

**NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I”
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES**



STRATEGIC IMPACT

Nr. 2[19]/2006

68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5
Telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93
E-mail: cssas@unap.ro; Adresă web: <http://cssas.unap.ro>

**NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I” PRINTING HOUSE
BUCHAREST**



The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine acknowledged by the National University Research Council as a B-type magazine

Editorial Board:

Marius Hanganu, Professor, Ph.D., president

Constantin Moștoflej, Senior Researcher, Ph.D., executive president, editor-in-chief

Nicolae Dolghin, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, director, Ph.D. (Institute for Compared Strategy, Paris, France)

Adrian Gheorghe, Professor Eng., Ph.D. (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland)

Josef Janošec, Professor Eng., Ph.D. (Institute for Strategic Studies, Defence University, Brno, Czech Republic)

Gheorghe Văduva, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Ion Emil, Lecturer, Ph.D.

Editors:

Vasile Popa, Researcher

Corina Vladu

George Răduică

Scientific Board:

Mihai Velea, Professor, Ph.D.

Grigore Alexandrescu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.



CONTENTS

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

Cooperation and nuclear nonproliferation

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD.....5

Lessons of history to be re-learned

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD.....12

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

Critique de la géopolitique

Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, PhD.....16

NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, AND ACTIONS

Planification strategique multinationale

Jean DUFOURCQ.....24

The Staff Operator in the digital era

Marius CRĂCIUN28

L'Etat-nation dans le contexte de l'intégration européenne

Petre DUȚU, PhD, Claudiu DRĂGAN35

The Romanian Army implication in Host-Nation Support (HNS)

Vasile POPA41

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Collective security - an evolving concept

Eugen SITEANU, PhD.....49

Elements of the insecurity's intricate equation

Alexandra SARCINSCHI.....53

ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

Turning politics into a show and security

Victor MORARU, PhD.....57

The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations deadlock and their impact on the regional peace process

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD.....61

***STRATEGIC EVENT***

<i>US National Security Strategy 2006 - geopolitical and geostrategic option</i> Cristian BĂHNĂREANU	64
--	----

POINTS OF VIEW

<i>The Greater Middle East between project and reality</i> Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD.....	67
--	----

TERRORISM. THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

<i>Considerations on the Italian participation in post-conflict operations in Iraq</i> Nicola PIASENTE	72
<i>The war against terror is consecrating a new war generation</i> Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD	77
<i>Research of molecular biology for the diagnosis of some viral and bacterial biological agents /biological weapons</i> Army Centre of Medical Research	81

REVIEWS

<i>The respect for the value of strategy</i> Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD	88
---	----

CDSSS' AGENDA

<i>The activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, April-June 2006</i> Irina CUCU.....	89
---	----



COOPERATION AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD

Reality demonstrates that globalization has a lot of positive effects but, on the other hand, it can generate negative effects as well: terrorism about which German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk wrongly thinks that is extremely important, criminality beyond borders and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, all of a huge gravity. Acquiring and having nuclear weapons by the terrorists – the most destructive elements in CBRN – represents, at present, one of the most serious threats and challenges to the international community security. There is also the risk that some countries use or threatens to use weapons of mass destruction in order to blackmail or intimidate. The necessity of a close cooperation at global level to prevent the access of terrorist groups and countries supporting terrorism to weapons of mass destruction, components and forerunners of those, makes that the international states, organs and organizations firmly support the relevant international documents, their improvement and the implementation of counter-proliferation measures.

1. The dangerous race of active nuclear proliferation

The nuclear energy space is extremely disputed at the beginning of this century, in a world which feels its very existence threatened not only by terrorism and by the fact that the Islamic fundamentalism is, as Rüdiger Safranski says, a religious continuation of totalitarianism¹ but also by the lack or scarcity of resources. According to specialists in this field², the contribution of nuclear electric energy is about 17 percent in the world and 10 percent in Romania. There are no nuclear plants in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Portugal while in France the nuclear contribution reaches 75 percent and over 40 percent in Belgium, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine and South Korea. In the European Union and the United States the contribution is of 35 and 20 percent respectively.

For all the developing countries, others than those in Eastern Europe, the nuclear power is estimated to grow from 25,466 GWe (1999) to 65,824 GWe (2020). Significant growth is foreseen in Asian big countries: China from 2,2 GWe (1999) to 18,7 GWe (2020), India, from 1,897 GWe (1999) to 7,571 GWe (2020).

While globally there is a constant concern to use nuclear energy peacefully, the countries develop nuclear weapons as well, as a continuation of the dangerous arming race during the Cold War period. For 2006 we could speak about an active nuclear proliferation with new forms which know how to manipulate the numerous answers at national and international level: prevention (through verifying treaties, export control, active non-proliferation), protection (population, armed forces in operation) and counter-proliferation (preventive action). Nuclear weapons represent the most serious threat from the destruction potential view, particularly if we take into account the interference of terrorism and organized crime with these weapons and their proliferation.

From such a perception results the rejection by the population and ecologists of nuclear plants with elements of real risk (accidents, seismic risks, old components, etc.), without taking into consideration the nuclear security measures at national and international level and the intense and effective cooperation in this field. To all this adds the fact that nuclear field and particularly nuclear energy produce radioactive waste for which no final accepted solution has been found³.

As the energetic scenarios foresee that, by 2050, the number of nuclear plants doubles, it's clear that, despite the intensification of international controls, there are all the conditions that the risks double because of the nuclear weapons proliferation, lack of safety, WMD terrorism expansion and faulty radioactive waste management.

Given the global proliferation risks, the international security organizations are very concerned



about the great nuclear power inconsistencies, the weaknesses of several countries possessing military or civilian nuclear installations, their gliding to non governable states, lacking authority, the existence of some regions beyond state control, elements facilitating the development of an active black market, disseminating such means.

Dipping into the future very lucidly, we perceive a dangerous reality and potentiality: the active nuclear proliferation race will go on because the need for nuclear energy is more and more acute, the nuclear weaponry prices are very high and they intersect with the proliferating interests of bad countries and Islamic fundamentalist nets.

2. Nuclear proliferation efficient control tools

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, established in 1970 and currently signed by 188 countries, had as its main objective the limitation of nuclear weapons to the five great powers possessing them at the time: USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China. The viability of this treaty seems doubtful as it is not observed by the very states signing it let alone the efforts of some non-signatory states to have atomic weapons.

This first and most important non-proliferation tool is among others: treaties, state organs and organizations, international organizations as U.N., EU, G8 or world organizations whose missions are disarming and non-proliferation (OIAC, AIEA) or different international initiatives as PSI, CSI etc whose activity tries to articulate joint solutions to a problem of a huge gravity to the future of the humankind.

The great powers nuclear strategy has tried and in time succeeded in finding elements of cooperation and consensus, of controlling and overturning the logic of the first shot threat, through Thomas Schelling's conception deduced from using the theory of games as a tool of conflict and cooperation strategies, threatening to use the second nuclear hit. This theory advised restraint and generated a system of mutual monitoring and signalling⁴.

Last year, at the New York NPT reunion, the International Agency for Nuclear Energy general manager, Mohamed El Baradei, suggested that the member states adopt a five-year moratorium regarding building the new centres of uranium enrichment. In his opinion, in the absence of such a moratorium, about 30 or 40 countries would have

rapid access to atomic weapons. Not only the international institutions representatives are worried about the evolution of events in the realm of proliferation but even the very states see the nuclear disarming perspectives fade away, this kind of disarming being the sole guarantor of non-proliferation and a fundamental problem of global peace.

It's obvious the fact that, although nuclear arsenals reduce significantly, countries' security policies are in a qualitative transformation drawing the international community attention. Keeping one's promises in the field is often ignored especially by nuclear countries. Hence the opinion of NPT member states representatives expressed at the reunion in New York that the nuclear disarming problem must be solved globally and included within a convention which should forbid improving, producing, storing, transferring and using nuclear weapons.

Especially that the generalized adoption of NPT additional protocol which foresees more profound inspections in the countries ratifying it seems to be problematic.

Numerous NPT members stated that nuclear powers didn't keep their commitments regarding "a disarmament" assumed at the conference in 2000.

It's also obvious the fact that the tragic events on the 11th of September 2001 couldn't justify such an approach of the only superpower of the world without creating powerful emotions of the American people. Here is the explanation of the new course of the US National Security Strategy, that of preventive actions stating the abandon of the former doctrines of deterring or damming for the defensive intervention that shifts war to the enemy in the international terrorist fief. The Nuclear Posture Review document depicted a new configuration of the American nuclear issue by revitalizing the nuclear weapons mechanisms, defining nuclear options variable in scope and objectives complementary with other non-nuclear tools. The most typical example is the nuclear research program called Reliable Replacement Warhead, launched two years ago.

Its objective is building more reliable, cheaper and less pretentious bombs. This program re-activates the American military industry nuclear sector. Extending nuclear options beyond conventional options could add the unwanted possibility to decrease the limit to use nuclear weapons.



If, from geopolitical and geostrategic reasons the great powers sign cooperation agreements with the South Asian countries that is because of economic interests translated by the visionary effort to harmonize their politics with a future expected by the Asian powers like India whose development concerns the West. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that Asia must be the object of Western attention because of its different situations⁵: owner countries, proliferating countries, non NPT countries, NPT violating countries, pacifist countries – which creates difficulties for the treaty and protracts it through technical manoeuvres.

From 1974 to 1998 two countries in that area, India and Pakistan, developed with the help of other owner countries complete nuclear programs, becoming nuclear powers. The ambiguity of the role of some of the nuclear powers in the region and the NPT limitations allowed then North Korea to conduct illegal military nuclear activities, more actively continued after its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003. Two years of ardent international negotiations were necessary for the North Korean state to accept in September 2005 its reintegration to NPT provided that it can continue its peaceful nuclear researches.

Finding some clandestine military nuclear programs and the difficulties in North Korea to verify the nuclear materials declared by this state have revealed the insufficient measures within the generalized guarantee agreements⁶. Though North Korea had consented, in an explicit agreement with the US, to limit their nuclear researches to civilian objectives, this country continued to sell medium-range missiles to other countries which could give them to terrorist organizations. Despite some interests like in Asia, the five NPT founding countries keep playing an important part in the process of nuclear weapons non-proliferation. In this respect they signed an additional protocol expressing their will to actively contribute to international peace and security. According to this agreement, the nuclear pentagon will provide AIEA with information on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy peaceful use as agreed with the non-nuclear countries. These countries accept the international control of the nuclear activities in cooperation with other states, stating that this cooperation doesn't favour the acquisition and possessing nuclear weapons by these ones. The five countries support the international non-proliferation regime.

To AIEA these additional protocols are very important because, even though they don't ensure preventing a clandestine nuclear program, they collect information about clandestine activities, allowing for these countries' stopping and sanctioning.

It's very important the fact that, out of the 60 countries subscribing to an additional protocol, several countries from the most sensitive areas like the Middle East are absent. Or these areas face with the risks existing within the realm of nuclear arsenal security, its destruction, the risks of stealing fissionable material or that of misappropriating the nuclear, material and human potential for the benefit of proliferating countries and the terrorist organizations.

The new non NPT nuclear powers are outside the international non-proliferation regime. This increases the fragility of the fight against nuclear proliferation. Hence the necessity to intensify the efforts destined to consolidate and improve the existent international tools.

Activating the international normative tools to control the NBC weapons proliferation represents the initiation of a process of ample preventive actions. As documents with a preventive value in the field, at the EU level were adopted the following: Declaration on weapons of mass destruction proliferation and The Basic principles for a EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its correspondent, The plan of action, finalized at the European Council at Salonic (20 June 2003). At its origin, it was the Council's decision in April 2002 adopted in the context of the fight against terrorism.

On 12-13 December 2003, there was adopted the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It emphasizes the significance of using the political and diplomatic preventive measures (the multilateral treaties and exports control regime) and appealing to the competent international organizations as the first line against the fight against proliferation. All these documents are consequences of the dramatic events on 11 September 2001 which confirmed the European conception that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their possible use by some actors, non necessarily countries, like the terrorist groups, is one on the most serious threats to the international security.



3. Non-proliferation regime generalization and consolidation

Post September 11th, AIEA warned on the existence of three main threats of nuclear terrorism: a direct attack destined to produce radioactive uncontrolled emission; using fissionable materials to make a bomb; detonating a nuclear bomb by some terrorist groups. Each of the 50 countries possessing nuclear installations could be anytime the object of terrorist attacks. The possibility to acquire fissionable materials is considered a threat from the ex-Soviet States and Pakistan. The most important problem is the destination of such illicit materials. A major nuclear risk represents also acquiring by terrorists of fissionable material like the enriched uranium, nuclear material reprocessed in nuclear plants or submarines' reactors or even used in daily activities as radiotherapy. The danger can also come from the researchers in the nuclear field who could go abroad and sell their knowledge to terrorist organizations.

All these explain why, at doctrinal and strategic level, September 11th caused the inclusion of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their launching systems within the global terrorist threat. Terrorist groups could launch a direct nuclear attack through the radioactive uncontrolled emission, attacking a nuclear installation, nuclear plant or detonating a bomb made of enriched fissionable materials. This justifies developing preventive actions, a preventive attack against a country or terrorist group before the threat is materialized. However the use of force must be the last resort, the international community intervention having the main role.

The Declaration on non-proliferation⁷ adopted in 2005 in Gleneable, Canada at the G8 Forum, insisted upon generalizing and consolidating the non-proliferation regime. It supported the proposal to adopt the International Convention on the repercussion of nuclear terrorism. The Convention created the legal framework necessary to punish the authors of such attacks and to eliminate their consequences. It also guarantees the civilian and military antiterrorist protection of nuclear domain and prevents the attacks with homemade nuclear weapons. The convention offers new possibilities to intensify the anti-terrorist cooperation under the UN care and to establish a general convention against international terrorism.

Also, the Security Council's Resolution no. 1540 was put into practice by most UN member states that presented reports on the national measures taken and the export control in favour of the non-proliferation and their contribution at the international cooperation in the field. The countries committed themselves to give a global answer to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by putting into practice the Security Initiative against terrorism and its Declaration of interdiction principles. They intensified the efforts regarding the fight against the proliferation net and the illicit financial fluxes establishing on an appropriated legal base concerted reparation procedures followed by blocking the respective financial operations.

As a global process, proliferation has its foundation stone the NPT, as the G8 Summit in Canada states. NPT must maintain its validity and consolidate its position and AIEA as the supporting institution must see that NPT is respected. As established in Sea Island, the countries must establish new measures to prevent the export of dangerous nuclear articles susceptible to be directed to states that could use them as weapons or let the terrorists seize them. The nuclear exporters must limit nuclear transfers to countries which don't observe the rules regarding the guarantees and non-proliferation. Over 70 countries committed themselves to apply AIEA's Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and was intensified the cooperation to strengthen the radioactive sources security in the world.

The British evaluations about the strategic tendencies in the first decades of the new millennium state the possibility to further develop weapons of mass destruction among which are weapons with radiological impulse. Such weapons have delayed lethal effects but their mass psychological impact is significant.

The resolutions of the UN General Assembly plenary Reunion in September 2005⁸ focus on the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation. In its final document, the Reunion emphasized the need to intensify the negotiations in the process of international non-proliferation and invited all states to ratify NPT reiterating its firm commitment to NPT and its three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The countries decided to act in a multilateral framework to prevent and eliminate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their de-



living means. The countries possessing nuclear weapons were demanded to take concrete measures in favour of nuclear disarmament in order to eliminate all weapons applying Article VI of the NPT, to maintain a moratorium on the nuclear explosions tests until the Global Treaty on Nuclear Tests Elimination comes into force, to strengthen NPT nuclear weapons control by ratifying the additional pattern protocol to prevent proliferation, to support the areas with no nuclear weapons, to reaffirm their commitment to the Negative Security Assurances. It was also stressed the idea to promote the agreements to prevent the expansion of enriched uranium and plutonium separation installations and technologies and also to encourage the countries members of the Convention on Nuclear Materials and Physical Protection to ratify the amendment adopted on the 8th of June 2005 and applying effective measures negotiated on multilateral level to prevent the armament race and the study of measures to fight against NBC weapons proliferation, and also the materials, technology, missile and portable surface-to-air missiles and forbidding their transfer to non-participant countries through effectively controlling national exports. It was demanded an involvement of the countries in shipping the radioactive materials across the regions called PEID – small developing insular states, a continuation of the dialog with PEID and other coastal countries in order to solve their problems regarding developing and strengthening the regulations about the security improvement and the validity and compensation of these transports.

In March 2006, the US National Security Strategy⁹ as a reply to transnational terrorism enters among the four important steps the non-acceptance to possess weapons of mass destruction by the *rogue states* and the terrorists' allies who won't hesitate using them. For this purpose, the most dangerous weapons will be kept far from the most dangerous peoples. As for the nuclear proliferation, SNS states that the best way to block the terrorists' nuclear aspirations is to block their access to the fissionable material essential ingredient. The document focuses on the fissionable material control through two major objectives: preventing the countries to have the capability to produce fissionable material to make nuclear weapons and deterring, forbidding or preventing any transfer of such materials from the states possessing this

capability to the *rogue states* or the terrorists.

The necessity to act against proliferation doesn't have to imply the use of military force. The proliferation problem will be solved through international diplomacy together with the key allies and regional partners but if needed, under the right of self-defence, the force will be used on the principle and logic of pre-emption before the attacks even if the moment and place of the attack aren't certain.

Iran is perhaps the hottest and most significant example from the American fears point of view that an Islamic state in close connection with the international terrorism would have real possibilities to produce nuclear weapons. After almost three years of diplomatic insistences neither the US or EU convinced Teheran to reach an agreement with them regarding the nuclear program, to close down a few nuclear reactors and to give up the verbal challenges to Israel. The great divergences regarding the sanctioning or non-sanctioning Iran for the continuation of its nuclear program stimulate Teheran to further develop its nuclear activity and Washington to prepare launching a military coup on Teheran's nuclear objectives. The very fact that one of the greatest oil-producing countries in the world insists on building nuclear reactors motivated by the need of electric energy is a big question mark for the activities in the field and its final intentions. By not ratifying NPT additional protocol, Iran didn't allow the AIEA inspecting its nuclear installations thing which confers great uncertainty alarming the American politicians and army.

The continuous tensions about Iran emphasize the difficulties of the international community in the problem of counteracting the mass-destruction weapons proliferation. If we consider the Conference for NPT analysis we see that, even if they wanted it, the member states couldn't reach an agreement stimulating a firmer attitude towards the countries withdrawing from the treaty or which are thought to violate its provisions. A likely example is the Security Initiative against Proliferation which gave big hopes to the international community in fighting the nuclear proliferation phenomenon but with little success for the UN.

As for NATO, it struggles to define its place within the international approaches to fight terrorism¹⁰, as a major threat to the world today. Its concerns about the proliferation cover the entire spectre of the Alliance's activities including those



with non-member or partner states both military and politically within the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) respectively the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP). Among the initiatives and activities launched or developed by the first group we mention: establish the Alliance's first ample and comprehensive assessment regarding the risks generated by the mass-destruction weapons proliferation, with the identification of the difficulties in the realm of mass-destruction weapons proliferation capabilities of NATO member states and establish plans to eliminate those difficulties; develop a new approach to build the Alliance's defence against mass-destruction weapons proliferation, through multinational capabilities based on national commitments realistically established; establish a post Prague response team and a disbandable analytical laboratory, of NATO CBRN Multinational Defence Battalion; establish the key threats dynamic evaluations regarding the proliferation, formulate the recommendations to the North Atlantic Council and prepare joint stands stated by the secretary general at its meetings; a greater attention paid to the partner countries and define the priorities of NATO efforts regarding the mass-destruction weapons; establish studies about the defence against missiles and the Alliance's potential support for PSI, the American initiative to fight the mass-destruction weapons proliferation, the systems to transport them and the adjacent materials to target¹, etc.

Our own analysis urges us to agree with NATO military specialists who state that the way to approach the proliferation threat is an important aspect within NATO transformation process which will ensure high tech hardware and improved software for making decisions given the new security challenges. Therefore it's only natural to have bigger hopes for the near future which can impose a more constructive dialogue and cooperation about the counter-proliferation problems and can find adequate answers to the important questions regarding the Alliance's ability and relevance to approach in a dynamic and efficient way such a serious threat for the 21st century.

Translated by Diana DIACONESCU

REFERENCES:

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006.

***, "A Vision for the Second Fifty Years of Nuclear Energy", INSC Comitee Report, 1996.

***, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, US Department Of Defense, January 2001 <http://www.defenselink.mil>

ALIGICĂ, Paul-Dragoș, *Despre raționalitate și iraționalitate strategică*, 22 Magazine, no. 823, December 12-18, 2005.

BINDER, Rodica, *Aria globalizării și duetul filozofic*, în ID (Idei în dialog) no. 4 (19), April, 2006.

CONSTANTIN, Marin, *Aspecte ale dimensiunii sociale a dezvoltării durabile a energiei nucleare în România*, National Energy Conference – CNE 2004, Neptun, June 13-17, 2004.

TERZUOLO, Eric R., *Combaterea proliferării ADM*, www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/graphics/contents/i3-a3-1b.jpg

VANDIER, Pierre, *La prolifération nucléaire en Asie menace-t-elle l'avenir du NPT?*, <http://www.diploweb.com/forum/vandier.htm>

Websites:

The International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, <http://www.nuclearfiles.org>

The Nuclear Weapon Archive, <http://nuclear-weaponarchive.org>

The RAND Corporation, www.rand.org

United Nations Organisation, <http://www.un.org>

NOTES:

¹ See Rodica BINDER, *Aria globalizării și duetul filozofic*, in ID (Idei în dialog) no. 4 (19), April 2006, p. 48.

² Marin CONSTANTIN, *Aspecte ale dimensiunii sociale a dezvoltării durabile a energiei nucleare în România*, National Energy Conference – CNE 2004, Neptun, June 13-17, 2004, http://www.cnr-cme.ro/FOREN2004/lucrari_foren_ro/s4/pdf_poster_s4/S4P-12-ro.pdf

³ Ibidem, p. 7.

⁴ Paul-Dragoș ALIGICĂ, *Despre raționalitate și iraționalitate strategică*, 22 Magazine, no. 823, December 12-18, 2005.

⁵ Pierre Vandier, *La prolifération nucléaire en Asie menace-t-elle l'avenir du NPT?*, <http://www.diploweb.com/forum/vandier.htm>

⁶ North Korea has also signed the NPT and a warranty general agreement with AIEA. According



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

to this agreement, it is allowed to verify the nuclear materials owned and declared by this state, but the prerogatives of the Agency's officials are limited, as they have only access to information and nuclear materials, within the inspected installations. An additional Protocol dated 1997 states that the signatory states are to communicate to the Agency not only information about the nuclear materials, but also about research and development, imports and exports of nuclear articles. This is how they achieved an increase efficacy of the international verifications and an important contribution for strengthening the international regime of non-

proliferation of nuclear weapons.

⁷ See www.g8.utoronto.ca/francais/2005gleneables/nonproliferation-fr.pdf

⁸ Check for details www.unicmor.ma/phpsite/pdf-files/REUNION%20DE%20HAUT%20NIVEAU.doc

⁹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006.

¹⁰ Eric R. TERZUOLO, *Combaterea proliferării ADM*, www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/graphics/contents/i3-a3-1b.jpg

General Professor Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD, is the Commandant (rector) of the National Defence University "Carol I". In his scientific and journalistic approaches from the "Strategic Impact" magazine he pleaded for developing some common efforts in order to increase the efficiency of combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in order to prepare some synthesized, smart strategies for fighting against terrorism, amplifying the multi-institutional, cooperative, pre-emptive character of the activities related to terrorism combating, for international solidarity within this field.



LESSONS OF HISTORY TO BE RE-LEARNED

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD

Currently, the strategic environment is dominated by information so that most of our knowledge needs to be revised in order to update them.

Lessons learned express continuity with our history and the ability to use others' experience in order to rapidly advance in accumulating knowledge and improving our skills. But lessons learned also have to be revised and updated in order to fit the requirements of future challenges of the strategic environment. Some lessons, considered already learned, has to be revised and updated because they have been partly forgotten or not well understood and applied from the very beginning. It seems that we have forgotten that the most probable answer for violence is violence and that enemy is no longer separated from our own troops, it is amongst us and sometimes from our side.

Democracy compels us to give the others a chance to have different opinion than ours without being considered enemy.

Information – one of the most dynamic factors of change – has revolutionized our thinking breaking the knowledge barriers thus making us give up routine and plough into a permanent struggle with ourselves in order to overcome our own limits.

While accumulating more and more knowledge we should not forget that this pyramid of information could fall anytime if not “restored” through re-assessment and renewal of those parts which no longer fit to reality and its tendencies. In this context, lessons learned footprint should be at least periodically re-assessed and validated within the vast patrimony of military science according to current requirements and especially to security-environment-related perspective requirements.

1. Violence gives birth to violence

It is rightly said that a clever person learns from others' experience and a less clever one not even from his. For the purpose of this common law,

“lessons learned” have lately been particularly emphasized with the focus of attention on structures whose task is to collect, analyze and capitalize on those findings, concept, structure, function, and operation-related, capable of adapting the military body to security environment requirements.

As for the principles, structures prove appropriate and the system operational. However, there are several question marks concerning lessons learned efficiency, and particularly concerning the way they are understood and applied.

So, it has been since ancient times a generally acknowledged fact that violence gives birth to violence and military occupation has almost always generated a repelling reaction in various forms: sabotage, riots, guerilla and partisan warfare, liberation wars, etc. Nevertheless, the most frequent solution currently adopted to settle conflicts is a military one. Moreover, although militarily peace enforcement has proved a non-lasting approach, because of its temporary and short-term characteristic, troops are sent to enforce peace in different regions worldwide.

Decision to employ the military for peace enforcement is to great extent reminiscence of the Cold War, of the responsive mentality and the **balance of terror**, respectively. Strong arguments in support of this statement are those numerous areas of conflict, frozen (chronic, dormant) but not terminated, where peace is kept (read defended) or monitored by UN forces: **conflict in Kashmir**, lasting since 1947 and under UN observation since 1949; **conflict in Cyprus** ended with separation of Turkish and Hellenic communities. Since 1964, UN observers have monitored the peace process in the region and starting from 1974 their tasks have been extended both to provide a separation stripe between the two communities and to conduct humanitarian operations; most of the UN Security Council resolutions and 3 (three) peace operations have been generated as a result of the **conflicts in the Middle East**: UNTSO in 1948 to monitor fire



ceasing between Israelis and Palestinians; UNDOF in 1974 to monitor fire ceasing on Golan Heights, between Israel and Syria, and UNIFIL in 1978 to monitor fire ceasing between Lebanon and Israel and the list may be added with: MINUSRO – Morocco 1991; MONUC – Congo 1999; UNMIK – Kosovo 1999; UNMEE – Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000; UNMIL – Liberia 2003; ONUB – Burundi 2004; UNOCI – Ivory Coast 2004; MIMUSTAH – Haiti 2004, etc.

Terrorist attack on 9th September 2001 against World Trade Center's Twin Towers in New York convinced everybody, forever, we think, that a responsive attitude cannot be an efficient approach in the fight against terrorism and those advocating unconventional warfare.

The solution chosen by the greater powers of the world and some regional powers – *preventive measures* – is also based on violence and the result is what we see in Afghanistan and Iraq: military confrontation has been won but not the peace. It is difficult to foresee how stabilization and reconstruction will end and the conclusion reached by President George W Bush is rather meaningful: *"this will be a long and tough war"*.

In order to learn again the lesson of violence causing violence we should be able to free ourselves from the anathema put on us by the ancestors whose strong belief was that the very core of human nature is violent (*homo homini lupus*) and, therefore, human being *"destiny is to immolate himself"*¹.

2. Better know the enemy

The reason why we should know our enemy is something we all are aware of but it was Sun Tzu who gave one of the most comprehensive answers: *"That one who knows both his enemy and himself will not be in danger in a hundred of battles. That one who does not know his enemy but knows himself will sometimes gain victory. That one who knows neither his enemy nor himself will be immutably defeated in any battle."*²

Need to know as much as possible about an enemy has resulted in concepts and development of a large and extremely sophisticated range of devices for collecting, processing and transmitting information, from a simple observation with optical equipment to permanent surveillance and registration of visual and infrared data by means of sat-

ellites. Moreover, to avoid surprise and maintain data veracity specific equipment for almost real time transmission is used.

However, the camouflage and deception are still efficient measures as Gulf War, operations in Kosovo and, partially, Afghanistan proves it.

Competition between reconnaissance equipment and concepts on one hand and camouflage and deception concepts on the other hand will continue either successfully or unsuccessfully for both sides. NATO objective of gaining **information dominance** as part of the concept related to **supremacy over the whole spectrum of armed operations** will lead to a better coordination of all forces and capabilities designated to enemy surveillance and reconnaissance.

Nevertheless, current concepts related to data collecting equipment employment are to a great extent dependent on conventional warfare where enemy and friendly forces are separated by a *"front line."* This conclusion has been emphasized by several security incidents (unauthorized landing of a commercial aircraft in the Red Square in Moscow; unauthorized intrusion of an aircraft in the airspace over the White House and its crash in the garden of the US presidential residence, etc.), but it appeared dramatically acute on 9th September, 2001. After this tragic event, an American military specialist bitterly admitted that the outwards-oriented defense system proved ineffective for such terrorist attacks.

The events before and after the terrorist attack against USA in September 2001 have demonstrated that **the enemy is among us**. Today it is widely acknowledged the fact that most of those ones who attacked the Twin Towers in New York studied either in the United States or in other Western countries³, or travelled at least once in US. Also, many of the former or current sponsors of terrorism studied in Western countries⁴ or, like ayatollah Khomeini, they were granted asylum there.

Another factor that should make us act more decisively to adjust the lesson about knowing the enemy to unconventional conflicts and asymmetric threats is the surprising, although uncomfortable, conclusion that **the enemy could be one of us**. Surprising is not the fact that betrayal occurs, this have always happened and it is likely to happen again and again. But our warriors' breach of international laws may cause serious damage to a military conflict. This was the situation in Abu



Ghraib⁵ prison which inflamed international public opinion and led to increased hostility of aboriginal population and Muslims worldwide towards multinational coalition in Iraq. It is true that there have been numerous breaches of international laws in centuries but now, as a result of mass-media active participation in monitoring the conflict areas (so-called “CNN Effect”), news are broadcast all over the world within minutes or hours, triggering a negative reaction that might be crucial to political decisions. It is worth recalling the war in Vietnam ended in a peace process not in victory, because the American public opinion was bringing pressure to bear on the political decision-makers to withdraw the troops and stop the war against North Vietnam.

On the other hand, when it is a war against terrorism and for human rights, the shock is greater if those ones involved in fighting for such an important cause commit abuses of prisoners. Coming back to Sun Tzu, we can see how much „*self-knowledge*” weighs, before facing an enemy.

3. Who is not with us is not necessarily against us

Samuel Huntington famous theory – the clash of civilizations – predicts „*replacing of the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed.*”⁶ This gloomy perspective is intensified by some religious extremists who aim at gaining the political power and, taking advantage of the precarious social and economical conditions in which most of the followers of other than Christians live⁷, accuse „*globalization, Christian world and Jews*”⁸ of this situation while promising a better life and fight to defend their faith and against those ones who bear the responsibility.

There are people who believe the West has replaced missionary work for spreading the Christianity with the „*rhetoric of universality, human rights, democracy and market economy*”⁹ that is another way for extending its influence and dominance. Cultural differences generally should not lead to other clashes, except the ones between ideas, at a debate level aiming at finding a commonly accepted conclusion or at least one which is not rejected, does not offend others’ sensitivities and leave the door open for dialogue in order to bring positions closer.

The clash of civilizations should not be understood as a fight „*who against whom*” but a competition to attract as many followers as possible. That is why labels such as „*cultural superiority*”, „*cultural underdevelopment*”, or „*dominant culture and... inferior culture*”¹⁰ should not be used. Hierarchies are not suitable as far as culture is concerned; they cause tensions that may be escalated through emotional involvement of their promoters and followers.

Differences between civilizations have always been and they will be as long as humankind exists. Mao’s attempts to „*homogenize*” through „*cultural revolution*”, imitated by Ceaușescu, Gaddafi and others lamentably ended. It is true that the milestones of the contemporary civilizations are not the same with our ancestors’. It is also a historically registered fact that several civilizations disappeared in times. Under the globalization and integration pressure, part of existing civilizations’ features is likely to disappear too, but this process takes time offering people the right to choose. Trying to dictate a higher tempo may determine, most likely, a rejection reaction as it currently happens in Saudi Arabia¹¹, Middle East, which tends to spread across the whole Muslim world.

Another clash, partially destructive, occurs between Hinduism and Islam in India, a country with about 15% Muslim population.

Attempt promoted by Western countries to extend globalization in Asia meets also China’s rejection, whose Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 90s asked: “*How is it possible that the United States with a 200-years political tradition teach a nation with a 4000-years tradition?*”¹²

Among the features which make the main difference between the East and the West is the way we place our existence on a time scale. As we know, for most Westerners „*time is money*”, which increases the importance of the motto „*faster is better*” in evaluating the efficiency. For Asians, time has no limits and seems to solve any problem even though it might last days, years or ... generations until the expected event happens (Hong Kong and Macao province come back to China again). These different attitude and rhythm may cause problems but they are not insuperable, and time could be our ally or enemy, depending on the extent to which we keep us informed and take account of our partners’ cultural characteristics. That one who has a different opinion from us is not necessarily our



enemy but it is up to us to a great extent that that one (international player) stays neutral, becomes an enemy or our ally. Even though we are right in following a certain cause, it is our task to persuade our partners and invite our enemies to dialogue in order to better know each other's views. Better mutual knowledge may and should lead to increased confidence and help us to avoid conflicts.

It is easy to cross the way to conflict but using force solves the problems only temporarily. Cooperation and confidence are ways ahead towards a safer world.

NOTES:

¹ Georges CORM, **Europa și Orientul (De la balcanizare la liberalizare: istoria unei modernități neîmplinite)**, Editura Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 1999, p.7.

² Sun TZU, **The Art of War**, Westriew Press, 1994, p.179.

³ Daniel BENJAMIN, Steven SIMON, **The Age of Sacred Terror (Radical Islam's War Against America)**, Random House Trade Paperback, 2003, New York.

⁴ Barry R. SCHNEIDER, Jerold M. POST (editors), **Know Thy Enemy**, USAF Conterproliferation Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2003, p.250.

⁵ Kate ZERNIKE, *Abu Ghraib Guard Recounts a Night of Violence*, International Herald Tribune, 15-16.05.2004, p.1.

⁶ Samuel HUNTINGTON, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Foreign Affairs (review), No.72 (Summer 1993), pp.22-49.

⁷ Raisa K. KADYRORA, *Protection of Power in Central Asia: Using Terror as a pretext? A Kyrgyz Ngo's vision*, in **Facing The Terrorist Challenge**, edited by the Bureau for Security Police at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, National Defence Academy, Vienna, Austria, April 2005, pp.185-207.

⁸ x x x *Notebook of a Terrorist*, in Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, pp.37-38.

⁹ Bassam TIBI, *Islam Between Culture and Politics*, cited by David G. KIBBLE, in *The Attacks of 9/11: Evidence of a clash of Religions?*, Parameters, U.S. Army War College, vol. XXXII, Autumn 2002, p.38.

