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THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE GLOBAL FIGHT ON TERROR

Mircea MUREŞAN, PhD

The unprecedented terrorism worldwide expansion and its ongoing evolution impose a firm intensification of the international collaboration and cooperation, adopting a global fighting strategy against this serious threat on humankind. Therefore, states, international, regional, governmental, nongovernmental organizations, political, social, financial, cultural institutions, mass media should be actively and coherently involved. Both the experts and the politicians consider terrorism has become very fast a global issue requiring radical solutions, systematic and coherent actions, involving the whole international community. Even the new Romanian National Security Strategy speaks of the necessity of this involvement: "Terrorism can not be either ignored or tolerated. It can and it must be won by international solidarity and collective action"[1].

At the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security held in Madrid, in March 2005, UN proposes adopting a worldwide strategy for fighting this terrible calamity. This action seems to be more and more necessary. The terrorist threat aims all world's states, the whole set of essential values defended by the United Nations: the law's pre-eminence, protecting the civilians, the mutual respect between people having different religions and cultures and the peaceful conflict resolving. The Group initiated by the UN Secretary General worked on studying the world threats and recommending the required changes to the global system. The strategy the Secretary General stated in 2005 comprised measures referring to: discouraging the unsatisfied groups to choose terrorism as a tactic for achieving their objectives, forbidding terrorists the means to carry their attacks, discouraging states to maintain terrorism and defending the human rights in the fight against terrorism.

The gravity of this global threat determine UN and its specialised institutions to play a central role during negotiations and adopting 12 international treaties against terrorism and preparing the convention on forbidding terrorism in all its shapes. The group estimated as necessary the elaboration of a terrorism definition. It should clearly state that any act is a terrorist act if its intervention aims causing death or seriously hurting civilians and non-combatants, for intimidating people or for constraining a govern or an international organization to fulfil a certain act or to refrain from acting accordingly.

Among the concrete initiatives undertaken by UN for combating terrorism[2] we may mention the UN Convention on repressing the terrorism financing and UN Security Council Resolution no. 1566 (2004) on creating an international indemnizations funds for the terrorist acts' victims and their family members. Those funds come from the money confiscated from terrorist organizations, their members and partners.

The unprecedented intensification of terrorist activities

A recent strategic evaluation made by the US State Department's experts[3] proves the long term tendency regarding the international terrorism is to get organized in 4-persons cells or to act isolated, as hard to get or to combat "micro-actors", because they use the modern technologies and the globalisation's instruments.

The National Antiterrorism Centre is responsible for collecting data related with terrorist acts, not only the one relevant for the international terrorism. There were also included the ones involving citizens or territories from more than two states, as the global total figures are quite impressive: in 2005, there were 11111 attacks, 14600 dead persons, most of them in Iraq.

Even if they will not change the way for polls, the terrorism analysts discovered a dynamic and radical terrorism, a continuation of violence on superior coordinates, some elements requiring solidarity from the civil society in order to fight this phenomenon. We face more and more with isolated individuals, fact proven by those 360 suicidal attacks that determined around 3000 dead persons, that is 20% of the total victims figure.

The Centre's last year figures show there were 7497 killed, wounded or disappeared persons in terrorist attacks, 1000 children, 6500 policemen, 170 believers and 100 journalists were killed or hurt. The evil states considerably support terrorism both morally and financially. The black list of the states actively supporting terrorism comprises: Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Libya (it is going to be erased from this list because of the measures undertaken on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the antiterrorist support), Sudan and Syria. The American experts' evaluation shows the main Al-Qaeda leaders are no longer able to lead as in the past. Even if Osama bin Laden still ideologically influences his supporters, his operational role has been reduced, due to the international harassment they have been put to.

The consistent objective – depriving terrorists of refugee places from some states' border regions – has required and requires applying a regional strategy involving a coordinate action between US, other states and regional and multilateral institutions.[4] The most problematic border areas are Afghanistan, Somalia, the common border between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay and Célèbes Sea, between Philippines and Indonesia. The above mentioned document asserts the key for an effective strategy regarding hosting terrorists is strengthening the partner states' capacity and their cooperation.

Iraq is one of the main battlefields for this global war on terror, the most important one for Al Qaeda and their counterparts.

Although there are united international efforts that succeeded in limiting Al Qaeda's actions in countries neighbouring Iraq, in damaging their operations, in capturing and killing more leaders, this organization still has connections on Iraqi soil and has a capacity to adjust to the new situation. The report notes that networks having a strategic importance support the arrival of foreign terrorists in Iraq.

Concluding, the world is just in a first stage of a lasting war on terrorism and that for the coming years the multinational coalition will have to face an obstinate enemy.

Antiterrorist worldwide strategy proposed by UN

The international effort for preventing and combating terrorism has become consistent and firm, has been translated into coherent strategies that consider terrorist risk factors threatening the states' security and interests, the international community. That is why Romania considers the fight against terrorism should strictly respect the democracy principles, the international law, the human dignity, the fundamental human rights when there is no compromise in the relations with the terrorists. The involved states and organizations must find a reasonable and effective balance between protecting freedoms and democratic rights and the restrictions, constraints and the required punitive measures, including by ensuring the responsible transparency and the right to be informed.[5]

The document states the main action directions for the national institutions having a role in this fight against terrorism: strengthening the international cooperation by re-launching the efforts aiming the widespread terrorism definition and establishing standard operation norms and procedures; achieving the consensus between politics, NGOs and civil society regarding the need to promote the "zero-tolerance" policy; improving the national crisis management system; a better knowledge of the terrorist structures, methods and techniques.

The actual National Security Strategy stresses out that it is necessary to elaborate a new fight strategy on terrorism that should aim: revitalizing the doctrines and norms on using forces; preventing, discouraging and proactively counteracting the terrorist danger by common actions within the European Union, NATO and partner states, including the areas generating terrorism; harmonising political, diplomatic efforts with the ones of the information services and the armed forces involved in this fight against terrorism, mainly by a better cooperation and operational co-ordination. Meantime, the strategy will legitimate the participation of the national forces to the global war on terror and will generate the convergence of efforts, the active support from population and reducing the vulnerabilities in crisis situations.

By sustaining this approach that seems to be more and more accepted by many states, the United Nations proves to completely understand the necessity to structure a global strategy for terror.

That was especially after the antiterrorist strategy errors made by certain big world powers and after the development of the terrorist phenomenon at international level. The need to point out certain action ways for combating terrorism has been shaped as an important document, based on a recommendation set made by the UN Secretary General in the Report he presented in front of the General Assembly on May, 2nd, 2006.[6] Without being a final structured strategy, the Report makes certain proposals for strengthening UN capacity to assist states to fight against terrorism and to better coordinate the activities.

The main idea is that a worldwide campaign against terrorism may employ United Nations, civil society and the private sector. The UN General Assembly and the Security Council, other meetings organised by UN or other international institutions may constantly support the fact that terrorism is not justified; they may condemn it, as different regional organizations do, during their summits. By unified efforts, terrorists may be deprived of certain means of actions, their access to conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the UN Secretary General senses the significance of a strategy aimed against terrorism, that is more than expressing the preventive action will or finding the proper riposte to the possible terrorist attacks.

The main element the strategy proposed by Kofi Anan is based on refers to its five pillars: discouraging people to use terrorism; depriving terrorists of certain means of actions; discouraging states to support terrorism; strengthening their capacities for fighting against terrorism; defending the human rights.

It is sure that It is sure that discouraging people to use or support terrorism may be achieved if it is made the largest distance between terrorists and the ones that may be tempted to rally their cause. The UN officials are right when they state it is necessary a worldwide campaign.

There should be involved governments, UN, civil society, the private sector, making everyone aware that terrorism is unacceptable, by all its shapes, and there also the best and effective means they can use in order to present their legitimate grievances. The proper mean for sending this message, suggested by the UN Secretary General, is increasing the importance and the assistance for the terrorism victims, as well as their families, by starting an assistance system that should support them for their reintegration in society and finding a productive, full of dignity existence. It is well known that the United Nations act constantly for creating an international solidarity movement for these victims, based on respecting their dignity and compassion.

This approach has already made several terrorist groups to give up their activities, as they lose their followers' support. However, it is considered that there should be also paid attention to all situations that may be exploited by terrorists, there should be made certain efforts to disaffect the elements directly supporting terrorists, to determine the moderates not to become extremists, and to impede extremists to become terrorists. A real perspective may be opened for this international fight against terrorism only by the United Nations' "absolute intransigence"[7]. This is possible, mainly now, after the 2005 Summit, when the UN member states condemned firmly and for the first time "terrorism in its all shapes, despite the authors, places and means, as it is one of the serious threats on peace and international security".[8]

The civil society, the religious authorities and mass media play an essential role as they may intensify the campaign at local, regional and global level. Therefore, they will be able to stress out the sufferings of the terrorism victims, other consequences of its criminal acts, the serious economical repercussions, slowing the state's development and its erosion, moreover, organizing non-violent but very effective opposition movements. UN is willing to name a coordinator that is to help the civil society in this fight against terrorism, in order to harmonize the actions. It is asserted that in order to prevent and repress terrorism the short time measures are the most effective. The worldwide research institutions may study the dynamics of terrorism, proposing long term measures for this global strategy against terrorism, in order to remedy the situations that are likely to be used by terrorists for gaining new supporters.

Also, civil society is required to play an essential role, together with the UN states and media, in discrediting the ultranationalist and xenophobe messages, in combating the extremist ideologies that favour violence and intolerance and whose supporters sustain the terrorist factions.

Promoting the religious and ethnic tolerance within the educational system will encourage the freedom of thinking, tolerance and moderation, and not militancy and extremism.

A global strategy can not ignore the violent conflicts that are the foundation for new terrorist groups, new suicidal attacks, especially in the context of a foreign occupation. It is to mention UN initiatives that engages its bodies to help the member states for strengthening their national capacities for conflict prevention, to put into place their own alert systems and risk indicators for starting a local or regional violent conflict, as well as their performances during negotiations, conflict mediation, especially in the field, and also peace consolidating.

The terror is also stimulated by the weak governance, by the limitation of the civil and political rights, by the violation of the human rights. That is why UN strategy projects as a solution the avoidance of using antiterrorist measures by the excessive show of force that may generate counter-violence, reactions from the population, even joining terrorists.

Equally, the ethnic and religious discrimination, the political exclusion and the social-economical marginalization may generate terrorism. Not integrating minorities or emigrants may determine malice that may facilitate the terrorists' recruitment. On economic and social level, the young people's unemployment, associated with other forms of exclusion, may create an explosive mixture, giving way to extremism and terrorism. Achieving the objectives related with the social development and integration has a positive, anti-terrorist effect.

On combating the terrorists is essential to deprive them of the means for preparing attacks: impeding them to create and transfer funds, to procure weapons, to recruit and train, to move and to communicate, mainly by Internet. This is the only way to prevent new attacks. An active role on combating terror and supporting terrorists is played by the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Funds that has been agreed upon by 153 states and the whole system of financial sanctions launched by the United Nations.

The weapons procurement, especially the ones for mass destruction, is very dangerous due to the huge destructive potential the biological, chemical or radiological weapons have. On classical weapons, the United Nations intensify its measures for forbidding the manufacturing, the smuggling of weapons or weapons' components, ammunition elements.

On nuclear weapons, the recent approval of the International Convention on Repressing the Nuclear Terrorist Acts is meant to give states the permission to hinder terrorist groups to procure nuclear materials. The danger of the biological terrorism determines the organization to look for new adjusted solutions, to adopt additional preventive measures, a manner of conduct for the specialists in biotechnology, to initiate new actions on the issue of the double usage.

The global strategy on terrorism has to include the "states' effort to strengthen their capacity to better protect the vulnerable targets and to organize an adjusted retort"[9]. This requires a professional approach of the replies to terrorist acts and achieving a partnership with communities and the private sector, in order to diminish the risks.

The international community has adopted important resolutions aiming discouraging states to support terrorist groups, urging them to abstain from organizing, financing, encouraging, facilitating or supporting terrorist acts and to adopt the required measures in order not to turn their territory into an area for such activities. For the states that do not have the necessary capacities, it is proposed the cooperation with the international community for strengthening their means and promoting an effective state. UN will continue this approach, with the required determination, and will sanction the states offering terrorists asylum or assistance.

Another pillar of the future global strategy refers to increasing the states' capacities to prevent terrorism. This includes the means that have been identified by UN that states may use in order to secure this preventive capacity and the assistance. The main fields are: promoting the state, respecting the human right and installing effective penal justice systems; promoting a good education, the religious and cultural tolerance; the fight against terrorism financing; the transports' security; the role played by Internet in the fight against terrorism; strengthening the protection of the vulnerable targets and the intervention means against them; bolstering the states' capacity to impede terrorists get nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological materials and offering them assistance in the event of such attacks. It is important to mobilize the necessary resources for the states fighting with terrorism, but also for promoting the coordination of the antiterrorist activities within the UN System. This coordination comprises: improving the information exchange, rationalizing the mechanisms for establishing the reports forwarded by the states, turning into institutional the Special Team for fighting against terrorism.

Defending the human rights in the context of terrorism and the fight against it is also part of the fighting strategy against terrorism. The states have to firmly condemn terrorist acts, methods and practices, forms and events that determine the annihilation of the human rights, the fundamental freedoms and democracy, to make sure the measures they adopt for this fight are in concordance with the obligations that devolve upon the international law, especially in matters related with the human rights, the refugees' rights and the international humanitarian law.

For a wider cooperation at UN Security Council level

The states' delegations notice less convergence in the Un Security Council's commissions responsible for the fight against terrorism[10]. At the meeting dated May, 30, the Security Council urged its committees to bolster the dialogue and cooperation and to update its working methods, in order to fulfil their obligations: sanctioning Al-Qaeda and Talibans, to fight against terror and to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons.

Many delegations asked a review for the enlisting and erasing procedures of the names or entities mentioned in the List of the ones involved in terrorist activities. In four different resolutions (1267 from 1999, 1333 from 2001, 1390 from 2002 and 1455 from 2003), the UN Security Council compels the states to block fortunes, to impede the entrance or transit of the persons or entities mentioned on the above mentioned list. Meantime, they should stop supplying, selling or transferring weapons and military materials to them. It is worth to mention the aspects related with the use of the Internet by Al-Qaeda or the fight against the misconception of Islam's assimilation by terrorism and also the legal and political difficulties aiming sanctioning people. It has been noticed that the Surveillance Team has consolidated its connections and cooperation with different international and regional bodies, such as Interpol, the Organization for International Civil Aviation, the Association for International Air Transport and OSCE. The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee has adopted an analytical instrument, "The preliminary evaluation for applying" that allows a systematic and transparent surveillance, in order to respect the provisions stated in Resolution 1373 about the antiterrorist fight.

The members of the delegations underlined the fact that states should identify the main action areas and announce the eventual technical assistance needs. Meantime, there should be increased the cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations. In order to increase the legitimacy of UN sanctions and their efficiency, there should be found a balance between preventive actions and the warranties for the accused ones. Only a global actions carried by the United Nations within an active strategy will end the terrorists' access to WMD. There should not be made a compromise in ensuring the antiterrorist measures in concordance with the international law. Achieving a wide cooperation between UN Committees, regional and sub-regional organizations, financial institutions and multilateral bodies will determine a complete and viable solution for combating the threat represented by terrorism.

The UN Committees' action, in a unique, coordinated and coherent manner may have notable results in combating terrorism, in achieving an active partnership with the regional organizations and the multilateral bodies on sanctions issue, in finding pertinent and smart solutions for waging this fight in this real war started by the international terrorism.

Conclusions

A worldwide antiterrorist strategy has become a must considering states are more and more vulnerable in front of terrorism and its effects. They are asked to assume new major responsibilities in the fight against terrorism. Starting from an initial strategy, UN member states will be able to periodically revise it and, as the Secretary General underlines, to call the responsible ones.

Different UN bodies will play a major role in these approaches, assisted by the Special Team for the fight against terrorism that will be responsible for coordinating the actions. As the beginning has been done, UN, governments, regional institutions, human communities and civil society have to unify their forces in order to give shape and viability to a global strategy that should end, once for good, the terrorism threat. The future will show if the United Nations' measures were beneficial and visionary.

It seems the international institutions are aware that the fight against terrorism is not just a matter related with the military intervention, but one related with solutions and opportunities for improving the quality of life, for peace promoting by intercultural dialogues[11], for sustaining and improving the intercultural educational programs. The best practices concluded from the regional, sub-regional and global organizations' experiences might significantly contribute to the efforts related with terrorism prevention and with the fight against it.

There should be encouraged the creation of synergies between different participant bodies to this sort of actions, in order to effectively react in case of terrorist attacks. It is necessary to apply a program of activities that should be coordinated at system level, in order to ensure a larger efficiency for the international community's strategy and to bolster the cooperation at subregional, regional and global level on the fight against terrorism.

NOTES:

[1] Romania, the President, Strategia de Securitate Naţională a României, România Europeană, România Euro-Atlantică: pentru o viaţă mai bună într-o ţară democratică, mai sigură şi mai prosperă, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 14.

[2] A Madrid, le Secretaire Général propose une stratégie mondiale de lutte contre le terrorisme, Communique de presse SG/SM/9757, March, 10, 2005, http://www.institutidrp.org/onu/onu_terrorisme.html.

[3] Rapport sur le terrorisme dans le monde en 2005, Departement d'Etat des Etats-Unis, http://usinfo.state.gov/fr/Archive/2006/Apr/28-481998.html

[4] Ibidem, p.1.

[5] Romania, the President, op.cit., p. 15.

[6] S'unir contre le terrorisme: recommandations pour une stratégie antiterroriste mondiale, Rapport du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU présenté devant l'Assemblée générale, le 2 mai 2006, http://www.un.org/french/unitingagainstterrorism/

[7] Ibidem, point 9, p.2

[8] Ibidem, point 10, p. 2.

[9] Ibidem, point 68, p. 12.

[10] For details, see http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2006/CS8730.doc.htm

[11] See the conclusions of the International Conference on the World Security and Terrorism, "Young people for Peace and Stability" (March, 9-13, 2005, Madrid), www.fapa.ro/facultatea-de-psihologie-ev.htm

General Professor Mircea MUREŞAN, PhD, the Commandant (rector) of the National Defence University "Carol I" , continues, by this analysis of the actual UN proposals for a global strategy within the fight against terrorism, to study from different new angles the aspects of the international cooperation in this complex area of combating this worldwide disaster.

LEADERS, CHARISMA AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD

Leaders play a particular role in any field of activity and that is why transformation process should take it in, too.

A leader's charisma means more than an image because it generates the power that musters the followers' desire for achieving the leader's vision.

Charisma has a dual nature because it is usually associated with power which sometimes corrupts and destroys the leaders. A leader with charisma but without integrity becomes a negative character.

A successful leader is that one who "makes investments in the future".

1. What is charisma?

The dual nature of charisma has given rise to various opinions about its substance and definition which covers both image-making (what Anglo-Saxons call "appearance" or "look") and deeper aspects going beyond the image and reflecting the human personality. No reputable specialist will define charisma as a personal charm raised from the attractive features of the face and physical qualities.

There still is implemented in the subconscious of most of us the association between physical beauty and angels, which cannot be otherwise than good. On this line, the most relevant are, probably, Romanian fairy-tales where heroes are Prince Charming and Cinderella. It is also true that heroes of the Romanian fairy-tales are **characters**, people who fight for ideals and principles, without giving up their dignity and honour in order to upstart or to get material benefits. Meantime, they feel compassion for their neighbours, try to understand and help them, join them in their suffering, and usually they win the fight with evil forces just because they are pure, unselfish, strong – mainly morally – and do not give up on fighting until reaching the goals they aim at. Therefore, a beautiful image (charm) is only a component of charisma, meant to make a good impression which is to be confirmed by the other individual qualities designed to energize the followers, to muster up their optimism and draw them into realizing the vision (ideal, program, objective, etc.).

Charisma dual nature originates in human nature which has contradictory sides. This aspect of dualism may be found both in ordinary people and leaders. Ordinary people seem also to be concerned of their problems and they are not always willing to look beyond appearances, or image.

That is why there are so many people for whom the first impression is the one that counts. They follow their instincts, the emotion aroused by a charismatic character at their first meeting by a simple hand-shaking, few words exchanged or just as a result of a speech during a public event. Most frequently, the first impression is influenced by the environment.

Based on these aspects and also on other aspects, not so relevant but capable of determining the extent of the impact a leader's charisma may have on the public opinion, a new subject of study appeared – imagology – and a new profession – public image specialist.

A public image specialist is generally an expert in mass psychology who analyses the character whose image has to be improved, surveys the community to be influenced and develops the strategy to follow. After completing the study, image specialist finds out the community's expectations, problems it has to face, educational level of its members, etc. Following the study of "audience" (community, organization, etc.), the image specialist puts a plan of meetings with community representatives and members to the leader, suggesting him topics to be approached, solutions to community problems, proper behaviour on different occasions, appearance (haircut, clothing, shoes), gestures, facial expression, etc.

Excessive concern about creating a favourable image associated with character features is the most important criteria generating the dual nature of charisma. Thus, a leader with negative qualities will be interested in a favourable public image and, therefore, will show "the man we need", "man of Providence", etc. But such a leader only pursues his own interests in his secret plans. Such individuals are referred to as "two-faced" (like Shakespeare's Jago or Bareface in the Romanian popular tales) and they reveal their purposes only when they think nobody and nothing can touch their interests.

One of the most interesting descriptions of charisma dual nature belongs to Patricia Sellers who said that *"Charisma is a tricky thing. Jack Kennedy oozed it – but so did Hitler and Charles Manson. Con artists, charlatans and megalomaniacs can make it their instrument as effective as the best CEOs, entertainers and presidents. Used wisely, it's a blessing. Indulged, it can be a curse. Charismatic visionaries lead people ahead – and sometimes astray. "*[1]

2. Charisma and Leaders

One of the tendencies in leadership modern theory is the attempt to shift away the emphasis from the leaders toward the **relationship leader-performers** and team spirit which leaders should encourage.[2] From this perspective, the leader role is subjected to slight changes because he should rule from inside the team and the team members should feel him like one of them. This type of leadership is not easy to accept and adopt for a traditional charismatic leader and especially for a leader of hierarchical structures like military ones, because he has got into the habit of being the "leader", "commander", "chief" or "boss".

Although the servicemen are often labelled as rigid and conservative, there are numerous examples of military commanders who know how to approach their subordinates, to motivate, encourage and lead them to fulfil the assigned missions. A significant role in building the team spirit is taken by mutual trust based on training, common values such as honour, dignity, responsibility, integrity, mutual respect grounded in a system of relationships which *"should not necessarily be either that between a superior and a subordinate, or master and servant, or teacher and student"*[3], as Lieutenant General John A. Lejeunne, US Marines, declared.

It is obvious that the lack of formalism (a non-rigid attitude) in the relation between commander (chief) and subordinates will be beneficial to working environment by reducing the stress specific to rigid hierarchical relationships. On the other hand, commander (chief) should not be the "good guy" who ignores defaults and disorder just to gain in popularity. It is a firm obligation for any leader, pre-eminently a military one, to demand his people to obey the law and specific regulations. Actually, a real leader must be a good example, justified when saying "Do as I do!"

A charismatic leader is the one who succeeds in turning his native qualities to a good account in order to influence (inspire) people, to find the shortest way to their hearts and minds, to discover those hidden triggers inside the human beings which activate and use unanticipated resources of energy, initiative and inventiveness. This enables ordinary people to be encouraged and get adequate support in topping their part and achieving goals, even at personal level, that they would never reach by themselves. A charismatic leader should have the power to persuade those ones he leads, that the distance between the starting point (initiation of an activity, program, plan, etc.) and the arriving one (goal) is shorter than it seems. Thus, people's self-confidence increases, they do not feel weak, helpless, inefficient or self-conscious any more, and prove superior capabilities to those ones shown in a less favourable environment to displaying initiative and innovation.

As far as military area is concerned, self-consciousness and fear may be eliminated through knowledge and training leading to competence, performance and unity of concepts and actions. All these qualities may be achieved through hard work and first-class training[4], the latter leading to physical and particularly mental status improvement, i.e. a mentality of a winner who is "able to make the difference" by shifting the victory balance in favour of those most determined to win.[5]

It is almost a truism to say a leader needs a vision, but this should be more than creative imagination and good intentions because, in order to achieve something important, experience, tenacity, competence, courage and a winner mentality are required. A successful leader must be creative, animated by good intentions and also he must have the ability to assess new trends in his area of expertise, know his own and his subordinate structure capabilities, forecast evolving environmental tendencies and set realistic goals and timetables for them.

A well-known military leader, specialised in leadership theory, said that *"there are no bad organizations but bad leaders"*.[6] A similar point of view comes from antiquity, from Philip of Macedonia, who considered *"an army of stags led by a lion is more dreadful than an army of lions led by a stag."*[7]

An insight into the gallery of the greatest personalities of the world will show us that all leaders of high calibre had and still have something in common: charisma. The way they used their charisma and individual qualities made their personalities unique.

The American President **Abraham Lincoln** had a distinctive personality due to his moral strength. Although in the 19th century media and information transfer technology were not so advanced, Lincoln made his mark through his imposing stature (almost 2 m), his baritone voice, his ability to address the large masses of people and progressive ideas he advanced. Due to his strength of character, proved by his deeds, tenacity in pursuing his creed – slave emancipation and human rights - he succeeded in gaining people admiration and respect. The ideas he promoted and followed made him get many enemies whose interests were to maintain slavery. They strongly believed that physically eliminating President Lincoln would have led to slavery re-establishment, which is why abolitionism hostile forces paid a murderer who shot him while at the theatre, shortly after the Civil War.

Winston Churchill, the British prime minister during World War II, was skilled at eloquence and persuasive discourse. Animated by his desire to focus British efforts on supporting the fight against German Nazism in its full expansion, Sir Churchill shifted the feeling of frustration, even treachery, caused by French capitulation in June 1940, to pride. Restoring the British self-confidence and dignity to go on fighting and even die to prevent Nazis from conquering their country, the prime minister gained the British adherence to his vision and made them endure extreme privation, scarcity and German bombing and led them to victory in "Battle of Britain".[8]

Charismatic leaders have normally a strong will, courage to take risks and ability to make their visions known in few words that may express an easy-to-perceive and comprehensive enough impetus to people from various social categories. Such a personality was the American pastor, **Martin Luther King**, who succeeded in mobilizing millions of people, both black and white, with his "*I have a dream*" speech against racism. His dream became true but, similar to President Lincoln, King lost his life for daring to rise against Ku-Klux-Klan and apartheid followers.

Among those remarkable leaders tragically ending just because they wished their dream come true **Mohandas Gandhi** must also be retained. Most of the people remember him as Mahatma (the Great) Gandhi. He militated for human rights (apartheid abolishment) and India's independence through passive resistance (ahimsa) and soul strength (satyagraha)[9]. However, the movement he led drove them to victory, but the result was an independence without unity, because the British Crown made the decision to create two states: India – mainly Hindu -, and Pakistan – mainly Muslim. This outcome drew extremists to hate him and one of them, Hindu Rashtra newspaper editor, shot him.

Charisma dual nature is easier to notice when studying negative leaders' evolution. They have qualities that support them in their efforts to become famous, even to lead a nation. Unfortunately, their abilities and skills are only employed to fulfil their vanity – to get the power. At the beginning of their development, some of these leaders militated for noble goals such as: liberty, equality, democracy but after getting the power they turned the political regimes in their countries into personal dictatorships (Stalin, Mao, Castro[10]), promoting the cult of personality and murdering their political opponents (Pol Pot, Duvalier[11], Sucarno) in the name of some noble ideals.

3. Leader transformation

In this century of transformation and information, traditional leader and pyramidal decision-making structures (rigidly hierarchical) have to adjust to the new trends. The course of transformation is given first of all by promoting a new type of relationships between the leader and those to be led similar to a partnership. At a first glance, it seems nonsense that the leading individual be a partner of those to be led but only if traditionally (i.e. rigid hierarchy) approach the subject. Considering the current theory of leadership in its spirit, **team work** and **authority delegation** enable the partnership between a chief and his subordinates.

Team work has been often blamed during the Communist epoch due to its association to lack of effectiveness and responsibility (there still subsist in our minds the idea that "*if you want a goal not to be fulfilled, then assign the task to a working group (!)*"). Teamwork makes goal achievement fail unless animated by the team spirit which is mainly defined by working together as colleagues, competence and wish to reach high performance.

Team spirit is not to be mistaken for caste spirit, gang spirit or fraternization[12]. This spirit is based on a new approach of the relationships within a collectivity (organization, military structure) focused on efficient goal accomplishment, not on formalism or rigid hierarchy.

Leader partnership with those to be led does not mean to deny (turn upside down) hierarchy by diminishing the due respect to the leader (commander) or the leader to give up his prerogatives. This new type of relationship aim improving communication, increasing permeability of hierarchical barriers by giving the performers a better access to the leaders and a faster exchange of opinions. To communicate strictly through hierarchical channels is time-consuming and frequently leads to opportunity loss.

Time has always been a barometer for effectiveness and, therefore, shortening the information-decision cycle will allow sooner and faster debates and the achievement of new projects. The more rings the decision-making chain has, the longer time is wasted through hierarchical bureaucracy. Any delay could cause critical effects, particularly during warfare.

Generally speaking, "*an efficient leader correlates subordinates' and organization objectives*".[13] On the other hand, "*subordinates will reject a leader whose behaviour is perceived as useless and who does not support them*".[14]

Any individual, including the one who executes tasks, needs certain independence when it is about accomplishing a job. The leaders take active part into personality, responsibility and initiative developments of those ones they lead through partnership and authority delegation.

Understanding and especially a proper application of centralized command and decentralized execution principles will be a significant step forward in transforming the leader and execution personnel mindset. It has been already proven that information blow-up may cause decision-making mechanism to be overloaded or blocked unless a preselection of information is done. Any individual who is part of the organization (community, military structure), not only the leading team, should perform such a selection. "Filtering" information by leading team only could act like a brake, and that is why delegation of authority and assignment of responsibility to each employee is required. Some information has to be submitted directly to the leader if it critically impacts on the course of action. Consequently, communication channels should be established thus enabling information to be timely delivered to the decision-maker by using real-time collection, processing and transmission technology. Particularly when dealing with military operations, information delivery and decision-making in due time may lead to victory or prevent casualties. Otherwise, fights, battles or even wars may be lost and, implicitly, many human lives.

Transformation of leaders and leadership in general entails both to reconsider the relational system between the members of the organization (military structure) and to re-assess their competence. To this end, delegation of authority will eliminate micromanagement and sometimes almost functional dependency between the leader and his subordinates. When approaching leadership this way, the leader bears major responsibilities in developing the vision and the strategy for it (that well-known phrase ***what must be done***) and subsequently in evaluating evolutionary trends of those factors that may act upon his area of activity as well as adjusting the strategy, if required. Another important responsibility of the leaders is to ensure the correlation between objectives and allotted resources and to adjust objectives in the event that those resources significantly change in amount.

Leaders' style should be dominated by **flexibility** to allow permanent adaptation to situations and by **determination** in pursuit of the objectives. Maintaining the objectives makes the operation and perspective more substantial and coherent but they may change if initial data basically change.

The leaders should not take over the subordinates' right of deciding ***how to accomplish the assigned objectives***[15] but have the obligation to control their activity in order to evaluate the implementation status of the strategy, plans, and programs, and to intervene, if required, for improving efficiency, reset timescales, or re-ordering priorities.

