers and articles with a multidimensional approach of the present and future conflicts in the Eurasian, Euro-Atlantic and OSCE areas.

Lieutenant-colonel Doina FILOTE is a lecturer in the Logistic, Finance, Accountancy Chair from the Command and Staff Faculty within the National Defence University “Carol I” and a PhD candidate in military sciences.



UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ DES CULTURES STRATÉGIQUES EN EUROPE

Dr. Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE

Ainsi l'Europe s'aventure-t-elle enfin dans le domaine de la défense. Après de multiples tergiversations, les pays de l'Union européenne se sont mis d'accord sur une politique de sécurité commune, prélude à une politique commune de sécurité et de défense. Il existe désormais une volonté politique, qui a engendré une dynamique institutionnelle. Des objectifs ont été fixés, une structure européenne de défense commence à se dessiner, certes très laborieusement et en prenant grand soin de ne pas vouloir concurrencer l'OTAN, mais enfin un tabou a été levé: l'Europe semble sur le point de se doter de la capacité militaire qui lui faisait jusqu'alors défaut et l'empêchait de s'affirmer sur la scène internationale en tant qu'acteur à part entière. „Avec le militaire vous ne pouvez pas tout faire, mais sans le militaire vous ne pouvez rien faire”. (Raymond Aron).

Savoir s'il sera possible de s'affranchir de tous les obstacles est encore prématuré. On se heurte ici au problème central qui ne peut plus être éludé: la défense est, plus encore que la monnaie, l'attribut suprême de la souveraineté, ultima ratio regum. L'Europe de la défense n'existera vraiment que le jour où l'Europe sera pleinement une entité politique, quelle que soit sa forme juridique. Force est de constater que nous en sommes encore loin, que les États n'entendent pas abdiquer leur compétences en la matière et que l'Union européenne semble dès lors condamnée à continuer, pendant un temps encore indéterminé, la politique des petits pas.

Jusqu'à présent, c'est une conception matérielle qui a prévalu, avec la recherche de capacités. Les différents sommets qui se sont succédé, depuis celui de Saint-Malo qui a donné l'impulsion décisive, ont défini des niveaux de force qui doivent permettre, dès 2003, de projeter 60 000 hommes avec tous les moyens nécessaires: navals, aériens, bientôt spatiaux. Le problème est cependant de savoir si l'addition de forces nationales va déboucher sur une puissance militaire européenne. Certes, le fait que la quasi-totalité des membres de

l'Union européenne appartiennent aussi à l'OTAN a favorisé, depuis longtemps, le travail en commun, l'homogénéisation des procédures et permis une interopérabilité, certes à parfaire, mais déjà réelle. Il n'empêche que les différences de perception entre les diverses composantes de cette puissance européenne en gestation restent considérables et que, là non plus, on ne pourra indéfiniment faire l'économie d'une réflexion sur l'autre volet, culturel celui-là, de la constitution d'une Europe de la défense. Dans l'Europe en voie d'unification, on discerne mal (c'est un euphémisme) le concept qui permettrait de fédérer les volontés et les moyens dans le domaine de la défense: les conceptions de la sécurité (globale ou militaire) et des rapports avec l'empire américain sont si variées, et souvent antagonistes, qu'on a du mal à concevoir un concept stratégique européen autrement qu'en trompe-l'oeil. Problème politique sans aucun doute, mais qui ne se réduit pas à un simple divergences d'intérêts ou d'évaluation.

L'approche culturaliste

Les théoriciens ont beaucoup travaillé, depuis une vingtaine d'années, sur cette dimension de la stratégie et de la tactique¹ au point que l'approche culturaliste est devenue, en deux ou trois décennies², l'une des voies les plus prometteuses (quoique finalement peu pratiquée) des études de défense. L'idée centrale est simple: il y a des caractères nationaux, ou, au moins „certains modèles de comportement découlant du conditionnement culturel”³ qui s'expriment notamment par la communication non verbale, magistralement analysée par Edward Hall⁴. Même des pays géographiquement proches peuvent être actuellement très éloignés. C'est ce qui arrive avec les Français, qui auraient une conception du temps polychrone („on mène plusieurs tâches de front”) et les Allemands, dont le temps serait monochrome („on se consacre totalement et exclusivement à la tâche entreprise”). Ces conditionnements culturels, inhérents à la nature humaine⁵, aboutissent à de véritables cultures



stratégiques qui se transmettent de manière diffuse, par imprégnation (mémoire héroïque, légendaire, rites initiatiques ...) plus que par enseignement didactique, et qui modèlent en profondeur les perceptions des décideurs politiques et des acteurs militaires, à tous les niveaux. Les principes stratégiques et tactiques, règles universelles, objectivement valables, se heurtent à des croyances subjectives, à des valeurs, qui en font une interprétation spécifique, voire parfois les récuse (négarion de tous les principes de concentration, de surprise, de sûreté, de liaison des armes ... par l'éthique chevaleresque). L'art de la guerre ne peut être le même en Europe et en Chine dès lors que le modèle du stratège européen est celui du grand conquérant, alors que dans la Chine classique, la guerre est un désordre auquel il convient de mettre fin, le stratège idéal étant un homme vertueux dont le souci est de restaurer l'ordre et l'harmonie. Bien entendu, ces particularismes sont particulièrement perceptibles lorsque les différences culturelles sont très fortes. Les recherches les plus remarquées ont mis en évidence la spécificité irréductible de la culture stratégique chinoise ou japonaise par rapport aux cultures stratégiques occidentales. Dans le cas de pays ayant une proximité géographique, les différences sont évidemment beaucoup moins marquées et donc attirent peu l'attention. Elles n'en existent pas moins et c'est l'une des tâches de la théorie que d'en cerner les contours, l'influence, mais aussi les limites.

Travail tout just esquissé. Les historiens n'aiment guère s'élever à des vues généralisantes, par crainte de tomber sous le coup de l'accusation infamante de sociologisme. En sens inverse, les sociologues ont trop souvent tendance à identifier des traits généraux qui font bon marché des contingences historiques et de la diversité des doctrines. La culture stratégique existe, elle oriente souvent, elle détermine rarement. La culture stratégique française s'est accommodée aussi bien de l'idéologie de l'offensive à outrance avant 1914 que de la défensive statique et linéaire après 1918 et il serait bien difficile d'identifier une unité de vues entre les chefs, ne serait-ce que d'une même époque. Tout oppose le style de Turenne à celui de Condé, celui de Pétain à celui de Foch ... Néanmoins, Bruno Colson a pu dessiner, de manière suggestive et convaincante, les lignes générales d'une culture stratégique française qu'il retrouve de manière sinon constante (il y a toujours des cas aberrants), du

moins régulière depuis l'époque moderne jusqu'à nos jours⁶.

Le pluralisme culturel des européens

Il y a tout un chantier à ouvrir en vue de la construction d'une véritable culture stratégique européenne. Même si les analystes modernes n'adhèrent plus au modèle simplificateur de la *British Way of Warfare* de Liddell Hart, nul ne peut nier l'existence d'un style de guerre britannique très différent du style de guerre français. Les soldats britanniques ont souvent été présents dans les batailles continentales (à Malplaquet, à Dettingen, à Waterloo, à Sébastopol ...), mais les stratèges d'outre-Manche ont généralement cherché à agir sur les marges (la stratégie périphérique) et par alliés interposés, alors que les Français, contraints par la géographie, poussés aussi par leur impulsivité, ont généralement privilégié l'affrontement direct, avec recherche de la bataille décisive (le modèle napoléonien). Ces différences se retrouvent au niveau d'exécution que l'on appelle aujourd'hui opératif: au-delà de multiples variantes, le styles français privilégie la manoeuvre, alors que l'allemand recherche d'abord la puissance de choc ou de feu. La doctrine allemande a toujours manifesté un intérêt pour les troupes légères et la guerre irrégulière (souvenir du Landsturm de 1813) que la doctrine française a rejetées après les douloureuses expériences de la Révolution (en Vendée) et de l'Empire (en Espagne et en Russie). On pourra toujours invoquer des contre-exemples, mais la tendance globale est assez nette.

Certes, il en est de la culture comme de la géographie: on peut soutenir qu'il s'agit de facteurs déclinants face à l'omnipotence du facteur matériel et de la technique. L'uniformisation technique est un fait avéré, encore renforcée dans le cas européen par l'appartenance depuis cinq décennies à une alliance qui a constamment cherché une standardisation matérielle et doctrinale. Cependant, la permanence des stéréotypes culturels reste très forte et il n'est pas sûr que l'appartenance à l'OTAN ait radicalement transformé les esprits. Après tout, l'alliance n'a que cinquante ans, temps trop court pour transformer complètement des cultures stratégiques et tactiques modelées par des siècles d'affrontements: France contre Angleterre, France contre Allemagne, mais aussi Portugal contre Espagne, Italie contre Autriche,



Danemark contre Allemagne, Grèce contre Turquie. L'histoire laborieuse des structures militaires de l'OTAN, qui commence à être écrite, révèle combien les rivalités entre „alliés”, peuvent rester vivaces: il a vraiment fallu la menace soviétique et l'hégémonie américaine pour en contraindre certains à travailler ensemble et encore, évite-t-on soigneusement certains face-à-face trop délicats...

Europe du Nord contre Europe du Sud?

La grande ligne de fracture opposerait les cultures stratégiques „managériales”, comme la britannique et l'allemande, aux cultures stratégiques „guerrières”, comme la française ou l'italienne. Les premières accordent beaucoup d'importance à la préparation des foces, à la planification et à la mise sur pied d'une chaîne logistique solide, l'engagement ne venant que lorsque toutes ces conditions sont réunies. Les deuxièmes s'en remettent davantage au panache et à l'improvisation, sinon au bricolage, pour pallier les retards ou les lacunes dans la préparation. Contrairement à ce qu'a affirmé un ministre de la Guerre avant le déclenchement de la guerre de 1870, la France est toujours partie en guerre avec un bouton de guêtre manquant et les événements récents ne suggèrent pas une transformation notable de ce point de vue, qu'il s'agisse de la guerre du Golfe, pour laquelle il a fallu constituer un corps expéditionnaire en „deshabillant” plus de 50 régiments, ou de la récente intervention en Afghanistan, pour laquelle la montée en puissance (si l'on peut parler ainsi) a été particulièrement lente et laborieuse. La planification à l'allemande ou à la britannique n'est pas encore entrée dans les moeurs des armées françaises. De même, les Allemands, traumatisés par le souvenir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et s'inspirant du modèle américain, sont-ils dorénavant très attentifs à minimiser les pertes, alors que les Français n'ont pas entièrement renoncé au „panache”. Certes, les Saint-Cyriens ne vont plus au feu en casoar et gants blancs, mais le bilan très lourd de l'attentat du Drakkar au Liban n'a provoqué ni crise politique, ni vrais remous dans l'opinion. La contrainte politique et méditative est beaucoup moins forte en France qu'en Allemagne ou en Grande-Bretagne, ce qui procure au gouvernement une certaine liberté d'action, dont il use avec plus ou moins de discernement. Cette différence de mentalité entraîne une différence d'organisa-

tion: le modèle français reste plus hiérarchique, moins „démocratique” que le modèle allemand de l'*Innere Führung*, qui tend à réduire la spécificité militaire⁷: le soldat est censé n'être qu'un fonctionnaire en uniforme, soucieux de ses droits et qui ne se réfère plus à un passé héroïque désormais condamné (le gouvernement social-démocrate a même entrepris de débaptiser les casernes) dans sa globalité: on rejette non seulement le nazisme, mais bien tout le militarisme prussien.

En revanche, les Français, une fois sur place, sont réputés pour leur débrouillardise, pour leur capacité à établir une relation avec les populations. L'héritage de près de cent cinquante ans de conflits coloniaux, dans lesquels les armées françaises ont acquis une expérience à peu près unique (avec celle de Grande-Bretagne) et globalement positive (militairement parlant), n'est pas perdu. Cette adaptation à l'environnement local s'est encore vérifiée dans les opérations en Yougoslavie, au Liban, et même en Afghanistan, alors que d'autres contingents européens opéraient beaucoup plus repliés sur eux-mêmes, en réduisant les contacts locaux au minimum exigé par la mission. La différence est nette entre les pays latins, plus portés à rechercher l'intégrations, et les pays protestants d'Europe du Nord, qui observent toujours une certaine réserve.

Ainsi donc, l'on voit resurgir pour notre domaine la grande opposition entre l'Europe du Nord et l'Europe du Sud. Bien entendu, il faudrait introduire de multiples tempéraments ou corrections. Ce serait une erreur que des concevoir tant l'Europe du Nord que celle du Sud comme de blocs homogènes qui se définiraient l'un par rapport à l'autre, ou en opposition à l'autre. Au contraire, l'histoire nous enseigne que les conflits, les rivalités ont été également vifs à l'intérieur des deux grandes régions de l'Europe. Aujourd'hui encore, la simple observation suggère des différences profondes entre Français et Italiens, entre Britanniques et Allemands ... Il n'y aura pas de soldats européens tant qu'il n'y aura pas d'Européens tout court et l'on sait parfaitement que l'idée d'un citoyen européen débarrassé de ses idiosyncrasies nationales est une pure chimère.

Au reste, cela est-il tellement important? Cette diversité rend les choses plus difficiles, mais pas impossibles. L'Europe économique s'est construite patiemment, au point d'aboutir à la construction impressionnante, en dépit de ses insuffisances, que nous connaissons aujourd'hui. L'Europe politique



et militaire aura une gestation probablement encore plus longue et laborieuse, mais rien ne permet d'affirmer qu'elle est irrémédiablement vouée à l'échec.

Europe contre États-Unis?

Le problème, une fois de plus, est politique. L'Europe veut-elle s'affirmer sur la scène mondiale comme une puissance indépendante ou accepte-t-elle de rester à la remorque des États-Unis, dans un rôle de brillant second, avec cette conception exprimée autrefois par Kissinger: les États-Unis ont des responsabilités mondiales alors que les Européens n'auraient que des responsabilités régionales? On retrouve le critère fondamental du politique exprimé par Carl Schmitt: l'acte politique fondateur c'est la désignation de l'adversaire. Les pays européens se considèreront-ils toujours comme rivaux et essaieront-ils de jouer de l'appui américain contre leurs voisins ou parviendront-ils à prendre leurs distances par rapport à une puissance impériale quelque peu encombrante?

L'avenir de l'Europe se joue sur la réponse à cette question centrale et le facteur culturel joue, ici aussi, un rôle important. La diversité des cultures stratégiques européennes n'exclut pas pour autant une certaine unité, au moins par rapport à la culture stratégique américaine. La tendance fondamentale de l'évolution est à un nivellement des cultures stratégiques du fait de la technique. Aujourd'hui, du fait précisément des progrès de la construction européenne, du fait aussi de la disparition de l'Union soviétique, la protection cède le pas à la projection. On s'oriente presque partout vers un modèle d'armée composée de professionnels, calqué sur celui qu'avaient adopté les États-Unis à la fin des années 1970 avec l'All Volunteers Force.

Mais, cet alignement sur le modèle américain ne se traduit pas par une mise à niveau. Au contraire, le fossé aurait quelque peu tendance à s'accroître, au moins dans les domaines de pointe, du fait de la disproportion entre le budget de la défense américain et les budgets de défense européens. Les Européens dépensent moins pour leur dépenses et gaspillent plus, du fait de la démultiplication des programmes nationaux. Conséquence logique, États-Unis et Europe tendent à ne plus jouer dans le même cour. La récente guerre d'Afghanistan a d'ailleurs confirmé, après la guerre du Kosovo, la

volonté de plus en plus affirmée des États-Unis de ne plus s'encombrer de consultations avec des alliés souvent réticents politiquement, et de moins de moins fiables techniquement. Par la force des choses, les Européens pourraient donc être conduits à constater qu'aucun d'entre eux ne pèse de manière décisive aux yeux des stratèges de Washington. Le conclusion peut alors être le renoncement ou un alignement encore plus poussé l'espoir de conserver le rôle de brillant second. Mais, à l'inverse, les Européens peuvent être tentés de prendre en main la conduite de leur stratégie au lieu de s'en remettre aux États-Unis.

Même une volonté politique affirmée, dont on a encore beaucoup de mal à discerner les prémices, ne parviendra pas à combler le fossé qui nous sépare des États-Unis. La rationalisation des efforts de défense européens serait, en tout état de cause, une entreprise de longue haleine. C'est là, précisément, que l'approche culturaliste pourrait se révéler utile, en incitant les Européens à ne pas se focaliser sur les seuls aspects matériels mais à privilégier la dimension culturelle.

C'est un chercheur italien, Virgilio Ilari, qui a récemment appelé l'attention sur ce point. Sur la base de quelques travaux récents, il a cru discerner l'ébauche d'un modèle humaniste européen qui'il oppose au modèle matérialiste américain. Il y a là une piste qui pourrait être approfondie. Aujourd'hui, les Européens souffrent du "syndrome de Polybe" (Lucien Poirier), c'est-à-dire de la tendance à copier en tout la puissance impériale, surtout dans les doctrines. Il suffit de voir la récente fortune du niveau opératif, théorisé depuis près d'un siècle par les penseurs allemands ou soviétiques, mais qui n'a connu une vogue universelle que lorsque les États-Unis l'ont repris à leur compte au début des années 1990. Le patrimoine stratégique européen est suffisamment riche pour que nous n'ayons pas besoin de copier un modèle venu d'outre-Atlantique.

La richesse de la pensée européenne pourrait être mise à profit pour élaborer un appareil théorique, puis doctrinal, qui pourrait être mis en balance avec celui des États-Unis. L'idée d'un Livre blanc européen de la Défense est peut-être prématurée. Mais la réflexion de fond sur la stratégie fondamentale permettrait d'esquisser un langage commun, d'identifier des paradigmes ou des principes autour desquels une doctrine européenne cohérente et crédible pourrait ultérieurement être architectu-



rée. On aboutirait ainsi au modèle humaniste rêvé par Virgilio Ilari: "HMA vs RMA", l'histoire militaire ancienne contre la révolution dans les affaires militaires.

Un tel propos fera certainement sourire les tenants de l'approche technicienne aujourd'hui triomphante. En quoi Thucydide ou Guibert peuvent-ils nous être d'un grand secours face à l'omnipotence américaine dans le domaine des armes de précision ou dans celui de l'observation et des communications spatiales?

Il ne s'agit pas de nier l'importance décisive de la dimension technicienne aujourd'hui. Celui qui dispose de la supériorité technique peut désormais frapper à grande distance et presque à coup sûr, au point d'en arriver, comme l'a bien relevé le général Poirier, à la négation de la stratégie, c'est-à-dire de la dialectique des volontés: le plus faible est condamné à encaisser les coups sans pouvoir les rendre, il n'y a plus d'incertitude stratégique. C'est l'axiome de base des partisans de la RMA, qui ont peut-être raison sur un plan strictement militaire mais qui oublient que la stratégie est dualiste: militaire mais aussi politique. La domination technicienne des États-Unis ne leur a pas permis de résoudre instantanément le problème posé par l'organisation terroriste Al Qaida. Et l'on se souvient de quelques échecs humiliants, à Haïti ou en Somalie. Le savoir-faire opérationnel compte plus que l'accumulation des moyens dans les conflits asymétrique qui tendent à devenir la norme. Un modèle stratégique européen aurait ici sa place. Nous ne pourrions pas faire tout ce que font les États-Unis, mais nous aurions tout de même une liberté d'action infiniment plus grande que le résidu dont nous pouvons nous prévaloir aujourd'hui.

Encore une fois, c'est un problème de volonté et de lucidité politiques. Il faut doter l'Europe militaire des moyens dont elle a besoin pour tenir son rang et répondre aux attentes du pouvoir politique. Mais les moyens en eux-mêmes n'acquiescent leur pleine signification que lorsqu'ils s'incrustent dans une architecture doctrinale cohérente. L'exigence intellectuelle reste toujours aussi forte. La diversité des cultures stratégiques européennes, trop souvent perçue comme un obstacle, ne doit pas empêcher l'élaboration d'un concept stratégique unifié.

NOTES:

¹ Survol dans Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, **Traité de stratégie**, Paris, ISC-Économica, 3^e éd., 2002.

² Le point de départ est l'ouvrage, devenu classique, de Russel WEIGLEY, **The American Way of War**, 1973.

³ Edward T. HALL et Milred REED HALL, **Guide du comportement dans les affaires internationales**, Paris, Seuil, 1990, p.11.

⁴ Il faut lire ses livres, notamment **La dimension cachée**, 1971; **Au-delà de la culture**, 1979; **Le langage silencieux**, 1984. Anthropologue américain, Edward T. Hall a fondé la proxémie, science de la perception de l'espace et du temps.

⁵ Cf. les superbes travaux d'Irenäus EIBL-EIBESFELDT, **Guerre et paix dans l'homme**, 1975; **Par-delà nos différences**, 1980. Disciple de Konrad Lorenz, Eibl-Eibesfeldt a réussi une alliance rigoureuse de l'éthologie et de l'ethnologie.

⁶ Bruno Colson, **La culture stratégique française**, *Stratégique*, 53, 1992-1.

⁷ C'était du moins l'idée de ses promoteurs. Le mise en oeuvre a abouti à des résultats plus modestes.

*Auteur des ouvrages importantes en traitant la théorie de la stratégie, notamment **Traité de stratégie et Bréviaire stratégique**, directeur de la revue **Stratégique**, Hervé COUTAU-BEGARIE est directeur du cycle de stratégie au Collège Interarmées de Défense – Paris, directeur d'études à l'École Pratique des Hautes Études et président de l'Institut de Stratégie Comparée et de la Commission française d'histoire militaire. Le professeur Hervé COUTAU-BEGARIE est docteur en science politique et membre correspondant de l'Académie royale des sciences navales de Suède.*



NEW TOPICS WITHIN THE BLACK SEA GEOPOLITICS BY THE END OF 2006

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD

Next year will bring, together with Romania and Bulgaria's accession to EU, the Eastern border of the community space to the Black Sea Shores. The event could not be overlooked either by the European Union or the neighbouring countries. The interferences between the European policy and the riparian countries' policies have become to reverberate in the Black Sea geopolitics. Their accents have become more and more acute around the NATO Summit that is to be held this November. That will be the moment when states from this region will try to do their best, hoping they will be accepted as potential candidates.

Today, nothing denies the fact registered in Universal History that the Black Sea has been, for centuries, a bridge and a frontier, and also a buffer and a transfer zone. Well-known routes, "from Varangians to Greeks", through Ponto-Baltic isthmus, then later, the "Silk Road" that was the vital centre of a large network used for exchange of knowledge, information and goods between East Asia, Middle East and Centre of Europe, for 2000 years, and nowadays, the "Caspian Oil Route", conferred this area the status of a region with significant weight in political, economical and military Euro-Asian equilibrium.

After the Cold War, the list of necessary arguments for sustaining this assertion was updated and diversified. This requires that the specialized literature searches a redefinition of the working concepts in order to respond to the new realities existing in the area and the relations between the Black Sea region and the rest of the world.

The last 16 years represented the reversal of equilibriums and the unpredictable evolutions of the regional security environment on the background of its stressed fluidity. Although the beligerent potential of zone has "frozen", the possibilities to contaminate the neighbourhood areas are still significant.

To the big picture of the region there were added new touches represented by the access to the resources. Clashes of interests appeared in the last period of time, based on the gas and crude oil prices and their directions of transport. Black Sea is or was the compulsory way to transit the Caspian gas and crude oil to the big economies from the Western Europe. The release of the anti-terrorist offensive carried on by the international coalition and the use of this region in logistical purpose raise it as one of the main priorities of the international security agenda.

However, the security issues haven't been sufficiently clarified yet, the region continues to be attractive. But this is seen in different ways by the interested ones. One group is constituted by riparian states that, excepting Russia, are countries called "local powers". The regional actors are directly interested in achieving and maintaining area's security and stability as a *sine qua non* condition of its durable development. This situation is proved by the diversity of cooperation mechanisms among Black Sea Basin states.

In the framework of European institutions' transformation principles – "opening, transparency, and participation" - those states try to build up an economic and security system that is suitable to their needs. This system completes the overall European construct. The new institutional structures and mechanisms design and put into practice decisions that encourage the development of mutual interest fields such as: agriculture; transport; security; fight against terrorism, organized crime, weapons, drugs, and human beings trafficking. The creation of such mechanisms' development strategies takes into account the "roadmaps" elaborated by the international institutions and seeks concordance with great powers' interests.

The *Russian Federation*, as a riparian state and a great power, acts toward consolidation of its regional military and economic status.



It uses political, economic, and military opportunities that can be dissipated from Black Sea Basin to other areas of interest. Thus, in the beginning of 2006, it paid more attention to the economical aspects, generating the so-called "natural gas crisis". In autumn, after solving out the economical objectives, it started to consolidate them by stressing the speech about the new Russian power. The Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence underlines that "only Russia and Turkey, owners of modern ships, are trustworthy in building the security within Black Sea basin"¹.

Above all, the trophy targeted by Russia is not the Black Sea Basin, but the European economy, that is incremental and needs both Russian gas and oil and the Russian huge market and investments opportunities. When the European Union started its European Neighbourhood Policy, Russia chose not to join it, because it aspires to be an "equal partner" of EU. Consequently, Russia and EU agreed to create four Common Spaces for cooperation in different spheres. Among other things, there was created an open and integrated market between EU and Russia. For consolidating its positions in the outposts of this market, the Russian Federation is under way to elaborate a "natural gas pact" with EU. It is a step ahead of starting the negotiations for a new agreement for cooperation and partnership between EU and Russia, as the agreement in place expires in 2007.

It considers that the economical problems in Black Sea are solved. The Russian companies have already created a strategic ring around this region through Russia's energetic control. The future pipelines to EU will avoid the area and pass over the Northern Sea. It is possible to re-examine this option, due to the fact that during the next decade the oil might not be an energetic resource and the sense of "vulnerable frontier", developed by Russians, is a crucial factor in strengthening their positions within the Black Sea.

The past politics influence spheres still have advocates at Kremlin. The frequent conflicts, larger or smaller, with former states that are sovereign states today, affect security and stability in the Black Sea region and not only. The crisis between Russia and Georgia, broken out when Georgia arrested four Russian army officers, accused them of spying, escalated very much. The tensioned relations between Moscow and Tbilisi are again inflamed.

Moving out the NATO's and EU's border to the west shores of Pontus Euxinus creates the interferences, especially in the region's North and East geopolitics. On the one hand, the states taken out of the communist Moscow, understand there is an opportunity for achieving the national thrive, on the other hand Russia feels more and more alone and threatened. In November, at Riga, there will take place the NATO summit and there will be analyzed the list with potential new candidates for admission. Theoretically, Ukraine and Georgia may be marked on this list, passing from the potential candidate to the official one. In order to receive the invitation, one of the most important conditions of success is solving out the internal and external disputes. Or, this is not possible, especially for Georgia, without Russia's assistance.

Thus, Russia continues to be an indispensable partner in the area, due to its civilization and present influence in solving area's frozen conflicts and those ones from the Middle East that are influence directly the Black Sea's stability and security.

Turkey has passed over a difficult time. There have been earthquakes and terrorist attacks. Despite of them, in the last period, Ankara has intensified its actions for energetic resources. The approval of the plans for placing an electro-nuclear plant, growing finances for prospecting the detection of the hydrocarbon deposit at the Black Sea. As a unique owner of the gate's key by the entrance in the Black Sea, it is one of the most important partners in insuring the basin's security. Turkey assumed this role generating credible security initiatives, or involving itself in political, economical, military, etc. arrangements, aiming the area.

Turkey's long-expectation of joining EU is moderate by the communitarian aquis. Turkey has already started membership talks. Annalists assess that Turkey is unlikely to be ready to join before 2011.

Ukraine is on the ascendant trend of settlement the differences with the neighbouring countries. In spite of this, Ukraine must wait for the accession in NATO. The huge Russian military basis from Crimea and the international lodger status given to the Russian fleet based there, till to next decade, reduce the value of Ukrainian integration trumps.

This fact was understood by Kiev. For renouncing to the Euro-Atlantic dream, the Ukrainian Prime Minister showed the bill to Russia: until



2010, the natural gas price from Russia must "be better than all others"². Probably, it prepares for the next period of enlargement; in the next two years it wants to allocate 800 million US dollars for exploiting the hydrocarbon deposits from the Black Sea³. Ukraine wants to eliminate the economical determinations of its national prerogatives, in this way.

Georgia is still milling by the conflicts, in spite of president Shevardnadze's institutional and economical reforms. War frozen theatres and foreign military presence on its territory complicate more its situation.

Georgia wants to join the big Euro-Atlantic family. But, one of the most important conditions of its success is a solution to frozen conflicts and to establish an efficient control on its territory.

"The Russian spies" conflict, instead of bringing Georgia closer to NATO, it fades it away. Russians have temporarily suspended a troops' pull-out from Batumi base – on the Black Sea shore and in Akhalkalaki, in the South, near the Armenian border⁴. Moreover, Russia is under way to set up two mountain motorized brigades, placed at the Georgian borders⁵.

Romania and Bulgaria, starting January, 1st, 2007, become full EU members. The accession of the two Black Sea states completes the "big bang" expansion of EU, which began in 2004, with eight Central and East European countries. From 2007, EU supports East borders on the Black Sea and *volens nolens* must be implicate more actively in solving out the problems the region confronts with.

The communitarian states' opinions are divided about this new challenge. Thus, France worries that the last expansions diluted the original essence of a Western club of wealthy countries. Other founding members fear that the EU has grown too big, too fast. For the United Kingdom, the predicted migration of workers is a reason to worry. Germany is about to take over the EU presidency. It wants "a new East-policy for EU" which is outlined in "Policy vicinity plus"⁶. Annalists' prognosis state that Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia may have to wait many years before the "symptoms of enlargement" in EU arise again⁷.

If the reserves of old EU states about the newcomers consist of extending the responsibilities in the EU space, then Romania is a gain bet. Knowing very well the problems of the new included

Black Sea area confronts with, and Bucharest's involvement in giving a solution is recognized by the world's big offices⁸.

The Republic of Moldavia represents both a poorest country of Europe and one with a security grave affected by the frozen conflict. Joining NATO and EU is for Chisinau the only solution for getting over this situation. Together with reaching the EU border on the Prut River, the Europeans worry about the trans-border threat generated by the "black hole" of Black Sea security, named Transdniester.

NATO made its first conclusive steps in the Black Sea region when it launched the Partnership for Peace Program. All the states from the area subscribed the adhesion statements. This changed the traditional Western perception about the area and has changed the climate.

Now, the Alliance is interested in establishing a stable security system at the Black Sea – which becomes one of its borders –, although the Alliance didn't identify a precise role for itself in the region.

However, lately, NATO began to focus on the region because of its capacity to provide force projection facilities, towards the Afghan theatre of operations, where it conducts the stabilization and post-conflict operations. The area is a turntable between Western Europe, the ex-sovietic space, Middle East and Central Asia. A new accession wave, by the possible admission of the new states resulted from the USSR dissolution, might lead to a direct contact with Russia, this time on the Eastern Black Sea shore.

The European Union continues the enlargement process, laying out its strategies and forces needed to manage the continent security beyond the Union's borders. Its need for energetic resources, in order to sustain its economic development, brings the Union closer to the oil and gas sources from the East of Black Sea. Thus, the Black Sea region is important for EU energy security, especially due to its increasing role as a transit energy zone from the Caspian Sea. Although it is sustained the idea that there is no EU strategy for the Black Sea region, the last period marked some macro-directions actions: strategic partnership with Russia, the European Neighbourhood Policy with Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus states, the enlargement with Romania and Bulgaria and starting the accession talks with Turkey.



In order to avoid the chaotic increase of energy price and the frequent breaks of Russia's deliveries, it is expected to be issued a common European energetic security strategy. This common strategy should be founded on the direct access to the Caspian oil and gas and a European control on energetic transport routes.

Today, in the middle of globalization process, we can not analyze the geopolitics of Black Sea without fully understanding at least the influences of the main international actors in the area.

Thus, *the USA* has discovered this region lately and the economic opportunities have brought here a large number of American companies. The logistical requirements of the war against terrorism have led to an increased American military presence in the Black Sea region and in the former Soviet Union space. Actually, the Pentagon considers this region has a strategic importance on fighting against terrorism.

Washington is, in fact, very active in Black Sea region: in the last years a number of American specialists have worked with various people from the region's countries, in order to understand occidental values and facilitate their future admission into NATO. The success of their actions is based on the fact that the native people perceive NATO as a guarantee for developing and welfare rather than a military one. There was a time when no other alternative looked attractive.

The economic factor is the main element which determines the growing of American presence around the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The capital investments are massive, therefore, the expectations are huge. Probably, the US will include Eurasian energy strategy in its transatlantic dialogue. In this background, the development of the East-West energy corridor from Central Asia to Europe determines to consider the Black Sea region the core of this corridor.

Breaking the Russian energetic monopoly and getting close to the American military bases could affect the region's stability. Strengthening the strategic partnership between Russia and USA, on one hand, and between NATO and Russia on the other hand is only one solution for ensuring the security in the area. Meantime, the Black Sea Basin is a confluence and a fault area, between the European and Asian continents.

From this perspective, *China* is a big, major power, stable, meantime interested in the major

regions of the world, with focus on the Eurasia confluence area.

For a long time, there was a battle in this area between migratory and sedentary populations, just as in the Northern and Western parts of Chinese territory. Regarding this issues, this two world regions – the Chinese one and the one of the Black Sea – have many similitude.

Volens, nolens, because of the geopolitical similarities, there are geopolitical affinities. These two regions have always been in good relations. We mention that the Silk Road was lying through the Black Sea region, linking Chinese territories with the Middle East and the European ones.

China ought to be interested in the Black Sea region to be a stable and prosperous one because is directly linked to the Eurasian stability, a very important issue. This great country of wisdom clearly understands that Black Sea region represents one of the Eurasian space's stability pillars.

China has always supported the Black Sea area stability. Obviously, besides the geopolitical argument – very important for China, which is one of the major powers, with responsibilities in the UN Security Council – there are the political and economic arguments. The Black Sea region is part of the energetic corridor, and China is a major energetic resources consumer. These resources are located in Central Asia, Caspian Sea, Siberia and Far East and in order to efficiently benefit from them, the proximity areas must be stable and safe.

The Black Sea area is an excellent commercial partner for China. Not only for the fact that such a relationship is a traditional one, but because it actually leads to strengthening the Eurasian space. It is an add-on to the actual strategic partnership with Russia, and a linking bridge for the three major economical and geographical entities – China, Russia and the European Union.

Moreover, the Black Sea region is a junction point between Asia and Europe, and we know that China has also a strategic partnership with EU. Central Asia stabilization process and stability of the Black Sea area may facilitate a direct, continental relationship between China and EU states, and this will be important for the entire Eurasian space. At least in this period of time the Black Sea's geopolitics is more dynamic and there is trend hard to establish.

Obviously, it is not necessary to emphasize the necessity of a periodical analysis of fight for power



equation in the Black Sea region. Similar with Romania, all the people we share our zone with are concerned about understanding the real interests of riparian states and that act within this region. This activity is beneficial both to identify emerging opportunities and the risks that result from there. Without their profound analysis, there can not be issued efficient development strategies.

NOTES:

¹http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id_issue=11592509

²<http://www.rusialazi.ro/print.php?a=externe2006092907.xml>

<http://www.rusialazi.ro/print.php?a=externe2006092907.xml>

³ Oleksandra IVANOVA, *No money, no sea shelf*, *Ukraynskaia Pravda*, September, 25, 2006.

⁴ *Russia suspends Georgia troop pull-out after row*, *Kalaleej Times*, September, 30, 2006.

⁵ <http://www.rusialazi.ro/print.php?a=externe2006092201.xml>

⁶ <http://www.rusialazi.ro/print.php?a=externe20060080904.xml>

⁷ George PARKER, *Door swings shut behind new boys as EU's welcome is exhausted*, *Financial Times*, September, 28, 2006.

⁸ See <http://www.Whitehouse.gov/news/release/2006/07/20060727-5.html> and the French President statement, Jacques Chirac, at the opening of Francophonie Sommet, Bucharest, September, 29, 2006.

Col. (ret.) Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD, is the Chief of the Studies and Research Department from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University "Carol I". He is the author or co-author of over 30 monographs, studies, and specialty papers. He published over 120 articles in prestigious strategy, security and military history magazines from our country and abroad.

He graduated a number of courses organized by Euro-Atlantic educational institutions and participated in stability and support operations.