¹⁰ Ilie BĂDESCU, Dan DUNGACIU, **Sociologia și Geopolitica Frontierei**, Editura Floare Albastră, București, 1995, pp. 18-19.

¹¹ Ralf PETERS, *Rolling Back Radical Islam*, Parameters, U.S.Army War College Quarterly, vol. XXXII, No.3, Autumn 2002, pp.5-6.

¹² Karl MAGYAR, *Challenge and Response. Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 1994, p. 16.

Major General Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD, is the Deputy-Chief of Air Force Staff. He has written books, studies and articles on military strategy and art, national and international security.



CRITIQUE DE LA GÉOPOLITIQUE*

Dr. Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE

La géopolitique est une science controversée. Même s'il est trop tôt pour parler d'une renaissance durable, même si l'institutionnalisation universitaire se fait toujours attendre (en dehors de quelques chaires ou centres de recherches isolés), nous sommes en présence d'un véritable mouvement de fond.

L'incertitude épistémologique et théorique demeure. On ne sait pas très bien ce qu'est la géopolitique. En tout cas, ses multiples définitions sont, soit vagues ou équivoques, soit contradictoires. Au-delà de cette incertitude, reste le besoin, confusément ressenti, d'une explication globale. Le progrès des sciences sociales a pour contrepartie inévitable leur spécialisation, leur atomisation: chaque spécialiste en sait de plus en plus, mais sur un domaine de plus en plus restreint. La géopolitique peut être comprise comme une tentative de suggérer des grands cadres d'explication qui, à défaut d'être d'une grande solidité théorique, ont le mérite de rendre intelligible la masse des phénomènes contemporains et de définir des orientations, positives ou négatives. Elle reprend, en somme, le programme qui fut celui de la sociologie à ses débuts. Aucune objection ne pourra jamais prévaloir contre cette volonté d'ordre et de compréhension globale des phénomènes sociaux.

Le XIX^e siècle a été celui du scientisme: la science triomphante prétendait pouvoir tout expliquer. On a alors vu proliférer des systèmes d'explication tous aussi dogmatiques et déterministes les uns que les autres. Parmi ces déterminismes, trois ont connu, au XX^e siècle, une fortune particulière: le déterminisme racial, théorisé par des auteurs comme Vacher de Lapouge, Chamberlain ... et repris à son compte par le national-socialisme allemand; le déterminisme économique, porté à son point de perfection par Marx et ses innombrables successeurs; le déterminisme physique ou envi-

ronnemental, théorisé par de multiples penseurs réunis sous l'appellation globale de géopolitique.

A priori, ces différents déterminismes sont exclusifs l'un de l'autre, puisque chacun prétend détenir la clef du comportement des acteurs internationaux. Dans la pratique, ils ont souvent trouvé des accommodements. Le déterminisme racial s'est ainsi combiné avec le déterminisme physique, sinon dans les travaux de Haushofer, du moins dans la *vulgate* que le régime nazi en a tirée: le peuple le plus doué par la nature a vocation à occuper tout l'espace désigné par la géographie. Les passerelles entre le déterminisme économique et le déterminisme physique sont plus difficiles à établir. À première vue, les deux systèmes d'explication semblent incompatibles et ils ont eu tendance à se définir comme ennemis: la géopolitique allemande a été une réaction contre le danger bolchevique et la géopolitique a été officiellement condamnée dans la Russie soviétique, pour des raisons à la fois théoriques (le rejet de tout déterminisme autre qu'économique) et historiques (la confrontation entre les deux totalitarismes communiste et national-socialiste). Néanmoins, il est possible de déceler une matrice de raisonnement semblable: sans nier la multiplicité des facteurs intervenant dans la vie sociale, tant le marxisme que la géopolitique prétendent placer au coeur de l'analyse un facteur déterminant. Et de la même manière qu'il y a un marxisme primaire, dogmatique, et un marxisme "évolué", qui ne fait plus intervenir le déterminisme économique qu' "en dernière instance", la géopolitique se décline sur une gamme extrêmement diversifiée, qui va de l'explication par les strictes données géographiques à la prise en compte de toutes les données de l'environnement physique ou humain. D' ailleurs, quelques auteurs marxistes célèbres se sont dangereusement approchés des eaux troubles de la géopolitique, il suffit de songer aux thèses célèbres de Karl Wittfogel sur le despotisme hydraulique¹.

* Cet article est issu de deux études préliminaires, «Bilan de la géopolitique» dans *Géopolitique et conflits au XX^e siècle*, actes du 27^e Colloque international d'histoire militaire, Athènes, 2001, et «L'aventure de la géopolitique», *Relations internationales*, 109, juin 2002, en attendant une très improbable synthèse.



Cette vision sera jugée simpliste par les géopoliticiens contemporains, qui s'efforcent de promouvoir une géopolitique complexe, éloignée de tout déterminisme, s'attachant à rendre compte de la globalité d'un système. Cette tendance a notamment été illustrée en France, de manière différente, par Yves Lacoste et l'école d'Herodote, qui a ressuscité la discipline après une longue éclipse, et par François Thual dont l'oeuvre abondante sur les constructions identitaires et le désir de territoire a suscité un écho certain. Mais on se heurte alors à l'objection centrale qui était déjà celle que Fernand Braudel adressait à la géographie: "S'il n'y a plus de déterminisme, il n'y a plus de géographie"². Propos excessifs, inspirés par le souvenir de disputes corporatistes datant, sinon du déluge, du moins des passes d'armes feutrées entre Lucien Febvre et l'école de géographie humaine de Vidal de la Blache et d'Emmanuel de Martonne³. Mais il n'est pas abusif de transposer l'objection à la fille naturelle, ou adultérine, de la géographie: s'il n'y a plus de déterminisme, il n'y a plus de géopolitique. En quoi, en effet, se distinguerait-elle de la géographie intelligemment pratiquée? Et si elle prend en compte la globalité des facteurs, pourquoi faut-il lui donner un intitulé commençant par géo, donc renvoyant à un ordre précis de facteurs? Autant de questions qui renvoient à l'indétermination du champ et du statut de la géopolitique.

Une géopolitique mal connue

Le fondement géographique de la politique et de la stratégie est connu de toute éternité, il était déjà affirmé par Sun Zi au IV^e siècle avant notre ère et on retrouve le thème tant chez les théoriciens politiques, avec la justification des guerres de conquête, que chez les géographes militaires⁴. Mais c'est au XX^e siècle que la géopolitique se constitue véritablement: Le Suédois Kjellen lui donne son nom en 1916 et plusieurs géographes lui donnent, par des voies indépendantes, mais à peu près simultanément, ses textes fondateurs: Mackinder⁵, avec sa célèbre conférence de 1904 sur le pivot géographique de l'histoire⁶; Ratzel, avec sa *Politische Geographie*⁷, en attendant les développements de l'entre-deux-guerres qui culmineront en Allemagne avec l'école du général-docteur Karl Haushofer⁸, et dans le monde anglo-saxon, avec Mackinder toujours, qui fait le bilan de la Première Guerre mondiale dans *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1922), puis esquisse les perspectives

de l'après Deuxième Guerre mondiale avec son non moins célèbre article "The round world and the winning of the peace" (1943)⁹. Les États-Unis prennent le relais de la Grande-Bretagne déclinante (tant sur un plan pratique que théorique) avec le plus grand des successeurs de Mackinder, Nicholas J. Spykman, professeur à Yale, qui pose le programme d'action globale des États-Unis face à l'axe germano-japonais dans *America's Strategy in World Politics* (1942) avant d'esquisser l'équivalent face à l'Union soviétique dans l'ouvrage posthume et inachevé, *The Geography of the Peace* (1943)¹⁰.

Suivra ensuite une longue période de discrédit de la géopolitique, tant du fait de sa collusion avec l'expansionnisme hitlérien ou japonais que du surclassement du facteur territorial par le facteur économique durant les Trente Glorieuses. La riche école américaine s'interrompt brutalement à la fin des années 40¹¹. En France, le Que sais-je? du contre-amiral Pierre Célérier, *Géopolitique et géostratégie* (1955, 3^e éd. 1969) va longtemps rester la référence unique. Ce n'est qu'à partir des années 1980 que s'amorcera un retour de faveur, grâce notamment à l'action de géographes venus de l'extrême-gauche qui laveront ainsi la géopolitique de sa souillure originelle: Peter Taylor et sa revue *Political Geography* en Grande Bretagne, Yves Lacoste et sa revue *Hérodote* en France.

Telles sont les grandes lignes d'un tableau largement accepté, mais sommaire et, pour tout dire, caricatural. En fait, le bilan de la géopolitique n'est pas seulement celui du passif des géopoliticiens, il est d'abord le constat de nos ignorances qui sont immenses, tant d'un point de vue historique qu'épistémologique.

Pour une histoire de la géopolitique

Sur un plan historique, les présentations habituelles de la géopolitique tombent dans le travers fréquent qui consiste à réduire un courant de pensée à quelques grands noms qui ont réussi et, plus encore, à réduire des pensées complexes à quelques formules sonores, mais mal comprises et vite transformées en caricatures: le *Heartland* de Mackinder, les panrégions de Haushofer, le *Rimland* de Spykman ...

Il n'y a pas lieu de s'en étonner, car la géopolitique se veut opératoire: elle n'est pas une science pure, elle doit déboucher sur des programmes d'action.



On pourrait lui appliquer la formule de Raymond Aron relative au marxisme: “*la doctrine contient une théorie et fonde une propagande*”. Bien évidemment, ce sont les aspects simplifiés de la doctrine ou même la caricature de la propagande qui retiennent l’attention. Mackinder n’a-t-il pas donné un encouragement à cette dérive avec sa célèbre formule: “*celui qui domine le Heartland contrôle la World Island, celui qui domine la World Island contrôle le monde*”? Formule inepte et vicieuse dans son énoncé même, avec le glissement pervers entre *to rule et to control*, mais qui a connu une éclatante fortune. Ratzel n’est-il pas à l’origine des pires excès hitlériens, avec son fameux *Lebensraum* que l’on traduit généralement par espace vital? Pourtant, André-Louis Sanguin a bien montré, mais sans beaucoup d’échos, que Ratzel pensait plutôt à un espace de vie sans la connotation raciste et agressive que lui donneront ses successeurs. C’est le devoir de l’historien d’aller au delà des clichés pour rétablir le contexte historique et la diversité d’un courant de pensée. La géopolitique ne fut pas unitaire: le seul affrontement théorique entre l’école anglo-saxonne et l’école allemande suffit à le montrer et même à l’intérieur de ces écoles, on pouvait trouver plus que des nuances (Mackinder vs Fairgrieve et Amery; Haushofer vs Niedermayer ...). Elle ne l’est pas davantage aujourd’hui: la géopolitique française contemporaine offre une palette idéologique complète, d’Aymeric Chauprade à Yves Lacoste, en passant par François Thual et le général Gallois.

D’où la nécessité de dépasser les figures emblématiques pour retrouver quantité d’auteurs, de revues, d’écoles nationales tombés dans l’oubli ou marginalisés par l’obstacle linguistique. Malgré la surabondance de la littérature sur la géopolitique, on ne dispose d’aucune histoire sérieuse qui permette d’avoir une idée de son développement réel. Le travail de recensement des auteurs et des écoles est à faire entièrement. Il est le préalable indispensable à une “pesée globale” de la géopolitique. On ne peut ici donner que quelques pistes¹².

La France, traditionnellement réticente à l’égard du déterminisme géographique (elle préfère le possibilisme théorisé par Vidal de La Blache)¹³, n’a pas fourni une contribution de première grandeur à la géopolitique. Elle s’est plutôt inscrite en contrepoint de la pensée allemande, avec *La France de l’Est* de Vidal de La Blache (1917), publié en pleine guerre pour justifier la revendication du retour de

l’Alsace-Lorraine, ou avec la *Géopolitique* (1936) de Jacques Ancel, qui est une réaction face à la montée du péril nazi. Mais elle a aussi fourni quelques essais géopolitiques de valeur, par exemple celui de l’amiral Castex qui, dans le tome V de ses *Théories Stratégiques* – “*la Terre contre la Mer*” dans *De Gengis Khan à Staline* (1935)¹⁴, a proposé une vision dialectique de l’affrontement entre puissance maritime et puissance continentale, bien plus riche que l’unilatéralisme anglo-saxon hérité de Seeley (historien britannique aujourd’hui trop oublié) et de Mahan. Mais on trouve aussi de véritables écoles géopolitiques en Italie, autour de la problématique méditerranéenne, du début du XX^e siècle jusqu’à l’intéressant petit livre de l’amiral di Giamberardino, *Mediterraneo centro strategico del mondo* (1942)¹⁵; au Japon avec la *Chiseigaku*, restée à peu près inconnue à cause de la langue alors qu’elle a connu un fort développement dans les années trente¹⁶; en Amérique latine, avec une littérature d’une profusion étourdissante, dominée par quelques auteurs de grande valeur, trop peu connus: le Brésilien Mario Travassos, maréchal de son état, dont le livre *Projecao continental do Brasil* (1931, 1938) a été directement à l’origine des politiques ultérieures de colonisation de l’Amazonie. Il a ouvert une voie qui a été poursuivie par les généraux Golbery (*Geopolitica do Brasil*, 1952, 1967) et Meira Mattos (*Projecao mundial do Brasil*, 1960) et par le professeur Theresinha de Castro. L’école argentine a été fondée par l’amiral Segundo Storni, avec son livre *Intereses Argentinos en el mar* (1916) et elle s’est poursuivie, avec des aléas, jusqu’à nos jours, par exemple à travers la revue *Estrategia* du général Guglielmelli¹⁷. Le Chili, lui aussi, a développé sa propre école: le général Augusto Pinochet Ugarte est l’auteur d’un estimable manuel de géopolitique (*Geopolitica*, 1964), même s’il est connu pour d’autres raisons. Il n’est aucun pays d’Amérique latine qui ait échappé à cet engouement, y compris la Bolivie enclavée qui a développé une production indigène dominée par Alipio Valencia Vega¹⁸. On pourrait multiplier les exemples. Tout cet immense corpus devra être au moins survolé avant de prétendre porter un jugement un tant soit peu argumenté.

Une géopolitique mal définie

Mais le travail de recensement des auteurs, d’identification de leurs discours, n’est qu’un aspect du problème. Pas d’histoire sans théorie dit-



on souvent. Combien plus encore cette maxime trouve-t-elle à s'appliquer à la géopolitique! En effet, la question centrale est de savoir de quoi on parle: toute géographie politique est-elle géopolitique? Ou, à l'inverse, faut-il limiter l'étiquette aux seuls auteurs qui s'en sont réclamés, ce qui réduit singulièrement (et abusivement) le champ d'investigation? Comme toujours, la vérité se situe probablement dans un juste milieu, mais où situer celui-ci? La géopolitique n'a pratiquement jamais reçu de consécration universitaire, de sorte qu'elle n'est qu'un rejeton plus ou moins bâtard de la géographie. En tout cas, elle n'est pas une discipline institutionnalisée.

Serait-elle alors un champ d'investigation? Il semble difficile de ranger sous sa bannière tous les géographes (ou autres) qui se sont intéressés aux rapports entre l'espace et la puissance, et dont certains ont catégoriquement récusé le concept même de géopolitique.

Une méthode peut-être? Saül B. Cohen, l'un des rares géopoliticiens américains des années 60, n'a pas recensé moins de six méthodes géopolitiques¹⁹, confirmant par là la conviction de Haushofer, lequel s'était toujours refusé à écrire un traité de géopolitique: il n'y a pas de la méthode géopolitique en soi²⁰. La géopolitique fait usage de diverses méthodes qu'utilisent les sciences sociales et notamment la géographie.

La solution la plus expédiente ne serait-elle point alors de dire que la géopolitique ne fut qu'un moment, peu glorieux, de la géographie qui se serait compromise avec le fascisme? Mackinder et Spykman n'ont jamais revendiqué l'appellation et ce serait par un abus de langage qu'on les qualifierait de géopoliticiens. Malheureusement, l'obstination d'Yves Lacoste à revendiquer aujourd'hui l'appellation géopolitique (et il n'est pas le seul) suffit à ruiner cette solution trop simple. La géopolitique est toujours là, son retour en force depuis une vingtaine d'années dans de nombreux pays est un fait incontestable et elle a même suscité une discipline soeur (ou filiale) avec la géostratégie qui connaît un certain développement aux États-Unis, avec, entre autres, Colin Gray (maintenant installé en Grande-Bretagne)²¹, Zbigniew Brzezinski (qui s'inscrit beaucoup plus, tant par son approche globale que par son dogmatisme, dans la tradition géopolitique que dans celle de la géostratégie dont il se réclame)²². Au passage, on notera que si le développement de la géostratégie est récent depuis

son lancement par le géographe américain John B. Cressey en 1944, celui-ci a repris sans le savoir un concept qui préexistait à celui de géopolitique: le mot de géostratégie a, en effet, été forgé par un auteur italien, le général Giacomo Durando²³, dès 1846 et il a survécu, modestement, sur le pourtour méditerranéen: on le retrouve en espagnol dans les années 1890 chez le colonel Castaños y Montijanos, puis en 1932 en portugais chez un géographe militaire de première ordre, le colonel Miranda Cabral. Le constat est identique pour la géoéconomie, récemment mise à la mode par Edward Luttwak aux États-Unis, Pascal Lorot²⁴ en France; tout le monde ignore qu'ils ne font que reprendre un concept forgé dès 1930 par un auteur grec, Konstantin Sfyris (*Geoikonomia tai ikonomia*). Simples exemples du travail qui reste à faire pour établir les généalogies intellectuelles, préalable indispensable à toute définition compréhensive, comme dirait Max Weber.

Autant dire que toute tentative de définition de la géopolitique serait, pour l'instant, prématurée. Le mot se rapproche davantage des pré-notions chères à la sociologie durkheimienne que des concepts hérités de la philosophie, enfermés dans un entrelacs rigoureux de définitions, de relations et de dérivés.

Science globale ou science partielle?

L'inventeur du mot, le Suédois Rudolf Kjellén, plaidait pour une science totale de l'État organique dont la géopolitique ne devait être qu'une composante. À côté de la géopolitique, il envisageait une science sur la composante démographique: la démopolitique, une science centrée sur la structure sociale: la sociopolitique, une science centrée sur les structures économiques: l'écopolitique, et enfin une science politique au sens strict, qu'il avait d'abord curieusement appelée politique de régiment et que ses successeurs ont plus élégamment rebaptisée kratopolitique²⁵. La géopolitique n'était donc qu'un élément d'une science beaucoup plus vaste.

Pourquoi donc la partie s'est-elle substituée au tout? C'est l'un des grands problèmes de l'histoire des idées contemporaines et l'on ne peut encore, en l'absence de biographies et de monographies nationales ou catégorielles en nombre suffisant, que hasarder des hypothèses bien incertaines. Le projet d'une science totale de l'État était bien trop ambitieux, surtout lorsque Kjellén écrivait, et il



n'avait aucune chance d'aboutir. Par la suite, lorsque les progrès de l'épistémologie et de la recherche auraient pu le rendre plus crédible, la conception organiciste qui le sous-tendait était passée de mode et l'État n'était plus nécessairement le pivot de l'analyse globale: au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, priorité était plutôt donnée aux facteurs économiques dorénavant perçus comme centraux, l'interrogation des sociologues portait plutôt sur l'éventuel déclin des idéologies (question posée par Edward Shils dès 1956²⁶) et, plus généralement, de la politique. Le problème d'une science totale ne se posait donc plus dans les mêmes termes.

Géopolitique et géographie

En laissant de côté la question d'une science globale, on retrouve la question initiale: pourquoi la géopolitique plutôt que la démopolitique ou l'écopolitique? La réponse semble liée à l'orientation et à l'institutionnalisation de la science géographique au sein du monde universitaire. L'université ne crée pas nécessairement les grands courants de pensée dans le monde contemporain, mais elle leur donne une légitimité scientifique et les ancre dans la longue durée²⁷.

La géographie, à la fin du XIXe siècle, était une discipline en plein essor, bien enracinée dans l'Université et les grands fondateurs de la géopolitique (qu'ils aient ou non revendiqué l'appellation) étaient souvent des géographes (Ratzel en Allemagne, Mackinder en Grande-Bretagne, Kjellèn en Suède). Ils ont fourni une contribution majeure parce que leur discipline les préparait, mieux que les autres, à cette compréhension des grands problèmes mondiaux. L'économie, également en plein essor et tout à fait institutionnalisée au sein de l'enseignement supérieur, était plutôt centrée sur l'entreprise (avec l'analyse marginaliste d'Alfred Marshall), donc moins sensible à ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui la théorie macroéconomique. La science historique, alors dominée par l'école positiviste, était surtout soucieuse d'objectivité des sources et répugnait aux synthèses trop englobantes, qu'elle jugeait non scientifiques. Quant à la démographie ou à la science politique, leur institutionnalisation était encore embryonnaire et la deuxième était plutôt tournée vers les problèmes internes aux États. Elle ne s'intéressait guère aux relations internationales, qui resteront sous la coupe des juristes jusqu'aux années 1930-1940²⁸.

Mais cette avance relative de la géographie, si elle a permis l'essor initial de la géopolitique dans les premières décennies du XXe siècle, s'est retournée contre celle-ci lorsqu'elle a prétendu acquérir une légitimité académique. Les géographes n'ont pas accepté de se voir supplantés par des géopoliticiens plus proches du pouvoir politique, mais moins sensibles aux enjeux d'objectivité et d'indépendance de l'analyse. Pour la corporation des géographes universitaires, la géopolitique était une doctrine au service d'une visée politique, plus qu'une théorie susceptible de fonder un champ académique du savoir. Cette résistance corporatiste a été couronnée de succès: la géopolitique n'a jamais acquis de véritable statut académique. Même dans l'Allemagne nazie, Haushofer a obtenu des moyens substantiels, une grande notoriété, mais la corporation des géographes ne s'est pas rangée sous sa bannière. Les chaires de géopolitique ont plutôt été créées, quant il y en a eu (particulièrement en Amérique latine), dans le cadre des écoles de guerre, c'est-à-dire de l'enseignement militaire supérieur.

Géopolitique et politique

Cette ambiguïté n'a pas seulement joué contre la géopolitique dans ses relations avec l'université. Trop peu scientifique aux yeux des universitaires, elle l'était encore trop aux yeux du pouvoir politique, qui ne s'en est jamais servi que lorsque cela correspondait à ses propres conceptions. On sait aujourd'hui que Haushofer n'a jamais été l'inspirateur du programme hitlérien et que ses relations avec la hiérarchie nazie ont été pour le moins compliquées: comblé d'honneurs et de subsides d'un côté, il était marginalisé de l'autre, quand sa revendication du Tyrol peuplé de germanophones allait à l'encontre de l'alliance avec l'Italie fasciste ou quand son plaidoyer pour un bloc continental germano-soviétique heurtait l'obsession anti-bolchévique de Hitler²⁹.

On retrouve cette ambiguïté dans toutes les écoles de géopolitique. La *Chiseigaku* (mot japonais pour géopolitique) a théorisé l'idée de sphère de coprosperité, mais celle-ci avait d'abord été conçue dans les milieux militaires et la *Chiseigaku* n'est intervenue qu'après coup. En outre, si elle a bien mis en lumière les conséquences diplomatiques et stratégiques de cette politique, rejoignant le point de vue de la marine, elle n'a jamais réussi à les faire admettre par l'armée de terre, qui est



restée jusqu' au bout dominante dans l'appareil militaire japonais. Il en a résulté une sous-estimation du risque de guerre et, une fois celle-ci déclenchée, une sous-estimation du théâtre Pacifique (ce que les Occidentaux appellent guerre du Pacifique était pour les Japonais la guerre de la grande Asie) qui s'est révélée fatale³⁰.

On ne peut guère citer qu'un seul cas véritablement probant de vision géopolitique ayant fondé une politique suivie: c'est celui de la colonisation de l'Amazonie, directement issue des travaux de l'école du général Travassos et de ses successeurs mais, il faut le souligner, cette école était presque exclusivement militaire et les géographes civils, à quelques exceptions près (le professeur Therezhina de Castro), sont restés très en retrait.

Cet exemple brésilien est d'autant plus significatif que ses auteurs ont tenté un réel effort théorique, le général Golbery do Couto e Silva a vraiment essayé de définir la géopolitique et la géostratégie³¹. Mais ils n'ont guère eu d'écho hors d'Amérique latine et, avec le temps, il est permis de se demander s'ils n'ont pas développé ce que l'on pourrait appeler une stratégie de substitution: faute de disposer des moyens modernes de la puissance (la technique, l'économie), ils se sont rabat- tus sur le seul facteur dont leur pays disposaient en abondance: l'espace. Ils n'étaient pas les seuls à procéder ainsi. On pourrait citer quantité de géopolitiques «du pauvre»: les théories sur le triangle stratégique portugais à la charnière des mondes européen, atlantique et méditerranéen ou point de liaison entre les espaces nord-atlantique, sud-américain, européen et africain procèdent de la même démarche³².

Ici la question devient plus globale et aucun discours géopolitique ne peut y échapper: peut-on fixer la puissance, notion par essence dynamique, sur un centre statique? C'était déjà la difficulté à laquelle se heurtait Mackinder avec sa zone pivot, son *heartland* qu'il prétendait fixer, en 1904, dans les marches eurasiatiques, dans les zones de contact entre le monde des nomades et le monde sédentaire. Le problème est qu'il s'agissait d'une zone désertique et glacée, à peu près inhabitable et d'un intérêt stratégique discutable, sauf à appeler à la rescousse le souvenir des invasions mongoles ou timourides. Il en avait d'ailleurs bien conscience et, dans son dernier grand texte, le célèbre article de 1943, il a déplacé le Heartland vers l'ouest, pour le faire coïncider avec les frontières de la Russie so-

viétique. Ce léger décalage signifiait qu'à la logique géographique de 1904, il substituait une autre logique stratégique, plus mouvante. Le problème s'accroît encore avec ses successeurs, lorsqu'ils prétendent concilier l'analyse géopolitique et l'analyse culturaliste, alors que les deux sont sinon inconciliables, du moins largement opposées. La première prétend définir des constantes alors que la seconde souligne la variabilité des comportements et des situations. La rationalité géopolitique s'avère problématique.

Il faut incriminer l'héritage du fixisme géographique que reprendra encore Spykman durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale lorsqu'il esquissera la perspective d'un changement d'alliances pour faire face à un éventuel hégémonisme soviétique après la guerre: «*les régimes changent, les dictateurs passent mais les montagnes sont toujours à la même place*», Conception réductrice qui ne tient pas compte du fait que le rapport à l'espace se modifie en fonction des moyens disponibles, comme l'avait déjà pressenti le géographe militaire russe Yazikov dans les années 1830, intuition développée un siècle plus tard par l'amiral Castex.

Géopolitique et déterminisme

Cela ne veut pas dire que la géopolitique ne soit qu'une rationalisation de l'esprit de conquête et condamnée au dogmatisme: si les pères fondateurs ont conçu une géopolitique quelque peu olympienne, raisonnant à l'échelle des continents, des océans et finalement du monde, sans beaucoup d'égards pour la complexité du réel, les tendances actuelles se montrent plus sensibles au détail du terrain, aux relations entre territoire et culture, aux différences d'échelle... Surtout, alors que l'on raisonnait auparavant d'abord en vue de l'accroissement de l'espace, la leçon principale du XX^e siècle a été qu'il fallait penser en termes d'organisation plutôt que d'extension.

Tout au plus est-il permis de penser que la géopolitique est, même si Yves Lacoste récuse fortement cette idée, une pensée déterministe. Elle établit une relation privilégiée entre l'espace et la politique. De par son intitulé même, la géopolitique place nécessairement au centre de son analyse le facteur spatial et lui confère une influence privilégiée, certes multiforme, concurrencée ou partiellement annihilée par d'autres facteurs, mais engendrant tout de même, «en dernière instance» si l'on ose dire, sinon des relations mécaniques,



au moins des constantes. C'est d'ailleurs le sous-titre du traité d'Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique* (2001) dans lequel on trouve une allusion aux «*lois d'airain de la géopolitique*». Refuser ce lien revient à vider la géopolitique de tout contenu spécifique pour en faire une science globale, à l'instar de Marcel Mauss qui disait: «*J'appelle sociologie toute science bien faite*». Les appellations sont ainsi relativisées et réduites à une simple marque que chacun peut choisir à sa guise, solution un peu trop simple.

La géopolitique aujourd'hui

La géopolitique est revenue en force aux États-Unis après un effacement complet depuis la fin des années 40. Elle sert, chez Zbigniew Brzezinski, à affirmer le bien-fondé de la suprématie mondiale des États-Unis, ou chez Samuel Huntington, à accrédi- ter l'idée d'un «choc des civilisations», discours aujourd'hui dominant même si la globalisation suscite des thèses antagonistes. En Europe occidentale, parti de France et de Grande-Bretagne, le mouvement a gagné les autres pays européens dans les années 1990: on trouve une revue *Geopolitika* en Grèce³³, des travaux de géopolitique variés en Italie (de la revue *Limes* aux ouvrages du général Carlo Jean³⁴). Sur les ruines de la défunte Union soviétique, la Russie cherche une nouvelle voie: l'eurasisme d'Alexandre Douguine lui en suggère une, qui reprend les thèmes géopolitiques les plus traditionnels. Même s'il est trop tôt pour parler d'une renaissance durable, même si l'institutionnalisation universitaire se fait toujours attendre (en dehors de quelques chaires ou centres de recherches isolés), nous sommes en présence d'un véritable mouvement de fond.

L'appréciation que l'on peut porter sur ledit mouvement varie en fonction des inclinations idéologiques et scientifiques. Certains déplorent le retour des vieux démons ou au moins le retour à des explications monocausales qui ne devraient plus avoir cours, alors que toutes les sciences tentent à démontrer la complexité du réel. D'autres soulignent la mutation de cette nouvelle géopolitique, qui est à l'ancienne ce que l'école des Annales était à l'histoire positiviste. Les paradigmes ont changé, la vision olympienne des grands fondateurs a cédé la place à des approches plus subtiles, moins centrées sur les seuls aspects physiques pour prendre en compte la globalité de la position structurelle des acteurs; au risque de retomber sur

l'écueil précédemment signalé: pourquoi qualifier de géopolitique une explication globale? La référence au cadre mondial suffirait-elle à justifier l'appellation? Paul Kennedy est-il historien ou géopoliticien quand il analyse le déclin inévitable des grandes puissances? Samuel Huntington a-t-il abandonné la science politique pour rallier le camp de la géopolitique pour parler du choc des civilisations?

L'incertitude épistémologique et théorique demeure. On ne sait pas très bien ce qu'est la géopolitique. En tout cas, ses multiples définitions sont, soit vagues ou équivoques, soit contradictoires. Yves Lacoste, qui est celui qui a poussé le plus loin la réflexion géopolitique en France depuis son célèbre essai *La géographie ça sert d'abord à faire la guerre* (1976), semble avoir renoncé à l'idée d'un traité de géopolitique qui essaierait de fixer une matière décidément insaisissable.

Au-delà cette incertitude, reste le besoin, confusément ressenti, d'une explication globale. Le progrès des sciences sociales a pour contrepartie inévitable leur spécialisation, leur atomisation: chaque spécialiste en sait de plus en plus, mais sur un domaine de plus en plus restreint. La géopolitique peut être comprise comme une tentative de se soustraire à la loi d'airain de l'éclatement du savoir, pour suggérer des grands cadres d'explication qui, à défaut d'être d'une grande solidité théorique, ont le mérite de rendre intelligible la masse des phénomènes contemporains et de définir des orientations, positives ou négatives. Elle reprend, en somme, le programme qui fut celui de la sociologie à ses débuts. Aucune objection ne pourra jamais prévaloir contre cette volonté d'ordre et de compréhension globale des phénomènes sociaux.

NOTES:

¹ Karl WITTFOGEL, *Le despotisme oriental*, Paris, Éditions de minuit, 1960.

² Fernand BRAUDEL, *Une leçon d'histoire*, Paris, Arthaud, 1985.

³ Cf. Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, *Le phénomène Nouvelle histoire. Grandeur et décadence de l'École des Annales*, Paris, Économica, 2^e éd., 1989.

⁴ Cf. Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, *Traité de stratégie*, Paris, ISC-Économica, 4^e éd., 2003.

⁵ Sur MACKINDER, W.H.PARKER, *Mackinder. Geography as an aid to statecraft*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982 et Brian W. BLOUET, *Halford Mackinder A. Biography*, College Station (Texas), A & M University Press, 1987.

⁶ Halford J. MACKINDER, «*Le pivot géographique*



de l'histoire", *Stratégique*, 55, 1992-3, pp.11-29.

⁷ Friedrich RATZEL, *Géographie politique*, Genève, Editions régionales européennes, 1988 (traduction abrégée; manque notamment le texte sur "la mer comme source de grandeur des peuples").

⁸ Cf. les travaux de Michel KORINMAN, *Continents perdus. Les précurseurs de la géopolitique allemande*, Paris, Économica, 1991 et *Quand l'Allemagne pensait le monde. Grandeur et décadence d'une géopolitique*, Paris, Fayard, 1989.

⁹ Halford J. MACKINDER, "Une vision globale du monde pour le conquête de la paix", *Stratégique*, 57, 1995-1, pp.7-20.

¹⁰ Il n'existe pas encore de biographie intellectuelle de Nicholas Spykman.

¹¹ En français, la référence la plus sûre et la plus complète sur le géopolitique aux États-Unis est l'article d'un chercheur italien, Marco ANTONSICH, "De la Geopolitik à la Geopolitics. Transformation historique d'une doctrine de puissance", *Stratégique*, 60, 1995-4, pp.53-87.

¹² Signalons tout de même deux articles fondamentaux: Ladis K.D. KRISTOF, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1960 et Marco ANTONSICH, "Itinerari di geopolitica contemporanea", *Quaderni del dottorato di ricerca in geografia politica*, 1995-5. Ces deux articles seront prochainement traduits dans Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE et Martin MOTTE, *Aspects de la pensée géopolitique*, Paris, ISC-Économica, 2006.

¹³ Réédité avec une riche préface de Béatrice GIBLIN, Paris, La Découverte, 198...

¹⁴ Amiral CASTEX. *Théories Stratégiques*, édition complète, Paris, ISC-Économica, 1997, 7 volumes.

¹⁵ Ezio FERRANTE, "Domenico Bonamico et la naissance de la pensée géopolitique navale italienne" et Marco ANTONSICH, "La géopolitique méditerranéenne de l'Italie fasciste" dans Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, *La pensée géopolitique navale. L'évolution de la pensée navale V*, Paris, ISC-Économica, 1995, pp.151-162 et 163-190.

¹⁶ Kyoichi TASHIKAWA, "La politique de la sphère de coprosperité de la grande Asie orientale au Japon", *Stratégique*, 81, 2001-1, pp.155-165.

¹⁷ Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, "Géopolitique théorique et géopolitique appliquée en Amérique latine", *Hérodote*, 57, avril-juin 1990, pp.160-179.

¹⁸ Panorama bibliographique très complet dans John CHILD, "Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America", *Latin American Research Review*, 1976, pp.84-111.

