



“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
Centre for Defence and Security Strategies Studies



PROCEEDINGS
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
STRATEGIES XXI

THE COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC
NATURE OF THE SECURITY
ENVIROMENT

Volume 1

Editors

Florian CÎRCIUMARU, Ph.D.
Cristina BOGZEANU, Ph.D.

NOVEMBER 14-15, 2019
BUCHAREST - ROMANIA

“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

**Centre for Defence
and Security Strategic Studies**

Doctoral School

**P R O C E E D I N G S
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
STRATEGIES XXI**

**THE COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC NATURE
OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

November 14-15, 2019

Volume 1

Editors

Florian CÎRCIUMARU, Ph.D.

Cristina BOGZEANU, Ph.D.



**“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING HOUSE
BUCHAREST, Romania**

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, Ph.D. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Daniel DUMITRU, Ph.D. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU, Ph.D. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Ion PURICEL, Ph.D. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Ioan CRĂCIUN, Ph.D. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Doina MUREȘAN, Ph.D. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Florian CÎRCIUMARU, Ph.D., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Iulian CHIFU, Ph.D., Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, Romania
Gelu ALEXANDRESCU, Ph.D. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Péter TÁLAS, Ph.D., Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, National University of Public Service, Hungary
Pavel NECAS, Ph.D. Prof. Dipl. Eng., Armed Forces Academy, Slovakia
Piotr GAWLICZEK, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., Cuiavian University in Włocławek, Poland
Stanislaw ZAJAS, Ph.D. Prof., National Defence University, Poland
Josef PROCHÁZKA, Ph.D., National Defence University, Brno, Czech Republic
Gábor BOLDIZSÁR, Assoc. Prof., National University of Public Service, Hungary
Igor SOFRONESCU, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., Armed Forces Military Academy “Alexandru cel Bun”, Republic of Moldova
János BESENYŐ, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., University of Obuda, Hungary
Daniel FIOTT, Ph.D. Institute for European Studies, “Vrije Universiteit Brussel”, Belgium
Mariusz SOLIS, Coordinator NATO Defense Education Enhancement Programme, Belgium
Alin BODESCU, Ph.D. Lecturer, European Security and Defence College, Brussels, Belgium
Sorin IVAN, Ph.D. Prof., “Titu Maiorescu” University, Romania
Florian RĂPAN, Ph.D. Prof., “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, Romania
Silviu NEGUȚ, Ph.D. Prof., Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Romania
Nicolae RADU, Ph.D. Prof., “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Police Academy, Romania
Bogdan AURESCU, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., University of Bucharest, Romania
Florin DIACONU, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., University of Bucharest, Romania
Marius ȘERBESZKI, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Ruxandra BULUC, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Elena ȘUȘNEA, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Stan ANTON, Ph.D. Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Gabriel STOENESCU, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Cristian ICHIMESCU, Ph.D. Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Răzvan GRIGORAȘ, Ph.D. Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Veronica PĂSTAE, Ph.D. Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Alexandra SARCINSCHI, Ph.D. Senior Researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, Ph.D. Senior Researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D., Senior Researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Marius POTÎRNICHE, Ph.D. Researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Dan PETRESCU, Ph.D. Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Mihai ZODIAN, Ph.D. Researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania
Daniela RĂPAN, Ph.D. Researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania

SCIENTIFIC SECRETARY: Cristina BOGZEANU, Ph.D. Senior Researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania

ORGANISING COMMITTEE: Florian CÎRCIUMARU, Ph.D.; Andra PÎNZARIU; Raluca STAN; Doina MIHAI; Marian BĂDOIU; Andreea TUDOR; Iulia COJOCARU

LAYOUT EDITOR: Andreea GÎRTONEA

COPYRIGHT: Any reproduction is authorised, without fees, provided that the source is mentioned. Authors are fully responsible for their papers content and for the accuracy of English language.

CONTENTS

SECTION I STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN POWER RELATIONS

THE COLD WAR GENEALOGY OF DONALD TRUMP'S CRITICISM OF NATO BURDEN-SHARING <i>Alexandru LUCINESCU, Ph.D.</i>	7
STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE ARCTIC <i>Florin DIACONU, Ph.D.</i>	17
SEPARATIST STATE FORMATIONS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RECOGNITION: INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF HYBRID WARFARE..... <i>Aurelian LAVRIC</i>	28
A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO STRATEGIC CULTURES OF CHINA AND INDIA TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA: ORIGINS, MANIFESTATIONS, AND IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY <i>Shakaib RAFIQUE, Ph.D.</i>	41
YEMENI HOUTHİ – INSURGENT OR TERRORIST MOVEMENT? <i>Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D.</i>	59
THE ROLE, OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY BASES OF THE STATE ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR (2011-2019)..... <i>Cătălin Alin COSTEA</i>	74
ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY <i>Doina MUREȘAN, Ph.D.</i>	97
AN ASSESSMENT OF UN RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS..... <i>Iffat NAHEED, Ph.D.</i>	101
ISIS AND WOMEN..... <i>Raluca LUȚAI, Ph.D.</i>	111
DIGITAL DIASPORA: VIRTUALISATION OF POLITICS AND NEW HYBRID CHALLENGES IN NOWADAYS ROMANIA..... <i>Iulia ANGHEL, Ph.D.</i>	118
DEFENDING VALUES: THE KEY RELEVANCE OF NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT <i>Cristina BOGZEANU, Ph.D.</i>	131

SECTION II SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

THE CHANGE OF THE NEW GENERATION OF THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY.....	143
<i>Iulian CHIFU, Ph.D.</i>	
NEW CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OF THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR	154
<i>Alexandra SARCINSCHI, Ph.D.</i>	
RUSSIAN FAKE NEWS – A NEW INSTRUMENT OF PROPAGANDA.....	163
<i>Mara Sofia CRĂCIUNESCU</i>	
FUTURE GEOPOLITICS OF A DEMOGRAPHICALLY CHANGING EUROPE.....	171
<i>Dragoş Ionuţ PALĂ</i>	
EXTREMISM AND RADICALISM – CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY	184
<i>Daniel-Mihai DUȚU, Teodor BADIU</i>	
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY – WHAT DOES IT MEAN?.....	195
<i>Sorina Ana MANEA</i>	
A STUDY ON CYBER SECURITY LEGISLATION.....	203
<i>Simona ENESCU</i>	
APPLICATIONS OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.....	213
<i>Cristina BODONI</i>	
OSCE WORK ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN CYBERSPACE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL FUTURE EVOLUTIONS	225
<i>Cristiana Florentina DINCĂ</i>	
MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN’S REFORMS VS. WAHHABI RULES: A CHALLENGE FOR THE STATUS QUO OF THE SAUDI STATE	235
<i>Ecaterina MAȚOI, Ph.D.; Diana-Monica CONSTANTIN</i>	
WAR FOR WATER.....	249
<i>Viorel ORDEANU, Ph.D.; Benoni ANDRONIC, Ph.D.; Lucia Elena IONESCU, Ph.D.</i>	
CROSS BORDER CRIME IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION	258
<i>Diana-Gabriela POHAȚĂ</i>	
THE VULNERABILITIES OF PUBLIC POLICIES - TAX EVASION.....	269
<i>Diana-Gabriela POHAȚĂ</i>	

SECTION III
STRATEGIC THEORY AND PRACTICE

ON STRATEGY IN HYBRID WARFARE	279
<i>Dan-Lucian PETRESCU, Ph.D.</i>	
THEORIES ON HYBRID THREAT AND HYBRID WAR. DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY THINKING	291
<i>Costinel Nicolae MAREȘI</i>	
NATO-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP FOR COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS	300
<i>Costinel Nicolae MAREȘI</i>	
SPACE STRATEGIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INITIATING “STRATEGIC PROTECTED COSMIC AREAS”. IS THE “IMMEDIATE COSMIC SPACE” AN “ASSET FOR THE ENTIRE HUMANITY”? THE NEW AMERICAN STRATEGIC CONCEPT – “MOON-MARS STRATEGIC COMPLEX”	308
<i>Mădălina ANTONESCU, Ph.D.</i>	
TOWARDS AN EXTENDED STRATEGIC CONCEPT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: “THE GREAT NATO SPACE” AND THE EXPANSION TOWARDS THE PACIFIC. THE STRATEGIC “DOUBLE-OCEAN” CONNECTION	320
<i>Mădălina ANTONESCU, Ph.D.</i>	
NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN JOINT MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	332
<i>Alexandru HERCIU, Ph.D.</i>	
SEA CONTROL – AN ESSENTIAL TASK FOR NAVAL FORCES	343
<i>Valentin Marian TOMA; Ion CHIORCEA, Ph.D.</i>	
CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION IN MILITARY OPERATIONS	350
<i>Ciprian Gabriel TUDOR</i>	
GEOINT IN MONITORING AND DETECTION OF MILITARY CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION – GEOINT COUNTERDECEPTION	362
<i>Ciprian Gabriel TUDOR</i>	
THE USE OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS FOR EVACUATION AND MEDICAL SUPPORT	371
<i>Eduard Grigore JELER</i>	
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS OF UAV SYSTEMS	379
<i>Eduard Grigore JELER</i>	
INDEX OF AUTHORS	387

THE COLD WAR GENEALOGY OF DONALD TRUMP'S CRITICISM OF NATO BURDEN-SHARING

Alexandru LUCINESCU, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, "Carol I" National Defence University
Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: lucinescu.alexandru@gmail.com

Abstract: *Since assuming office, Donald Trump turned the burden-sharing among NATO members into one of the most contentious issues of the transatlantic relations so that his stance became a relevant topic for research and debate. Given that the roots of Trump's criticism are to be found during the final years of the Cold War when he began to widely publicized his dissatisfaction with the major financial loss for the United States that, in his view, resulted from the defence it provided to its allies around the world, framing his views in the policy towards NATO burden-sharing followed by the United States during the Cold War, which is the purpose of this paper, contributes to further the understanding of his current position on this topic. For this purpose, in the first section of the paper are highlighted and described the two approaches to the NATO burden-sharing developed at the political level in the United States from 1949 to 1989 and the importance that successive presidents of the United States attached to them during that period is considered. In the second part of the paper, these approaches are used for analysing Trump's influential open letter from 1987 and the widely commented speech he delivered the same year at Portsmouth Rotary Club, which both addressed the financial aspects of the defence by the United States of its allies and which turned him for the first time into a potential presidential candidate. The paper concludes that Trump's position was not out of the ordinary because it reflected the political debates on NATO burden-sharing that took place in the United States during the Cold War and that a correct understanding of it is highly relevant for his present position on this topic given that he continued to hold the essence of it after the end of the Cold War.*

Keywords: *Donald Trump; NATO burden-sharing; Cold War; transatlantic relations; United States; defence budget.*

Donald Trump's insistence on rebalancing the burden-sharing among NATO members, his strongly voiced dissatisfaction with the financial contribution of the European members of NATO to the costs entailed by the defence provided to them by the United States and, as a result of it, his calling into question of the commitment of the United States to defend these states have been perceived as a sharp break with how the previous administrations approached the cooperation within NATO and fuelled speculations about a possible demise of the transatlantic solidarity and of NATO itself. However, the novelty for the transatlantic relations of Trump's stance could be qualified by considering the controversies on NATO burden-sharing which took place even before the establishment of NATO and which continued all along the Cold War. Such a historical perspective equally reveals that Trump did not become critical towards the European members of NATO since he assumed office but that he held such a view beginning with 1987 when he publicly expressed his position on the financial loose incurred to the United States by those states whose defence it was then providing. Analysing Trump's views from 1987 in the context of the Cold War debates on NATO burden-sharing contributes to a better understanding of his present-day stance and, thus, of the relevancy of those debates for the formulation of his viewpoint. The first section of this paper retraces the position on NATO

burden-sharing adopted during the Cold War by the United States, pointing out the types of demands addressed to the European members of the Alliance and assessing the perseverance with which they have been followed by successive administrations from the United States. The second section provides a reading through the lens of those demands of Trump's position on financing the defence of the allies of the United States that he expressed back in 1987.

1. The NATO burden-sharing debate during the Cold War

The issue of burden-sharing is an old one and dates back to the establishment of the Alliance which was part of the so called *transatlantic bargain* and which consisted in equilibrating the commitment of the United States to the defence of Western Europe with the Western European states themselves substantially contributing to their own defence¹. This bargain was essential for the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate of the United States, in line with the view of the American public opinion, agreeing to support it only on condition that the European parties to it would strive to develop their own defensive capabilities in exchange for the defence provided by the US exclusively through its air and naval forces². The *Vandenberg Resolution*, which was adopted by the Senate in 1948 and which opened the way for the negotiations in view of establishing NATO, mentioned that the United States had to join collective arrangements designed to provide defence on a collective basis on condition that they "are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" and that they "affect its national security"³. The so-called *Washington Paper*, a document that resulted from the negotiations conducted the same year from July to September in view of concluding an alliance involving the United States in the defence of Western Europe, mentioned that the support provided by the United States was designed to complement the "maximum efforts of the other nations on behalf of themselves and each other"⁴. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty was understood by the Senate of the United States as encapsulating these ideas so that it was read as committing the European members of NATO to do everything in their power to defend themselves individually and collectively⁵. The detailed explanations about that article that have been provided to the members of the Senate by the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson made clear that the defence of the prospective members of NATO had to be provided mainly by themselves so that these states and not the United States had to contribute the most to the attainment of the objectives pursued through NATO. Moreover, Acheson assured the Senate that under the treaty the United States would not increase the number of the ground forces already present in Western Europe and entrusted with handling the occupation of Germany given that the costs entailed by deploying there much more ground forces would be very high and would have a significant impact on the federal budget⁶.

¹ Charles A. Cooper, Benjamin Zycher, *Perceptions on NATO Burden-Sharing*, p. v, The RAND Corporation, June 1989, URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3750.html>, accessed on 04. 08. 2019. The term of *transatlantic bargain*, which was introduced in the '60 by Harlan Cleveland, a former U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (1965-1969), could be defined as "the United States' commitment to the rebuilding, both economically and militarily, of Western Europe after the devastation of World War II – in exchange for Europe organizing itself in its own defence". (See Lawrence S. Kaplan, "Question One: What has the Transatlantic Bargain been and Evolved into Today?", in Mark D. Ducasse (ed.), *The Transatlantic Bargain*, NATO Defence College, Rome, 2012, p. 34).

² Charles A. Cooper, Benjamin Zycher, *op. cit.*, p. 2 and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

³ *Vandenberg resolution. U.S. Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 11th June 1948*, URL: https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/Vandenberg%20resolution.pdf, accessed on 12. 08. 2019.

⁴ Phil Williams, *The Senate and the US Troops in Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1985, p. 14.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 22, 23.

It is relevant that the prospective European members of NATO were asked to make a substantial effort against the background of the severe economic difficulties they were facing after the end of the World War II⁷, which demonstrates that the United States did not consider their depleted economic situation as an argument for lessening their demands. It is also telling for the way the United States then understood the relationship within NATO that at the end of the 1940s the United States enjoyed a strong economy enabling it to support the defence of Western Europe almost by itself and with no serious detrimental consequences for its economy⁸. The European counterparts have not been satisfied with the conditions they had to comply with given that they preferred to rely on the military support provided by the United States without assuming hard commitments in return, a perspective that motivated them to hope that they would later manage to ease these conditions⁹.

It follows that, when NATO was established, the burden for the defence of Western Europe fell mainly on the European members of the Alliance which, by signing the North Atlantic Treaty, assumed the obligation to develop their armed forces to the highest possible level in the given circumstances. This design of the burden-sharing aimed precisely at avoiding the situation in which the costs for the defence of the European members of NATO had to be covered by the United States, so that the idea of those states accumulating debts to the United States and the subsequent idea of reimbursing them were not in line with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty and therefore it was expected for them never to be turned into a subject for transatlantic disputes.

The original structure of NATO burden-sharing was substantially altered with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 when the United States had to rapidly and significantly increase their military presence in Western Europe in order to defend it against a Soviet attack which was then considered a serious possibility. Henry Truman had to act in this way because the European members of NATO disposed of a weak capacity to defend themselves but, by taking this decision, he departed from the assurances previously given to the Senate by Dean Acheson that in Western Europe there would be no ground forces in addition to those needed for handling the occupation of Germany. By agreeing to include the deployed US ground forces into a structure of integrated forces placed under the command of the United States, president Truman emphasised that “The United States should make it clear that it is now squarely up to the European signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to provide the balance of forces required for the initial defence. Firm programs for the development of such forces should represent a prerequisite for the fulfilment of the above commitments on the part of the United States”¹⁰. The establishment of these forces have been decided afterwards at the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York from 16 to 18 September 1950 and it resulted in the United States paying for the defence of Western Europe, a situation which changed the initial design of NATO burden-sharing.

⁷ Charles A. Cooper, Benjamin Zycher, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁸ Alan Tonelson, “NATO Burden-Sharing: Promises, Promises”, in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 3 [23]/2000, p. 31.

⁹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁰ Alan Tonelson, *op. cit.*, p. 32. The cited document is National Security Council-82 *United States Position Regarding Strengthening the Defence of Europe and the Nature of Germany's Contribution Thereto* approved by Truman on 11 September 1950. On the decisions adopted by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting from September 1950 see NATO, NATO Archives, *The pace quickens*, available at <https://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/4.htm>, accessed on 07. 08. 2019 and *Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council*, 16-18 September 1950, New York, available at <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c500918a.htm>, accessed on 07. 08. 2019.

Following that decision adopted by the North Atlantic Council, the United States forces stationed in Europe grew with more than 100, 000 people in 1951¹¹ and, as a result of it, the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower, warned the European members of NATO that the substantial increase by the United States of its military presence in Western Europe represented a temporary measure corresponding to a crisis situation and intended to last only up to the moment those states would have enough economic force to be able to provide for their own defence¹².

Succeeding Henry Truman as President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, continued to increase the number of ground forces deployed to Western Europe which reached a peak during his second term with 438 859 men stationing there in 1957¹³. This policy entailed substantial financial efforts on the part of the United States in a period when its economy experienced difficulties so that Eisenhower pressured the European members of NATO to allocate more financial resources for improving their conventional forces¹⁴. In 1958 Eisenhower reached the conclusion that the economic problems of the United States were partly arising from the large share of its GNP that it was obliged to allocate for defence (10%) and partly from the increasing economic competitiveness of the Western European states¹⁵. One could argue that his position was built on the assumption that the underfinancing of the defence by these states benefited their economic performance and disadvantaged the economy of the United States which was equally affected by bearing a substantial share of the cost of their defence. The dissatisfaction of president Dwight D. Eisenhower with the underfinance of defence by the European members of NATO was equally motivated by security concerns because their weakness obliged the United States to attribute more importance for their defence to its nuclear arsenal, an option which entailed greater risks for the United States¹⁶.

It could be argued that, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the issue of burden-sharing started to be discussed on two interrelated levels, namely the level of the development by the European members of NATO of their own armed forces and the level of reimbursing the costs for the defence provided to them by the United States. The latter level gradually became the most important one in the next two decades¹⁷ and its connection with the former level laid in the fact that strong armed forces developed by the European members of the Alliance enabled the United States to reduce its military presence in Western Europe which, in turn, led to a decrease of the amount of money that these states had to reimburse to the United States for defending them. However, it is to be remarked that only the first level of the burden-sharing corresponds to how the sharing of responsibilities within NATO was conceived when the Alliance was established.

Under the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the United States became even more concerned with what was perceived as the inability of its European allies to do more for their own defence, the intense development of the nuclear arsenal of USSR and the growing involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War adding a sense of urgency to the existence

¹¹ Tim Kane, *A Report of The Heritage Centre for Data Analysis, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003*, October 27, 2004 available at <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>. The *Troops dataset* which accompanies this report is available at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/troopsdb.cfm. According to the data provided by Kane, in 1950 the United States disposed of 120,497 troops in Europe and the next year their number reached 250,601.

¹² Alan Tonelson, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹³ Tim Kane, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Alan Tonelson, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 32.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 32, 33.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

of strong conventional armed forces in Western Europe¹⁸. Kennedy vividly expressed his criticism of the European members of NATO in January 1963 when he argued at a meeting of the National Security Council that “We cannot continue to pay for the military protection of Europe while the NATO states are not paying their fair share and living off “the fat of the land””¹⁹. He considered that these states were taking advantage of the defence provided to them by the United States and accelerated their economic development up to the point where they started to produce negative consequences on the economy of the United States. As an argument for his criticism, Kennedy illustrated the imbalance between the United States and the European members of NATO by pointing out that, for combat situations, the forces of the United States in Western Europe disposed of supplies for ninety days while the forces of its allies had supplies for maximum three days and by mentioning that the forces of the United States were closer to the potential frontline than those of France²⁰.

The criticism on the part of their main ally, which continued during the Johnson administration, contributed to the European members of NATO providing financial support to the military involvement of the United States by, among other things, buying more military equipment from the United States and allocating more money for the United States forces stationed on their soil²¹, an approach which marked the rise to prominence of the framing of the burden-sharing in terms of them paying for the deployed US forces in Western Europe.

The Nixon administration inherited this dominant perspective to the burden-sharing but decided to reduce its importance in favour of the need for the European members of NATO to focus on developing their defence capacity²². However, Nixon’s desire to refocus on what has been previously called the first level of the burden-sharing had to cope with the pressure on the part of the Congress for the reimbursement of the military involvement of the United States in Western Europe, the initiative of two members of the Senate, Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn being particularly relevant in this respect. Thus, in 1973 the two Senators managed to pass an Amendment to the Defence procurement bill which asked the European members of NATO states to pay until 1975 the costs entailed by the deployment of the US troops for the purpose of defending them and demanded an withdrawal of them in case of noncompliance²³. In order to take into account the demands of the Congress, Nixon had to put the focus back on the European allies paying for the deployed US forces in Western Europe and thus to abandon his initial approach to the burden-sharing problem within NATO²⁴.

The Carter administration could be said to have returned to how Nixon had initially framed the issue of the burden-sharing given that, on grounds of reducing the risk of a nuclear war between the United States and the USSR, it insisted on the developing by the European members of the Alliance of strong conventional forces capable to engage the Soviet ones; despite this intention Carter failed to apply sufficient pressure on these states to make them comply with the demanded changes²⁵.

During his first term (1981-1985), Ronald Reagan was unwilling to engage in a controversy with the European members of the Alliance over the issue of burden-sharing which thus became a background topic within NATO. However, he brought it to the fore in his second term (1986-1989) but without turning it into a source of strong disagreement despite the fact

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

¹⁹ *Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council Meeting, Washington, January 22, 1963*, p. 486, URL: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d168>, accessed on 24. 08. 2019.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 486.

²¹ Alan Tonelson, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

²² *Ibidem*, pp. 33, 34.

²³ Phil Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 219, 220.

²⁴ Alan Tonelson, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

that significant disparities in the defence spending of the United States and of its allies continued to exist²⁶. Thus, in 1986, at the beginning of Reagan`s second term, the United States assigned 6,8% of its GDP to defence while the European members of NATO assigned less to it: Greece 6,1%, Turkey 5,8%, United Kingdom 5,1%, France 3,9%, Portugal 3,2%, Germany 3,1%, Netherlands 3,1%, Norway 3,1%, Belgium 3,0%, Spain 2,6%, Italy 2,2%, Denmark 2,0%, Luxembourg 1,1%²⁷. The Reagan administration was well aware of the disproportion in defence budgets among NATO members and of the fact that, in 1988, its European allies clearly met the economic conditions for providing more money for defence but it chose not to insist too much on it for the sake of preserving the solidarity of the Alliance in face of USSR²⁸. In a speech delivered in London on 4 May 1988, William H. Taft IV, the then Deputy Secretary of Defence, said that "our allies are prosperous enough to do more than they do now" so that the "Alliance members must be prepared to spend more on their defences". Thus, the Reagan administration seemed to return to an understanding of the burden-sharing primarily in terms of the European members of NATO developing their own armed forces.

In the late 80`s, the central media and the public opinion in the United States critically approached the problem of the imbalance among NATO`s members that characterized the financing of the defence sector, with a journalist from *Chicago Tribune* pointing out in 1987 that the percentage from the GNP assigned for defence in the United States was double compared to that of Germany and more than triple compared to that of Denmark²⁹, and with the public opinion being largely in favour of reducing the financing of the defence provided by the United States to Western Europe, an idea that was linked with the conviction of ordinary citizens that the European members of NATO disposed of powerful economies which seriously threatened the security of the United States³⁰.

It is to be mentioned that the transatlantic controversies generated in the 1950s by the size of the national budget allocated to defence by the European members of NATO were not to be found with respect to the common budgets of the Alliance, namely the civilian budget, the military budget and the Common Infrastructure Program budget that had been established in 1951. Given that these budgets are to be understood as a third level of the burden-sharing within NATO, it follows that only its first and its second levels represented a source of significant controversies and criticism. The member states successfully negotiated several formulas taking into account objective factors for determining their share of contribution to the civilian budget and to the military budget and, despite not being able to do the same in the case of the third common budget, they agreed upon criteria for a fair sharing of the costs entailed by the projects they implemented and, based on them, they elaborated specific arrangements for sharing the costs of each project³¹. The first formula common for the civil and the military

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 36, 37.

²⁷ Charles A. Cooper, Benjamin Zycher, *op. cit.*, Table 2, 1986 Defence Spending, GDP, and Defence/GDP, p. 20.

²⁸ William H. Taft IV cited in Alan Tonelson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²⁹ Charles A. Cooper, Benjamin Zycher, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 1, 2.

³¹ Dominika Kunertova, *One Measure Cannot Trump it all: Lessons from NATO's Early Burden-Sharing Debates*, pp. 8,9 and US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *NATO: History of Common Budget Cost Shares* (Letter Report, 05/22/98), 22 May 1998, URL: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-98-172/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-98-172.htm>, accessed on 07. 08. 2019.

budgets operated from 1951 to 1952³², the second such formula was agreed upon in 1952³³ and a third formula for both the civil and military budgets was elaborated in 1955³⁴. In 1966, the formula for determining the share of the contribution to the military budget was modified so that there was no more a common formula for both types of budget³⁵. It is telling for the ability of the allies to devise fair burden-share arrangements with respect to common budgets that, in 1966, when France ceased to contribute to the military budget, the remaining contributors agreed to proportionally share it among them and that, in 1982 when Spain joined NATO, its demand for calculating its share for the military and the civilian budget based on the value of its GDP per capita was agreed upon and resulted in a share considered to be fair for it³⁶.

2. The 1987 emergence of Donald Trump on the US political stage as a critic of the foreign defence expenditures of the United States

In the context of speculations about his possible candidacy for the Republican Party presidential primaries scheduled for 1988, Donald Trump published on 2 September 1987 in three of the most influential newspapers from the United States, namely *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *The Boston Globe*, an open letter in the form of an advertising in which he expressed his dissatisfaction about the conditions under which the United States defended since the end of the World War II various states around the world among which he explicitly mentioned only Japan and Saudi Arabia³⁷. One could rightly argue, given that, beginning with the establishment of NATO, the contribution of the European members of NATO to the burden-sharing within NATO represented a traditional contentious issue in the United States that his assertion referred equally to those states. Trump complained that the states for which the United States provided defence did not pay for it albeit they disposed of enough economic resources to do it and considered that the United States should not continue this defence policy because no vital interest of the United States was advanced in this way and because its economy was seriously crippled by the huge costs entailed by assuming such a responsibility and, also, by enabling the economy of Japan to develop at the expense of the economy of the United States against which it competed more and more. The lack of reference

³² This formula was grounded on the idea that states whose economic strength was similar had to pay the same share of the total budget and that the size of share to be paid by each state should reflect its national income. According to this formula, five groups of states emerged, the first consisted of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the second group being made up from Canada and Italy, the third group included Belgium and Netherlands, the fourth group consisted of Denmark, Norway and Portugal, while the last group was represented by Luxembourg and Iceland. (See US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *op. cit.*, Table II.1 Historic Cost-Share Changes to the NATO Civil Budget and Dominika Kunertova, *op. cit.*, pp. 7,8).

³³ The new formula kept from the previous one the inclusion of the United States, the United Kingdom and France into a single group as well as the 22,5% share for each member of that group but established for the other states a share calculated in relation to their gross national product and which was thus considered to mirror their capacity to make available the required financial resources. (See US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *op. cit.*, and Dominika Kunertova, *op. cit.*, pp. 7,8).

³⁴ This formula completely abandoned the grouping approach and instead calculated the share of each member based on the percent from the total NATO expenditures up to 1955 that was represented by its contribution during all those years. (See US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *op. cit.*).

³⁵ The formula peculiar to the military budget was elaborated in response to the demand by the United Kingdom for more equity among the members of the Alliance and, consequently, it relayed on how their GNP modified since 1955, on how it was predicted to evolve and also on their involvement in providing defence at international level. (See US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *op. cit.*).

³⁶ US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *op. cit.*

³⁷ Donald Trump, *There's nothing wrong with America's Foreign Defence Policy that a little Backbone can't cure. An open letter from Donald Trump on why America should stop Paying to defend countries that can afford to defend themselves*, 2 September 1987, URL: <https://twitter.com/nytarchives/status/788932518615650304>, accessed on 21. 08. 2019.

to the economies of the European states has not to be interpreted in the sense that the argument based on economic competition was not valid in their case, but rather in the sense that their economic power was below that of Japan and therefore they have not been considered the best example to be given.

Later that year, on 22 October, Trump delivered a speech at Portsmouth Rotary Club, a symbolical place for the Republican Party presidential primaries, where he reiterated the ideas from his open letter, assured his audience that by means of astute negotiation the United States would determine the states it defends to pay for it and he seemed to portray himself as the one capable to successfully conduct such negotiations³⁸.

It is to be remarked that Trump's stance on defence matters did not demand for an improvement of the armed forces of the states defended by the United States but only for these states to pay what the United States spent for this purpose which meant that this is how he implicitly framed the problem of the burden-sharing within NATO. Given that his criticism refers to a long period of time after the end of the World War II, it is to be considered that in his view the economically prosperous states had to pay the United States not only for the defence it was providing to them and would provide to them, but also for the defence it had already provided to them and which turned into a historical debt towards the United States. Trump did not explain why he implicitly preferred what have been termed as the second level of NATO burden-sharing but one could put forward the hypothesis that he considered that the European members of NATO were not capable of building sufficiently strong armed forces to defend themselves so that relying on the United States for defence was the only solution available to them. Such a reading of his position means that he asserted the absolute superiority of the armed forces of the United States compared to the armed forces that could be developed by those states and thus that he simply removed the first level of the burden-sharing and, consequently, the criticism of the European members of NATO for not investing enough in their armed forces. Taking into account that Trump was a prominent businessman and, as a result of that, endorsed a profit-oriented thinking, one could argue that he considered the defence weakness of the European members of NATO a business opportunity and not a danger for the United States.

The fact that Trump chose to address in his first nationwide political message the issue of defence shows what an important topic it was for the public opinion and also that Trump himself considered it as a defining problem not only for the foreign policy of the United States but also for the whole politics of the United States. His preference for this topic could also be explained by pointing out that, as mentioned above, it had been generally neglected by the Reagan administration and thus it could represent an important rhetorical argument against the most high profile candidate in the 1988 Republican presidential primaries, George H. W. Bush,³⁹ who served as the vice-president of Reagan beginning with his first mandate. The internal economic difficulties caused by the defence policy practiced abroad by the United States are equally to be considered a reason for Trump approaching this policy, given that he was already an important businessman operating at both national and international levels which enabled him to claim expertise in economic affairs and thus to give substance to his criticism and to the solutions he put forward.

³⁸ Fox Butterfield, *New Hampshire Speech Earns Praise for Trump*, 23, 10, 1987, URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/23/nyregion/new-hampshire-speech-earns-praise-for-trump.html>, accessed on 07. 07. 2019.

³⁹ George H. W. Bush announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for the presidential elections from 1998 on 13 October 1987 (See Stephen Knott, *George H. W. Bush: Campaigns and Elections*) URL: <https://millercenter.org/president/bush/campaigns-and-elections>, accessed on 31. 08. 2019.

After the end of the Cold War, Trump continued to endorse the central elements of his open letter from 1987⁴⁰ so that an in depth understanding of it, which requires it to be considered within the context in which it was published, is indispensable for grasping his present day perspective on NATO burden-sharing.

CONCLUSIONS

This travel back to the origins of NATO and to its evolution during the Cold War made possible for three interrelated levels of the burden-sharing responsibilities incumbent to the European members of NATO to be identified, namely the development by these members of strong armed forces, the reimbursement by them of the costs entailed by the armed forces of the United States being deployed overseas to defend Western Europe and, finally, their contribution to the common budgets of the Alliance. The first two levels which, unlike the third one, have been a subject of controversy all along the Cold War, did not simultaneously emerged and, when they coexisted, different degrees of importance have been attached to them. Thus, the first level was agreed upon during the negotiations for the establishment of NATO and was enshrined in article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty but the outbreak of the Korean War added to it the second level as a result of the deployment by the United States of substantial grounded forces in Western Europe in order to compensate for the weakness of the conventional forces that the European members of NATO disposed of. Up to the end of the 1950s when the United States was confronted with serious economic difficulties, the second level of burden-sharing operated in the background but afterwards it began to move in the forefront to become the most important one towards the end of the 1960s. Richard Nixon restored for a while the prominence of the first level of burden-sharing but he had to reconsider his position as a result of the pressure on the part of the Senate of the United States. However, in the final years of the Cold War the first level of burden-sharing seemed to have regained his importance.

With respect to the connections between the first two levels, the second level of burden-sharing could be conceived as a version of the first one because it presupposes that the European members of NATO indirectly bear the main share of the burden for their defence by paying to the United States the cost of providing conventional forces in their place. During the Cold War it varied not only the importance attributed by the United States to the first two levels of the burden-sharing but also the degree of the pressure the United States applied on its European allies to comply with their responsibilities under that level of burden-sharing that was considered as paramount. Thus, until the Carter administration the pressure was a significant one but since then it started to decrease and it almost disappeared during the first term of Ronald Reagan to be poorly recuperated in his second term when Donald Trump first widely publicised his views on the defence policy that the United State was following abroad.

Trump's perspective could be read as implicitly dealing only with the second level of the burden-sharing which was considered as an important financial opportunity for the United States and not as a situation that it had not to be involved in. It is possible to interpret Trump's stance as removing the first level of the burden-sharing on grounds that the European members of NATO could not develop armed forces capable to bring a decisive contribution to their defence so that they simply had to rely on the United States for this purpose and pay it for that. The removing of this level of burden-sharing meant that, according to Trump, the noncompliance with it could not be turned into a criticism of the European members of NATO. By expressing these ideas he implicitly intended to bring to the fore the then relatively neglected topic of the burden-sharing within NATO and to determine the increase of the pressure applied

⁴⁰ See on this problem Alexandru Lucinescu, "Donald Trump on the Price for the U.S Foreign Defense Policy – Tracing Back the Opinions of a Presidential Candidate", in *Bulletin of the „Carol I” National Defence University*, no. 1, 2017, pp. 56-63.

on the European members of NATO for them to comply with their responsibilities under the second level of the burden-sharing. Donald Trump's indirect approach of NATO burden-sharing reflects the Cold War debates on this issue and therefore has to be read in that context in order for being correctly apprehended. Such a consideration of it also enables one to better understand his current position on NATO burden-sharing given that he continues to hold the central ideas he expressed back in 1987.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, NATO, *Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council*, 16-18 September 1950, New York, URL: <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c500918a.htm>
2. ***, *Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council Meeting, Washington*, January 22, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII Western Europe and Canada, URL: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d168>
3. ***, *Vandenberg Resolution. U.S. Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 11th June 1948*, URL: https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/Vandenberg%20resolution.pdf
4. BUTTERFIELD, Fox, *New Hampshire Speech Earns Praise for Trump*, 23.10.1987, URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/23/nyregion/new-hampshire-speech-earns-praisefortrump.html>
5. COOPER, Charles A.; ZYCHER, Benjamin, *Perceptions on NATO Burden-Sharing*, The RAND Corporation, June 1989, URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3750.html>
6. KANE, Tim, *A Report of The Heritage Centre for Data Analysis, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003*, October 27, 2004, URL: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>
7. KAPLAN, Lawrence S., "Question One: What has the Transatlantic Bargain been and Evolved into Today?", in Mark D. Ducasse (ed.), *The Transatlantic Bargain*, NATO Defence College, Rome, 2012.
8. KUNERTOVA, Dominika, "One Measure Cannot Trump it all: Lessons from NATO's Early Burden-Sharing Debates", in *European Security*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 1-23.
9. NATO, NATO Archives, *The pace quickens*, URL: <https://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/4.htm>
10. TONELSON, Alan, "NATO Burden-Sharing: Promises, Promises", in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 23, no. 3, 2000, pp. 29-58.
11. TRUMP, Donald, *There's Nothing Wrong with America's Foreign Defence Policy that a Little Backbone Can't Cure. An open Letter from Donald Trump on why America Should Stop Paying to Defend Countries that can Afford to Defend Themselves*, 2 September 1987, URL: <https://twitter.com/nytarchives/status/788932518615650304>
12. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *NATO: History of Common Budget Cost Shares* (Letter Report, 05/22/98), 22 May 1998, URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-98-172/html/GAOREPORT_S-NSIAD-98-172.htm
13. WILLIAMS, Phil, *The Senate and the US Troops in Europe*, MacMillan Press, London, 1985.

STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE ARCTIC

Florin DIACONU, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest (FSPUB),
Romania. E-mail: florin.diaconu@fspub.unibuc.ro

Abstract: *Along the past few centuries, the Arctic has on several occasions been the scene for intense strategic competition and/or strategic conflict. First of all, in the Age of Great Geographic Discoveries, several competing European Powers poured a lot of resources into an effort aimed at finding the so-called Northwestern Passage. Later on, in both World Wars, the Arctic was an area used by some of the Western Powers to send arms and ammunition to Russia. In the context of the Cold War, both superpowers tried a lot to operate in and control the Arctic. Nowadays, in a dramatically changed environmental context, access to the Arctic is becoming easier than ever before, strongly boosting the strategic competition of the great powers in the region. Several important actors of the international arena are now trying to expand their presence in the region, aiming at least three major goals: strategic control of vitally important sea routes, strategic control of natural resources in the region, and blocking or containing the presence and actions of their strategic competitors.*

Keywords: The Arctic; strategic interests; sea routes; natural resources; strategic competition; military power; sea shelf; Russia; USA; Arctic Council.

INTRODUCTION

The general aim of this paper is to briefly present and analyze, using mainly *Western* official documents, academic studies and media reports, strategic competition in the Arctic nowadays. In order to accomplish such a goal, we are going to offer the reader first of all some opening remarks, mainly dealing with dramatically changed environmental conditions in the Arctic, then a brief survey of the most important past stages of strategic competition (sometimes escalating until reaching the level of open conflict) and cooperation in the region. A third segment of the text is exploring the Russian strategic posture in the Arctic, which is increasingly ambitious, assertive and sometimes even overtly aggressive. The Russian ambitions and actions in the Arctic are openly challenging the current balance of power in the region, being an important part of the wider and more general Russian policies and actions aimed at eroding the current global balance of power and the power status of Western powers.

The Arctic is a really large region. Geographers are stating its “boundary is generally considered to be north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33’N), which is the limit of the midnight sun and the winter twilight”¹. For our debate here, the most important feature of the region is „the Arctic... is mostly made up of ocean and seas”². And the Arctic Ocean, “although... is by far the smallest of the Earth’s oceans..., its area of 5,440,000 square miles (14,090,000 square km) is five times larger than that of the largest sea, the Mediterranean”³.

¹ ***, “What is the Arctic region?”, the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland (Finland), at URL: <https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion>, accessed on August 21, 2019.

² ***, “How Is The Arctic Region Defined?”, *Worldatlas.com*, URL: <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/how-is-the-arctic-region-defined.html>, accessed on August 22, 2019.

³ Ned Allen Ostenson, “Arctic Ocean”, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (online), URL: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Arctic-Ocean>, accessed on August 28, 2019.

Along the past few decades, natural conditions in the Arctic have massively changed, generating a lot of consequences, including at *political* and *military* levels, on the international arena. In the era of the Cold War, results of ice thickness observations made by patrolling submarines were the first to clearly indicate climate change was already present – “when I compared surveys of ice thickness that I had made from submarines in 1976 and 1987 and found a 15 per cent loss of average thickness”⁴, the author of a work recently published by the *Oxford University Press* is openly stating. In the context generated by global warming, the total size or areas in the Arctic Ocean covered by ice grew smaller and smaller. For example, “in September 2012 sea ice covered only 3.4 million square kilometers (km²) of the Arctic Ocean’s surface, down from 8 million km² in the 1970s”⁵.

As a direct result of such changes, *two major strategically significant windows of opportunity have occurred*. First of all, several *sea routes*, previously (almost) completely blocked by ice, became usable *on large scale*, for the first time in human history. We have to take into account the basic fact that sea routes crossing the Arctic Ocean can significantly shorten the huge distances international (and mainly intercontinental) trade has to cope with. For example, “experts estimate that during ice-free months, eastward shipment from Europe to China through the NSR (Northern Sea Route) is estimated to be around 40 per cent faster than the same journey via the Suez Canal... At the moment the Arctic Ocean has just three ice-free months a year but several estimates suggest that number will increase in coming years, boosting access and driving up traffic”⁶. Recent reports are also indicating “the Northwest Passage is now easily navigable, and by the end of 2015 a total of 238 ships had sailed through it”⁷. Secondly, *natural resources* in the region, mainly oil and natural gas deposits below the oceanic bottom, are now easier to exploit than ever before. And these deposits in the Arctic are really huge. Fifteen years ago, in 2004, *The New York Times* was reporting the Arctic Ocean floor might have natural resources deposits which are larger and richer than previously estimated: “Petroleum deposits are already charted along the shallow shelves fringing the Arctic from the North Slope of Alaska to northernmost Europe. But the cylinders of dark, ancient rock extracted from the submerged mountain range, the Lomonosov Ridge, are the first hint that such deposits may lie in the two-mile-deep basins near the top of the world”⁸. More recently, *Reuters* stated, reporting on the natural resources in the Arctic, the ongoing climatic changes are boosting “competition for oil and gas - estimated at 15 percent and 30 percent respectively of undiscovered reserves”⁹. In April 2019, *Voice of America* was reporting the Arctic region “is believed to hold up to one-quarter of the Earth’s undiscovered oil and gas”, and we also know the Russian President “has cited estimates that put the value of Arctic mineral riches at \$30 trillion”¹⁰. And in June 2019, *LiveScience* was stating: “now, three northern nations are vying to stake their claim to part of the Arctic seafloor, a region chock-full of fossil fuels that lies under thousands of miles of water and ice”, adding that in late May 2019, “Canada threw its

⁴ Peter Wadhams, *A Farewell to Ice: A Report from the Arctic*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, p. 1.

⁵ Peter Wadhams, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁶ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, “Polar powers: Russia’s bid for supremacy in the Arctic Ocean”, in *Financial Times (FT)*, April 28, 2019, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/2fa82760-5c4a-11e9-939a-341f5ada9d40>, accessed on September 16, 2019.

⁷ Peter Wadhams, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁸ Andrew C. Revkin, “Under All That Ice, Maybe Oil”, in *New York Times*, November 30, 2004, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/science/earth/under-all-that-ice-maybe-oil.html>, accessed on September 4, 2019.

⁹ Lesley Wroughton, “U.S. rejects interference by non-Arctic countries in polar region: official”, in *Reuters*, May 3, 2019, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pompeo-arctic/u-s-rejects-interference-by-non-arctic-countries-in-polar-region-official-idUSKCN1S8299>, accessed on September 28, 2019.

¹⁰ ***, “Russia Stakes Its Hold on Arctic with Military Base”, in the *Voice of America (VoA)*, April 4, 2019, URL: <https://www.voanews.com/europe/russia-stakes-its-hold-arctic-military-base>, accessed on September 15, 2019.

metaphorical hat into the ring, joining Russia and Denmark in arguing that science is on their side in laying claim to almost half a million square miles of underwater Arctic territory, based on the extent of its continental shelf - including the geographic North Pole”. The same source was also stating “at the center of the debate is the 1,100-mile-long (1,800 kilometers) Lomonosov Ridge..., which is about the size of California, is considered a promising source for oil and gas...”¹¹. As a direct result of the two windows of opportunity listed above, *strategic competition in the Arctic has been boosted again, several actors of the international arena trying a lot, each of them, to get positions enabling them to control both sea lanes and deposits of natural resources. Blocking the moves of strategic competitors in the region is another goal easy to understand.*

1. International cooperation and competition in the Arctic: very brief historical survey

Two basic formats of international relations have been used (and can be academically explored, when dealing with realities) in the Arctic region, including the Arctic Ocean and the surrounding seas: *competition* and *cooperation* (both *bilateral* and *multilateral*).

Strategic competition (sometimes escalating until reaching the level of *open* and *major* political and military *conflict*) is not at all new in the Arctic. *Several* previous episodes along the past few hundred years are to be taken into account, in order to better understand both some of the ongoing events and trends, and also some possible (and more or less probable) future scenarios in the region. Starting very early after the moment when European explorers have discovered and immediately afterwards begun colonizing the both American continents, several of the European powers (both large ones, belonging to the immensely significant category usually called *world powers*, but also some smaller and weaker states, belonging to the category of *minor powers*¹²) started pouring quite important resources into a deliberate attempt aimed at quickly identifying and using the so-called Northwest Passage (NWP). This is „a sea route connecting the northern Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via waterways through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago”¹³. Along several centuries, the importance of the NWP has been obvious to political leaders, military strategists, bold businessmen and various types of explorers, because of a *very* simple reason: such a route was (and still is) able to significantly shorten the distance between Europe and the Far East. Later on, the Arctic region was used by some Western powers in order to send weapons to Russia, in World War I, and again in World War II, to send military support from Great Britain and USA to the Soviet Union¹⁴. Nuclear submarines of both superpowers have later on patrolled the Arctic Ocean in the era of the Cold War, and both Soviet Union and the United States have built and operated important military bases in the region (see the U.S. airbase at Thule, in Greenland, for example)

Nowadays, the increasing intensity of strategic competition (for sea routes and natural resources) in the Arctic is most vividly illustrated by the size of military exercises. Western powers are currently using such military drills in order to reach several goals: deterring as much as possible Russian aggressiveness, publicly expressing a political will strong enough to match the political will of the Kremlin, and boosting intra-NATO political and military cooperation. If we are to mention only a few recent examples, in October 2018, “some 50,000 soldiers, 250

¹¹ Tom Metcalfe, “Canada Makes a Claim to the North Pole”, in the *LiveScience.com*, June 7, 2019, URL: <https://www.livescience.com/65659-canada-claims-north-pole.html>, accessed on September 3, 2019.

¹² For the exact meaning of these two concepts see, for example, Martin Wight, *Politica de putere*, Editura Arc, Chişinău, 1998, pp. 62-68, and 69-75.

¹³ ***, “A Day at the Northwest Passage in July 2017”, the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland (Finland), URL: <https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion>, accessed on August 21, 2019.

¹⁴ See, for example, Winston Churchill, *Al Doilea Război Mondial*, Ed. Saeculum I.O., Bucureşti, 1996, vol. II, pp. 248-256.

aircraft, 65 ships and 10,000 tanks and other ground vehicles” have been used in the *Trident Juncture* war games, the largest NATO military drills since the end of the Cold War. These military exercises took place “from Iceland to Finland”, and media was reporting “31 countries” (including some which are *not* NATO members) have participated. Media reports were also stating the massive drills were “meant to test NATO’s response to an attack on Norway”¹⁵. A few months later, in March 2019, “hundreds of troops” belonging to several NATO member countries and partners, “joined Canadian soldiers, reservists and rangers for the Nanook-Nunalivut exercises that aimed in part to help alliance forces match Russian readiness in extreme-cold climes”¹⁶. And, more recently, a massive Russian military exercise which has *a lot* to do with the Arctic was “a strategic command staff exercise codenamed *Tsentr-2019*”, which has taken place between September 16 and September 21, 2019. The total amount of forces used has been really large – “128,000 personnel, 20,000 units of military equipment and artillery, 600 aircraft and helicopters and 15 naval vessels”. These military drills, “in addition to bolstering the cooperation in Central Asia” (mainly with China), have focused “on the defense of the Russian assets in the Arctic region”¹⁷.

But *legal and symbolic means are also used within the framework of the strategic competition in the Arctic*. For example, “on May 23, 2019 Canada filed a 2,100 page submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at United Nations. This follows a decade of scientific and legal work to determine the limits of Canada’s undersea landmass in the Arctic. This marks the first step in the process set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to obtain international recognition for the outer limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean”¹⁸. We are also to take into account that “Russia has already claimed the North Pole, and in 2007 sent two minisubmarines to place a titanium Russian flag on the seabed”¹⁹. A few months ago, interested in strengthening even more its positions in the Arctic, Russia made some moves aiming a tighter control of large underwater territories and immense resources in the region. International media is already paying increased attention to this trend. *Financial Times*, for example, is reporting Moscow “has gone in search of more territory, claiming that underwater ridges mean it should be granted another 1.2m square kilometres of the Arctic Ocean”, and “the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has recognised part of the neutral Arctic waters as a continuation of the Russian shelf”²⁰.

More recently, after the end of the Cold War, in a new geo-strategic context, several actors of the international arena (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America), all of them with territories in or near the Arctic and with significant interests in the region, have established, in September 1996, an interesting framework of *multilateral international cooperation* dealing with the Arctic problems, by means of establishing the *Arctic Council*. The official declaration of establishment of the new international institution was stating “the Arctic Council is established as a high level

¹⁵ Alec Luhn, “NATO holds biggest exercises since Cold War to counter Russia’s growing presence around the Arctic”, in *The Telegraph*, October 25, 2018, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/25/nato-holds-biggest-exercises-since-cold-war-counter-russia-arctic/>, accessed on September 3, 2019.

¹⁶ Helene Cooper, “Military Drills in Arctic Aim to Counter Russia, but the First Mission Is to Battle the Cold”, April 12, 2019, in *The New York Times*, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/world/europe/global-warming-russia-arctic-usa.html>, accessed on September 9, 2019.

¹⁷ “Tsentr 2019 and More: Russian Military Drills Reach Their Apex”, *Warsaw Institute*, September 17, 2019, URL: <https://warsawinstitute.org/tsentr-2019-russian-military-drills-reach-apex/>, accessed on September 28, 2019.

¹⁸ For all text fragments quoted in this segment of the text, see *Canada and the circumpolar Arctic*, on the official webpage of the Canadian Government, URL: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/index.aspx?lang=eng, accessed on September 25, 2019.

¹⁹ Helene Cooper, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, *op. cit.*

forum to... provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States... on common arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic”, also adding: “Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to: a. Non-arctic states; b. inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, global and regional; and c. non-governmental organizations”²¹. If we briefly explore *bilateral cooperation* in the Arctic, we are to take into account, for example, that in March 2016, the U.S. President and the Canadian Prime Minister have publicly “announced a new partnership to embrace opportunities and confront challenges in the changing Arctic, with Indigenous and Northern partnerships, and responsible, science-based leadership”. In the final stages of the same year, the same political leaders were launching a broad set of “actions ensuring a strong, sustainable and viable Arctic economy and ecosystem, with low-impact shipping, science based management of marine resources, and free from the risks of offshore oil and gas activity”, clearly stating, on the same occasion, they were targeting significantly increased cooperation in the foreseeable future: “these actions set the stage for deeper partnerships with other Arctic nations, including through the Arctic Council”²². Even if such episodes of international cooperation *do* exist in the Arctic, the general idea both media and academic sources of all sorts are presenting with a lot of details is that, *visibly, strategic competition is becoming more important than international cooperation in the Arctic*. This means, almost directly, *the associated political and military risks and threats are also growing larger*.

And, to make our very brief analysis more complete, we are also to take into account *the competition in the Arctic is now seriously overheated by some very ambitious ‘newcomers’, states not traditionally present in the region*. Along the past few years, some *non-Arctic* states have tried a lot to use any possible political tool and any sort of opportunity in order to accomplish two goals: increasingly involving themselves in the Arctic, and also making attempts aimed at getting a large share of the natural resources in the region. The most significant example is that of China, which “sometimes refers to itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’”. China has also “become one of the biggest mining investors in the region”, press agencies are reporting²³. In such a situation, on several occasions, senior U.S. officials made clear statements by means of which they strongly criticized the increased Chinese interference in the process of forging and implementing policies for (and in) the Arctic. In early May 2019, for example, an American official said “the United States rejects attempts by countries, like China, that are not members of the eight-nation Arctic Council, to claim a role in crafting policies governing the polar region”²⁴.

2. Role and goals of Russia in the strategic competition in the Arctic region

At this very moment, *the Russian Federation obviously is the most ambitious and most assertive (and sometimes overtly aggressive) political actor of the international arena, actively involved in the strategic competition in the Arctic. Several elements are indicating Russia is increasingly and deliberately challenging the traditional regional balance of power in the*

²¹ *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996)*, on the official webpage of the Government of Canada, September 19, 1996, URL: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/declaration_ac-declaration_ca.aspx?lang=eng, accessed on August 29, 2019.

²² *United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement*, on the official webpage of the Prime Minister of Canada, December 20, 2016, URL: <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2016/12/20/united-states-canada-joint-arctic-leaders-statement>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

²³ Lesley Wroughton, “U.S. rejects interference by non-Arctic countries in polar region: official”, in *Reuters*, May 3, 2019, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pompeo-arctic/u-s-rejects-interference-by-non-arctic-countries-in-polar-region-official-idUSKCN1S8299>, accessed on September 28, 2019.