IDENTITÉ NATIONALE ET IDENTITÉ EUROPÉENNE

Petre DUȚU, PhD

L'identité nationale et identité européenne sont deux concepts fortement véhiculés dans les mass media et dans les discours de politiciens. Tous les deux cherchent de décrire les principales caractéristiques des groupes grands de gens qui vivent et travaillent en commun, soit grâce leurs volonté, soit grâce leur développement au fil du temps. Certes est le fait que l'identité représente tant une donnée (voir l'identité nationale), qu'une construction volontaire et conscient (voir l'identité européenne).

1. Considérations préliminaires

L'époque contemporaine est marquée par un double processus apparemment contradictoire: *la globalisation économique, technologique, écologique, médiatique et culturelle de la planète*, d'un côté, *son apparente fragmentation politique, ethnique, culturelle et religieuse* de l'autre. Par la suite, on peut affirmer qu'il y a deux aspects d'apparent fragmentation de la planète: l'apparition des revendications "régionales" et d'un nationalisme minoritaire dans l'Europe occidentale¹.

La question des revendications "régionales" et du nationalisme minoritaire présente de nombreuses facettes. Ainsi, elle est sociologique et psychologique, dans la mesure où elle concerne les modalités de construction de l'identité. Puis, elle est politique, parce qu'elle met en cause l'Etat nation et la sacralité de l'État. Elle concerne aussi l'administration, puisqu'elle met en cause la centralisation. En même temps, elle est économique et sociale car elle a des retombées sur la division du travail, le mode de vie et la protection sociale. Enfin, elle est philosophique, parce qu'elle amène à réfléchir aux conditions d'épanouissement de la personne humaine, et à opposer l'universalisme abstrait au particularisme.

Une analyse attentive, minutieuse et pertinente des causes de ces tendances dans l'évolution des Etats européens mettrait en évidence que il n'y a

pas le contexte contemporain qui les fait naître. Ainsi, les revendications irlandaise, basque, catalane, corse ou bretonne sont récurrentes depuis – au moins – le XIX^e siècle. Cependant, il est vraisemblable que le contexte pèse sur la nature des revendications comme sur la façon dont elles se manifestent. Parmi les phénomènes et les procès complexes qui concourent à alimenter les revendications identitaires régionales on peut se rappeler: la mondialisation et l'intégration régionale; les mutations produites en évolution de l'Etat nation. Les premiers ont créé les possibilités des manifestations de nature identitaire, par les valeurs et les normes qu'elles promouvaient dans le domaine de droits généraux de l'homme, de libertés individuels et de groupes. Les mutations produites à l'Etat nation représentent une autre prémisses importantes des manifestations de revendications identitaires régionales. Aujourd'hui, on assiste à la destruction de l'Etat nation, qui depuis la fin du XVIII^e siècle, constituait le cadre d'existence et d'action du social, du culturel et de l'institutionnel. Or, depuis les années soixante, la vie économique et sociale, d'un côté, et la vie culturelle, de l'autre, sont de plus en plus séparées.

La nation, la mémoire, la langue, la religion, les traditions et les valeurs se séparent de l'univers globalisé des marchés, des flux financiers et des réseaux d'information mondialisés. Entre ces deux univers, les institutions qui assuraient la socialisation et la mise en relation des individus, de la culture et de la société sont en crise.

Globalement, deux types de réactions apparaissent face à ces dissociations. Les uns acceptent la tendance contemporaine à une dissociation de l'économie et de la culture. Ils souhaitent un affaiblissement du rôle de l'État, soit dans une perspective néo-libérale (au nom du pragmatisme et de l'efficacité), soit dans une perspective libertaire (au nom du refus de l'autorité et du renforcement des libertés locales). Les autres appellent au maintien de ce qui se défait. Ainsi, ils invoquent souvent le



caractère unitaire et indivisible de l'Etat nation et ses grands principes d'égalité, de solidarité et de laïcité. En même temps, ils sont hostiles à la reconnaissance de différences culturelles dans l'espace public.

Pratiquement, les transformations des États nations ont d'importantes conséquences sur les régions. On distingue trois étapes dans le rapport des États européens aux régions². La première est celle de l'État providence. Elle constitue l'apogée du système étatique national et de la bureaucratie centralisée. L'État intervient beaucoup dans l'économie et dans la société. La politique européenne est très limitée et la politique régionale est nationale. Dans ce contexte, les langues et cultures régionales sont considérées comme des obstacles. Elles sont folklorisées et vouées à disparaître.

La deuxième étape est celle de l'État néo-libéral. L'emprise de l'État nation sur l'économie est mise en cause. Les premières politiques abolies sont les politiques régionales: les apports de l'État diminuent et les régions doivent donc repenser leur développement économique de façon endogène. Donc, elles mobilisent leurs ressources intérieures. C'est une période de revalorisation des cultures et langues régionales où l'on voit s'affirmer le rôle de régions telles que la Catalogne ou l'Écosse.

Enfin, la troisième étape est celle de l'État contemporain, qui combine néo-libéralisme et valeurs sociales. L'État n'est plus éliminé: il joue un rôle de stimulateur. La décentralisation politique renforce la mobilisation régionale. On parle désormais de "gouvernance à niveaux multiples". Les transformations de l'État nation amènent les partis nationalistes régionaux – qui visaient à créer un petit État nation – à repenser leur stratégie en relativisant l'idée de souveraineté nationale.

Avec la globalisation de l'économie et le recul de l'État providentiel, les régions s'engagent plus forte dans le développement économique. La globalisation provoque la mobilisation des acteurs locaux. Face à la globalisation, le local montre une capacité d'initiative et il s'adapte.

Les identités locales ou régionales sont très souvent ayant en vue comme ressources nouveaux, les marqueurs de différence ou de qualité spécifique dans un monde avec une compétitivité croissant. La qualité régionale, comme "Fabrique en..." emploie l'imaginaire culturelle d'une région pour favoriser ses exports. Divers modèles de développement régionaux émergent, surtout en Lombardie, en Cata-

logne ou en Ecosse. Elles posent la question, central, de liens entre le projet économique et le projet politique dans les régions motrices de l'Europe.

2. Qu'est que c'est l'identité nationale?

L'identité nationale représente l'ensemble des caractéristiques définitoires commune des personnes qui appartient à une nation. Elle est l'attribut qui fait que les gens, dans leur qualité d'habitants d'un espace géographique délimité par les frontières d'étatique, de sembler, d'être unis et solidaires, de partager les mêmes valeurs, normes, aspirations et idéals, d'avoir le sentiment d'appartenance commune au même peuple, de reconnaître les traditions, les habitudes et l'origine commune. D'ici, le caractère multidimensionnel de cet concept. Il s'agit, parmi d'autres, de dimension sociale, psychosociale, culturelle, linguistique, économique, politique, militaire et religieuse.

L'identité nationale n'est pas un mythe³. Ou plus exactement, il y a des mythes de l'identité nationale. Ils font partie, et sont une partie importante, des mythologies politiques développées depuis la création des nations dans le sens moderne du terme c'est à dire depuis la création des nations dans le sens moderne du terme, c'est à dire depuis le début du XIXe siècle. Ces mythes politiques pour une part représentent une des formes d'expression de l'imaginaire politique et social, qui s'expriment aussi dans les rituels et cérémonies politiques, tels étendards, blasons, hymnes, emblèmes, dans la poésie et dans l'art dites patriotiques, dans les manifestations populaires et sportives, dans les funérailles ou les commémorations des grands hommes, de nos héros et nos ancêtres.

La mythologie politique, y compris les mythes sur l'identité nationale, fait l'objet des recherches scientifiques dans le domaine de quelques sciences de l'homme, notamment de l'histoire politique, de l'anthropologie, de la sociologie politique dans l'étude de la psychologie de masse. Certains ouvrages et certains auteurs se sont tout particulièrement distingués par la qualité et la finesse de la réflexion sur la mythologie du nationalisme.

En même temps, l'identité nationale doit voir comme le produit d'une construction volontaire, consciente et responsable des personnes qui s'attribuent la même origine ethnique, culturelle, religieuse, sociale, de langue. L'histoire plus ancienne ou récente offre beaucoup d'exemples dans ce



sens. Ainsi, on peut rappeler le cas d'Israël, de Slovaquie, etc. Mais, il y a encore des "peuples" qui n'est pas obtenus leur reconnaissance internationale en tant d'Etats nationale. Par exemple, la population basque, d'Espagne ou la population de la Corse, qui tache de lutter tant par les moyens légaux que d'une autre facture pour obtenir leurs indépendance, autonomie et, évidemment, la reconnaissance de la communauté mondiale comme Etat autonome, objet et sujet de droit international.

Ce désir de retourner aux origines a lieu, simultanément, avec la tendance plus forte d'intégration régionale et de la globalisation. Bien sur, aussi l'intégration ainsi que la globalisation sont acceptées comme modalités d'évolution de la société humaine, seulement dans la mesure dont l'identité nationale reste non altère dans le sein de ces nouvelles structures politico-économiques et sociales.

D'autres part, l'identité nationale agit comme un important facteur de garde non altère de toutes les caractéristiques d'une nation - *la langue, les traditions, les valeurs, les coutumes, la religion, la fierté d'appartenir à une communauté spéciale, de posséder une certaine territoire, d'être apporter une contribution majeure au développement de patrimoine de la civilisation et de la culture humaine*. L'identité nationale toujours a agi dans la direction de garder non altère des origines nationales d'un peuple, an allant, parfois, jusque retourner à la source ou de tacher, par tous les moyens possibles, de se construire leur Etat national.

Ainsi de tentatives ne sont pas encourage pour tant de communauté internationale parce qu'elles peut constituer des prémisses sérieuses d'altérer gravement et pour la longtemp de la stabilité, de la paix et de la sécurité aussi en différents zones ainsi à l'échelon planétaire.

Cependant, la demande de reconnaître – des individus et des groups – est en jeux dans les revendications identitaires. Cette demande serait un besoin humain fondamental et l'un des moteurs principaux de la mobilisation sociale. De fait, toute identité se définir par différences, en comparaison avec soi ou avec les autres.

Contrairement à une vision couramment répandue, la volonté de reconnaître d'un peuple ou une nation sans Etat n'est pas obligatoirement synonyme avec la violence, la satisfaction de soi ou l'égoïsme. Elle ne conduite pas systématiquement à la séparation ou la sécession. Nombreuses sont

les situations intermédiaires dont les expériences d'autonomie tacher de concilier de satisfèra une aspiration identitaire propre et la volonté d'appartenance aux ensembles plus vaste. A ces solutions institutionnelles les correspondent souvent les constructions sociales et une vision civique de la revendication identitaire. Partout dans le monde, les nouvelles formes d'organisation institutionnelle ou sociale mènent des solutions aux besoins de mutation aux Etats nation.

La soif de reconnaissances identitaire qui parcourir nos sociétés a comme pair l'émergence d'un universalisme concret, naître de la conscientisation que les grands enjeux – écologiques, économiques ou sociaux – ont, de plus en plus, une dimension planétaires.

L'édification difficile d'une société mondiale, poussées fondamentalistes, des difficultés de la construction européenne, des affirmations régionales, des problèmes des cartiers périphériques, des multiples questions d'actualité nous souvenons combien de difficile est de concilier le particulier avec l'universel.

3. Qu'est que c'est l'identité européenne?

L'identité européenne demeure en effet une notion ambiguë⁴. L'accélération du processus de construction européenne conduit les citoyens comme les responsables politiques à s'interroger sur l'avenir des organisations fondées sur l'adéquation entre état, nation et territoire. Ces interrogations prennent place dans un contexte où se développent à la fois un sentiment de fragilité face aux processus de globalisation (quelle place l'Europe occupera-t-elle dans le monde?) et des tentatives de reterritorialisation ou de réinvention d'identités dont le rapport au territoire semble précisément difficile à cerner.

Aussi, la question de l'identité européenne a-t-elle permis de croiser des approches qui ont peu l'occasion de se féconder mutuellement: recherches sur l'histoire européenne, sur la transformation des sociétés en Europe, sur les défis de l'économie européenne et sur l'émergence de nouvelles formes de régulation politique et juridique au sein des pays et régions qui forment l'ensemble européen.

La notion "Europe" est de plus en plus un défi à la compréhension. Afin de mettre un peu d'ordre dans cette complexité des modèles et des percep-



tions, les hommes d'Etat ont recours à des notions à la fois simples et symboliques. "La maison européenne" et "l'espace européen" en sont des exemples. De telles métaphores servent comme véhicules pour suggérer des approches pleines d'implications stratégiques.

Elles servent à la fois comme codes pour la communication parmi les cognoscible et comme phrases clefs dans l'interaction avec l'opinion publique⁵. Les problèmes graves de l'intégration européenne soulèvent la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les métaphores actuellement employées sont d'une richesse adéquate pour articuler des options stratégiques utiles et viables. Le dilemme reste la nécessité, d'un côté, de refléter la richesse de la complexité dont toute stratégie européenne doit tenir compte, et, de l'autre, de fournir une image intégrative capable de séduire des populations cherchant un sens à leur développement personnel et professionnel. Ce dilemme est rendu d'autant plus problématique par la multiplicité des cultures et des écoles de pensée, sans oublier les groupes marginaux divers.

A présent, la communication à travers les médias devient de plus en plus importante dans la vie des initiatives politiques. C'est l'ultime contrainte dans la transformation sociale et politique. Les métaphores commencent à jouer un rôle prépondérant dans l'articulation de la transformation sociale ou dans l'opposition à celle-ci. Il semble que le combat se déplace du monde des idées vers le monde des images.

Ainsi, l'identité européenne est étroit associée avec le réservoir des métaphores. La vision de la gouvernance européenne ne demande pas une transformation radicale des institutions. Elle sollicite plutôt un léger changement dans la manière de penser à ce qui circule à travers les systèmes d'information de la communauté européenne comme élément déclencheur d'action nouvelle. Maintenant, comme phases successives dans un cycle des stratégies politiques.

La gouvernance au sein de communauté est hantée par une forme qui promeut les modèles académiques et programmes administratifs "sérieux", et une préoccupation avec des penchants de l'opinion publique pour des actions concrètes et dramatiques (même "sensationnelles"). Cette querelle entre modèles et métaphores pourrait être transformée en mettant l'accent sur les implications stratégiques des métaphores, celles-ci étant

déjà essentielles pour une motivation soutenue de l'opinion publique.

Cependant, l'identité européenne ne devrait pas être étroitement liée à la tâche impossible de maintenir un consensus sur les solutions appropriées, justes et donc "correctes". L'identité à cultiver devrait être en recul par rapport à ce niveau de préoccupations à court et moyen terme. Confondre ces niveaux est générateur de résolutions sans suites réelles, renforçant ainsi le cynisme, l'aliénation et la perte de crédibilité.

Dans la complexité de la problématique actuelle, toute solution simpliste devient un problème, comme tout problème est en effet une solution désagréable. La possibilité à cultiver est la compréhension de la manière par laquelle des solutions stratégiquement incompatibles peuvent être tissées ensemble.

4. L'impact de l'intégration sur l'identité nationale

L'Union européenne doit contribuer "à l'épanouissement des cultures des Etats membres dans le respect de leur diversité nationale et régionale, tout en mettant en évidence l'héritage culturel commun" (article 128 du traité de Maastricht)⁶. En essence, cet héritage concerne les principales valeurs caractéristiques de la civilisation européenne:

- le souci du respect des droits de l'Homme, ce qui la distingue des civilisations basées sur un mode d'organisation communautaire comme la Chine.
- le refus de la fatalité, l'implication de l'individu dans le monde, dans la quête d'un idéal et la recherche du progrès avec la volonté de transmettre un héritage à d'autres civilisations.
- un attachement aux libertés individuelles.
- la coexistence des contraires, des antagonismes et des complémentarités, une confrontation des idées dégagée de tout dogmatisme.

Chaque culture nationale européenne à son apport à l'identité culturelle de l'Europe. Cette identité européenne est fondée sur la diversité, l'unité et l'universalité. *Diversité*, parce que le vingt et cinq nationalités sont présentes en l'UE.

Elle enrichit et constitue une composante essentielle de l'identité européenne. *Unité*, parce que nous avons la responsabilité éminente de bien



garder la monnaie unique des Européens. Parce que l'Union économique et monétaire est une magnifique entreprise sur laquelle les Européens fondent leur prospérité et leur stabilité communes. Le monnaie unique est elle-même l'illustration emblématique de l'unité de l'Europe. *Universalité*, parce que nous nous ne sommes pas repliés sur nous-mêmes mais totalement ouverts sur le monde, en relation étroite avec les Institutions des autres continents⁷.

L'Union européenne doit affirmer son identité en compétition économique et culturelle avec les autres grands pouvoirs régionaux. Dans ce sens, elle doit viser qui soient les siens pour elle comme entité et aussi pour ses pays composantes.

Par la suite, elle doit agir ouvertement pour servir: tant ses intérêts que les intérêts de la communauté mondiale. Il s'agit de la protection de faune et de flore, la sécurité de circulation maritime, la sauvegarde de la couche d'ozone etc. exigent une détermination collective et multilatérale alors qu'il faut promouvoir contre les puissants intérêts capitalistes, l'approche entre Nord et Sud, de promouvoir les droits de l'homme et de l'esprit démocratique sans que l'indignation soit sélective au gré des intérêts ou des passions médiatiques du moment.

L'intégration européenne ne se résume pas seulement au domaine culturel. Elle a aussi d'autres dimensions (économique, sociale, militaire, psychosociale, écologique).

L'héritage économique de l'Europe est imprégné de coexistence et de confrontation entre les politiques libérales et dirigistes, entre interventionnisme étatique et la valorisation de créativité, entre les phases de libre-échange et les phases de protectionnisme.

En même temps, il est vrai que le principe du *tout au marché* a fait long feu en Europe. Dans le économique, les efforts se concentrent vers l'harmonisation des niveaux de développement, de législations, de dépens, de tout type, etc. pour que chacun Etat membre profiter plus beaucoup de l'intégration en Union européenne.

L'aspiration de l'Europe à l'unité est multi-séculaire, à partir du Moyen Age. Mais l'Europe n'est que trouvé d'une demie siècle le temps et les conditions propices et nécessaires pour les réaliser⁸. A présent, le processus d'élargissement de l'Union européenne continue. Dans le janvier 2007, aux 25 Etats membres, ajouteraient la Roumanie et la Bulgarie.

Bien sur, l'intégration européenne qui mène inévitablement à la construction d'une nouvelle identité européenne se fondera en déploiement de ce processus complexe et de longue durée sur l'apport de chaque identité nationale.

5. Conclusions

L'identité européenne et l'identité nationale de chaque pays membre seront en interaction et influenceront mutuels dans le procès de l'intégration européenne. L'identité nationale, comme réalité qui définit le spécifique de chaque nation qui s'intègre en l'Union européenne, désirens se conserver et se garder non altère pour jouer un rôle significatif dans la formation et affirmation de l'identité européenne. La dernière doit voir comme la résultante de l'interaction et de l'interdépendance des personnes qui composent les Etats intègres, les véritables porteurs de l'identité nationale.

Pratiquement, l'identité européenne est en pleine construction et affirmation. Bien sur, ce procès ne nie pas les identités nationales mais il les suppose comme sources d'énergie et d'inspiration, comme fondement sérieuse.

De fait, l'identité européenne se voudrait une synthèse constructive des valeurs, des caractéristiques définitoires des personnalités d'européens, de la richesse de la culture de chaque pays membre. En fin, elle sera l'expression des valeurs, des traditions, de ses coutumes et des sentiments nouveaux de toutes les personnes qui appartiennent de l'espace géographique et culturelle européenne.

L'identité européenne et l'identité nationale auraient des dimensions multiples (sociale, économique, culturelle, politique, psychologique, philosophique). Tous les dimensions seront présentées et agiront concertées pour affirmer du grand rôle de l'Union européenne dans la région et dans le monde.

NOTES:

¹ Voir *Identités et globalisation*, <http://www.breizh.net/identity/galleg.htm>, p.1.

² Ibidem, p.2.

³ Dr. Ivan COLOVIC, *Le mythe de l'identité nationale*, <http://european.memory.free.fr>, p.1.

⁴ Voir *L'identité européenne en questions*, sur <http://www.cnrs.fr/>, p.1.

⁵ Voir *Une Identité Européenne. Articulation expérimentale à travers un système dynamique de*



NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

métaphores, <http://www.europepolycentrique.org/>

⁶ Voir *L'identité européenne*, <http://www.europepolycentrique.org/communautaireexogame.html>

⁷ Voir Jean-Claude TRICHET, *Identité européenne*, <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/speaker/html/index.en.html>

⁸ Jean-Noël JEANNENEY, *Quelques réflexions sur l'identité européenne*, définie par rapport aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique, http://www.europartenaires.net/compte-rendu/Jnj_Europe_etatsunis.htm

Petre DUȚU, PhD, est chercheur degré deux au CSSAS, sociologue militaire, auteur de livres et des nombreux articles sur la sécurité nationale, régionale et globale, ainsi que sur le moral des militaires et d'armée, etc.



EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: COORDINATION, COOPERATION, COMPETITION

Pascu FURNICĂ

This article briefly analyzes the relations among the three major European Institutions (namely OSCE, NATO and European Union), comparing them in some relevant domains (enlargement, evolution of functions/responsibilities and coordination of transformation processes). The aim is to identify where do they co-ordinate, where do they overlap and where do they compete. The level of analysis chosen in this is the systemic one, trying to identify the inter-action between the evolutions of the respective institutions.

1. The 90s Europe, laboratory to test institutions' cooperation

The European security environment after the Cold War is a vast domain to study. But during the Cold War, the security scene was less complex. It was dominated by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the domination of the two powers, the US and USSR, over the security of the other members of the two blocs. Any "rival" institution was marginalized and it had not chance to live in the confrontational environment in Europe between 1945 and the 1980s.

In Western Europe, the Western European Union (WEU), created in 1948 as the Brussels Pact, played the role of showing both to Soviets and Americans the European countries' resolve to defend themselves against Soviet moves to impose control over the countries of Central Europe. It also played the role of bringing the US alongside West European countries in their effort to maintain the trans-Atlantic link and it was an important factor in NATO's creation. This definitively changed in 1984, when it was reactivated and started to play a role in security issues.

The CSCE/OSCE appeared on the scene of Europe in 1975. Signing the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 marked a breakthrough in East-West rela-

tions, offering the rival Cold War blocs permanent channels of communication.

The Council of Europe, European Steel and Coal Community, the later European Economic Community (this institution had security concerns, but mainly led to economic integration), European Atomic Energy Organization (EURATOM) created a dense security environment in Western Europe.

The communist bloc was totally dominated by the Soviet Union and any attempt by other members of the Pact to become more independent or to transform into a player in the security and defence domain was blocked by the Soviet Union using either political or military means. The participation of communist countries in CSCE was a breakthrough in Europe's security environment.

After 1990, the environment changed dramatically. The 1990s brought an increased interest in improving the security in Europe. Former communist countries were looking for a new "security umbrella" against the possible revival of Russian power in East, and the only direction they were looking was westwards. Most of them became interested in NATO membership and in a new European community of independent states, but NATO was at first not prepared to receive former enemies in "The Club", and EU looked mostly to unaligned countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden joined EU in 1995). CSCE reacted and, in 1990, at the Paris Summit, the Paris Charter was signed and the re-institutionalization of the security environment in Europe started. WEU continued the process of transformation in an active actor in European security, participating in operations either alone or in cooperation with other actors. The operation to enforce the UN sanctions on the borders between Yugoslavia and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria was a "practical example of concrete cooperation with the Associate Partners, within WEU, and of OSCE-WEU co-ordination, through the WEU



Presidency delegation to the OSCE Sanctions Co-ordination Committee in Vienna”¹.

In 1994, NATO created Partnership for Peace, North Atlantic Co-operation Council, (later EAPC) and became committed to enlargement, opening the doors for cooperation with former enemies.

The Wars in Balkans reinforced the idea that the cooperation of European states is needed in solving the problems that were “kept frozen” by the Cold War. The United States, the only major power left, got involved, actively participating in the creation of a new and diverse security environment in Europe, by sponsoring the creation of different regional and sub-regional organizations (South East Defence Ministerial Process, Stability Pact, BLACKSEEFOR, BALTNET, SHIRBRIG, and others) in order to foster the cooperation in this domain. The security environment in Europe became complex and various, with many actors, but no (or limited) cooperation and coordination.

Different concepts were used by different institutions in order to provide the framework for these difficult circumstances. The concept of Interlocking Institutions was launched by the OSCE, a concept that gave this organization the leading role in European Security environment. NATO uses the concept of Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. According to NATO Handbook, “NATO countries would therefore work towards a new European security architecture, based on principles established by the United Nations Charter, in which NATO, the CSCE (later OSCE), the European Community (later the European Union), the WEU and the Council of Europe would complement each other and in which other regional frameworks of cooperation would also play an important role”². These are only two of the concepts that have been used in order to explain the need of cooperation of all these actors in the security and defence domain.

“The network of European security institutions is a system of rule-based (formal or informal), dense cooperation among formal security institutions on a continuous, long-term basis (including the creation of regimes) with the aim of synergy and added value (“mutually reinforcing”) by pooling the comparative advantages of each one of them.”³

Pessimistic views also exist. Hieko Borchert and Daniel Maurer speak about the fact that “since 1990, we have witnessed the OSCE-fication of the European security architecture.”⁴

The question most asked today is if existing security institutions created in Europe are able to work together and if they are capable of overtaking the difficult times of competition and lack of coordination in the current complex European security environment.

2. Evolution of NATO, EU and OSCE after the end of the Cold War

After the Cold War, NATO, EU and OSCE evolved and transformed. All of them enlarged and changed/transformed their functions and responsibilities. An analysis of these processes could draw some conclusions about their capability to create a system of inter-acting security institutions in which to bring added value by bringing their comparative advantages in a synergetic system

Comparative analysis of change in membership and enlargement process

All three institutions enlarged after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. The pace, the principles of enlargement differed, but the analysis of these processes could help in identifying if there were any coordination or cooperation among them.

All of them changed their membership starting from 1990s. NATO enlarged from 16 to 25 members, EU from 12 to 25 and OSCE from 35 to 55 members. The biggest change in membership was made by EU, practically doubling its membership. Numbers alone do not count, but it is interesting that the changes in membership cover generally the same new members. NATO and EU generally enlarged by accepting the membership of the same group of countries from Central and Eastern Europe, creating a big overlapping of membership among the two institutions. OSCE had a different approach to enlargement. It went well beyond the geographical limits of Europe with the purpose to cover the entire Northern hemisphere. Anyway, the overlapping among the membership of all three institutions made the security environment more complex and difficult to manage.

Despite of the common interest in changing membership, the principles of enlargement differed from organization to organization and from period of time to period of time. NATO and EU had relatively similar principles of enlargement. Both had clear criteria used in order to accept the



membership of the candidate countries. The difference was in details. NATO requested political and military reforms, having the economic criteria at the end of the list. EU criteria of enlargement were stricter in terms of the objectives to be achieved by the candidate countries. According to Copenhagen Criteria, European Union membership requires stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities (political criterion), a functioning market economy (economic criterion) and adherence to the various political, economic and monetary aims of the European Union (incorporation of the Community *acquis*).⁵

The difference between these two institutions stands not in principles, but in precursor processes. EU uses a formal association system in order to prepare and support the candidate country in achieving the criteria for accession. NATO, through Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan, supports the countries that declared that want to become members in their efforts to prepare for membership, but this is not a formal association and does not guarantee the future membership.

OSCE had only one enlargement principle: “Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. This aim was rapidly achieved, making the scholars to wander “what the ‘E’ in OSCE stands for. Of course it is ‘Europe’, but where does Europe begin and end? Why are some states in the Organization and others not? Is it geographical? Are the Caucasus and Central Asia part of Europe? Perhaps, but then what about North Africa? The Straits of Gibraltar are narrower than the English Channel and Tunis is closer to Vienna than Helsinki. And what about Canada and the United States? It is all a matter of history, so goes the argument. Countries in the OSCE are those with a long history of engagement in Europe with direct interests in European security”⁶. The pace of enlargement was also different. OSCE achieved its goal very rapidly. In 1992, at the First Additional Council of Ministers Meeting in Helsinki, with the acceptance of Croatia, Georgia and Slovenia, OSCE reached its maximum in membership, process which probably will continue with acceptance of the new states appearing on the map of Europe (Montenegro declared its independence and its willingness to be accepted in the “family of European states”⁷, being very likely to request OSCE membership).

For NATO and EU, enlargement was a different story. Even EU made the decision to enlarge much earlier than NATO (June 1993, January 1994), its accession process was slower because of the stronger criteria used for assessing the candidate countries. The similarity between the processes of accepting new members in the two organizations as related with the fact that both had a “step by step” approach to enlargement at the beginning and a “big bang” afterwards (10 new members accepted by EU and 7 by NATO in the same round of enlargement).

It is important to analyze the role of the US in the enlargement processes of European Security Institutions, because of the fact that the US remained the only global power and continued to influence the European politics after the Cold War.

In NATO, the US was the engine of enlargement. Even it had different “associates” during different stages of accepting new members, it remained the promoter of a larger and stronger Alliance. The negotiation held to select the new members was not easy because of the different interest the US and some European members had (i.e. the case of Romania during the negotiations for the first wave of enlargement, Romania being proposed by France for membership and not being accepted by the US, UK and Germany), but the US sustained its point of view and the decisions were according with its interest.

Donald Rumsfeld’s remark about “Old Europe and New Europe” (made by Mr. Rumsfeld in the case of the second Iraq War) is one of the “non-diplomatic” tries of the US to indirectly influence the European political decisions. This remark made French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to react to this new “division” of Europe.

In the EU enlargement process, US did not have a direct involvement, but the decisions made by one of these two institutions (NATO and EU) were indirectly influenced by the decisions made by the other related to enlargement. This was generally influenced by the fact that geographically and politically the interest of both institutions was to accept former communist countries into the new political, economic and security environment in Europe. The US interference with the EU enlargement process was unacceptable for EU itself, but, as in the case of Turkey, informal “pressure” was put on European politicians by American leaders.



The enlargement processes carried out by the three major European institutions had important consequences both on themselves and on the security system in Europe. All three had encountered more complex decision making processes because of the larger numbers of members (and because the “consensus rule”).

OSCE was the most affected and tried to avoid the blocking of decision making process by adopting different solutions. Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, MC, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, said at the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in Sofia, in December 2004 that “one of the main weaknesses of the OSCE lies in its decision making procedure. The highly decentralized responsibilities and the fact that the Permanent Council in its collectivism is the chief executive officer, together with a non transparent and indiscriminate application of the consensus principle not only make it difficult to come to decisions, but also render it sometimes virtually impossible to hold anybody accountable for the organization’s activities or – most of all – its failure to act.”⁸ At that meeting, Hon. Hastings proposed that “both in terms of enhancing its transparency and of looking into the possibility of differentiating the consensus principle, providing for instance for a consensus minus two or three for decisions on budget and personnel”⁹.

As Ingo Peters comments in his article (written in 2003), that “the EU and NATO will increasingly join the OSCE in facing the ‘weakness in numbers’ that exacerbates the general difficulties of collective action”¹⁰. NATO has avoided this “syndrome” because of its high degree of institutionalization and experience in negotiation.

The EU has chosen another option. Qualified Majority Voting was selected as the solution to make decisions in the EU’s ‘second and third pillars’ - the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs¹¹.

The increased complexity of decision making process in the new context of “weakness in numbers” made Leo G. Michel to write the article “NATO Decision making: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?”, making different proposals regarding the future changes of the decision making process in NATO. His options, “Threatened Ally” Rule, “SACEUR’s Discretion” Rule and Empowering “Coalitions within NATO” present advantages and disadvantages that should be well analyzed

because of the danger of altering the democratic essence of the Alliance¹².

The enlargement processes in the main European security institutions were similar in political-geographic terms. NATO an EU enlargement processes were based on clear accession criteria, with EU very firm in observing the candidates “progress” in meeting these criteria during the entire process. OSCE enlargement process was faster and had no accession criteria, fact that created difficulties to this institution in making its decisions.

Function and responsibilities: overlapping, competition or coordination

In order to continue the process of analyzing the concept of *Interlocking European Security Institutions*, the comparative analysis of the individual organizations’ functions and responsibilities is a method to understand if they do cooperate in the complex security environment created by the end of the Cold War, demise of the Soviet Union and, more importantly, the post 9/11 era.

In table 1, a picture of the most important functions and responsibilities is presented in order to create an analytical framework of the comparative analysis of the three institutions in terms of their role in the European security context¹³.

	NATO	EU	OSCE
Collective Defence			
Military Intervention			
Partnership and cooperation	-	-	+
Public Admin. & Civil Society Strengthening			+
Conflict prevention	-	-	-
Human Rights			+
3rd party diplomatic intervention			+
Democratization	-	-	+
Disarmament and Arms Control			+

Table 1. Comparative functions and responsibilities of NATO, EU and OSCE

a. Collective defence is the task that makes NATO the unique institution in Euro-Atlantic security environment. Even EU was supposed by France to be the NATO’s rival in this domain, this would have made incompatible the two organizations and the result would have been devastating for Europe. Collective defence is the border between the NATO and EU responsibilities and a



potential conflict area in the future.

b. Military intervention refers to what was called in NATO “out of area operation”. This field is covered both by NATO and EU, both having, in different degrees, the political will and capabilities to intervene in crisis with military means. The cooperation and complementarity was proved by the fact that NATO handed over the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina to EU and they have been cooperating in Balkans for some time. OSCE, not having its own military structure, has no interest in this domain.

c. Partnership and cooperation is an area in which all three organizations are involved. Each of them has special bodies (NATO and EU) or is dedicated to this goal (OSCE). In this domain, the overlapping and competition is self evident.

d. Public Administration and Civil Society Strengthening is an area where EU and OSCE compete, and NATO is not present. The solution found was similar with the previous, but in this domain it is also a second solution adopted: the separation in terms of level of administration (for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE is present mainly in local administration and civil society projects, compared with EU presence in central administration).

e. Conflict prevention is one of the responsibilities where all three institutions are present. All of them have “crisis management centres” and the competition is present. Hierarchization of responsibilities and division in long term – short term (or structural – operational) tasks could solve the competition, but none of them is ready to accept a “second role” in this field.

f. Monitoring Human Rights is the domain where OSCE is the institution that has an important role. It has the tools, experience and expertise to accomplish this task. Neither NATO nor EU competes with OSCE and this is one of the areas where OSCE could find its unique role in the European security environment.

g. Third party diplomatic intervention is another domain in which EU and OSCE are competing. Both organizations have organisms dedicated to this task and, in the last years, EU has taken the lead in this field, pushing OSCE in areas where it does not want or is not accepted as the mediator.

h. Democratization is a task that could be considered another field of competition among all three institutions. But NATO is more indirectly

concerned with the democratization inside its area of interest (member or partner countries,), leaving EU and OSCE to compete in other geographical areas. OSCE was the first institution that “broke the iron curtain” in the 1970s with the purpose to support the democratization process in Eastern Europe, having on its part the experience and expertise. EU is a relatively new actor in this field, but it has created a system of structures to deal with it (CFSP, Enlargement Process, Copenhagen Criteria, its development policy) and is heavily competing OSCE, an organization blocked by its numerous membership and complex decision making process.

i. Disarmament and Arms Control presents the same characteristics of a task covered by two of the three institutions, in which a hierarchization of responsibilities is needed.

The result of this comparative analysis is that it is obvious that the field of European security is competition. There are some functions and responsibilities covered by all three institutions, some covered by two of them (mainly, in this category there are tasks assumed by EU and OSCE, creating a competition between these two organizations) and some functions that are taken by only one of them. Officially, none of the institutions accepts hierarchization, but that could be a solution that would make all of them to continue to exist and to support the effort of providing a secure environment in Europe or beyond its borders. The trend is that the competition between NATO and EU will continue and will increase in intensity because EU’s possible involvement in areas covered so far by NATO.

Practical cooperation, the test of the security institutions capabilities

In order to understand if these three institutions are really cooperating, a case study should be analyzed. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the conflict area where NATO, EU and OSCE have been present for long time and it is the case study that could be better used than other because it is situated in Europe (inside the area of interest of all three institutions), they had enough time for them to create a system of cooperation (if any) and currently is neither “hot” nor “cold”, covering almost the entire spectrum of missions/tasks assumed by all three institutions. For European Union, the exist-



NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

ence of two important bodies, EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) and the Office of High Representative (OHR) makes the analysis more detailed.

Table 2 presents briefly the missions and tasks assumed the three organizations in their mandates.

	NATO	EU		OSCE
		EUFOR	EU/OHR	
Primary mission	- defence reform	- deterrence - compliance with G7/AP, - safe and secure environment	- the rule of law - reforming the economy - institution building - defence reforms	- transition to a stable, secure and democratic society
Supporting tasks	- counter-terrorism; - support ICTY detention of PIFWCs.	- support ICTY detention of PIFWCs; - provide the security environment for police ops.	Not mentioned in the mandate	- promote democratic institutions; - strengthen the rule of law and human rights norms

Table 2. Comparative mission and tasks of NATO, EU and OSCE in BiH¹¹

At a glance, it can be seen that the image offered by the operational environment of international co-operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is much better than the image shown by the theoretical analysis.