¹⁹ Saül B. COHEN, *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, Londres, Methuen, 2^e ed, 1973.

²⁰ Parmi les essais de réflexion sur ce point, François THUAL, *Méthodes de la géopolitique*, Paris, Ellipses, 1996.

²¹ Qui a donné l'élan initial avec son petit livre *Geopolitics of Nuclear Era*, New York, Crane Russak, 1977.

²² Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *Le grand échiquier*, Paris, Bayard Edition, 1998.

²³ Ferruccio BOTTI, "Le concept de géostratégie et son application à la nation italienne dans les théories du général Durando", 1846, *Stratégique*, 58, 1995-2, pp.121-137.

²⁴ Pascal LOROT (dir.) *Introduction à la géoéconomie*, Paris, Économica, 1998.

²⁵ Cf. Lars WEDIN "Kjellèn. La naissance de la géopolitique et la pensée navale suédoise", dans Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, *La pensée géopolitique navale. L'évolution de la pensée navale V*, Paris, ISC-Économica, 1995, pp.227-244.

²⁶ Cf. Pierre BIRNBAUM, *La fin du politique*, Paris, Seuil, 1980.

²⁷ Songeons simplement au triomphe de la sociologie durkheimienne sur ses rivales, comme la psychologie sociale de Théodule Ribot ou Gustave Le Bon ou la sociologie de Le Play ou Worms, qui ont eu une grande influence en leur temps, mais qui n'ont pas eu de postérité.

²⁸ Le livre fondateur étant celui de Hans J. MORGENTHAU, *Politics among Nations*, 1948. Avant lui, Spykman avait apporté une contribution importante avec *International Politics*, 1933.

²⁹ Cf. les préfaces de Hans Adolf JACOBSEN et Jean KLEIN à Karl HAUSHOFER, *De la géopolitique*, Paris, Fayard, 1987.

³⁰ Cf. H.P. WILLMOTT, *La guerre du Pacifique 1941-1945*, Paris, Editions Autrement-Atlas des guerres, 2001.

³¹ Cf. Golbery do COUTO e SILVA, *Geopolítica do Brasil & Conjuntura política nacional o poder executivo Rio de Janeiro*, Libreria Jose Olympio, 3^e ed., 1980.

³² Cf. Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, *Traité de stratégie*, op.cit., pp.751-754.

³³ Ioannis LOUCAS a écrit un essai de géopolitique (1999), malheureusement réservé aux érudits (fort rares) capables de lire le grec moderne.

³⁴ Notamment Carlo JEAN, *Geopolitica*, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1995. Cf. Marco Antonsich, *Geografia politica e Geopolitica in Italia dal 1945 ad oggi*, Trieste, Quaderni di ricerca del dottorato in Geografia Politica, Quaderno Speciale, 1996, 2a.

Auteur des ouvrages importantes en traitant la théorie de la stratégie, notamment Traité de stratégie et Bréviaire stratégique, directeur de la revue Stratégique, Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE est directeur du cycle de stratégie au Collège Interarmées de Défense – Paris, directeur d'études à l'École Pratique des Hautes Études et président de l'Institut de Stratégie Comparée et de la Commission française d'histoire militaire. Le professeur Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE est docteur en science politique et membre correspondant de l'Académie royale des sciences navales de Suède.



PLANIFICATION STRATEGIQUE MULTINATIONALE*

Jean DUFOURCO

D'où vient l'OTAN? On sait que c'est la réponse militaire organisée par l'Alliance atlantique pour faire face à la menace militaire soviétique, une réponse qui prend forme peu à peu, en plusieurs étapes, pour établir un barrage dissuasif à l'armée rouge. L'histoire commence tout d'abord par l'Union occidentale du traité de Bruxelles de 1948 à laquelle se superpose dès 1949 le rempart du traité de Washington puis, après l'épisode de la communauté européenne de défense et les accords de Paris de 1954 qui établissent l'Union de l'Europe occidentale, l'OTAN porte la charge principale de la guerre froide¹. Où va l'OTAN? On sait ce qu'elle est devenue après la guerre froide avec le nouveau concept stratégique arrêté à Rome en novembre 1991 et développé à Washington en 1999 au sommet du cinquantenaire, avec le lancement de la transformation militaire au sommet de Prague en novembre 2002 et avec sa transformation politique qui sera peut-être lancée au sommet de Riga en novembre prochain. On parle déjà de ses prochains élargissements et d'un nouveau concept stratégique, peut-être pour fêter ses 60 ans en 2009.

Qui décide? On voit moins bien comment elle planifie ses opérations, ses partenariats, son avenir, comment elle prépare ses actions. C'est l'objet des quelques réflexions qui suivent qui vont examiner la question de la prise de décision, de la planification multinationale, de ses modes et méthodes, de ses difficultés (dans la PESD de l'Union européenne comme dans l'OTAN), avant de conclure par quelques perspectives d'avenir pour l'Alliance atlantique.

La planification: de quoi s'agit-il?

Cette discipline assez technique a pour objet de préparer l'action et, dans le cadre qui nous occupe, l'action collective.

**D'après une conférence donnée à Budapest le 9 mai 2006 lors du colloque sur "L'OTAN pour et contre".*

S'il s'agit de préparer les instruments de l'action à moyen terme on parle de *planification de défense*. Dans l'OTAN, cette discipline est celle de la planification de forces; elle obéit à un processus pluriannuel qui combine des objectifs politiques traduits en moyens nécessaires pour constituer le dispositif militaire répondant à la stratégie arrêtée. Cette méthodologie de planification de forces est en évolution depuis le sommet de Prague, fin 2002, vers une démarche différente plus proche de la planification capacitaire adoptée d'entrée de jeu en 2000 par la PESD pour satisfaire l'objectif global d'Helsinki arrêté par l'union européenne fin 1999. La démarche capacitaire fondée sur les moyens nécessaires pour produire les effets militaires recherchés est une démarche plus souple et plus efficace qui permet d'orienter le comblement des lacunes constatées non seulement par des acquisitions nécessaires mais aussi par une politique industrielle commune celle qu'a entreprise de préparer l'agence européenne d'armement depuis sa création en mai 2004.

Très différente est la *planification opérationnelle* qui consiste à élaborer les concepts et les plans opérationnels qui permettront la mise en œuvre sur le terrain des options stratégiques choisies au niveau politique, par des forces appropriées et selon un phasage soigné. La planification opérationnelle peut être préparée à l'avance selon des scénarios génériques, puis adaptée aux circonstances du moment; elle peut aussi être développée en urgence, en réaction immédiate selon des schémas réflexes concertés et préétablis. Mais elle se développe toujours selon une méthodologie exhaustive qui permet de passer en revue tous les paramètres nécessaires qui permettront d'établir le plan d'opération et ses différents plans annexes, notamment logistique, ainsi que les structures de commandement et de contrôle nécessaires à la conduite sûre de l'action.



La *planification stratégique* est quant à elle la discipline amont, du plus haut niveau de décision qui associe politiques et opérationnels dans le but de décider si l'on doit passer à l'action et dès lors pour obtenir quels effets et aboutir à quelle situation finale. Elle s'intéresse au "pourquoi" quand la planification opérationnelle répond au "comment" et la planification de défense au "avec quoi".

Chacune de ces trois disciplines associe étroitement praticiens, experts, responsables politiques dans des travaux complexes, souvent itératifs, et qui doivent s'appuyer tout à la fois sur une stratégie générale, des doctrines d'emploi, la connaissance et la disponibilité de capacités d'analyse, de décision et d'action dûment répertoriées. On devine qu'à l'échelon national l'entraînement des équipes de planification est déjà chose complexe. Mais qu'en est-il à l'échelon multinational? A plus de 25 ou de 26 acteurs?

Planification multinationale des opérations de crise, l'art et la manière

La planification multinationale est rendue délicate par les quatre difficultés principales qu'elle doit résoudre pour se développer utilement et permettre l'action collective.

Il faut en effet au départ une analyse commune de la situation pour répondre à la question, *que se passe-t-il?* Ensuite une évaluation commune de l'état final recherché et de la solution souhaitable en répondant à la question, *que voulons-nous?* Puis un catalogue commun d'actions possibles (intensité, tempo, points d'application, modes d'action et leur combinaison), avec la question *que faire?* Enfin il faut se mettre d'accord sur un cadre d'action approprié avec dès le départ une certaine répartition des charges et des tâches avec une réponse appropriée aux questions, *quoi, qui, quand?* On devine que le choc des cultures et des aptitudes nationales ne facilite pas l'approche et la résolution de ces difficultés.

En réalité, les processus diffèrent peu dans l'Union européenne² et dans l'OTAN. La prise de décision d'action en crise dans l'Union est du ressort des Etats membres qui se coordonnent à travers le conseil politique et de sécurité, le COPS, éventuellement présidé par le Haut représentant pour la PESC, futur ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Union. Un dialogue itératif

s'installe entre le COPS, le comité militaire et le comité civil de gestion des crises qui actionnent les structures d'expertise du secrétariat du Conseil, l'état-major de l'Union européenne, le centre de situation et les directions civiles compétentes. Ce dialogue a pour objectif d'établir d'abord un "concept de gestion de crise" réaliste qui dès l'origine prend en compte les moyens que les Etats membres pourraient affecter au traitement de la crise; ensuite des "options stratégiques", militaires, policières, civiles de gestion de crise sont élaborées, hiérarchisées, développées éventuellement avec un concours extérieur (QG national ou de SHAPE); enfin une combinaison d'options stratégiques de différentes nature est choisie pour élaborer une directive militaire de planification initiale confiée au commandant désigné d'opération pour lancer le processus de planification opérationnelle qui passera ensuite par les étapes du concept général d'opération et du plan d'opérations. Tel est le cheminement méthodologique conduit lors de la planification stratégique. Il s'achève politiquement par une "action commune" de l'Union européenne qui notamment prévoit une chaîne de commandement et ouvre droit à un financement.

La prise de décision s'élabore de façon analogue dans l'OTAN même si les structures diffèrent un peu. Ce qui change fondamentalement dans l'Alliance, c'est la présence de l'allié américain, avec ses moyens militaires à nuls autres comparables et c'est l'absence de combinaison possible avec des moyens civils et administratifs, ceux que la Commission européenne peut actionner avec son expertise spécifique et les leviers de ses financements. Ce qui distingue également l'OTAN c'est la présence d'une forte structure de quartiers généraux, centraux comme SHAPE et SACT à Norfolk, mais aussi régionaux comme Naples et Brunsum qui peuvent fournir l'expertise et l'ossature militaires nécessaires, notamment pour la planification opérationnelle. Dans le cadre plus vaste de l'Alliance, des débats stratégiques peuvent aussi apparaître comme ceux qui ont été lancés sur les questions de préemption et de prévention et ceux qui se développent à partir de la recherche d'actions orientées par les effets (EBAO, *effect base approach to operations*) dans la continuité des recherches américaines.

Les défis que pose cette activité de prise de décision dans l'Alliance sont importants et quatre



méritent d'être détaillés. Le premier est celui de la rapidité de décision, de la réactivité de l'Alliance face à une situation de crise. Pour dépasser les lenteurs inhérentes à l'action multinationale les nations de l'OTAN procèdent à de nombreuses consultations informelles préalables, des travaux "de couloir", des engagements provisoires, qui permettent l'élaboration progressive de consensus partiels qui préparent la décision finale. Le deuxième défi est la question du partage des coûts, des risques et de responsabilités, de l'indivisibilité et de la solidarité de l'Alliance. Et là les questions de la place et de l'autorité des contributeurs majeurs comme celle des contributeurs extérieurs est posée, sans solution générique possible. Le troisième est celui de l'applicabilité des décisions prises; c'est le défi de la cohérence et de l'efficacité. Chacun voit bien que les réservoirs de forces nationales sont presque vides et que les finances nationales ne suivent que difficilement les besoins d'interventions. La question des financements communs est désormais posée avec insistance. Le dernier défi est celui du rôle de la NRF créée au sommet de Prague en 2002 et qui arrive à maturité cette année. *Quand et comment faut-il l'utiliser, seulement en urgence, pour un coup? Peut-on l'engager partiellement en soutien ou en complément des forces qui tournent déjà dans les opérations existantes?*

Chacun de ces défis doit trouver sa réponse dans le cadre du consensus qui reste la pierre angulaire de l'action collective de l'OTAN à laquelle il est aujourd'hui impossible de renoncer sans réels dégâts sur la cohésion de l'Alliance. Ces défis sont également à la racine de tous les dilemmes auxquels ont confrontés tous les acteurs de l'action multinationale, le dilemme légitimité/efficacité, le dilemme dissuasion/action, préemption/prévention, multinationalité/leadership ...

Comme l'ONU et le DOMP, l'UE et la PESD mais aujourd'hui plus qu'elles, l'OTAN est considérée comme l'un des seuls acteurs capables d'affronter et de surmonter les situations difficiles de tension auxquelles est confrontée la communauté internationale. De son devenir dépend une certaine forme d'organisation du monde.

Principales tendances à l'œuvre dans l'OTAN

Au vu des évolutions et des défis de la planète stratégique, on voit nettement se dessiner trois tendances principales entre lesquelles se partagent

les faveurs des 26 pays alliés³. Aucune ne prédomine vraiment, mais on sent bien qu'elles répondent chacune à des préoccupations sérieuses, plus ou moins présentes sur les deux rives de l'Atlantique.

La première consiste à adapter en permanence l'organisation et les partenariats de l'OTAN aux événements qui affectent la sécurité des pays alliés. De sommet en sommet les nations cherchent la meilleure façon d'organiser leur défense et leur sécurité collective. Aujourd'hui la lutte contre le terrorisme et l'enrayement des désordres potentiels liés à la prolifération des armes spéciales et des Etats faillis préoccupent les alliés qui cherchent les moyens d'y faire face. L'Alliance prend désormais en compte ces nouvelles réalités. Cette façon de s'adapter au cas par cas, en réponse à la conflictualité internationale a été la règle depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Elle a bien fonctionné jusqu'à maintenant mais semble approcher ses limites aujourd'hui parce que l'organisation s'est complexifiée, alourdie, que l'Alliance s'est distendue, diluée et a pu donner l'impression de se disperser dans de nombreuses actions, de multiples partenariats dont la cohérence est à consolider par une vision d'ensemble renouvelée⁴.

Une seconde tendance réside dans la volonté de mieux valoriser la capacité militaire de l'Alliance et de tirer un meilleur parti de son expertise opérationnelle multinationale, notamment de son QG opérationnel Shape à Mons. En capitalisant sur sa capacité à prendre soin des coalitions militaires du monde occidental, l'OTAN se positionne comme opérateur stratégique central, sorte de société de service opérationnel, offrant à ses clients une multitude de contrats; à la base la possibilité de préparer et de qualifier des forces pour agir dans une coalition; ensuite la capacité à monter, à structurer une force multinationale et à "générer" la formule qui répond le mieux à la planification opérationnelle décidée par les contributeurs de troupes; un autre service peut être un soutien au déploiement, un support logistique pendant l'opération et au sommet des services, la fonction complète, de commandement et de contrôle de l'opération dans tous ses aspects. Telle est la gamme des différents services qu'une telle "OTAN +" pourrait offrir à ses clients. Ceux qui pensent à amplifier les accords techniques dits "Berlin +" passés en 2003 avec la PESD de l'Union européenne ont ce genre de formule en



tête. Opérateur stratégique complet, “l’OTAN +” serait avant tout une sorte de référence militaire occidentale pour toute forme d’action multinationale en coalition.

Une dernière piste fait aujourd’hui l’objet d’un développement accéléré, en phase avec l’idée d’une union des démocraties, regroupées dans un forum stratégique associant leurs capacités d’influence politique et d’action militaire, une “OTAN globale”. Réunies par la mission commune d’exporter la démocratie et le marché, gages de liberté, les nations rassemblées dans ce club auraient pour objectif de valoriser le capital politique de l’Alliance et d’en étendre les bénéfices vers l’est du continent européen, le Moyen orient et l’Asie; un cadre fonctionnel de dialogue politique et d’action commune serait aussi offert aux pays avancés, déjà au contact régulier des pays occidentaux, comme le Japon, l’Australie ou la Corée du Sud. Cette formule aurait comme avantage d’établir une ceinture démocratique autour du monde chinois, pôle de puissance attendu et à contenir à la mi-21^{ème} siècle.

Naturellement ces pistes peuvent se combiner même si leurs logiques diffèrent⁵. Mais leur interaction peut aussi contribuer à affaiblir

l’Alliance, à diluer son organisation et à brouiller leur image d’efficacité voire la pertinence d’ensemble d’un dispositif qui a jusqu’ici à peu près réussi à surmonter plusieurs changements de paradigmes stratégiques depuis près de 60 ans.

Nul ne peut prédire ce que deviendra l’Alliance qui, comme toutes les constructions humaines et les formules diplomatiques et juridiques, dépend de la façon dont ses concepteurs et utilisateurs voudront l’utiliser.

A 26, les nations qui la composent doivent faire preuve de patience pour élaborer des consensus qui associent légitimité politique et efficacité opérationnelle. Une Union des peuples libres d’une centaine de membres y parviendrait-elle?

NOTES:

¹ Voir “Vers l’Europe stratégique”, Stratégique n°86/87 (2006).

² Voir “Les Européens face à la gestion de crise: un point de situation”, in RJA n°4/2002.

³ Voir “Régulations occidentales: quelle alliance voulons-nous?”, Défense nationale (décembre 2004).

⁴ Voir “Pour une alliance durable: l’OTAN dont nous avons besoin maintenant”, Défense nationale (à paraître).

⁵ Voir “OTAN: pour un nouveau rapport Harmel”, Politique étrangère 3/2005.

Jean DUFOURCQ, Contre-amiral (CR) est le chef de la Branche Recherche du Collège de défense de l’OTAN à Rome, l’auteur de nombreuses articles et études sur la stratégie, la politique de défense, l’Union Européenne et l’OTAN publié dans nombreuses revues, y compris en quelque revues roumaines.



THE STAFF OPERATOR IN THE DIGITAL ERA

Marius CRĂCIUN

Romanian political, economical, social and military integration in the Euro-Atlantic family imposes a process of adopting common recognized standards. Not only standards, technical and technological, must be put in place, but also cultural requirements, to adopt/accept new values, concepts and procedures. Integration into the Euro-Atlantic collective security organizations requires costly efforts, but costs of not doing it are much higher.

The Transformation process of Romanian Armed Forces involves changes in force structures, adopting new standards, doctrines and procedures which, along with new technology and modern military systems acquisition, should allow us to fulfil our missions, to contribute to national and collective defence, to improve our capabilities offered for multinational operations, crisis management and combating terrorism missions.

Re-designing the decision making process, ensuring informational superiority and implementing modern military concepts, such as Effect Based Operations (EBO) facilitated by network enabled capabilities is considered the key transformational element of the Romanian Armed Forces¹.

In this complex process, where situational awareness and proper operation of C⁴I systems is decisive, we would like to emphasize the necessity of sustained educational and intellectual efforts for “cultural” adaptation of staff personnel to the new performance requirements.

The appearance of new technologies and new communication forms changed our personal lives and the world we are living in. A new social order with new ways and problems arises. Some call it “the information society”, some call it “the knowledge society”. Some even decided to go forward and call it “the network society”, considering the existing networks are changing the way the modern society operates.

Electronic networks connect people in an un-

traditional way. New types of personal communications and networks appeared, business and worker networks, producer and consumer networks, professor and student networks.

More or less important messages land on computer screens causing reaction from the recipients. International stock markets react instantly, sometimes even without direct human interference, with large sums on buying/selling operations. Digital images instantly sent and immediately used by mass media are able to generate political and social storms. Military related news from different theatres of operations, sent by Internet, usually arrive before the official military reports, causing adverse reactions and problems. The social development, characterized by globalization and the division of labour becomes less dependent on space and time and more dependent on communications. Military domain, same as others, is also affected. More over, the evident advantages of becoming a “club” member of a security provider alliance or organization, where the members perform efficiently different security and defence tasks, determine more and more nations to express their desire to join. Nationally, plans have been drawn, terms have been estimated and resources have been identified. „... after entering in the EU, integration depends mostly of the way we will implement the strategy to recuperate the differences in information technology and communications, and I could say, maybe a bit enthusiastic, that Romania could be able to recuperate the differences in maximum ten years.”²

Integration, as a process per se, does not come cheap and the final bill is large enough to cause problems for national defence budgets. But technology and financial support is not enough. At the same difficulty level is procedural integration and interoperability achievement within an alliance.

In the last hundred years, staff officer’s culture considerably evolved. Industrial development was always an evolutionary factor for military doc-



trines and consequently, the new technologies had always an impact on staff procedures, education and training of staff personnel.

The Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs), process that generically means radical changes in using military power and capabilities through technical, conceptual and organizational innovations, changed forever the culture of the staff officer. An impact such as the introduction of the machine-gun on the battlefield in 1914, of the tank-airplane binom in 1940, vertical manoeuvre using helicopters starting with 1950 and the late new intelligence and communication systems changed again military doctrine and the way staffs are thinking and operating.

The purpose of this paper is not to deal with the technological aspects regarding the introduction of such systems, but to analyze and acknowledge that a new type of staff officer (or NCO³), trained as a “network operator” is required in order to properly operate them. We do not want to analyze the technical details, done by IT and comms specialists but to address the staffing part of the process, the required changes in training and thinking of “**the staff operators**”.

There are some opinions that in a cell of a “digitized” staff only officers are able to use the information systems, with NCOs set aside and tasked with non-essential staff work. Some wrongly consider that only officers have proper tactical knowledge to study the battle space⁴, to determine the force ratios, to compare probable enemy and friendly forces courses of action and properly use the information systems.

We should consider these ideas as at least simplistic, maybe even snob, if we take into account the „Bicaz”⁵ or SIMEX⁶ experiences, which confirm there is an important number of staff NCOs, perfectly able to operate such systems with very good results. The raising number of NCOs with University degrees, the exponential expansion of Internet connected personal computers nationwide are other arguments that contradict the theory.

This is why we support the introduction of “the staff operator” expression, not to emphasize the type of staff personnel but only performance in the working place. New relations between time and space in the information age, integration into a multinational force and digital instruments to process and manage collected information impose, in the military system, that staff operators adopt

new cultural concepts. Here are, in our opinion, some of them:

1. The emerging of network enabled capabilities, obtained through integration into the National Military Communications Network of all other networks belonging to departments and agencies part of the National Defence System nationally and integration into allied networks internationally, using common security and information-parting standards, change the culture and the job description of an staff operator.

One proper example is the Romanian integration, in March 2004, into NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS). NATINADS applies principles like unity of command and control for collective air defence and generates crisis and conflict crisis management capabilities, but also retains some elements of national sovereignty and decision.

In accordance with Allied Command Operations (ACO) operational plans, Romanian airspace is integrated within the Alliance, becoming subject of common air-defence. The Romanian airspace, along with the Bulgarian one, was placed under the responsibility of the Combined Air Operations Centre – CAOC, located in Larissa, Greece. The Romanian components of the network perform using NATO standards, protocols and procedures, fully adopted nationally. One other example is the sustained effort, at the RO MOD level, to field an integrated information management system⁷. Integration of other fully NATO compatible and interoperable subsystem is planned in the near future, such as:

- a. Joint Information System C⁴I, designed to conduct operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels;
- b. Combat Service Support Information System;
- c. Defence Intelligence Information System;
- d. Simulation Information System;
- e. Different Weapon Systems;
- f. Military Education Information System.

On the responsible military structures’ agenda there are, in different stages, other sub-programs and capabilities, part of Romanian efforts to connect to different allied networks, such as:

- Allied Deployment and Movement System, ADAMS;
- Allied Integrated Logistic System;
- Integrated Personnel and Career Management



System;

- Three-dimensional Radar System for low and medium altitude GAP-FILLER;

- National Air Command and Control System, integrated into NATO's Air Command and Control System.

Converging with technical efforts there are, of course, training efforts for the staff to be able to operate them. The operators had not only to elaborate operational standards and procedures but network integration and interaction with other systems protocols.

But what are Network Enabled Capabilities? First, it is the **increase of command and control efficiency** through using the information networks. Operating the actual C² system, which in a future not so far away could turn into C⁴I⁸ or even C⁴ISR⁹, implementing the network centric concept should minimize the existing technological gap between Romanian Armed Forces and other allied forces, much more advanced in this field.

Second, it is a **decrease in reaction time**, by reducing the time for decision-making, and, in our opinion the most important thing, by having instant situation awareness and a clear-cut order on all levels, from the command and control structure, targeting cells to the computer screens of the platoons or patrols in contact with the enemy.

There are studies done which state that, when the combat capacity of all players is sensibly equal, to achieve superiority over your enemy is possible only through command and control, an area not easy to measure and compare using force ratio calculations, but nevertheless paramount in military operations.

That is why there is a constant trend in the modern world for continuous modernization and network integration of command and control systems at all levels in order to achieve the decisive edge in any military confrontation.

Third, when we talk about Effect Based Operations, where „interagency” is the key word, where a working synergy should exist between all government structures and agencies belonging to the National Defence System, we think that a new concept of **interconnecting them into a unique C⁴ISR network** should be put in place.

Present problems, ranging from technical and technological compatibility to major differences in „staff culture” impose adopting the same set of NATO and UE standards and procedures, educa-

tional endeavour where we see MOD education and training facilities, mostly the National Defence University “Carol I”, playing a major role.

2. **Transforming the way we think and operate** is an important action and has to be done in parallel with dismissal of old command concepts. There are still some “traditionalistic” commanders and staff officers who think that using technology in the decision making process or even using the computer to transmit orders is not a feasible solution.

But transforming the way we think and operate is a very complex process, requires education and training, both in theory and practical, using the same standards and staff Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) as NATO and EU.

Connecting the elements and modules of a headquarter through a computer network and using the network to distribute working documents, drastically reduces circulation time and obviously reduces decision time at all levels. E-mail and an increased computing capacity impose implementing the horizontal data exchange concept in opposition with the “classic” pyramidal military command and control structure.

Here arises the need for better information management in a Command Post (CP), done by a liaison officer or a battle captain, with filter and coordination authority, which also uses NATO's SOPs and has the authority to transfer data through the different levels of the pyramid. This information manager has to have the authority and responsibility of tracking documents, tasks and orders throughout the CP and to have an internal evaluation and feedback mechanism.

Digital era does not impose only major changes in staff working relations and functional structures, but affects the subordinates' initiative spirit and leaders' capacity to change and adapt.

Unfortunately, there are some real life examples showing that one does not easily give up institutionalized bureaucratic instruments in order to retain control.

The exponential increase in paperwork, the emerging of e-paperwork, medium time-consuming, the diminishing decision making time and switching from a long and complicate verbal order to a mouse click just to input the number of rounds into a targeting network are just brief examples of changes that need to be analyzed and solution to be identified and implemented.



Adopting, for the MOD LAN, a system similar with ACO's and its subordinate commands tasker-tracker¹⁰ could reduce, first of all, the time allotted to daily correspondence, estimated to be, in a busy day, at least three - four hours per day for a division or directorate chief.

Returning to NATINEADS example, the implementation process imposed not only measures to select and train staff personnel but complex actions in other areas like operational, technical and legal. SOPs were adopted, staff personnel was identified and trained to solve all kinds of situations.

Along with different types of training abroad, at the COAP level a training facility was put in place, with all the necessary equipment for training, testing and evaluating the staff personnel, including the simulation of different operational scenarios.

In a digitized HQ, at the brigade level for example, the information manager doesn't add information on the situation map, the process being done electronically, on the digital map, by the sub-network that originates that specific information.

If the information is about the enemy, it is done by the intelligence systems, and if it is about friendly forces, it is done by the „Blue Force Tracking”¹¹ systems, with all information going down to squads, crews or even individuals belonging to the special operation forces.

The information manager has to continuously follow up the situation and to interfere only for fine-tuning or to prevent some negative consequences, an activity somehow similar with that of the air traffic operators.

In the programs dedicated to develop future combat systems, fratricide prevention and even elimination is an essential objective. In fact, NATO decided to establish the technological requirements of such a friendly forces identification system. So, the Allies adopted STANAG 4579, which states the minimum requirements and the parameters of the identification systems in modern battle space.

Moreover, some allied nations combined more systems in one, the so-called Multi-Function Radio Frequency system, with radar, comms and friend and foe identification capabilities. There are nations who plan to adopt the Air and Surface Electronic Responder (ANSER) solution, which allows communications and digital data transfers within the network from all ground platforms, as stated in STANAG 4579.

In Iraq, in a programme conducted by US, a

Coalition Combat Identification¹² System is now fully operational, networking platforms from all participants on military operations. Nations like UK, France or Italy managed to implement their own fratricide avoidance programs, using their own equipments and systems.

Modern command and control (C²) systems, from Brigade to Land Component Command (LCC) could be considered as the weapon systems of the HQ. Manned by staff operators, supervised by the chief of staff, such a system permits unprecedented situation awareness, because of the „blue force tracking” subsystems, because of the information provided by the sensor network and because the detailed information about the battle space.

Present under the name of **Common Operational (Situation) Picture**, information about the enemy, friendly forces and the surroundings are present immediately at all levels, saving a lot of time.

But right now there are no such systems and there are no digital high-resolution display capabilities in our HQs, so we still relay on the not so old boards and paper maps.

Even for HQs due to be equipped with such systems, or the ones which already have an effective LAN, there is a need for an unavoidable transition time, years maybe, when staff personnel will parallel use the digital and paper maps and documents, time consuming and with a higher risk for error.

The pyramidal command and control hierarchy gives slowly but steadily away to horizontal, transversal matrix type of organizations. A good example could be the **matrix working system** used by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, US. Based on the projects they are working on, the chiefs of staff could chose to adopt collective “ad-hoc” working relations, managed with the help of temporary changes in network configuration and a modern e-mail software, in a way to allow temporary virtual grouping of different staff cells and modules together and an internal exchange of messages to solve the respective task.

Truly, the internal **communication within a staff** lies with the partial capacity and ability to reach the information in the database, to update and process them in accordance with the access authority allotted to the respective user. For example, the Intel workstation can read and update/alter



all data related to the enemy but can only “see” the data related to friendly forces. For the CIMIC¹³ workstation there could be granted access to the commercial Internet to extract, exchange data and communicate with public sources and nongovernmental organizations.

External communication becomes a problem too. There are voices that express the need to keep some degree of national specificity in the staff procedures. The problem is that there is a high probability that Romanian Armed Forces will act only within NATO, UE or a multinational coalition, so using standards and procedures adopted and utilized by these organizations is paramount.

Integration into a multinational force C⁴I systems and using the reporting formats and standards are a must in order to ensure full interoperability. Even so, differences in language, the achievement of a working level of English and of military slang are extremely difficult problems, requiring years of hard work at the individual level and extra training at the HQ level.

Training using simulation for a HQ, in a CPX/CAX¹⁴ type of exercises could be a great opportunity for training and evaluation. Because the actual capacity of the Romanian Simulation Training Centre (RSTC)¹⁵ is mostly used by units waiting to be deployed in different theatres, we believe some other solutions should be identified.

For example, with minimal investments there may be purchased the software and a number of workstations, some experimentation labs, such as „Combat Leaders Environment”¹⁶, where frequent combat scenarios and solutions are experimented. With a similar lab a battalion or brigade staff could be efficiently trained during a variable number of days. Another solution to increase the performance of individual staff operators could be to purchase strategy computer games from the commercial market, with modicum financial resources.

Returning to the RSTC, its actual simulation capacity allows for verifying orders, SOPs, doctrines and regulations, from crew to brigade or even corps level and the experience gained by the participants in this SIMEX represents a very positive development for the Romanian military.

Staff operator training differs at the individual level from command training. Individual training is provided in training centres through different staff courses, and later on through simulation exercises. The individual primary training should

be followed by staff training using the actual peace establishments’ end using existing networks, if possible.

Adapting to digital era could be done through collective training and maximizing the use of available working tools. So, programming a short CAX at the beginning of the working day, to exercise the HQ in performing their required jobs, using operational English, the LAN and actual workstations, will enhance the level of training, the allow for a better understanding and usage of SOPs and preformatted documents and even a better information circuit and an improved internal organization.

One of the consequences of digitization is the **information flooding**, and the excess information could lead to a temporary paralyze of the command and a slower decision making process. We consider that the internal protocols regarding the information flow, how the information is processed and by whom, who primarily assesses the importance of it and decides what has to go to the command group as the only solution to solve the problem. Practice showed us that the volume of data used by the commander for decision is relatively small. From the amount of data and information collected by the staff, most of it does not present interest for the decision making process. So the commander has to get a synthesis of it and only the essential.

The commander doesn’t have to make his decision based on the reports by isolated tanks, but rather to determine the manoeuvre of the entire tank formation and try to foresee the intentions and the end-state of such a manoeuvre.

The actual working system in the digital era, in a networked HQ, could become even dangerous, if some essential items are left out of sight. We consider that even the actual essential command and control documents, in a NATO agreed format and content, are way to „stuffed” and could cause a misunderstanding of commander’s intent. As General Fritz Von Korjj, the Commanding General of Bundeswehr Academy puts it, „digitalization of warfare will never replace commander’s responsibility and the necessity for more operational freedom”¹⁷.

3. Adapting legislation and military regulations in support of the transformation process is another area requiring sustained efforts.

From the legislation actions, the most important one is the Transfer of Authority, either for force packages or for military actions and tasks.



One example is the Transfer of Authority between Romanian Air Force and SACEUR of Romanian Air Policing forces offered to NATO. Through this act, Romania was included into the Alliance Air Police System, with the Control and Reporting Centre from the Centre for Air Operations as the main integrator.

In this centre, Romanian staff operators conduct operations in an area of responsibility larger than Romanian Airspace. With few exceptions where national sovereignty is retained¹⁸, all activities, from flight control to fighting air targets, are decided by the Alliance, with the direct involvement of Romanian staff operators.

Running military operations through a decentralized execution focuses on mission objectives, not on procedures and the efficiency and success are quantified in the initiative showed by subordinate commands in fulfilling the mission and in reaching commander's end-state. Command becomes informal and flexible but not formalized and in this context the commanders decide the concept and the end-state and their subordinates make estimations and establish courses of action.

Diminishing the time allotted to decision making and knowing the detailed decision at all command and control levels impose the existence of freedom of action much more than in a classical situation, with a more centralized execution.

A formal element of decentralized execution is the **delegation of authority** on different phases and stages, as a procedural action that can simplify things. The commander cannot know everything anymore and that is why he needs to put more trust into his subordinates.

In modern armed forces the delegation of authority is used more and more exactly because the commander needs to focus more on the essential problems. "A strong commander needs strong subordinates and he is not afraid to give the freedom they need to be just like him."¹⁹

We believe that in the Romanian Armed Forces there is still a lot to do, from scientific to legislative and procedural domains, in order to implement and even force, if necessary, the delegation of authority toward an inferior level.

In the same context, in modern forces new institutions, concepts and functions are implemented, such as the Project Officer, Point of Contact (POC) or the Subject Matter Expert (SME). They are also used nationally but are not yet institution-

alized, with an official job description and specific requirements stated in military regulations. That is why we also strongly support the idea that the terms "staff operator", Project Officer, POC and SME need to be formally adopted, including a standardization of the respective job descriptions.