²⁴ Lesley Wroughton, *op. cit.*

Arctic, most probably aiming international *de jure* or at least *de facto* recognition of its regional 'special' or hegemonic status. The Russian "government had been working on restricting the passage of foreign warships in the Arctic Ocean since 2018"; and in 2018, "Russia's vice premier stated that the government was also considering allowing transportation of hydrocarbons along the NSR only by Russian ships". The same study is indicating "in recent months statements by Russian officials reiterating Russia's rights in the Arctic have accelerated"²⁵.

The most visible strategically significant instrument used by the Russian Federation in its attempt to control and dominate the Arctic is military power. The June 2019 U.S. Department of Defense report addressed to the U.S. Congress and directly dealing with *strategic* threats, risks and opportunities in the Arctic region is openly stating "Russia views itself as a polar great power and is the largest Arctic nation by landmass, population, and military presence above the Arctic Circle". The same U.S. official document is stating "Russia's commercial investments in the Arctic region have been matched by continued defense investments and activities that strengthen both its territorial defense and its ability to control the NSR (Northern Sea Route)", adding that "Russia formed the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in December 2014 to coordinate its renewed emphasis on the Arctic. Since then, Russia has gradually strengthened its presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure in the Arctic, and establishing new military bases along its Arctic coastline. There is also a concerted effort to establish a network of air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars, rescue centers, and a variety of sensors"²⁶. Along the past 15 years, *Financial Times (FT)* is reporting, Russia "has built seven new military bases" along the so-called Northern Sea Route, in the Arctic Ocean (not far away from the northern shores of European Russia and of Siberia), and "deployed missile launchers, radars and thousands of troops"²⁷ in order to protect the coastal region and, most probably, in order to implement, step by step, by means of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) technologies, a new type of military (and, more broadly, strategic) reality in the Arctic, trying to deny, in case of need, any potential competitor easy access to the Northern Sea Route. Up to a certain point, in our opinion, some of the Russian activities in the Arctic are, broadly speaking, of the same nature as China's ongoing actions in the South China Sea, a region where Beijing is also deploying A2/AD pieces of military hardware, and troops. According to a map²⁸ made public, in the opening stages of 2017, by Dan Sullivan, U.S. Senator for Alaska, the Russian military bases in the Arctic quickly expanded along the past few years. Older bases grew significantly larger, and new ones have been established, not only on the Northern rim of Eurasia, but also on some islands in the Arctic ocean and in some of the surrounding seas - see, for example, several military facilities in the area of Franz Josef Land (or archipelago), the air base on Sredny Ostrov island, in the Northern Kara Sea, and the air base, the naval base, and the electronic warfare and radar facility on Wrangel Island. According to Sen. Dan Sullivan, "numbers don't lie", and "in recent years, Russia unveiled a new Arctic command, four new Arctic brigade combat teams, 14 new

²⁵ Nurlan Aliyev, "Russia's Military Capabilities in the Arctic", June 25, 2019, on the webpage of ICDS (Estonia's International Centre for Defence and Security), URL: <https://icds.ee/russias-military-capabilities-in-the-arctic/>, accessed on September 2, 2019.

²⁶ Department of Defense, USA, *Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy*, June 2019, URL: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF>, accessed on September 2, 2019, p. 4.

²⁷ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, *op. cit.*

²⁸ See the map in Robbie Gramer, "Here's What Russia's Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like", in *Foreign Policy*, January 25, 2017, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/>, text (and map) accessed on September 22, 2019.

operational airfields, 16 deepwater ports, and 40 icebreakers with an additional 11 in development”. Sullivan, directly representing in the upper chamber of the U.S. Congress the interests of Alaska, a state placed in the Arctic, the *U.S. military presence and capabilities in the region are not at all large enough*. He said, in the context of a public speech, the Russians “clearly recognized what the stakes in the Arctic are”, while the U.S. lacked, for quite many years, a strategy for the region: “What has been our national security strategy in the Arctic? Well I think until recently, from the U.S. perspective, from the [Pentagon] perspective, it really hasn’t existed”²⁹. The process of building and / or expanding already existent military bases is almost continuous in the Russian Arctic. A few months ago, in April 2019, for example, *CNN* was reporting “the Kotelnny base is one of three new Russian bases above the 75th parallel, part of a larger push by Russian President Vladimir Putin to flex his country’s military muscle across its massive Arctic coastline”³⁰.

The *Northern Fleet*, which is that part of the Russian Navy operating mainly (but not only) in the Arctic Ocean and in its surrounding seas, mainly using ports on the shores of the Arctic Ocean is, according to a very recent study, “the largest, most powerful and most modern naval force in Russia”³¹. Speaking about the *strategic significance of the Russian naval forces operating in the Arctic Ocean*, we also know a major change of the status of the Northern Fleet is imminent, in direct correlation with the increased significance of the Arctic region (including the Arctic Ocean) in the long-term plans of the Russian decision-makers. A quite recent study is indicating “Russia’s Ministry of Defense has proposed an amendment to the existing presidential decree on the military administrative division of the country. The amendment is expected to be completed and signed into law by December 1, 2019. It will mark an upgrade to the status of the Northern Fleet, effectively detaching it from its current subordination to the North Military District (MD)”³². Along the past few years, the pace of development and modernization of this segment of the Northern Fleet is an impressive one. A few examples can vividly illustrate this trend. First of all, reliable sources are reporting “from the *Petr Velikiy* battlecruiser to the *Admiral Gorshkov* frigate, Russia’s Northern Fleet is home to some of the newest, most advanced Russian surface ships”; more than this, the same Northern Fleet is going to be reinforced, in 2019, with several “new logistics vessels and submarines”. According to a statement made by Fleet Commander Nikolai Yevmenov, the submarines we are speaking about are “*Knyaz Vladimir* and *Kazan*, from the Borei and Yasen classes respectively”. The source we are quoting here from is also reporting “two more Borei vessels” are going to be “commissioned over the next several years”, and also that two major methods are used by the Russians in order to strengthen their Northern Fleet: “saturating the Northern Fleet with modernized submarines at the expense of shrinking its total submarine roster. The other is iteration in the form of deep refits of existing submarines, as the Pacific Fleet has recently done with a modernized batch of old Kilo models”³³. In early September 2019, Russian media confirmed, quoting official sources, “Russia’s *Knyaz Vladimir* (K-549) submarine is expected to be delivered to the Northern Fleet this year”, and the same source indicated that

²⁹ Robbie Gramer, *op. cit.*

³⁰ *Take exclusive look inside Russia's Arctic military base*, brief text and *CNN* video file (4.01 minutes long), on *YouTube*, April 5, 2019, URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nhZjAmr2Was>, accessed on September 24, 2019.

³¹ Nurlan Aliyev, *op. cit.*

³² Roger McDermott, “Moscow Plans to Upgrade the Status of the Northern Fleet”, in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 16, issue 58, *The Jamestown Foundation*, April 24, 2019, URL: <https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-plans-to-upgrade-the-status-of-the-northern-fleet/>, accessed on September 9, 2019.

³³ Mark Episkopos, “Naval Muscle: Russia's Northern Fleet Is Getting Some Seriously Dangerous Submarines”, in *The National Interest*, March 17, 2019, URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/naval-muscle-russias-northern-fleet-getting-some-seriously-dangerous-submarines-47827>, accessed on September 6, 2019.

“originally”, the submarine “was supposed to sail to the Pacific Fleet”³⁴. In order to better understand the capabilities of the Northern Fleet, we strongly underline that, “according to 2014 estimates, 81% of Russia’s sea-based nuclear weaponry is assigned to submarines attached to the Northern Fleet”, and in April 2019, the Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, has “stated that in the coming months the Northern Fleet would receive 368 of the latest weapons and military equipment, and that by the end of the year 59% of the country’s modern arsenal would be there”³⁵. We also know, from quite reliable Russian media sources quoting senior officials in Moscow, “in all, 10 *Borei*-class submarines will be built and commissioned by 2027. It is expected that five of them will sail to the Pacific Fleet and five other to the Northern Fleet”³⁶. These numbers, probably accurate, are clearly indicating the Arctic Ocean seems to be more important for Moscow than the clearly larger Pacific Ocean. We also know that reliable sources are indicating *the number and size of the military exercises the Russian Northern Fleet is involved in is growing*. Such a trend is clearly showing the Arctic Ocean is an increasing priority for the strategists in Moscow. Dealing with such massive military exercises, a recent study is indicating “in 2016, for example, the Northern Fleet participated in two large-scale two-month-long exercises. The exercises rehearsed the interaction between naval, aviation and ground forces in operations in the Arctic. This involved surface vessels and submarines, strategic bombers, air-defense units, naval infantry and motorized rifle brigades for combined air, land and sea operations”³⁷.

When we are exploring, with academic tools, Russia’s chances in the strategic competition for (and in) the Arctic, we have to pay special attention to the role of some vitally important technological assets. Some of the most visible ones are, for really mastering the Arctic Ocean, the icebreakers. As far as we know, one of Moscow’s important assets in the Arctic is the fact that, at this very moment, “Russia has the world’s only fleet of nuclear icebreakers”. More than this, “all but one of its... strong fleet will be replaced over the next decade at an estimated cost of between \$500m and \$1.5bn each. By 2035, its Arctic fleet will include at least 13 icebreakers, including nine nuclear powered vessels”³⁸, according to very senior Russian officials. On the contrary, U.S. icebreaker capabilities are, at this very moment, significantly smaller and weaker than those of Russia. In 2016, media reports were indicating “the American icebreaker fleet — the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard — has been severely neglected. It currently consists of one heavy icebreaker (recently refurbished but due for decommissioning sometime between December 2019 and December 2022 and one medium icebreaker”, and current “studies commissioned by the Coast Guard put forth that three of each class are required for the year-round fulfilment of northern responsibilities”. The text we are quoting here from was also estimating the Russian icebreaker fleet was, at that very moment, one “which boasts more than 40 vessels”³⁹.

³⁴ “New Russian Nuclear-Powered Sub to Be Delivered to Northern Fleet”, in *The Moscow Times*, September 6, 2019, URL: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/06/new-nuclear-powered-sub-to-be-delivered-to-northern-fleet-a67176>, accessed on September 8, 2019.

³⁵ Nurlan Aliyev, *op. cit.*

³⁶ “New Russian Nuclear-Powered Sub to Be Delivered to Northern Fleet”, in *The Moscow Times*, September 6, 2019, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/06/new-nuclear-powered-sub-to-be-delivered-to-northern-fleet-a67176>, accessed on September 8, 2019.

³⁷ Roger McDermott, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, *op. cit.*

³⁹ For these data about the so-called “icebreaker gap” see Andreas Kuersten, “Icebreakers and U.S. power: Separating fact from fiction”, *War on the Rocks*, October 11, 2016, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/icebreakers-and-u-s-power-separating-fact-from-fiction/>, accessed on September 11, 2019.

We are also to take into account academic studies trying to explore and explain the reasons making Russia behave in a more and more ambitious (and clearly revisionist, or anti-status quo) way in the Arctic region. A recent study, for example, is openly stating that Russia's "more assertive and revisionist foreign policy in combination with its military build-up and improved military capability have brought" are clearly visible in the Arctic region, and above all when dealing with the Arctic Ocean. Here, Russia's actions are driven by several goals, the study we are quoting here from is indicating. First of all, "Russia sees its national security and international influence as being based on nuclear weapons", and "in this equation, the Arctic is of the utmost importance" mainly because "the ballistic missile submarines operating under the Arctic Ocean ice cap are very hard to detect, making them suitable for a second strike in the unlikely event of a nuclear war". That is why "a total of 81.5 per cent of Russian strategic maritime nuclear capabilities are concentrated in the Northern Fleet". Secondly, "the Arctic Ocean is of key importance for Moscow's power projection as it also provides Russia with its only uncontested access to the Atlantic Ocean"⁴⁰, and *also* access to the Pacific Ocean as well. So that, concentrating forces in the Arctic Ocean and trying to completely dominate it is a strategic tool enabling Moscow to play, in case of need, a major role *both* in the Atlantic *and* in the Pacific.

CONCLUSIONS

At this very moment, the *global* strategic competition is wider, deeper and more complex than ever before, vividly unfolding in traditional areas and contexts, but also in some *new* ones (see, for example, competition in cyberspace, and competition in the outer space). *The strategic competition in the Arctic, which is an increasingly important constitutive part of the global strategic competition, is also more intense than ever before*: several actors of the international arena, including some which are geographically placed far away from the region, are more and more intensely competing not only for the control of some major sea routes, but also for the control of some undersea areas with large natural resources deposits. Several (or, better said, *most* of the) states directly involved in the strategic competition (and also in the limited cooperation made possible by the framework of the Arctic Council) in the Arctic are either small or medium-sized powers. In such a situation, a special responsibility falls on the shoulders of the U.S., the most powerful political actor in the Western world. Most obviously, the U.S. is the only actor of the international arena with a power potential large enough to allow designing and implementing policies aimed at maintaining the current balance of power in the Arctic, and also aimed at denying Russia and China increased control or fully dominant status at regional level.

For quite many years, the Arctic has not been a really major strategic priority for the United States. Such a strategic attitude has generated a major window of opportunity for Russia (and China), which have made some important steps in its attempt aimed at gaining regional mastery. Recently, some significant changes have occurred in the U.S. According to the most recent version of the U.S. *Arctic Strategy*, made public in June 2019 (and representing a *major* upgrade of the 2016 *Arctic Strategy*), "the United States is an Arctic nation". The same official document is clearly stating "the Arctic security environment has direct implications for U.S. national security interests. Geographically, the Arctic... represents a potential vector both for attacks on the homeland and for U.S. power projection", also adding that "approaches to the Arctic Ocean to both the east and west of the United States form strategic corridors for maritime

⁴⁰ Harri Mikkola, *The Geostrategic Arctic. Hard Security in the High North*, FIIA Briefing Paper, April 2019, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), URL: https://www.fiaa.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/bp259_geostrategic_arctic.pdf, accessed on September 19, 2019, pp. 1-2.

traffic”⁴¹ to be regarded as vitally important. *If* such clear political statements are going to be practically supported by really adequate financial resources, *if* NATO is going to adopt a more resolute attitude in the Arctic, *if* the Western powers (which, in the end, are the largest group within the Arctic Council) are going to behave in a more assertive and more coherent way, the most dangerous possible consequences of the increasing strategic competition in the Arctic might be kept under control. Otherwise, we think, the tensions will continuously accumulate in the Arctic, increasing the risk of major conflicts and crises. In the end, we can easily imagine, in a not too distant future, a new ‘Fashoda Incident’: not in Africa, as in 1898, but, fully possibly, somewhere in the Arctic, where power interests are now clearly and massively colliding, more intense than even before.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, “A Day at the Northwest Passage in July 2017”, *Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland* (Finland), URL: <https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion>
2. ***, “Canada and the circumpolar Arctic, on the official webpage of the Canadian Government”, URL: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/index.aspx?lang=eng
3. ***, “New Russian Nuclear-Powered Sub to Be Delivered to Northern Fleet”, in *The Moscow Times*, September 6, 2019, URL: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/06/new-nuclear-powered-sub-to-be-delivered-to-northern-fleet-a67176>
4. ***, “Russia Stakes Its Hold on Arctic with Military Base”, *Voice of America (VoA)* webpage, April 4, 2019, URL: <https://www.voanews.com/europe/russia-stakes-its-hold-arctic-military-base>
5. ***, “Take exclusive look inside Russia's Arctic military base”, text and *CNN* video file, on *YouTube*, April 5, 2019, URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nhZjAmr2Was>
6. ***, “Tsentr 2019 and More: Russian Military Drills Reach Their Apex”, *Warsaw Institute*, September 17, 2019, URL: <https://warsawinstitute.org/tsentr-2019-russian-military-drills-reach-apex>
7. ***, “What is the Arctic region?”, *Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland* (Finland), URL: <https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion>
8. ***, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996), on the official webpage of the Government of Canada, September 19, 1996, URL: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/declaration_ac-declaration_ca.aspx?lang=eng
9. ***, *Northwest Passage*, text on the website *History.com*, URL: <https://www.history.com/topics/exploration/northwest-passage>
10. ***, United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, on the official webpage of the Prime Minister of Canada, December 20, 2016, URL: <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2016/12/20/united-states-canada-joint-arctic-leaders-statement>
11. ALIYEV, Nurlan, “Russia’s Military Capabilities in the Arctic”, June 25, 2019, Estonia’s International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), URL: <https://icds.ee/russias-military-capabilities-in-the-arctic/>

⁴¹ Department of Defense, USA, *Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy*, June 2019, URL: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF>, accessed on September 2, 2019, p. 3.

12. ASTRASHEUSKAYA, Nastassia; FOY, Henry, “Polar powers: Russia’s bid for supremacy in the Arctic Ocean”, in *Financial Times (FT)*, April 28, 2019, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/2fa82760-5c4a-11e9-939a-341f5ada9d40>
13. CHURCHILL, Winston, *Al Doilea Război Mondial*, Ed. Saeculum I.O., București, 1996.
14. COOPER, Helene, “Military Drills in Arctic Aim to Counter Russia, but the First Mission Is to Battle the Cold”, April 12, 2019, in *The New York Times*, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/world/europe/global-warming-russia-arctic-usa.html>
15. Department of Defence of the USA, Report to Congress: Department of Defence Arctic Strategy, June 2019, URL: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF>
16. EPISKOPOS, Mark, “Naval Muscle: Russia's Northern Fleet Is Getting Some Seriously Dangerous Submarines”, in *The National Interest*, March 17, 2019, URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/naval-muscle-russias-northern-fleet-getting-some-seriously-dangerous-submarines-47827>
17. GRAMER, Robbie, “Here’s What Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like”, in *Foreign Policy*, January 25, 2017, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map>
18. KUERSTEN, Andreas, “Icebreakers and U.S. power: Separating fact from fiction”, *War on the Rocks* webpage, October 11, 2016, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/icebreakers-and-u-s-power-separating-fact-from-fiction/>
19. LUHN, Alec, “NATO holds biggest exercises since Cold War to counter Russia’s growing presence around the Arctic”, in *The Telegraph*, October 25, 2018, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/25/nato-holds-biggest-exercises-since-cold-war-counter-russia-arctic/>
20. McDERMOTT, Roger, “Moscow Plans to Upgrade the Status of the Northern Fleet”, in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 16, issue 58, The Jamestown Foundation, April 24, 2019, URL: <https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-plans-to-upgrade-the-status-of-the-northern-fleet>
21. METCALFE, Tom, *Canada Makes a Claim to the North Pole*, *LiveScience.com* webpage, June 7, 2019, URL: <https://www.livescience.com/65659-canada-claims-north-pole.html>
22. MIKKOLA, Harri, *The Geostrategic Arctic. Hard Security in the High North*, FIIA Briefing Paper, April 2019, *Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)*, URL: https://www.fia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/bp259_geostrategic_arctic.pdf
23. OSTENSO, Ned Allen, “Arctic Ocean”, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (online), URL: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Arctic-Ocean>
24. REVKIN, Andrew C., “Under All That Ice, Maybe Oil”, in *New York Times*, November 30, 2004, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/science/earth/under-all-that-ice-maybe-oil.html>
25. WADHAMS, Peter, *A Farewell to Ice: A Report from the Arctic*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017.
26. WIGHT, Martin, *Politica de putere*, Editura Arc, Chișinău, 1998.
27. WROUGHTON, Lesley, “U.S. rejects interference by non-Arctic countries in polar region: official”, *Reuters*, May 3, 2019, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pompeo-arctic/u-s-rejects-interference-by-non-arctic-countries-in-polar-region-official-idUSKCN1S8299>

SEPARATIST STATE FORMATIONS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RECOGNITION: INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF HYBRID WARFARE

Aurelian LAVRIC, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, Senior Researcher at Defence and Security Strategic Studies Center,
"Alexandru cel Bun" Military Academy, Chişinău, Republic of Moldova
E-mail: aurelianlavric@hotmail.com

Abstract: *Separatist states without international community recognition could be considered a threat to regional and international security, challenging the international order established after the Second World War and in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. They are an expression of the tendencies of revising the international system as, first and foremost through separatism, they undermine territorial integrity, the national security of the states they want to separate from and that face certain vulnerabilities. Analysing the list of these states, it can be noticed that they are geopolitical entities; they cannot exist without the support of some strong actors, which use them in their geopolitical games (hybrid wars). A hybrid war is part of a geopolitical game, whereby a regional power realizes its interests in a region.*

Such formations can survive as political entities only receiving the political, financial, logistical (military) support of a regional or global power, in exchange being tools to exert the influence of the supportive power. They survive if this is in the interest of a regional or global power.

Keywords: *not recognized by the international community and partially recognized state formations; separatism; secession; regional security; hybrid warfare.*

INTRODUCTION

Not recognized by the international community and partially recognized state formations – are a phenomenon that proliferated at the end of the Cold War, when the world order established at the Conference in Yalta (February 4-11, 1945) and enshrined in the Final Act of Helsinki Conference (August 1st, 1975), began to change, by breaking down federative states such as Yugoslavia, USSR, Czechoslovakia and so on. Only the breakup of Czechoslovakia took place amicably, the two republics negotiating also exchanging border territories – there was an exchange of localities between the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1994), in order to establish a border that corresponds to the will of the population from the neighbouring localities. The Czech-Slovak precedent is a worthy one to be followed by the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, whose common border, established on October 4, 1940 by the Soviet authorities in Moscow, by far corresponds neither to the historical right nor to the ethnic composition of the population of some districts, both Bessarabians (from northern and southern Bessarabia), with a majority Moldovan population (Noua-Suliţă, Reni and others), passed by the Soviets into Ukraine, as well as some from the Transnistrian strip – with a compact Ukrainian population (the district Rîbniţa et al.), passed in the composition of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The breakup of Yugoslavia led to the creation of a pro-Serbian separatist state formation – the Serbian Republic of Krajina (1991) – on the territory of Croatia, which was abolished following the withdrawal of the Serbian army from the region and following the takeover of the territory by the Croatian army (1995). It was clear that the separatist republic

Krajina could survive only with the support of Serbia, but the latter was pressed by the West to withdraw. The so-called republic of Krajina, created with the encouragement of the Belgrade federal government and funded by Belgrade to sabotage the efforts to create an independent Croatia, was an example of the use by the government of a state (Serbia) of its minority of co-ethnic group (Serbs) from the territory of another state (Croatia), in order to influence the situation in Croatia and the region.

The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina concerned the creation of Serbian and Croatian pretended as state formations, but which were reintegrated into a federal Bosnian state system, following an agreement signed by the leaders of the three component communities: Muslim, Serbian and Croatian, with the mediation of the West.

The disintegration of the USSR led to conflicts that determined the creation of several pretending as state formations: a) Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan, 1991), b) Transnistria (Moldova, 1992), c) Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia, 1992, 2008), d) Lugansk and Donetsk (Ukraine, 2014).

The independence of the separatist republics Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Lugansk and Donetsk has not recognized by any state, all these entities being unrecognized by the international community. After the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, Russia recognized the statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After Russia, the two separatist state formations have been recognized by Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu and Syria. Formally, Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be called as partially recognized state formations. It is worth mentioning that Russia has recognized the independence of the two separatist state formations on the territory of Georgia after several states recognized in 2008 the independence of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia.

However, states included in the former Socialist bloc during the Cold War period are not the only ones facing the phenomenon of the emergence of separatist state formations, self-proclaimed despite the agreement of the central authorities. Other older cases are worth mentioning: Taiwan (since 1950 – the self-entitled “China Republic”, after the Chinese civil war, claiming the succession of the Chinese state before the communists took power in Beijing), “The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus” (since 1974) et al.

We can define the object of this study – a not recognized by the international community or a partially recognized state formation – as: a self-proclaimed, pretending as a state entity in search of full recognition of its political independence by the international community, including the central government of the state from which it wishes to emerge. However, there are also cases when a pretending as state formation adopts independence as a transitional act in order to (re)unite with another state, from which it receives support. The expression “pretending as state formation” has the connotation that it is an entity that cannot be called *a state*, which cannot exist on its own, except with the help of a regional power that gives its support, without which the respective entity will disappear. According to Barry Buzan, a state consists of three components: a) *the physical basis of the state*; b) *the institutional expression of the state* and c) *the idea of the state*¹. Referring to his approach, Buzan specified: “The model suggests that the units must meet certain criteria before they can be considered as states”². George Cristian Maior also referred to “the nominal and structural attributes of the statehood (including territory)”³. A pretending as a state formation has problems in terms of the idea of the state: for example, Transnistria or Lugansk and Donetsk

¹ Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și frica*, Cartier Publishing house, Chișinău, 2014, p. 75 (the author’s translation).

² *Ibidem*, p. 76.

³ George Cristian Maior, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI*, Cartier Publishing house, Chișinău, 2015, p. 80 (the author’s translation).

“republics” – as there are no such ethnic communities and historical traditions regarding such states. In the specialized literature these formations are also called “de facto states”, a qualification with which I cannot agree. A frozen conflict, which allows the existence of a state formation without international recognition, for example – Transnistria, is the framework for the use of the pretending as state entity, by the state which supports it (Russia), as an instrument to promote its geopolitical interests. As the Transnistria’s exports (about 80% – in the Republic of Moldova and the EU) are carried out under the brand name “Made in Moldova”, the respective entity is far from could be called *a de facto state*. It can be examined rather as an autonomy within the Republic of Moldova – although it does not recognize this status, it enjoys the benefits it brings.

The not recognized by the international community or partially recognized state formations and those which especially can be called *pretending as state formations* (without a real base) are among the major objects of research in security studies because they represent threats to regional security, sources of destabilization and tension of interstate relations, especially when they are used as instruments by a regional power in a hybrid war, in order to strengthen its sphere of influence.

1. The separatist state formations: causes of emergence

There are several causes of emergence of the various separatist state formations, which either remain unrecognized or obtain limited recognition.

1. *The main cause is related to the fragility, the weakness of a state, in terms of societal security – failure to consolidate all communities within a society into a political nation, which share a common set of values (political, civic).* This determines the appearance of a conflict, which can be: interethnic, inter-confessional, inter-religious, linguistic, cultural, political-ideological, and geopolitical – with reference to the country’s orientation vector and so on.

A conflict can generate a separatist movement or is the consequence of such a movement. A separatist movement may take the form of a pretending as state entity. The concept of *fragile state* is related to the concept of *failed state*, in which the helplessness spiral is triggered by a series of characteristics of the vulnerable state. However, a divided state, with a frozen conflict, with a pretending as state formation on its territory, may not necessarily be a failed state, and Cyprus is an example in this regard. Due to the economic indicators (a functional market economy) and the performance in other fields (democracy and respect for human rights etc.), the Cypriot state has been admitted to the European Union. However, Cyprus is an exception that confirms the rule: a fragile state, with a pretending as state formation on its territory – an expression of a conflict, either frozen or active – is at risk to be qualified as a *failed state*.

A fragile, weak (and/or failed) state is most often also a *captive state*, which means *captive institutions* serving the interests of the ruling group. Power in a captive state faces problems in terms of *legitimacy* – due to dubious regulations regarding the electoral process, but especially because of suspicions related to the correct calculation of results, which favours the holding of political power. As a rule, in a captive state, political power stakeholders also hold: the judiciary, the economic power, the media power and so on, which they do not exercise for the benefit of the population of the country, but in their own interest of personal enrichment, respectively of keeping of the power as long as possible. Thus, state institutions become for the usurping group of power an asset. Finally, a captive state means *a captive population*, as from the results of its labour the group monopolizing the political power takes advantages, accessing in a discretionary way the state budgets, made up by the contributions of the citizens of the country. If the population does not have a participative political culture,

if it does not manifest solidarity and cannot fight for its rights, causing usurpers to surrender power, a solution for active citizens, who do not have the necessary conditions for a competitive economy in which they could manifest their talents and skills, is the release from “captivity” by leaving abroad, in search of a well-paid job, from which to support financially their families left home.

Referring to the Wider Black Sea Region after the Cold War, American researcher Charles King noted that “At the beginning of the new millennium [the 3rd], not the strength of the states threaten the peace and stability of the region, but rather their weakness. In many areas, poverty is endemic, and not so much as an effect of the ‘transition’ from centralized communist planning to a different system, but as a structural, chronic, feature of local economies. Where it exists, the state authority survives only as a source of income for various officials, in the form of small gifts, but also of fat bribes. The inadequate quality of social services makes the subsistence a permanent help effort, while the dependence on the old networks of the family, the clan or the ethnic group, keeps individuals unable to define themselves as equal in rights citizens of a modern state. Worse, the absence of adequate police forces allows cross-border criminal groups – willing to deal with everything from weapons to drugs and human beings – to act almost incessantly. The degradation of the environment and the potential ecological disasters, some produced by the communist economy, others by the aberrant industrial and agricultural policies of the successor states, endanger the health of the present and future generations”⁴. Referring to the state of the post-socialist countries, King also mentions: “The fragility of the states in the region is strikingly evident with the outbreak of separatist movements and civil wars. In the early 1990s, a series of small-scale conflicts and insurgent episodes ravaged South-Eastern Europe, but the calm was restored to some extent by the mid-decade. Conflicts in the Balkans and in the territories of the former Soviet Union have been resolved by peace or temporary ceasefire agreements”⁵.

In the Introduction to book “Uncertainty. Strategic Thinking and International Relations in the 21st Century”, by George Cristian Maior, Vasile Sebastian Dâncu mentioned: “The new threat arises from the ‘weak states’, the ‘failed states’, a structural weakness of the international order and the source of major conflicts of the 21st century”⁶. In his turn, George Cristian Maior notes: “the problem of ‘weak states’ (which the terrorist phenomenon and its processes are increasingly linked to), of ‘failed states’, degenerate, unable to provide elementary functions in law enforcement and after 1989, the control of its own national security became a major aspect of the structural weakness of the international order”⁷. Citing Christopher Coker, Maior noted: “These [weak states] are the most important issue of international order”⁸.

On the territory of a fragile (captive) state, a separatist state formation may appear as a result of a separatist movement, speculating on the vulnerability of the state from which it wants to detach, but benefiting from the support given by a state abroad, which has interests in the region. However, the separatist state formation will be all the more a captive formation, even by virtue of the control exercised from the outside by the *regional power* that patronizes the “being” of the not recognized state entity, through its administration and the subordinated law enforcement agencies.

⁴ Charles King, *Marea Neagră. O istorie*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2015, pp. 260-261 (the author’s translation).

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 261.

⁶ Vasile Sebastian Dâncu, in: George Cristian Maior, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI*, Cartier Publishing house, Chișinău, 2015, p. XII (the author’s translation).

⁷ George Cristian Maior, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI*, Cartier Publishing house, Chișinău, 2015, p. 46 (the author’s translation).

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 47.

2. *In the list of causes of the emergence of separatist state formation, should be considered cases when a community of considerable age, characterized by one or more identities – ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and so on – acts for:*

a) *Regaining the political independence* it had and lost at a certain historical moment (examples: most Soviet republics, Yugoslav republics etc.).

Catalonia is a special case for the recovery of independence. On October 27th, 2017, Barcelona Parliament voted for Catalonia's independence from Spain, after, as Catalan leaders declared, 300 years the Catalan people pursued the ideal of national liberation – of regaining the status of independent state. No state has recognized the independence of the Catalan state. Catalonia is currently the richest province in Spain.

On September 11th, 2019, some 600,000 people gathered in central Barcelona to participate in a rally dedicated to the National Day of Catalonia, while demanding the province's independence from Spain. In 2018 they were about one million. Supporters of the secessionist movement came armed with flags and wore T-shirts in Catalan colours. The National Day of Catalonia is celebrated annually on *September 11* and marks the fall of Barcelona during the Spanish Succession War, which took place in 1714 and the subsequent loss of Catalan institutions and laws. Beginning with 2012, September 11th became the date when are organized marches for of the secession movement of Catalonia.

The Catalan case showed that in order to obtain international community's independence recognition, it is necessary for the independence to get the recognition of the central government of the state from which the separatist formation wants to break up. Without the recognition of the central government and without the recognition from the international community, secession is difficult.

b) *Obtaining state status for the first time in history* (see the cases of East Timor, South Sudan, Kosovo and so on), following confrontations with the military forces of the central governments, which have resorted to bloody repression, causing victims and mass displacement of the population. The cases of *East Timor* and *South Sudan*, formations that gained independence from Indonesia, respectively, from Sudan, are relevant in this context. The international community recognized the independence of the respective entities, as in the case of Kosovo – a partially recognized separatist state formation– because of the atrocities found by international authorities, committed by the central authorities of the states from which the three mentioned formations were detached.

East Timor proclaimed independence on November 28th, 1975, but nine days later Indonesia invaded and occupied the country, and East Timor was declared the 27th province of Indonesia. The Indonesian occupation was characterized by violent clashes between the East Timorese separatist group and the Indonesian army, with significant losses in the East Timorese civilian population. In 1999, the Indonesian government decided, following strong international pressure, including from the United Nations, to hold a referendum on the future of East Timor. Portugal had begun to gain political allies to exert pressure on Indonesia, firstly within the EU, and then worldwide. The referendum was held on August 30th, and 78.5% of voters voted for independence, rejecting Indonesia's alternative bid to organize the state as an autonomous province within Indonesia – the Special Autonomous Region of East Timor. Immediately after that, the East Timorese Unionist militias backed by the Indonesian army, along with Indonesian soldiers, launched a campaign of violence and terrorism. About 1,400 Timorese were killed, there were reported rapes on women and girls, 300,000 East Timorese took refuge in West Timor⁹. Most of the country's infrastructure, including houses,

⁹ Nicu Pârlog, "Tigrii Tamili: Cea mai sângeroasă organizație teroristă din lume", in Descopera.ro, URL: <https://www.descopera.ro/cultura/13514391-tigrii-tamili-cea-mai-sangeroasa-organizatie-terorista-din-lume>, accessed at 19.09.2019 (the author's translation).

irrigation systems, electricity supply systems, schools and almost the entire electricity grid of the country were destroyed. On September 20th, 1999, peacekeeping troops, mostly Australian, were deployed in the country and stopped the violence. Activists in Portugal, Australia, in the United States, and in other countries have exerted pressure on their countries' governments to take action, and US President Bill Clinton warned Indonesia, which was already having economic problems, that IMF loans would be withdrawn. The Indonesian government agreed to withdraw its troops and allow the multinational force from Timor to stabilize the region. It became clear that the UN did not have sufficient resources to directly confront the paramilitary forces. Instead, the UN authorized the deployment of a multinational military force known as INTERFET (International Force for East Timor), following resolution no. 1264 of the Security Council. The troops consisted of soldiers from 17 countries, approximately 9,900 in total. 4,400 came from Australia and the rest from other countries in Southeast Asia. Troops entered East Timor on September 20th. Indonesia gave up control on the territory of East Timor. On May 20th, 2002, East Timor joined the United Nations and the Portuguese Language Community, becoming the newest independent state of the 21st century. The case of East Timor proved that Portugal's pressures and the support of the international community were critical for the independence of the respective entity.

Regarding *South Sudan*, the dissensions between North Sudan (Muslim) and the South (predominantly Christian and animist) had been constant ever since the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1898-1955) and reappeared immediately after the proclamation of Sudan's independence, on January 1st, 1956, which was followed by two civil wars (1956-1972 and 1983-2005). In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was concluded between North (Party of National Congress) and South (People's Liberation Movement of Sudan). The document provided, among other, granting of the autonomy of the Southern part and the organization, after five years, of a referendum on the self-determination of this region. The event, which took place on January 9th – 15th, 2011, was attended by 3.9 million people, who were overwhelmingly (98.8%) in favour of secession from the Northern part of the country, with a Muslim majority. On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan declared its independence, being admitted as a member of the UN on July 14th, 2011. On July 26th, 2011, South Sudan joined the African Union¹⁰ In the case of South Sudan, the support from the international community, following the bloody repression of the riots, transformed into civil wars, facilitated the recognition of independence, including by the authorities in Khartoum (the capital of Sudan).

The case of South Sudan presents an interesting aspect in the context of the studied topic. After gaining independence, the new state was the scene of a civil war between local groups, which showed that although South Sudan obtained *the status of a state*, its population did not represent a political nation, united around common values, of *an idea of state*. The transformation of a population into a political nation is a difficult process, but absolutely necessary in order to consolidate a state, in order to become a viable one, not a temporary, a failed one.

Kosovo is also a special case as it is a state entity with partial recognition, which obtained the recognition of its independence in 2008 following the atrocities of the Serbian law enforcement forces, found by UN documentation missions (2007). Five EU states – Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania – do not recognize Kosovo's independence, and neither does Serbia. Currently, 98 of the 193 UN member states have recognized the independence of the Kosovo region. The United States provided substantial aid to Kosovo,

¹⁰ Sudanul de Sud, URL: <http://www.mae.ro/node/9808>, accessed on 10.10.2019.

and after recognizing independence (in 2008), Washington established its own military base in Kosovo.

There are several peoples whose representatives have expressed the option of acquiring state independence: *the Kurds* (Iraq), *the Palestinians* in the occupied by Israel territories, *the Scots* (United Kingdom), the francophone inhabitants of Quebec (*les Québécois*, Canada), *the Flemings* (Belgium), *the Catalans and the Basques* (Spain), *the Germans* from South Tyrol (Italy) and so on. Generally speaking, from the perspective of the norms of international law, the right of peoples to existence within their own national state is recognized in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, resolutely promoted at the end World War I by US President Woodrow Wilson. There are people pursuing the ideal of freedom for millennia in a row (see the case of the Jewish people, who rebuilt their state – Israel – in 1948, with the support of the great powers). However, at a practical level, always (except for Czechoslovakia case) this principle contradicts the principles of the *territorial integrity*, the *inviolability of borders*, invoked by the central authorities of a recognized state. When the central authorities of a state resort to violent measures to suppress a separatist movement (through *ethnic cleansing*, *extermination*, *genocide*) the chances for a peace agreement, which would allow the preservation of the territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence of several communities with different cultural identities within a state, are considerably reduced. In cases when the authorities of a state resort to measures of repression against an ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious minority, the international community involves in defending the community in danger and, as a rule, recognizes the statehood of that community.

3. *Another cause of the emergence of separatist state formations is the speculation of the situation of a minority in a vulnerable state, by another state (a world power, a regional power or a protectorate state of a world or regional power), which can incite, encourage the respective minority to breakup from the central state, and can provide moral, logistical (military), financial support, etc. in this respect.* It is basically a violation of the principle of *non-interference in the internal affairs of another country*. The most recent cases of such support are the “people’s republics” Lugansk and Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine (since 2014), supported by the Russian Federation, but also the case of the Republic of Crimea. In the latter case, the Crimean parliament firstly voted for independence in relation with Ukraine and then voted for the unification with Russia, thus legally approving the annexation of Crimea by Russia. It should be noted that the scenario applied by Russia in Lugansk and Donetsk in 2014 was a resumption of the scenario applied by the Kremlin in the Transnistrian area of the Republic of Moldova in 1992 and in other states (in Georgia and, indirectly, in Azerbaijan) at the beginning of the ‘90s. The use of a minority from another state, the support for a separatist group, acting on behalf of that minority are all parts of the concept of *hybrid warfare*, which a regional power can use to strengthen its position in a region it wants to turn into its own sphere of influence.

2. The separatist state formations: scenarios regarding the evolution of conflicts

The emergence of a separatist state formation indicates the existence of a conflict between the central authorities of a state and the leaders of a separatist movement, which claims the recognition of statehood for a community characterized, as a rule, by a common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, ideological and so on identity. The outcome of such a conflict may concern several scenarios:

Scenario 1. An agreement between the central authorities and the leaders of the separatist movement regarding the establishment of autonomy, so the stay within the state from which it wanted to break away. An example of this is the formation of the Gagauz

autonomous territorial-administrative unit within the Republic of Moldova, whereby the crisis in the South of the country, which emerged in the context of the disassembly of the Soviet colossus, was defused. After November 12th, 1989, the first Congress of the Gagauz people proclaimed the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Gagauz Republic, *as part of the Moldovan SSR*, and a year later, on August 19th, 1990, the first Congress of the People's Deputies from the south of Moldova proclaimed the separatist republic in South of the country – already *in the framework of USSR*. Not receiving outside support (neither from Moscow nor from Ankara), the Gagauzians accepted the status of Autonomous Territorial Unit (UTA) “Gagauz Yeri”¹¹ within the Republic of Moldova (on December 23rd, 1994, the Parliament of the Republic Moldova adopted “Law on the special legal status of Gagauz Yeri”, thus resolving the dispute peacefully). The Gagauz separatist leaders got external support for their independence neither from Russia nor from Turkey. Moreover, Turkish President Süleyman Demirel supported the peaceful settlement of the conflict by preserving the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, by granting the status of autonomy for the Gagauzian community.

The cases of Quebec and Scotland, following the failure of referendums on secession from Canada, respectively, from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, can be also included in this scenario.

The Catalan case can also be examined in this context, because after not recognizing the results of the referendum on secession, respectively, after not recognizing the declaration of independence (2017), the relations between Madrid and Barcelona have returned to the previous state, without confrontations, even if street protests still have periodic place.

Scenario 2. Taking over the control by state's law enforcement forces: cases Krajina in Croatia, Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka and so on.

As we referred to *Krajina's* case was presented above, in the Introduction of this article, here, we will only focus on the second case.

Tamil Eelam is a former separatist state formation on the island of Sri Lanka. Tamil Eelam's independence from Sri Lanka has not been recognized by any country in the world. The pretending as state formation existed in the Northern and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka in period 1976-2009. The concept of Tamil Eelam comes from the organization of the Liberation Front of the United Tamil Union, which in 1976 presented the idea of an independent state for Tamils, the organization being described as a secular and nationalist one, although it used terrorist methods. Following the political conflicts related to constitutional changes, in 1978, the first requests for territory delimitation began, armed groups were created and the name, Tamil Eelam, appeared. The organization of the Tamil Tigers presented itself as an exclusively ethnic and cultural one, having no other ideology and no other purposes other than breaking a part of Sri Lanka and declaring a state constituted strictly on ethnic criteria, where only Tamils would live. Most of the Sri Lankan Tamils live in the Northeast of the island and, according to an official census of 2001, constituted at that time about 10% of the total population of the country. Unlike Sri Lankans, who are almost exclusively Buddhists, the Tamils are instead Hindus. Also, Tamils have their own unique language and alphabet, totally different from Sri Lankan language and alphabet. Considering themselves as a legitimate front that is fighting for the freedom of the Tamils ethnics, the Tamil Tigers have set up a parallel civil administration in the territory they own, proceeding to establish structures such as: own police, courts, post office, banks, administrative offices, police stations, radio and television, schools, etc.. It is known that the United States helped Sri Lankan troops with counterterrorism training against the military forces of Tamil Tigers.

¹¹ “Gagauz Republic”: *Gagauz-Yeri* in Gagauz language also means “Gagauz land” or “The Country of Gagauzes”; it is an incorrect name, a more appropriate variant would have been: “Gagauz Autonomy on the Republic of Moldova territory”.

According to some estimates, the Tamil militant organization killed over 60,000 people during its existence.

The mentioned cases – Krajina and Tamil Eelam – showed that the separation is very problematic when the following conditions are met:

- a) the central government does not accept secession;
- b) lack of outside support;
- c) the rebels of the separatist state formation resort to violence.

In the cases of Croatia and Sri Lanka, the international community did not support the secession movements, recognizing the territorial integrity of the mentioned states. Similarly, in the case of Catalonia: a) the lack of any outside support; and b) not accepting the secession by the central government from Madrid, made the province unable to (re)gain the independence.

Scenario 3. Recognition of the independence of a separatist state formation by the state from which it breaks up and by the international community, as a result of the atrocities committed by the central governments (see the cases of *East Timor*, *South Sudan*, etc.). The *Kosovo* case is a special one: the entity was recognized by 93 states, but was not recognized yet by the Belgrade government.

In this context, a question arises: when a separatist state formation can be recognized? There are several possibilities:

a) When the central government recognizes the independence of the entity that wishes to separate and the secession takes place peacefully (see the case of the breakup of Czechoslovakia, of the USSR – Moscow has recognized the independence of the 14 Soviet republics);

b) The international experience so far shows that in cases where law enforcement forces of the central government resort to drastic repression measures, the international community intervenes in the name of the *principle of respect for human rights* to save the human lives of the repressed community (see above mentioned cases of *East Timor*, *South Sudan*, *Kosovo* and other).

In this context, there is a question raising: what criteria must meet a separatist state formation in order to be recognized as a state? Researcher Hurst Hannum pointed out that: “No author has stated that international law recognizes the right to secession, although some scientists have tried to develop criteria to decide when the secession can be considered legitimate”¹². Hannum considers that: “In seeking the means to decide whether a secessionist movement is legitimate or not, a common denominator is the violation by the state of fundamental rights, only in the case of human rights violations can secession be justified”¹³. Hannum concluded: “The only test to determine the reasonableness of the request for self-determination must be the nature and extent of the lack of human rights in the subgroup claiming this right”¹⁴.

Scenario 4. Freezing a conflict: the state formation without international recognition remains either *unrecognized* (see the cases of Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Lugansk and Donetsk “republics” and others) or obtains a *limited recognition* (see Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kosovo, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and others).

The international community is aware of the fact that one way of counteracting the involvement in the internal affairs of a state – by supporting some state formations without international recognition, is to apply economic sanctions (Russia’s example, for supporting

¹² Hurst Hannum, *Autonomie, suveranitate și autodeterminare*, Paideia Publishing house, Bucharest, p. 434 (the author’s translation).

¹³ *Idem*.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 435.

the “republics” of Lugansk and Donetsk and for annexation of Crimea), so that the costs of maintaining a pretending as state formation to be too high for the geopolitical actor. Unfortunately, the sanctions applied to Russia have not yet had the desired effects, but the solidarity of the international community and the maintenance of a firm common position in this regard may in time determine Kremlin’s attitude towards respecting the norms of international law and respecting the independence and sovereignty of neighbouring states.

3. State formations without international recognition – instruments of geopolitical actors in the context of hybrid wars

There is a set of characteristics of the pretending as state formations from the current stage. One feature is that they represent disputed territories, between a central government and a separatist group, which can benefit from support: a) from the community they claim to represent and b) from the outside – from a regional or global power.

The unrecognized and with limited recognition state formations can emerge with outside support and can survive through outside support – they can remain pretending state entities only benefiting of the political (diplomatic), financial, logistical (military) support of a regional or global power. In exchange, the regional power that provides such support, establishing a protector-protectorate relationship, can use the not internationally recognized state formation as a tool to exercise its influence in the region. This becomes the reason, the cause, the purpose, the justification of the existence of a state formation without international recognition. It survives if it is in the interests of the regional or global power that protects it.

Obtaining outside support, from a regional or global power, a pretending as state formation, unrecognized by the state from which it wants to detach, or recognized by other states than the one from which it wants to detach, will carry out missions to promote the interests of power which provide support (first of all, destabilizing the state from which it wants to break free). In this way, a pretending as state formation becomes an instrument of exercising the influence of a regional or global power, which supports it, in geopolitical disputes – in hybrid wars – between geopolitical actors.

From this perspective can be viewed the relations:

- *Russia* – Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
- *Russia* – Transnistria (the so-called “Nistrian Moldovan Republic”);
- *Russia* – the “people’s republics” Lugansk and Donetsk;
- *Russia* (via Armenia) - Mountain Karabakh: through control over Armenia, which is a protectorate of Russia – Russia’s exercise of its influence over Azerbaijan;
- *Turkey* – Northern Cyprus.

Also, to a certain extent: *US* – Taiwan, Kosovo. However, we cannot imagine a scenario according to which the US would recognize a pretending as state formation for its subsequent annexation. In this regard, there is a major difference between the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia.

The support provided by a geopolitical actor for a state formation without international recognition is all the more necessary, since it could hardly survive economically, being unable to carry out international trade relations, not being renounced as an actor of international law. A state formation without international recognition that has a small surface area, has a small number of population, has no institutional traditions – the necessary *know-how* for being a state (after a long period of incorporation in the state from which it wants to detach or did not existed as a state before), which has low economic production capacities, which does not have a state idea (except, often, hatred towards the state from which it wants to break away), the more it can encounter difficulties in affirming and consolidating the desired statehood.

All pretending as state formations in the post-Soviet space, including the recent case of the “people’s republics” Lugansk and Donetsk, are relevant in this context. Several researchers have invoked the concept of *hybrid warfare* for the analysis of events – from 2014 to present – in Eastern Ukraine. Yury Fedorov claims that “hybrid” warfare means: “a complex of measures, which in itself combines military actions in their traditional understanding with non-military measures of destabilization, destruction and annihilation of the enemy, including the exercise of economic pressure, inciting political and social conflicts, conducting subversive activities and mass propaganda campaigns known as «psychological warfare» or «information warfare»”¹⁵. Referring to the events in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Fedorov mentions: “The Kremlin concluded that with the help of the «hybrid» warfare, which involved mobilizing the local population, which would then be thrown into the fight against the Kiev government, Moscow would be able to achieve their goals with much less losses compared to the «classic» war”¹⁶. Fedorov specified, regarding the case of Eastern Ukraine, that: “by giving his aggression in Ukraine as a certain rebellion of the local population, the Kremlin will be able to disguise its aggression as a civil war and, in this way, avoid the considerable aggravation of his relations with West”¹⁷. The creation of the “People’s Republics” Lugansk and Donetsk is part of the Kremlin’s scenario of exerting pressure on Kiev regarding its intention to associate Ukraine with the European Union and, especially, on Kiev’s cooperation with NATO actions. Serhiy Hromenko dedicated his study to propaganda of the Russian Federation on Crimea, noting: “In 2014, a large number of separate myths and falsified facts gave rise to the so-called «Crimea is ours» *myth* designed to justify the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation in the eyes of the world”¹⁸. Propaganda regarding Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk regions continues to this day as part of the hybrid warfare that Russia is waging against Ukraine.

Romanian-born American researcher Alex Berca, specialized in addressing the “truth – lie” relationship, claims in his study on Ukraine during the bloody events of 2014, that President Putin is actually pursuing “the restoration of the Great Soviet Union through various political strategies”¹⁹. Let’s remember the famous statement of President Vladimir Putin from 2005, that “The dismantling of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”. At the beginning of 2014, the press wrote about a fact: having a talk with a close friend of him, at the end of a press conference, without knowing that the microphones are still open and that anyone else can hear him, Putin said: “The dismantling of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”²⁰ and he is also assumed to have asserted that he will try his best to reunite it. From this point of view, Alex Berca interpreted the events in Ukraine as a way of annexing Ukraine: “After the annexation of Crimea the leadership of the Russian Federation went to support with weapons and military personnel separatist extremist groups from the East of Ukraine seeking to create an economic and social imbalance in Ukraine and thus an easier way of annexation. President Putin’s hope is to annex Ukraine for its natural resources, for the granary it represents and which could meet the

¹⁵ Юрий Федоров, *Hybrid War à la Russe: «Гибридная» война по-русски*, (in Russian) Бизнесполиграф, Киев, 2016, p. 8 (the author’s translation).

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 42.

¹⁷ *Idem*.

¹⁸ Serhiy Hromenko, *Crimea is Ours. History of the Russian Myth*, Himgest, Kiev, 2018, p. 7.

¹⁹ Alex Berca, *Ucraina – un punct de vedere geopolitic*, Top Form Publishing house, Bucharest, 2014, p. 14 (the author’s translation).

²⁰ Strobe Talbott, “The man who lost an empire”, in *The New York Review of Books*, 7 December 2017, URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-man-who-lost-an-empire/>, accessed on 28.09.2018.

consumption needs of the Russian population, as well as for the human resource that would cover the declining Russian population”²¹.

The risk of using the state formations without international recognition as a bridgehead for launching an aggression against the states to which they formally belong, in order to annex those states, for the “reintegration” of the territories of the former USSR into the present Russian state must be permanently considered by the political leadership of the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. These pretending as state entities should be viewed not only as instruments for influencing post-Soviet states in order to prevent their closer relations with Euro-Atlantic structures, but as possible tools of aggression against post-Soviet states, for rebuilding Soviet space within the Russian state.

CONCLUSIONS

The basic concept of the present study and the object of the study is the *pretending as state formation* – unrecognized or with limited recognition. A pretending as state formation is a separatist entity, seeking full recognition by the international community of the status of independence, sometimes for (re)unification with another state, from which it receives support. It can be a quasi-state of a community characterized by an ethnic, religious (confessional), and linguistic, cultural, political-ideological and other identity. The number of pretending as state formations increased during the *post-Cold War* period, in the new geopolitical context, the mentioned entities becoming a phenomenon come to the attention of researchers in the field of Security Studies. The pretending as state formations, unrecognized and those with limited recognition, represent threats to the regional security, due to the uncertainty that characterizes them and due to the possibility of the resumption of hostilities between the parties of a frozen conflict – by defrosting it. By accessing the support from an outside geopolitical actor, the pretended as state formations become instruments of the power that supports them, in order help it to achieve its geopolitical interests. For example, through the Transnistrian conflict (since 1992) Russia has forced the Republic of Moldova to remain in its sphere of influence, by joining the CIS. Currently, through the conflicts in Lugansk and Donetsk, as well as by annexing Crimea, Moscow seeks to exclude the possibility of Ukraine's accession to NATO, hence the extension of NATO space to the Ukrainian-Russian border. But one should not be ruled out any eventual scenario of using pretending as state formations as bridgeheads for launching the aggression of the Russian Federation against post-Soviet states, independent and recognized by the international community, in order to reintegrate the former Soviet space into the current Russian state.