Even at the first look there could appear again an overlapping and a competition in the field of “defence reform” between NATO and EU OHR, they have complementary tasks. The OHR core task is to “establish a functioning single defence establishment with initial operational capability across the full spectrum of State-level responsibilities and commitments in defence matters, as well as a basic understanding and skills for interoperable information and planning mechanisms according to NATO/PfP standards”¹⁵. The NATO HQ in Sarajevo Defence and Security Sector Reform Cell’s mission is to “direct defence reform policy, co-ordination and implementation”¹⁶.

These two tasks are complementary, NATO having a supporting role for EU OHR’s mission. In addition, OSCE is also involved in this field, Major General John Drewienkiewicz, Director of the OSCE Department for Security Co-operation (DSC) being also Military Adviser to the High Representative and the point of contact for this task.

The other tasks show the complementarity of the work among these three institutions. The primary task of EUFOR is to provide deterrence and a safe environment for the other organizations, OSCE, NATO and EU OHR cooperating in the transition to a stable secure environment (with the

last two heavily focused on institution building at the central level and the first one concentrating its efforts at the local level). Both NATO and EUFOR are supporting ICTY detention of PIFWCs, NATO’s task of “intelligence sharing” supporting the other’s primary missions.

The conclusion of the analysis of the coordination of three major security institutions in an operational environment is that a clear division of labour or “specialization”, mutually supporting tasks (NATO sharing of information to other organizations, support given by NATO and EUFOR to ICTY), indirect supporting tasks (creation of a “stable environment”) is the solution found when the leadership of the institutions had the political will to cooperate.

3. Conclusion

The overcrowded security environment in Europe is unique because of the multitude of the institutions that are dealing with it.

Even the evolution and transformation processes were not officially coordinated among the major European security institutions, they eventually “looked over the fence in the other’s yard” to see what is happening and which is the trend. This happened because of some obvious reasons.

Firstly, the membership of these organizations had had an important overlap before enlargement and there had been the same political decision-makers that made the decisions of acceptance of new members “in the club”.

Secondly, they were interested in the same geographical area (Central and Eastern Europe), and this trend is going to be continued in the next years, because both NATO and EU look at Mediterranean Area and Middle East as potential areas of interest.

Even now there is no cooperation in these areas, the assumption is that is a likely possibility that mainly NATO and EU will have to coordinate their efforts if they want these areas to be brought closer to Europe.

Thirdly, the competition with the US in terms of providing security, in fact the competition between the different means used by Europeans and Americans to this purpose, is not beneficial, and, if the competition is continued, the Trans-Atlantic link will be transformed into an un-bridgeable Trans-Atlantic rift. The first signs of co-operation



are seen in BiH, all three organizations having a relatively good cooperation by specialization and complementarity of tasks.

Should not be forgotten that all three institutions are now established bureaucracies, and they reacted, and will be reacting as all bureaucracies. When OSCE, at its Istanbul Summit in 1999, assumed by itself “the key integrating role” in the cooperation of European security organizations, the other institutions had no reaction and this initiative has not been reflected in the political reality of the “interlocking network of European security institutions.”¹⁷ Nor the hierarchy of institution was officially accepted because none of the security institutions likes to be seen as “subordinated” to another, because it loses significance, credibility and, finally loses political and public support. And no bureaucracy wants that.

In fact, it is an informal hierarchization of the security institutions, NATO’s current position of “the most equal among equals” being challenged by EU through CFSP and ESDP.

Coming back to the question asked at the beginning of this article (are all these organizations able to work together?), one possible answer would be “yes”, but a conditional one.

Firstly, they should become more flexible in assuming tasks, accepting that is not beneficial to compete, neither for them nor for the success of their enterprise. This was relatively proven in BiH in the last years.

Secondly, they should continue the “learning process” which took place inside them in the last fifteen years, continuing to apply the principle of “form follows function”.

Thirdly, they should continue to implement a certain degree of specialization inside their organizational structure and culture in order to be able to accomplish tasks better and more efficient.

And finally, the trend on which OSCE is now, a trend of marginalization and finding niche capabilities, should be avoided because in Europe there is an example of an organization that took this way and currently not many people know that it still exists: the Council of Europe.

NOTES:

¹ Western European Union, *History of WEU*, <http://www.weu.int/>.

² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO*

Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1500.htm>.

³ Definition presented by Prof. Dr. Rafael Biermann.

⁴ BORCHERT and MAURER, *Co-operation, Rivalry or Insignificance? Five Scenarios for Future Scenarios for the Future of Relations between the OSCE and EU*, p. 403.

⁵ European Union, *Copenhagen criteria*, http://europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/atwork/_documents/dgenlargementbrochure/sld005.htm.

⁶ Walter KEMP, *From Vancouver to Vladivostok — and beyond?*, in Helsinki Monitor. Netherlands Helsinki Committee, 2005.

⁷ Montenegro Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, Speech after the independence referendum, May 21st 2006.

⁸ Alcee L. HASTINGS, MC, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Speech at the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Sofia, 6 – 7 December 2004, <http://oscepa.org>.

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Ingo PETERS, *The OSCE, NATO and EU within the “Network of Interlocking Security Institutions: Hierarchization, Flexibility, Marginalization*, OSCE Yearbook 2003, Baden-Baden, p. 396.

¹¹ Qualified majority voting (QMV) was designed by the Treaty of Rome to be the principal method of reaching decisions in the Council of Ministers, qualified majority voting (QMV) allocates votes to member states in part according to their population, but heavily weighted in favour of the smaller states.

¹² Leo G. MICHEL, NATO Decision making: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule, *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, August 2003.

¹³ A table is presented in Ingo Peters’ article *The OSCE, NATO and EU within the “Network of Interlocking Security Institutions: Hierarchization, Flexibility, Marginalization*, OSCE Yearbook 2003, Baden-Baden, p. 402, but he does not comparatively analyze each important responsibility/function of the three organization.

¹⁴ GFAP – General Framework Agreement for Peace; ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia; PIFWC – Persons Indicted for War Crimes.

¹⁵ EU OHR Mission Implementation Plan 2005, Core Task 4 – Defence Reform, <http://www.ohr>



int/ohr-info/ohr-mip.

¹⁶ DSSR Cell - *Scope of Work*, http://www.af-south.nato.int/NHQSA/DSSR/Factsheets/DSSR_ScopeWork.htm.

¹⁷ OSCE, *Charter of European Security, Istanbul, November 1999*, in OSCE Yearbook 2000, Bade-Baden, 2001, p. 429, available online <http://osce.org/docs>

Colonel Pascu FURNICĂ is director of the Joint and Multinational Operations Course from the Crisis Management and Multinational Operations College within the National Defence University "Carol I". He had different ranks at tactical and operational level up to 1999, when he was appointed in different positions within the Regional Training Centre NATO/PfP. For the time being he is a student at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, the Civil-Military Relations Program. This article is the result of studies on the structure of the international security.



EU PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT IN THE FIELD OF ESDP. Consequences for the Romanian policemen and gendarmes' education and training

*Marius MILITARU
Ion DRAGOMAN, PhD*

Authors analyse the consequences the EU's concept on professional training in ESDP area has on the Romanian policemen and gendarmes' education and training. Multinational operations imply using the national states' military and police forces under the competent international organizations' mandate. The professional requirements that the members of this force must meet, regarding the education and training, are usually foreseen in the agreements the organization that sets up the multinational force concludes with each member state, either a large structure (EU), an ad-hoc structure (UN operations) or a permanent alliance (NATO).

Let's see, first of all, what are the particularities of the training process for the states' personnel involved in operations led by UN. The Memorandum of Agreement between Romania's Government and UN regarding Romania's resource contribution for the UN special police unit in Kosovo (UNMIK) established in the Resolution no. 1444 (1999)¹ states that Romania should contribute with the personnel foreseen in Annex A. Any other personnel category that exceeds the number in the Memorandum is a national responsibility and therefore the UN will neither pay nor support it. In the above Annex A there are also the general requirements about the standards in the fields of education and training, requirements based on **the UN Guidelines for the force-contributing states** and **The UN Manual for peacekeeping operations**. All these documents constituted the motivation to establish the Government Resolution no. 278/2003 in order to ensure the organizational framework of Romania's participation with gendarmes at the UNMIK². The Ministry of Administration and Interior established an Order regarding its personnel selection, training, appointment and sending them to international

cooperation missions or multinational operations.

The OSCE has express provisions about the requirements the member states have to meet, regarding the education and training of military, paramilitary and internal security forces and also the intelligence services and the police. Thus, the Code of conduct for the security political and military aspects adopted by this regional organization in 1995 in Budapest³, foresees the following obligations of its member states: recruiting or convoking personnel in the respective forces should be in accordance with the obligations and commitments regarding the observance of the human right and the fundamental freedom; reflecting these rights and duties of the respective forces' personnel in the national laws or other relevant documents; the introduction of the warfare humanitarian international law in the military training programs; training the respective forces in the field of humanitarian law, rules, conventions and commitments referring to the armed conflict; ensuring that the respective personnel is aware that he is responsible for his own actions in front of the national and international law; ensuring that the armed forces personnel with command authority should exercise it in accordance with the national and international law's relevant provisions and be aware that they are responsible, individually, for the illegal exercising of authority. They can't give orders contrary to national and international law, the superiors' responsibility doesn't exempt the subordinates from any of their individual responsibilities; ensuring that, in peacetime and wartime, the armed forces are conducted, armed, trained and equipped according to the international law's provisions, the obligations and engagements regarding the use of armed forces in armed conflicts the way they are stipulated in the Hague Conventions dated 1907 and 1954, in Geneva



Conventions from 1949 and in the Additional Protocols from 1977. It's easy to notice that in the OSCE documents the focus is on the quality of the personnel as law enforcers during crises and armed conflict besides other specific professional characteristics as armed violence users with a social purpose and to be invested with public power to fulfil their functional attributions.

There were similar provisions in the EU as well after the changes of its Nice Treaty when the crisis management was institutionally organized within ESDP. An example is the Agreement between Romania and the EU, signed in Brussels, in November 2001, which established the general framework of Romania's participation in EU crisis management operations.⁴ Establishing the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the EU became more active, more capable and more coherent in its confrontation with the global challenges and the essential threats specific to the current security environment. These demands have imposed a real EU doctrine in the field of recruiting, educating and training the personnel forming the capabilities in the field of the EU Common Foreign Security Policy; subsequently, the European Police College was established in order to stress out the common training of the policemen from different member states, through courses and exercises supporting their integrating action in the European operations. In 2004, within the European Gendarmerie Force, the authorities established the operational standards of the respective force's units, the methods to reach their level is a national responsibility enforced by multinational training to ensure the necessary level of interoperability after a program proposed by the EGF Commander.

The above necessities and approaches determined the approval of the EU ESDP development Concept by the Council of Ministers⁵ on the 13th of September 2004. This Concept⁶ defines and details the EU professional forming policy in this field (approved by the Council on the 17th of November 2003), establishing the EU police and operational framework and the EU objectives and needs, particularly in the civilian, police and military sectors; it also states the personnel category, the guiding principles, the attributions and describes the measures and procedures necessary to apply the approved policy, especially regarding the way to improve the collaboration between the

EU member states and the competent instances and also the regular courses regarding ESDP. The European Security Institute has a potential role in the respective development. The "development" notion used in the EU Concept is defined as "a development device, commonly ensured, which contributes to a better understanding and perception of ESDP. It also allows for the assimilation of knowledge and, if necessary, of the competence necessary to apply it". It focuses mainly on the cooperation in the European operations, but it also has a component regarding the mission preparation. The respective development process embodies: planning the development activities (analysis of the development needs and prepare the current activities); the effective training and education in this field, development evaluation (analyzing and validating the precedent phases regarding their future improvement). The analyzed document stipulates that its objective is to apply the European policy of ESDP development and to establish the devices and procedures necessary to analyze the global needs of professional development and to plan, run and assess both the training and education process as a whole and also each participant. The development at the European level is complementary to the one ensured by the national authorities and has a more active role in spreading ESDP culture and ensuring the effective EU crisis management; for this, a special attention must be paid to the exercises, development and lessons learnt from the former European operations.

The contribution of a global and coordinated concept of professional development in the military and civilian crises management will be achieved by enforcing the synergies of different methods of theoretic and practical training, developing the interoperability with all the actors involved, a special stress on the necessity to articulate the political, military and civilian fields and improving the military-civilian and civilian-civilian cooperation in order to facilitate the general objective. All these mean that the development within ESDP must lead to the ESDP development, be based on a regular assessment of the development necessities in the field, be according to the European Security Strategy, answer the operational needs in the field of crises management, guarantee a global approach of the civilian, police and military actions, take into account the EU crises management capabili-



ties, integrate the lessons learned from operations and exercises, emphasize the best practices, have a maximum efficiency with a minimum cost by rationally using the resources, take into account the EU guidelines about the crises management fields (e.g., children in armed conflicts), contribute to the integration of the international law pertinent elements, including the international humanitarian law, complete the development in ESDP achieved by member states and international organizations. Besides favouring ESDP common culture throughout the EU, the developing process focuses, at the **strategic planning level**, on streamlining the access of European institutions to qualified personnel, able to work efficiently in all ESDP fields and allowing for the appointment of qualified personnel from the state member structures, accustomed to European policies, institutions and procedures; **at operational level**, this process focuses on the civilian and military personnel training in order to participate in the EU operations and favouring the interoperability and coordination between the civilian and military sectors. While the EU developing policy in the field of ESDP stipulates only the development's strategic and operational level, the Concept stipulates that it applies, to a certain extent, **to the tactical level** as well, given the current evolution in this field, covering the general professional training, the one prior to a concrete mission and the one achieved "in the theatre", implying that the development needs at this level will be different for the military personnel.

The different European institutions' **attributions** are stipulated in order to ensure the concept's concrete applying. Thus, the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, will supervise the coherent action of different organs taking part in the development policy and the EU pertinent policies and procedures approving the triennial gliding Program. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) in cooperation with the Commission and the General Secretariat will set up the guidelines for all the development activities and will approve the EU Development Program in the field. It will be assisted by the Politico-Military Group (i.e. military and civilian experts in education and training), in meetings where the programs are coordinated and re-examined. The purpose of these meetings will be improving the exchange of information regarding the development activities and will maximize the synergies between the

national and European structures on professional training, in order to ensure their compatibility, complementarity and efficiency by avoiding the repetition, parallelism and superposition. The EU Military Committee (EUMC), supported by the EU HQ will inform PSC about all the pertinent military aspects of the Program's development, while the Committee that is responsible with the crises management civilian aspects has the same attribution on civilian aspects.

As for the EU development Program, it enumerates all the educational and training activities, stipulating the date, type of activity, organizer, place, participants' number and category and the purpose of each activity. Each development activity on successive 36 month-period will be "approved" (first year), "provisionally approved" (second year) or "envisaged" (third year) by the PSC before the Council adopts them. The Development Program focuses on the entire military and civilian personnel of the member states or the European institutions and organs, participating in ESDP or with a view to a future mission; it also includes persons selected from other states thus increasing the EU crises management capability but for which special programs can be made. In order for the system to work, the Concept proposes forming a net with all the military and civilian actors, **net organized** in annual conferences of the institutions and schools involved in the education and training in the field of ESDP⁷; organizing and preparing the conference represents the President's attribution with the support of the Council's General Secretariat and the European Commission, and particularly the above Politico-Military Group. This meeting has the following purposes: defining and harmonizing the theoretical syllabus dedicated to ESDP; avoiding the useless redundancies of different courses by coordinating the actors; presenting the resources and the manuals; emphasizing the EU evolutions in this field. The process to apply the professional development has normal phases: planning where the Politico-Military Group sets up the plans and syllabuses and their methodologies, the participants are the academies, institutions and national schools, net coordinated; running the activities conceived and selected where the European Defence and Security College is involved at a strategic level and the institutions, schools and national academies have other activities; assessing all the involved actors



and setting up reports to the Politico-Military Group which, through competent experts, analyzes the participants at the development process and finally it reports to the Political and Security Committee.

Regarding the **content** of the professional development activities, at strategic level, it will include issues regarding: the ESDP realistic understanding and the EU foreign action; ESDP's origins, evolutions, and the fundamental objectives and principles; getting accustomed to the EU and its institutions, including sharing the competence between member states and European institutions; fully understanding the EU crises management structures and procedures; the military and civilian capabilities within ESDP; pertinent concepts and crises management exercises; the civilian, police and military personnel specific training; the EU relationship with the UN, NATO and other international organizations such as the OSCE and supporting some international regional organizations (the African Union); the relationship with NATO European member states that are not EU members, with candidate states and other partners regarding conflict prevention and crises management; means of the civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) and the EU civilian-military coordination; ESDP financial and juridical aspects⁸; lessons learned from the ESDP operations. At operational level, the content of the professional development activities depends on the crises management operation considered (military or civilian or if civilian, whether the focus is on police activities or others). The EU already has common development criteria for all the four civilian fields (political, legal state, civilian administration, civilian protection). **The didactic methodology** has courses, seminars, personalized assistance, group projects, simulation, workshops, conferences, Internet, direct practical development, etc.

The EU concept we're analyzing warns that, in the field of professional development, it's essential to encourage solid links with different actors participating in the education and training activity at national and European level, both in the public sector and the private one. The international links are very important as well in order to streamline the mutual understanding of concepts and procedures of other actors involved in crises management and conflict prevention; the objectives of this cooperation and the coordination of the common actions in the field are defined in the general

policies the Council approved for each actor (UN, NATO, OSCE, AU) and which can be adapted whenever necessary. Given the large number of international organizations and agencies interested in the professional development in the field of defence and security, at different levels and fields, the cooperation is important and necessary in three main fields, the exchange of information regarding: education and training, exchange of teaching staff and syllabuses and mutual invitations to specialized training activities.

The detailed analysis of the EU professional development in ESDP demonstrates the complexity of this activity without which the EU couldn't be an important actor in international relations because it wouldn't have professional human capabilities. Another conclusion is that the development in the field of formulating the security and defence policy and applying it at European level is a field different from other teaching elements. A new EU professional development concept in ESDP means that the Romanian ministries and institutions with attributions in the field of military and civilian teaching and training specialists in any field of crises management and conflict prevention must create and develop programs adequate to this objective. The Army and the Gendarmerie have already taken important steps in this direction. Their example should be followed by other public and private authorities and institutions with attributions and competences in this field. Romania will join EU and we must be ready to fulfil our obligations. While the military, police and gendarmerie participation in different crises management operations was a success, this will be only the premise of a more responsible active and efficient future participation. Knowing the EU concept in the field can support this perspective.

Translated by Diana DIACONESCU

NOTES:

¹ Published in Mon. Of. no.140/2002.

² See the text published in Mon.Of. no.184/2003; also, it is relevant for this matter Law no.42/2004 regarding the armed forces' participation to mission outside the Romanian territory (Mon. Of. no.242/2002).

³ Spread in Romania by *Observatorul Militar* no. 3, January, 20, 1998.

⁴ Approved by the Government's Emergency Order no. 117/2004 and published in Mon. Of. no.1124/2004.

⁵ This EU decision body approved, in the same



NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

meeting, the Concept of ALTHEA operation from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Conclusions regarding Iraq and Sudan and the Third Party States' Participation to ESDP operations (by adopting two standard-agreements, as it was the one with Romania that has already been mentioned).

⁶ Published in *Cahier de Chaillot* no.75, p.228.

⁷ There are also taken into consideration the teaching and training institutions that are subordinated to the Ministry of Administration and Interior, including the

military institutions for gendarmes' ongoing training.

⁸ For this matter, it is important to state the papers elaborated by the Defence Ministry in 2005, **DIU-1. Manualul pentru instruirea militarilor în drept internațional umanitar, DIU-2. Manualul instruirii personalului Armatei Române privind statutul persoanelor capturate.** For the training system as a whole, see **SMG/I.F. Doctrina instruirii Armatei Române**, 2005.

Second Lieutenant Marius MILITARU is a public relation officer within the Romanian Gendarmerie. He graduated a Postgraduate Course on Negotiation organised by the Ministry of Administration and Interior.

Colonel (ret.) Professor Ion DRAGOMAN, PhD, is a doctorate consultant within the National Defence University "Carol I".



THE ACQUIS OF JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

Victor AELENEI, PhD

Justice and Internal Affairs Acquis represents the European paradigm conceived to insure freedom, security and justice for all the citizens of the old continent, contributing to the general welfare. European and national institutions that manage Internal Affairs and Justice must permanently watch over and counterattack organized crime at international level in order to protect life within the European community.

The citizens of the European Union have the fundamental right to free movement and to choose the place they want to work or to live with no restriction from the member states of the European Union. This right seems easily when formulated, but there are a series of impediments that have to be corrected for the Europeans to fully benefit from this right. The most important impediment and also very difficult to accomplish is the setting up of European space of freedom, security and justice. Within this space, the Europeans must enjoy the free movement and the protection against organized crime at international level as well as the equal access to the legal system and to have all the fundamental rights granted by the member states of the European Union.

All the activities, actions and policies within the European Union are included in a legal framework, the so called Community Acquis. The word *acquis* comes from French and is written and pronounced as in its language of origin, meaning "what was acquired".

The community *acquis* is a set of rights obligations and legal norms regulating the activity of European Communities and EU institutions that the EU member states committed to.

The community *acquis* consists of the following European laws: the fundamental law (The treaty for developing a European constitution); basic community legislation (treaties like the ones of Paris, Rome, Brussels, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, Accession to the EU treaties, etc); secondary

legislation adopted based on treaties (regulations, directives, decisions, etc.); the jurisprudence of European Communities Court of Justice and the First Instance Tribunal; declarations; resolutions; international agreements the European community is part of; general principles of law, etc.

The community *acquis* is implemented directly, there is no need for the norms to be ratified; they are either adopted in the national legislation (as directives are), or are directly implemented (as regulations are). These dispositions are translated into the national language of the EU member state for a better understanding. The physical bodies and the legal bodies must have equal access to these community legal acts.

The community legislation targets both legal and physical bodies, covering various fields from agriculture, fishing to telecommunications, energy, competition or justice and home affairs where each field develops an *acquis* with specific terminology.

A common space for justice and cooperation was developed for the first time, being one of the fundamental objectives of the Rome Treaty which had to be enforced in order to develop a common market. Still, cooperation in the justice and home affairs field was established for the first time at the Tampere European Council meeting in 1999. The free movement of persons, the dissolution of internal borders checks, fighting organized crime, drug trafficking and the cooperation in the criminal and the civil field are part of the broader concept of internal market and cannot be implemented while internal borders still exist and individuals' movement is still restricted. The meaning of the concept of cooperation in justice and home affairs has changed very much in time.

Justice and home affairs is one of the three pillars the European Union is based on, together with European Communities (Pillar I) and External affairs and Common Security (Pillar II). The third Pillar, cooperation in justice and home affairs is



NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

part of the special dispositions in title VI of the Maastricht Treaty, where problems of common interest are provided with cooperation procedures. Later on the Treaties of Nice and Amsterdam Treaties restructured the cooperation in justice and home affairs, setting as an objective the developing of a common space of freedom, security and justice introducing the Schengen legislation at the same time.

Currently, justice and home affairs are provided in articles 29 – 42 of the EU Treaty, articles 17-22 and 61-69 of the Treaty for setting up the European Community.

Currently the JAI acquis includes the following fields of analysis that can appear in the common space of freedom, security and justice: the Schengen space; the visas policies; the data protection field; the police cooperation and fighting organized crime field; the customs cooperation field; fighting fraud and corruption; legal cooperation in the criminal and civil fields.

In the near future the JAI aquis will be unified in a general common legal frame, according to the European Constitution provisions, signed by the heads of states and governments at the Capitol in Rome on October 29th 2004, eliminating the pillar structure. JAI will be monitored by the European Council which defines the strategic approaches of the legislative and operational program within the space of freedom, security and justice. Within the Council a permanent committee will be set up to ensure the development of the operational cooperation regarding internal security within the European Union. This committee facilitates the coordination of the actions performed by the competent authorities in the member states. The permanent

committee will involve representatives of organizations and agencies of the European Union. The European Parliament and the national parliaments will be informed upon the carrying out of the discussions. The permanent council adopts European regulations in order to ensure administrative cooperation between the competent departments of the member states in the field of freedom, security and justice as well as between these and the European Commission. This council will decide on all the issues regarding cooperation in order to maintain European public order; this decision will be taken upon the proposal of the European Commission, following debates in the European Parliament.

The full success of implementing the JAI aquis in Romania, after January 1st 2007 depends on the fulfilment of three requirements: to employ specialized professionals for each field; the selection must start with the manager and end with common employees according to the community standards; to complete the standardization of the institutions / authorities and organizational structures according to the community requirements (from our point of view the main action must be taken in the field of border police, because the public order starts from the border); to continue trainers' training on the community curricula.

The effectiveness and the quality of the actions performed by the institutions and authorities with competences within JAI, regarding the maintenance of a European public order will be assessed by means of community variables ranging from one hour/day/week/month/trimester/semester to years for each member state/institution/national authority/directorate/department/office/public clerk.

Chief commissioner Victor AELENEI, holds a PhD in History, a degree in military science and law and he is a lecturer within the Law Faculty of the "Al. I. Cuza" Police Academy of Bucharest, he is an author of books, university manuals, studies and articles of fundamental research concerning the border police, border management and European legislation concerning the borders, and history.



EQUALITY OF CHANCES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Mirela ATANASIU

All the human beings are born free and equal in their dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and must behave each other in the fraternity spirit. Every human being can prevail by all his rights and freedoms proclaimed in the present Declaration (n.b. The Human Rights' Universal Declaration) no matter the race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, by national or social origin, wealth, born or any other circumstances.

The equality of chances can really assure when there won't be made no differences taking into account the political, judicial or international state's situation or its territory that detains from a person, no matter that country or territory is independent, under tutority, non-autonomous or obeyed to a sovereignty infringement.

Every human being has the right to life, freedom and its own person security. On this base, which comprises the entire European legislation in the field, is built the chance' equality in European Union, subject approached in the present article.

The Human Rights' Universal Declaration, adopted at 10 September 1948, is one from the primary but the most important from those kinds of acts that stipulates the human and citizens' rights. In this document, is stipulated for the first time the „equality of chances” concept in the wider framework of all individuals' equality. *“All the human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”*¹.

The European Union Policy regarding to the equality of chances between men and women is wide and comprise the legislation, the main-streams and the positive action that approaches this field. Also, there is included financial support through an action plan. This policy key objective is to eliminate the inequalities and to promote the equality between genders into the European Community borders conform to art. 2 of the European Commission Treaty and art. 141 (stipulates the equality between men and women on engagement

an occupation issues) but also in art. 13 (sexual discrimination inside or outside the workplace).

The fundamental human and citizen's rights are stipulated in many legislative European documents to create a close union between the Europe's peoples for a future based on common values.

The European Union's members must be aware about their moral and spiritual values, because of the fact that the Union itself is based on indivisibility, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity and although on democratic principles and law guidance.

1. The European laws that regards “the equality of chances”

a. The European Chart of Human Rights, signed at 7 December 2000, stipulates many elements that refer to the human dignity inviolability, personal physical and psychical integrity, the right to freedom and security.

In Chart's 20 to 26 articles are stipulated rights for the unfavourized categories right to „*equality in front of the law*”, to interdict all the discriminations of different natures: sexual, racial, colour, ethnical, social origin, language, religious or belief, political or any other opinion, belonging to a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.

Equality between men and women must be assured in all the areas inclusive of engagement, workplace or payment. The equality principle is available in the both ways. Other unfavourized categories over which a special protection is focused on: children, with wider or narrow rights after their age and maturity, the old people and the disabled people.

In the European Union states, the family policy is a base element that has as objectives: children, sexes, justice and social integration. So, the governs support the families:

- to minimize the material disadvantages for children of the monoparental families;



- to encourage the birth of children, element that actively participates to the demographic security;
- to prevent/reduce the children's poverty;
- to assure the equality of chances for children without focusing on their family background;
- to assure the equality of chances on the work market between men and women;
- to assure the new generations' socialization in the family environment.

In countries as France, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, children and families in generally have a special social protection from the state's part supporting families as:

- children's allocation;
- taxes' reduction for parents;
- provision of public facilities for child's care;
- covering a part of the children's needs: medical care, education, meals at school, transport;
- the preferential access assurance to houses for parents;
- parents' protection on the work market.

b. The Treaty instituting a Constitution for Europe from 16 December 2004. It stipulates as a fundamental principle of the European Union policies the one of eliminating the inequalities between women and men and of promoting the equality between genders.

c. The EU frame Strategy regarding the equality of chances between women and men (2001/2005). It has as an objective the elaboration and development of the Community Strategy in the equality of chances between men and women field by promotion the values and practices that are the base of the equality of chances through a preliminary analysis, through an improvement of the questions regarding this equality, through monitor and evaluation of the policies' impact to the European Union level by strengthening social partners role in equality of chances efficient promoting.

d. The European Social Chart from 26 February 1965, ratified by the Law no. 74 from 3 May 1999 for ratifying the revised European Social Chart, adopted at Strasbourg, 3 May 1996. It guarantees the access to the social rights without discrimination of gender and recognizes the worker of both genders right to an equal payment for an equal job, as well as is the maternal protection to the workplace and mothers' and children's rights to social and economic protection.

e. The Directive 79/7/CEE, 19 December 1978, referring to the progressive appliance of the treat-

ment equality between women and men in the social assurances field. The legal rules are applied to the social assurances. It concerns the equality treatment principle which supposes the lack of all the, direct or indirect, discrimination forms after criterion of gender in issues regarding the civil or family situation. The equality will comprise especially some aspects as:

- The area of rules' involvement in the social assurances field and their access.
- The obligation to fees and contributions' calculation.
- The benefits calculation (for example, social aid), inclusive their growth when there are persons in care and if the persons are involved in an marital affair and those rights maintenance.

f. The European Directive 86/378/CEE, 24 July 1986, regarding the application of the treatment equality principle between men and women in the occupational schemes framework of the social assurances. This rules woman's work, unemployed woman's statute, woman's position, the community engagement policy, equal treatment, fight against unemployment.

g. The European Directive 86/613/CEE, 11 December 1986, regarding the application of the treatment equality principle between men and women engaged in an activity, inclusive agriculture, developed on their own, as well as women's protection that have economic activities on their own in the pregnancy period. The Directive's prescriptions are applied when a couple lives together without being married, unemployed, not associated in a business that participates normally and in conformity with the national legislation to activities developed on their own making the same work or a complementary one. It prescribes the equality of treatment the same as the other directives and defines it as the lack of all forms of direct and indirect discrimination under the gender regarding the civil or family state.

h. The European Directive 73/2002/CE, 23 September 2002, modifies the Council's European Directive 207/76/CEE regarding the application of the equality of treatment principle between women and men concerning the access to occupation, formation and professional promotion and labour conditions. It defines the concept of equality of treatment as being the lack of all forms of direct or indirect discrimination under criterion of gender regarding their civil or family state. It willingly



prescribes the discrimination forbidden including a definition for direct and indirect discrimination and for the same time the concepts of harassments and sexual harassments.

i. *European Directive 75/117/CEE, 10 February 1975, regarding the member states legislations' alignment to the equal payment principle for male or female workers. It introduces the principle „equal payments for equal job”, that supposes an important step forward in the fight against the indirect salary discrimination. It's guaranteed, so, not only the right to the same payment for female and male workers that proceed the same job, but also for equal valued jobs.*

j. *The European Directive 113/2004/CE, 13 December, regarding the application of the equality of treatment principle between women and men concerning the access and provision of goods and services. The European Directive has as an objective to create a frame to prevent the discrimination after gender criterion in the issues concerning the access and provision of goods and services for the implementation to the member states level of the equality of treatment principle between men and women especially in problems concerning the payment and social contribution calculation, the gender criterion mustn't exist.*

k. *The European Directive 97/81/CE of the Council, 15 December 1997, concerning the Frame Agreement regarding the work with norm fraction signed by UNICE, CEEP and CES. Its main objective is the one which guarantees the elimination of the employees (male or female) discriminations.*

2. The Romanian legislation regarding the “equality of chances”

a. *The Romanian's Constitution. The fundamental law of the Romanian state ruled the fundamental rights, freedoms and duties of its citizens. In the art. 16 is stipulated the equality of chances: „The citizens are equal in front of the law and public authorities, without privileges and discriminations ... The functions and public dignities, civil or military, can be occupied, in law's conditions, by the persons with Romanian citizenship and living in our territory. The Romanian state guarantees the equality of chances between genders for occupying these functions and dignities”².*

b. *The Law no. 202/2002 regarding the equality of chances between women and men published*

in the Official Monitor Part I no. 301 from 8 May 2002 which contains prescriptions that have as goal to eliminate the direct and indirect discrimination by the gender criterion in all the public life spheres in Romania. By this law, as „equality of chances” is understood to take into consideration the different capabilities, needs and aspirations of males and females and also their equal treatment. These measures exist at work, education, health, culture and information field, decision making, as well in another fields, ruled by specific laws. In this law, are defined many notions as:

- „direct discrimination” – difference of treatment of a person on other's disfavour because of his belonging to a certain gender or gravidity, birth, maternity or paternal holiday;

- „indirect discrimination” represents the prescriptions', criteria and practices appliance apparently neutral, which, through their generating effects affects a certain gender persons, excepting the situation when their appliance can be justified through objective factors, without links with the gender;

- through „sexual harassment” is understood any form of behaviour close to the gender, about which the guilty one knows it affects persons' dignity if this behaviour is refused and represents the motivation for a decision that affects those persons;

- „stimulating measures” or „positive discrimination” are understood those special measures temporarily adopted for accelerating the actual accomplishment of this desire of chances' equality between men and women and that aren't considered discriminatory actions;

- „equal valued work” means the paid activity which after comparison having to the base the same indicators and measure units reflects some similar or equal knowledge and professional means use and equal intellectual or physical effort quantities to deposit³.

The organisms which survey and force this vision accomplishment regarding the free access on the work market, the non-discriminatory engagement and maintenance of a job are: The Labour and Social Solidarity Ministry, through its bodies (The National Agency for Workers Occupation, The National House for Assurances and Other Social Assurances Rights, The Work Inspection, The National Council for Adults' Professional Training), The Ministry of Education and Research, The



Ombudsman, The National Institute of Statistics, The Economic and Social Council and the syndicates' representatives.

3. Conclusions for Romania

The recent data show that the contemporary Romanian society having some progressist pattern lacks, tends to guide the relations between women and men built in the family, as well in the public life, toward a patriarchal pattern.

This pattern is shaped on the poverty and negative retrograde social evolutions of Romanian's transition and generates behaviours and retrograde and discriminatory social behaviours and practices especially from the country town as the studies shows.

It induces the idea of a sex inferiority/superiority and permits the practice different treatment for persons conforming to this criterion, fact that disrespects the elementary principles of democracy. The discriminations after the gender criterion elimination— visible or discreet – is one of the needed conditions for building an equitable society and for the evolvement to progress, this supposing the state's authority and every politician's effective involvement.

Equality of chances has long been ratified in Europe. In our country, too, **legislation** formally ensures equality between men and women.

Practically, discrimination is nevertheless quite spread, especially in the rural areas, where, according to the Rural Barometer 2006:

- **69%** of the respondents consider that a mother who is employed can look after her children just like one who is not,

- **71%** believe the best way a woman can become economically independent is a working place,

- **63%** answered university studies are less important for girls,

- **62%** opinate men conduct business better than women do,

- **97%** have electricity in their households,

- just **9%** have gas,

- **16%** have sewage,

- **50%** have a draw well in their yard,

- **18%** get their water from a public fountain,
- **16%** have running water in the house,
- **85%** have their toilet in the garden,
- **2%** have no toilet.

Moreover, in the European Union enlargement, Romania must choose between remaining an archaic-traditional isle with cultural models and sizeable production relations or integrating in a ruled space by the democracy standards and occidental civilization, with cultural options and progressist production relations.

If the choice is directed toward the European social pattern, the decision factors can't ignore anymore the problems regarding the existent discrepancies between the women and men situations and neither the economic and social consequences generated by them. The equality of chances is a necessity and simultaneously a chance for Romania.

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² **Romanian Constitution 2003.**

³ **The Law no. 202/2002 regarding the chances' equality between women and men**, published in the Official Monitor, Part I no. 301 from 8 May 2002.

Mirela ATANASIU is a reference specialist within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I".