In conclusion, we think that technology can radically improve staff performance. On the other hand, though, we also do believe that depending too much on technology can be dangerous especially in an asymmetric type of conflict.

The recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq emphasize the danger of being too dependent on technology. On one hand, the obvious electronic and cybernetic supremacy made possible for the American and British forces to commence military actions when their force ratios were a lot inferior to the Iraqi ones and started an offensive when the Iraqis had the advantage, at least in ground forces.

On the other hand, just as in Vietnam War, it was again proven that the sophisticated equipment as helicopters for example, are vulnerable to the attacks from the ground and to the frequent mechanical problems. In all recent military operations it was proved that one could fight even with primitive or less sophisticated means against the best technology that exists so far. The moment all forces will become dependent on computer networks, new efficient ways and means to oppose them will be identified, like impulse generators or cutting off the electrical supply, in order to wreck the network, counterpoising the advantages of a digital force.

We believe that one should not consider the technological revolution as the most important element. In this equation the concepts and the doctrines count for a lot, but their evolution is slower than the technological one. Also, the educational process and the training level count a lot. The capacity of military leaders to use this new technology and to introduce it in the planning cycle it is also very important. Another thing that also counts is our capacity to identify those elements of technology, which will allow the Romanian Armed Forces, part of a multinational coalition or part of a NATO action, to plug into all significant force networks, to permanently adapt the concepts, the doctrines and national laws to the practical capabilities Romania could offer to the respective force.

The new dimension of military confrontations, which implies active involvement in the war



against terrorism and combating other asymmetric threats, the development of an expeditionary force, the integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures and generalization of the Effect Based Operation concept impose the acquiring new technologies, concepts, SOPs and the implementation of “the staff operator” concept, to operate the national components of the respective networks.

In order to prepare this staff operator for the job, we need to put up a lot of effort and to maximize the experience of our allies. This is the only way we can ensure consistence, continuity and finality to the transformation process the Romanian Armed Forces are going through.

NOTES:

¹ For details, see, „Strategia de Transformare”, presented in http://www.mapn.ro/strategie_transformare.doc.

² Interview with Traian Băsescu, in Ziua, 4 Mai 2006.

³ NCO – Non Commissioned Officer.

⁴ Because “battlefield” does not express the realities of modern warfare, present in much more dimensions to include space, information and media, we suggest the word “battlespace” to be used instead.

⁵ Bicaz is the name of a military exercise at national level.

⁶ SIMEX - Simulation Exercise.

⁷ For details see Dumitru, CRISTEA, ROCEANU,

Ion in **Războiul Bazat pe Rețea, provocarea Erei Informaționale în spațiul de luptă**, Ed. UNAp “Carol I”, București 2005, pp. 130-146.

⁸ Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence.

⁹ Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

¹⁰ Tasker – Tracker – system adopted in ACO and subordinate commands to follow up documents and ensure everybody who is supposed to has access to the document and contributes to the problem solving.

¹¹ Blue Force Tracking – system that is tracking all friendly forces, with the information displayed on screens at each level, from squad to brigade HQ.

¹² Coalition Combat Identification (CCCID) – Blue force tracking system used by Coalition Forces in Iraq.

¹³ CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation.

¹⁴ CPX/CAX – Command Post Exercise / Computer Assisted Exercise.

¹⁵ Romanian Simulation Training Centre is collocated with National Defence University “Carol I”, in Bucharest.

¹⁶ Combat Leaders Environment – test bed fielded by US Army. For more details see DefenseNews.com, dated 30 Jan. 2006.

¹⁷ For details see French Armee de Terre magazine no.1, 2004, pp. 8-10.

¹⁸ For example, the decision to shoot down a “RENEGADE” aircraft, de-turned by terrorists and heading towards major strategic sites on Romanian territory belongs to the National Command Authority.

¹⁹ BĂDĂLAN, Eugen, General PHd., in Revista Gândirea Militară Românească no.5 / 2005, p. 20.

Colonel Marius CRĂCIUN is the Chief of the Evaluation and Programmes Section from the Coordination Cell of the Partnership for Peace, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium.



L'ETAT-NATION DANS LE CONTEXTE DE L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

*Dr. Petre DUȚU,
Claudiu DRĂGAN*

L'intégration de l'Etat-nation dans l'Union européenne est un processus nécessaire et de longue durée. Ce processus a un impact significatif et général sur les compétences et les attributions de l'Etat-nation. L'identité et la citoyenneté nationale existeront avec l'identité et citoyenneté européenne. Elles seront complémentaires.

1. L'Union européenne- produit de l'intégration régionale

L'Union européenne représente un produit de l'intégration régionale. Si s'analyse les étapes de processus de sa constitution on peut constater qu'initial elle a été une entendu économique entre dix pays européen. Il s'agit de « Communauté européenne de charbon et d'acier » créée en mai 1950, a la proposition de France. Les principes fondatrices de futur Union européenne ont été: d'assurer la paix politique et de reconstruire économique ; des actions communes de la France et de l'Allemagne (elles visaient la réconciliation historique) ; d'assurer la coopération entre les nations européennes ; la convergence des intérêts des peuples européennes¹. En 1957 s'a signé le Traité de constitution de la Communauté européenne de pays fondateur.

Si la sécurité et la défense collective étaient assurées et garanties par l'existence et le fonctionnement de l'Alliance nord-atlantique, alors la tranquillité économique et sociale se pourrait réaliser seulement par un processus d'intégration européenne. De plus, ainsi, on préparait les bases d'évolution de cette organisation européenne vers atteindre des paramètres et des coordonnées plus ambitieuses que seront celles de projet initial. Ainsi, l'organisation créée de les dix Etats européens ne avait pas des compétences en matière de défense et de sécurité. Dans ce cadre institutionnelle, au niveau continental, la sécurité intérieure (nationale) était assure de l'Etat national. La sécurité extérieu-

re (zonale, régionale et globale) se fonde, en principal, sur la politique étrangère mettre en œuvre par la diplomatie de chaque pays et sur la défense dont le responsable était l'armée nationale.

Dans les années 1990, le menace majeur qui venait de part du Pacte de la Varsovie est disparu et des autres conflits et des crises ont lésées les intérêts et la sécurité des pays occidentaux. Dans ce contexte, on assiste à l'adaptation des structures et des stratégies de l'Union européenne en matière de défense et de sécurité collective.

Au présent, l'Union européenne a dépassée tous les objectives proposées initial. Elle a 25 des Etats, mais de janvier 2007, par l'adhésion de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie, serraient 27 des Etats. En outre, l'Union européenne a constitue des institutions comme sont: Le Parlement européen, la Commission européenne, la Court de Justice de la Communauté européenne, le Comité économique et social, le Comité de régions. Tous ces institutions veillent l'implémentation des valeurs démocratiques et de respecter des droits fondamentaux de l'homme dans le sein de l'Union européenne.

Toutefois, l'Union européenne est intéressée, dans l'actuel contexte mondial, d'implication active et concret de résoudre des conflits tant à l'échelon continental que global. D'ici sa préoccupation d'élargissement comme organisation, par l'accueil de nouveaux membres et par la création d'une structure militaire propre, capable d'actionner dans tout le monde, là-bas où ses intérêts la demander.

Aujourd'hui, l'Union européenne se présent comme une force crédible économique, politique, militaire, culturel et social. Elle est un centre de puissance de notre continent et même du monde. Par conséquence, l'Union européenne, on peut dire, a dépassée tous les attendes de ces qui ont créés l'organisation dans l'année 1949.

Pratiquement, l'Union européenne représente un ensemble des Etats européens lies depuis 1957 (le Traite de Rome) jusqu'en 1992 (le Traité de



Maastricht) par les politiques communes et dorénavant lies par un nombre des objectives d'harmonisation de la politiques de libre circulation des personnes, de la sécurité, de l'immigration et de l'asile. Elle s'appuie sur **trois piliers importants** tant le plan intérieur qu'extérieure². **Le premier pilier** est constituée de méthode communautaire qui implique l'intervention de ses institutions – c'est-à-dire la Commission, le Conseil et le Parlement. Ce pilier contient tous les politiques communautaires adoptées depuis 1952, c'est-à-dire l'Union économique et monétaire (UEM), l'Union douanière, le Marché unique, la Politique agricole commune, les Transports, l'Aide pour développement, l'Aide pour les régions, la Concurrence, la Politique sociale, la Recherche scientifique, l'Environnement, etc. **Le deuxième pilier** concerne la Politique extérieure et de sécurité commune (PESC). Elle se fonde sur coordination croissant des politiques extérieurs des Etats membres de l'UE et sur la construction d'une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD). **Le troisième pilier** regarde la coopération dans les domaines de la Justice et des Affaires intérieures (JAI). Mis en œuvre par le Traité d'Amsterdam, «L'espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice» repartit pourtant les domaines de l'JAI entre le premier et le troisième pilier, en comparaison avec la situation antérieure quand ces domaines étaient gérés par le troisième pilier. De fait, les décisions prises dans le cadre de deuxième et troisième piliers sont soumises à la méthode intergouvernemental (on décide par unanimité). Les principaux acteurs de deuxième et troisième piliers sont le Conseil européen, le Conseil de ministres et le Haut représentant pour PESC.

Les fondements de l'Union européenne sont la démocratie et l'Etat de droit. Les citoyens de l'Union européenne sont liés par les valeurs communes: la liberté, l'égalité, la tolérance, la solidarité et la diversité culturelle.

2. L'Etat-nation

L'Etat est une collectivité qui englobe tous les groupes humains, soit situés sur un territoire, soit composant une unité culturelle sous le nom de «peuple» ayant vocation à occuper un territoire³. Cet ensemble territorial limité par les frontières établis, par différents accords et traités internationaux, est occupé des hommes et des femmes qui

appartient d'une population qui se soumette à l'ordre de l'Etat. D'habitude, la population d'un pays contient deux grands catégories de personnes: les *nationaux*, c'est-à-dire ces qui sont nés sur ce territoire et ces qui ont la citoyenneté de cet Etat ; les *étrangers*, c'est-à-dire, les personnes qui n'ont pas la citoyenneté de cet Etat.

La nation se caractérise par le présence d'un groupe humain dans lequel les individus se sentent liés les uns avec les autres par les liaisons tant matérielles, selon d'une conception objective, qui peuvent être la langue, la religion, la race, que spirituelles, conformément d'une conception subjective, qui sont les racines communes, un rêve futur partagé, une volonté de vivre ensemble. Elle est un élément composant de l'Etat mais pas le seul. Or, il existe des théories de l'Etat-nation qui fait de coïncider ces deux notions, tandis que, parfois, certaines situations internationales voient un éclatement de ce mariage.

Donc l'Etat-nation se définit par une ensemble cohérent d'attributs que celui-ci accomplis constant, utilisant les institutions et les méthodes adéquates, sur tous les citoyens, trouvés dans l'espace géographique dans lequel il exerce sa souveraineté. Ce représente un domaine dans lequel les frontières culturelles se confondent avec les frontières politiques⁴. L'idéal d'Etat-nation est celui-ci qui a sa population formée seulement des personnes de la même ethnie et culture. Pourtant, les plusieurs Etats sont pluriethniques.

Aujourd'hui, la nation est vue comme un produit de XIX- me siècle. D'habitude, la nation est définie comme la communauté politique qui assure la légitimité d'un Etat sur son territoire et qui transforme l'Etat dans l'Etat de tous les citoyens. La notion l'Etat-nation insiste sur cette nouvelle alliance entre la nation et l'Etat. La nationalité est considérée comme la liaison entre citoyen et Etat, renforcée par les avantages des politiques sociales de l'Etat.

Le terme national signifie tout ce qui est conduit et règle par l'Etat. En présent, l'idée est que les nations doivent être représenter en intérieur d'un territoire délimité.

Pourtant, l'idée de l'Etat-nation devienne problématique parce que l'Etat n'est plus considéré comme le principal refuge de la culture nationale. La crise de l'Etat-nation se rapporte à la séparation entre Etat et nation. Les identités sociales et surtout la culture nationale peuvent se réaffirmer dans



multiples manières car l'Etat se libère de ses fonctions traditionnelles.

Maintenant, il y a beaucoup de théories en ce qui concerne l'Etat-nation. Plusieurs auteurs croient que le temps de l'Etat-nation est passé. Une cause de cet état de choses pourrait être la globalisation qui pose en discussion les fonctions générales de l'Etat et les dimensions de la nation.

Depuis environ deux siècles, c'est dans le cadre de l'Etat-nation que les démocraties européennes ont pu se développer en adoptant et concrétisant les valeurs du libéralisme politique: respect de l'autonomie individuelle, de la réflexion et du choix personnels, traitement égalitaire des citoyens de la part d'un Etat neutre et impartial, protection des droits et libertés individuels, élections libres dans un climat de pluralisme et de tolérance. Maintenant, ces valeurs humanistes sont largement acceptées, et la démocratie de caractère libéral – tout comme l'Etat-nation – est devenue un modèle tant envié que copié en dehors du monde occidental.

3. L'impact de l'intégration européenne sur l'Etat-nation

L'intégration européenne a un impact significatif sur l'état actuel et de l'évolution des Etats-nation. Cet impact a des implications dans tous les domaines d'activité humaine et sur tous les attributs et les compétences des Etats-nation. Ainsi, dans le plan économique, l'intégration européenne a trois répercussions majeures.

La première répercussion: les marges de manœuvre des politiques macroéconomiques nationales se sont réduites considérablement. Dans ce contexte, il ne peut pas faire abstraction de nécessité de parvenir à réduire les déficits, de rééquilibrer les budgets ou de maîtriser l'inflation. Par la suite, les marges de manœuvre de l'Etat-nation sur le plan de politiques économiques se réduisent fortement.

La deuxième répercussion: l'Etat-nation n'ayant pas les capacités nécessaires pour faire face, avec le succès, à des défis d'envergure mondiale, il existe une tendance très claire à la supranationalité, qui s'incarne de la manière la plus satisfaisante dans l'Union européenne. Mais l'Etat-nation souffre également des tensions provenant de ce que s'appelle « intranationalité ». L'Etat est trop complexe pour que ces citoyens puissent sentir directement et adéquatement représentés, sur le

plan de leur identité et de leurs intérêts immédiats. C'est le raison pour laquelle il existe un processus de centralisation du pouvoir, plus rapide dans certains endroits, moins dans d'autres, qui contrecarre la force homogénéisatrice exercée de un pouvoir centralisé unique. En Europe, on peut distinguer au moins quatre niveaux de pouvoir représentatif: le niveau local, nationale, régionale et supranational ou européen.

La troisième répercussion: l'Etat se retire de l'activité de production, puisqu'il n'est plus un facteur direct de création de richesse et qu'il est de moins en moins impliqué dans la formation du PIB, tendance que renforcent les privatisations. D'autre part, l'Etat ou les pouvoirs représentatifs définissent les droits des citoyens, tels que le droit à l'éducation, le droit à un système de retraite, et tout en définissant ces droits, il crée des obligations pour les responsables politiques. En outre, l'Etat fournit des services publics à vocation universelle: l'éducation et la santé publique etc. Mais ces droits créent des obligations pour les responsables politiques, et ceux-ci doivent pouvoir s'appuyer sur les instruments nécessaires à l'exercice de ces droits, et donc au respect de leurs obligations. Or, l'Etat dans ce rôle traverse une crise, même si nous nous plaçons à un second niveau de débat, qui consiste à déterminer qui gère les prestations découlant de ces droits et qui le fait avec le plus grand degré d'efficacité.

L'impact d'intégration européenne sur l'Etat-nation, *sous aspect politique*, est important. Il concerne l'existence et le développement de démocratie, des élections libres, de pluripartisme, de souveraineté nationale. L'Etat-nation peut se targuer d'un beau succès en matière d'institution et de pérennisation de la démocratie. Cela parce qu'il a réussi de doter avec les mêmes droits l'ensemble d'individus de son territoire, qui appartient du groupe nationale, d'établir une correspondance sans faille entre un peuple homogène et les compétences étatique. Au présent, une série de compétences qui appartient de démocratie représentative sont accomplies par les institutions européennes. D'ici la nécessité d'informer opportunément et correctement aux citoyens de chaque Etat membre en ce qui concerne leurs droits et leurs obligations dans ce nouveau contexte démocratique. Par exemple, dans le Parlement européen sont des parlementaires qui représentent tous les Etats membres de l'Union européenne. Cette modalité peut mener,



petit à petit, à la conclusion de réduire le nombre de députés et de sénateurs à l'échelon du Parlement national.

En ce qui concerne la souveraineté nationale des Etats-nation, pratiquement, celui-ci « cède » une partie de leur souveraineté à l'Union européenne. L'adoption de décisions politiques importants au niveau des institutions européennes est, dorénavant, un fait fréquent rencontré. Pourtant, « le transfert » de souveraineté entre les Etats-nation et l'Union européenne s'impose perçue comme des interactions et des échanges d'influence entre les pays membres qui, n'importe comment tenaient compte et antérieur d'obtenir le statut actuel, des facteurs extérieurs pendant qu'ils adoptaient les décisions d'importants majeur dans tous les domaines d'activité et non comme une perte d'unes attributions de l'Etat.

Face à l'érosion de la souveraineté étatique et à son transfert à des institutions supranationales, du moins à la perception qu'ils peuvent avoir du phénomène, nombreux sont les citoyens à se réfugier dans des réactions - généralement nationalistes - exacerbées. Ces réactions à leur tour, en tant qu'elles s'accompagnent d'un rejet des règles du jeu démocratique, représentent en soi une véritable menace pour la démocratie et ses valeurs.

Bercés du mythe de la souveraineté nationale, certains citoyens croient à tort leur nation privée de son pouvoir légitime, et s'imaginent spoliés d'un de leurs droits fondamentaux, qui plus est de leur unique droit collectif. D'où des réactions de "frustration nationale", s'exprimant à la fois par des attitudes nationalistes parfois problématiques, un détachement, voire une critique violente des institutions démocratiques, ainsi qu'une indifférence croissante vis-à-vis de la vie politique nationale, et plus encore européenne. Un tel malaise peut aller jusqu'à la haine de l'Autre, du non national, jusqu'à une rébellion contre l'Etat. Il est probable qu'il participe à l'anomie politique des Européens en général, ainsi d'ailleurs qu'à certains bons scores des partis d'extrême droite en Europe⁵.

Il y a aussi un impact significatif de l'intégration européenne qui concerne la *palier psychosocial* des Etats-nation. Dans ce sens, il s'agit de cohésion et de consensus nationale, de conformité et d'acceptation volontaire des normes et des valeurs propres, de traditions et de mentalités définitives pour la population de l'Etat respectif. L'existence des institutions supranationales (européennes) et la

légitimité démocratique de ces structures de pouvoir influencent les caractéristiques qui appartiennent de dimension psychosociale de l'Etat-nation. Dans ce contexte, l'atténuation des implications négatives de l'intégration européenne devrait faire remonter la légitimité des structures supranationales à celle des gouvernements nationaux auxquels les citoyens se réfèrent. Cela est possible, dans la mesure où les organismes supranationaux sont constitués de représentants des Etats-nation, nommés par les gouvernements ou, plus rarement, démocratiquement élus. Ainsi, un renforcement du Conseil des ministres, organe décisionnel déterminant de l'Union, exclusivement composé de membres des gouvernements nationaux des Etats européens permettrait que la souveraineté nationale reste aux mains des représentants nationaux. Il n'y a pas alors d'érosion de la souveraineté nationale, tout au plus une nouvelle organisation de cette dernière, au reste tout aussi légitime. Dans ce cas, on pourrait dire que la politique européenne applique la souveraineté nationale des pays membres de l'Union, et par conséquent représente démocratiquement leurs populations. S'il est vrai que la participation de ministres nationaux à l'exécutif européen, outre la cessation volontaire de souveraineté aux institutions supranationales, est aujourd'hui la seule légitimation possible de ces institutions celle-ci est hautement insuffisante ; et ce pour deux raisons principales.

D'abord parce qu'elle ne remplit pas la condition démocratique de correspondance. Pour qu'il y ait démocratie, le territoire sur lesquelles les mesures politiques sont appliquées doit coïncider avec le territoire sur lequel elles prennent effet. A titre d'exemple, on pourrait difficilement tenir pour démocratique la décision du gouvernement britannique de revenir à une loi écologique particulièrement laxiste, si celle-ci avait pour conséquence directe de polluer les mers scandinaves et de priver de travail les pêcheurs norvégiens. Dans un tel cas, les citoyens norvégiens concernés par la mesure britannique en question ne pourraient nullement sanctionner les décideurs britanniques, et guère plus exercer sur eux de pression efficace. Bien qu'ils aient été représentés par des délégués de leur gouvernement national lors de la délibération, les citoyens de cet Etat n'ont alors guère de recours. Les problèmes de correspondance sont relativement fréquents dans le monde contemporain, où il n'est pas rare que la politique d'un Etat ait



des répercussions au-delà de ses frontières. Mais ils gagnent en intensité lorsque les décisions sont prises au-delà même de l'Etat-nation, dans une sphère transnationale.

Toutefois, dans ce manière les caractéristiques psychosociales de l'Etat-nation ne seraient pas affecter négativement. En outre, les populations de ces Etats devraient apprendre ce qui représente cette qualité dans le cadre de l'Union européenne et comme la cohésion, la consens, la conformité, l'acceptation de valeurs démocratiques ont une existence et un signification positive et à l'échelon européenne. Aussi, le palier psychosocial est présent et il agit au niveau de l'Union européenne. Par la suite, il peut apparaître les unes dysfonctionnements dans tous les deux paliers psychosociaux.

Une autre implication majeure de l'intégration européenne concerne l'*identité nationale*⁶. D'habitude, les citoyens d'un Etat sont fortement sensibles alors quand il s'agit de leur identité nationale. Au présent, il s'agit insistent d'identité européenne, relativement différente de l'identité nationale. Probable, celui-ci est associé avec le droit d'accorder la citoyenneté européenne pour tous les habitants des Etat membres de l'Union européenne. Pour doter la citoyenneté européenne d'un caractère démocratique, il faut aussi se pencher sur la question paradigmatique du pouvoir et inventer un équilibre d'un autre type, qui ne renvoie plus à la structure centralisée et simplificatrice de l'Etat-nation (un peuple = un Etat = une politique), mais soit adapté à la réalité européenne. Autrement dit fonde une organisation politique dans laquelle un centre décisionnel unique puisse correspondre à différents peuples, à des traditions multiples. Pour cela, l'Europe politique doit cesser de croire en l'indissociable lien unissant compétences, territoire et identité sous peine de contradictions et dysfonctionnements démocratiques croissants, et distinguer les unes des autres les différentes compétences de l'Etat-nation classique, qui tendent de plus en plus à être réparties entre plusieurs instances. La clef du pouvoir n'est plus aujourd'hui l'*agrégation* de toutes les attributions étatiques, idéalement incarnée par l'Etat-nation - français - de la fin du XIX^e siècle, mais la *répartition* des fonctions gouvernementales à différents niveaux de pouvoir⁷. Autant dire que l'idée d'Etat-nation européen serait ici particulièrement malvenue.

Ainsi l'Etat national, bien qu'il ait cédé de larges parts de souveraineté aux institutions euro-

péennes et ne soit plus guère en mesure de garantir seul à ses habitants sécurité extérieure et intérieure ou bien-être social, conserve-t-il une fonction fondamentale, à savoir la fonction identitaire.

De leur côté, incapables de susciter à ce jour une véritable identification affective, les institutions européennes n'en détiennent pas moins un important pouvoir dans les domaines sécuritaire et socio-économique.

Pourtant, l'Etat-nation n'est pas complètement dépourvu de ses attributs traditionnels. Ainsi, il conserve par exemple, même s'il est limité, un certain pouvoir de régulation économique -, de même que régions et Union européenne peut, elles aussi, endosser un certain rôle identitaire et d'administrateur d'affaires publiques interne.

En ce qui concerne le concept „nation européenne“, il ne couvris pas une réalité et ne peut pas légitimer démocratiquement la politique des institutions européennes. Il suffit que les individus vivant à l'intérieur de l'Union européenne aient conscience de l'utilité de la collaboration supranationale et développent l'envie et le besoin de résoudre ensemble des problèmes communs. Une telle association d'individus aux identités divergentes, rassemblés par un consensus sur des valeurs non culturelles, n'est pas caractérisée par la solidarité "ethnique" propre à l'Etat-nation, fondée sur de mêmes expériences historiques et culturelles, mais par la solidarité spécifique à toute communauté soudée par des défis civilisationnels communs. Dans le cadre d'une démocratie européenne ouverte, ce modèle est à même de soutenir l'émergence d'un sentiment d'appartenance européen et d'un lien communautaire fort entre les citoyens d'Europe, ainsi que de garantir les valeurs humanistes en leur offrant une nouvelle structure sûre, au-delà de l'Etat -nation.

Conclusions

L'Union européenne de plus en plus joue son rôle et amplifie ses compétences dans l'administration de tout activité humaine, individuel, de groupe et institutionnelle de l'espace géographique propre. Ses institutions dirigent démocratiquement l'activité interne et externe, assure la sécurité humaine et la défense commune de tous les Etats membres.

Les Etats membres de l'Union européenne bien qu'ils transfèrent une part de leurs compétences



vers les institutions européennes, ils continueront d'exister et d'exercer leurs fonctions de défense et de sécurité des ses citoyens. Toutefois, ils resteront les porteurs et les défenseurs de l'identité et de la culture nationale, ainsi que l'administrateur autorisé des affaires publiques du pays. Les prérogatives économiques, politiques, militaires, sociales, culturels biens qu'elles sont réduites seront d'actualité dans le futur.

L'intégration des Etats-nation dans l'Union européenne a un impact significatif et fort. D'abord il s'agit de nécessiter d'harmonisation législative, institutionnelle et relationnelle des activités au niveau de l'Union européenne avec celles de chaque pays membre. Puis, s'impose de définir l'aire de compétences politiques, économiques, sociales, de défense et de sécurité des institutions européennes et cela-la de chaque pays. En fin, le contrôle des institutions européennes sur tous les domaines d'activité individuel, de groupe et institutionnel s'intensifieront et élargiront, tandis que les institutions nationales restreindront ce type d'activité.

Les valeurs démocratiques défendues et promues par l'Union européenne obtiendront beaucoup des adeptes, en généralisant dans tout l'espace européenne intégrée. Aussi, on parlera beaucoup plus de citoyenneté et d'identité européennes, mais dans le même temps avec la citoyenneté et l'identité nationales.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE:

1. Rodica BACONSKI, François BENOIT (coord.), *Ce este Uniunea Europeană?*, București, Editura Est, 2001
2. Claire DEMESMAY, *Au-delà de l'Etat-nation: quelle démocratie pour l'Europe?*, <http://www.robert-schuman.org/synth2.htm>
3. Felipe GONZÁLEZ, *L'Union Européenne, union des peuples*, <http://www.globalprogress.org/frances/novedades.html>
4. *L'Etat-nation*, http://www.ledroitpublic.com/libertes_fondamentales/index.php
5. *Les incertitudes de la citoyenneté*, <http://droit.univ-lille2.fr/enseignants/villalba/courspsc.htm>

NOTES:

- ¹ Voir Rodica BACONSKI, François BENOIT (coord.), *Ce este Uniunea Europeană?*, București, Editura Est, 2001, p. 13.
- ² Felipe GONZALEZ, *L'Union Européenne, union des peuples*, <http://www.globalprogress.org/frances/novedades.html>
- ³ *L'Etat-nation*, http://www.ledroitpublic.com/libertes_fondamentales/index.php
- ⁴ Claire DEMESMAY, *Au-delà de l'Etat-nation: quelle démocratie pour l'Europe?*, <http://www.robert-schuman.org/synth2.htm>
- ⁵ Idem.
- ⁶ *Les incertitudes de la citoyenneté*, <http://droit.univ-lille2.fr/enseignants/villalba/courspsc.htm>
- ⁷ Claire DEMESMAY, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Dr. Petre DUȚU est chercheur degré deux au CSSAS, sociologue militaire, auteur de livres et des nombreux articles sur la sécurité nationale, régional et globale, ainsi que sur le moral des militaires et d'armée, etc.

Sous commissaire Claudiu DRĂGAN est spécialiste dans le management de crises et des conflits sociaux.



THE ROMANIAN ARMY IMPLICATION IN HOST-NATION SUPPORT (HNS)

Vasile POPA

The Host-Nation Support (HNS) is the one of the essential NATO member state's participation elements to peace, crises and war, to national and collective defence operations, to stability and civil emergencies, according with the capabilities it disposes of.

In the collective defence effort, that comprises the totality of the taken measures and undertaken actions by the inter-allied military structures for delaying, stopping or rejecting the aggressor, HNS represents a very important factor that rises the Romania's share as a Host-Nation (HN) and, implicitly, its army's to the missions accomplishment by the Alliance's forces.

1. The Romanian participation optimization to the collective defence

As a NATO member, Romania is obliged to act for its own forces strengthen, for being able to lead a national defence war, to participate with a force quantity to the collective defence effort in the Alliance's framework and to take part for the security environment development and maintenance favorable for its interests' protection. On the way of these obligations, Romania has the possibility and capacity to optimize its actions interference regarding the national and the collective¹ defence.

The optimal intermission of some national defence elements with the collective defence ones will lead to their optimization, determining for our country to affirm more consistent as a security generator source wherever the Alliance's missions and responsibilities ask for it.

Romania's appreciable economic power will have a positive impact over the capabilities that it owns and can offer to the Alliance in the HNS framework. The material and human potential but also the geo-strategic position represent important privileges in some future complex allied roles accomplishment, including HN.

Its security system continuous modernization and the Romanian state capacity growth to im-

pose itself as a NATO member are guaranties for the ample implication possibilities in HNS action. The Romanian army reform amplifies its role in Alliance's missions, through power projection capacities' development for security assurance in the NATO's South-Eastern Area, for participation in other zones for combating terrorism and peace management missions as the ones from Middle and Near East.

The realization, modernization and sustenance of the national defence designated to HNS, the facilities Romania can put to Alliance's structures disposal are activities which depend directly on the governance quality and country's durable development, on the responsible action of the society's involved components, but also on the engagement of all its members in a functional market economy, in the legislative framework improvement and justice function, administrative capacity, economic reforms accomplishment and combating corruption.

Although there is no connection between the capabilities offered by Romania, as a HN, and corruption, the latter, slowly but surely, diminishes the state's economic and infrastructure potential, affects the economic-social growth and development and, implicitly, the possibility to sustain and grow the needed capabilities. The important economic losses produced by the economic, financial or other way of criminality weaken the society's force to sustain the sectors and components which are put at Alliance's disposal.

The quality and functionality for conferring HNS depend, as it follows, on the economic development level, social productivity, the state's economic performance, politic, economic and social stability.

The accelerated rhythm of how our country succeeds to overlap the delays from the information technologies field, fix and mobile communications, electronic governance, represents a significant step for the projects' implementation from HN program. The economy dynamism and, complementary with



it, the consolidation of the capabilities offered by Romania in the framework of HNS will be up to the mark stimulated by the near EU integration, when the development perspectives of all the activity fields will rise, through the European partners support and solidarity. Within EU, Romania would be able to grow its economic performances, competition, and able to use new technologies in the HNS connections and structures, to be an active part of ESDP, NATO missions and to generate stability and regional security. Choosing the European values and a stable security environment, Romania would do whatever is possible for defending its own and allies' interests. The close correlation of the generated activities as HNS with the other NATO nations' ones will be found re-objective in HNS dimension, where the Romanian Army will accomplish, as a military institution that is part of an Alliance member, a complex of missions:

- army's contribution for ensuring national security during peacetime;
- defending Romania and other allied states';
- contributing to the regional and global stability, including by the use of defence diplomacy;
- supporting the state's institutions and local authorities at civil emergencies.

The politic and military role which our country will assume to the integrated structures level and in a HN posture it isn't just a technical and military process of interoperability and standardization, of a rigorous frame in a scheme that must be literally respected, but also one of human and material performance, of responsibility and liability, of cooperation and education, as well as of transparency, if it is regarded from the information context that are mutual available to the allies, and the NATO Headquarters, too. That is how the organization's interests are promoted and protected, and the deficit of security is diminished to minimum.

The mechanisms put in motion by our country in the HNS framework must be efficient and perfect functional, from a responsibility that passes the obligations from the Alliance's member quality or bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded by HN with NATO's organizations and nations that provide forces which operate on national territory and which derive, in the same time, from our willingness of playing a substance role in the European and Euro-Atlantic security equation, for ensuring peace and stability to regional and global level.

2. Romania's HNS capabilities

The effort of stocktaking the military and civil assistance elements which our country can offer as a HN, to allied forces and NATO's organizations, deployed or in transit over Romania's territory, to peace, crises and conflict, has been materialized in the Planning Catalogue of the Romanian HNS Capabilities (RO-HNS CAPCAT), which will facilitate HNS planning at strategic level, offering Alliance's and SN's planning structures very important primary information.

From the national HNS point of contact (RO-HNS POC), from the Logistics Direction (J4) of GS/NMoD, there can be obtained detailed information over Romania's HNS offer. The fast access to data of interest from HNS field is made by an appeal to Romania's HNS Database (RO-HNS DB) in ADAMS format, which is available to NATO structures using the CRONOS infrastructure.

It is remarkable that during the operations support planning process, the NATO Headquarters establish the detailed operational requirements regarding the accordance by our state of HNS (different facilities, materials, equipments, services, other infrastructure elements).

According to the chapter VI from the *General Conception and Procedures concerning the offering by Romania the Host-Nation Support for NATO members' and partner states' military actions on national territory*, the potential fields whereas our country can offer support comprise:

- 1 Direct support capabilities for receiving, temporary stationing and continuing forces displace process;
- 2.Education facilities, training shooting stands;
- 3.Equipments and material stocks pre-positioning;
4. National transport infrastructure;
- 5.Communications and informatics infrastructure.

The first group of capabilities includes key-capabilities for the planning and execution process of receiving, temporary stationing and continuing forces displace: SPOD/Es; APOD/Es and RPOD/Es.

Each port and airport identified as SPOD/E, respectively APOD/E, disposes by potential facilities as accommodation, meal, work spaces, storage, maintenance, fuel re-alimentation, medical assistance, transport services for the personnel and for



all the military and civil materials classes, which confer them an integrated character.

Other ports and airports potential identified characteristics as SPOD/E and APOD/E refer to: operation and multimodal transport (allow a quick access to land transport infrastructure, dispose of loading-discharge detachments, transfer-cargo and supervision traffic, endowed with necessary technique equipments); connection teams (composed from contact officers, endowed with NATO interoperable communication equipments); radio-navigation and aerial surveillance systems; protection and force security devices during the temporary stationing (protection of road and railway transport convoys, lines of communication is ensured by military police units); prevention and extinguish fire facilities and emergency medical support.

An ensemble view over the document suggests the greatness of the support Romania can offer, on different levels, to allied forces as a HN.

There are mentioned the HNS facilities of the three armed forces categories, aerial and naval operations logistic support, temporary stationing zones for the allied forces transiting the Romanian territory, reception facilities, national transport infrastructure – road, railway and civil aerial -, as well as the naval one, all kind of material storehouses, headquarters locations, support facilities, testing, maintenance, intervention, protection etc.

When there is a military operation led by NATO, within the collective defence concept framework, Romania offers itself to take some complex measures for the assurance from peace-time the national territory preparing for offering HNS.