The support given by Russia to the pretending as state formations in the post-Soviet space is an involvement in internal affairs of the post-Soviet states. The pretending as state formations play the role of tools to promote Russia's interests in maintaining and strengthening its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. Through the functions they carry out for the benefit of Russia, unrecognized (Lugansk and Donetsk, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh) and, formally, with limited recognition (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), pretending as state formations gaining full support from the Kremlin. They are instruments of the reconfiguration of the geopolitical space – of the creating of a new (multipolar) world order, promoting Russia's interests in strengthening its sphere of influence. By supporting the pretending as state formations, Moscow wants the vulnerability of the post-Soviet states, the compromise of the aspirations and capacities of their European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and after some authors: the re-annexation of the post-Soviet states. Succeeding in the vulnerability of post-Soviet states by maintaining conflicts (frozen or hot) – by inciting,

²¹ Alex Berca, *Ucraina – un punct de vedere geopolitic*, TopForm Publishing house, Bucharest, 2014, p. 14 (the author's translation).

encouraging and supporting separatism, the Kremlin aims to transform the post-Soviet states from *subjects* of international law into geopolitical *objects*, proceeding to annex some parts of them and maintaining the risk of their entire the annexation.

A solution to a frozen conflict – for the problem of a pretending as state formation, would be to raise the costs of maintaining that entity by the regional protective power. International sanctions may contribute to diminishing Russia's financial capacity to provide financial and logistical (military) support to pretending as state formations. In any case, it is important that the international community – the states of the world and the international organizations (especially the EU and NATO) – not to leave the post-Soviet states that have expressed their pro-European option, alone, face to face, with the Russian Federation, because in such a case they will easily become victims of aggression and annexation by Russia.

Regarding the assurance of the national security of the Republic of Moldova, in the face of the danger of rebuilding the Soviet space by the Russian Federation, the best solution is to follow the accession to the EU and NATO.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BERCA, Alex, *Ucraina – un punct de vedere geopolitic*, [*Ukraine – a geopolitical point of view*], (in Romanian), Top Form Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014.
2. BUZAN, Barry, *Popoarele, statele și frica*, [*Peoples, States and Fear*], Cartier Publishing House, Chisinau, 2014.
3. FEDOROV, Yuri, *Hybrid Warfare à la Russe*, Kiev, *Businesspolygraph* [«Гибридная» война по-русски, Киев, Бизнесполиграф], 2016.
4. HANNUM, Hurst, *Autonomie, suveranitate și autodeterminare*, Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest.
5. HROMENKO, Serhiy, *Crimea is Ours. History of the Russian Myth*, Kiev, Himgest, 2018.
6. KING, Charles, *Marea Neagră. O istorie*, Polirom Publishing House, Iasi, 2015.
7. MAIOR, George Cristian, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI*, Chișinău, Cartier Publishing House, 2015.
8. PÂRLOG, Nicu, “*Tigrii Tamili: Cea mai sângeroasă organizație teroristă din lume*”, in Descopera.ro, URL: <https://www.descopera.ro/cultura/13514391-tigrii-tamili-cea-mai-sangeroasa-organizatie-terorista-din-lume>
9. TALBOTT, Strobe, “The man who lost an empire”, in *The New York Review of Books*, 7 December 2017, URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-man-who-lost-an-empire/>

A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO STRATEGIC CULTURES OF CHINA AND INDIA TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA: ORIGINS, MANIFESTATIONS, AND IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY

Shakaib RAFIQUE, Ph.D. Student

National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA),
Bucharest, E-mail: Irtiqal000@gmail.com

Abstract: *The notion of strategic culture has gained pivotal significance in terms of foreign policy behaviors of Nation States today. This concept, coined by Jack Snyder, stands at the core of comprehending the nature of inter-state relations and therefore serves as the crux of the foreign policy behaviors of modern Nation States. The notion of strategic culture has constructivist roots on one side, while on the other side it serves a blow to the ‘rational choice theory’ as well. This paper is essentially aimed at employing the constructivist approach for understanding the constitutive elements of the strategic cultures of China and India towards South Asia. This paper establishes that the roots of the strategic cultures of China and India towards South Asia are essentially premised on their peculiar historical experiences, ideologies, notions and beliefs of their leadership towards the region. Furthermore, the strategic cultures of both these countries are also guided by the “We” vs. “Others” notions that form the central core of a constructivist paradigm. The paper then argues that it is owing to the above characteristics that the strategic cultures of China and India differ so much from each other.*

Keywords: *Strategic Culture; Constructivism; Hindutva; Arthshastra; Confucian; Hegemony.*

1. Strategic Culture and its constructivist undertones

Although the notion of strategic culture traces back its roots to the 1970s when Jack Snyder introduced this concept, the historical origins of the concept can be traced back to the works of Thucydides and Sun Tzu¹. In its rudimentary characterization at that time, the discourse essentially began with the role that culture could play in terms of the formation and pursuit of the national security policies. During 1940s and 1950s, the inter linkage of culture and state behavior started gaining coinage as studies on the character of Nations became an important topic within philosophical pursuits². Over a period of time, as the scope of discussions pertaining to the role of culture in terms of state behavior got widened, the concept of political culture also evolved gradually. The conceptualization of the notion of political culture is associated with Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, who through their study on the above concept defined political culture to include an association or affiliation with certain values; thoughts or perceptions about the concepts of morality as well as employment of force; individual and collective rights as well as assumptions regarding the role of a specific Nation State in international matters³.

¹ J. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism”, in *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 4, Issue 10, 2005, p. 3, URL: <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-claus.pdf>, accessed on 24 September 2019.

² *Ibidem*, p. 4.

³ G. Almond, S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 3-42.

It was essentially in 1977 that Jack Snyder formally introduced the theory of strategic culture in order to underline the significance of the concept of political culture within the domain of contemporary security studies. In essence, he attempted to signify that as a result of socialization process, there emerges a certain set of belief system and behavioral pattern that assumes the pedestal of cultural rather than mere policy⁴. Building up on this aspect further, Gray understood the term "strategic culture" to imply the thought process as well as the action in respect of the use of force drawing inspiration from the specific perception regarding the national historical experiences; and aiming in respect of what constitutes responsible attitude at the national level⁵.

On the basis of the above theoretical improvements in the concept of strategic culture, finally in the 1990s, the notion of strategic culture took an evolved dimension as the constructivist approach contributed towards the evolution of this concept⁶. It is essentially this particular approach through which this paper would be assessing the strategic cultures of China and India towards South Asia as well. As a gist, one would recall that the constructivist theoretical framework as elaborated by scholars such as Ted Wendt, Alexander Hopf, etc. underscore the significance of ideas, culture, norms, values, notions, identity, and perceptions in understanding the structures in international system. Resultantly, the identities and interests of the Nation States are assumed to be socially constructed and therefore, it is the identity formation based on the cultural inter-subjective beliefs as well as the conceptualization of "We" vs. "Others" that occupies the central core in terms of the theoretical framework of constructivism⁷. In essence, it was on the basis of the above theoretical framework that Alastair Iain Johnston later defined the notion of strategic culture to imply a combination of such symbols as arguments, languages, structures, metaphors, etc that cause to constitute a durable set of grand strategic preferences through formulation of notions such as that of role and force efficacy in interstate relations⁸.

From the above discussion, one can clearly deduce that the notion of strategic culture as elaborated through the constructivist theoretical framework implies that national predispositions, premised on ideational social construction of the international system dictate the specific national security policy. In all this theoretical underpinning, the role of culture assumes significance in terms of defining national security policies as well. For the purposes of projecting a specific strategic culture based on the above factors of specific interpretive dispositions and resultant historical experiences, the elite of that particular Nation State assumes the role of the transmitter for this strategic culture. It may also be useful to highlight at this stage that in terms of shaping up of the strategic culture, not only the domestic factors, but also external shocks and events play a dynamic role⁹.

Having identified the notion of strategic culture and its constructivist underpinnings, we now move ahead with the understanding of Chinese and Indian strategic culture towards South Asia. At this stage, it may be recalled that essentially South Asia serves as a periphery for China¹⁰, while India itself is a part of the South Asian subcontinent. The study of the strategic cultures of China and India assume special significance for understanding as to what in specific

⁴ J. L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1997, pp. 8-9.

⁵ C.S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example", in *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1981, pp. 21-47

⁶ J. Lantis, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 8-9.

⁸ M. Graham, *Redefining Strategic Culture*, University of Northern British Columbia, June 2014, pp. 56-57.

⁹ J. Lantis, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁰ V. Kaura, "China's South Asia Policy under Xi Jinping: India's Strategic Concerns", in *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 12, No. 2, 2018, pp. 8-29.

constitutes the manner in which China and India approach South Asian security paradigm. Furthermore, as we are assessing the whole concept of strategic culture from the standpoint of constructivist theoretical framework, we would note that essentially, it is ideational factor of “we” vs. “others”, defined through the peculiar philosophical undertones in both countries that we can better understand the concept of strategic cultures of these two countries.

It would not be out of context here to briefly highlight as to why the study of the strategic culture of China and India can be better explained through the constructivist approach rather than the traditional realist and neo-realist theoretical framework. It may be highlighted that scholars such as John Mearsheimer, Kenneth N. Waltz and Stephen Walt have thus far remained focused on attempting to understand the behavior of major power only. However, their conceptualizations of the notions of interest and power tend to ignore altogether the ideational and cultural causal factors, which remain of huge significance to comprehend the strategic culture and approaches of countries especially such as China. The Chinese mindset of remaining untangled from any alliances and the approach of non-interference in the affairs of other countries is a clear reflection that realists cannot explain this phenomenon through their theoretical preferences¹¹. Accordingly, constructivist approach appears best suited for explaining the Chinese strategic culture. The same holds valid for understanding the Indian strategic culture as well.

2. Chinese Strategic Culture: Origins

China’s strategic culture is unique in the sense that most of the western scholars tend to characterize it as dualistic in nature¹². Accordingly, some researchers argue that the Chinese strategic culture is neither bellicose nor pacifist in the true sense of the word. The Chinese strategic culture is therefore mostly characterized as being based on Confucian-Mencian philosophical principles on the one side, while on the other end it is implied to be based on principles of Realpolitik. In his work entitled “China and Strategic Culture”, Andrew Scobell specifically defines the above factor as the “Chinese Cult of Defence”. Scobell argues that as part of the “Chinese Cult of Defence”, Chinese leadership tends to pursue offensive actions while attempting to rationalize the same as defensive in characterization¹³.

If we employ a purely constructivist approach towards understanding the manner in which the strategic culture of China has evolved over the years, we would appreciate that the above disposition of the western scholarship to signify the Chinese strategic culture as being dualistic in character appears rather incorrect. For China, not only the role of culture is vital for comprehending the country’s national security strategies, but what is rather more dominant remains the ideational disposition of the Chinese elite as the purveyor of Chinese strategic culture towards what constitutes China and its periphery besides the signification of the “others”. Furthermore, an amalgam of the domestic factors¹⁴ adding up to the perception of the role of peripheries in contouring those domestic factors plays an important role in terms of defining the strategic culture of China towards its neighboring regions. This implies that the manner in which China perceives other States, especially its neighboring countries is flavored by China’s understanding of the cultural inclinations of these neighboring countries on the one side and its perception of the role of these countries in shaping the domestic factors within China, on the other side.

¹¹ H. Feng, *A dragon on defence: China’s strategic culture and war*, Arizona State University, May 2005, p. 2.

¹² A. Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, USA, 2002, p. V.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. V.

¹⁴ C.K. Johnson, *China’s Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle USA, 2009, p. 11.

Before venturing deeper into the Chinese strategic culture towards South Asia, it would be useful to highlight its philosophical undertones. The strategic culture of China is essentially shaped by the Confucian philosophical framework. This philosophical framework is essentially non-confrontationist and harmonious in character. Accordingly, China prefers harmony over the state of conflict. This ultimately results in China's preference of defence over offence. There are analysts who also assess that owing to its Confucian inklings, Chinese strategic mindset prefers strategies over combat and thus psychological warfare takes precedence over the one-on-one confrontation in the theatre of war. As we are approaching the issue of strategic culture from the theoretical standpoint of constructivism, it would be pertinent to observe as to how the Chinese elite and other strategic decision makers perceive China's strategic culture. To begin with, the Chinese elite hold the perception that peace is very precious for China owing to its historical traditions and that the country wants to "befriend good neighbors". Here, emphasis should be placed on the notion of "good neighbors", because it is this perception that is pivotal in terms of defining as to what strategic approach would China adopt towards a specific Nation State in its periphery and in what manner would it respond accordingly. Another ancient Chinese principle which states that peaceful means should be tried before resorting to force, is also taken to imply Chinese preference for peace over confrontation or achievement of objectives through violent means¹⁵.

As one delves deeper into the manner in which the strategic culture of modern China has evolved over the years and as one takes a closer view of the recent 2019 Defence White Paper entitled "China's National Defense in the new Era", the Chinese despise for hegemony as well as desire for peaceful development appear clearly discernable elements. This is an approach unique for a global power like China. This aspect was even highlighted by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping when he asserted during the 1980s that his country did not seek any hegemony. Instead, as one takes a deeper look at the Chinese strategic culture, one would discern that it underscores the significance of "benevolent rule" or "kingly way" instead. From this approach also emerges the aspect that China neither seeks to occupy foreign soil nor plans to colonize such areas. Furthermore, China strongly believes in the notion of self-defence¹⁶. In fact the Chinese 2019 Defence White paper entitled, "China's National Defense in a new Era" identifies the principle of self-defence as an important element of the country's military strategic guideline as well¹⁷.

As per Scobell, another tenet of Chinese "cult of defence" remains that China does not believe in attacking someone if the other country does not attack China. Chinese Great Wall is a clear manifestation of this non-aggressive defensive approach. As part of its strategic culture, China believes in the notion of "just war" which indeed is to be fought against oppression as per Chinese perceptions. Accordingly, a war that is fought to retain territorial integrity or even for protecting national unification would be meant to imply a "just war". Another overarching factor of China's strategic culture remains the country's strong belief in the notion of "active defence"¹⁸. While many western scholars tend to imply from this notion, the so-called Chinese proclivities towards expansionism in the name of defence, in reality, the notion of active defence in Chinese perceptions or ideas is intended to entail efforts aimed at securing China's national integrity and the objective of national unification¹⁹.

¹⁵ A. Scobell, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ Dennis J. Blasko, "Steady as She Goes: China's New Defense White Paper", *War on the Rocks website*, 12 August 2019, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/steady-as-she-goes-chinas-new-defense-white-paper/>, accessed on 18 October 2019.

¹⁸ A. Scobell, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

As mentioned earlier, the Chinese strategic culture is premised on the Confucian philosophical ideals. Accordingly, the “Chinese cult of defence” has its roots in such guiding ideational notions as preciousness of peace; lack of aspirations for hegemony; and non-offensive defence²⁰. In the words of Li Jijun, a former Deputy Director at the Academy of Military Sciences, the ancient strategic culture of China traces its roots back to the ideal of “unity between man and nature”. As per Li Jijun, this ideal leads to the pursuit of harmony²¹. China’s strong adherence to the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” finds its origins in the above philosophical premise. Chinese despise for hegemony is manifested through the remarks of Deng Xiaoping who used to insist on the opposition to hegemony (*fandui baquanzhuyi*)²². As regards the Chinese non-offensive defence characteristic of strategic culture, the famous remarks of Mao are often referred to, as he had once stated that if someone did not attack China; his country would not attack them either²³.

During the 5000 years of Chinese history, the country has rarely demonstrated any aggressive ideals. The only exceptions to this approach were the expansionist expositions carried out by the Manchurian and Mongolian minorities. This is also mostly explained in connection with the agriculture-based and self-sufficient economy of China which enabled the emergence of peace loving and defensive psychology²⁴.

Having underlined the above foundational characteristics and features of Chinese strategic culture, one can clearly discern that at its core, it is essentially China’s perceptions of what constitutes China’s territory as well as threats to its national unification, through which China postulates its strategic culture. Expansionism or hegemonic ambitions do not factor into China’s strategic culture *per se*.

3. India’s strategic culture: Origins

India strategic culture is interesting in the sense that though based on Hindu or Vedic values and philosophical undertones²⁵, there has essentially been no natural evolution of the strategic culture of India as such. This is owing to the fact that Indian state is basically an artificial construct and only recent and post-colonial in terms of its origins. As a matter of fact, what is normally implied to mean “ancient India” was never one political entity and the region of South Asia was primarily a sub-continent comprising many Empires and States that historically existed in the aforementioned geographic space²⁶. In order to understand modern India’s strategic culture, the constructivist theoretical framework remains pivotal. It is because India’s strategic culture is heavily influenced by the ideas, perceptions, values, ideals and interpretations of history made by the elite of modern India towards the region of South Asia as well as regarding the newly crafted concept of so-called nationhood of India. Furthermore, India’s conception and perception of what constitutes the geographical limits of so-called historical India and its perceptions regarding South Asia as being part of so-called contested concepts of “Akhand Bharat”²⁷ heavily influence India’s strategic culture towards the whole region.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 13-14.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 7.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

²⁴ H. Feng, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

²⁵ K. Kamal, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences”, in *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 03, 2018, pp. 27-54.

²⁶ C.B. Asher, C. Talbot, *India before Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 4-13.

²⁷ M. B. Beitelmaier-Berini, *Delineating India’s Strategic Pluralism: The Subculture-Cleavage Model of Grand Strategic Thought*, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, 2018, pp. 135-136.

Some of the prominent philosophical ideals of India's strategic culture include Indian elite's perception that it is sacredness that basically permeates India²⁸. This perception about the "self" implies that Indian elite considers Indian identity as sacred in contradistinction to "other" identities in the region. This impression about "self" also connotes a sense of self-righteousness to the extent that such "other" identities are even treated as unholy. This element is manifested through the manner in which the rise of Hindu Nationalism is being witnessed in India over the past few decades. Although initially starting as a reaction to British colonialism, the concept of Hindu Nationalism is essentially premised on "demonizing" other religious minorities in India²⁹. This element, though attempting to create a unitary Indian state has not only created segregation within Indian society³⁰ but also appears to have reflected negatively on the whole of South Asia as the region in its current form serves as a challenge to the Hindu Nationalism's vision of "Greater India" or "Akhand Bharat". Furthermore, other regional identities are at times considered to be an "antithesis" of India³¹ and a hurdle in terms of the realization of the Indian identity to its fullest extent. On another note, the above mentioned Indian perception of sacredness about Indian identity³², not based on historical facts but guided by a mythological perception of "self" as an ancient consolidated entity within a defined geographical area has come along with an artificially created sense about so called "Indian self" which got humiliated by foreign powers over centuries³³ thus resulting in disintegration of the so-called "ancient India". As much artificial as this cycle of history creation³⁴ is on one hand, so has this element contoured Indian strategic culture. Based on the above elements, the manner in which Indian strategic culture consequently appears to be premised on the notion of radically changing the regional environment to its advantage can be discerned even from a report entitled "India's National Security Policy" that was commissioned by the Indian opposition party Indian National Congress in March 2019³⁵. In this report, while on one side, it is argued that India should "create" a "conducive external and internal environment" in which India "occupies its due place in world affairs"³⁶, the report even goes to the extent of indicating the possibility of shaping countries with a view to creating regional and global partnerships thus enabling India's assumption of leadership role at the international level³⁷. For any country, an open indication of even resorting to shaping up i.e. to create new or disintegrate existing countries or their systems with an aim of achieving global leadership is indeed unprecedented in character. This also signifies that for the purposes of "self", Indian strategic culture essentially assumes an antagonistic "other".

²⁸ S. Xinmin, "India's Strategic Culture and Model of International Behavior", China Institute of International Studies, 2014, URL: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-06/25/content_7007616.htm, accessed on 28 September 2019.

²⁹ Arun S. Swamy, "Ideology, Organization and Electoral Strategy of Hindu Nationalism: What's Religion Got to Do with It?", 'Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia', Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2004, p. 99.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 264.

³¹ Thorsten Wojczewski, "Identity and world order in India's post-Cold War foreign policy discourse", in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 40, Issue 1, 2019, URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1552079>, accessed on 18 October 2019.

³² R. W. Jones, "India's Strategic Culture", SAIC, 2006, p. 5.

³³ R. Chandrasekaran, *Hindutva Movement: Burkean Examination of Violence As Retributive Justice*, North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota, USA, 2012, pp. 52, 69.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

³⁵ Lt. Gen. D. S. Hooda (Ret.), *India's National Security Strategy*, March 2019, URL: https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda.pdf, accessed on 8 October 2019.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

Another important philosophical premise of Indian strategic culture is that the goals that the Indian State pursues are considered to be timeless and not limited to any specific timeframe³⁸. This implies that whatever political goals India sets for itself, basically remain permanent in character, know no bounds, and are continuous in nature. For instance, as the goal of “Akhand Bharat” implying absorption of the whole of South Asia into larger India³⁹ is an objective of the Indian nationalist elite, this goal would remain intact and free of any temporal considerations or restrictions. This also implies that the above goal would continue to reverberate till its completion. Another philosophical foundation of India’s strategic culture is that Indians hold the self-perception regarding their country’s status as being ‘given’ rather something ‘to be earned’⁴⁰. This is indeed a dangerous notion and inculcates national arrogance as well as nullifies any chances of course correction or recognition of the views of the other side. The fact that today India is world’s 6th largest economy⁴¹ and 4th in terms of global power index⁴² appears to have added to this sense of arrogance in Indian elite. For instance, rather than exhibiting a more responsible behavior in terms of resolution of its territorial disputes with its neighboring countries, Indian approach seems to have deteriorated to that of brinkmanship. India’s recent violations of UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir despite global criticism are a case study in this regard.

Another important psychological factor influencing India’s strategic culture holds that the world order is hierarchical in character⁴³. This notion traces its roots to the British Indian Empire when the Indian elite from the Congress Party considered itself as the natural heirs to British Indian Empire, following the departure of the British from the subcontinent. This element of the Indian strategic culture is also a manifestation of the colonial legacy and origins of India and entails that Indian perspective of the regional order is not premised on equal status of all the Nation States but believes in the role of the Hegemon⁴⁴. This factor of Indian strategic culture also manifests that in its true essence; Indian strategic culture especially towards the neighboring countries is not based on democratic values either⁴⁵. As India aspires for a so-called leadership role in global affairs and assumes this role for itself to be a given, the country does not appear to be inclined towards giving weight to democratic values at the international level for the purposes of ensuring regional order either⁴⁶. These elements also indicate that Indian strategic culture is strongly influenced and motivated by the Kautilyan treatise entitled “Arthshastra”⁴⁷, whose pronouncements on foreign relations are in marked contrast with the thematic undertones of the internal administration. In “Arthshastra”, Kautilya considers expansionism as the interest of every State, world conquest marks an important plank of

³⁸ R. W. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³⁹ J. Assayag, “The body of India: Geography, Ritual, Nation”, in *Etnografica*, Vol. I (1), 1997, pp. 33-56.

⁴⁰ R.W. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴¹ ***, “The World’s top ten largest economies”, in *FOCUSECONOMICS*, November 2018, URL: <https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-largest-economies-in-the-world>, accessed on 20 October 2019.

⁴² ***, “2019 Military Strength Ranking”, in Global Fire Power (GFP), 2019, URL: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>, accessed on 10 October 2019.

⁴³ R.W. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴⁴ J. Falak, Strategem website, URL: <https://stratagem.pk/setting-the-record-straight/indian-hegemony-roots-south-asian-conflict/>, accessed on 5 October 2019

⁴⁵ R. W. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴⁶ Sandra Destradi, “A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? India’s Involvement in Nepal (2005–2008)”, in *German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Papers*, No. 138, June 2010, p. 6, URL: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71733894.pdf>, accessed on 28 August 2019.

⁴⁷ K. Kamal, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences”, in *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol 12, No. 3, 2018, pp. 27-54.

diplomacy. It promotes active diplomacy which is premised on the notion of conquest⁴⁸. One can clearly deduce from these policy prescriptions that when it comes to foreign policy, the strategic culture promoted by "Arthshastra" is inherently undemocratic and hegemonic in character. This is also relevant for modern India's strategic culture.

Before delving deeper into the aspect of Indian strategic culture towards South Asia, it would be useful to have a look at some of the prominent features of the Kautilya's "Arthshastra" in order to understand as to how the strategic culture of India in general has been defined by this Machiavellian-styled treatise. It may be noted that an important concept of warfare defined in Kautilya's "Arthshastra" remains Kutayuddha" (devious warfare), being the preferred form of warfare aimed at self-aggrandizement. This aspect is in contrast with the Chinese strategic culture's despise for physical warfare and preference for psychological warfare instead. Furthermore, Chinese strategic culture incorporates the concept of "just war" which places morality at the centre of its application⁴⁹. On the other side, foreign policy aspects or relations with other nations under "Arthshastra" are neither premised on any notions of morality nor rest on such elements as the existence of a good society or good intentions etc. In addition, while the Indian Strategic culture is based on the concept of "Mandala" that focuses on the conceptualization of hostile neighbourhood⁵⁰; the Chinese strategic culture on the other side does not desire to have the "territorial conflicts" spill over to the neighbourhood⁵¹. Some Indian scholars tend to divide the philosophical premise of Indian strategic culture on such lines of thinking as the so-called Nehruvianism, neoliberalism and hyperrealism⁵². However, in reality, these are all essentially based on different variants of Hindutva philosophical approach elaborated through Kautilya in his treatise entitled "Arthshahstra". As an instance, the Cold-war era of Indian political relations with the rest of the world are assumed to be based on the policy of non-alignment. However, there appears to be no such Indian policy of real non-alignment *per se*. In essence, as per Kautilyan philosophy, a Nation should use its strengths against the weaknesses of its enemy. Accordingly, based on the historical developments in the region, the so-called non-alignment policy of India⁵³ appears to be based on Kautilyan principle of increasing one's security through "low-risk strategy" of using one superpower against another till the time that India could itself gain enough global power⁵⁴.

Another prominent dimension of the Indian strategic culture that has taken its roots from the Kautilyan treatise is that of the concentric circles or "Mandala". As per this element, the immediate neighbors of the State are assumed to be antagonists, while the enemies of the neighbors are taken as friends⁵⁵. This element forms the core of the Indian strategic culture as India's approach towards South Asia is radically based on the aforementioned approach. Added to this factor is another dangerous dimension of the Indian strategic culture which states that a

⁴⁸ Vinay Vittal, "Kautilya's Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand Strategy", School of Advanced Air And Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2011, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1019423.pdf>, accessed on 28 August 2019, p. 18.

⁴⁹ Nadine Godehardt, "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China", in *German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Papers*, No. 88, September 2008, pp. 16-21, URL: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6862967.pdf>, accessed on 27 August 2019.

⁵⁰ C. H. Singh, *The Kautilya Arthasāstra: A military perspective*, Centre for Land Warfare Studies; KW Publishers PVT Ltd, New Delhi, India 2013, p. 6.

⁵¹ Nadine Godehardt, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁵² S. Xinmin, India's Strategic Culture and Model of International Behavior, China Institute of International Studies, 24 June 2014, URL: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-06/25/content_7007616.htm, accessed on 4 October 2019

⁵³ R.W. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵⁴ C. H. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 5-6.

weaker neighbor is to be harassed; reduced and destroyed⁵⁶. Interestingly, as per the Kautilyan treatise, the policy of peace is only to be pursued in case the other State is stronger. Accordingly, the role of diplomacy though emphasized is not to be preferred over war. The role of diplomacy is also restricted essentially to making allies; delaying war as long as one is weak; and for making arrangement in the post-war scenario for the purposes of creating a new order. Based on Kautilyan principles which guide the Indian strategic culture, there should be delays and “foot dragging” in case of peace treaties which are imposed through force⁵⁷. These factors lead one to deduce that as per the spirit of the Indian strategic culture, peace is undesirable especially within the context of the neighbors. Furthermore, it is national interest which takes precedence over the moral principles⁵⁸. It may be added here that national interests would be subjective and contingent upon one’s own perceptions and ideas.

An important segment of the Indian strategic culture is the fact that over the years, India has continued to evolve into an ultra-right and extreme nationalist State. Unfortunately, the continued alteration of the Indian masses’ perception by imbuing a feeling of victimhood rather than assimilation and hatred against the “others” in the name of rewriting history has instilled hatred within the Indian masses that has resulted in political ramifications of unprecedented character⁵⁹. The return of ultra-right and extreme Hindu nationalist political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power twice, coupled with public acts of mob lynching of minorities⁶⁰ were always expected to be the foregone outcomes of such extremist philosophy instilled over the decades in Indian masses. The outcome of all this has also been felt on the manner in which Indian strategic culture has evolved accordingly. The Indian Strategic culture’s strong orientation towards an “Akhand Bharat” (Greater India) and hegemony is a direct result of the above mindset of the Indian nationalist elite. Furthermore, the Indian strategic culture defined on the above Hindutva characterization has another problem. As Hindutva defines “Indianness” or “Indian identity” on Hindu parameters, the Indian strategic culture assumes ideological proportions based on majoritarianism. Added to this, the Indian victimhood card has led to the laying of foundation of Indian strategic culture on primordialism that glorifies Hindu culture and texts while placing Hinduism as the causal factor for all civilizations⁶¹. Indian strategic culture defined on those lines becomes therefore, uncompromising towards other countries in terms of their political ideologies.

4. Assessing the Chinese and Indian strategic culture towards South Asia: Manifestations

Before assessing the strategic culture of China and India towards South Asia, it would be useful to define as to what South Asia would imply for the purposes of this paper. In essence, the region called South Asia is routinely interchangeable with the term “subcontinent” as well. Since the recorded history of the region, there have existed different powerful empires in the

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 28.

⁵⁹ R. Thapar, “They Peddle Myths and Call It History. India’s governing party rewrites the country’s history to justify its Hindu nationalist ideology”, in *The New York Times*, 17 May 2019, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/opinion/india-elections-modi-history.html>, accessed on 5 October 2019.

⁶⁰ E. Griswold, “The Violent Toll of Hindu Nationalism in India. A populist Prime Minister has legitimized India’s more militant groups, and targeted attacks against religious minorities are on the rise”, in *The New Yorker*, 9 March 2019, URL: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/on-religion/the-violent-toll-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india>, accessed on 5 October 2019.

⁶¹ R. Chandrasekaran, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

region of South Asia⁶². Similarly, the region of South Asia has also been home to different cultures and civilizations⁶³ unlike what is commonly believed.

Owing to its various complexities, for the purposes of this study, we would take South Asia to be a region comprised of the countries that are currently members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Accordingly, South Asia would stand to comprise Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Interestingly, India lies at the Centre of the region and except for Afghanistan and Pakistan that directly share their borders with each other; no other country of the region has any common borders with any other country of the region, except for with India.

4.1. China's Strategic Culture towards South Asia

South Asia constitutes an important peripheral region for China. The underlying basis of China's strategic culture towards South Asian periphery remains China's urge for peace and protection of its national core interests especially those pertaining to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Chinese strategic culture strongly believes in "befriending good neighbours"⁶⁴, the country has been using economic development as a means towards reviving the old silk route and strengthening its relations with the regional countries⁶⁵. Chinese despise for hegemony which is another central plank of China's strategic culture⁶⁶ is also evident from China's counter-hegemony role in the South Asian region against India⁶⁷.

China's strategic culture towards South Asia is part of the wider "peripheral diplomacy" of China. At the core of this "peripheral diplomacy" lie China's core national interests of ensuring its territorial integrity; national sovereignty and national cohesion⁶⁸. If one starts with the analysis of approaches of Chinese leadership starting from the time of Chairman Mao, there is a visible manifestation of their desire for peace in the peripheral regions and therefore war is only considered a last resort⁶⁹. Even if one looks at the approach of Chinese President Xi Jinping towards "peripheral diplomacy", the traces of China's strategic culture become highly visible. For instance, during a speech in 2013 at a "Work Forum", he stated that China's diplomacy towards the peripheries should aim at inter alia developing relations with the countries in the Chinese periphery on the basis of "friendship, sincerity, reciprocity and inclusiveness"⁷⁰. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once also stressed the Chinese desire of having "peace, stability, and common development" in the Chinese peripheries⁷¹. The same strategic culture of China applies to South Asia, being a peripheral region of China.

In the region of South Asia, China's strategic culture towards India is a special case. This case is indeed unique in the sense that it depicts as to how China actually responds as a practical manifestation of the guiding principles of its strategic culture. At the core of China's relations with India remain the Indian claims and intrusion into what China considers parts of

⁶² R. D. Kaplan, "South Asia's Geography of Conflict", Centre for New American Security, 2010, p. 6, URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120933/2010_08_South%20Asias%20Geography%20of%20Conflict_Robert%20D.%20Kaplan_0.pdf, accessed on 6 October 2019.

⁶³ A. Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the making of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1996, p. 8.

⁶⁴ A. Scobell, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶⁵ B. Jain, *China's soft power diplomacy in South Asia: Myth or Reality?*, Lexington Books, 2017, London, p. 78.

⁶⁶ A. Scobell, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶⁷ V. Kaura, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-29.

⁶⁸ R. Zongze, Yurong, C., Jianxue, L., Junying, S., & Jinyue, G., *China's New Neighborhood Diplomacy: Seeking Stability through Management and Planning*, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 2016, p. 48.

⁶⁹ H. Feng, *op. cit.*, pp. 88.

⁷⁰ W. A. Callahan, "China's Asia Dream: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order", in *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1 (3), 2016, pp. 226-243.

⁷¹ M. D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy", in *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 44, 2014, p. 9.

its territory as well as those parts which despite having remained part of ancient China on historical basis are currently under Indian occupation. Except for the borderline between Sikkim and Tibet, most of the 3380 km long border between China and India is called the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). LoAC is neither marked on ground, nor on mutually recognized maps⁷². On the eastern side of the LoAC, around 90,000 square kilometers claimed by China to be South Tibet is under Indian occupation and renamed as Arunachal Pradesh. In this sector, there also exists an important holy city of Tawang which is also under Indian occupation at present. In the middle portion of the LoAC, there exist patches of disputed territory between the two countries that are currently under Indian occupation. In the western portion of the LoAC, the Ladakh region is also under Indian occupation at present and following recent abrogation of Article 370 of Indian Constitution, China clearly stated that “India has undermined China’s territorial sovereignty”⁷³. From these disputed areas under Indian occupation, one can clearly understand as to how the perceptions and ideas of the Chinese elite as the main purveyors of the Chinese strategic culture have been shaped up over the decades. As can be deduced from our earlier discussion regarding the origins of Chinese strategic culture, China is quite sensitive about its territorial integrity. Its relations with other countries of the periphery are accordingly shaped up in line within this central guiding principle. However, owing to the fact that Chinese strategic culture is such that the country deeply aspires for peace and harmony and despises hegemony or unjust war, China, despite its territorial claims against India, has not been an aggressor against India⁷⁴.

As per some recent research, in 1962, when China and India had their war on their territorial disputes, it was indeed India and not China that actually started the aggression. The contents of the Indian Army’s own internal inquiry report of its defeat in 1962 war at the hands of China, that recently came to the surface have revealed that it was indeed the then Indian Prime Minister Nehru who had given orders to the Indian Army to attack China in pursuit of India’s forward policy in the eastern sector of the McMahon line⁷⁵. The events of China-India war of 1962 had for all practical purposes started as early as September 1962, as Indian army made several attempts of incursion into Chinese territory that were warded off by the Chinese “People’s Liberation Army”. Furthermore, India also continued in general with the British false claims concerning the Simla Conference through which it attempted to force McMahon line but that was never accepted by China. Last but not the least, India even went ahead with laying claims to the Aksai Chin region that was never even claimed by the British colonial Empire⁷⁶. However, well in line with the Chinese strategic culture, China has never attempted to attack India for reclaiming its territory but has preferred negotiations over war. Even in 1962, though China had had a decisive victory against India, it moved back to its borders without taking back any of the disputed territory. This factor also shows that even if China has to resort to “just war” for pursuing its core national interests, it would prefer reverting to table for peaceful negotiations soon afterwards. The self-defence war by China against India also reflects on the Chinese strategic culture that in case the use of force is “unavoidable,” it should follow the

⁷² K. Wang, *Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes: How the Value of Contested Land Shapes Territorial Policies*, University of Pennsylvania, 2014, p. 119.

⁷³ TRT World, URL: <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/india-s-division-of-jammu-and-kashmir-angers-china-28892>, accessed on 5 October 2019

⁷⁴ H. Feng, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-152.

⁷⁵ P. Rautela, “It wasn’t China, but Nehru who declared 1962 war: Australian journalist Neville Maxwell”, in *The Times of India*, 2 April 2014, URL: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/It-wasnt-China-but-Nehru-who-declared-1962-war-Australian-journalist-Neville-Maxwell/articleshow/33094229.cms>, accessed on 0 October 2019.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*.

standard of righteousness (yizhan), implying that the war should be aimed at contesting those who actually invaded⁷⁷.

In 2017, during the Doklam standoff, Indian border troops entered Chinese territory in the Sikkim sector in contravention of the 1890 Convention that was concluded between China and the British on the issues of Tibet and Sikkim. Indian forces entered Doklam area of China, where Chinese side was busy undertaking a road-building project. Again, in this instance, as India was an aggressor and China as part of its strategic culture never compromises on its territorial integrity, there was a strong political response from China⁷⁸. China's strong resolve and India's "moral disadvantage" finally forced the Indian forces to withdraw⁷⁹. One would observe in this episode as well that China used diplomacy as a means to resolve the above crisis first and also succeeded in doing so. This again reflects China's preference for peace which is a core plank of the country's strategic culture.

As for other countries of South Asia, China's strategic culture of despise for hegemony; and desire for friendly neighbourhood, is all the more prominent. China is also seen to be pursuing its "peripheral diplomacy" in respect of other countries of the region through economic development. The importance that China accords to its "peripheral diplomacy" is also linked to consolidating its internal cohesion and defending its territorial integrity and national sovereignty while warding off any foreign threats⁸⁰.

As instances of the above, China has a very friendship relationship with Pakistan. China and Pakistan have historical relations and are termed as "Iron brothers"⁸¹ with time-tested bilateral relations. At present China and Pakistan are undertaking a massive multi-billion dollar project called "China-Pakistan Economic corridor (CPEC)" as part of China's larger regional connectivity projects⁸². China has also come to Pakistan's support against Indian's designs against Pakistan at various junctures in history⁸³.

In case of other smaller countries of the region such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and Maldives; China has not only been pursuing different economic development projects but has also been acting as a counter-Hegemon for these countries against the threats that these countries face from India⁸⁴. As regards Bhutan, China has again been seen to be pursuing peaceful means to resolve whatever border disputes are left between the two countries⁸⁵. In case of Afghanistan, China has again been pursuing economic development as a means towards

⁷⁷ H. Feng, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁷⁸ Xinhua, "Full text of facts and China's position concerning Indian border troops' crossing of China-India boundary", in *China Daily*, 2017, URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-08/03/content_30341027.htm, accessed on 1 October 2019.

⁷⁹ Z. Bo, "India is running out of time in Doklam dispute with China", in *South China Morning Post*, 2017, URL: <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2103850/india-running-out-time-doklam-dispute-china>, accessed on 3 October 2019.

⁸⁰ M.D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy", in *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 44, 2014, pp. 8-27.

⁸¹ S. Sareen, "China and Pakistan's 'Iron Brotherhood': The economic dimensions and their implications on US hegemony", Observer Research Foundation, 2019, URL: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-and-pakistans-iron-brotherhood-the-economic-dimensions-and-their-implications-on-us-hegemony/>, accessed on 6 October 2019.

⁸² M. D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy", *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 44, 2014, p. 5.

⁸³ A. Rashid, "Pakistan-China Partnership: US and India's response", *Margalla Papers*, National Defence University, Islamabad, 2007, pp. 247-258.

⁸⁴ V. Kaura, "China's South Asia Policy under Xi Jinping: India's Strategic Concerns", in *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 12, No. 2, 2018, pp. 8-29.

⁸⁵ Commodore Katherine Richards, "China-India: An analysis of the Himalayan territorial dispute", The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS), 2015, URL: <https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20paper.pdf>, pp. 5-6.

bringing peace and stability in that war-torn country. The main aim of China in respect of that country is again essentially to secure its region of Xinjiang. However, one may again note that while China wants to ensure that its own territory is not threatened through Afghanistan, it has not resorted to military means but promoted economic development and peaceful discussions for achieving its national objectives⁸⁶. This again reflects that Chinese strategic culture towards South Asia is non-aggressive in character.

4.2. India's Strategic Culture towards South Asia

India's strategic culture towards South Asia is defined on the core principle of considering the neighboring countries as antagonists rather than friends⁸⁷. Furthermore, it is premised on aggression against the weaker countries in order to destroy them altogether⁸⁸, while also aimed at becoming a Hegemon in the region. As mentioned earlier, Indian strategic culture is based on the notion of "Akhand Bharat" and has evolved over the years to become more intolerant of other countries. Accordingly, in South Asia, India is always seen to be not only interfering in the internal affairs of other countries with the aim of weakening them, but also going to the extent of outright aggression against its neighbors⁸⁹.

As examples of the above, India's strategic culture towards Pakistan has been a peculiar case. India considers Pakistan to be a hurdle in its pursuit of regional hegemony and thus the dream of "Akhand Bharat". To begin with, one of the founding fathers of India Jawaharlal Nehru was a hardcore believer in the notion of "Akhand Bharat" or "Greater India" in the notion of indivisibility of Subcontinent's security⁹⁰ and was staunchly against the idea of Pakistan⁹¹. It may be recalled that it was under his rule that India occupied States of Hyderabad and Junagadh in 1947⁹². The roots of the Kashmir dispute are also traceable to Nehru. Under Nehru, India even attacked China in 1962 only to suffer a decisive blow⁹³. These episodes manifest that while "Nehruvianism" is oft presented as a rather moderate form of Indian foreign policy towards the region, it was premised on the same aggressive Indian strategic culture defined by the ambition of regional hegemony and expansionism.

The manner in which India attacked the then East Pakistan in 1971, aimed at disintegrating Pakistan and creating Bangladesh, is a reflection of how Indian strategic culture works out, based on creating rifts within the neighboring countries. Followed by this, India's occupation of Sikkim in 1975; and Goa in 1961 also reflect India's expansionist actions as a manifestation of its peculiar aggressive strategic culture. As regards Sri Lanka, another regional

⁸⁶ S. Pandey, "Understanding China's Afghanistan policy: From calculated indifference to strategic engagement" Observer Research Foundation, 2019, URL: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-chinas-afghanistan-policy-from-calculated-indifference-strategic-engagement-54126/>, accessed on 6 October 2019.

⁸⁷ C. H. Singh, *The Kautilya Arthashastra: A military perspective*, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, KW Publishers PVT Ltd, New Delhi, India, 2013, p. 6.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁸⁹ M. Naazer, "Internal Conflicts and Opportunistic Intervention by Neighbouring States: A Study of India's Involvement in Insurgencies in South Asia", in *IPRI Journal*, 2018, pp. 63-100.

⁹⁰ C. R. Mohan, "Raja Mandala: Akhand Bharat and other stories", in *The Indian Express*, 5 January 2016, URL: <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/rss-ram-madhav-akhand-bharat-and-other-stories/>, accessed on 05 October 2019

⁹¹ K.S. Hasan, Z. Hasan, Z. *The Kashmir Question*, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966, p. 325.

⁹² P. Vartak, "India at 70: These five states were reluctant to join Independent India", in *The Free Press Journal*, 3 August 2017, URL: <https://www.freepressjournal.in/cmcm/india-at-70-these-five-states-were-reluctant-to-join-independent-india>, accessed on 5 October 2019.

⁹³ P. Rautela, "It wasn't China, but Nehru who declared 1962 war: Australian journalist Neville Maxwell", in *The Times of India*, 7 April 2014, URL: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/It-wasnt-China-but-Nehru-who-declared-1962-war-Australian-journalist-Neville-Maxwell/articleshow/33094229.cms>, accessed on 5 October 2019.

neighboring country of South Asia, India attempted to export its internal weaknesses in Tamil Nadu to that country by training LTTE terrorists and attempting to disintegrate that Island nation⁹⁴. As India was faced with a secessionist movement in Tamil Nadu and this issue had become a constant headache for the country, India started flaming Tamil issue within Sri Lanka as a means towards diverting attention of the local Tamils within India from their own plight⁹⁵. In Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan, Indian strategic culture of expansionism has not been any different. In all these countries, India has been supporting dissension and secessionist movements as well. Afghanistan, a neighboring country of Pakistan is a clear example of India's strategic culture based on "Mandala" approach. Indian support of proxies by using Afghan soil in order to flame instability in Pakistan is a clear example of this approach⁹⁶.

In recent years, under Indian Prime Minister Modi, India's strategic culture towards South Asia has assumed worst proportions. The Modi Government is seen to be openly pursuing a muscular foreign policy vis-à-vis its neighbors⁹⁷ and this is likely to assume further lethality under the second term of the right-wing ultra- Hindu nationalist Modi Government.

5. Implications of Chinese and Indian strategic cultures for South Asia

China and India's strategic culture are poles apart in terms of their orientations. While the Chinese strategic culture towards South Asia is pacifist and non-aggressive in nature; Indian strategic culture towards the region appears to be defined by expansionism and aggression in character. As a result thereof, Chinese strategic culture towards South Asia essentially acts as a protective shield for the regional countries against Indian hegemonic designs. On the other side, India with its central geographical location continues to pursue its expansionist and aggressive strategic culture towards South Asia. The implications of the strategic cultures of China and India towards South Asia are obvious. While South Asian countries continue to face wide-ranging threats from India, these countries would continue to rely on China to ward off any such potential threats from India. Furthermore, it is less likely that an immediate and positive change in the Indian strategic culture would be witnessed in future. This is due to the world community's condoning of Indian actions in South Asia on one side, and India's continued drawing of inspiration from Hindutva for its strategic culture glorifying the "self" at the cost of "others", on the other side. India is less likely to give up on its mythical ideal of "Akhand Bharat" in any foreseeable future either. As a result, the region of South Asia is likely to continue oscillating between the regional and global powers for ensuring their security and survival.

CONCLUSIONS

From the above discussion, one may conclude that with their peculiar historical experiences coupled with their ideological and philosophical orientations, both China and India have evolved their strategic cultures towards South Asia on entirely divergent trajectories. For understanding as to why the strategic cultures of China and India towards South Asia have

⁹⁴ S. D. Waduge, "India gave birth to LTTE & Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka", *Sinhalanet*, 1 April 2016, URL: <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2016/04/01/india-gave-birth-to-ltte-tamil-militancy-in-sri-lanka/>, accessed on 6 October 2019.

⁹⁵ S. D. Waduge, "Grand strategy to disintegrate Sri Lanka", in *Lankaweb*, 2016, URL: <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2016/10/19/grand-strategy-to-disintegrate-sri-lanka/>, accessed on 6 October 2019.

⁹⁶ I. Sehgal, "India's proxy hybrid war: sacrificing US and Afghan lives", in *Daily Times*, 2019, URL: <https://dailytimes.com.pk/372951/indias-proxy-hybrid-war-sacrificing-us-and-afghan-lives/>, accessed on 6 October 2019.

⁹⁷ S. Miglani, "If Modi wins election, neighbours can expect a more muscular India", in *Reuters*, 2014, URL: <https://in.reuters.com/article/india-election-policy-modi/if-modi-wins-election-neighbours-can-expect-a-more-muscular-india-idINDEEA2T00620140330>, accessed on 6 October 2019.

developed in the manner as they have, it is important to understand as to how this region is perceived by these countries to begin with. While for China, South Asia essentially serves as a periphery, for India, the region forms part of its envisioned and mythological “Akhand Bharat” or “Greater India”. Added to this, owing to the fact that Chinese strategic culture is heavily contingent upon an emphasis on moral values as well as self-defence, China does not appear to carry any expansionist agenda towards South Asia. On the contrary, Indian strategic culture has evolved in such a manner that Hindutva and “Hindu nationalism”; India’s lack of focus on moral based foreign policy’ and the country’s emphasis on expansionist agenda pronounced by “Arthshastra” play resounding roles for its development. Owing to their differing approaches towards South Asia, Chinese and Indian Strategic cultures have also adopted different approaches towards the notion of Regional Hegemony. As the Chinese strategic culture despises hegemony in principle, it has evolved in such a manner so as to act as a benevolent counter-Hegemon for the South Asian region. On the other side, as Indian strategic culture assumes a given great power status for India coupled with the notion of “Akhand Bharat” or “Greater India”, the country appears inclined towards creating Hegemony in the region in the name of its so-called evolving leadership role for the region. The above essential characteristics of Chinese and Indian strategic cultures towards South Asia have led to contrasting possible scenarios or implications for the region. India’s strategic culture towards South Asia, owing to its specific evolutionary pattern of expansionist and aggressive posturing is likely to create challenges for the long-term security for other regional countries in South Asia. In contrast, the Chinese strategic culture towards South Asia has evolved in a totally different manner. Resultantly, it appears that China would continue to act more as a balancer and counter-Hegemon towards South Asia, thus serving as a benevolent counterweight against India.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, “2019 Military Strength Ranking”, *Global Fire Power (GFP)*, 2019, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>
2. ***, “The World’s top ten largest economies”, in *FOCUSECONOMICS*, November 2018, <https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-largest-economies-in-the-world>
3. ***, TRT World, URL: <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/india-s-division-of-jammu-and-kashmir-angers-china-28892>
4. AHSAN, A., *The Indus Saga and the making of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1996.
5. ALMOND, G.; VERBA, S., *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton University Press, 1963.
6. ASHER, C.B., TALBOT, C., *India before Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
7. ASSAYAG, J., “The body of India: Geography, Ritual, Nation”, in *Etnografica*, Vol. I (1), 1997.
8. BEITELMAIR-BERINI, M.B., *Delineating India’s Strategic Pluralism: The Subculture-Cleavage Model of Grand Strategic Thought*, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, 2018.
9. BLASKO, Dennis J. “Steady As She Goes: China’s New Defense White Paper”, War on the Rocks website, 12 August 2019, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/steady-as-she-goes-chinas-new-defense-white-paper>
10. BO, Z., “India is running out of time in Doklam dispute with China”, in *South China Morning Post*, 2017, URL: <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2103850/india-running-out-time-doklam-dispute-china>

11. CALLAHAN, W.A., "China's Asia Dream: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order", in *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, Vol I. (3), 2016.
12. CHANDRASEKARAN, R., *Hindutva Movement: Burkean Examination Of Violence As Retributive Justice*, North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota, USA, 2012.
13. DESTRADI, Sandra, "A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? India's Involvement in Nepal (2005–2008)", German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Papers, No. 138, June 2010, URL: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71733894.pdf>
14. FALAK, J., *Strategem*, URL: <https://stratagem.pk/setting-the-record-straight/indian-hegemony-roots-south-asian-conflict>
15. FENG, H., *A dragon on defence: China's strategic culture and war*, Arizona State University, 2005.
16. GODEHARDT, Nadine, "The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China", German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Papers, No. 88, 2008, URL: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6862967.pdf>.
17. GRAHAM, M., *Redefining Strategic Culture*, University of Northern British Columbia, 2014.
18. GRAY, C.S., "National Style in Strategy: The American Example", in *International Security*, Vol. 06, No. 02, 1981.
19. GRISWOLD, E., "The Violent Toll of Hindu Nationalism in India. A populist Prime Minister has legitimized India's more militant groups, and targeted attacks against religious minorities are on the rise", in *The New Yorker*, 9 March 2019, URL: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/on-religion/the-violent-toll-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india>
20. HASAN, K.S.; HASAN, Z., *The Kashmir Question*, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966.
21. HOODA, D. S., "India's National Security Strategy", March 2019, URL: https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda.pdf
22. JAIN, B., *China's soft power diplomacy in South Asia: Myth or Reality?*, Lexington Books, 2017, London.
23. JOHNSON, C.K., *China's Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle USA, 2009.
24. JONES, R. W., *India's Strategic Culture*, SAIC, 2006.
25. KAMAL, K., "Kautilya's Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences", in *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2018.
26. KAPLAN, R. D. "South Asia's Geography of Conflict", Centre for New American Security, 2010, URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120933/2010_08_South%20Asias%20Geography%20of%20Conflict_Robert%20D.%20Kaplan_0.pdf
27. KAURA, V., "China's South Asia Policy under Xi Jinping: India's Strategic Concerns", in *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 12, No. 2, 2018.
28. LANTIS, J., "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism", in *Strategic Insights*, Volume 4, Issue 10, 2005, URL: <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-claus.pdf>
29. MIGLANI, S., "If Modi wins election, neighbours can expect a more muscular India", in *Reuters*, 2014, <https://in.reuters.com/article/india-election-policy-modi/if-modi-wins-election-neighbours-can-expect-a-more-muscular-india-idINDEEA2T00620140330>
30. MOHAN, C.R., "Raja Mandala: Akhand Bharat and other stories", in *The Indian Express*, 5 January 2016, URL: <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/rss-ram-madhav-akhand-bharat-and-other-stories/>

31. NAAZER, M., “Internal Conflicts and Opportunistic Intervention by Neighbouring States: A Study of India’s Involvement in Insurgencies in South Asia”, in *IPRI Journal*, 2018.
32. PANDEY, S., “Understanding China’s Afghanistan policy: From calculated indifference to strategic engagement”, Observer Research Foundation, 2019, URL: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-chinas-afghanistan-policy-from-calculated-indifference-strategic-engagement-54126/>
33. RASHID, A., “Understanding China’s Afghanistan policy: From calculated indifference to strategic engagement” Observer Research Foundation, 2019, URL: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-chinas-afghanistan-policy-from-calculated-indifference-strategic-engagement-54126/>
34. RAUTELA, P., “It wasn’t China, but Nehru who declared 1962 war: Australian journalist Neville Maxwell”, in *The Times of India*, 2 April 2014, URL: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/It-wasnt-China-but-Nehru-who-declared-1962-war-Australian-journalist-Neville-Maxwell/articleshow/33094229.cms>
35. RICHARDS, Commodore Katherine, “China-India: An analysis of the Himalayan territorial dispute”, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS), 2015, URL: <https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20aper.pdf>
36. SAREEN, S. “China and Pakistan’s ‘Iron Brotherhood’: The economic dimensions and their implications on US hegemony”, Observer Research Foundation, 2019, URL: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-and-pakistans-iron-brotherhood-the-economic-dimensions-and-their-implications-on-us-hegemony/>
37. SCOBELL, A., *China and Strategic Culture*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, USA, 2002.
38. SEHGAL, I., “India’s proxy hybrid war: sacrificing US and Afghan lives”, in *Daily Times*, 2019, URL: <https://dailytimes.com.pk/372951/indias-proxy-hybrid-war-sacrificing-us-and-afghan-lives/>
39. SINGH, C.H., *The Kautilya Arthaśāstra: A military perspective*, Centre for Land Warfare Studies; KW Publishers PVT Ltd, New Delhi, India 2013.
40. SNYDER, J.L., *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1977.
41. SWAINE, M.D., “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy”, in *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 44, 2014.
42. SWAMY, Arun S., “Ideology, Organization and Electoral Strategy of Hindu Nationalism: What’s Religion Got to Do with It?”, ‘Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia’, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2004.
43. THAPAR, R., “They Peddle Myths and Call It History. India’s governing party rewrites the country’s history to justify its Hindu nationalist ideology”, in *The New York Times*, 17 May 2019, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/opinion/india-elections-modi-history.html>
44. VARTAK, P., “India at 70: These five states were reluctant to join Independent India”, in *The Free Press Journal*, 3 August 2017, URL: <https://www.freepressjournal.in/cmcm/india-at-70-these-five-states-were-reluctant-to-join-independent-india>
45. VITTAL, Vinay, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand Strategy”, School Of Advanced Air And Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2011, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1019423.pdf>, accessed on 28 August 2019.
46. WADUGE, S.D., “Grand strategy to disintegrate Sri Lanka”, in *Lankaweb*, 2016, URL: <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2016/10/19/grand-strategy-to-disintegrate-sri-lanka/>

47. WADUGE, S.D., "India gave birth to LTTE & Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka", Sinhala.net, 1 April 2016, URL: <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2016/04/01/india-gave-birth-to-ltte-tamil-militancy-in-sri-lanka>
48. WANG, K., "India gave birth to LTTE & Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka", Sinhala.net, 1 April 2016, URL: <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2016/04/01/india-gave-birth-to-ltte-tamil-militancy-in-sri-lanka>
49. WOJCZEWSKI, Thorsten, "Identity and world order in India's post-Cold War foreign policy discourse", in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 40, Issue 1, 2019, URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1552079/>
50. XINHUA, "Full text of facts and China's position concerning Indian border troops' crossing of China-India boundary", in *China Daily*, 2017, URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-08/03/content_30341027.htm
51. XINMIN, S., "India's Strategic Culture and Model of International Behavior", China Institute of International Studies, 2014, URL: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-06/25/content_7007616.htm
52. ZONGZE, R.; YURONG, C.; JIANXUE, L.; JUNYING, S.; JINYUE, G., *China's New Neighborhood Diplomacy: Seeking Stability through Management and Planning*, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 2016.

