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CONTENT

ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION IN EU-LED OPERATIONS

Admiral prof. Gheorghe MARIN, PhD,
Chief of the General Staff

Ladies and Gentleman,

It is my pleasure to present few general aspects on the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in EU-led operations.

The topic is related with the general framework of the Romanian military contribution on the European and Euro-Atlantic security architecture and represents a synthesis of the international realities and the responsibilities Romania undertook by the accession to EU.

As a NATO and EU member, Romania is and will be a pillar of the local and regional stability, an active participant on ensuring and developing the security environment, therefore, an active actor of the European and Euro-Atlantic architecture.

After presenting the background, it is my intention to stress out the significant aspects related with the Romanian Armed Forces participation on ESDP's institutional and politico-military dimension, both within the initiatives for building-up EU's common defence capacities, and to EU-led military operations, and I will end up by presenting few perspectives for the next period of time.

1. Background

The development of EU's security and defence dimension had gone through a spectacular evolution the last five years, being one of the most dynamic areas of the European project.

Currently, the European Union is fully engaged in developing a global profile within the international security environment, having a strategic vision, integrated in its own Security Strategy, and also

having the required tools for assuming an operational role in crisis management.

All of them are major phases in an extended process of reconfigurating the role played by EU in the management of the global security. In this context, Romania participated in developing this process from the very beginning, contributing with forces and capabilities, as well as with engagements in EU-led operations.

The endorsement of the EU Adhesion Treaty, in April 2005, marked a new phase within the process of connection to this evolution, oriented towards shaping Romania's strategic profile, as future EU member. Thus, the pre-adhesion period, when Romania was an observer of the activities performed by the EU political and military structures, offered significant opportunities for getting used to EU mentality and working procedures.

The efforts made by Romania demonstrated that our country is an active participant in the political-military dialogue, within EU military structures. The new EU membership confirms the fact that Romania is irreversibly connected to European democratic values, that it meets the adhesion criteria and also generates new opportunities for the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces to the development of European military capabilities.

As a member state, Romania will permanently take action in order to fulfil its assumed obligations and will continue to work for enhancing its contributions for the Union.

2. ESDP obligations assumed by Romania

The efforts made by Romania while engaging in the European Security and Defence Policy were concentrated on three main directions:

• Establish Ro Force package for HG 2010, based on Requirements Catalogue RC-05, elaborated by EUMS;

• Participate with military experts at the Working Groups in EUMS and EUMC, in order to elaborate, complete, adopt and implement guidance documents in ESDP area (strategies, concepts, methodologies) - in generating and activating rapid response forces- BGs;

• Participate with military forces and capabilities for EU-led missions and operations, at regional as well as at global level.

In support of fulfilling the EU assumed engagements, at General Staff level, the following actions have been undertaken, by the structures with responsibilities in this area:

2.1. The participation in ESDP institutional and political-military dimension

• Following the endorsement of the Adhesion Treaty, on the 25th of April 2005, Romania participated in the political-military dialogue with EU, according to its active observer status, at EUMC reunions with CHODs from member states and non-member states (May and November 2005 and 2006);

• In 2006, the Romanian General Staff participated with military experts from the Strategic Planning Directorate (J5) in three working groups, concerning "EU Long Term Vision – defence capabilities needs" - organized by EUMC (February, March and April 2006) and coordinated by the European Security Agency (EDA). Their contribution consisted of defining the Future Military Environment for 2006-2030.

• A high level seminar concerning LTV took place on June, 29, 2006, in Brussels. The LTV draft was adopted and then it was analysed by Defence ministers at the EDA Steering Board held on October, 3, 2006.

• In November 2006, the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) adopted LTV. It is a reference document for the defence planning process, at EU member states' level, based on prospective analysis elements concerning trends in the future security environment and it will be used by EDA for elaborating the EU Defence Capability Development Plan.

• Ro GS and Navy representatives participated in developing Maritime Dimension Study, focused on identifying means of possibilities to contribute ESDP tasks.

• The Romanian General Staff and services' experts participated in EUMS Working Groups for the elaboration of Scrutinising, Assessing and Evaluating Methodologies.

2.2. The Romanian participation in the initiatives for creating EU defence capabilities

Contribution to EU Force Catalogue

• In January 2006, the Memorandum with Romanian EU force package, the General Staff and the Department of Policy of Defence and Planning Department(DPDP) Common Order, concerning the filling in of Headline Goal Questionnaire (HGQ-2010) were elaborated and endorsed, together with the establishment of the Working Group, at MOD level, so as to respond to requirements of HGQ;

• Military experts from General Staff and Services participated, between January and February 2006, at the training organized by EUMS for fulfilling the HGQ-2010 requirements;

• The Romanian force package will be maintained at the level of two battalions and will be increased to 2 brigades, after 2010. HGQ-2010, endorsed by Defence Planning Council, at General Staff level, was transmitted to EUMS, in March 2006, through the Romanian Mission at NATO and EU(RO MISS EU);

• The RO GS participated with experts from the Romanian mission EU in March-April 2006, at three EUMS Working Groups for the elaboration and implementing of Scrutinising Methodology, which defines the way of evaluating and scrutinising military structures made available for EU by nations;

• In May and June 2006, EU military forces and capabilities scrutiny reports were elaborated and filled in, and by the end of June they were transmitted to EUMS;

• In July 2006, Romania confirmed the data reported in HGQ-2010, and the force package was included in Suplemment EU Force Catalogue;

• In October 2006, a Clarification dialogue concerning Romanian force package took place. The participants were representatives from J5/GS, DPD/MOD and ROMISSEU;

• In January 2007, the Romanian force package was included in EU Force– FC-07.

3. The Romanian contribution to EU

3.1. EU's Battle Groups:

Romania participates with forces in 2 BGs: in 2nd semester 2007, with Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus and in 2nd semester /2010, with Italy and Turkey;

In May and October 2006, representatives of GS and MOD participated in the BGs Coordination Conferences. At the Reunion of Defence Ministers from EU member states and members-to-be (13-14.11.2006) the Technical Agreement for making the Greece-led BG;

• Romania participates in the BGs with forces at platoon/company level:

- In Greece-led BG "HELBROC" (sem. II/2007) with 1 pl. CRBN, 1 PSYOPS team, staff officers.

- In Italy-led BG, together with Turkey (sem.II/2010) with an infantry company, 1 CIMIC pl., 1 PSYOPS team, staff officers.

3.2. European Defence Agency –EDA

The objectives of the European Defence Agency are the following:

a. Development of defence capabilities for crisis management through:

- identifying the requirements, in terms of quality and quantity, in accordance with Headline Goal 2010;

- management of ECAP projects, in cooperation with EUMC – air to air refuelling, strategic transport, C3 systems, satellite communication, imagery (satelites, UAVs);

- promoting and coordinating the harmonization of military requirements;

- proposals regarding financial priorities for the development of capabilities and acquisitions.

b. Promotion and increase of European cooperation in the area of armaments through:

- multi-annual projects in order to meet the requirements for ESDP capabilities;

- coordination of programs implemented by member states.

c. Research /technology and defence industry:

Focused on ad-hoc cooperation formulas, the establishment of European priorities and a strategy, financial aspects, a new judicial base for ad-hoc cooperation, for including third parties; elaboration of financing models for defence.

These objectives are accomplished, in accordance with Long Term Vision (LTV) in the area of ESDP capabilities, completed and agreed on by defence ministers, in October 2006, and they are concerning the Agency's long and medium term initiatives (strategies and policies which would aim at ESDP capability development, R&T within European defence, cooperation in the area of armaments, European defence industry);

d. Relationship with European Defence Agency –EDA

• In the context of EDA integration, in July 2006, EDA executive director visited Bucharest and held a Conference, at GS and MOD high level, concerning ESDP an EDA.

• In October 2006, the Chief of Strategic Planning Directorate was nominated as point of contact for Ro GS in relation with EDA, in the area of "defence capabilities".

• In February 2007, the Chief of J5/GS received the visit of EDA director from Capabilities Directorate and a reunion took place, where all POCs dealing with EDA defence capabilities, from GS and services, were invited;

• In coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOD initiated all necessary steps for joining EDA, and in 2007, March, 09, MOD sent the adhesion letter to EDA;

• Romania joined EDA in April 2007.

The progress achieved in developing the institutional and conceptual dimension have been established in parallel with concrete development of EU's operational capability, in different operation theatres.

EU can launch a crisis management operation, with NATO resources and capabilities or in an autonomous manner:

- when developed with NATO resources and capabilities the cooperation framework is grounded on "Berlin Plus" agreements;

- in the case of an autonomous crisis management mission, the EU Political Security Committee (PSC) is the structure which manages the crisis situation and studies the options in order to find a solution.

3.3. EU missions:

Europe:
EUPAT (FYROM) – civilian mission;
EUPM (BiH) – civilian police mission;
EUFOR Althea – the most important EU led mission in BiH;
EUBAM – Moldavia.

 Africa:
AMIS II - Darfur Sudan – civil-military mission;
EUPOL Kinshasa - DR Congo – civilian police mission;
EUSEC DR Congo - civilian mission, extended mandate - June 2007.

Middle East/Asia:
EUPOL COPPS – civilian mission
EUBAM - Rafah
EUJUST LEX - Irak
ACEH - Indonezia (AMM)

3.4. The Romanian participation in EU-led missions:
- **EU police mission (EUMP)** in Bosnia-Herzegovina, started in 2003; at present, we contribute with six police officers;
- **ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina** started in December 2004; between January-October 2006, Romania continued its participation with 82 military.
 - In the context of training the military observers for **EU support mission– AMIS II in Darfur/Sudan**, GS offered in 2006 a trainer for Peacekeeping School in Koulikoro/Mali, (our participation represents a support in developing African Union crisis management capabilities).

 The participation in EU civilian operations:
▪ Operation "Proxima" (FYROM 2003-2005) – three police officers;

▪ Mission "EUPAT" (Bosnia-Herzegovina) – nine police officers;

▪ "EU COPPS" Rafah (Palestine) and "EU BAM Rafah" (assistance and monitoring the border point Rafah, between Gaza and Egypt) – four police officers.

The future EU mission in Afghanistan is part of the assistance programs, developed by EU in this country, for development projects but also in support of a strategy for combating drug trafficking and helping Afghan farmers develop alternative solutions. The mission's mandate will cover monitoring, guidance and counselling, at central/ strategic level, as well as at a regional one.

The EU member states manifested their support for this mission and for providing coherence of these activities (FR, EL, Lithuania/ LT, PT, Italy/IT, NT, Poland/PL, Sweden/SE, Slovakia/SK,), together with NATO, including PRTs (SE, SK, PT, PL, UK, GE) but also for providing decision making autonomy within EU (FR). The problems Afghanistan confronts with require a long-term engagement of the EU in this country.