Therefore, our country can dispose of railway terminals that could be used for embarkation/debarkation, ports, airports and support facilities, for achieving a quick reception of NATO Reaction Force and sustaining the flows of human and material resources to the operation theatres.

In accordance with the *General Conception and Procedures concerning the offering by Romania the Host-Nation Support* in the situation when are lead some Crises Response Operations (CRO), inclusive Peace Support Operations (PSO), Romania is ready to assume the Lead Nation (LN) status or Role Specialist Nation (RSN), for providing some vital resources to the entire theatre of operations or some military units and formations designated to support the critical processes from that logistics of the theatre of operation.

For the situations when there will occur transition operations over the national territory, the Romanian state commissioned bodies will be able to offer a wide range of personnel and merchandise transport services at strategic level, by transport infrastructures, which assure the connections between the localities and beyond the administrative border, as well as with the European and world-wide space.

At present, these infrastructures are situated in the public property, or in the private one, companies or national societies. The use of public transport infrastructures is free and without any discrimination and the military transports on this way are done according to some permanent technical agreements between NMoD and national transport companies.

For the future, the national transport network will really improve, offering bigger possibilities for HNS. It should be considered the priority projects that are to be accomplished until 2015 on Romania's territory, which comprise highway building for connecting to the pan-European transport corridors, the gradual creation of the transport network, by integrating the road, railway, internal navigable, maritime and aerial communications in the trans-European network.

“Arranging territory and transports” program considers an effective transport system development for passengers and merchandises, safe and unpolluted, ensuring the transport networks interconnection and interoperability; modernization, capacity's development and increasing the quality of transport infrastructure; developing a transport system for passengers and goods, integrated, at national and European level; the transport networks interconnection and interoperability growth in the multimodal transport, assuring the transport operators, users and authorities with adequate decision instruments, based on mobility, traffic flows, infrastructures and their interdependencies acknowledgement; smart transport systems development.

The general objectives of the program include, among others: the improvement of the transport conditions; durable transport development (that assures the capabilities durability offered by Romania to HNS), the alignment of the transport system to the European one; ensuring compatibility between the transport infrastructures and the vehicles of different ways of transport; the comfort improvement and increasing the security and



safety for transports, technologies, systems, procedures and equipments for increasing the comfort, the safety; developing smart transport systems for traffic management (transport planning, traffic control, incidents managements, traffic regularization, infrastructure maintenance management); emergencies, emergencies' vehicles, incidents, personnel security management; increasing the security in transports.

To reach, by accomplishing those objectives, the performance level imposed to transport quality on worldwide level will have a remarkable positive impact over the inventory of capabilities offered by our country for HNS.

There is no doubt that Romania disposes of adequate capabilities it engages to put at military forces' disposal even when there are operations in ad-hoc coalitions, designated for combating terrorist actions against allied or partner nations and for ensuring the international security and stability, limiting and eliminating the effects of the disasters provoked or major natural calamities, inclusive NBC accidents.

A significant capability share we should have in the storage facilities field, military and civilian, different stocks shared on materials types and classes, having a quick access to the strategic transport national infrastructure. From this point of view, Romania can form, at peacetime, Integrated Storage Capabilities belonging to NATO structures.

In the particularized Romania's contribution to HNS we could also include the possible locations for the Alliance's headquarters, as we have numerous buildings and military or civilian fields that are adequate for installing some important structures.

The Romanian state capability offer for HNS comprises older facilities, but some new ones, modern, achieved in the last years, following the NATO preparation adhesion operational programs and the full Alliance integration accomplishment. We speak about railways terminals, as are the ones from București, Constanța, Timișoara, Craiova, Brașov, Arad, Iași, Galați; the military aerodromes and civil airports (Fetești, Boboc, Câmpia Turzii, Băneasa, Târgu-Mureș, Iași, Suceava, Bacău, Oradea, Baia-Mare, Caransebeș, Arad), with the available installations, fulfilling the NATO standards (airstrips, runways, tactic aerial parking spaces and also for transit airplanes, stationing spaces, maintenance hangars, testing spaces for the airplanes engines, armament and ammunitions

storage, support facilities for visiting airships, intervention and firemen services, transmissions equipments and navigation protection, road and railway communications ways, fly control towers, weather service, storage capacities and aerial fuel distribution installations, access ways, buildings for air operations and exploitation offices and air base HQs, etc.

There are also enclosed instruction, shooting and applied shooting stands for different echelons from the Army, training polygons for different specialties (including NBC defence), aviation shooting stands and also for **anti-aircraft shootings**. We also mention some landing, manoeuvring and sustaining airports for NATO airships; air traffic services when closely watching the Romanian air space by military airships belonging to NATO and partner states; refuelling facilities; repairing base for the fight technique of maritime forces; facilities in the maritime ports - Mangalia, Constanța, Midia and the fluvial ones - Brăila, Galați, Tulcea, Sulina, Giurgiu, Turnu Măgurele; naval and air infrastructure; military equipment storage infrastructure (logistic materials, food, autos and armoured, armament and ammunition, aviation and anti-air defence, technique, civil protection, medical assurance and topography-geodesy or mixed materials).

We underline that, in 1994, the National Ministry of Defence signed a frame-contract with the American company Northrop Grumman that stipulates providing a range of services and assistance in problems concerning military bases modernization and management for accomplishing the NATO standards regarding HNS.

It is obvious that Romania will continue to do whatever is possible to achieve the fundamental objective for the assumed engagements accomplishment as a NATO member, and we include here the HN obligations, that require an increase of forces and capabilities operational level, for successfully covering the entire range of Alliance's missions.

The active participation to NATO missions and operations in further theatres will be closely corroborated with the training, in order to offer a consistent and efficient support on national territory.

The Romania's government makes constant efforts for ensuring the necessary resources for defence, although, probably, it will be difficult to designate a 2,38% from PIB for defence budget until 2007.² A share from the annual budgets of the



NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, ACTIONS

National Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are contribution payments for the military and civil NATO budgets.

We will also stress out the concern of the Parliament and Government for introducing in the national legislation the exception of drawing out from the custom taxes of the NATO member state forces transitory over Romania's territory, as well as to contribute and participate to NATO Security Investment Programme – NSIP³ for the improvement of our capacities in supporting NATO allies' collective security.

In this Program framework there will be included some strategic infrastructure objectives in major interest, comprised in specific Capabilities Packages, deduced from the *Situation concerning the strategic infrastructure state of major interest for Romania and North-Atlantic Treaty Organization*, elaborated at National Ministry of Defence level.

Returning to the capabilities field, we will show that, when the NATO specific logistic is accomplished by the Romanian Government, as HN, the HNS documents stipulate the relations that will follow to be established between NATO, Government and civilians, CIMIC measures, between NATO's forces commandants, the governmental agencies and NGOs, private organizations and other authorities, when the forces are stationary, supported or engaged on our country's territory.

According to the methodology for conferring HNS, Romania has to underlie its Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs), Technical Agreements (TAs) signed with other NATO member states.

General Conception and Procedures concerning the offering by Romania the Host-Nation Support underlines that the central pillar for conferring HNS by our country is represented by the SMOU between Romania and the Allied Command for Operations.

For a certain operation, the HNS settlements stipulate that the offer by our country of this support to be based on a peculiar Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

The NATO members SN's adhesion to this memorandum will be made through NOA and the PfP members SN's or/and NATO or PfP non-member states could adhere to memorandum through NOA in concordance with NATO's Strategic Concept and also within CJTF framework, on an Additional SOFA between Romania and the respective

SN and also with a Multilateral SOFA Agreement associated with complex combined military operations.

The necessary products and services for foreign armed forces for subsistence, operation and maintenance, for accomplishing the mandate, during stationing, enter-exit, operation and transit over Romania's territory, will be purchased through NMoD specialized structures.

In crises situations, civil emergencies and war, the purchase will be done exclusively through certain NMoD structures, but in peace, optionally, there can appeal to assistance services from the signatory contracts field offered by NMoD specialized structures.

When there are agreed acquisition contracts for products and services and also for renting mobile and immobile goods necessary to CJTF for accomplishing the given mandate there will be strictly respected the national and international legislation.

NMoD will guarantee by its structures, the purchased products and services quality, acquisition prizes for products and services at the products and services acquisition prizes contracted by itself as well as the acquisition procedures legitimacy.

By ROHNS DB, NMoD will offer the Sending Nations (SNs), by request, all the information regarding the economic agents authorized to merchandise products and services necessary for foreign armed forces, in the required quantities and within the quality standards imposed by beneficiaries.

The Force members, the civil component and their families will be able to buy products and services for their consumption from the local market, in similar conditions with the Romanian citizens. The foreign armed forces will purchase them by contracts signed with the entitled structures from NMoD: products from NMoD stocks or from civil markets; services performed by entitled NMoD structures or by civilian economic agents; houses, spaces, fields and civilian storage facilities for rent.

We underline that the Romanian authorities are very preoccupied of the modernization of all strategic infrastructure components, vital activity for the national and the collective security.

By this, the facilities offered in the future to allies' disposal in the HNS concept framework will be numerous and better, optimizing the entire support process of the foreign armed forces that are



stationed, enter/exit, operate or transit the Romania's national territory.

A strategic infrastructure, scientifically developed, planned by an appropriate budgetary share will add dynamic, technique, comfort and competition elements to the activities carried on as a HN.

3. The Romanian Army Contribution to HNS

Fidelity is the essential principle that Romanian state follows when offering HNS and also in Romanian's Army participation to this field. If we enunciate them, we will see that the principles have a fundamental role in the fluent and effective activities execution. These are: 1. Point of contact identity; 2. Responsibility; 3. Ensuring the resources; 4. Guaranteeing the authority; 5. Cooperation; 6. Coordination; 7. Resources economy; 8. Transparency; 9. Flexibility of means for payment. The ninth principles guarantee mobility and flexibility of HNS planning for all the involved parties – HN, SNs, NATO headquarters.

The Romania's HNS management system is structured in concordance with NATO stipulations and includes: The Director Committee (RO-HNS SC), which leads and coordinates all the activities where Romania offers HNS, and the Management Council (RO-HNS MC) that analyses and elaborates the specific documents for HNS field, assures the common coordination of the plans implementation for offering HNS.

The composition and attributions of the both structures are detailed in articles 68-69, respectively 71-72 from the *General Conception and Procedures concerning the offering by Romania the Host-Nation Support*.

The HNS offer is based, according to article 30, on MOUs, TAs and JIAs signed between our state and other allied or partner states.

The document specifies the compulsory character for the foreign armed forces situated on Romania's territory to respect the legal prescriptions and politic engagements assumed by our country to OSCE in the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) and especially the CFE prescriptions and Wien Document and also the ones concerning the strategic products' import/export. Also, the foreign armed forces should strictly respect the national and international legislation regarding the environment protection.

Romania, as a HN, affirms its responsibility to assure the legislative frame that allows an optimal development of the specific HNS activities; the specialty HNS assistance regarding the potential support fields; the coordination and cooperation between civilian and military sectors; the access to resources; the specialty assistance in financial and acquisitions fields; collaboration with NATO and SN HQs on the ongoing HNS planning process.

On Romania's territory, the fluent and untroubled HNS involvement consists in the correct knowledge and understanding of the host-nation legislation; respecting by SNs the imposed limits by the given mandate, each activity correspondence with the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the Multinational Force and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) issued for this goal.

Our country's participation as a HN and its army's to NATO missions and actions we consider that depends on the following factors:

- the conditions created by the authorities for preparing the whole material, financial, technical, human potential, implied in HNS activities;
- the continuous modernization and development of the capabilities offered by Romania, as a HN;
- the profound knowledge, by the ones involved at different levels, both civilian and military, of all the aspects regarding the HN obligations, responsibilities agreed in the field;
- the complex approach, from a more complete and pragmatic perspective, for HNS issues and activities occurring in the Romania's offer as a HNS;
- the thoroughgoing study field's research, from the perspective of different structures and decision factors role and specific engagement, as elements of the HNS management system component;
- the application, in HN activities, of the "lessons learnt" by our country's participation to NATO members' and partners' missions and actions, together with the assimilation of the strategic aspects derived from the HN status;
- performing the military and civil military structures roles and responsibilities when Romania offers HNS;
- the growth of the operational efficiency, coordination and cooperation between military and civil sector, of the access to resources and specialty assistance, etc., when Romania offers HNS to SNs;



- the Army's and military education documentation database development on issues regarding HNS;

- increasing the national investment effort growth in developing strategic capabilities which will be offered by Romania to allied and partner forces.

A wide vision over our country's participation to allied and partner military operations as a HN or SN can be built only through complex analysis of all the aspects assumed by this very important activity.

That is why we suggest this kind of analysis to connect the requests with the real possibilities, with HN results and assumed risks.

The analysis leads to optimizing consequences and relations created during those evolving missions that especially have a preventive function.

Therefore, there can be realized programs for a permanent supervision of the respective relations, for monitoring the vulnerabilities, threats and results dynamic and to diminish risks.

As an example, the actual situation from Iraq shows the fact that there was not foreseen the vulnerabilities and menaces dynamic referring to the new created situation.

A more complex analysis may be accomplished by monitoring system taking into account the status and dynamic indicators related to HNS system.

Conclusions

Our approach regards the HNS concept from its importance perspective achieving the success of allied and partner missions.

We think that there is disclosed, clearly enough, the complexity of the HN engagement and its responsibility in projecting and offering to SNs forces a complete capabilities spectrum, corresponding to their formulated request and the previous signed agreements.

The accumulated experience by the other NATO member states, but also the one acquired in the last years by Romania in the HNS for the allied forces that crossed over or stationed on our national territory, make useless a more ample study of procedural anticipation for HNS offer.

However, the complexity of the phenomenon, corroborated with the largest situations variety presumed by the wide spectrum of multinational missions request from the involved military and

civilian factors' a more attentive research over the details, afferent technical operations, national support activities, as for the efficiency to be maximum.

The missions' individualized character that determines distinctive HNS negotiations for each of them does not constitute a major impediment for the HN offered support dosage and optimization. The HNS process has clear marks for each action context. The only compulsory condition is to know the conception and procedures for offering HNS and their applicability without derogations, in the framework of a close cooperation HN-SN, HN-commissioned structures from NATO headquarters.

The importance of the ongoing modernization of the strategic capabilities and facilities can be hardly underestimated because it is the base for obtaining net superior performances when Romania offers HNS.

Translated by Mirela ATANASIU

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

MC 334/1, NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support (HNS)

MC 336/2, NATO Principles and Policies for Movement and Transportation (HNS)

MC 343/1, Military Committee Policy on NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Capability

MC 400/2, MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy

MC 319/2, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics

MC 327/2, NATO Military Policy for NON-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

MC 328/1, NATO's Military Cooperation Guidance

AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2002)

AA(-15, NATO Glossary of Abbreviations

AJP-4 (A), Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine

QAJA-4.4, Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine

AJP-4.5, Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures

FM-100-8, Appendix. Host Nation Support

NATO Manual, Office of Information and Press NATO, Brussels – Belgium, 2001

NATO Logistics Handbook, NATO Head-



quarters Brussels, Third Edition, October 1997

General Conception and Procedures concerning the offering by Romania the Host-Nation Support (HNS) for the NATO member and partner states military actions on national territory

The Capabilities Planning Catalogue for HNS (ROU-HNS CAPCAT)

The National Minister of Defence Order regarding the organization, preparation and functioning of the Connection Teams in landing/embarking airports and landing/embarking maritime ports

Romania's HNS Database (RO-HNS DB)

The Multinational Joint Operations Doctrine

NOTES:

¹ See Lieutenant General Sorin IOAN, PhD, **The Army role for Romania's – NATO member state - security assurance**, in the volume "*Challenges to security and strategy at the beginning of the XXIst century*", the Scientific Communication Session with international participation of National Defence University, from 14th-15th April 2005, National Defence and Security Section, The National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 447-448.

² PPBS, www.mapn.ro

³ *Ibidem*.

Colonel (ret.) Vasile POPA is a scientific researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I" and edited a recently comprehensive study regarding the Host-Nation Support (HNS) and the issue of Romania's accomplishment from its role of Host-Nation (HN).



COLLECTIVE SECURITY - AN EVOLVING CONCEPT

Eugen SITEANU, PhD

The cooperation security pattern consists of the four concentric circles: the nucleus or the first ring is the individual security, and the other circles are: the collective security, collective defence and the stability promotion. The collective security and collective defence stood to the base of League of Nations, UN, OSCE, and NATO creation, but only NATO succeeded, in fact, to operate efficacious and efficient in all the fourth security circles. The collective security and the national security are two concepts situated in interdependency. Collective security serves to national security and defence, and the national security is, at its turn, essential for the collective security and defence.

After the terrorist attacks dated September, 11, 2001, the United States of America released a non-conventional war against terrorism. The terrorist attacks that followed, in the next years, against Madrid, Moscow, London, etc. showed there's no state protected in front of the terrorist threat, entire world being now vulnerable to this scourge.

The globalization, a complex and multidimensional process¹, each human activity, social phenomenon, has both positive and negative parts. The ones that are against the globalization forget or ignore its advantages, and the ones that agree with the globalization neglect its negative aspects.

The American billionaire George Soros affirmed that the globalization does not function for the world's poorest, for the environment or for global economy stability because the global economic game has rules established by the industrialized countries in their own interest.

The globalization influences the relation between the national security and the international one, but also others (between the national security and the collective security, as well as between the collective security and the international one). Although, it also determines all this relations' components, through the influence exercised separately over the national security, collective security

and international security. So, national security is strongly influenced by the globalization, by the induced effects in economic, social, politic, military or others activities development from every country on Earth.

The globalization, together with other phenomena, determines the shape of a new security medium that needs a global and unitary approach of the collective security issues. The defence concept became useless in front of the risks, dangers, threats and aggressions against the national states and nations.² Therefore, there are necessary political decisions which, primordially, look for the state's institutions organization and nation's reorganization, for maintaining its capacity of performing reproduction.³

The different state governs do not have the same capacities of public management and dispose of different possibilities of scientific substantiation for the information processing. Furthermore, they have unequal performances according to the theoretical patterns used in support of the security issues scientific solving.

Under these circumstances, taking security and defence decisions represent a complex process that contains many internal contradictions between the decision factors regarding the choosing objectives. Some politic leaders opt for more flexible objectives' definition, and others want a more exact definition of the security objectives for an opportune planning of the military operations.

Regarding the collective security accomplishment, that process must be scientifically grounded and the theoretical horizons must be defined. This approach supposes the national strategy defining by the collective security, into a global projection regarding the society. That's why a coherent legislative frame is needed for assuring the normal and opportune development of the national security management institutionalization process. It is also necessary to achieve a law system which guards the state and the nation against all aggressions,



because it is known the possibility of the judicial norms disappearance in crisis situations. Without being defined, in conformity with the constitutional prescriptions, attributions, competencies and military institutions responsibilities, the process for taking security decisions is difficult. For defining the responsibilities, there must be projected, first of all, the competencies, so that to be precisely quantified all the possible responsibilities, in order not to repeat crises, conflicts and wars. Thus, the judicial norm is necessary to assure: 1) some performing institutional architecture building in the opportune security decisions elaboration support and 2) an optimum level of responsibility of all the elaboration structures and applying the national security strategies.

The decision factors must begin with the nation's and state's capacity of taking decisions concerning the national security, which would make possible the consequences analyses accomplishment before taking the decisions.

Moreover, for a scientific substantiation of the national security cooperation and planning it is necessary the acknowledgement of all types of risks, threats and aggressions, including the new ones (informational, financial, economic, military, etc.), of the fundamental national interests, vulnerabilities, geopolitical situations and its evolution tendencies, internal and international legislation, etc. The security theory can't be detached from the big mutations which take place on the international arena at the century and millennium beginning: the transnational actors' multiplication, regional and global integration mechanisms functioning, the transnational actors' organization in network structures, as, for example, the terrorist organization Al Qaeda, the failure of the classic discouragement policy, etc. The nation-state époque produced concepts, theories and paradigms of the "military security", of the forces balance, concepts that are part of a realist trend. In the framework of these theories, international policy was presented as a permanent collision between the great powers and their satellites, with some temporary peaceful moments, conform to the practice called "realpolitik". Both realism and neo-realism consider the international environment as an arena where sovereign states in confront in a total anarchy and where there is a permanent risk of war between states.

According to this theory, the world is seen as a system, and the procession's effects from the

systemic structure composed from interdependent states lead to ceaseless repetition of conflicts/wars, as a response to power's distribution. In the system's framework, all the states were trying to apply discouragement, strategies, and their internal power or to assure alliances, especially with the great powers.

But, the politicians who took decisions based on realism/neo-realism often made the mistake of forgetting to take also into account the ideas, national values, myths and co-nationals belief, the wish of freedom and the will to fight for the national ideals' accomplishment, the will to unite in a single national state and for the territorial integrity defence with the supreme sacrifice.

The political realism describes the world exactly as it is, with its interests and especially with the national ones, which are determinant, with the politicians, dominated by the chase for power, etc. The realists considered that by the laws discovered by them reality can be known, because they renounced to the preconceptions. Also, the objective acknowledgement was assured, they stated, by the epistemological discovery and validation of some objective laws which govern the human nature and sovereign states nature into an international system characterized by anarchy.

The trend represented by realism/neo-realism was criticized, due to the patterns taken from the natural sciences and which shouldn't be mechanically applied in the human sciences. American president Woodrow Wilson proposed, at the beginning of 1918, a new security formula, for the scope "to determine the right to prevail against any selfish aggression, for avoiding the rise of an alliance against other alliance".⁴ Unlike the old security formulas, he considered that to the base of the new global order should lay democracy, collective security and the peoples' right to self-determination.⁵ Then, the theory proposed by realism/neo-realism must suffer important modifications. The security concept always suffered transformations, but recently passed to post-positivist scientific theories adoption, which correspond to the geopolitical mutations from the globalization era and to renounce to the simplistic explanations based on so-called "objective" laws.

The qualitative paradigm appeared based on intuition, historical tendencies and cultural-imagistic interactions study and analysis between the actors. This paradigm attributes to socio-political actors



more freedom and it doesn't consider them totally conditioned by their position into the system. Thus, the qualitative research represents a flexible theory, which is always adapting to the new situations, by the chosen hypothesis testing, so that they are able to be continuously modified.

In opposition with the qualitative analysis, the quantitative one is based on a fix, rigid theory. In the human sciences there are used qualitative methods, based on "national spirit", on the époque's concept and group identity. These are part of the intuitive understanding of the reasonable acts created by people in concordance with their goals, of the socio-political events sense that change the old order, historical tendencies, great trends that characterize an époque, thus the whole to be surprised in its evolution beyond the simple causality and rational calculus of the socio-political actors with their interests. After the end of the World War II, the security concepts and language got a more scientific character, by standardization and some definitions emission acknowledged by the international scientific community.

The decisional factors strongly need a theory of the national security for elaborating decisions scientific grounded.

In security theory there can't be applied the pattern of rationality according to which the decision taker formulates the problem in certitude conditions and establishes possible solutions to choose the optimum solution after a rigorous analysis. In the political-military phenomena and processes, there act an impressing amount of occasional factors which generate complex striving processes. In this fluid framework, sometimes relevant information misses, determining an incomplete, shared, acknowledgement of the accomplishment probability of the established objectives. Therefore, the rationality pattern is incomplete and imperfect, and the decision-taker behaviour can't be completely rational when decisions are taken in incertitude conditions. The decisional pattern proposed by H. Simon is situated in the limited rationality field (*The Limited Rationality Theory*), thus in risk and uncertain conditions. Its theory starts from the premise that the man isn't a reasonable human being, but one that tends to rationality, each decision-taker owing an original decisional logic. This pattern (this theory) can be also used in the security decision elaboration process, each process being a universe of diversity. The political decision-taker

must find solutions not only in relation with the immediate consequences of the variants and states of the security environment, but also with those ones with future decisions' consequences and permanently improving its collective security concept, its principles, institutions and mechanisms.

The risks are those ones that lead to more action alternatives, but choosing an alternative chose as it happened, for example, when it was about creating the League of Nations, didn't guarantee the integral security issue solving, because any action alternative can lead to at least two different results. Furthermore, it is always necessary to keep in view the probability of different consequences for each security alternative. The disregards of this truth determined the failure of the League of Nations and collective security from the interwar period.

Before 1990, by collective security there was understood ensuring security in the framework of a sovereign states' group, but in the interwar period, the League of Nations was created for protecting each member state from a possible attack from another state from the same alliance. The Anglo-French contradictions were some of the factors which determined the League of Nations failure, together with France and Great Britain pacifist policies' regarding Hitler's troops invasion in Austria and Czechoslovakia. UN also states about collective security in articles 41 and 42 from the United Nations Charta and CSCE in the '70s.⁶

Surveying the specialists' arguments that comment on the relation between the national security and the collective one in the globalization context, it is released the idea that the NATO missions from the last years recommend the organization more as a collective security Alliance with "non-Article 5" type mission. There can be given examples of the "out of area" missions (from the ex-Yugoslav space, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.), that maintained operational the collectivism spirit.

The collective security and the collective defence stood to the League of Nations, UN, OSCE and NATO creation, but only NATO succeeded, in fact, to operate in all these fields: cooperative security, collective security, collective defence and human security (individual) or human.⁷

The collective security and the national security are two concepts situated in an interdependency, which is re-wrote and defined nowadays, when the international reality and the one of the nations is



adapted to the world's reality situated in centre of the globalization process. The collective security and the collective defence serve to national security and defence consolidation through the principle "all for one" assuring the states' protection by a strong political-military organization. However, this principle gives national security (and defence) the chance to develop its specific fields in the highest degree, giving to the respective state and nation the chance to occupy an unique and important place in the NATO states family they are part of. Secondly, the collective security serves the national security and, implicitly, because the national defence and security benefits from a "novelty" infusion, from connection, adaptation to the international security environment, information, etc., from the actualization with the last discoveries and endowments in the field, which are essential elements for touching some performances impossible to accomplish in isolation conditions.⁸

On its turn, the national security is essential for the collective security, because the collective security is the national securities and defences sum. It is understood the fact that the collective security couldn't exist without each entity forming it, despite the disproportions between these component elements. So, for instance, Luxembourg's security and defence forces and means have a lesser share to NATO than the other member states. This does not mean it is a less important partner from the Alliance's status point of view, from the international (collective) legitimacy of the political-military actions, as well as its international law subject quality. Still, collective security isn't just the national securities sum, but something more, because as it comprises forces and means of different origins, potential qualities, different aptitudes, from different cultures and traditions, the result is more complex and diversified, so that it is more capable to fight against the contemporary challenge than one country could, nation (or national defence), no matter how strong this is. Thus, there is a synergic character of NATO's actions, over all the summed qualities and quantities, given by the actions' and collective defence/collective security cohesion, by the interoperability rules and principles, within

the NATO's structure framework. For outlining the national security – collective security valence' importance, there can be seen the unitary action mode in the war against terrorism. The more importance of the international environment for each state's or international organization action, the more the states grow their individual share to the international security. So, as after 9/11, the solidarity does not have barriers because the terrorist phenomenon doesn't. Even two states with divergent visions, as Russia and the USA, acted jointly against the terrorist attacks (aggressions).

In these conditions, the collective security is a form of security guarantee and assurance for the allied states, being the expression of the free, volunteer and conscious assumption of an ensemble of guaranties and responsibilities by each member state of a political-military organization, as it is, for example, NATO. The national security is and remains for the future one of the collective security main elements and, the more the national security is "solid", the stronger will be the collective security.

Translated by Mirela ATANASIU

NOTES:

¹ MUREȘAN, Mircea, **Globalization, Integration, Development – Pillars for a Durable World**, *Impact Strategic Magazine*, no. 1/2005, pp. 7-8.

² TOBĂ Francisc, PhD thesis, **The Military Sciences Field, "Scientization of the Political Decision in the National Security Field"**, Bucharest, AISM, 2000, p. 124.

³ MUREȘAN, Mircea, **Globalization, Integration, Development – Pillars for a Durable World**, *Impact Strategic Magazine*, no. 1/2005, pp. 7-8.

⁴ IACOBESCU, Mihai, **Romania and the Nations Society 1919-1929**, Bucharest, 1988, p. 32.

⁵ BABOȘ Alexandru, RIZESCU Alexandru, **European Nations Security Architecture in the Interwar Period**, the Army Academy, no. 4(36)/2005, the Army Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 2005, p. 14.

⁶ HOHENZOLLERN-VERINGEN-DUDA Radu, prince, colonel (ret.), PhD thesis, **"Evolving European Security in the new continental democracy and liberty context"**, Bucharest, National Defence University "Carol I", 2006, p. 64.

⁷ Ibid, p. 64.

⁸ Ibid. pp. 124-125.

Colonel (ret.) Professor Eugen SITEANU, PhD, is a fellow professor in the National Defence University "Carol I". He published many specialty papers in the following fields: management, fiability, maintenance, national security, military strategy, military art, etc.



ELEMENTS OF THE INSECURITY'S INTRICATE EQUATION

Alexandra SARCINSCHI

The challenges to security studies that result from the development of a new international background are obvious: the global emergence of new threats has proved the inefficiency of older concepts. The presence and the amplitude of all those risks, dangers, and threats lead to an approach focused on security in globalization and to an emphasis of the security – insecurity antonym's artificiality.

The Study of Insecurity

To analyze security/insecurity means to first establish a referential object that shall be reflected by the concept's definition. The plainest definitions of security and insecurity based on the common knowledge are to be found in the Romanian Language's Explanatory Dictionary¹, but their domain is too broad to be useful in scientific analysis.

It is obvious that the analyses of security at each level are largely based on basic psychological and sociological theories. The concepts denote an ideal state for humanity to feel secure each day, to be protected from diseases, starvation, unemployment, criminality, ecological disasters, etc. The framework for the world of security can be translated into security needs in the political, economic, social, military, and ecological fields, but the daily life is characterized by a *state of insecurity*. Therefore, to achieve the total security state is an impossible mission because each level of security implies the existence of a certain level of insecurity. However, in order to avoid the potential philosophical debates on this matter, we will consider that security is the antonym of insecurity.

In the process of defining security we must pay attention to a simple requirement referring to the level of analysis. It might be agreed to be one of the following: individual, group, national, regional, and global.

For instance, at individual level, security is often understood as safety, and insecurity – obvi-

ously, as uncertainty. The individual security concept might be linked in a first phase of analysis on his perception on quality of life and thus there is a tendency to identify the security state with a higher standard of living. Still, we need to study both objective and subjective living conditions unified as *social representation of security* concept, in order to be able to develop a more accurate analysis.

Group security concept is similar with the previous. As the individual has some expectation regarding his security, also has the group. Nevertheless, the most important aspect of group security/insecurity is the absence/presence of discrimination. If one individual might be marginalized on religious, national or ethnical bases, the discrimination regarding a group is more visible and easier to prevent. Whatever the typology or the nature of the analyzed group are, security might be defined as the absence of threats to the group's identity. As in the case of individual security, there is a certain level of group security that can be provided by legislation. If the rules are discriminatory, new conflicts might emerge.

The national level of security is probably the most commonly used in defining security. The nation-state is the actor that usually assumes the role of individual, group and even regional security's guarantor. Instead, the state's security is defined by the totality of political, economic, social, military, and ecological situations that are requisite to ensure its sovereignty, independence, and the advancement of national interests. If we will agree on the nature of such situations and requirements, it will be obvious that both threats to national security and counteracting solutions are the same in their nature.

The security analysis at regional level requires region's defining. There are some points of view arguing that the region is "a nation's physical area"² and others defining it as an aggregate of provinces, states or even towns. In the security studies, the most used definition is the one that asserts that the



region includes an aggregate of physical and geographical bounded states. The threats to regional security are both those against the concerted interests of the states and their security as distinct entities.

The global security is a newly concept that is simultaneously a reflection of UN's image and a subject of controversy due to its broad realm. The global security is easily to undermine by the pursuits to establish a certain level of national security: if one nation is felling threat by another and world's actors are disagreeing, then the global security will not be fulfilled. That is why the global security concept is not so solid. It implies the existence of a supranational entity that should be able to take decisions for the whole humankind. Moreover, it is unlikely that this concept will became an important one in the international relations due to the strengthening of the competition for natural resources.

Insecurity in a Globalizing World

The scholars have agreed that the main three overall characteristics of globalization are: the contraction of space, the contraction of time, and the contraction of boundaries.

Those features have important consequences in the security field, especially the human one. People all over the globe are able to interplay more profound, more intense, and faster. This means that they are subjected both to opportunities and risks, dangers and threats deriving from another world's area. Moreover, the lack of control over globalization process has negative effects on this interplayed world.

The reality proves that globalization is the engine of insecurity's amplification. Thus, the classical security matrix, suggested by the scholars of the Watson Institute for International Studies, is rather a matrix of insecurity's globalization. It shows a pattern of risks, dangers, and threats spreading from the individual level to the global one and viceversa³.

Globalization is the most important and powerful force in development of a new matrix of international security. It is associated with the rising of insecurity most of all because of the one of its characteristics – namely, the strengthening of interdependences. This process's evolution not only has transformed the characteristics of exist-

ent risks, dangers, and threats, but has created new ones that are specific to a world of contracting time and space.

For instance, the war has developed from the classical definition (open armed conflict, often extended, that uses politically motivated organized violence between nations, states or factions) to definitions that prove the new characteristics of a security environment, which is influenced by globalization, terrorism, and astonishing technological innovations. Those definitions take in account the multiplication of actors and the change of violence's typology. They assert an act of violence by a state, criminal organization, terrorist group, revolutionary group or a coalition of states that is aimed to compel the enemy to obey to some specific rules, to accept a particular ideology or to prevent or allow a criminal activity⁴. It is obvious that there is an important change into the sources of warfare – from geopolitics and ideological aspects to resources and identity conflicts. Now, there is a new concept – “the fourth generation wars” – in which war and peace are crossing each other and they are becoming indistinct. The armed fight is completely changed due to the fact that both victory and defeat are the result of some operations taken in mentally and morally space⁵.

In the last few years the transnational dimension of terrorism and criminality has strengthened. Even they are considered to be distinct threats that have incomparable results, both are illicit human activities taken by intra- or extra-state actors. Most of the transnational criminal organizations have economic reasoning and implies various types of smuggling, piracy, and illegal financial activities. Still, the interest of international community is focused on those types of activities that have political motivation, such as terrorist groups. Both terrorism and criminality might combine, such as weapon smuggling and the use of transnational criminal activities in order to finance terrorist operations.

Terrorism and criminality have created a very important threat to security: weapons of mass destruction. The potentiality of an attack from a criminal transnational group that possesses WMD rises together with the permeability of borders and development of specific technology. In the context of globalization-led changes, some states and dictatorial regimes focused on creating a nuclear power that is able to counteract the desire of great



actors to modify by violent or economic-diplomatic means their international status⁶. Also, cyber-terrorism is a new risk that international community is interested in due to the opportunity for terrorist groups to centre their actions on network systems of various countries and international organizations.

Unlike the other risks, dangers, and threats, the informational warfare is able to influence the understanding itself of risks, dangers, and threats to security by manipulation and reconstruction of individuals' social representations. Moreover, if the international system, states and groups are seen as social constructs, then the enemy will be represented in the same manner, their images being mutually created by mediated projections of risks, dangers, threats, and even conflicts. Thus, the mass-media created confusion is a threat itself to our social representation of security.