Traditional leader mainly differs from that leader who is to control transformation of the military by the way they approach the leading process. The first places the emphasis on individual leading while the latter bases on a team and has also responsibilities in facilitating the process conducted within the structure (organization) he (she) leads, as well as in motivating and stimulating his staff to improve their knowledge and skills and become proficient. Partnership with subordinates and team work do not exonerate the military leader of responsibility. It is him who makes major decisions and controls their implementation. But, taking advantage of a larger participation of his subordinates in information / decision-making process as well as in identifying the solutions to increase their work effectiveness, it will be easier for him to reach a more durable **unity of concept and action**.

NOTES:

[1] Patricia SELLERS, *What exactly is charisma?,* Fortune magazine, January 15, 1996.

[2] Joseph D. ROSE, **Leadership for the 21st Century,** Paraeger, Westpost, Connecticut, USA, 1993, p.102.

[3] William COHEN, Ph.D Major General, USAFR – **Înțelepciunea generalilor**, Editura Antet XX, Filipeştii de Târg, Prahova, 2001, p.79.

[4] Marshall Erwin Römmel, quoted by Wiliam COHEN, *op. cit.*, p.136.

[5] John T. ROURKE, *International politics on the World Stage*, The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc, Shice Dock, Guilford, Connecticut, USA, 1991, p.231.

[6] General S.L.A. MARSHALL, **The Officer as a leader, Stockpole books**, Harrisburg, Pensylvania, U.S.A., 1996, p.252.

[7] Wiliam COHEN, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

[8] **Marcel JULLIAN, Bătălia pentru Anglia**, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1968, p.264.

[9] Kelly KNAUER (editor), **Great People of the 20th Century**, Time Books, New York, USA, 1996, p.53.

[10] Pierre ACCOCE, dr. Pierre RENTCHNICK, **Bolnavii care ne conduc**, Editura Z 2000, Bucureşti, 2000, pp.28-31.

[11] Pierre ACCOCE, dr. Pierre RENTCHNICK, **op.cit.**, pp. 53-162.

[12] x x x – **The Military Commander and the Law**, Air Force Judge Advocate General School Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 1998, pp.101-104.

[13] x x x – **Comportamentul organizațional şi gestiunea resurselor umane**, Editura ASE, Bucureşti, 2002, p.32.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] x x x – **Guidelines for Command**, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 2003, p.25, “Never tell people how to do their job. Just tell them what to do and you will be surprised by their ingenuity”, General George C. Patton.

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CONTRE L'OPÉRATIQUE

Dr. Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE

Au commencement était la tactique. Lorsque l'art de la guerre s'est véritablement transformé en science, au début de l'époque moderne, avec la substitution de la discipline militaire à l'héroïsme chevaleresque, le souci dominant était celui des ordres, des formations, en vue des combats.

C'est cette discipline nouvelle qui s'est appelée tactique, par reprise d'un vocable grec transmis par les quelques auteurs anciens qui avaient survécu.

Au XVIII[e] siècle, cet art de la guerre devient plus complexe, du fait des progrès des armements et de la croissance des effectifs qui oblige à marcher divisés pour combattre réunis; le maniement de masses de plus en plus nombreuses exige une science des marches et des mouvements, ainsi qu'une conception d'ensemble plus subtile, dont la théorisation est esquissée dès les premières décennies du XVIII[e] siècle. Le maréchal de Saxe parle, dans ses Rêveries, des „grandes parties de la guerre", Napoléon des "hautes parties de la guerre", Jomini et les auteurs du début du XIX[e] siècle imposeront un mot réinventé, dans Ies années 1770, par un auteur français aujourd'hui quelque peu oublié, Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy: la stratégie. L'art et la science de la guerre s'articuleront désormais autour du diptyque stratégie/tactique.

Jomini avait suggéré une ligne de séparation simple qui sera reprise par la plupart des auteurs du XIX[e] siécle et de la première moitié du XX[e] siècle: stratégie avant et après le combat, tactique pendant le combat. La littérature stratégique étant pragmatique, ce critère contestable avait l'avantage décisif de la simplicité.

En outre, il s'accordait parfaitement à l'environnement de l'époque, dominé par le modèle napoléonien centré (à tort ou a raison, ce n'est pas le problème) sur la recherche de la bataille décisive censée régler d'un coup le sort d'une campagne.

Telle était la vulgate, c'est-à-dire ce qu'ont retenu la plupart des lecteurs et des praticiens. Les observateurs les plus avisés se doutaient bien que les choses n'étaient pas aussi simples. Jomini lui-même n'avait-il pas distingué des opérations mixtes, relevant à la fois de la tactique et de la stratégie? Dès les années 1820, le général Lamarque introduisait la notion, assez floue, de "bataille stratégique" réunissant en un même ensemble plusieurs batailles ou combats livrés en des lieux ou des jours diffé, mais s'inscrivant dans une même séquence opérationnelle. Ce n'est qu'à la fin du XIX[e] siècle que la théorie s'est sérieusement attaquée à la question.

Les auteurs allemands, après 1870, se sont mis à parler d'opérations. Cette idée va cheminer à travers les écrits d'un certain nombre de penseurs dont le recensement reste à faire. Il pourrait réserver quelques surprises: ainsi, alors que l'histoire de la pensée militaire, jusque dans ses travaux les plus récents, semble considérer que cette idée d'opérations est l'apanage des auteurs allemands et russes de la fin du XIX[e] siècle et du début du XX[e] siècle, on trouve une définition très nette et tout à fait moderne de la différence entre rupture tactique et rupture stratégique chez le général espagnol Eicardo Burguete, don le line La ciencia de la guerra est paru en 1917 c'est-à-dire une décennie avant les grands travaux des théoriciens soviétiques auxquels on attribue aujourd'hui le crédit de cette découverte.

Quoi qu'il en soit de ces pionniers méconnus, c'est dans la nouvelle Union soviétique qu'apparaît, dans les années 1925-1935, la première définition globale et cohérente du concept d'art opératif. Les écrits de Svechin et de Triandafilov sont maintenant bien connus depuis leur traduction récente en langue anglaise. Les historiens de la pensée militaire ont explicité le développement du concept, mettant en lumière les racines profondes de l'art opératif dans la pensée militaire de la Russie impériale et soulignant le rôle d'auteurs moins connus que Svechin et Triandafilov car non traduits, notamment Isserson dont l'essai non publié serait, à en croire l'un des rares Occidentaux qui l'a lu, aussi important que l'ouvrage de Svechin *(Strategija,* 1926) reconnu comme un classique[1].

Leur idée centrale était que la guerre moderne pouvait difficilement être tranchée par une seule bataille comme à Austerlitz et qu'il fallait plutôt envisager une suite d'opérations continues pour abattre l'ennemi. A vrai dire, le statut épistémologique du concept n'était pas clairement précisé, et l'on pourrait montrer le balancement entre deux tendances, l'une qui plaçait l'art opératif à égalité avec la tactique, le critère du premier étant le mouvement alors que le critère de la seconde serait le combat (c'est la tendance allemande, prolongée aux États-Unis dans Ies années 1950 par Herbert Kosinski)[2] l'autre faisant au contraire de l'opératique une catégorie à part, supérieure à la tactique (c'est l'école soviétique).

Pendant des décennies, il ne s'est agi que d'un débat purement théorique, n'intéressant que quelques érudits, le concept même d'art opératif étant étranger à la quasi-totalité des .cultures militaires. II a fallu sa découverte et son adoption par l'appareil militaire américain pour que le concept se diffuse et connaisse, en à peine une décennie, une diffusion quasi-universelle. À l'ancienne dialectique stratégie tactique s'est donc substituée un triptyque stratégie/opératique/ tactique. Tous les recueils récents de définitions, aux États-Unis comme ailleurs, consacrent dorénavant cette hiérarchie à trois niveaux. On peut interpréter le phénomène de deux manières.

La première consiste à dire que l'art de la guerre ou plutôt l'art du conflit est devenu plus complexe: l'introduction d'un niveau supplémentaire correspond à une prise de conscience de cette complexité. Dans les conflits contemporains, la dimension politique est de plus en plus constante, le politique ne se borne plus à décider du déclenchement du conflit et à lui assigner ses fins, il intervient en permanence dans la mise en oeuvre des moyens militaires. La conséquence logique est une "élévation" de la stratégie, de plus en plus tirée du côté politique et donc de plus en plus démilitarisée. Le vrai stratège est maintenant le chef du gouvernement et non plus le chef des armées. L'apparition de l'opératique correspond à un besoin, celui de combler l'écart grandissant entre une stratégie de plus en plus politique et une tactique qui reste militaire et qui n'a pas connu la même évolution sémantique et épistémologique.

Il y a une vérité indiscutable dans cette affirmation. Cela étant, force est de constater qu'un autre élément est intervenu, à savoir le phénomène d'imitation de la puissance dominante, que le général Poirier a appelé le syndrome de Polybe, par référence à cet historien de culture grecque, devenu le théoricien et le propagandiste de l'impérialisme romain qui avait mis fin à l'indépendance de sa patrie. Le concept d'art opératif n'intéressait personne tant qu'il était allemand ou russe, tant ces deux langues, même l'allemand, sont devenues aujourd'hui des langues rares. Le concept d'art opératif s'est vulgarisé à partir du moment où il a trouvé sa traduction anglaise et où il a été adopté par la puissance impériale du moment, celle qui sert de point unique de référence, dont on s'efforce de reproduire les doctrines et les procédures. Le résultat est spectaculaire et témoigne de cette influence prodigieuse des doctrinaires américains.

La question se pose cependant de savoir si une telle imitation est justifiée. La distinction stratégique-tactique était peut-être insuffisante, elle avait l'immense mérite d'être immédiatement perceptible par le praticien. L'introduction d'un niveau supplémentaire aboutit à démultiplier les problèmes de frontières: où s'arrête la stratégie? Où finit la tactique? La clarté apparente des définitions ne doit pas dissimuler de redoutables problèmes de délimitation. Ceux-ci existaient auparavant, ils ont simplement été démultipliés et il est permis de se demander si cet inconvénient théorique est compensé par des avantages pratiques, dès lors que l'une des caractéristiques majeures des opérations récentes est précisément la confusion croissante des niveaux: lorsqu'on songe que l'autorisation de riposte en cas d'agression contre une simple section ou un petit poste doit parfois remonter jusqu'à l'autorité suprême, on a bien du mal à dire où s'arrête la tactique et où commence la politique. Est-il nécessaire dans ces conditions, ou seulement utile, d'introduire une catégorie intermédiaire?

Le concept d'opératique aboutit à ôter encore un peu plus aux militaires leur influence sur la définition et la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie qui devient encore plus politique. II n'est pas sûr que cela soit un progrès. Non seulement pour des raisons théoriques, en raison du contenu du concept même de stratégie, qui s'en trouve appauvri (la stratégie n'est plus que la politique en acte) mais aussi parce que la perte de sens militaire dans la formulation de la stratégie peut engendrer des conséquences pratiques néfastes; il serait facile d'en donner des exemples, tirés des expériences récentes en Somalie, à Haïti ou en Yougoslavie.

On objectera que l'opératique permet une remise en ordre appréciable, en évitant une dispersion de la stratégie entre des niveaux qui n'ont guère de points communs: à l'autorité suprême la stratégie, au chef militaire sur le terrain l'opératique. Mais cette extension du spectre n'est-elle pas caractéristique de la plupart des activités humaines? Ne regroupe t-on pas sous la même appellation de religion Ies spéculations de Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la foi du charbonnier illettré? Sous celle de politique le gouvernement des États et Ies basses manoeuvres électorales des comités Théodule ou des comices agricoles? Ce qui compte, au-delà de la multiplicité des niveaux, c'est l'existence d'un critère unificateur qui donne sens au concept: stratégie et opératique (dans le sens aujourd'hui retenu, hérité de l'école soviétique) relèvent de la même dialectique des intelligences utilisant la force pour résoudre leur conflit. Évidemment, cette réflexion conceptuelle est plus difficile qu'une simple hiérarchisation des niveaux[3], ce n'est pas une raison pour s'en dispenser.

La science stratégique est pragmatique, gouvernée par la recherche de l'efficacité. La dialectique traditionnelle stratégie/tactique était, de ce point de vue, plus pratique que l'articulation ternaire qui lui a été substituée. Certes, celle-ci autorise des développements théoriques plus fins, mais au prix d'une perte de sens de la stratégie. Son principal avantage, sil faut absolument lui en trouver un, est, si l'on ose dire, tactique: les militaires peuvent récupérer sous le couvert de l'opératique tout ce qui relevait autrefois de la stratégie militaire. Alors que leur liberté d'expression est fortement limitée dans le débat stratégique, leur liberté de manoeuvre est totale dans le domaine opératique, mot barbare qui ne signifie pas grand chose pour Ies conseillers du prince. C'est un avantage dont il faut tenir compte et user avec modération. Mais ce n'est pas nécessairement un argument suffisant pour justifier le dévoiement contemporain du vocabulaire conflictuel. Contre la vogue actuelle du concept d'opératique, on en appellera au principe de parcimonie de Guillaume d'Ockam: "*Les entités ne sont pas à multiplier sans nécessité*".

NOTES:

[1] Richard W. Harrison, **The Russian Way of War. Operational Art 1904-1940**, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2001.

[2] Herbert Rosinski, „Frontières conceptuelles entre stratégie, opérations et tactique dans l'art de la guerre", *Stratégique* 68,, 4-79, pp.7-19.

[3] Comme celle que fait le *Glossaire interarmées d'emploi des forces*, qui définit un niveau stratégique, mais s'abstient de définir la stratégie.

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EUROPEAN NATIONS' NAVIES FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Krzysztof KUBIAK, PhD

The author presents the changes of the main tasks of the European navies after the end of the Cold War. He asserts the contemporary fleets are similar to the Victorians ones and they accomplish mainly expeditionary tasks. The most important factors which determined future naval environment are: significant dynamism of situation changes and wide scope of challenges requiring flexibility of forces, littorality – focus on coastal (littoral) waters, expeditionary capability, asymmetricity, jointness, network centricity.

The author states that fleets are the very effective tools of international policy, but they lost their ability to single-handed operations. The fleets have become the part of great joint, combine system which is able to utilize the synergy effect.

The end of the Cold War has brought – in a regional, European dimension – a decreased threat of a high intensity conflict. The Old Continent was in a state of strategic pause[1].

However, it doesn't mean the come of Francis Fukuyama's vision of the end of history[2], which is viewed as a global spread of liberal democracy and market economy. In parallel, a wide spectrum of new, dangerous facts has appeared. They were the more threatening for their complete independence from those unwritten, but accepted by both East and West, the limitations of the past era.

Most of all, there is a new energy both in the local conflicts, which had been previously canalized within the global rivalry of antagonistic political-military blocks, as well as in the internal conflicts, which had been kept under control of authoritarian governments.

The fights are not only at the outskirts of the European security area but also in the Balkans and on the Transdniester, which are in a close vicinity of the continent's strategic core.

Terrorism has become an equally important factor influencing the European security. That method, which had been seen as a political aberration, a kind of cancer in a healthy society, transformed from tactics into strategy, which was adapted by an enemy grown in a different culture. The gaining in abilities by the terrorist organizations is tightly connected with the mentioned earlier increase in numbers of various local conflicts. There is a disappearance of effective and functional governmental rule in the so called *conflict areas*, like the Bay of Guinea coast (Liberia – Ivory Coast – Sierra Leone), the Democratic Republic of Congo with the neighbouring Central African countries, Afghanistan, Southern and Western Sudan, Southern Somalia. They became, therefore, a perfect asylum for various political extremists, international terrorist organizations cells among them.

By negotiating agreements with sides of local conflicts, terrorists gain full freedom to act and get an access to serious means and recruiting pool. There is a possible scenario, in which – like it had happened in Afghanistan – structures of a nation raising after a civil war merge with a terrorist organization that have supported it.

It has to be stressed that, in many cases, sides of a conflict try, more or less successfully, to move the activities out into a sea. As a result, not only the naval forces of an enemy are attacked but also merchant shipping and various facilities, for example oil rig. The global "non-peace", therefore, does not concern only land areas. The areas of instability extend and deeply influence merchant shipping.

Another activity connected with the end of the Cold War is the development of transnational criminal structures. The transformation of authoritarian governments into liberal structures, the introduction of easier border crossing procedures and general increase in mobility of Europeans were exploited by organized crime groups. The scale of drug trafficking, the scope and volume of illegal immigration have increased, a completely new class of threats derives from potential involvement of organized crime in weapons of mass destruction components traffic. The specific conditions, for example, the legal status of maritime areas, make the waters surrounding Europe a more attractive place for the actors of the above mentioned procedures than a land zone.

All the above mentioned factors, which, in the European NATO fleets, are accompanied by disappearance of the classical "ocean-going enemy", determine a deep revaluation of naval tasks and functions.

New tasks for new times

In the age of rivalry between the *East* and the *West* the main tasks of the European NATO fleets, to simplify it, came down to maintaining constant advantage in the Western Baltic, in the Mediterranean and to control the sea lines of communication between the American backup and the European War Theatre. In the current, post-Cold War era, the general tasks for fleets may be defined as follows:

➘ participation in a wide scope of activities aimed at controlling the trouble spots and suppression of crisis situations that pose a direct or indirect threat to the European security;

➘ ensuring security of the most important, from the European point of view, sea lines of communication (anti-piracy and anti-terrorist activities);

➘ supporting maritime law enforcement agencies in fight against criminal activities at sea.

The fundamental evolution of tasks goes together with the change of operational areas for the naval forces and with the emergence of a new kind of enemy. To effectively operate in the new circumstances, naval forces were forced to forsake the open – blue waters and concentrate their attention on coastal – littoral waters. Operations carried out with the participation of naval forces take on an expeditionary form, conducted far away from home, in conditions of weeks or even months of self-sustainment. More and more often, the enemy is not a naval fleet of another nation but seagoing vessels of criminal groups, pirate gangs or terrorist organizations. Therefore, the naval forces face all challenges of current asymmetric international relations, the asymmetric warfare.

Before we get into the detailed tasks that may be conducted by naval forces in the current situation, a few more remarks must be noted. First of all, besides the fundamental change in political situation, fleets have entered the phase of technological revolution, which results in introduction and use of more and more sophisticated and advanced computer technologies. The traditional view of *the maritime communication* slowly fades away, while the dominating standard in modern naval forces is network centric solution[3], which enables the increase of combat potential without significant investment in weapons. The leading tendency at that is the implementation of network centric solution without limiting it to one service and developing *common information cyberspace of armed forces (joint forces).*

Two of the above mentioned elements: change of tasks character and technological revolution resulted in naval operations losing their autonomic character (both operationally and within the information scope). At present, navies operate, therefore, in most cases, within the frames of joint operations, where they are one of component forces conducting a land-air-sea battle (in the future: land-air-sea-cyberspace-outer space).

Summarizing, the future naval operations will be characterized by:

➘ significant dynamism of situation changes and wide scope of challenges requiring flexibility of forces, meant as the ability to conduct a wide spectrum of tasks both military (low, medium and high intensity conflicts) and non-combat (operations other than war);

➘ littorality – focus on coastal (littoral) waters;

➘ expeditionary capability – operate in areas far away from home coast, independent of home base support;

➘ asymmetricity – act against non-state groups, terrorist organizations, organized crime, pirate gangs;

➘ jointness – naval operations will be one of the elements of joint operation conducted by common effort of at least two services;

➘ network centricity – certain elements of battle formation will be linked by high speed transfer lines used to exchange information;

➘ multinationality – with the decreasing size of fleets (as well as whole armed forces) it seems that one European country would not be able to carry out the full scope of activities during an expeditionary operation. It is almost certain that in most cases forces of a few nations will participate in such an engagement.

Naval forces in a joint operation

While discussing a problem of naval forces participation in joint operation, the author does not intend to describe a solid, specific scenario of the future engagement. The intention is to present potential capabilities but also the limitation of navies engaged in such venture, thus it is intended to draft a shape and equipment for some kind of a *tool box* which could be used according to needs and conditions of a given situation. It was assumed, however, that the *tools* delivered by fleets will be presented against a background of generally viewed escalation of crisis situation undergoing in an area away from Europe (for example Bay of Guinea).

Analyzing capabilities of naval forces related with the joint operations, it must be taken under consideration that they are capable of relatively quick deployment to the designated area and may be there self-sustained for a longer time.

It is assumed that a group of ships of various types, amphibious landing ships among them, may sail about 400 nautical miles (740 km) during 24 hours. If the amphibious component is discarded and the group is composed only of surface ships of frigate (or higher) class, the distance increases to about 600 nautical miles (1100 km).

A group of warships (depending on classes and types of ships as well as on conducted operations) is self-sustainable from a few to several days. If a Replenishment at Sea is prepared and carried out, however, the time of self-sustainment in the area might be extended and limited practically only by psychological endurance of the crew and technical reliability of fundamental system.

For example, the US Navy assumes that six months is the maximum time of operation without basing, during Falklands war the Royal Navy ships operated in the Southern Atlantic, on average, 90 days each, the Polish Navy deployed its ship ORP *Xawery Czernicki* to the Persian Gulf for one year (however, it had support from allied bases and the crew was exchanged after six months). Thus, if replenishment at sea and rotation of a crew is organized, the presence of naval forces in designated area may be unlimited.

Moreover, it must be underlined that there are legal international conditions for operation of naval forces. The areas of world oceans, except for a 12 mile territorial waters belt on coastal countries and archipelago areas, make for a so called "open sea". No country may extend its sovereignty over the area or try to limit shipping. The above rule applies also to warships. Therefore, generally speaking, deployment of group of ships, even for a long time, to a littoral area outside territorial waters, does not require any formal agreement or approval.

Thus, a group of ships in littoral waters may form a kind of *mobile operational base* for both full scale combat and operation other then war. The *mobile maritime operational base* is therefore a tool enabling a flexible reaction to possible outcomes of situation. Such use of forces is probable, of course, during an expeditionary operation, when the own forces cannot built a base on land, or when supporting other components of joint forces operating in littoral area.

Showing a flag and surveillance

The mere fact of a ships group's presence in an area where tensions exist is so reliable demonstration of force and determination that it may prevent further escalation. In that early phase of engagement, called a *presence phase*, naval forces, apart from showing a flag, may conduct surveillance (for political reasons often called *monitoring of situation*).

A naval force, depending on its composition, may conduct surveillance with shipborne aircraft (also unmanned air vehicles), surface ships (unmanned surface vehicles), submarines (unmanned underwater vehicles) and naval special forces.

The main advantage of the surveillance carried out by a group of ships is their standing presence in the area, hence the periodical effect may be eliminated. When utilizing a submarine (unmanned underwater vehicle) surveillance may be carried out in a covert way and, if the situation requires, it may be also conducted inside territorial waters of a coastal country. Submarines are also used as a mean of transport ashore and evacuation for special forces.While analyzing a matter of a presence in an area (showing a flag) we cannot overlook a fact that in the coming years naval forces (of some countries, first of all the USA) will probably develop theatre air and missile defence capability.

A creation of the *Theatre Air and Missile Defence Group – TAMDG* will be a result of the foreseen for 2010 introduction of missile systems to counter ballistic and cruise missiles[4].

The opinion of the American working group on the theatre air and missile defence is that apart from a military role (a kind of an anti-missile umbrella over a theatre providing security for expeditionary forces) it will also play a splendid political role. For its implementation it will provide an opportunity to offer and secure defence against ballistic and cruise missiles for whole territories of allied countries, like Israel or Taiwan. That would lead to strengthen the American allied reliability and closer ties with allies. Moreover, the United States will be more resistant to the so-called *denial of access* to certain areas, carried out with missile – nuclear weapons. The described group will be characterized with self-sustainment, mobility and high combat readiness. The group will be able to commence operation immediately after arriving to a designated area without necessity of developing any coastal facilities. The concept of *showing a flag* will acquire then a completely new meaning.

If, however, the mere demonstration of readiness to use a force will turn out to be insufficient to stop escalation of a crisis, the naval forces will be able to initiate tasks of the *preliminary engagement phase.*

The control (surveillance) of shipping

The experiences of the conflicts that took place after 1990 indicate that typical element of activities in that phase is introduction of various forms of control (surveillance) of shipping to and from a port of a nation responsible for a start and escalation of the crisis. The control of shipping must be viewed as a wide spectrum of tasks, starting with monitoring the maritime traffic, hailing ships and inquiries about a cargo, and ending with enforcement of embargo imposed by international organizations that would include boarding, inspection and escort of suspected ships to own ports.

The naval forces' control of shipping capability may be also used during operations other than war. It enables activities aimed against crime at sea (piracy, smuggling, drug traffic, etc.), weapons of mass destruction proliferation and support of maritime police formations. Notwithstanding the unquestionable *nautical* character of the control of shipping, it does not seem probable that it would be conducted in the future with naval forces only. There is no doubt that it is necessary to have some form of cooperation, especially with air force.

The magnitude of effort and duration of activities connected with a control of shipping is best illustrated by naval forces operations during the Balkan crisis. The international forces operated then in Adriatic from July of 1992 to mid-1996 enforcing embargo (Table 1).

Table 1- The control (surveillance) of shipping during the Balkan crisis

Mean daily intensity of activities		Mean daily effort of ships and aircraft	
Surface ships surveillance	56,9	Surface ships in a patrol area	15,1
Control of ships at sea	4,28	Base aircraft patrols	4,58
Control of ships in ports	1,13	Early warning aircraft patrols	4,73
Total: 19 699 days of ship patrols, investigated 74 192 surface vessels, thorough control at sea 5 591, escorted to Italian ports for a complete inspection 1 480 vessels.			

If neither the demonstration of force – presence of a group of ships in littoral waters, nor the control of shipping give desired results, it is very probable that the next phase will commence – *the full engagement phase.*

Power projection from the sea

Using once more the reference to the experiences of armed conflicts that took place after 1990, we may assume that the first step of the discussed phase is gaining air superiority. Naval forces will therefore participate in *Joint Air Campaign,* committing shipborne aircraft (both combat and support) and conducting attacks on designated targets with cruise missiles. Reaching air superiority does not mean the elimination of a threat for own surface forces from that direction. The main threat is posed by guided missiles launched from various platforms (surface ships, submarines, aircraft, mobile shore launchers). The danger is reduced through own anti-air actions, which are conducted, depending on the composition of a group, with:

shipborne aircraft, surface to air missiles, ships guns. The participation in *Joint Air Campaign* is one of the elements of force projection ashore, but it does not exhaust all capabilities of naval forces in that area.

Recently, we have observed a very dynamic development of shipborne land attack weapons and supporting surveillance systems. The first to appear were SLAM (*Stand off Land Attack Missile*) weapons which were built on the base of typical naval surface to surface missiles. They filled a gap between cruise missiles (range about 1500 km) and ship guns (range about 18 km). At present, almost every anti-ship missile (including the Swedish RBS-15 missiles) has its counterpart in the SLAM class. New types of fibre-optic guidance missiles able of precision attacks against land targets, were introduced into an arsenal of naval forces (for example the German *Polyphem*). Also, ship artillery experiences renaissance. In the coming years we should expect the introduction of 130-203 mm guns of 100-130 km range. The drive towards enhancing the land attack capabilities of shipborne artillery may be indicated by the example of a German experiment – mounting a turret of 155 mm PHZ 2000 howitzer on a 123 class frigate (to replace 76 mm naval gun), or the Swedish experiments with arming the *Stridsbat* assault boats with a twin barrel automatic mortars AMOS type. We may even present a thesis that whereas the anti-ship weapons undergo slow evolution, the fleets land attack capabilities increase geometrically. Together with the technological advance and constant improvement of communication systems (creation of common operational picture for joint forces) it enables combined strike of naval forces and other components against targets tens or hundreds kilometres inland.

It should also be stressed that the new weapons increase flexibility and selectivity in engagement against land targets. Using those weapons, for example, it is possible to precisely strike small targets: selected cars, designated elements of infrastructure or even selected windows in a building.

Permanent superiority at sea

The air superiority is an essential condition for achieving a permanent superiority at sea, which is understood as:

- elimination of enemy's submarines;
- elimination of enemy's surface ships;
- elimination of coastal missile launchers;
- elimination of naval special forces and non-regular formations;
- elimination of mine threat.

Attaining that objective may serve to secure safe passage for own warships and transport ships or to create conditions for amphibious operation, or to open captured enemy ports for own shipping.

Despite all the appearances, like in the case of the control of shipping, attaining superiority at sea is not a domain of only naval forces anymore. We should assume that the tasks connected with it would be also carried out by designated air force units and (with the theatre moving to coastal areas) by army air units (mainly attack helicopters). That trend is best illustrated in the Royal Navy – the air wing of the aircraft carrier *Invincible* consists of both naval aircraft Harrier FA2 and air force Harrier GR7.

Moreover, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands analyze the possibility of using strike helicopters *Apache* from ships equipped with an adequate size flight deck. It is also hard to overestimate the role of special forces while discussing the tasks. It may come out that a key role in attaining a permanent superiority at sea would be played by land forces, for example, by capturing area of enemy's ships basing.

Amphibious operations

The formed on the basis of a group of ships *mobile operational base* by default will have a modular character. If the situation requires, it will also encompass an *element – module* of amphibious ships with a Marine Corps or land forces onboard. At this point, it should be stressed that there is currently a tendency for most of units considered *light forces* to be capable of sea operation, especially since the prime means of moving soldiers from a ship to shore is at the present a helicopter, not an assault boat. On the other hand, *Marine Corps* slowly cease to be classical amphibious landing troops when they conduct operations in the mountains of Afghanistan or in the Iraqi dessert.

Another remark – the modern amphibious ships, also vessels of European fleets, were constructed to be able to provide conditions for long stay of troops and equipment onboard.

We may assume, therefore, that even a few months long stay onboard will not affect either the soldiers' condition or combat potential.

We distinguish the following types of amphibious assaults:

➘ *amphibious assault* – on an enemy's coast, with an objective to secure the shore, a specific form of the amphibious assault is an operation on the coast of the potential enemy – forces land with a permission of the side controlling the coast, but it is probable that the situation may change; it is characteristic mainly for the wide spectrum of operations other then war;

➘ *amphibious demonstration* – conducted to deceive an enemy as to the real intentions of own forces or to provoke them to reveal their positions;

➘ *amphibious raid* – a quick incursion into enemy's coast with an objective of temporary control of designated area (object, facility) to conduct damage, gain information, capture or evacuate designated persons;

➘ *amphibious withdrawal* – withdrawal of forces, by the sea, from an enemy's or potential enemy's coast, or from an area where the presence of the forces is undesirable (for example, the end of peace support mission in Somalia).

Forces landing from amphibious ships may operate independently or may conduct initial phase of sortie of land forces – through taking control over beachhead, organizing a field reloading base, capturing and securing ports. Amphibious groups were also used to carry out mobile withdrawal of forces operating on land.

Like in the case of the full scope of tasks related to the control of shipping, in case of the amphibious tasks, ability to perform them by naval groups in time of conflict also means that they will be capable of similar action in operation other then war. In the *second variant*, it is possible to carry out, for example, delivery of forces which monitor a cease fire, guard camps (wait areas) for refugee or control humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation of own citizens from endangered areas. Additionally, from the sea, a wide scope of activities related to disaster relief may be conducted.

Maritime dimension of strategic transport

Besides activities in a crisis area (combat zone), naval forces played and, we may assume, will play in the future a key role in transport of troops to the area of operation and in their support. Sea lift was and will remain a dominant mean for strategic transport.

It is almost a rule that air transport is used to transfer personnel and sea lift is used for equipment and supplies.

We cannot, however, assume *a priori* that the coordinator of the strategic transport would always and in all places have at disposal airfields and safe dislocation areas in the immediate neighbourhood of area of operation and that it would have adequate capacity.