The EU operations in the Balkans, namely **EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina** are developed in good conditions and the transition of this mission is progressing, according to plans and contributes to reaching normality in the area.

EUFOR will reach its Full Operational Capacity in June 2007.

ESDP mission in Kosovo will be, as numbers and mandate coverage, the most important and complex EU-led civilian mission.

The mission mandate will cover monitoring, guidance and counselling activities, and certain executive powers.

This mission will need a UN resolution, which would allow undertaking the mission from UNMIK, cooperation with KFOR being of critical importance. Another important matter to be taken into account while accomplishing this mission is the proper use of "lessons learned" after EUMP, as well as cooperation in theatre with ALTHEA.

There are cooperation possibilities, at regional level, in combatting transnational threats, such as organized crime, illegal drug and people trafficking.

4. Way ahead for Romania - 2007 and further

• Participation in elaboration of EU Force Catalogue and Progress Catalogue, Project Groups and Subgroups, within ECAP and EDA, will be continued;

• Participation in EUFOR ALTHEA with 90 military will be continued;

• Participation with response teams in the 2 exercises with Greece led BG (in May 2007), with 42 military in the same group (semester II/2007) and continuation of the negotiations with Italy and Turkey for completing and endorsing the Technical Agreement;

• Fulfilling the tasks resulted from the EU force operationalising calendar;

• Selection of personnel so as to ensure rotation at the Romanian Mission in Brussels and manning the 5 quota positions dedicated to Romania;

• Analysis of positions to be manned in the EU Operational HQs.

5. Conclusions

The efforts made by Romania proved that our country is an active participant in the political-military dialogue, within EU military structures. The new EU membership confirms the fact that Romania is irreversibly connected to European democratic values, that it has met the adhesion criteria and also generates new opportunities for the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces to the development of European military capabilities.

As a NATO and EU member, Romania continues to be a pillar of regional and global stability, an active participant in peacekeeping missions and operations in the Balkans, Central Asia, Middle East, as well as within regional initiatives, including the Black Sea area.

POLITICAL-MILITARY ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Rear Admiral Cornel MIHAI, PhD,
Deputy of the Head of the Department for Policy of Defence Planning

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all I would like to begin by expressing the pleasure of addressing you today at this seminar: "ESDP requirements for Romania's security and defence".

With your permission, I would like to present to you in the following minutes several aspects related to Romania's participation in this vast process, firstly from the perspective of our involvement since the pre-accession period in its development and also from the perspective of our contribution as a new Member State to the strengthening of the European Union security and defence dimension.

Thus, since the very beginning of the negotiation process for the EU accession, Romania's efforts have focused on the harmonization between its foreign policy guidelines and the prerequisites of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In this context, the accession negotiations related to the Chapter 27 - Common Foreign and Security Policy were started, as well as for other four chapters, within the initial negotiation package (during the EU-Romania Accession Conference/15th February 2000), and were successfully concluded in the first phase of aquis communautaire negotiation process.

Subsequently, the accession negotiations were supported by Romania's active involvement in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy since its beginning. Our commitment in this area was highly appreciated at the EU level, being frequently

highlighted in the Monitoring Reports of the European Commission and also in the highest decisional body of the EU, the European Council.

Without a doubt, the European Security and Defence Policy has registered in the last years a significant development, encouraged by the development of political consensus regarding the need for shaping of an individual security and defence dimension at the European Union level. Launched seven years ago, at the Helsinki European Council (1999), the European Security and Defence Policy has succeeded in becoming in a short period of time one of the key dimensions of the Union and also one of the most dynamic policies of the European Union. The adoption of the European Security Strategy (December 2003), the launching of a significant number of civilian and military operations (which cover a geographical area of three continents – Asia, Europe, Africa) are important landmarks of a joint effort of the European Union to increase its role in the management of the current security environment.

Along the same line is the establishment in December 2004 of the European Defence Agency, designed to contribute to the optimization and harmonization of Member States policies in the areas of defence industry and defence capabilities development. The European Defence Agency has achieved in the short period from its establishment significant progress both in finding ways to streamline the Member States' approach to the new defence technologies advancements and in providing the strategic guidelines for the development of a global role and profile of the European Union in the field of security environment management.

On the same line is the adoption by the Member States of the Long Term Vision by which the European Defence Agency, together with other agencies and bodies of the European Union, provides the strategic paradigms through which the European Union will be able to develop its strategic profile in sustaining the European Security Strategy objectives. The guiding principles of this document provide the necessary guidelines for the development of the security and defence component of the European Union.

Taking all this into consideration, it is interesting to see that Romania has joined a Union which is in its turn involved in an ample

process of adapting, process in which the development of security and defence component is orientated towards the support of the European Union strategic profile, in accordance with the goals of the Security Strategy, adopted by the Member States in December 2003.

From a chronological perspective, Romania's first commitment within European Security and Defence Policy dates from November 2000, when its offer of military forces and capabilities was submitted to the Union. Afterwards the Romanian offer was improved by corroborating it with the offer to the North Atlantic Alliance. Romania's offer was included in the Supplement to the Force Catalogue of the European Union, subsequently being integrated in the Force Catalogue 2007, after becoming a fully fledged member of the Union.

I would like to add that Romania has also contributed to the development of the civilian dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy by providing a significant number of experts in the field of police, rule of law, administration and civil protection, part of them being currently deployed in various EU operations.

As I have already mentioned, Romania was involved in all the important moments of the development of the security and defence dimension of the European Union. From this perspective, an important aspect related to Romania's contribution to the development of the EU defence capabilities is currently represented by its contribution to the development of the rapid reaction capabilities, especially of the EU Battle Groups. Up to now, the Member States' efforts have been materialized in 14 such groups whose operational capability was achieved on January 1st, 2007.

Our commitment in this area consists in Romania's participation in two such groups, together with other Member States. Thus, Romania together with Greece, as framework nation, Bulgaria and Republic of Cyprus will set up a Battle Group which will be available to the European Union to be deployed in possible crisis management operations in the second half of 2007. The second group, in which Romania takes part, will be set up with Italy's contribution, as framework nation, and Turkey, and it will be available to the European Union in the second half of 2010.

Romania's commitment to the development of the security and defence component of the European Union has included together with the contribution to the conceptual development of this pillar, the actual participation in EU crisis management operations. Thus, from an operational perspective, Romania has been a steady military and civilian presence in EU crisis management operations, especially in the Balkans, but also in other regions.

In this context, I would like to mention our regular participation in the operations led by the European Union in the Western Balkans and the current EUFOR Althea Mission. This is in addition to the current and previous military or civilian missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Also, Romania's contribution to the development of the civilian component of the European Security and Defence Policy consisted in our participation in EU missions in this area, especially those in the Palestinian Territories and in RD Congo.

In the context of the European Union efforts towards strengthening the African crisis management capabilities, Romania sent last year an instructor to Koulikoro Peacekeeping School/Mali, where African military observers were trained for the African Union mission - AMIS II in Darfur/Sudan.

Starting with January 1st, 2007, the status of Member of the European Union offers Romania opportunities to achieve its own national interests but represents also a major challenge. As a fully fledged member, the concrete involvement in the process of adapting the European Union to the new risks and threats that characterize the current security environment represents a major opportunity for Romania to develop its strategic role and profile. Thus, Romania will continue to actively support the European Union in assuming a consolidated profile in managing the present security environment by bringing its contribution to the three dimensions: institutional, capability development and operational.

In this respect, it is worth pointing out the activity of the high officials and experts of the Ministry of Defence, of the Permanent Representation of Romania to NATO and EU, which take part in the

activities of political and political-military bodies of the EU Council, permanent and ad-hoc working groups.

In the end, I would like to underline that all these aspects form a valuable acquis which Romania has acquired in its relations with the EU, during the accession process, which allows our country to further develop its profile and contribution within the process of strengthening the security and defence dimension of European Union.

DEBATES
SECTION I

Col. (Air) Florian RÂPAN, PhD: The main idea of the presentations held in this first section is that, for the time being, we are in a deep process of reconfiguring the role the European Union has on managing the global security. The Union is looking for its own identity and emancipation on this vector, on this dimension related with security and defence.

Col. Mircea COSMA, PhD: I have a question for colonel Condurovici. I would start by saying that the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force, summing up 60.000 military men, that needs the support of other 200, in a first option needs corresponding expenses up to 42 billion dollars, only for endowment. If we also take into consideration solving out the issues related with communication, by using the satellites, we may add up to 25 billion dollars. Regarding the European public opinion, 40% of it is able to accept this level of expenses, despite the American population, where 42% agrees with increasing the military expenses. How does the Agency consider to solve out the issue of endowment with modern technics and armament and the proper training? Starting from this point, what is your opinion on solving out the issues the Romanian Army confronts with on fulfilling its missions.

Col.eng. Marcel Teodor CONDUROVICI, PhD: It is not my intention to give you a detailed answer on your question, as there are certain elements related with the defence policy. Regarding the endowment, we intend to develop capabilities, starting from the Rapid Reaction Force, that requires a certain endowment and the Basic Requirements. Therefore, there are some efforts on the endowment with equipments, starting from the individual ones, up to units level, the ones involved in the common activity. Moreover, we participate at the four programs I have mentioned, at the level of the European Defence Agency, referring to the future soldier, future armoured carrier,

communication systems and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection. We are running a lot of programs on the individual protection, at the soldier's level, regarding his endowment with optical equipments and at the soldier-system level, that means communication equipments, equipments for surveilling the individual mental and physical state, and also his connection with the superior echelon, from the soldier level to group, platoon, company, etc., by achieving interoperable equipments, similar to the ones from the NATO and EU member states.

Regarding the public opinion, it reacts due to the factors influencing it at a certain time. We have a clear and relevant example in the antiterrorist fight, in the matter of protection and the identification of the threats in this field. That is why there are certain activities related with the endowment both on the level of the fight against terrorism, and on the level of protection.

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD: The European Security and Defence Policy raises enough problems for the European Union. We may continue without it. As a rule, what the European Union is not able to solve out, or has no predictable solutions, because the European Union is built on small steps policy, that is what is built, established, has to last.

However, it is very difficult, as the European continent was not built on a *tabula rasa*. It has a very long history, this is the place of a universal civilisation nucleus. Therefore, any attempt of pushing things gets a painful return. Remember what happened with the European Constitution Treaty or with the European Army in 1948. That was the moment when the European continent, or to be more specific, the Western European Union, proposed itself to establish an army. The project was rejected. And then, in that very complex situation, a lot of countries that make Europe, each of them is an entity, has its history, its own system of values, harmonizing with the other values, therefore, it was almost impossible to achieve an entity of entities. It is very difficult and it is about a very complicated philosophy. Any attempt of hurrying-up things may determine not necessarily a failure, but a postponement of solving out that matter.