YEMENI HOUTHI - INSURGENT OR TERRORIST MOVEMENT?

Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D.

Senior Researcher, Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
“Carol I” National Defence University, Romania. Email: atanasiu.mirela@unap.ro

Abstract: *In the Middle East, a series of armed non-state actors are playing increasingly changing role in the political and security dynamics of the states. Since 1990, Houthi rebels are acting as religious-based political-military movement supported by Iran, presently controlling part of northern Yemen and fighting against the governmental forces by using insurgency tactics. In the late years, there are some discussions at the international security community level related to the shifts in promoted ideology and used tactics of Houthi rebels as insurgent movement. The most recent comes from the US administration considering designating Houthis among the terrorist groups based on the shifts in Houthis ideology and actions. Thus, the paper is intended to be a theoretical case study limited at asking some questions: What background could have led to the discussions concerning the shift of Houthi group from an insurgent to a terrorist movement? What drove US administration to think of including Houthi movement in the terrorist groups' category? How can be categorized the Houthi group from the International humanitarian law perspective, given the actual status quo of Yemen? Which could be the potential changes in the security situation of Yemen if Houthi movement will be categorized as terrorist?*

Keywords: *Yemen security; non-state actors; threat; power; terrorism; change.*

In the Middle East a series of violent non-state actors emerged, with different organizational, ideological, and strategic architectures and goals. They are fighting for territorial supremacy in the name of a religious faction (Sunni Daesh and Al-Qaeda), in support of a foreign government as Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah (financially fueled by Iran) is fighting in Syria on the side of president Bashar al-Assad regime, for their claimed right of secession (Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq and People's Protection Units in Syria), but also for governmental control as Zaydi Shiite Houthi Ansar Allah (Supporters of God) group does. Some of these non-state actors are already considered terrorist groups by utmost of the international community (for example, Daesh, Al-Qaeda), some are considered terrorist groups by a part of the international community (Hezbollah, proxy of Iran, is considered terrorist organization by US, Canada, Israel, UK, Australia, the Arab League, the EU, but not UN or other states) and some, as Ansar Allah, is presumed of becoming a terrorist group. There are at least four important incentives that makes al-Houthi movement worthy of thorough analysis: the changing nature of its ideology, goals, means, and future perspectives in the Yemeni politics; its role as a proxy among Iran and Saudi Arabia in the context of their ongoing competition over regional influence; its capacity of conflict resilience despite the international military efforts of the coalition against it lead by Saudi Arabia and US; direct mutual enmity with US and this relation effects on the geopolitics of the region.

1. Zaydi brief history and evolution

The actual al-Houthi¹ movement's pursuit is not new but transformed in time with current conditions and challenges of geopolitical environment. It comes from their Zaydi Shiite historical religious identity.

Their ideology comes from their root spiritual leader Zayd bin Ali (Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law) martyred by his followers after leading an uprising against the Umayyad Empire in 740 invoking as main reason fighting corruption², a goal that remained on Houthis agenda also today.

Zaydis enjoyed international recognition as an imamate in some territorial parts of northern Yemen for about 1000 years (893-1962). In the nineteenth century, a Zaydi community was established in the mountains of Northern Yemen that started to fight to control the whole country with different ratio of success. The republican revolution ended the Zaydi imamate in Yemen and this was followed by the political marginalization of northern areas communities, such as Zaydis predominant in Sa'ada governorate. Now, Zaydis remained only in Yemen although they were once found in Iran and North Africa. About Zaydism is often said to bear more similarities to Sunni than to Shiite Islam³. Also, while the majority of Houthi followers consist of Zaydis, it is not the case that all Zaydis are Houthis. Zaydism, which was once associated with the imamate, is today associated with the Houthis, which is kind of exaggerated. A Zaydi republican general named Ali Abdullah Saleh came to power in Yemen after a succession of coups d'état in 1978 and ruled the country for 33 years. In 1990, under his ruling The Republic of Yemen emerged from the unification of the former Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen with the Yemen Arab Republic. Since its inception as northsouth common body, the country had serious issues with governmental corruption and mismanagement promoted by Ali Abdullah Saleh⁴.

1.1. Houthis – reviving Zaydism and fighting against corruption

Al-Houthi movement's name comes from al-Houthi family, more precisely from Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, former member of the pro-governmental *Zaydi al-Haqq Party* (Party of Truth) established to counterweight *al-Islah Party* (The Yemeni Congregation for Reform). These parties have in common two things. The both parties were created in 1990, and both reached to be part of the Joint Meeting Parties opposition, in 1992. Houthi insurgent movement was initiated in 1992 when Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi joined the paramilitary group called *Shabab al Moumineen* (the Believing Youth) aligned with *al Huqq* - then pro-government, and in a couple of months later, opposition party. The Believing Youth emerged in the northern governorate of Sa'ada in response to growing Salafī influence in northern Yemen. Its stated mission was to revive Zaydism, as “a Shiite sect whose tenets include the belief that only descendants of the Prophet Mohammad can be legitimate Muslim

¹A.N.: In the specialty literature the references to this movement is found under different names. Some of those are: Hothi, Houthi, Huthi, Ansar Allah, Ansarallah, al-Shabab al-Mum'en, Shabab al-Moumineen, Partisans of God, Believing Youth. Also, the group is addressed as religious and/or insurgent movement, paramilitary group, rebels, guerrilla, and militia.

² Bruce Riedel, “Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?”, in *Brookings.edu*, 18 December 2017, URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/whoare-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/>, accessed 4 October 2019.

³ World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, “Yemen. Zaydi Shi'a”, Minority Rights Group International, January 2018, URL: <https://minorityrights.org/minorities/zaydi-shias/>, accessed on 5 October 2019.

⁴ Peter Salisbury, *A multidimensional approach to restoring state legitimacy in Yemen*, Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, Oxford, 2018, p. 10.

rulers”⁵. Al-Houthi quickly became altogether the Believing Youth religious, political and military leader and was fighting with the government and other opposed groups to preserve Zaydi unique identity, religious beliefs and practices by all means, including by establishing their own schools and university. Also on their political agenda was resistance against Saleh corruption⁶. Thus, in 1993-1997, while he was a member of the Yemeni parliament, Hussein Al Houthi represented the al-Haqq opposition party but with no real chance to impose its party’s agenda as the ruling General People’s Congress party and President Ali Abdullah al-Saleh had authoritarian behavior on the Yemeni political scene. Therefore, his regime was called by political science’ specialists to be “an electoral autocracy”⁷.

1.2. Houthi – change (f)actor in the Yemeni domestic politics and security

After 11 September attacks in the US, the Americans increasingly involved in the Middle East security, and on this background of international antiterrorist fight, the Yemeni presidency cultivated the relationship with the American presidency, officially justified on their common cooperation against terrorist Al-Qaeda, active in the Arabian Peninsula as well in Yemen. Already concerned of the foreign influence in Yemen, with the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, “many Yemenis viewed Saleh’s participation in the War on Terror as a tacit approval of America’s occupation and colonization of the Middle East”⁸, and the Houthis began making the people’s grievances known in the capital Sana’a by their activists. Thus, Hussein al-Houthi increasingly stood up against the Sunni state regime, and his movement held anti-government and anti-American mass demonstrations. Since 2004, this Yemeni movement has fought a local insurgency against the government in the north of the country. In result, the government issued a reward for the capture of Hussein and security forces killed him in September 2004. His death made of him a martyr for his followers, many of them comparing him with their spiritual leader Zayd, and so an uprising movement ignited under the name al Houthis comprising Zaydi but also Sunni or other sects displeased with Saleh government and its relations with US.

Hussein’s father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi took control of the al-Houthi movement, but he served primarily as spiritual guide of the organization, as the military operations were led by Abdullah Ayed al Ruzami, Abdul Malik al-Houthi and Youssuf al Midani. Concomitantly, a branch of the Believing Youth approached more extreme Houthis ideology, preaching open opposition to its enemies under the slogan “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse upon the Jews, and Victory to Islam”⁹.

Between 2004 and 2010, the Saleh regime fought six wars (2004, 2005, 2005-2006, 2007, 2008, 2009-2010) with northern Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels conducted by Hassan’s successors (his father and then his younger brother), and the conflict transformed from a local insurrection into a national uprising as from 2007 “an increasingly vocal secessionist movement had emerged in the south of the country”¹⁰ and the situation worsened in

⁵ Christopher Harnisch, Katherine Zimmerman, “Profile: Al Houthi Movement”, in *Foreign and Defense Policy, Middle East*, AEI Critical Threats Project, 28 January 2010, URL: <http://www.aei.org/publication/profile-al-houthi-movement/>, accessed on 8 January 2019.

⁶ Bruce Riedel, *art. cit.*

⁷ Andreas Schedler, “Electoral Authoritarianism” in: T. Landman and N. Robinson (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Sage Publication Ltd.), London, United Kingdom, 2009.

⁸ Samy Dorlian, “The Sa’da War in Yemen: between Politics and Sectarianism”, in *The Muslim World*, No. 101(2), April 2011, p. 133.

⁹ Hannah Porter, *‘Screaming in the Face of the Arrogant’: Understanding the Logic and Symbolism of Yemen’s Houthi Movement*, MA thesis, University of Chicago, Division of Humanities, US, May 2018, p. 5.

¹⁰ Peter Salisbury, *A multidimensional approach to restoring state legitimacy in Yemen*, Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, Oxford, 2018, p. 10.

November 2009 when Saudi Arabia's military forces started to fight Houthis in support of the government, internationalizing what had been a domestic conflict. Meanwhile, there were some trials to install peace among the government and Houthis, one of those was Qatari-brokered peace talks started in May 2007, resulted in a joint ceasefire agreement and also a peace agreement were signed by the both parties but fighting continued, each of them blaming the others for re-initiating armed conflict. Another truce was agreed in February 2010, when Ali Abdullah Saleh declared to end the military operations against the Houthis but it was breached many times.

1.3. Houthi – powerbroker in the post-Arab Spring Yemeni political transition

The Arab Spring debuted in Yemen in 2011 with months of protests; Abdel-Malek alHouthi positioned as a revolutionary national leader as the Houthis changed their rhetoric more pragmatically on criticizing high gasoline prices (an issue concerning all Yemeni) leaving aside hate speech addressed US and Saudi Arabia and so the movement got more support from the Yemeni citizens despite the government strives to stop them. It is the moment the Houthis adopted the name Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) and developed a Beirut-based television station, Al-Masirah (The Journey), American sources say "with Lebanese Hezbollah support"¹¹.

Once with gaining popular support, the Houthis started to control territories in Northern Yemen. Thus, "by the end of 2012, Ansar Allah controlled almost all of Sa'ada province and large parts of the adjacent governorates of Amran, al-Jawf, and Hajjah' and, captured all the armament it found in these localities. Thus, the same source shows that Ansar Allah reached to control the entire Yemeni brigade sets of tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons as well as 'six operational 9M117M launchers and 33 R-17E Elbrus (NATO name SS-1C Scud-B) short-range ballistic missiles, a system with a range of 310 miles"¹².

Following the mass uprising of population mostly led by the Houthis, Ali Abdullah Saleh was constrained to step down from power after he signed a deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), promising immediate transfer of his powers to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, in return of retaining his title of president (which granted him immunity from prosecution for his corruption crimes) until a new chief of state was elected¹³. Consequently, the Gulf initiative (GCC) was signed on November 23, 2011, and the transfer of power was achieved. In this framework, Yemen's political elite acceded to the Gulf initiative establishing "a caretaker transitional government for a two-year transitional period and created a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as a forum to solve the country's political problems"¹⁴. NDC presidency gathered 9 members including President Hadi who is chairman of the organization, and one representative for each constituency involved (General People's Congress and allied parties, Yemeni Socialist Party, Nasserite Unionist Party, Peaceful Southern Movement, Ansar Allah, Islah Party, Women List¹⁵). Thus, the consensus

¹¹ Michael Knights, "The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture", in *CTC Sentinel*, No. 11(8), September 2018, p. 17.

¹² Michael Knights, "The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture", in *CTC Sentinel*, No. 11(8), September 2018, p. 17.

¹³ Marwa Rashad, "Yemen's Saleh signs deal to give up power", in *Reuters*, November 23, 2011, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen/yemens-saleh-signs-deal-to-give-up-power-idUSTRE7AM0D020111123>, accessed on 15 October 2019.

¹⁴ Charles Schmitz, *Yemen's National Dialogue*, Middle East Institute, March 10, 2014, URL: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/yemens-national-dialogue>, accessed on 15 January 2019.

¹⁵ Women candidates must meet the following criteria: The participants, whether individuals or organizations, must not be affiliated with a political party. They must be members of active organizations or their participation

government shared power between the former ruling General People's Congress and the opposition Joint Meeting Parties alliance where also Houthi group participated.

Hadi's political transition government was supposed to bring stability in Yemen, a failed state with multiple security issues to be solved (terrorism, separatism in the south and north, food and water scarcity, big unemployment rate, and poor economy), all of these making impossible the establishment of a new constitution or electoral process. As concerns the resolution of separatists' request, a first step was acquired in the NDC Final Communiqué issued in 2014 where 'the vision for the modern civil *federal* Yemeni state' was a clear direction¹⁶.

In first, the new political formula was seen by many Yemenis as the only non-violent means of resolving the crisis in the country, thus, it was accepted and supported by many of the internal and external stakeholders. Later, the Southern Movement (Al Hiraq) secessionist group established in 2007, that was seeking for a long time to restore the southern state and fought for the right to self-determination even against GCC and UN decisions, contested the legitimacy of NDC and of the transitional government disagreeing many of the points of the package of measures set to address key-challenges¹⁷. Also the Houthis participated in the UN-sponsored NDC from 2013 to 2014 and although they did not reject the reform agenda in principle, they opposed proposals to convert Yemen into a six-region federalist state, as in the proposal Sa'ada was linked with Sanaa, but the Houthis want Sa'ada to be its own autonomous region¹⁸.

But, in 2014, under the gap of trust and legitimacy related to the interim government win-win solutions, a vacuum of central power was created and Houthis exploited it in their advantage by taking the territorial control by armed force in the north in Sa'ada province and its neighbouring areas¹⁹. After gaining control over key government buildings in capital Sana'a, the Houthis and Yemeni provisional government signed an UN-brokered deal on 21 September to form a "unity government"²⁰. On this political background, Yemen has been the subject of a coup d'état initiated by Houthi *Ansar Allah* helped by former president Saleh (by a convenience alliance), who played a key-role in transforming Ansar Allah into the dominant military and political force in the country. Thus, in September 2014 the prime-minister Mohammed Basindawa resigned in order to smooth the way for implementing the UN-brokered deal and in January 2015, the active president of Yemen Mansour Hadi was forced by Houthi rebels to flee the country. In February, the Houthis declared the so-called constitutional declaration, dissolved the parliament, and formed the Revolutionary Council endowed with the mandate to run the state and government affairs²¹. In a month, the Houthi rebels replaced Hadi's parliament with their interim government, the Supreme Revolutionary

in public activities must be proven. With respect to youth, they must be activists in the revolutionary arena, URL: <http://www.ndc.ye/page.aspx?show=69>, accessed on 15 October.

¹⁶ ***, *Final Communiqué of National Dialogue Conference 2013-2014*, Sana'a, Republic of Yemen, 2014, p. 6.

¹⁷ Ali Saif Hassan, "Yemen National Dialogue Conference: managing peaceful change?" in *Accord*, No. 25, 2014, p. 53.

¹⁸ Cameron Glenn, *Who are Yemen's Houthis?*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, US, May 29, 2018, URL: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis>, accessed on 15 March 2019.

¹⁹ ***, "What Is the Houthi Movement?", Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, September 7, 2016, URL: <https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-houthi-movement>, accessed on 20 May 2019.

²⁰ Mohammed Gobari, "Houthi rebels sign deal with Yemen parties to form new government", in *Reuters*, 21 September 2014, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/houthi-rebels-sign-deal-with-yemen-parties-to-form-new-government-idUSKBN0HG04T20140921>, accessed on 22 October 2019.

²¹ Emirates New Agency, *International report documents crimes committed by al-Houthi militia, Saleh group: Report in full*, ReliefWeb, UAE, 26 September 2015, URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/international-report-documents-crimes-committed-al-houthi-militia-saleh-group-report>, accessed on 12 March 2019.

Committee (SRC). By the spring of 2015, the Houthis controlled 16 Yemeni provinces in north and northwest Yemen. Thus, Houthis became one of the main actors and important powerbroker of the ongoing civil war.

In these circumstances, alarmed by the increasing accumulated power of Houthis believed to be backed militarily by Iran regional Shiite power, Saudi Arabia and other mostly Sunni Arab states began an air campaign against the northern Yemen controlled by the Houthis aimed at restoring Mansour Hadi's government. Thus, in March 2015, the insurgency dramatically escalated, changing from an internal civil war to an internationalized conflict and this is still ongoing. Also, the US and the UN imposed sanctions on Houthis on April 14, 2015 for threatening Yemen's stability.

2. Houthis and foreign involvement in Yemeni civil war

Yemen has failed in chaos following the foreign intervention of the Saudi-led coalition at the request of the fled President Hadi invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter (in a letter send to the UN Security Council). It is not the place or the moment to discuss how legal is to start such armed conflicts against a country whose president ran away and the article invoked would have been relevant if Yemen (or the Saudi coalition) were asserting that Yemen was responding to an external armed attack, that presumable, in that moment was not the case. In March 2015 the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen began with airstrikes and a naval blockade with the stated goal of restoring Hadis government to power. The country divided between the fighting groups of the legitimate President Mansour Hadi and former President Ali Abdallah Saleh, Houthi rebels supported by elements of Yemen's military loyal to the country's former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Al-Qaida. Saleh changed parties from the rebels' group to the Saudi-backed coalition, and was killed by the Houthis in 2017 for his betrayal. Consequently, the balance of forces slightly improved for the opponents supporting the legitimate president. But, until then as result to this armed conflict, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 2201 and 2216 (2015) demanding the end to Yemen violence, the both documents "expressing alarm at the acts of violence committed by the Houthis and their supporters, which have undermined the political transition process in Yemen, and jeopardized the security, stability, sovereignty and unity of Yemen"²². Thus, Houthis were considered by the large international community as an destabilizing and insecurity f(actor), acting against the lawful government.

On November 4, 2017, tensions between Iran and Sunni states, specifically Saudi Arabia, escalated when Yemen's Houthi rebels fired a ballistic missile at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, the first time a Houthi missile had come so close to the capital²³.

In March 2019, Yemeni battlefield consists of many state and non-state actors with different agendas. The main opponents in here are: the Saudi-led coalition composed of Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait), supported by Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, the US (which has been providing logistical and intelligence assistance), the UK, France and Canada²⁴; the factions supporting the legitimate President Mansour Hadi; the Houthis; the Southern Movement; al-

²² Resolution 2201 (2015) adopted by the Security Council at its 7382nd meeting, on 15 February 2015 and Resolution 2216 (2015) adopted by the Security Council at its 7426th meeting, on 14 April 2015.

²³ Cameron Glenn, *Who are Yemen's Houthis?*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, US, May 29, 2018, URL: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis>, accessed on 15 March 2019.

²⁴ Zachary Vermeer, "The Jus ad Bellum and the Airstrikes in Yemen: Double Standards for Decamping Presidents?", in *Ejil: Talk!*, April 30, 2015, URL: <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-jus-ad-bellum-and-the-airstrikes-in-yemen-double-standards-for-decamping-presidents/>, accessed on 11 March 2019.

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Moreover, since its formation in March 2015 ISIS branch in Yemen seems to try to take some share of the profit, but in more than 4 years it proved to play “a marginal role in the current Yemeni conflict”²⁵.

It seems the single actor prospering as result of the Yemeni chaos are Houthi forces that gained increasingly support and thus metamorphosed in few years from guerrilla war fighters into a powerful military entity, state-level actor capable of deploying medium-range ballistic missiles²⁶. American information source presents the Houthis organization formula of resilience and success as a “mixture of indoctrination, machismo, material sustenance and threats”²⁷. No matter the formula of its resilience, the main conclusion is Houthi group have proved to be at least resilient in front of challenges by using a combination of adapting ideology, partly flexible policy, and step-by-step opponent’s weaknesses and mistakes exploitation. For example, as the Saudi Arabia and the coalition airstrikes and blockades where blamed for the killed civilians in raids, the Houthis were able to divert the criticism for the grievances they produced to the Yemeni people invoking the fight against the foreign power. Moreover, this unpopular foreign military intervention attracts people’s support or at least sympathy for the Houthis as they are the only force actively fighting against it. And, people’s support means more resilience for any organization. Thus, although, the Houthi movement is portrayed in mass-media by his main opponents as a “localized phenomenon led by the single family”²⁸, is got far more than a localized uprising.

In December 2018, a new truce was agreed in Sweden²⁹ among the Houthis and the government forces. Consequently, the Houthi group promised to achieve the first step of the agreement and hand over control of the Hodeidah port. Meanwhile in January 2019, the Special Envoy for Yemen to the Security Council referred to the UNSC Resolution 2451/2018 endorsing Sweden Agreement and showed there are positive evolutions in the dialogue between the belligerents in Yemen conflict in terms of “significant decrease in hostilities [...] On the agreement for the exchange of prisoners, we are working with both parties to finalize the lists of prisoners submitted by each in Stockholm [...], there is a tangible contribution to peace”³⁰.

What it is important to note out of this all allegations is the Houthis, from a family-based riot group ended to be a widely accepted political entity to the negotiation table one-to-one with the Yemeni government supported by important foreign powers. Furthermore, its ideals and ideology extended within other parts of the country, not only in the controlled territory in north, making adepts also in other religious sects, and thus became an important military and political game changer and security power broker in Yemen gaining as well transnational legitimacy.

²⁵ Andrea Carboni, *The Islamic State in Yemen*, ACLED, July 5, 2018, p. 1, URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/islamic-state-yemen>, accessed 14 August 2019.

²⁶ Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture”, in *CTC Sentinel*, No. 11(8), September 2018, p. 15.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

²⁸ Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention”, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2018, p. 1.

²⁹ The parties agreed on the Houthis to hand over the control of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa, to complete an executive mechanism on activating a prisoner exchange agreement, to issue a common statement of understanding on Taiz. See URL: <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-agreement>, accessed on 11 March 2019.

³⁰ ***, “Briefing of the Special Envoy for Yemen to the Security Council”, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGL), 9 January 2019, URL: <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/briefing-special-envoy-yemen-security-council>, accessed on 15 March 2019.

3. Conceptualizing insurgency, civil war and terrorism

When specialists or mass-media sources referred to Houthis' political and military struggle against the government and foreign intervention, the more used concepts were insurgency and civil war³¹.

If we take into consideration the definitions given to insurgency in the online Cambridge Dictionary as "an occasion when a group of people attempt to take control of their country by force"³², or by political science specialists from Stanford University as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas [...] harnessed to diverse political agendas, motivations, and grievances"³³, one might easily consider Houthis in the category of the insurgent groups.

In fact, insurgency is an organized expansion of the political-military struggle to weaken the control and undermine the legitimacy of a government elected by taking over the power or other positions of the political authorities, along with increasing control, which proved also to be a valid allegation for the Houthi movement. But the same goal could also have a terrorist organization, and, thus, insurgency does not exclude terrorism. Still, a key difference is that an insurgency is a movement, namely a political effort with a specific aim that does not exclude negotiation. Thus, if one takes into consideration how Al-Houthi group was initiated, from its social goals (to preserve the historical rights for Zaydi community), ideals (to fight against corruption), means of action (building cultural and educational events and facilities, participating as a legitimate political party to fight for their rights), it is obvious the Yemeni government faced a social movement. The trigger to insurgency was the lack of positive response from the political leaders with decisional power who ignored this community. Then, the situation has changed for Houthis in terms of ideology, means of action and goals, and by military means they observed can have more, even the control over much of Yemeni territory, at least their historical legacy or maybe another imamate. Their leader became aware of their possible bigger role to play in the Yemeni political scene, with or without Iran military support, as they are already access to armaments and munition captured in their *de facto* governed territory.

In Encyclopedia Britannica civil war is defined as "a violent conflict between a state and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory [...] are thus distinguished from [...] similar violence by non-state actors, such as terrorism or violent crime"³⁴. Also, a civil war can have one of two goals: to control the state government as al-Houthi rebels are seeking in the Yemeni conflict, or to obtain territorial autonomy as the movement in southern Yemen. Thus, civil war is waging all over Yemen and among all parties involve so we will skip analyzing it in this perspective.

As concerns terrorism, from the multitude of definitions given to it by specialists, states and organizations³⁵, most of them have three common elements: the use of violence,

³¹ In a simple 'search' on google on 'Yemen Houthi insurgency' we found 608,000 results and for 'Houthi civil war' we found 715,000.

³² ***, "Insurgency", Cambridge Dictionary, URL: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/insurgency>, accessed on 15 October 2019.

³³ James D. Fearon, David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", in *American Political Science Review*, No. 97(1), February 2003, p. 75.

³⁴ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Civil war", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2019, URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war>, accessed on 22 October 2019.

³⁵A.N.: For example: Walter Laqueur defines terrorism in its book with the same name published in 1977; Australian Federal Government defines it in the Criminal Code Act 1995 Part 5.3 Divisions 100-106; US Department of Homeland Security define it in Homeland Security Act of 2002; Romanian National Strategy for

political ends and the intention to induce fear among the population. A type of modern terrorism is the one practiced in the context of insurgencies used by ethnic rebels or politicians, their actions being, as a rule, of paramilitary or guerrilla type nature³⁶. Here might be included the Houthis if one can prove they have the intention to induce fear because the other two elements are already present, use of violence and stated political ends. But, if one looks closer can see fear is not the first option of this kind of relations Houthis have one to each over and thus, a behavioural pattern can be traced.

4. Some possible questions and answers related to the main topic

Based on the definitions previously given to insurgency, civil war and terrorism, in the following we will answer as much as possible in conformity to the analyzed sources and the research rationality to some questions related to Houthis dilemma: insurgent or terrorist movement? Of course, with the limitations imposed by a theoretical study constrained to mostly online sources available in Romanian, English, French or Italian but which can be a practical spectrum for Westerners' wide perception concerning the approached topic.

4.1. What background could have led to the discussions concerning the shift of Houthi group from an insurgent to a terrorist movement?

A report of United Nations concluded by an independent group of experts shows that since March 2015 up to 23 August 2018, 6,660 civilians were killed and 10,563 injured and children between 11 and 17 years old were conscripted or enlisted into armed forces or groups and used them to participate actively in hostilities³⁷. From these numbers Human Rights Watch states the majority of civil casualties resulted from the Saudi Arabia-led coalition airstrikes³⁸. On Yemen conflict, Amnesty International reports for 2017-2018 that "All parties to the continuing armed conflict committed war crimes and other serious violations of international law, with inadequate accountability measures in place to ensure justice and reparation to victims"³⁹. From these first statement one can say that if we are about to classify some participants in the Yemen civil war as terrorist, evidence shows that we should do this for all parties involved. Also, in the same source is stated that "In Yemen, the Houthi armed group arbitrarily arrested and detained critics, journalists and human rights defenders in the capital, Sana'a, and other areas they controlled"⁴⁰. Looking in mass-media one can find some cases of forced detention⁴¹, torture⁴², killing⁴³ and kidnapping⁴⁴. Also, the Houthis are accused

Prevention and Control of terrorism on the prevention and combating of terrorism defines it in 2004; NATO in the *AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, Edition 2014.

³⁶ Mirela Atanasiu, Lucian Stancila, *Terorismul — răul din umbră al începutului de secol*, "Carol I" National Defence University publishing house, Bucharest, 2014, p. 26.

³⁷ ***, *Yemen: United Nations Experts point to possible war crimes by parties to the conflict*, United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 28 August 2018, URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23479>, accessed on 22.2019.

³⁸ ***, *Yemen. Events of 2018*, Human Rights Watch, 2018.

³⁹ ***, *Amnesty International Report 2017/18. The state of the world human rights*, Amnesty International, London, UK, 2018, p. 400.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 56.

⁴¹ A.N.: See the case of 113 detainees stated by The Netherlands-based foundation for human rights in the Arab world, Rights Radar (RR) killed in Houthi detention centres since September 21, 2014. See details in: ***, *Yemen: 113 detainees killed under torture in Houthi prisons*, Rights Radar, 12 January 2018, URL: https://rightsradar.org/en/latest_details.php?id=47, accessed on 21 October 2019.

⁴² See the case of Hisham al-Omeisy, prominent activist against Yemen's civil war with 35,000 followers on Twitter. Details at: Raf Sanchez, "Yemen's Houthi rebels step up persecution in paranoid Sana'a", in *The Telegraph*, 30 September 2018, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/30/yemens-houthi-rebels-step-persecution-paranoid-sanaa/>, accessed on 20 October 2019.

of indiscriminately using “weapons with wide area effect” in Taiz and other urban settings, which would constitute a war crime⁴⁵ and firing “artillery indiscriminately into Yemeni cities” and “launching indiscriminate ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia”⁴⁶. If one follows the data can easily see that the situations suspected to be terrorist acts are more frequent after 2014.

4.2. What drove US administration to think of including Houthi movement in the terrorist groups’ category?

The first that described Houthis as terrorists was the Yemeni government in 2009⁴⁷, when Ali Abdullah Saleh was in power, but President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi formally requested that the United Nations designate the Shiite Houthi rebels a terrorist organization in February 2017⁴⁸. Meanwhile, in March 2014, Saudi Arabia designated the Houthis as a terrorist group.

One motif of US designating the Houthis group as terrorist is this organization’s motto openly expressing rage toward other countries and religions: “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam”⁴⁹, “in first chanted collectively at Imam Hadi school in the Marran mountains on January 17, 2002”⁵⁰ displayed across Sana’a including on the badges of university students⁵¹.

This motto was modeled on Iran’s revolutionary motto, and many Yemenis drew parallels between the Houthis and Hezbollah, Shiite organization used by Iran as a proxy in the Middle East. That comparison extends to their leaders, with analysts pointing to similarities between Abdel-Malek al-Houthi and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah in terms of

⁴³ At least two civilians have been killed and 16 others wounded after Houthi rebels shelled a residential district in Yemen’s besieged city of Taiz. See details at: Mohammed Al-Rumim, “This is how we welcomed 2019: Civilians killed in Houthi attack”, in *Al Jazeera*, 6 January 2019, URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/welcomed-2019-civilians-killed-houthi-attack-190106141240211.html>, accessed on 20 October 2019.

⁴⁴ See the cases of Major General Mohammad Ahmed Salem al-Subaihi former Yemeni Minister of Defence kidnapped on 25 March 2015 when he was in power (See details at: *Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014, Report of the UNHCR of technical assistance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner to the National Commission of Inquiry*, 17 August 2018) or Awfa Al Naami, the country manager for Saferworld, a UK-based organisation helping people in conflict zones, was summoned for questioning at the Houthi national security office in Sanaa and released after three weeks (Details at: Mina Aldroubi, “Houthi rebels free Yemeni activist Awfa Al Naami after three weeks”, *The National*, 17 February 2019, URL: <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/houthi-rebels-free-yemeni-activist-awfa-al-naami-after-three-weeks-1.826865>, accessed on 20 October 2019).

⁴⁵ ***, “Yemen conflict: UN experts detail possible war crimes by all parties”, in *BBC*, 28 August 2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45329220>, accessed on 10 October 2019.

⁴⁶ ***, *Yemen. Events of 2018*, Human Rights Watch, 2018, URL: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen>, accessed on 18 October 2019.

⁴⁷ ***, “18 Houthi terrorists killed in separate areas”, in *Almotamar*, 28 September 2009, URL: www.almotamar.net/en/6718.htm, accessed on 18 October 2019.

⁴⁸ Edwin Mora, “Report: Trump May Designate Yemen’s Iran-Allied Houthis as Terrorists”, in *Breitbart*, 9 November 2018, URL: <https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2018/11/09/report-trump-may-designate-yemens-iran-allied-houthis-terrorists/>, accessed on 18 October 2019.

⁴⁹ Embassy of the Republic of Yemen Washington, DC, *The Houthis legacy in Yemen: Lasting Damage Internally and Looming Danger Internationally, Special Report*, May 2018, URL: <https://www.yemenembassy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/The-Houthis-Legacy-in-Yemen.pdf>, accessed on 12 February 2019.

⁵⁰ Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, Madeleine Wells, *Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen. The Huthi Phenomenon*, National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 119.

⁵¹ Seth J. Frantzman, “Curse the Jews,’ Yemen’s Houthi rebel slogan handed out at university”, in *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 October 2018, URL: <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Curse-the-Jews-Yemens-Houthi-rebel-slogan-handed-out-at-university-569074>, accessed on 16 March 2019.

how they use media and even how they structure their speeches⁵². Of course, Iran, and Houthi common Shiite Islam faith worried the Americans probably also as a result of the avalanche of mediatized attacks, assaults, and beheadings specific to Islamist terrorists.

In 2010, an US report was referring to the Yemeni conflict as a sectarian one based on “increasing religious and political radicalization of the Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels resulted in more reports of violence between the Zaydi and Salafi communities”⁵³. Until now, some group’s leaders, also Abdul Malik Al Houthi, have been designated as terrorist by the US⁵⁴. Still, Zaydi Shiism is very different to the version practiced in either Lebanon or Iran and the Houthi leader has shown he is highly pragmatic, rather than ideologically driven, in making political alliances⁵⁵.

The direct threat against the American citizens, living or passing through Yemen⁵⁶ can be a steady legal motif for US to enlist Houthis group as foreign terrorist organization; in conformity with Section 219 of the US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) when the security of US nationals is threatened the foreign organization’s activity is considered terrorist (INA).

Before the Sweden Agreement closed between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, in November 2018, American president Trump declared “is considering designating Yemen's Houthi rebels as a terrorist organization”⁵⁷, speculation being done over the fact that this declaration was a part of a campaign to end Yemen civil war and pile pressure on their ally Iran. On 13 February 2019, The US Congress passed a bill to halt US involvement in Yemen's civil war, and thus to end the support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen, in order “to support the peaceful resolution of the civil war in Yemen, to address the resulting humanitarian crisis, and to hold the perpetrators responsible for murdering a Saudi dissident”⁵⁸ – Jamal Khashoggi⁵⁹. Thus, this can mean the Americans quitted on designating Houthi as terrorist for the moment for the sake of calming down the overall situation in Yemen and maybe also the hate of Houthis against US.

⁵² Angus McDowall, “Abdel-Malek al-Houthi: provincial rebel turned Yemen powerbroker”, in *Reuters*, 21 January 2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-houthi/abdel-malek-al-houthi-provincial-rebel-turned-yemen-powerbroker-idUSKBN0KU1MF20150121>, accessed on 15 March 2019.

⁵³ ***, “Yemen”, US Department of State, 2010, p. 1, URL: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171749.pdf>, accessed on 11 March 2019.

⁵⁴ ***, *Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List*, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 15 March 2019, p. 13.

⁵⁵ Angus McDowall, *art. cit.*

⁵⁶ A.N.: The situation of the four American citizens kidnapped by the Houthis in May 2015 and released in June same year was much mediatized in the international media. See: ***, *Houthis*, Counter Extremism Project, 2018, p. 2, URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/Houthis-10122018.pdf, accessed on 21 May 2019.

⁵⁷ Misst Ryan, “Trump administration considers naming Yemen’s Houthi rebels a terrorist group”, in *The Washington Post*, 8 November 2018, URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2fworld%2fnational-security%2ftrump-administration-could-name-houthi-rebels-a-terrorist-group%2f2018%2f11%2f08%2f4d007bf4-e35b-11e8-b759-3d88a5ce9e19_story.html%3f, accessed on 14 May 2019.

⁵⁸ ***, “Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2018”, Summary: S.3652 — 115th Congress (2017-2018), URL: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3652>, accessed on 10 June 2019.

⁵⁹ A.N.: Saudi Arabian dissident columnist for *The Washington Post*, and a general manager and editor-in-chief of Al Arab News Channel assassinated at the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul on 2 October 2018 by men with close ties to the highest levels of the Saudi government. See details at: ***, “Jamal Khashoggi: Who is murdered Saudi Journalist?”, in *BBC News*, 22 October 2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45789369>, accessed on 17 June 2019.

4.3. How can be categorized the Houthi group from the International humanitarian law perspective given the actual status quo of Yemen?

The conflict is still ongoing and as humanitarian organizations studies and reports have shown, as we already presented, all the parties involved in the Yemen civilian war infringed some international humanitarian law provisions.

Some elements to classify Yemeni al-Houthi movement as insurgent or terrorist are listed below.

	Elements	Terrorist	Insurgent
1	Evident relation with Iran	x	
2	Own political agenda	x	x
3	Exploitation of central government weakness	x	x
4	Use of military force	x	x
5	The grievances Zaydi population suffered from the central government		x
6	Extremism expressed in speech against other countries and other religions other than Islam ('death to America, death to Israel, damn the Jews, victory to Islam')	x	x
7.	Preaching a moderate form of Islam		x
8.	Using means as kidnapping, detention, intimidation, torture and killing against some Yemeni and foreign (American, British etc.) civilians	x	x
9.	Some similarities to Hezbollah (hate speech against America, same personality of their leaders, the both organizations supported by Iran, the both Shiite)	x	x
10.	Suspected to infringe the international humanitarian law (using civil facilities to mask military activities, children as soldiers, stopping or diverting the humanitarian convoys from the people in need for the use of Houthi military group)		x

Collateral victims, as human casualties of the bombings are a harsh part of each war but the problem comes when violence becomes a goal in itself, not just a means of enforcing power over a territory. Yemen is part of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that has jurisdiction over war crimes committed by nationals of states parties or within the territory of states parties. Thus, also the Houthi group's intentions are not of affirming on the political as a terrorist leader but as a legitimate actor trustful to govern Yemen, members or partisans of the movement could have committed acts of exaggerate violence, even terrorism in a place where the law is overcome by the facts, and all people become participants in a total war with or without their will.

4.4. Which could be the potential changes in the political and security situation of Yemen and Middle East if Houthi movement will be categorized as terrorist?

Consequences of Houthi designation as terrorist would be less damaging for the organization itself, but for the overall security situation in Yemen. This will directly trigger collapse to Yemen creating more instability and shake the credibility of the most important powerbroker of the moment. Houthis, already extreme player in Yemeni conflict, will be such invited to become terrorist, to follow Hezbollah means, or maybe even associate to Al-Qaida, that will indirectly increase the regional insecurity and instability. Of course, this will surely hamper UN negotiators' efforts to get peace discussions off the ground because usually terrorists are not invited to negotiate with a state. Thus, Houthis must be kept in the game of negotiations with Yemeni presidential party, because this is the way out of conflict. My

opinion is the foreign actors has to quit this war which is not its concern and leave the Yemeni people to enact their secession right and try to find a peaceful solution with their federal state formula.

CONCLUSION

Non-state actors are a reality of International Relations in the age of globalization that cannot be ignored. They are indirect actors of world that can influence many countries at a time. Houthi movement as a non-state actor acts as powerbroker inside and outside the country able to influence Yemeni domestic and foreign policy and uses its ideology to fulfill its own organizational interests.

Although the Houthi conflict is often defined through the lenses of either the Iranian-Saudi proxy war or the Sunni-Shiite divide as the Houthis are backed up by Iran (and this makes it the enemy of Sunni states), Al-Houthi movement is more than that because its shifts up and down (quite rapid change in ideology, switched narratives and means of action, allies become enemies and vice versa from a moment to another) represent a precise radiography of the Yemeni unclear political scene because of free main reasons: the government in power partly lack of legitimacy and the gap in the harmonization of the different parties and tribes' divergent interests as well as the fragmentation present inside each entity able or entitled to participate to ruling the country.

History have shown that the Houthi conflict is a result of both historical unproductive structural conditions and detrimental political developments since Yemeni independence and the Zaydi Houthi group has gone some evident phases, each of them triggered by the empowered political regimes' key-facts or actions seen as geopolitical game-changers for the overall Yemeni domestic policy and Zaydis religious community future. Thus, various failed policies by the Yemeni government resulted in a weak group (hardly represented in governance) to become a strong military and political force by utilizing such neglect (particularly the perceived threat to Zaydi ideology and identity) as an effective tool of mobilization for their adepts. Thus, the Houthi movement initially emerged as political-religious resistance to preserve Zaydism, it transformed in a political-social-military movement against Zaydi President Saleh corruption acts and his foreign supporters, US and Saudi Arabia, interference in Yemeni political life and became an important game changer in Yemeni domestic policy and security field. Thus, the war in the north of the country affected directly Yemeni insecurity by weakening the central government and contributing to the worsening of the political and humanitarian crisis, and indirectly by exposing other vulnerabilities of the contested regime, and making room for more vivid Al-Qaeda action.

In juridical terms, given terrorism is not regulated very clear in the international law does that many activist and insurgent movements to be considered to act to the limit of the law.

The available information about the Houthi movement is quite scarce in terms of means of action and there was no real proof that they used terrorist means, but military means aiming their military opponents, although the international community suspected all the parties involved in the Yemeni conflict of using outlaw methods of war against civilians.

It may be obvious the US took into consideration the idea of assigning Houthi group as terrorist because of their direct enmity with Iran (considered to be the world's leading state sponsor of terror and one of the top threats the Americans are facing) suspected to help the anti-governmental movement in Yemen. Also, one more reason for US possible decision of enlisting Houthi as terrorist is their slogan against America of course, an offense against a super power of world politics and also actions against American citizens on the Yemeni territory. This decision could have been also a strengthening of Saudi Arabia and the Israeli

president declarations on Houthi to be terrorist organization, president Trump as ally of both of them had a strong trigger to act in this direction but after colder relation with Saudi Arabia US seem to change course.

In reality, the Houthi movement has its own political and ideological agenda in terms of preserving Yemen's Zaydi legacy that supersedes both relation with Iran, other terrorist organization as the Muslim Brotherhood or Al-Qaida and even Hadi or Saleh governments. In fact Houthi armed resistance can be described as defensive and reactive to Yemeni government forces methods of war. As concerns the violation of human rights they were on the both parties but Houthis' violations were more substantiate by its opponents' propaganda, but obviously Houthi contribution to conflict initiation and prolongation cannot be ignored.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, *Amnesty International Report 2017/18. The state of the world human rights*, Amnesty International, London, UK, 2018.
2. ***, *Final Communiqué of National Dialogue Conference 2013-2014*, Sana'a, Republic of Yemen, 2014.
3. ***, *Resolution 2201 (2015) adopted by the Security Council at its 7382nd meeting, on 15 February 2015 (S/RES/2201/2015)*.
4. ***, *Resolution 2216 (2015) adopted by the Security Council at its 7426th meeting, on 14 April 2015 (S/RES/2216/2015)*.
5. ***, *Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List*, Office of Foreign Assets Control, March 15, 2019.
6. ***, *US Immigration and Nationality Act*, United States Code, 1952.
7. ***, *Yemen. Events of 2018*, Human Rights Watch, 2018.
8. ATANASIU, Mirela; STANCILA, Lucian, *Terorismul — răul din umbră al începutului de secol*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2014.
9. BRANDON, James, "From Obscurity to Dominance: The Continuing Rise of Yemen's al-Houthi Movement" in *Terrorism Monitor*, No. XII (23), December 2014, pp. 7-9.
10. DORLIAN, Samy, "The Sa'da War in Yemen: between Politics and Sectarianism", in *The Muslim World*, No. 101(2), April 2011, pp. 182-201.
11. FEARON, James D.; LAITIN, David D., "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", in *American Political Science Review*, No. 97(1), February 2003, pp. 75-90.
12. FRANTZMAN, Seth J., "Curse the Jews,' Yemen's Houthi rebel slogan handed out at university", in *The Jerusalem Post*, October 10, 2018.
13. HARNISCH, Christopher; ZIMMERMAN, Katherine, "Profile: Al Houthi Movement", in *Foreign and Defense Policy, Middle East*, AEI Critical Threats Project, 28 January 2010, URL: <http://www.aei.org/publication/profile-al-houthi-movement/>
14. HASSAN, Ali Saif, "Yemen National Dialogue Conference: managing peaceful change?", in *Accord*, No. 25, 2014, pp. 50-54.
15. KNIGHTS, Michael, "The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture", in *CTC Sentinel*, No. 11(8), September 2018, pp. 15-23.
16. PORTER, Hannah, "'Screaming in the Face of the Arrogant': Understanding the Logic and Symbolism of Yemen's Houthi Movement", MA thesis, University of Chicago, Division of Humanities, US, May 2018.
17. RIEDEL, Bruce, "Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?", *Brookings.edu*, 18 December 2017, URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/>

18. SALISBURY, Peter, *A multidimensional approach to restoring state legitimacy in Yemen*, Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, Oxford, 2018.
19. SALMONI, Barak A.; LOIDOLT, Bryce; WELLS, Madeleine, *Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen. The Huthi Phenomenon*, National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2010.
20. SCHEDLER, Andreas, "Electoral Authoritarianism", in: T. Landman and N. Robinson (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Sage Publication Ltd.), London, United Kingdom, 2009, pp. 381-393.
21. SHARP, Jeremy M., "Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention", *Congressional Research Service*, August 24, 2018.
22. Website of ACLED, URL: <https://reliefweb.int>
23. Website of *Middle East Institute*, URL: www.mei.edu
24. Website of *Reuters*, URL: www.reuters.com
25. Website of *the Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Washington, DC*, URL: www.yemenembassy.org
26. Website of *Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*, URL: <https://institute.global>
27. Website of *US Department of State*, URL: www.state.gov.
28. Website of *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, URL: www.wilsoncenter.org/
29. Website of *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*, URL: <https://minorityrights.org>

THE ROLE, OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY BASES OF THE STATE ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR (2011-2019)

Cătălin Alin COSTEA, Ph.D. Candidate

Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: costea.catalin-alin@fspub.unibuc.ro

Abstract: *The aim of this article is to analyse the military involvement of state actors in Syria's Civil War between 2011-2019, focusing on the role and their objectives in the field. After the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Iran, Russia, United States, Turkey, China, France and United Kingdom sent troops on the ground in Syria to support different sides in the conflict. Besides this, the states mentioned above supported military and financially either the rebels or Assad. This kind of involvement is known in specialized language as proxy war. As a result, Syria was divided into three zones of influence and complicated even more the situation due to the different interests of the state actors involved. The article aims to identify the foreign military bases located in Syria and to analyse the role and objectives of the state actors involved in the conflict.*

Keywords: *Syrian Civil War; proxy war; Daesh; military bases; Bashar al-Assad; YPG; Kurdish forces; China; US; UK; France; Turkey; Iran; Russia; state actors.*

INTRODUCTION

After the beginning of the pro-democracy uprising in Syria in March 2011, the government started the crackdown on protests. Shortly after, the events turn out into a civil war between the Syrian government and anti-government factions. At the same time, the suppression of the protests by the Syrian regime attracted numerous critics from the international community, especially from the West¹ and international organisations² which condemned these actions and imposed sanctions against Syria³. Thus, Assad's regime became isolated in the international arena and had to fight alone against the anti-government forces and Daesh. Due to the poor economic situation, lack of resources, considerable number of defectors from the security structures, low morale of the soldiers, and the lack of military equipment, Assad seemed that it would not last long in power⁴. Contrary, Assad's regime was able to resist because it received strong political, economically and military support from Iran, Russia⁵, and

¹ ***, "Britain and US condemn violence in Syria", in *The Telegraph*, 26.03.2011, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8408218/Britain-and-US-condemn-violence-in-Syria.html>, accessed on 01.07.2019.

² ***, "UN chief slams Syria's crackdown on protests", in *Al-Jazeera*, 19.03.2011, URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011318231622114396.html>, accessed on 01.07.2019.

³ Council of the European Union, "Syria: EU renews sanctions against the regime by one year", 17.05.2019, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/17/syria-eu-renews-sanctions-against-the-regime-by-one-year/>, accessed on 01.07.2019.

⁴ ***, "Insight: Battered by war, Syrian army creates its own replacement", in *Reuters*, 21.04.2013, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-paramilitary-insight/insight-battered-by-war-syrian-army-creates-its-own-replacement-idUSBRE93K02R20130421>, accessed on 01.07.2019.

⁵ ***, "Russia says 63,000 troops have seen combat in Syria", in *BBC*, 23.08.2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45284121>, accessed on 01.07.2019.

China⁶. These three actors are the main supporters and allies of Damascus and the reason why Assad is still in office.

Besides allies, Assad has a lot of enemies, especially state actors who are against him and want new leadership in Damascus. Among the most prominent critics of Assad and the main Western countries involved with troops on the ground in Syria are the US, Turkey, France, and UK. These states have supported with money, arms, and training the opposition and other groups that were fighting against Assad's government or Daesh. Also, they offered military support to these groups by sending troops on the ground and by offering air support. The conflict has turned into a proxy war in which each party tries to achieve its strategic objectives. Thus, this paper aims to analyse the development of the situation on the field in the last eight years, more precisely from March 2011, when the conflict began until March 2019 when the main Daesh forces were supposed to be wiped out from Syria⁷.

1. The US, UK and France military presence in Syria

The US⁸, UK⁹, and France¹⁰ condemned the Assad regime since March 2011 when the Syrian security forces started to use live ammunition against the protesters¹¹. After this event, the states mentioned above, mainly the United States began funding the rebel groups that were fighting against the Syrian Armed Forces. US tried in different ways to pursue this objective. First attempt began in 2013 when the CIA secretly started to arm, fund, and train the rebel groups¹², spending approximately \$1 billion without any result because the groups started to fight between them. The program, code name: *Timber Sycamore*, was shut down in 2017 by the Trump Administration as being inefficient¹³. The second started in September 2014. Then the United States House of Representatives voted for the authorization of an operation consisting of training and equipping Syrian rebels to fight against Daesh and the Syrian army¹⁴. On 20 September 2015, 75 Syrian rebels trained by the US and its allies entered Northern Syria¹⁵. In less than a week, most of the rebels were captured or joined other groups like the terrorist

⁶ ***, "China says seeks closer military ties with Syria", in *Reuters*, 16.08.2016, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-china/china-says-seeks-closer-military-ties-with-syria-idUSKCN10R10R>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷ ***, "Daesh no longer holds any territory in Syria: Pentagon", in *Daily Sabah*, 22.03.2019, URL: <https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2019/03/22/daesh-no-longer-holds-any-territory-in-syria-pentagon>, accessed on 01.08.2019.

⁸ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/25/2011, URL: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/25/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-3252011>, accessed on 01.08.2019.

⁹ ***, "Britain and US condemn violence in Syria", in *The Telegraph*, 26.03.2011, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8408218/Britain-and-US-condemn-violence-in-Syria.html>, accessed on 01.08.2019.

¹⁰ Suleiman al-Khalidi, "Syrian forces shoot protesters, kill 6 in mosque", in *Reuters*, 23.01.2011, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-gunfire/syrian-forces-shoot-protesters-kill-6-in-mosque-idUSTRE72M04T20110323>, accessed on 01.08.2019.