The military sea lift utilizes usually three types of units:

➘ naval ships (amphibious, transport, supply ships or any other vessels that can be used);

➘ ships of various agencies and institutions subordinate to the navy or the defence ministry (for example the British *Royal Fleet Auxiliary or the US Military Sealift Command);*

➘ ships acquired, by various means, from the civilian market (STUFT – *ships taken up from trade).*

Although, in all those cases, the naval forces are responsible for transport coordination and providing security for ships (acquired vessels) during their sea passage. The second of the mentioned responsibilities gained importance recently.

Whilst in the Cold War era the protection of sea lift was usually limited to the destination ports and their immediate neighbourhood, at present, because of the greater threat from a *non-state enemy*, there might be a need to provide protection along the entire route, or at least in a more compact areas or along the coasts of unstable countries.

A good example is represented by the security measures undertaken by the NATO in the Gibraltar Strait, during the operation *Active Endeavour.*

The role of sea lift is illustrated in the Table 2. It shows the quantity of the British equipment transported to the Persian Gulf in the period preceding the operation *Iraqi Freedom.* The personnel, total 46150 soldiers, was in majority transported by air.

There is no exaggeration, then, in a thesis that the sea lift is a core of modern expeditionary operations.

Meantime, though, it is hard to determine the dimension of the required sea lift because it depends on the changing character of the contemporary security architecture.

It may happen then that one year there was a need for thousands tons sea lift and in the following years a sea lift was not needed at all. The question, then, is how to secure a required sea lift capability for a nation and also to keep the costs at a low level. It seems that in the case of small and medium sized nations, none of the first two above described solutions is good because they are too expensive.

Table 2 - The British heavy military equipment transported to the Persian Gulf by sea

TANKS AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY		ARTILLERY AND ANTI-AIR WEAPONS		HELICOPTERS	
MBT Challenger 2	116	Self propelled howitzers AS 90 (155 mm)	36	Gazelle	16
Evacuation vehicles for tanks	26	Artillery command vehicles	24	Lynx	18
Armored infantry vehicles Warrior	140	Reconnaissance vehicles Stricker	12	Chinook	11
Command vehicles	26	Towed howitzers 105 mm	39	Puma	7
Evacuation vehicles	46	Air defense sets Rapier	3	Sea King	10
Reconnaissance vehicles Scimitar	66	Unmanned vehicles launchers Phoenix	4		
Biological surveillance vehicles Fuchs	12	Unmanned vehicles Phoenix	89		
TOTAL	412	TOTAL	207	TOTAL	72
ENGINEERING CORPS		TRANSPORT		OTHER VEHICLES	
Road makers Chiftain	12	Vehicles with hooks	464	Fuel cisterns	162
Bridge tanks Chiftain	12	Hook trailers	149	Water cisterns	7
Mine layers Alvis Shielder	10	Light tractors	29	Heavy all-terrain cars	23
Pontoon vehicles M 3	30	Light tractor trailers	24	6 x 6 cars	93
Bridge sets BR 90	4	Heavy tractors	61	Ambulances	173
Engineering cars	24	Heavy tractor trailers	60		
TOTAL	92	TOTAL	787		458

The third solution has a big margin of uncertainty, derived from a market situation – when there is a need for sea lift, it may be not available.

There are some solutions, coming out of a merger of solutions two and three, with an idea of public-private partnership as a glue.

That solution will be discussed using the British example. To increase both the sea lift capabilities and decrease costs, the UK Ministry of Defence ordered two vessels in Harland and Wolff Shipyard in Belfast and four vessels in Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft - *Hurst Point, Hartland Point, Eddystone, Anvil Point, Longstoe, Beachy Head*. On a regular basis they are utilized by AWSR Ltd. which is, however, obliged to provide them at a designated time for a request from the armed forces.

The contract for that service was signed for 25 years. The transit operation before the second war in the Gulf, in the fall of 2002, used the following ships: *Hartland Point*, *Anvil Point*, *Hurst Point* and *Eddystone*. Together they provided 15000 meters of cargo line, which comprised 11 % of the needs of the armed forces[5].

It seems that such a solution could be also used, after some legal changes, in Poland. New possibilities may appear also after giving the venture international dimension – a Baltic Sea lift Initiative.

Attempt to summarize

Seas and oceans comprise about 70% of the Earth surface. No less then 60% of the Earth population lives less then 400 km from a coast. The trade by sea is the core of the contemporary market – about 98% of international trade is conducted by sea, only the seas allow for communication (transport) between the natural resources deposits and the areas of their consumption.

Only the given above facts incline to the thesis that naval forces may provide political rulers with a wide spectrum of possible options in different crisis situations. Meantime, there is no doubt that the success of the operation will depend, to a large extent, on the land operation success. Considering that, naval forces must be ready to carry out tasks in coastal (littoral) areas, to be able to influence situation ashore. The full use of naval forces capabilities may happen only during joint operations.

Analyzing the above, it is hard not to pose a more general thesis.

With regards to naval forces, Michael Howard's thesis became valid once again. During the previous big revolution, caused by replacing wood with metal and sail with steam, he wrote:

It is hard not to feel sorry for naval officers of 19th century who, during one generation, had to change their thinking about ships, weapons and tactics from Nelson to Tripitz, and had replace their Victory ship with a dreadnought. At the same time they had to realize that if they fall behind the outcome may be catastrophic for a country.

At present, the pace of changes is faster then in Howard's times and one generation is too long time to spend it on adaptation.

NOTES:

[1] The problem is widely discussed and fully interpreted by Bolesław Balcerowicz. See B. BALCEROWICZ, **Pokój i "nie – pokój", W**arsaw 2002, pp. 199-206.

[2] See F. FUKUYAMA, **Koniec historii**, Poznań 2000.

[3] The idea of the Network Centric Warfare - NCW – is to gain information advantage, and next to use it by a commander to acquire command advantage, and finally – operational advantage. The advantage is acquired through a wide, constantly updated, picture available for

a commander of the given level. In order for the picture to be stable, full and up to date, the structures that acquire, analyze and utilize information must be linked in network. Summarizing, the main objective of the NCW is gaining supremacy in the field of information in order to increase effectiveness of conducted operations. See M. ZIELIŃSKI, *Rozwiązania sieciocentryczne w siłach morskich,* „Zeszyty Naukowe AON (Scientific Scripts of the National Defence Academy)"/2005, no.1, pp. 150-151.

[4] The core of the group will be composed of Ticonderoga class cruisers. Works on the first ship, aimed at its adaptation to carry elements of the TAMD system, will begin in 2006. It is planned that the works will cover 27 vessels. The Area Air Defense Command – AADC will be located onboard cruisers. The optimized for anti-air warfare cruisers will be protected by an universal ship – destroyer Arleigh Burke class and a multipurpose nuclear submarine.

[5] At that time two remaining ships - *Beachy Head* and *Longstone* - were chartered to a Finish ship owner, Transfennica Limited, and served the connection Hanko-Lubek.

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THE GEOPOLITICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPACT IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FROM THE SOUTH EAST ASIA

Ion PETRESCU, PhD

For a long time and everywhere, the economic and social life, work, politics and military life have been influenced by the world crisis, the market crisis, the job crisis, the crisis inside the government, the geopolitical crisis, the financial crisis, etc. Crises accompany us, mark us, form us, offer us models and symbols, and control us.

In the geopolitical and managerial register, too, the crisis is attached to the events or to the economic, social and political events and episodes that are unusual but tend to become habitual with consequences that vary on the scale of situational aggressiveness.

The financial crisis from the South East Asia has not passed unnoticed. Its violence made it obvious in the eyes of witnesses and mainly in the eyes of those who felt it.

1. South East Asia under the sign of some contradictory geopolitical and geo-strategic tendencies

Being located in a very narrow geographical area, between the Pacific Ocean and India, the South East Asia has tolerated – from the geopolitical and geo-strategic point of view - many pressures provided by the interests of the great powers England, France, the Netherlands and later the USA. At the beginning, these interests were inter-regional conflicts especially of territorial nature, but later they were transformed into open disputes related to some maritime regions.

From the ethnic and cultural point of view, the traces of the civilizations from India, China and Indonesia have had consequences. Geographically, Indochina (the region located between India and China) is presented as a mountainous peninsula separated from the Indonesian archipelago by the Strait of Malacca. Politically, the South East Asia consists of the continental states from the Indochinese Peninsula[1] and the insular states[2] and non-autonomous territories[3].

From the military point of view, the states from this area have an increasing interest for building a security system where China or Japan or both of them should replace the USA as the power in the area. Such an orientation has determined the ASEAN[4] to establish a regional cooperation to be again closer to China.

On their turn, the economic aspects can become the source of the regional conflicts. We focus on the issue regarding the energetic resources and the necessity to protect the vital maritime ways, which may determine the creation of an unstable geopolitical environment. Firstly, the weak results in the economic field are caused by the great dependence of the regional industries upon the foreign raw materials and components supply, secondly, by the financial difficulties of the South East Asia enterprises, and, thirdly, keeping down the development of the exports because of the intra-regional commerce increase. We should not forget the massive indebtedness of the private sector to the foreign banks willing, on their turn, to develop their business in this dynamic region of the world.

2. The managerial component in the financial crisis from the South East Asia

2.1.The Asian crisis and the problem of the economic security

By positioning the Asian countries between inexorable ascension and collapse, Thierry de Montbrial[5] presents some advice that can be taken from the shaking phenomena that appeared in Thailand in the spring of 1997.

The recent cause is the malfunction of the financial markets of the countries involved[6]. As a matter of fact, the public or private agents convinced that their loss would be always covered by the state moved to an irrational financing of some strange investments, mainly in the real estate segment. Therefore, an inflationist movement appeared, located in the dues portfolio. This phenomenon has not been sufficiently taken into consideration, but after the first alarming signals from Thailand the anticipations were almost simultaneously disturbed.

As George Soros[7] underlines, the Thai financial crisis became extremely discouraging due to its covering area and gravity. The causes of the crisis are mentioned, too. Thus, the first cause of the crisis was considered a wrong alignment of the national currencies. The countries from the South East Asia maintained an informal arrangement regarding the relationship between their national currency and the American dollar. The apparent stability of this arrangement encouraged banks and local business circles to contract loans in foreign currency, converting the loans in the local currency – without being covered by hedging operations – and then investing the money or lending it to some local projects, mainly to those related to real estates. This seemed to be a risky procedure of getting money as long as the informal arrangement of the dollar dependency was functional. But the arrangement was put under pressure, firstly by the underestimation of the Chinese currency from 1996 and secondly by the appreciation of the US dollar in relation with the Japanese yen. The commercial balance of the countries involved deteriorated, even if the trade deficits were, at the beginning, counterbalanced by the substantial and continuous afflux from the capital accounts.

About the unexpected character of the phenomenon Joseph E. Stiglitz[8] stated that when the Thai baht collapsed, on 2nd of July 1997, no one knew that it was the beginning of the biggest economic crisis after the Great Crisis.

Another significant opinion synthesized by Thierry de Montbrial refers to the international institutions, mainly to the International Monetary Fund. It was accused of not focusing on the risks, making them bigger, ex ante leaving the imprudent states to believe that it would help them if it were necessary, and ex post forcing them to use inadequate remedy.

Among the three judgments, the most significant is the first one in Thierry de Montbrial's opinion. It is incontestable that in 1996, the IMF's authorities directed the attention of the leaders from Bangkok and less of those from Kuala Lumpur on the necessity to reduce the current loss, to better control their budget and especially to consolidate their financial segment. But, euphemistically speaking, the advice was very discreetly expressed, because no state acknowledges any authority to be above it in the international system. It is obvious that this is the weak point. The economic predictions published by the international organizations – and also those published by OCED – have never referred clearly to the possibility of such a strong trust crisis. No one knows about the IMF's opinion about the excessive vulnerability of the Japanese financial system. To justify themselves, the Fund's employees state that a simple loud warning signal may lead to catastrophic effects. The author asserts that this argument is not convincing because the best way to limit the consequences of a malfunction is to find it and reveal it as soon as possible.

In Thierry de Montbrial's opinion, the other two judgments referring to the IMF are more contestable and contradictory. In an effective crisis, IMF forces the involved states to swallow potions so bitter that no government can contemplate their perspectives light-hearted.

The nature of the remedies was analyzed, too, arguing that an international institution cannot be judged because it promoted the measures of stopping a fire which proved to be useful in some other places before examining in detail the structural reform proper to every and each country.

Bringing more sever criticism, Joseph E. Stiglitz states that unfortunately the IMF's policies, imposed during this riotously period, worsened the situation. Because IMF was created with the clear purpose of sending warning signals to prevent such crises and handle them, the fact that it made mistakes in so many occasions made many people from the USA and from other countries to ask for a re-examination of its role, its policy and even its position as an institution. Looking behind, it is obvious that the IMF's policies increased and were totally responsible for the economic failures, for their apparition, too: the too fast liberalization of the financial and capital markets represented, probably, the most important cause of the crisis even if the mistakes made by the countries involved had a role in its launch. Nowadays, IMF acknowledges many of its mistakes, though not all – for example, its representatives have realized how dangerous the extremely fast liberalization of the capital market could be – but the change of strategy comes too late for the suffering countries and cannot help them.

The third judgment related to the Asian crisis, in Thierry de Montbrial's opinion, is explained in this way: in the '90s, the interdependency degree within the Eastern Asia increased considerably, but the regional cooperation structures, mainly economic and financial, did not. After the end of the crisis, these countries whose representatives used to proudly claim the high degree of integration without difficult mechanisms, like the ones of the European Union, discover that there is no real insurance without an insurance agent. Thus, they realize that, by pegging their currency to the American dollar, they created only the illusion of a stable rates system without being capable of having a coordinated reaction in case of a storm. Hence their answers, disastrous at the beginning, and their incapacity to resist to a wave of depreciation that unpleasantly reminds them of the chain of events in the '30s. Japan's incapacity to decide in accordance with its economic potency and the opposition of the USA[9] to any attempt to rescue did not fix the problems.

In this way, the author came to the conclusion that the Eastern Asia should provide its own institutional means of integration beyond the economic segment because of the territorial or ethnical problems in litigation.

If this important region keeps on being passive, the prestigious man of science warns, the economic recession followed by social and political consequences (South Korea and Indonesia reflect this at present) combined with a frontier incident could have a bomb effect. It is not to forget about the fact that most of the states in the area are multiethnic states that suffer from an insufficient identity. In case of recession, the different communities unequally touched by the crisis can be ready to fight each other, like in Indonesia, or to incriminate foreigners.

And finally, the fourth judgment highlighted by Thierry de Montbrial is related to globalization, the extension of free trade and the tendency to the perfect mobility of capitals. The planetary interdependency has been highly intensifying while the means of a total settlement are missing. Under these conditions, the old suggestion made by the American economist James Tobin is recalled again. In his opinion, the taxation of the short-term capital movement is completely unrealistic. It is more useful the discussion about the opportunity of controlling the capital entrance to countries with temporarily tempting image in order to avoid the saturation effects and mainly to prevent the shocks provoked by the reflux of the capitals in case of the change of the market operators' strategy no matter what reason.

2.2. Forms of crisis manifestation

As J. Stiglitz says, those crises had two well-known forms:

➢ the first is illustrated in the South Korea, a country with many impressive accomplishments, such as:

- once stepped out of the destroying war of Korea, this country formulated a development strategy regarding the growth of the income for each inhabitant for eight times within 30 years that considerably reduced poverty, erased illiteracy and diminished significantly the technological discrepancy between the South Korea and the more developed countries;
- at the end of the above mentioned war, Korea was poorer than India; at the beginning of the '90s, Korea was registered in the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OCED), the club of the most developed industrialized countries. Korea had become one of the most important world producers of integrated circuits for computers and its great companies SAMSUNG, DAEWOO and HYUNDAI had manufactured world famous products;
- although from the beginning of the transformations the internal capital market had been strictly controlled the pressures of the USA made the local companies to focus on the foreign capital with abstention;
- The local companies that borrowed from abroad exposed themselves to the variations from the international market. At the end of 1997 Wall Street was shaken by the rumor that this country had problems and that it could not have the possibility to renew the due loans given by the occidental banks and it did not have the necessary reserves in order to pay its financial obligations. These rumours may be self-supplied. Immediately the banks, which, a little earlier, were eager to lend their money to the Korean firms, decided not to renew the loans. When all decided this thing the rumour became reality: Korea was in trouble.

➢ the second form of manifestation is illustrated by Thailand. Here, as we have already shown, a speculative attack (combined with a big rate of short-term indebtedness) was the main culprit. Let us give details about the situations:

- Speculators, believing that a certain currency will depreciate, try to get rid of it and buy dollars; under the conditions when the currency is freely convertible – that is it can be changed in dollars or any other currency – this thing may be easily done. But, while the quantity of the sold currency increases, its value decreases – thus the speculators' suppositions will confirm;

- Another situation, met more often, is that when the state tries to back up the national currency. It sells dollars from its own reserve (money, dollars usually, kept for the country's 'black days'), buying local currency in order to back its value. Eventually, the state ends having no forte currency. It has no dollars to sell. The national currency collapses. The speculators are content. Their suppositions confirmed. They may buy, again, the local currency, gaining good money. The gains may be substantial.

2.3. Managerial elements in the IMF's reactions

It is worth to keep in mind that, if the crises manifested in a usual way, the IMF's reactions were as usual as them. This gave huge sums (95 billion dollars, including the financial help from the countries from the G-7). In this way, they wanted the countries to keep their exchange rate. Moreover, it was believed that if the market knew that it was enough money in the treasury, it would have been pointless to launch an attack on the national currency, re-establishing thus the 'trust' in it. In reality, the money served another purpose: it allowed the countries to supply dollars to the firms that took loans from occidental banks giving them the possibility to discharge their debts. In this way, the respective money was, partially, a help given to the international banks and equally a help given to the involved countries. On the other hand, the creditors did not suffer from the impossibility of receiving the given loans. Yet, each country that used the IMF's money to back temporarily a non realistic exchange rate had to deal with another consequence: the rich people from that country took advantage of the fact that they could easily change their money in dollars at a favourable exchange rate and transfer it abroad.

Under the managerial-financial impulse IMF attached some conditions to the given money, in a package of measures which were supposed to solve the problems generating the crisis. These other components of the package, together with the offered money, should have convinced the markets to renew the loans and the speculators to attack other things easier to reach. The respective components consisted of bigger interests – in the case of East Asia the interests were much bigger – plus smaller expenses of the state and bigger taxes. They also consisted of 'structural reforms', i.e. changes in the structure of economy. They were considered to be at the basis of the problems. In East Asia's case, the conditions referred also at some political and economic changes, at major managerial reforms, for example increasing the degree of openness and transparency and improving the settlement framework of the financial markets, and minor reforms, such as abolishing the monopoly on cloves from Indochina.

The IMF will say that imposing such conditions was a responsible act. They gave billons of dollars; they were responsible not only for the reimbursement of the money, but for being sure that the countries did "what they should" in order to recover their own reserves. If the macroeconomic crisis was provoked by structural problems, these should be solved. The conditions were monopolizing for the countries that had accepted the IMF's help should renounce their economic sovereignty and their managerial autonomy. Some critics looked at this aspect and the fact that they could have led to the disruption of the democracy; others took into consideration the fact that those conditions did not help (and it seems that they were not meant to help) the economies to recover.

The facts proved that the programs – with all the respective conditions and money – were without results. They should have stopped the collapse of the exchange rates, but this thing did not happen, the markets catching a glimpse of the fact that the IMF 'helped them'. Every time, hindered by the lack of effectiveness of its potential solutions, the IMF asked the guilty countries to take the reform matter seriously. Every time its representatives told the world that there were important issues that should be handled before talking about a real recovery.

Instead of re-establishing the belief that the money will enter the country again, the IMF's critics rushed the flight of capital. Because of this, as well as other reasons we are going to talk about shortly, the perception existing in the big majority of the developing countries, perception we also agree with, is that the IMF became also part of the problem, instead of being part of the solution.

The negative outcome is huge, with unprecedented effects. As the crisis advanced, the unemployment increased more and more, the GDP decreased very rapid, the banks closed. The unemployment rate increased four times in South Korea, three times in Thailand and ten times in Indochina. In the latter, 15% of the men working in 1997 lost their jobs, by the end of August 1998, the economic disaster being bigger in the urban areas of the main island, Java. In South Korea, the number of the poor almost tripled, about a quarter of the population being touched by poverty; in Indochina the number of the poor doubled. In some countries, such as Thailand, the unemployed people from towns came back to the countryside, the place they left years ago. This thing increased the pressure on the rural sector. In 1998, GDP decreased by 13.1% in Indochina, 6.7% in Korea, 10.8% in Thailand. Three years after the end of the crisis, the Indochina's GDP was still inferior to the one before the crisis by 7.5%, and the one of Thailand was 2.3% smaller.

The effects of the crisis spread. Thus the deterioration of the conditions existing in a country led to the collapse of the neighbouring countries' economies. This region's decline influenced the whole world: at the global level and at the same time the economic increase and the prices of the raw materials decreased. From Russia to Nigeria, many countries with an emergent market economy depending on the natural resources had huge problems. While the investors who risked investing their money in these countries were watching their fortunes decreasing more and more, while the financing banks were asking their money back, the investors were forced to reduce their investments in other emergent markets.

Even Brazil, a country depending neither on oil, nor on the trade with the countries with big problems, a country with economic features different form those of the involved countries, was drawn into the whirl created by the international financial crisis because of the foreign investors' fear and unwillingness of lending money. Eventually, almost all the countries with an emergent economy, even Argentina, considered by the IMF the reform's child because it managed to lower its inflation, were affected.

Analyzing – from the exigencies, requirements and principles of the financial management point of view – the phenomena of garrotting the economy with big interests, nowadays the IMF agrees with the fact that the promoted fiscal policies (those ones regarding budget deficits) were excessively restrictive, but it does not admit the mistakes it made regarding the monetary policy. When it interfered in the East Asia, the Fund forced the countries to increase the interests so much that they reached astronomic levels compared to normal standards.

The consequences were the predicted ones: the big interests increased the number of firms found close to bankruptcy, and together with this, the number of banks with loans that were not performing. The more and more difficult situation of the enterprises and the financial sector accelerated the decline generated by the restrictive policies by reducing the aggregated demand. The IMF had made a simultaneous decrease of the aggregated demand and offer.

In the end, we would like to notice that the Asian crisis brought with it many useful changes for the countries in future. The standards from the sphere of enterprises' administration and management accountancy were improved – sometimes this thing made the respective countries be in front of those ones with an emergent market economy. Thailand's new Constitution promises to assure the creation of a more solid democracy (it contains a clause regarding the "citizens' right to know", a clause which does not exist even in the US Constitution), promising a transparency certainly superior to that one of the international financing institutions. Many of these changes created the conditions for a more sustained future economic increase.

NOTES:

[1] Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuckia are the six states from the Indochinese Peninsula.

[2] Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines are the insular states.

[3] Brunei and the East Timor represent non-autonomous territories of South East Asia.

[4] ASEAN - The Association of Southeast Asian Nations - includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

[5] MONTBRIAL, de T., **Cincisprezece ani care au zguduit lumea**, Ed. Expert, 2003, pp. 259-265.

[6] Starting in Thailand, the crisis has spread over South East Asia, threatening China and Japan and even the whole world economy, too.

[7] SOROS, G., **Criza în capitalismul global. Societatea deschisă în primejdie**, Ed. Polirom, ARC, 1999, pp. 133-147.

[8] STIGLITZ, E.J., **Globalizarea. Speranță și deziluzii**, Ed. Economica, 2003.

[9] When the crisis started, the western representatives did not realize the gravity of the situation. Asked about the help for Thailand, the president of the USA, Bill Clinton, called the baht collapse "a little breakdown" issued on the way to economic wealth. The president's self-confidence and calm were shared by the financial leaders of the world that participated in September 1997 in Hong Kong at the annual meeting of MF and World Bank. The representatives of IMF were so self-confident about their references, that they even asked for a change in the organization's status in order to press more the developing countries to liberalize their capital market.

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BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN PIPELINE: GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS

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It was May, 25th, 2005 when a crucial event for the beginning of the 21st century occurred in Baku: the opening of the gigantic American pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, whose political construction had started more than ten years before. The great event - with even greater implications geopolitically speaking - passed almost silently within media. The reason is that the building and opening of this pipeline was not meant to be connected to the US military presence within the Central Asia and Caucasus, once under the USSR influence.

Geopolitical and geo-economic determinations

The process of economical and information globalization do not and can not solve all the problems about vocation, virtues, asperities and human acts' non-conformism.

On the contrary, along with new challenges and consequently, new risks involved, new types of confrontations imposed or facilitated by informational-type societies, numerous asymmetries, some of them really new come to life or simply reappear while their economic, cultural, social and military impact is brought to light, bearing the right consequences.[1]

The famous Zbigniew Brzezinski, in *The great chess board. US supremacy and its geo-strategic imperatives*, published in New York, in 1997, shows that "the collapse and fall of the USSR perfected the fast rise of the US as a sole and actually the only real world power. (…)All of the sudden, they became the first and the only real global power. (…) For America, Eurasia is the main geopolitical stake". Also, the author uses the collocation "The Eurasian Balkans", to differentiate them from the European Balkans, to refer to the non-Russian part of the ex-Soviet Union, a large area in front of the great powers' intervention, among which Russia's contestable one and the main and legitimate one of the US. This unstable region unfolds itself from the Eastern Ukraine to Central Asia, going through Caucasus and the Caspian Sea.[2]

The Caspian rich hydrocarbon basin and the ways of export for oil and gas represent the fighting ground between the old dominant power, Russia, and the US, which requires the supremacy in Eurasia on the premises of its wish to be the ruler of the world. At least this is the way the American strategic people see things, no matter if they are close to president Bush or his adversaries, liberals or democrats. Transcaucasus (or Southern Caucasus or middle Caucasus) is the most advanced area on the way of "dropping off" in the US or NATO camp. It includes three states: Azerbaijan, where the Caspian oil is extracted, Georgia, where is passed through and Armenia, which had lately got rid of this drop off due to the pro-Russian sympathy and especially to its conflicts with Azerbaijan and the neighbouring Turkey. However, the geopolitical context is on the verge of changing rapidly. Just as Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia could candidate for joining NATO.[3]

By achieving the BTC pipeline, the political and economic map of the area will significantly change. The longest pipeline in the world is not less than 1779 km and it is 4 billion $ worth. The pipeline building started in 2002 and lasted three years. The designed transport capacity for the itinerary is 50 million tones a year. The Caspian oil is carried through this pipe south of Baku, then it passes Georgia and some of the rockiest Caucasian areas to Ceyhan harbour, Turkey, where the tankers will take it all over the world.

The biggest issue, however, was not "technical", but a political one: the BTC pipeline carefully avoids Russia and Iran oil systems and territories, as is also the shortest and the most economic route from Central Asia to the Caspian Sea.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline stands as a long term strategic economic target for Washington, while the energy supply in the Arabian Peninsula and Middle East will quickly decrease, according to the statistics, around 2010-2015.The US have constantly and greatly used the opportunity of USSR fall (1991) to settle its hegemony in the areas like Central Asia and around Caspian Sea, which are extremely rich in oil supply. The BTC pipeline has yet generated a decade of political intrigues in the whole area, Washington permanently trying to ensure a dominant position in the region, to Moscow's detriment.[4]

Mass-media believes that US is the greatest pipeline beneficiary. The final pipe destination is very close to the US military base in Incirlik. In the past, the oil and gas supply in Central Asia was carried mainly to Europe, against US will. The fact that the Caspian oil passes through Turkey in the Mediterranean area, avoiding Russia, will drastically decrease the energetic power of the latter and will reduce the strategic space in all the fields in Central Asia.

Moreover, finishing building the oil pipe will be a plus in US controlling the situations from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the whole Central and West Asia as well as reinforcing the former's energetic security for the 21st century. These are, according to an article published in *The Financial Times*, the first political signs shown since the building of the already mentioned main oil pipeline.[5]

At the pipeline opening, the US secretary for Energy, Samuel Bodman, read a letter signed by the President Bush and attended the ceremony along with the presidents of the three states involved in the project, (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey), together with the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaiev.

Prior to this ceremony, Nazarbaiev had already signed a declaration stating his country binds itself to carry a part of the Caspian Sea oil to Baku.

The executive director of the British Petroleum (BP), Lord Browne, attended the ceremony as well. BP holds 30,1% within the BTC corporation. The rest splits among the state company SOCAR – Azerbaijan-25%, the US UNOCAL-8,9%, Statoil – Norway - 8,71%, Petroleum- Turkey - 6,53% along with other US, Japanese, Italian, French corporations, which hold insignificant figures.[6]

Crossing Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the pipeline determined major political changes in the area. Practically, it "woke up" one of the richest energy regions in the world from a "geopolitical dose". The Bush Administration and the US NGOs (*Freedom House, National Endowment for Democracy*, etc.) supported Mihail Saakasvili in his attempt to overthrow Eduard Sevardnadze, in 2003, making way for a pro US government in Tbilisi.

President Saakasvili strongly wished to underline that finishing BTC pipeline represents a „geopolitical victory" for the states around the Caspian Sea. His statement refers to the US allied states in the region, freed from the Moscow's watching over, due to Washington's help. The new Tbilisi regime is one of the main beneficiaries. The US signed an agreement in April 2005, by means of which Washington will grant Georgia 110 million $ as a financial help. In May the same year, President Bush included Georgia in his East-European tour, praising the „rose revolution" in Tbilisi, calling Saakasvili "a fighter for freedom".[7]

In the letter read by the American secretary for Energy, President Bush calls BTC "a monumental achievement", adding: "This pipeline can trigger an economic growth for the entire area and will settle a prosperous and fair society for the countries promoting freedom". However, we need to underline that the BTC pipeline ensures, on the other hand, a full subordination of the former Soviet republics from Central Asia to the American interests.

The President of Azerbaidjan, Ilham Aliev, wanted to utterly express his appreciation towards Bush Administration on the BTC pipeline opening: "This achievement would not have been possible without the US consistent support and involvement." Aliev wanted to say that the US had preferred the pipeline to pass through Azerbaijan rather than through Armenia, which could have offered an alternative route towards Turkey. Yet, Ilham Aliev's gratitude to the US is quite embarrassing. It clearly shows that „promoting democracy" is not American representatives' main concern, as the Baku dictatorial and corrupt government is not quite a preferable business partner for the "champions of freedom".

Gaidar Aliev, the first Azer President, ran Azerbaijan between 1969 and 1991 in the purest communist style, and in 1991 he changed the "Communist Party dictatorship" with his one. After Gaidar Aliev died – according to a communist script for the ex-soviet republics - his son, Ilham Aliev, the SOCAR vice-president for the petrol company, with 25% shares of the BTC, took over.

According to *Transparency International,* regarding worldwide corruption (starting with the lowest corrupt state), Azerbaijan ranked 140 out of 146 countries.

On May, 21, 2005 the Azer police acted in force against an opposition mob. Those protesting were asking for amendments in the election law in Azerbaijan, which had been in favour of the Aliev family, creating an independent radio broadcasting and an investigation for the death of Elmar Guisenov, the journalist who criticized the Aliev regime, was shot early March, 2005, by unknown people, while he was leaving his house.

Bush Administration seemed to be blind to all this. A *Human Rights Watch* report, in April, 2005, showed the human rights are not too well represented in Saakasvili's Georgia either, even Bush considers it a "freedom landmark". According to HRW, the new Tbilisi regime continues torturing and force techniques, in order to make people disclose secrets." Some of the new rules support the police that is accused of human rights violation, torture and inappropriate treatment to the convicts", warned the HRW report.