Why does the European Union need a European Security and Defence Policy? To protect itself against who? Russia? Russia is one of the most important countries of the European continent. Against Turkey? Turkey is a candidate to become a European Union member, Russia and Turkey are Euro-Asian countries. The European Union develops partnerships with them. If we speak of this world's entity, if we speak of security in this huge platform called Eurasia, then it cannot be achieved but in a Euro-Asian dimension. The line separating East and West, Christian and Muslim, has been blurred, there is no longer available. Even if it is, it has been transformed in a contact surface, one where there is something building-up. If this something will be achieved, than the world has a future. If it will not, then it does not have, as we cannot live and cohabit in this world only by managing the strategic faults. Russia and Turkey will probably become some of the most important European countries in the future, because Russia has resources, thousands of years of experience, it is one of the biggest European powers that plays a huge role, not only in Europe, but in the world. Turkey is also a country situated on the fault line between the secular, Western-type society and the deeply-religious societies, as the Muslim ones. On this strategic fault line, Turkey tries to build-up a model. We will see if it succeeds or not.

Under these circumstances, the European Union protects itself against who? Against terrorism? Well, you do not need an army to fight against terrorism, army is not meant to fight against terrorists. All these questions, and some more, show that the problem of establishing this European Union's construct, the European Security and Defence Policy, is complicated and hard to achieve. All these European countries build a security system based on cooperation, trust, etc. But we live in a conflicting world, we do not know from where and when a possible disaster may rise, that may be a new Sarajevo. Therefore, managing the world's conflictuality is the greatest challenge of the 21st century. What are the means of this management? The solution is a policy but it assumes a certain strategy for its achievement. And this strategy is in construction. The European Security and Defence Policy is followed by Solana's Strategy, that gives certain strategic solutions. Why not more

solutions? Because at this moment it is not likely to have some. There have been established the military structures, the Military Committee, the European Staff, the Rapid Reaction Force that comprises 60.000 people and it is working, the Tactical Groups or the Battle Groups. All of them are solutions to be tested and to be examined in the theatres of operations and in the confronting areas, for managing a situation also by military means, that should put into practice the political ones, as it is natural.

There are two very interesting things within this framework. One refers to a coherent policy and attitude, in order to understand the philosophy of this complicated situation, and the second one is about acquiring a certain required experience in order to be part of this process. Everyone has to get involved, not just to be part of an audience. And as no one can be just a witness, our experience from Afganistan, Kosovo, Iraq, Angola, Somalia is special. An army is usually trained, the philosophy of establishing and building an army for the future, the policy and strategy, the strategy of forces, means and actions is shaped on the experience of the previous big war it has been involved in. The times of the Second World War are gone, there us almost nothing left, nothing is actual, and that is why you need a new experience, an experience on crisis management, managing armed conflicts. The effort made on acquiring this experience will be beneficial for the future. This is the only way for cultivating that state of activating the military and economical potential that each country needs, and therefore, the European Union, too. I think ESDP has jus started to be put in place, after the first structures have been established, the Armament Agency is in place, the forces have started being endowed accordingly. The problem is that within this process there should be also involved other states, the concept has to be expanded, because we live in a world of partnerships and interdependencies, not in a world of opposition and conflictuality, even if it exists. This is the greatest paradox of our times. We, Romanians, we also witness a special experience. Sometimes, the forces' structure, that is the strategy of forces and actions, overlapped the strategy of means. However, it must be coherent, or, at any rate, it must start with the actions' strategy up to the forces' and means'

strategies. Due to the budgetary limits, due to the difficult times we live, they can not be achieved concomitantly. However, there is a certain coherence in this area. I think that if our economy is in a good shape, we succeed on harmonizing these three components, the forces' strategy, the means' strategy and the actions' strategy, taking into consideration the new challenges and the new coordinates of the security environment, and the responsibilities the countries and the armies have, then we can be optimistic. But not too early, because we have not solved out all the problems. However, the experience we gain in the theatres of operations, what we do here, the scientific research done on armament field, on the conceptual one, and that have started working together, the ongoing programs, all of them are a cheque, not a blank one, but an endorsed one. I think the future will be better from this perspective, the one referring to the European security.

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD: In my opinion, we should not look for reasons to justify the importance of the European Security and Defence Policy. It has to be developed and implemented. It is not the European Union's intention to fight against any state entity, but against the ones willing to destroy those state entities, to manage the crisis and the conflicts within its area of responsibility. The European Union has a huge experience in this matter, although short in time. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia are just some of the areas the European Union got involved, being able to turn into concrete the required elements for a specific European Strategy, one to combat the risks and threats we confront with at this beginning of millennium, in its area of responsibility. However, what has not been done yet, at the European Union's level, regarding the Treaties, the EU's military force, that has been cancelled, all of them are things that mark the necessary base for strengthening and elaborating a European Security and Defence Policy, one in concordance with the EU's actual interests. However, there are many things that have not been done, many problems that this complex of entities created by the European Union has to take into consideration and to establish a common strategy. If it possible, I would like to have presented a parallel between the Romanian military commitments for the European Union and for NATO. What are the

similarities and the differences? I think it will be useful to know them.

Rear Adm. Cornel MIHAI, PhD: First, of all, I would like to make some comments on the question regarding the European Defence Agency, how it will solve out the Romanian Army's problems. From the very beginning, we must start from the premises that it was hard to join EU and NATO. Once we are members in these organisations, it is extremely important and responsible to fulfil our commitments. The European Defence Agency is a body harmonising the states' policies and does not substitute them on solving out their problems. That is why we must solve out our problems, in concordance with the others. By becoming a European Union member, we do not expect someone else to solve out our problems, on matters related with policies, capabilities.

Now, regarding the forces, the differences related with our approach for NATO and the European Union, I don't think there is a huge one, as Romania supplemented its capabilities for the European Union, harmonised them with the ones offered for NATO. Therefore, there has been created a pool of forces. The forces we turn into operational and offer to the Alliance, with small differences, are similar with the ones we offer to the European Union, applying the so-called principle of "first customer, first served". Definitely, the big states, having other forces and possibilities, may make a difference between forces for the Alliance or forces for the European Union.

Still, I would like to stress out something particular, related with the engagement manner. What we have put at the NATO's disposal, and stated as for its disposal, refers to firm commitments, while our offer for the European Union is a large, generous one. But the decision for the engagement of the forces we stated as being available will be taken by the Romania's political leadership, at that time. Maybe this is the slightly difference, on the manner of using the forces for an organisation or the other.

I agree with Mr. Alexandrescu, regarding the fact that the European Union's military force is not against anyone. The European Union is one of the world's most important political and economical actors. Therefore, the European Union needs a tool for force projection,

in order to be able to engage in situations requiring its presence as a very important actor on the international level. The military component, the "armed arm", as it has been tailored and the way it will be developed in the future, has to be perceived only as an instrument the European Union use for intervention, when necessary, on crisis management situations, in different parts of the world. So, we can not state that it is a tool against someone. This is out of the question. As we know, its development has been necessary due to the fact that in the North-Atlantic Alliance we have partners from the North-American continent that, at a moment, may not be interested in engaging themselves in certain areas. That is why the European Union develops itself all the instruments, in order to be able to use its forces for intervention, for crisis management situations, in areas where the Union has an exclusive interest.

Eng. Niculae SPIROIU: I would like to draw your attention on certain tendencies that existed even when there were the first options for Romania's joining the North-Atlantic Alliance. In '91-'92, when these options were made public, there was a certain fear, that we needed to change all the military equipments that the Romanian Army had at that time. It is my suspicion that this tendency is also present now, when there have been created the institutions of the second European Union's pillar, that got a more stressed out dynamic than the pillars I and III. This part is dealt by the European Defence Agency and by a nongovernmental organization, Eurodefense. They take into consideration this common policy on developing armaments, aquisitions, rules, this is the result of such a concept, that we need to change all the military equipment. I think it is a wrong approach and this may be a trap for the decision makers, for the ones deciding on the Romanian Army's policies on endowment. It is not compulsory to change all the equipments. The European policies in this area do not even request it, even if, Romania, starting January, 1, has also obligations related with the second pillar, especially on ESDP. These obligations are not related with the total replacement of equipments, but it is about interoperability. The interoperability can not be achieved by replacing the equipment, but by replacing the system of education, language knowledge, common

methodologies and procedures, compatible communication equipments - I mean frequencies, if it is about radio equipment, that means we do not necessarily need to replace all these equipments. Let's bear in mind that there are NATO member states that use, even now, equipments that are even 50 years old. I will give you just an example, the Infantry's tank, M110, made in the United States since 1959, as the first aluminium armoured carrier, M111. They have changed engines, transmissions, turrets, equipments, in concordance with the technological evolutions of these means, but they are maintained in the endowment of dozens of armies.

I wanted to stress out this aspect, in order to show that there should not appear the fear of huge expenses, once Romania got involved in the European Union's second pillar, as it happened when Romania joined NATO. Everything is related with Romania's capacity, of finding a niche in this system, in order to bring its own contribution. There must be such a niche, because there were developed capacities that may be ongoing valued, within this process of European integration on the second pillar.

Col.eng. Marcel Teodor CONDUROVICI, PhD: As mentioned during my presentation, it is about achieving a common technical and industrial base. As Mr. Spiroiu has said, we need to find the niches in order to be able to respond to the demands, according to the existing capabilities and to the ones we will create by different investments and by our participation to other developing programs or for making certain products that are necessary to our forces.

I would like to add something, regarding the answer I have given to Mr. Cosma, on achieving common capacities for testing and training the personnel, in order to reduce the required investments for this infrastructure, and also in order to have a common training, that should have a unique base and management system at the European Union level.

On defence and security, of course, this field is not only related with the Ministry of Defence, therefore, its forces, but also with the other structures from defence and security. I would also like to make some mentions on the study that has been done by the EU's Institute

for Security Studies, regarding Long-Term Vision. There have been analysed the problems related with the potential future threats. As you may know, it is even about the differences generated by the economical development, issues related with the cultural differences and the way to approach the matters concerning defence and security.

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD: I will start from an assertion made by the Chief of the General Staff, Mr. Gheorghe Marin, in his paper. He stated that the forces meant for ESDP disposal will be selected from the ones at NATO disposal. Mr. Cornel Mihai stated the same thing here, when he spoke about the forces that will be placed at disposal. Mr. Condurovici spoke about capabilities. I think this should be the starting point, in order to avoid the possible confusions.

Capabilities, the concept of capabilities, is a new reality for the Romanian military practice, it is a reality that wants to express those combinations that will turn it into a military structure able to fulfil a certain mission. Meaning, troops, doctrines and the armament Mr. Condurovici spoke about.