AIR POWER MISAPPLICATION AND ITS EFFECTS AT STRATEGIC LEVEL

Mihail ORZEȚĂ, PhD

As an outgrowth of the creative imagination of some visionary builders, airplane embodied many enthusiasts' hopes, which deeply believed that they, finally, found out the key for rapidly gaining the victory in war. By overestimating the new weapon capability and also uncorrelated with real potential goals, several strategists and even military theoreticians ended in creating the impression that airplane was a sort of "oversold stock" as it could not meet the expectations during World War I.

Another category of military experts, generally people with a limited creative imagination, exerted great efforts and succeeded, for a rather long period of time to create a false impression that air force was a kind of "long-range artillery" and it should, therefore, be particularly employed in land force support and not to accomplish missions aiming at strategic purposes.

Practice mostly eliminated theoreticians' overrating, lack of imagination and creative initiative, and also some military commanders' voluntarism and fear to employ air force congruent with its combat capability. Over the time, aviation has evolved both conceptually, technologically and structurally into Air/Aerospace Forces. For the last decades, military experts have started to make use of a new concept clearly expressed by "Air Power" which defines a country (alliance) ability to project its force employing air assets.

Evolutionary process from aviation, through Air (Aerospace) Forces, to air (aerospace) power has been rather sinuous and marked by a chain of events that led to significant negative, both immediate and prospective, consequences. In this era of information and continuous learning, the real thing to do is to recall several lessons history taught which must not be forgotten. Otherwise, history will teach us again and the price to be paid may cost many human lives and damages along with, most frequently, loss of the battle, whether it is an operation or a war.

1. Blitzkrieg or Employing Aviation as "Long-Range Artillery"

Designed as an operation of armoured vehicles and assault troops supported by fighters and fighter-bombers, Blitzkrieg was a German experience during the civil war in Spain and produced spectacular effects during the World War II – the campaigns from Poland and France. Deafened by euphoric shouts of victory, only few Nazi leaders could remember strategy is more than a sum of operational actions; the error of concept was more obvious when Germany extended the front eastwards – to USSR – and southwards – to Africa. That was the time when there was felt the need for strategic aircraft to perform reconnaissance, transport and bombing over the deep enemy lines. Front extension called also forth an increase in airlift requirements as land and maritime assets were incapable of providing the necessary weapons, ammunitions, materials and manning within time limits and areas required by theatre commanders. Lack of adequate airlift assets was the result of both Nazi warfare concepts, firmly entrenched in operational field, and the difference between economic potential of Germany and its allies, on one hand, and USA, USSR, Great Britain, France and their allies, on the other hand. The first signs showing Nazism decay appeared during the "Battle of Britain" (from May to November 1940), when Luftwaffe did not succeed in achieving air supremacy, in spite of its superiority in numbers.

Starting with "Barbarossa" Operation (attack on the Soviet Union on 22nd of June, 1941) and the first remarkable results of the air attacks on the Soviet airfields led to gaining air supremacy on the Eastern front and created the illusion of a new rapid success. While land forces were moving forward eastwards, Nazi air force was constrained to act more and more as "long-range artillery", neglecting strategic tasks of maintaining air supremacy and air interdiction. This concept gradu-



ally resulted in losing the air supremacy, then the strategic initiative and ultimately the war.

2. Vietnam War or Employing Aviation against Guerrillas Using Concepts and Tactics Specific to Conventional and Nuclear Wars

Vietnam War opposed South Vietnam forces, supported by USA and their allies in Southeast Asia, to Vietnamese guerrillas (Vietcongs) directly supported by North Vietnam and indirectly by China, USSR and all other countries belonging to “socialist block”.

The experience from Korea (1950-1953), which could have led to an open war between USA and USSR, and even to a nuclear war, acted upon the US political decision-makers’ concept of conducting military operations. Thus, to avoid escalation of war and also USSR and China direct involvement in military operations, they dictated to in-theatre military commanders to report for validation all their major decisions.

This way of thinking and acting proved ineffective because, on one hand, it increased the probability of losing the advantages brought about by the courses of actions and, on the other hand, it denied the military commanders their right to initiative, turning them from decision-makers into “decision transmitters” or simply executors. As a consequence of this intricate situation, the Air Forces were operationally engaged based on concepts, equipment, tactics and procedures specific to a classical (Korean experience) and nuclear warfare against guerrillas. Such a policy caused a reduced operational effectiveness, air force employment, including B-52 bombers, prevalently in air support tasks which resulted in heavy losses of life and equipment; a negative impact on warriors’ morale; increased operations of North Vietnam forces culminating in General Giap-led offensive operation and appearance of the terrible spectre of an inglorious defeat. To avoid being defeated and determine the North-Vietnamese government to make peace, there was launched the “Linebaker I” operation (April – November 1972), marking the first adequate employment of the Air Forces in a war. It consisted in destruction of airfields, command posts and antiaircraft artillery elements and surface-to-air missiles, depots, bridges, road and railway junctions, etc. Considering the situation, North Vietnam rulers had to ask for peace nego-

tiations. Under the increasing pressure of public opinion against the war, the President of the US accepted North Vietnam request, which tried to delay peace negotiations in Paris in order to replace their losses and recover the damages from bombing. Americans conducted Operation Linebaker II (December, 18-29, 1972), in order to make North Vietnam abide by their commitments. President Nixon’s goal was an “honourable peace” but military planners aimed at gaining victory by causing economic and military crack-up to North Vietnam. Operating for the first time almost without any restrictions against selected targets, according to combat principles in correlation with strategic goal, the Allied Air Forces succeeded in only 11 days to force North Vietnam to come back to the negotiating table and make peace with South Vietnam in March 1973. Thus, the ultimate political goal (honourable peace) was reached but **not** the military one. The war final result generated a strong reaction of dissatisfaction among the military, particularly air personnel. They considered that the war was lost because of the political leadership, which limited them in doing their duty.

3. The War between Arabians and Israelis in 1973 (Yom Kippur War) or Employing Air Forces in Defensive Operations

After the “6-day War” from 1967, ended with the Israeli victory and occupation of Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and West Bank territory, both the winners and defeated prepared for a new “round” that occurred in 1973. Reviewing the strategic background, the following are the conclusions to be drawn:

- Israelis were superior as far as Air Forces and combat equipment were concerned; they had a capable ground based air defence system and highly trained personnel.

- In combat, they were at a disadvantage by the small dimensions of their national territory; limited human resources so that they could not afford heavy losses; their limited economic potential, which did not enable sustained operations; their lack of respect towards Arabians.

- Arabian forces were superior in numbers but partially the combat equipment and the personnel training were lower than Israelis’.

- International public opinion still was under the impression of the “6-day War”, when Israel



took Egypt by surprise with a successful air operation which led to gaining the war; a repetition of the events dated 1967 would have led to the isolation of Israel or at least to an extremely reduced support.

Both sides knew rather well each other and after a careful consideration Arabian forces decided to launch a surprise attack with an offensive air operation. The ultimate goal of the war was to regain the territories lost in 1967. The aim of the air operation aim was to gain air supremacy and, therefore, the following tasks were assigned:

- Destroy the forward positions of radars, antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles in Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights; gain limited control over the combat air space to prevent Israeli Air Forces (IAF) to capitalize on their technical superiority.

- Force IAF to scatter their efforts by operating within two theatres – Sinai and Golan – therefore, diminishing their responsiveness.

- Strike IAF airfields and their logistic support elements in order to reduce their offensive potential.

- Focus air efforts on land support and employ air combat only in strategic depth of the national territory or when ground based air defence within the combat area was unable to operate.

Arabian military planners planned Yom Kippur (an Israeli significant holy day) for starting the war through an offensive air operation; they only performed an air strike employing about 200 aircraft over 12 airfields and several other sites where radars, antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles, land batteries and depots were located. Israeli sources appreciated that further strikes were not carried out because of Arabians' heavy losses (over 60 aircrafts) and marginal point effects. Other sources said that the reason for not performing further strikes was that the first air attack accomplished the offensive air operation goals. The truth is likely to be known when the records are disclosed and allowed for reading. Noteworthy is the fact that Arabian forces' initial plans changed and they deliberately gave up initiative and air force

employment in offensive missions, thus limiting its capability and negatively affecting chances of gaining victory. The effects felt instantly materialized into a truce not a victory as the Arabian participants planned. It has also to be noted that the truce conditions were detrimental to Arabian forces. Therefore, the reasonable conclusion is that air force employment in mostly defensive tasks means a deliberate limitation of their capability, which leads to tipping the victory balance in enemy's favour.

4. Conclusions

We must learn the lessons history teaches us. Otherwise, it may cost many human lives and combat equipment in order to learn them again. The simplest and most beneficial way of avoiding errors and minimizing irretrievable losses is learning from others' experience. Although lessons learned represent a constant concern all over the world, learning appears to be more a desire than a real fact; how could otherwise someone explain why many mistakes repeatedly occur (as it happened in August, when Israeli Air Forces were employed against Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon, just as the American Air Forces were employed in Vietnam).

Air force employment, mostly in tactical missions, will inevitably lead to losing air supremacy, strategic initiative and eventually the war.

Aiming at a desired and not a possible goal along with incompetence and lack of courage most frequently result in air force wrong employment during a war.

No major war or conflict has been won without air supremacy and that is why it must be the primary task of a strategic commander.

To assign solely defensive tasks to Air Forces means to deliberately diminish their capability, to focus on present time and not on future, on operational and not on strategic area. Using a metaphor, it is like keeping a dog chained while it is earmarked to guard a whole yard.

Major General Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD, is the Director of the General Staff. He has written books, studies and articles on military strategy and art, national and international security.



SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE EARLY XXIST CENTURY

Sorin MOISE, PhD

Identifying the security strategies and policies at the beginning of the XXIst century is tantamount to defining security. The major mutations of the international relations in the late XXth century, following the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and the South-Eastern European countries, have led to a new pattern of power relations, with unmediated consequences for the international and national security. As the only superpower, the United States has global responsibilities that forge their role as the supreme world leader on the international stage. On the other hand, the Russian Federation, while striving to build a democratic society, aims mainly to restore its image of a great power on the international scene, which was seriously damaged in the aftermath of the fall of communism. Analysing the trends in Asia-Pacific entails pertinent conclusions for the security strategies and policies, as the main focus of the American foreign policy is acknowledged to have set in this region.

1. Evolution trends of the Euro-Atlantic security

Two events that have left a heavy mark on the international relations should be presented before identifying the aspects of security at the beginning of the XXIst century. The first one is the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower, which led to the end of the Cold War, and the second one is the consolidation of the United States as the only superpower for the time being.

The dissolution of communism in the Soviet Union and the South-Eastern European countries confirmed the history logic according to which “empires are inherently politically instable, as the subordinated parts would always prefer a greater autonomy, and the counter/elites of these parts would act, whenever fit, for greater autonomy. Thus, empires do not fall, but rather disintegrate usually very slowly, although sometimes quite fast”¹.

The American supremacy is the result of the

historical development, which fostered during the XXth century the rise of the United States as a main actor on the international scene. The first World War saw two different views clash over the approach of international relations. The American president W. Wilson showed to the Europeans another perspective on the international relations, which would replace the balance of power dominating the international scene as promoted by the great European powers, with the concept of collective security. It entailed the diminution of the role of the traditional diplomacy as empowered by experts and the development of new means for regulating the relations among States, with the open agreements and the public opinion playing a major role². The American supremacy is the result of an unrecorded economic dynamism, as after the Second World War, the United States became the uncontested leader of democratic society and the engine of world economy. The United States account for approximately 30% of the world GNP, and significant investments and technological transfer to areas of strategic interest as Europe, Asia and Latin America contributed to their developing into major economic centres of the international economic system. The international financial institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were established following American initiatives and are controlled by the United States. Unlike other historical ages, US is the superpower lying at the core of an interdependent universe, in which power is promoted through negotiations, dialogues and, not seldom, diverging approaches in search of a solution in forging formal consensus.

Consequently, any approach of the regional or international security requires analyzing the role and influence of the US, as the main regulating force of the current international system. It should be pointed out that the US has priority geo-strategic and geopolitical interests in Europe, due, on one hand, to the political and economic significance of the European continent and, on the other hand, to the role that the European states play in order to



maintain the American influence in the region. After the Second World War, the United States provided the security umbrella for the Western Europe against the aggressive politics of the Soviet Union, as well as substantial financial support in order to redress their economies. Although issues such as the political or military cooperation have sometimes entailed contradictory views or misunderstandings, on the overall, the relations between the United States and the Western European countries have evolved accordingly.

As for the European security, the mainstream of foreign policies considers it to depend mainly upon the relations of Germany and France, which are the hardcore of the European Union. The evolution of these relations is most interesting to analyze as the Franco-German reconciliation was a priority for both countries after the Second World War. After the war, Germany subdued to France's leadership in Europe so as to prove its loyalty to the European values and restore its political and moral credibility. Although France is a middle power, the illusion of a global role was maintained by its contribution to securing the security of some African francophone countries and the favourable climate during the cold war when a divided Germany and the open pro-American politics of Great Britain left France as the only great European power that could have promoted its vision of European Union. The reunion of Germany changed the balance of forces since its economic dynamism made it the first European power and even a partial world power due to its financial contributions to support some important international institutions³.

Given the new international climate, Germany would no longer accept France's leadership, particularly since, as far as security is concerned, the only country capable of ensuring the security of the whole Europe, not only Germany, was US. This led, beyond contesting the importance of the Franco-German relations for the future of Europe, to areas of special interests for each of the two countries. Consequently, Germany, benefiting from the US' tacit support, undertook to affirm its stronger regional role, favourable for the formation of a modern Mitteleuropa that would include France to the West and the former Central-European socialist countries and the Baltic countries to the East. The elimination of the last barriers with Poland (the formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse border) significantly amplified the German-Polish

relations. This strategy brought particular results for the relations of the two countries, having Poland as the main Germany's commercial partner in the Eastern Europe and Germany as the stronger advocate for the Poland's European and North-Atlantic integration.

Poland's role in building the future of Europe was designed and consolidated when acceding to the *Weimar Triangle* as the two great European powers, France and Germany, appreciated the necessity and opportunity to Poland's participation to the periodical consultations launched in the German little town of Weimar meant to consolidate the German-Franco-Polish influence to deploy the projects for the affirmation of the European Union. Equally, Germany aims for Poland to bridge its influence to the North over the Baltic countries and to the East to Ukraine⁴. It should be stressed that, paradoxically, Germany emerged stronger after the two World Wars of the XXth century than its neighbours. The vitality of the German people proved by its strong coming back to the regional and world economic flow is a reason for the pundits of international relations to predict a more and more outstanding in the future European and even global security architecture. Accepting on short term the protection of the American security it does not mean that Germany would not be tempted following strengthening its position in the European Union, to tighten its relations, in the long run, with a restored Russia as favoured by the historic tradition according to which the two states recorded appropriate development when cooperating and stagnated when tension arose⁵. It is difficult to envisage such alternatives for the time being, as Europeans are sensitive to a leading role for Germany in the continent and as US is interested in preserving a united Europe attached to the Franco-German alliance, so as to prevent the aspirations of supremacy of a single great European power.

The American diplomacy should opt for a flexible and considerate approach to spare Germany and France's elation, since both display the tendency to extend their regional influence in the logic of their historical past. Thus, US should persuade France to commit to a deeper military and political integration into the Euro-Atlantic security and political structures and to recognise the German current leadership while preventing the distrust of France, England and other European middle powers. The explanation for the US indulging the French taking



the spotlight on such issues, as the European identity or NATO, is lying in its historical role to block up the rising of Germany which might menace the European unity and, consequently, the security of our continent. Although France is no longer a significant world force, its constructive influence in the African francophone countries, especially Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, is not to be dismissed as it fosters stability and security in the southern flank of Europe overlapping the NATO security concerns in the area. Europe's consolidation as a regional entity holding a significant weight for the world affairs was constantly promoted by the European leaders enjoying the support of US as it always promoted the strengthening of the European political and economic structures in connection to NATO, as the only way to ensure, according to the American perspective, the real security of the European continent.

If during the Cold War the political and military cooperation of US and Europe was normal, some issues pertaining specifically to this cooperation surfaced after the end of this period. One of the pending issues concerns the evolution of the military and political American-European relations, more precisely the perspectives of the security guarantees offered by NATO in the framework of its enlargement as well as European Union enlargement and consolidation. NATO's capacity to quickly adjust to the new climate following the fall of communism was acknowledged by some of its initiatives, as the special partnerships with the former communist countries of the Centre and South-East of Europe, including Russia, which increased its credibility and favoured the enlargement. Equally, its strategic intervention for the resolution of the crises in the former Yugoslavia proved it as the main provider and warrantor of the European security. As mentioned above, the US constantly expressed its support for the idea of a united Europe and consequently, every European Union's enlargement was regarded as compatible with NATO's enlargement as ensuring Europe's security provided for the Americans to maintain their control over Eurasia, the most important area of the world geopolitics. The recent European security initiatives promote the idea to prepare and deploy military operations with partial involvement of NATO induced some serious controversies. The most sensitive issue concerns the use of the American logistics bases in Europe which, in

the perspective of military operations engaged by Europe without the US participation, would generate frustrations for the US for not being involved in an area of major interest for the world security. Although, US is convinced that such ambiguities should be settled, provided for the consolidation of the political identity of the European Union, when adjustments of the structure and missions of NATO would be required in order to treat Europe as a partner and to conceive the security cooperation as 1+1, meaning US+EU⁶. A powerful and united Europe should engender a new US approach of the American-European relations that would go beyond the current strategy of regarding Europe as a regional market to measures of increasing US' inclination to view Europe as a global partner in matters of politics and security. The European Union, currently engaged in the deepening of its own institutions needs US to ensure its security and, consequently, NATO provides for a viable and efficient solution for all the states in the area. It is equally significant that the European security strategy assigns an essential role to Ukraine that might in the future evolve into an important link of a security area including Germany and, as such, the whole of Europe, Poland and France. Although the March 2006 elections recorded the pro-Russian option of the Ukrainians, the accession to the Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security structures is still a viable objective, which might become achievable in the future due to the pressure of the public opinion.

2. The place and role of the Russian Federation in the international and regional security structure

The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a present-day Russia dealing with new issues, related not only to the economic development and political restoration, but also to its emergent role and place in the international system.

The end of the communist period meant a chance for Russia to revolve to democracy and market economy, against the inherent hardships of the transition. The loss of supremacy in the communist world and the disappointment and chaos caused by the poor administration of Eltsin presidency, which recorded the rising of the criminal activity and the consolidation of mafia structures, fostered a negative perception of most of the Rus-



sians over the internal evolution of the state affairs. This perception was speculated by the extreme right and left nationalism criticism claiming the Occident to be the main culprit for the state of affairs in Russia.

The post-communist age disclosed some serious issues that Russia should settle, and their pointing out allows a better framing of this great power in the contemporary international relations. The fact that the fall of communism damaged Russia's traditional supremacy in the North, West and South, as some of the newly independent states officially claimed their distance from Moscow, is beyond contestation. Building on the support of some still submissive states, Russia promoted the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Independent States as the means to minimise the consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and to induce the states within its area of influence to subdue to its leadership.

The newly adopted concept, that of the "close abroad", envisages regional economic cooperation, as well as important political and security objectives such as: the conclusion of a formal treaty stipulating the cooperation of the military forces of the member states, under Russian leadership; a decisive role for the Russian military forces in the peace-keeping tasks in the CIS area; common foreign policy defined by all the CIS member states, and the main institutions established for the implementations of the decisions adopted in this area to be seated in Moscow; the Russian president chairing the high-level meetings. The project is not deprived of real support as the Russian Federation and some CIS member states have established economic ties which could be re-launched in the framework of regional cooperation.

The success of this policy depends on the approach of these relations as enjoining from Moscow of projects unrelated to the interests of all the parties involved may cause tensions and, consequently, unpredictable consequences for the regional security. Unlike this system, in the European Union, most of the them record a similar level of economic development, all States participate to decision-making, independent of their economic power and territory, and the European budget allows for the substantial support of poorer countries.

Consequently, Russia is not politically powerful enough to impose its own vision and not enough

economically developed to become an attraction for the newly independent states. The pressure from Russia made these states look for alternative solutions, some in the West, others in China or Islamic countries. Ukraine is a pertaining example. Ukraine's reluctance to Russian proposals to integrate into the economic structures of CIS led to a violent reaction from Russia against its independence propensity in the form of denial of the recognition of its borders and contestations of Ukraine's rights over Crimea, etc. These acts favoured the Ukrainian nationalism head against Russia and the assertion of the intention to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures, which was already endorsed and heavily stimulated by the West. The approaches of the European and American politicians over the matter have pointed out ideas referring to Ukraine's importance as an independent state for the security and stability of the whole Europe and to Ukraine's uncontested place in Europe. US, in particular, endorsed the necessity of a strategic partnership with Ukraine, of equal importance and significance as the one with Russia. Ukraine's geopolitical role for the plans aiming to restore Russian influence in the European area is fundamental. Without Ukraine, Russia loses its links to Europe and is more of an Asian than European power. It accounts for the early 2006 Ukrainian-Russian crisis generated by the increase of the natural gas prices. The display of pressure from Russia was intended to sanction Ukraine's affinity for the West as well as a reminder for the countries in its area of influence that Russia did not exhaust all its resources as concerns the trends in the region. As to confirm the latest evolutions, the March 2006 elections ruled in Victor Yanukovich led pro-Russian party. Although a compact part of the Ukrainian electorate opts for their country's integration into the European Union and NATO, the Russian preferences of the Eastern Ukraine is not to be dismissed. The stake is very high as, according to analysts, Russia perceives Ukraine as a geopolitical pivot in Eurasia playing a similar part to the Franco-German alliance in the European Union⁷. In the South, Russia is confronted with complicated and highly sensitive issues due to the major interest proved by other regional powers in the evolution of the states located in the area. The well-known American politics analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski names this area as the *Balkans of Eurasia* given its similarities to the *Balkans in Europe*⁸.



The Balkan region in Europe is known throughout history as a tensioned area, experiencing a high level of insecurity which triggered many ethnic and international conflicts, calling for the involvement in the area of great powers of the time to resolve the problems. The extension of the term to the countries of Central Asia and Caucasus as provided by the comparison operated by the American analyst is not lacking substance, as they are all facing issues surprisingly similar to those ones of the European Balkans. All the countries in the area are politically instable, face serious internal problems, pending border issues as they all claim territories within neighbouring states, are ethnically heterogeneous and some of them are already scarred by interethnic and religious wars and conflicts.

The end of Moscow's trusteeship over these territories left room for other important geopolitical actors, such as Turkey, Iran and more recently, China to step in along Russia, which continues to exert its influence. The major interest of the mentioned states is justified on grounds of economic significance of the area due to its rich natural gas and large oil reserves. This area comprises nine countries, out of which eight - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia - were part of the former soviet empire and Afghanistan. The Caucasian countries - Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan - have a well-defined historical conscience, while the states of central Asia are striving to achieve their national identity, as tribal entities are still powerful and cause conflicts and dissension.

The specific problems of the area are very important and require a thorough analysis of their implications for the regional and international security. For instance, as the national feeling predominates over the Islamic population in Central Asia, it may lead to an Islamic renaissance, discretely and astutely encouraged by Iran and even Saudi Arabia⁹.

As Turkey is concerned, it shows some interest for the Turk populations in the area of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia and is tempted by the historical role it could play in the region, amplified by the strong economic consequences. Turkey would not settle for a contemplative position, as it defined clear strategies capable to increase its influence in the area.

Thus, Turkey undertook to train the new generations of officers and tenths of thousands of Turk-

ish-speaking students originating from the Asian countries. It also planned important programmes to promote common education patterns, the extension of transport networks, the development of commerce and intensified cultural cooperation with Turkey. Both Iran and Turkey, although they account for significant geopolitical landmarks in the area, do not rise to a real threat to Russia's position for they have different political inclinations which hamper the mutual support of their interests. It should not be neglected that Russia's interests in the South cross over those ones of Turkey and Iran tension could arise in the future. On short term, Russia's strategy builds on the exploitation of the current climate within these countries using its ties with the elites trained in Moscow and interfering with their internal problems provided for their lack of consistency and national unity. Thus, taking advantage of the tensions in Abkhazia, Russia established military bases in Georgia, saw the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as an opportunity to bring troops in Armenia, maintained its forces in the area on account of the civil war in Tajikistan and put economic and political pressure over Kazakhstan to elicit its agreement for setting up Russian military bases.

The control over Azerbaijan is vital for Russia as its placing within the Russian influence area allows the isolation of Central Asia from the West, favouring Russia's supremacy in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and consolidating its influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the peoples in the regions are more and more aware of their national identity and their opportunities, the Russian objectives are harder to achieve or be conserved where they were already fulfilled. Their suspicions for the CIS formula which conserves Moscow's leadership made them coalesce within the framework of the Central Asian Economic Union, established in 1993, aiming to intensify regional cooperation. The evolution of Azerbaijan confirms these trends. It refused hosting Russian military bases and rejected Moscow's request to build an oil pipeline crossing a Russian port, opting for a route through Georgia towards Turkey. Uzbekistan displayed similar attitudes as it repeatedly declared its opposition to Russia's propensity to rule through the supranational organs of CIS causing violent reactions in the Russian media. Kazakhstan, in its turn, due to the restrictive Russian policy, preferred alternative routes for its pipelines by-passing Russia



uted with substantial amounts of money to China's economic development, and the business environment in Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand is significantly controlled by the Chinese community in these countries. Equally, although the Chinese in Malaysia account for a third of the country's population, they dominate its economy¹⁵. Thus, the spiritual unity of all the Chinese proved an important incentive, generating progress and emulation. Paradoxically, it was Confucianism, China's defining philosophy, held the main responsible at the turn of the century for the country's underdevelopment that would set the basis for the Chinese progress as intended by the Chinese rulers. The Chinese Government asserted the union of all Chinese for the service of the Great China, proclaiming Confucianism as the mainstream of the Chinese culture.

This way of thinking is specific to the whole Asia and many believe that its economic success owes much to the Asian culture, thought to be superior to the Western one. For many Asian groups, the success of their regions was fostered by the primacy of the group interests over the individual ones and the promotion of the Asian virtues that allowed to the area to reach up to the Western countries. A Malaysian official asserted that "*the work ethics promoted by the Japans and Koreans, consisting of discipline, loyalty and industry, served as a reason of force for the economic and social development of their countries. This work ethics was built on the philosophy according to which the group or the country is more important than the individual*"¹⁶.

As far as security is concerned, there are some particular features that require a thorough analysis of the consequences for the economic development of cultural affinities and it should not be ruled out the possibility for economic success and prosperity to hide vulnerabilities related especially to national ambitions. Unlike Europe, where NATO and the European Union regulate the relations among states and preserve the stability and security of the area, there are no multilateral cooperation structures in Asia to dilute absorb or contain possible conflicts generated by ethnic, national or territorial issues which are pervasive in the region. *SEATO* (South East Asia Treaty organization), the only regional security organization was dissolved and replaced by *ASEAN* (the Association of the South East Asia Nations) enjoying competences for the economic and political cooperation and less for

dealing with security issues. Other two regional organizations, *ARF* (the Asian Regional Forum) and *APEC* (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) do not resemble the multilateral cooperation system in Europe. The European security is conceived and achieved on the basis of the North-Atlantic cooperation and the US and Europe have created mechanisms and structures to ensure an integrated military command. There are no such institutions in Asia, as the security treaty concluded by the USA and Japan provides for a unilateral guarantee and does not reflect a comprehensive Asian strategy. Although most of the Asian countries benefit of the American protection of world balance, many of them uphold an unaligned politics avoiding formal political ties with the US. It is true that the European security model was established as a reaction to the threat embodied by the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. There is no strategic or political background in Asia which would favour the grouping of all the countries in the region in one structure, but for a serious threat to their security from the part of China. Even though, it would be difficult to envisage a duplication of the Cold War scenario. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union was considered as a real threat to the entire Europe, while an Asian nation, even China, is unlikely to be currently perceived as capable of threatening simultaneously all its neighbours¹⁷.

After all, every power in the region is more interested in preventing its neighbours to coalesce against it than to conquer them. The situation engendered by the early 1996 crisis relative to Taiwan is symptomatic for the position of the states in the area. The blockage of the maritime and air access to an area close to Taiwan by the Chinese military forces determined US to retaliate by deploying a demonstrative naval operation. Thailand supported China's intervention and Indonesia insisted that this issue concerned China exclusively, while Philippines and Malaysia claimed neutrality¹⁸.

The fact that the most Asian States continuously pile up military equipment is of concern for the regional security.

According to the last statistics of the International Strategic Studies Institute, Asia has become the world's biggest weapons importer, leaving Europe and the Middle East behind.

The region's insecurity is caused by many territorial issues added up throughout the history that



are still pending as, for instance, the Paracel and Spratly islands generating a dispute among China and some states of South-Eastern Asia over the energy reserves in the sea shelf, China claiming that the two islands in the Southern China Sea are included in the Chinese jurisdiction. Senkaku islands form the object of a dispute between China and Japan, pertaining to their historical rivalry for regional supremacy as this difference acquired a symbolic colour. The instability in the Korean peninsula, caused by a North-Korean decision to produce nuclear arms may tension the area upholding the risk of a war to which both China and Japan would not rest indifferent. There are many other latent territorial issues related to the borders between Russia and China, China and Vietnam, Japan and Korea, China and India, etc. The regional security is influenced by the two strategic action lines: in the North-Eastern Asia, China, Japan, Russia and US are facing a potential conflict in the Korean peninsula, and in the South-Eastern Asia, the interests of China, Japan, India, US and Indonesia should be made compatible with those ones of Vietnam, Thailand, Australia and Philippines. The different distribution of power in the region accounts for different perceptions of the regional security of the mentioned states. China is the region's most important military power, as embodied by a strategic doctrine according to which its naval forces have the mission to undertake an *active defence at sea*, which would allow the control of the Taiwan Straits and in the South China Sea. Japan is certain to envisage increasing its military capabilities, but for the time being its armed forces are not involved in the Japanese foreign policy relying on the American military presence¹⁹. The lack of a power balance is favouring lately regional regrouping in order to prevent the increase of Chinese power and influence in the area and to diminish the American presence. Thus, Australia and Indonesia, although had some hostile relations for some time, began cooperation in order to coordinate their military actions to adopt a common position over security issues. Singapore acceded to the agreement. Indonesia, with Muslim majority,

enjoys friendly relations with Iraq, Iran, Libya, all of them facing an American embargo, and justifies them on grounds of the interests of its foreign policy. The American presence in Asia-Pacific is extremely important for the security of the region, but as great powers as Japan, China and India are willing to get more involved, it is possible to cause changes in the power configuration.

NOTES:

¹ Donald PUCHALA, *The History of the Future of International Relations, Etics and International Affairs*, no. 8/1994, p. 183.

² Henry KISSINGER, **Diplomația**, Bic All, Bucharest, 2003, p. 17.

³ The German total budget breakdown: EU – 28.5%; NATO – 22.8%; UN – 8.93%; it is one of the most important shareholders of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

⁴ Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, **Marea tablă de șah. Supremația americană și imperatiivele sale geostrategice**, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucharest, 2000, p. 84.

⁵ Henry KISSINGER, **op. cit.**, p. 28.

⁶ Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, **op. cit.**, p. 91.

⁷ John MORRISON, *Pereyaslan and after: The Russian-Ukrainian Relationship*, *International Affairs*, no. 69/1993, p. 677.

⁸ Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, **op. cit.**, p. 139.

⁹ Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, **op. cit.**, p. 150.

¹⁰ “*The disappearance of the empire or the rebirth of Russia*”, article published by the general Alexandr Lebed in *Segodnia* newspaper on 26 April 1996.

¹¹ Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, *Why International Primacy Matters*, *International Security*, 1993, p. 149.

¹² Kishore MAHBUBANI, *The Pacific Way*, *Foreign Affairs*, no. 79, January 1995, pp. 100-103.

¹³ Alex KERR, *Japan Times*, 6 November 1994, p. 10.

¹⁴ Edward FRIEDMAN, *A Failed Chinese Modernity*, *Daedalus*, 1993, p. 5.

¹⁵ *The Economist*, 27 November 1993, p. 10.

¹⁶ Mahathior bin MOHAMAD, *Mare Jirerna*, Inura Bunka Jigyō, Tokio, p. 267.

¹⁷ Henry KISSINGER, **op. cit.**, p. 97.

¹⁸ Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, **op. cit.**, p. 176.

¹⁹ Henry KISSINGER, **op. cit.**, p. 99.

Sorin MOISE holds a BA degree in Law from the University of Bucharest, a PhD in military sciences and he graduated the National Defence College. He is a diplomat within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.



THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO THE LONG WAR

Alin BODESCU

The aim of this article is to highlight the General Abizaid's manoeuvrist approach to crises in the world's hottest region.

In March 2006, Commander United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), General John P. Abizaid, was expressing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee the *Statement on the USCENTCOM posture in 2006¹ (the Statement)* or, in other words, his views on how crises must be addressed in his command's Area of Responsibility² (AOR) for the short term period. *The Statement* let us know that the War in that area of the globe would be a long one, *the Long War*.³

The Statement came after a speech⁴ General Abizaid held at the US Naval War College, in the fall of 2005, which attracted some controversy around it. Then, reportedly, General Abizaid expressed his views on the situation US was facing in the Middle East to those for whom, more than for his generation, the Long War would make more sense. Although the General's intent was to deliver a speech to a limited audience, a student jotted down the ideas, and got them spread having a very high military authority's consent - General Peter J. Schoomaker, the *old boy* called back in service, after he retired, to revitalize the US Army. That General Schoomaker considered important to spread the word throughout the military community reveals the magnetism and the role that message could have played. He empowered the military organization to convey the message to the American people. Since then, the commander USCENTCOM appeared again (August 2006), before of the same committee, to update its members on the status of the war in Iraq and, although the General's optimism appeared diminished, his messages are still relevant for the issue under discussion.

Both the *Statement* delivered in March 2006 and the speech held at Naval War College are marked by General Abizaid's personality and his strong belief that the crises in the Area Of Responsibility

must be approached in an *interagency* manner, and on a *long* term perspective.

Why do we consider General Abizaid a supporter of manoeuvrist approach to the Long War? Although there is no direct reference to this command philosophy in one of the documents we are discussing about in this article, several undertakings or statements could indicate his inclination for this attitude. Before discussing the major themes that reflect the General's approach to warfare, we will try first to introduce the reader in the essence of the *manoeuvrist approach* to warfare and then to grasp the need for a Long War.

Either from a British⁵ or an American⁶ perspective, the *manoeuvrist approach* to warfare or the manoeuvre warfare refer to the same doctrinal concept that seeks to develop an attitude of mind *in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed and to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function*. Or in other words, is how to adapt one's military behaviour to the continuously changing environment. The emphasis is on *how a commander thinks about the execution of the mission he has been given*.

It is not only the *friendly forces* commanders' realm, but even Al Qaeda could be suspected to have been embarked on a manoeuvrist platform. We know that the Manoeuvrist Approach has its roots in the difficulty a small army had to fight a larger opponent. The comparison that we have just made suggests an asymmetry. By comparing the physical strength of Al Qaeda to the strength of the *Leviathan* one, there can be discovered an obvious asymmetry.

The conduct of a conflict between such disproportionate forces is an asymmetrical warfare in which the weaker, aware of its impotence, would try to *negate the US strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and "dirty" in combat*.⁷ Isn't that sound familiar to the manoeuvrist fan club members?



Manoeuvrist approach is not mere manoeuvre the enemy around the battlefield. Manoeuvrist approach is more about “manoeuvring” one’s mind toward finding the most efficient and less bloody course of action to win a battle.

In the stability operations, like those ones carried out in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, the manoeuvrist approach has its own particularities. The commanders have to seek those situations whose outcome might be advantageously used and their effect maintained. The legal aspects and rules of engagement, the prevention of ethnic cleansing or sectarian violence could be some examples of situations which can be exploited to help defeating the enemy. The commander who focuses exclusively on the material, seeking attrition rather than the perceptions and attitudes of the local populations or enemy’s, will not succeed in persuading the world about his peaceful intentions. The application of the manoeuvrist approach in stability operations requires time and resources to be allocated to perception management activities.

This comes to explain why General Abizaid was preferred as the commander of USCENTCOM when the war in Iraq lost its attritional character and gained a more sophisticated, mixed military and civilian nature.

The General’s strength is given by his Arab-mindedness expressed through his descend, language proficiency and cultural awareness. He was assessed as the most appropriate person to win the minds and hearts of the population in whose countries he was also supposed to deliver some bold strikes against terrorist and insurgents. By winning this soft battle he would take the lead against the hard nucleus of Islam world – the fundamentalism. It takes a manoeuvrist mind to employ forces under your command throughout a so diversified realm of tasks, from the punctual task of killing Taliban or Al Qaeda leaders through the humanism of building a school or a well to winning by your side the elders of a community as to not provide the terrorist safe haven. This is the substance of *defeating terrorism*.