BTC pipeline influences onto the countries it crosses through

The administration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is ensured by an agreement - *The Intergovernmental Agreement* - signed by the participating countries. This agreement gives great privileges to the BTC beneficiaries. In other words, the pipeline has a special status, as being his own boss, in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The privileged country allows BTC to elude the national laws which could diminish its own business profit. This is, on a long run, extremely dangerous.

The organizations for environment protection were the first to raise awareness over the danger. Hannas Ellis from *Friends of the Earth*, stated: "It is outrageous that public money, given by the institutions like World Bank, were used for this project, as a way to help. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline generates huge problems for the people and areas it claims to support." These problems have been identified in a series of documents published by *CEE Bankwatch Network*, the British organization *Friends of the Earth*, *Green Alternative* from Georgia, *Les Amis de la Terre* from France and *Ecology National Center* from Georgia. The fact that the pipeline presents large risks for the environment has been published in a report few days before the pipeline official opening. What is worse is that these risks have not even been evaluated properly. Thrilling for profit, the national authorities have not hesitated to sacrifice national parks or protected sites, considered to be of great natural or historical value. The farmers, whose land has been taken for the pipeline building, haven't been properly rewarded. Besides, *Asia Times* stated: "According to rumours from Baku, the man who is currently and literally governing Azerbaijan is David Woodward, the president of British Petroleum. He is a real 'viceroy', a sort of living 'atlas' of the British Petroleum, within the last 30 years, from Scotland to Abu Dhabi and from Alaska to Serbia. Woodward and BP desperately want to present BTC as the cleanest and the safest pipeline ever built. The Georgian peasants and the international organizations for environment protection have a very different opinion."

Ensuring the pipeline safety

The funds that the three states crossed by the BTC pipeline will get from the oil transit are a real gain. The earnings are so appalling that the governors from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey accepted giving great privileges to the „energetic corridor" administration[8] with no remorse. The BTC pipeline is designed to reach a capacity of eight million barrels a day by 2008, which will bring an important influx of money to some extremely poor countries.

Thus, Azerbaijan, a poor ex-soviet republic, will earn 29 billion $ a year only from the pipeline. Georgia, a small country, lacking natural resources, will earn 600 million $ a year by having foreign companies exploiting the pipeline. Due to this pipeline, Turkey will earn 1.5 billion $ a year.[9]

Even if in Azerbaijan and Georgia the living standard is low (710 and 730 $ income a year per capita), the considerable income from the pipeline will not improve the living standard.

Only 30 million $ roughly will be invested in the community and environment fields.

To Washington, the BTC pipeline is just an element of a more ambitious plan. The economic reasons are backed by a military, strategic interest. Bush administration has now the chance to enforce its military presence in Central Asia and Caucasus, arguing the need to provide the pipeline's safety, to Russia and China's detriment that see their interests threatened.

As a reaction to the war against terrorism, the US have already settled military posts in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The US will deploy forces to Georgia and Azerbaijan for the pipeline's safety, replacing thus the former USSR in the area.

The need for settling some US military bases

Ensuring the pipeline safety may follow the Bondsteel pattern from Kosovo, the one which ensured safety for the AMBO pipeline. The US military base Bondsteel from Kosovo is the largest US location abroad, built after the Vietnam War.

The AMBO pipeline (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria Oil) was also opened in 2005, a little earlier than the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. The AMBO pipeline needed an investment of 1.3 billion $. It lays between Burgas harbour, going through Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania and the Vlora harbour, at the Adriatic Sea, where it is connected with oil tankers.

Building AMBO through Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania hardened the relations between US and Turkey.

In order to ensure the future of the energetic corridor - the AMBO pipeline within the Trans-Balkan Oil -, in June 1999, the US Army purchased 1000 acres of land in the South-Eastern Kosovo, on the border with Macedonia, near Uresevici.

A huge US military base has been built in about three months. The base has three districts, a church, a library and one of the most modern military hospitals. In 2002 there were already deployed 55 Black Hawk and Apache attack helicopters.

Soon, the US military base from Aviano, Italy, will be transferred to Bondsteel, according to some information. The high-tech Bondsteel base has a total of 25 km roads and over 300 buildings. Apart from the Bondsteel base, the US have already built some smaller bases, near Presevo Way and near the Eighth European Corridor financed by EU.[10]

The building of the huge US base Bondsteel has been credited to Brown & Root Services, a subsidiary of the Halliburton Oil Company. "1000 ex-US military selected by Brown & Root have worked, together with 7000 local Albanians and 1000 military engineers, from early July till October 1999, 24 hours a day, in shifts, seven days a week, to finish Bondsteel", colonel Robert L. McClure wrote in the *Bulletin* engineering magazine.

We add that, according to the data we have, the Albanian region around the base has an extremely high unemployment and one of the lowest living standards in Europe. Brown & Root paid each of the 7000 locals with 1 to 3$ an hour. In other words, an Albanian could get to at most 24$ a day, 820$ a month, a fabulous figure for the Albanians from Kosovo.[11]

The pattern of the US base Bondsteel defending the AMBO safety will be applied, according to the military and political analysts, to former Soviet republics, to ensure the safety of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.

Washington Post wrote in 1999: "With a more and more fragile Middle East, we have to build military bases in the Balkans, to ensure the oil from the Caspian Sea". It is clear now that the East-West axis will join the two pipelines, joining also the Caspian Sea with the Adriatic Sea, Central Asia to Europe, the Italian daily paper *Sole 24 Ore* concluded. [12]

It is interesting to notice that the US pipeline axis surprisingly avoids Romania, a resourceful country when it comes to oil industry, having the Constanța II harbour, the Petromidia Plant and the Danube-Black Sea Canal, beside the opportunity of connecting a much cheaper pipeline through Pancevo and Croatia.[13] The first speculations about the US intention to build military bases in Azerbaijan came up in April 2005, soon after the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, visited Baku. Early that same year, Gen. James Jones - the US Forces Commander in Europe - had declared that the US are interested in settling a "Caspian Police" to protect the BTC pipeline. The information came into detail in April 2005, in *Wall Street Journal*, stating that Washington is willing to invest about 100 million $ to create the "Caspian Police" and to build a command point in Baku. Fearing the tough Russian reaction, the Azer government avoided giving a straight answer to the US offer. The hostility that Moscow gives in considering the US military bases settlement in the former Soviet republics - which are considered to be under its immediate influence - has been restated by Mihail Marghelov, the Chief of the Duma Foreign Affairs Board, who also said that "Russia will always be against any foreign military force within the CSI countries".

Another Russian Parliamentarian, Konstantin Kosakov, denounced Washington's ambition in the area: "It is obvious that this project (BTC pipeline) holds more of political than economical reasons, being meant as an alternative to the energetic transfer from the Caspian to the West, bypassing Russia and other states such as Iran".

They consider that the Caspian Basin holds *8% of the world natural oil and gas reserves.* A new pipeline will be ready in 2006, tracing the same route like BTC. There was signed an agreement between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in March 2005.The new pipeline will exploit resources from Kazakhstan and will carry the Kazakh oil to Baku, where it will be taken by the BTC pipeline.

Different geopolitical and geoeconomic constraints have led to finding other solutions to evacuate the Caspian hydrocarbons: transport capabilities, US' persistent wish or Azers' desire (Turkmen's and Kazakhs' as well) to be independent from the Russian routes. Under these circumstances, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan appeared, from the very beginning, to be the most important alternative to Russian projects so far. Whatever they may say, nobody denies the need for two main routes today, not even the Russians themselves.

Actually, Georgia has permanently looked for other financing sources, especially for those coming from the US, as the US are interested in an extended region network, in order to value their contracts signed with Kazakhstan with a view to exploiting the Tenguiz field.

To the US, the Caspian Sea is a mean for diminishing its dependency to the countries in the Near East. To counter pose Teheran and Moscow, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has become a top priority to the US people. This pipeline has to become the safety and security pillar for the states in the area. "This is not an extra pipe, it is a strategic structure promoting the US national security interests", Bill Richardson, the State Secretary for Energy declared, in 1999.[14]

The US will be supporting a project for the Transcaucasus pipelines to be linked to BTC. The Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan hydrocarbons will avoid transiting Russia and Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, the US provide a more and more important military assistance to the eight countries on the shores of Caspian Sea, the amount of expenses being evaluated in 2000 to about a billion $, Georgia having the greatest portion. It is obvious then that Washington had wanted to deal with the most unstable state in the area, Georgia (with three secessionist republics, Abhazia, Adjaria, South Osetia). On the premises of helping the Georgians and combating the Chechen Islamists infiltrate in the Pankisi Defilee, as the Russians have put it, the Pentagon settles a first political-military bridge-end, even though it refers to a small contingent, this thing involving intimidating the Russians (in order not to approach the US soldiers), in the event they try to take offensive action or reactions on the Georgian land. However, it is obvious that even though this contingent has a low number of military, the fact that it is here, implies the existence of advanced military technique equipment

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COMPRENDRE LA TRANSFORMATION MILITAIRE DE L'OTAN

Frank H.J. HYE

Pour que la transformation de l'OTAN soit menée à bien, il est indispensable d'avoir, dans toute l'Alliance, une compréhension partagée des principes qui sous-tendent la transformation. Il nous faut comprendre pourquoi l'OTAN doit se transformer, quels domaines cette transformation abordera et comment on procèdera à cette transformation. Dans ce processus de compréhension, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) joue un rôle fondamental.

Les 26 nations de l'OTAN peuvent avoir des perspectives différentes, des objectifs différents et des situations de départ différentes. Elles doivent néanmoins se diriger ensemble dans une direction unique, afin de conserver une Alliance capable de sauvegarder la paix et la sécurité de ses membres dans les années à venir.

Quatre facteurs-clé convergents ont requis et rendu possible les transformations larges et puissantes qui sont à l'oeuvre dans l'OTAN.

L'**environnement stratégique** est le premier facteur.

Les menaces et défis de sécurité d'aujourd'hui sont moins définis, plus diffus et potentiellement plus dangereux qu'il y a moins de dix ans. L'utilisation de la force armée seule n'est plus suffisante pour garantir l'efficacité de l'action.

Le second facteur est **la révolution des techniques de l'information**.

La révolution des technologies de l'information, commencée dans les années soixante-dix a profondément changé la façon dont la population mondiale pense et agit. Les nations de l'Alliance et les nations partenaires restructurent leurs forces pour capitaliser sur ces innovations – et pour être prêt à contrer les menaces qu'elles représentent.

Le troisième facteur est **la sensibilisation du public.**

La couverture permanente des événements dans le monde fait que l'audience internationale est plus informée – et plus impliquée – que jamais auparavant. Le succès d'une campagne militaire repose désormais autant sur la force des relations publiques que sur la solidité des plans d'opération.

Enfin, les forces militaires de l'Alliance ont besoin de **nouvelles capacités** pour améliorer, perfectionner et élargir leur aptitude à travailler en formant une force unifiée et cohérente.

ACT est une organisation conçue de manière unique, et créée de manière durable par les nations de l'Alliance pour explorer, développer et appliquer la transformation militaire au sein de l'Alliance. Trois thèmes fondamentaux constituent le coeur de l'activité d'ACT pour rendre cette transformation possible:

• *D'abord, la* **capacité de projection rapide et l'interopérabilité.** *Les forces de l'Alliance doivent se rendre là où c'est nécessaire, et être mieux à même de coopérer dans des environnements complexes, à tous les niveaux d'engagement.*

• *Ensuite, la transformation militaire de l'OTAN est la* **propriété des nations** *membres. ACT peut organiser ce processus mais – en fin de compte – ce sont les nations qui le maîtrisent et le réalisent.*

• *Enfin, ACT est le* **moteur** *de l'Alliance pour la transformation militaire. C'est le travail d'ACT de donner l'impulsion pour que l'OTAN et les nations membres transforment leurs forces, leurs méthodes et leurs organisations de manière à faire face aux besoins de l'Alliance au 21ème siècle.*

Nous allons aborder la transformation militaire de l'OTAN en tentant de répondre à trois questions fondamentales: pourquoi, quoi et comment?

En retraçant quelques événements-clé qui ont eu des conséquences majeures sur l'Alliance et le monde en général nous explorerons la question de "*pourquoi"* l'OTAN a besoin de se transformer.

En examinant "*Quoi*" doit être transformé nous étudierons les défis, les occasions et la complexité qu'engendre la transformation de l'OTAN.

Enfin, en étudiant "*Comment*" l'OTAN se transforme, nous explorerons les méthodes et les structures requises pour tirer bénéfice des nouvelles technologies et d'idées nouvelles pour mener et soutenir cette transformation.

I. La transformation: pourquoi?

La chute du mur de Berlin fut en 1989 l'événement caractéristique d'une cascade de changements qui affecta l'Europe centrale et l'Europe de l'est à la fin des années quatre-vingt, et modifia définitivement la dynamique stratégique qui avait défini la sécurité mondiale pendant plus de 40 ans. L'OTAN avait gagné la guerre froide sans tirer un seul coup.

Le vieil ennemi familier s'était effacé, mais l'OTAN se trouva soudainement en situation délicate pour faire face aux incertitudes d'un contexte géopolitique changeant rapidement. Ce qui était sûr, c'est si l'OTAN voulait rester pertinente, elle devait transformer une alliance de forces stationnées, prépositionnées pour une guerre de survie nationale en Europe et dans l'Atlantique Nord, en une alliance structurée pour relever les défis de l'avenir, où et de quelque manière qu'ils se présentent.

Les origines de cette transformation se trouvent dans la déclaration d'une Alliance transformée, à Londres en juillet 1990, et dans le sommet de Rome l'année suivante, où fut élaboré un concept stratégique pour l'Alliance qui définissait un nouveau contexte stratégique et envisageait une approche plus large de la sécurité dans le futur.

Non sans ironie, le défi immédiat dans cette nouvelle ère de l'OTAN ne provint pas d'une nouvelle direction, mais d'une région longtemps en guerre au sein même du territoire européen: les Balkans. C'est en 1999 qu'il atteint son apogée, alors que l'OTAN menait au Kosovo les premières opérations de guerre de son histoire. Mais malgré leur succès, ces opérations mirent aussi en évidence le besoin pour l'OTAN de rechercher l'interopérabilité et de combler un fossé grandissant entre l'ambition de l'Alliance et ses capacités.

En s'appuyant sur les enseignements des années quatre-vingt dix, le sommet de Washington en 1999 redéfinit le concept stratégique, en particulier par la délimitation qu'il donne des principaux éléments d'une approche plus large de la sécurité. Il reconnaissait de nouvelles menaces émergentes comme la prolifération des armes de destruction massives (ADM), la progression de la criminalité transnationale, et les problèmes engendrés par la défaillance des Etats.

Ce concept stratégique mit l'accent sur la capacité de déploiement rapide, le soutien et l'interopérabilité comme capacités militaires clé, et lança l'initiative des capacités de défense pour identifier quelles déficiences militaires critiques requéraient une restauration immédiate, pas seulement en termes d'équipement mais aussi conceptuellement.

L'innovation résidait dans une approche en termes de capacités, plutôt que de se fonder sur la menace ou sur un scénario. Concentrer le développement futur de l'OTAN sur une menace du type de celle de la guerre froide – qui n'existait plus – était inadapté et potentiellement dangereux. La solution consistait à développer un certain nombre de capacités interopérables et reliées entre elles, qui permettrait à l'OTAN de réagir de manière adaptable et flexible à des menaces surgissant sans qu'on les ait prévues.

Le 21ème siècle avait à peine commencé lorsque les attaques terroristes aux Etats-Unis ont révélé un nouveau genre d'ennemi, et ont démontré que des sources d'instabilité dans les régions situées au-delà des frontières traditionnelles de l'OTAN pouvaient atteindre directement à la sécurité des pays de l'Alliance.

Les événements du 11 septembre ont tragiquement confirmé que le terrorisme mondial, le recours potentiel aux armes de destruction massive, l'instabilité régionale, les états en déliquescence, les idéologies radicales et les conflits non résolus constituaient aujourd'hui les plus grandes menaces sur la paix et la sécurité futures des pays de l'Alliance.

Avec ces événements en arrière-plan, les dirigeants de l'OTAN se réunirent en sommet à Prague en novembre 2002 et décidèrent que l'OTAN s'engagerait dans un programme exhaustif de transformation et de réforme. Ce processus devait comporter:

- *Un élargissement de l'Alliance;*
- *Une restructuration de ses commandements militaires, de ses processus de décision et de ses forces armées;*
- *La création de force de réaction de l'OTAN (NRF) qui serait à la fois un outil pour les opérations et un véhicule de transformation.*

Le sommet de Prague engagea aussi l'Alliance, par l'engagement des capacités de Prague, à développer les moyens nécessaires pour conduire des opérations potentielles. Cet engagement oblige les nations membres de l'OTAN à entreprendre les changements nécessaires au sein de leurs forces afin de transformer les capacités militaires de l'Alliance.

Ces objectifs, précisés au sommet d'Istanbul en 2004, fournirent à l'OTAN un modèle et un tremplin pour le processus de transformation, et pour la première fois définirent une Alliance qui recherchait une portée mondiale pour défaire des menaces où qu'elles surgissent dans le monde.

En partie à cause de ces événements historiques et à un souci croissant au sein de l'Alliance de traiter les questions de sécurité dans un contexte mondial, l'OTAN reconnut les défis futurs que poseraient l'émergence de menaces asymétriques, ainsi que le besoin de s'impliquer dans des rôles tels que:

• *la prévention des conflits et la gestion de crise;*

• *le maintien de la paix, les opérations humanitaires et les secours en cas de catastrophes;*

• *de plus, les opérations en cours commencent à démontrer le possible besoin de s'impliquer pour soutenir aussi les opérations de stabilisation et de reconstruction.*

Pour garantir le succès de ces nouvelles missions, l'OTAN reconnaît qu'il doit adopter de nouvelles manières de penser, et que les moyens et les procédés militaires doivent aussi comprendre l'emploi coordonné et mutuellement bénéfique des outils économiques, civils et politiques du pouvoir des nations de l'Alliance.

Maintenant comment l'OTAN va-t-elle s'y prendre – et – dans quelle direction?

En mettant à profit les technologies émergentes l'OTAN peut s'adapter à la demande – se reconfigurer autant qu'il est nécessaire – et faire appel à un ensemble varié de compétences selon ce que le besoin impose.

Devenir interarmées, c'est devenir interopérable – de sorte que toutes les armées présentes travaillent de concert de manière coordonnée et se soutenant mutuellement.

La cohérence – c'est le but final – sera atteinte lorsque l'OTAN, agissant comme une force unique, interarmées et interopérable, pourra transformer encore davantage, pour harmoniser la réflexion et l'action, et avec une perception partagée de l'environnement où l'action a lieu, les décisions de ses chefs et les intentions de ses adversaires.

Maintenant que nous comprenons pourquoi l'OTAN doit se transformer, nous pouvons aborder le „quoi", ce que cette transformation doit accomplir.

II. La transformation: que transformer?

La transformation de l'OTAN ne se résume pas à de nouveaux systèmes d'armes et un équipement plus moderne. C'est une nouvelle façon d'améliorer la manière dont les affaires sont menées.

La transformation est un processus continu, pas un état final.

Beaucoup de pays se sont lancés dans ce processus depuis des années, mais le changement au sein de l'OTAN a été inégal, limité et désordonné. L'Alliance a besoin d'une approche nouvelle qui s'oriente vers l'avenir et favorise le changement.

Le plus grand défi est – peut-être – dans l'état d'esprit des personnes – intellectuellement et culturellement. Ceci signifie adopter un comportement qui cherche à **innover et expérimenter** pour **développer** rapidement la capacité appropriée.

Les perspectives pour les forces transformées de l'OTAN sont les suivantes:

Les opérations récentes en Afghanistan et en Iraq ont montré que nous faisons déjà quelque progrès. Les opérations ont été menées à un rythme sans précédent – avec des forces plus compactes



Figure 1

– et avec un faible nombre de victimes. La marque de fabrique de ces opérations consistait en ces forces véritablement interarmées et intégrées. La figure ci-après représente l'évolution vers le caractère intégré et interarmées des forces – **déconfliction, coordination, intégration** et **cohérence**.



Figure 2

En tant qu'Alliance nous estimons que nous avons atteint le stade 2 avec certitude et que nous progressons vers le troisième stade. Nous estimons aussi que le meilleur véhicule pour permettre à l'OTAN d'atteindre et dépasser le stade 3 est la Force de réaction de l'OTAN *(NRF – NATO Response Force).*

La NRF est notre catalyseur pour la transformation des forces militaires de l'OTAN – comme des nations. Le stade 4 se décrit comme une force basée sur les effets, mise en réseau et interdépendante. Pour le dire simplement, c'est une force cohérente. Bien que ce soit le mandat d'ACT de promouvoir la transformation dans le cadre de l'Alliance, ce sont les nations qui font progresser ce travail au niveau national pour transformer leurs propres forces.

A l'heure actuelle, les forces identifiées pour la force de réaction de l'OTAN n'ont pas encore atteint ce niveau de cohérence. Beaucoup de contributions individuelles agissent encore isolément, autant sur le plan national qu'au niveau de la composante.

Voici ce vers quoi nous devons appliquer nos efforts: une force interalliée, interarmées et sans distinction, avec des unités interchangeables quelle que soit la couleur de l'uniforme ou le drapeau.

L'approche des opérations basées sur les effets (EBAO)

Afin de transformer les forces de l'OTAN de manière méthodique et logique, ACT développe un cadre conceptuel pour recueillir les besoins et les transformer en capacités. Le concept dominant



Figure 3

dans ce cadre est l'approche des opérations basée sur les effets, ou Effects Based Approach to Operations – EBAO.

L'EBAO adopte une approche globale de la menace, en se concentrant sur ses causes et ses effets, et en dirigeant les efforts de manière à produire les effets adéquats pour vaincre, contrer ou atténuer la menace. Elle incite à employer des capacités militaires intégrées et interarmées, à l'opposé d'une approche uniquement terrestre, navale ou aérienne.

L'approche EBAO comprend tous les instruments de puissance politique, économique et militaire à la disposition de l'Alliance et au-delà. Elle recherche le soutien mutuel et la coordination avec les autres organisations et agences internationales.

L'approche EBAO et l'emploi qu'elle fait des instruments de puissance politique, économique, civile et militaire de l'Alliance permettront à l'OTAN d'opérer efficacement dans le nouvel environnement stratégique. Le commandant militaire prendra la direction de la mission militaire, taires seront très probablement aux commandes pour produire des effets désirés dans les sphères économiques, politiques et civiles, avec le soutien des militaires.

Trois objectifs de transformation

Il existe trois objectifs critiques de transformation pour le soutien de l'approche EBAO:

La supériorité dans la décision est un état dans lequel le commandant allié détient une supériorité au niveau de l'information par rapport à son adversaire, et est capable de prendre des décisions plus efficaces. **La cohérence des effets** est un état dans lequel les forces alliées emploient des capacités intégrées pour produire et distribuer l'information, engendrer les effets désirés, évaluer les résultats et renouveler l'engagement si nécessaire. **Le déploiement et le soutien interarmées** permettent à l'Alliance de déployer rapidement des forces taillées pour la mission où qu'il le faille, et de les soutenir tout au long des opérations, jusqu'à leur succès final.



Figure 4

avec le soutien coordonné des autres domaines. Au sein de ce domaine de la mission des actions seront confiées à des leviers non militaires, que le commandant militaire devra intégrer et/ou soutenir, pour participer avec succès à la situation finale recherchée. De même, d'autres acteurs non mili-

Sept domaines de transformation

Pour mener à bien ces trois objectifs, sept domaines prioritaires – ou **domaines d'objectifs transformationnels (Transformation Objective Areas)** – ont été développés pour se concentrer sur des capacités spécifiques basées sur les effets, et sur la planification de défense.

La relation entre les domaines et les objectifs transformationnels est représentée ici. Elle vise à disposer de forces futures de l'OTAN qui soient adéquates, à travers un **système de gestion des capacités de défense de l'OTAN.** Des défis non négligeables nous attendent, parmi lesquels les moindres ne sont pas les changements culturels requis pour étayer cette politique de transformation. La transformation n'est pas un choix facile – c'est ne rien faire qui le serait. Le défi unique pour l'OTAN est qu'elle tente cette "révolution" dans une Alliance à 26 pays.

Si l'on garde ceci à l'esprit l'OTAN est amenée à admettre qu'à court terme, le progrès ne soit pas aussi rapide qu'il serait nécessaire. Il est de la responsabilité d'ACT – en tant que moteur du changement de l'OTAN – de continuer l'effort sur tous les fronts de la transformation.

III. La transformation: comment?

Le processus de transformation est conduit à travers des processus hiérarchisés, qui détaillent les travaux conceptuels. Il applique les outils de management et de planification pour livrer les capacités transformées dont l'OTAN a besoin.

Le processus de développement des capacités (CDP)

L'expérience nous montre que le changement est souvent mal accueilli, rarement volontaire – et qu'occasionnellement il doit être imposé pour être efficace. En tant que moteur du changement de l'OTAN, ACT est amené à prendre des risques et à oser explorer l'inconnu.

Recueillir les besoins et transformer un concept en capacité est une tâche considérable. Pour s'assurer que le développement d'une capacité progresse d'une manière bien définie, ACT emploie une méthodologie connue sous le nom de processus de développement des capacités – ou CDP (Capability Development Process).

Bien que ce processus soit structuré il n'est pas complètement rigide car il est possible de l'adopter ou de l'abandonner à différentes étapes. En ceci le CDP est comparable à une autoroute, qui possède un point de départ et une destination bien définis, mais aussi plusieurs entrées et sorties intermédiaires.

Une gamme complète de processus

L'art et la science de la transformation requièrent qu'un certain nombre de processus complexes et spécifiques se coordonnent et s'équilibrent harmonieusement. Aucun d'entre eux n'est plus important que les autres; et tous dépendent des autres.

Le **processus de planification de la défense** de l'OTAN fournit un cadre au sein duquel les planifications de défense au niveau national et au niveau de l'OTAN sont harmonisées. Ce processus garantit que les commandants militaires de l'OTAN disposent de la combinaison adéquate de forces et d'équipement pour conduire toute la gamme des opérations de l'Alliance.

Déterminer quelles capacités futures sont nécessaires au sein de l'Alliance est extrêmement important. La **recherche et la technologie** jouent un rôle important dans ces choix. Ils donnent l'occasion d'étudier les technologies en cours de développement dans les milieux de la science, de l'enseignement et des affaires, pour faire la démonstration de leur capacité potentielle à combler des lacunes de capacités militaires.

Le **développement de concepts**, et **l'expérimentation** sont deux autres éléments-clé qui sont des parties intégrantes du développement des capacités. Par une méthode connue sous le nom de „développement en spirale", les solutions potentielles sont insérées dans des expériences ou dans les opérations militaires, alors qu'elles sont encore en cours de développement. Ces solutions sont alors affinées et améliorées pour renforcer leur efficacité et leur rendement. Elles sont enfin mises en œuvre dans les nations de l'Alliance ou par un financement commun de l'OTAN. C'est dans cette mise en œuvre que les concepts d'aujourd'hui deviennent les capacités disponibles de demain.

Le processus de transformation est poursuivi plus avant par un réseau complet de **formation et d'entraînement** qui inclut des organismes et des installations dans toute l'Alliance et les nations partenaires. Ces moyens dispensent aux forces et aux états-majors de l'OTAN les connaissances stratégiques et opérationnelles ainsi que les tactiques, techniques et procédures nécessaires pour mettre les capacités au service de l'action.

Enfin, à travers le **retour d'expérience** des opérations et exercices, les capacités de l'OTAN et la performance de son personnel sont évaluées et analysées. Les conclusions en sont introduites dans le développement des nouvelles capacités comme dans les nouvelles formations et les nouveaux entraînements, de manière à ce que l'OTAN reste en permanence cohérente et en amélioration.

Une structure interne innovante pour ACT

Admettant que les aspects de management uniques liés à la transformation, et convenant du besoin d'optimiser l'organisation et les méthodes pour améliorer et évaluer leurs résultats, l'Etat-Major d'ACT a délaissé la traditionnelle structure militaire codée en divisions „J" pour adopter une organisation matricielle plus alignée sur le monde de l'entreprise.

Dans ce cadre matriciel, les éléments ou domaines verticaux travaillent sur les aspects plus routiniers, de plus long terme ou permanents de la transformation, alors que la structure horizontale (les équipes capacitaires intégrées ou Integrated Capability Teams – ICT) se concentrent sur les domaines d'objectifs transformationnels qui contribuent à l'approche EBAO.

En premier lieu, le Commandement Allié Opérations (ACO) est à la fois notre partenaire et notre client; le lien fort qui unit les deux commandants stratégiques est indispensable au succès de l'OTAN.

Dans le même temps nous travaillons tant avec que pour les nations, qui sont en définitive les arbitres des capacités que nous produisons.

ACT maintient aussi des partenariats avec d'autres agences, centres d'entraînement ou d'enseignement; en particulier, la relation entre ACT et le monde de l'industrie, nécessaire pour l'adaptation des nouvelles technologies, est vitale pour le développement des expérimentations, des exercices, et de l'entraînement.

Des résultats incontestables

Les résultats de ces travaux menés par ACT prennent des formes tangibles, comme de nouveaux équipements, de nouvelles procédures et des processus rénovés de planification et d'exécution,

Figure 5

ACT - pôle central de la transformation

L'Etat-Major d'ACT et ses organismes subordonnés ne travaillent bien sûr pas de manière isolée; bien au contraire ils entretiennent un certain nombre de relations privilégiées avec d'autres acteurs.

de formation et d'entraînement.

Les résultats sont parfois moins tangibles et plus subtils comme l'amélioration continue de l'interopérabilité entre les nations membres, des investissements de défense plus efficaces et une collaboration renforcée, pour n'en nommer que quelques-uns.

Collectivement, les résultats concrets comme intangibles d'ACT fournissent aux pays membres un „retour sur investissement" avec des forces interarmées de mieux en mieux entraînées qui sont en mesure d'employer une vaste gamme de capacités nouvelles et renforcées.

Par l'interopérabilité, par une appropriation commune, et avec le soutien du Commandement Allié Transformation, les nations membres seront mieux en mesure de transformer les forces et les processus pour permettre à l'OTAN de rester une alliance sans équivalent dans un avenir prévisible.

Géneral-major Frank H.J. HYE est representant en Europe du Allied Command for Transformation, OTAN.

NATO POLICY TOWARDS THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA – A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN?

Ioan CRĂCIUN , PhD

The end of the Cold War marked the end of the Europe division. This fact has not only transformed East-West relations, but it has also affected the transatlantic partnership. Europe is now broader and the US ambitions are now different.

Thus, if the transatlantic relationship is to remain healthy, a new bargain must reflect the new reality, including a united Europe working together with US in managing challenges in and outside Europe. This new bargain has to include Central and Eastern Europe in defining a common strategic purpose centred on meeting the major strategic challenges of the day. In this context, Romania wants to play an active role in strengthening the transatlantic link by offering the power of example, influencing through its generosity and acting with wisdom.

For more than 50 years, North America and Europe shared their destiny in a community which is unique in history. It is a community based on many factors: emotions, ancestry, cultural affinity and shared interests.

Yet, what has made it so durable is the fact that it has always been based on strong shared values: democracy, human rights and freedom.

The North Atlantic Alliance is therefore unique. It is not only a military alliance; it is also, and more importantly, a moral alliance. It is not like alliances of the past which came together for a single purpose, then disbanded when that purpose was achieved.