I don't think there can be made a comparison between the forces for ESDP and the ones for NATO, because there can not be made a comparison between them. The collective defence is not ESDP's intention, it is related with managing some conflictual situations, larger or smaller. Do not forget that ESDP has been established after the unfortunate EU's experience from managing the conflict from Yugoslavia. At the beginning, it has tried to manage it by European traditional means - peaceful ones, discussions, negotiations. It was necessary to have the United States intervened, in order to solve out the issue, in a way or another, in the ex-Yugoslav area. That is why ESDP does not have any connection with the collective defence, and, probably, that is why it is likely to have created capabilities for ESDP, because the base is the one for NATO, that is related with the collective defence, the most complex and the most difficult mission an Army can be employed.

I have a question for Mr. Mihai. Both you and the Chief of the General Staff have mentioned the situation from Kosovo, the future of Kosovo. We all know that the situation is unclear. Despite the Security Council's decision, it seems there will be created dissatisfactions in the

area. The leaders from the Srpska Republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, state they have nothing to do in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a way or another, they turn into actual the old scenario in this area. In the concept and practice of the crisis management, it is said that preventive actions, the one that should forbid the burst of violence, must have a very important role. Under these circumstances, Mr. Mihai, are there any discussions on this topic at EU level, do they examine the possible evolution of the conflict from Kosovo, split on scenarios, options and the possible forms of intervention, as the European Union will have huge responsibilities in this area? Are there taken into consideration any preventive options?

Rear Adm. Cornel MIHAI, PhD: I would like to make a comment on what Mr. Dolghin has said, regarding the possible difference between NATO and the European Union. From the very beginning, we should exclude the term of contradiction, competition. The European Union has a larger component than NATO. When it is about the European Union, for interventions in certain areas, besides the military component, we may speak of the Police contribution, the rule of law, administration, civilian protection. Therefore, the European Union's approach is wider.

Getting back to Mr. Dolghin's question, Kosovo is a very complex issue. Romania has its own position on this matter. On the other hand, judging the statements of the Foreign Affairs Minister, it is said that the decision that will be taken, on international level, and the matter will be discussed and decided at the level of the Security Council, and there are many divergent positions. So, once again, this is to be decided by the UN Security Council. When the decision will be unanimous, then it will be implemented on the field. At the European Union level there are discussions related with preparing a mission in Kosovo, after implementing the decision that will be taken by the Security Council. So, for the time being, the European Union does not analyse scenarios regarding the possible evolutions, but its own contribution. There is an exploring team that prepares the future mission in Kosovo, but this mission will support the decision taken by the Security Council. No one can state what will be that decision or how it will be shaped.

CONSIDERATIONS ON NGOs' CONTRIBUTION ON BUILDING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

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On approaching the topic of the role played by the non-governmental organisations on building and consolidating the institutions that turn into practice the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established in the Maastricht Treaty as the second pillar of the European Union, taking also into consideration what is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as it was defined by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties - , it is necessary to take a look on the broader role played by the civil society in our contemporary world, expressed in its nongovernmental structures.

For that matter, it is important to remind the analysis by Alvin Toffler, three decades ago, in his paper, **The Third Wave**. He concluded that, in the middle of the 20th century, the traditional governing systems, based on the principles established in the 18th century by Montesquieu's generation and by the American "Founding Fathers", began to confront with insurmountable difficulties and failures on managing the more and more complex processes from the political, economical and social arena, that were developing globally, requiring serious adjustments, in order to handle the new challenges the governments were confronting with within the decisional process.

The natural conclusion was that the decisional burden, which had determined real blockings on adopting the executive resolutions, had to be split-up, redistributed. Toffler's solution: the civil society, by its structures, aggregated in nongovernmental organizations, should monitor

the governmental behaviour on its different dimensions, and should impose itself as a force able to offer solutions where administrations failed, acting as their partners.

The idea was embraced both by most national democrat administrations, and by the United Nations. Ten years ago, UN created within one of its main bodies, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. Based on certain, well-established criteria, referring to capacity and performance, the *Special Consultative Status* are granted. In 2005, more than 350 NGOs received this status, including two Romanian ones, involved on defending human rights and freedoms. Therefore, it has been established an institutional framework for consulting the global civil society on more than 150 issues mentioned on the agendas of the Ordinary Sessions of the UN General Assembly, assisting the organisation on adopting those resolutions.

EURISC Foundation, A European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management, has been acting on promoting the values related with the foreign policy of peace, security, stability and regional and subregional cooperation, is about to gain this special Status that is directly connected with our today's topic, on the dimension of the second EU's pillar.

It is very important to evaluate the way the Romanian civil society has "produced" a critical mass of NGOs that are congruent with the values sustained by European Union's second pillar, as they were defined in its founding act, the Maastricht Treaty – **the common foreign policy** and the **common security policy. The common foreign policy** implies cooperation, peacekeeping, election observers and common intervention troops, human rights, democracy, assistance given to third party states. **The common security policy** includes both ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy – with its military and civilian components, but also issues related with disarmament, its economical implications. They may be also found in the joint investment programs on research, on defence procurement opportunities, managed by the European Defence Agency.

After joining the European Union, Romania has explicit obligations, as a member state, on fulfilling the demands raised by

the CFSP's Security and Defence component. There are rather few foundations, societies or associations that have concerns on foreign policy area, security and defence, promoting democracy, human rights and freedoms. Unfortunately, they were not significantly sustained by the involved public authorities, by creating an environment that should favour their existence.

The fact that a small number of them expose actively, by multiple activities that made them known on national and international level is not meant to replace the "forces" in this area, that are required by the actual context.

On one hand, this situation is partly explained by the fact that due to three successive dictatorships in Romania, half a century, namely, there was no civil society in our public life. On the other hand, by the difficult process of democratic restoration and transforming mentalities on the post-Revolution level, especially the new public authorities, that did not seize the existent tendencies in the societies having a continuous democratic evolution, associating the NGOs as partners on identifying solutions for the complex issues raised by Romania's participation on creating a European and Euro-Atlantic security and stability environment.

The experience of the activities undertaken by EURISC Foundation, Euro-Atlantic Council - Casa NATO-Romania, member of the Atlantic Treaty Association, EURODEFENSE-Romania Association, has proved that the civil society's organizations:

- may have a significant contribution in the specialised scientific research, as the EU's Framework Programme-7, on the security culture (EURISC, in cooperation with the Center for Information on Security Culture from the Romanian Intelligence Service), on elaborating studies on the internal security, citizens' safety, editing publications in a partnership between public and private organizations (for example, in 2004, EURISC, in cooperation with the European Institute from Romania, issued the study called **The European Security and Defence Policy – element of influencing Romania's actions on security and defence policy**);

- may organize scientific events – communication sessions, workshops, symposiums, conferences, having international guests;

- may represent Romania at international NGOs level;

- may monitor, from the civil society level, in cooperation with NGOs specialised in security, as SAFER WORLD-Londron, the Centre for European Security Studies from Groningen – Netherlands, etc, activities related with the prevention of the illegal weapons and dangerous substances trafficking, combating terrorism and organised crime;

- may assist the governmental agencies on developing studies and programs - having an international support - for protecting the critical infrastructures, therefore, overtaking activities related with the estate administration's institutions, including the ones referring on Romania's contribution on building-up EDSP, for its own security interests, as a part of the common European and Euro-Atlantic security.

All of them are possible if the NGOs' potential is taken into consideration and cherrished by an effective partnership between the public authorities and the civil society that is developing in the European cultural space that we have always belonging to.

CHALLENGES AND TRENDS IN TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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There are no contradictions in the basic postulates that the United States and European Union states use guidelines in the international policy. They include:

• developing and strengthening democracy and the rule of law, as well as respecting human rights and basic liberties;

• protecting common values in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

• strengthening regional and world security and peace;

• promoting economic development and international cooperation.[1]

As far as common actions that would lead to carry out the mentioned above postulates, the agreements have not been reached. This results from different, sometimes even opposing political, economic and sometime security interests.

Challenges for the transatlantic development in the international security area are mainly connected with crisis management and, on this background, the coordination of cooperation between the European Union and NATO.

Challenges for crisis management capabilities

Undertaking the challenge by NATO and the EU to co-create crisis management capabilities in places far away from Europe put in the agenda not only the method of organising cooperation but first of all the issues how to shape international security, what means to use and with whom it should be provided. These trivial

but fundamental for transatlantic relations questions are connected with the situation when the alliance got weaker due to the US withdrawal and creating "the coalition of will" under its auspices. Moreover, in spite of the US absence in allied operations, the US, supported by Great Britain and several other countries, exerts a profound influence on NATO decision making process. A similar situation takes place within the European Union, which after the fiasco of approving the constitutional treaty, has become weaker as an organisation. Furthermore, it has not solved the problem to what extent the EU international operations should be conducted – whether including fully not only engagement but stabilisation and peace enforcement or not. Due to the mentioned above reasons, both organisations seem currently to be capable only to undertake "low intensity" operations such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, training and reconstruction. This raises questions related both to the effectiveness of operations and real ability to shape the international security environment not only on the European continent, but outside, where real security threats to transatlantic community states appear.[2]

Nowadays, the border between what is important and essential and connected with transatlantic community security fades gradually. In the perception of societies, especially European ones, operations on the frontier of Europe and Asia, Africa, Far East, in spite of being justified, may appear incomprehensible and raise doubts about their consequences. On this background, processes initiated by the Alliance: stabilisation of the European continent after the end of the Cold War period; successive enlargement of the organisation to include democratic countries based on the rule of law, cooperation with other countries which remain beyond the main stream of European integration were understandable and clear as they ensured security and welfare and strengthened the feeling of social ties in international relations. Now NATO and the EU do not have such a strong legitimisation of their operations as during the European continent transformation after the end of the Cold War. Mentally, the community of values, needs, interests and goals needs refreshing and, possibly, redefinition.[3]

There is no doubt that only mutual American-European cooperation can:

• reconcile often contradictory interests emerging among democratic states;

• prevent negative phenomena and tendencies appearing in the international environment;

• influence the course of events in transatlantic relations not only on the European continent but in processes generating contemporary reality.

It is crucial for countries which require having common structure to implement cooperation of:

- reconstructing the existing transatlantic security architecture. It would mean, among others:

the United States respecting the will of European Union's countries to conduct a particular operation, and the EU support for operations with NATO participation in which the US would play a leading role;

the US readiness to designate its armed forces for NATO and EU operations if the operation complied with American security interests;

European countries' active participation in reconstructing NATO structures, their functioning in order to make the alliance as useful as possible. Instead, the US should accept the EU sovereign role as a political and military entity.[4]

- common understanding of the present and future security environment. In this area, answers permanently given should concern the following questions:

Is NATO cooperation with the EU justifiable?