When it comes to Long War, a few questions naturally arise in one’s mind. Why does USA need to approach the war against terrorism on a long basis?

Moreover, who are the artisans of this work and how are they going to do it? The answers should be looked for in the highest US security policy docu-

ment and the framework it creates: The US National Security Strategy.

The US National Security Strategy of March 2006 (NSS)⁸ creates the policy framework which defines this new concept and clearly articulates the conditions for the Long War. The main task of the NSS, which *the Statement* reiterates, is *defeating the terrorism*. Subsequently, it states that *winning war on terror requires winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq*. These decisive points along the strategic path toward a terrorism-free world need a *long-term strategy*, which will have to get rid of the *old patterns*. The old patterns might be associated with the scenarios US was prepared to fight against a *traditionally defined opponents*. Thomas Barnett, in his *The Pentagon’s New Map*, portrayed the US in the unparalleled posture of *Leviathan*. This behemoth, a huge war machinery determined the Al Qaeda to take an asymmetrical warfare posture, and this at least because no one could match such a physical power to face it directly. But now, the enemy is no longer what it used to be, a state-like enemy, and its reach is global.

Although *the NSS 2006*, without capitalizing it, specifically speaks only once about a *long war*, with a reference to the Special Operations Forces role, *the NSS* lets the term *Long War* implied and splits the War on Terror in two distinct sections which do not necessarily need to be seen as following to each other. In the short run, the military would take the lead, to perform the “dirty job”, kill the terrorist and keeping them off the safe havens and denying them the resources they would need. In the long run, the fight would take a more abstract aspect and would move to the ideology battlefield, where the battle of ideas is fought, of course those not matching the Occidental culture. As we have previously foreseen, it would be to simplistic to strictly divide the battle against terrorism in short and long run. On the one hand, the Islam will permanently create anti-Western culture fighters able to keep the US military busy and, on the other hand, the battle of ideas, as an uninterrupted struggle to impose your “truth” on others, could not wait a declaration for cessation of hostilities. That battle of ideas, which NSS planned to happen in the long run, has already started when Iraq and Afghanistan have received brand-new governments and constitutions. But it is the followers of Islam that have to lead the *battle of ideas*, they are the artisans that



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

have to master this work. This message appears not only in the *NSS*⁹, but it also constantly marks the discourse of political and military leaders. *By Iraqis for Iraqis* is one of the messages General Abizaid sends to those ones concerned when he reminds them that the fate of the people in the area should be decided by themselves.

If for the short run strategy US needs hard military runners, for the long run US will need soft *system administrators*, to paraphrase again Thomas Barnett.

The Long War needs also a considerable amount of energy, on both primary and figurative meanings. The latter meaning refers to the human energy which, although it would be provided mainly by the American people, it is also expected to be sought from the international community side. *We came into this war with a short-war mentality, but this is going to be a long war*¹⁰, is a signal through which General Abizaid warns everyone to get prepared to run a long way requiring an indefinite amount of resources, confidence and patience. Everything to be achieved in the USCENTCOM AOR needs time: the cooling down of insurgents, the improvement of the people's standard of living, the formation of the democracy, the change of mentality. On this long way, the military component of the interagency effort is the specialized element, able and best suited to trade time for the space the non-military actors need to do their job¹¹.

Largely influenced by the *NSS*, *the Statement* is a military policy document that establishes the mission, principles and the courses of action for the USCENTCOM to be successful in accomplishing its tasks in the region.

This document conveys some major themes that shape the USCENTCOM philosophy and reflects General Abizaid's personality, as a supporter of the manoeuvrist approach to Long War.

The Statement defines the USCENTCOM mission through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic military activities: *attack, disrupt and defeat terrorism, deter and defeat adversaries, deny access to WMD, assure regional access, strengthen regional stability, build the self-reliance of partner nations' security forces, and protect the vital interests of the United States within the area of responsibility*.¹²

The execution of these tasks requires an important amount of resources and international political

support. These factors could simultaneously enable and constrain the mission.

Defeat, deter or disrupt are military tasks we find in the USCENTCOM mission that give the substance to the manoeuvrist approach and somehow put off balance a task with a more obvious attritional weight: *attack*. On the other hand, the civilian, interagency print is defined by tasks like: *build the self-reliance of partner nations' security forces*.

Defeating has a broader significance, and *could* include in its accomplishment elements of *destruction*. The former requires, for its masters, a manoeuvrist thinking which General Abizaid encourages US military to look forward to acknowledge it. *To defeat* is about bringing your enemy to the point that, although it would still have physical resources, it becomes unwilling to continue to fight. Moreover, as Sun Tzu put it, like water following the lower ground, the manoeuvrist commander seeks to apply his forces' strength on his enemy's weaknesses, thus preserving his resources.



For 2006, General Abizaid has envisaged that the stability in the USCENTCOM AOR could be reached on a case by case basis. In Iraq, the stability would be achieved through a combination of reliable security forces, an improved economy, and a legitimate government, whose legitimacy would be eventually defined by its competence in managing the sectarian violence.¹³

In Afghanistan, the successful transition to NATO of the stability mission would play a decisive role for the reconstruction process in this region.

US would maintain a significant conventional presence in the Eastern part of the country, conduct the counterterrorism mission throughout the Afghanistan, lead the development of the Afghan National Security Forces and assist with the recon-



struction through a significant number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

In the *Horn of Africa*, USCENTCOM focus would be for the countries in the region, to *strengthen their ability to resist extremist activities*.¹⁴

The more you go through the principles of the long war in the *Statement* the more you understand this philosophy. Tasks like *partner, make clear to the people..., provide protective shield..., evolve and broaden the coalition..., invest in human capital...* overwhelm those with an evident militaristic weight: *shut down...or target...*

The USCENTCOM does not foresee clearing the scourge of terrorism in the world (it could not do it alone), but it plans to make it ineffectual by defeating it.

The following messages and principles are the major themes that transpire from the *Statement* and other public apparitions, and which are considered by General Abizaid key in the resolution of the Long War.

Expose the enemy's fanatical ideology and dangerous designs

"This is not a clash between civilizations, but within one – the Muslim world".

To wage a war, even The Long War, one needs an enemy to fight on. And as with the controversial debate on the term of terrorism, it has been agreed that a more tangible enemy has to be identified. It was President Bush that did it, when he addressed The State of the Union on 31st of January 2006. He then was declaring that *"Our generation is in a long war against a determined enemy"*.

General Abizaid identifies *Al Qaeda and its associated ideological movements (Al Qaeda)* as being that enemy and, moreover, that *this stateless enemy capable of delivering state-like destruction without having state-like vulnerabilities*¹⁵ requires a careful consideration in the *years ahead*.

In fact, General Abizaid put it very clear in an interview that *defeating an ideology is much more difficult than defeating a physical threat, but that is at the heart of U.S. Central Command's strategy in this region ...*¹⁶

We learn from the *Statement* that the main concern for General Abizaid is not to let the ideology promoted by *Al Qaeda* and its associated move-

ment to become a mainstream in the region, which situation would deepen the gap between West and Muslim world. The enemy must, of course, be approached militarily but yet non-militarily. As far as military action is concerned, USCENTCOM will continue to *kill and capture Al Qaeda leaders, shut down training camps, destroy operational cells, and prevent Al Qaeda and associated movements from exploiting ungoverned spaces*¹⁷. The attrition tasks we have just mentioned would be intelligence-driven action carried out through precision targeting and highly sophisticated intelligence networks by the SOF.

But this enemy is not as much physically relevant as it is ideologically. That is why General Abizaid assesses that *Al Qaeda* itself has no beliefs that it can defeat US militarily.

Consequently, the battle against *Al Qaeda* will not be primarily military but it will be fought, mainly on the political, economic, and ideological battlefields, supported largely by the international community. The positive aspect of the problem is that *Al Qaeda* has not yet taken hold in any country in the Middle East. *Al Qaeda* must not be allowed to gain physical *safe havens from which to conduct military training, propaganda operations, and plan future terrorist attacks*¹⁸, a military task requiring boots on the ground, physical control of the countries most exposed to *Al Qaeda* ideology: Iraq, Afghanistan and Horn of Africa. A continued US presence, as a long-term commitment, would hinder the conventionally vulnerable *Al Qaeda* and would deprive it from creating a stronghold in the region.

The long war is more of perception, will and intelligence-driven counterterrorism actions, than of firepower, mass, manoeuvre, and territory conquered

"It [Al Qaeda] holds hostage the vast majority of moderate Muslims."

This strategy focuses not only on the enemy, not only on physical aspects materialized in kinetic operations, direct engagement of insurgents, Taliban or militias for their subsequent destruction (remember that manoeuvre implies a certain amount of attrition) but also on the intangible components of this battle space, minds and hearts of civilian population, its perceptions.



Al Qaeda or Taliban and USCENTCOM alike focus on Muslim population. *It holds hostage the vast majority of moderate Muslims*¹⁹, said General when referred to the posture of Al Qaeda with regard to the population in the area.

The intimidating power of the radicalism Al Qaeda proffers has a more influence than the capacity of the Muslim population to freely take the religious precepts.

An indirect success could be that referred to by Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt, the Deputy Director for Strategy and Plans, one of the most important voices for USCENTCOM planning efforts when he has recently said in an interview²⁰, that the Al Qaeda could have suffered a flaw in its strategy due a tactical error Osama bin Laden did when threatening Muslim nations. Over time, this tactic could convince these nations *that their only choice is to align themselves with the West.*

The solution to this extremist ideology lies exactly with this *vast majority of the moderate Muslims* whose minds and hearts must be won. It will take a long period of time and a considerable amount of resources to achieve this endeavour.

To take only an example, it is relevant the effort that the coalition and later NATO have been making to offer alternative livelihood options for rural Afghans currently economically dependent on opium poppy, that unfortunately finance and sustain terrorism.

No one in Afghanistan or Iraq has defeated a single coalition forces platoon, is another message that constantly occurs in the military leaders' speech or interviews²¹ and diverts the public opinion attention toward a conventional conflict scenario.

But let us not forget that what is happening in the world now is far from this scenario. Indeed, no coalition forces platoon has been defeated so far, but the global economy. This suggests that the *battlefield* should be *populated* with more than conventional forces: economic, political, diplomatic efforts.

"They're killing our soldiers, not to defeat us, but to make you think this is too hard and to break our will", said General Abizaid during a conference this year, acknowledging the Al Qaeda focus on US centre of gravity, the will of American people to support the war.²²

Adapt the components of the US Fighting Power

"It takes a network to defeat a network."

General Abizaid considers that one of the first steps US must take in this Long War *is to adapt the American Cold War Structures, authorities, organizational structures, doctrine, training, and equipment to confront the 21st Century battlefield*²³. By adapting the doctrine he sees *to reform...our thinking to deal with the way the world is moving.* But adapting also means to almost reproduce the network conditions that Al Qaeda created to spread its ideology, money and fighters. So does US need a counterpart to balance the effect each component of the Al Qaeda network creates.

Let nations help themselves

"I think often some of the problems we Americans have with this part of the world is caused by lack of understanding, followed by lack of respect."

This has several components. First, it is about cultural awareness, a critical and mandatory way towards winning the minds and hearts of the people. With an Arab descent and with civilian studies on Arab world issues (he earned a Master of Arts degree in Area Studies at Harvard University writing about Saudi Arabia's defence policy and was an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Jordan in Amman, Jordan), General Abizaid could not better apprehend the culture and the way this part of the world has to be approached. He acknowledges that America suffers from the *lack of understanding, followed by the lack of respect*²⁴ the people in the region deserve. The second component is that of nation-building. If we were to look for attrition in the US conduct of war in Iraq, this would be the way US tried to impose the US style democracy in the middle of Islam world. This determined a lot of casualties and hatred. General Abizaid managed to shift away to a more manoeuvrist approach: *building Iraqi police and army forces that can take over the fight and shoring up crumbling infrastructure.* He realized that stability and security is more important than a perfect democracy²⁵.

Finally, it is the people in the region which have to choose their way toward either a peaceful coexistence or a permanent warfare²⁶.



Be in the media with positive achievements, promote your achievements

“Tell your story. Tell the truth.”

The main tactic of Al Qaeda is to exploit the US center of gravity, which has been identified as being the will of the American people. The main strategic weapon: media and its neutral unquenched thirst for sensational. Unfortunately, the most sensational thing the American people do not need is the unfinished death toll whose increasing number would trigger a mass conviction that this war could not be won and the withdrawal would become unavoidable.

And because Al Qaeda is aware of its inferiority in the conventional field, it focuses on the information campaign, which is to feed the media with a constant casualty toll that would eventually defeat American people's will to support the war.

The question is how to deal with that amazing information operations campaign waged by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and even American media, when they focus on *mission non-essential events*, say Abu Ghraib?

General Abizaid brings forward the most credible messengers: young people in the armed forces, soldiers spreading words about good intentions and facts with positive connotations. The rhetoric question of how the effects of unrest and sectarian violence in 4 provinces can overwhelm the achievements in the other 14 of Iraq appears as a leitmotif in the military leaders' discourse. In Afghanistan, there are a few spots, in the Southern part of the country and at the border with Pakistan where the Taliban try to keep the ISAF off balance.

Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden are seen by the General Abizaid as super-empowered enemies through the access to Internet; a tool over which US has, if not an inexistent at least, a limited control. When the two US soldiers were kidnapped, in June 2006, USCENTCOM leadership had nothing to do but wait. Waiting for what they knew would happen, the very well planned effect-based broadcast of the “inevitable video” over TV and Internet, depicting the soldiers' death. It happened a few days after the kidnapping. The news, posted on Internet by The Mujahedeen Shura Council was assessed to have had a setback effect to *US efforts to seize the momentum against al-Qaeda in Iraq*

*after killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.*²⁷ On the other hand, a very simple ambush organized by seven masked people took off the battle some 8,000 Iraqi and U.S. troops that have searched for the missing soldiers. A more recent opportunity kidnapping of a US soldier in Baghdad, in October 2006, dislocated an even larger army.

*The Al Qaeda strategy is all about media impact*²⁸, considers General Abizaid who is concerned by the tremendous *soft power* Osama bin Laden has over the world perception.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban stories keep busy the Associated Press and Reuters news service in Kabul after every attack on coalition forces or Afghan village.

On the other hand, the media said almost no word on the *terrorists' attempts to acquire a weapon of mass destruction and use it against the United States*.

To counter this strategy is for the US *commanders in the region to educate the world about their work*²⁹, to decry the enemy atrocities whenever possible, to tell the world about humanitarian role and reconstruction efforts, to counterbalance the enemy presence in the media.

Abizaid sees progress where others do not

“The only thing that can defeat us is ourselves.”

For Iraq, General Abizaid acknowledged that after invasion and liberation, after transitioning with Coalition Provisional Authority, after partnering with Iraqi Government, 2006 is the year Iraqi people should start trusting its own security forces and newly-elected government institutions. Transition is a key word one can find it quite present in the political and military statements made in 2006. The *Statement* envisaged major transition in 2006, the handover of counterinsurgency to Iraqi security forces and, in Afghanistan, the extension of NATO stability mission (ISAF) all over the country. Unfortunately, *transition* has negative connotations for most of the people, a state that gains more in strength as the insurgents and terrorists organizations manage to keep the coalition forces off balance.³⁰

There is unrest in the Middle East but there is progress too, it depends on what side of the area you are watching the problem, from inside or outside. General Abizaid could see the situation only



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

from inside. He is part of the problem, of the effort, and he is confident in his command mission success.

In Iraq, he recalls the building of the armed forces, of institutions or progress made in Iraqi self-governance.³¹ Recently, General George Casey, commander of the Multi National Force from Iraq denied the remark that the country would be *awash in a sectarian violence*. His argument and of General Abizaid alike is that sectarian violence in Iraq takes place in about a 30-mile radius from the centre of Baghdad and that only 5 out of 18 provinces face this violent situation.³²

In Afghanistan, the Taliban violence has increased in South and East of the country, on the one hand because of the transition from the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom to NATO which allowed Taliban to get reequipped and regrouped, on the other hand because the population does not show sufficient confidence in the Afghan Government's capacity to expand its powers in those areas. But the progress exists. The Afghan people have made an unimaginable leap from a dark age to a new era whose benefits few knew. They elected a government and a parliament, they have demobilized warlords, their security forces have been taking on the Taliban and move against Al Qaeda and they have even showed an economical progress.

It would be an unforgivable mistake to leave Iraq

"I believe that we either fight in the Middle East or we fight at home".

That success in Iraq is critical for the USCENTCOM mission is without any doubt. General put it clear that *"The single most important thing we have to do in the region is to stabilize Iraq"*.³³

Although a reduction of US troops in Iraq has been envisaged, General Abizaid considers a mistake to precipitously withdraw forces from Iraq. Three quarters of Iraq, with almost 100 Iraqi Army battalions, will be controlled by the end of the year, but these forces are not yet well suited to face alone a fierce and diversified enemy.³⁴ For the Iraqi security forces to be proficient, General Abizaid assessed that 2006 should bring in attention the intangibles components of the strength an army needs: leadership, unit cohesion, and loyalty, not

necessarily timelines that would show an increase in physical strength. Therefore, he suggested that Iraqi security forces are still affected by disciplinary events that can help insurgents and militias in taking the initiative. Building a new local security forces is an implied task deduced from the analysis of defeating terrorism in a Long War, but *building a military takes a long time*, Abizaid said, and cannot be reduced to equipping those forces.

As of this writing the elections for US Congress have come to an end proclaiming a clear victory for the democrats. This implies a shift in the strategy for the war in Iraq, which Robert Gates, the new Secretary of Defence and a former member of bipartisan Iraqi Study Group, charged with finding a way out of Iraq, would impose by the end of this year.

There are several options for this new strategy:

1. Stay the course, an option which has little chance to be considered as it has been already seen by the democrats as failing;
2. Strategic redeployment, after a handover to Iraqi Security Forces, maintaining the number of troops at the same level, but from an over-the-horizon posture, probably from Kuwait, to react only if situation in Iraq would deteriorate;
3. More US troops, especially in Baghdad, which US commanders say will not help on a long term;
4. Partition of Iraq along the sectarian lines;
5. A phased withdrawal, the most likely course of action, under a carefully planned timeline to determine the Iraqi to take responsibility for their own security. But if senator Carl Levin, the incoming Chairman of Senate's Armed Services Committee, consider feasible the withdrawal in four to six months, the future Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, senator Joe Biden, sees Iraqi unprepared to take over yet such a huge responsibility.³⁵
6. Engage Syria and Iran, an option vigorously opposed by hardliners.

On 15th of November, General Abizaid will have to pass a very difficult exam, this time in front of a more pragmatic Senate's Armed Services Committee. On the one hand, he will have to inform the Committee on how well USCENTCOM achieved its mission in the last quarter and, on the other hand, what is the most feasible option for the US to redress in Iraq. Nonetheless, the national in-



terests of the US will have to prevail regardless of the shift in strategy with regards to this part of the world.

The messages sent by the general, well reflected and projected in the operations the US troops are carrying out in USCENCTOM area of responsibility, make him a supporter of the manoeuvrist approach to Long War:

- The war with Al Qaeda will be primarily an ideological struggle inside Islam, with military power shaping the *battle space* to better allow economic, politic and diplomatic tools to alleviate and solve the problems;

- Help others help themselves;
- Deny Al Qaeda safe heavens by maintaining a physical deterrent presence in the area;
- Enable moderate Islam to fight extremist and not fusion with radicals by winning their minds and hearts;
- Adapt continuously the structure, military doctrine and interagency network;
- Understand and respect the Muslim world;
- Penetrate the world's mind through an intelligent Information Operations strategy;
- When in a Long War, look patiently through the full half of the glass.

This is the General's philosophy that brought about a lot of critics, from the conservative military and political side alike. Very well informed and cultural aware, General Abizaid is striving to show everyone, equally Senate or Arab world that the US presence in Iraq is as critical as the future of this country depends on the American troops backing and mentoring the new Iraqi security forces.

Help and truth, the prerequisite commandments for success, are magic words with which one can get obsessed if they were not referring to such a desperate world like Iraq and Afghanistan.

NOTES:

¹ Statement of General John P. Abizaid, United States Army Commander, United States Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2006 Posture of the United States Central Command, 14 March 2006 (*the Statement*), <http://192.31.19.143/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/PostureStatement2006.htm>

² The CENTCOM region spans 6.5 million square miles and 27 countries including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Egypt, the countries of the Horn of Africa,

Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. It incorporates a nexus of vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf. It is the home of the strategic maritime choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. It encompasses the world's most energy-rich region – the Arabian Gulf alone accounts for 57% of the world's crude oil reserves, 28% of the world's oil production, and 41% of the world's natural gas reserves. (*the Statement, Chapter III, Nature of the Region*).

³ The term "Long war" was coined by General Abizaid in 2004, but it was publicly used on 31st of January 2005, in the US president's State of the Union address, when Bush said: "Our own generation is in a long war against a determined enemy."

⁴ http://www.c-span.org/pdf/abizaid_comments120905_3.pdf, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20051216-125645-3291r.htm>

⁵ Design for Military Operations -The British Military Doctrine, 1996.

⁶ Warfighting, US Marine Corps, 1997.

⁷ Thomas P.M. BARNETT, *Pentagon's New Map, Glossary*, <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/glossary.htm>

⁸ The National Security Strategy, March 2006, p. 12, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/

⁹ Ibidem, p. 11.

¹⁰ Donna MILES, *Abizaid: Staying Power Critical for Security in Middle East*, American Forces Press Service, <http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/JCOC/Abizaid%20Staying%20Power%20Critical%20for%20Security%20in%20Middle%20East.aspx>

¹¹ Greg JAFFE, *A General's New Plan to Battle Radical Islam*, Top commander Gen. Abizaid uses soldiers to build health clinics and dig wells. But is it enough?, Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2006.

¹² *The Statement, Chapter II. Mission.*

¹³ *The Statement, Chapter I. Introduction and overview.*

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Ibidem, *Chapter IV. Global counterterrorism and the long war.*

¹⁶ Jim GARAMONE, *Abizaid Discusses Defeating Extremist Ideology in CENTCOM Region*, American Forces Press Service, <http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/FrontPage%20Stories/Abizaid%20Discusses%20Defeating%20Extremist%20Ideology%20in%20CENTCOM%20Region.aspx>

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ *The Statement, Chapter XI. Strategic issues.*



¹⁹ Jim GARAMONE, *Central Command's Mission Includes More Than Iraq, Afghanistan, American Forces Press Service*, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2006/20060619_5454.html

²⁰ <http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/147/documentid/3409/history/3,2359,2166,147,3409>

²¹ http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6618&Itemid=30; <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123022115>

²² <http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/JCOC/Abizaid%20Staying%20Power%20Critical%20for%20Security%20in%20Middle%20East.aspx>

²³ *The Statement, Chapter XII. Joint warfighting.*

²⁴ Paul DE LA GARZA, *In search of ground truth*, *St. Petersburg Times*, September 3, 2006 http://sptimes.com/2006/09/03/Floridian/In_search_of_ground_t.shtml

²⁵ Greg JAFFE, *op. cit.*

²⁶ *Ibidem.*

²⁷ <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13432770/>

²⁸ Jim GARAMONE, *Central Command's Mission Includes More Than Iraq, Afghanistan, American Forces Press Service*, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2006/20060619_5454.html

²⁹ Paul DE LA GARZA, *op. cit.*

³⁰ See the situation in Iraq - Anbar and Baghdad which still remain the barometer of success.

³¹ Paul DE LA GARZA, *Cautious optimism for 'The Long War'*, *St. Petersburg Times*, September 3, 2006, http://sptimes.com/2006/09/03/Floridian/Cautious_optimism_for.shtml

³² http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6618&Itemid=30

³³ Donna MILES, *op. cit.*

³⁴ Army Sgt. Frank PELLEGRINI, *Coalition Conference Looks at the New Iraq*, Multi-National Force - Iraq, 10 October 2006, <http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/FrontPage%20Stories/Coalition%20Conference%20Looks%20at%20the%20New%20Iraq.aspx>

³⁵ Ben FELLER, *Bush's advisers adopt new tone on Iraq*, Associated Press Writer, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061113/ap_on_go_pr_wh/us_iraq

Lieutenant-colonel Alin BODESCU is currently assigned as Romanian Liaison Officer to HQ USCENTCOM.



MIDDLE EAST: PEACE OR CONFRONTATION?

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

When it seemed that, at last, it was reached an agreement and the world hoped in a peace beginning in Middle East, that may be lasting, the events on the field completely turn around this eventuality. Here comes a conclusion: the logic of the Near East and Middle East is not yet an understandable one. The most optimistic and probable predictions with 100% realizable chances proved to be unrealizable.

1. Preliminaries. According to the AFP and Reuters, quoted by Rompres, the Palestinians fractions (except the Islamic Jihad) concluded, on June 27th an agreement of “national understanding” which implicitly recognizes the existence of Israel. The document decided over the creation of a Palestinian state in all occupied territories by Israel in 1967, with Jerusalem as a capital. Also, this agreement foresaw the Resistance to be limited at the Palestinian territories. According to the analysts’ opinions, the agreement represents a fundamental change of the Islamic Movement Hamas (who leads the Government) and who refused always the Israel’s right to existence.

The Gaza Strip was attacked, by the Israeli forces, on June 28th, during an offensive unleashed “to recover” an Israeli soldier kidnapped by the Palestinian guerrilla three days ago¹. The Israeli aircrafts² took as targets the Palestinian PM’s offices, the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, a bridge from the middle of Gaza Strip placed on the main road which connects the North to the Southern region, the residences of militants leaders and not only these. Also, the Israeli armoured cars penetrate the North of Gaza Strip in order to discover the secret tunnels and warehouses for explosives. At least 200 Palestinians were killed from the beginning of this campaign due to the Israeli bombs and land enclosures.

Few days later, on June 28th, the Israeli mass-media, by AFP, refers to some divergences between the Israeli PM, Elhud Olmert, and the chief of Israeli General Staff, regarding the initiation

of a full-sized military operation³ in Beit Hannon sector designated mainly to stop the missiles fire against Israel.

On July 1st, Israel rejected the kidnappers’ proposal to release at least 1000 “Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims and other nationalities” prisoners in exchange of Israeli soldier kidnapped before. The Israeli PM, Elhud Olmert, firmly refused any negotiations with the kidnappers, restating his decision to not conclude any kind of agreement. Furthermore, Israel considers Hezbollah to be “a brutal terrorist group” and decided to continue the fight against it.

2. The conflict’s escalation. Continuing its policy of resisting to the blackmail, Israel rejects the 24 hours ultimatum released by the kidnappers on July 3rd. Israeli troops stand by and starts first punctual incursions followed after, by the air raids with killings through the Arabs militants.

On July 13th, the Israeli government gives green light to a series of operations based on striking objectives from Lebanese infrastructure and on the “causes” which determined the unleashed of Israel – Hezbollah conflict was mentioned the kidnapping, on July 12th, of two Israeli soldiers by the Hezbollah Shiite group from Lebanon.

In spite of the Lebanese PM’s appeal⁴ to cease the fire in Lebanon⁵ and in spite of the international community efforts, the war in the Middle East continues to develop and the Lebanese offensive⁶ (as Elhud Olmert to be understand) will continue as long as it is necessary to free the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah⁷, as long as it is necessary to be assured that this group didn’t represent anymore a threat for Israel⁸ and will be end as sons as it will reach its purpose: creation of a security area⁹ in the Southern part of the country till when will be possible to deploy an international interposing force. We can say that it is a continuation and, simultaneously, a reinforcement of the warning given before by the Israeli minister of Interior: as long as the Israeli citizens from the borders are-



as can not live secured nobody will enjoy by peace in Lebanon.

Simultaneously with the military operations, in development, in Lebanon took place a gigantic operation of civilians' evacuation¹⁰, operation where Romania was involved. Many countries sent their military or civilian ships in order to hurry this evacuation and Israel accepts the entrance of the humanitarian aids in Lebanon.

3. The evolution of the situation. Israel excludes, for the time being, an agreement with the Hezbollah - the group who attacked the Israeli state while its Armed Forces was engaged in fight on other front, against Hamas from Gaza Strip – and continues its air attacks on the areas from the South and East of Lebanese territory. Furthermore, for the first time by the unleashing the air attacks, Israel attacks the North Lebanon and even penetrate, on July 19th, with Land Forces this territory with main purpose to free the two soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah. The troops were engaged in a violent exchange of fire with the Shiite guerilla and the terrestrial offensive continues parallel with the air raids.

At its term, Hezbollah – considered terrorist and main adversary from Lebanon of Israel – fight back with missiles volleys which hit many cities from the North of Israel. Hezbollah claims the series of attacks with missiles and continues with violent bombing over the North of Israel. Furthermore, the leader of Shiite Hezbollah Movement from Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, was goading, through the television speeches, the Lebanese people and state to resist to Israel, promising the victory. He claims that Israel didn't succeed to fulfil any military goals and the "insistent appeals" for a "negotiable solution of the conflict" can be explained by the resistance opposed by Hezbollah. Furthermore, the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, affirms that the return of the American state secretary, Condollezza Rice, in Middle East, could mean imposing conditions to Lebanon through a restoration plan of a new regime in the region. According to Reuters, at its term, the Iranian Hezbollah affirms that it is prepared to attack the USA and Israeli interests in world.

Due to the Israeli bombing, the situation of the civilians and refugees from the South of Lebanon becomes "more and more dramatic and it goes worst day by day"¹¹. The Lebanese economy and

infrastructure arrived in a disastrous situation, too. Most of the roads are unused and lots of bridges were destroyed, especially in the South of Lebanon. Last estimations of the humanitarian disaster in Lebanon spoke themselves¹² but the number of the victims still grows and the official statistics can not hold tide with the events. The large number of the victims in the Middle East and its predictability could presume the penal responsibility of those who are involved, as an official UN stated. Same case is in the proportion of the destructions¹³ provoked by the bombs that, shows together the "proportion of the catastrophes and violence of this conflict".

The Israeli refuse to the UN proposal to end a 72 hours truce with Hezbollah in order to allow the supply with humanitarian assistance of the civilians surprised in the conflict area from Lebanon was motivated by the Tel Aviv authorities by the fact that already opened a series of secured corridors on the Lebanese territory in order to be realise the aids transportation¹⁴.

4. Was legitimate the continuation of military actions in Lebanon? The failure of the Rome international conference, as it was the initial plan proposed by Washington – "Hezbollah disarming and deployment of a multinational peace force in region under the NATO command"¹⁵ – seems to legitimate¹⁶ the continuation of the Israeli military actions till Hezbollah will be disarmed and no more present in the South of Lebanon. As Condollezza Rice affirmed during the first tour in conflict area that "because an immediate cease of fire is not sufficient" in order to set a "long term solution" but, contrarily, could give to Hezbollah the opportunity "to rearm and to resume their attacks against Israel"¹⁷. This was a message really encouraging for Israel. Just such an "attitude" of Washington incited dissatisfactions in the Arabic and Muslim world where, from the beginning of offensive in Lebanon and Gaza Strip took place, almost every day, protests against Israel. Moreover:

- The Syrian ambassador to UN says the Washington gives "green light" to Israel to continue the military campaign;

- The leaders of the Arab League¹⁸ avoided qualifying the Hezbollah Shiite Movement as being responsible by the unleashing the conflict due the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers on July 12th;



- The general secretary of Arab League, Amr Moussa, considered Lebanon to be the object of a “disproportionate reaction”¹⁹ of Israel and the ministers of Foreign Affairs from 22 states members of the League adopted a Resolution for sustaining Lebanon – in spite it was made an appeal to the parties in conflict to avoid any action which can undermine peace and security in the region.

On the other hand, Indonesia²⁰ – the most populated Muslim country and a traditional supporter of Palestinians – accused Israel by the violation of international law. Venezuela did the same thing²¹, while the well-known enemy of President George W. Bush – the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, continues to threaten: “If Israeli will not reconsider their aggressive behaviour, they will confront with the anger of the countries from the region which will be manifested as a great explosion and which will be not limited to the borders of these countries”²². Even Saudi Arabia – who blamed Hezbollah for the Lebanese crisis – warns the international community that there is the risk of unleashing a regional conflict if Israel continues its attacks in Lebanon. A natural concern for which the ministers for Foreign Affairs from EU meet to discuss the situation from Lebanon and the UK PM, Tony Blair is confronting with great pressure - including from his Labour Party – to move away from the USA refuse to requests the immediate cease of fire in Lebanon²³. More than that, even members of the British Cabinet lead by Tony Blair – faithful partner of USA – considers the Israel’s “reaction” given by the “kidnapping” of those two Israeli soldiers by the Hezbollah Shiite group as “disproportionate” and this reaction “risks to destabilize the Middle East”.

The former British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, declared that Tony Blair should not sustain the Israeli military action because it risks destabilizing Lebanon.

Meanwhile, as stated by the chief of Intelligence Services of Israeli Armed Forces, - and the chief of Syrian diplomacy, Wallid Moallem, doesn’t hide this fact - Syria declared its Armed Forces in “maximum alert” and is prepared for a war if the Israeli aggression will continue.

5. Iran and Syria implications in solving out the conflict became more and more necessary.

Iran is the most powerful and decided supporter of Hezbollah but – as declared by the Iranian ambas-

sador to Paris – Hezbollah is not located on Iran’s borders. Still, a cease of fire in Lebanon will be difficult to be obtained without the implication of Iran and Syria. This is the point of view expressed by the UN emissary for Middle East, Terje, and other international leaders and emissaries of Israeli state.

Also, the French president Jacques Chirac is criticizing Syria and is blaming Iran for the role played in Lebanon crisis, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, Philippe Daiste-Blaz, continues to sustain the important role played by Iran in the area. Also, Tony Blair declares that Iran should be dealing more with solving the conflict and not obstructing the peace efforts²⁴. A similar opinion was expressed by the Israeli ambassador to UN, Dan Ghinerman, too, when he requested the international community to act in order to stop the Hezbollah Shiite militias’ arming by Iran and Syria – countries labelled as “terrorism’s traders”.

Hezbollah will never stop the military actions against Israel till all the Israeli militaries will be retreated from the Lebanese territory. The discussions about the conflict between the Hezbollah group and Israel carried on between the Iranian minister of Foreign Affairs – arrived at Beirut during this period – and the Lebanese authorities and the latest declarations²⁵ of the Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah and the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, entirely confirm that.

Meanwhile, Syria is preparing for military actions and Wallid Moallem²⁶, the chief of the diplomacy from Damascus, doesn’t hide this fact – Syria is ready for a regional war and will respond to an attack launched by Israel.

6. New priorities for a lasting peace in Middle East after the discussions Blair – Bush from July 28th, from Washington D.C. The meeting of those two international leaders was focused to the ways of obtaining an urgent UN Resolution.

In this purpose, the American president, George W. Bush, requested to Syria to participate to the peace efforts in Middle East and the American State Secretary, Condollezza Rice, returned in the conflict area for new meetings and discussions, which are more and more difficult, with the Israeli and Lebanese leaders. The USA is decided to end, once for all, the violence from Lebanon.

In his turn, the British PM, Tony Blair – who was requested by many ministers among them



being the minister for Foreign Affairs, Margaret Becket²⁷, to move away from the USA policy – according to the daily newspaper *Observer* statement – affirms²⁸ (without giving up of the “causes” that led to the releasing of the Israel – Hezbollah conflict meaning the kidnapping, on July 12th, of two Israeli soldiers by the Hezbollah Shiite group from Lebanon) that “is important to end the violence, too” and “to take the chance” in order to establish a strategic direction for the whole region.

After the Blair – Bush discussions from July 28th, from Washington D.C., the following issues are important for a lasting peace in Middle East: urgent supply of the aids in Lebanon, stopping the violence, assuring the home returning of the evacuated population and sustaining the reconstructions in the area. Condoleezza Rice hopes to obtain a cease fire agreement of whose conditions²⁹ will be included in UN Security Council Resolution’s content.