The need to stand together

This unique alliance is as important today as it was in the past. Yes, the Cold War has ended, and we are thankful for that. We wanted it to end, and it was first and foremost the transatlantic solidarity that brought it to an end. But the need to stand together has not disappeared, even if the nowadays transatlantic relations are dominated by tension.

If both Europe and North America shared efforts to complete a 20th century security agenda, the new agenda for the 21st century is dominated by tension, because of power and threat perceptions. The United States and Europe must again define a common strategic purpose centered on meeting the major strategic challenges of the day. There are at least two major strategic challenges for the future transatlantic cooperation. The first is what might be called the new *"Eastern"* agenda and the further consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic community. The second is what might be called the new *"Middle East"* agenda and the further globally actions of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The wider Europe and the new trans-Atlantic bargain

The historic accomplishment of the 1990s was the inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe – from the Baltic to the Black Sea – in the West. Western countries must now make a comparable commitment to help transform and to embrace the next set of states lying East of the new borders of NATO and the European Union.

Extending stability into this part of the world becomes even more crucial when the second fundamental challenge is considered dealing with the Greater Middle East. If during the twentieth century Europe was the region from which some of the greatest threats to international security emanated, today that distinction belongs to the Greater Middle East. The greatest danger to Americans and Europeans is likely to originate from this region.

To meet these challenges, however, the West needs more than a military strategy. It needs an approach that addresses the root causes of these problems, otherwise, the names of the terrorist groups and rogue states might change, but the long term threat will not.

The West needs a grand strategy to reorganize itself to deal with the issues of conflict and instability and to globally project collective defence, democracy and security. The obvious tool for this new strategy is NATO, a NATO that could respond to this strategy. This is the new NATO, a different organization than it was during the Cold War, one based on a new political bargain between the United States and Europe, a different set of political and military understandings, as well as a new relationship with the East. This bargain has to be focused on redefining the transatlantic relationship and finding new ways to share responsibilities and burdens.

If during the Cold War, the US-European relationship was mainly, not exclusively but basically, about Europe itself, now it is no longer about Europe itself, it is about what the United States and a whole, free, and at peace Europe, can do together in the world. The European-American agenda is about how Europe and America can work together to face common challenges. It is what Allies should be doing together.

Romania's perspectives

Speaking in terms of a wider Europe and the transatlantic link, what should be the perspective from a East-European country which, on one hand, became a NATO member and on the other hand is in the process of becoming a full EU member, a country that shares a strong interest on these two key items, the transatlantic link and the idea of a wider Europe?

As other countries in Central Europe, Romania has been perceived as a country that in many difficult times had to choose between Europe and the United States. The most recent moment was the war in Iraq which has triggered the most severe transatlantic tensions in a generation, dividing Europeans and Americans from each other and themselves. To be honest, we wondered why is it happening so, where is that big family, which is the democratic Western world? Why this family that we want to be part of, is no longer working together?

At that moment, when we were just entering to this democratic transatlantic family, there took place this really very strong debate that tested the transatlantic relationship. Facing with such a test, Romania has stressed out, from the very beginning, that there is no choosing between the two, and actually the key objective of our membership within the North Atlantic Alliance and within Europe will be strengthening this transatlantic relationship.

Did the fact that the Central European countries entered Europe change the dynamic or the debate within EU or within NATO? It does, to a certain degree, but not in the sense of threatening the key values or foundations of these organizations. It rather strengthens them and gives them a broader scope and a broader area of expansion. But how to accomplish this objective? Even if Romania is still in a process of strong transformation and reform to become a full EU member, our country can strengthen the transatlantic link by offering *the power of example, influencing through its generosity* and acting *with wisdom.*

Indeed, we got from the United States, and from the Europe that kind of chance and support to consolidate freedom, democracy, and market economy in our country, which now has to be really spread out towards our neighbouring regions: the Balkans, the Black Sea area, Eastern Europe at large. Spreading the Romania's example means to spread the freedom frontiers. So, you can say that this is idealism, and you are right, but there is also a lot of self-interest, and support for the idea of a new Europe, a wider Europe construction with a new destiny cemented in the Euro-Atlantic community which Romania can support, influencing through its generosity.

Yes, there is in our self-interest, both in Central European countries, and Western European countries, to anchor all Eastern European countries especially those ones in the western Balkans and the Wider Black Sea area, including Russia, to this unbelievable new construction that is one of the new United Europe and a united transatlantic link, and this objective has to be done acting with wisdom.

The Wider Black Sea area efforts

We would like to give a special focus on one particular area, and this is what we call the Wider Black Sea area, because when we speak of a wider Europe, we have to include this region in it. Without the Wider Black Sea area, the wider Europe could be an unfinished business. Let's have a look on this Black Sea area, and discuss about it in terms of "the great gain which challenges us". We would say that this area is located at the intersection of three key geopolitical tectonic plates: the former Soviet Union towards the East, the broader Middle

East towards the South, and the West which is the transatlantic democratic world towards the West. All these areas meet in what we call this broader Black Sea Caspian region and if we want to address the challenges coming from the Middle East, or from the former Soviet Union territory, or the opportunities coming from the transatlantic community, then we have to look to this bridge area which is the Wider Black Sea Area. Moreover, it is not difficult to see that this region shapes the interests and the politics of many countries, not only the bordering countries but some from different regions of the world.

I would say that in this context Romania started the debate related to the importance of this region, a interesting discussion about the future of this area and how to connect it, as a whole, to the transatlantic community, and how to generate more synergy in order to develop cooperation and help the transformation. Romania's proposal is to arm ourselves with the values of the transatlantic civilization, and fight against chaos and instability with the weapons of market economy, democracy, tolerance and rule of law. Romania wants to see this region - the Wider Black Sea area - anchored in the stable democratic organization of the West.

Now, there are a number of efforts being simultaneously discussed in the region. The Bulgarians have some ideas, the Romanians have some ideas, the Georgians have some ideas, and there are a lot of ideas floating around the region for cooperation between countries for the sake of reforms and security.

On the other hand, Romania issued the idea of having a Wider Black Sea forum, that should generate a dialogue both on key political and values issues, but also in some practical cooperation areas. And the first Wider Black Sea Forum took place in Bucharest on 5th of June 2006. There are some other countries' declarations (Ukraine, Georgia) which mention the idea of a community of democratic choice which would be values-driven, and that would actually support cooperation among the countries from the region, towards consolidated democracy, and this idea of choice.

All these things prove that there is a good framework for intensified meetings, dialogue, coordination, from the top level, to the working level, and we are actually looking for the complementarity and the essence of bringing peace, security and prosperity to a community of nations who share common interests and values. We should look at these initiatives, with the perception of a variable geometry in approaching the broader Black Sea region in terms of initiatives and concrete actions which strengthen those links to connect it to what we would say mainstream transatlantic community and to the wider Europe.

Conclusions

To meet the twentieth first century security challenges it means Europe and US work together, not only inside Europe, but also outside Europe. Europe is now different than it was in the past and US is committed to play the main role in redefining the new world order. In the last decade, the NATO and EU expansion, they were incentives that our Euro-Atlantic community had to offer to the states in transition. In this context, Europe and US need a new common strategy based on a new transatlantic cooperation. Flexibility and adaptability are the key notes of this new rational strategy.

There is a clear need to re-engage Europe and US in a multilateral process of consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic community. This process must include what might be called the new *"Eastern"* agenda and Western countries must now make a comparable commitment to help transform and to embrace the next set of states lying East of the new NATO and EU borders. Both NATO and European Union have to act more and more globally in addressing new strategic challenges and become real tools in implementing the new transatlantic strategy.

One the other hand, East European states which want to be integrated in the transatlantic community have to develop common projects and strategies, such as the Wider Black Sea area one, in order to be easier integrated. They have to share experiences, learn from each other and act with wisdom to set up a good framework for intensified meetings, dialogue, coordination and cooperation.

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LES DÉFIS DE L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

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L'intégration européenne, phénomène complexe, de durée et multidimensionnelle, génère des défis, d'une part, et elle doit faire face aux défis mondiaux, d'autre part. La qualité et la promptitude des réponses données par le décident à ces défis faciliterons l'intégration et augmenterons l'influence de l'Union européenne dans la région et le monde.

1. Considérations générales

L'intégration européenne représente un phénomène *complexe, de durée et multidimensionnel*. *Sa complexité* dérive du contexte mondial et régional dans laquelle elle se déroule, de l'interactions entre ses Etats composants entre les Etats qui aspirent à l'adhésion, ainsi que de l'interrelations avec les autres acteurs étatiques et non étatiques, régionales et globaux. En même temps, la multitude des aspectes impliqués dans ce processus, depuis les sociaux à celles écologiques amplifie cet sa caractéristique. Un autre aspect essential qui appartienne à la complexité de l'intégration européenne est élargissement de l'Union européenne par l'accueil de nouveaux membres. Les dix Etats récent reçues ont des niveaux et des rythmes différents de développement économique, social etc. et souvent avec des valeurs en dessous de celles des indicateurs économiques des pays européens anciens membres.L'intégration européenne est aussi un phénomène *de long duré* parce que, par la définition, il a comme traites caractéristiques une série de phases et étapes successives obligatoires d'accomplir par tous les Etats qui adhérent a l'Union européenne. Pratiquement, l'acceptation de la demande d'adhésion d'un Etat à l'UE ne signifie que le début d'une vaste activité d'assimilation, d'appropriation et d'application par tous les citoyens de l'Etat ou de majorité de la population des valeurs, des normes et des règles dominants dans le sein de milieu intégrateur. De plus, les institutions de l'Etat doivent faire la même chose comme la population, c'est-à-dire ils s'assimilent les valeurs, les normes et les règles spécifiques à l'Union européenne. D'autre part, il ne faut pas omettre le fait que l'intégration représente un processus de nature psychosocial ce qui lui amplifie le temps pour se réaliser, au cause des traits psychologiques des individus et de l'implication des caractéristiques sociaux des groupes d'appartenance et de référence. En même temps, les conditions imposées par le milieu intégrateur se rencontrent avec ces de l'intègre. La résultante de ce „confrontation" peut être soit la réduction du temps d'intégration quand existe une compactibilité élevé entre ces deux milieux –intégrateur et intègre-, soit l'augmentation du temps dans le cas des dysfonctionnements ou même incompatibilités entre les deux milieux mentionnées.

L'intégration européenne est également *un phénomène multidimensionnel* parce qu'il quant une multitude d'aspectes. Concrètement, il s'agit de la dimension sociale, économique, politique, militaire, culturel, informationnelle et psychosociale. De fait, ces dimensions reflètent les sens principaux dans lequel on action tant de milieu intégrateur que le milieu intègre pour atteindre la finalité du processus de l'intégration propre dit. Évidement que la consolidation de ce phénomène, d'une part, doit faire face aux grands défis mondiaux et, d'autre parte, aux défis internes que l'UE génère elle-même. Les programmateurs et le décident politique de l'institutions de l'Union européenne doivent tenir compte de tous le deux genres de défis. Dans ce contexte, les politiques nationales et régionales d'intégration doivent être élaborer seulement tenir compte de tous les défis internes, régionales et mondiaux. Les défis mondiaux sont le résulta de la globalisation dans laquelle a lieu l'intégration européenne. D'ailleurs, dans une certaine mesure, l'intégration européenne représente la réponse que la majorité des Etats européens donne au phénomène de globalisation, omniprésent aujourd'hui, dans tout le monde et dans tous les domaines d'activité humaine.

2. Types de défis de l'intégration européenne

Intégration européenne, comme phénomène complexe, de longue durée et multidimensionnel, doit faire face aux défis divers, comme nature, intensité, fréquence, et amplitude, de la part du milieu régional et global dans la quel il existe et se déroule. D'autre part, à son tour, l'intégration européenne génère une série des défis pour les Etats membres de l'UE et pour les pays candidates à l'adhésion.

Ces défis, selon leur nature, peut être: *sociaux, économiques, politiques, culturels, informationnels, militaires et psychosociaux*.

Les défis sociaux se referont d'une part, à l'état de chose existent en domaine au niveau de l'UE et aux Etats membres, et, d'autre parte, "la dot" de pays candidates. Il s'agit de protection sociale, de santé publique, de renseignement, d'égalité de chances, d'équité et de solidarité garantes par la loi et le niveau du développement économique de chaque Etat, par une législation adéquat, relative uniforme comme conséquence de l'harmonisation, mais le niveau de leur assurance est différent d'un pays membre à l'autre. Le défi apparies de nécessiter d'harmoniser ces droits de citoyens, qui sont assures différent d'un Etat membre à l'autre, au niveau existent dans l'Union européenne.

Toutefois, les défis sociaux restent une réalité dans les conditions d'élargissement de l'UE avec des pays dont les systèmes de protection sociale se situent net en dessous les standards européens, d'une part, et le fait que l'Union européenne n'a pas de compétence dans le domaine social selon le traité constitutionnel, d'autre part.

Les défis économiques regardent l'élimination de décalages de rythme, de qualité, de niveau etc. de l'activité de production de services entre les Etats membres, ainsi que entre l'UE et les autres acteurs économiques régionales/globaux. Au niveau de l'UE existe le Pacte de stabilité et croissance (PSC), adoptée au printemps de l'année 2005. Le PSC est considère comme l'organe essentiel de la politique économique et financière de l'UE dont le défi majeur est de réaliser l'ambitieux objectif économique fixé par la stratégie de Lisbonne: devenir l'économie la plus compétitive au monde.

Cet objective est difficile d'accomplir parce qu'il y a les déficits de la majorité des Etats membres de l'Union européenne (UE), en particulier ceux de l'Allemagne et de la France, pays leaders de l'UE, et l'élargissement à nouveaux membres, favorisant l'augmentation du nombre et parfois de la durée des déficits budgétaires, ont incontestablement déclenché le processus d'assouplissement du PSC.

Afin de dépasser cet inconvénient se impose d'augmenter l'attractivité de l'UE, c'est-à-dire d'assurer la concurrence fiscale et la santé des finances publiques adéquates dans le cadre de l'Union économique et monétaire. "En incitant les pays membres à s'inscrire dans une action pluriannuelle et à améliorer la qualité des dépenses publiques, le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance peut être d'une grande utilité dans la conduite des politiques d'attractivité"[1]. Il est nécessaire aussi une politique de cohésion économique et sociale de part de tous les Etats membres. Cette politique est nécessaire parce que l'UE est confrontée aux nombreux problèmes posés par l'élargissement à dix nouveaux États membres (au printemps de l'année 2004), et de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie qui adhérons à cette organisation au janvier 2007. Il est attendu de cet élargissement de l'UE un processus de rattrapage économique et une coordination plus transversale entre tous les acteurs sociaux européens. Il semble qu'au contraire ce soit la méthode intergouvernementale, voire supra étatique qui domine.

Dans ce contexte, le développement de l'investissement productif et du commerce extérieur ayant permis à la croissance économique des Pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, ce qui semble confirmer l'idée que le rattrapage est amorcé. Toutefois, la diffusion de ces gains est limitée: les taux de chômage dans les nouveaux pays membres sont élevés et l'écart entre l'évolution des salaires et celle de la productivité augmente. Ces pays doivent en outre faire face à différents nouveaux défis. La réponse qu'on doit donner est difficile et complexe. Ainsi, si on favorise le développement des investissements directs à l'étranger, par exemple, encourage la transmission des technologies et allège la contrainte financière de ces économies mais risque d'accroître le dualisme entre les entreprises à capital étranger et les petits secteurs constitués d'entreprises locales. Adopter l'ancrage fixe de la devise locale sur l'euro favorise la stabilité monétaire mais risque d'exercer une pression sur la compétitivité nationale. Au contraire, choisir une transition souple à l'euro permettrait d'éviter la contrainte pesant sur la compétitivité mais incite, dans le même temps, à la dépréciation et peut provoquer de l'inflation.

On semble que la solution optimale a ce type de défis signifie, pratiquement, accomplir les trois principaux objectifs de Lisbonne, c'est-à-dire: une intégration économique plus poussée, une meilleure coordination des marchés du travail domestiques et des systèmes de retraite et une restructuration de la dépense publique.

Les défis politiques comprissent, en essence, les suivants aspects: l'assimilation, l'accomplissement, le respect et l'application des valeurs démocratiques et des normes propres de l'UE dans tous les Etats membres et de tous les citoyens, l'acceptation de l'autorité de les institutions européennes et de la souveraineté limitée de tous les pays composantes. Il s'agit d'assurer une concordance élevée entre les structures et les institutions politique européennes et celles naţionales, de fait, entre ce qui elles font concrètement. Ici, on peut parler aussi de la nécessite d'harmonisation législative dans le domaine de relations et d'activité politique des Etats membres et au niveau de l'Union européenne. La corrélation entre les droits politiques que suppose le citoyenneté nationale et le citoyenneté européen est un de la résulta de cet harmonisation.

En même temps, se impose de clarifier idéologique aux différents courantes existent dans le sein des partis politiques au niveau nationale et ces du Parlement européenne. Pratiquement, il s'agit de l'approche des partis nationaux parlementaires des partis européens, qui sont dans le Parlement européen.

Les défis culturels consiste en l'assimilation, le respect el la promotion des valeurs culturelles européenne et nationales. De fait, ces défis peut être considère la résultante d'interactions entre les culturels naţionales des Etats membres et la culture spécifique de l'Union européenne, organisation qui doit contribuer "à la développement de la culture des Etats membres dans le respect de leur diversité nationale et régionale, mentant toutefois en évidence l'héritage commun"[2]. Dans ce contexte, on doit rappeler les principales valeurs caractéristiques de la civilisation européenne: le souci du respect des droits de l'Homme; le refus de la fatalité, l'implication de l'individu dans le monde, dans la quête d'un idéal et la recherche du progrès avec la volonté de transmettre un héritage à d'autres civilisations; un attachement aux libertés individuelles; la coexistence des contraires, des antagonismes et des complémentarités, une confrontation d'idées dégagée de tout dogmatisme.

A son tour, chaque culture nationale se distingue par un ensemble de traites caractéristiques, par une identité spécifique. L'adhésion au UE permit que les différentes identités culturelles d'agir mutuel et avec l'identité culturelle européenne. D'autre part, on manifeste la tendance que chaque identité culturelle nationale garde les traites caractéristiques spécifiques.

D'ailleurs, la politique de l'Union européenne garde les identités culturelles nationale, en impliquant activement et constructivement dans le processus de former l'identité culturelle européenne. Dans ce contexte, le renseignement de chaque Etat membre, les institutions de culture nationales et les personnalités marquantes de la culture nationale et européennes joueront un rôle important. Autrement dit, L'Europe défendra les signes d'identité des valeurs culturelles européennes en préservant la force créatrice de la culture de ses peuples, en promouvant également le respect de la culture de tous les peuples dans le cadre d'un pluralisme culturel mondial en encourageant la communication interculturelle.

Les défis informationnels résultent de nécessité de réaliser d'une compatibilité en matière entre les Etats développes de l'UE et les Etats récentes adhères a l'organisation. Dans le domaine informationnel et de communications il y a un décalage entre les Etats développes et les nouveaux pays membres, ce qui peut générer des défis pour tous ce qui communiquent. Les différences de point de vu de la dotation avec la technologie moderne qu'il existe d'un part, entre les Etats membres de l'UE et, d'autre parte, entre les institutions de l'Union européenne et les pays composantes doivent d'abord diminuer puis éliminer afin que garantir une communication optimale, opportune et sûr entre les pays et les institutions impliquées. Si nous prenons seulement l'exemple de l'Internet, les défis informationnels vont obtenir une forme suffisent de claire. Sans doute l'Internet, comme invention sociale et comme outil social, une fois invente, est devenu un procès d'auto organisation à l'échelon mondial. Ce procès d'auto organisation continuera et pourrait, que dans ce cadre, d'apparaître des aspectes qualitatives nouvelles[3]. Le rôle important que l'Internet a dans l'UE et dans les pays composants représente en même temps sa vulnérabilité qui se peut transmettre comme une nouvelle vulnérabilité importante de la société humaine. Evidement, ne peut pas poser le problème de renoncer à l'Internet comme réseau mondiale, mais de trouver des antidotes, des systèmes de défendre, ce qui conduit à une nouvelle étape techno sociale pour l'Internet. Bine sûr, l'Internet existe dans tous les Etats membre de l'UE mais diffère l'ampleur du réseau et le nombre constant des utilisateurs. En outre, ces différences entre les Etats européens on peut apprécier comme un défi informationnel, si on a en vu la tendance d'évolution de la société humaine vers la société informationnel.

Les défis militaires apparient de multiples sources et regardent la constitution d'un système adéquat de défense et de sécurité communs pour les Etats membres de l'Union européenne. En même temps, ces défis apparient et comme la suite du rôle croissant de l'UE de résoudre les conflits, de garantir la paix et la stabilité régionale et globale. Une autre source de défis dans le domaine militaire semble être l'appartenance de l'Alliance Nord Atlantique de beaucoup d'entre pays membres de l'UE, le statut qui les oblige d'assumer un système de responsabilités en ce qui concerne la défense et la sécurité collective[4]. D'autre parte, les Etats de l'UE, dans les cas de créer d'un system commun de défense et de sécurité à l'échelon de l'Union européenne, ont une série de obligations militaires qu'ils doivent accomplir. Il s'agir de l'apport humain, financière et matériel que doit apporter chaque pays pour constituer une structure militaire propre de l'Union européenne.

Les défis psychosociaux sont un produit de l'interaction entre les conditions sociales concrète de chaque pays membre et de l'UE et les traites caractéristiques psychologiques des personnes et des groupes humaines qui habitent dans l'espace géographique de l'Union européenne. Ils concernent, en principal les suivants aspects: la réalisation d'une cohésion sociale, d'une climat psychosociale, d'une consensus sociale, d'unes relations interpersonnel et interhumaine, d'une opinion publique adéquates tant au niveau des Etats membres qu'au niveau de l'Union européenne. Tous ces phénomènes psychosociaux doivent se réaliser dans les conditions de l'existence et de l'interaction constante et significative des traditions, des habitudes et des mentalités nationales entre eux et avec celles de l'UE qui sont au début. La présence des traditions, des habitudes et des mentalités spécifique pour chaque pays donne une particularité de leurs implications dans le procès de former la cohésion sociale, le consensus, le climat, les relations interhumaine et l'opinion publique européens. Sans doute, petit à petit on formera et manifestera des traditions, des habitudes et des mentalités européens comme la résultante de la vie et de l'activité, dans l'espace de l'Union européenne, de tous les personnes appartenant aux Etats membre de cette organisation.

Selon le critérium "le lieu d'origine" on distingue: *les défis internes et les défis extérieures*. Les *défis internes* ont comme source la vie et les activités de l'Union européenne et de ses Etats membres. En se basant sur la consolidation de l'intégration européenne, l'Union européenne devra non seulement faire face au cours des prochaines années aux défis internes de développement de la vie politique et de l'espace politique européen en une Union élargie ouverte à de nouveaux Etats membres mais elle devra également faire face, avec ses signes d'identité, aux grands défis mondiaux pour que l'Union devienne "un facteur de stabilité et un modèle dans la nouvelle organisation du monde"[5]. D'autre part, l'Union européenne se confrontera avec les *défis extérieurs* génères de son aspiration d'affirmer plus consistent son rôle d'acteur politique mondial, mais de l'action d'autres acteurs globaux et régionales étatiques et non étatiques de défendre et de promouvoir leurs intérêts. Ainsi, dans ses relations avec le reste du monde, l'UE affirme et promeut ses valeurs et ses intérêts. Dans ce façon, elle contribue à la paix, à la sécurité, au développement durable de la planète, à la solidarité et au respect mutuel entre les peuples, au commerce libre et équitable, à l'élimination de la pauvreté et à la protection de droits de l'Homme, ainsi qu'au strict respect et au développement du droit international, notamment au respect des principes de la Charte des Nation Unis.

3. Conclusions

L'intégration européenne représente un phénomène complexe et multidimensionnel. Sa réalisation sur les coordonnâtes et les paramètres désires par ses initiateurs impose de la part de ces qui sont impliques les efforts continus et constantes pour donner un réponse adéquat (prompt et efficace) de tous les défis en ce qui concerne l'UE et les pays composantes.[6]

Les principaux défis pour l'UE et ses Etats membres sont: *la globalisation*: l'implantation géographique reste un facteur déterminant pour la recherche et l'innovation dans tous les domaines d'activité humaine. Dans ce sens, c'est essential d'améliorer attractivité de l'UE pour production, service, tourisme, éducation, renseignement, culture etc.; *l'évolution technologique*: il s'agit de combiner les technologies informationnels et communicationnels, les nouveaux techniques managériales et organisationnels et le développement de main d'œuvre qualifie pour permettre une amélioration substantielle de la compétitivité dans tous les secteurs d'activité de l'UE; *l'innovation et l'esprit d'entrepreneur*: la compétitivité entre les entreprises se fonde sur la création permanent de nouveaux entreprises et la croissance de celles existants, surtout dans une phase de progrès technologique rapide. L'industrie, l'agriculture, le renseignement, l'éducation, la culture, la santé, la protection sociale, la sécurité et la défense européenne ont besoin de développement et d'exploitation économique des produits et des services nouveaux ou améliores et d'optimisation des processus des institutions et des entreprises. Une croissance des dépens de recherche et de développement en rapport avec le PIB est nécessaire, car l'UE est devancé par ses principaux concurrents en plupart de domaines mentionnes; *le développement durable et les nouveaux demandes de la société*: l'UE doit faire face à une demande croissant de sécurité, de santé, de protection sociale et de protection du consommateur qui reflète en part les préoccupations de l'opinion publique face de conséquence de certaines technologies nouveaux en matière de environnement, d'éthique ou de santé publique. Il faut trouver un équilibre juste entre les objectives de Lisbonne et de Goteborg[7].

On impose aussi prioritairement l'amélioration de l'intégration des politiques de l'Union européenne dont cette organisation et ses membres sont confrontés. Dans ce sens, c'est essentiale de veiller à l'intégration approprie de toutes les activités de l'UE susceptibles de contribuer à la suivre des ses objectives stratégiques dans tous les domaines d'activité. Il s'agit de politique commerciale, des politiques liées de marché unique, des politiques de transports et d'énergie, de politique de recherche et de développement, de politique de concurrence, de politique régionale, et de politique macro sociale. Pour poser d'accord les objectives du Conseil européen de Lisbonne avec celles du Conseil européen du Goteborg et pour poursuivre simultanément les objectives économiques, sociales et de milieu dans le sein du concept de développement durable, les autres politiques doivent prendre en considération. Parmi ces politiques il faut tenir compte des politiques sociales, d'emploi et de formation professionnelle, des politiques de protection de consumation et de santé publique, la protection d'environnement et de la responsabilité d'entreprises.

La Roumanie, l'Etat candidate à l'adhésion de l'UE au 1 janvier 2007, confrontera, à son tour, avec les défis que nous avons analyses auparavant. C'est pourquoi il est absolument nécessaire que le décident adopter, maintenant, une série des mesures politiques, sociales, économiques, culturelles, par lesquelles se pouvoir donner un réponse mieux aux défis spécifiques au processus d'intégration européenne, mais également aux défis génèrent par son adhésion dans cette organisation.

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[1] François Mouriaux, *Le concept d'attractivité en Union monétaire*, **Dossier: Les défis d'une Europe élargie**, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/librairies/points-vente/index.shtml

[2] *L'identité européenne*, http://www.europepolycentrique.org/

[3] Acad. Mihai DRĂGĂNESCU, *Societatea*

informaţională şi a cunoaşterii. Vectorii societăţii cunoaşterii, http://www.rocai.ro/, p.10.

[4] Jean-Pierre PAGE, *Identité européenne et solidarité atlantique*, http://www.geopolitis.net/geopol/geo/

[5] MANUEL NÚÑEZ ENCABO, *L'Intégration politique Européenne face aux défis mondiaux (le moteur de la Constitution Européenne)*, http://www.europa.eu.int/

[6] *Les trois piliers*, http://www.europe.gouv.fr/actualites_1/les_articles_2/site_europe.gouv.fr_67.html

[7] Athanassios THEODORAKIS, *Le développement dans le contexte de la mondialisation; priorités, nouveaux défis, perspectives,* http://europa.eu.int/

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THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY OF STRENGTHENING THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Vasile POPA

The EU's involvement in the environmental security problematic starts from the attentive study of the globalization-security report which shows a long ignorance for the environment's security element, motivated, obviously, by the economic implications and responsibilities which arise from the surrounding environment damage and hence the individual and communities affection by the wide process of globalization.

At Barry Buzan's work we find out an explicit recognition of the environmental factor as a major sector, from the security perimeter, affected by the globalization. This underlines that the human collectivities security is endangered by five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. In the environmental security is involved the local and global biosphere's stage as an essential support from which depends the other human activities. The five sectors operate, Buzan stated, interconnected through a complex network of links[1]. In this „the most complex theoretical analysis of the security concept", as Ken Both appreciated it, in 1991, the author outlines marks which will be extended in the Copenhagen School papers and even into the NATO Conception, which, at the Rome Summit, from the same year, accepts the existence of the five security dimensions including the environmental one. The new development also sets out the more correct perspective of security. The securization of the non-military aspects is so important that it deserves profound approaches[2]. Among them, the environmental securization remains the newest, but also the gravest problem among the ones aroused by the globalization, whose EU reserves a special attention.

1. The environment, the instability and the insecurity

Analyses made by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' researchers[3] rationally show that the environment degradation generates instability and insecurity at the human communities' level. Thus, the environmental security practically controls the socio-political stability and protects the security interests. The phenomenon's researchers figured that the person's or group's security status is largely damaged by the local and regional environmental degradation as an effect of the natural resources poverty, the lack of water and food, the greenhouse effect etc. Hence, the need to elaborate some strategies to lead to the reasonable use of the natural resources and implicitly to the environment protection and safeguarding but also to the prevention of some eventual instability sources at national and regional level.

The end and the beginning of the millennium seriously aware us that the security of the natural environment is strongly affected by the dramatic natural resources' diminishing like: the drinkable water, the fertile soil, the forests, the piscicultural resources but also the biological diversity owed to the continuous rare species disappearance. This motivates the UN Conference decision over the Environment and Development (UNCED) from Rio de Janeiro, in 1992, which adopted those 21 program which settled the political objectives and the environmental criteria universally accepted after that the international community proving a better conscience of the necessity to jointly and coordinated react in confronting the consequences owed to the planet's natural resources unreasonable use. Otherwise, the International Conference "Rio Plus Five" from 1997 proved an increased preoccupation for finding some global remedies for the environmental problems.

Returning to the 21 Program, we underline the close relationship established between the environmental security and the economic development, this time eliminating the fatalist sense accepted by the anti-ecologists – the one that the development produces automatically the environment's damage. From their separated, counter-productive approach, we reach now to their jointly treatment, element that contributes for the practical cease of the environmental degradation process. The term “sustaining capacity”, launched at Rio, explains the active spring of the environment security and development – the joint approach of all the ecological risks, dangers and threats.

Therefore, we could point out a reality which has chances to be imposed: the one of more governments’ involvement in environmental aspects, considering the fact that those can also affect the states’ economies and the population’s life level.

Then we have the interguvernamental and nongovernmental organizations which see the cooperation intensification the only way out from the deadlock, to find viable solutions for environmental security strengthening.

It’s a clear proof for the general consciousness over the fact that the instability and insecurity which are constantly generated by the surrounding environment damage are induced phases whose existence can be controlled through the prevention of the environment factors modification, in peaceful or conflict zones and regions, as well through the systematic prevention of the natural environment global degradation. This explains those issues’ fast incorporation with a high priority degree, on the industrialized countries and other countries’ political agendas which are aware of the environmental dimension’s importance for the international relations future[4].