Is there a deadlock in NATO – the EU relations?

Does the dialogue concerning strategic issues between NATO and the EU take place?[5]

- defining roles that NATO and the EU will play in the security area in Europe and the world.[6]

The mentioned above issues point to a political – military relations complexity in the security area in the USA – NATO – EU as well as NATO – EU relations. This results from implementing common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which aims at achieving

the position of "a global player". This aim was defined in the strategy of December 2003, "A Safer Europe in a Better World", and results from the conviction that the EU does not have another alternative in the 21st century if it wants to remain an eminent entity in international relations. Apparently, this assumption did not appear in transatlantic relations as an absolute point of reference for setting American-European political and military relations based on principles of partnership. So far, they have been considered only in the context of supporting NATO by the EU and undertaking independent actions only if NATO does not want to take them. Thus, in the way of thinking of political and military relations, the model emerging in the first half of the 1990s, in the EU – WEU – NATO relations, was copied.[7]

Putting in order the military-political cooperation within the US – EU – NATO triumvirate would enable creating effective mechanisms of influence on international security not only within the transatlantic relations framework, but also beyond them, for instance, within the United Nations. In the new formula of cooperation, NATO could become *de facto* the only effective instrument of the US and EU political – military cooperation on a global scale.[8] Nonetheless, it would require:

• enlarging the organisation of a further group of countries, this time outside the European continent – probably South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand;[9]

• withdrawing from the Washington Treaty, mainly from Article 5 in the new, not transatlantic any more, but global formula of "Global NATO";

• giving up defence planning, which is currently sustained mostly due to Poland's request.

However, this type of activities is not possible without the agreement of NATO Member States and they, particularly the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and the newly admitted (Bulgaria and Romania), as well as those ones that joined it in 1999 (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) seek for tough guarantees of their security and see no reason to change anything.

The new *modus vivendi* within NATO and organizations in the international security environment is not certain, not to say, that for

many countries undesirable. However, it means that NATO, known in the past as an organisation ensuring security and protection for the European continent, assisting essentially in its transformation after the end of the Cold War, as an instrument of policy of the 21st century countries, loses its sense. In the nearest foreseeable future, the risk for the European countries to be attacked with the use of conventional weapons in an armed conflict, similar to the one during the Cold War is illusory, a nuclear conflict is doubtful for the European members of the organisation. On this background, most European NATO members set priorities in the following areas:

• ensuring internal security (protection against terrorism, e.g. Islamic or ethnic in some Western European countries);

• stabilising conflicts whose implications for European countries are undesirable, taking into account public opinion, or may have negative consequences;

• controlling transportation (mostly shipping) routes ensuring access to energy resources (crude oil, natural gas) regions;

• building foreseeable security environment on the European continent and adjacent regions using peaceful means.

These are not all priorities, they are not even the most essential from the point of view of some countries – members of the organisation, therefore there are striking interest discrepancies determining the condition of the alliance.[10] On this background, there can be differentiated a group of American security interests which do not appear within NATO framework. They include:

• crisis connected with nuclear armament programme on the Korean Peninsula, potentially threatening North Eastern Asia's stability, therefore the countries, as Japan, China, the Russian Federation, the United States has its vital interests;

• Iranian – American conflict, where the United States recognises Iran's threat for its economic interests (crude oil, its excavation and supplies from the Persian Gulf region) and political ones (Palestinian – Israeli conflict, Muslim community hostility towards the USA);

• wars in the world of Islam, in Afghanistan under NATO and the UN auspices and in Iraq with the participation of "the coalition

of will", which generate uncertainty not only about the future of the Persian Gulf and Asia Minor regions but they also question American presence in this part of the world.

These are neither all interests nor they belong to their most representative part, however, they demonstrate where there are differences in the way of understanding the international security environment, threats emerging in it and their classification as far as actions are undertaken.

In connection with this, we are currently facing a situation in which NATO and the EU activities are incoherent. It shows, among others, the lack of coordinated actions towards European countries in Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) aspiring to membership in both NATO and EU. On this background, the complex issue of Caucasus security is in fact absent from transatlantic relations, whereas it determines such matters as:

• energy security of some European countries which may be ensured due to the new energy connections in Central Asia, independent from Russian transport routes. However, it is closely connected with geo-political location of such countries as Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and solving conflicts in Transnistria and Moldova, Georgia and Abkhasia, Nagorny-Karabakh;[11]

• political confrontation with the Russian Federation in the context of Ukraine's and three Caucasian countries' potential joining NATO and EU;[12]

• political-military activities of the transatlantic community countries for security in the Central Asia region.[13]

Challenges in the area of cooperation between the European Union and NATO

Referring to the issue of looking for the way to harmonise the cooperation between the European Union and NATO at the beginning of the 21st century, it must be stressed out that the breakthrough for mutual EU – NATO relations was to approve a set of documents essential for both organisations' cooperation, called Berlin Plus[14] arrangements on

17th March 2003. They derived from decisions made one year before, at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Prague on November, 21-22, 2002, and concerning the development of the alliance operational capabilities (NATO Response Force).[15]

Also, in this area, the European Union took on obligations at the defence ministers' meeting in Brussels, in May 2004, and agreed to create "battle groups", which may be treated as complementary forces to NATO Response Force. The decisions taken by the EU and NATO caused that hypothetically they not only have a common activity platform but also common forces to provide this activity.[16]

In connection with this, we currently deal with the situation in which:

• Decisions to launch or terminate activities belonging both to NATO countries and, in most cases, those which are also EU Member States. There appears the requirement of the EU participation in NATO decision making process, and also, probably, in military operations themselves. This poses a challenge for the USA, as it introduces the necessity of consensus both in the EU and NATO bodies;[17]

• Arrangements worked out in the Berlin Plus package in the context of failure of EU and NATO joint political-military activities planned in Darfur are not sufficient[18], and the approved way of taking action between the organisations seems to lead to making decisions only in "secondary" issues, the main ones left unsolved (aims, assets, methods, as well as where and when);[19]

• There is a lack of arrangements which basing on American and European strategy of operation would identify common aims and methods of action allowing drawing a new, transatlantic agreement in this area. Its aim should be to protect American and European countries' space both within their borders and outside them – at conflict and crises sources.[20]

Due to this, NATO and the EU should develop elementary mechanisms of cooperation which would enable taking actions in case of crisis situations which would create the basis of new transatlantic security architecture. Assumingly, only in the situation when such a mechanism appears, the EU – NATO cooperation would be possible and

guarantee applying a wide spectrum of political, military and economic solutions. The example of binding, in fact inadequate solutions might be the negotiations concerning the EU taking over NATO mission in Bosnia, which, in spite of appropriate Berlin Plus arrangements, lasted many months and sometimes proved to be very difficult.[u] In case of emerging necessity to conduct an operation of a different character with the use of different assets, there may rise difficulties which merely multiply the negative phenomenon of the lack of cooperation between the European Union and NATO.[22] Such elements as: joint planning (being held basing on earlier identified scenarios of operation assuming various choice of forces – from military to civil ones); generating forces (using eventuality planning) basing on the mechanism of creating joint forces; joining works of military structures; common political approach, are on the present stage of development deciding about the future of political-military cooperation between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The discrepancies emerging currently in transatlantic relations are in fact the consequence of incomprehension that the security environment not necessarily on the European continent, but in other regions of the world changed dynamically and suddenly and methods applied so far to stabilise and make peace have become archaic. Moreover, the lack of transatlantic relations' vision in the international security environment results in today's misunderstandings between the USA and its main European allies from the Cold War period. NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, still in force in spite of the decade passed, can prove it as it has not been changed probably because of fear of facing the problem of radical transformation in transatlantic relations including, among others, the role of NATO and the US position in Europe's security in the 21st century.

The carried out diagnosis concerning transatlantic relations security shows that these relations may be the basis of joint activities for countries creating the transatlantic community only when there is an interest correlation of entities that generate them, states and organisations. Unilateral actions undertaken now by the USA, e.g. in the context of missile defence shield, may merely lead to the break-up of transatlantic

ties, not economic or social but political and psychological ones. Then, the transatlantic relations, which contain innumerable contents and refer to all areas of human activity, will be reduced to an official language of symbols and gestures, not representing any deeper meaning.

In the actual and future international realities, there is no place for discussions and arguments concerning the crux of common American – European activities as they lead to diminishing its importance, weakening the position of countries and their organisation in international relations (NATO, EU), lack of effective opportunity to shape the international security environment. These discussions should be reduced as far as methods and forecast or achieved political and military aims are concerned. Maybe, the new transatlantic relations formula based on an international treaty as important as the Washington Treaty signed almost 60 years ago, would be more advisable.

Nowadays, there is a need to create a long-term vision of common activities, the strategy of operation including, which in its crux will be the reflection of thinking about existence and development not only in the 5 – 10 years time span or a decade, but a quarter or half of a century. Without the vision, the past and present transatlantic relations will become another episode expressed on the dusted charts of humanity history. Such fears are not unjustifiable. The lack of actions, even wrong ones, is sometimes more destructive than taking them. Especially that there are common values which, so far, determined the shape of American – European cooperation and which have a chance to do it in the future.

ENDNOTES:

[1] *The European Union and the United States. Global partners, global responsibilities, European Commission's brochure*, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/library/publications/23_us_infopack_2006.pdf, accessed on May, 8, 2007.

[2] According to the authors of the report concerning long-term vision of European needs in the area of defence capabilities, fundamental challenges in the security area will include increasing communication problems in many areas of social life that result from deepening globalisation process; the change

in current state of economic power, consequently social one; demographic asymmetry between different regions of the world, scientific and technological progress eliminating present research disproportions in such fields as Information Technology, Biotechnology, Nanotechnology – cognitive sciences; competition for energy resources. This will cause, among others, the increase in social tensions, population migrations, wars and conflicts. *An initial long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, LTV –*October, 3, 2006 – SB MoDs Levi, pp. 6-7.

[3] "Western values" – the term commonly referring to democracy, free market, civic liberties does not evoke such emotions when their importance on the European continent is concerned. However, it is an essential source of controversy taking into account the cultural and civilisation comparison with other societies. Therefore, a question appears how and if it is right to promote them in the modern world and to what degree they are the part of European and American communities' security. T. BLAIR, *A Battle for Global Values*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007, Vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 2-3 (Internet subscription).

[4] F.G. BURWELL, D. C. GOMPERT, L. S. LEBL, J. M. LODAL, W. B. SLOCOMBLE, *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO – EU Security Architecture*, p. 21.