Although hard, the negotiations could go on favourable if the Israeli bombs wouldn’t kill, in the Lebanese city Qana, 54 civilians, out of which 37 were children. As much as, in Lebanon, the two Hezbollah members of the Cabinet accepted to include among the truce’s clauses the “disarming enforcement” of the Shiite militia even if the PM Fouad Siniora would insisted that Israel should end the Sheban farms sector’s occupation, claimed by Lebanon and to release all the Lebanese prisoners. On the other hand, officials from the Israeli Foreign Affairs ministry stated that they will not pretend the immediate disarming of the Hezbollah militia as a condition of ceasing the fire. This bloody attack from Qana – blamed by all Arab community³⁰ even the Israeli PM tried to justified by calling the town as “refugee for Hezbollah militia”³¹ – transformed the American State Secretary’s attempt for mediation into a total failure. Lebanon seems to not accept any other discussion excepting the immediate and unconditioned cease of fire and blamed Israel for war crimes. In the same way were doing the radical groups who promised to revenge, the Hezbollah Shiite group launching tens of missiles over the Jewish Northern cities and towns³². On the other side, 30,000 Israeli reservists went to the units to reinforce the military combat disposition in the North of Israel. Israel doesn’t give up to the Lebanon offensive against the Hezbollah Shiite militia³³ and the hostilities rise in intensity. The terrestrial operations were extended over the Baal-

beck region (East Lebanon) – one of the Hezbollah bulwark – and the Israeli Army established already a “secure area” which – according to TV Channel 10 – incorporates 20 villages from the border with Lebanon. The air attacks continue going to the Lebanese capital, Beirut, where many neighbourhoods from the Southern part were destroyed, and there were done air raids in North, near the border with Syria.

The military operations continue to Gaza Strip, too, to destroy, what the Israeli called, “a terrorist infrastructure”³⁴, the Palestinians being afraid by a new offensive of the tanks and armoured cars already penetrated in an industrial area from the North of the territory. Moreover, after the Qana attack, an angry mass of people devastated the UN residence and waved the Lebanese and Hezbollah flags. Meanwhile, the Israeli Army arrested the president of the Palestinian Parliament and raised the pressure over Hamas – that was under a total embargo of West till it will recognise the existence of the Israeli state, ends the violence and accepts the peace treaty in Middle East.

7. The reaction of the Security Council. The UN Security Council didn’t succeed to adopt, on July 15th, a joint declaration which contains an appeal for cease the fire by the belligerent parties. According to some diplomatic sources, the American and British delegations proposed not to vote this declaration before the G8 Summit from Sankt Petersburg³⁵ and the UN General Secretary Emisaries missions³⁶ in Middle East – position who provokes critics besides the special representative of Lebanese diplomacy to UN.

Still, the international community should act faster in order to obtain a cease of fire and to end the crisis between the Israel and Lebanon.

The President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, criticizes the USA position, protesting against the use of veto procedure by USA on the UN Security Council regarding the Resolution requesting the end of the military operations in Gaza Strip and the admittance of using the oversized reaction by Israel.

This veto – it is mentioned in a statement of the ANP presidency – is an “encouragement of rising the Israeli violence”, president Abbas expressing also the regret that USA didn’t use in the past such pressure in order to “make progresses in the peace process”.



On his turn, Kofi Annan, UN General Secretary, requested the organization of an international force of 15 – 20,000 military personnel in order to stabilize the South Lebanon. And not only this. If the decision for the deployment of such force was delayed till there will be a larger political clarity of the “road to be followed” regarding the Middle East crisis.

France, one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, being at the presidency of the Council, could play an important role in the international mission in Lebanon, but rejects the idea of such force – whose mandate will include disarming of the Shiite militia – till there was not decided the preliminary cease of fire. Still, USA – as the American State Secretary, Condoleezza Rice, affirms – hopes to say, as soon as possible, “the end of the violence, of the military operations, of missiles launching” and to pass away to the next stage – the deployment of an international force. More than that, Washington and Paris reached an agreement regarding the Middle East situation and that should be discussed at the reunion of Security Council.

But Arab League requests the modification of the Resolution regarding the Lebanon, the draft of Resolution contains – in presented version and sustained by the USA and rejected by Lebanon and Arab countries – only the “cease of hostilities” – without mentioning the necessity to withdraw the Israeli troops from Lebanon. Such version of project which not excludes the fear, officially mentioned by the president of the Lebanese Parliament³⁷ and by the chief of the Egyptian diplomacy, Wallid Moallem – the project leads to the continuation of the war and to a civil war in Lebanon. Even if the American State Secretary, Condoleezza Rice, assures Lebanon that the Israeli troops will not remain on its territory.

8. The conditions for stopping the Middle East conflict and possible peace. Even in the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s vision – who will request the immediate cease of fire in Lebanon – the only solution for ending the Middle East conflict is “the elimination of the Israel”, still Tel-Aviv will accept – as Ehud Olmert affirms, quoted by the *Times* – “any reasonable solution which has to be in the Israeli people interest and to respect the right to defence”.³⁸ On its turn, the Shiite Hezbollah group, by its representative in

the Lebanese Cabinet, Mohammed Fineish, conditioned the cease of fire and any military actions against Israel by the “withdrawal of all Israeli military personnel from the Lebanese territory”³⁹, stating that, on contrary, they will not respect the UN Security Council Resolutions.

And that is what they have done. Lebanon rejected the UN Security Council Resolution in the version proposed by France and USA and Arab League requested its modification.

The conflict – as stated by the Israeli PM Ehud Olmert – could come to an end only when the UN Security Council “will authorize the international troops’ intervention”⁴⁰, but the “fight will end once the Hezbollah group will be disarmed”⁴¹, according the 1559 Council’s Resolution. But in order to clear up all the Hezbollah objectives in the area and to disarm the Shiite militias, before the USA and international community to force a cease of fire⁴², the officials from Tel Aviv were estimating that they need a respite of two weeks.

On the other hand, the head of the French diplomacy, Philippe Daiste-Blazy, quoted by Rador, reaffirms the France opinion: as long as there will not be a cease fire, an international force for stabilizing Lebanon can not be efficient.⁴³ More realistic for the conflict area it seems to be the deployment of the Lebanese force⁴⁴ according the 1680 Resolution of UN Security Council.

France considers that not by force and not by the violence rising there can be obtained a result in this conflict. The Qana attack, considered to be the bloodiest attack since unleashing the offensive and qualified by the Arab League as war crime, fully confirms it. Even the American State Secretary, Condoleezza Rice, sustained, for the first time in public, in the end of the negotiation with the Israeli officials, the necessity of immediate cease of fire.

Moreover, the Arab League requested and still insistently requests the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Lebanese territory as an indispensable element for concluding a cease of fire agreement and the realisation of an equitable and global peace in Middle East.

9. Resolution 1701 – the result of a compromise negotiated by France and USA. The UN Security Council adopted on August 11th, in unanimity, the Resolution 1701 who invites Hezbollah to end the attacks against Israel and Israel to stop the offensive military operations in Lebanon. The



text foresees that Lebanon and the UN intermediate force (FINUL) deploy together their forces in South of Lebanon simultaneously with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.

The hostilities end between Hezbollah and Israel enforce at 05.00 hrs., after a month of war. This is first stage of the 1701 Resolution enforcement. The international community is mobilizing in order to realize the UN International Force which will assure the truce's reverence between Israel and Shiite Hezbollah Movement.

The Lebanese Army settles down, for the first time after 30 years at the border with Israel⁴⁵, occupying so-called "Fatima Gate" from the South-East of Lebanon while the Israeli Army will maintain the air and maritime blockade in Lebanon till the enforcement of a control mechanism over the illegal gun transfer to Hezbollah.

On October 1st, 2006, the Israeli Army withdrew all the troops from the Lebanese territory but there are fears that the security of the South Lebanon, after the Israeli troops withdrawal, will not resist and the radical Shiite Hezbollah Movement will consolidate its forces behind the Lebanese Army and the foreign military personnel deployed in South Lebanon. Still, the deployment of UN forces in Lebanon means, for many analysts and politicians, the beginning of a new period in diplomacy. UN becomes, once again, the main force for peacekeeping in world.

10. Will there be peace or confrontation?

In Middle East there is a great quantity of forces that confront and in Near East⁴⁶ there is an Israeli Army, very well equipped and many groups acting asymmetrically over the Israeli Army. None of them can obtain victory. This is the faith of the asymmetric war which is an attrition war and has no losers or winners.

As a result, the solution can come only from logic and in the face of logic the guns should be silenced (even if they exist and will continue to⁴⁷), otherwise, there will be an ongoing war.

NOTES:

¹ Corporal Gilard Shalit was kidnapped on June 25th.

² The Israeli attacks took place short time after 70 Hamas militants blow up a gate of the border point between Egypt and Gaza and through the breach passed in Gaza Strip hundred of Palestinians who where no more forced to wait the opening of the border.

³ According to the Israeli media, the proposal regarding the launching of an attack was rejected by Ehud Olmert on June 28th (Haaretz Daily Paper) based on the fact that applying this attack will provoke a large number of victims through civilian population (Yediot Aharonot Daily Paper).

⁴ Lebanese PM, Fouad Siniora, also proposed an exchange of prisoners under the Red Cross auspices.

⁵ In the declaration of the minister for information, Ghazi Al-Aridi, given at the ending of first emergency reunion of Lebanese Cabinet, on July 13th, and presented by the Romanian TV stations, there was mentioned the main request of Lebanon – total and immediate cease of fire and ending Israeli flagrant open aggression. The fact that Israel considers Hezbollah to be a "brutal terrorist group" who launches missiles attack over its territory, suggests Beirut authorities to move away from Hezbollah and from other terrorists groups and so they will find that they are "trustful partners for different activities which will make a easy life for the population.

⁶ The right to self-defence – as a natural right of all nations to defence itself – is established in international common law and was codified in a specific mode in art.51 of UN Charta. For details, see C.G.BALABAN, **Security and International Law – Challenges on the beginning of XXIst century**, P.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2006, pp.178-184.

⁷ The motivation was mentioned in the official statement published after the meeting of the chief of Israeli government with the high representative of EU for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana – "Israel will carry out the fight against Hezbollah as long as it will be necessary to bring back all kidnapped soldiers and to reinforce the UN Resolution".

⁸ According to the Declaration from July 19th 2006 of the Israeli PM, Ehud Olmert, quoted by Reuters.

⁹ According to the Israeli minister of Defence, Amir Perez. They wish to push Hezbollah over the border on a distance of at least 7 – 8 km, which allows the settlement of an international security force along the border.

¹⁰ Lebanon is a country with 3.8 million people. Due to the confrontation between the Israeli Armed Forces and Hezbollah guerrillas, over 900,000 Lebanese citizens became refugees.

¹¹ Sven Berthel, Chief of the UN Office for Palestinian refugee, UNRWA, to Beirut.

¹² According to AFP, the last data supplied by the Committee for helping the Lebanese government, on July 2nd mentioned the death of at least 835 people and over 3210 wounded. The data included Lebanese soldiers and policemen, but not Hezbollah militants.

¹³ According to Beirut officials, the damages were estimated to 2.5 billion, while the compensations received as help from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were estimated at 800 million.



¹⁴ A passage for the evacuation of the foreigners and people with double citizenships and a humanitarian maritime corridor from Cyprus to Lebanon, controlled by the Israeli Navy.

¹⁵ The USA State Secretary Condoleezza Rice stated that there should be established “the bases for long term solution which will maintain peace in the region for long time” but the “plan” proposed by the USA for solving the crisis is, in the opinion of the analysts, hard to be achieved and will give Israel couple weeks for continuing the bombing.

¹⁶ By the Romanian president, Romania recognizes, without a doubt, the right of Israel to security. Great Britain assured calls for the American aircrafts who transported bombs to Israel.

¹⁷ Due to the fact that the Hezbollah Shiite group continues to represent a threat for the Israel, Israel has all the rights to defend itself.

¹⁸ The Arab States League or the Arab League is composed by 22 Arab countries among them, since 1996, Palestine is considered to be an independent state – according the Arab League Pact’s Annex – so, a full membership of the League.

¹⁹ The International Justice Court does the following specifications: the legitimate defence, individual or collective, it is justified only in very well-defined conditions, when there are adopted proportional measures with the military aggression act necessary to end this. Also, according to the UN Charta, any action taken will last till the Security Council will adopt the measures which are necessary for the peacekeeping, for details see C.G.BALABAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-184; I. CLOSCA, *Was legal or illegal the Iraq’s attack?*, Romanian Humanitarian Law Magazine, Year XI, No. I (44), p.11.

²⁰ In the same time, the Indonesian Government requests the immediately cease of fire and sending a UN mission in the area for the peacekeeping operations.

²¹ Venezuela condemns the Israel’s offensive and, as a protest sign regarding the Israeli action, it called back its ambassador from Jerusalem.

²² Of course, the Iranian president is not at his first declaration against Israel. For example: “the Zionist regime is deeply unfair and represents a permanent threat to the Islamic world [...] the Jewish state is, day by day, closer to the disappearance while the Palestinian resistance is strengthening continue [...]”.

²³ A couple of British newspapers mentioned that a large number of the Cabinet’s members are “unsatisfied” by the fact that Tony Blair “stands without condition the Israeli offensive” and shows up the concern for a possible deterioration of the situation from the region.

²⁴ Tony Blair revealed the fact that some guns with the Iranian origin are identical with the ones used against the British troops at Basra, in South of Iraq.

²⁵ In a TV interview, quoted by the French newspaper

Le Figaro, the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, stated: “If you attack Beirut, the Islamic resistance will attack Tel-Aviv and then you will stop bombing our houses, cities, civilians, our infrastructure, we will not launch anymore missiles against Israel”. As a response, the Israeli Armed Forces will destroy the Lebanese infrastructure.

²⁶ Before the extraordinary reunion of Arab League, from Beirut, on August 7th, the Egyptian official who visited Tripoli was welcomed by the Lebanese people with streets protests due to his warrior behavior. He stated to the Egyptian diplomacy that he arrived in Lebanon to place at the Hezbollah leader’s disposal the Syrian Armed Forces, capable to defend Lebanon.

²⁷ As chief of the British diplomacy, Margaret Becket expressed certain “reserves” regarding the PM policy. We are talking about the “unauthorized” use of an airport from Scotland by an American aircraft that was transporting bombs against blockhouses by Israel. Although the Washington administration “apologised”, these shipping still go on.

²⁸ In a TV interview for the American channel Sky, the British PM “minimized” the clash of opinions inside his Cabinet on how to approach the conflict in Lebanon. Afterwards, even London denied these divergences.

²⁹ The American State Secretary saluted the decision of those two Hezbollah members of Lebanese Cabinet to include among the truce’s clauses the “disarming enforcements” of the Shiite militia.

³⁰ The Palestinian PM affirmed that Israel is guilty by the war against the humanity and requested UN to impose sanctions to Israel.

³¹ Reuters mentions an Israeli inquiry connected with this case. The Israeli Armed Forces admitted that it was done a serious error when the Lebanese city Qana was bombed. The aircraft’s raid was executed according to instructions regarding the attack of the suspect structures but if it was knew that inside the building exists civilian, with certainty, the building wouldn’t be bombed.

³² According to the Israeli Police, quoted by Rompres, the missiles record for one day, launched by Hezbollah from Lebanon over the North of Israel was on August 2nd, numbering 230 missiles.

³³ Vice premier Shimon Peres, quoted by Rompres.

³⁴ The experts affirm that the tensions were not eliminated even after the Israeli retreat from the Gaza Strip, dated last year.

³⁵ The most powerful leaders requested the following: freedom for the Israeli soldiers kidnapped in Gaza and Lebanon; immediate stop bombing of the Jewish state, ceasing the military operations from North and South and retreat of the Israeli forces situated on other territories. After the situation from Middle East got worst, the eight leaders suggested the need of an international security and observation force in South of Lebanon. The Declaration blames the extremism and



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

those ones who support it, but the text never mentions any particular state, although the USA wishes the express conviction of Syria and Lebanon.

³⁶ The counsellor for political issues of the UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan - who leads the UN delegation to Beirut – declared that UN support the Lebanon appeal regarding the cease of fire and its promises to re-establish the full control on its territory.

³⁷ The Lebanese PM says the Lebanon requests are not taken into consideration by the great powers. The great powers agree on some facts which are not in the interests of Lebanon but against Lebanon and against peace. The war will continue in Lebanon for ever. What will happen is that the aggression will continue but the Israeli will be on each stone and the resistance will over all places. Then the Hezbollah resistance will attack the Israeli and they will bomb again.

³⁸ Israeli PM, Ehud Olmert, quoted by the Times magazine on August 2nd, 2006.

³⁹ On contrary, Hezbollah will not respect the UN Security Council Resolutions.

⁴⁰ The Israeli ambassador to UN, Dan Ghinerman, requested that in the South Lebanon to be deployed a strong and powerful international force, capable to end the attacks of Hezbollah guerillas against the Israeli state.

⁴¹ Moreover, it is expected that the Shiite Hezbollah group to receive new reinforcements. Among this there will be an Indonesian suicidal units.

⁴² There is a serious fear of some critics inside the

Israel. If Israel will be forced to conclude a crisis in the conditions in which the Hezbollah militant organization will not be fully disarmed and liquidated, there will be a hit for its image of “military superpower”, main argument in the relations with its rivals from region. Also, the American president, George W. Bush, sustains that there cannot be discussed about a cease of fire till the Shiite Hezbollah militia will be disarmed and the borders and sovereignty of Israel respected.

⁴³ In the vision of Arab League and of the UN Lebanese ambassador, the UN intermediate force mandate should be extended and consolidated.

⁴⁴ The Beirut Government – who requested that the peace along the Southern borders to be assured by the Lebanese Army with the assistance of UN intermediate force and not by the international force – announced the reserve of deploying 15,000 Lebanese military personnel in order to take over the control over the South Lebanon from the Shiite Hezbollah militia after the Israeli withdrawal. The Beirut officials wish that the peace along the Southern border to be assured by the Lebanese Army with the assistance of the UN intermediate force and not by an international force.

⁴⁵ The Lebanese Army abandoned its positions from the border since 1976, from the beginning of the war in Lebanon (1975 - 1990).

⁴⁶ More used by the British, French and other Europeans.

⁴⁷ Nobody will ever disarm Israel or Hezbollah.

Professor Constantin - Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD, is a doctorate consultant within the National Defence University “Carol I”.



US AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE. PERSPECTIVES ON TWO DECADES OF DEBATE

Manuela BĂDĂLUȚĂ

This article sets out the history of US NMD programmes and the design and technical challenges of the proposed system. The presentation is chronological, as it is related to national defence objectives, the critical technical problems in achieving these objectives. The US National Missile Defence (NMD) programme aims to protect the US against a limited number of ballistic missiles, fired from a "state of concern". NMD plans have attracted criticism that it is technically difficult to implement and risks destabilising international security by undermining nuclear arms control.

The idea of developing a national missile defence system, designed to intercept incoming missiles, was launched in the US at the beginning of the Cold War. **Santinel**, **Safeguard** and **Star Wars** are chronologically the programs aiming at developing this system. At that time, those programs were classified, but presently the national missile defence program, known as the **Son of Star Wars**, is being strongly mediatized. The most important advocate is George W. Bush, who, during his presidential campaign, expressed his goal of developing this program¹, even at the expense of damaging US-Russian relations - for developing the NMD program, it was necessary either the ABM² Treaty modification, or the US' withdrawal from this Treaty, which actually happened in 2001. Since Reagan launched SDI in a speech dated March 23, 1983, the idea of developing a system capable of neutralizing a missile threat has become a major security policy priority for US. Reagan believed that science would make nuclear weapons *impotent and obsolete*³:

Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn

to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.

SDI proved to be a very ambitious program on both technical and financial grounds⁴. Following Reagan, the idea of developing a BMD system has tempted two other US presidents: George Bush and Bill Clinton⁵, but with no concrete result. The project could not overcome two crucial obstacles: the technological difficulties and Russia's opposition⁶. From the technological point of view, developing a missile defence system was very complex. The necessary components include a sophisticated radar system, an adequate satellite technology and devices designed to intercept and destroy the ballistic missile target. The latter major obstacle was the international community's reaction, especially Russia's. The NMD opponents, most of them states that pose a potential threat to US security, the so-called „rogue” states – North Korea, Iran, Irak - motivated their position by arguing that developing NMD would make US a world gendarme and would give the right to put pressures on the other states in order to achieve their goals. Without exception, Russian reactions to US plans for NMD have been from critical to negative. Russian officials argued that the development of the missile defence system would violate the ABM Treaty. François Gere considers that the development of the missile defence system would reconsider the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty (1972) had permitted each side two ABM deployment areas, one to defend its national capital and another to defend an ICBM field. The ABM Protocol (1974) limited each side to one site only restrained the deployment of ABM systems.

Russian Federation, claiming to be the legal successor to the Soviet Union in all treaties, strongly opposed to any ABM Treaty modification, which would have permitted US to develop a national missile defence program. The ABM Treaty codified the strategic equilibrium in the



area of nuclear weapons, ensuring that both remain vulnerable to retaliation. The nuclear balance of terror was based on the ABM Treaty. After the USSR disappeared, Russia tried to maintain the Soviet nuclear inheritance and an equal position in the negotiation with US. The ABM Treaty represented a diplomatic guarantee that Russia was not willing to give up so easily.

The national missile defence efforts were revitalized by the George Bush administration. In 1991, he launched the **GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes)** program. President Bush redefined SDI program to focus on developing a system against limited strikes⁷. One year later, USSR collapsed, but Russia, under president Boris Yeltsin, soon addressed this issue. In his address to the UN in early 1992, Yeltsin proposed a joint Global Protection System (**JGDS**). But the cooperation tendency from the beginning of the '90 failed. In 1993, the Clinton Administration launched the same national defence program, trying to change Russia's position on this issue. On their meeting in 1994, Clinton and Yeltsin expressed their willingness to cooperate on the development of theatre missile defence systems, but the ABM issue was not brought into discussion. In March 1996, Clinton launched the **National Missile Defense 3 plus 3 Programme**, which established a three-year evaluation period to determine whether an NMD system was feasible, affordable, and politically acceptable, followed by a three-year deployment period if results were positive⁸. The overall assessment was not satisfactory. The dialogue between US and Russia reduced to scientific cooperation, while the US intention to develop the national missile defence system was becoming more and more stringent. The following alternatives have been suggested in order to solve the differences between US and Russia on the ABM Treaty:

1. the ABM Treaty abolishment;
2. the negotiation of minimal modifications for the initial NMD deploying;
3. addressing the ABM Treaty issue during a new round of negotiations for START III.
4. the unilateral interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

On the 15th of July, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States - popularly known as the Rumsfeld Commission, after its Chair, former Defence Secretary Donald

Rumsfeld - released an unclassified version of its major study into the likelihood of US territory - particularly Hawaii and Alaska - being the subject of ballistic missile attack. The nine members of the Commission unanimously reached the conclusion that US were exposed to the threat coming from an uncertain number of overtly or potential hostile nations⁹. The report individualizes two categories of hostile nations. The first category included the emerging ballistic missile powers, countries with regional ambitions, but not in possession of short-range missiles. The report concluded that "rogue states" such as Iraq, North Korea, or Iran could deploy ballistic missiles within "five years of a decision to do so". The latter category included the states already in possession of ballistic missiles, nations with which the United States were not in conflict but which remained in uncertain transitions. The report made references to Russia and China. The threat coming from Russia was different from the one during the Cold War. With the Cold War ended, the likelihood of a deliberate missile attack on the US from Russia has been greatly lessened but not entirely eliminated. The risk of an accident or of a loss of control over Russian ballistic missile forces - a risk which appeared small - could increase sharply and with little warning if the political situation in Russia was to deteriorate. As for China, the modernization of its long-range missiles and nuclear weapons made it a more threatening power in the event of a crisis.

The framework of the Rumsfeld Commission Report gave greater political urgency to NMD development efforts. In January 1999, President Clinton approached Russian President Yeltsin with a request to modify the ABM Treaty to allow the US to deploy a limited National Missile Defence, which was stated to only protect the US from potential nuclear proliferators. Russia's reaction was a positive one.

In June 1999, both Presidents met in Cologne, for discussions on the ABM and START III. They agreed to adhere to the earlier signed agreements on the limitation and reduction of arms. They also agreed to continue discussions of the future START-3 Treaty. Until now, the negotiations have not reached considerable results. While Clinton's second term was coming to an end, in Russia, Vladimir Putin won the 2000 presidential elections. In New York, on September 6, 2000, Clinton met Putin for the first time. The two presidents launched



the US-Russian *Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative*, an agreement that covers cooperative efforts on theater missile defence, early warning information, missile non-proliferation measures, and confidence and transparency-building measures. On the other hand, the document was a diplomatic victory for Russia on the ABM Treaty issue, described as the “a cornerstone of strategic stability”¹⁰.

But President Clinton deferred the deployment decision to his successor. NMD development was very important from the diplomatic point of view. Russia was not willing to abandon the ABM Treaty, like a Cold War relic. But the game was not over. Elected as President in November 2000, the Republican G.W. Bush approached the NMD issue¹¹. Bush’s election marked a new era for the US domestic and foreign policy. Bush’s goal was to achieve the development of the national missile defence system:

Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world. Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible speeds. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least-responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough.

*We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defences to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30 years old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace. **Russia and the United States should work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 21st century.***

That’s why we should work together to replace this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a

clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. We may have areas of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic adversaries. Russia and America both face new threats to security. Together, we can address today’s threats and pursue today’s opportunities. We can explore technologies that have the potential to make us all safer. This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces¹².

The speech analysis highlights the two major goals of US security policy. The first one is obviously the development of a national missile defence system, regardless the abandoning the ABM Treaty. The latter goal is to reduce the strategic nuclear weapons to levels compatible with national security needs, the so-called “minimum nuclear deterrence”.

The September 11 terrorist attacks had immediate impact on the debate over missile defence. For the first time the US homeland remained vulnerable to an atypical, unpredictable and devastating aggression. During the days following the attacks, at the governmental level, it was launched the idea of a global threat to national security, including the possibility of ballistic missile attacks. The statement released on September 17, 2001 by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, synthesised the idea of a global threat: US must face the threat of terrorism and rogue states. There is no doubt of the fact that we must continue to work on the development of the missile defence system.

During a summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC)¹³ on October 21, 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin clarified their positions on NMD issue. Their statements highlighted two different points of view. Bush stated that the ABM Treaty was “outdated and dangerous”, as it prevented US from defending against potential attacks. On the other hand, Putin considered the



Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability. The reasons Russia objects to ABM abandoning are multiple. First of all, the treaty is a document with a very important political value; it preserves the strategic balance between Washington and Moscow, even after the USSR disappearance. The US NMD development would trigger a new round of technological race that Russia cannot afford to launch in response. Russia fears of asymmetry in arms race, being deprived of economic resources that would allow maintaining the strategic equilibrium.

On December 13, 2001 US mass-media announced officially the US intention to withdraw¹⁴ from the ABM Treaty. In his address to nation, Bush brought into discussion the idea of the development of an efficient missile defence system in order to protect US and the allies from unpredictable attacks. Moscow's reaction was very quiet. In his statement on December 13, 2001, the Russian President did call it a mistaken move, however he ruled out any aggressive reaction in response.

We would have no intention of raising any anti-American hysteria. Nor do we think this step could result in the emergence of new threats to Russia's security - for several reasons. First of all, a nationwide missile defence system is not in place. Second, it is not known whether it could be created. And third, if the attempt to establish it is successful, it is not clear when that could happen¹⁵.

The ABM issue did not affected the negotiations on the strategic nuclear tests reduction. On May 24, 2002, when Bush and Putin signed at Moscow the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the ABM issue was not in the forefront anymore. The nature of the US and Russian diplomatic actions can be understood after a few decades. For now, we can only make suppositions. Maybe the ABM issue and SORT are part of a single mutual compensation strategy. Russia remains a powerful actor on the world stage. No US president can deny that. Moscow is not a threat anymore. In 2000, during his presidential campaign, G.W. Bush promised that he would establish a new relationship with Russia. "Our mutual security need no longer depend on a nuclear balance of terror".

NOTES:

¹ Bush's national missile defence project proposes adding additional interceptor sites, on the US and allies'

homeland, in order to intercept incoming ballistic missile warheads outside the earth's atmosphere (exoatmospheric) and destroy them by force of the impact.

² The ABM Treaty places stringent limits on strategic missile defence components as a way of physically imposing its limits on missile defence capabilities. Article I of the treaty prohibits missile defence systems that could provide a defence of the national territory (although it permits the defence of a single individual region) and it prohibits efforts to build a base for a future national defence. The Treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. The two sites defended must be at least 1,300 kilometres apart, to prevent the creation of any effective regional defence zone or the beginnings of a nationwide system. At each site there may be no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers.

³ Address to the Nation on National Security By President Ronald Reagan, March 23, 1983, <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/rrspch.htm>

⁴ SDI was intended to provide total US protection against nuclear attack, equipping the satellites with weapons capable of intercepting and neutralizing incoming missiles in midcourse, high above the earth. Since 1983, there have been several changes in the system's architecture.

⁵ During the Clinton presidency, three NMD tests were conducted, but all of them failed.

⁶ CIRINCIONE, Joseph, *Still Kicking: A Forecast of the Post-Clinton NMD Debate*, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd50/50nmd.htm>

⁷ Data on the national missile defence program chronology are available at www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/chron.htm

⁸ The project proposed by the Clinton Administration stated that the Ground Based Intceptor was the "weapon" of the NMD system. Its mission was to intercept incoming ballistic missile warheads outside the earth's atmosphere (exoatmospheric) and destroy them by force of the impact.

⁹ The report is available at fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/execsum.htm

¹⁰ The text of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative, September 6, 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_10/dococt00.asp

¹¹ After three failed tests during Clinton Administration, the first successful U.S. Ballistic Missile-Shield test took place in 2001. The \$100 million test involved a Minuteman 2 intercontinental ballistic missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base on California and an interceptor fired from Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 4,800 miles away. Russia protested, arguing that the test was a violation of the ABM Treaty, which would trigger a new round of arms race.



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

¹² Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defence University, May 1, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html>

¹³ At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shanghai, Bush and Putin agreed on “significant reduction” in strategic arsenal and announced that progress had been made in the negotiation on ABM issue.

¹⁴ Art. 15 stipulates that “each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to

withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests”.

¹⁵ <http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/missiledefense/Panofsky-ABMWithdrawal.htm>

Manuela BĂDĂLUȚĂ holds a BA in International Relations European Studies, the University of Bucharest, the Faculty of Letters. She is currently a master student in International Relations: Conflict Management, within the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration.



THE SECURITY IMPACT OF ROMANIA'S ACCESSION TO EU

Vasile POPA

Romania's alignment – at the 1st of January 2007 – to the European Union's member states represents the strategic event with the best impact in the close reality and also in perspective. An eagerly expected moment by millions of Romanians, the integration into the European community is, among the numerous economic and social advantages, a remarkable security benefit. Romania's post-accession development will build solid pillars for defence, public order and national safety institutions. Surpassing the threshold that today separates it from the EU's countries will assure Romania the necessary capabilities for the field's infrastructure renewing, the material, financial and human potential growth which will permit the approach to the NATO and EU exigency level of the military missions.

From the Romanian point of view, regarding its participation to the European organization, we can estimate that the EU's economic valences growth will become more obvious after the Romanian economy's full integration into the community one, approach that will transform the organization into a regional actor with possibilities that strengthen and extend the defence and security dimensions.

Strongly defining its role in the international relations framework, but also reactivating its economy and strengthening its intern cohesion, EU will create to the new member states development opportunities that will raise the social prosperity, simultaneously strengthening the state security in front of serious present and future risks and threats.

The thorough look over the main threats against the national security, that the new Romania's Strategy of Security does, underlines the leading places' importance of the poor governance, associated with corruption, international terrorism threat, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crises situations and frozen conflicts from our country's neighbourhood as well as the totalitarian regimes which support the terrorism.

It is clear that the Romanians' expectations primarily regard to cease these threats, that is possible especially in the post-accession period, when, the interweave of the Union's exigencies with the internal administration ones will improve the governance and stop the corruption, will confer new valences of the fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, will induce that the approach of the crises situations to be done more effective, when will act more firmly and with more authority for the frozen conflicts' disappearance from Romania's vicinity and deter the totalitarian regimes to help terrorism.

The accomplishments that strengthen the Romanians' hopes in a more promising future from the vision of standards of life, combined with the will and concentrated action at the community level will constitute major provocations created by the accession process.

If we analyze the integrations' costs and economic advantages we can count on the consequences of a higher security degree at national and international level, built on the consistent stipulated economic growth, the professional mobility, the economic convergence and direct foreign investments, but also on the process' internal and external political dimensions, which comprise increasing the environmental protection, the clandestine immigration ceasing, the fight against organized crime and drugs trafficking, etc.

It's normal for the Romanians' optimism to be partial undermined by some fears regarding the difficulties that could generate a defective management of changes, elements that will stress over the living level of all the people and over the national security. It shouldn't be broken from the start the trust in the Romanian political class, that will elaborate and apply with determination true European policies, to innovate and reform, to ensure the development of competition and to create new jobs within an extended market,



STRATEGIC EVENT

to manage effectively the integration process, to offer higher standards of life and a higher security, to strengthen the regional, European and global security and stability.

The infrastructure investments and the regional supports, the allocations for agriculture, the funds allocated to the nuclear safety growth, to the improvement of the public administration and borders' security are just some of the impact elements in the security plan that are to be better stressed out after our EU accession.

The economic analysts, but also the political ones, have foreseen that a real convergence between the two new member states and the other 25 European states, on long term, when the social differences between the wide old European citizens and the new ones will be no longer a gap reality. Everything will depend as the EU's specialists appreciate by the way how the change will be managed, by the quickness of operating the necessary reforms, by the political and social stability because it is already noticed the fact that in the Union's member states appeared the phenomena of social turbulence owed to the politic errors and this is a sign that the European citizen doesn't tolerate anymore the lie, the excessive costs, the political engagements non-fulfilment or even bankrupted politics, no matter the sector they manifest. The political instability wave itself, quickly noticed by the mass-media, that also marked the lives of other states joining EU before Romania determined our citizens to clearly see the result of corruption, political conflicts, cheap populism and reforms delay.

We still must look trustfully and hopefully to the future and each state's community that counts, from the 1st of January 2007, 27 democracies and more than 480 millions of people that commonly protect their right to peace and calm with safety and prosperity. Even if some countries will set out some restrictive measures for the access of the labour force from the new member states to the old ones or there will be decided some safeguarding clauses, Romania will be an example for securing the Union's frontier on its Eastern side and surely it will be as the actual leadership states, "the most pleasant Union's surprise". Therefore, if Romania adopts and applies, starting the 1st of January, a realistic, modern, effective strategy in all the activity fields, by no means it will not fail in its effort to become an European country,

perfectly aligned to the front echelon states of the continent's states that function to the EU's high standards, a base link in the security belt of the extended Europe.

Enlarged with two states – Romania and Bulgaria – Europe will become a more important actor in the international relations and in this multiplicity effect there will be found the Romanian contribution itself with a distinguished identity among the continent's nations, with an army and national security structures that strengthen the internal and also the regional, continental and global security with an acknowledged share to the world's peace and stability.

A NATO and EU member, our country will significantly influence the European stability and security participating from the European and Euro-Atlantic communities inside new continental and global security architecture. From its double posture, as a NATO and EU member, Romania has now the possibility to actively sustain the both organization complementarity in security plan to the Euro-Atlantic and global level space. In the case of EU's Atlantic core strengthen, a more concrete Romania's implication perspective in the ESDP development remains open as the one of the effective participation to develop the dialogue between both organizations.

Romania could have, in the relations' dynamic between these two organizations, a significant role in solving the common security problems with an active involvement in the European program for preventing the conflicts and civil crises management on different spaces, in increasing the military intervention capacity, in searching new solutions for a coherent and united common continental defence.

Concomitantly, our country will involve deeply in the internal dynamics of security continental institutions, in improving the military capabilities and forces' interoperability, making them to be able to handle a wider problems' spectre from the security environment, including terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction.

As a neighbour of the Balkans and the Black Sea, Romania will bring an important contribution to these pin-regions stability and development, to the integral management of some non-conventional risks which affect these transit regions' security.

The more emphasised multiregional involvement in reconstruction and stabilization activities



STRATEGIC EVENT

(in areas from Central Asia, Middle East or Africa) will request a redefinition of the Romanian Army role and missions, a reorganization of its security institutions built on the NATO and EU affiliation.

The historic moment, the 1st of January 2007, will design a new dimension of the Romania's global role which will have increased responsibilities in security and stability plan that will be added to the ones comprised in politics and engagements established by developed partnerships with other states. From this point of view, we must pursue to strengthen Romania's security cooperation with the Black Sea region states and also with others, as a constitutive part to consolidate the both organizations' vicinity relations, to increase the efforts of creating an efficient multilateral system for strengthening the international order, consolidating the regional and global trust and security, within a world where the threats have a planetary dimension and the economy and information are globalised and the efficient crises management asks for a preventive engagement of governments and states, political will and, especially, a real capacity to act.