The demarche is far from being easy because it supposes some noticeable efforts development and implies meaningful economic, social and political costs. The environmental analysts remark the importance and the deepness of the themes for defining the “sustainable development” that lies to the base of the new mode to attack the environmental problem, strong inter-related themes: the desertification, through changes provoked by deforestation and activities that affect the biodiversity conservation; the water contamination and humid spaces preservation activity; the dangerous residues transfrontalier storage, the use of the dangerous chemical substances and among them of the ones with contamination organic elements with persistent effects; the oceans contamination and the pisciculture resources depreciation; the climate change derived from the terrestrial global heating through the gases emission effect, especially carbon bioxide and the ozone stratum perforation; the endangered rare species preservation.

The UN frame-Convention over the Climate Change manages to introduce grown responsibilities for the industrialized states and especially the more developed ones, which must take measures of reducing or limitation of their gases emissions into the atmosphere. This needs some economic instruments creation to promote the adequate policies adoption for diminishing or limiting the gases emission in the atmosphere. There will be surely involved important economic costs but only this way the specialists believe „that will be reshaped the productive infrastructure which will involve the new technologies use”[5].

2. The Kyoto Protocol and the fight against the climate change

As it is known, in 1997, at the 3rd Conference of the UN Convention Parties over the Climate Change, there was worked for the Kyoto Protocol adoptation which establishes, in a quantitative form, the diminishing percentage of the greenhouse effects of the states from the Convention’s Annex 1, which reunited must reduce the concentration into the atmosphere with 5,2%, between 2008 and 2012, reporting to the 1990 year level. There were also established some mechanisms “of flexibilization” or derogation measures as a manoeuvre space regarding the means of reaching the objectives. They aim a developing mechanism: credits obtaining for emissions by the industrialized countries if they finance projects to reduce the emissions in the developing countries; an exchange program for the emission rights. Despite Rio’s Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol prescribes sanctions for the states which don’t respect the agreement’s disposals without the text to also prescribe constraints which can be imposed. Only the Buenos Aires Action Plan from November 1998, adopted by the fourth Parties Conference establishes concrete measures in fighting against the greenhouse effect insisting on the importance of the mechanisms of supporting the countries in their way to development.

Although, the Kyoto’s Protocol application rules which were on the way of establishing by the Haye Conference in 2000 remained in the intentional stage because of: the “umbrella” group (USA, Japan, Canada and Russia, Australia, New

Zeeland, Norway, Island and Ukraine, which want to instate a worldwide market for the greenhouse effects gases emission right; of EU, that regards the emission rights market complementary to the diminishing measures; of the G 77, which throws the responsibility over the rich states, the most important greenhouse gases producers or of the OPEC states, which want to get compensations for the suffered loss in the oil field. It isn't out of question that applying in a such inadequate manner the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms to be finally obtained, as Greenpeace calculation shows (corroborated with the ones of some NGOs and even governments), a growth with 15% of gases emissions.

After USA opposed to the Protocol signing, they proposed an own plan, less constraining through which the emissions to be reduced with 18% during ten years through the development of the alternative energies. It's a pity because after the intergovernmental experts Group calculations regarding the climate evolution the real diminution of the greenhouse effect gases into the atmosphere and their stabilization to the 1990 year is possible only through a diminution with 60-80% of the emissions reported to the actual world production.

A significant step forward is marked by the Bonn Conference (July 2001) which adopts a system to submit the Kyoto's Protocol rules. The international efforts continue in Marrakech, in 2001, where it succeeded the translation in judicial language of the ones established at Bonn but also continuing to the New Delhi reunions (October-November 2002), Milan (December 2003) as well as Buenos Aires (to the so-called "Post-Kyoto Conference") from December 2004, where the parties tried unsuccessfully to fix a negotiation calendar for defining the objectives of greenhouse gases emissions diminishing.

All these efforts as well as the ones which followed during the last three years are based upon the non-optimistic experts' predictions, which indicate for this century a medium growth of the temperature with 0,2-0,5°C per decade. An one degree growth until 2025 and 3 degrees from now on until the century end leads to a climate reheating with important consequences against the environment, health ands economy (sea level increase, people exodus, ecosystems affectation, desertification, the growth of the insects number carrying viral diseases, etc.).

Therefore, the climatic changes retardation through the new technologies development with high energetic performance are measures undertaken to reduce the polluting emissions, etc. It represents the only viable alternative to the sombre spectre which the scientists foreseen. The future of the polluting automobiles obviously is more and more insecure because in keeping with the calculations a litre of burned gas produces 2,5 kilos of gas with greenhouse effect. The states should recommend the reasonable car use and prescribe also each action which leads to pollution emissions diminishing.

The will to apply the Kyoto Protocol disposals is visible at community level. EU established measures regarding the CO2 emissions in the biggest emitent sectors (paper, glass, cement, the energetic sector and refineries), monitors about 12.000 installations from the 25th member states. Establishing rigorously for every period objective to reduce the emissions at each installation, at national level, is succeeded the growth avoid and moreover an organized diminution of the emitted gases percentages. There aren't forgotten the "clean" technologies, the modern technologies transfer, research projects stimulation in the field which bring new technological solutions permitting the CO2 capture and storage, less carbonate energetic sources development, etc.

This process develops especially since 16th February 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol was enforced. Since then, 30 industrialized states must reach the quantitative of their greenhouse gases effects diminishing or limitation, the carbon international market becomes a legal and practical reality, the emissions' commerce allowing the industrialized states to buy and sell emissions' credits among them. The "clean" development mechanism passes in the complete operational phase consequently promoting sustainable development. In the same time, the Protocol's development Fund is ready to assist the countries on their development way confronting with the negative effects of the climate changes.

3. EU and environment's security

The person's insecurity sources analysis (the personal security, economic security, the security use damage – the access to labour, food security, but also the cultural one) which is generated by

Julliette Voinov-Kohler[6], lies in a vital place the environment's security degradation (water's, soil's, air's pollution, the deforesting, natural calamities, etc.) as a threatening element for the person and population, affecting them physically, material, psychically. At present, this problematic is in national and international institutions' attention, especially EU, which approaches the environment's security from the Lisbon Strategy objectives' perspective for the Sustainable Development and on the Kyoto Protocol prescriptions.

At the recent EU's Environment Council reunions there were debated aspects related to the "clean" technologies and the cohesion policy for environment. It shaped the conclusion that it is necessary the organization to grow its contribution for the environment's infrastructure project's co-financing which interests the majority of the states in developing, alike the finances for high-tech of the developed countries. The sectorial operational programs which base the organizations makes finances for the environment's protection refer to: the energetic efficiency for Competitivity SOP (The Sectorial Operational Program), the contaminated sites issue for the Regional Operational Program, the education for environment, for Human Resources Development SOP and awarding compensatory payments conform with the Rural Development National Plan for the protected areas comprised in the 2000 Nature Network.

In the projects' field for the environment infrastructure a wider flexibility approaching the projects is needed which will contain also the third stage (the biological one) in used waters' cleaning. The communitary acquis' implementation in the water's field imposes environment investments in the rural infrastructure sector through development funds addressed to this sector[7].

EU is also preoccupied by thematic strategies regarding the wastes, urban environment, the situation in the genetically reordered organisms field, the risk management at floods, the ambient and air's quality, the strategy regarding the bio-combustible, the action in the bio-mass sector. There is necessary an environment problematic integration into the government's socio-economic development policy.

EU is intensely preoccupied by the communitary environmental stage negative evolution. The European Environment Agency concludes in a report over the energetic sector tendencies in EU between 1990-2003, published by the end of this June, that there is an energy consume constant growth owed to transportations which "just cancel the benefits of the greenhouse gases emissions diminishing policies"[8]. Between 2003 and 2004, the report shows that the CO_2 emissions grew with 0,4% in the 25th EU's member states. Therefore, the surrounding environment security damage worries EU, but also the European Council and UN, which closely cooperates in a global manner approach, with the trans-border and inter-regional mechanisms of this certain problematic. Many resolutions of these institutions regard the cooperation and the sustainable development, the aerial and terrestrial or the marine space environment protection. In the Mediterranean Sea Area, as an example, there are involved in the environment's protection and sustainable management UN (through the Barcelona's Convention and the Mediterranean Action Plan, and also through the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization – FAO – the Mediterranean General Fishing Commission, the Action Plan for Environment UN's Program and the Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Mediterranean), EU (by CARDS, INTERREG, the Regional Consultative Council for Mediterranean), the European Council (through the Ministers' Committee, the Parliament's Meeting and the Local and Regional Powers Congress).

Justifiably, EU considers the environment's degradation as a major factor which should be taken into account by the European security policy. Even if the threat against the surrounding environment is not a clear one, like the terrorism, trans-border organized crime, drugs, human beings and weapons trafficking, the strengthening but not the weakening the environment's standards is an objective which lies permanently on the organization's work-agenda. The adhering states are constrained to implement the communitary acquis in the environment's protection field until the adheration date[9]. This supposes the application of the European Council Directives regarding air's quality, wastes management and water's quality, the industrial pollution's control and risk management, nature protection, chemical substances and genetically modified organisms, noise, civil protection, nuclear security and radio-protection, national legislation harmonization with the environmental communitary acquis, the new legislation implementation's promoting and control. The permanent monitoring of the strategic objectives' accomplishment concerning this kind of communitary policy will lead to natural, social, economic, health, safety and population living environment security strengthening and planet's life defence.

Translated by Mirela ATANASIU

NOTES:

[1] Barry BUZAN, **People, States and Fear,** 1991, pp. 19-20.

[2] It is significant, in this sense, the analysis made by dr. Dan Dungaciu, in *Geopolitics and security at the Black Sea – the Romanian's and Moldavia's strategic options*, which underlines the idea that the Black Sea is the only European natural "suburb" ignored by Bruxelles. The Black Sea Basin security growth involves a more intense EU's and NATO's preoccupation for the respective space problems and in the Romanian president's vision, "the internationalization of the Black Sea" (http://www.studiidesecuritate.ro/pdf/c1.pdf).

[3] Research assistant Mihai-Ştefan DINU, dr. Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, **Surse de instabilitate**, http://cssas.unap.ro/pdf-studii/surse-surse-de-instabilitate.pdf, pp.11-12.

[4] Elsa KELLY, *Cambio global y medio ambiente*, ISIAE Bulletin, Year 2, No. 7.

[5] Ibidem, p. 2.

[6] Julliette VOINOV-KOHLER, *La sécurité globale. Une approche exhaustive de menaces envers la securite de l'individu,* http://www.studiidesecuritate.ro

[7] See The Environment Council Communiqué, Luxembourg, 28 June 2006, www.mmediu.ro/presa/presa.htm

[8] See L`Expansion.com dated June, 28, 2006, *UE: les emissions de CO2 continuent d`augmenter*, http://www.lexpansion.com/art/15.0.144985.0.html

[9] See www.mapam.ro/pages/ue/cap2.pdf

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TACTICAL BATTLE GROUPS - OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Ion DRAGOMAN, PhD,
Marius MILITARU

After the success of Artemis Operation, that took place in the Republic of Congo in 2003, France, Germany and Great Britain have proposed the building up of battle groups, consisting of 1,500 military, that could be deployed rapidly, in order to improve the capacity of rapid reaction and the autonomy of the European Union. This initiative permitted a new orientation of the global objective for 2010. The concept of Combat groups, developed separately by the above mentioned countries, would be adopted lately by the whole Union. 2005-2006 was an important moment, when EU was able to produce a battle group with a coherent tactics, able to take over an operation of such dimensions. The total operational capacity will be attained in 2007, when EU will be able to undertake more operations of rapid reaction that will be endowed with a force equal o that of a tactic group.

As an effect of globalization, the risks addressed to the human communities, organized in states, change their nature, content, causes and consequences, thus appearing the need to adapt the security policies to the new evolutions which threat whole societies, certain social groups and even each person. As the "threats" organize in the globalization era, the states transform their security strategies according to the vulnerabilities they confront with, in order to counteract their effects by developing the preventive, coherent and synergetic character of the actions that protect the safety of the citizens; thus, unlike in the past, when the mobilization of the nation in order to successfully sustain a war against the external threats needed long term efforts, that asked for the concentration of the efforts to defence the national interests, lately alongside with reducing the effective force, national rapid reaction forces[1] were constituted, in order to answer promptly to the challenges on security.

The international security organizations have a similar attitude; they make continuous efforts to transform themselves according to a creative and effective management in order to prevent conflicts and deal with crises. UN, for example, is aware of the fact that, after adopting the intervention resolutions in order to settle national and international conflicts, it is not able to rapidly create the necessary forces to accomplish the mission, and that is why it rather used a regional organization of a coalition of states to accomplish the international decisions in order to maintain peace and international security; based on the same reasons, and lacking its own military forces, UN has asked the states to always have "stand by" forces, in order to rapidly constitute peacekeeping missions, as the high capacity combat brigade that has been initiated in a few European countries[2]. NATO finds itself in a deep transformation process, generated by the same causes and with the same objectives. Based on a new strategic concept of the Alliance, NATO has created its own Rapid Response Force[3] to face the threats existing at the beginning of the millennium, and the critics addressed to OSCE inefficiency are based on the same idea of lack of operational capabilities for rapid intervention in order to accomplish the objectives of this organization to ensure the safety of the states and citizens.

UE, within its Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), has developed after Maastricht and Nice, a real European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which included the WEU objectives so that in the future a common European defence to be established. This real system of European security, which has developed actively and coherently in the last years, has already undergone the transformation from an institutionalized form to an operational one. EU has succeeded to create and develop its own operations[4]. The fundament of this system is represented by the European

Security Strategy, which directs the efforts of its 25 (and from 2007, 27) member states to develop a strategic culture in order to rapidly protect the security, and whenever necessary to be able to give a response in force; spending more than 169 billion euros for Defence, EU wants to be able to sustain simultaneously more operations that require military and civilian capabilities of rapid reaction. For this, its military structures have to be more flexible and capable to face the threats. The resources needed to accomplish this objective must be enough and used more effectively. The European Security Strategy mentions the increase of coherence, synergy and communication between different civil and military capabilities, including the police, administrative, legal and diplomatic ones.

The accomplishment of these objectives of European security is achieved, in fact, through periodical conferences, where the member states offer the necessary military and civilian capabilities. For example, The Meeting of the Police Chiefs from UE, regarding the role of police in ESDP, October 25, 2004, has acknowledged the main role played by the police in international crises management operations by implementing The Action Plan for civilian aspects of ESDP[5]; in this context, it was decided to form a European Gendarmerie, with an initial capability of rapid reaction, formed from 800 persons in 30 days[6].

Until a real European armed force is formed, the same system, used for creating the police forces and gendarmerie forces, is needed to create a European Rapid Reaction Force. Thus, at the Council meeting for general affairs and international relations, a decisional body of EU, on military capabilities[7], where the ministers of national defence from the member states participated, it was reached the conclusion that the global objective for 2010 is to form a force of rapid reaction of the battle groups[8] of the European Union, formed by a state or of a coalition of states that are registered in a data base under the responsibility of the EU Military Committee (EUMC). This was an initiative to apply the European Security Strategy and an instrument to make ESDP function. EU has the ambition to be able to make a decision to launch an operation within five days after the approval of EU Council to manage a crisis. The forces deployment in the theatre of operations should take ten days, which means that the tactical groups must be constituted by mobile means and capabilities from 5 to 10 days. The tactical groups can be used in actions like Petersberg[9] or those established by the European Security Strategy; the groups should be able to maintain their combat force up to the end of the mission or until they are replaced by other forces in a period varying from 30 to 120 days.

The ministers of defence from EU member states have also declared that in order to be considered as UE military units, the battle groups should be formed according to the norms already established referring to military capabilities as they were defined through availability, utility and deployment, state of training, agility, connectivity, capacity to resist and survive, medical protection, inter operability, characteristics that can be achieved with a consistent support of the European Defence Agency[10]. EU Council has already decided in May 2004 that at the beginning of year 2005 the tactical groups should have an initial capability, the general one to be accomplished in 2007. From 2005 to 2007 EU has to be able to accomplish at least a rapid operation with a battle group; after the general capability is achieved, the Union will be able to perform two rapid reaction operations with a force equivalent to a tactical group. The operations can be launched simultaneously.

Taking into account the complementarities of European security through cooperation with NATO, the Declaration of the ministers of defence, based on the European Conclusions from Nice, has invited the member states to integrate in their tactical groups, forces offered by the European countries that are NATO members, but are not EU members. This only adds to the multinational and global character of this concept. It is underlined the fact that the documents regarding NATO's Reaction Force (NRF) and the concept of tactical groups of EU will be complementary and can replace each other taking into account their specific characteristics and so the norms, the practical methods and procedures to be as compatible as possible, especially through a constant exchange of information regarding the guarantee of global coherence, and the complementarities of the two rapid reaction forces.

The origin of the EU tactical battle groups is to be found in former means of operational military component of the states, through the integration of some national sub units or units in multinational groups like Eurocorp, Euromar, and the Romanian-Hungarian battalion, the South European Brigade, BLACKSEAFOR and Tisa Multinational Battalion. This kind of collaboration between the states in the field on military security has rapidly evolved under the impulse of the globalization of international affairs. After the success of Artemis operation of EU in Congo in 2003, France, Germany and Great Britain (countries that took part in that operation) have proposed the creation of some permanent units formed by 1,500 military[11], that can be easily deployed in order to ameliorate the autonomous and rapid EU capability of reaction, through a new orientation of its global objective, mainly to respond to UN requests as it is stated in Chapter VII of UN Chart[12]. In 2010, in order to obtain military capabilities with a great force of immediate response and in order to create the consultancy, planning and decisional mechanism, the conception of battle groups has to develop and to put into practice this mechanism, so that EU can have all the operational force needed to materialize its intentions.

The initiators have integrated the already experimented concept in other forms in the vision of EU for a rapid reaction besides other elements for advanced planning, mechanisms for permanent financing, general SOFAs[13], establishing the following essential elements of the battle forces: a coherent and credible forces (around 1,500 military) with adequate elements of support (both operational and logistic), including the strategic air transport and the support capabilities.

These forces are not meant just to answer a request from UN, but they have to be able to take part in an autonomous operation under a mandate form Chapter VII of the Chart; the forces must be used in weak states or ones where the government decreases its power (most of them are to be found in Africa); the forces must be formed in only 15 days to be deployed in order to respond a crises, with the help of the Department for Peace Keeping Operations, from the UN Secretariat. The following measures, requests and Petersberg missions have been established, especially in the conflict prevention: to rapidly and decisively take action in complete military effectiveness, credibility, coherence, capability to solve by themselves the missions; high combat capability in order to separate the belligerent parts and to prevent conflicts; a generic specialization of the battalion for urban, alpine, jungle, desert and amphibious fights; the multinational character given by the multinationality of the situations in which the forces may take part (especially for the states that cannot form by themselves a tactical group); the national character of the training.

From the command and control point of view, the European tactical group may take action under European auspices or it may coordinate a military headquarters that is already operational in the theatre, or it may serve under the command of such headquarters in an operation that has at its base the General Concept of Nation of EU (2002). The force can take action according to EUMC conception (2002) which has stated the general principle and procedures in order to identify, generate, activate and deploy EU forces. The European tactical groups can interrelate with UN's SHIRBRIG of with NATO's NRF, as well as with other regional organizations, even with national forces for peacekeeping. The EU presidency (with the help of EU Staff) will initiate connections with UN, and COPS will authorize EUMC to develop the tactical groups of the member states for a future evolution of the European Force for rapid response.

Indeed, at the Engagement Conference, regarding the tactical groups (November 2004), Great Britain and France have each promised to form a group in the first semester of 2005, and Italy another one in the second semester of 2005; France and Germany will build up a common group with an alternative command and supported by other states (Belgium), and Spain and Portugal will constitute an amphibious multinational group together with Greece. The EU member states want to accomplish 13 national tactical groups and 4 states offered their specialized capabilities such as medical units, units for the coordination of military transports or Staff Structures[14].

Besides offering forces for NATO, Romania has also offered her capabilities for the UE battle groups and on November 21 2005, the Romanian Minister of Defence has signed, together with his counterparts from Greece and Cyprus, a letter of intent for creating a battle group, that will become operational in 2007. In May 2005, Romania has engaged itself in taking part in a operational group together with Italy and Turkey (2010).

All of them represent the contribution of our country to the collective defence, but also to our national one. This is why the Romanian military have to learn the defence diplomacy of Romania, so that our country can become a security pillar.

At the analysis made by the Ministry of Defence in 2005, it was mentioned the fact that Romania's integration in EU is a strategic priority, and that the Romanian Armed Forces participation at ESDP was well appreciated by the political decisional factors; some objectives were mentioned like: the participation with forces to EU tactical battle groups, as well as a new offer of forces for the period 2006- 2010 for crises management operations led by EU. It was underlined the fact that the defence of our national territory is a vital mission for the Romanian Armed Forces. They are also able to take part in other missions, like dealing with natural disasters, as security providers, with our allies, abroad, as well as an extraordinary element of foreign affairs[15].

Translated by Alexandrina VLAD

NOTES:

[1] Mircea MUREŞAN, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, **Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului**, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2004, pp.276-285.

[2] Romanian Parliament Resolution regarding *Romania's participation to the System of Commitments for UN "stand by" forces*, in Mon. Of. nr. 364/2002 and the *Treaty between member states from SHIRBRIG*, in Mon. Of. No. 469/2002.

[3] NATO Response Force (NRF) sets the idea of "NATO forces" and CJTF.

[4] The best known is Althea operation from Bosnia-Herzegovina, besides those ones from Macedonia, Congo or Georgia.

[5] Cahiers de Chaillot no. 75/2005, Institute d`études de securité, UE, Paris, p. 307 and 311.

[6] O. ANTONESCU, **Jandarmeria de la peacekeping la peacebuilding**, Editura CTEA, Bucureşti , 2006, p.224.

[7] Cahiers de Chaillot, no. 75/2005, p. 316.

[8] In the original French text they are called "groupes de combat", while the English version is "battle groups".

[9] They are mentioned in art. 17.2 of EU Treaty and refer to other operations than war.

[10] The European Defence Agency was created by a mutual action of EU Council on July, 12, 2004, with the goal to support CFSP and ESDP in the EU institutionalized framework, in the field of defence, research and weapons acquisition development.

[11] See the Concept of battle groups in Cahiers de Chaillot, p.10.

[12] We refer to constrain of using force in case of threat peace violation or aggression.

[13] Treaties regarding the status of forces on foreign territories.

[14] See the Appendix A, *Engagements regarding the EU battle groups*, in Cahiers de Chaillot, no. 75/2005, p.323.

[15] Observatorul Militar nr. 8/2006, p. 2.

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"HOMELAND SECURITY" OR THE SECURITY OF THE SPACE OF INTEREST

Alexandra SARCINSCHI

The concept of "Homeland Security" is subjected to debates. The strict translation into Romanian does not illustrate the entire definition established by the American scholars. That is why we need to carefully analyze the existing theories in order to be able to juxtapose a Romanian one.

The concept of "Homeland Security" is the answer to a stringent security need that has been developed since the beginning of this century by the international community that was unaware of some events totally detached on the logic of that time's international relations.

The "Romanian – English / English – Romanian Dictionary" shows that the strict translation of "homeland" is "patrie, ţară"[1] (mother-country, country). In this case it is obvious that "Homeland Security" is about mother-country's security. Still, this translation does not show the entire content of this concept. We will demonstrate this assertion in the present paper.

The first step in building up this concept was made by the United States of America that decided to enhance their territory's security as a result of 9/11. They have initiated actions in six fields of activity: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defence against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response[2]. In the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, "Homeland Security" represents a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur[3]. "Homeland" is here the physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States' territories and possessions, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace[4].

Unlike other countries, USA makes a clear distinction between "Homeland Security", "National Security", and "Internal Security". The "National Security" is a collective term encompassing both national defence and foreign relations of the United States[5]. Specifically, the condition provided by: a military or defence advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; a favourable foreign relations position; or a defence posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. The concept of "Internal Security" restricts even more the domain: the state of law and order prevailing within a nation[6].

The American concept of "Homeland Security" extends and reintegrates the responsibilities of a large part of the executive branch, including the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the National Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Coast Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Central Intelligence Service, etc. Bush Administration has consolidated a number of these activities under the Department of Homeland Security that was established by the Homeland Security Act[7], 2002.

The USA is not the only country that has recognized the necessity of some "Homeland Security" governmental mechanisms. The Russian scholars identify "Homeland Security" with "National Security". Andrei Fedorov, Director for Political Projects at the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy[8], argues that "Homeland Security", as "National Security", and the fight against terrorism are one of the most important problems for the Russian Federation. He proves his assertion by a quotation from the "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation"[9], adopted by Presidential Decree (2000): "Terrorism is a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. International terrorism holds [an] open campaign to destabilize the situation in the Russian Federation…[The] struggle against terrorism, drugs and illegal trafficking should be based on the complex approach with the use of all the state structures." Unlike the American point of view, the Russian Federation has not an institution created only for "Homeland Security". This responsibility belongs to some governmental structures such as the Ministry of Interior, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry for Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Defence and the Security Council. According to the present Constitution, all these institutions are directly responsible to the President who usually has meetings with the chiefs of all the important structures twice a week, and his agenda includes issues of "Homeland Security". Although this issue seems to be already regulated, the main remaining obstacles to an effective "Homeland Security" policy are: continuation of the conflict in Chechnya, with very few chances of a long-lasting political solution, the radicalization of Islamic groups in the Caucasus area, migration from the CIS, lack of effective cooperation between the law enforcement and security forces within the CIS, a very high degree of corruption exists on all levels, a high level of criminality, lack of practical cooperation with Western law enforcement and security forces, unsatisfactory control over military hardware, and continuation of the ethnic/political conflicts in the former Soviet space.

According to the European Association for Homeland Security, the Nordic countries identify "Homeland Security" with "Societal Security"[10]. Those countries feel less threatened by the terrorism than the rest of Europe. Thus, they adopted in the first phase the concept of "Total Defence" that, in the next period of time, has gained a new stance ranging from environmental and health threats to terrorist ones.

The European Commission has been developing for years some policies in fields such as the protection of critical infrastructures, environment and civilians. The 9/11 triggered a new impulse for changing the security approach, but this transformation did not have the same speed as in the American case. Also, the meaning of the transformation did not concur with the one of the American vision: the 2003 "European Security Strategy"[11] promotes another point of view than the American one. Even if the concept of "Homeland Security" does not integrate a full consensus, the European approach emphasizes three of its dimensions: political, economic and social. The political dimension is about the European Community's responsibility regarding the safety and security of its citizens; the economic one – about securing the European markets that are in competition with the other powerful markets; the social one – about citizen's awareness of contemporaneous threats with impact upon security, trust, and freedom. The European governments operate with four instruments in order to achieve "Homeland Security"[12]: civil protection, security forces, armed forces, and intelligence community.

Peter Faber - Researcher at the National War College, National Defence University, Washington, D.C. – suggests another approach to "Homeland Security"[13]. He argues that "Homeland Security" might be affected by three types of risks, dangers and threats: non-state international adversaries, state adversaries and domestic adversaries. The first category includes terrorism and organized crime; the second – terrorism, organized crime and military attack; the third – terrorism, civil disturbances and natural disasters. All of these risks, dangers and threats might be counteracted by an efficient algorithm: prevention, protection and response. Although this approach seems to be simple, each element disguises an aggregate of actions. The prevention phase is to be achieved by border control; intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination; arms control and non-proliferation; cooperative engagement with international and national domestic law enforcement agencies; diplomacy, etc. The protection phase refers to both critical infrastructure and the population from that particular area. The response comprises crisis and consequences management and the support to continuity of government operations.

At this point it is obvious that "Homeland Security" is an evasive concept. In a broad sense, it refers to the defence from a not known enemy or threat and its component elements include the vital national interests, counterterrorism, non-proliferation and international crime. This concept, although ambiguous, is still expansive, flexible and inclusive. It connects all that is to connect in a large network that gathers humans, agencies, institutions and infrastructure. It brings under the same roof the state's mechanisms for intervention and the foreign instruments of power and it is characterized by a plurality of stakeholders: from local and national ones to European and Transatlantic ones.

According to those approaches and the ad-litteram translation of the concept, we might ask ourselves if the Romanian translation "securitatea patriei" (mother-country security) is able to enfold all of the enunciated characteristics. The Explanatory Dictionary of Romanian Language states that "patria" (mother-country) is "the territory that historically belongs to people who live there; the country in which someone was born, is living and is its citizen"[14]. The reported theories show that such a definition is too narrow in order to reflect the complexity of the concept. We are talking on security of our home that might be the national, the European Union's or the transatlantic territory. That is why the proper translation might be "the security of the space of interest". It enfolds all of the required items: the security of state's interests or zonal, regional and global organization's interests in the area that belongs to each one of them.

NOTES:

[1] Panovf, Irina, *Romanian – English / English – Romanian Dictionary*, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1986, p. 308.

[2] *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Office of the Homeland Security, SUA, 2002, p. viii.

[3] JP 1-02, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12nd of April 2001 (as amended on 14th of Aprili 2006), p. 241.

[4] Ibidem, p. 241.

[5] Ibidem, p. 361.

[6] Ibidem, p. 272.

[7] "Homeland Security Act of 2002" is the short name of the "An Act to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes", http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf

[8] Fedorov, Andrei, *Homeland Security: Russia's Challenges. A Russian Perspective*, in „Readings in European Security", Vol. 3/2005, pp. 67-74.

[9] http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html.

[10] http://www.e-hsa.org.

[11] http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

[12] Brito, Paolo, *Developing Interoperability between European Security Agencies in order to Maximise Capabilities and Avoid the Duplication of Resources*, paper on „Homeland Security Europe. Interoperability Focus Day", organized by World Bussines Research, 27th of June 2006, Bruxelles, http://www.presentation.wbr.co.uk/.

[13] Faber, Peter, *Homeland Security: General Templates and Options for the Future*, in „Information & Security. An International Journal", Vol. 17/2005, pp. 9-22.

[14] *Dicţionarul explicativ al limbii române*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1998.

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CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT IN IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

The United States and the allied European powers, together with Russia and China, consider that Iran should suspend the nuclear program and to come back to the table of negotiations. Despite Iran has stated its nuclear program is meant for peaceful purposes, Nicholas Burns, the US Deputy State Secretary re-asserted on the 18th of January 2006, in the first part of his Asian tour, the US request to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to send the Iranian nuclear file to UN Security Council after the seal on the main Iranian nuclear centres has been removed.

After the United States and European Union announced they will send the file to Security Council, Russia and China – countries with the status of a permanent member of the Security Council, having the right to vote – were against this decision.

In their turn, the Iranians say sending the file to Security Council is not positive at all and will represent the end of the diplomatic relations; the Iranian Government will be obliged to suspend all "the voluntary measures, including the industrial enrichment"[1].

1. The problem of Iranian nuclear file finds the members of Security Council divided. As long the US and Great Britain supported the presentation of the file to Security Council, Russia and China had a "prudent"[2] position and, in case of economic sanctions, dictated by the UN, they can oppose.

The big powers are in a very ticklish situation. The way of economic sanctions is not a very comfortable one. The crisis of negotiations has already raised the oil price.[3] In fact, Iran asked the oil exporter countries met in Vienna to reduce the oil production – a failed plan, because the OPEC countries, the main supplier of energy with about 50% of the needs[4] for European Union, decided to maintain the quote of 28 millions barrels per day. However, OPEC thinks the eventual economic sanctions against Iran could lead to the raise of the oil price.