[5] According to the Polish Ambassador to NATO, the above questions imply a factual state of cooperation between NATO and the EU, and answers to them allow defining roles which will be designated to the Alliance and the Union. J. GRYZ, *Sprawozdanie z 23 warsztatów nt. bezpieczeństwa światowego* (Report from 23rd workshop on world security), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2006, no. 3 (64), p. 302.

[6] Ibidem, I. DAALDER, J. GOLDGEIER, *Global NATO*, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, Vol. 85, no. 5, pp. 1-2, 5 (Internet subscription), B. RATHBUN, *Continental Divide? The Transience of Transatlantic Troubles*, in N. JABKO, C. PARSONS (ed.), **With US or Against US? European Trends in American Perspective, The State of the European Union**, Vol. 7, Oxford University Press, 2005.

[7] One of the conditions that the EU must meet in order to become "a global player" is to search platforms of cooperation with NATO. Both EU and NATO should remain complementary to each other, although there is no final answer in this respect. On this background, Lt. Gen. Jean-Paul Perruche, Director General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) stressed that both the EU and NATO do not have enough "flexibility" to perform new kind of tasks resulting from evolution of international security environment. These tasks concern mainly compiling military – civilian elements which will emerge in missions on areas remote from Europe. J. GRYZ, *op. cit.,* p. 303.

[8] See Gen. James L. Jones's speech presented in J. GRYZ, *Sprawozdanie z 23 warsztatów nt. bezpieczeństwa światowego* (Report from 23rd workshop on world security), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2006, no. 3 (64), pp. 297-298.

[9] Ibidem.

[10] Considering, for example, the issue what connects Lithuania with France or Spain in the matter of fighting Islamic terrorism? The answer: nothing or little is both true and false in the context of demographic changes in the European Union and the growth in Muslim population, involving its radical elements contesting the European order. There are much more problems like that. In the situation of NATO countries' political disintegration and the lack of coherent vision how to solve the problems, they may seem to increase and deepen the existent differences.

[11] Borys Tarasiuk, Ukraine's Foreign Minister stated that in case of the Balkans, the international community undertook active measures for stability and security, whereas its efforts in the Black Sea area are not sufficient. It may result from two classes of conflicts. The first, the Balkans, the international community countries and international organisations put forth effort to solve the problem. Consequently, it was stabilised and currently it is being finished with the EU and NATO participation. The second, the Black Sea region, conflicts appearing there are left unattended, as no appropriate action is taken to solve them (Transnistria and Moldova, Georgia and Abkhasia, Nagorny-Karabakh). It can be noticed that the Balkan region was included in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes, whereas in the Black Sea region there are no such perspectives. In consequence, natural transportation routes for energy resources (crude oil, natural gas) running in the Black Sea region are not appropriately used and appears the security deficit.

[12] Here it is worth quoting Gen. Col. Anatoly I. Mazurkevich, Chief of the Main Department for Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, who stated that the Black Sea security problem does not exist. Challenges for security in these areas are only Western countries' and their organisations' *idée fixe*. As far as problems are concerned, they are only caused by unconsidered activities of countries, e.g. Georgia's. Moreover, getting rid of stabilisation factor, as the Russian troops are, additionally complicates local security matters, not regional ones. Without their engagement, a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny-Karabakh may develop. From the Russian Federation's point of view, only the port in Sevastopol, in fact its future, requires resolving.

[13] In the context of Central Asia security, there must be quoted the words of Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, who, referring to NATO presence in this region, stated that it is positive. However, the lack of the UN is visible. According to Akram, due to the cooperation

between the countries of that region and organisations such as NATO and the UN, there is a possibility to create cooperative security in Central Asia, similar to the one in Europe. NATO may here launch initiatives to institutionalise security in Central Asia and consequently create one homogeneous region of cooperation, due to which it will be possible to excavate natural resources (crude oil, natural gas) from the North (Kazakhstan, Uzbekhistan, Turkmenistan) and transport into the South (the Arabian Sea – the Indian Ocean). Also, the Ambassador defined three conditions of success: 1. The process of Afghanistan's rebuilding and Central Asia region reconstruction. It requires a complex, multisided approach with individual solutions without copying old schemes. The three basic instruments contributing to creating this process should be: defence, deterrence, and diplomacy. 2.The cooperation and activities of the regional "actors" not only in current (operational) issues but mostly for creating economic complementarity of the countries in that region – connecting Central Asia's North and South. 3. International cooperation assuming leaving international community in Afghanistan for at least a decade and in this way confirming the engagement in Asian "Marshall Plan" – achieving success "in the hearts and minds of the Afghans".

[14] Berlin Plus arrangements base on the assumption that both NATO and EU countries take advantage of limited resources of Member States. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary doubling of assets, the EU access to NATO operational planning was established. It was also agreed that the NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will be the operational commander of EU-led missions. These arrangements, along with earlier arrangements from Berlin 1996 concerning exchange of classified information, allow the EU to take over NATO's responsibilities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). For more information see: F.G. BURWELL, *op. cit.* pp. 13-14.

[15] M. SZKODZIŃSKA, Z. PĘKALA, **Od Pragi do Stambułu – implementacja założeń wojskowego wymiaru transformacji NATO** (From Prague to Istanbul – The Implementation of Assumptions of NATO Military Transformation Dimension), DPO MON, Warszawa, 2006, pp. 14-17; M. RUTTEN (comp.), *From Nice to Laeken, European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Papers no. 51, Paris, April 2002, J-Y. HAINE (comp.), *From Laeken to Copenhagen European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Papers no. 57, February 2003.

[16] A. MISSIROLI (comp.), *From Copenhagen to Brussels — European defence: Core documents*, Volume IV, Chaillot Papers no. 67, December 2003, *EU security and defence – Core documents 2004*, Volume V, Chaillot Papers no. 75, February 2005.

[17] F.G. BURWELL, *op.cit.*, p.15.

[18] The conflict which took place since July 2003 in the Sudanese

province Darfur, between Muslims sponsored by Sudan and local ethnic Muslim communities, took a heavy toll of about 400,000 and around 2,500,000 were forced to leave their homes. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005.

[19] F.G. BURWELL, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-16.

[20] Ibidem.

[21] Ibidem.

[22] According to General James L. Jones, the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of the United States European Command (CDR USEUCOM), the lack of appropriate approach to the cooperation of the EU countries, the USA and Canada causes that its framework is unknown. Consequently, the direction of the organisation transformation is not defined, and thus so is its place and role in the European and world security architecture. For more information, see J. GRYZ, *Sprawozdanie z 23 warsztatów nt. bezpieczeństwa światowego* (Report from 23rd workshop on world security), Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2006, no. 3 (64), pp. 297-298.

HUMAN DIMENSION OF ESDP AND ROMANIA'S SECURITY

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The current debates on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are focused both on its goals, institutions, and capabilities and also on its key-concepts. There are some voices arguing that the main goal of ESDP is to achieve international peace and order and other voices that plead for the security and defence of *European homeland*. If we translate this debate into conceptual dimension, we enter a new area of disputes on the ESDP key-concept: *offensive defence* or *human security*?

The concept of offensive defence is obviously of American inspiration and underlines the fact that the changes in security environment don't allow to counteract the new asymmetrical threats by territorial defence. The offensive dimension of the new military thinking is emphasized: the action outside own borders is necessary before the attack occurs. Implementing such a concept permits a large scale of actions: from preemptive military strikes oriented against a specific threat to large scale military interventions in order to change a regime. Still, a security policy based on this concept must be completed with specific capabilities that EU don't have yet[1]. That is why European officials must turn to the other key-concept, the human security.

The concept of human security was initially developed by United Nations (UN) in the 1994 *Human Development Report*. The main goal was to broaden the traditional military meaning of security to a higher multidimensional level that will encompass economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

Although the concept of human security itself seems to be an utopian project similar to the one of global security, its inclusion into ESDP debates offers it a human dimension that reflects the new trends in structuring national and international security policies. ESDP approaches human security in a way that refers exclusively to the security policy which bringing into force includes crises prevention, civil conflict management, political mediation, socio-economic stabilization, and state reconstruction. Unlike offensive defence, the human security does not imply the unilateral right of intervention, but the collective responsibility to intervene and protect. Thereby each state has the responsibility to safeguard the life of its citizens. If the state is not able to do it, this responsibility will be transferred to the international community that must forestall the threats to human security by all means, including military one. Accordingly, EU needs in this situation too extended military capabilities even the civilian structures have the most important role[2]. The use of military power is seen as a legitimate instrument for achieving human security only in severe cases of human rights violation, such as genocide.

Joseph Nye defined two concepts: *soft power* and *hard power*. According to his definition, EU is a soft power. That is why the EU's role on the international arena will be strengthening by developing the concept of human security inside ESDP. There is no role for EU as a global actor, but "civil power that promotes multilateralism and non-military means"[3], as the politologist Stefanie Flechtner said. As a global actor, EU must be able to act anywhere in the world and in each field of social life at any moment in order to solve the globalization problems. Still, EU hasn't the resources that are requisite for such an important role. Thus, the collocation suggested by S. Flechtner seems to describe more accurately the present stage of EU.

For that matter, the priorities of the Finish presidency of EU in the second half of 2006 underlined three main trends for ESDP: the improvement of military capabilities, the development of civil-military co-ordination during crises management, and a stronger emphasis on human rights and human security during ESDP operations. The German presidency has taken at the beginning of 2007 some of the

Finish priorities and has added a new one – the development of co-operation with USA in the field of civil crises management.

Also, the *Barcelona Report*[4] (edited in 2004 at Javier Solana's initiative) underlines the necessity of fundamental re-thinking of European approach on security by orienting the security policy towards human security. The authors of the Report argue that ESDP missions must be focused on protecting civilians first of all on the basis of existing legislation and in the final by using force. In order to carry such missions, EU needs an integrated civil-military force composed by approximately 15,000 persons (at least one third – civilians with various skills and vocations). This force will be called *Human Security Response Force* and it will be composed by three tiered elements that will need the already existing pieces of ESDP: Brussels civil-military planning headquarters that would be composed of strategic planners and would be able to call upon observers/monitors/special representatives who could be sent to particular regions in advance of any deployment to plan a particular deployment in response to early warning signals given by EU monitors or representatives on the ground as well as civil society and other key local actors; 5000 personnel at a high level of readiness able to deploy within days; 10,000 personnel, who would be at a lower level of readiness but nevertheless could be called on for deployment and who would periodically train and exercise together.

There are three sources for creating this force. The military personnel could be drawn from the 60,000 troops made available under the Headline Goal, agreed in Helsinki in December 2001, for a European Rapid Reaction Force, as well from forces who straddle the military/police divide, such as gendarmerie, guardia civil and carabinieri. The civil component would include police, legal specialists, human rights monitors, tax and customs officers, humanitarian aid workers, doctors and medical personnel etc, and also people who straddle the military/police divide, such as gendarmerie, guardia civil and carabinieri.