¹¹ Anthony Shadid, "Security Forces Kill Dozens in Uprisings Around Syria", in *The New York Times*, 22.04.2011, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/middleeast/23syria.html?mt_rref=www.google.com&gwh=9054F692EB97732B8E50BA5FBDAD18EE&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWAL, accessed on 01.08.2019.

¹² Fabrice Balanche, "The End of the CIA Program in Syria", in *Foreign Affairs*, 02.08.2017, URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-08-02/end-cia-program-syria>, accessed on 11.09.2019.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Patricia Zengerle, Richard Cowan, "U.S. House votes to arm Syrian rebels, but questions remain", in *Reuters*, 17.09.2014, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-crisis-congress/u-s-house-votes-to-arm-syrian-rebels-but-questions-remain-idUSKBN0HC28120140917>, accessed on 02.08.2019.

¹⁵ ***, "Syrian monitor: 75 U.S.-trained Syrian rebels enter Syria from Turkey", in *Reuters*, 20.09.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels/syrian-monitor-75-u-s-trained-syrian-rebels-enter-syria-from-turkey-idUSKCN0RK07520150920>, accessed on 04.08.2019.

organisation Jabhat al-Nusra¹⁶. In October 2015, after approximately one year, the program was closed due to its failure¹⁷. So, after these failures, Washington had to find another strategy in Syria, one to be efficient.

The third attempt for the US started officially in October 2015 after the failure of the Pentagon's training rebels program¹⁸. The new strategy was to choose a reliable group in Syria that was able to fight against pro-governmental forces and Daesh and to support it. The rise of Daesh in 2013 and its rapid expansion into Iraq and Syria in 2014 worried the United States. Daesh and its terrorist activities represented a bigger threat for US security than the Assad regime. So, Washington had to find a solution for defeating Daesh and after that it could concentrate on Assad. After the Syrian Kurdish forces known as YPG (People's Protection Units) succeeded in taking control of the Syrian town of Kobani from Daesh in January 2015¹⁹, Obama Administration understood that the Kurdish forces are the main actor to rely on in Syria. So, the US decided to support the Kurdish forces financially, military and tactically. Also, Washington offered protection to this group against other state and non-state actors. On 30 October 2015, President Obama announced that several dozen Special Operations troops would be deployed to Syria to advise and support local forces, mainly the Kurds, in the fight against Daesh. According to Obama, Special Forces would not play a direct combat role in Syria²⁰. The main objective of this unit was to train the local forces, to support them in maintaining the territories liberated from Daesh and to liberate more territories occupied by this terrorist organisation. At first, Obama wanted to avoid sending American soldiers on the ground in Syria because he did not want to involve the US in another war²¹. Because of this reason he concentrated only on supporting the rebel groups with money and arms. In the end, the US decided to send a small number of troops in Syria and to give full support to the Kurdish forces. Obama took this decision in a special moment, the Pentagon program just failed a few weeks after Russia sent its army to support Assad²². White House made a strategic move to obtain and consolidate a sphere of influence in Syria and to balance Moscow's presence and influence in the region.

For Washington, YPG was the main ally in Syria in the fight against Daesh. Helped by the US, the Kurdish forces managed to control an important part of Northern Syria, where American troops established several military bases. These territories give an important advantage to the US in the eventual negotiations about the political future of Syria with Assad's regime, the Russian Federation and Iran. By the end of his term Obama sent officially

¹⁶ Nabih Bulos, "US-trained Division 30 rebels 'betray US and hand weapons over to al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria'", in *The Telegraph*, 22.09.2015, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11882195/US-trained-Division-30-rebels-betrayed-US-and-hand-weapons-over-to-al-Qaedas-affiliate-in-Syria.html>, accessed on 04.08.2019.

¹⁷ Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, "Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS", in *The New York Times*, 09.10.2015, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html>, accessed on 04.08.2019.

¹⁸ Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, "Obama Sends Special Operations Forces to Help Fight ISIS in Syria", in *The New York Times*, 30.10.2015, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/world/obama-will-send-forces-to-syria-to-help-fight-the-islamic-state.html>, accessed on 04.08.2019.

¹⁹ Constanze Letsch, Fazel Hawramy, "Kurdish forces take control of Syrian town of Kobani", in *The Guardian*, 26.01.2015, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/kurdish-forces-take-control-kobani-syria>, accessed on 04.08.2019.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine", in *The Atlantic*, April 2016 Issue, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>, accessed on 04.08.2019.

²² Gabriela Baczynska, Tom Perry, Laila Bassam, Phil Stewart, "Exclusive: Russian troops join combat in Syria – sources", in *Reuters*, 10.09.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-exclusive/exclusive-russian-troops-join-combat-in-syria-sources-idUSKCN0R91H720150910>, accessed on 04.09.2019.

approximately 500 special troops to Syria²³. The Trump administration decided to send more troops. By December 2018, the US had approximately 2,000 forces in Syria²⁴. In the same month, after a discussion with his Turkish counterpart, President Trump announced that he would order the retreat of the US troops²⁵. However, this did not happen, but by the end of July 2019, the US retreated approximately 1000 soldiers from Syria²⁶. By the end of December 2018, according to Anadolu Agency, a Turkish news agency, US had 18 military bases in the north-eastern part of Syria in the territories held by the Kurdish forces²⁷. Also, the US had another military base in the city of Al Tanf in the south eastern part of Syria near the border with Iraq, which makes a total of 19 military bases in Syria²⁸.

In September 2014, *France* and the *UK* joined the US international led coalition against Daesh²⁹ after this terrorist organisation occupied an important part of Iraq and Syria³⁰. Even if both states were against Assad, they concentrated more on the fight against terrorism because Daesh posed a bigger threat to their national security as any other actor in Syria. In June 2016, UK special troops (SAS) were seen for the first time on the ground in Syria near the US Al Tanaf military base near Iraq's border³¹. In December 2016, British defence secretary, Michael Fallon, announced that the UK would send approximately 20 soldiers in Syria to train the Kurdish forces, to assist them in medical treatment and in the identification of hidden explosive devices³².

As of September 2019, there is no information about the official number of UK troops in Syria. In July 2019, the Ministry of Defence spokeswoman did not want to comment about the presence of the Special Forces in Syria³³. At the same time, on the UK Ministry of Defence website, we can see a map that shows the presence of the British army in different countries around the globe but there is no mention of Syria³⁴. On 9 March 2017 House of Commons Defence Committee published a Ministry of Defence report about the UK military operations

²³ Eric Schmitt, "U.S. to Send 200 More Troops to Syria in ISIS Fight", in *The New York Times*, 10.12.2016, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/us/politics/us-adds-200-troops-syria-isis.html>, accessed on 05.09.2019.

²⁴ ***, „Syria conflict: US officials withdraw troops after IS defeat”, in *BBC*, 19.12.2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46623617>, accessed on 05.09.2019.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ David Martin, "Nearly 1,000 U.S. troops still in Syria months after last ISIS-held territory was liberated", in *CBS*, 22.07.2019, URL: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1000-u-s-troops-still-in-syria-months-after-last-isis-held-territory-was-liberated/>, accessed on 08.08.2019.

²⁷ ***, "Implications of planned US withdrawal from Syria", in *Anadolu Agency*, 20.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/12653>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

²⁸ Lara Seligman, "U.S. Considering Plan to Stay in Remote Syrian Base to Counter Iran", in *Foreign Policy*, 25.01.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/25/us-considering-plan-to-stay-in-remote-syrian-base-to-counter-iran-tanf-pentagon-military-trump/>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

²⁹ Justin Worland, "3 More Countries Join the Coalition Against ISIS", in *Time*, 26.09.2014, URL: <https://time.com/3433346/isil-isis-uk-belgium-denmark/>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

³⁰ Denver Nicks, "U.S. Forms Anti-ISIS Coalition at NATO Summit", in *Time*, 05.09.2014, URL: <https://time.com/3273185/isis-us-nato/>, accessed on 08.08.2019.

³¹ Quentin Sommerville, "UK special forces pictured on the ground in Syria", in *BBC*, 08.08.2016, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37015915>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

³² Ewen MacAskill, "UK troops sent to train anti-Isis rebels have arrived in Syria", in *The Guardian*, 15.12.2016, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/15/uk-troops-sent-to-train-anti-isis-rebels-have-arrived-in-syria>, accessed on 08.08.2019.

³³ Ben Glaze, "UK 'poised' to send more SAS troops into Syria", in *Mirror*, 09.07.2019, URL: <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/uk-poised-send-more-sas-17782921>, accessed on 08.08.2019.

³⁴ UK Ministry of Defence website, Operations and Deployments, URL: <https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/>, accessed on 20.09.2019.

in Syria and Iraq³⁵. According to this report, the main interest of the UK was to defeat Daesh and its ideology in Syria and Iraq “in a way which minimises the threat to UK security and UK interests overseas”³⁶. Also, UK interest is to stabilise the region and “to contain and prevent the spread of Daesh beyond Iraq and Syria”³⁷. As for the location of British Special Forces in Syria, they share the same military bases with US forces³⁸.

France and Syria shared a common history for two decades in the XX century. From 1923 until 1943, when it succeeded to obtain its independence, Syria was under France control³⁹. In 2000 at Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad funeral, who was Bashar’s father, the French President Jacques Chirac was the only western president to participate at the event⁴⁰. Also, in 2001 soon after he took the power, President Bashar al-Assad was decorated by President Jacques Chirac with the Grand Croix of the Legion of Honour, France’s highest award⁴¹. He was the only Syrian President and Middle East leader who received this award which was withdrawn by French President Emmanuel Macron in April 2018⁴². The link between Paris and Damascus continued to be strong until August 2011 when French President Nicolas Sarkozy criticised Assad for using force against his people⁴³. For France, Syria represented an important ally in the Middle East which helped it to promote its influence and interest in the region. Starting with September 2014 France air force hit for the first time Daesh positions in Iraq as part of the US-led coalition against this terrorist organisation⁴⁴. Four months later, in January 2015, France was hit by a terrorist attack directed against the satire magazine Charlie Hebdo⁴⁵. On 27 September 2015, France air force launched its first airstrikes on Daesh targets in Syria⁴⁶. According to the French President Francois Hollande the strikes took place as the national security of France was at stake⁴⁷. Two months later, on 13 November, another terrorist attack hit Paris and left 130 people dead⁴⁸. In June 2016, the French Minister of

³⁵ House of Commons Defence Committee, *UK military operations in Syria and Iraq: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report*, 9 March 2017, URL: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/1065/1065.pdf>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ Ben Farmer, Josie Ensor, Sara Elizabeth Williams, “ISIL militants attack British special forces base in Syria”, in *The Telegraph*, 10.04.2017, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/10/isil-militants-attack-british-special-forces-base-syria/>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

³⁹ William I. Shorrock, “The Origin of the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon: The Railroad Question 1901-1914”, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), pp. 133-153.

⁴⁰ ***, “Key world leaders won’t be at Assad’s funeral”, in *CBC*, 13.06.2000, URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/key-world-leaders-won-t-be-at-assad-s-funeral-1.218478>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁴¹ John Henley, “France to strip Bashar al-Assad of his Légion d’honneur”, in *The Guardian*, 17.04.2018, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/france-to-strip-syria-leader-bashar-al-assad-legion-honneur>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ Samuel Ramani, “Why France is so deeply entangled in Syria”, in *The Washington Post*, 19.11.2015, URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/19/why-france-is-so-deeply-entangled-in-syria/>, accessed on 08.08.2019.

⁴⁴ ***, “France launches first air strikes on IS in Iraq”, in *BBC*, 19.09.2014, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29277630>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁴⁵ ***, “2015 Charlie Hebdo Attacks Fast Facts”, in *CNN*, 24.12.2018, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/21/europe/2015-paris-terror-attacks-fast-facts/index.html>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁴⁶ Ben Brumfield, Margot Haddad, “France launches its first airstrikes against ISIS in Syria”, in *CNN*, 27.09.2015, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/27/middleeast/syria-france-isis-bombing/index.html>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ ***, “Paris attacks: What happened on the night”, in *BBC*, 09.12.2015, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian admitted that France had sent its special forces on in Syria, especially in Manbij, to advise the YPG, to fight against Daesh⁴⁹. Also, Jean-Yves Le Drian stated that France is providing weapons and air support to YPG to liberate the territories occupied by Daesh in Syria⁵⁰.

On the France Ministry of Defence website it is mentioned that 1,100 troops are present in Iraq and Syria without specifying the exact number for each country⁵¹. From open sources, we could identify approximately 200 French soldiers in north-eastern Syria until December 2018⁵². Also, France has declined to comment about its special forces in Syria⁵³. In March 2018, Turkish state-owned news agency, Anadolu, posted a map that showed the location of five military bases in north-eastern Syria claiming that they belonged to France⁵⁴. This happened a day after Syrian Kurdish representatives went to Paris, in an official visit to the presidential palace. Then, President Emmanuel Macron assured Kurdish delegates of France's support⁵⁵. According to another article posted by Anadolu in December 2018, France expanded to nine its military bases in north-eastern Syria⁵⁶.

For France and the United Kingdom, their military presence in Syria is a good opportunity to gather intelligence about their citizens who joined Daesh in the last years, to identify them and to prevent other terrorist attacks on their soil. Both want to eliminate this terrorist organisation and to avoid other attacks. In the same time, France and the UK want to show their great power capabilities and that they are able to take action when their national security is at stake.

⁴⁹ ***, "French special forces on ground in northern Syria: government source", in *Reuters*, 09.06.2016, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-france/french-special-forces-on-ground-in-northern-syria-government-source-idUSKCN0YV15P>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ Ministère de la Défense de la République Française, Carte des opérations et missions militaires, 05.08.2019, URL: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaires, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁵² ***, "France admits military presence in N. Syria", in *Anadolu Agency*, 28.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/france-admits-military-presence-in-nsyria/1351288>, accessed on 10.08.2019.

⁵³ Lara Seligman, "Britain, France Agree to Send Additional Troops to Syria", in *Foreign Policy*, 09.07.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/09/britain-france-agree-to-send-additional-troops-increase-syria-us-withdrawal-uk/>, accessed on 09.08.2019.

⁵⁴ ***, "French military cooperating with YPG/PKK terrorists", in *Anadolu Agency*, 30.03.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/france-military-cooperating-with-ypg-pkk-terrorists/1104265>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁵⁵ ***, "Turkey's Anadolu news agency publishes map of French military positions in Syria", in *France 24*, 30.03.2018, URL: <https://www.france24.com/en/20180330-turkey-france-military-syria-kurds-map-soldiers>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁵⁶ ***, "French Military Presence in Syria", in *Anadolu Agency*, 28.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/12730#!>, accessed on 09.10.2019.




Figure no. 1: A map that shows US military bases in the North-Eastern Syria by December 2018, according to Anadolu Agency⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ ***, "Implications of planned US withdrawal from Syria", in Anadolu Agency, 20.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/12653>, accessed on 11.09.2019.




Figure no. 2: A that shows France’s military bases in the north-eastern Syria by December 2018, according to *Anadolu Agency*⁵⁸.

2. Turkey’s military presence in Syria

In the Syrian conflict Turkey is in the anti-Assad camp with US, France and UK but it is against YPG, the Kurdish militia supported by the countries mentioned above. After protests degenerated in Syria, Turkey criticised Assad for his decision to use live ammunition against civilians. After this episode Ankara started to support a rebel group known as The Free Syrian Army (FSA) by offering them arms and training⁵⁹. On 24 August 2016, Turkey, along with the FSA (an anti-Assad militia) launched a military operation in the north of Syria in order to eliminate Daesh from its border with Syria. On 20 January 2018, Turkey launched its second

⁵⁸ ***, “French Military Presence In Syria”, in *Anadolu Agency*, 28.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/12730#!>, accessed on 09.10.2019.

⁵⁹ Hanna Hassan, “Turkey’s changing war in Syria”, in *The Middle East Monitor*, 07.12.2017, URL: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171207-turkeys-changing-war-in-syria/>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

military operation in the north-eastern part of Syria to liberate the territories held by the YPG. Both organisations, Daesh and YPG, pose a threat to Turkey's national security. Turkey considers YPG as a terrorist organisation and an arm of PKK, which organised numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey in the last 40 years. Also, in July 2015 Daesh organised a terrorist attack that killed dozens of people in Suruc, a Turkish town near the Syrian border⁶⁰. Thus, in August 2015, Turkey decided to join the anti-Daesh coalition⁶¹. Besides the Kurdish problem, Turkey had another problem with Daesh. Between 20 July 2015⁶² and 20 August 2016, 11 terrorist attacks hit Turkey causing the death of hundreds of people⁶³. Also, before Turkey's intervention in Syria, many towns from its south-eastern border were hit by rockets from the territories controlled by Daesh⁶⁴. These attacks caused the death of dozens of persons.

Another problem for Ankara is represented by the large number of refugees. Starting with 2011, Turkey is confronting with a huge pressure caused by the millions of Syrian refugees that came into the country. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, at the end of September 2019, Turkey was hosting officially 3.6 million Syrian refugees⁶⁵. For Turkey, it was essential to reduce the economic pressure represented by the refugees and to take steps to stabilise Syria. Only in this way, Syrians would have been able to return to their country. Besides this, Turkey wanted to avoid the creation of a Kurdish state in the north-west of Syria. Starting with 2015, Kurdish militia started to liberate territories from Daesh in north-eastern Syria near Turkey's border⁶⁶. The main aim of YPG was to create a Kurdish state. Turkey has an old problem with the Kurdish minority from its eastern part of the country that wants to become autonomous. So, for Turkey, the creation of a Kurdish state at its eastern border will encourage Kurdish fight for autonomy and will be a threat for its territorial integrity. All these factors led Turkey to a military intervention in Syria.

After its two military operations in Syria, Turkey managed to block the creation of a Kurdish state at its border and to create a safe zone where refugees can return and have a normal life. Besides this, Turkey obtained a seat at the negotiations table with the US, Russia, and Iran regarding Syria. This intervention ensures Turkey a say in Syria's political future and reconfirms its regional power status. By these military operations, Ankara was able to exist from the diplomatic isolation which entered into after the failed coup. Also, Turkey showed that it can launch complex military operations outside its borders and that it can defend its interests in the region. At the same time, by intervening in Syria, Turkey succeeded to counterbalance Russia's and Iran's influence in the Middle East. After the military intervention Ankara established military bases in the liberated territories from northern Syria. From open

⁶⁰ Karam Shoumali, Ceylan Yeginsu, "Turkey Says Suicide Bombing Kills at Least 30 in Suruc, Near Syria", in *The New York Times*, 20.07.2015, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/europe/suruc-turkey-syria-explosion.html>, accessed on 04.09.2019.

⁶¹ Gul Tuysuz, Zeynep Bilginsoy, "Ministry: Turkey joins coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria", in *CNN*, 29.08.2015, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/29/europe/turkey-airstrikes/index.html>, accessed on 04.09.2019.

⁶² Constanze Letsch, "Erdoğan blames Isis for suspected suicide attack at wedding in Turkey", in *The Guardian*, 22.08.2016, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/20/several-dead-in-suspected-terrorist-blast-at-wedding-in-turkey>, accessed on 04.09.2019.

⁶³ ***, "Turkey will not be Europe's firefighter", in *Daily Sabah*, 21.08.2016, URL: <https://www.daily-sabah.com/editorial/2016/08/21/turkey-will-not-be-europes-firefighter>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

⁶⁴ Humeyra Pamuk, "Anger, fear sweeps Turkish border town under attack from Islamic State", in *Reuters*, 16.05.2016, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-border/anger-fear-sweeps-turkish-border-town-under-attack-from-islamic-state-idUSKCN0Y71JG>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁶⁵ United Nations Refugee Agency, Syria Regional Refugee Response, URL: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁶⁶ Kurdish fighters on the march against Islamic State, *The Times of Israel*, 29.05.2015, URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/kurdish-fighters-on-the-march-against-islamic-state/>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

sources, we could identify only 15 military bases, but the number is for sure much higher. The number of Turkish military bases in Syria is mentioned without the 12 observation posts established in the Idlib region under the Astana agreement with Russia and Iran⁶⁷. They are positioned in the following areas: Ahterin (North of Aleppo)⁶⁸, Al-Bab⁶⁹, Jarabulus⁷⁰, Idlib⁷¹, Mare (Tel-Rifat region)⁷², Azaz⁷³, Kaljibrin (South of Azaz)⁷⁴, Afrin⁷⁵, Darmic Mountain⁷⁶, Jindires (West of Afrin)⁷⁷, Basufan⁷⁸, Bourseya Mountain⁷⁹, Dabiq⁸⁰, Kimar (North of Tel Rifat)⁸¹ and Menagh airbase (South of Azaz)⁸².

Turkey's aim is to avoid the creation of a Kurdish state near its borders and to eliminate this threat. Besides this, Ankara wants to create a safe zone in Syria to facilitate the returning of thousands of Syrian refugees to reduce the pressure on its economy, resources and institutions. The "Peace Spring" military operation in Syria launched in October 2019 shows Turkey's determination to achieve its objectives. In the same time, the fact that Ankara was able to convince the United States to withdraw from northern Syria and soon after to negotiate with Russia the creation of a buffer zone in that region shows the abilities of Turkish

⁶⁷ ***, "Syria war: Turkey 'reinforces military posts in Idlib'", in *BBC*, 13 September 2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45510972>, accessed on 04.09.2019.

⁶⁸ ***, "Türkiye Halep'in kuzeydoğusunda üs kuruyor", in *FHA*, 25.11.2016, URL: <https://tr.farsnews.com/defence/news/13950905000048>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

⁶⁹ ***, "TSK, EL Bab'da Akil Tepesi'ne askeri üs kuruyor", in *T24*, 28.02.2017, URL: <https://t24.com.tr/haber/tsk-el-babda-akil-tepesine-askeri-us-kuruyor,391185>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

⁷⁰ ***, "Türkiye Suriye'nin Cerablus Kentinde Askeri Üs Kuruyor", in *Haberler*, 04.04.2017, URL: <https://www.haberler.com/turkiye-suriye-nin-cerablus-kentinde-askeri-us-9458474-haber/>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

⁷¹ Uğur ERGAN "İdlib'te son dakika: Türk askeri İdlib'de... Özel Kuvvetler, Komando girdi...", in *Hürriyet*, 13.10.2017, URL: www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-turk-askeri-idlibde-ozel-kuvvetler-komando-girdi-40608845, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷² ***, "Tel Rifat kırsalında Türk Birliği ne saldırıda 3 Türk, 1 OSÖ askeri yaralandı TSK", in *Haber Türk*, 30.04.2019, URL: <https://www.haberturk.com/kilis-haberleri/68715475-tel-rifat-kirsalinda-turk-birligine-saldirida-3-turk-1-oso-askeri-yaralanditsk-tel-rifat>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷³ ***, "Savunma Bakanlığı: YPG saldırısı sonucu Azez'de bir asker şehit oldu", in *BBC*, 09.06.2019, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/48572617>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷⁴ Hikmet DURGUN, "Hiddo: Türkiye, Afrin çevresinde askeri üsler kurdu", in *Sputnik*, 12.07.2017, URL: <https://tr.sputniknews.com/columnists/201707121029242731-demokratik-suriye-meclisi-hiddo-afrin-askeri-us-turkiye/>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷⁵ ***, "Afrin'deki TSK üssüne saldırı: 2 asker yaralandı", in *NTV*, 09.08.2019, URL: <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/afrindeki-tsk-ussune-saldiri-2-asker-yaralandi,YM4AD6h4kKL96icnEciZw>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷⁶ ***, "Darmık Dağı'na askeri üs kuruluyor", in *NTV*, 15.02.2018, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/video/turkiye/darmik-dagina-askeri-us-kuruluyor,XjuYeiL0F00JwocErSjvXg>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷⁷ ***, "Efrin from a new military bases in Turkey", in *KRD News*, 11.07.2019, URL: <https://www.krdnews.net/news/bati-kurdistan/turkiyeden-efrinde-yeni-bir-askeri-us>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷⁸ ***, "SON DAKİKA – İşgalci Türk askerinin üssü vuruldu: 2 işgalci Türk askeri ve 4 çete öldürüldü", in *Nüçe Cıwan*, 01.09.2019, URL: <https://www.nuceciwan29.com/2019/09/01/son-dakika-iscalci-turk-askerinin-ussu-vuruldu-2-iscalci-turk-askeri-ve-4-cete-olduruldu/>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁷⁹ ***, "Korgeneral Temel, Afrin kahramanlarıyla Bursaya'da iftar yaptı", in *Anadolu Agency*, 07.06.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/-korgeneral-temel-afrin-kahramanlariyla-burseyada-iftar-yapti/1168840>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁸⁰ ***, "En kritik noktaya Türk askeri üs kurdu", in *CNN Türk*, 28.02.2017, URL: <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/en-kritik-noktaya-turk-askeri-us-kurdu>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁸¹ ***, "TSK'nın Afrin'deki üssüne YPG saldırısı: 2 asker yaralı", in *Independent Türkçe*, 09.08.2019, URL: <https://www.independentturkish.com/node/60211/haber/tsk'nin-afrin'deki-ussune-ypg-saldirisi-2-asker-yarali>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

⁸² ***, "Tal Rifaat, Menagh Air Base vital to Turkey's counterterrorism push", in *Daily Sabah*, 29.03.2018, URL: <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2018/03/29/tal-rifaat-menagh-air-base-vital-to-turkeys-counterterrorism-push>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

diplomacy⁸³. On 22 October Putin and Erdoğan had a meeting in Sochi, a Russian city on the Black Sea coast. The two leaders signed a memorandum regarding Syria according to which Turkey will secure and control a 120 km long (between the Syrian towns Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain) and 30 km deep territory near its border. According to the agreement, the Kurdish forces had to retreat 30 km depth from the Turkish-Syrian border⁸⁴. Syrian forces will control the remaining territories after YPG forces retreat, and Turkey and Russia will establish joint patrols in these territories⁸⁵. Both Ankara and Moscow reiterated their commitments to the preservation of Syria's territorial integrity and political unity and to the protection of Turkey's national security⁸⁶. According to the Turkish Foreign Minister, the United States and Russia acknowledged Turkey's security concerns as legitimate and accepted Turkish military intervention in Syria⁸⁷. After the "Euphrates Shield", "Olive Branch" and "Peace Spring" military operations, Turkey managed to create a safe zone in Syria approximately to the size of Lebanon⁸⁸. In these territories, Ankara can assure the returning of the millions of Syrian refugees. Also, Ankara managed to secure its borders by eliminating the YPG forces from its border and preventing the creation of a Kurdish state. So, Turkey succeeded to reach its objectives assumed in 2016 during the first military operation in Syria. Also, indirectly Turkey helped Russia and Assad by reaching an agreement with the US for retreating from the North East of Syria occupied by the Kurds to the Deir ez-Zor region, rich in oil reserves⁸⁹. This forced the Kurds to reach an agreement with Russia and Assad to protect them against Turkish army. In this way, Assad managed to regain possession of important territories in the North East of Syria.

In the same time, Turkey showed good negotiation abilities by succeeding to reach an agreement for its third intervention in Syria first with the US and after that with Russia. This shows that Turkey does not have only hard power abilities but also soft power ones. Most probably Turkey's presence in Syria will last until the country will stabilise and Ankara and Damascus will reach an agreement. Until then, Turkish military presence in Syria it's an assurance for Ankara that it will take part in the negotiations about the political future of this country.

3. Iran, Russia, and China

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Russia, Iran and China supported Assad first politically economically and after some time military. Since 2011, both Russia and China supported the government from Damascus in the United Nations Security Council by vetoing any resolutions against Syria⁹⁰. From October 2011 to October 2019, Russia used its veto⁹¹

⁸³ Greg Norman, "Russian military forces move into Syria to help Turkey keep Kurds away from border", in *Fox News*, URL: <https://www.foxnews.com/world/russian-military-moves-into-syria>, accessed on 24.10.2019.

⁸⁴ ***, "Full text of Turkey, Russia agreement on northeast Syria", in *Al-jazeera*, 22.10.2019, URL:

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁷ Semih Idiz, "Following Trump's lead, Putin gives Erdogan what he wants", in *Al-Monitor*, 24.10.2019, URL: <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-russia-syria-putin-gave-erdogan-what-he-wants-sochi.html#ixzz63dydGz2H>, accessed on 27.10.2019.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁹ Julian Borger, Dan Sabbagh, "US to send 'mechanised forces' to Syrian oilfields", in *The Guardian*, 25.10.2019, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/24/us-military-syria-tanks-oil-fields>, accessed on 27.10.2019.

⁹⁰ Adam Gabbatt, "Russia and China veto of Syria sanctions condemned as 'indefensible'", in *The Guardian*, 19.07.2012, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/19/russia-china-syria-sanction-veto>, accessed on 01.07.2019.

⁹¹ ***, "Russia's 12 UN vetoes on Syria", in *Arab News*, 10.04.2018, URL: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1282481/middle-east>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

13 times to block resolutions regarding Syria⁹². In the same period, China used its veto power six times to block resolutions against Syria⁹³.

Syria is *Iran's* main ally in the Middle East since the 1979 Islamic revolution. In the last 40, years Damascus' and Teheran's foreign policy had almost the same interests regarding Israel, Lebanon, and the support for the terrorist organisations⁹⁴. Between 2011 and 2013, Iran sent military advisers, financial,⁹⁵ and logistical support to Syria⁹⁶. Also, since 2012 Iran has been supporting Hezbollah fighters and Iraqi Shia groups with money and arms to fight in Syria along with Assad's forces⁹⁷. At the same time, Iran recruited Shia fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan and sent them to fight in Syria under Fatemiyon and the Zaynabiyun brigades⁹⁸. At first, Teheran fought only by its proxies but soon had to send its army to avoid Assad's defeat. Starting with 2013 Assad's forces started to lose important positions in favour of anti-government forces and Daesh. His army was in a very bad condition and the number of deserters was rising alarmingly. So, Iran sent its troops to Syria⁹⁹ to help the Syrian army to stabilize its positions and to regain the lost territories¹⁰⁰. From 2011 until 2018, Iran sent approximately 10,000 soldiers to help Assad¹⁰¹ and approximately 2100 died in Syria and Iraq in the same time period¹⁰². Why did Iran decide to involve in the Syrian civil war?

First, Damascus is an old ally of Teheran in the Middle East against Israel. Second, the Syrian territory is vital for Iran to continue to supply with armament and money the terrorist organisation Hezbollah in Lebanon. Third, Iran wants to consolidate its position as a regional power and to expand its influence in the Middle East. Teheran wants to pose as a leader, supporter and a protector of the Shia Muslims in Syria, Iraq and other Middle East countries. Besides this, Iran succeeded in consolidating its military presence in Syria by establishing numerous military bases, approximately 34¹⁰³. The number of the bases could be higher; these

⁹² Jennifer Peltz, "Russia halts UN Security Council statement on Syria's Idlib", in *Fox News*, 04.06.2019, URL: <https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-halts-un-security-council-statement-on-syrias-idlib>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

⁹³ ***, "Syria war: Russia and China veto sanctions", in *BBC*, 28.02.2017, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39116854>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

⁹⁴ Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer, *Iran Strategy in Syria*, Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, May 2013, pp. 9-33.

⁹⁵ Sylvia Westall, Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "Syria ratifies fresh \$1 billion credit line from Iran", in *Reuters*, 08.07.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran/syria-ratifies-fresh-1-billion-credit-line-from-iran-idUSKCN0PI1RD20150708>, accessed on 11.09.2019.

⁹⁶ Ali Ansari, Aniseh Tabrizi, „The View From Tehran Understanding” in Aniseh Tabrizi, Raffaello Pantucci (Eds.), *Iran's Role in the Syrian Conflict*, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), August 2016, pp. 4-5.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 5

⁹⁹ Ariane M. Tabatabai, "Syria Changed the Iranian Way of War", in *Foreign Affairs*, 16.08.2019, URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2019-08-16/syria-changed-iranian-way-war>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

¹⁰⁰ ***, "Iran buries Guards commander 'killed in Syria'", in *BBC*, 05.11.2013, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24818043>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

¹⁰¹ Ariane M. Tabatabai, "Syria Changed the Iranian Way of War", in *Foreign Affairs*, 16.08.2019, URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2019-08-16/syria-changed-iranian-way-war>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

¹⁰² ***, "Tehran: 2,100 Iranian soldiers killed in Syria and Iraq", in *Middle East Monitor*, 07.03.2018, URL: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180307-tehran-2100-iranian-soldiers-killed-in-syria-and-iraq/>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹⁰³ Thomas Homas, GibbonS-Neff, Jeremy White, David Botti, "The U.S. Has Troops in Syria. So Do the Russians and Iranians. Here's Where", in *The New York Times*, 11.04.2018, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/11/world/middleeast/syria-military-us-russia-iran.html>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

are only those that we could identify from open sources. Officially, Iran denies that it has military bases in Syria¹⁰⁴.

As we said before, *Russia* offered political support to Assad after the starting of the civil war. In September 2015, Russia decided to offer Syria military support and humanitarian aid¹⁰⁵, too, as the situation on the field was evolving against Assad. Moscow did not want Assad to be overthrown from power because it's Russia's only strategic partner in the Middle East. Since 1971 Russia signed an agreement with Syria for leasing its Tartous naval base from the Mediterranean¹⁰⁶. Tartous was Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean and it had to maintain its strategic position in the region. For Russia, Syria is a gate to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow's influence in the Middle East was severely affected. The Syrian civil war was a good occasion for Moscow to re-enter on the Middle East stage as an active actor. Two years after Russia's intervention in Syria, the two countries signed an agreement for the leasing of the Tartous port by Moscow for 49 years¹⁰⁷. Another agreement signed between the two states stipulates that Russia can use the Syrian Hmeymim airbase for 49 years and the arrangement can be extended for another 25 years¹⁰⁸. Through these agreements, Russia has strengthened and ensured its presence in the Mediterranean and Middle East for the next 50 years. In 2018, the Syrian government offered a 50 years concession to invest and extract phosphate in the Palmyra region to a Russian company (Stroytransgaz). Stroytransgaz was founded in 1991 and 80% the company is owned by Gennady Tymchenko, a Kremlin-linked oligarch¹⁰⁹.

In July 2017 the Syrian government offered to Evro Polis Company 25 per cent of profits from oil and gas fields freed from Daesh. Evgeniy Prigozhin, a Putin linked businessman, allegedly owns this company¹¹⁰. In January 2018, Russia signed an agreement with Syria that grants Moscow exclusive rights to produce the Syrian oil and gas. The agreement also stipulates that Russia will rehabilitate Syria's energy infrastructure and will build new fuel storage depots. In the same time, Russia will provide advisory support in the energy field and will train Syrian petroleum engineers¹¹¹.

Also, in Syria, Russia had the chance to show its military capabilities and that it can organise complex military operations far from its borders. Russia is trying to regain its global power status lost after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and this war offered the chance to

¹⁰⁴ Sue Surkes, "Iran insists it has 'no military bases in Syria'", in *The Times of Israel*, 19.02.2018, URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-insists-it-has-no-military-bases-in-syria/>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

¹⁰⁵ ***, "Russian cargo planes 'carrying aid' arrive in Syria", in *BBC*, 12.09.2015, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34233723>, accessed on 11.09.2019.

¹⁰⁶ Frank Gardner, „How vital is Syria's Tartus port to Russia?", in *BBC*, 27.06.2012, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45284121>, accessed on 11.09.2019.

¹⁰⁷ ***, "Syria parliament okays Russian lease of Tartus port: state media", in *France 24*, 12.06.2019, URL: <https://www.france24.com/en/20190612-syria-parliament-okays-russian-lease-tartus-port-state-media>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹⁰⁸ ***, "Putin signs Syria base deal, cementing Russia's presence there for half a century", in *Reuters*, 27.07.2017, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-syria/putin-signs-syria-base-deal-cementing-russias-presence-there-for-half-a-century-idUSKBN1AC1R9>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁰ Nikita Sogoloff, "Russia's Energy Goals in Syria", in *The Washington Institute*, 30.08.2017, URL: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/russias-energy-goals-in-syria>, accessed on 25.10.2019.

¹¹¹ Viktor Katona, "Russia Is Taking Over Syria's Oil And Gas", in *OilPrice.com*, 14.02.2018, URL: <https://oilprice.com/Energy/General/Russia-Is-Taking-Over-Syrias-Oil-And-Gas.html>, accessed on 25.10.2019.

show its military capabilities¹¹². Also, Moscow is dissatisfied about the fact that the United States considers Russia a regional power¹¹³ and not a global power¹¹⁴.

Unlike Iran, Russia acknowledges that it has military bases in Syria. More than that, Russia's military presence in Syria it is legitimate because is based on agreements signed with the internationally recognized Syrian government represented by Assad¹¹⁵. In August 2018 Russia's Defence Ministry stated that Since September 2015 until August 2018, 63,000 Russian military personnel received combat experience in Syria¹¹⁶. The exact number of the Russian troops stationed in Syria is unknown but in March 2018 Russian Defence Ministry stated that 2,954 soldiers voted in presidential elections in Syria¹¹⁷. This gives an idea of the number of troops. Also, Russia did not send only troops to Syria, but also mercenary groups; the most known is the Wagner group¹¹⁸. By March 2018 the number of Russian mercenaries was between 2,000 and 3,000, but no specific numbers were available¹¹⁹. Also, Russia established approximately 22 military bases in Syria but their real number could be higher. Besides those, we could identify another three Russian airbases in Syria from open sources: Jirah airbase in east Aleppo¹²⁰, Deir-Ez-Zor airbase¹²¹ and Kuweires airbase in the Aleppo province¹²². Thus, the number of Russian military bases in Syria identified from open sources reaches 25.

China supported Assad politically and economically and used its veto to block any resolution against Syria in the United Nations Security Council. Also, from March 2011 to March 2018, the bilateral relations between Damascus and Beijing considerably improved. In the last decades, China started to expand its economic influence all over the globe especially in Africa, a rich continent in natural resources. China's huge industry sector, rapid economic growth and development made it dependent on external natural resources, especially oil. China does not have consistent oil reserves or other natural resources to support its development so it has to import from the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, China has ambitions to become a global power so, to achieve this goal it has to expand its influence in the strategic

¹¹² Dityriy Frolovskiy, "What Putin Really Wants in Syria", in *Foreign Affairs*, 01.02.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/01/what-putin-really-wants-in-syria-russia-assad-strategy-kremlin/>

¹¹³ Steve Holland, "Jeff Mason Obama, in dig at Putin, calls Russia 'regional power'", in *Reuters*, 25.03.2014, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-weakness-idUSBREA2O19J20140325>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹¹⁴ ***, "Obama Calling Russia a Regional Power Is 'Disrespectful' – Putin", in *The Moscow Times*, 12.01.2016, URL: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/01/12/obama-calling-russia-a-regional-power-is-disrespectful-putin-a51414>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹¹⁵ Agnes Helou, "Russia and US engage in 'military base race' in Syria", in *Defence News*, 15.01.2018, URL: <https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2018/01/15/russia-and-us-engage-in-military-base-race-in-syria/>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹¹⁶ ***, "Russia says 63,000 troops have seen combat in Syria", in *BBC*, 23.08.2018 URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45284121>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹¹⁷ ***, "Russia's military presence in Syria", in *France 24*, 11.04.2018, URL: <https://www.france24.com/en/20180411-russias-military-presence-syria>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹¹⁸ Neil Hauer, "The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army", *Foreign Policy*, 06.10.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/06/rise-fall-russian-private-army-wagner-syrian-civil-war/>, accessed on 10.10.2019.

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁰ Leith Aboufadel, "Syrian, Russian air forces begin using liberated Jirah Airbase in east Aleppo", in *AMN*, URL: <https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-russian-air-forces-begin-using-liberated-jirah-airbase-east-aleppo/>, accessed on 09.10.2019.

¹²¹ ***, "Russia prepares to establish second base in Syria", in *Hawar News Agency*, 07.08.2019, URL: <https://www.hawarnews.com/en//haber/russia-prepares-to-establish-second-base-in-syria-h10765.html>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹²² Paul McLoughlin, "Syria Weekly: Russia begins to rebuild Syria's military from scratch", in *The New Arab*, 17.05.2019, URL: <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/5/17/syria-weekly-russia-rebuilds-syrias-military-from-scratch>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

regions on the international arena. For China, Syria is a gate to the Mediterranean and Middle East regions where it wants to play a more active role in the future. Beijing intends to incorporate Syria along with Iraq and Iran into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a major transit hub¹²³. China is primarily focusing on economic trade deals with Syria. Chinese companies are waiting to enter new markets and Syria is a perfect one. Lots of Chinese companies want to play an important role in the Syrian reconstruction process and to invest in the country. Also, since November 2016, Beijing announced that it would continue its humanitarian aid to Damascus with the US \$70 million every year¹²⁴. In December 2017, Chinese elite counterterrorism Special Forces and military advisers arrived in the Syrian port of Tartous¹²⁵. China sent its special forces to eliminate the Uyghur rebels who are fighting since 2015 in Syria alongside radical opposition groups in Idlib¹²⁶. China has a long problem with Uyghur terrorist movements. Uyghurs are a Muslim minority who live in the north-western China region of Xinjiang and they are claiming autonomy from Beijing¹²⁷. For China is a good opportunity to collect intelligence about the Uyghur fighters and to defeat them outside its borders. In this way is preventing them from returning to China and organise terrorist attacks for obtaining autonomy. Regarding the number of Chinese troops, there is no official number. Also, we could not identify any Chinese military bases from open sources in Syria and most probably they are hosted at the Syrian army military bases.

Iran, Russia and China have the same interest, to maintain Assad as Syria's leader to consolidate their influence in the Middle East and not only. Russia and China have bigger ambitions, to affirm themselves as global powers and to challenge US influence on the international system. Also, Moscow, Tehran and Beijing want to gain economic advantages by obtaining important roles in Syria's reconstruction process. This will trigger a competition between the three countries regarding who will take the most important contracts, the rights to exploit resources and who will control the main industrial sectors¹²⁸. Also, Iran and Russia are competitors in the energy sector and they try to protect their interests in Syria.

¹²³ Dan Hemenway, "Chinese strategic engagement with Assad's Syria", *Atlantic Council*, 21.12.2018, URL: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/chinese-strategic-engagement-with-assad-s-syria/>, accessed on 11.09.2019.

¹²⁴ Kristin Huang, "Humanitarian aid for Syria to continue, Chinese envoy says", in *South China Morning Post*, 15.11.2016, URL: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2046303/humanitarian-aid-syria-continue-chinese-envoy-says>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹²⁵ Logan Pauley, Jesse Marks, "Is China Increasing Its Military Presence in Syria?", in *The Diplomat*, 20.08.2018, URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/is-china-increasing-its-military-presence-in-syria/>, accessed on 10.09.2019.

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁸ Samuel Ramani, "Russia's Eye on Syrian Reconstruction", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 31.01.2019, URL: <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/78261>, accessed on 25.10.2019.




Figure no. 3: A map that shows Iran’s military bases and a part of Russia and US military bases in Syria by April 2018, according to *The New York Times*¹²⁹

CONCLUSIONS

The powers involved in Syria wanted to minimise their direct casualties by sending small contingents of troops and by concentrating on using local actors in the conflict. This made the conflict a textbook example of proxy war. The main actors support their proxies according to their interests. All the states involved are interested in the political future of Syria after the ending of the war. In September 2017, Syria announced that Iran, Russia and China would have priority for all infrastructure and reconstruction projects soon after the war ends. Assad needs Iran and Russia for military and economic support. Also, because the most important oil fields are in Eastern Syria, which is now under the control of the Kurdish forces backed by the US, Syria is dependent on hydrocarbons from Russia and Iran. In the same time, for Assad, Chinese investments and loans are very important for the reconstruction process. They are attractive

¹²⁹ Thomas Homas, Gibbons-Neff, Jeremy White, David Botti, “The U.S. Has Troops in Syria. So Do the Russians and Iranians. Here’s Where”, in *The New York Times*, 11.04.2018, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/11/world/middleeast/syria-military-us-russia-iran.html>, accessed on 09.09.2019.

because Beijing is not imposing how the money should be spent or conditions for receiving money as the Western countries do. Before Turkey's "Peace Spring" military intervention in Syria, the US troops started to retreat from the Nord East of the country to the Deir Ez-Zor region and reduced by approximately 1000 its soldiers on the ground. This significantly reduced its role in Syria and strengthened Moscow's, Damascus' and Turkey's influence. Even if Turkey is cooperating for the moment with Russia regarding Syria, they still have different interests on long-term. So, their partnership could suffer if they would not manage to agree on Assad and on the future of the Idlib region.

Unfortunately, the conflict in Syria is far from having an end. As the interests of the states involved are different it will be very hard to understand on the political future of Syria. Also, it is unclear if Syria will regain its sovereignty over all the territories controlled by different actors involved in the conflict.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, "2015 Charlie Hebdo Attacks Fast Facts", in *CNN*, 24.12.2018, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/21/europe/2015-paris-terror-attacks-fast-facts/index.html>
2. ***, "Afrin'deki TSK üssüne saldırı: 2 asker yaralandı", in *NTV*, 09.08.2019, URL: <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/afrindeki-tsk-ussune-saldiri-2-asker-yaralandi,YM4AD6h4kK L96icn EciZw>
3. ***, "Britain and US condemn violence in Syria", in *The Telegraph*, 26.03.2011, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8408218/Britain-and-US-condemn-violence-in-Syria.html>
4. ***, "China says seeks closer military ties with Syria", in *Reuters*, 16.08.2016, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-china/china-says-seeks-closer-military-ties-with-syria-idUSKCN10R10R>
5. ***, "Daesh no longer holds any territory in Syria: Pentagon", in *Daily Sabah*, 22.03.2019, URL: <https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2019/03/22/daesh-no-longer-holds-any-territory-in-syria-pentagon>
6. ***, "Darmık Dağ'na askeri üs kuruluyor", in *NTV*, 15.02.2018, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/video/turkiye/darmik-dagina-askeri-us-kuruluyor,XjuYeiL0F0OJwoc ErSjvxg>
7. ***, "Efrin from a new military bases in Turkey", in *KRD News*, 11.07.2019, URL: <https://www.krdnews.net/news/bati-kurdistan/turkiyeden-efrinde-yeni-bir-askeri-us>
8. ***, "En kritik noktaya Türk askeri üs kurdu", in *CNN Türk*, 28.02.2017, URL: <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/en-kritik-noktaya-turk-askeri-us-kurdu>
9. ***, "France admits military presence in N. Syria", in *Anadolu Agency*, 28.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/france-admits-military-presence-in-nsyria/1351288>
10. ***, "France launches first air strikes on IS in Iraq", in *BBC*, 19.09.2014, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29277630>
11. ***, "French military cooperating with YPG/PKK terrorists", in *Anadolu Agency*, 30.03.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/french-military-cooperating-with-ypg-pkk-terrorists/1104265>
12. ***, "French Military Presence in Syria", in *Anadolu Agency*, 28.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/12730#!>
13. ***, "French special forces on ground in northern Syria: government source", in *Reuters*, 09.06.2016, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-france/french-special-forces-on-ground-in-northern-syria-government-source-idUSKCN0Y V15P>

14. ***, “Implications of planned US withdrawal from Syria”, in *Anadolu Agency*, 20.12.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/12653>
15. ***, “Insight: Battered by war, Syrian army creates its own replacement”, in *Reuters*, 21.04.2013, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-paramilitary-insight/insight-battered-by-war-syrian-army-creates-its-own-replacement-idUSBRE93K02R20130421>
16. ***, “Iran buries Guards commander 'killed in Syria'”, in *BBC*, 05.11.2013, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24818043>
17. ***, “Key world leaders won't be at Assad's funeral”, in *CBC*, 13.06.2000, URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/key-world-leaders-won-t-be-at-assad-s-funeral-1.218478>
18. ***, “Korgeneral Temel, Afrin kahramanlarıyla Burseyada iftar yaptı”, in *Anadolu Agency*, 07.06.2018, URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/-korgeneral-temel-afrin-kahramanlariyla-burseyada-iftar-yapti/1168840>
19. ***, “Kurdish fighters on the march against Islamic State”, in *The Times of Israel*, 29.05.2015, URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/kurdish-fighters-on-the-march-against-islamic-state/>
20. ***, “Obama Calling Russia a Regional Power Is 'Disrespectful' – Putin”, in *The Moscow Times*, 12.01.2016, URL: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/01/12/obama-calling-russia-a-regional-power-is-disrespectful-putin-a51414>
21. ***, “Paris attacks: What happened on the night”, in *BBC*, 09.12.2015, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994>
22. ***, “Putin signs Syria base deal, cementing Russia's presence there for half a century”, in *Reuters*, 27.07.2017, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-syria/putin-signs-syria-base-deal-cementing-russias-presence-there-for-half-a-century-idUSKBN1AC1R9>
23. ***, “Russia prepares to establish second base in Syria”, in *Hawar News Agency*, 07.08.2019, URL: <https://www.hawarnews.com/en///haber/russia-prepares-to-establish-second-base-in-syria-h10765.html>
24. ***, “Russia says 63,000 troops have seen combat in Syria”, in *BBC*, 23.08.2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45284121>
25. ***, “Russia’s 12 UN vetoes on Syria”, in *Arab News*, 10.04.2018, URL: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1282481/middle-east>
26. ***, “Russia’s military presence in Syria”, in *France 24*, 11.04.2018, URL: <https://www.france24.com/en/20180411-russias-military-presence-syria>
27. ***, “Russian cargo planes 'carrying aid' arrive in Syria”, in *BBC*, 12.09.2015, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34233723>
28. ***, “Savunma Bakanlığı: YPG saldırısı sonucu Azez'de bir asker şehit oldu”, in *BBC*, 09.06.2019, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/48572617>
29. ***, “SON DAKİKA – İşgalci Türk askerinin üssü vuruldu: 2 işgalci Türk askeri ve 4 çete öldürüldü”, in *Nüçe Ciwan*, 01.09.2019, URL: <https://www.nuceciwan29.com/2019/09/01/son-dakika-iscalci-turk-askerinin-ussu-vuruldu-2-iscalci-turk-askeri-ve-4-cete-olduruldu/>
30. ***, “Syria conflict: US officials withdraw troops after IS 'defeat'”, in *BBC*, 19.12.2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46623617>
31. ***, “Syria parliament okays Russian lease of Tartus port: state media”, in *France 24*, 12.06.2019, URL: <https://www.france24.com/en/20190612-syria-parliament-okays-russian-lease-tartus-port-state-media>
32. ***, “Syria war: Russia and China veto sanctions”, in *BBC*, 28.02.2017, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39116854>

33. ***, "Syria war: Turkey 'reinforces military posts in Idlib'", in *BBC*, 13 September 2018, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45510972>
34. ***, "Syrian monitor: 75 U.S.-trained Syrian rebels enter Syria from Turkey", in *Reuters*, 20.09.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels/syrian-monitor-75-u-s-trained-syrian-rebels-enter-syria-from-turkey-idUSKCN0RK07520150920>
35. ***, "Syrian Oil Crisis Pushes Assad to Choose between Russia and Iran", in *Haaretz*, 05.05.2019, URL: <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syrian-oil-crisis-pushes-assad-to-choose-between-russia-and-iran-1.7195625>
36. ***, "Tal Rifaat, Menagh Air Base vital to Turkey's counterterrorism push", in *Daily Sabah*, 29.03.2018, URL: <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2018/03/29/tal-rifaat-menagh-air-base-vital-to-turkeys-counterterrorism-push>
37. ***, "Tehran: 2,100 Iranian soldiers killed in Syria and Iraq", in *Middle East Monitor*, 07.03.2018, URL: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180307-tehran-2100-iranian-soldiers-killed-in-syria-and-iraq/>
38. ***, "Tel Rıfat kırsalında Türk Birliği ne saldırıda 3 Türk, 1 OSÖ askeri yaralandı TSK", in *Haber Türk*, 30.04.2019, URL: <https://www.haberturk.com/kilis-haberleri/68715475-tel-rifat-kirsalinda-turk-birligine-saldirida-3-turk-1-oso-askeri-yaralanditsk-tel-rifat>
39. ***, "TSK, EL Bab'da Akil Tepesi'ne askeri üs kuruyor", in *T24*, 28.02.2017, URL: <https://t24.com.tr/haber/tsk-el-babda-akil-tepesine-askeri-us-kuruyor,391185>
40. ***, "TSK'nın Afrin'deki üssüne YPG saldırısı: 2 asker yaralı", in *Independent Türkçe*, 09.08.2019, URL: <https://www.independentturkish.com/node/60211/haber/tsk'nin-afrin'deki-ussune-ypg-saldirisi-2-asker-yarali>
41. ***, "Turkey will not be Europe's firefighter", in *Daily Sabah*, 21.08.2016, URL: <https://www.dailysabah.com/editorial/2016/08/21/turkey-will-not-be-europes-firefighter>
42. ***, "Turkey's Anadolu news agency publishes map of French military positions in Syria", in *France 24*, 30.03.2018, URL: <https://www.france24.com/en/20180330-turkey-france-military-syria-kurds-map-soldiers>
43. ***, "Türkiye Halep'in kuzeydoğusunda üs kuruyor", in *FHA*, 25.11.2016, URL: <https://tr.farsnews.com/defence/news/13950905000048>
44. ***, "Türkiye Suriye'nin Cerablus Kentinde Askeri Üs Kuruyor", in *Haberler*, 04.04.2017, URL: <https://www.haberler.com/turkiye-suriye-nin-cerablus-kentinde-askeri-us-9458474-haberi>
45. ***, "UN chief slams Syria's crackdown on protests", in *Al-Jazeera*, 19.03.2011, URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011318231622114396.html>
46. ***, Council of the European Union, "Syria: EU renews sanctions against the regime by one year", 17.05.2019, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/17/syria-eu-renews-sanctions-against-the-regime-by-one-year/>
47. ***, House of Commons Defence Committee, *UK military operations in Syria and Iraq: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report*, 9 March 2017, URL: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/1065/1065.pdf>
48. ***, Ministère de la Défense de la République Française, Carte des opérations et missions militaires, 05.08.2019, URL: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaires
49. ***, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/25/2011, URL: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/25/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-3252011>
50. ***, UK Ministry of Defence website, Operations and Deployments, URL: <https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments>