On February, 4, 2006, the Council of Governors[5] of the International Atomic Energy Agency decided with majority to inform UN Security Council on Iran's "nuclear file" because the "suspicions" that would try to secretly produce nuclear weapons.

Iran immediately retorted, announcing on one hand that will forbid the IAEA experts' sudden inspections and will limit the voluntary co-operation with the Agency.

On the other hand, Iran announced that will resume the program of Uranium enrichment[6] – a crucial stage in production of nuclear fuel, as well as in development of the nuclear weapons. Also Iran blamed the United States for "sabotaging" Russia's efforts regarding its nuclear program. Later on, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs excluded the return to the moratorium in the Iranian territory, as Russia requested.

Asserting its support to IAEA Council of Governors' decision to transfer the Iranian file to UN Security Council, the European Parliament also adopted on 15th of February a resolution, asking Iran to cancel all activities with Uranium conversion, as long as the delimitation of an area free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in European Parliament members' opinion in Strasbourg, is an important step forward along the line of quieting down the countries in the region.

On April, 28, IAEA presented a report to UN Security Council, where the IAEA General Director, Mohamed El Baradei, asserted that Iran refused to comply with the international community request to cease the Uranium enrichment[7] operations. Iran is accused of infringement of the international regulations and the author of the report does not exclude the possibility that Plutonium would have been obtained from abroad by this country.

Only a day after the IAEA report presentation, the Vice-President of the Iranian Organization of Atomic Energy (IOAE), Mohamed Saidi, stated for the State Television from Teheran that his country will continue the activity of Uranium enrichment but accepts the international inspectors' access to Iranian nuclear facilities in case the "UN Security Council renounce of examination of the Iranian file and returns it back to IAEA".

Afterwards, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addressed a letter[8] to American President George W. Bush, but without a direct reference to the issues expected by the American homologue.

2. Iran, the main defiance for the American foreign policy. Iran is and will remain probably the greatest challenge for the US national security. Washington blamed Teheran on supporting terrorism, threatening Israel, trying to counteract the peace efforts in the Middle East, denying the peace aspirations of the Iranian people, on secretly developing the atomic bomb. The United States requests a firm reaction against the Iranian program for Uranium enrichment.[9] The same ideas result from the official document published on March, 16, where President George W. Bush exposed the new strategy on security.

Despite Washington is for negotiations, Iran represents, according to the statement made by American State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "the main defiance for American foreign policy". Moreover, the Chief of American Administration, George W. Bush, continues to support the idea of a preventive action, which allows US to make use of force against a country considered to be dangerous.[10] In fact, Mr. John Bolton, the permanent US representative to UN also seriously drew attention even before the IAEA Council of Governors' meeting in Vienna. He stated, with unprecedented hardness, that Iran exposes itself to "concrete and painful consequences" and if persists in going on with the sensible nuclear activities, the White House will resort to "all available means" to prevent it. The erosion of the trust in the Government of Iran already began. During 18 years Teheran has been lying to IAEA, as Condoleezza Rice[11] warned, about the nuclear projects the Islamic state asserts are following exclusively civil goals, but which are considered by the US and a part of their Allies as being a masked form for obtaining nuclear weapons.

The United States ask the UN Security Council to vote a resolution on Iran, on the ground of the VII Chapter of the UN Charter (Action in case of threats against peace, peace infringements and acts of aggression). This resolution could lead to constraint of sanctions for Islamic state. But Russia, China and Qatar avoid supporting such an initiative, pretending new consultations needed.

In his turn, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched too a warning against the West. Iran will hardly[12] react in case of being attacked. According to *Sunday Times*, Iran already has prepared battalions of terrorist suicide bombers, ready to attack British and American objectives. A possible military operation against Iran, as His Majesty King Abdullah II Bin Al Hussein of Jordan mentioned, could make the entire region to explode. As AP and Reuters informed on 3rd of April, Iran has already successfully tested the fastest submersible missile able to destroy huge war ships and submarines, a test which, in German minister of foreign affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmier's opinion, will not help either negotiations or Iran.

The British Prime Minister Tony Blair informed American President George W. Bush that Great Britain can not offer military support for an attack against Iran.

On the other hand, *The Guardian* announced that the American and British forces have simulated the Invasion of Iran within military exercises at the American Base Fort Belvoir in Virginia in July 2004.

USA continues to ask UN Security Council members to act more firmly regarding Iran, which wants to become a nuclear[13] military power.

3. The Russia's and China's positions in the Iranian nuclear file. Russia declared to be against both to any solution by force for the Iranian nuclear problem and a compromise allowing Iran to enrich Uranium.

According to Reuters and AFP, Russia proposes another approach to get out of the crisis: the Uranium enrichment on Russian territory, a solution considered by China "a good attempt to get out of the deadlock"[14].

Russia doesn't agree with the sanctions for Iran and is against any ultimatum. The Chief of the General Staff, Youri Baluvski thinks Iran is not capable to build the nuclear weapon.

Russia's position has been expressed also by the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Serge Lavrov, during his visit to Beijing in March: in order to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis, the UN Security Council has to limit itself from supporting IAEA initiatives, eliminating de facto the idea of certain sanctions against Teheran.

In its turn, China[15], as declared by the speaker of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has always been a supporter of "solving problems by negotiations" and supports all diplomatic efforts meant to find a correct solution to the nuclear problems.

The Russian and Chinese Ambassadors to the UNO, according to Reuters, welcomed Washington's initiative to launch direct negotiations with Iran on condition that the Uranium enrichment must be stopped.

4. Consensus and disagreement in the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council tries to get an agreement on a resolution asking Iran to comply with IAAE requests and to abandon any sensible nuclear activity, mainly the Uranium enrichment.

According to the British Ambassador, Enyr Jones-Parry, the Security Council has been discussing for three weeks, concluding a text of compromise regarding this file: "The Council clearly expresses its worry and recommend Iran to comply with the requests formulated by the IAEA Council of Governors.[16]

The five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany insisted that Iran must end those projects and obey the 30 days term given by the Council. Meantime, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmier, stated that together with his homologues from Russia, the USA, Great Britain, France and China will not renounce to find out a diplomatic solution to the present deadlock.

However, Iran definitely refuses to cancel the Uranium enrichment on the reason that the nuclear research is to be applied within the energetic industry. And this Iranian obstinacy in producing the enriched Uranium continues to worry the entire world.

The American State Department really thinks that from this point up to the atomic bomb is only a step and the United States asserts that Iran could produce the nuclear weapon within 15 months.

The Security Council announced that it will react after the IAEA report by the end of April and the General Director Mohamed El Baradei, who was in Teheran, tried to mediate an approach between these positions. "We want to persuade Iran – El Baradei said – to comply with the international community requests."

However, the dispute between the Islamic regime from Teheran and the West on nuclear ambitions has reached higher levels. United States try to convince the international community about the measures to be taken against Iran, including the military intervention[17]. Russia and China, both having economic interests there, oppose.

In its turn, Teheran, using the "oil weapon" as negotiation instrument in the problem of the nuclear energy, threatens with a retreat from the Nonproliferation Program[18] and also with a retort[19] in case of foreign military intervention. Iran states to be "ready" for an "eventual American attack" and to have a planned "reply": the attack on Israel.[20] According to the Teheran authorities, for the moment, they have no intention to cancel the Uranium enrichment program and consider any action against them as "illegal". Even more, Teheran warns that any action from the Security Council will have a negative effect on co-operation with IAEA and the involvement of Security Council can, according to Iranian leader's opinion, "transform co-operation into confrontation".

Despite all progresses towards a unitary position against the Iranian nuclear ambitions, UN Security Council did not succeed to remove all divergences and continues to be divided. Even after the reunion of the chiefs of democracies in the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council with Germany and the Higher E.U. Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana in May, at UNO Centre in New York. Even the United States have alleviated their warnings to Teheran and the European Union has the intention to offer more advantages to this country, among them: more relaxed commercial relations and some political compensations. Moreover, with the UN Security Council consent, European Union could allow Iran to continue with limited activities of Uranium enrichment, all of them with the desire to convince Iran to give up its nuclear program.[21]

5. Conclusion. After the foreign ministers' reunion in Vienna, from June – the representatives of the 5 permanent members of Security Council and those ones of Germany – there is more optimism on the possibility of reaching an agreement.[22] The recent EU – US Summit, where the American President, George W. Bush, met the leaders of the European Union, is another united front, intended to ask Iran to come back to the table of negotiations.

Iran studies the Western states' proposals regarding the solution of the "crisis" regarding its nuclear program. Whether Iran agrees to re-start the dialogue with the United States[23], it announced that will not negotiate its own right to carry on activities for Uranium enrichment.

For the moment, the attention from the international community is moving from the Iranian nuclear program to the North Korean one, the possible test[24] of North-Korean missile being considered by the Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi as a "declaration of war".[25]

NOTES:

1 Ali Larjani, the Iranian chief negotiator, quoted by the international press agencies, February, 1st, on the occasion of a press conference in Teheran.

2 According to Kong Quan, the speaker of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted by Reuters and AFP, his country hopes that all interested parts will show "calm and restraint" in order to solve peacefully the Iranian nuclear problem.

3 Any disturbance on international scale occurred within the energetic domain, as in our case is the raise of the oil price, affects not only the energetic dimension of the states , but also their national security. See: DUȚU Petre, *Globalizarea şi raportul dintre securitatea națională şi securitatea internațională*, Impact Strategic, no.1/2005, National Defence University „Carol I "Publishing House.

4 For more details see also C.G. BALABAN, *Resursele naturale-obiect al unor ample dezbateri internaționale*, Impact Strategic no.1/2006, National Defence University "Carol I" Publishing House, pp.27-31.

5 The IAAE Council of Governors comprises 35 states.

6 According to Reuters, the announcement has been done in Vienna on 4thFebruary by the Chief of Iranian Mission in Vienna, Javad Vaeidi.

7 Public speech made by the IAEA General Director before the presentation of the IAEA rapport to UN Security Council.

8 According to the explanations given by Frederik Jones, the speaker of the National Security Council of the American Presidency, nothing refers in the letter to the subjects of interest for the American President.

9 The American Senate unanimously voted a resolution blaming the Iranian nuclear program and, as President George W. Bush stated, the application of international sanctions to this country is "a real possibility". See more in C.G. BALABAN*,* **Securitatea şi dreptul internațional – Provocări la început de secol XXI**, CH Beck,Bucureşti, 2006, pp.147-149, 200-201.

10 The new Security Strategy is detailed in a 49 pages document presented to mass-media by the President's counsellor for national security.

11 According to the Romanian TV Channel, TV1, March, 24, 2006.

12 Warning resumed by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during a military parade in the assertion: "Iran will react with all forces".

13 USA is in consultations with UN Security Council member countries on possible measures against North Korea, because it is preparing to launch a ballistic intercontinental missile with enough power to reach American territory.

14 Kong Quan, the speaker of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 January 2006, apud C.G. BALABAN, **op.cit.**, *p.49.*

15 China, a country with an impressive economic development, provides 60% of the need of oil from the Middle East, and this is partly the explanation for the attention it gives to the developments in the region.

16 The agreement among the 5 members of the Security Council, 30th of March, 2006.

17 George W. Bush declared that he didn't exclude a military intervention in Iran and he is convinced that the diplomatic efforts for determining Teheran to give up its nuclear ambitions will have no results.

18 If it will be considered that other countries use the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in order to limit the Iranian nuclear program. See at large in Dr. M. MUREŞAN, *Securitate, cooperare şi neproliferare nucleară,* Impact Strategic, no.2/2006, National Defence University "Carol I" Publishing House, pp. 8-12.

19 Even the Iranian military equipment is out of fashion, the military experts consider it is sufficient for destabilizing the Persian Gulf area and disorganizing the main oil supply targets.

20 In his speech at the International Conference of Islamic countries on offering support to Palestine, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, for the second time, his doubts regarding the reality of Holocaust and predicted the disappearance of the Israeli state.

21 All these advantages, including the encouragement of Iran to import the needed fuel for the future civil atomic plants, are carefully examined by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council and Germany in the reunions scheduled after launching their offer.

22 For details, see the statement by new British

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margaret Becket.

[23] According to Reuters, the Russian and Chinese ambassadors to UN welcomed the Washington's initiative to start direct negotiations with Iran on the condition to stop the Uranium enrichment.

[24] Conclusion of the American authorities based on images from satellite

[25] The Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koiyzumi, warned North Korea with a "vigorous retort" together with the United States if, obviously, the suppositions will be confirmed.

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ROMANIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - A New European and Euro-Atlantic Vision -

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU

On April 2006, 17th, the Supreme Council of National Defence adopted the New Romania's National Security Strategy[1], a paper for the European and Euro-Atlantic Romania, for a better life in a democratic country, safer and more prosperous. According to the Romania's Constitution, the Strategy will be presented by the President in Parliament.

Romania's National Security Strategy responds to "the need and obligation for a legitimate protection against the risks and threats which may endanger the fundamental human rights and freedoms and the basis of Romanian state's existence"[2]. Generally speaking, the Strategy stresses the necessity to "ensure the individual's security, his life and family"[3], that is "social security". The Strategy is referring both to prevention and counteracting the dangers generated by the international environment, and internal security state warranting by developing the anticipation capacity and a pro-active action.

The paper is structured in twelve chapters which refer to: priorities of active participation to the fulfilment of international security; building a new European and Euro-Atlantic identity of Romania; ensuring the regional security and stability; internal security; good governance guiding marks; increasing the competitiveness and performance of economy; modernization of the national security institutions; development and increasing the infrastructure's degree of protection; resources and responsibilities.According to the new Strategy, the existence of nation and Romanian state is conditioned mainly by the national security. The national security is considered as an imprescriptibly right which derives from the people's complete sovereignty and is based on constitutional order. It is projected and promoted by Romanian state through security policy.

In essence, the National Security Strategy' substantiation is guided on the following *principles*[4]:

• Convergence between security policy and development policy;

• Systemic and comprehensive approach of security policy;

• Stressing the citizen safety and public security;

• Concordance between security environment evaluation, political option, and strategic action.

Of course, the national security must be understood through its fundamental elements:

▪ *National interests* which have in view the promotion, protection and defence of the Romanian identity's fundamental values – democracy, freedom, equality and law supremacy; respect for human dignity, fundamental rights and freedoms; civic responsibility; political pluripartity; property and market economy; solidarity with democratic nations; peace and international cooperation; dialogue and communication between civilizations.

▪ *Risks and threats* which may endanger the Romanian national security, its values and European and Euro-Atlantic interests.

According to the paper, the *national interests*[5] of whose promotion, guarantying and realization is the key for national security and prosperity ensuring, are:

− Complete integration in European Union and responsible assuming the membership of North-Atlantic Alliance;

− Maintaining the integrity, unity, sovereignty, independence and indivisibility of Romanian state;

− Development of a competitive, dynamic and performing market economy;

− Radical modernization of educational system and an effective turn to good account of human, scientific and technological potential;

− Increasing the citizens' welfare, population's life quality and health;

− Affirmation and protection of culture, national identity and spiritual life in the context of the active participation on European identity building.

Different of the 2001 version of National Security Strategy, the present paper has as a major objective the "radical modernization of educational system and the effective turn to good account of human, scientific and technological potential", which proves the fact that Romania needs a well educated society, knowledge oriented, able to maximum turn to account the intelligence and creativity resources. Only in that way our country may became really competitive in context of close integration in European community and exploitation of globalization process' opportunities.

The steps we must follow for the successful achievement of those objectives as it follows:

− Opportune identification and pro-active counteraction of risks and threats;

− Prevention of conflicts and efficient management of risks, crisis situations and its consequences;

− Active participation to democracy promoting and security and prosperity building in Romania's vicinity and other strategic interest areas;

− Transformation of institutions and improvement of national capabilities.

But the achievement of those requirements is influenced by many conditions[6], more or less important:

− *Internal*: complete exercitation of democratic rights and freedoms; political stability; active participation of civil society to governance process; interethnic and inter-confessional harmony ensuring; critical infrastructure modernization; maintaining the stability of financial-banking system and capital market; protection of natural resources and environment;

− *External:* rebuilding and dynamization of transatlantic cooperation; consolidation of strategic partnership relations; promoting and ensuring democracy, peace and stability in strategic interest areas; active supporting of Romanian Diaspora in order to maintain the national and cultural identity.

Although the Strategy stipulates that the changes in security environment are very rapid, and international relations' dynamism leads to a new international equilibrium building – able to ensure the expansion and consolidation of freedom and democracy - the crisis and conflicts proliferate with important causes both in resources access, their distribution mechanisms and markets, and in identity differences of ethnic, cultural or ideological nature. Thus, the *major risks and threats*[7] which may endanger the fundamental human rights and freedoms, as the basis of Romanian states' existence, are:

− International terrorism;

− Weapons of mass destruction proliferation;

− Regional conflicts;

− Transnational organized criminality;

− Inefficient governance;

− Serious geophysics, meteorological-climatic or associated phenomena.

In addition, the major risks and threats may be amplified by the existence of several economic and social *vulnerabilities and dysfunctions*[8], such as: increasing dependence from some difficult access vital resources; persistent negative trends in demographic sphere and massive migration; high level of social insecurity, chronic poverty and increased social differences; inefficiency of middle class in economic-social life organization[9]; fragility of civic spirit and civic solidarity; low developed and insufficient protected infrastructure; precarious state and reduced efficiency of health system; the organization, the resources and the poor adaptation of educational system to society's needs; inadequate organization and low resources allocated for crisis situations management; insufficient engagement of civil society in security problems' debating and solution.

Counteracting those risks and threats is focused on active measures in political, economic, diplomatic, social, juridical, administrative and military fields, as on efficient crisis management. Otherwise, one of the main objectives of this Paper is the pro-active engagement of Romania in opportune identification and efficient counteracting of those risks and threats, which once launched have serious consequences on citizens' rights and freedoms.

At regional level, the close cooperation with the Republic of Moldova, assuming the task to contribute on building a security and stability environment in the Black Sea region, active support to the elaboration of a Euro-Atlantic

Strategy for the Black Sea area, and the firm option for organizing a Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership (its scope is adoption of a Black Sea Charter) are new elements from 2001 Strategy, and practical actions for increased responsibility in NATO and European Union frontier area.

According to the paper, the *main directions to act*[10] for promoting the national values and interests and consolidating the relations and partnerships are:

− Active participation to the fulfilment of international security;

− Building a new Romania' European and Euro-Atlantic identity;

− New paradigm of regional security and stability;

− Romania's undertaking the role of a dynamic security vector in the Black Sea area;

− Comprehensive and adequate approach of internal security problematic;

− Good governance;

− Increasing the competitiveness and performance of national economy;

− Transformation of national security institutions;

− Development and active protection of critical infrastructure.

This Strategy stipulates that the Romanian state is obliged to achieve theses objectives through legislative, executive and juridical powers, local public authorities, in cooperation and collaboration with a variety of non-state actors such as: mass-media, political parties, syndicates and other professional organizations, non-governmental organizations and other participation forms of civil society, leading companies' bodies.

This is the first strategy elaborated after the adheration of our country to NATO, and soon to European Union. It reflects the changes of internal and international security environment, the global realities and trends, and is totally adapted to the new European and Euro-Atlantic security demands. The paper combines the provisions of our strategies, NATO's Strategic Concept and European Security Strategy and is based on the coagulation of national effort, on common action, cooperation and partnership. Also, the paper reflects the Romania's rights and commitments as an OSCE member and other regional organizations, the interests and role of our country in the Black Sea or Western Balkans region, and Romanian options for regional security.

The New Romania's National Security Strategy shows the vision and fundamental principles for national security sector's transformation, including the national security law. The paper is actual and represents a reflection of our present aspirations, through promoting, protecting and defending the national values and interests, as an integrant part of European and Euro-Atlantic community and an active contributor to regional and international security.

NOTES:

[1] The Strategy (in Romanian) is posted on www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf.

[2] *Romania's National Security Strategy*, Aprilie 2006, p. 5.

[3] Ibidem, p. 2.

[4] Ibidem, p. 12.

[5] Ibidem, p. 6.

[6] Ibidem, p. 11.

[7] Ibidem, pp. 8-10.

[8] Ibidem, pp. 10-11.

[9] The 2001 version of the Romania's National Security Strategy stipulated that "the absence of a strong middle class" is very important vulnerability which may affect the social security.

[10] Ibidem, p. 12.

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THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY AT THE MILLENNIUM CROSSROADS

Iulia BĂDĂLUȚĂ

On January 1, 1992, USSR disappeared as an international actor. At the same time, the four decades of Cold War ended. It was clear then, at the beginning of the nineties, that the rivalry between USA-USSR would not be prevalent anymore on the world political scene. Less clear, though, was the future development of the new international relations system and the way the relation between the two major actors would evolve.

The USSR disappearance raised new problems regarding the world security: an entire geopolitical and strategic universe had disappeared together with the breaking up of the Soviet bloc. After the dissolution of USSR, the Russian Federation has remained the only subject capable to inherit its political and military rank.[1]

In fact, this status was actually confirmed by signing the START II treaty, on January 3, 1993, which established for the Russian Federation the role of exclusive consultant in the issues regarding the nuclear strategic balance. The START treaty raised the problem of the continuity of the legal subject in relation with the US, as a legitimate side of the treaty. Four newly independent states had inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The objective of setting up a control supervised by Moscow represented one of the reasons that made Eltsin promote the integration of the former Soviet republics into the Commonwealth of Independent States. Such a union would have allowed Russia to assume the role of "primus inter pares" and, above all, the leadership in administrating the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR. Not only by Eltsin, but also by the American side relished the prospect of a unitary and exclusive control of the Soviet arsenal under the supervision of the Russian Federation. Both parties were interested in maintaining a credible partner, capable to manage the nuclear arsenal.

Ukraine was the main obstacle in clarifying this. The dissolution of USSR had left on the Ukrainian territory almost 4000 nuclear arms, both tactical and strategic. If Kiev had kept them, Ukraine would have become the third nuclear power in the world, in volume, after the US and Russia[2].

Thus, the stability of the European continent would have been put again under risk. A possible deterioration of the Ukraine – Russia relationship was posing a scenario where the regional tensions

Former USSR strategic nuclear forces

STRATEGIC WEAPONS	RUSSIA	UKRAINE	KAZAKHSTAN	BELARUS	FORMER URSS
ICBM	1064	176	104	54	1393
SLBM	940	/	/	/	940
Strategic Bombers	122	101	40	/	263
The aggregate number of vectors	2126	277	144	54	2610
The aggregate number of warheads	7449	1408	1368	54	10 271



could have led to a nuclear escalation. Besides, Ukraine possessed 1408 strategic nuclear warheads attributed to 277 deployed vectors, among which ICBM-s and bombers. Installed during the Cold War, their role was to initiate an intercontinental massive attack against the American territory.

The table inserted above illustrates the former USSR strategic arsenal distribution among the four former Soviet republics. The examination of the figure points out the fact that Ukraine had took possession of a considerable arsenal, the second in size after the Russian one[3].

The occidental interests for a denuclearized Ukraine were also sustained by the Russian Federation. The new Ukrainian leaders were perfectly aware of the enormous risks and costs that the maintenance of the nuclear arsenal would have involved.[4]

With the Lisbon Protocol signed on May 23, 1992, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan assumed all the commitments derived from the START I treaty, as legal successors and inheritors of the former Soviet strategic arsenal[5].

The preamble to the treaty stated the obligation for the former Soviet republics to maintain the nuclear arsenal "under definite, sure and credible control of a unified authority". In addition, the article V underlined that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were soon to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968.[6] This meant that the three former Soviet republics were supposed to destroy the tactical and strategic weapons deployed on their territories, in accordance with the stipulations of the START I treaty, and transfer them to Russia[7].

This way, Russia would have remained the unique inheritor of the statute of nuclear power and the only one that the Americans would negotiate with, regarding the future reduction agreements.

1991 came with the conclusion of the START I treaty, after ten years of discussions, signed between the Bush and Gorbachev presidents. The START I treaty brought not only significant reduction measures, but its most important achievement was the fact of having solved the problem regarding the unique interlocutor for the US in the nuclear arms issue. The threats that had been in the centre of the world balance of power for almost fifty years were finally removed. However, it remained the problem of WMD, which represented, actually, the main source for these threats.

Although significant, the reductions stipulated by the START I treaty preserved two arsenals capable to guarantee the objective of the "mutual assured destruction" doctrine. The intent of strengthening the strategic balance, by decreasing the number of weapons to a minimum level of nuclear sufficiency, was confirmed during the high-level meeting between Bush and Eltsin, on the 16th-17th of June, 1992.

"The Declaration of Mutual Agreement", adopted at the end of this summit, stipulated the need to reduce the number of nuclear warheads, down to a level inferior to the one stipulated in the START I treaty. This opened the way to conclude a second historic agreement, between Russia and US, in the field of offensive strategic arms limitation: START II treaty, signed, in Moscow, January 3, 1993.

START II brought further limitation measures. The strategic nuclear warheads - those ones installed on the ICBM-s, SLBM-s and bombers – were to be reduced down to 3000-3500 units. As for the submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBM-s, the limit was 1750 units. The most important stipulation and, at the same time, the most innovative, regarded the nuclear weapons system, considered the most dangerous: MIRV[8]. The treaty intended the elimination of all the ICBM-s equipped with multiple warheads. This meant that only the ballistic intercontinental missiles with only one warhead were accepted. The table below illustrates the limitations of strategic nuclear forces stipulated by the two START treaties.

After START II came into force, the stipulations of the former START treaty were to hold good as long as they were in accordance with the new treaty. START II stipulated the ending of the elimination process of the surplus of warheads, by January 1, 2003. This was not simple at all, taking into consideration the size of the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. That is why the deadline has been subsequently extended to December, 31, 2007. After more than 25 years of multilateral negotiations, within the Disarming Conference from Geneva organized by the UN General Assembly, the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** was finally opened for signature, in New York, on September, 24, 1996.

The CTBT has now been signed by 176 states and ratified by 132, but it can only come into force if at least 44 of the then nuclear-capable states countries participating to the conference from 1996, ratify it. As noted, (as of April 2006) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified the CTBT, and China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the USA have not ratified it.

However, some experts in nuclear nonproliferation considered US stand towards the ratification of the treaty, as being "at the very most, an ambiguous one", taking into consideration that the US have already shown their interest in developing the so-called nuclear minute-bombs, e.g. the bombs destined to destroy underground infrastructures. Yet, in accordance with the CTBT, testing of such devices is clearly forbidden.

The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions: towards a safer world?

In Moscow, on May 24, 2002, Bush and Putin signed a document that the world mass media hastened to cal "a historic treaty", the most important and, in the same time, incisive agreement in the history of disarmament. The two protagonists made similar statements. Significant for this was the declaration of the American president, who conferred the treaty the credit of "having put an end to the nuclear hostility of the Cold War".

It is not easy to evaluate, for the time being, the real significance of this treaty. Among all the comments and opinions expressed, the text of the document remains the only analyzable objective element. We will try to analyze it from a technical point a view and only afterwards we will make some assumptions regarding its strategic implications. The first issue that arouses attention is the time of negotiation: it took them only two international level meetings, during a couple of months, to arrive at an agreement: Geneva (July 2001) and Washington (November 2001).

Undoubtedly, the quality of diplomatic dialogue between the two states has considerably improved, but the rapidity of negotiating a treaty regarding such a delicate issue is astonishing[9].

The limitations of strategic nuclear forces stipulated by the two START treaties:

LIMITATIONS	START I 31 IULY 1991	START II 3 IUNE 1993
The number of strategic nuclear warheads	6 000	3000-3500
Warheads attributed to deployed ballistic missiles (ICBM or SLBM)	4 900	No limit
MIRV warheads attributed to deployed ICBM-s	No limit	0
Warheads attributed to deployed SLBM-s	No limit	1700-1750
The aggregate number of strategic vectors	1 600	According to START I

Another important aspect is the unusually small proportion of the text of the treaty, composed by only five articles. Analyzing exclusively through this point of view, some analysts have brought into discussion "the technical insufficiency of the Moscow Treaty". The drawing up of the stipulations does not even compare to the accuracy of the former agreements regarding nuclear arms limitation. The key-stipulation, written in the article I, states: "each of the parties is to reduce and limit its nuclear strategic weapons (…) so that, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party"[10].

Nevertheless, the essence of the treaty lies in the significant limitation of the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia that, in 2002, possessed 7000, respectively, 6000 strategic nuclear warheads. This represents the fundamental stipulation of the treaty, apparently very simple and clear.

However, if one starts to make comparisons and to analyze the technical particularities, the imperfectness and the limits of the Moscow Treaty become more than obvious.

Firstly, the limitation regards only the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads - the one that possesses the highest destructive potential. The tactical nuclear weapons (mainly the short-range ones with limited destructive potential weapons) those that, today, are most likely to be used, remain under no limitation disposition.

US and Russian nuclear forces in 2002, before signing the Moscow Treaty

	US	RUSSIA
Strategic nuclear warheads	7.300	6.000
Tactical nuclear warheads	4.700-11.700	7000-15.000
ICBM-s	687	756
SLBM-s	464	504
Strategic bombers	300	78

Secondly, The Moscow Treaty's limits relate solely to the number of each Party's strategic nuclear warheads. The Moscow Treaty does not limit the number of US or Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM-s) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-s) or their associated launchers, or heavy bombers; the stipulations of the treaty do not regard the vectors. The experts in nuclear armament know that the vector represents, practically, the most important part, from a technological and tactical point of view.

Thirdly (and this is the issue that has aroused sharp criticism), the treaty prescribes only the limitation of the warheads, but not also their destruction, this disposition allowing a large freedom of decision regarding their destination. The high costs for the maintenance of such an obsolete arsenal will probably force Russia to destroy the surplus. The US, on the other hand, will be able to choose the alternative of storing them, namely, "preserving" them in special highly secure warehouses, so that, in case of need, the weapons become operational, in a relatively short period.

Overall, the general opinion is that the Moscow Treaty presents considerable deficiencies, not only formal, but also of essence.

The disarmament measures are, eventually, no drastic at all. The levels prescribed for 2012 do not bring fundamental changes of the concept of nuclear deterrence between the two actors.

That is why we venture to say that a non-nuclear order does not figure yet on the two actors' agendas. Possessing nuclear weapons up to a level that allows you to threaten the other's existence remains the essential means in order to deter a possible adversary.

Moreover, this is the most alarming inheritance of the Cold War.

Concluding, deterrence remains intact in the relation between the two major actors of the Cold War, even at a lower level of the armament (the so-called minimum level of deterrence).

A nightmare that seemed to have disappeared after the end of the Cold War has reappeared.

NOTES:

[1] That is why Russia replaced USSR as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

[2] MEARSHEIMER, John J., *The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent*, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993, p. 50.

[3] For more detailed information regarding the nuclear arsenal of the four former Soviet republics, see WALKER, William, *Nuclear Weapons and the Former Soviet Republics*, in International Affairs, no. 2, vol. 68, pp. 255-277.

[4] MILLER, E. Steven, *The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent*, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no.3, 1993, pp.50-66.

[5] The first article, the Lisbon Protocol, signed the 23rd of May, 1992, www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/lisbon.htm#lisbonPROTOCOL

[6] For more information regarding the actual development of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see also MUREŞAN, Mircea, PhD, *Nuclear Security, Cooperation and Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, in Strategic Impact, no. 2(19)/2006, National Defence University „Carol I" Printing House, Bucharest, 2006.