The third source should have a professional core, a voluntary element to contribute to the human security task forces. It should comprise two elements: a Civil Peace Corps (mid-career or post-career professionals with skills to offer) and a Humanitarian Volunteer

Aid Service (school-leavers and students who would be used for less challenging missions).

The Human Security Response Force is not the only element of EU's new security approach. During 2006, the EU Political and Security Committee drafted the document called *Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP* that establishes the necessary steps to develop the human dimension of ESDP, including the framing of a standard field handbook and some training guide-books for ESDP missions.

Also, it requires the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (31 October 2000) regarding women, peace, and security within limits of ESDP. Thereby the military crises management operation in Democratic Republic of Congo – EUFOR - was the first ESDP mission that had a gender adviser. More than that, the EU Council (14 May 2007, Brussels) resume once more the issue of human rights and gender during all of the ESDP operations.

Due to the fact that the Human Security Response Force will be multinational and both its sources and implementation requires civil and military capabilities of member states, it is obvious that Romania might play an important role towards human dimension of ESDP. The new *Romania's National Security Strategy* underlines that national security has an important external component that is achieved by active political, diplomatic, economic, informational, military part in promoting democracy, security and prosperity in the neighborhood of Romania and other strategic interest areas[5]. Romania is a member of the most important security organizations and that is why it has as main priority to act in building international security. Our country is already part of ESDP civil, military and police operations and it is component of the EU Force Catalogue. Romania had deployed 58 military in EU mission in Bosnia and Hertegovina (EUFOR – Althea)[6] and in other closed missions such as: the first EU military operation (CONCORDIA that was followed up by PROXIMA, in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), police mission in Bosnia and Hertegovina (EUPM), assistance mission at Rafah border (EUBAM Rafah), EUPOL Kinshasa in D.R. Congo, police mission in Afghanistan[7]. Also, a Romanian expert is member of the planning team for the future ESDP civil mission in

Kosovo that will be deployed after the establishment of province's status[8]. In the future, Romania will contribute to two EU Battle Groups: Greece-led BG (participating nations: Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus) to be operational in the second half of 2007[9] and Italy-led BG (participating nations: Romania and Turkey) to be operational by 2010.

Therefore, the inclusion of the concept of human security with all of its components into ESDP develops a new dimension of this policy – the human one – that allows the stabilization of the disparities between world's regions. We must underline the fact that EU vision is not similar with the utopian one promoted at the beginning of the '90s, but a mildly one with practical significance.

The traditional military approach seems to have no results in Iraq or Afghanistan. Also, in large parts of the world, millions of people live in a high degree of insecurity. That is why the development of the ESDP human dimension offers the advantage of combining more ESDP concepts and ideas with generally valid principles in order to manage crises, prevent conflicts and develop civil-military cooperation. These principles are: the breach of human rights, the legitimization of political authority, efficient multilateralism, and bottom-up approach in order to establish a new relationship between EU and states and their citizens that are the target of the intervention. ESDP will acquire more coherence, efficiency and visibility by applying these principles and will consolidate its common strategic culture that now is diluted. Romania has been a part of this process since its launch in 1999. Therefore our country is able to help on the development of ESDP in two ways: by being part of the EU's both civil and military Force Catalogue and by sustaining the understanding of this wide political strategy.

ENDNOTES:

[1] EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), European Defense. A Proposal for a White Paper. Report of an Independent Task Force, Paris, 2004, p. 38.

[2] Stefanie Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy: Between „Offensive Defense" and „Human Security", International Policy Analysis Unit, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006, p. 7.

[3] Stefanie Flechtner, Towards „Human Security", interview in on-line edition of „Madrid 11.net", 11 April 2007.

[4] The Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, Barcelona, 15 September 2004.

[5] The President of Romania, Strategia de Securitate Națională a României. România Europeană, România Euro-Atlantică: pentru o viață mai bună într-o țară democratică, mai sigură și prosperă (Romania's National Security Strategy. A European Romania, a Euro-Atlantic Romania: Towards a Betters Life in a More Democratic, Secure and Prosperous Country), 2006, p. 15.

[6] According to the web-site of the Romanian Ministry of Defence (http://www.mapn.ro/indexro.php), May 2007.

[7] According to the web-site of Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=4980&idlnk=1&cat=3), January 2007.

[8] Idem.

[9] Idem.

DEBATES
SECTION II

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD: Let's thank professor Gryz for his presentation. Indeed, the topic you approached is a very interesting one not only for the political-military decision makers, but also for the ones working in the scientific research area. We are preparing a meeting with representatives from the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies from Oslo, and one of the topics we intend to debate refers to the transatlantic change. Even if Norway is not a member of the European Union, it feels the need to analyse these changes, as we also do. This is also one of our objectives, to approach these issues in our research papers, in order to offer to the decision makers the theoretical background for the required measures.

Everything states here may be corroborated with the evolutions from the European environment. When it is about the European Union, I think we should consider a statement made by the French President, Mr. Sarkozy, about the European Constitution, to overpass this element of establishing a fundamental document at European level. We are sure that there will be some changes, both at EU level and more broadly, on security and defence policy level, and at NATO level, but also on the relations between them.

I also thank to my colleague, miss Alexandra Sarcinschi. I think she has succeeded on stressing out our will, that starting from concrete elements, the factual elements mentioned in the first three conferences, to widen the line of horizon, approaching the issues of the Romania civil society, with its actors, and, by miss Sarcinschi's conference, to go to the human dimension of all subjects of security and defence.

Col. Mihai RADU: Thank you for having also invited the services, the staffs, to this very interesting and very important seminar. Someone said that it was not our intention to establish the importance of the European Security and Defence Policy, because we are all aware of it.

However, we discuss today about this importance, about its necessity and the way this side of the European Union will be transformed, especially on military field. I think we, as military, should be more concerned on the military differences between NATO and the European Union. Why? Because, for the time being, forces are both on NATO and EU disposal, and they are common. At the European Union level, are there any standards for forces at disposal and included in the Catalogue? No. Are there any standards for forces at NATO's disposal? Yes. Romania offers the same forces package, both for NATO and the European Union. As we have put at disposal the same unit, the same force, capability and so on, my question is: How will we provide that force, according to which standards? Obviously, considering the existing ones. Is there any interoperability? Yes, there is. And there is the paradox of this question, in 2007, 2008, when these forces are put at NATO disposal, they are evaluated, in order to check their level of interoperability and operability and they successfully pass these tests. Well, what if these forces and objectives, our capabilities, as a whole, will they be able to participate to these operations, too? Yes, they will. So, this difference between NATO and the European Union, from the military perspective, should be stressed out more. Secondly, let's see the evolution of the European Union in the military field. What's the European Union's way, what's NATO's? As we have noticed, The European Union has the same objectives as NATO. NATO is transforming, restructuring. The command-control from NATO is more flexible. NATO has a Rapid Reaction Force, NRF, the European Union has a rapid reaction force. NATO has NRDC, those rapid reaction corps, in those five countries, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain and France, so far EU has two Battle Groups that Romania is part of. NATO has two entities, high-readiness forces and low-readiness forces, the European Union has forces based on the same principle, with a higher or lower degree of availability. I think we should analyse carefully our participation both in NATO and EU with the same forces. Mr. Spiroiu said that there are forces and means dated 1950 that there are still in place. Maybe this situation is possible to certain services, not to all, because we cannot use a plane from 1950, we cannot use a ship from 1960 or means of communication from that

time. We should make these aquisitions, using the existing standards and clearly establishing our participation to the future NATO or EU operations. Even if we have clear, well-established forces at NATO disposal, and we can choose for EU (there is also this option within NATO, on planning-force generating), the political factor is the one that decides if a force will participate to that operation or not.

Col. Constantin HRISTODORESCU: I have a question for professor Gryz and one for miss Sarcinschi. Professor, what is your personal point of view on a recent statement made by President Putin, and I will try to quote: Establishing the military bases in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania may be the beginning of a new arms race. Miss Sarcinschi, you mentioned that Reaction Force for Human Security, that will comprise almost 15000 people. It will be subordinated to whom?

Jaroslaw GRYZ, PhD: If I understood corectly, colonel Hristodorescu asked about the bases that will be settled in Poland and Romania, we are talking about the shield. The question is not about the bases, but it is about the present and future shape of security in Europe. As we all know, the United States would like to build a component of their defence on our territories. Those defence components are not against Russia. But it seems they are provoking Russia to give announce, both for the international community, and for the Russian society, that we don't agree on such of investment and we are able to diminish them. Regarding the international community: the Russians say that if you wish, we will come back to the times we had during the Cold War. The question is why Russia puts on the table such an argument. I think the answer is connected with the Russian policy, as a whole, towards the European Union's states and NATO. As we all know, Russia is against NATO's presence and existence. Since '90s, nothing happened in this area, Russia still says that NATO is an unnecessary organisation. In the Russians' point of view, the European Union is a temporary organisation that will disappear in 15-20 years. Now, in this respect, the Russians may use the argument of building elements of the shield as a trick to separate the Poles, the Romanians, the Czechs from the community and to give an information, that, firstly, such an

installation is useless for them, secondly, they raise problems from the Cold War and thirdly they do not guarantee peace and stability on long term. This could be an answer on Putin's disagreement on the shield.

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD: That force is a project established by a Study Group entitled „A human security doctrine for Europe". For the time being there have not been clearly established the guiding lines for forming that force. Probably it will be subordinated as in the other cases. The only aspect that gives legitimacy to such a proposal is the social order of that study, that is by Javier Solana's request.

Col. Mircea COSMA, PhD: The European Union and ESDP are obvious nowadays realities. In order to understand them and in order to generate certain ideas, reflections, I think we should pay attention to their history, in order to see what they confront with, and then to see what are the possible options regarding their future. The history does not show us a happy situation, as the European Union knew to overcome the special obstacles it had confronted with, starting with the expansion of its dimension - the beginning was economical -, then these dimensions have been multiplied - there have been added the political dimension, the educational one, the social, the institutional ones -, and now we are in front of this new special dimension - the security dimension, actually, the defence one. If EU knew how to overcome these obstacles, one conclusion should be that the nowadays obstacles and the future ones may be overcome. However, I will give you a counterargument, and then other arguments that will sustain this point of view. In 2000, as a community institution, the European Union did not have the financial resources in order to buy a jet fighter. Let's see now what are the issues it confronts wit. One of the matters refers to identifying the ways for ensuring the financial resources, whose importance we are all very aware, besides the political conduct, in general. How long will be this planning process, from the ESDP perspective? Neither me or anyone else is able to estimate in real time, let's say, five, ten years. We all know that this is a process.