51. ***, United Nations Refugee Agency, Syria Regional Refugee Response, URL: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>
52. ABOUFADEL, Leith, “Syrian, Russian air forces begin using liberated Jirah Airbase in East Aleppo”, in *AMN*, URL: <https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-russian-air-forces-begin-using-liberated-jirah-airbase-east-aleppo>
53. AL-KHALIDI, Suleiman, “Syrian forces shoot protesters, kill 6 in mosque”, in *Reuters*, 23.01.2011, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-gunfire/syrian-forces-shoot-protesters-kill-6-in-mosque-idUSTRE72M04T20110323>
54. ANSARI, Ali; TABRIZI, Aniseh, “The View From Tehran Understanding”, in: Aniseh TABRIZI, Raffaello PANTUCCI (Eds.), *Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict*, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), August 2016.
55. BACZYNSKA, Gabriela; PERRY, Tom; BASSAM, Laila; STEWART, Phil, “Exclusive: Russian troops join combat in Syria – sources”, in *Reuters*, 10.09.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-exclusive/exclusive-russian-troops-join-combat-in-syria-sources-idUSKCN0R91H720150910>
56. BALANCHE, Fabrice, “The End of the CIA Program in Syria”, in *Foreign Affairs*, 02.08.2017, URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-08-02/end-cia-program-syria>
57. BRUMFIELD, Ben; HADDAD, Margot, “France launches its first airstrikes against ISIS in Syria”, in *CNN*, 27.09.2015, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/27/middleeast/syria-france-isis-bombing/index.html>
58. BULOS, Nabih, “US-trained Division 30 rebels 'betray US and hand weapons over to al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria”, in *The Telegraph*, 22.09.2015, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11882195/US-trained-Division-30-rebels-betrayed-US-and-hand-weapons-over-to-al-Qaeda-s-affiliate-in-Syria.html>
59. DURGUN, Hikmet, “Hiddo: Türkiye, Afrin çevresinde askeri üsler kurdu”, in *Sputnik*, 12.07.2017, URL: <https://tr.sputniknews.com/columnists/201707121029242731-demokratik-suriye-meclisi-hiddo-afrin-askeri-us-turkiye>
60. ERGAN, Uğur, “İdlib'te son dakika: Türk askeri İdlib'de... Özel Kuvvetler, Komando girdi...”, in *Hürriyet*, 13.10.2017, URL: www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-turk-askeri-idlibde-ozel-kuvvetler-komando-girdi-40608845
61. FARMER, Ben; ENSOR, Josie; WILLIAMS, Sara Elizabeth, “ISIL militants attack British special forces base in Syria”, in *The Telegraph*, 10.04.2017, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/10/isis-militants-attack-british-special-forces-base-syria>
62. FROLOVSKIY, Dimitriy, “What Putin Really Wants in Syria”, in *Foreign Affairs*, 01.02.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/01/what-putin-really-wants-in-syria-russia-assad-strategy-kremlin/>
63. FULTON, Will; HOLLIDAY, Joseph; WYER, Sam, *Iran Strategy in Syria*, Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project, May 2013.
64. GABBATT, Adam, “Russia and China veto of Syria sanctions condemned as 'indefensible’”, in *The Guardian*, 19.07.2012, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/19/russia-china-syria-sanction-veto>, accessed on 01.07.2019.
65. GARDNER, Frank, “How vital is Syria's Tartus port to Russia?”, in *BBC*, 27.06.2012, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45284121>
66. GLAZE, Ben, “UK 'poised' to send more SAS troops into Syria”, in *Mirror*, 09.07.2019, URL: <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/uk-poised-send-more-sas-17782921>

67. GOLDBERG, Jeffrey, "The Obama Doctrine", in *The Atlantic*, April 2016 Issue, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>
68. HASSAN, Hanna, "Turkey's changing war in Syria", in *The Middle East Monitor*, 07.12.2017, URL: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171207-turkeys-changing-war-in-syria/>
69. HAUER, Neil, "The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army", in *Foreign Policy*, 06.10.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/06/rise-fall-russian-private-army-wagner-syrian-civil-war>
70. HELOU, Agnes, "Russia and US engage in 'military base race' in Syria", in *Defence News*, 15.01.2018, URL: <https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2018/01/15/russia-and-us-engage-in-military-base-race-in-syria/>
71. HEMENWAY, Dan, "Chinese strategic engagement with Assad's Syria", in *Atlantic Council*, 21.12.2018, URL: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriacouncil/chinese-strategic-engagement-with-assad-s-syria>
72. HENLEY, John, "France to strip Bashar al-Assad of his Légion d'honneur", in *The Guardian*, 17.04.2018, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/france-to-strip-syria-leader-bashar-al-assad-legion-honneur>
73. HOLLAND, Steve, "Jeff Mason Obama, in dig at Putin, calls Russia 'regional power'", in *Reuters*, 25.03.2014, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-weakness-idUSBREA2019J20140325>
74. HUANG, Kristin, "Humanitarian aid for Syria to continue, Chinese envoy says", in *South China Morning Post*, 15.11.2016, URL: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2046303/humanitarian-aid-syria-continue-chinese-envoy-says>
75. LETSCH, Constanze, "Erdoğan blames Isis for suspected suicide attack at wedding in Turkey", in *The Guardian*, 22.08.2016, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/20/several-dead-in-suspected-terrorist-blast-at-wedding-in-turkey>
76. LETSCH, Constanze; HAWRAMY, Fazel, "Kurdish forces take control of Syrian town of Kobani", in *The Guardian*, 26.01.2015, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/kurdish-forces-take-control-kobani-syria>
77. MacAskill, Ewen, "UK troops sent to train anti-Isis rebels 'have arrived in Syria'", in *The Guardian*, 15.12.2016, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/15/uk-troops-sent-to-train-anti-isis-rebels-have-arrived-in-syria>, accessed on 08.08.2019.
78. MARTIN, David, "Nearly 1,000 U.S. troops still in Syria months after last ISIS-held territory was liberated", in *CBS*, 22.07.2019, URL: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1000-u-s-troops-still-in-syria-months-after-last-isis-held-territory-was-liberated>
79. MCLOUGHLIN, Paul, "Syria Weekly: Russia begins to rebuild Syria's military from scratch", in *The New Arab*, URL: 17.05.2019, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/5/17/syria-weekly-russia-rebuilds-syrias-military-from-scratch>
80. NICKS, Denver "U.S. Forms Anti-ISIS Coalition at NATO Summit", in *Time*, 05.09.2014, URL: <https://time.com/3273185/isis-us-nato>
81. PAMUK, Humeyra, "Anger, fear sweeps Turkish border town under attack from Islamic State", in *Reuters*, 16.05.2016, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-border/anger-fear-sweeps-turkish-border-town-under-attack-from-islamic-state-idUSKCN0Y71JG>
82. PAULEY, Logan; MARKS, Jesse, "Is China Increasing Its Military Presence in Syria?", in *The Diplomat*, 20.08.2018, URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/is-china-increasing-its-military-presence-in-syria>

83. PELTZ, Jennifer, "Russia halts UN Security Council statement on Syria's Idlib", in *Fox News*, 04.06.2019, URL: <https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-halts-un-security-council-statement-on-syrias-idlib>
84. RAMANI, Samuel, "Why France is so deeply entangled in Syria", in *The Washington Post*, 19.11.2015, URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/19/why-france-is-so-deeply-entangled-in-syria>
85. RASHEED, Ahmed; ALI, Idrees, "Iraq says U.S. forces withdrawing from Syria have no approval to stay", in *Reuters*, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-iraq/iraq-says-u-s-forces-withdrawing-from-syria-have-no-approval-to-stay-idUSKBN1X10RE>.
86. SCHMITT, Eric, "U.S. to Send 200 More Troops to Syria in ISIS Fight", in *The New York Times*, 10.12.2016, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/us/politics/us-adds-200-troops-syria-isis.html>
87. SELIGMAN, Lara, "Britain, France Agree to Send Additional Troops to Syria", in *Foreign Policy*, 09.07.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/09/britain-france-agree-to-send-additional-troops-increase-syria-us-withdrawal-uk>
88. SELIGMAN, Lara, "U.S. Considering Plan to Stay in Remote Syrian Base to Counter Iran", in *Foreign Policy*, 25.01.2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/25/us-considering-plan-to-stay-in-remote-syrian-base-to-counter-iran-tanf-pentagon-military-trump>
89. SHADID, Anthony, "Security Forces Kill Dozens in Uprisings around Syria", in *The New York Times*, 22.04.2011, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/middleeast/23syria.html?mt_rref=www.google.com&gwh=9054F692EB97732B8E50BA5FBDAD18EE&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL
90. SHEAR, Michael D.; COOPER, Helene; SCHMITT, Eric, "Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS", in *The New York Times*, 09.10.2015, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html>
91. SHEAR, Michael D.; COOPER, Helene; SCHMITT, Eric, "Obama Sends Special Operations Forces to Help Fight ISIS in Syria", in *The New York Times*, 30.10.2015, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/world/obama-will-send-forces-to-syria-to-help-fight-the-islamic-state.html>
92. SHORROCK, William I., "The Origin of the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon: The Railroad Question 1901-1914", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), pp. 133-153.
93. SHOUMALI, Karam; YEGINSU, Ceylan, "Turkey Says Suicide Bombing Kills at Least 30 in Suruc, Near Syria", in *The New York Times*, 20.07.2015, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/europe/suruc-turkey-syria-explosion.html>
94. SOMMERVILLE, Quentin, "UK special forces pictured on the ground in Syria", in *BBC*, 08.08.2016, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37015915>
95. SURKES, Sue, "Iran insists it has 'no military bases in Syria'", in *The Times of Israel*, 19.02.2018, URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-insists-it-has-no-military-bases-in-syria/>
96. TABATABAI, Ariane M., "Syria Changed the Iranian Way of War", in *Foreign Affairs*, 16.08.2019, URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2019-08-16/syria-changed-iranian-way-war>

97. TUYSUZ, Gul; BILGINSOY, Zeynep, "Ministry: Turkey joins coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria", in *CNN*, 29.08.2015, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/29/europe/turkey-airstrikes/index.html>
98. WESTALL, Sylvia; aL-KHALIDI, Suleiman, "Syria ratifies fresh \$1 billion credit line from Iran", in *Reuters*, 08.07.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran/syria-ratifies-fresh-1-billion-credit-line-from-iran-idUSKCN0PI1RD20150708>
99. WORLAND, Justin, "3 More Countries Join the Coalition Against ISIS", in *Time*, 26.09.2014, URL: <https://time.com/3433346/isil-isis-uk-belgium-denmark>
100. ZENGERLE, Patricia; COWAN, Richard, "U.S. House votes to arm Syrian rebels, but questions remain", in *Reuters*, 17.09.2014, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-crisis-congress/u-s-house-votes-to-arm-syrian-rebels-but-questions-remain-idUSKBN0HC28120140917>

ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS OF THE 21st CENTURY

Doina MUREȘAN, Ph.D.

Colonel, Professor, Head of the National Defense College, Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: dmuresan_cnap@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Alliances and partnerships are one of the modern world systems built by great efforts in almost three quarters of a century. However, in the last two decades, there have been difficulties in finding a consensus on the characteristics of strategic alliances adapted to new developments. If we refer to the United States, not only have they achieved a leading position using this instrument, but they are at the top of two thirds of the world's economic activity; they also have a similar activity in terms of military expenditures. Yet, as Michael Mullen said in relation to current partnerships, we cannot continue to make an integrated version of what we have done in the past.*

Finding a new model for alliances and partnerships does not mean that traditional alliances, based on a set of tactics whose strategic utility has been widely demonstrated over the last century, are overcome. But it suggests the need for another dynamic, based on the new identities and new features of the context, with a fundamental role in an ever-changing, constantly changing landscape with a direct link to the new predicted dynamic of power.

Keywords: *alliances; strategic partnerships; global security; peace; world economy.*

INTRODUCTION

The decisive role of alliances in the current international dynamic is constantly articulated in the pragmatic approach of international affairs and is based exclusively on three pillars of analysis. Firstly, a large network of partnerships is and will remain vital for the fundamental interests of states, secondly, maintaining efficient relations is a difficult, intense continuous activity, and the third thesis is that traditional assumptions are not enough

Former Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams argues in his speech that alliances grant the United States a “huge asset” relative to Russia and China, which have no real allies¹. It is worth noting that the US partnerships are essential to meeting some of the Trump administration’s stated foreign policy priorities, including stability in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. In these areas, he argued that “There is no way the United States can protect its vital interests without an alliance structure”².

1. Tactical, historical and natural alliances

However, the social, political, economic and military context is dominated by both the increasing complexity of the current issues and the challenge of mastering the speed of decision-making cycles, which is more than a critical challenge for the political decision-makers. The ability to keep up with all the problems simultaneously is almost impossible and setting clear priorities is imperatively needed so that officials are not overwhelmed by the volume and speed

¹ ***, “Twenty-First Century Partnerships: Examining U.S. Partnerships Worldwide”, Conference Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Middle East Program, July 2017, URL: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/170808_Summary_Twenty-First%20Century%20Partnerships.pdf, accessed at 10.10.2019.

² *Ibidem.*

of data. Moreover, as an influencing factor, the re-emergence of the big power competition with all its characteristics is also to be considered.

As a result, a more rigorous classification of alliances could be particularly useful to better understand the main challenges and to illustrate the strategic creativity displayed by the allies. In this respect, distinguish between tactical, historical and natural alliances. The main purpose of tactical alliances is to counter an immediate threat or an adversary who has the potential to challenge the most vital interests of a state. "Tactical alliances are instrumental and often opportunistic in nature as they allow states to address a pressing and urgent issue. Leaders usually justify them on the basis of conditions on the ground and by the imperatives of realpolitik. Historical instances include alliances in 19th century Europe, the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of nonaggression signed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as the relationships that Israel maintains with its Sunni neighbours and the United States with China"³.

Historical alliances are enduring partnerships in which the states support each other, even if the international system goes through ruptures or takes different characteristics. This type of alliance implies that the support given to the allies to counter a specific threat is based on past successes and achievements, considered enough to justify additional partnerships. "Historical allies tend to accept short-term compromise that may not be fully congruent with national interests, in the hope that they will obtain some benefits in the longer run. Such a trade-off is impossible within the framework of a tactical alliance. In fact, historical alliances constitute a heterogeneous set of partnerships by nature but offer state actors the possibility of guarding against a wide set of historical contingencies, as ruptures may weaken some of these partnerships and strengthen others. An instance of a historical partnership that this paper discusses is the lasting relationship between Riyadh and Washington"⁴.

As for the natural alliances, we can say that they go beyond partners' shared sense of history by generating additional assumptions about how the world should work. Existing ties and institutions that formalized the relationship allow the Alliance to self-sustain and strengthen over time. Therefore, a natural alliance is resilient and more likely to withstand shocks, although these may affect it in the short term. In this situation disagreements and tensions are not excluded, but the formula reduces the likelihood of long-term misunderstandings.

2. Challenges and opportunities

If the Cold War imposed a relatively simple image for power in the second half of the twentieth century, then contemporary conflicts in the Middle East, Europe and Asia lead to something much more abstract and the lines between friends and opponents become fragile and are constantly shifting. "The dirty secret of international politics is that allies are often more difficult to manage than adversaries. Otto von Bismarck, the great German practitioner of Realpolitik, was far more successful in defeating his Danish, Austrian and French enemies than in getting his British and Russian friends to follow his lead"⁵.

It seems that the US will face more alliance challenges this century as high diversity and high dynamics international crises will put pressure on them to develop new partnerships and alliances. Also, US recognized allies and partners will increasingly discuss Washington's dependence on them and defend interests and beliefs different from those promoted by the US.

³ Jeremy Ghez, *Alliances in the 21st Century. Implications for the US-European partnership*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2011, URL: <http://www.rand.org>, accessed at 12.10.2019.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ Jeremi Suri, "The New Alliances of the 21st Century", Global Brief, Fall/Winter 2015, URL: <https://globalbrief.ca/2014/11/the-new-alliances-of-the-21st-century/>, accessed at 12.10.2019.

It seems that the current complex alliance landscape is both a challenge and an opportunity. In a world with diverse and changing conflicts, more flexible and functional alliances will work better than the large, permanent structures built in the past to address the almost universal Cold War threats. Smaller crises, specific to the 21st century context (in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine and elsewhere) require an array of actors aligned around solving a particular set of problems, rather than supporting a treaty or protecting a set of institutions designed in another time, for different issues. “The new configurations of actors and technologies require adjustments in the tools and the thinking about security [...] Alliances with a clear purpose are more disciplined and less susceptible to corruption and mission creep than institutionalized dependencies. In the pluralistic international landscape of the 21st century, filled with diverse actors and ever-shifting power dynamics, flexibility is more important than permanence. As the most powerful international actor with the widest range of military and economic tools, the US will profit from a more complex and pluralistic set of alliance relationships, provided it uses its resources wisely. The same applies, to a lesser degree, for other powerful international actors”⁶.

Although alliances, such as NATO, still provide security in specific contexts, current decision-makers will look at more realistic and perhaps more efficient ways of thinking that go beyond the current mode of alliance and partnership. Thus, the allies on one issue may have different positions in another situation, and then the possibilities of acting in pursuit of common interests will be used. A careful analysis will show that the current international space is dominated by these situations that are becoming more and more important because they involve powerful actors and refer to increasingly complex situations. We believe, therefore, that the new challenge identified in the current international relations is to follow and transpose into important alliances and partnerships the important fields of agreement between the regional actors, carefully following the rivalries with the same states. Leaders are likely to look at future alliances as relationships defined by the problem they are addressing and here we can find some extremely important directions such as economic, social and military coordination, intelligence, etc. Of course, the allies will be very cautious so that this sort of co-operation around one problem does not create the misimpression of a total agreement, concluded under the conditions and characteristics specific to the current period. Cooperation must remain focused on the problem without spreading beyond and the strategic alliances of the 21st century will change frequently. The leaders of this century will face the challenge of applying this incoherence in defence of the state’s interest in accordance with a well-articulated general strategy, doubled by the formation of a culture in the field, by educating the population, in order to receive the expected reactions.

CONCLUSIONS

In light of the above, the management of the 21st century alliances will be based on defining the interests and problems that the state faces, as well as on identifying the actors with compatible interests, while ascertaining and defining the terms and areas that hold these interests together.

In the 21st century actors will work to maintain a wide and diverse field of potential partners, regardless of whether they are currently considered adversaries, on the grounds that yesterday’s enemy is rapidly becoming an ally today on a problem of common interest and tomorrow, just as fast, will become an opponent again, on another area of interest. Both leaders and diplomats will be prepared for this flexibility recorded in the evolution of current international relations with all that this requires: agility in approach, special language skills, a

⁶ *Ibidem.*

very good knowledge of local societies, economies, figures and trends, all accompanied by a very good strategic training, regional expertise and greater decision-making autonomy.

In this complex and ever-changing landscape, it is extremely important to innovate policies, master strong observation and selectively deploy the force. Rapid efficiency is emerging in the conclusion of alliances and partnerships so that the efficient countries will be those that take advantage of opportunities for creative partnerships and then abandon them when these go beyond their goals. As a result, the most effective alliances will adopt this dynamic, wise leaders will make and break alliances much more frequently than in the previous period and the management of potential allies will prove extremely important.

Thus, the definition by which alliances are understood as the relations of two or more states based on the allied agreement, created to combine military, political and economic forces and to solve a common action in counteracting a threat (aggression) from the third party is transformed into a process of combining efforts on the basis of common or complementary political goals of the allies. Basically, this approach is perfectly valid for all forms of international cooperation of states, together with military alliances and diplomatic coalitions, friendship and cooperation pacts, federations and confederations, personal and real unions, international intergovernmental organizations, supranational organizations and strategic partner states. A common denominator is that "states decide to assume international commitments only when they are not able to cope with the problems, culminating in their own potential", and the coalition's power exceeds the simple amount of the resources of each of the allies.

The challenge is that the strategy-makers and leaders of alliances can gain greater influence and efficiency by finding an appropriate mix of alliances, each achieving a different purpose in a broader strategy. The question that underlies this approach is, can the tactical, historical and natural alliances be considered strategically complementary in a country's alliance portfolio?

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, "Twenty-First Century Partnerships: Examining U.S. Partnerships Worldwide", Conference Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Middle East Program, July 2017, URL: [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/170808_Summary_Twenty-First %20Century%20Partnerships.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/170808_Summary_Twenty-First%20Century%20Partnerships.pdf)
2. DON, B., *Allies and Adversaries: Policy Insights into Strategic Defense Relationship*, Santa Monica 1986.
3. GHEZ, Jeremy, *Alliances in the 21st Century. Implications for the US-European partnership*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2011, URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP340.html
4. LISKA, G., *Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence*, Baltimore 1962.
5. SNYDER, G., *Alliance theory: a neorealist first cut [in:] The evolution of theory in international relations*, R. Rothstein (ed.), Columbia 1991.
6. SURI, Jeremi, "The New Alliances of the 21st Century", Global Brief, Fall/Winter 2015, URL: <https://globalbrief.ca/2014/11/the-new-alliances-of-the-21st-century/>
7. WALTZ, Kenneth, *Theory of international politics*, published in 1979.

AN ASSESSMENT OF UN RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Iffat NAHEED, Ph.D. Student

National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA),
Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: Irtiqaa86@gmail.com

Abstract: *The phenomenon of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTFs) is considered to be a growing threat to international security and the gravest challenge to UN counter terrorism efforts. FTFs travel on call of terrorist organizations harm the states of origin, transit and destination along with the neighbouring zones.*

This paper is focussed on an assessment of UN’s overall efforts to combat the challenge of FTFs that are aimed on addressing the underlying causal factors that contribute towards the growth of FTFs. The issues pertaining to prevention of radicalization, recruitment, travel, and financial aspects of FTFs also constitute the primary concerns of the UN’s efforts towards combating FTFs. For its aforementioned objectives, the institutional framework of the UN has launched a capacity building implementation plan to resist the flow of FTFs in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2178.

The paper however concludes that despite its capacity building programmes, the scorecard of the UN and its institutional framework has remained less than impressive on account of combating FTFs. One of the main reasons for such limited success rate of UN’s counter FTF efforts is owing to a lack of focus on tailor made and customized regional solutions when it pertains to countering FTFs. This inter alia necessitates a deeper understanding of the needs of the Member States and the concerned countries’ legal and administrative systems.

Keywords: *Foreign Terrorist Fighters; UN Security Council resolutions against FTFs; UN institutions against FTFs; FTFs in Syria and Iraq; UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.*

INTRODUCTION

Although the history of terrorism is very old, the recent discourse on this issue has assumed renewed significance since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the United States. Owing to its complicated aspects, international cooperation has now become an irrefutable necessity for dealing with the menace of terrorism. It is now beyond the capacity of any individual state to counter the threat of terrorism single-handedly, be it at the international or domestic level. As the menace of terrorism gains increased complexity, the aspect of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) has become a new challenge to be countered.

The world has witnessed the greatest convergence of FTFs in Iraq and Syria in past few years. There has been observed a significant transformation in the scope of FTFs phenomenon particularly in relation to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, resulting in legal debates within the sphere of counterterrorism which is of crucial relevance. Following the several terrorist attacks around the world especially the European countries, the UN has rapidly called upon states to address the issue of FTFs through enhanced cooperation, information-sharing, and enactment of new domestic criminal justice and administrative measures to address this emergent phenomenon¹.

¹ Marnie Lloyd, “Foreign fighters under international law and beyond”, in *Melbourne journal of international law*/2017, volume no.18, pp. 95-103, accessed on June, 27, 2019.

FTFs play a major role in strengthening the terrorist groups and get involved in radicalization, creation of new terrorist groups, and recruitments for terrorist networks. After 2011, the problem became more complex with the returning and relocating of FTFs. Some FTFs returning from Iraq and Syria, after having created havoc in these two countries, were found to be involved in attempting similar malicious activities in their own countries as well. One of the key issues is the difficulty in assessment of returnees, as nobody can anticipate which one of them can pose a threat of being involved in future terrorist activities².

While the concept of Foreign Terrorist Fighters is relatively new to the global political lexicon, the notion of "Foreign Fighters" is about 250 years old³. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights states that "A foreign fighter is an individual who leaves his or her country of origin or habitual residence to join a nonstate armed group in an armed conflict abroad and who is primarily motivated by ideology, religion, and/or kinship⁴". In recent years, the term Foreign Fighters was used officially for those fighters going to Afghanistan from around the world to fight against the Soviet occupation.

The evolution of FTFs passed through many stages and FTFs contributed to conflicts in different countries. Research shows that FTFs remained involved in civil conflicts of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Chechnya and in the attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington. After the invasion of Iraq, about five thousand FTFs joined the war with formation of Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). Similarly, there was a great flow of FTFs to Syria after the outbreak of Syrian civil war resulting in another multinational militant group called Al-Nusra Front. Later, in 2003, another terrorist group appeared as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which made the so-called "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria, resulting in a flow of FTFs which was unprecedented in character.

1. Addressing the causal factors towards growth of FTFs

Estimates suggest that FTFs who travelled to and got actively engaged with ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated groups in Iraq, Syria as well as many other countries – came from about 110 states around the globe. As per some estimates, more than 40,000 FTFs had travelled to just Iraq and Syria alone as of late 2017⁵. By the end of 2015, more than 5,000 FTFs from different EU countries, about 4,700 FTFs from Russia and former Soviet Republics, more than 8,000 FTFs from Maghreb and North Africa, around 1,000 FTFs from Horn of Africa and the Balkans, about 600 FTFs from South East Asia; and around 250 FTFs from the Americas travelled to Syria and Iraq⁶.

The "reverse flow" of FTFs is taking place in waves and as per estimates, by 2015, around 5,600 FTFs had already returned to their home countries. Some 30 per cent of FTFs had returned or moved to other states by 2016. The "shrinking territories" in Syria and collapse of the ISIL

² Michele Coninx, "Tackling the world's multiple challenges simultaneously; the role of the United Nations", in *UN Chronicle*, no.2/2018, pp. 26-27, accessed on September, 27, 2019.

³ United Nations, "Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Cases for South and South-East Asia", United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, p. 1, URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FTF%20SSEA/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters_Asia_Ebook.pdf, accessed on October, 03, 2019.

⁴ UNODC, *Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Manual for Judicial Training Institutes South Eastern Europe*, United Nations, Vienna, 2017, p. 3, URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/2017/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters.pdf, accessed on October, 3, 2019.

⁵ OSCE/ODIHR, "Guidelines for Addressing the threats and challenges of FTFs within a human rights framework", OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)/2018, p. 11, URL: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/393503>, accessed on June, 26, 2019.

⁶ The Soufan Group, *Foreign Fighters: An updated assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, 2015, URL: <https://wb-iisg.com/docs/foreign-fighters-an-updated-assessment-of-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-into-syria-and-iraq/>, accessed on July, 10, 2018.

in October 2017 added to the latest wave of returnees. By early 2018, a sharp decrease in the number of FTFs travelling both in and out of Iraq and Syria contributed to growing concern regarding possible use of FTFs by ISIL elsewhere. This aspect has indeed been a defining feature of the political discourse and related developments in law and policy in recent years. The involvement of several former FTFs, widely reported in attacks in Brussels, Paris, Istanbul and London between 2015 and 2017 tends to confirm this fear⁷.

The overall response of UN to the growth of FTFs can be assessed by its holistic approach towards Countering Violent Extremism which is one of the major causal factors for the growth of FTFs and the basic part of the FTFs lifecycle. Violent extremism is defined as “an ideology that accepts the use of violence for the pursuit of goals that are generally social, racial, religious, and/or political in nature⁸”. Violent extremism is a complex phenomenon which has been addressed by UN through a global framework which is presented comprehensively in form of *UN Global Counter Terrorism-Strategy* (UNGCTS) comprising of four pillars:

- Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
- Preventing and combating terrorism;
- Building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the UN;
- Ensuring human rights and the rule of law.

UNGCTS relies upon governance measures alongside the criminal justice response to suppress the underlying causal factors for the growth of FTFs. The governance measures help to mitigate the violent extremism which is conducive to terrorism. There could be many complex societal and cultural issues that cause the birth of violent extremism and could be systemic. Such causes cannot be solved merely by criminal justice and they demand such good governance approaches in each state as inter alia moderating religious education and promoting counter narratives in response to the misleading narratives created by terrorist organizations. These terrorist organizations tend to recruit FTFs by exploitation of social media through strong calls to action and transmitting criminal content linked with terrorism. This objective is being achieved in many countries at present by practicing Global framework presented by UN with the help of analytical experts, social media and technology innovators.

One of the causal factors towards growth of FTFs has been the identification of FTFs to certain religious or ethnic groups and unnecessary media coverage of FTFs and violent extremism. This adds to the conditions that promote the spread of terrorism⁹.

2. Legal Framework against FTFs

The notion of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” came to prominence since 2003 with the rise of insurgency in Iraq. FTFs appeared for the first time in the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2170 and it was properly defined in the Resolution 2178 as “individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of

⁷ OSCE/ODIHR, “Guidelines for Addressing the threats and challenges of FTFs within a human rights framework”, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)/2018, p. 12, URL: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/393503>, accessed on June, 26, 2019.

⁸ United Nations, *Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Cases for South and South-East Asia*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, pp. 43-45, URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FTF%20SSEA/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters_Asia_Ebook.pdf, accessed on October, 3, 2019.

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 45-47.

terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict¹⁰". So, it is apparent as per the aforementioned definition that FTFs are in fact linked to a "Terrorist" activity for some kind of financial, political or ideological interests.

There is a long list of UN Security Council resolutions to tackle the ever evolving nature of Violent Extremism, Terrorism and FTFs. However, resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017) specifically focus on dealing with the challenge of FTFs faced by the international community. These instruments put obligations on Member States which they must implement under international law.

Resolution 1373¹¹ was adopted in the wake of terrorist attacks of 9/11 by the UN Security Council in 2001. It mainly addresses the challenges posed by terrorism in a most comprehensive manner, targeting the violent extremism as well. Moreover, it stresses the need for the formulation of different legal instruments in this regard and in particular adopted different legally binding measures for the Member States to suppress terrorism. The most revolutionary part of this resolution was the obligation on Member States to criminalise not only the terrorist acts but also the financing, facilitating and supporting of terrorist acts.

The part of Resolution 1373 that directly relates to FTFs is the obligation on Member States to control the movement of terrorists through effective border controls and controls on the issuance of identity and travel documents. It also creates obligations to suppress and prevent the recruitment of FTFs in their territories.

Resolution 2178¹² was adopted by UN Security Council in September 2014 when a great number of individuals were witnessed to have joined different terrorist organizations e.g. ISIL and Al-Nusra Front. Accordingly, the subject focus of this resolution is on those individuals who tend to become FTFs.

Resolution 2396¹³ was adopted in December 2017 and it mainly addresses the returning FTFs, their families and children born in conflict zones. According to this resolution, the Member States should build their capacity to deal with a range of issues related to returning FTFs. It requires making arrangements to assess the involvement of returning FTFs and their families in conflicts and determining their children's legal status and citizenship issues. In the Resolution 2396 the UN Security Council expressed its gravest concern in these very words "that returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters have attempted, organized, planned, or participated in attacks in their countries of origin or nationality, or third countries, including against "soft" targets, and that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Da'esh, in particular has called on its supporters and affiliates to carry out attacks wherever they are located¹⁴."

All the three resolutions are interconnected to each other in a way that the second one is built on the framework of the first one and so on. There are other Security Council resolutions

¹⁰ UNODC, *Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Manual for Judicial Training Institutes South Eastern Europe*, United Nations, Vienna, 2017, p. 3, URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/2017/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters.pdf accessed on October, 03, 2019.

¹¹ Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted by Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001, URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf accessed on October, 03, 2019.

¹² Resolution 2178. Threats to international peace caused by terrorist acts, 2014, URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2178>, accessed on October, 26, 2019.

¹³ Resolution 2396 (2017) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8148th meeting, on 21 December 2017, URL: [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2396\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2396(2017)), accessed on October, 26, 2019.

¹⁴ UNSC, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, *The American Society of International Law*, 2018, accessed on October, 26, 2018.

that are also related to countering FTFs framework and addressing the minute details related to the issue. UN Global War on Terror has almost defeated the ISIL¹⁵.

After UN Security Council resolution 2178, the number of FTFs crossing Turkish-Syrian border has reduced to 50 per month as estimated by September 2016. The number of ISIL Terrorists in the area of Global Coalition has reduced to about 1,000 as per estimates by the end of 2017. Around 15,000 FTFs have already left the area after Global Coalition action in 2014. Some of those FTFs go back to their homelands but many seek refuge in other countries¹⁶.

3. UN institutional framework against FTFs

After the adoption of Resolution 1373 in 2001, a dedicated Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established under obligation of this resolution for the first time in history. The CTC is assisted by an Executive Directorate (CTED) which carries out the policy decisions of CTC. It has the responsibility to conduct expert assessments of 193 Member States of the UN.

The CTED has the obligation to conduct visits of Member States on behalf of Committee to identify and assess the trends and challenges in implementation of UN resolutions. It can also provide technical assistance by observing areas where progress has been made, as well as identifying priority areas and addressing any shortfalls. By the end of 2018, the CTED has conducted more than 150 visits to about 100 Member States of the UN since the time of its creation. CTED includes experts in these assessment visits from relevant international, regional and sub-regional organisations, inter alia, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and other specialized bodies and institutions with expertise in specific aspects of counter-terrorism. In 2017, the UN Security Council Resolution 2395¹⁷ renewed the mandate of CTED and extended its Special Political Mission until 31 December 2021.

The UNOCT was established through adoption of a resolution by UN General Assembly in June 2017. Therefore, CTED and UNOCT are working in tandem, which includes: sharing of information; identifying priority regions and areas for collaboration; undertaking joint country visits and follow-up; cooperating on the design and development of projects and programmes; and aligning their strategic communications and joint outreach activities¹⁸.

In addition to strengthening the delivery of UN counter-terrorism capacity building assistance to Member States, UNOCT also enhances coordination among 38 Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (former Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force) entities to ensure implementation of the four pillars of the UNGCTS¹⁹.

As the movements of FTFs are transnational in nature, the regional and cross-regional cooperation has also become a vital part of implementing the global counter-terrorism framework.

¹⁵ United Nations, *Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Cases for South and South-East Asia*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, p. 45, URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FTF%20SSEA/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters_Asia_Book.pdf, accessed on October, 03, 2019.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 5-6.

¹⁷ Resolution 2395 (2017) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8146th meeting, on 21 December 2017, URL: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2395\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2395(2017)), accessed on October, 26, 2019.

¹⁸ Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, About the Counter-Terrorism Committee, URL: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/about-us/>, accessed on October, 11, 2019.

¹⁹ Security Council Report, *Thematic issues, Counter terrorism/2019*, URL: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-03/counter-terrorism.php>, accessed on October, 11, 2019.

4. Major shortfalls in implementation of UN Security Council resolutions

Governments around the world continue to address the complex set of challenges posed by this threat including the radicalization of youth²⁰. UN Security Council has marked many achievements in countering the challenge posed by FTFs in some regions of the world with implementation of its resolutions. However, there are a huge number of systemic shortfalls in complete implementation of resolutions in many regions which have affected its success to a large extent in suppressing the acute and growing threat of FTFs.

Resolution 2178 specifically got much criticism as it was referred to as US President Obama's legacy in UN Security Council. Critics argued that the resolution left room for some undesirable interpretations e.g. it defined FTFs but not "terrorism" because of political difficulties. They say that extensive legal obligations particularly the obligation to enact "serious criminal offenses" in prosecuting FTFs requires agreement on that point as regimes need to define "terrorism" to limit their ability to classify individuals or groups as terrorists, otherwise it can be misused against political opposition, trade unions, religious movements, and minority or indigenous groups²¹.

Issues linked to the definition of "terrorism"

Each element of the term Foreign Terrorist Fighters has ended up in creating controversy and uncertainty. Resolution 2178 associates the term "foreigner" with individuals who "travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality"²² but it still creates significant ambiguity. As per the basic principles of international law, dual nationals or individuals with important personal, cultural and social links to other states beyond their residence or nationality should not be confused with the term "foreigners" when they travel to a state of relevant links.

As there is no internationally agreed upon definition of the term "terrorist" or "terrorism", it creates a space for diverse interpretations and increases the potential for abuse in implementing Resolution 2178. Human rights bodies frequently criticized broad and ambiguous definitions of terrorism which tends to violate human rights and principle of legality. For example resolution 2178 (2014) and resolution (2017) create obligations for states to take broad reaching measures²³, without clearly defining the target particularly the obligation in operative paragraph 6 of resolution 2178²⁴ to enact "serious criminal offenses" to prosecute FTFs. This would lead the regimes to many political inferences and allow them to define "terrorism" as "whatever they do not like", for example, political opposition, trade unions, religious movements, minority or indigenous groups²⁵ In this regard, human rights violations also include inter alia the right to liberty, freedom of movement, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression.

The provisions on FTFs often cover travel to support terrorist organizations and entities, but the question of how that qualification is made, and by whom, is not addressed. However, confining the term in this way would at least limit the scope for abuse. There is a CTED report

²⁰ GCTS (Global Counter Terrorism Forum) Foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) initiative, *The Hague Marrakech memorandum on good practices for a more effective response to the FTF phenomenon*, Hague/ 2014, URL: www.theGCTF.org, accessed on September, 26, 2019.

²¹ Cory Kopitzke, "Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): An ineffective response to FTF phenomenon", in *Indiana journal of global legal studies*, volume no. 24, 2017, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, pp. 309-341, URL: <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol24/iss1/13/>, accessed on September, 26, 2019.

²² OSCE/ODIHR, "Guidelines for Addressing the threats and challenges of FTFs within a human rights framework", OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)/2018, p. 22, URL: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/393503>, accessed on June, 26, 2019.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

²⁴ Resolution 2178. Threats to international peace caused by terrorist acts, 2014, URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2178> accessed on October, 26, 2019.

²⁵ Cory Kopitzke, *Op. cit.*

on FTFs that has drawn attention to this problem and called for the “adoption of procedures to make national terrorist designations in compliance with human rights principles²⁶”.

Challenges to prevent interstate travel of FTFs

In some countries the creation of FTFs is prevented by hindering the travel of suspected persons from their country of origin to conflict zones in order to restrain them from perpetrating, planning, preparing or participating in terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, there are some states which have a few or no operational measures to prevent the travel of potential FTFs. So, there is a need of awareness-raising and capacity-building measures in some areas.

FTFs also move deliberately through “Broken Travel” technique²⁷ which is the use of a multi-stage route combining air travel, local transport and even walking in order to mislead the counter-terrorism officials. Most of the public and private sector entities have not taken any measures to prevent “Broken Travels” in order to stem the flow of FTFs specifically in the neighbouring zones of armed conflicts. There is a need of strengthening the capacity of border authorities and counter-terrorism officials in particular regions to determine the exact spot of start of travel and to understand the manner in which FTFs travel in and out of conflict zones and transit states.

Moreover, as there is no international requirement for any state to ensure immigration controls on transit or transfer of passengers, most of the states offer transit without visa and provide vulnerability for FTFs to transit freely through states without being checked by counter-terrorism officials. Visa-free or visa-upon-arrival arrangements between many states also provide same kind of vulnerability for FTFs. There is also a need to provide the advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities by the airlines in a certain territory.

Most of the states do not have legal measures to criminalise smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons and functioning refugee status determining system to exclude FTFs from such protection. Many states could not address the issue of porous borders to suppress the flow of FTFs. So, there is a need of utilizing coordinated border management methods and developing effective regional cross-border cooperation.

FTFs threat demands for a holistic approach towards the law enforcement. Mobility of FTFs is one of its main characteristics which requires law enforcement cooperation beyond the national level and support of the intelligence community for availability of timely and complete information about FTFs to the front line officers at border crossings, immigration services and custom authorities, lacking in many countries.

Challenges in countering incitement to terrorism

Most of the states have taken measures to prohibit the incitement to terrorism by enacting criminal laws. However, in some states, legal measures against incitement to terrorism appeared to violate the responsibilities of states under international human rights law and right to freedom of expression. In such situations, the counter measures proved to be counterproductive and contributed more towards radicalization among different parts of population²⁸.

Criminalization against FTFs

The criminalization requirement against FTFs has not been fully achieved by many countries. Most of them have criminalized the recruitment for terrorism and few states the

²⁶ OSCE/ODIHR, “Guidelines for Addressing the threats and challenges of FTFs within a human rights framework”, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)/2018, pp. 16-24, URL: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/393503>, accessed on June, 26, 2019.

²⁷ CTED, Implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected by foreign terrorist fighters, *A compilation of three reports (S/2015/338; S/2015/683; S/2015/975)*, United Nations/ 2015, p. 28, URL: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/a-compilation-of-three-reports-s2015338-s2015683-s2015975-implementation-of-security-council-resolution-2178-2014-by-states-affected-by-foreign-terrorist-fighters/>, accessed on September, 26, 2019.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

facilitation of FTFs' travel. Providing training to FTFs has been criminalized more rather than the aspect of receiving training. So, the challenge of criminalization against FTFs is required to be addressed²⁹.

Risk assessment of returning FTFs

The anticipation of risks posed by returning FTFs is a great challenge. There are still many evidentiary and jurisdictional problems faced by countries that are related to prosecution of returning or relocating FTFs. FTFs that have already entered the criminal justice systems of many states pose new demands placed on prisons and as well as carry the potential of in-prison radicalization. Moreover, the released FTFs from prisons create a potential to be re-engaged in terrorist activities³⁰.

Human rights implications

States which succeeded in adopting wide-ranging responses to the potential challenges posed by FTFs have brought changes in their legislation, policy making, and application of counter-terrorism laws and practices which are all pursuant to FTF-related UN Security Council resolutions and legal instruments. The new legislations criminalized inter alia, recruitment, travel, and facilitation of travel, the provision of funds, the delivery and receipt of broadly defined training (self-training via Internet) or all kinds of facilitation, support, and incitement.

The restrictive administrative measures that are being used in the FTF-context include stripping individuals of their citizenship, deporting, imposing travel bans and blocking their entry into or transit through different territories, or the removal of travel documents. Special investigative techniques, surveillance, the collection and sharing of personal information of individuals, blocking and regulating Internet websites are all activities practiced more regularly. Moreover, restricting liberty through practices such as house arrests, control orders, or area restrictions alongside the assets freezing of suspected individuals have also been applied in several states³¹.

CONCLUSIONS

The overall response of United Nations to the challenge of FTFs and terrorism developed important counter-terrorism norms and narratives. The ground-breaking focus of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on countering violent extremism established the fact that terrorism cannot be effectively countered through military, intelligence, and law enforcement tools alone, but it must be addressed in partnership and collaboration with non-governmental actors. UN Security Council resolutions 2178 and 2396 also emphasized that countering the issue of FTFs faced by the entire global community must not be done at the expense of human rights.

All the aforementioned responses to the perceived threat of FTFs and returnees imply potentially significant interference with human rights. It is perceived by the study that the measures against FTFs must be considered carefully. In order to get alternatives aimed at inter alia preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, "softer" approaches need to be implied. All the above mentioned measures can also raise serious concerns regarding the implications for rights such as freedom of thought, religion or belief, expression, privacy, and equality.

The current study assessed that there are numerous remarkable and substantive accomplishments that UN Security Council delivered successfully against the acute and disastrous threat posed by FTFs in many regions. This paper also suggests that there have been

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 75.

³⁰ OSCE/ODIHR, "Guidelines for Addressing the threats and challenges of FTFs within a human rights framework", OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)/2018, pp. 12-13, URL: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/393503>, accessed on June, 26, 2019..

³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 19-20.

many systemic shortfalls in implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to tackle the issue of FTFs which can be improved by customized regional solutions. CTED is already on pace in dealing with these complications, however, a complete cooperation by the entire global community is still lacking.

Moreover it is notable regarding the language of UN Security Council resolutions that the council has greatly regarded the concerns of Member States and the language is quite strong on human rights. The broad support that UN Security Council resolutions received at adoption was because of its grip on protecting human rights and its assurances of compliance with international humanitarian law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, CTED, Implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected by foreign terrorist fighters, *A compilation of three reports (S/2015/338; S/2015/683; S/2015/975)*, United Nations/ 2015, URL: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/a-compilation-of-three-reports-s2015338-s2015683-s2015975-implementation-of-security-council-resolution-2178-2014-by-states-affected-by-foreign-terrorist-fighters/>.
2. ***, Global Counter Terrorism Forum, Foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) initiative, *The Hague Marrakech memorandum on good practices for a more effective response to the FTF phenomenon*, Hague/ 2014, URL: [www.theGCTF](http://www.theGCTF.org).
3. ***, OSCE/ODIHR, “Guidelines for Addressing the threats and challenges of FTFs within a human rights framework”, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)/2018, URL: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/393503>.
4. ***, Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted by Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001, URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf.
5. ***, Resolution 2178. Threats to international peace caused by terrorist acts, 2014, URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2178>.
6. ***, Resolution 2395 (2017) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8146th meeting, on 21 December 2017, URL: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2395\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2395(2017)).
7. ***, Resolution 2396 (2017) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8148th meeting, on 21 December 2017, URL: [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2396\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2396(2017))
8. ***, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, About the Counter-Terrorism Committee, URL: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/about-us/>, accessed on October, 11, 2019.
9. ***, Security Council Report, *Thematic issues, Counter terrorism/2019*, URL: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-03/counter-terrorism.php>, accessed on October, 11, 2019.
10. ***, The Soufan Group, *Foreign Fighters : An updated assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, 2015, URL: <https://wb-iisg.com/docs/foreign-fighters-an-updated-assessment-of-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-into-syria-and-iraq/>
11. ***, United Nations, *Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Cases for South and South-East Asia*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FTF%20SSEA/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters_Asia_Ebook.pdf
12. ***, UNODC, *Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Manual for Judicial Training Institutes South Eastern Europe*, United Nations, Vienna, 2017, URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/2017/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters.pdf
13. ***, UNSC, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, *The American Society of International Law*, 2018, accessed on October, 26, 2018.

14. ***, UNSC, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, *The American Society of International Law*, 2018.
15. CONINSX, Michele, "Tackling the world's multiple challenges simultaneously; the role of the United Nations", in *UN Chronicle*, no.2/2018.
16. KOPITZKE, Cory, "Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): An ineffective response to FTF phenomenon", in *Indiana journal of global legal studies*, volume no. 24, 2017, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, URL: <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol24/iss1/13/>
17. LLOYDD, Marnie, "Foreign fighters under international law and beyond", in *Melbourne journal of international law*/2017, volume no.18.

ISIS AND WOMEN

Raluca LUȚAI, Ph.D. Candidate

Junior Lecturer at International Relations and Contemporary History Department
Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania
E-mail: raluca_lutai@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The status of the woman in the Islamic religion is very special. In the social sphere their status is minimal or almost non-existent. The terrorist organization known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, Dae'sh) has paid special attention to the woman's status and roles in the society. This can be seen by analysing the group's latest production, "Rumiyah" magazine. Women are considered an important part of the struggle the Islamic State is taking against "unbelievers"¹. They are the ones who nurture and grow future soldiers and are responsible for taking care of the household. They can, at the will of their husbands, leave their homes and join military operations.*

The article analyzes the woman's image as it is presented in the 13 issues of Rumiyah.

Keywords: *ISIS; women; Rumiyah, terrorist propaganda, terrorism.*

INTRODUCTION

The terrorist group The Islamic State has managed in recent years to scare the international arena with the brutality and the violence they have promoted. The whole world was terrified by the countless attacks it perpetrated but also by the historical announcement they wanted to establish the Islamic Caliphate. Aware of the value that the Internet has in the life of the modern individual, the Islamic State has constantly promoted publications aimed at attracting new members into the organization. One of these publications is *Rumiyah* magazine. The 13 issues of the English-language version of the publication represent a driving force for the ideas that the group spreads, and a good means of information on the activities of the group. They understood the importance of mass communication and choose to publish the magazine in many other languages like Russian or German.

The status of women in Muslim states is often a topic of discussion especially for the Western world. The veil she wears is often seen as a symbol for oppression and persecution. The complexity of the subject is the result of the interaction between history, religion, culture and politics. They are seen as different and this makes us more intrigued by their role in the society and their life in general.

The present paper is an analysis of the way the woman is viewed within the Islamic State terrorist group. Starting from the premise that *Rumiyah's* publication represents the vision of the group, we will analyze the roles assigned to the woman within this social group. From a methodological point of view, we will analyze the content of the 13 issues of the publication. Starting from the analysis of how the woman positions herself in the Islamic society, we will analyze how she is perceived by the terrorist group.

¹ In the Islamic Religion the term "unbelievers" particularly refers to Jews and Christians.

1. The status of the woman under Islam

Before analyzing the vision jihadi fighters have in relation to the role played by the woman in the fight they carry out, it is important to see which the status of the woman is in the Islamic society, as it is described in specialty literature.

Gerda Lerner in *The Creation of Patriarchy* presents metaphorically, and as eloquently as possible, the role played out by woman in Islamic societies: "Men and women live on a stage on which they act out their assigned roles, equal in importance. The play cannot go on without the both kinds of performers. Neither of them "contributes" more or less to the whole; neither is marginal or dispensable. But the stage is set, conceived, painted, and defined by men. Men have written the play, have directed the show, interpreted the meanings of the action. They have assigned themselves the most interesting, most heroic parts, giving women the supporting roles"². The Islamic society is, therefore, a patriarchal construction in which the role played by the woman is a minimal one. From the spiritual point of view, the Quran makes no distinction between the woman and the man "*God is said to have created the man and women from a single soul (Sura 4:1) to be mutual friends and protectors*" (9:17)³. Thus, in the eyes of God, the man and the woman do not show differences and they are equally compensated for their good deeds and equally punished for their evil deeds, ("*o whoever does right and believes, be it man or women, we will give a good life. And we will apportion them their reward according to their best deeds*" 16:97⁴), still the woman lives covered by a veil and excluded from the social sphere while God has chosen the male for the role of patriarch, religious leader and politician. They have different roles and different rights. Women are not inferior but different, created for a special function in life.

The role of father, brother or husband which can be played by a man comes with great responsibilities in relation with the mother, the daughter or the wife. The man is responsible for the maintenance of the social system. They are the ones who must provide their wives, their daughters and their mothers a home and those necessary for their day to day lives. They are the providers and the protectors and this can offer them almost limitless powers over women. According to the Quran: "The men take precedence over the women because God has honored them more than the others and because they give (to their wives) from their property. And if you fear that the wives rebel (against you) then remove yourself from them in the marriage bed and beat them. If they obey you undertake nothing further against them" (4:34)⁵.

The woman is born in a different world and lives, most of the times, in a relation of dependence in relation to her father, first, and her husband after that. The news related to the birth of a girl is not as celebrated as the one related to the birth of a boy. The boy grows in a close relationship with his mother even though the father is the honored person and, as soon as he grows up, he is educated by the father, who prepares him for the life of a husband, a father, and an important member of the society. Boys have access to a complex education and to all sectors of social life. Girls, on the other hand, do not have access to much education and live around their mothers who are responsible for their transformation in true wives and mothers.

An important role played by the woman is the one of a wife. The family, formed by a man and a woman, is the basic cell of the Islamic society. Marriages are mostly arranged,

² Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, *The idea of women under fundamentalist Islam*, University Press Florida, 2003, p. 233.

³ Christine Schirrmacher, "Islam and society - Sharia law, Jihad, Women in Islam", *The WEA Global Issues Series*, vol. 4, Bonn, 2008, p. 90.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 91.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p.100.

and living alone is not a variant. Marriage is the realization of God's desire. Arranged marriages are associated with decency and respectability while marriages for love are seen as westernization. Polygamy is accepted in almost all Islamic societies in which a husband can have up to four wives and an unlimited number of concubines. The main task of the wife is to give birth and to raise children while, at the same time, taking care of the home. The relationship between a husband and a wife is established on sexual grounds and on obedience. Her sexuality and her sensuality, against which man cannot resist, seem to be the only powers a woman has. A sexually unsatisfied male is considered to be a social danger. The importance of women in this context is underlined also by the often reaffirmed promise of the 72 virgins awaiting them at the gates of Heaven. According to the Quran the man has unlimited right to maintain intercourse: „Your women are a fertile field for you. Go to the field whenever you wish” (2:223). Therefore, the women must satisfy their husbands' sexual desires. Otherwise, men has the right to punish his wife by ignoring her or beating her in case of disobedience (Sura 4:34).

For what is related to divorce, the male is the one who takes charge of the children, while the wife has no right to ask for anything. Men can repudiate their wives with no ground while women need to bring proofs in every court. Widows have no right to live alone.

The third major role played by the woman is to be the mother. Being completely excluded from social life, the woman has the sexual functions and psychology to be unfit for any work or activity except child bearing⁶. They are responsible for reproducing and the healthy upbringing of their children. They teach children to love Islam and its right principles according to which life must be lived. If the man's jihad⁷ is often interpreted as violent and directed against any non-Muslim person, the Muslim women jihad has to do with the protection of the Islamic values, the culture and the domesticity.

Even though they are spiritually equal, when living their lives on earth, the women from Muslim societies have an inferior condition, the one of being a supporting character. With limited opportunities and some deprivations, the woman is the personification of sexuality, love, desire, sexual fulfilment, procreation and motherhood, and simultaneously, the embodiment of shame, seductiveness, infidelity and anarchy⁸.