Moreover, Romania will affirm itself as a stability pillar in the Central and South-Eastern Europe, will contribute to the area's states trust consolidation on its potential to act as an important factor in the region's stability. In this context, our country will take part to all regional and security projects and organisms, to the NATO, EU, UN and OSCE initiatives that regard this space, especially the Black Sea Area, where it manifests a wide range of threats against the region's security, which is a genuine corridor of transnational terrorism, drugs and human beings trafficking towards EU.

Post-adheration, our country will adopt a coherent ensemble of administrative, juridical, military, diplomatic, political, etc. measures in order to reach the aims regarding its border security and defence from the external risks and threats effects. Thus, Romania will accomplish the strict control of EU's external borders, will rise the judicial system quality, will fight, together with the other member states, against the organized crime, corruption, will reinforce the international and regional cooperation.

Obviously, the efficient security of the country's border will have a positive impact over economic, cultural, scientific, political, military and all the other relations between our country and the neighbouring countries that aren't part of NATO and EU. Therefore, the Black Sea will become, because of the Romania and Bulgaria accession to EU, a strong source of unity, development and stability, in a permanently unstable geographical area.

Clearly, our country can, by the experience got in the transition and the EU integration processes, to contribute to the development of the neighbourhood policy, the improvement of the accession process, enhancing the credibility and trust in the EU's enlargement.

The new cooperation conveniences agreed by the EU accession assure Romania to be a bridge of the European organization toward the East space, to wide and strengthen the prosperity and good vicinity zone to the EU's borders, to consolidate freedom, security and justice area, by ensuring an effective management at its borders.

Colonel (r.) Vasile POPA is a scientific researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I".



ON THE WAR'S TRAPS

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD

Nowadays conflicts are seldom consequences of certain military realities. Generated by political, economical, social, ethnical, territorial, religious, etc., sources, or, as in most of the cases, by their combinations, they are followed-up by confrontations where solutions are looked for by armed violence. Seldom wars and military conflicts end the way intended by their initiators. Wars are nonlinear, because results are not either proportional to the inputs or equal to the sum of its compounds.

Wars are just as nonlinear as politics. They have the capacity to adapt to modifications, chances, uncertainties generated by the nonlinearity that, in its turn, generates synergy, innovation, changes and continuity. All of them are turned into concrete forms by traps, planned or not, wished or accidental, minor or dramatically ended. Within these traps there is a little attention paid to the potential differences, even the astonishing ones. Traps have their own rules. We guess them in the wars developed in the last years: Chechnya and Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East and in all the others less presented by media.

When the Cold War ended at the beginning of the '90, together with the bipolar world rivalry, one could have had great hopes for world peace. But it took only few years and it became clear that armed violence is as present as ever in today's civilisation, even if the number of hot spots in the world has diminished over the past years and the probability of inter-states war is lower than ever. Moreover, the cases of Iran and North Korea suddenly made actual the issue of nuclear dissemination kept under control during so many decades.

9/11 has revealed a new face of violence – terrorism in its most fearful forms – generated by combining extremism and the cult of death. Five years have passed and terrorism has managed to establish itself as a real threat for stability and security. So, it is a quasi-normal thing to hear more and more voices today asking not if the nuclear

weapon will arrive in the terrorist's hands but **when** it will happen, being convinced about the inevitability of such an evolution. Thus, a new problem will appear for world's security, namely what will happen with the deterrence role of the nuclear weapons in the future.

However, the diversity of the nature of violence generating sources, more than spatial extend is what characterizes today's conflicts: political, economical, social, ethnical, territorial, religious, etc. In most cases, they are not pure, they are combinations of them and that's why the nature of wars and military conflicts is a complex one, sometimes chaotic, and the keys to ending difficult to find.

Thus we are somewhere between Sun Tzu who regarded war as "... a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin."¹ and Clausewitz who underlined "*the chameleonism of war*"² and elaborated the concept "*fog of war*", war that in every specific case changes its nature. Even if there is a lot of time between them, both thinkers pointed out **the nonlinearity of war**, as it is called nowadays. As a system, war is nonlinear, because its results are not proportional to the inputs and, at the same time, are not equal to the sum of its compounds. That means wars rarely end as their planners think they will.

War is the reflection of the civilization that generates it. Thus, it includes all the latter's features: political, economical, psychosocial, technology, religious, military and so on. The globalization puts all these under a speed of changes, yet unknown in mankind's history. Their effects, especially the long term ones, hardly could be predicted. New risks and threats to world peace are inevitable. Most of them are not the immediate effects of military realities that alter the traditional representation about the efficiency of armed forces in peace building and about their missions today. Inevitably, this keeps the armed force in a quasi permanent transformation process including organization, equipment, training, doctrines, etc.



But transformation has to be sustained by great financial resources and this affects other priorities of social development. This is a way for feeding today's risks and threats, etc. The process of security management could end up in a vicious circle. Despite all these, armed forces continue to be among the main tools of the states when the protection of their interests needs the projection of the organized armed violence.

Under these circumstances, now, more than ever, we could say the wars and military conflicts belong to those complex activities with unpredictable behaviour and nonlinear dynamic. War is as nonlinear as politics. It can very well adjust itself to changes, chances and uncertainties, to means and to the involved actors. Wars are built from infinite numbers of subsystems and interdependent elements between themselves and with the physical and cultural environment in which they take place. That is why they can only be analyzed holistically. Nonlinearity could generate uncertainty, instability, disruptions, and malfunction. On the other hand, it generates synergy, innovation, improvement and continuity. In military conflicts, all these use to make traps: planned or not, wished or accidental, minor or dramatically ended, etc.

Thus, military operations reach surprising overturns, hardly predictable during the organizational period even in the conditions when the gaps between the belligerent potentials are great. Such overturns could provoke damages but also offer real opportunities for victory, provided their senses are timely noticed, before the enemy does.

The enemy, at its turn, has become an ambiguous political concept, and difficult to distinguish exactly. The practice of wars has imposed during the time the axiom that later became a truism, that the enemy decisively influences military policy of the states, military strategies and doctrines, the face of armed forces, etc.

A concrete enemy, with concrete armed forces characterized by concrete quantity indicators which have permitted accurate enough quality estimations, has given rationality and predictability to shaping and managing war. The enemy image fulfils some needs of the state which are influenced by the common history, political differences, geographical distances, etc. In the most of the cases, this image generates confusions between the current but ephemeral state position and its

interests that are more perennial. Thus, the goals of a conflict could become ambiguous, and could be obvious in the development of operations, the priorities overturns and this could generate confusions for "the third parts" and makes difficult to find out the appropriate solutions for a conflict.

Who could exactly point today to **the enemy** and **his location** in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya, in order to elaborate the best military strategies?

Linearity means structural stability and balance. War generates entropy that means the lack of order in a system. Thus, we speak about nonlinearity. It is difficult to predict the end of a war taking into account the estimation of the input data, even if they are complete, and the balance of forces. Consequently, we use the term 'victory' to speak about this end, a short word which does not reflect either the huge price paid to obtain it or future difficulties. The demonstration has been made by military operations in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and against Hezbollah in Lebanon. After a successful start, the goals were reached differently, but peace is still far away.

In **Chechnya**, overthrowing the separatist regime was a laborious process and needed extended fighting, but in time violence turned into a terrorist war and extended to proximate areas. Even children were caught in its spider web, as it happened in Beslan. Its humanitarian implications quickly became a delicate problem which put the Russian authorities in difficult situations and Chechnya war has changed into a serious menace for the security of Russia's southern territories. The nonlinear effects of this conflict have had an important role in the Russian state option to avoid the direct use of military violence and to prefer other "weapons", the energetic ones for instance.

In the other cases mentioned earlier, the goals were achieved swiftly:

- overthrowing the terrorist linked Taliban regime in Kabul;
- overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his regime in Baghdad;
- occupying the southern territory of Lebanon in order to disarm the Hezbollah.

Later on, difficulties began to emerge.

In **Afghanistan**, the government in Kabul, with NATO's assistance, began the process of national reconstruction and the stabilization. Meanwhile, the Taliban movement has become active in Southern Afghanistan. Gen. James Jones, former NATO's



Supreme Commander, estimated fighting strength at three to 3000-4000 militants.³ They are better armed, trained and organized. It needs to increase NATO forces with 2000 more troops in Afghanistan. They will join the already existing 20000 NATO troops and the Afghan armed forces. Meantime, the British Defence Secretary, Des Browne, stated that *“The Taliban’s tenacity in the face of massive losses has been a surprise, absorbing more of our effort than predicted and consequently slowing progress on reconstruction.”*⁴

But Afghanistan faces much more complex problems than those related strictly to the armed forces. In Congress, gen. Jones mentioned:

- Al Qaeda remnants;
- opium trafficking;
- criminal gangs;
- corruption;
- tribal conflicts.

The sum of all these led the British official already mentioned to admit it has been harder than expected, and that *“Success won’t be what we understand by security and prosperity and proper governance, but it will be progress and it will be massively worth achieving.”*⁵

The swift military victory of the multinational coalition in **Iraq** has started the process of internal democratization and brought about serious complications that accompanied the Iraqi internal process of stabilization and normalization. Iraqi war has provoked a sudden increase of the political price paid by the US, its initiator. It became strategically obvious that a solution for Iraq does not exist and a stabilization strategy has to involve the whole Oriental region.

The military victory made the figure of Iran’s greatest enemy, Saddam Hussein, fade away. Out of his spell, Teheran became a serious problem for the international community, because of its nuclear program and its role in the Middle East. Thus, a quasi-isolated actor some years ago has changed into a quasi-participant part in finding a long term solution. Nobody wanted such a situation. Inevitably, this means involving actors which did not take part in the Hussein regime overthrowing such China, Russia, some EU states, also an undesirable situation.

The **Israeli** armed forces are considered among the most modern and efficient in the world. They proved this in all military operations against the armed forces of some Arab states. But for the first

time in the last decades, their operation against Hezbollah was not followed by a quick victory that for many decades used to deter the traditional enemy.

The bombing of Lebanon’s civil infrastructure and the refugee problem it caused have led the international public opinion to see this conflict with less understanding than other times.

The summer war in Lebanon has caused political debate in Israel, the kidnapped soldiers are hostages even today, while the Hezbollah continues to be armed and even proclaims victory, and the Arab world has started to sharpen its attention on the vulnerabilities of the Israeli armed forces. Also, it has turned into operational two actors whose voices will be stronger in the future: Iran and Syria. Enough reasons for the future destabilizing events for peace in the region. This probably explains the surprisingly quick reaction of the UN, which strengthened its mission from Lebanon with an additional 15 thousands troops, mainly from European Union. But, as you know, the European community has other opinions regarding some evolutions in the Middle East and it will not take long time when they will be applied.

All these hot spots of the world will continue to have enough nonlinear potential if wrong steps will be made, especially military steps.

The concern of all political actors of the world about the armed forces technologization, of course, in the limits of each state’s resources, the temptation of technology could be considered the way to make the war linear. The technological supremacy could permit the monitoring of any action that could generate armed violence. Therefore, the intentions of a potential adversary may be easier decoded. Action could be taken against him starting from the period of planning. But the most probable outcome is that technology will sharpen the non-linearity of war, since its main actor is and will remain the human being, not the weapons. His ability to act creatively even in the war and his capability to fight non-traditionally even in the most difficult conditions, and using obsolete military equipment, are unlimited. **The human being’s creativity will feed the nonlinearity of war.** It has been demonstrated during the Iraqi war which was considered, after some days, a triumph of “network centric warfare”, technology, namely. The further events showed the success in military operations is not assured by the abilities of the soldiers to handle



high-tech. The interdependencies are much more complex and subtle ones.

Terrorism has induced absurd accents of nonlinearity, uncommon for mankind. It combined so-called “traditional values” with the latest technological discoveries offered by the society it actually fights against. The result is unacceptable, inhuman ways of action. In this combination, the weapons themselves, the vector of violence, are not new. That is why terrorism is so dangerous for world’s security. **The war against terror** could be seen as an out of proportion and inefficient reaction of world’s community, since it is more expensive than a terrorist act. But this would be an explanation, too narrow to be accepted. The war on terror is a legitimate reaction of the civilized world against an inhuman, unacceptable way to reach some goals, is nonlinear reaction against one kind of violence.

Interdependency becomes more complex, thus vulnerable in a globalizing society. Even the most insignificant system “disorder” could have exaggerated consequences and could generate different behaviour. For example, Israel’s reaction to the kidnapping of its soldiers is a clear example of the complex interdependency in region. In a

normal situation the reaction might have been different.

At the same time, the complexity of interdependency confirms a reality as old as the world: **ideal solutions** are not fated to live long, because the problems they solve are in a continuous changing. That is why armed violence has been used to impose some solutions, but also condemned.

Thus, we can only suppose that when Sun Tzu stated the art of war is vital for state he invited the emperor to think deep before starting it, because of its nonlinearity.

NOTES:

¹ LIANGCAI Chin, **Research and Application of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War**, Zhejiang University Press, p.14.

² CLAUSEWITZ, von Carl, **Despre război**, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 53

³ <http://feeds.mongolianews.net/?rid=ald042696083656718cat=929bcf2071e>

⁴ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1875709,00.html>

⁵ Ibidem.

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD, is the scientific director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I”, author of numerous studies and articles on topics related to security and national defence.



CRISIS AND WAR

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

The war is a complex social phenomenon, a limit-phenomenon. It belongs to a social essence which is confrontation. By all means, not all the confrontations are wars, but each war is a confrontation, namely, a violent armed one. The war isn't a curse or a catastrophe, even if sometimes leads to inconceivable human, material, ecology and cultural disasters. War is a reality of all the times. It's a mean to open up a strategic situation. It's a way to end or to emphasize a crisis, to prolong, to bring it to a limit-threshold from where the change, the mutation follows. This is the case of the revolutionary war. But, the war isn't a state, even if often people are powerless confronting it. It isn't a punishment, a fatality; it's a resultant of some political, economic, social, ideological, psychological vectors that are in a state of confrontation, incompatibility or competence. After all, war is an act of political will namely a violent instrument of politics for getting out of a crisis.

Because it is a very special act, war was investigated and studied in all times and from all horizons. Some people studied war to discover its causes and to eradicate it, preventing this type of cataclysm, this seism of the human society, others wanted just to understand its philosophy, physiognomy and mechanisms. In 1945, the French sociologist Gaston Bouthoul (1896-1980), the founder of polemology – the war's sociology science – wrote, together with René Carrere, the paper *Le défi de la guerre (1740-1974)*¹, and he makes a pertinent analysis of war, reasons that generate it, as well as its consequences and involvements in social, economic, demographical and ideological plan. These involvements are just marked out, and this is of course very important. More important is still to study the origins of wars, the causes producing them, reasons perpetuating them, their manifestation forms, laws and principles that express, impose and explain them in relation to the grown frequency of different crisis and conflicts. There aren't universal

valiant explanations. Societies are too different – what separates them is often much pressing and obviously more gravely than what unifies them, as differences produce both crisis and conflict – , therefore, the diverse angles to look over and analyse war.

„The human race knows to calculate, in a second, the secrets of the Jupiter's satellites, to built computers capable to process tens of million of data per minute but it does not have the capability to predict or to avoid the civil violences and wars which for thousands of years provoked blood and continue to provoke it over cities and lands: reviewing the major armed conflict which produces starting with 1740, the authors enumerated 366, from almost 71 after 1945. The people have knowledge and potentials which they could left off; but they continue to obey the ignorance and impotence with cruel effects that they always sniff”². This finding doesn't solve the war's situation. The people can't rise against the war as a social phenomenon; they can still improve crisis and conflict, can reduce the war, as the chaos theory states the variation of the initial conditions, they can control the war in a certain measure.

The crisis's evolvement to war

Crisis and war are complex phenomena specific for the human society. Until now, we couldn't succeed in their eradication and probably we won't in future. There are at least two means to look over the relation between crisis and war:

- as separate and distinctive parts, each having its causes and determinations;
- as inseparable part of the same process, war being, in fact, the crisis' top, its worse conflictual part.

The first mean refers to the fact that each crisis is a malfunction generated by a multitude of that system's internal and/or external factors. Sometimes, this malfunction is a normal follow-up of the system's evolution toward the maxim performance, from there will follow a degradation



and a significant fall, even destruction, or transformation, thus a radical metamorphosis to a new state.

The thresholds generally are significant moments for the system's crisis. Some of them are predictable, others not. Some can be evaluated, others can't. But their notice is essential in the crisis management process.

War is, theoretically, a political phenomenon, thus an instrument of politics and, in this case, it seems that it doesn't take part to the usual term crisis. The both phenomena – crisis and war – even if they have similar evolutions and close casualty, they don't confound. It's true that there were times where there are crisis, there also wars, but they are wars – violent confrontations, with complex engagements of forces, means and big actions, on wide spaces and in a variable period of time, following to open up a strategic situation -, while the crises remain a phenomenon caused by the system's or the systems' malfunctions but aren't ways to solve intricate and conflictual strategic situations. The economic crisis dated 1929-1933, as an example, didn't contain a war but the germs of the Second World War can be found also in the numerous crises and conflicts that characterized the strategic environment after the First World War.

The second way to look over the relation between crisis and war – as parts of the same process – has also its realism. In this vision, war is a sum of crises. So, it's the top, the highest moment of a complex and extremely hard crisis that inevitable leads to armed conflict. Crisis that comprises war (as complex social-political phenomenon) is itself a very complex crisis, a wider system and also a process one.

Its character as a *system crisis* is given by the fact that the system reached a limit that imposes a radical, revolutionary change. So, war can be regarded as a revolutionary crisis as one through which a system denies itself, exists from itself and fights for a new identity.

Simultaneously, the crisis that comprises war is also a *process crisis*, because that respective process reached, in its evolution, a bifurcation where they should choose. No matter the chosen way, it isn't the same as the other one because it does not have either the same direction, or the same parameters. The new way means something else, different, it means a radical change, a transformation, a denial.

This change of direction, combined with the change of configuration and even of philosophy, thus the system's reason and the process can lead to a strategic blocking from where can't exit but with war. That situation always was and, probably, will always be in the future.

In this case, war is a crisis' product, its sum. It shouldn't be mixed up with an armed conflict, because it isn't a simple conflict in which we reached resolution with the use of arms.

War is a very complex social-political phenomenon determined by grave system and process malfunctions, political and politic-military crisis and, especially, by the impossibility to leave this state using other means but the violent, extreme ones.

The way from crisis to war is characterized by:

- grave disturbances regarding the access to resources, especially to the energetic and rough materials, to create some unbearable or unacceptable situations concerning this access;
- economical and financial crises, with some countries' despoliation and quick accumulation of a part of the planet's wealth or the respective regions in hardly controlled and managed zones;
- the most serious international political crises;
- the recrudescence of some hostile political regimes;
- the recrudescence of ethnical and religious tensions;
- the recrudescence of the terrorist phenomenon, with all the consequences that rise from here;
- the social anomy growth in the countries that can be engaged in the armed confrontations;
- grave border problems;
- the recrudescence of armament.

In the Yugoslav space, for example, the accumulation of some interior tensions began immediately after the First World War. But, even the First World War unleashed as a result of the accumulated tensions in Europe and especially in the Austro-Hungarian Empire but as a pretext, starting with the Sarajevo moment, by the 28th of June 1914, when Prince Franz Ferdinand was murdered.

After the Second World War, the tensions from the Yugoslav space continued. Firstly, there were very big economic discrepancies between Slovenia which, from the economic point of view, was very



developed, and Macedonia, as if they weren't parts of the same federal state politic entity.

Consequently, they continued the Kosovo's "albanization", where the Serb population reached 10%. Each of the entities that comprised this space seemed to have other political and strategic objectives than the Yugoslavian one. Even the country's name - Yugoslavia, meaning the South-Slavs Country – was artificial and undoubtedly unsuitable for a part of the new Europe's architects.

Yugoslavia, after the partisans' actions experience from the Second World War and under the authority of the Croatian Tito, adopted the concept of popular war and widely prepared for such a war, including the development and territoriality of the armament industry. In the crisis gestation period, the groups that wanted the separation by violence (because they thought there is no other viable solutions, even in the Federation Constitution was also stipulated the right to secession) provided with local means as well with armament brought from abroad. The Yugoslav secret services discovered and even made public some situations, but the crisis was irreversible. Practically, there was nothing to be done, especially because in that period the European Union and generally all the European continent's countries were concerned about the communist implosion, the chaos created by the breaking of the bipolarity and the new way that the East-European states and not only them should have designed and followed, hadn't the capacity (or, maybe, the interest) to manage the Yugoslav crisis. Thus, the way towards war was one without return.

The same thing happened almost in all zones where bloody wars were started.

In Angola, the extremely bloody civil war between the governmental forces and UNITA wasn't just a confrontation for the political power, but also a way, imposed or encouraged by the circles interested in Angola's oil, diamonds' industry and generally the territory of Africa's pearl, with more than a million square kilometres surface, a former Portuguese colony until 1961.

The stupid and wasting war between Aidid and Berisha clans from Somalia, that led to the country's complete destruction (in 1994, there wasn't a single enterprise or school functioning and the country's government, if we could spoke about a govern, didn't have at least a phone), is a

sum of a grave political crisis which crushed for almost a century the Africa's continent.

Even the Iraqi war where there participated, on one hand, a coalition led by the United States and, on the other hand, the Saddam Hussein's army, had more profound causes than toppling a dictator that was producing conflicts and wars³ in an oil country. There's about a grave crisis that crushed the Middle East countries, the strategic fissure still opened among a part of the Muslim world, by religious fundamentalism, and the democratic civilization and also about an obvious reality: here, in the most unstable planet's area, there is the cheapest oil.

The conflictuality and the physiognomy of war

The armed conflicts are part of the social conflictuality, increase and decrease in relation with this conflictuality, representing, for a long time, a sum of it. The armed conflicts are possible where the tensions grow chaotically, thus in a society crushed by abnormality and crisis.

Therefore, they must be regarded and analyzed in relation with the society's main characteristics and also with the tendencies which manifest in its dynamics. The social conflictuality is, alike, a matter related to the social dynamics and also the social malfunction. The armed conflicts are somewhere to the top of the crisis curve trajectory, are defined on such kind of dynamics and can't be solved out but through a coherent and effective ensemble of measures that regards the conflictuality management and the optimization of the relations between the systems' and processes' elements and structures. The conflictuality always was identified and defined on a scale with social, political, economic, military, etc., state and dynamic indicators.

The globalization of information, economy, politics, international relations, and, consequently, the social life, brings a new dimension – given by the connections accomplished through network – the one of the network effect. The network effect interconnects the conflictuality, lightens it, enter some communication roads, but doesn't equalize it but maintains it in a quasi-permanent or at least long oscillation. Under these circumstances, the conflicts, even the local ones, have (or could have) global implications. That is why, in the social dynamics, it is to be reconsidered the variation knowledge problem of initial conditions and,



closely related to it, the proper management of the conflictual process. This is, otherwise, the essence of a new society type, which becomes widely a knowledge society, a scientific knowledge society, namely an epistemological one. Lately, the network will also equalize the conflictuality, crises and war. This should determine the conflictuality's „death”, to crisis, conflict and war disappearance. Maybe from the practical point of view this will never be accomplished. The conflictuality is and will always be a sinuous movement with essential and eternal internal determinations.

The new armed conflicts will continue to be violent expressions of the crises phenomenon, of political, economical, social, informational and military conflictuality. Their main characteristic will be the *dependency*, in the sense that will be more conditioned by the political, economic, social, informational and military relations and realities thus by the global, regional and national political, economic, informational, social and military strategies. No armed conflict, no matter its spreading area and the intensity degree, could be regarded and treated as an isolated fact, as a matter concerning exclusively the direct ones involved. Each conflict's resolution, lesser or bigger, imposes a global solution or one with global implications, because the conflictuality phenomenon affects the entire community. The crises, wars and armed conflicts proceed today, under the attentive surveillance of the TV cameras, sensors placed everywhere – in Cosmos, in the air space, land space and the maritime one -, as well they are hidden in the cyber, psychological and informational space, using to the maximum all the networks and the information weapon. These both dimensions - the visible and the invisible one – are deepening and developing in direct proportion. The more we see and know about conflictuality, the more we don't know about the invisible spectre, as it becomes wider, bigger and more sophisticated.

Also, the systems' and processes' exaggerated flexibility rise the social confusion, the individuals' and the human entities' anguish and unsafety, situated on different conflict levels. The direct character, face to face, of the armed conflicts is more and more substituted by the indirect, perverted, stratagems, stuffed and hidden of the political, economic, financial, military and civil-military actions and reactions in the armed

conflictuality framework. Undoubtedly, the political and religious extremism, the racism and all sort of discriminations significantly contribute to the direct armed conflictuality growth but also the indirect armed conflictuality one.

The principles that identify the physiognomy and typology of the new armed conflicts are also flexible and dynamic. Practically, the armed conflictuality, when it is generally analyzed, but also the concrete armed conflicts in their particularity and individuality, can be identified easy variable and gradated principles and rules. The frequent principles of the new armed conflictuality are:

- the unexpected principle of variation;
- the *high-tech* and *IT* principle;
- the disproportionality principle;
- the asymmetric generation and regeneration principle;
- the riposte principle;
- the surprise principle;
- the resonance principle;
- the remanence principle;
- the domino principle.

These principles, resulted from the modern impact of the general laws of war and armed conflict with the actual, and possible, the future society challenges, outline a new conflictuality type that becomes more and more diluted and, consequently, paradoxically, disproportionate and asymmetrical, therefore harder to control and manage.

Keeping in mind these considerations, the Centric Network Warfare, the XXIst century war, aims to dominate the space of the direct fight but also the one of the confrontation in the virtual space. This type of war is possible because of the network. But it isn't at everybody's hand. For now, its fundamental principle is based on *info-domination of the tactical space and also the strategic one* and also on *maintaining the informational and strategic initiative*, on *technological and informational superiority* and, due to this, on *disproportionality*. It seems that such kind of war, no matter how rapid, comprising and integrated would be, won't succeed (at least in the first decades of the XXIst century) to practise its preemptive and disuasive function. The passionate, extremist and *in extremis* reactions succeed to balance the strategic relation and most of the times, even to put in difficulty situations the big technological powers, alliances, coalition forces and international organisms (Afghanistan



crisis, the Iran one and also the one produced after the attack by the Israeli army on Liban's territory over the Hezbollah militias).

These very powerful and diversified reactions are, generally, asymmetrical and don't come only from the dictatorial regimes, even if they form the other power's pole, opposed to the democratic one, but especially from the vague, extremist, conservatory, atypical entities area, some of them trans-border, others pathological and schizophrenic ones. It would be a mistake to consider that all the actions and reactions against the globalization process, the technological and informational domination have a pathological nature. The military conflicts have their causes, generally, in the conflicts of interests, in the battle for power (that means battle for resources, markets and influence).

Conflicts are like waters. They never disappear. Or they disappear from a place and appear in another. More exactly, it doesn't disappear the armed character of the conflicts. But these armed conflicts can be also led, by military, paramilitary and militarized structures. The stage we are has some characteristics and we can trace certain tendencies regarding the evolution of forces and means that are to be engaged in armed conflicts, as well as their area of development. The more obvious characteristics are the following:

- the armies' professionalization;
- the weapons' system perfecting;
- the emergence and the development of the real and virtual networks;
- the armed conflictuality extension especially in poor and intolerant environments;
- the conflicts' diversification, including the armed ones;
- the diminution of the difference between military and non-military conflicts;
- the terrorist actions' intensification;
- the coming out and the very quick proliferation of a new type of conflictuality, the cyberspace one.

Even the war doesn't remain the same. It extends its manifestation area and tends to become permanent, combining different forms of armed and non-armed conflict manifestation, as dynamics of the continuous war. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to make a distinction between peace and war, between a conflictual situ-

ation and a non-conflictual one, between military and non-military conflicts. As a rule, the military conflicts are characterized by the arms engagement, but, today, in the world, there is improved, sophisticated and miniaturized armament and so many destruction means – including the mass ones – which can be, practically, used at one's wish. World continuously creates and reproduces itself all types of aggressive architectures and armed structures – others than armies -, which maintain almost a continuous state and an armed conflict mosaic. Therefore, the armed conflicts as well as the non-military ones take shape practically from the management and disarmament point of view, following the same philosophy and the same methodology. They become a sort of business, following clear rules to accomplish an established aim and a certain profit. All types of conflicts are launched because of the interests' conflictuality and follow some political decisions, more or less responsible. As a rule, concerning the military conflicts, we deal with symmetries and dissymmetries (non-symmetries), because if we speak about armies or military structures that are confronting in concordance with the war's law, principles and habits. But, in the armed conflicts where there are not confronting only military forces, but also other structures, in the non-military and the mixed ones, military-civil, asymmetries prevails.

The symmetry supposes a certain proportionality. The proportionality always offers the possibility to calculate and use, generally, some rules of the forces report, of some conventional typical strategies. The dissymmetry (non-symmetry) means disproportionality and even incompatibility. This is the correspondent of the *disproportioned war* (for example, the war between the coalition of forces led by the United States and the Iraqi Saddam Hussein's army from 1991 and the one from 2003).

Each directly participating forces in the symmetric or dissymmetric conflict act, as a rule, as instructed and with the means it owns or creates, in concordance with the effective requests of the confrontation space. There is a front between the belligerents and their philosophies are limited to forces, means, strategies.

The asymmetry means a sort of continuous adaptation to the concrete situation by the assimilation and getting familiar, starting from the initial conditions and conjugating them with



the present ones. This means to search these vulnerabilities, their stimulation or even their production, achieving different diversions and the maintenance of a confuse space, diverse crises, impossible to quantify and manage, which allow each party, according to the conditions it creates, to strike other's sensitive or hard points or other elements, with the means at its disposal or possible to acquire or create in time. In these conditions, the front is everywhere, the face-to-face philosophy, while the stratagems multiply and diversify. This type of armed or non-armed conflict, where asymmetric strategies are used, can't be either located or precisely identified. It doesn't have a pre-conflict and a post-conflict stage, because it is part of a continuous war that, practically, takes all the forms, in the geophysical and cyber space from the classical to the confrontation ones. In these new conditions, *weapons* and *armed conflict* terms expand, because, meanwhile, there appeared numerous other weapons or means – lethal or non-lethal -, from the hallucinogenic substances to the laser guns, from the geophysical weapons (clime is modified or catastrophic variations are produced in the physical space) to the weapons based on information or the million times multiplying of the radio waves.

The structure of the intersection of armed, non-armed and mixed armed conflicts is defined by a lot of elements and structures constituted in complex dynamic systems and processes that are characterized by:

- the information omnipresence;
- the information predominance in real time;
- the data bases interconnectivity;
- the strategic domination;
- the network power growth;
- the deep knowledge reality in its dynamism;

- the structures' and actions' adaptability and flexibility;
- the rapid (adequate) action (reaction);
- the complex finality.

These characteristics are constituted in a sort of flexible architecture that facilitates the importance given to the *effect based operations*. Under these circumstances, it results that not only the conflicts' nature or means are important, but the effects. Thus, it reverts, in the crises and armed conflict analysis, to a long-term known and successful applied methodology, but sequential (for example, when calculating the march, the motion offensive, but also in another activities and circumstances), according to which the calculation begins from the final point. The forces, means, strategies and the way of engagement depend on the effects we wish to obtain in the end or in different stages. Theoretically, such a methodology was always possible. It was, of course, put in practice many times. But, in the newly created conditions by the network configuration, *the effect* not only passes in first plan, but becomes almost simultaneous with the cause and the mechanism that it produces. The centric network warfare accomplishes this simultaneity in strategic and also in tactical plan, allowing the approach, nearby the fusion, of strategic, operational and tactical level. *The network effect* is translated here by action and reaction in real time.

NOTES:

¹ Gaston BOUTHOU, René CARRERE, *Le défi de la guerre (1740-1974)*, PUF, Paris 1976.

² <http://www.chez.com/saintpierre/Bouthoul.html>, Gaston BOUTHOU, *Le défi de la guerre*, p. 9.

³ We speak about the war Iraq - Iran, between 1980-1988, and also about Kuwait's attack and the repressions against the Kurds.

Brigadier General (ret.) Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD, is a fellow researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I". He wrote numerous strategy papers, among which we mention "The Rapid Actions Strategy", AISM Publishing House, 2003, "Military Strategy for the Future", Paideia Publishing House, 2003, "Military Art During Millenia", CTEA Publishing House, 2004, co-author of "The Future's War, the War's Future", NDU Publishing House, 2004, "Essay on Strategic Art", Military Publishing House, 2005, "Partnership Strategy, the Strategic Partnership", NDU Publishing House, 2006. He also wrote studies, article, essays on the military art and the strategic culture, issued by the NDU Publishing House and by specialty papers.



ELEMENTS OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Gheorghe MINCULETE, PhD
Romică CERNAT

The terrorism, the large threat of the 21st century, imposed the beginning of the global war against it. If we accept one of the former secretary of state of United State assertion as “the war against terrorism is the future war”, then, there is no doubt that the preoccupations to analyse and predict specific features are more than necessary. The complete image of this new type of war must be sketched step by step, on the base of an assiduous study of existing information, researches realised by specialised institutions, new elements identified by war phenomena analysts. And such an approach may prove very difficult, because, according to John Terraine’s vision, the modern war is similar a cobweb and, we consider that the study of this complex structure offers the most unexpected conclusions.

Characteristics of building antiterrorist coalition

The United States is now in the fourth year of the global war on terrorism. The war began as a fight against the organization that was responsible for the shocking attacks of September 11, 2001, but soon became much more, including, among other things, the invasion and the occupation of Iraq. Recognised, but also self imposed as the leader of the war on terror, the United States has committed not only to ridding the world of terrorism as a mean of violence but also to transforming Iraq into a prosperous democratic state, a model to be followed by the major part of a non-democratic and economically stagnant Middle East¹.

According to Paul Dibb, the one that seems to be shaping the Bush administration’s strategy, United States is to formulate policy based on the belief that the September 11 attacks were neither a historical turning point nor a tragedy of “transient significance”, but instead a “momentous event” that has helped clarify national interests “long muddled by arcane speculation about the nature of

the post-Cold War era”². Moreover, the September 11 attacks and following U.S. military actions have led to a radical restructuring of U.S. defence priorities, including a possible reevaluation of the U.S. alliance system – above all America’s military ties with NATO.

Yet, at the beginning of the war against terrorism it was not entirely clear where exactly the United States will place the emphasis in its relations with NATO. Countering terrorism has been a relatively new mission for U.S. forces, and, as the recent visits to NATO and some European countries indicated, the Bush administration is still struggling to find the right mixture of armed operations and diplomatic measures³. What is clear, however, is that the United States is trying to make its alliance partners accept the new threat priorities, where counter terror efforts will have a primacy. As the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* states: “We must use the full influence of the United States to delegitimize terrorism and make clear that all acts of terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behaviour that no responsible government can condone or support and all must oppose. In short, with our friends and allies, we aim to establish a new international norm regarding terrorism requiring non-support, non-tolerance, and active opposition to all terrorists.”

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were widely interpreted in Europe as a broader attack on Western values, such as freedom, tolerance, and openness. Almost all leaders from states throughout the continent ensured the United States about their willingness to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism. For the first time in its 52- year history, NATO invoked its Article 5 collective defence provision, and other European supranational organizations also expressed their backing. The invocation of its self-defence clause of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation made



many people think that NATO would have a decisive role in the military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, since the very legitimacy of the Alliance was based on the principle that an attack on any of its members would be considered an attack on all. However, it soon became obvious that the United States would conduct military operations in Afghanistan without any explicit NATO role, preferring instead to incorporate European assistance on a bilateral basis⁴. When the military operations in Afghanistan began, the White House in effect told NATO to stay out of the conflict, despite its offers of help and the “chivalrous” gesture of evoking the mutual defence clause in its founding document, the Washington Treaty dated 1949, for the first time ever. It was supposedly U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, who said that “If we need collective action, we’ll ask for it”⁵.

As presented, it is clear that a military logic had been accumulating ever since the early nineties that the United States can best fight wars by coalitions of the will which subordinate themselves to a U.S. central command structure and that the capability gap does not allow deeper cooperation with the most traditional allies. The final push came from 9/11, which completed the shift towards a certain unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. It was not only the new kind of U.S. foreign policy made by the neo-conservative Bush administration, but also the lessons gathered of a decade of military experience that made the United States more inclined to take military actions with less consultation and coordination with the allies than was politically desirable.

Although Enduring Freedom Operation from Afghanistan began with only few openly recognized coalition assistance, committed (coalition) forces became more and more acknowledged and important as the mission carried on. European countries provided a wide range of capabilities on a bilateral basis, including special forces, air forces, naval forces, ground forces, and specialized units⁶. Yet, the United States accepted only a few contributions from NATO as a military alliance organization, and many European members were disappointed with the small role given to the multilateral alliance after its dramatic invocation of Article 5. Intense questions were raised over NATO’s suitable role and mission as transatlantic tensions over Iraq grew, revealing

some deep divides between the United States and the Europeans as well as among the Europeans themselves⁷.