Let's see the positive arguments. Where does this power of EU, ESDP come from? First of all, it is a new model. If it is a new model, where does it get this capacity and power of vigorating its functionality

and power of achieving its objectives? It has been stated and it has been insisted on the fact that ESDP aims expanding and consolidating peace, it does not aim imposing force. Secondly, the old principle, established by the Westphalic peace, from 1648, the one referring to the power balance in the international relations and the one referring to the states' hegemony, at individual level, is replaced with another principle, a more human one, that is the appeal to the morale construct. This time, morale is the one governing sovereignty. Starting from this elements, let's see where is the army and where are the militaries. We all know that military were always trained, prepared for meeting an enemy and causing him huge losses, in order to defeat him. According to the ESDP policy, the new military man's status is changing. He is the one that should intervene in order to minimize everyone's losses in a conflictual state.

A second reality is given by the fact that so far, the military was perceived only from a perspective related with the mission's noblesse, given by the fact that, if needed, we should give up our lives. The military's sacrifice was for defending his country, now it is for defending the civilians, and the peace mission gives him a new status, as a peacemaker for humanity. Under these circumstances, I think we need certain reflections and maybe a new future conduct. We need to rethink a certain change in our mentality. Can we consider as equal the military that participates to missions within ESDP and the one within NATO, starting from their objectives and missions, the European culture and the Euro-Atlantic one.

We also take into consideration our will to train people, in order to communicate with the military men participating to these missions and the accent placed on interculturality. I would also like you to think of something else. I don't know why the Romanian Estate Television does not pay any attention to the visibility of the problems the Romanian Army confronts with and solves out. Maybe someone should intervene out there, in order the Army to have a space to present its concerns from special areas. However, let's not forget that the Army was the main pillar that „pushed" Romania to NATO and EU structures. It would be a sign of respect from us.

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD: Thank you, professor. Regarding the last part of your comments, the one referring to the Romanian Television, yesterday, at the National Defence University level, there was a meeting with a group of producers. They made a presentation film of the National Defence University "Carol I". There were discussions related with the comments on the national TV channel. There are intended some other measures, not only a special show. For 15 minutes, during the morning shows, there will be invited representatives from our NDU. Your comments will be published in the volume that will comprise the presentations, and we hope that your message will be well-received. In my opinion, we are not that blocked from the perspective of promoting our image, as an Army.

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD: It is about other image strategy, taken from the French, and others, but also considering our needs, a strategy that was estimated as better. From my perspective, it is not better, but they say that the appearances in these shows are larger than before, when there was a one-hour show. I think it is absolutely necessary to have a show at the right time. Regarding the European security, it is focuses on the human security. This is where the other dimensions are derived from, the internal security dimension, that is, actually, a human security, but also having the resulting elements, the security of the critical infrastructures, the security of institutions, the social security and the economical security, because Europe has to defend itself, first of all, against itself, it is its own enemy. This Muslim settling movement in Europe, millions of people looking for jobs are realities of this century and Europe should defend itself in front of them. This is a matter related with a future construct, the European security construct and the relations one should be established carefully, in order to have these things disappearing. Ensuring the networks' security is included in the human security. We live in a network physiognomy and philosophy, we are in an almost total interdependency. As a person that has been looking for information for years, we have never had a wider access to information as now. We are addicted to information, and a construct opposing is less probable, but not impossible. We live in two levels, as Kierkegaard said. The individual existence is considered on

two dimensions, one aesthetic, dominated by hedonism, pleasure, and an ethical one, dominated by morale, duty. This is how man lives and combine these two sins, this is what society also does. Our sins are: one - the history's ghosts, I do not mean its truths, second - it is about the rooted duty, there is no duty without no roots. Together with my colleague, Alexandrescu, I went to a seminar in Poland, at the National Defence University from Warsaw. I was impressed by one thing. You may know that during the war Warsaw was 80% destroyed. They rebuilt it, they made a beautiful city, with highways, nice neighbourhoods. Before that, they restored the old city, as it used to be. You live in this Warsaw on two levels, the level of this great country that always had an important role in the European civilisation. All the European countries had an important role to play in the European civilisation. Secondly, it is about this future dimension, the one of the people building their future on different coordinates. All of them serve the human security, because, for the time being, the man is the one threatened, not the state. He is threatened on all aspects: he is threatened from Cosmic space, the protective layer is more and more aggressed, he is also threatened from the thought universe, just look at the figures related with the number of suicides and the figures are increasing, he is also threatened within the political dimension, as, unfortunately, policy, as an expression of interests, is not always connected with the interest of protecting human and the human civilisation, the individual civilisation. Human protection does not mean its wealth, but that fulfilment and safety feeling, security that man should feel. That is why I think this European Union's action is very interesting and maybe will have a larger success than the Rapid Reaction Force. Against who? Against murderers you cannot react that way, you need to find the roots of those murderers. The first dimension of managing this conflict state is respect. Respect for ma and especially respect for countries. For the time being, people live in countries and when you state that a country is in a way, other one in other way, that proves nothing but the lack of respect. Under no circumstances, no one has to say that Russia is, or China is, in a way or another, because nobody can prove those statements, it is about communities, there are thousands of people living there, they

have built-up values, they have created a civilisation and they should be respected for that. Wherever you go, in every city, you should bow in front of those value, you are charmed by what those people have done there. I think the human security, the people's security, is, first of all, about acknowledging those values and sharing them. That is why I think that the first pillar of this dimension - ESDP is improving itself, it has not been kept at the level of the discussions from Riga. The European Security and Defence Policy is a dynamic concept, it will be improved together with the security dimension, together with the vulnerabilities, challenges and the new risks. It will be developed, as nothing is immutable on this world. The European Union is an entity of entities whose architecture becomes more and more stable and more and more interesting, even if it includes many fractal elements. Maybe that is why it is so beautiful, but I think the most beautiful and the most interesting part is the one related with this human security.

Rear Adm. Cornel MIHAI, PhD: I would like to make two comments, especially regarding the military bases. This term, „military bases", is wrongly used and sometimes abusively by mass-media. Both from theoretical and practical perspective, we cannot speak of military bases in Romania. There is a Defence Cooperation Agreement, signed by the Romanian and the US governments, that has been ratified by the Parliament. According to this Agreement, American troops or America forces may use Romanian military facilities. The difference is huge, because there are no military bases and there will not be, at least on medium-term, in Romania. A military base is an area where the sovereignty has been ceded, where foreign troops install themselves, together with families, children, schools, armaments, ammunitions. Based on the above mentioned agreement, the Romanian military facilities may be also used by our US partners. Then the troops come for training are here for limited periods of time, they do not use these facilities as in other European areas. For example, in Germany, there are American military bases where they install themselves with all the things implied by this term. I wanted to make this comment, because "military base" is a term that generates lots of sensitivities and it was not our intention to make people sensitive. This Agreement is not

against anyone, it is a Bilateral Agreement, beneficial for both signing parties.

Regarding the differences between NATO and EU missions, I think they are somehow similar. At present, all the missions deployed by the Alliance and by the European Union are crisis management missions. The only difference that may be considered, hopefully, not in the future, would refer to a collective defence mission, in case of an aggression against one of the Alliance's member states or against Alliance, as a whole, and then the reaction will be in concordance with the stipulations of the Article 5. If we skip this exception, then there is no difference between NATO and EU missions.

On the question regarding the future of the European Union, I would say that towards a complex approach, towards solving crisis situations worldwide. The European force is neither a tool or an element, or a discouraging force. I would think of a comparison. It acts like a fire extinguisher, it is like a force that intervenes and is used by the European Union in order to intervene in crisis situations. Today, miss Sarcinschi presented us a new approach, a new dimension. In this complex approach, when we have a hard action, then the military tool, adding the Police intervention, rule of law, administration, civil protection, gets a new approach, a new dimension, the human one, addressed to the locals. Therefore, if we have a military intervention, we do nothing but extinguish the fire. Then the civilian and humanitarian approach are the ones contributing on solving out the issue that generated the fire in that area. This is where the complex approach of the European Union is derived from, it launches it by a military intervention that usually is a soft one, then it is continued, complemented and developed with its civilian and humanitarian components. We hope to find the required resources for this human component and to see it shaped in a reasonable period of time.

Constantin MOŞTOFLEI, PhD: Thank you, rear admiral. I have a question. You have stated that we put at US disposal those military facilities, based on the Agreement. According to our political concept, do we offer these facilities only to the United States, or also to other allied or partner countries?

Rear Adm. Cornel MIHAI, PhD: For the time being, there is a single Agreement, the one between Romania and US. Therefore, starting July, 1st, in those facilities there will be acting Romanian and US troops. Any other possible future presence, in Romania, is realistic, but exclusively based on an agreement or other bilateral agreements between Romania and other partners of ours from NATO and the European Union. DCA is exclusively a Romanian-US agreement.

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD: Within few hours we have discussed about the Romanian Army participation not only within the European Security and Defence Policy, its implication, the forces, we have mentioned NATO, we drew a comparison between EU and NATO. Mr. Cosma reminded us that the situation is great, that there is a very good cooperation with the other armies, we have the possibility to communicate with them, there has been about intercultural aspects, and I agree with all of them. As a former military, I would like to weigh carefully the gains and the losses of our participation to these missions. Do not forget the main Army's mission, the ones stated in the Constitution, referring to defending the national territory. The issues related with the peace-support operations, stability operations, other than war, punctual ones, that are outside the national territory, are very important issues. However, let's not forget that within the North-Atlantic Alliance and within the European Union we have collective defence missions, missions related with the protection of the national territory. Then the matter of these two types of missions becomes just as important for both organisations. Therefore, defending the national territory is not out of fashion, it is something still actual for the Army.

CLOSING REMARKS

Constantin MOŞTOFLEI, PhD:

As the time allotted for our seminar has passed, I would like to end it by saying that we have tries to organise a scientific event only during four hours, we tried to assign a larger space to questions and debates. I think we have succeeded on achieving our objective. As you have noticed, we tried to group the topics and the lecturers, on different areas, on certain ways of approaching the main subjects. You are the ones to decide if we have succeeded or not in achieving our goals. In the end, I would like to thank the lecturers, as they responded positively to our invitation, to the ones who joined us today. We also would like to thank to the ones that unfortunately could not come, but they sent us their papers and also to you. The management of the National Defence University „Carol I" has noticed the interest shown by you for this seminar, and it is a great deal the fact that there were present today many structures from the Romanian Army and others. I would also like to thank to the military attachés, accredited to Bucharest, for their presence here, and also to our guests from mass-media. I would also like to thank to our colleagues responsible for the sound and to the ones providing the translations. Once again, please accept our thanks and we expect you to join us in November, at our already traditional scientific session, and also to the seminar that we will organise in May 2008. These are the two main scientific events organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University „Carol I".

Thank you all. Good luck!