2. *Rumiyah* – an Islamic State publication

Terror groups have always been worried about their members' loyalty degree, on one side, and attracting new supporters on the other side. In this logic, it is no surprise that the larger terrorist groups have developed real marketing departments. Some of these departments employ real editorial bureaus. The activity played by these editorial bureaus translates into long lasting publications which are filled with information disseminated online and which can be accessed online from anywhere in the world, at just a single click's distance. There are many examples in this regard: the Al Qaeda group publishes *Inspire* and *Azan*, while ISIS, one of the most recent terror group, is spreading its ideology and plans through *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines.

Rumiyah is published online in an interesting geopolitical context. The period before 2016 was, for the Islamic State terrorist group, an extraordinary moment of territorial expansion and impetus. Meanwhile, the international coalitions were able to successfully repossess many of these territories and the group was defeated many times. One of the

⁶ Christine Schirrmacher, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁷ It is important to note that in this context we use the term *jihad* as a holy violent war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty and not as the struggle to make personal and social life conform with God's guidance.

⁸ Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

crossroads moments took place in October 2016 when the town of Dabiq with a major symbolism for the terror group, was freed from terrorists. N The has not only the name of another successful publishing project, but is also the name of the place where the crusaders and Allah's courageous troops were to meet for a last battle which would have ended, in their view, with the triumph of Islam. For the Islamic State, losing the control over Dabiq meant delaying the Islamic Armageddon they were imagining, thus *Dabiq* ended because it lost its legitimacy and thus the debut of a new terrorist publication, the *Rumiyah* magazine, started.

Therefore, the *Rumiyah*⁹ is replacing and continuation the *Dabiq* publication. This is published by the Al Hayat Center and is available online since the end of the year 2016. It can be read in more languages: English, French, German, and Russian or, even, Indonesian¹⁰.

The 13 issues of *Rumiyah* magazine popularize the idea of the Caliphate and the main teachings of Salafist Islam, as well as the organizational structure of the Islamic State. The purpose is, without a doubt, a propagandistic one. The magazine functions as a tool for Islamic radicalization and attracting new followers.

3. The women in *Rumiyah*

The pages of the magazine are mostly dedicated to religious propaganda with the stated purpose of attracting new soldiers in Allah's „army”. The sections of the magazine show the successes recorded by the group, martyrs who die for the objectives proposed and administrative issues related to the group. Unlike the *Dabiq* magazine, predecessor of the *Rumiyah* magazine, the issue of women is often discussed. Almost each issue (beside number 2) debates aspects related to the role played by women in the Islamic State. Beginning with issue number 5, section *Sisters*, it becomes a constant and it is found in all the 13 numbers of the publication.

The article “O, women, give charity!” (*Rumiyah*, Issue 1) shows the woman as a negative element in the family's life. She is portrayed as being wasteful: “*When we reflect over the condition of some of the women today, we notice them spending extravagantly on transient worldly things of clothing, jewelry, feasts, and so forth. All the while, we see them being miserly and stingy when it comes to the religion of Allah*”¹¹. They are not seen as the Mujahidin's' reliable partners “*It is known that women – other than those whom Allah protects, and they are very few – often engage in nonsense, showing ingratitude towards their husbands, backbiting, and other grave sins*”¹². They are urged to give up luxury life and useless expenses and to direct the money toward the fight carried out by the soldiers in the name of Allah.

Sometimes, they are seen as a burden for their husbands: “The one who ponders on the situation of some women today will see from them an excessive indulgence in luxury and aspiration for this debased worldly life. ... And they often push him (man, a.n.¹³) to taking advances and loans, such that they harm his reputation among other men and he becomes

⁹ The name of the publication refers to the city of Rome, the place where the jihadi fighters will rest after they have conquered the world. Rome is a location with a special meaning, desired, throughout history, by the Muslim empires, a place of reference for Christianity (especially for Catholics) and a symbol for Western civilization. This time Rome is seen as the place where the last meeting between Islamic fighters and their enemies will take place.

¹⁰ Ghosh Torsha, Pooja Basnette, „Analysis of *Rumiyah* Magazine”, in *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 2017, p. 16.

¹¹ ***, “The woman is a shepherd in her husband's home and responsible for their flock”, in *Rumiyah*, Issue 9, 1439, p. 18.

¹² ***, “O women give charity!”, in *Rumiyah*, Issue 1, p. 1.

¹³ A.N. – author's note.

distressed by asking others for so much help”¹⁴. She is urged to transform herself in a support for her husband: “This duty is even greater among the wives, mothers, and sisters of the mujahidin, that they might support them in their homes, protecting them from the irjaf of the scaremongers and the speech of the munafiqin. So they should only speak to them in ways that will make them more steadfast and strengthen their hearts”¹⁵.

In the 11th issue of the magazine, the call is reiterated, and the role of the woman is clear: that of a partner and a supporter. She is responsible for the atmosphere in the house and the needs of the mujahedin: “Be as those women who knew their role and fulfilled them, for being supportive of your mujahidin husband is one of your key roles in the land of jihad, my dear sister, and the importance of it cannot be overemphasized”¹⁶.

The woman plays an important role in the life of the Islamic State’s society. She is capable to bring to the world the future soldiers of the Caliphate. “Praise herself to increasing the Ummah in lions and preparing them, making a den for them out of her house, wherein she nourishes them with tawhid and wala and bara, until she opens the den’s door for them, after their hearts have become severe against the disbelievers and merciful to one another” (Al-Fath 29), and “humble to the believers, mighty against the disbelievers, waging jihad for Allah’s cause and not fearing the blame of any blamer” (*Al-Maidah* 54) Thus they are the ones who raise children and form them as fighters. This is their jihad; this is the biggest contribution they bring to the war against the unbelievers. The publishers of the magazine consider this aspect has been understood in the Western world by the enemies who intensely promote contraceptive methods. “As for the policy of birth control, it is a disease that was injected into our fertile Ummah by the enemy in order to decrease the Muslim population and weaken its strength”¹⁷. Women are urged to not use them, to continue to procreate because “By increasing the number of Muslims, kuffar is terrified and the religion further triumphs”¹⁸.

The women’s responsibility goes beyond bringing children to the world. The article “The woman is a shepherd in her husbands’ home – and responsible for her flock” (*Rumiyah-Issue* 9), clearly describes and explains a woman’s responsibilities. They must take care of educating their children, of teaching them that there is no God but Allah, to raise them in the spirit of the fight for Allah’s cause. Their children must love the soldiers of the Islamic State and wish to join them but, also, show interest for the Arabic language. With other words, the mothers are the ones who communicate the love for the group’s principles and the first educators of the soldiers who, in their vision, will conquer the world.

Women are able, with their husbands’ permission, to leave their homes and join the military operations. Unfortunately, we did not find any reference about this in the 13 issued of the magazine. We don’t know if they are taking part in the battle because none of the publication ever discuss their stories.

Other aspects related to their behavior refer to the way in which they relate between themselves: “Yes, there is nothing wrong with Muslim women visiting each other, nor with keeping families ties, and nor with her going to the market. However, nothing should be done in excess. Going out should be occasional in comparison to the default rule, which is that she stays at home. The believing woman in her own room is the closest she can be to her Lord in this life,”¹⁹. Even though friendships are encouraged, the woman’s place is near her husband: “A woman is always in need of a husband who will look after her and tend to her affairs, and

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

¹⁵ ***, “Be a supporter not a demoralizer”, in *Rumiyah*, Issue 10, p. 19.

¹⁶ ***, “Our journey to Allah”, in *Rumiyah*, Issue 11, p. 16.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ ***, “Abide in your homes”, in *Rumiyah*, Issue 3, p. 41.

any woman who says otherwise is opposing the fitrah upon which Allah created her. No one around her can fill the place of a husband, neither her father, nor her brother, nor the closest of her relatives!"²⁰.

Even though sometimes she is presented in a negative light, the terrorist publication places the woman in a special place within the group. She is the support for the soldier and the mother for the future soldiers. "Every one of you is a shepherd and every one of you is responsible for his flock. The man is a shepherd over his family and is responsible for his flock, the woman is a shepherd in her husband's home and is responsible for her flock, and the servant is a shepherd over his master's wealth and is responsible for his flock" (Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim)²¹.

One last hypothesis the woman has in the pages of *Rumiyah* magazine is that of the victim of enemy attacks. Women killed by enemies are often invoked to catalyze the mujahedeen's struggle against unbelievers.

Also, important to note is that the magazine's illustration leaves the female character aside. The abundant images with which the magazine is printed surpass exclusive male characters, children (boys) and the destruction that the Islamic State leaves in its hatred.

CONCLUSIONS

In the Islamic society the woman is considered inferior to the man. The roles she must assume are those of loving wife and caring mother. They are responsible for providing their husbands with the necessary peace and support. Also, they give birth to children and educate them in the Islamic tradition. Men have powers over them and their role in the social life is almost non-existent.

The terrorist publication *Rumiyah* presents the woman as she is perceived in Islamic society: humble and useful from the perspective of procreation.

Women are considered an important part of the fight carried out by the Islamic State against the unbelievers. They are the ones giving birth and raising the future soldiers of the Caliphate and they are the ones responsible for the home.

The status of the widow is allowed but she is encouraged to remarry in order to bring to the world as many children as possible to be Jihad's fighters.

Women are able, with their husbands' permission, leave their homes and join the military operations but the magazine doesn't present any situation when a woman decides to join the fight. Clear rules of conduit are established, which must be followed by the women who chose this path: they must establish a nice climate at home for their tired and brave soldiers, they are not allowed to be greedy and to ask for jewelry or to be a burden for their husbands. They must create friendships with other women always keeping in mind that their family is more important than anything in this world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 4, "Rabi' al Awwal 1438", December 2016.
2. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 1, "Dhul-Hijjah 1437", September 2016.
3. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 10, "The rule on Ghanimate, Fay and Ihtitab, Shawwal 1438", June 2017.

²⁰ ***, "Marrying widows is an established Sunnah", in *Rumiyah*, Issue 4, p. 32.

²¹ ***, "The woman is a shepherd in her husband's home and responsible for their flock", in *Rumiyah*, Issue 9, 1439, p. 18.

4. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 11, “It will be a fire that burns the cross and its people in Raqqa, Dhul-Qa dah 1438”, July 2017.
5. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 2, “Muharram 1438”, October 2016.
6. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 3, “Safar1438”, November 2016.
7. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 5, “Rabi` al Akhir 1438”, January 2017.
8. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 6, “Jumada Al Ula 1438”, February 2017.
9. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 7, “Rajab 1438”, March 2017.
10. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 8, “Sha`ban 1438”, April 2017.
11. ***, *Rumiyah*, Issue 9, “The Jihad in East Asia, Ramadan 1438”, May 2017.
12. BARLAS, Asma, *Believing women in Islam. Unreading Patriarchal interpretations of the Quran*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2002.
13. GHOSH, Torsha; POOJA, Basnette, „Analysis of Rumiyah Magazine”, in *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Volume 22, Issue 7, Ver. 12, July 2017.
14. RUSTUM SHEHADEH, Lamia, *The idea of women under fundamentalist Islam*, Florida University Press, 2003.
15. SCHIRRMACHER, Christine, “Islam and society – Women in Islam”, *The WEA Global Issues Series*, vol. 4, Bonn, 2008.
16. WADUD, Amina, *Inside gender Jihad. Women’s reform in Islam*, Oneworld Publication, 2006.

DIGITAL DIASPORA. VIRTUALIZATION OF POLITICS AND NEW HYBRID CHALLENGES IN NOWADAYS ROMANIA

Iulia ANGHEL, Ph.D.

Lecturer, Faculty of Communication Sciences, Ecological University of Bucharest
E-mail: iulia.anghel@ueb.ro

Abstract: *Starting with de-territorialisation of power and going one step further to the ascent of non-state political actors, the influential duo of digitalisation and globalization reshaped in a capital manner the geopolitical landscape of Eastern Europe. Since social media proved to be an essential tool of hybrid warfare, diasporic communities playing often the role of an interface amid local and transnational identities, the article aims to discuss the consequences triggered upon regional politics by ascent of digital diasporas, addressing topics as diasporization of homelands and autonomization of diasporic bodies, effects exerted by diaspora's political militantism upon changing societies of former communist space and not lastly the hybrid challenges associate to virtualization of politics and ascent of non-state power groups. The last section encompasses a study case dedicated to the Romanian scenario, whereto the rise of digital diaspora influenced in a capital manner the configuration, prospects of evolution and democracy engagement of local politics.*

Keywords: *Romanian diaspora; digital diaspora; virtual politics; hybrid challenges; geopolitical challenges; modernization.*

INTRODUCTION

The changing nature of communication, nation-states and politics

The term of diaspora has regained prominence in the last decades, as a part of a complex phenomenon involving multiplication of modernity¹ and democracy versions, globalization of identities and not lastly the decline of nation-states monopolies upon international affairs. The unprecedented "porosity of the borders", generated by intense circulation of individuals, goods, ideas and cultural products, resulted also in a renegotiations of the relations between politics and culture, territorialized states and de-territorialized power actors². In the same time, the rediscovery of diaspora(s) political, civic and cultural accountability raised complex questions upon the role of overseas communities in shaping security and democracy equilibriums, mainly as regards the disputed geopolitical realm of Eastern Europe. In this context, diaspora communities started to play the role of triggering vectors of civic renewal or, on the contrary, began to act as catalysts for autocratization and democracy erosion in the area. The "third wave of autocratization" which severely affected democratization and liberal consolidation prospects of several regions across the globe, was also potentiated by phenomena as media and civil society manipulation, toxic polarization and digital spread of disinformation³. In many cases, government manipulation of media outlets, civil society, rule of law or elections significantly diminish the freedom of expression and the discursive space of civic bodies, including refugees or asylum diaspora. Moreover, toxic polarization of the public gave rise to major cultural and identity cleavages. Giving the fact that one of the most influential fault lines revealed by

¹ Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Multiple Modernities*, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 7.

² Roger Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora", in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2005, p. 8.

³ ***, *Democracy Facing Global Challenges*, V-dem Annual Democracy Report, V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, 2019, p. 4.

democracy's recent crisis concerns the fracture amid national conservative agendas and globalized and western oriented civic discourses, the very relations amid homelands and diaspora could become the subject of tensional inquiries.

A meaningful sample upon this tendency it is offered by Hungary's democratic erosion, whereto the antagonism amid nationalist radicalization and western inspired civic resistance gave birth to a culture of contestation, highlighting the role of youth diaspora and sanctifying the theory of a digital egalitarian public sphere⁴. Neither Bulgaria nor considerably more democratic evolved Romania, did not escape the turmoil of civic reactions, started and conducted by mobilizing, western-based diaspora. The Ukrainian story proves to be once again a special case, influenced by the presence of two antinomial equations of diasporic communities, one as well as the other built on digital agendas. Russian ethno-cultural diaspora, labelled initially as incipient⁵, dormant community, rediscovered alternative post-soviet identities as a reaction to Euromaidan political uncertainty, while further radicalization will be connected to the Russian military and propaganda involvement. It remains important to mention that recovery of Russia's cultural *ecumene* under flag of pan-Slavism was directly related to the increasing westernization of the counterpart digital space. Even if the roots of modern Ukrainian national identities can be traced in the 19th century⁶, contemporary translations of national resistance, seen as a western inspired civic effervesce, left influential marks upon country's struggles towards democratization. The initial successful resolution of Orange Revolution possible through the use of digital networked technologies by pro-democracy organizers⁷, but their dominance upon internet driven communities was ephemeral. Recapture of digital playground by separatist forces under the formula of a sophisticated hybrid conflict, demonstrated hereby the ambivalence of the internet culture and the nativist and authoritarian propensity of some of the diasporic entities.

As an intermediary conclusion, since the digitalization enables the spread of disinformation, diaspora ascendant upon domestic and foreign politics was often labelled as defiant to the national interest, fostering new identity and community fractures. The myriad of traditional agendas flourished in many countries of former Soviet Bloc, as a counter-reaction in front of social-media inspired civic movements, proving therefore once again the rising tide amid the classical, border limited political communities and the de-territorialized diasporic entities.

In the late 90th many scholars were investigating the chances of complex power actors as Russia, to transform into classic nation-states⁸. The research interest was motivated by the presence of a strong cultural heritage, which maintained the fluidity of borders and the persistence of very interesting cases of diasporic enclaves. It was beyond any doubt a time of nations power architecture, aiming to surpass the geopolitical fractures inherited from Cold War era. In spite of all this pacifying picture, the early 2000 disclosed a geopolitical picture placed under influence of two key phenomena: the fragmentation of nation-states identities and proliferation of a nexus of diasporic communities.

Nowadays, more than ever, the tensional axes which segregates the globalization projects from "glocal" reactions, dividing also the national identities from various diasporic and alternative communities, call for reflection. Following Benedict Anderson influential quote due

⁴ Anna Everett, *Digital Diaspora: A Race for Cyberspace*, Suny Press, New York, 2009, p. 23.

⁵ Ivan D. Loshkariov, Andrey Sushentsov, "Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from 'accidental' diaspora to rebel movement", in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Volume 16, Number 1, January 2016, p. 71.

⁶ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Richards Sawka (Eds.), *Ukraine and Russia People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, E-International Relations, Bristol 2015, p. 57.

⁷ Joshua Goldstein, "The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution", in *Berkman Center Research Publication* No. 14, 2007, p. 5.

⁸ Geoffrey Hosking, "Can Russia become a nation-state?", in *Nations and Nationalism* 4 (4), 1998, p. 449.

to a “nation represents an imagined community”⁹, de-territorialization and virtualization of politics may change the very constitutive clauses and functions of diasporic entities. Recent changes supervened within the nature of nation-states and ascent of non-state hegemony may conduct also to a provocative hypothesis. Not only that nations remain dependent by their cultural, representational and imagined identities, but also the communication revolutions started by digitalization may enable the diasporic entities to play the contender role. The nation states become slowly rhetorical arenas within the bounds of multiple imagined communities live, often challenging the monopolies of the states in critical topics as political action, use of legitimate violence or international affairs and security pacts¹⁰. The diasporization of nations and the re-nationalization of diaspora may constitute two synergic moves, grafted on the digital revolution heritage. The socialization role of the communication cultures may be used thus to reinforce connections of some nations with their historical or political diasporas, while for other governments the Internet era divulged the resilience of major internal fractures. Smart mobs¹¹ and netwars do not represent intrinsically new phenomena, but their intersections with digital diaspora reveal new geopolitical challenges. Hybrid became a puzzle word of contemporary debates on security and politics in the same time span in which digitalization and virtualization of politics reached the zenith point of their popularity. Moreover diffusion of technology, made available for heterogeneous publics, fostered new snapshots of modernity, the very nature of peace and conflict becoming increasingly blurred¹².

In the light of these considerations, further sections aim to discuss the correlations raised by growing domestic and transnational influence of diasporic communities and the panoply of hybrid threats promoted by this major change within the substance, borders and accountability of nation-based security systems. A more detailed look on the Romanian case it is perhaps motivated by the presence of a well-defined and vivid digital diaspora, which in not long ago proved its compelling force in restyling both nation and politics.

1. The rise of Digital Diaspora. Mapping the effects of virtual politics

Paradigmatic examples of diaspora structures were defined by a set of critical criteria, including the dispersion in space, the orientation to a homeland, and the boundary maintenance¹³. Seen as ethnic communities divided by states frontiers or reduced to the sharp definition of people living outside their homeland¹⁴, diaspora entities were framed primarily as minority groups. Following this perspective, the criteria of homeland orientation, due to the origin country exerted the function of an authoritative identity and loyalty model, acted as a unifying argument. Traditional diaspora communities tended to import their identities and representations from their native culture, while they manage to conserve the principle of border-maintenance. Thus, the preservation of a distinctive image within host societies played an essential role in maintaining the diaspora availability in acting as a transnational community. Yet, contemporary semantics of diaspora seldom respects all the three conditions mentioned above. Proliferation of diasporic communities under influence of both digitalization and globalization fostered countless hybrid versions, the intersections amid youth diaspora, cultural

⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, London, 2006, p. 7.

¹⁰ Elena Banciu, Ana Birtalan, Iulia Anghel, “Mediatization of Romanian and French politics: Reshaping electoral discourses and cultural legacies in the age of digital crowds”, in: Mihaela Alexandra Tudor, Ștefan Bratosin (Eds.), *Believe in Technology: Mediatization of the future of Mediatization*, Editions IARSIC et ESSACHES, Les Arcs, France, 2018, p. 291.

¹¹ Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs. The next social revolution*, Basic Books, New York, 2002, p. 164.

¹² Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century. The rise of hybrid wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Virginia, 2007, p. 12.

¹³ Roger Brubaker, „The ‘diaspora’ diaspora”, in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2005, p. 5.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

diaspora or militant and political diaspora generating new peculiar meanings. Consequently, the growing distances amid dispersed diaspora and committed diaspora¹⁵, created new divides, materialized in multiple and sometimes conflictual diasporic projects.

Digitalization contributed furthermore to the diversification of the diaspora hypostases, transforming the bounded group model, which revolved around ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural entities, into a collection of diasporic stances¹⁶. Starting from youthful digital diaspora that militates for civic democracy and community engagement from abroad, going one step further to the Eastern European economic migrants, portrayed sometimes as middling transnationals¹⁷ and ending with immersive diaspora, activated only by temporary political or cultural vectors, the twin forces of mass migration and media communication¹⁸ offered the grounds for new alternative community and identity formation. In this manner, the orientation towards the homeland clause was shadowed by ascending the globalist agenda, replacing gradually the referential function of the native culture. The border maintenance stipulation lost its compelling force while individuals started to appertain simultaneously to different groups, as the dispersion in space condition became obsolete once the Internet offered new de-territorialized association experiences.

Still, the internet culture was affecting in the same fashion the identity clauses of nation states, new definition attempts which concerned the digitalization of diaspora highlighting the complex and multivalent nature of cyberspace communities. In this context, the virtual diaspora circumscribes the „use of cyberspace by immigrants (...) for the purpose of participating or engaging in online interactional transactions.”¹⁹ Even if the virtual interactions can reunite members of the same foreign country or different host territories, virtual diaspora should be perceived as cyber-expansions of real diasporic communities²⁰. Michael S. Laguerre contribution in conceptualization of interactions amid information technology and diasporic communities presumed the presence of other three critical conditions, in order for a digital diaspora to emerge. Those terms were the immigration, the information technology connectivity and networking behaviour. Immigration it is considered necessary to create the diasporic status of individuals and groups, while the networking and connectivity requirements enable the diaspora communities to „to express and perform” their digital identities²¹. However, taking into account that digital diaspora participates in virtual networks in order to achieve a variety of political, economic and political purposes, which may concerns their homelands, their host lands or both, the autonomy and teleological nature of communities living outside their nation’s borders seems to change²².

The classical diasporic entities were placed under direct influence of homelands, their political, cultural or civic agendas remaining essentially subordinated to their native states. Thence the conditions of segregation and border maintenance within the bounds of their host societies, enunciated by classical definitions, were assured by this unidirectional and privileged relation with origin countries. Yet, the acting roles of diaspora communities in these latter days tend to become more and more dynamic. Youth civic activists marching in East European

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

¹⁷ Violetta Parutis, “Economic Migrants” or “Middling Transnationals”? East European Migrants’ Experiences of Work in the UK’, in *International Migration*, no. 1 [52]/2014, p. 36

¹⁸ Koen Leurs, Sandra Ponzanesi, “Mediated Crossroads: Youthful Digital Diasporas”, in *M/C Journal*, 2014, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 1.

¹⁹ Andoni Alonso, Pedro Oiarzabal, *Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, Politics, and Community*, University of Nevada Press, Nevada, 2010, p. 63.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 65

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 65.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 65.

capitals are more certain to find a common language with some of the diaspora members, than with citizens of their national community. This may be the sign of an alienation tendency that may reiterate the conditions of stratification and elite segregation of the pre-modern states. The lack of shared communication channels, common projects and political congruence created parallel societies. Somehow the cleavages and fragmentation of the pre-national European context reopened, the invented traditions²³ of homelands declining in favour of new symbolic narratives. While Internet became the medium of a new *lingua franca*, transforming markets and societies in conversational patterns, the borders seclude from now, not only national territories but also strong inland societal and civilizational divides.

It remains important to underline that digital diaspora may experience different incarnations, motivated by their missions, structure or domestic context. Their potential contribution to home and host lands development may include knowledge transfer, policy influence and civic participation²⁴, but diaspora can also contribute to the degradation of local and global security environments. The diaspora communities' abilities in accelerating regime changes, democratic inversions, fostering also internal instability and aggravating the social and representational cleavages, are confirmed by a quick look on recent European turn of events.

The second generation of civic activism which occurred after 2013 and apparently moved the Eastern Europe towards an awakening of the civil society, unique after the ephemeral effervescence of the early '90s, was followed by the rise of a new populist wave. Digital diaspora acted as catalyst for both phenomena. The youth environmentalist and reformist agendas echoed in the streets during the 2013 civic symptomatology and brought together dispersed national quests, the mimetic translation of similar political claims incriminating sometimes foreign influences²⁵. Starting with Romanian casuistry of eco-inspired grassroots movement, built around Rosia Montana topic, and transformed into a long-term anti-corruption protest, and going one step further with well-known casuistry of Hungary and Poland political activism of youth, the mobilizing function of diaspora was perceptible in at least two critical levels.

First, the digitalization enhanced in these late transitional grounds the political and cultural divides amid the centres and the marginal spaces, the reformist messages circulated through social media forging new concepts as *Facebook generation*, *on-line civil societies*, *networking democracy* or *digital politics*²⁶. In Romania, for example, fragmentation and re-coagulation of political space was considered during the prodromal stages of *Facebook generation*, as a positive rediscovery of new symbolic ties, reaffirming an elementary solidarity, of individuals sharing same basic and yet iconic values: direct participation, community celebration or individual interest in context of collective responsibility. Yet later developments of these new tribal politics, revealed scattered groups' appetency towards religious intolerance, symbolic violence²⁷, and even domestic terrorism related acts. *Facebook generation* sinuously political engagement was potentiated by extreme fluidity of the identity projects, constantly

²³ Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger (Eds.), *The invention of tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 263.

²⁴ Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, *Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 8.

²⁵ The new conspiracy theories blossomed subsequent to activation of recent civic movements across the globe had followed heterogeneous arguments, for East European context the most influential themes remaining the "foreign funding" of protests and the anti-national agendas promoted by multinational companies. Ana Adi (Ed.), *#Romania's 2017 Anti-Corruption Protests: Causes, Development and Implications*, Quadriga University of Applied Sciences, Berlin 2017, p.74.

²⁶ Sandu Frunză, "A Mythic-Symbolic Perspective on Politics", in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, vol. 14, issue 40, Spring 2015, p. 245

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 245.

reshaped under pressure of different political claims and also by its ideological hybridity. Lacking a consistent dogma, digital communities became available for a complex panoply of mobilization vectors, including malign non-state bodies, challenging the rules of traditional politics through instrumentally of new social media mobs.

Undoubtedly, it was the case of a strong segregationist project, detaching the urban modern political cultures, from yet traditional, nation oriented marginal spaces. Diaspora and digital activism often made a plea in favour of globalist versions of democratic development, including dissolution of borders, genesis of post-national identities and enhancement of generational and technological credos. Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, Hungary's Momentum Party recently improving country's diagnosis upon democracy's backsliding, or Save Romania Union are only some of the new social-media driven political actors, redrawing Europe's electoral picture. At the same time, growing popularity of anti-establishment actors, supporting civil rights, *e-democracy* and end of traditional politics, doubled by restless activism of grassroots, mushrooming frequently evanescent political vehicles, promoted a deceitful image of a liberal European atmosphere. Yet, the enclavisation paradox of digitalisation will be revealed once as populism claimed its share from new shaped virtual politics.

It is considered that populism has emerged as a dominant trend in Europe since 2014²⁸, but the causes which tear apart the new activist generations are for certain rooted in more distant times. Decline of cohesion on national, regional and European levels seems to prove that the major drive for this inversion of democracy originates in a paradoxical turn of both mediatisation and virtualization of politics and public affairs²⁹. The rhetorical revelation offered by social media participatory discourses, reshaping the interactions among leaders and groups, reduced the costs of political participation and allowed populist and nativist political parties to take the floor. Simultaneously, the less regulated Internet activism opened new paths for association, communication and public engagement for radical voters, digitalisation generating a late reunification of previously disconnected social clusters. Nevertheless, ascension and decay of projects as Poland's Law and Justice Populist Party, Italy's Five Star Movement or Viktor Orban's already famous Fidesz will remain linked by their capacity to promote digitally attractive nativist and conservative agendas. It has been sad that Russia served as role model for the rediscovery of ethno-centric and populist discourses in Europe³⁰, but the Russian case may be perceived rather as a more in-depth expression of the new connections created amid religious and national imaginary, political uncertainty and ascent of alternative, hegemonic community models.

Directly related to this insight, the second class of effects disclosed by digitalization may refer to maturation and mobilisation of secondary digital communities, which gradually will outperform the first generation of progressionist diasporic entities. The intellectual and civic based diaspora, migrating in Western Europe from the East, for studying or working abroad, will lose the monopoly of digital discourse, along with the second wave of digitalization. The 2014 landmark disclosed thus the presence of a shadowed diaspora, based on economic migrants leaving their suburban and rural native cultures and emerging into temporary diasporic enclaves. The popularization of Internet and the increasing digital literacy of individuals and groups previously expelled from the virtual arenas will bring an adjourned mobilization process. While the new diasporic identities flourishing among working migrants

²⁸ Ronald J. Pohoryles, "How to cope with the rise of populism in Europe", in *Journal Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 32, Issue 2, 2019, p. 165.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

³⁰ Punsara Amarasinghe, Eshan Jayawardne, "The Rise of Populism in Europe Ahead of the EU Elections", BESA Center for Strategic Studies, 30 January 2019, URL: <https://besacenter.org/author/eshan-jayawardne/#.XYuaOkYzBIU>, accessed September 15, 2019.

began to be spread into the new media, occupying the front line of social networks, micro blogs, video platforms and instant communication technologies, the new configurations of European politics discreetly changed. Digitalization and virtualization of politics, made available new communication and actions means for less active audiences, which now found the opportunity to express their involvement within new public sphere. At the same time, popularization of digital participation coexisted with rise of populism by intervention of two other subsidiary factors. In the first place, the modernity divide conserved amid the peripheral space of former communist societies and their urban epicentres was concealed for decades by the unidirectional model of mass-media communication. Missing a genuine *Green Up Rising*³¹ of the rural peripheries, numerous East European societies were experiencing in the late 2010 the disruptive effects of both modernization and political mobilization of silent electoral fields.

The changing architecture of virtual politics, within the bounds of individuals can associate, communicate or built action pacts without the mediation of classical institutions and regulations, it has reopened the rites of succession of former nationalistic and authoritarian agendas, fallen into oblivion during transition years. The second layer of diasporic bodies, colligating individuals attracted by personalist agendas and conserving strong providential expectations, acted as mobilization tool for latent publics, who remained in the homelands. Many East European nation-states have encompassed since 2010 with presence of more and more de-territorialized electoral fields, the working diaspora fragmentary migration rising new questions upon already complicated topics as sovereignty, citizenship, national identity and viability of European project as a whole. The working migrants from Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and other distant European countries became the basis for a secondary political revolution. Their availability in using the new social media structures for promoting new political quests, mostly recovered from pre-modern or post-communist nationalist legacy, conducted to creation of new transnational solidarities. All this complicated subsurface process fostered the fragmentation and enclavisation of national politics. The working diaspora preserved its bounds with their homeland political cultures, located within suburban and rural spaces, challenging thence the centres dominance upon public discourse. The reorientation of many formulas of domestic politics towards these new activated populist electoral fields was in the main justified by their entrance into the new communication frames and by their new discovered tranzactionist potential. The atomization of national political agendas and the birth of parallel experiences of communication, socialization and political participation may open so the debate upon of a further diasporization of inlands. Digital diaspora meet nowadays half-way, considering that the domestic political enclaves started to produce their own radical political partners, while the first generation of digital diasporic bodies continue to exert meaningful influences against homelands.

In this context, a critical query tends to detach. What are the key hybrid challenges designed by mediatisation, empowerment of virtual politics and diasporization of nations and concomitantly autonomization of diasporic players? The use of diaspora as forged public spheres, monopolizing the public and political debates, the malign employment of settings agenda in order to manipulate de public attention, and the empowerment of malign non-state actors, political parties, companies, networks or groups, through fake news or disinformation campaigns³² are only a few of the hybrid related topics of recent media and information consumption trends. In this context, last the section aims to discuss the interdependencies

³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, London, 1968, p. 72.

³² ***, Final report Facing Hybrid Threats through Consolidated Resilience and Enhanced StratCom, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), March 2019, URL: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Event%20Report%20-%20HRS.pdf>, accessed September 15, 2019.

created between virtualization, coagulation of new diasporic formulas and hybridity spectre in Romania's context, labelled as an ideographic case study for present influence and power of digitally immersive diaspora.

2. Romania's Digital Diaspora in the social media playground. Building the hybrid citadel

It is considered that more than 10 million of Romanians live abroad, within the borders of historical communities, or in new emerged diasporic bodies, mostly hosted by Western European countries, as a statement released by the minister for Romanians living outside the country in July 2019 confirms³³. Also the World Migration Report on 2018, issued by International Organization of Migration and The UN Migration Agency, points out that since 2016, Romania had the highest number of citizens living in diasporic groups in other European Union countries, colligating more than 3 million of temporary or settled immigrants³⁴. Giving the fact that emigration from Eastern European countries to Western Europe has remained a growing trend, media coverage on diasporic and migrants' communities involving peculiarly sensitive topics as national identity, culture or cohesiveness, addressing both host societies and homelands, it remains important to investigate the consequences of this major contemporary movement upon security, politics and democracy in the region.

Upraise of "circular migration patterns"³⁵ and the development of dual identity references due to individuals appertain simultaneously to different societies, bring into discussion the influence of transnational groups³⁶, combining mobility with yet high loyalty to their native land. The influence of de-territorialized publics, functioning in diasporic terms, was often incorporated in multiple logics of instrumentalisation, including the use of migration as a political and election theme, the argument of diaspora's identity reconstruction function or use of diaspora as democratic and civic prototype. Furthermore, in Romania's case, the very patterns of mediatisation and legitimation of diasporic identities³⁷ made the subject of multiple appropriation attempts, the political use of diaspora subject reaching a critical point in August 2018, when a large scale anti-corruption protest was organized in Bucharest under flag of multiple civic, diaspora-based groups. The protest, considered one of the most influential civic actions from post-communist years, was motivated by the interest of activists in preserving democratic values and independent institutions, especially the rule of law. The protest made international headlines, mostly due to the presence of an interesting convergence phenomena³⁸, the returning diaspora reuniting with homelands publics, in an apparently coherent societal project. Still, while the images of a national flag recreated with lights by protesters was still lingering in Romanians recollections upon civic turmoil of 2017, the following year protests offered new interrogations topics under pressure of more and more pessimistic European political atmosphere.

Despite the climate of political uncertainty and the undeniable anti-liberal drifts, Romania seemed to escape, at least for the moment, from authoritarian and radical scenarios

³³ Sorin Melenciuc, "Huge diaspora: Almost 10 million Romanians are living abroad", in *Bussines Review*, July 24, 2019, URL: <http://business-review.eu/business/huge-diaspora-almost-10-million-romanians-are-living-abroad-203482>, accessed September 15, 2019.

³⁴ ***, World Migration Report for 2018, Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2017, p. 72.

³⁵ Camelia Beciu *et alia*, *Diaspora in the Romanian Media and Political Sphere. From Event to the Social Construction of Public Issues, Research Report 2015*, p. 2, URL: <http://codipo.ro/dox/Raport%20engleza%202015.pdf>, accessed September 15, 2019.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

³⁸ Andra-Lucia Martinescu, Rares Burlacu, "Understanding the Romanian Diaspora", in *The Foreign Policy Centre*, URL: <https://fpc.org.uk/understanding-the-romanian-diaspora/>, accessed September 15, 2019.

which seize other parts of Europe. Yet, despite the moderated optimism that characterized the 2017-2018 civic effervescence, some questions tend to persist as regards the future developments and local democracy, trapped at the intersections of major political and communication revolutions. The Romanian diaspora came into prominence under auspice of virtualization and mediatisation of politics, its digital reflections remaining critical for its power action, especially after 2013 environmentalist awakening. The initial unity and coherent development of civic agendas, recalling for profound reformation of society and politics, fight against corruption and rule of law, was overpassed by multiple conflictual discourses. The initial claims circulated under hashtags as #unitedwesave, #rezist or more recently coined "zero tolerance for corruption", presidential strategy, the landscape of Romania's civic movements become more and more diverse. Between 2018 and 2019 some yet discrete populist shades employed by both traditional political parties along with new ideologically "thin" social-media political actors proves the change of turn within Romanian civil activism. Strong symbolic terms as "democracy", "solidarity", "justice" or almost forgotten post-communist credo of "liberty"³⁹ were used in rather manicheistic rhetoric, while the political functions of digital communities, including diaspora, became ambivalent. In this context, the evolution tendencies call for reflection. Did Romania passed the populism test, under tutelage of a vivid civic oriented Diaspora? May be considered the Diaspora as a true *Watchdog* of the democracy in the homeland? The civic diaspora, is it the only relevant Romanian diaspora? Are the digital diasporic stances, real reflections of living diasporas, or sometimes we may speak of forged public spheres? Not lastly, enclavisation phenomena triggered by ascent of virtual politics may determine the genesis of isolated, reactive digital communities? Digital crowds' soft-power can or should be regulated?

Taking into account the complex pictured sketched above, an important step in deciphering the effects of new emerged cyber crowds and smart mobs may imply a reconsideration of the nation-state security and institutional functions. All the more, for Romania's contemporary dynamic, where growing influence of virtual networks and grass-roots politics didn't revealed maybe its fully disruptive potential. The hybrid challenges and threats connected to social media dominated politics and empowerment of digital publics cover a range variety of topics, but recent scenarios have highlighted the prevalence of a few critical tolls: use of cyber troops for actions as group influencing and targeting, creation of fake news content and manipulation of public opinion⁴⁰. Giving the fact that valence defines the attractiveness or averseness of the message, the main cyber troop's actions are divided into three main categories: pro-government, positive and nationalist language or harassment and trolling approaches, aiming to silence the users who express dissenting positions⁴¹. However, the diasporic communities' dual nature, rotten simultaneously in virtual communion and multiple referential and identity triggers, may add some supplementary hybrid vulnerabilities as: radicalization and autonomization of dissident groups⁴², challenging state's authority or domestic affairs, the contagion of discontent and the assertion of majority illusion in social networks, and more increasingly the marginalization and delegitimation of alternative discourses or political and social projects. Even if traditional approaches upon hybrid

³⁹ D. Roventă-Frumușani, A. Stefanel, "Populism and New/Old Media: The 'Populist Turn' in Western and Emerging Postcommunist Democracies", in *International Conference 5th Estidia Conference, Hybrid Dialogues: Transcending binary thinking and moving away from societal polarizations*, eds. Emilio Amideo, Michele Bevilacqua, Antonio Fruttaldo, University of Naples L'Orientale, September 2019, p. 46.

⁴⁰ Samantha Bradshaw, Philip N. Howard, *Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation*, Working Paper 12, University of Oxford, 2017, p. 32.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 32.

⁴² Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Sascha-Dominik, "Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century's New Threats to Global Peace and Security", in *Scientia Militaria. South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2015, p. 83.

challenges arisen from growing power of social media tend to focus on the trending labels of trolls, bots, dark political campaigns or controlling of settings agenda, new hybrid vulnerabilities may derive from subsidiary background processes.

Weaponization⁴³ of social media may be grounded also on the fragmentation and atomization of the political cultures. In Romania's case, the epitome expression of modernization was offered by the digital mobilization of dormant political clusters, under the pressure of a new informational revolution. The civic enlightenment of the early 2010, giving the impression of a new created civil sphere, recovering the historical deficit of political awareness and participation of the transition, was followed by a silent segregation of newly discovered group identities. Romania's lack of democratic traditions and the everlasting affinity for providential leadership models was in the first stage concealed by civic diaspora's monopolies upon digital rhetoric. As a sample, during 2013 and 2014 pro-environmentalist movement gazed around Roşia Montana topic, the convergence of the various publics in supporting an ecological agenda was assured through instrumentality of nationalist reverberations. Exploiting a traditional semiotics, built around agrarian symbols, as the leaf-
logo of the movement instantly proves, the early Romanian activism abandoned its initial unity during subsequent electoral test. The traditional parties' interest in recovering the digital deficit, and the new populist assaults on social media responded to the rhetoric expectations of a second-generation of smart mobs. New digitally literate Romanian users were coming from peripheral and marginal cultures, previously shadowed by urban and civic oriented publics. The popularization of the social media and the virtualization of politics, embodied in decreasing ideological distinction and growing influence of leaders, led to a less optimistic picture upon vernacular democracy. The 2017 anti-corruption and 2018 anti-government social media mass protest encountered a more heterogeneous reaction on behalf of digital crowds, the counter response against European and reformist rhetoric being well-structured around nationalist, nativist and protectionist claims. The discrete ascent of populist approaches, even within communication strategies of well-established political actors demonstrates in Romania's case the true colours of its digital publics, this resettlement of the local political culture being strongly influenced by the action and power of diasporic groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Romania is nowadays a nation on the move, colligating more than 10 million of mobile citizens, the prospects of a major break into the values, representation and cohesion of its diasporic communities corresponding also to a fragmentation of its inland social pacts. Therefore the actions and increasing relevance of its secondary diaspora, grounded on working circular migrants, rediscovering sometimes the authoritarian nostalgia, may announce a silent nation-state crisis. Revisiting the classical definition of hybrid threats, it becomes clear that hybrid conflicts are more than a variety of warfare amid states and non-states actors. Hybrid conflicts and by extension, hybrid threats are beyond all multi-modal activities, that intend to address the psychological and the physical dimensions of the manifest or latent conflicts⁴⁴. In recent times, the relevance of digital propaganda in dissemination of legitimacy or identity narratives had overpassed in some specific contexts other equations of hybrid conflicts, the pivotal role of social media networks in building consensus transforming the digital sphere into a new battle place. If before the advent of social media, the traditional media had the duty to act as gate keeper, advancing certain topics and shaping the public debate, this function is no

⁴³ Thomas ElkjerNissen, *#TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia, @Characteristics of Contemporary Conflicts*, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, 2015.

⁴⁴ Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges", in *JFQ* / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009, p. 4.

longer exclusive⁴⁵. Actors and groups who would never had the chance to voice their opinions, such as minorities, radical groups or extremists, can reach now wide audiences and thus magnify their capabilities⁴⁶. In Romania's case, the list could be enriched by participation of populist groups, radical religious communities, ethnic minorities or growing platforms of nationalist militants. It becomes clear that empowerment of these independent communities, diasporic entities or domestic enclaves, could make them available to non-state malign actors or regional or global hegemon. Thus the new hybrid challenges associated to social media use and virtualization of politics, could reflect in Romania's case and not only, the fragmentation of the collective identities and nourished parallel societal structures. Virtual Diasporas may be considered as new frontiers of national security due to their power to develop strategic alliances with the grassroots, allowing them to apply global pressure upon their homelands or host lands⁴⁷. Extending Michel S. Laguerre ground-breaking observation, new emerged virtual groups, imitating sometimes the containment and segregation clause of the genuine diasporas, may act as mobilization vectors in the homelands, hybrid conflicts reuniting from now on not only classical non-state actors as economic networks, political lobbies and security blocs, but also a myriad of new and highly volatile digital players.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, *Democracy Facing Global Challenges*, V-Dem Annual Democracy Report, V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, 2019.
2. ***, *Final report Facing Hybrid Threats through Consolidated Resilience and Enhanced StratCom*, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), March 2019.
3. ***, *World Migration Report for 2018*, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 2017.
4. ADI, Ana (Ed.), *#Romania's 2017 Anti-Corruption Protests: Causes, Development and Implications*, Berlin: Quadriga University of Applied Sciences, 2017.
5. ANDERSON, Benedict, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, London, 2006.
6. ANDONI, Alonso; OIARZABAL, Pedro, *Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, Politics, and Community*, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 2010.
7. BACHMANN, Sascha-Dominik; GUNNERIUSSON, Håkan, "Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century's New Threats to Global Peace and Security", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol 43, No. 1, 2015.
8. BANCIU, Elena; BIRTALAN, Ana; ANGHEL, Iulia, "Mediatization of Romanian and French politics: Reshaping electoral discourses and cultural legacies in the age of digital crowds", eds. Mihaela Alexandra Tudor, Ștefan Bratosin, *Believe in Technology: Mediatization of the future of Mediatization*, Editions IARSIC et ESSACHES, Les Arcs, France, 2018.

⁴⁵ Sanda Svetoka, *Social Media as a toll of Hybrid Warfare*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, 2016, p. 6

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

⁴⁷ Michel S. Laguerre, "Virtual Diasporas: A New Frontier of National Security", in *Virtual Diasporas and global problem solving project papers*, Nautilus Institute, 2002, URL: <http://oldsite.nautilus.org/gps/virtual-diasporas/paper/Laguerre.html>, accessed September 28, 2019.

9. BECIU, Camelia; MĂDROANE, Irina Diana; CIOCEA, Mălina; CÂRLAN, Alexandru I., *Diaspora in the Romanian Media and Political Sphere. From Event to the Social Construction of Public Issues, Research Report 2015.*
10. BRADSHAW, Samantha; HOWARD, Philip N., *Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation*, Working Paper 12, University of Oxford, 2017.
11. BRINKERHOFF, Jennifer M., *Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement*, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
12. BRUBAKER, Roger, „The 'diaspora' diaspora”, in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2005.
13. EISENSTADT, Shmuel N., *Multiple Modernities*, Routledge, New York, 2007.
14. EVERETT, Anna, *Digital Diaspora: A Race for Cyberspace*, Suny Press, New York, 2009.
15. FRUNZĂ, Sandu, “A Mythic-Symbolic Perspective on Politics”, in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, vol. 14, issue 40, Spring 2015.
16. GOLDSTEIN, Joshua, “The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution”, in *Berkman Center Research Publication* No. 14, 2007.
17. HOBSBAWM, Eric; TERENCE, Ranger (Eds.), *The invention of tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
18. HOFFMAN, Frank G., “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges”, in *JFQ* / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009.
19. HOFFMAN, Frank, *Conflict in the 21st Century. The rise of hybrid wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Virginia, 2007.
20. HOSKING, Geoffrey, “Can Russia become a nation-state?”, in *Nations and Nationalism* 4 (4), 1998.
21. HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, London, 1968.
22. LAGUERRE, S.; S., Michel, “Virtual Diasporas: A New Frontier of National Security”, in *Virtual Diasporas and global problem solving project papers*, Nautilus Institute, 2002.
23. LEURS, Koen; PONZANESI, Sandra, “Mediated Crossroads: Youthful Digital Diasporas”, in *M/C Journal*, 2014, Vol. 14, No. 2.
24. LOSHKARIOV, Ivan D.; SUSHENTSOV, Andrey, “Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from ‘accidental’ diaspora to rebel movement”, in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Volume 16, Number 1, January 2016.
25. MARTINESCU, Andra-Lucia; BURLACU, Rares, “Understanding the Romanian Diaspora”, in *The Foreign Policy Centre*.
26. MELENCIUC, Sorin, “Huge diaspora: Almost 10 million Romanians are living abroad”, in *Business Review*, July 24, 2019.
27. NISSEN, Thomas Elkjer, *#The Weaponization Of Social Media. @Characteristics of Contemporary Conflicts*, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, 2015.
28. PARUTIS, Violetta, “Economic Migrants” or “Middling Transnationals”? East European Migrants’ Experiences of Work in the UK.’, in *International Migration*, 2014, 52 (1).
29. PIKULICKA-WILCZEWSKA, Agnieszka; SAWKA, Richards (Eds.), *Ukraine and Russia People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, E-International Relations, Bristol, 2015.
30. POHORYLES, Ronald J., “How to cope with the rise of populism in Europe”, in *Journal Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 32, Issue 2, 2019.
31. PUNSARA, Amarasinghe; JAYAWARDNE, Eshan, “The Rise of Populism in Europe Ahead of the EU Elections”, in *BESA Center for Strategic Studies*, 30 January 2019.
32. RHEINGOLD, Howard, *Smart Mobs. The next social revolution*, Basic Books, New York, 2002.

33. ROVENȚA-FRUMUȘANI, D.; STEFANEL, A. "Populism and New/Old Media: The 'Populist Turn' in Western and Emerging Postcommunist Democracies", in *International Conference 5th Estidia Conference, Hybrid Dialogues: Transcending binary thinking and moving away from societal polarizations*, eds. Emilio Amideo, Michele Bevilacqua, Antonio Fruttaldo, University of Naples L'Orientale, September 2019.
34. SVETOKA, Sanda, *Social Media as a toll of Hybrid Warfare*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, 2016.

DEFENDING VALUES: THE KEY RELEVANCE OF NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Cristina BOGZEANU, Ph.D.

Senior Researcher, Center for Defence and Security Studies
"Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: bogzeanu.cristina@unap.ro

Abstract: *This paper's objective is to bring in the limelight the utmost importance of the fundamental principles and values laying the basis of the North Atlantic Alliance ever since its creation. This study is based on the premise that liberal democracy values and principles (respect for political and civil rights, the rule of law) are the indispensable condition of the cohesion and credibility of the Alliance, the genuine centre of gravity. The hypothesis of the present approach is that one of the most dangerous facets confrontation takes nowadays is the information one, targeting the image of liberal organizations, contributing at the erosion of their capital of trust and cohesion. In this line of thought, this is also one of the main targets in the information warfare on which all Members shall focus to enhance. The main arguments brought up will be related to evolution of NATO's strategic concepts in relation to the major changes of international security environment, the significance and role of its core values, the description of the manner in which the current internal and external challenges impact on the Alliance, as well as the emphasis of the stillborn gap between discourse and action when referring to NATO are the main subjects approached for arguing the hypothesis. Instead of concluding this argumentation, we will launch a wake-up call on the significance of the manner in which NATO Member States report themselves to the Alliance.*

Keywords: adaptability; flexibility; cohesion; values; external challenges; liberalism; political division; strength; vulnerability.

INTRODUCTION

In 2019, NATO celebrated 70 years of existence and Romania 15 years of NATO membership, with all the subsequent benefits and obligations. Such contexts are the ones usually favouring assessments of successes, failures and of what needs to be done in the future¹.

Romania's National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019. A Strong Romania in Europe and in the World (2015) relates its foreign and national security policy to the NATO and EU membership, similarly to the previous strategic documents and to the documents of the other member states. "US Strategic partnership, NATO and EU membership are the basis of our foreign policy. The construction of a strong Romania is closely connected with these ones"².

After the fall of the communist regime in Romania (1989), this country's vision and approach on security revolved around NATO and EU membership, first, as the main objective

¹ The present paper has at its basis one of the author's public lectures held at the National Military Palace – "NATO la 70 de ani de la semnarea Tratatului de la Washington. România la 15 ani de la aderarea la Alianță. Tendințe, provocări și oportunități" (*NATO at 70 years since the signing of the Treaty of Washington. Romania at 15 years of NATO membership. Trends, Challenges and Opportunities*), on October 10th, 2019.

² ***, National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019. A Strong Romania in Europe and in the World, Bucharest, 2015, URL: https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf, accessed on 10 October 2019.

of foreign and security policy, and, subsequently, as the main and strongest guarantee a state could get in terms of stability and security. Committing to NATO and EU standards, responsibly assuming the implications of the membership to these organizations have been the cornerstones of Romania's action on the international arena.

NATO membership equalled to the highest degree of security ever reached by Romania in its modern history and joining NATO and EU have been considered an essential contribution to the democratic transformation and to the enhancement of rule of law and economic and social development. Romania's adhesion to the Euro-Atlantic security organizations, similarly to the other countries included in the Warsaw Pact, can be considered a historical moment, enshrining the end of the divisions characterizing Europe in the 20th Century and placing the Alliance as the main factor in guaranteeing Euro-Atlantic security.

All these could be easily considered a cliché by anyone who has at least minimal understanding of foreign and security policy, but the current context is not only favourable to bringing all these in the forefront of security related discussions, but also a context making it necessary to bring to the forefront all these advantages resulting from NATO membership, not only for Romania, but also for all the Allies.

1. The enduring Alliance – adaptation, flexibility, cohesion

NATO is known as one of the most enduring Alliances in history. According to a report published by *The Economist*, "the average lifespan of a military alliance during the last 500 years is 15 years, with just 40 of them surviving 40 years or more"³. In the seven decades of existence, NATO proved an undeniable capacity to adapt to the changes in international environment, to the main challenges arising from the security evolutions and to overcome crises, constantly improving itself in terms of organizing, functioning and reacting.

There are many arguments which could be brought forward to argue the assertions above, but we consider that looking into the evolution of the Alliance strategic vision in the course is sufficiently relevant in this respect. During the Cold War, there were four NATO strategic concepts, delineating its nature, purpose and the main security tasks assumed. All these strategic concepts, together with other documents establishing the measures the military were supposed to take in order to implement the strategic vision, reflect not only the steps in the evolution of the Alliance, but also its continuous adaptation to the changes of the international security environment during the Cold War, as well as the internal challenges.

The first Strategic concept for the Defence and of the North Atlantic Area (DC6/1 – 01.12.1949) emphasized that NATO's first function was the prevention of war and the engagement of the Alliance military forces only in case the first function failed. Also increasing complementarity and standardization between its members was of key importance⁴. The second strategic concept of the Alliance was issued in 1952 – The Strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic Area (MC 3/5(Final)) which, broadly speaking, followed the 1949 strategic approach. This concept was the result of the need to make a series of structural changes reflect in the Alliance strategic vision. A couple of years before, North Korea invaded South Korea, which triggered a series of changes of the Alliance's strategic thinking; namely, it had to focus of the effectiveness of its military structures and the strength of its forces – NAC approved the creation of an integrated military force, D. Eisenhower was nominated the first SACEUR (1950) and the new SHAPE HQ was activated (1951).