While allies are seen by U.S. as rather burdensome when fighting real wars, it now seems that they will be very much in need when it comes to post-conflict peace building. Allies with less mobility and interoperability will probably be asked to make available “niche capabilities”, which include capabilities such as de-mining, NBC decontamination, chemical warfare, transportation and supply. They may also be asked to offer peacekeepers and civilian police after actual fighting phase is over, which has been termed “role specialization.” Although for some allies it would be the only practical way of maintaining the alliance, it could prove politically difficult in some cases because it would mean virtual subordination to U.S. political/strategic judgments and the allies will become the “tools in a tool-box”, inevitably reinforcing divergent viewpoints⁸.

Coordination of contributions to military operations in Afghanistan

Not only the European states collectively promised to assist the United States through NATO in its efforts to combat terrorism, but they also contributed with concrete military support to Enduring Freedom Operation from Afghanistan on a bilateral basis. Finally, the United States received so many offers of military support that policymakers struggled in September and October 2001 to determine the best ways to use them. In spite of this fact and that many European countries had promised unlimited team spirit to the United States immediately after September 11 attacks, the use of military force to overthrow the Taliban had engaged the passions of many Europeans. In his article “*Mutual Incomprehension: U.S. German Value Gaps beyond Iraq*”, published in *The Washington Quarterly*, Klaus Larres states that despite Germany’s involvement in the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Germany, along with much of the rest of Europe except Great Britain, views military force as a very last resort— only after all other alternatives have been exhausted and if there is a broad international endorsement⁹.

According to observers, while the number of offers was considerable, their usefulness in actual war fighting was often questionable. Consequently,



the United States eventually began to turn down most of the contributions of combat forces that it had been offered, because, in many cases, the American military would have had to deploy and sustain the offered contingents, and U.S. policymakers were not willing to overburden U.S. transportation and logistics networks¹⁰.

If we reanalyse the Pentagon statements, we realise that, in some cases, the offered contingents were not appropriate for the military plans being developed, leading some U.S. civilian and military personnel to speculate that the offers were made to gain the political benefits of supporting the United States without having to follow through by actually participating in military operations. Nevertheless, some offers of combat forces were accepted, enabling European militaries to participate among the American forces that operated in Afghanistan. It was the United Kingdom and France that contributed with a wide variety of military services to the operations, while most other countries made available smaller contingents, often with specialized capabilities and skills. More important, European countries, both Western and Eastern, provided crucial basing, access, and over flight rights¹¹.

While many NATO members hoped that invoking Article 5 would lead the United States to conduct any military response against Al Qaeda under the NATO flag, or at least coordinate its actions with the integrated military structure and political institutions, by early October, the U.S. decision makers made clear that the Alliance would not be involved in any military actions against Afghanistan. This U.S. political decision came as no surprise many in the United States¹². Many U.S. policymakers believed that NATO's war in Kosovo was an unacceptable example of "war by committee," where political interference from the alliance's 19 members prevented a quick and decisive campaign. The policymakers were determined to retain the one and only command power in Afghanistan, so that experience would not be repeated. Just like during the first Gulf War, The Central Command (CENTCOM) gained the operational control in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. Again, with a great military success. CENTCOM's headquarter from Tampa, Florida, has grown into an "international village" with many countries sending liaison officers in order to gain information and coordinate their contribution to the campaigns¹³.

However, many Europeans were dissatisfied with the small role that the Alliance was given in the response to the September 11 attacks and attributed it to U.S. unilateralism and arrogance. To some extent, these annoyances came from the fact that the military operation did not correspond to the concept that had been widely expected during the Cold War - that an invocation of Article 5 would lead the alliance members to join together and defeat a common enemy. But these frustrations also reflected a fear that the U.S. decision to pursue the war on its own after invoking Article 5 would irrevocably weaken the core alliance principle of collective defence.

Opposition and international commitment in Iraq war

As the U.S. decided to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam's regime, Washington created a division within the North-Atlantic Alliance. Even its successive efforts to stabilize that country have caused great controversy in the alliance. At least early 2002, some allies, particularly France and Germany, could not agree with the United States on the threat priorities of the alliance. Most Europeans felt that the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, and the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan were posing a greater menace to world peace than Saddam's regime at that time. The general European perspective was that Iraq could be contained through sanctions and, after the fall of 2002, U.N. WMD inspections. While both sides of the Atlantic agreed that the Iraqi regime had a certain potential threat to international security, there was significant disagreement on what the world should do about it.

The major question which the transatlantic partners were divided on was whether to attack Iraq or not. Many experts share the view that French and German opposition at the U.N. was not just about their economic ties to Saddam Hussein, or even to their ancient difference of opinion with America over broader Middle East policy, but about their vision of Europe's position in the world vis-à-vis the United States. Like the Russians and the Chinese, many Europeans see American "hegemony" as means to serve purely U.S. interests¹⁴.

Not only did the French and the German oppose a resolution in the Security Council to allow the United States to go to war against Iraq but they



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

refused to allow NATO to send early-warning aircraft and Patriot anti-missile batteries to protect Turkey from an Iraqi attack as well, which further deepened the split within the Atlantic Alliance. Eventually, the decision was made by NATO's defence policy committee, where France is not a member and while Germany and Belgium dropped their objections, the weapons could ultimately be sent¹⁵. Even Turkey, considered by the US as a vital NATO ally, refused to allow US troops to cross its territory to invade Iraq.

In his article published in *Foreign Affairs*, James P. Rubin states that the international support for the Bush administration's policy regarding Iraq should not have been so hard to gain, because Baghdad had already violated a number of UN Security Council resolutions before. His predecessor, Bill Clinton, had also considered that Iraq poses a substantial threat to the international community, because of its apparent desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), its demonstrated willingness to use them, and, of course, Saddam's history of human rights violations and his refusal to act in accordance with the demands of the international community. As a result, the Clinton administration had also supported regime change in Iraq. Rubin argues that it was the series of shortcomings in the Bush administration's rhetoric that eventually led to the failure that the international community remained unconvinced: despite months of consequent international debate and diplomacy, Washington failed to muster a lot of cooperation for its policy before actually going to war. It was The United Kingdom, Spain and most states in Central and Eastern Europe who were backing the United States' foreign policy but these countries, like Australia, had been on the United States' side from the beginning¹⁶.

In his work, *New Alliances for a New Century*, David M. Huntwork even seemed to discover newly created alliances: an "oddball axis of Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow that opposed the United States led coalition in the Iraq war" which now is "developing into a permanent anti-U.S. political and military alliance". As he states, each of these countries are "bumbling actors on the world stage" with Germany searching for identity after causing two world wars and suffering territorial division during the Cold War, France searching for international weight and a substitution of its lost territorial empire with an empire of influence

and with Russia seeking to undermine the world's last remaining superpower and regain a part of its former power and prestige¹⁷. To be sure, the war in Iraq brought some strains to the point of crisis. Indeed, France and Germany organized resistance to the United States in the UN Security Council alongside Russia, historically NATO's chief adversary. The Bush administration, in turn, sought to separate these states from other members of the alliance and the European Union¹⁸.

The split that occurred in NATO was even further deepened by a decision by US, Spain and Great Britain to sign an open letter supporting a war together with other Eastern European EU and NATO members. On January 30, the *Times* from London and other newspapers printed the letter signed by the leaders of eight European nations - five of them EU members - supporting the US demand to disarm Iraq. Jose Maria Aznar (Spain), Tony Blair (UK), Silvio Berlusconi (Italy), José Manuel Barroso (Portugal), Péter Medgyessy (Hungary), Leszek Miller (Poland), Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark), and Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic) argued that "the Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security". The letter further stated that "we know that success in the day-to-day battle against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction demands unwavering determination and firm international cohesion on the part of all countries for which freedom is precious". These were the countries secretary of defence Rumsfeld referred to as "new Europe". French president Chirac and Germany's Chancellor Schröder responded with their own letter. As a response, Washington said it was planning to move some of its 80,000 troops in Germany further east, to bases on the territory of the "new U.S. friends". The French reaction was to urge the EU to take a more independent line on defence and security policy, with its own military headquarters separate from NATO¹⁹.

It is important to note that, at this moment, there was a great disparity between policymakers' views and the public opinion. According to polls, opposition to the Iraq war was way above 50% in many key European states of the "new Europe". Thus it was governing elites that ultimately determined the respective national course; at the same time they wanted, public confirmation. Germany and France, countries that were against



the operations, were aligned with majority opinion, while those supporting the campaign were not and tried to modify their positions to contain popular protest. Spanish and Italian governments supported the Anglo-American position but did not take part militarily, because participation would not have gone down too well with their public.

Against all the odds, today the Atlantic Alliance is present in Iraq which, while small, aims to develop Iraq's military on a strategic level turning out 1,000 officers a year. The NATO effort includes efforts to set up military staff and officer colleges. Bush administration officials have also advocated the NATO mission as a way of pushing the alliance to transform into a more deployable, internationally involved force. Other NATO allies have refused to send trainers to Iraq, but have offered equipment, money or training outside Iraqi borders. International post conflict involvement in Iraq is, at present, very substantial, as peremptory evidence that terrorist actions have still intensity that will be difficult to overcome.

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Lieutenant-colonel Gheorghe MINCULETE, PhD, is a lecturer at the Command and Staff Faculty within the National Defence University "Carol I".

Colonel Romică CERNAT is a Chief Staff Officer within the South Logistic Base.



SUICIDAL TERRORISM – A GLOBAL THREAT

Ionel STOICA

A suicidal terrorist attack is an act by which one or more attackers kill other persons and they also die in the process. The terrorist is fully aware that if he does not die, then the planned act will not be achieved. Nowadays such kind of attacks is carried out by detonating the explosive transported by the terrorist either with cars (called vehicle borne improvised explosive devices) or as explosive belts or explosive vests.

Due to its advantages, this “weapon” was frequently used along the time. If we refer only to modern times, the Japanese kamikaze pilots used it during the Second World War (they blew up their own aircrafts upon the American vessels in Pacific Ocean), different terrorist and extremist groups employed it, too, as well as the resistance movements, including the guerrilla and insurgent groups.

A brief history of suicidal terrorism.

General considerations

The first major suicidal attack was carried out in December 1981 against Iraqi Embassy in Beirut resulting in killing 27 persons and wounding over 100. The suicidal terrorism gained a major political importance after the assassination of Bashir Jumayyil in September 1982. It became an international phenomenon after bombing the US Embassy in Beirut, on April 1983, when 63 persons were killed. In the '80s, suicidal terrorism spread in Lebanon, Kuwait and Sri Lanka, and in the '90s it appeared in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, India, Argentina, Turkey, Tanzania, Russian Federation and Kenya. The most destructive terrorist attack, with the largest impact upon international public opinion, is the one from September 11th 2001, carried out against symbolic American targets.

The suicidal attacks can be carried out on the battlefield or outside this area. Those ones developed on the battlefield involve the participation of many persons, while in case of those ones devel-

oped outside this area a single person is involved in the attack. The targets of the suicidal attacks can be fixed or mobile and can be orientated against infrastructure elements (administrative buildings, shops, markets, bars, restaurants) or personnel.

Currently, there are ten terrorist groups that carry out suicidal attacks as fighting tactics against their own governments or some foreign governments. These are: Hamas (Islamic Movement of resistance) and Islamic Palestinian Jihad in Palestinian Territories, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic Egyptian Jihad and Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt; Islamic Armed Group (IAG) in Algeria, Barbar Khalsa International in India, Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam¹ (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Workers Party of Kurdistan (WPK) in Turkey and Al-Qaeda terrorist movement in Afghanistan. It can be noticed that, most frequently, these tactics are encountered in the Middle East and in Sri Lanka, if we consider the number of the attacks.

In the '80s there were other four pro-Syrian and pro-Lebanese groups engaged in suicidal terrorism: the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, the Syrian Nationalist Party; Communist Lebanese Party and the Baas Party in Lebanon.

The terrorist organizations increasingly use the suicidal terrorism in order to achieve major political aims. For instance, the Palestinian terrorist groups use it in order to force Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian Territories, LTTE uses it to determine the government of Sri Lanka to accept the establishment of a Tamil state inside this country, and Al-Qaeda uses it to force the USA to withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula. In recent years, the suicidal attacks have intensified in frequency and have spread throughout new geographical areas. Between 1980 and 2001, 187 suicidal attacks occurred, 75 of them were carried out by the LTTE, a group with a Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Tamil Tigers are unique because they possess a hybrid tradition, both Occidental and Eastern, which promotes a nationalism expressed by the organization's leaders in terms of religious



which promotes the cult of martyrs. From 1987 to 2001 the group carried out over 200 suicidal terrorist acts, becoming the world leader of this kind of terrorism.

Although currently it is frequently met throughout the Middle East (whose religion is Islam) and especially inside the Palestinian Territories and Israel, its use as a political or military weapon is not specific to the Islamists. From this point of view, we present below two examples of using the suicidal attacks in a political or military context.

Japanese kamikaze pilots

During the Second World War, the Japanese kamikaze pilots participated in suicidal operations against the American war vessels in the Pacific Ocean. These are cases of self-sacrifice, as a last weapon against the enemy rather than suicidal attacks in the current acceptance of the term. The Japanese pilots were led by the desire to sacrifice themselves for their country and they did not display any external sign of unusual behaviour. For them, carrying out the suicidal missions did not reflect any form of negativism, but a desire to give everything to their families, to the country and to the emperor.

The LTTE terrorist organization

The members of the LTTE are responsible for carrying out the largest number of suicidal attacks (over 200). The aim the members of this organization fight for consists of the establishment of a Tamil state in Sri Lanka. The organization's fighters are well trained, dedicated to the cause they fight for. Before fulfilling the mission, the suicidal attackers intake cyanide pills in order to avoid the risk of being captured alive and thus forced to disclose military secrets. Both men and women are selected. The Tamil leaders describe the suicidal terrorists as having a strong mind but a heart like the petals of a flower.

The suicidal terrorists' motivation

The Koran forbids suicidal acts. However, the martyrdom in the name of Allah leads to permanent happiness. Those who sacrifice themselves are welcomed in Paradise, see the face of the Prophet, their sins are forgiven, they will live among rivers of milk and honey, they can ask for the admission

in Paradise of some relatives and will be married with 72 virgins. Initially, the jihad (the holy war, one of the Muslim duties) was seen as an internal struggle whose final aim was the permanent improvement of the individual condition. But, since the appearance of the Wahhabism, at the end of XVIII century (a form of radical interpretation of Sunni Islam which presupposes an ad-litteram interpretation of religious Islamic precepts), the term jihad as an external form of fight gained terrain. In spite of Koran precepts, some radical Islamist clerics have justified the killing of the civilians in the name of jihad. But we must not confuse the justification of suicidal acts by some Islamists clerics with the religious motivation for these acts. The religion represents a justification for terrorism, rather than a motivation for it. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the fundamentalist Islam serves only as justification for the lack of hope of the potential suicidal persons and for the need of armed fight from the terrorist organizations' side.

We have to make a clear distinction between the reply of the terrorist answer of Hamas organization and that of the Al-Qaeda movement. Both organizations use the fundamentalist Islam and suicidal attacks in order to promote their goals, but while Hamas is involved in the political struggle aimed to establish the Palestinian state, Al-Qaeda is the adept of hatred politics, without any other goal except promoting jihad.

The logic of the suicide attack is not a common one. According to Christoph Reuter, an expert in terrorism, "the Palestinians understand their military inferiority compared with Israel Army and intelligence services, but they also understand that, like all people, the Israeli want to live and are afraid of death. The suicide bomber has developed a mentality which abandoned the natural desire for living through embracing the death. The mechanism by which the Palestinian terrorist groups have developed this mental attitude that ignores the desire for living is the religion".

Experts in terrorism consider that the motivational factor lying beyond the Palestinian suicidal attitude is neither the poverty, nor the religious fundamentalism. It is the sense of lack of power, the lack of an expectation horizon – waiting for their own land, for their own state, for independence and freedom. Their logic is that the suicide attacks represent the only way of fighting for gaining their dignity and independence.



The preparation of the suicide operations

The planning of a suicide attack is a highly secret operation. The success of the mission depends on some essential elements: the secrecy of the operation, the detailed study of the target, its characteristics, the approach, as well as the rehearsals of different steps in the development of the mission. Keeping the secret of the mission which is to be carried out is an essential aspect in such a mission. The study of the target allows the group to plan and build a scale-pattern of the target, and the rehearsals give the suicide operator the required skills for carrying out the mission.

While preparing the attack, the suicide bomber is supported by a cell made up from members of the organization, responsible for providing accommodation, food and providing security for the potential suicide bomber until he arrives in the proximity of the target.

Usually, the martyr does not volunteer to fulfil the mission, he is selected by his religious guide from the mosque he frequents or from the Islamic education centres. The most devoted students are selected after a careful examination of the guide and after a long period of observation.

After his selection, the future martyr participates in a training programme which will test his abilities and performance under pressure and in life threatening situations. Only those ones who prove themselves courageous enough are selected for the next stage of the operation.

In general, the martyr leaves his family without a farewell and, for several days, he follows an intense training programme in order to understand all the operational aspects of the mission which is to be fulfilled and learns how to use the explosives. All this time, he follows a "physical and mental purification programme".

Prior carrying out the suicide attack, the martyr is able to fulfil the mission for which he was selected. This is the moment when he writes a last letter, in which he asks his family not to mourn him, because he will not die, but pass into the other life, in which he will be with Allah.

Sometimes, he records a videocassette having a propagandistic role, writes a special pray and, together with his collaborators from the terrorist organization, he sets towards the target.

The suicide bomber's profile

The study of the known cases reflects that we cannot speak about a single profile of the suicide attacker.

There were opinions stating that the carrying out suicide attacks is specific to some isolated persons, religiously indoctrinated, with a low level of intellectual training, who suffered failures in their lives, without jobs and without the perspective to improve their personal lives. This profile was, probably, valid in the case of the first Palestinians suicide attackers. The analysis of the known cases (where it was possible) reflects the fact that, currently, the things are otherwise. This aspect is obvious if we take a look at some distinct cases: the Palestinian suicide bombers and the Japanese kamikaze pilots at the end of the Second World War.

The Palestinian suicide bombers were uneducated persons as well as university graduates (having a high graduation score), some of them were good specialists in different fields (sometimes even in research), married or single, having a job or not, generally young, but not always religiously indoctrinated.

The Japanese kamikaze pilots were educated persons, having a high sense of duty for their families and for their country. As we mentioned before, their actions represented a self-sacrifice, as the last weapon against the enemy, rather than suicide attacks.

The difficulties in identifying a single profile of suicide attacker make more difficult to stop the phenomenon.

Advantages for the terrorist organizations using suicidal attacks

The religious and nationalist terrorist groups describe suicide attacks as a kind of divine command and a call for holy war. The phenomenon gained an increasing popularity, especially for Islamic fundamentalist groups. Hamas is an example, as they carried out an important number of suicide attacks against different Israeli targets: buses, malls, bars. For Hamas, a suicide attacker is a martyr in the process of fulfilling a religious duty - jihad.

The suicide attacks are attractive for terrorist organizations because they offer them some advantages, such as:



- *low operating costs*. Carrying out a suicide attack does not require special technical knowledge, being enough the purchase of the explosives, which many times can be found in public trade;

- *produce a large number of victims and important material losses* due to the fact that they have a precise effect on target. Between 1980 and 2001, the suicide attacks represented about 3% from the total terrorist attacks carried out worldwide, but they caused about 48% from the total victims of the terrorism. Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, the Hamas leader in 2004, stated that it represented a “strategic weapon” of the Palestinian resistance, and dr. Ramadan Shalah, a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, resumed the utility of the suicide attacks as follows: “our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapon in the world, and its army is trained at the highest standards. We have nothing else to replicate except the martyr weapon. It is cheap and it costs only our life ... human bombs cannot be defeated even by the nuclear weapon”;

- *they attract the mass-media’s attention*. Such an act presents a special interest for media, because it displays a strong desire and the self-sacrifice inclination from the terrorist side, human values appreciated as extremely valuable. Moreover, the high number of victims resulted from such an attack impresses the public opinion;

- *they have good chances of success*. Although the suicide act is a primitive one, its use guarantees that the planned operation will be fulfilled at the chosen moment and time, according to the circumstances of the location where the target is situated. This offers the guarantee of producing the maximum number of victims compared to the use of any other form of action. Moreover, such kind of act is extremely difficult to counteract once the terrorist is in his way to the target. Therefore, the collection of accurate information referring to the plans and the intentions of the terrorist organizations has a crucial role in preventing such acts;

- *it does not require the elaboration of an evacuating plan of the attacker after carrying out the suicide act*, often a difficult phase of planning the terrorist act. Because the attacker is killed in the mission, there is no the risk of capturing and interrogating him by the security forces, thus eliminating the possibility of disclosing information referring to the terrorist organization’s activity;

- *they offer legitimacy for the actions carried*

out. The terrorist organizations know how to exploit the death of a martyr. They glorify the attacker’s actions, giving them legitimacy and spread the culture of the martyrs by broadcasting poems and songs as well as posting posters with the suicide martyrs.

Even before the development of the action, the attacker is a martyr alive. Before carrying out the mission, he takes photos and records video clips, explaining the reasons of his decision of becoming a martyr. Then, he writes a letter to his family and friends, explaining his endeavours for being a martyr. The suicide attackers from LTTE, for instance, have the last lunch together with their leader. The organization members made some movies with suicide attacks in order to increase the recruitment activity and to motivate the future suicide attackers.

The Palestinian children (aged between 12 and 17) tend to idolatize the martyrs. According to some data, approximately 25% of them want to become suicide attackers. “In their minds, the life of the martyr is full of glory and power”, according to dr. Eyad Serraj, a psychiatrist in Gaza Strip. The entire Palestinian society glorifies the suicide attackers.

The revenge feeling, met at some suicide attackers, is exploited by the terrorist organizations in order to radicalize them, according with the doctrine and politics of the terrorist organization. In many cases, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad recruited suicide attackers during the funeral processions and public commemorations.

Advantages for suicide attacker in using suicide terrorism

Carrying out a suicide act can offer substantial advantages to the attacker and to his family.

The majority of the martyrs come from the periphery of the society. They believe that their action will help their families improve their social status. Their families receive financial rewards (usually, several thousands US dollars) following a suicide attack by one of his members.

Before the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, the Iraqi Baath party gave between 10.000 and 25.000 US dollars for each suicide act carried out inside the Palestinian Territories. LTTE receives yearly about 150 US million dollars from the Tamil diasporas from Australia, Canada, Europe, in order



to carry out terrorist attacks.

For the potential martyr, a suicide attack is an act of noblesse, a divine call. Hisham Ismail Abd-El Rahman Hamed (a suicide attacker who carried out an attack in Netzarim, on November 1994, killing three officers of the Israeli Intelligence Services, wounding two Israeli and four Palestinians) wrote: "Dear family and friends! I am writing this letter with tears in my eyes and sadness in my heart. I want to tell you that I am leaving and I ask you to forgive me because I have decided to see Allah today, and this meeting is more important than life on this earth".

Another reason of satisfaction for suicide attackers is the feeling of revenge. Salah Abed El Hamid Shaker wrote before carrying out a suicide attack: "I will revenge on those pigs – the infidel Zionists and the enemies of mankind".

These thoughts and feelings represent stimulating elements for the fundamentalist believers adopting the suicide attack tactics.

Apart from the feeling of noblesse and revenge, the martyr also receives some personal rewards, in accordance with his belief: the eternal life in Paradise, the permission to see the face of Allah, the love of those 72 virgins who will serve him in Heaven, the promise that 70 relatives of his will be accepted in Paradise.

The women's participation in suicide terrorism

The Islamic religious restrains the women's right to participate in suicide attacks. However, there were registered some cases during recent years. Terrorist groups such as LTTE, Hamas, The Kurdistan Workers Party and the Nationalist Socialist Syrian Party engaged women in carrying out suicide attacks.

Women participated in about 30-40% from the total suicide attacks carried out by the LTTE. Such an attack occurred in 1991 and targeted on the Indian prime-minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and another incident occurred in 1999, when a woman, member of the LTTE organization, carried out a suicide attack in which Chandrika Kumaratunga, the president of the Republic of Sri Lanka, was wounded and another 23 persons were killed.

Although Yassin, the Hamas' parent and spiritual leader, disagreed with the involvement of women in suicide attacks, in 2002 there was registered the first case of a woman participating in

such an attack. Since then, the number of women involved in suicide attacks carried out by Hamas increased continuously.

In the case of the Kurdistan Workers Party, two thirds of the total numbers of the attacks were carried out by women. They are also involved in terrorism in Chechnya, and in Iraq there were registered more than six cases of women involved in suicide attacks since the beginning of the Iraqi Freedom operation.

The increasingly use of women in such kind of operations has some probable explanations. They are less susceptible of performing such actions than men. Moreover, women are less exposed to the corporal control (or they are controlled superficially). In addition, they have the advantage of hiding the explosives better inside their clothes, looking like they are pregnant.

Combating suicide terrorism

In recent years, the suicide terrorism was used against some democratic states where the public opinion plays an important role in adopting the political decisions. The states confronting with the risk of suicide attacks inside their territory must take the measures they consider adequate (even if this can lead to the certain diminishing of some democratic rights of the citizen), thus conveying a firm message towards the terrorists that try to create tensions between the population and the state's democratic institution and to exploit these tensions in their interests.

The current terrorist organizations proved extremely innovative and adaptable to the operational framework in which they operate and to the counterterrorist operations adopted by the states.

The state can counteract the terrorist actions through anti and effective counter-terrorist² measures.

The effectiveness of such measures includes not only data and information collection referring to the terrorist organization's activities, to their plans and intentions, but also a good cooperation between different state institutions: administration, police, intelligence services, but also mass-media, by organizing and developing propagandistic and educational programmes.

In Israel, for example, the adoption of such measures leads to the reducing number of suicide attacks.



Anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist measures.

The anti-terrorist measures refer to the adaptation of existing legislation and completing it with new points which allow to take the firm discouraging measures of terrorist acts, the propaganda towards the terrorists, set up counter-terrorist units, secure the potential targets, the use of false targets to protect the personalities, as well as the cooperation between the states. The counter-terrorist measures involve the infiltration in terrorist organizations, arresting the terrorists, breaking up terrorist cells.

The suicide terrorism has been increasingly used during the recent years, all over the world. In the fight with this calamity we have to keep in mind that a suicide attack does not represent an act of a desperate person, but a well planned act, which requires a special preparation and involves a number of leaders and activists of the terrorist organization. As the actions directed towards the suicide attacker are complicated and difficult to develop, the operational efforts have to focus on the others elements involved in the planning and organizing the operation.

When it is about the suicide terrorism, the counter-terrorist measure has to be aimed at hindering the martyr to reach the target or to enter inside it. Even a suicide terrorist can be diverted from his plan of action or at least he can be obstructed. The increasing protection measures by establishing more security rings can hinder the development of the suicide action.

In the case of the Palestinians attackers, for instance, the Israeli structures dealing with terrorism have identified the existence, close to the martyr, of some circle of activists who know the plan of the attacks prior to its execution. The first circle is the family.

In many cases, they observe a change in the future martyr's behaviour. In some cases, the martyr has a relative working for the Palestinian security services and this relative can report the intentions of attempting a suicide attack, thus contributing to its prevention. The second circle is formed by activists who initiated the attack, recruited terrorists, trained them, collected information about the target and offered guidance for the martyr in fulfilling his mission. The third circle is made up from collaborators who give to the suicide attacker the logistical and operational assistance and lead him to the target. The last circle is represented by the supporters of this kind of attacks who create

an atmosphere which make him capable to action freely. The operational measures have to focus simultaneously on all these circles.

Psychological measures. Another aspect of the fight against the suicide terrorism, as we mention before, consists in educating people, in order to minimize the moral damage such an action induces.

In this sense, it is important to know that the main goal of the terrorists is to induce fear and panic among people, in order to affect their morale and to create tensions between the population and the state institutions. The support given to the population in presenting and understanding the risks involved by such an action and the way it needs to react are essential. The population needs to understand that the main victims of the terrorism, in general, and of suicide terrorism, in particular, are civilians. Therefore, the population represents an important element in the fight against the suicide terrorism.

Conclusions

The analysis of the known cases reflects that the reason for carrying out the suicide attacks is a combination of religious fundamentalism and extremist nationalism and a desire of revenge, but not necessarily a feeling of isolation of an individual or a personal sentiment of desperation. The use of this form of terrorism is also based on some financial arguments, but also arguments related to effectiveness.

The international terrorist organizations use the suicide terrorism as a weapon aimed to strike a range of targets, both civilian and military, especially in crowded public places.

The suicide attacks represent a new stage in escalating the international terrorist activity, with the clear intention to maximize the number of the victims and material losses and to shake the public opinion.

The effective combating of this form of terrorism includes the accurate intelligence data collection referring to the terrorist organizations activities, the development of operational activities, the adoption of some security measures, and the international cooperation.

The terrorist groups learn from each other, share knowledge referring to the technologies for making bombs, data collection and training the



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

activists, tactics and procedures used.

In the same way, the states have to cooperate, having more working tools and a freedom of action much larger than the terrorists. The effective cooperation between states had positive results in the fight against terrorism. An example in this sense is the effective cooperation between France and Spain, causing important losses to ETA separatist organization.

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NOTES:

¹In 2000, LTTE was the most effective and brutal terrorist organization using suicidal terrorism. Since 2001, when this terrorist organization signed a cease fire agreement, the Islamist militants and the Iraqi insurgency have increasingly used these tactics.

²Antiterrorist measures mean passive, while those counter-terrorist ones mean active.

Major Ionel STOICA works for the General Staff.



SELF TERRORISM

Cristian DELCEA

The identity of self-terrorism is the result of the process of exploration and structure of its own characteristics, having as a result the interface terrorism – target-group. Self-terrorism is the essential indicator of all antisocial behaviours in the name of some ideological cognitions or political-religious doctrines found in contradiction with human, moral, legislative and cultural reasons. Self-terrorism also represents the cognitive interface of self criminal identity in which its politics, ideologies, algorithm and the heuristic anti-social steps are included. The latest research emphasizes the new identity of modern terrorism, which has new behaviourist forms. Some cognitions of terrorism concept varied so much that the real identity of this phenomenon was lost, easily passing from simple labels for violence forms that cannot be associated with terrorism to biases from the government people. For the first time in the history of terrorism, self terrorism is a paradox or a “nebula” concept for researches and government. Moreover, the concept of self-terrorism hasn’t been outlined yet, for cultural, social, religious, political and legislative reasons. This article will perform a critical analysis on the present theories and researches about the identity of (self) terrorism today, also proposing a cognitive criterion in order to understand it.

Introduction

The publication of many specialty studies formed the base of cognition for self-terrorism, who can become a terrorist and why and in whose name these acts, catalogued as terrorists, are done. For example, some researches, as Williams (2004), Chomsky (2003), Hoffman (2001) and Ariel (2001) assert that terrorism’s forms of manifestations evolved from political reactions to those of social constraint by acquiring anti-social behaviour. Even more, it was proven in several specialty studies (Wilkinson, 2006; Lehr, 2006; Scraton, 2002) that contemporary terrorism doesn’t represent a transactional form anymore, but has adopted

a newer, more dangerous, unpredictable, powerful, organised and professional method against the target group, to reach its aim. Other researchers, like Sookhdeo (2006) and Ahmed (2003) argue that terrorist’s reactions are caused by the imperialistic American policy. And Huntington (1996) contradicts “the mediatory current” of the secret services, arguing that religious fundamentalism represents the effect of an inevitable conflict between the civilizations of different beliefs, recruiting potential human subjects for the Holy War. The third category of contemporary researchers, as for example Horgan (2005), emphasize the psychopathological reactions of terrorists, underlining the fact that there are many similarities with totalitarianism as central part in using terror as a means of social control, which marked the second half of the twentieth century: communism, fascism and other dictatorial doctrines from the religious world. Observing the things from this perspective, the present article proposes a conceptual approach to self-terrorism, keeping in mind the latest research in this field.

The terrorism’s cognition

The terrorism’s cognitions are very varied and usually inadequate. Although a violence act, usually regarded as a terrorism act in the USA, cannot be interpreted in the same way in other country, the type of violence that distinguishes terrorism from other specific types of violence, like murder or a military action during war can still be defined in reasonable objective terms. The cognitive delimitation of self-terrorism cannot include the multitude of cognitive “knots” or the variety of cognitive schemes regarding this phenomenon, which started to grow from the ‘70s and has totally new forms of manifestation today. In the cognitive delimitation of self-terrorism it’s very important to mention the analysis and synthesis of the forms of manifestation: of violence, of destruction, terrorists’ algorithm and their comparison with some forms of criminality that don’t represent acts of



self-terrorism. The psychology of personality does not have a unique definition; there are varieties in its cognitive delimitation. Similarly, we can say that there is not a unique definition for self-terrorism. Why? Because self-terrorism shows the most bizarre and unique forms of violence against civil people, sensitizing the government to facilitate different aims.

It is difficult to give a general accepted cognition to self-terrorism, because what self-terrorism means for an individual, a group or a state, for others means fight for national freedom. Also, there is confusion between *violence*, *self-terrorism*, *organized crime*, *civil war* and *dictatorial state*, as terms, the confusion being even bigger when somebody tries to associate self-terrorism with insurgent or separatist movements.

Self-terrorism is the only noxious and anti-social phenomenon that generates fear, chaos, dread, shock and anxiety and mass psychical turmoil among the civil society. The conceptualization of the cognition of self-terrorism considers the self-terrorist as an individual and self-terrorism as an organization. It is worth mentioning that the term "terrorism" comes from the Latin word "terror", which means physical violence and fear, deliberately provoked through acts of public violence, carefully using means able to lead to a common danger; and "self" comes from the English word that means "identity".

Self-terrorism can be defined as an identity of terror pointed against a target-group to suggest vulnerability and his / its lack of security (individual, group or state) and which doesn't recognize certain rights or wishes expressed by those who appeal to these actions. The characteristics of self-terror are: violence and violence threatening, the systematic and persistent use of violence, intimidations and sensitizing through aggressiveness and hate, the deliberate use of consume sources (mass media, tourism, IT, etc.) to shock and to prove the vulnerability of the consumers who are part of the civil society (Delcea, 2006).

Conclusions

The first part of the article briefly mentioned some of the most important names in the field of terrorism, in order to outline the form of manifestation of self-terrorism, actually this being the most controversial concept from many perspectives.

The second part delimited the cognition of self-terrorism. We don't assert that the definition of self-terrorism in this article is satisfactory from the perspectives of models and theoretical patterns relevant for this phenomenon, but it is worth remembering that despite the difficulties in the conceptual delimitation of the term "self-terrorism", nevertheless, there is a unanimous accepted definition in the academic centres.

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Cristian DELCEA is the President of the Association for Studies and Researches on Terrorism, an author of studies and papers on the terrorism's psychology.



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2006

The most important scientific event organised this year was the CDSSS' VIth International Session of Scientific Papers on "Defence and Security Strategies on the Eastern NATO and EU border". It took place on November, 23-24 and was split into two sections: "Security, defence, Homeland Security – conceptual approaches" and "Crises at the Eastern border of EU". There were papers presented by guest speakers from the Presidential Administration, from the Romanian Army management, specialists from Luxemburg, Greece, Bulgaria. There were representatives from Ministry of Defence's structures, Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Romanian Intelligence Service, civilian and military professors, specialists from NGOs. The papers presented were published in a volume and can be accessed on the Centre's web page, at cssas@unap.ro.

Researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies participated to some international scientific events: in October, to the conference "Peaceful Development and the Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific Region" Beijing, China and the International Security Forum ISF 2006, on "New risks and threats – challenges on state and society", Zurich, Swiss; in November, to the Conference "The new challenges in the field of military sciences", Budapest, Hungary, the IXth International seminar on "Strategic cultures and the cultural interoperability in civil-military relations", Vienna, Austria and the Conference on the "Current challenges in International Humanitarian Law", Ljubljana, Slovenia.

In November, 8-11, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I" hosted a delegation from the Institute for Strategic Studies from Brno, the Czech Republic. During the visit, there were exchanged information on the scientific research activity and on turning into profitable the results obtained by the two institutions, there were discussions on regional cooperation and security after joining NATO and there were established new ways of collaboration.

The most recent studies published by CDSSS are: "Critical infrastructures, dangers, threats on them. Protection systems", "The energetic resources and the security environment at the beginning of the XXIst century", "Optimizing Romania's Army participation to collective defence missions".

Irina CUCU



After five years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

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