The globalization of insecurity is emphasized also by the failed states. The favourable conditions for riots and transnational insurgency movements are created by poverty, lack of economic stability and state's incapacity to provide social welfare and security. The failed states can host terrorist groups and activities. They often are the source of refugee crisis, political and religious extremism, ecologic degradation, and criminal organizations' activities.

The issue of resources and resources competition is another important problem of globalised insecurity. The world's political development has been decisively modelled by the interdependence between resources and development, prosperity, and power. The industrial revolution emphasized an idea that is promoted in those areas in which resources were vital. It says that especially the natural resources are to be found "where they should not be" and belong to "those who do not deserve them". As the world's political geography has arranged itself into some legitimate or illegitimate borders, this idea has become bigger⁷. Thus it is obvious that the most important war motivation is the acquisition, access or control over critical resources. As world's population continues to rise, the consumption of resources will rise and there will be poverty, inequality and intra- and interstate violence.

Another element in the security equation is the biological threats that are created or not in a laboratory. Each level of security is threatened by the

rapidly global expansion of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, anthrax, acute and severe respiratory syndrome, and birds' flu. This state is more complex due to the fact that the countries with huge demographic increase are the poorest. They have no means to develop scientific research and to implement the needed decisions to eradicate those diseases. Some of the biological threats to humans are transmitted by animals and that is why the control of spread is difficult. Some recent example is the 2004 birds' flu that was transmitted to humans. The World Health Organization urgently created projects to prevent and counteract the virus. Still, the beginning of 2006 has recorded new cases of birds' flu even in the Western Europe.

The ecological problems are also linked to globalization of insecurity. Numerous international ecological organizations and governmental agencies signalized that the last decade brought important climate changes. In the following years, those changes will affect all aspects of human activity, especially the economic and social welfare. The present trend of environment degradation will become, at least in the industrialized countries⁸, an aggression to ecological systems that will destroy the ecosystem's ability to sustain life.

Even if the ecological disasters and climate changes have an important impact over the security environment, this effect is not equally distributed in various countries. The seriousness of such an event and the capacity to counteract differ from one country to another. That is why one event will cause different economic and social damages from one case to another. Finally, such a situation will develop into a conflict.

Therefore, there is a powerful trend of globalizing insecurity. The shown elements might not be the basic pattern of this process. It is just one variant for systematization of such complex process. As the insecurity globalizes, we are witness to a new trend in the security environment – the globalization of security politics.

NOTES:

¹ **The Romanian Language's Explanatory Dictionary** (2nd Edition, The Romanian Academy, The Institute for Linguistics "Iorgu Iordan", Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998) defines *security* as "the circumstance of being protected from any danger; sense of trust and peace given by the absence of any danger; protection, defence" (p. 969),



and *insecurity* as “state of uncertainty, lack of security” (p.494).

² KANJI, Omario, *Security*, Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base, 2003.

³ POPA, Vasile, **Implicațiile globalizării asupra securității naționale**, NDU „Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p.14.

⁴ FORSYTH, Michael, *Finesse: A Short Theory of War*, în *Military Review*, July/Aug 2004, p. 17.

⁵ ALEXANDRESCU, Grigore, **Perspective în lupta armată**, NDU „Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest,

2006, p. 44.

⁶ BĂHNĂREANU, Cristian, *Armele de distrugere în masă*, in **Lumea 2005. Enciclopedie politică și militară**, Eds.: Teodor Frunzeti and Vladimir Zodian, Military Publishing Center, Bucharest, 2005, pp.177-190.

⁷ DOLGHIN, Nicolae, **Geopolitica. Dependențele de resursele energetice**, NDU „Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, p. 4

⁸ See the Kyoto Protocol.

Alexandra SARCINSCHI is a scientific researcher in the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I”, Romania. She is a doctoral student in Military Science.



TURNING POLITICS INTO A SHOW AND SECURITY

Victor MORARU, PhD

One of the East-European media capital sins is turning politics into a show, in support of glamour politics. But show-politics cannot develop political effort or its efficiency, contributing to the democracy's crises proliferation. Meantime, media ignores or superficially focuses on the major contemporary issues like national and social stability and security, state integrity, democratization of society, reality in conflict areas, etc.

Lately media practices proves that the process of monitoring political phenomenon is characterized by minimizing the real complexity of given situations and phenomena. It is regrettable to find that the journalists give, frequently, examples of a simplified approach to some major political issues.

In media it is often found a "minimized information of the world we live in" (Pepin, 1997: 13), accused not only for the simplification that has place, in the sense of clarity, but especially for maximum minimization of reality, when the "lens effect on the visible part of iceberg take the first place to profound and nuanced navigation's cost" (Watine, 1997: 15). But, in the moment when a continuous battle for society democratization is taking place, for national stability and security, for state and territorial integrity, minimizing the problems, treating them superficially signifies a reality abstraction, a non-implication, or a fake implication, all causing real damages to the process itself and to the society at large.

In several cases, the changes in Moldova's Constitution, for example, regarding the form of government, media interpretations and debates do not succeed to break the superficiality condition, proposing abstract analysis, proving tributary affiliation – hidden or not – to a certain party. "The journalists, who maintained the subject, choose the easiest manner to present the events: voting the republic, the deputies saved the country by Lucinschi, or, voting the parliamentary system,

the people's representatives had opened Pandora's Box... Consequently, two major issues remain unclear: who executes the entire executive power in Moldova and why the Moldova's citizens did not have the right to choose their president anymore... These issues were the object of profound meditations, but only tangential and having argument value in favor of one of the political soap opera actors... The actors speculated the interest of common voter and... recruited the newspapers to clear the score." (Gherasim, 2000: 8).

This is how one of the journalists appreciates the way a major issue was interpreted, in conformity with the politics' mediatization rules. In such a context it is included the observation from the *Meridian* magazine: "The terrible imposture of our times is to make people believe that to communicate means to inform... The people think that they know what is going on because they watch live images from what seems to happen, along with the commentaries on what is convenient to think about all this" (1991, May-June: 83).

It is to be noticed that in previous comments we mentioned it is used the phrase "soap opera actors". Basically, more often in the newspapers the politics is compared with the theatre (cf.: "This new political show with the referendum..." – *Flux*, 1999: April, 8, etc). In fact, the tradition to associate political action with theatrical one comes from the ancient times, their confluence being already a rule: "Any political activity, when it pretend to be known, tend to a scenic appearance" (Dader, 1998: 125).

Modern political communication inclines to the politics' spectacular, exploiting, dramaturgical resources of politics, the real issues, from tension areas (Transnistrean area, for example), being ignored or treated in a simplistic manner. We have the example of theatres of operation, from where media brings only the brutal images of the attempts, soldiers killed in ambushes, ignoring the real causes of these events: ethnic and religious



conflicts, corruption, divergent political interests, and terrorist group activity.

From the media analyses, we observe an increase of political information, achieved in the new form of *infotainment* (derived from *information* and *entertainment*), where the information is ironically presented, emphasizing the fashionable aspects of the event, like in “the Parliament parliaments” (Săptămâna, 1998: 11 December), or the series of articles, from *Flux*, about the concerns of “poor parliamentarians” who did not get their salary on time.

Media manifests a real tend to caricaturizing politics, presenting the politicians in a unfavorable light (Luceafărul, Academia Cațavencu, the cartoons presenting representative politicians). Such a humor, “engaged humor” (Robert Escarpit, 1980: 279) is tasted by the public: notorious success of the Russian show *Куклы* from NTV, or *Gignols de l’Info* from French TV *Canal Plus*, is a prove in this sense. But, that kind of presence in media space guarantees maximum of visibility for politicians, and “this persiflage is not an charisma enemy” (Guy Carcassonne, 1996: 59).

If we expect this mockery to “unthroned” the idols, we are mistaken. Putting the politicians in such ridiculous situations leads to a “role amplification”, in the most direct sense, increasing their popularity. Political leaders want to be observed at any cost, getting credential in a very popular TV-show, and to be in the public eye in spite of any mockery. Although, tacking politics in focus is good for the country, also, by attacking the corruption, personal political interests, putting a satirical mask on political machinations, influence traffic, bribe or power abuse, issues that may affect national security. Media often criticizes the patrimonial conception of power, represented by the politician, who acts like a proprietor, not like a community representative.

Romania’s media often presents a needless show, which produces public hilarity. Editors from some private TV stations present as political incriminatory actions some elements that would be situated in the area of classified information, regarding security and national safety, but, in fact, they are common issues, with no major significance. Leak of knowledge in this field is coming back, this way, damaging their own public image.

Message’s vulgarization isn’t in detriment of the edition – that seems to be understood by the

editors Viorel Mihail (*Săptămâna*) and later Constantin Tănase (*Flux, Timpul*). The “daily hackney” (one of the mediatization mechanisms – V.M.) in the political communication process presents, as J. Habermas remarked, a danger for its semantic feeding (1992: 54), but the renunciation of that isn’t possible in actual conditions. The phenomenon is general and everywhere, with partisans and opponents. The latter admit, as the famous Italian sociologist Franco Ferrarotti, “the fact that a real ideas patrimony as the journal founded by Antonio Gramsci was in the situation to humble itself pending acceptance of the perverse politics-show’s logic, shouldn’t definitively surprise us that much” (1996: IV).

In fact, the contemporary politicians don’t abdicate from Machiavelli’s visions that affirmed: “Under a cloud is the one which has behaviour in jarring with the times”. The times dictate the political message’s recordation at the exigencies determined by mass-media.

The politics-show in the Republic of Moldova was initiated in the period of first sovereign government, once the National Television’s emission space was given to prime-minister’s prolix interventions or bombastic interviews with various pseudo-businessmen.

The events as MIG aircrafts selling, radioactive waste materials transportation, the participation of Moldavian politicians to the wedding of the magnate Birștein’s daughter, general Alexei epic, etc., continues to provoke valve in mass-media and were strong marked by the mass-media trend to politics-show, the common element of all these political manifestations/scandals, wide mediatized, and which represent its mediatic orientation, the glamour promoted by mass-media.

Considering the fact that in the actual circumstances the mediatic presence constitute one of primordial conditions for political existence, but the power exercise isn’t rest only in coercion or rational adhesion obtaining, “obeyed, from far days, to the show laws” (Lochard, 1998: 105), and is naturally that political mediatization to be released especially in journalist formulas with an easy effect, to stake on semblances valorization, on simplification of the complex information, reduced to a dramatic and plastic theme, on vulgarization (in some cases, encoding) of the transmitted message, to insist through “the method of repetition and communication of some already known things”



(Collina, 1994: 13), to develop, in other words (conscious or unconscious, forced or unforced), the virtual image of the reality.

The politician has a privileged place in that mediatic space and is aware of the rules of the game: it is important not *to be*, but *to appear* (“to govern means to appear” – this is the eligibility principle in Jean-Marie Cotteret’s vision; “Only few know as you are, many know as you appear”, Niccolo Machiavelli suggested). The exposed ideas, draft schedule or sustaining formations aren’t important, but weigh his presence, his emanating fascination, his individual attributes, the humor sense, the retort sharpness, namely all those qualities which may assure his scenic success. “In other times, the politics means ideas. Today, the politics means persons. Or rather characters. Each leader seems to choose a position and assume a role. As in a show”. These observations of Roger Gerard Schwartzberg (1995: 7) condense, in fact, the spirit of the contemporary political communication: the politician is turned into an actor (his communicational strategy is based on scenic representation techniques) or, in Alain Minc’s opinion, in “publicity man” (1995: 108), and the entrench of his image in mass-media has become the most important concern. The conversion of the politician’s *image* into a base for his power and influence is produced, especially, on television, which, in actual conditions, reshapes the politics into an alloy consisting of show, information and propaganda.

Trying to sediment his image in auditorium conscience, the politicians don’t miss the opportunity to participate in television and radio entertainment shows, they are present in press pages with political declarations or even culinary opinions, promoting the home-made specialty. Insertion of politician-character with his habits, preferences, beliefs and doubts in untraditional situations, which isn’t linked by his professional activity, pronounced opinion in every occasion, repeatedly appearance on TV or in magazine pages, may contribute to memorization of his face and, in final, to play a certain role in election.

But, as we know, “it is (has social value) only what appears on TV and does not exist, even if it is important, what does not appear on TV” (Livolsi, Volli, 1998). The extrapolitic sphere, politicians’ private life gets in the new conditions a distinctive signification. However, the opening of this sphere, transforms it, initially, in a contentious weapon of

political battle and, secondly, comprises several dangers for the respective character and for mass-media implied for that in a whole range of judicial suits.

The victory in the political approach, as in military conflicts, according to specialists, depends decisively by the way you communicate your intentions, strategies. Recently, we find the Internet integration among the political communication practices. On his site, the politician directly chats with citizen, while he rarely sees people in audience in his senatorial cabinet. However, this digital democracy can be unfavourable, even fatal, when in other mass-media communication means his image appears strongly ridiculed or marked by contradictions.

Turning politics into a show can’t increase the span and efficiency of political effort, which, according to communication specialists, depends more on political communication quality. Many researchers insist over the vulnerability of the “everyday show of horror” (Kellner, 2005: XVIII), produced by media, which demonstrates, considering the cases of the US’ mediatic practice, how turning politics into a show contributes to the democracy crises’ proliferation (Nicols, McChesney, 2005). It is needed of a much more professionalism and abnegation in that matter, and when politics intersect the national and social interest, security interest, the approach with superficiality of political communication and action may be synonym, for politicians, with the political suicide and for journalists with the gradual credibility loss.

*Translated by Mihai DINU
and Cristian BĂHNĂREANU*

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- CARCASSONNE, Guy (1996), *Le pari démocratique*, Le Debat, Nr. 88, pp. 58-62.
- COLLINA, Vittore (1994), *Politica, estetismo e tempi correnti*, Mass-media, Nr. 2, pp. 5-15.
- COTTERET, Jean-Marc (1977), *Governantes y gobernados. La comunicacion politica*, Buenos Aires, El Ateneo.
- DADER, Jose Luis (1998), **Tratado de comunicacion politica**, Madrid, Cersa.
- ESCARPIT, Robert (1980), **De la sociologia literaturii la teoria comunicării**, București,



Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică.

FERRAROTTI, Franco (1996), *Le radici tagliati*, La Critica sociologica, Nr. 116, pp. III-IV.

GHERASIM, Arcadie (2000), *Subiectiv despre un subiect*, MASS-MEDIA în Republica Moldova, Decembrie, pp. 7-9.

HABERMAS, Jurgen (1992), *Demokratia. Razum. Nравstvennosti*, Moscova, Nauka.

KELLNER, Douglas (2005), **Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy**, Boulder, Paradigm Publishers.

LIVOLSI, Marino, VOLLI, Ugo (1998), *La comunicazione politica tra prima e seconda*

repubblica, Milano, UILM.

MINC, Alain (1995), *La borrachera democratica*, Madrid, Temas de Hoy.

NICOLS, John, McCHESNEY Robert W. (2005), *Tragedy and Farce: How the American Media Sell Wars, Spin Elections, and Destroy Democracy*, New York, London, The New Press.

PEPIN, Patrick (1997), *Le traitement journalistique de la complexité*, Les Cahiers du journalisme, Nr. 3, pp. 10-13.

SCHWARTZENBERG, Roger-Gerard (1995), **Statul-spectacol. Eseu asupra și împotriva star-sistemului în politică**, București, Scripta.

WATINE, Thierry (1997), *Journalisme et complexité*, Les Cahiers du journalisme, Nr. 3, pp.

Victor MORARU, PhD, is a professor at the State University of Republic of Moldova and Free International University of Moldova. He is author of the monographs: Mass-media vs politics (Chișinău, USM, 2001); Política y comunicacion: conciencia civica, espacio publico y nacionalismo (Madrid, Catarata, 1999); Mass-media between incertitudes and aspirations (Chișinău, USM, 2002); Mass-media from Republic of Moldova (Chișinău, Presa, 2005) etc.



THE ISRAELI –PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS DEADLOCK AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESS

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

The Hamas victory in legislative elections dated January 2006 and the attitude of the new leadership against the Israeli state and Palestinian territories as well as the position of Israel against a government dominated by Hamas continue to cause worries in the international community¹ and to put under the question mark the continuity of the peace process road map implementation in the Middle East. This is proved by the very reactions and warnings of some important international organizations and leaders.

As it is known, Hamas does not have in view to negotiate with Israel and is still not giving signs to renounce of this position. Even more, the status of this organization provides the integral retrieval of Palestine including the Israeli territory and destruction of the Jewish state, and its leaders do not want to negotiate with Israel on the ground that the last 10 – 12 years of negotiations between the Israeli state and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) brought no solution for Palestinians.

In its turn, Israel asserts that it will not negotiate with any Palestinian government implying Hamas. According to Ehud Olmert, the interim Israeli Prime-Minister, if Hamas does not accept all agreements signed by the Palestinian National Authority with Israeli Government², his country will not initiate any contact with the Palestinians³. More clearly, the Israeli minister of defence threatens with an unprecedented attack into Palestinian territories in case the peace agreement from December 2004 will be cancelled. Also, after the Israeli Government has decided economic sanctions against PNA⁴, it has launched an appeal to the international community to stop the assistance for PNA with the only and justifiable exception – the assistance in humanitarian purposes.

In the international and European leaders' opinion, Hamas risks to be internationally isolated if it

will not respect the requests by the international community, i.e. to disarm and to renounce of violence. That is because, as the American President George W. Bush drew attention on “an organization having an armed wing and a political platform focused on destruction of another state cannot be a partner of negotiations”.

Even the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan who is disposed to co-operate with the new Palestinian authorities led by Hamas, does not forget to remind that the „Quartet for peace in the Middle East ” comprising the United States, Russia, the European Union and UN will not support the violence and terrorism. This is demonstrated in the piece of news published by the Quartet itself after the London reunion (January, 30, 2006), according to which the international assistance depends only on the future Palestinian Government commitment to respect the principles of non-violence, to recognize Israel and to accept the existing agreements and duties including the map road. Consequently, the Quartet's approval to give Hamas 2-3 months as a period when it will continue to finance the Palestinian Authority is still conditioned by renunciation of violence.

The Hamas victory in legislative elections in Palestinian territories has also put into a delicate position the European Union, considered to be the main source of financing the PNA. The European Union is now re-assessing its position regarding Hamas which is seen by the US and Israel as “a terrorist organization”. The new Palestinian Parliament will have to support, as it results from the announcement by the EU Austrian Presidency, a government which will put an end to violence and will go out from the conflict with Israel. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair considers that Hamas, despite its obvious victory⁵, has to choose between peace and violence, because, as Condoleezza Rice stated, if Hamas does not recognize the right of Is-



raeli state to existence, one could not speak about peace process in the Middle East. Even more, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has stated that Hamas victory in elections is extremely negative. At the same time, the EU insists on the need to build in the Palestinian territories a state of law, institutional reform and rigorous financial management.

As a matter of fact, the worries continue. After the appeal launched to the international community by the Israeli Government regarding the cessation of the assistance for the PNA, the US have suspended their own assistance to the Government, Cabinet and Palestinian ministers on the reason expressed by State Department speaker Sean Mc Cormack that the new Palestinian Government led by Hamas has not respected the Quartet's principles we mentioned above. EU will proceed in the same manner as it is considered the main donor for the Palestinian Government with 500 millions Euros per year, if Hamas will not admit the legal existence of Israeli state.

Of course, the Hamas speaker stated they will not give up to the "blackmail" with the financial assistance cessation and will not abandon the principles of their fight. Certainly, according to recent news from Reuters, the Palestinian minister of foreign affairs, Mahmoud al Zair, has addressed to ministers of foreign affairs of the EU member countries at their reunion in Luxemburg requesting to respect the democratically taken decision of the Palestinian people and not to initiate measures affecting Palestinians. In other words, an attempt and some other manner of making EU sensitive in order to re-assess decision "to freeze" the financial aid given to the Palestinian Government announced by the European Commission.

The international community together with Israeli authorities are still waiting for a statement of the Palestinian Government scattering the created worries. In order to prevent such a situation, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel herself, during her visit to the Palestinian territories asked the future government to assume this responsibility because the implementation of the peace road map is very important for the new Palestinian Authorities. Even more, as the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip stated at the Davos Economic Forum, his country is prepared to act as an intermediary between Israel and a Palestinian Government led by Hamas. In his turn, the Russian President Vladimir

Putin invites Hamas leaders for talks to Mosco⁶ and more recently the Russian Minister of Defence Serghei Ivanov asserted that Russia will not give military assistance to Palestinian Police without a favourable agreement by the Quartet for the Middle East.

It has to be mentioned that the EU asked Israel also to co-operate with Hamas if the latter will renounce of violence. Especially because at the first Palestinian Hamas Government Reunion which took place in Gaza and Ramallah the Ministers belonging to this Cabinet were not authorized by Israel to travel from a Palestinian territory to another.

On the other hand, Hamas has already proposed to Israel a truce through some foreign mediators: a mutual cessation of violence and to observe the calm. If the Jewish state does not attack the objectives of the other groups in Palestinian territories Hamas commits itself, as mentioned by the daily Haaretz of 7th of April 2006, to stop the anti-Israeli violence, including the obstruction of the other Islamic movements. But this proposition has been rejected by Israeli politicians and military officials who consider it to be another Hamas "new stratagem". In Ismail Haniyeh's vision⁷, the Chief of Hamas and designated Prime Minister, as it has been expressed since the late February 2006, an extended agreement to cease fire, i.e. a truce could be taken into consideration by Hamas only if Tel Aviv fulfils certain conditions: the Israel retreats from the occupied territories since the war of 6 days (1967) and the liberation of the Palestinian prisoners.

Certainly, the UN is also adopting a new restrictive policy in its relations with the Palestinian Authority led by Hamas. This is confirmed by a more recent statement for the press at UN Centre in New York by the UN speaker Sephane Dujarrik, according to whom the work contacts with the new Palestinian Government will be continued, but the political ones will be examined on case to case basis.

Consequently, we are asking ourselves: Will the new Palestinian Government recognize Israel or not? Which way will follow the future negotiations between an Israel concerned with making a new government and the new Palestinian Government led by Hamas? Will be the implementation of the peace process in the Middle East continued, and "if so", on what compromise or price?



NOTES:

¹ There are voices asserting that as Al-Fatah lost its political supremacy, a party more moderate than Hamas, considered a terrorist organization, there will be a real “political earthquake”, able to brutally end up the peace negotiations with Israel.

² Ehud Olmert - the successor of Ariel Sharon who officially is not able any more to exercise the position of a Prime Minister in Israel, has been declared valid Prime Minister since the end of 100 days Sharon spent in the hospital.

³ A message sent also to the world’s leaders proposing the same attitude in case the Hamas leaders will not take into account the Israel’s conditions.

⁴ Among others, these conditions provide “to freeze” the monthly transfer of about 50 millions USD that should be reimbursed by the Jewish state for the cus-

toms fees and VAT resulted from the goods destined to Southern Jordan and Gaza Strip.

⁵ According to official data, 75% of the 1.4 millions Palestinians having the right to vote came to ballot boxes. Hamas has got 76 of the 132 places in the Palestinian Legislative Council (the Palestinian unicameral Parliament).

⁶ An invitation appreciated as a break in the common front achieved at the international level regarding the attitude against Hamas. According to the American experts’ opinion, the Hamas leader’s visit to Moscow is considered to be a success in recognizing the group and an opportunity for Russia to become a “main actor” in the region and to reinforce its position of “global actor”.

⁷ Ismail Haniyeh is considered to be a pragmatic and moderate personality having good relations with Al-Fatah, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmud Abbas’ party.

Professor Constantin - Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD, is a doctorate consultant within the National Defence University “Carol I”.



US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2006 - Geopolitical and Geostrategic Options -

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU

The new US National Security Strategy is the updated version of the one from 2002, which takes into account the changes emerged in the intern and international security environment. The major elements analyzed in this paper are: new global challenges; the threat of Iran's actions; importance of the globalization and extension of the global economy; reinforce of the preemption principle; and foreign relations development.

The March 2006 version of the US National Security Strategy (NSS06) is the updated version of the one from September 2002 (NSS02). The paper follows the anterior structure and adds two new chapters: "Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization" and "Conclusion". The new strategy is based upon two pillars:

– *Promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity* through action to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies.

– *Confronting the challenges of our time* by leading a growing community of democracies.

Differing from the previous paper, which appear as a crises times' strategy, NSS06 is a strategy for the wartimes that passes America and not only: "America is at war. This is a wartime strategy required by the grave challenge we face"¹. If the 20th century was characterized by the fight against fascism and communism, the 21st century is threatened by a new totalitarian ideology with similar means: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression.

The new strategy is characterized by a higher degree of multilateralism and puts more emphasis on diplomacy. The paper's key elements are:

- Extension of the new global challenges.
- Perceptions about Iran – Iran is described in

the strategy as the state that will pose great challenges for USA. The Iranian regime sponsors the terrorism, threatens the Israel, undermines the peace process in Middle East, and blocks the democracy in Iraq.

- Sustaining the preemptive strategy – USA will maintain the proactive attitude and will not exclude the preemptive strikes.

New global challenges

NSS06 identifies more clearly than the previous paper the *transnational terrorism* as the principal threat to the international security, which is now the result of political alienation, grievances that can be blamed on others, sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation, and an ideology that justifies murder. USA will take action to prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur, deny WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies, who would use them without hesitation, deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states, and deny the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror. The overall scope of these actions is to extend freedom and human dignity through democracy. As in the previous version of the paper, USA reaffirm their will to lead this fight against the international terrorism, together with their allies and friends.

The regional conflicts are still a concerning matter, which can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. Despite the fact that since 2002 we have witnessed at remarkable progress in solving the conflicts from Sudan, Liberia, Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, Aceh (Indonesia), Northern Ireland, those in Darfur, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea,



Nepal are in the focus of international community. The US administration's strategy for addressing regional conflicts includes three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are, as in NSS02, the key for solving these crisis and conflicts.

Different from previous version, NSS06 includes in that category the *genocide* defined as "the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group". The genocide must not be tolerated, but military intervention will constitute the last instance solution.

The new events subsequent NSS02' adoption impose the intensification of the counteracting efforts regarding the *weapons of mass destruction proliferation*. The actual challenges are still: North Korea retreat and Iran violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, pursuing of the WDM by the terrorists, including those associated with the al-Qaeda network, not properly protection of the fissile material, biotechnology advances. All these require efficient measures in order to "keep the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people".

USA reinforce the principle and logic of pre-emption: "The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same"². But, the non-proliferation problems will be initially addressed with the international diplomacy instruments and if these don't have the proper effects the use of force will not be excluded before attacks occur under long-standing principles of self defense. Just as in NSS02, the new strategy stresses that "the reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just"³.

Globalization and global economy

In NSS02, the globalization phenomenon is a tangential deal, stressing that "the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing"⁴ and events that occur beyond America's borders have a greater impact inside them. The new strategy devotes a whole chapter to globalization and its implications over the national security.

Globalization has many negative aspects, but simultaneously may generate many opportunities. So to continue extending liberty and prosperity

all over the world, the paper stresses the need of: opening markets and integrating developing countries in global economy; opening, integrating, and diversifying energy markets; and reforming the International Financial System. In the last years, the advance of democracy, the ideals of liberty and the quality of life are without doubt the result of global trade, investment, information and technology extension.

Global economy expansion transforms the national security. The new challenges generated by globalization process don't have any frontiers and they have strongly changed the way in that national interests and values are affected: HIV/AIDS, birds flu, illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern era's greater ease of transport and exchange; environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters (floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis). But, it is true that all of these globalization' new negative aspects have greatly improved the cooperation and capacity of response.

The new challenges, which don't have any with traditional ones, such as conflicts of arms or ideologies, may threaten the national security and for that:

- Preparing for and managing these challenges requires the full exercise of national power, up to and including traditional security instruments.

- Technology can help, but the key to rapid and effective response lies in achieving unity of effort across a range of agencies.

- Existing international institutions have a role to play, but in many cases coalitions of the willing may be able to respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term.

- The response and the new partnerships it creates can sometimes serve as a catalyst for changing existing political conditions to address other problems.

The development gap generated by globalization, especially of poverty, strongly requires an increasing help for least developed nations and their integration into global economy in scope to build and consolidate stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. The ways to follow, according to NSS06, are: transformational diplomacy and effective democracy, and a more efficient foreign assistance.

All the problems and challenges of our times must be carefully controlled and take action for:



meaningful reform of the UN, enhancing the role of democracies and democracy promotion through-out international and multilateral institutions, establishing results-oriented partnerships.

Foreign relations

The 2002 strategy stressed the necessity that NATO must develop new structures and capabilities in order to carry out the missions given by the circumstances of the 09/11 attacks. The last years reinforced the idea that the struggle against militant Islamic radicalism is the great ideological conflict of the beginning of the 21st century. That campaign finds all great powers on the same side – opposing the terrorists. USA will develop their relations based on the following principles:

- these relations must be set in their proper context;
- these relations must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching;
- USA interests are affected by states' treatment of their own citizens;
- while USA do not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make, they do seek to influence the calculations on which these choices are based;
- USA must be prepared to act alone if necessary.

NATO remains a vital pillar of US foreign policy, which acts beyond its responsibility area as an instrument for peace and stability. The cooperative relations with Europe must be set on the sure foundation of shared values and interests.

Russia, China and India represent the possible actors that have the potential to become USA “near-peer” competitors. Regarding Russia, NSS02 illustrated the closest relations of that time between Bush and Putin. Russia was seen as a country “in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror”. The present paper specifies regarding the

Moscow administration that “Recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions. We will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along freedom’s path”⁵.

China becomes an important global actor, but it is warned to act responsibly and to achieve its obligations. The paper expresses the US concern over the major rises in the China’s arming. China’s leaders, stress the strategy, must understand the fact that they can’t use the old ways of thinking and acting that exacerbate concerns throughout the region and the world.

India is a great democracy, sharing the values of democracy, freedom and rule of law. In July 2005, USA and India signed a bold agreement, a road map to realize and develop a meaningful cooperation. Consequently, India becomes a major US’ strategic partner in South and Central Asia region.

Concluding, the new US’ National Security Strategy is “idealistic about goals, and realistic about means”⁶, based on a multidimensional security concept that take into consideration both the military and especially non-military means. Different from NSS02 when “United States possesses unprecedented - and unequalled - strength and influence in the world”, the actual version stress the fact that yet USA “have enormous power and influence to address those challenges”.

NOTES:

¹ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. i.

² *Ibidem*, p. 23.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 23, The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p. 16.

⁴ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p. 31.

⁵ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 39.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 49.

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU is a research assistant at the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University „Carol I”, Romania. He is a doctoral student in Military Science.



THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN PROJECT AND REALITY

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

Is the Greater Middle East both a concept and reality? How is configuring this concept reported to reality? The concept, if we accept it as it is, reflects more ... a virtual reality, while the all days reality can't be influenced by the very intruding concept. Is it really a Greater Middle East or is it only about a project, more or less to accomplish? In the globalization era and also fragmentation where is the use of this concept? Or if we speak about a reality, how can it be identified in the large flow of realities which are fast succeeding around this inflexible and paradox part of the world? And, now, above all, this world's hot core, that conventionally represents the Middle East, can it be qualified as inflexible, stubborn, crises and conflicts, terrorism generator and all kind of troubles which the civilized world is crying about more than is necessary? The paradox consists in the moving world inflexibility or the movement in this wide region's inflexibility context is a paradox? In other words, the Middle East is the cause for or the evils and harm of the Planet, or itself is a victim of the chaos state which the humanity passes through? This chaos state is an exclusive product of the Cold War or it has the origin in the enclosure concept, in a finite space often very narrow or very limited, of the infinite Universe? From a wider perspective, "the new chaos", released or, more exactly, expressed in the last decade of the past century, and understood as a disorganization for organization, leaves space for a new organizing, which could mean a new bipolarization, on a side being this "Greater Middle East" and, on the other side, the civilized world, especially The United States of America? Is the West looking for a new "enemy", after it destroyed the communism, or is it trying to bring to the technological civilization level this remained bastion, here and there, kept in extremisms and prejudices hard to accept in a world full of interdependencies where the network philosophy and physiognomy are in the first plan? What is given and what is refused in from this region?

Risk and inflexibility

The firm and violent reaction of the Muslim world after the caricatures with Mohamed, published in some occidental publications, as in the old times, the occidental world's amazement and indignation to the death conviction by the Muslim's community from India and by the ayatollah Khomeiny from Iran, against the British writer Salman Rushdie, born in India, in 1947, for the novel "Satanic Verses", published in September 1988, is revealing. In this book the writer condemned a religion that by some concepts' absolutization built an Islamic terrorism. For escaping from the condemnation, the author hid in New York ... There were also "reprobated" or even condemned others, in another parts of the world, inclusive Romania, as General Ion Eremia for the novel "Gulliver in the Lies World". But still no one overpass the religious extremist from the Middle East in inflexibility. In fact, there is nothing new under the sun. In the Middle Ages, the Inquisition had the same inflexibility ... In those times, the Arabic civilization improved the Mathematics, discovered the Algebra, generated Avicena's and Averoes' philosophy ...

The Greater Middle East isn't just a simple amateur thing but a project with high risk and great amplitude, aiming the democratization of countries from a wide region, between Afghanistan and the Africa's shore, the destruction of the terrorist networks and centres, or terrorism generators and the acceptance of the Western values.

This project doesn't have a very high audience even if underneath it appears to be generous. And there is something else, very important: this region corresponds with the strongest and the most consistent corridor of the world's energetic resources. The region contains big oil deposits, many of them in exploitation, but also other reserves that only now begin to be discovered. For example, recently, in Zakho, in the Iraqi Kurdistan,



at the frontier with Turkey, the Norwegian company DNO discovered a new oil deposit. It is added to another deposit also discovered in the Northern region of Iraq, and not only.

Some analysts suggested the entire tensioned situation from the Middle East, including the American intervention, more exactly, of a coalition led by the Americans, doesn't aim anything else but the area's energetic resources management. At the middle of the last decade, Pierre Marie Galois wrote "The blood of the oil. Bosnia" where he widely speaks about the dramatic created or amplified situation in the Gulf, after the war from 1991, by the American interests from the area, but also a certain "compensation" which the Americans offered to the Muslim's world, allowing them, indirectly, by the Bosnian Serb bombardment to build a Islamic junction in Europe, respectively, in the Western Balkans, which can get work to the Europeans a century ahead. But, of course, there is an Islamic corridor, of the Islamic extremism, which aims Europe, creating many advanced elements of the "Vth Column" in almost all the important states from the Western continent ...

Other analysts sustain that, on the contrary, the American intervention in the Middle East doesn't do anything but mud the waters and to put the oil firms in a very hard situation, even impossible, for the accomplishment of some contracts with the area's states.

For example, on the April, 11, 2006, the barrel course reached, at London, a record, 69 dollars. An historical record and which, probably, won't stand for a long time. The causes of this increase are considered to be the provisioning from Nigeria, the bigger tensions between the United States and Iran, the American gas penury rising as a result of the low refining capacities, the damages produced by the summer hurricanes and the environment standards.