[7] Before the signing of the Lisbon Protocol, the three former Soviet republics had already informed the White House about their intention to assume all the obligations derived from the START I treaty, as

well as their acceptance to start the procedures of destroying their strategic weapons and accelerate the adhering process to the NPT treaty. The text of these official letters sent to Bush by the presidents of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, between the 7th and the 20th of May, 1992 is available at www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/lisbon.htm#lisbonPROTOCOL.

[8] MIRVs - multiple independently retargetable re-entry vehicles.

[9] Just in terms of comparison, we remind that the START I treaty required ten years of negotiation before being signed (1981-1991).

[10] http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm#1

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LES MILITAIRES SUR LE CHEMIN DE LA PAIX

Jean DUFOURCQ

Comment accepter l'autre dans sa différence? Comment faire en sorte que l'altérité ne soit pas belligène? C'est une sourate du Coran qui rappelle que „ si Dieu l'avait voulu il aurait fait de nous une seule communauté". Dès lors comment assumer la responsabilité qui revient à tous de bâtir un monde de paix, un monde fondé sur la vérité et la justice? On peut dresser la longue liste de tous les „faiseurs de paix" à l'œuvre aujourd'hui dans nos sociétés occidentales: ceux qui s'adonnent avec humanité aux souffrants et aux victimes; ceux qui empruntent les chemins des cultures qui s'entremêlent pour les apprivoiser et apaiser leurs interférences; ceux qui explorent les voies des philosophies pour dégager des horizons d'espérance universelle; ceux qui cheminent sur les routes des religions, qui ouvrent aux hommes des fenêtres sur le spirituel et créent les liens sacrés entre eux; ceux qui apprivoisent les voies et moyens de l'économie pour satisfaire les besoins vitaux des hommes et réduire les tensions humaines; et enfin ceux qui cheminent sur les voies des engagements politiques pour essayer de garantir à leurs concitoyens paix et sécurité dans une planète plus équitable. Si tous nous rappellent que le désir de paix est au cœur de l'homme, beaucoup relèvent que c'est l'homme dans son altérité, dans sa différence, qui est le premier ennemi de l'homme, et que la différence crée trop souvent l'adversité.

La paix peut-elle faire aujourd'hui l'économie de la guerre?

Dans cette énumération des hommes de paix on oublie généralement de citer le militaire comme acteur de paix; on le voit seigneur de guerre. Pourquoi? Alors que chacun rêve de démilitariser la paix on voit bien que l'horizon de „paix perpétuelle" est encore bien lointain et qu'il faut aujourd'hui encore confronter de terribles questions récurrentes: „la paix peut-elle se passer de l'épée? La paix peut-elle faire l'économie de la force militaire?". Le militaire connaît trop bien la réponse et la déplore. Il est, le sait-on assez bien, le témoin privilégié et douloureux de l'humanité souffrante et divisée. Chargé du devoir sacré et légitime de protéger les siens il a aussi la tâche de défendre les intérêts de ses mandants légitimes, qui ne sont pas nécessairement des promoteurs de paix, de paix universelle. Si pour faire la paix, il dispose de l'ultima ratio, de la force d'Etat, s'il se doit d'user de la „juste force", il est le mieux placé pour voir la violence déchaînée de l'homme et les ravages occasionnés par les cycles de la vengeance perpétuelle.

Aussi se demande-t-il légitimement, pourra-t-on un jour se passer d'une épée et d'un bouclier pour promouvoir et maintenir la paix pour tous, une paix juste et durable? Peut-on espérer établir et maintenir sans l'usage de la force un ordre international juste?

Pour analyser ces questions angoissantes, il peut être utile de parcourir les rudes chemins des militaires vers la paix, chemins qui croisent d'ailleurs les chemins de tous les autres faiseurs de paix. Ces dernières décennies, trois voies ont été ouvertes successivement pour tenter de conjurer la guerre : la paix des nations européennes, la paix des armes; la paix institutionnelle exigée, la paix par la paix; l'espoir de paix durable, la paix par l'homme réunifié.

Retour sur l'histoire du continent européen et sur la paix des nations. Comment a-t-on pu passer des rêves de paix universelle de Rousseau, de Bernardin de St Pierre ou d'Emmanuel Kant, à la constitution de „peuples en armes" dressés les uns contre les autres dans des combats radicaux d'une sauvagerie et d'une détermination jamais vus? Rappelons-nous le soixantième anniversaire des combats de Verdun ou de Gorizia que l'on célèbre en 2006. Comment a-t-on pu passer de cette folie militaire à cette „communauté de destin et d'intérêt" que constitue la construction européenne? N'oublions jamais d'où nous venons pour mesurer le chemin parcouru en Europe depuis „la dernière”: *„pas de conflit armé depuis plus de 60 ans et la guerre interétatique définitivement hors la loi; une mise en ordre générale, des minorités, des frontières, des systèmes politiques; une ouverture générale de la circulation des biens, des personnes, des idées, des capitaux; des relations généralisées de bon voisinage et favorisées par de multiples enceintes de consultation; des forces multinationales multipliées et des engagements opérationnels communs dans les Balkans avec des responsabilités militaires assumées à tour de rôle; une convergence générale des appareils de défense des pays d'Europe illustrée par des acquisitions faites ensemble, une entreprise résolue de développement autonome de capacités européennes de gestion militaire des crises dans l'Union européenne.*

Voilà le bilan, il est impressionnant et il nous oblige. Il est extensible, transférable, adaptable à d'autres zones ravagées par les conflits, plus comme un exemple pour espérer que comme un modèle à suivre. Des hommes de paix et de réconciliation ont été les acteurs de ce quasi-miracle; on les connaît Spaak, De Gasperi, Schuman, Adenauer; ils y étaient incités par le souvenir du prix payé et des désastres subis et par des hommes de vision et d'avenir comme G. Marshall et W. Churchill. Cette „détermination de concorde”, cet „enchevêtrement de solidarités diverses” est le chemin de la paix qui a détourné les Européens des gouffres de la guerre. Une leçon simple peut en être tirée : il n'y a pas de fatalité à l'histoire et l'esprit peut souffler sur les décombres de la guerre. Mais avant que Kant fleurisse sur Hegel, pour arriver à cette paix des nations européennes, que de désordres, de ravages et de victimes! Des armées nationales en guerre, des peuples en armes, l'emploi radical des sciences et des techniques de la supériorité militaire ont été des passages obligés vers cette paix des nations européennes.

Regard sur la paix générale de l'ONU, la paix exigée, la paix institutionnelle. Un contrat social global à l'échelle de la planète habitait l'ONU à la fin de la guerre froide avec une exigence de paix; B. Boutros-Ghali déclarait en 1992 *„la paix n'est pas un phénomène ponctuel, elle est un processus, une dynamique qui s'inscrit dans le temps, dans l'espace et dans la société internationale, un processus continu qui ne saurait se réduire au temps, ou à l'intervalle de temps, sans guerre; un processus global, car elle ne se limite pas à l'espace politico-militaire; un processus de coordination, enfin, qui implique l'ensemble des acteurs de la société internationale autour des Nations Unies. En tant que processus continu, la paix n'a de sens, comme le développement, que si elle est durable. Il y a en cette matière, nous le savons, une vraie difficulté à inscrire l'urgence dans la durée et une forte tendance à confondre la politique avec la gestion des crises. Il ne suffit pas de s'opposer à la guerre, de la combattre, pour assurer la paix, encore faut-il préserver celle-ci ou la raffermir. De la prévention des conflits à la consolidation de la paix, avec des moyens pacifiques ou coercitifs, la promotion de la paix et de la sécurité internationales dans le monde est à la fois une préoccupation quotidienne et une œuvre de longue haleine”.*

Tel est l'esprit dans lequel essayent de travailler les quelques 70.000 casques bleus qui tentent de prévenir et de réguler les tensions, de juguler les conflits et de mettre en place des espaces de sécurité où les hommes peuvent vivre ensemble et forger les instruments d'un destin commun malgré leurs différences.

Un nouveau militaire, soldat de la paix, a émergé de cette dynamique. Tout à la fois homme d'autorité et homme de dialogue, frère compatissant et juge impartial, policier sourcilleux et travailleur social miséricordieux, il a la lourde tâche de faire passer des belligérants d'une coexistence subie à un voisinage assumé et à une „convivienza ” fructueuse, selon une formule à l'italienne. Bâtisseurs ou reconstructeurs d'Etats, soigneurs de sociétés meurtries, tuteurs de structures fragiles, les agents de la paix, civils et militaires, gouvernementaux ou humanitaires, sont les techniciens faiseurs de paix, les artisans de paix du 21ème siècle. Mais ils connaissent pour l'avoir expérimentée la limite, l'asymptote à cette voie de „la paix pour la paix”, celle des conflits gelés; car faute d'accéder à des solutions durables, on fait de mauvaises paix, des paix forcées qui ne résolvent rien mais encagent seulement les tensions et mettent la conflictualité entre parenthèses.

Les chemins qu'empruntent les soldats de la paix sont étroits et leurs tâches sont souvent ingrates. Justice, Vérité, Equité doivent les habiter, des valeurs dans lequel le Chrétien se retrouve facilement. L'agent de la paix d'aujourd'hui, est un homme de la réconciliation et de l'unité dans la diversité; un homme d'idéal, un expert en humanité, „un croyant en l'homme". C'est Jean-Paul II qui affirmait fortement que „la paix est une mission pour les croyants", ce pape que la paix obsédait.

Regard prospectif sur la sécurité durable*[1]*, une paix démilitarisée: comme l'a dit le pape Benoît, dans son adresse au corps diplomatique au début de l'année, „la paix n'est pas le silence des armes, …, on ne peut pas parler de paix là où l'homme n'a même pas l'indispensable pour vivre dans la dignité". C'est la raison pour laquelle de nouveaux concepts voient aujourd'hui le jour qui veulent promouvoir une sécurité durable mieux établie, un bon voisinage durable entre hommes de bonne volonté qui auront surmonté leurs peurs et accepté leurs différences. La paix ne sera plus alors le résultat de la guerre, le fruit de l'action de force des militaires mais bien autre chose, une nouvelle forme de culture préventive qui s'attache à mettre l'homme en accord avec l'homme. Et là aussi les militaires auront, avec d'autres, un rôle à jouer, un rôle d'artisans de paix. De quoi s'agit-il?

Tout d'abord d'une véritable promotion de la sécurité humaine, celle qui relève des besoins vitaux des hommes, besoins matériels, la nourriture, la santé, le travail; besoins immatériels, la dignité, l'espoir. Mais aussi la sécurité culturelle; celle qui permet de vivre ensemble dans la "nécessaire diversité" qu'évoquait Plotin. Ces nouvelles dimensions de la sécurité se rattachent aux besoins fondamentaux des hommes à l'identité; elles passent par l'éducation des complémentarités, l'acceptation des différences, la purge des facteurs de violence hérités des siècles passés, le nettoyage des mémoires et la valeur irremplaçable des processus de vérité et de réconciliation. Elles doivent conduire de la coexistence belliqueuse au bon voisinage accepté et positivé. Et le mot clé ici est pluralisme pour passer „l'épreuve de la différence" déjà évoquée, pour établir la prévalence des pluralistes, fauteurs de paix, sur les puristes, fauteurs de guerre.

Mais aussi des mécanismes d'arbitrage et de régulation capables de maintenir un équilibre dynamique entre des facteurs contraires, et l'on songe ici à la valeur positive, libératrice des disputes, des controverses, de la dialectique qui purgeait hier la violence des sociétés antiques et médiévales. De nouveaux mécanismes pour illustrer, compléter les principes du droit international idéalisés et à l'universalité insuffisamment établie; plus puissants, plus déliés et plus fluides que les règles du cosmopolitisme, ils font intervenir des médiations tierces et des compensations extérieures pour prévenir toute forme d'extrémisme et de recours à la violence aveugle. La mobilisation de l'éthique doit permettre à ces mécanismes un recours limité à la contrainte, à l'emploi de la force. Ce créneau de médiation est du ressort principal de la société civile internationale qui peut épauler une communauté internationale défaillante pour tenter de rapprocher les ennemis et d'accorder les contraires. Des „transvaleurs" nouvelles peuvent constituer des instruments de convergence, des outils de régulation complémentaires, voire alternatifs, aux règles d'un droit international rigide, encore insuffisamment fondé, trop imparfaitement universel.

Pour finir ce propos, à une époque où les menaces du terrorisme aveugle et indéchiffrable risquent de ramener la planète aux temps des guerres barbares, la combinaison de ces différentes pistes porte tous nos espoirs pour faire face à un phénomène grave que les techniques militaires ne sauront pas éradiquer et qui menace les sociétés des hommes du 21ème siècle. Car la paix ne pourra ici procéder de la fin de la guerre, de la victoire puisque dans le terrorisme, c'est l'homme qui porte atteinte de façon aveugle à l'homme. La paix procédera de la réconciliation de l'homme avec lui-même dans sa diversité; ce sera la paix des hommes de bonne volonté.

NOTES:

[1] *Promouvoir la sécurité durable*, Occasionnal paper n°12- mars 2006 Rome, cf www.ndc.nato.int.

Le Contre-amiral (2°S) Jean DUFOURCQ, ancien de la DEG, du CAP, et de l'IHEDN, dirige actuellement l'équipe des chercheurs du Collège de défense de l'OTAN à Rome. Ce texte fait suite à une intervention prononcée à Rome dans un colloque sur les chemins de la paix au Centre culturel St Louis de France, 11 mars 2006.

A NEW GENERATION OF MILITARY CONFLICT TECHNOLOGY – THE FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

Sorin TOPOR, PhD

The new wave of technological revolution as a whole has induced a new phenomenon in the military field, phenomenon represented by the implementation of the electronics and cybernetics latest methods and techniques leading to the military equipment miniaturization and adapting the latest discoveries in Maths, Physics, Chemistry and other scientific top fields to the battlefield contemporary demands. That's why within military scientific environment the study of contemporary military conflict has always generated numerous debates about the concepts, forms and future of military conflicts.

The main characteristic of the current armed forces' action is the possibility to execute accurate strikes on the enemy infrastructure, from very far, with no compulsory involvement and in real time of human factor. Man has a very important role in the decisional process on long and short term, with implications on the way in which the action is organized, planned and controlled.

Today, striking the enemy is mostly striking the symbols of the elements governing the target, none of the actors can actually see one another. The first acting model of such a military conflict is the operation **Desert Storm** – 1991. Subsequently, it was modernized to Network Centric Warfare during the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003.

This Network Centric Warfare represents the most advanced and integrating form of informational warfare. This model's strategy is based on the "Shock and Awe" concept, considered thoroughly by the American analysts Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in their paper with the same name. This concept is not entirely new, its roots are identified in the Mongol hordes' way of action and subsequently it was adapted based on the technological possibilities in those times to the "Blitzkrieg" during World War II. Nowadays, applying this pattern is facilitated by the existence of a huge communication and informational capability, due to the implementation of the new satellite communication systems and the multi-spectral and multi-role sensor systems on different platforms: cosmic, air, naval and land. Executed with a joint military system, the action in Irak (2003) is considered by the Western military analysts to be "the first war of the informational era".

The military technological progress is the fundamental engine of the changes in carrying classical wars by modern military wars. The countries not capable to maintain their armed forces' capability to the required technological standards have a big problem. That's why they identified and developed new forms of combat, specific to the other military technology components, cumulated in knowledge, procedures and operational relations, exploiting some strategies with limited effect, totally different from those ones specific to classic military systems.

Therefore, current modern military forces face new challenges materialized in their involvement in a series of actions not specific to direct confrontation and whose main objective was to ensure a climate of real security and stability. We're talking about those post-conflict action patterns of NATO or UN military structures, beginning with the 1992 US humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

The military literature calls these military interventions "4GW" (the Fourth Generation Warfare), we will discuss about it in the present paper.

The initial moment of acknowledging this concept is the article "T*he Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*" in the Marine Corps Gazette in October 1989.[1] The authors, William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, captain John F. Schmitt, colonel Joseph W. Sutton and lieutenant-colonel Gary I. Wilson warned about combining terrorist strategies with high-technology and beyond borders infrastructures (physical organizations or ideologies based on different fields: military, social, economic, religious, etc.) in a direct attack on the enemy culture, attack executed with PSYOPS sophisticated tools, focusing on the audio and visual elements specific to televisions. The forms and ways of action of the first generations warfare – whose decisive elements were: the fighters' strike force, capability to induce losses using the fire and manoeuvre capabilities – have become irrelevant and useless. However, they haven't completely vanished even though the authors consider that the current "military revolution" is based upon making changes in political, social, economic and technological fields at the expense of the old military criteria focused on the manoeuvre and fire power capabilities.

The article published by the Marine Corps Gazette made the following delimitation of waging wars:

"First Generation Warfare" – 1GW – corresponds to any model of military conflicts prior to the Napoleon period having as the upper limit the strategic constraints period, fire weapons and the beginning of the decline of the armed forces mercenary elements. 1GW is characterized by the capability to develop its combat power by increasing human forces and subsequently the appearance of machine guns and indirect fire, achieving and executing suicidal actions under high moral considerations.

"Second Generation Warfare" – 2GW – corresponds to the pattern of the fire power increase. It's specific to World War I, the American civil wars, the strategies to achieve the alliances and support the human actions. Studying the military tactics of those times, one can easily notice the important role of fire manoeuvres and forces under a strong indirect fire support executed by artillery individualized groups.

"Third Generation Warfare" – 3GW – represents the pattern of "fundamental manoeuvres and conceptions" and is representative for World War II. This is characterized by ample forces and means manoeuvres and the appearance of armoured forces. 3GW was based on mobility and almost real time communications. The most eloquent example is the "Blitzkrieg" pattern, adopted by the Nazi troops during World War II. The strategy of such an attack was based on infiltration in order to surpass the enemy main fighting forces, interrupting their rear support and finally leading to their collapse (destroying or seizing). This pattern was considered innovating at that time at the expense of former tactics to destroy the enemy through direct engagement once it's found.

"Fourth Generation Warfare" – 4GW – corresponds to the pattern of "actions with small and independent cells" which leads us to ethical scenarios and asymmetric conflicts achieved with ad-hoc fighting structures. 4GW is the effort to prevent or undermine the enemy power by exploiting the enemy social and human vulnerabilities of any kind using methods totally different from the enemy operations usual ones.

Therefore, 4GW is based on scattering the forces and maintaining real time direct communications. These objectives fundamentally modify the combat concepts between two antagonistic forces, the fourth generation combat carrying out throughout the area of responsibility and interest, according to the principle "front everywhere".

The attacks of this kind adopt those forms of striking the cultural objectives and are achieved mainly through the media based on a unique conception, in an extremely violent coordinated and systematic action with the main purpose to paralyze or bring to a collapse the enemy political will. This objective is extremely difficult to achieve through a decisive symmetrical military action (or it can be achieved but with a huge resources in order to reach a higher level of stress for the victim). Due to the huge diversity of the involved fields and the economic and social impact on the actors, nowadays we cannot adopt a unanimously accepted definition for 4GW. But it is accepted that "the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear."[2]

The global fight against terrorism of different military structures against Al-Qaeda's elements abroad is a good example. The other forms of combat against organized crime, the illegal drug trade are examples of 4GW specific actions. These challenges to national and global security are similar to terrorist actions. Some examples are provided by the actions to neutralize the ETA and IRA organizations and the drug cartels in Columbia and Venezuela. To achieve a concrete analysis of 4GW we suggest as the initial point the 11th of September 2001 (or 9/11) because this represented the beginning of the global fight against terrorism and shaped an uncomfortable reality for any country, the awareness of the idea of vulnerability which is not due to daily technological performances. 9/11 was possible due to an error of the US air space security system. The terrorist attack against the school in Beslan – North Osetia in 2004 (400 dead out of which 150 children), the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 2004 (198 dead and 1463 injured), the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005 and those in Bali – Indonesia in September 2005, all of them were due to social security systems' faults, from the legislative point of view or the economic policies or mass educational policies.

Similar to the technological progress assimilated in the development of any field of contemporary society, "the niche strategies" have evolved exploiting the opportunities and vulnerabilities of applying theory to practice. It's not about a technological void, but the characteristic of any system to adjust its own mechanisms by correcting the errors or excluding the procedures not used anymore.

If really there are no limits for the 4GW actions where we include the possibility of nuclear, biological or chemical attacks whose effects increase considerably the economic and social potential of the informational impact, it seems that there are no other interpretations to establish a pattern for the future warfare. Within this new type of war, we won't need large forces to reach an objective but dissembled elements acting systematically and constructively so that the target is convinced to change its natural evolution. Thus, even an extremely well-equipped country could become the victim of a "slow attack" against which it's hard to apply a neutralizing tactics or it's extremely expensive and with very serious collateral damage on all social and economic fields.

In our opinion, 4GW can be defined as a subtle conflict form used to achieve a moral victory by undermining the potential enemy's quality based on the exploitation of the enemy informational infrastructures' weaknesses with frequent asymmetric actions, with weapons and techniques differing from those of the enemy's.

We consider that the 4GW pattern can focus on achieving the following objectives:

At strategic level:

- losing the state's governing monopoly imposing the state of war;

- the escalation of cultural, ethnic and religious conflicts and going back to cultural values morally obsolete;

- implementing technologies (segments/divisions) allowing the control by direct dependence or by encouraging multiple division on social isolation orientations (ethnic, religious, civic, etc.).

At operational level:

- alterations of major perceptions or other psychological effects (amplify the desire to fight, manipulate the public opinion through scenarios);

- obtaining disproportionate and inefficient results of the target/victim's social and economic evolution.

At tactical level:

- changing the victim's forces objectives and acting directions from those they are prepared to act with. For instance: the victim organization's military forces will be forced to act on its own society and the army has to deal with large masses of unarmed but extremely violent people;

- psychological manipulation actions in order to achieve a state of "terror";

- utilizing the enemy power against themselves.

Many of the methods used by 4GW are not new, there are numerous historic precedents. The Roman military legions used *terror* as tactics and strategy against the enemy population in order to make peace and make them surrender. Subsequently, they combined this method of "making peace" and ethnic combing out of the occupied territories with the recruitment of men fit for the military service luring them with good rewards and stimulating rights after their discharge.

Also, some of the most vigorous men from an armed legion were transferred as far away as possible from their birthplace through military changes of place. Their place was taken by young soldiers belonging to other ethnical group. Hence resulted a mix of peoples and the purpose of this process was to annihilate the population's resistance. Much later, in the Middle Ages, the crusaders fighting to free Jerusalem and the Holy Grave from the Muslims used some extremely cruel methods often going to killing the protesters in order to neutralize the population's resistance. In the next lithographs we present some of these methods such as "bombing" the besieged castle



Figure 1 – Soldiers “bombing” the besieged castle with the heads of those captured or showing the head of the rebels’ leader to terror the people and order to surrender the city

with the heads of those captured[3] or showing the head of the rebels’ leader to the people in order to make them surrender.

Therefore, 4GW main characteristic is that it executes and is aimed against the human factor. We can truly say that it is a “battle of intelligences”. The military performances aren’t a decisive factor in winning a battle anymore. They facilitate this desideratum which however is not decisive. We support this by studying some actions of the antiterrorist global fight and the attempts to capture Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda. We are convinced that the US have and use the most modern informational technologies and yet he hasn’t been captured. Don’t misunderstand us! We are not praising the no.1 terrorist but the reality that the unimagined performances of the technique used by the military forces involved are counteracted by the terrorists’ intelligent use of improvised and non-standard devices.

According to the American colonel John Boyd, 4GW strategy is based upon the cycle Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA).[4] In the observation segment, it gathers information from the allotted sensors and/or the reports of the engaged forces. In the orientation phase, the information resulted from the observation are converted into reconnaissance information used simultaneously to shape the battle space image. Based on that and on exploiting the former knowledge, we make an assessment of the battle space “reality” at a given time.

Since no informational source is perfect from the analytic and functional point of view and because of the vulnerability towards the enemy manipulation actions, the commander’s assessment of the theatre’s “reality” will be invariably different from the theatre’s concrete “reality”.

Therefore, the decision will be established by assessing the interpreted reality. These processes apply to the enemy as well. Thus in a conflict between two actors the fight will be applying their own OODA cycle at the expense of the enemy. Once an actor’s action starts, new information will be



Figure 2 - A conflict model between two OODA cycles

generating information which will change the initial situation, which is a new orientation. In the following figure, we show the image of the effects obtained by increasing the speed in reaching a decision.

Accepting the enemy cycle and the total lack of action on him represents the biggest error of any conflict. Understanding this, we notice that a short and rapid OODA cycle has protection and applicable coefficients much bigger than a longer cycle, regardless of the applied technologies performances.

The method of "small steps" could be the key of the acting 4GW pattern with the general purpose of ending their own OODA cycle before the enemy can through systematic wearing away.

The next generations of warfare will probably achieve these simultaneous actions using both old principles and techniques (individual firepower, manoeuvre to concentrate the firepower, scatter forces and means, etc.) and also systems designed to coordinate the actions in a common matrix which will impose the development of new principles in the tactics, strategies and resources involved.

We consider that the strategy of this type of warfare implies coordinated actions subordinated to the entire spectrum of human existence (political, social, military, economic, etc.), the main element in generating decisions.

The importance of this subject derives not from the number of polemics it can generate but from the fact that it can represent the binder of the conception to use military forces against an organization functioning by exploiting, maintaining and deepening some vulnerabilities of social and human security infrastructures and policies which are in a permanent state of inter and intra systemic self-adjustment.

That is why, from the military point of view, the future conflicts' main objectives will probably be those destined to lead the enemy to either an inferior conclusion by being aware of the non-existence of his possibilities to achieve his political objectives or to being aware of the existence of a rapport benefits/costs unfavourable to the objectives suggested. Unlike conventional approach, promoting the technical superiority as a main solution to success, 4GW emphasizes the necessity of the political and social factors in order to know the enemy's every aspect, the military action becoming, as von Clausewitz said, "a continuation of politics with other means".[5] In the case of 4GW, the distinction between peace and war, civilian and military personnel, tactics and strategy, front and behind front, order and disorder is less and less obvious. Such a war will have no limits in space, time and methods. The methods specific to this type of confrontation will aim neutralizing the enemy through "implosion".

As a conclusion, we can say that the 4GW concept represents another type of approach of the phenomenon war characterized by unconventional and asymmetric actions, such as the insurgent and terrorist ones representing the most dangerous threat to the international security.

This concept, as all military theories, can be adapted, modernized and reconfigured.

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Security and international law: challenges at the beginning of the XXIst century”

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN



The series of developments at the beginning of the XXI century represents for the field of the international relations both an opportunity and a challenge. Opportunity - because it creates a fertile framework for new re-interpretations of the world and, implicitly new scientific paradigms. Challenge – because, in fact, all these events led to deterioration of the world security condition and made necessary supplementary financial and human efforts in order to efficiently manage them.

As a need born from the desire to reach the ideal of a profound security Bg. Gen.(r) Prof. Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD, studies all these aspects of the contemporary world in his work “*Security and international law: challenges at the beginning of the XXIst century*” (C.H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, 324 pages).The author starts from the premise that “the practice of international relations demonstrates that maintenance and reinforcement of peace and international security means first to solve all litigious problems among the states by peaceful means, following a political path, using negotiations and talks” (p. XIV) This assertion is sustained with scientific arguments and brief but very actual case studies.

Starting with the conceptual dynamics of security and international law, Prof. Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN makes a rigorous analysis of the way the new features of the security environment are reflected by the international law, this one being understood as a tool for prevention and solution of conflicts, peacekeeping, interdiction of aggression within the actual international law, identifying the use of force in the actual legal order, terrorism in the international law, etc. Also, there should to be remarked the case studies centred upon present day events developing in this very moment.

One of the most actual and interesting chapters is that one dedicated to terrorism in the international law. The analysis of this phenomenon begins with the documents dated 1856 when Belgium was the first state which introduced certain national measures against terrorism (p. 204) and it is continued with the legal framework of the fight against terrorism and the effects of its implementation, but with case studies referring too to the moment 11th of September 2001 as well as to involvement of some security and collective defence organizations and even Romania’s implication in the confrontation with terrorism.

From the examination of these aspects, the author draws the conclusion that a common vision on the terrorist phenomenon and its legal framing is necessary. It is also needed a system of reference allowing to eliminate from the analysis the subjectivism and the superficiality leading to the finding that certain conclusions are elaborated in order to serve a certain end linked more or less with the idea of world peace and stability conservation.

The *book “Security and international law: challenges at the beginning of the XXIst century“* represents not only a scientific, rigorous examination of the approached problems, but also an ample breviary of the most important documents on international law and of the most complex Romanian and foreign works in this field.

This is the reason the study of the book must be one of the main topics in the initial stages of future specialists' in national and international security formation, but also a basic task for those ones who are working already in this domain and want to permanently improve the level of their professional training.

A.S.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JULY-SEPTEMBER 2006

A scientific activity organized this year was The CDSSS's International Seminar regarding „Romanian Army's participation to collective defence under NATO leadership and ESDP", which took place on 25th of May t.y. and conferenced many personalities as Romanian Army leaders, specialists from Luxembourg, Poland and the International Commitee of Red Cross Regional Delegation for Central Europe. The materials presented to the activity were published in a volume and can be ellectronically accessed on the Center's web page, at cssas@unap.ro.

Furthermore, the CDSSS's researchers participated to international scientific activities. Between 26 – 30 June 2006, a delegation lead by Col. (ret.) Constantin Mostoflei, Ph.D., the director of Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from National Defence University „Carol I", attended the Pan-European Conference concerning the National Security, organized at Bruxelles.

The most recent CDSSS's publications are: „Actualities and perspective in the European Security and Defence Policy", „Insecurity's globalization", „Perspectives in the armed conflict" and „Host-Nation Support".

There are already started the preparations for the CDSSS's Annual International Session for Scientific Communication, over „Security and Defence Strategies on the NATO's and EU's Eastern Border", plannified between 23 – 24 November, where are expected to conference field's personalities from country and abroad.

In this period, were won for financing from Ministry of Education and Research, CEEX programs (excellence research), two scientific research projects:

- „Security of the military and civil-military systems and actions in crises and armed conflicts management", project director Bg. Gen. (ret.) Gheorghe Vaduva, PhD, CDSSS/NDU having as partners: Military Technic Academy Bucharest, Economic Studies Academy Bucharest and "Stefan cel Mare" University Suceava. At present, began the first stage of the emerging Plan which consists in the development of a database and an armed crises and conflicts methodology for the acknowledgement and thorough study of the armed crises and conflicts phenomenon.

- "The religions implications over security in the European Union's enlargement context", project that aims the Romanian research integration in the actual directions approached to the European research level. Among the project's coordinator, NDU, the project benefits by local partners (The Bucharest University's Orthodox Theology Faculty "Patriarhul Justinian", The "Valahia" University's Theology Faculty - Targoviste) and also by European partners: The Laussane University – Observatoire de religions en Suisse (Switzerland), with the support of European Curches Conference (KEK), Geneve, Switzerland and JFM Recherches et Analyses, Fribourg, Switzerland. The project's director is Bg.Gl. (ret.) prof. univ. Viorel Buta, PhD, supported by an experimented collective with many young researchers. Among the researchers from CDSSS are Constantin Mostoflei, PhD and Mihai-Stefan Dinu, PhD candidate. The first important activity from October will consist in a workshop with the participation of some Christian and military life personalities and mass-media, where will be presented the work hypothesis regarding the religions' influence over security in the European Union's enlargement context.

Irina CUCU

After five years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I" is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column "Strategic Event" that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Romanian Ministry of Defence, General Staff, services' staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state's organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine's quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies, etc.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B-type magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, one in Romanian and one in English and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.

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