In the United States, the brute oil barrel opened, in the same day, at a price of 68,55 dollars, close to August 2005, 70,85 dollars, when Katrina devastated the Eastern Coast of the United States of the America.

One of the main causes of the continue rise, from 2002, of the oil barrel cost is represented, undoubtedly, by the geopolitical tensions from the Middle East. The efforts for obliging the Mullah's regime to renounce to the nuclear program which affects the oil's rate, made by the American

administration, including the risky threats, don't give the aimed results. The investors continue to be alarmed by the articles edited in the American press about the possible military strike against Iran.

The Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinejad seemed more determined in complicating things, declaring that Iran will never renounce to its nuclear program and will never step back.

A program with variable geometry

There was released a real battle between the European troika EU-3 (Germany, France, the United Kingdom), supported by the United States of America, and Iran, in the nuclear issue. Iran rejected the European proposals and resumed the researches in Ispahan, under the surveillance of IAEA, for improving uranium.

This crisis isn't just one among others. It is developed in an extremely dangerous and sensible area. Iran is included by the Americans in the so-called George Bush's "axis of evil", Iraq isn't yet stabilized, and the Afghanistan situation, despite the presence of two international missions – Enduring Freedom and ISAF -, continues to evolve asymmetrically and complicated, the relations between the Palestinians and Israelis weren't improved but, on the contrary, they got worse after the elections won by Hezbollah.

Some Western experts consider Iran already disposes by the necessary means for manufacturing the nuclear weapon. The clandestine researches, during two decades, and officially permitted the reach of the "conversion" stage. It is expected in every moment to be reached the uranium enrichment stage. The experts that expressed their opinions ask United States to stop, by all means, this Iran's action, because it would generate a real competition in the nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East. Or, the Middle East should be, in these experts' vision, a zone without nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom dispose of such kind of weapons, without reminding the United States, some states have on their own territory, others in European military bases or from the planetary ocean, embarked on some submarines, surface water-ships, embarked in airships for strategic bombardment, in ballistic missiles or in cruise rockets.



Obviously, the solution is not for each country from the Middle East to become a nuclear power, for accomplishing in this way, on the very dramatic step of threat and discourage the strategic equilibrium. This type of nuclear weapons exists in many countries, probably even in others that aren't officially part of the nuclear club, and, while the discrepancies maintain, non-proliferation will be, for some states, a frustration. Iran is considered to be one of them. If Israel disposes of nuclear weapons, why shouldn't Iran? This kind of question, of course, isn't trenchant asked and don't constitute a major premise in the nuclear arming syllogism, but Iran, further firmly sustaining that has the right to develop its researches in the nuclear field, for producing electric energy it needs, determines a part from the world's countries to suspect the Teheran regime of hiding, in fact, its real intentions, those ones of producing the nuclear weapon. The missiles Iran disposes, especially the ones with middle range, Shahib-3, and which, with or without nuclear fuses could hit Israel and even the European countries. They can transport a tone of explosive to a 250 km altitude.

Is interesting that the Nonproliferation Treaty (TNP) that Iran has also joined, as well as the Additional Protocol signed in 2003, but which the Parliament has not ratified yet, does not forbid the nuclear program. The Article IV of TNP prescribes that "neither disposition from the present treaty would be translated as bringing harm to the inalienable right of all the parts of the Treaty to develop the nuclear energy research, production and use in peaceful goals, without discrimination ...". All the signatory states are engaged in never using the nuclear energy than in peaceful goals, and IAEA has to supervise the nuclear energy misuse from the peaceful area to the nuclear weapon.

TNP recognizes only five countries as being part from the nuclear club (China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States of America), these countries are also permanent members of the UN's Security Council. Therefore, the Treaty suddenly shares the world in two camps: *the nuclear states camp* recognized and accepted as they are, because there's no other way, nobody renounces to what it has, and the *non-nuclear camp* which, according to TNP, and its own engagements (we refer to the signatory ones), they can't ever have nuclear weapons, but they can use energy for peaceful goals. But India, Pakistan and Israel

are also states that dispose of nuclear weapons. Correa is also suspected. The conclusion is that the nuclear weapons proliferation will not stop, either vertically, discovering new technologies, or horizontally, in the space area extension for the ones that have such weapons or can be able to produce them.

Using this kind of reason, there would result that Iran has the right to enrich uranium, in a nuclear program framework that aims using nuclear energy in peaceful goals. Otherwise, this thing is sustained by Teheran, that feels very offended by the pressure exercised from everywhere for determining it to renounce to this nuclear program.

This situation appears really absurd, for the both sides, because, in such a conjuncture, everybody loses, including Iran, or especially Iran. In that sense, there may be brought some arguments that deserve to be analyzed or at least overviewed.

Iran is an oil producer. It can increase production, means the extraction and the crude oil processing, as well as the new deposits prospecting and refining capacity etc. Also, it could amplify the existent network and develop new and modern transport systems by pipes for the own hydrocarbons, and for the ones from the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, where there would participate, without any discussion (if the situation had been more stable), the main world's oil companies, especially the ones from the United States of America.

The oil transport from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the ports from the Indian Ocean would be cheaper and easier to accomplish by Iran, then in another part. If Iran would be stable and secure, of course. So, it is not necessarily that Iran needs to produce electric energy by nuclear means, because it wouldn't have traditional resources.

Moreover, as it has lots of oil, logically, Iran would not have to set out, as a priority, to produce electric energy by nuclear means, especially if such an attitude would generate worries on the international level, on the contrary, the priority would be, for this country, to develop its maximum oil industry with all its facilities.

From here there can be expressed the conclusion that Iran doesn't necessarily desire a nuclear program for the use of nuclear energy in peaceful goals, but, effectively, aims, in essence, to produce the nuclear weapon, because it is a big country and it considers that it can't remain behind India, Pakistan and Israel and does not accept the perspective of



the nuclear threat, especially from Israel, without being able to have a nuclear feedback. Therefore, Iran might consider that the accomplishment of the nuclear weapon is a request for surviving, when almost all the big countries bordering the Middle East have nuclear weapons. The main function of the Iranian nuclear weapon, if it is accomplished, and it seems that Iran isn't willing to renounce its uranium enrichment program -, would be one with invariable geometry: counteracting the power of Israel and the accomplishment of a Arabian world leader status for the Middle East area, even of a Greater Middle East, different from the American concept.

The main battle for such project accomplishment, unfortunately, Iran should lead with the biggest nuclear power of the world, the United States of America, when, in fact, Americans should be the first supporters and the first benefactors of the development, by Iran, of an oil transport network to the South-Asian ports to the Indian Ocean, of the petrol industry development and even a nuclear program with peaceful use for this country. Somehow, the Iranian nuclear program shouldn't trouble the Americans as it does not trouble India, Pakistan or Israel.

Logically, Iran shouldn't represent a direct threat for the United States as it does not matter how many nuclear programs would have, this poor country from the Middle East – Iran – is far away from reaching a potential closing to the American one. Iran doesn't have an aviation for strategic bombardment, or, in any case, this can't be compared and can't confront with the United States, or cruise missiles with a 2.500 kilometres range, or ballistic missiles with a 10.000 kilometres range, or nuclear submarines with WMD at board, or aircraft carrier, or satellites network, or C4 systems, and also any capacity to harm America, maybe, just an asymmetrical one, as if it will sustain the international terrorism or Al-Qaeda type networks.

But, as far we know, after the Iraqi war, and even before, Iran kept away from the Afghan conflicts, from the Central Asia, from the Caucasus ones, from terrorism (besides the domestic one, which is presented rather as a state terrorism than an international network), despite the Islamic Revolution, searching for building an area balance, to keep its unity and stability.

The exit from paradox

All the world's great entities – the United States, India, China, Russia, the European Union – will benefit more from the relation with a stable, strong and prosper Iran, even possessing nuclear weapons, rather from a torn, passed on the other side of the barricade, considered the world's main enemy and threatened with the bombardment or invasion, if it doesn't quit the nuclear program.

This paradox could be annihilated, fuzzy or at least analyzed by two possible explanations – it is true, with the same great importance for a new world's security argumentation architecture, but nevertheless sufficient – that some accepts and sustains, but others reject.

One of these possible explanations refers to the fact that a stable and prosperous Iran wouldn't be possible, as long as it is lead by dictators and regimes that hang, kill and humiliate Iranians. Perhaps, a new Pahlavi would be more appropriate, in the conception of those who see a categorical, bloody, terrorist and humiliating breach between the Iran leadership and the Iranian people. Although the dictatorial regimes from this country don't guarantee that Iran will ever benefit from this stability the United States and the democratic world wish for. Therefore, for resolving this tiny problem which overturns the huge democratic horizon, there should be made an appeal to an indirect strategy, aiming to destroy the Mullahs' leadership and instituting a democratic leadership, the only one capable to stabilize Iran. Unfortunately, such solution did not prove to be a very one in Iraq. But, you never know, maybe for Iran things could be different. The facts aren't judged after statements, but after results, and they don't appear suddenly, but, sometimes, there must pass years, many years, for accomplishing the intended goal.

The second explanation would result, in our opinion, from certain interests which emerge from the logic of the international relations based on the principles, philosophy and physiognomy of the United Nation and pursue other goals. There are more and more invoked, by analysts and practitioners (for example, the diplomat Hocine Meghlai), that the motives and the causes of the United States' and other allies' attitude concerning the Middle East problematic isn't part of the oil's game, or combating terrorist networks and organizations (it wasn't proved that Iran is involved



POINTS OF VIEW

in), but in Israel's interest protection and sustaining its geopolity in the area. Many arguments are brought for this, but also many arguments sustain other numerous explanations.

However, the arguments and explanations don't solve the serious problems created in the area or their strategic impact over the entire world's security.

On the 12th of April, Mohamed El Baradei, the General Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA -, arrived in Teheran for discussing the controversy Iranian nuclear program. His intention was to persuade Iran to stop that program, at least until this case clarification. Despite all the pressures by the United States, European Union and UN, Teheran announced, on the 11th of April, that it succeeded, for the first time, to enrich uranium, and the very next day underlined that it is ready to develop a program on a larger scale. The UN Security Council asked Iran that, until 28th of April, to cease any activity to enrich uranium. However, until the 28th of April, IAEA has to present a report on this issue in the Security Council. If Iran continues, it will pass to a next phase. No one knows exactly what will happen, because the Security Council is divided. While USA and EU – that suspect Iran, from the

above mentioned reasons, but also others, that intends to use the nuclear energy for military goals – wish for some sanctions application against this country, Russia and China don't agree with such sanctions. Iran isn't and wasn't intimidated of such pressures. On the contrary, at the beginning of April 2006, they developed a vast application in the Gulf area, where 17.000 military participated and 1.500 ships, testing a capable torpedo, according to the Iranian statements, to destroy each surface or immersed target.

We don't know exactly if the Iranian president and the Mullah regime live scared to death and act desperately, if they are very sure and know what are doing, if they pursuit to transform Iran in a resistance pillar of the very beautiful entitled project, "The Greater Middle East", without being internationally sustained, if they want to dominate the region, or, simply, they can't exit from the paradox we mentioned before. The only certitude is represented by the Iran tensions growth and the American administration, the Teheran leadership inflexibility and the serious danger of a new conflict of weapons into a space where God disorderly put poor people, sand and oil.

Translated by Mirela ATANASIU

Brigadier General (ret.) Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD, is a scientific researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I". He wrote numerous strategy papers as „Strategia acțiunilor rapide“, AISM Publishing House, 2003, „Strategie militară pentru viitor“, Paideia Publishing House, 2003, „Arta militară de-a lungul milenilor“, CTEA Publishing House, 2004, co-author of „Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului“, NDU Publishing House, 2004, „Eseu despre arta strategică“, Military Publishing House, 2005, „Strategia de parteneriat, parteneriatul strategic“, NDU Publishing House, 2006. He has also published studies, articles, essays on military art and strategic culture, edited by the NDU Publishing House or published by other specialised magazines.



CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Nicola PIASENTE

The analysis of the IT Joint Task Force participation in Iraqi Antica Babilonia operation underlines the complexity of the accomplished missions and the way post-conflict and nation building operations got the characteristics specific to an antiterrorist operation. It Joint TF acts in the South-East of Iraq and is augmented with a Romanian detachment, battalion level, controlling the territory, supporting the Iraqi authorities in their fight against insurgents or terrorists, offering military and humanitarian aid, creating the safety conditions that will allow the reconstruction of infrastructures and new state institutions, for the country's democratic transformation, etc.

Introduction

Following the campaign leading to the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime, the operation in Iraq started as a rebuilding and post-conflict operation but gradually it became more and more an anti-terrorist operation where the process of "nation building" faced numerous attempts to create disorder and uncertainty by using the terrorist violence.

That was because the coalition didn't plan the operations in order to create a solid stability. Many factors contributed to this mistake¹:

- the UN incapacity to assess the nature and dimension of Iraqi nationalism;
- the incapacity to plan the informational operations to improve the Iraqis' perception towards the coalition forces;
- the incapacity to provide a sufficient number of civilian elements to enhance the provisory government authority;
- the incapacity to plan and conduct the actions to support the local authorities;
 - the over trust in the groups of Iraqi exiles;
 - the incapacity to foresee the terrorist elements infiltration;
- the incapacity to provide sufficient forces for

the safety of urban areas following the advancing of the coalition forces;

- the mistakes in supporting the allies.

In this article we will analyze an Italian brigade participation in Iraqi post-conflict operations from the point of view of command and control and the types of actions conducted taking into consideration the following characteristics:

- the operations in Iraq started as post-conflict and "nation building" operations following an armed conflict and gradually occurred what we call "mission creeping" and the operation changed into an antiterrorist fight²;
- the way to approach this type of operation by the Italian forces;
- the organization of the terrorist groups was prepared before the military operations and the terrorist campaign started after the end of the war in spring of 2003³;
- the terrorist actions occur generally in towns, the most favourable terrain to attack the coalition forces⁴;
- the terrorist groups have trained professionals, former members of the security structures and Saddam's army or foreign militants recruited and trained by Al Qaeda⁵.

1. "It Joint Task Force" structure and command in the operation "Antica Babilonia"

The Italian brigade in "Antica Babilonia" called "It Joint Task Force" was strengthened with fighting, fighting support and logistic support units by all services among which a Romanian battalion and a Portuguese company.

It Joint TF is subordinated to UK MND SE (United Kingdom Multinational Division South East).

It Joint TF commander is a brigadier general and the commandment is run by a chief of staff and is made up of the following compartments: G1 (human resources), G2 (information), G3 (current



operations, future operations, fire support, G3 air, ALO), G4 (logistics), G5 (civilian-military cooperation), G6 (communications).

1.1. Operation structure (G3)

G3 manages all the operational activities and is the commander's main co-worker.

For future planning it uses the "G3 plans" and to manage current operations it uses "G3 ops" which has an operational centre chief.

The operational planning is run by a parallel process with four main steps:

- **MISSION ANALYSIS** – the commander helped by the G2 and G3 chiefs, analyzes the received mission and prepares the commander's planning training guide, it's presented during the mission analysis briefing and ends with the issue of warning order 1;

- **SITUATION ANALYSIS** which foresees drafting an estimate by every department chief, starting with G2 chief who drafts "IPB", presenting them to the commander, during the situation analysis briefing and issuing warning order 2;

- **COMPARING COURSES OF ACTION** begins with the identification of different COAs (course of action) and comparing them through the decisional support matrix. The commander gives his opinion about each decisive point after listening to the Staff opinions. This phase ends with the briefing of comparing the courses of action and issuing warning order 3;

- **DECISION MAKING.** The commander makes decisions about adopting a course of action, his goal and intentions are redefined as well as the "high pay-off target" and the operational activities that must be analyzed before the action and which end with decision-making briefing.

As for G3-OPS, the chief of the operational centre is the officer who, within TOC, deals with the operation in progress followed scrupulously through the automatic command and control system (SIACCON). He uses the following response cells:

- G2 ops (information)
- G3 air
- G3 ENG (engineer)
- G4 ops

To conduct the operations he uses:

- The protected information net which allows for:
 - managing classified information up to the

SECRET level

- information traffic through the electronic mail

- The command and control system SIACCON which links the dependent units and nationally, the NCC (national contingent commander), SNR (senior national representative) and the Joint Operational Headquarters;

- The telephone communication net SOTRIN which allows for a protected link with all the subordinated units;

- VHF and HF nets for the radio communications with the units operating in the brigade area of responsibility.

1.2. The information department (G2)

It coordinates the work of the subordinated TF G2 elements and uses:

- the operational intelligence cell;
- the analysis and reconnaissance cell;
- the "HUMINT" cell;
- the information security cell.

The department is in constant contact with the Special Forces, the MSU components (multinational specialised units) and other departments and agencies in the theatre. The G2 cell technically coordinates all the reconnaissance and intelligence units which, besides their own capabilities, has also the following elements:

- HUMINT;
- SIGINT;
- IMINT.

It particularly uses:

- "HUMINT teams" operating with the civilian population;

- The electronic warfare subunits with "SIGINT";

- The reconnaissance subunits;

- The "ISTAR" subunits (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance) with "Pointer" and "Predator" unmanned aircrafts.

1.3 The civilian-military cooperation department (G5)

G5 deals with the relations between the civilian and military authorities that are very important during the "nation building" mission. Subordinated to it is a unit specialized in the civilian-military cooperation. The CIMIC department includes engineer specialists in rebuilding the infrastructures



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

and specialists in hydrocarbon geology and specialists in the preservation of the Italian cultural heritage. The department is divided into an analysis and assessment cell which conducts the CIMIC assessment and a planning cell dealing with the development of the rebuilding projects.

Within the It Joint TF, G5 is very important for the following reasons:

- The civilian authority's rebuilding and support activity is considered extremely effective in convincing the population to give up using terrorism to reach the political objectives;
- In the effect-based operations, the contact with the civilian population is very important to monitor the campaign course through certain statistic indicators.

1.4. The third dimension

The G3 Air department deals with the support provided by helicopters and airplanes working in close connection with the ROA HQ ("Reparto Operativo Autonomo", aviation unit at the Tallil airport with AB 412, A-129 and HH 3 F helicopters). For the operational activity, it coordinates all the helicopter-linked operations, particularly personnel embarking/disembarking, weapon systems and means. For the logistical activities, it coordinates the supply and save-evac transportation.

While within the logistical activities, G3 Air deals with material and personnel transportation between different airports in the theatre and Italy, it cooperates closely with the air force liaison officer responsible with the air transport and the offensive air contest, particularly with CAS management both for planned and emergency missions. Thus he:

- is in close contact with ASOC (Air Support Operational Centre);
- receives ATO (air task order) daily;
- coordinates FAC and TACP.

2. It Joint Task Force actions within the "Antica Babilonia" operation

It JTF area of operations is in the South East Iraq within the MND south east area of responsibility and includes the entire "Dhi Qar" area.

It JTF actions are meant to create safe conditions in order to allow the development of the rebuilding activities of Iraqi infrastructures and institutions and the democratic transformation process⁶, taking

into consideration the fact that it is in an area of continuity from the ethnic point of view and of influence of the Teheran authorities.

The operations' general concept follows the new way to approach the operations, well explained in the theory named "three block war", particularly regarding It JTF activities. The emphasis is laid more on the rebuilding operations than on those of armed combat, in accordance with the MND SE operational directions such as:

- safety;
- the role of law;
- government and administration;
- infrastructure rebuilding;
- assistance and humanitarian aid;
- perception.

The main effort is aimed at controlling the territory and developing the Iraqi capability to act independently against insurgents or terrorists⁷.

Planning and conducting activities is according to the effect-based operation principles⁸. These represent a conception, modality or way of thinking applicable in all types of missions, they use both lethal and non-lethal force, offers a modality where the enemy is considered a system and ensures the force economy.

It JTF main types of operations are the following:

- free hostages;
- find and requisition the weapon, ammunition and explosive depots;
- conquer the objectives under the insurgents' control;
- military assistance supporting Iraqi police and armed forces;
- humanitarian assistance.

Each has generally four phases:

- gather information and conduct rehearsals;
- achieve the formation through land manoeuvre;
- act against the objectives;
- return to base and reactivate the operational capability.

The gathering information phase starts with the Special Forces action that conduct target identifying and selecting activities based on the information obtained through the HUMINT team and other sources, particularly surveillance with unmanned aircrafts and SIGINT. This phase is very delicate because the concealment procedures



are very difficult to establish in the desert or towns and discovering a Special Forces team during the target identification by the population can lead to failure.

Conducting rehearsals is absolutely necessary to complete the force planning and coordination during the operation but it endangers keeping the secrets.

The phase of achieving the formation through land manoeuvre starts with isolating the objective in the distance and the land reserve move, using light or mechanized infantry forces. It goes on with its isolation in the vicinity using special operation forces, generally rangers and prepares the force conducting the action against the objective if the action is conducted by land manoeuvre or in the embarking area if these are conducted by vertical manoeuvre.

The phase of acting against the objectives starts with going to them and continues with exploiting them. Generally, the action is conducted by the special forces supported by the EOD teams (explosive ordinance device).

The phase of returning to base and reactivate the operational capability is conducted opposite to the phase of achieving the formation through combined manoeuvre (land and vertical), but the target surveillance continues in order to check the operation effects. Once returned to base, the detailed post-action analysis starts. From the logistical point of view, these reintegrate the level of "combat power" to the equipment, vehicle and helicopter maintenance.

Translated by Diana DIACONESCU

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Monographies:

Iraq, geographical monography, Istituto Geografico Militare, Firenze, 2003.

Iraq - operazione Antica Babilonia, Rapporto esercito 2004, supplemento a Rivista Militare, Gen.-Feb. 2005.

Papers:

Liang Qiao, Yiangsui Wang, Guerra senza limiti, l'arte della guerra asimmetrica fra terrorismo e globalizzazione, a cura del Gen. Fabio Mini, Editrice Goriziana, Gorizia, 2004.

Mini Fabio, La guerra dopo la guerra, Einaudi, Torino, 2003.

Periodicals:

Bellinzona Carlo, Luci ed ombre di Antica Babilonia, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.6/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso.

Bove Giancarlo, Terrorismo in formato mediatico, Rivista Militare, Nov.-Dic.2004.

Cordesman Anthony, Baetjer Patrick, Evoluzione dell'insurrezione in Iraq, Center of Strategic Studies, maggio 2005.

Corsini Roberto, I Predator italiani in Iraq, Rivista Aeronautica, Gen.-Feb. 2005.

Gen. B. Di Marco Leonardo, Operazioni basate sugli effetti, Rivista Militare, Gen.-Feb. 2005.

Franco Claudio, I martiri di Al-Zarqawi e la strategia del caos, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.6/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso.

Mini Fabio, Missioni incompiute, perchè non controlliamo il territorio, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.6/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso.

Filippi Marco, Carrozzo Antonio, Condizionamento psicologico e addestramento nei campi di Al Qaeda, Intelligence e Storia Top secret, febbraio 2005.

Gen. C.A. Novelli Armando, Ten. Col. Panizzi Massimo, L'Iraq verso la svolta, Rivista Militare, Mar.-Apr.2005.

Parigi Giovanni, L'Iraq che conta e quello che appare, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.3/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso.

Sema Antonio, Nel pantano iracheno crolla il mito dell'iperpotenza, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.6/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso.

Conferences:

Major General Staff Iskander J. Witwit, Iraqi terrorist groups, conference held on December, 20, 2005, the National Defence University "Carol I".

Web:

- www.army.mil
- www.army.mod.uk
- www.cia.gov/cia/publication
- www.difesa.it
- www.esercito.difesa.it
- www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterterrorism
- www.mod.uk



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

NOTES:

¹ Cf. CORDESMAN, Anthony, BAETJER, Patrick, *Evoluzione dell'insurrezione in Iraq*, Center of Strategic Studies, maggio 2005, p.76.

² Cf. BELLIZONA, Carlo, *Luci ed ombre di Antica Babilonia*, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.6/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso, p.155.

³ Cf. MINI, Fabior, *La guerra dopo la guerra* (Torino: Einaudi, 2003), p.255.

⁴ Cf., *Idem*, *Missioni incompiute, perché non controlliamo il territorio*, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.6/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso, p.37.

⁵ Cf., FRANCO, Claudio, *I martiri di Al-Zarqawi e la strategia del caos*, Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, nr.6/2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso, pp. 79-90.

⁶ Cf., *Iraq-operazione Antica Babilonia, Rapporto esercito 2004*, supplemento a Rivista Militare, Gen.-Feb. 2005, p.58.

⁷ Cf., Gen. C.A. Armando NOVELLI, Ten. Col. Massimo PANIZZI, *L'Iraq verso la svolta*, Rivista Militare, Mar.-Apr.2005, p.22.

⁸ Cf., Gen. B. Leonardo DI MARCO, *Operazioni basate sugli effetti*, Rivista Militare, Gen.-Feb.2005, p.72.

Captain Nicola PIASENTE is a student within the Faculty for Command and Staff from the National Defence University "Carol I".



THE WAR AGAINST TERROR IS CONSACRATING A NEW WAR GENERATION

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD

The greatest challenges of the 21st century are closely related to terrorism, the possible use of weapons of mass destruction and the presence of insurgency and guerrilla wars in different parts of the world. Military confrontations are configured on two dimensions: a) the violence and the extremely destructive character of the terrorist actions, guerrillas and insurgency; b) slow down character, dissuasive and constructive of the actions carried on by the military forces, and not all, in crisis and conflicts management process. Within the volume and the value of dissuasive actions grow up decreased the amplitude of brutality and diminished the destructive character of fight actions. For a substantial diminishing, the destroying character of future wars it is necessary their cognition.

Strategic schools from different parts of world overtook the conclusion that the modalities for preparing and carrying on the war suffered, in the last time, substantially modifications which, soon or later, should lead to the mutations in physiognomy of war. It is considered that the situation is similar with the moments which preceded the fundamental reforms in the military practice.

For a facile analysis of conflicts between human being, in the late 1980s¹, theoreticians and military strategists divided evolution scale of modern warfare (post-Westphalian) in many distinct phases. They call "generation" each stage of war, thus:

-the first generation of modern war has been characterized by the domination of mass manpower on the battlefield (trained, equipped, and endowed in concordance with the mission planed). This phase culminated in Napoleonic Wars.

-the improvement of armament led to growing the power of fire, this sanctioned the second generation of war. This culminated in the First World War, where the planning of each guns for fire every target was very sharp planned;

-the three generation of war is defined through the amplification of forces' mobility, the process which carried on to the growing importance of manoeuvre in the battle space. The scholars think the German actions in the Second World War marked the start of this stage²;

- the fourth generation has evolved in the background of Cold War, when political, social, economic, military and another nature determined the appearance of some unconventional forms of fight with ideological enemy, considerate a force hard to win only the military means.

This last type of war was developing subsequently in the framework of the thickening of states' legitimacy crisis that is generated by some elements such as: putting up-to-date the open historical problems with neighbourhoods; the discontent regarding the powerful international actors; the appearance of some intolerant human groups on others religion, culture, living standard and living philosophy. The effects of globalization and IT development provided the favourable evolution framework.

The huge attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon ended with a tremendous summing-up and were followed up by terrifying aggressions on civilians at the Madrid's stations and London's subway entitle us to assert that the terrorist phenomenon gets some extended mutations. The records of its presence have echoes and reverberations similar to a world conflagration.

Terrorism, called or not this way but understood as a free violence on civilians or non-combatants, is part of each type of war. Now, unlike previous periods of time, the terrorist actions are not punctual strikes or ensembles of autonomous strikes, but components of some great amplitude operations.

Most of the time, these are conjugated with "guerrilla", "special" or some other type of actions, some of them new, based or not on historical experience. The situation was analyzed and signalized in the 1980s' theoretical papers as a



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

constituent element of a new type of war, unknown by then, called “the fourth generation of war”.

In the absence of a unanimous accepted definition, the recent specialty papers introduce the fourth generation of war as: a “modern form of insurgency”³, “the tactics of the weak”⁴ or “a war method that uses undermining of enemy’s power, exploitation of his weaknesses, and asymmetrical operations in order to achieve victory”⁵. The former political analyst of the USA Embassy in Bucharest, Moscow, and Paris – Tony Corn – regards it as a stage of the sixth World War⁶. Until the establishment of a unique definition, the majority of scholars agree that the purpose of this generation of war is to destroy especially the enemy’s political will and less his armed forces.

Therefore, we can assert that the transition from technology to ideas is the main characteristic of the transition process from the third generation of war to the fourth generation of war. The main objective of the conflict is substantially modifying. The drawing out of fight of enemy forces and assets is no longer its object. The keystone of the entire war is the enemy’s will to resist. This is the convergence point for all of the political, economic, social, cultural, armed or another type of actions.

If the victory of ideas, not of the force is pursued in the fourth generation of war, the classical armed fight passes in a second-ground and it is becoming lesser distinctive. Our present military knowledge is not enough to win such a war.

After a long period of latent evolution of the fourth generation of war and companionship with previous generations of wars, they are powerfully reverting as a reflex of the contemporary world’s realities. There are some great opportunities for “opponent forces”⁷ to take advantage, such as the loss of state’s monopoly on violence, strengthening the cultural, ethnic and religious conflicts, globalization, etc.

Terrorism is the phenomenon that earns the most from opportunities supplied by the third millennium international environment.

There are more and more terrorist organizations and groups that exceed not only the state frontiers, but the continental limits by their methods and areas of action.

Moreover, there is a certain trend of coalition and even unification of terrorist groups. The modus operandi of this type of opponent forces is not to be framed in any modus operandi specific

to previous generations of wars. Still, it has some conjoint features with the ones specific to guerrilla, insurgency, organized crime, and other transfrontalier threats.

The idea that the theatre of war is deteriorated is based on the experience of the armies that confronted in types of war like the analyzed one⁸ and introduced in “lessons learned” or monographs. Each corner of the world might represent an area of operations. The front is indefinite and most of the time there is no line of contact.

The opponent forces proceed from different states. Their bases are not located in internationally recognized territories and usually their components are not loyal to any state or recruiting and material supporting organization. Their opponents are everywhere and nowhere. A large part of them does not wear uniforms, distinctive marks or with the lid off weapons and that is why is difficult to discriminate between civilians and militaries. The encounters between combatants are sporadic, sometimes dangerous and carried on in the presence of unemployed civilians and with their sacrifice.

The non-combatants might develop non-violent actions that are dissimulated, intrinsic parts of violent actions.

The militaries might be turned into victims due to the route created in their conduct by combatants’ peaceful protests, mere presence in the conflict area, mass-media democratic statement of the discontent regarding the forces of order, Internet messages calling to disobedience and fight, and some other non-aggressive forms of action.

This situation is amplified by the non-discernment bringing into force the humanitarian international law regarding the protection of civilians.

Under these circumstances, the terms of combatants and non-combatant are not to be used in the fourth generation wars and the judicial heading of the opponents’ categories must be brought up-to-date.

The weaponry used by the opponent forces is heterogeneous – an amalgam of cybernetics, latest techniques and handcrafted means.

The opponent forces might be transnational groups that have no stable territorial bases and do not act in pre-defined structures. The fighting forms and methods are borrowed from the panoply of the guerrilla war, terrorist actions or low intensity conflict. Those forces are able to fulfil tactical,



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

operative or strategic missions. Their military value is rarely concurring with the importance of established targets.

Concluding, the war - and within its limits, the battle – as it was inspired defined by the German general Karl von Clausewitz, is the “the carrying on of politics with other means”.

Our day’s military scholars and not only reinforce von Clausewitz’s assertion and point out that in the new type of war, the one called the “fourth generation of war”, the trend of carrying on the war with “other means” is increasing.

The terrorism, insurgency, fratricide fights, organized crime, illegal traffic of persons, weapons and means of mass destruction are only some of the elements of a fourth generation war in which war and peace meddle becoming indistinct.

The decisive confrontations are carried on with light weapons or no weapons at all. The operations are conducted in mental or moral space bringing both victory and defeat.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Hervé COUTAU-BÉGARIE, **Tratat de strategie**, Tome I, National Defence University “Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006.

Eugen BĂDĂLAN, Valentin ARSENIE, Dumitru ALEXIU, **Tratat de tactică militară. Forțele Terestre**, Tome I, Land Forces Academy “Nicolae Bălcescu” Publishing House, Sibiu, 2003

*** **Tratat de știință militară**, Tome 3, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004.

General prof. univ. dr. Mircea MUREȘAN, General de brigadă (r.) prof. univ. dr. Costică ȚENU, Colonel (r.) prof. univ. dr. Lucian STĂNCILĂ, **Corelația artei militare cu fenomenul militar contemporan**, National Defence University “Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.

Gl. dr. Mircea MUREȘAN, gl. bg. (r.) dr. Gheorghe VĂDUVA, **Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului**, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004.

Frank BOLZ, Jr. Kenneth J. DUDONIS, David P. SCHULZ, **The Conterterrorist Handbook, Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques**, Tampa, Editura CRC Press, 2002.

Robin WRIGHT, *U.S. Obtains Treatise By Bin Laden Deputy*, Washingtonpost.com., 07.10.2005.

Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, **Principii ale războiului și luptei armate. Realități și tendințe**, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003.

Dr. Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, dr. Gheorghe VĂDUVA, **Tendințe în lupta armată**, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004.

Dr. Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, dr. Gheorghe VĂDUVA, **Întrebuințarea marilor unități de infanterie ușoară ca forță expediționară pentru impunerea stabilității în zonele aflate sub controlul grupărilor teroriste**, National Defence University “Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.

Dr. Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, dr. Eugen SITEANU, **Optimizarea sistemelor de armament de mare precizie și bătaie lungă în scopul adaptării acestora la desfășurarea acțiunilor militare asimetrice**, National Defence University “Carol I” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.

Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, **Fizionomia acțiunilor militare**, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004.

NOTES:

¹ William S. LIND in article *Understanding Fourth Generation War* affirms that syntagm “Fourth Generation War” was issued for the first time in 198, in Marine Corps Gazette (USA).

² Thomas X. HAMMES, *4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths*, in Armed Forces Journal, November 2004, pp.40-44, http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_warfare.htm

³ Thomas X. HAMMES, *Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation*, in Strategic Forum, no. 214/2005, National Defense University Publishing House, p.1

⁴ G.I.WILSON, John P. SULLIVAN, Hal Kempfer, *4GW: Tactics of the Weak Confound the Strong*, in http://www.military.com/NewComent?file=Wilson_090803, p.1.

⁵[http://globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html](http://globalguerrillas.tzpepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html)

⁶ Tony CORN, *World War IV As Fourth-generation Warfare*, in Real Clear Politics- January 6, 2006.

⁷ In the absence of a well-known denomination



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

for those who acts on the basis of the fourth generation of war's principles, we will use the following appellatives: opponent forces and opponents.

⁸ For instance, the USA in Vietnam, Lebanon,

and Somalia, France in Vietnam and Algeria; USSR in Afghanistan, Russia in Cecenia, Republic of Moldova in Transdnier, Georgia in Osetia and Abkhazia, the Coalition against Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc.

Col. (ret.) Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD, is the Chief of the Studies and Research Department from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University "Carol I". He is the author or co-author of over 30 monographs, studies, and specialty papers. He published over 120 articles in prestigious strategy, security and military history magazines from our country and abroad.

He graduated a number of courses organized by Euro-Atlantic educational institutions and participated in NATO-led operations other than war.



RESEARCH OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY FOR THE DIAGNOSIS OF SOME VIRAL AND BACTERIAL BIOLOGICAL AGENTS / BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

*Army Centre of Medical Research**

Biological weapons or/and with toxins, although are formally prohibited by international legislation (BTWC 1972) represent a real danger, not only through the perspective of a biological war but also as "bio-chem". Military medicine stands in the first in line of defence against biological weapons, by specific means and resources, for the diagnosis, prevention, treatment and recovery of patients. The military medicine scientific research in the area of the protection against biologic weapons must orientate and coordinate the national effort in order to maintain health of the troops, population, animals, plants and surrounding environment.

I. Research of molecular biology for the diagnosis of viral biological agents

The techniques of molecular biology¹ are nowadays used for the characterization of viral isolations, in the microbiologic diagnosis of laboratory and research, but also in the area of medical protection against biological agents, for the viral diagnosis. In the situations in which criminate pathogenesis agents are also listed as biological agents, the military medicine is required to be involved for specific expertise, in order to differentiate a natural focus from a biologic attack, especially since certain situations have occurred in a number of countries thus founding the bio-terrorism concept.

In Romania² there are recorded emergent arboviroses, diseases with various implications for the public health, taking into consideration that the entire population of the country can be subject to the risk of illness, through the presence of the populations of vectors. Among arboviruses³, the

flavivirus of the West Nile fever (WN), transmitted by mosquitoes, and that of the tick-borne encephalitis (TBE), transmitted by ticks, are the infectious agents with risks of dissemination and moderate rates of morbidity and mortality, but potentially usable as biological agents. In Romania⁴, in 1996 we identified an epidemic produced by WN virus and⁵ an epidemic centre produced by the TBE virus, in the year 1999.

West Nile virus and TBE virus are arboviruses belonging to the Flaviviridae family, constituted from infectious agents that may cause serious diseases for human beings and other vertebrates. The name of the family derives from the Latin word flavus = yellow, associated with yellow fever, determined by the amaril virus, prototype species of the family.

Starting with the 1930–1940 years⁶, a major part of the early studies concerning arboviruses was accomplished. The optimization of serological techniques led to creating three groups of arboviruses -A, B, C- based on seroneutralisation, complement fixation and hemagglutination-inhibition reactions. For the past decades this division proved to be limited, because the progress concerning the viral morphology, genomic structure and the phylogenetic relationships established through nucleotides sequencing brought important dates, which led to new taxonomic integrations, group B arboviruses containing presently viruses which constitute the Flaviviridae family.

According to the OMS reports, during the last 15-20 years new arboviruses were identified, and a tendency of expansion was also observed. Cases of infections with imported arboviruses were signalled, such as: the Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic

** The paper was presented at the Annual International Session of Scientific Communication Papers, STRATEGIES XXI/2006, organised by the National Defence University „Carol I”, and was prepared by the following researchers: Diana-Mihaela Popescu, Lucia-Elena Ionescu, Simona Bicheru, Aurora Alexse, Marius Necşulescu, Viorel Ordeanu and Cristian Nicolae.*



fever, hemorrhagic dengue, Rift Valley fever and West Nile fever.

West Nile virus⁷ was isolated for the first time from the blood of a febrile woman from the West Nile district, in Uganda, in the year 1937, then from ill people, birds and mosquitoes in Egypt starting with the year 1950. The virus was framed in the Flavivirus genre, the antigenic group of Japanese encephalitis. Besides Africa, Europe, European Russia and the Middle East, the geographic distribution includes North America (USA, Canada) starting with the year 1999.

The TBE virus⁸, an arbovirus from the Flaviviridae family, Flavivirus genre, is transmitted by ticks, mostly from the *Ixodes ricinus* genre for the Central-European strain and *Ixodes persulcatus* for the Far East. It is transmitted to humans through the bite of virus infected ticks or through consumption of fresh milk and freshly prepared from sheep and goats which were infested with ticks.

The disease is seasonal and appears depending on the activity of ticks, commonly during the months of spring and autumn. In this context⁹, the tests are performed on all the animal species involved in the propagation of the virus, both on vectors (mosquitoes, ticks) and potential hosts (birds, mammals, humans) and it consists in emphasizing the specific antibodies IgG and IgM for WN virus or TBE virus from sera and CSF sample, through the ELISA test. The virological diagnosis implies the isolation of the virus from CFS and the brain, the detection of the virus in tissues through the emphasis of antigens with immunohistochemical techniques and the analysis of nucleic acid through RT-PCR.

For the study of the arboviruses circulating in Romania, we optimized the reverse-PCR technique with reference strain WN Egypt 101, multiplied on suckling-mice brain. The method was also applied for the molecular characterization of some arboviruses isolates.

In conclusion, the first concrete action in the medical protection against biologic weapons is the quick and precise microbiological diagnosis, in order to establish in the real time, the measures of counteracting the biologic attack.

Molecular biology has a major role, having adapted methods and techniques for this aim, complementary to the classic means of microbiological diagnoses.

1. Materials and methods

Viral strains and samples. In this study we used the WN Egypt 101 strain, TBE Hypr strain and 9 lots of *Culex pipiens*. The mosquitoes were collected from the basements of some blocks of flats from the capital city, where WN virus infections were found at humans.

After the collection and identification of the mosquitoes, they were splitted into lots, and for each lot intracerebral inoculations were performed on suckling-mice families.

The mosquitoes pools were suspended in phosphate buffer saline with bovine serum albumine and antibiotics. The inoculation was done immediately after the centrifugation of the product.

The mosquitoes' suspensions were inoculated on suckling-mice families of 1-2 days old, which were observed up to 10-15 days post inoculation. For 2 lots we observed neurologic symptoms, including hind limb paralysis, tremors, difficulty in walking and loss of balance, 3-4 days postinoculation. Then we performed three successive passages on suckling-mice families for both lots. The phenomena characteristic to the disease appeared to all three passages.

RNA viral extraction. RNA viral was extracted from suckling-mice brain, using RNeasy Lipid Tissue Mini Kit (Qiagen). For the homogenization and split of tissue we used the buffer of lyses (about 100 mg were homogenized with 1 ml buffer of the lyses). The extraction was performed on RNeasy columns using the chloroforms, ethanol and buffer from kit, according to the instructions. RNA was eluated in 50 µl total volume of Rnase free watter, aliquotted in small amounts in order to avoid multiple evening frost /defrost series and maintained to -80°C.

Reverse-Transcription PCR. A 408 bp fragment containing the C-terminal portion of the C gene (viral capsid) and the N-terminal part of the prM gene (transmembranare protein) was amplified to detect WN virus RNA. The oligonucleotides for the standard RT-PCR assay were recommend by Robert Lanciotti (quotation of Shi), CDC, carried to amplify the region C-preM of the viral genome. For reverse-transcription were used Omniscript Kit (Qiagen), according to the manufacturers' instructions, but in the reaction was used one of the primers used in the amplification process. The reaction mix contained buffer of reverse transcription 10X, dNTPmix 5mM, primer WN 150 pmoli, RN-ase



Inhibitor 10 units/ μ l solution OmniScript, matrix ARN and was incubated one hour to 37°C.

In the amplification reaction were used Taq ADN polymerase 5U/ μ l (Sigma), according to the manufacturers' instructions, 25mM MgCl₂, 10X PCR buffer, primers WN, water of 18 Ω for the completion of final volume and the reverse transcription reaction product. The samples was loaded and amplified on equipment GeneAmp 2400, Perkin Elmer, using a specific program of amplification. The PCR products were analyzed with an horizontal electrophoresis reaction on agarose gel 1,5%, using the specific buffer and ethidium bromide.

Serologic analyses From suckling-mice brain, who presented characteristic signs of encephalitis, at the third passage, we prepared the antigen through the sucrose-acetone extraction technique (Clarke and Casals, 1958), which was then inactivated with beta-propiolactone 0,1%.

We obtained two lots of antigen which were then tested through IgM antibodies capture ELISA.

2. Results

WN virus Egypt 101 strain and viral isolates B119 and B125 were submitted to extraction reactions and the reverse PCR. The amplification was achieved both for the positive blank sample (West Nile Egypt 101) and for the viral isolates, using different quantities of RNA which was diluted 1/1, 1/10 and 1/100. Samples were loaded on a horizontal electrophoresis system in agarose gel and visualised on ultra violet light (UV) transilluminator. We obtained the DNA bands of approximate 408 bp.

To confirm the results based on molecular biology techniques, for both antigens lots prepared from viral isolates B119 and B125, we performed the IgM capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. The tests were performed for both WN virus and TBE virus.

We mention that the WN and TBE viral antigens used in reaction were prepared in laboratory, through the same sucrose-acetone extraction technique from suckling-mice brain inoculated with WN Egypt 101 and TBE Hypr strains. We used 2 positive and negative control sera (WNV, TBEV).

Both antigens isolated from B119 and B125 lots, were tested with IgM capture ELISA techniques in double copy of antigen and reacted posi-

tive with WN virus control sera and didn't react with positive control sera for TBE virus.

3. Discussions

The appearance of the epidemic of meningoencephalitis in Romania in 1996, but as well of other diseases determined by the WN virus during the last years in world, requires our country to establish some efficient methods of diagnoses and control. The etiology of the infections during the epidemic with WN virus was realized by the Microbiology and Epidemiology Laboratory from the Army Centre of Medical Research. Subsequently, the Ministry of Public Health established a program of supervision of the infections with this virus for the southern and south-east zone of the country, including Bucharest. As part of this program our laboratory realized serological tests of human sera from the field, from patients diagnosed with encephalitis, meningoencephalitis and meningitis.

Taking into consideration that, nowadays, the techniques of molecular biology tend to take the place of the serologic techniques and to be used more often in the diagnosis of many viral infections, we established a method of rapid diagnosis through reverse PCR for the infections with West Nile virus from samples of tissues, adapted to the working conditions from the laboratory.

As we previously described it, the technique was optimized on WN Egypt 101 strain from the laboratory collection and subsequently applied for the identification of viral isolates obtained from *Culex pipiens* mosquitoes, the principal transmitting vectors of the WN virus in Romania.

After the RT-PCR reactions, we obtained, in agarose gel of electrophoresis, DNA bands of approximate 408 bp for B119 and B125 isolates (dilutions 1/1, 1/10, 1/100, for each), similar to the fragment of 408 bp (dilutions 1/1, 1/10, 1/100) WN Egypt 101 strains. DNA bands were obtained for all RNA dilutions which were made, the initial amount of infectious material having no influence upon the process of enzymatic amplification (in this case).

Obtaining bands of the same size with those of the positive control demonstrated the fact that the tested viral isolates could possibly be the West Nile virus, because specific primers were used for this virus. In addition, to confirm the results we obtained, the testing through serological analysis



demonstrated that antigens isolated from B119 and B125 lots, reacted positively with WN virus control sera and they didn't react with positive control sera for TBE virus, which suggested that both isolates can possibly be WN virus, confirming the molecular results.

Although the current tendencies in diagnosis, tend to use real-time PCR techniques, we demonstrated by this study that through correct optimization of the standard reactions of extraction, reverse-transcription and enzymatic amplification we can obtain similar results from the point of view of sensibility and specificity. This fact could be explained by the use of different protocols of processing the material from which the analysis starts, or by using other kits and reagents of extraction and amplification.

Analyses stopped here following that future to achieve a nucleotides sequencing technique on WN Egypt 101 strain, can be applied to identification both B119 and B125 isolates and for another arboviruses isolates.

In the zoonotic episode of avian influenza from Danube Delta, October 2005, our collective realized nucleotides sequencing through vertical electrophoresis in capillary system of sample from suspicious birds of avian influenza, using ABI PRISM 310 Genetic Analyzer system, Applied Biosystem. Sequencing samples were sent to Molecular Epidemiology Laboratory from INCDMI "Cantacuzino". Following analyses performed were identified the H5N1 virus before reception of confirmation from London. The sequences obtained were similar with an isolate from Russia, from 2005-th year (93% identity for hemagglutinine 5 and 94% for neuraminidase 1, Access Gene Bank Number: DQ 095654).

This demonstrates as the techniques of molecular biology can be applied in case to identification of some less usual biological agents, but which can be possible to used in bioterrorist attacks.

4. Conclusions

First concrete act in the medical protection against the biologic weapons is biological diagnosis, rapid and precise, for can established in real-time the measures of counteract the biologic attack.

An important role comes back the molecular biology, with methods and adjusted techniques for this complementary purpose of classic methods

from microbiological diagnosis.

Both antigens obtained from B119 and B125 lots, reacted positive with WN virus control sera and they didn't react with positive control sera for TBE virus, what suggested that both isolates it possible can be WN virus, confirming the molecular results.

PCR specificity is dependent on cross-breeding specificity of primers to target situs. Molecular biology techniques are able to put an microbiological diagnosis, rapid and precise.

II. Research of molecular biology for the diagnosis of bacterial biological agents

1. Biological weapons

The bacteria are biological agents can be easy multiplied, conditioned store as the weapons and disperse. *Bacillus anthracis*¹⁰ represents one from the favourite microorganisms species for biological attacks and for bioterrorism, beside other biological agents identify as potential biological weapons. The convention from London, from 1972-th year, confirms that *Bacillus anthracis*, variola virus and botulinum toxin are the most aggressive criminate biological agents. The anthrax was implicated in international events after the terrorist attack from 11 September 2001 and the war from Iraq.

2. Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism¹¹ is a constitutive the terrorism and is defined thus:

Its use the menace with the use biologic (etiological) agents have infectious diseases (viruses, bacteria, parasites, fungi and his toxins, vegetable toxins, bioregulators - structurally compose natural have the cells of alive which organisms regulates diverse natural process) what facts can induct and spread the anxiety, fear, fear, the terror in the of a strong population continuations religious politic ideological aims, his financial personal interests.

Bioterrorism agents can be separated depending on how easily they can be spread, the severity of illness or death they cause and he potential for major public health impact, namely:

- can be easily spread or transmitted from person to person
- result in high death rates and have the potential for major public health impact
- might cause public panic and social disruption



- require special action for public health preparedness.

Based on these criterions, *Bacillus anthracis* is considered most important threatening as biological weapon, with the exception of smallpox. The attraction for anthrax in biologic attack, comes back and below another aspect, namely of “weapon terror’s”.

The biological agents list with possible implications in bioterrorism contains a big number of germs among which remember: *Poxvirus variolae*, *Yersinia pestis*, toxin B from *Clostridium botulinum*, *Francisella tularensis*, Filoviruses (Hemorrhagic fever – Ebola and Marburg), Adenoviruses (Lassa and Juniu), etc.

The history of biological weapons grouped in the arsenal of “weapons of mass destruction” mentions the fact as biological agents selection in the sight realization of biologic weapons is accomplished based on criteria which grounded the classification of biological agents in three distinct groups (A, B, C).

Bacillus anthracis has many biologic features, technically and virulence which make suitable as biological weapon.

The anthrax is endemic in many known or suspicious country as have active programs concerning the biological weapons, such as: Iran, Korea.

Bacillus anthracis can be stolen from microbiology laboratories or obtained through other obscure means. Is easy to cultivate and remake. Bacteria can be easy spreaded as aerosols. Dry form is more dangers. Necessary knowledge to processed or spread of bacillus can be obtained from numerous sources incite legally how much the illegal.

The contamination with *Bacillus anthracis* produces the anthrax, that is an infection disease common to more animals’ species and transmissible to human, clinically characterized by acute evolution, fever, digestive and circulatory disturbances, followed by death. As a biological weapon, the anthrax¹² is recognized by the scientists for a long time, but is not necessarily an ideal weapon. *Bacillus anthracis* is not highly pathogenic, been necessary a minimal infection dose of spores to produce the infection. Anthrax infection is transmitted from person to person only under exceptional circumstances. To became *Bacillus anthracis* spores have to be transmitted as very fine aerosols, mix with different agents that prevent the agglutination. Due to high resistance of the spores, the decontamina-

tion is an extreme difficult task once these spores have been spread on a large area.

With all these, the anthrax can induce fear and panic among population, just as the events from America, proved so convincing.

To be used as biological weapon, *Bacillus anthracis* under dry or moist forms has to be spread in particles with diameter less then 5µm, dimension that would allow the penetration of the pulmonary cells. The number of spores there is variable the particle diameter and preparation purity. The estimation of halve doses of the respiratory infection (ID50) is vary wide, between 2500 and 50000 UFC/ml, with average estimation of 8000 - 10000 UFC/ml. ID50 and lethal dose of halve (LD50) are probable similar to entreated patients because of increase mortality generated by inhalation (≥ 90% back of treatment).

Spreading. In the past, the anthrax was widely spread in Europe, Asia and Africa and starting XIX century it was introduced in America and Australia. The diseases appears more frequently in countries with warm and temperate climate and else rare in cold climate. The disease was widely spread in our country were large prevalent, enforcing the institutionalization of starting 1808-th year (animals isolation, of the animals, cuttings interdiction). Starting 1948, the anthrax cases constituted an exception, due to vaccinations in concordance with some plans and correct squaring. Still, we have to point out that the Health Ministry declared an anthrax epidemic in Tulcea district, during 12 July – 15 September 2000 in the county this evolved consecutively and concomitant with the epizootic of anthrax appeared to the mammals from Danube Delta zone and subsequent to the domestic animals from the rural house-keepings.

In the last ten years we noticed a present an epidemic centre that evolved on the territory of Tulcea district, prior to epidemic, in 1994-th year and that contained 25 cases of cutaneous anthrax.

From the existing evidence in the specialized literature it was established that Dobrogea region has registered in Romania the maximum incidence constantly for the anthrax infection according to the disease centre for animals from this district.

3. Contamination, Infection, Pathogenesis

*Zoonotic disease*¹³ - the entering gate is through damage buccalopharyngeal mucosa, the penetration been favorite by the frequencies of continu-



ity solutions due to tip of alimentation. The contamination for herbivores is massive, the spores been ingested with the foddors. This explained the highest incidence of a disease for ovine. The big number of the contamination spores and resistance at the encapsulated bacterium at phagocytosis is followed by a considerable multiplication of bacterium that concomitantly elaborates toxins generating a lethality hire then 80%. Accidental opening of the body allows the sporulation of bacilli in contact with air and their spread in soil. Such a contaminated can store the anthrax spores for to tens of years, been the source of sporadic cases of anthrax after abundant rains and floods.

Human disease - human contamination is accidental, through consumption of meat or through contact with contaminated animals products (fur, wool, skins), taking the form a professional disease. Clinical syndrome there is depending of contamination path and trans gate:

- The cutaneous anthrax¹⁴, “malignant pimple” - appears after the penetration of spores through continuity solutions of the teguments (farmers, butchers, curriers). On stretched edemas, enpainful it appears a vesicle (pimple), that is surrounded of a crown a format from another vesicles. After a period centers gets necroses and create a black eschar. The pathologic modifications in the tegument are followed by inflammation of regional ganglia. This form of anthrax is easy of clinical diagnosed and can be treated without difficulty.

- The pulmonary anthrax appears consecutively inhalation of spores to furrieries and the work-people from the textile industry and skin dressing industry. In specialty literature were described little epidemic which blasts evolves similar with a hyperacute bronchopneumonia, always deadly, because the biological diagnosis is late request.

- The digestive anthrax was diagnosed followed the consumption of contaminate meat flesh (the cuted animal to first signs of the complaint and gived without veterinary sanitary control in the consumption), evolves as an gastroenteritis acute, cholera syndrome with dead in 1-2 days.

4. The diagnosis of *Bacillus anthracis* infection

*Bacteriological examination*¹⁵. From suspicious infection, freehanded from blood and the punction liquid from edema are sent for laboratory examination. From animals body there is achieved blood, fragments of spleen and long bone.

*Serologic examination*¹⁶. Most known methods for clinical utilization are: immunofluorescence, immunohistochemistry and ELISA.

*Molecular analysis methods*¹⁷. Molecular biology techniques are used in the present for the characterization of bacteria isolates, in laboratory and research biological diagnosis, but and in the medical protection area against biologic agents, for the bacteriological and viral diagnosis. In the situations which in pathogenetic agents criminate the by-paths the lists as the biologic agents of medical interests – it is necessary to involved of military medicine in specific expertise, with the aim differentiated a natural focus of a biologic attack, with how much last in such years situations were encountered in many country, founding the bioterrorism concept.

One from the molecular analysis methods¹⁸ for the marker emphasis of *Bacillus anthracis* is Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR).

Treatment - in case of anthrax infection is administered antibiotics (soon after exposure): beta-lactamine, tetracycline, doxycycline, ciprofloxacin.

Prophylaxis - the anti anthrax vaccination indications to human are limited to the persons exhibited of a permanent risks: agrozootechnic and farrier personnels, the personnel from investigation laboratories For immunization is recommended the anti anthrax vaccine with contains whole inactivated bacteria, results from filtered acapsular *Bacillus anthracis* attenuated and which was initial used-up on a military groups and persons with professional hazards of infection. It was tested in America and it has an efficient of 92,5%.

Anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) is a protective antigen vaccine and confers immunity to both cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax by stimulating a critical (protective) level of antibody. Similar to other bacterial toxoid vaccines AVA requires multiple injections and boosters to induce and maintain an optimal level of immunity.

5. Conclusions

By molecular biology techniques is possible to identify, in real time, the bacterial biological agents.

We considered that a mobile biological laboratory for molecular biology can contribute to the medical protection against biological weapons.



NOTES:

¹ POPESCU M. D., IONESCU L. E., BICHERU N. S., ALEXSE A., NECȘULESCU M., ORDEANU V., *Research of Molecular Biology for the Diagnosis of some Viral and Bacterial Agents*, 2005, Student and Young Doctors First European Congress of Military Medicine.

² NICOLESCU G., UNGUREANU A., CIOLPAN O., et al., *Investigations upon the circulation of some arboviruses transmitted by mosquitoes (Diptera: Culicidae) and ticks (Acarina: Ixodidae) in Romania, Romanian Archives of Microbiology and Immunology*, 1991, 50, 4: 284 – 285.

³ UNGUREANU A., CEIANU C., NICOLESCU G., et al., *West Nile Flavivirus as a Causative Agent for Some Acute Viral Meningo-encephalitis in Romania, The 5th Congress of Balkan Military Medical Committet Ankara-Turkey, September, 25 – 28, 2000.*

⁴ NIȚESCU L., UNGUREANU A., CEIANU C., NICOLESCU G., ORDEANU V., VLADIMIRESCU Al., *Implicarea arbovirusurilor West Nile și Tahyna în etiologia meningoencefalitelor acute virale în județele din sud-estul României în perioada 1997-1999, in Volum de Rezumate al VIII-lea Congres Național de Boli Infecțioase, 17-20 mai, 2000, Constanța-Mangalia, pp. 416-417.*

⁵ UNGUREANU A., CEIANU C., NICOLESCU G., NIȚESCU L., PAUL F., BĂLAN M., OLARU C., *Investigations into the focus of tick-borne encephalitis in Brateiu village, Sibiu district, Bacteriologia, Virusologia, Parazitologia, Epidemiologia*, 2001, 46, 3: 125.

⁶ *** “Investigații privind elaborarea modelului de monitorizare a infecțiilor neurologice reemergente cu virusul West Nile prin corelarea multidisciplinară a metodelor moleculare, virusologice, entomologice și ecologice în scopul prognozării și controlului acestor infecții”, *Contract VIASAN, nr. 167 / 2002 (2002-2005).*

⁷ CIUFECU ES, *Virusologie medicală*, 2003, Editura Medicală Națională, pp. 492-520.

⁸ PEI-YONG Shi, KAUFFMAN E. B., REN P. et al., *High-Throughput Detection of West Nile Virus RNA*, *Journal of Clinical Microbiology*, 2001, pp. 1264-1271.

⁹ UNGUREANU A., CEIANU C., NICOLESCU G., PAUL F., POPESCU D., ILINA L., NIȚESCU L., ORDEANU V., CIULACU-PURCĂREA V., *Infecțiile cu virusul West Nile în România, the VIth National Conference on Epidemiology, September, 27-28, 2001, p. 107.*

¹⁰ LEW D, *Bacillus anthracis (anthrax). Principles and Practices of Infectious Disease*, Churchill Livingstone (NewYork), 2000, pp. 2215-2220.

¹¹ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Update: Investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax and interim guidelines for exposure management and antimicrobial therapy, MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep.*, 2001, 50:909-19.

¹² THOMAS V., INGLESB Y, Donald A. HENDERSON, John G. BARTLETT et all., *Anthrax as a Biological Weapon*, *JAMA*, 1999, 281:1735-1745.

¹³ HOLT J.G. et all., *Bergey's manual of determinative bacteriology*, Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1994.

¹⁴ SHLYAKHOV E., RUBINSTEIN E., *Evaluation of the anthrax skin test for diagnosis of acute and past human anthrax*, *Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis.*, 1996, 15(3):242-5.

¹⁵ FURMANSKI M., HANNA P.C., DIXON T.C., *Anthrax*, *N Engl J Med*, 2000, 342:61-62.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ MUSCILLO M., LA ROSA G., SALI M., DE CAROLIS E., ADONE R, CIUCHINI F., FASANELLA A., *Validation of a pXO2-A PCR Essay To Explore Diversity among Italian Isolates of Bacillus anthracis Strains Closely Related to the Live, Attenuated Carbosap Vaccine*, *J. Clin. Microbiol.*, 2005, 43: 4758-4765.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

The authors, researchers within the Army's Centre of Medical Research, are: Diana-Mihaela POPESCU, specialist biologist and PhD candidate, Lucia-Elena IONESCU, biologist specialist and PhD candidate, Simona BICHERU, research assistant and PhD candidate, Aurora ALEXSE, scientific researcher and biologist, fellow researcher, vet dr. Marius NECȘULESCU, colonel (ret.) dr., fellow researcher, Viorel ORDEANU and colonel dr. Cristian NICOLAE.

THE RESPECT FOR THE VALUE OF STRATEGY

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD



Hervé Coutau-Bégarie's book, *Strategy Treatise*, covers a huge vacuum created in what we call strategic reflection. According to the author, it is a treatise that tries to cover the whole strategic field. Since Clausewitz there have not been published such a tome. Even if the treatise is a course or maybe just because of that, this paper whose first volume has been translated into Romanian, is an exceptional one. There has been seldom written something that complete, complex, free and intelligent about strategy. In a time when strategy has become a common topic, just as football and politics, it is considered that each petty thing comprises a strategy. Just because everyone is good at football, politics and strategy, Coutau-Bégarie, this encyclopaedic, creative, perseverant spirit develops a marvellous paper, following up therefore the Admiral Castex, Generals André Beaufre, Pierre Marie Gallois and Lucien Poirier, completing somehow General Alain Bru¹, that wrote a

marvellous treatise called „*Histoire de la guerre à travers l'armement*“, published on the Internet by the Institute for Compared Strategy that is managed by Mr. Bégarie.

The author starts his book with a phrase that states almost everything about strategy: “The General's art or the knowledge of the main parts of the war, or conducting the conflict, despite the accepted definition, is a noble activity, reserved to the ones with a certain responsibility or with a certain level of training.”²

Coutau-Bégarie treats strategy as an art, as a strategist's practice, namely the general's, and as a science, as a teaching for the theoretician, labelled by French a *strategist*. The author proves in his paper “the need to study strategy both as a science, for a good practical activity, and as an art”³. In this treatise the strategic art is as a *sublime strategy*. The author is not afraid of smart formulas, interesting and sometimes metaphoric prescriptions. This treatise has to be read and understood. It is for the intellect and sensitivity, aiming to stimulate the strategic meditation, the strategic reflection. Bégarie remarks that the “Theoretician in strategy field (the one who thinks) has to think globally, while the strategist (the one who acts) has to act locally”⁴. Therefore, the one who acts in the strategic space does not think, but acts quickly, sometimes in uncertain situations, having incomplete data and information. The theoretician in strategy field should be a strategy's “mathematician” (that is not particularly someone with a military background and career), while the strategist is the “engineer”, that applies the information learnt, namely, the general. Strategy is not tactics but conditions tactics and largely depends on it, has to adapt to tactics. Consequently, strategy has to be flexible and adjustable, even if does not exclude the rigour of the planning process and the action precision. The supporters of the long term strategic planning have to know that their plans are generally speaking viable only for the first battle.

According to the author, the purpose of this treatise is not to bring new visions on strategy, but to organize, inform. “There will not be found a single revolutionary sentence in these pages, rather a systematized presentation of the fundamental concepts and issues related to strategy that some suggest know better, even if they are often far from that”.⁵

The treatise comprises three tomes. According to the author, the first one deals with the general strategy that is applicable in each field. The second is about particular strategies, the maritime and the air one, while the third tome deals with geostrategy. The author underlines there would have been necessary two more volumes – one dealing with the nuclear strategy – and another one about alternative strategies (small war, revolutionary strategy, terrorism), but because of the huge text, he chose to make references to these fields in the first three tomes.

War was and will always be a complex phenomenon, a real “history matrix”, as the author calls it, that comes from the stage of the war’s legitimacy - *jus in bello* and *jus ad bello* - related to the state’s competence (only the state has the right to start a war and to declare a war) – to the war’s illegitimacy from our times. Collective security begins to be identified with the disarmament, a concept that passes from utopia to strategy. Bégarie shows that *collective security* opposes to *national security*. The latter gives defence a large importance. But not the defence, as a mean of the fight actions, therefore, opposite of offensive, but the defence identified with the defence war. States are forbidden to start a war, as after the Second World War “the fundamental issue is not related to the space expansion, but rather its organization.”⁶

There are voices supporting the concept of “security without defence”, getting back to a utopia dates 1920s. Bégarie underlines that “security is inseparable of defence and peace dividends will never get to the dissolution of the military capital”, citing Julien Freund who stated that “any political state, peace or war, requires a forces balance”. This is where the opportunity and the longevity of strategy are derived from. Starting from definition given to strategy by Beaufre, as a *dialectics of wills confronting in order to solve out the conflict between them*, Bégarie defines strategy as a “dialectics of intellects in a conflict environment, based on the use of violent means for political rea-

sons”⁷. On the next page the author underlines that “strategy is a matter related with the intelligence ordered by will”, citing again Julien Freund, that asserts that „strategy is related to intelligence and tactics to will“. These definitions may be debatable, but the essence of strategy and tactics consists in the fact they are presented as a science (theory) practice, method and art of war or conflict and not only as a rigid sum of principles and concepts or as a simple general’s intuition. There should not also be excluded the sum of principles or the general’s intuition. Strategy, as tactics, comprises all, as they are part of the science, experience and art of effective action. Therefore, strategy is a system, a system of systems, or a dynamic complex system involving this flexible dynamism, that cumulates holism with fluidity, cunning with art, science with intuition and ability.

These are only words. Bégarie achieves a solid construction, with an exceptional architecture, in a space that was once rigid and inaccessible. What is really remarkable in this first volume translated into Romanian is the return to the strategy’s sources, to its fundamental truths and values, namely to the strategy’s military meanings and significance. General Gallois names this process the strategy’s rebirth, and Bégarie underlines the fact there is no strategy where there is no conflict. To erase strategy from the conflict environment means to dissipate it in insignificant trifles, to dilute and to destroy it. Beyond any speculation or extension (economical, political, security, etc.), strategy is the art of leading an army, therefore the knowledge, the accumulated experience, the reflection, the practice and art of war.

Reading this volume is actually an exceptional opportunity for meditation and strategic reflection, in a huge space, with supreme historical arguments (Bégarie is a historian) and meantime an opening to new horizons from a permanent platform built up by great strategists and strategy theoreticians.

The translation of this treatise and the fact that it has been published by the prestigious Publishing House of the National Defence University “Carol I” is an military culture act, an act related to the strategic culture we salute and warmly support. This is another step to the reconsideration of a permanent beneficial bridge between the Romanian strategic school and the European one, starting from the Greek-Roman ancient times, moving on with the getae-dacians stratagems, with the French,



REVIEWS

German, British, Russian and American strategic schools. Liddell Hart, Castex, Edward Mead Earle, Colson, Beaufre, Poirier, Gallois and now Bégarie bring together the values of the European and American Strategic schools with the ones from the Russian, Chinese and Indian schools, with the new philosophy represented by the network centric warfare and with the coordinates imposed by this new era. The strategy is always actual, even if the politics tries to assume it as an instrument, without completely understand and respect it. Or, Herve Coutau-Bégarie's *Strategy Treatise* underlines the value of the respect for strategy.

NOTES:

¹ On his real name, Brigadier General Jean Baptiste Margeride.

² Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, **Tratat de strategie**, vol. I, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2006, p. 21.

³ Ibidem, p. 23.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 26.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 30.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 36.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 59.



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

APRIL-JUNE 2006

Between 13-15 March, professor Hervé Coutau-Bégarie from the Institute for Compared Strategy, Sorbona, paid a visit to the National Defence University "Carol I", where he lectured on „Strategy-geostrategy relation in the contemporary military theory” and “Geostrategic methods used in the conflicts and political crises analyses appeared after the end of the Cold War” and launched the first volume of the Romanian edition of the Strategy Treatise, in Romanian. The French professor, member of our editorial board magazine, had also a meeting on strategy and defence issues with the researchers from CDSSS.

The main topic of the Annual International Scientific Communication Session of National Defence University „Carol I” „Strategies XXI” was “The Security and Defence of the European South-Eastern Space, in the Third Millennium Transformations Context”, between April, 13-14. To the 13th sessions’ panels attended personalities from the National Defence Ministry management, representatives of the institutions with tasks in the national defence and security field, professors, researchers, military attachés assigned in Bucharest, as well as specialists from Bulgaria, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland and Moldovan Republic. As each year, the National Defence and Security session was organized by CDSSS. The lectured papers in the session’s framework were published in a volume and can be accessed on <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

We must remind the CDSSS’ seminar on “Romania’s Army Participation to the Collective Defence under NATO Leadership and to ESDP”, which is organized on 25th of May and where personalities from the Romanian Army, specialists from Luxembourg, Poland, Regional Delegation for Central Europe of the International Committee of the Red Cross will lecture.

April-May is a rich period in international scientific activities. The CDSSS’ researchers were invited and attended to conferences and symposiums in Poland “The Military Strategy Changes in the XXIst century”, organized by NDU Warsaw and “War Privatization” under the aegis of Regional Delegation for Central Europe of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Hungary – “NATO - pros and cons” organized by the Defence University from Budapest; China – The 7th International Symposium War Art from Sun Tzu Perspective on “Sun Tzu Thinking, the Relations between the Great Powers and the China’s Development in Peace” organized by the War Art Research Society – Sun Tzu (CRSSTAW).

The most recent of our center are: “Hominis 2005”, “The Ethnical-Religious Component of Conflicts”, “The Post-Communist Army and Society in Transition”, “The Security System Reform in Romania”, “2005 – Events, Processes, Significances” and “Civil Society – Major Nonstatal Actor”.

The most significant scientific event of CDSSS is the Annual Scientific Communication Session on “Security and Defence Strategies to the Eastern Border of NATO and EU”, planned between 23 - 24 November.

Irina CUCU



After five years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Romanian Ministry of Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state’s organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies, etc.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B-type magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, one in Romanian and one in English and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.

Issue organizer: Corina VLADU
Designer: Corina VLADU
Masterproof: Corina VLADU
Front cover: www.mapn.ro
The National Defence University “Carol I” Printing House