³ ***, "NATO at 70: Special Report", in *The Economist*, 14 March 2019, URL: <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/03/14/how-nato-is-shaping-up-at-70>, accessed on 12 September 2019.

⁴ Gregory Pedlow (Ed.), "NATO Strategy Documents. 1949-1969", URL: <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf>, accessed on 10 September 2019.

The third Strategic concept – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of NATO Area (MC 14/2 – 23.05.1957) is the first strategic concept relying on the concept of “massive retaliation”, embraced by some members especially due to the advantage of contributing to the reduction of force requirements and, implicitly, to defence expenditures, and rejected by others as not all the member states would have been willing to go so far⁵.

Another high relevance document is the Report of the Three Wise Men/ The Report on the Non-Military Cooperation in NATO (1956), which gave a new impetus to the political consultations between Member States. The Harmel Report (1967) complemented the provisions of the Report of the Three Wise Men widening the strategic framework within which the Alliances functioned⁶.

Also, as USSR developed its own nuclear potential, NATO’s relative nuclear advantage in deterrence diminished and the concept of “massive retaliation doctrine” has been gradually replaced with “Mutual Assured Destruction – MAD”. The fourth Strategic Concept was issued in 1967, after France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command structures. Flexibility and escalation were the two key main concepts promoted by this vision. Also, this strategy was strongly influenced by Harmel Report, setting the double direction of security approach – political and military. In this context, it is also noteworthy the reasons invoked by Paris to justify its 1966 decision. Among others, De Gaulle, the French president, indicated in the letter sent to US President Johnson that “the ‘evolution’ in the world situation – and in France and Europe specifically – (...) made the military organization unnecessary”⁷. However, this reasoning hasn’t determined France to denunciate the Treaty of Washington and it has constantly reasserted its loyalty to the Alliance. Surely, beyond de Gaulle’s justification, there are a wide series of possible strategic calculi and strategic interests, the respective context is relevant not only for the Alliance capacity to overcome such internal crises, but also for the wording in which the different interest of a Members state are put, which is at a large extent similar to some justification one could have heard recently⁸.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO released its first non-confrontational strategic concepts. The first one in 1991 maintains the fundamental purpose of the Alliance – collective defence and opened the way for promoting security at European level through partnerships and cooperation. The second one, issued in 1999, maintains collective defence as the fundamental purpose of the alliance but has a multi-dimensional approach to security and identifies new risks and threats such as terrorism, ethnic conflict, political instability, etc. The third post-Cold War strategic concept – 2010 – reflected the evolutions after 9/11 terrorist attacks, including the world economic and financial crisis with direct and serious implications on the military budgets and the pointing out the importance of the non-military dimensions of security.

All these evolutions of NATO’s strategic vision were accompanied by changes, transformations at the operational level, as well as in terms of military capabilities, command structures, troops’ training, and even military thinking. However, the pessimistic opinions

⁵ ***, Strategic Concepts, 12 June 2018, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm, accessed on 10 September 2019.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ ***, France and the Atlantic Alliance. Intelligence Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 6 October 1967, Approved for release in December 1999, p. 3, URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000274181.pdf, accessed on 28 August 2019.

⁸ For instance, see: Mary Dejevsky, “Donald Trump is right about one thing: NATO is obsolete”, in *The Independent*, 7 April 2016, URL: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-is-right-about-one-thing-nato-is-obsolete-a6973231.html>; Simon Jenkins, „Donald Trump is right. NATO is a costly white elephant”, in *The Guardian*, 12 July 2018, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/12/donald-trump-nato-costly-white-elephant-russia>; Christian Whiton, „NATO is obsolete”, in the *National Interest*, 6 July 2018, URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-obsolete-25167>, accessed on 10 September 2019.

claiming that NATO has lost its *raison d'être* have been constant ever since the end of the Cold War, the main argument being that NATO was born as a reaction to the Soviet threat and, once the threat vanished, there could be no other reason for the existence of the Alliance. Despite all these, NATO not only continued its existence, but also continued to be considered the cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic security.

The Alliance endurance can be surely explained through its flexibility and capacity to adapt to the continuously evolving challenges of international security environment not only in terms of the manner of relating strategically to these ones, but also in terms of anticipating their evolution and of developing the necessary capabilities.

However, the headstone of this flexibility and adaptability resides in the Allies' cohesion. As the cohesion of an alliance was defined through how easy is for the member states to remain in the alliance⁹, as far as NATO is concerned, one can assume that it is one of the most unitary multilateral organizations of the 21st Century due to the common character of its member states, to the shared principles and values (subsumed to liberal democracy – individual liberty, rule of law) and the fact that almost all NATO Member States' governments are elected in a democratic manner and are committed to respect civil and political rights and the rule of law. Also, NATO's cohesion is not just a catchword, void of actual importance. In a report arguing for the need of new Strategic concept of the Alliance, Ambassadors Douglas Lutte and Nicholas Burns mention that "Alliance Cohesion remains a key element and a revised Concept will help strengthen cohesion"¹⁰, as it is the fundamental condition for an consensus-based decision-making organization to function.

As a matter of fact, NATO is not a classical military alliance. Beyond deterrence and defence against external threats, NATO has constantly been a promoter of liberal democracy. This principle has been at the basis of the Alliance ever since its creation as it can be read in the Preamble of the Treaty of Washington (4 April 1949): „The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty (...)”¹¹.

Furthermore, Article 2 of the Treaty enhances the principle-based nature of the Alliance, as well as its commitment to promoting the principles and values laying at its basis, which can be also considered the fundamentals of its enlargement policy: „Article 2: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them”¹².

⁹ Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*, South Carolina, 1990; Pierre Martin, Mark R. Brawley (ed.), *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?*, Palgrave, New York, 2000, *apud* Joshua S. Goldstein, Jon C. Pevenhouse, *Relații internaționale*, Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 132.

¹⁰ Douglas Lutte, Nicholas Burns, *NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis*, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Report, February 2019, p. 38, URL: <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/NATOatSeventy.pdf>, accessed on 2 March 2019.

¹¹ ***, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed on 10 September 2019.

¹² *Ibidem*.

Usually, under the pressure of the security challenges attracting our attention, many of us are bent to omit the relevance of the common, shared value and civilizational basis which actually underlie the Alliance from its very beginning. A turning towards the values and their utmost importance is nowadays more necessary as never as they represent the very basis of maintaining the Alliance's cohesion, no matter if we considered it our main advantage and strength or the main target for the other actors' actions. In our opinion, there is no better way to acknowledge and understand the weight of values in the current security context than to look into the nature, evolution and direction of the present security threats.

2. External and internal challenges

Euro-Atlantic community faces nowadays a unique mix of internal and external challenges, in an international context requiring firm and solid reaction to security risks and threats while being shattered from within. Russia's act of illegally annexing Crimea is can be certainly considered a moment of strategic inflexion¹³ as it has brought back the spectre of military risk in the European security equation. Ever since 2014, the relations between Western actors, including NATO and EU, and the Russian Federation have been characterized through a continuous tension, the two parties often placing themselves on opposing sides in various aspects of international affairs.

At the same time, Western actors – Russian Federation relations are not the only ones characterized by tensions. The relations within the Euro-Atlantic community have also known disruptions under the emergence of politics led under “America First!” or “Make America Great Again!” slogans, of Brexit or of anti-European political visions emerged within EU member states. US foreign policy has been marked during the last years by a strong unilateralism, and by a high emphasis on the financial dimension of the Alliance and even by conditioning the complying with Article 5 provisions by meeting the financial engagements. Therefore, one could easily find arguments for a trend of the US to withdraw from liberal multilateralism and a trend of the European states to stay aloof from the political centre of Brussels and to turn towards themselves.

Additionally, it is easily noticeable the fact that more and more actors in the Euro-Atlantic community are drifting away from the core values of principles constituting the very basis of NATO and EU. US under D. Trump's mandate and UK in the context of Brexit are only the most obvious of the illustrative examples in this regard. One could also mention Hungary and Poland on which cases the EU called for Article 7 due to their serious breaches in complying with the standard values of the organization. Another eloquent example can be found in the evolution of relations between NATO Allies. One of the most tender subject in the last years is related to the financial contribution of the Allies to NATO's budget, a problem as old as the Alliance itself¹⁴, which climbed in NATO member countries' priorities after US president

¹³ In the area of security and defence studies, a point of strategic inflexion defines the strategic situation or context representing the initial point of a change in terms of strategy or international relations; the point of strategic inflexion can be seen as a set of conditions which, taken together, can provide predictions on the future behaviour of international actors. For details, see: Stan Anton, *Șocul strategic – implicații asupra dinamicii mediului internațional de securitate*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2019, pp. 74-89.

¹⁴ Concepts referring to the balance of Member States' financial contribution to NATO budgets have been constant in the conceptual field of the Alliance. Burden sharing, defining the manner in which the costs of providing collective goods or common initiatives should be shared between states, has its origins in the 1960s. For details, see: Eiko Thielemann, *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, Jan 2013, URL: <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199546282.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199546282-e-56>, accessed on 1 October 2019. Also, in 2010, smart defence initiative approached the same issue which, in 2014, was the subject of Defence Investment Pledge.

conditioned the commitment to collective defence principle by the respect of the financial commitments assumed by the European Allies.

Also, at the beginning of 2019, Freedom House released its *Nations in Transit* Report, a document warning about the illiberal¹⁵ drift of US and European countries and about the serious consequences and negative implications brought up in this way. Among these, there could be also mentioned the damage of the identity of the EU as democratic organization¹⁶, and we would also add NATO. Another insidious implication consist in the fact that illiberal leaders benefit from the advantages of NATO and EU membership while continuing acting against the standard democratic values: “The security umbrella of NATO gives populist politicians room to uproot state institutions, stoke bitter societal divisions, and goad neighbouring states without fear of armed conflict or direct intervention by a hostile power. The EU’s funds can be used to sustain patronage networks without risking financial collapse”¹⁷.




Figure no. 1: Democracy score averages evolution by subregion in 2008-2018
Source: Freedom House, *Nations in Transit* 2018¹⁸

For Europe, this phenomenon is also translated in the ascension and development of nationalist and populist political trends, situated in the extremes of the political spectre, with a high anti-European note. Vulnerability isn't characteristic only to Euro-Atlantic cohesion¹⁹, but

¹⁵ Illiberal democracy describes the situation in which a democratically elected government are “routinely ignoring constitutional limits of their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms”. For details, see: Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, in *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 1997, pp. 22-43.

¹⁶ Nate Schenkkan, *Nations in Transit 2018. Confronting illiberalism*, The Freedom House, 2019, p. 5, URL: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NationsInTransit_Web_PDF_FINAL_2018_03_16.pdf, accessed on 9 September 2019.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

¹⁸ Nate Schenkkan, *Nations in Transit 2018. Confronting illiberalism*, The Freedom House, 2019, p. 4, URL: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NationsInTransit_Web_PDF_FINAL_2018_03_16.pdf, accessed on 9 September 2019.

¹⁹ Parts of this description of the Euro-Atlantic security context were also used in Cristina Bogzeanu, *Conflictele din Balcanii de Vest – Războaie înghețate? Regiunea Vest-Balcanică în Contextul de Securitate Europeană*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2019, pp. 7-14.

also to the democratic system in itself and, even more, they enhance each other. Actually, in F. Zakaria terms, liberal democracy, implying free and fair elections, as well as rule of law, the separation of powers, respect for basic human liberties, is losing ground in the advantage of other forms of democracy, different from the liberal one.

Another constant key feature of the recent evolutions of Euro-Atlantic security environment is the notion of “hybrid warfare”. Still the subject of academic debates and with different understandings in the Euro-Atlantic and Russian Federation²⁰, the concept has a high relevance through its implications. In our opinion, one of the most relevant implication of “hybrid warfare” can be summarized as follows: “Practitioners of hybrid warfare are often less intent on seizing and holding territory than destroying or disrupting the ability of societies to function”²¹.

Also, a similar hypothesis can be found within a study issued by NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence, *Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia’s Manipulative Techniques*. According to this paper, the stake in hybrid confrontation is not conquering new territories, but “creating mental landscapes susceptible to political manipulation”²². Furthermore, the Russian Federation’s objectives, as far as the West is concerned, consist in economic weakening, political division and setting Russia as hegemonic power on the European territory²³. A similar warning in other words can be found in Freedom House report, Nations in Transit 2018: “Russian proxies and propaganda outlets have exploited the situation, stoking grievances and encouraging division within and among democratic countries”²⁴.

There can be found a large series of actual proofs, illustrating how Euro-Atlantic community deepens its vulnerability and how this phenomenon is turned to advantage by other actors in their own interest. However, one of the most recent and eloquent examples in this respect comes from an interview of V. Putin with The Financial Times (27 June 2019)²⁵. The main idea argued by the Russian president is that the “liberal idea has outlived its purpose”. Framing its approach in the context of the European refugee crisis, he continued by connecting the liberal value of freedom to the lack of action and creating an exacerbated image of the threat: “This liberal idea presupposes that nothing needs to be done. That migrants can kill, plunder and rape with impunity because their rights as migrants have to be protected” and added that “Every crime must have its punishment. The liberal idea has become obsolete. It has come into conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population”²⁶. Obviously, the connections between the liberal idea, the freedoms attached to the liberal idea, and the lack of action and reaction in front of threats is a false one and directed towards deepening dissensions between Western actors, as well as to shattering the credibility of liberalism.

What is characteristic to nowadays security dynamic, especially in the context of information warfare is the weight carried out by information, by information communicated

²⁰ A. Korybko, *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change*, People’s Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, 2015, p. 10; Marius-Titi Potîrniche, “Non-linear Warfare vs. Hybrid Warfare”, in *Romanian Military Thinking*, no. 1-2/2018, pp. 10-21; Dan-Lucian Petrescu, “Advanced Model for Configuring Hybrid Aggression”, in *Strategic Impact*, no. 2 [63]/2017, pp. 45-51.

²¹ Franklin Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, Dan Hamilton, “Defend the Arteries of Society”, in *US News and World Report*, 9 June 2015. *Apud.* Guillaume Lasconjarias, “Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared”, ETH Zürich, URL: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/ac42738e-f524-462a-bb16-18e5eba459ef/pdf>, accessed on 12 September 2017.

²² ***, *Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia’s Manipulative Techniques*, NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence, Riga, p. 5.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

²⁴ Nate Schenkkan, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁵ ***, “Vladimir Putin Says Liberalism has become Obsolete”, in *The Financial Times*, 28 June 2019, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36>, accessed on 5 August 2019.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

through public discourse. Vulnerabilities can be created and deepened from within and exploited from the outside. Also specific to the recent evolution in terms of security is that there are circumstance in which these vulnerabilities are exploited especially at discursive level, without having a correspondent in terms of actual actions and measures.

3. The gap between discourse and action

As mentioned above, putting under the question mark the actuality and necessity of NATO, or the incumbency of committing to collective defence principle under the conditions in which not all the allies succeeded in meeting the 2% of the GDP for defence threshold, US tensed relation with Germany and France in the context of negotiating international treaties (TTIP, JCPOA etc.), his conciliatory attitude towards the authoritarian leaders²⁷, the frequent critique of NATO and EU as well as the critique to EU's efforts to develop military capabilities²⁸.

However, NATO and, especially, US reassurance actions undertaken in the context after the Ukrainian crisis stand as a proof not only of NATO's properly functioning in a challenging international context, but also of US engagement in European security. As far as NATO's reaction to the aggressive stance of the Russian Federation after 2014, a clear image on the Alliance reaction and on the flexibility shown in reacting to a new challenge can be seen when analysing the decisions made during the summits held ever since then. For instance, during the *Wales Summit*, the allies decided undertaking reassurance measures, it was agreed a Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the enhancement of NATO reaction capacity through the creation of the Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF). The command structure was adapted so as to be more robust, capable of approaching multiple challenges simultaneously, and the Connected Force Initiative (CFI) was launched in order to increase the interconnection degree and interoperability between Allies and their partners. Wales Summit was also the occasion of resuming the importance of an equal contribution of the Allies to NATO's budget, setting the Defence Investment Pledge and of acknowledging the weight of information in the current confrontation and, therefore deciding to set the Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence in Latvia.

In 2016, in *Warsaw*, NATO heads of state and governments decided to enhance the Alliance military presence at its Eastern frontier (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), to extend their naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea (in the context of the European refugee crisis), took the engagement to enhance their cyber defence at individual and collective levels and also declared that the anti-missile shield reached the operational capability.

During the following summit, in 2018, held in *Brussels*, NATO continued to enhance its readiness and preparedness to approach current security challenges. It is launched NATO Readiness Initiative, supposing that 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days' readiness or less will be organised and trained as elements of larger combat formations, in support of NATO's overall deterrence and defence posture²⁹. Additionally, the allies decided to increase their forces' readiness and the increase the capacity of troop movement across the Euro-Atlantic area and to modernize the command structure as well as to set new elements such as the Cyberspace Operation Centre

²⁷ US relations with North Korea and the Russian Federation under D. Trump mandate.

²⁸ In 2016, EU launched PESCO, an instrument meant to favour the development of military capabilities at EU's level. Despite being compatible with the US call for increasing European contribution to the European security, the initiative was strongly argued by US as it considered the EU initiatives in defence capacities development as damaging Euro-Atlantic relations and hindering US access to Europe's defence market. For details, see: Daniel Fiott, "The Poison Pill. EU Defence on US Terms?", Brief No. 7, June 2019, URL: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/7%20US-EU%20defence%20industries.pdf>, accessed on 20 June 2019.

²⁹ ***, Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm, accessed on 12 September.

(Belgium), Joint Force Command (Norfolk), Joint Support and Enabling Command (Germany). It is also created an operational hub for the Southern region and the open door policy is reasserted while inviting Skopje to launch the procedures for joining NATO.

All these are just a few examples which can be used to argue NATO's, as well as US', serious commitment to European security. Even more, beyond these actual measures, NATO also benefits of strong public support. A high relevance in this context is attached to the American citizens' perception on NATO and NATO's role in the world, under the mandate of a president who, at least at a discursive level, reports very critically to the Alliance.

A study of Pew Research Centre, based on data collected in 2017, reveals that more than 6 in 10 Americans has a positive perception on NATO, with a significant increase in report to 2016, when only 53% of the US citizens expressed a favourable view on NATO³⁰. In another study, published in 2019, Pew Research Centre indicated that the poll showed that 77% of US citizens consider NATO membership as beneficial for their country, but when it comes about the US active/inactive stance on the world stage, they remain divided in almost equal sides – 49% consider that US should pay less attention to problems happening overseas, while 44% say that being active in solving overseas problems is beneficial for the US³¹.

Additionally, almost half of them consider that NATO shall involve more in solving world's problems, while 31% of them considered that NATO is does enough and only 5% of them believe that the Alliance does too much to solve international issues³² (Figure no. 2).




Figure no. 2: NATO member countries perception on the Alliance and US citizens' image on NATO's involvement in international problems' resolution
Source: Pew Research Centre, 2019³³

³⁰ Moira Fagan, "NATO is seen favourably in many member countries, but almost half of Americans say it does too little", Pew Research Centre, 2 July 2018, URL: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-member-countries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little/>, accessed on 31 August 2019.

³¹ ***, "Large Majorities in Both Parties Say NATO Is Good for the U.S. Wide partisan divide in views of U.S. compromising with allies", Pew Research Centre, 2 April 2019, URL: <https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/02/large-majorities-in-both-parties-say-nato-is-good-for-the-u-s/>, accessed on 31 August 2019.

³² Moira Fagan, *op. cit.*

³³ *Ibidem.*

Beyond the active measures undertaken at NATO's level and beyond the public support of the Alliance among US citizens, we shall also consider the financial dimension, especially as D. Trump laid a great emphasis on this aspect when approaching NATO-related matters. One good example in this respect can be considered the European Reassurance Initiative, a financial program launched by the White House in the immediate aftermath of the Crimea's illegal annexation by the Russian Federation (2014)³⁴. The main objective of this initiative is to provide reassurance to the Allies regarding US engagement on their security and territorial integrity as NATO members. This program doesn't equal to a change in strategy, but it represents change of the emphasis in international affairs, as it recognizes that Russia is a security threat which is not expected to vanish anytime soon. In 2017, the program was rebranded under the name of European Deterrence Initiative.

Year	Budget	Investment areas
2015	\$ 985 mil.	a) Military presence; b) Training and exercises; c) Infrastructure; d) Pre-position equipment; e) Partners' capacity building.
2016	\$ 789 mil.	
2017	\$ 3.4 bln.	
2018	\$ 4.8 bln.	
2019	\$ 6.5 bln.	
2020	\$ 5.9 bln.	

Table no. 1: European Reassurance Initiative (2014) – European Deterrence Initiative (2017) – Budget evolution in 2015-2019³⁵

Despite the tensed relations between D. Trump and the European allies grounded on financial issues and this occasionally ambivalent attitude to Russia, the European Reassurance Initiative not only has continued after the end of B. Obama's mandate, but it also increased its value. Therefore, at an easy analysis of the data (Table no. 1), one could conclude that US involvement in Europe hasn't decreased. On the contrary. The funding for European Deterrence Initiative increased, in 2019 alone, for almost 40%.

CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War came with a period of optimism, where the unipolarity of the international system favoured the development and the rooting of liberal values and liberal-based values. The current international security challenges come as a result of the evolution of the international system towards multipolarity and take a unique form, not seen in the Euro-Atlantic space in the post-cold War history. For NATO, as for the entire Western world, it is a moment of strategic inflexion, with serious challenges both from within and from the outside,

³⁴ Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, "The European Deterrence Initiative", Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019, URL: https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/EDI_Format_FINAL.pdf, accessed at 30 September 2019.

³⁵ ***, European Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defence Budget Fiscal Year 2020, Office of the Under Secretary of Defence (Comptroller). March 2019, URL: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_EDJ_JBook.pdf, accessed at 2 September 2019.

usually reinforcing each other. The fundamental question raising nowadays is whether NATO can adapt to this international dynamic.

In our opinion, the answer is clear, the North-Atlantic Alliance has all the necessary premises for maintaining its relevance on the short and medium term, but it is on its members to fully acknowledge its advantage, to properly discern between truth and disinformation, to remain committed to liberal fundamental values, to continue defending and promoting these values. Enhancing US role in the Alliance is of major importance, as well as the European engagement in NATO, including in financial terms. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, even under the conditions of a narrative which is not always positive and constructive, facts speak louder than words. At the same time, in the era of information warfare, words also weigh hard. Therefore, when approaching the role of the Alliance in nowadays' security context, it becomes of key importance to be aware not only of the benefits resulting from committing to NATO's fundamental values, from the cohesion they generated, but also of the fact that this area is the one often becoming the target for third parties' action, as it functions as the indispensable strength and, once shattered, the highest vulnerability.

A 70 year old history of adapting to multiple and various changes in the strategic environment, of overcoming several internal crises, of maintaining the capacity to face and manage changing security challenges can make a sound basis for confidence in the Alliance capacity to adapt and reinvent itself. Yet, not creating and not deepening vulnerabilities which can be exploited in our disadvantage shall be our common mind when approaching this topic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, "Large Majorities in Both Parties Say NATO Is Good for the U.S. Wide partisan divide in views of U.S. compromising with allies", Pew Research Centre, 2 April 2019, URL: <https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/02/large-majorities-in-both-parties-say-nato-is-good-for-the-u-s/>
2. ***, "NATO at 70: Special Report", in *The Economist*, 14 March 2019, URL: <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/03/14/how-nato-is-shaping-up-at-70>
3. ***, "Vladimir Putin Says Liberalism has become Obsolete", in *The Financial Times*, 28 June 2019, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36>.
4. ***, European Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defence Budget Fiscal Year 2020, Office of the Under Secretary of Defence (Comptroller). March 2019, URL: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_EDJ_JB_ook.pdf
5. ***, France and the Atlantic Alliance. Intelligence Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 6 October 1967, Approved for release in December 1999, URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000274181.pdf.
6. ***, National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019. A Strong Romania in Europe and in the World, Bucharest, 2015, URL: https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf
7. ***, *Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia's Manipulative Techniques*, NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence, Riga.
8. ANTON, Stan, *Șocul strategic – implicații asupra dinamicii mediului internațional de securitate*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2019.
9. GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S.; PEVENHOUSE, Jon C., *Relații internaționale*, Polirom, Iași, 2008.

10. KORYBKO, Andrew, *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change*, People's Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, 2015.
11. LASCONJARIAS, Guillaume, "Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared", ETH Zürich, URL: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/ac42738e-f524-462a-bb16-18e5eba459ef/pdf>.
12. LUTTE, Douglas; BURNS, Nicholas, *NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis*, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Report, February 2019, URL: <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/NATOatSeventy.pdf>.
13. FAGAN, Moira, "NATO is seen favourably in many member countries, but almost half of Americans say it does too little", Pew Research Centre, 2 July 2018, URL: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-member-countries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little>.
14. PETRESCU, Dan-Lucian, "Advanced Model for Configuring Hybrid Aggression", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 2 [63]/2017.
15. POTÎRNICHE, Marius-Titi, "Non-linear Warfare vs. Hybrid Warfare", in *Romanian Military Thinking*, no. 1-2/2018, pp. 10-21.
16. SCHENKKAN, Nate, *Nations in Transit 2018. Confronting illiberalism*, The Freedom House, 2019, URL: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NationsInTransit_Web_PDF_FINAL_2018_03_16.pdf.
17. SHEVIN-COETZEE, Michelle, "The European Deterrence Initiative", Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019, URL: https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/EDI_Format_FINAL.pdf.
18. THIELEMANN, Eiko, *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, Jan 2013, URL: <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199546282.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199546282-e-56>.
19. Zakaria, Fareed, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", in *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 1997, pp. 22-43.
20. NATO official web page, URL: <https://www.nato.int>.

THE CHANGE OF THE NEW GENERATION OF THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

Iulian CHIFU, Ph.D.

President of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning
Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: keafuyul@gmail.com

Abstract: *National security threats and risks have evolved in ways that are putting under a question mark the very change in nature of the new generation of threats. Technology, social media, their impact on the society, as well as new instruments of hybrid nature which determine huge rifts in our democratic liberal societies are creating a new environment and new categories of threats that have never showed up before. Moreover, this type of changes have tremendous impact on the resilience of democratic societies, on the public support for spending in the security field and on the perception of the threats, including those of conventional source – military operations, espionage, subversion.*

Keywords: *unconventional threats; hybrid conflicts; technological society; identity gap.*

1. The new generation of threats to national security: internal societal and political security at stake

Security as a concept has evolved and so did the substance of national security threats. At the beginning, it was all about *military conventional threats*. Then we embraced the classical definition of the European School of Copenhagen¹, with the *five dimensions of security* – military, political, social, economic, and environment² – that became, in 1991, with the Strategic Concept in Rome³, the basis of NATO's approach to security. Barry Buzan added the need to consider three objects to be „securitized” – state, society and individual⁴.

Beginning with 2010, concerns at NATO level evolved from „*non-traditional threats*” to „*emerging security challenges*”, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, disruption of energy supplies and even extending to climate change and migration⁵. This approach led to the new “Emerging Security Challenges Division”⁶. Then *hybrid threats* emerged and added up to the list of the evolution of security matters' complexity. The EU and NATO formally established in Helsinki, on 11 April 2017, the *European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats*⁷.

¹ The Copenhagen School of security studies is an academic school that employs a critical approach to security studies. It is part of the postpositivist movement in the field of international relations (IR), which became a salient part of post–Cold War scholarship. See Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, “Copenhagen School” in: Bruce A. Arrigo. *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy*, SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks.

² Buzan Barry, *Popoarele, Statele și Teama*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2012.

³ NATO Strategic Concept Rome, Article 24, in “The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, 7 November 1991, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, accessed on August 10, 2019.

⁴ Buzan Barry, *Popoarele, Statele și Frica*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2014, p. 385; Iulian CHIFU, *Gândire Strategică*, Editura Institutului de Științe politice și Relații Internaționale al Academiei Române, București, 2013.

⁵ ***, *NATO's new division: A serious look at 'emerging security challenges' or an attempt at shoring up relevance and credibility?*, ISIS Europe Briefing Note, No. 51, September 2010, URL: https://www.nato-watch.org/sites/default/files/NATOs_New_Division_0.pdf, accessed on August 1, 2019.

⁶ *Idem*.

⁷ ***, *NATO welcomes opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats*, 11 April 2017, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_143143.htm, accessed on August 1, 2019.

The new generation of threats to national security has a very specific format, that's why we tend to assume that we can even talk about a change in the very nature of the threats to national security. The *unconventional threats* we already studied⁸ are a hybrid typology of threats⁹ developed on internal vulnerabilities turning to threats. It is the case of all the characteristics of the liberal democracy's values and principles which are considered to be vulnerabilities by some players (specifically the Russian Federation)¹⁰ that build instruments in order to take advantage of those characteristics, becoming real *threats with external sources against our societies*¹¹ coming from *the speculation of the values and principles of our democratic systems*¹².

Another source for those unconventional threats is generated by the speculation of the internal vulnerabilities of our liberal-democratic societies¹³ coming from the evolution of technology and its impact on societies¹⁴. Social media and information warfare, drones and hypersonic weapons are shaping the security environment of the future, with impact on the approach and the way of thinking security related matters. And specifically, the most profound change comes from the impact of technology on democracy itself¹⁵.

Technology has a tremendous impact on democracy and society¹⁶ via the direct influence on the criteria and behaviour related to the societal cohesion – solidarity, the sense of community, alienation and fragmentation¹⁷. On another point, the sense of lack of privacy, altered identity – individual and collective –, need for dignity and respect¹⁸, all are the new effects of technology on our day by day life that have an impact on our societies and the participation in the democratic processes, as well as on the life of the community, on the substance of our democracy¹⁹.

These specific processes have been underlined in a number of studies, in some other cases the study is just at the beginning. In some other cases, the psychological processes linked

⁸ Iulian Chifu, "Non-Conventional Threats and the New Types of Conflicts of Hybrid Nature in the 21st Century", in Romanian Military Thinking Conference "Security and Defence between History, Theory and Public Policies", 6-7 November 2019 – in course of publishing.

⁹ Iulian Chifu, "Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride", in *Revista Infosfera*, February 2018, pp. 23-30.

¹⁰ Iulian Chifu, Simona Țuțuianu, *Torn Between East and West: Europe's Border States*, Routledge, London and New York, 2017; Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, *The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century*, Routledge, London and New York, 2017.

¹¹ See the debate and definition on threats, risks and vulnerabilities in Iulian Chifu, *Gândire Strategică*, Editura Institutului de Științe politice și Relații Internaționale al Academiei Române, București, 2013.

¹² Jan-Werner Muller, *Ce este populismul*, Polirom, Iași, 2017; Steve Richards, *The Rise of the Outsiders. How Mainstream Politics Lost its way*, Atlantic Books, London, 2017.

¹³ Robert Kagan, *The Jungle Grows Back. America and Our Imperiled World*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2018.

¹⁴ Iulian Chifu, "Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations", in: 15th International Scientific Conference "Strategies XXI" Proceedings "Strategic Changes and International Relations", 11-12 April 2019, Bucharest, Romania, National Defence University, pp. 11-23.

¹⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁶ Gavriluță Nicu, *Noile religii seculare. Corectitudinea politică, tehnologiile viitorului și trans-umanismul*, Polirom, Iași, 2018.

¹⁷ Arjun Appadurai, Donatella de la Porta, Nancy Fraser, Heinrich Geiselberger (Ed.), *Marea Regresie: De ce trăim un moment istoric*, Art Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2016; Condoleezza, Rice; Amy, Zegart, *Political Risk. Facing the Threat of Global Insecurity in the Twenty First Century*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2018; James Kirchick, *Sfârșitul Europei. Dictatori, demagogi și Noul Ev Întunecat*, Polirom, Iași, 2018.

¹⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *Identity. Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recongnition*, Profile books Ltd, London, 2018.

¹⁹ Martin Gurri, *The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium*, Stripe Press, Stripe Matter Inc., 2018.

to our reaction as humans to the speed of change²⁰ are playing against ourselves. In all those cases, the deep study has to be launched and we have to consider that those evolutions themselves are creating vulnerabilities to our society²¹ that we have to cope with. And the bases of this reaction should be building resilience for our societies. Not so easy, since the resilience needs the involvement of the state, society and individuals alike, and that cohesion could be forged only if there's a reasonable level of trust in the authorities^{22, 23}.

2. Social media and the impact on democratic societies

We all witnessed the evolution and the use of social media in shaping the society. From the Twitter Revolution in the Republic of Moldova, 7th – 9th of April 2009, to the Arab Spring, the capacity of mobilization proved enormous, when the stakes and impact are passing a certain threshold of emotional impulse. Then, the use of social media in information warfare has been extensively studied²⁴.

At least as important as the information warfare is the impact of social media as an instrument on political security and societal security. The extensive use of social media proves to determine important changes in the human individual behaviour, on society development and the evolution of the community spirit, as well as its impact on liberal democracy as a political system.

Once again, it is not the instrument which is bad, on the contrary, it is an added value to democracy, free flow of ideas, empowering people and hearing their opinions. But the way this instrument is used can create side effects of the society that, at least, we have to know and research in depth. Internet itself has originally created a side effect in transforming the people accessing the virtual reality into a far more *contemplative and passive* group, reacting with a click in front of a computer rather than taking the streets or protest and claim their rights in the physical reality.

Once social media has the advantage of *reaching targeted audiences*, people placed in determined geographic locations and diverse individuals all over the world with specific

²⁰ Hans Rosling, *Factfulness. Ten Reasons We're Wrong About the World-and Why Things Are Better than You Think*, Sceptre, 2018.

²¹ Wolfgang Ishinger, *Lumea în Pericol. Germania și Europa în vremuri nesigure*, "Curtea Veche" Publishinghouse, București, 2019.

²² Iulian Chifu, "Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride", in *Revista Infosfera*, February 2018, pp. 23-30.

²³ See Iulian Chifu, "Non-Conventional Threats and the New Types of Conflicts of Hybrid Nature in the 21st Century", in Romanian Military Thinking Conference "Security and Defence between History, Theory and Public Policies", 6-7 November 2019 – in course of publishing.

²⁴ Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, *Op.cit*; Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, *Război informațional: tipizarea agresiunii informaționale a Federației Ruse*, The Publishing House of "Ion I. C. Brătianu" Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 2016; Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, *Information warfare. The pattern of aggression*, The Publishing House of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations "Ion I. C. Brătianu" of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 2016; Iulian Chifu, „Informational warfare, from STRATCOM to Psyops”, in: Working Papers of the “World LUMEN Congress Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty”, 12-17 April 2016, Iași, International conference, Lumen Media Publishing UK, 2016, pp. 132-133; Iulian Chifu, Cristina Ivan, “Rolul democrației participative, al meta-narațiunilor și autorului colectiv în secolul XXI. Mesaj din viitor”, in *Revista Română de Studii de Inteligență*, RRSI no. 10/December 2013, Bucharest, pp. 221-239; Iulian Chifu, “Război hibrid, lawfare, război informațional. Războaiele viitorului”, in International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI “The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment”, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, 2015, pp. 200-209; Iulian Chifu, “Războiul informațional: componentă a războiului hibrid și instrument de acțiune agresivă cu relevanță strategică”, in *Revista Infosfera*, 2016; Iulian Chifu, “Trei generații de război informațional. Nivelul dezvoltării domeniului în partea sa publică”, in *Revista Infosfera*, September 2017, pp.20-28; Iulian Chifu, “Cum alterăm realitatea în războiul informațional: Post-adevăr, post-factual, post-umanitate”, in *Revista Infosfera*, Decembrie 2018.

preferences in political, social, beliefs or ways of living the religious feelings, it constitutes an instrument that has an important share of the impact on the changes in society and individual preferences. Moreover, it is a tool that could let everybody reaches all of us across borders and barriers of any type.

3. Societal, psychological and political impact on democracy

There are several ways social media is influencing the democratic societies. It has an impact on societal security through its abilities and side effects in the general fragmentation of the society, in affecting participation in several events, in its capacity of mobilization, in modifying the human and social behaviour in several ways. With a double type of impact, it also refers in different way to the different type of people – active or passive, contemplative or inclined to action.

Then, it has an enormous psychological impact on the individuals and, as a consequence, on the society through the impact and spread of collective emotions, addressing pragmatism, accentuating sensibilities and senses and, at the same time, depriving of sensibilities and humanity some events and factual realities. It also creates big splits between perceptions and realities with bubbles promoting uncritical ideas and isolation from other ideas and the real debate. It creates environments very friendly to each of the opinions, but that approach creates stronger and unchallenged perceptions of the truth and reality that it doesn't confront with other arguments and never verifies those perceptions with the reality and truth around us.

Last but not least, it is about social media important impact on political security, favouring strong statements and giving equal saying to all participants in a conversation, in spite of the different credentials and legitimacy. So that anybody could attract the traffic and win a debate of popular vote instead of expert or specialist credentials, turning aside arguments less adapted to the communication at the general level of education and in the real world.

It favours ideas that are attracting traffic and that privilege nationalist and extreme statements, anti-system believes, and thoughts and opinions well supported and spread via conspiracy theories²⁵. So social media is promoting, at a high speed, extreme and shocking ideas, even those without any link with the truth or reality, sensations, emotions and personal opinions instead of verified information, expert analysis, traditional journalism with its rules of checking the facts.

Therefore, social media favours populism, nationalism, extremism of any kind, including extreme progressist ideas, as it puts a huge emphasis on emotions, perceptions instead of factual realities. Identities – both classical and new ones²⁶ – are also in the forefront of the impact of social media, both linked to the fragmentation of society, but first and foremost to the emergence of new types of political ideas, interest groups and fight for new types of rights.

All this impact with the classic political ideas change the majority support from mainstream politics into a blow for extreme ideas and political parties, or populist figures instead of strict, conservative, limited, decent politicians who have, practically, no chance. The personalisation of politics is also a side effect of the impact of social media.

4. Social media and the impact on societal security

Social media has a side effect of fragmenting the society. This type of bubbles that could self-isolate are creating strong new types of identity but also isolated from the real debate of ideas and confrontation with other people's arguments²⁷. Fragmenting the society creates a real

²⁵ Condoleezza Rice, *op. cit.*

²⁶ Classical identity is the sociological one, related to concrete criteria linked to human characteristics. New ones are linked with perceptions, preferences and beliefs related to social media groups.

²⁷ Arjun Appadurai, Donatella de la Porta, Nancy Fraser, Heinrich Geiselberger (Ed.), *op. cit.*

threat to solidarity, generosity, communitarian spirit, participation for common goals in the local communities and rifts in the society as a whole. It creates problems of cohesion on common national policies and strategic options.

As we have seen before, social media has paradoxical and biased impact on participation, keeping people away from reality and protests rather through likes and dislikes in a contemplative virtual space, on another part being able to mobilise huge numbers of people that don't know each other, once the emotion involved and the level of excitement reaches and touches an important number of followers. Both attributes can harm or mislead concrete ideas and initiatives for protest or defending rights or, on the contrary, can mobilise on biased and non-representative ideas of the agenda who could be promoted in the mainstream with their supporters and leaders of the minority groups, well organised in order to take over the lead of the public space with marginal and controversial ideas that are tainted and presented as mainstream preoccupation of a society.

Social networks reaffirm in a "bubble" our own opinions and beliefs like an echo chamber, a bubble that filters what we read, limiting our vision of the world. *Groupthink* is also a side effect of it²⁸. The impact is the creation of strong identities, fragmentation of the social spectrum and lack of dialogue and debate, which is an integral part of the formation of opinions and development of a democratic society. Instead we just have individuals with strong opinions on different subjects without hearing the arguments of the others. This is a threat to societal security.

On another point, social media is giving short, obvious, harsh and strict answers to any type of problem. In this environment, we don't have time for nuances, elaborated answers or complex evaluations, with open questions and unsolved dilemmas. Social media is simplifying the reality to the level of caricaturising it, because we find it hard to understand it in its complexity. The effect on the society is the same clear and strict perception, the lack of questions on a subject and the split of the society on each question. Cohesion is hard to reach and any decision is criticised or supported on emotional rather than on rational bases. Accepting the others' opinion and weighting its arguments, a bases of liberal democracy, disappears on those platforms.

Social media has also an impact on the behaviour of individuals linked to socialisation, humanitarian approach as well as community involvement and participation. It creates new types of behaviour at different individuals, fuelling fears and alienation²⁹ or, on the contrary, forcing pragmatism and efficiency without compassion or taking advantage, on the contrary, of emotions, amplified to passionate approaches to themes promoted in a disputable way at the national level (nuclear energy, presence of foreign troops on the national territory etc.)³⁰.

But the most important part is linked to post-truth, perceptions and realities and the psychological impact of this instrument, social media, used by specialised users with bad intentions that could harm individual conscience, will or social behaviour of people³¹. Here the society is directly targeted by means that are using extensively social media.

Democratization brought by the technical build-up of the social media has led to an explosion with enormous consequences by promoting a generous idea that every truth, every idea has equal value. So Internet and social media have made each sentence and every opinion equal. We have come to an *absolute democratization of the Truth* and those ideas are confronted

²⁸ Eric Stern, *Crisis Decision making. A Cognitive institutional approach*, Swedish National Defence College, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 2003.

²⁹ Greg Simons, Iulian Chifu, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Iulian Chifu, Cristina Ivan, *op. cit.*

³¹ Martin Gurri, *op.cit.*

in a competition for audience in the public space where popularity is the driving factor that consecrates the spread of the idea.

Any group or theme is an image of the people using social media and addressing a subject. It reflects their traits and their knowledge when they become public in such a special media environment, if we consider social media as also being a source of news and a mass media space. It reveals education, habits, traditions, characteristic features, and also society, relationship, community spirit and its natural hierarchy. But it also alters the same characteristics via the fashion it establishes and the multiplication of some models and leading ideas. But this once the only criterion is the idea of attractivity, a dramatic change in the societal hierarchies.

5. Social media and political security: populism, nationalism, identity and progressist ideas

Social media introduced some tremendous changes when it offered to anybody free access to infinite information, with practically no cost. And those changes are clearly in favour of the democracy. The low level self-censored people that didn't participate in the elections due to the lack of understanding of the impact and relevance of the vote, of the low civic spirit and to the lack of information now move to polls all over the world³². It has an impact on the political capacity of the society.

The second phenomenon is the creation of numerous groups of like-minded persons, with very concrete and difficult problems, knowledgeable with nuances about their own problem that found themselves and get together via the social media. This creates problems for any administration or party that wants to solve concrete problems. Because finally we are talking about tens of thousands of such concrete problems³³ and there's no administrative capacity to analyse and respond to all of them, or to have a solution for each one.

On another note, we have studies³⁴ that present the „increasing sentimentalization” of democracies, through social media and their dominant presence in the public sphere. And this supports and develops populism, since the “sentimentalization” is facilitated by social media and expresses itself in populism: “digitalization shows an important expressive and formative dimension and paves the way for a populist way of communication”³⁵. Populism has been described as an ideology that designs an opposition between people and elite and populists are claiming that they are the only true representatives of the people, making use of both verbal and non-verbal strategies of representation³⁶.

Social media supports the development of populism, on different levels. It is not only about teasing emotions and harsh speech in order to attract numerous followers via social media³⁷. It is also about challenging existing elites and promoting “normal people” in the forefront of the public and political institutions, giving satisfaction to big number of people,

³² Iulian Chifu, “Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations”, in: 15th International Scientific Conference “Strategies XXI” Proceedings “Strategic Changes and International Relations”, 11-12 April 2019, Bucharest, Romania, National Defence University, pp. 11-23.

³³ Iulian Chifu, Cristina Ivan, *op. cit.*

³⁴ Manuel Arias Maldonado, “Rethinking Populism in the Digital Age: Social Networks, Political Affects and Post-Truth Democracies”, in XIII Congreso AECPA, Santiago de Compostela, 20-22 September 2017GT 1.8 The Contemporary Public Sphere -Protest Movements and Populist Actors, URL:

<https://riuma.uma.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10630/14500/Rethinking%20Populism%20in%20the%20Digital%20Age%20-Manuel%20Arias%20Maldonado%2C%20GT%201.8%2C%20XIII%20Congreso%20Aecpa.pdf?sequence=1>, accessed on August 3, 2019.

³⁵ *Ibidem.*

³⁶ *Ibidem.*

³⁷ Wolfgang Ishinger, *op.cit.*; Muller, Jan-Werner, *Op. cit.*; Francis Fukuyama, *op. cit.*

without any genuine ambition of ever taking a public office. And therefore, traditional parties can't compete with populist movements due to the balanced language, inclination to present details and nuances in the speeches and in trying to solve real problems, issues that are far more complicated to communicate to large groups of followers than the solutions that look simple, unsophisticated, in the clear and harsh direct messages³⁸ of populists.

There are *five key elements of the populism* that are enforced through the use of social media: emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracising others, and invoking the 'heartland'³⁹. *Sovereignty* of the people versus bureaucrats, technocrats, experts, elite is easy to frame in conspiracy theories spread by populists. Claiming that populists are the real people and their representatives – and existing institutions, parties, leaders are fake – is easy in closed groups on social media and in environment driven by groupthink; attacking the elite is an easy task on social media where emotions and harsh words have a more important reach than balanced language and rational arguments or facts; populists are very good in finding and defining enemies, and social media allows easier the creation of clear cut groups, us and them. And invoking traditions, old good times, ways to do things in my time is easier in an emotional environment like the one favoured by social media.

We could add an extensive use of mass microtargeting campaigns to spread inflammatory messages among susceptible voter groups⁴⁰ during populist elections like Brexit or American presidential elections in 2016, with Donald Trump. This tactic would have been impossible before the social networks. Populism is the first political approach to take profit on the social media. *Nationalism* is another point very well defined in social media, with very clear ideas and coherent statements, harsh ones that create a high number of followers.

Social media has, also, a direct impact on *identities*. And this also alters the political landscape, affecting political security. Social media is an instrument easy to use in creating new types of identities and groups, with different agendas, building new sets of demands for new categories of rights or advantages. The support for populism can also come through the enforcement, via social media, of the new types of identities⁴¹. Social media is a way for forging identities. In some cases, the existing ones, the classic ones – ethnic, religious, professional, preferences, ideologies or attachment to different ideas or opinions – in some others, the new types of identity, on the making, completely linked to preferences, background or psychological structure of the components of a group or another. Creating new groups could be a way of dissolving the old traditional ones, as in some other cases, social media and excessive internet use could harm societal cohesion and alienate the person from the community and society, therefore harming the classical identities that are supportive of populism⁴².

The effects of social media supporting and developing populism and favouring the spread of populist ideas come also from challenging the global leadership, fighting the elite, contesting traditional parties and institutions⁴³. They spread ideas of revision and revolution of

³⁸ Jiri Pehe, *Populism in the Age of Mediocracy and Mediacracy*, URL: <http://www.pehe.cz/Members/redaktor/populism-in-the-age-of-mediocracy-and-mediocracy>, accessed on August 3, 2019.

³⁹ Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser & Florin Büchel, *Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology*, *Information, Communication & Society*, 20:8, 2017.

⁴⁰ Enrique Dans, "Did Social Networks Cause Populism?", in *Forbes*, December 3, 2018, URL: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2018/12/03/social-networks-and-populism-cause-and-effect/#19a17d475276>, accessed on August 4, 2019.

⁴¹ Francis Fukuyama, *Identity. Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition*, Profile Books Ltd, London, 2018.

⁴² Iulian Chifu, "Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations", in: 15th International Scientific Conference „Strategies XXI” Proceedings “Strategic Changes and International Relations”, 11-12 April 2019, Bucharest, Romania, National Defence University, pp. 11-23.

⁴³ Jan-Werner Muller, *Ce este populismul*, Polirom, Iași, 2017.

the global security and international relations⁴⁴, rather than changing, adapting and reforming them.

As we know, the pressure of populism has its malign effect on the liberal world order and is very real. Populism means, generally, governing with one eye on the media and the other on the polls. And it leads to *Mediocracy and Mediocracy*⁴⁵. The influence of social media on traditional politics, ideologies and parties also have an important impact on party hierarchies, including in the mainstream parties, where populist leaders are more favoured by social media. They favour personalities with less responsibility and able to communicate emotions, in strong words and extreme forms that are attracting the public instead of people with arguments and knowledge.

On another note, social media helps promoting extreme progressist approaches that harm individual identities and social, group identities⁴⁶. Once their manifestations are creating the sense of threat to a number of individuals who felt pressed, threatened and prevented from their liberty of assuming and exposing their identity, the reaction of those individuals moving to the extreme and populist ideas is supported via the activity developed and favoured by social media.

Political correctness, progressive approaches, excesses of a left-wing liberal democracy, secularism, trans-humanism and preach for the new technologies instead of humans⁴⁷, all are approaches that are favoured by the social media. First, because social media does not make any distinction between rational and passional or emotional. They are all equal as statements and posts. Second, it is a democratic approach, where all the persons that are accessing/using social media are equal, in spite of their CVs and credentials or their lack. And third, through the action of the social media platforms that are eliminating the hate speech, extreme right-wing approaches – a good choice – as well as other rules of the communities, the space given to those ideas is far more important in the whole virtual space.

Conservative political figures as well as Christian thinkers are looking critically to those type of ideas claiming that political correctness, for instance, become real social phenomenon, involving social control, it is an instrument of public intimidation, introducing an excessive culpability sentiment, a social instrument of manipulation and cohesion, blame and shame, where the first target is the white, Christian, heterosexual majority. Moreover, the positive discrimination attached to political correctness is presenting the characteristics of altering the competition and sacrificing meritocracy⁴⁸. The side effect is the perception of an attack to individual or group identity and the reply is to migrate towards populist, nationalist and extreme views of those that perceive themselves under attack.

6. The changes in national security resulting from social media as an instrument⁴⁹

All these societal and political security threats have a huge impact on the new threat environment, on any current threat assessment. And all come amplified in any current and future attempt to cope with the security and defence of a nation. That's why all those non-conventional and unconventional threats that are harming the internal immutable realities we used to consider

⁴⁴ Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die*, Broadway Books, New York, 2019; Rice Condoleezza, Amy Zegart, *op. cit.*; Bill Emmott, *The Fate of the West. The Battle to Save the World's Most Successful Political Idea*, Profile Books Ltd, London, 2018.

⁴⁵ Jiri Pehe, *op.cit.*

⁴⁶ Robert Kagan, *op.cit.*; Nicu Gavriluță, *op.cit.*

⁴⁷ Nicu Gavriluță, *op.cit.*

⁴⁸ Horia Roman Patapievic, Gabriel Liiceanu, Robert Kagan, Niall Ferguson, apud Nicu Gavriluță, *Op.cit.*

⁴⁹ Iulian Chifu, "Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations", in: *15th International Scientific Conference „Strategies XXI” Proceedings “Strategic Changes and International Relations”*, 11-12 April 2019, Bucharest, Romania, National Defence University, pp. 11-23.

as fixed, constant and solid need to be explored, known and approached in a scientific and comprehensive manner in order to prevent strategic surprise on those areas and the emergence of the new types of conflicts.

It should be easy to realise that those gaps in perception and the surprises at the level of common knowledge, the impact of those technological developments on individual and societal threat perceptions are influencing in the highest level the internal security. The alteration of societal security, fragmentation and alienation of individual, loosing sense of community spirit or societal cohesion are directly influencing the security of a nation. Moreover, the new vulnerabilities could be used by external actors that could take advantage of those evolutions and lack of prevention.

Support for decision-makers and political approaches claim trust and understanding of the real evolutions of the threats and security concerns coming from experts at the level of the whole population. Financing security need is also linked to a clear perception of those evolutions and a general understanding where we are all wrong as humans and how it happens that we are all subject of those collective mistakes or misleading⁵⁰.

Assuming that a part of the general information linked to security is not a subject of the public area and that there are things we cannot know and we are not supposed to know is another point that needs to be taught and realised at a societal level, in order to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings, as well as to accentuate vulnerabilities due to the lack of public trust.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, *NATO welcomes opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats*, 11 April 2017, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_143143.htm.
2. ***, *NATO's new division: A serious look at 'emerging security challenges' or an attempt at shoring up relevance and credibility?*, ISIS Europe Briefing Note, No. 51, September 2010, URL: https://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATOs_New_Division_0.pdf.
3. ***, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*", 7 November 1991, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
4. Arias Maldonado, Manuel, "Rethinking Populism in the Digital Age: Social Networks, Political Affects and Post-Truth Democracies", in *XIII Congreso AECPA, Santiago de Compostela, 20-22 September 2017* GT 1.8 "The Contemporary Public Sphere-Protest Movements and Populist Actors", URL: <https://riuma.uma.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10630/14500/Rethinking%20Populism%20in%20the%20Digital%20Age%20Manuel%20Arias%20Maldonado%20C%20GT%201.8%20C%20XIII%20Congreso%20Aecpa.pdf?sequence=1>.
5. Buzan, Barry, *Popoarele, Statele și Teama*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2012.
6. Chifu, Iulian "Cum alterăm realitatea în războiul informațional: Post-adevăr, post-factual, post-umanitate", in *Revista Infosfera*, December 2018.
7. Chifu, Iulian, "Hybrid Warfare, Lawfare, Informational War. The Wars of the Future", in: *Proceedings International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI "The Complex and Dynamic Nature of International Security Environment"*, "Carol" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 203-211.

⁵⁰ Iulian Chifu, "Intelligence and Crisis Decision-making: a Bridge Too Far?" in *IAFIE – EUROPE 2019*, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, 14.04-17.04.2019, to be publish in proceedings.

8. Chifu, Iulian, "Informational warfare, from STRATCOM to Psyops", in: *Working Papers of the „World LUMEN Congress Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty”*, 12-17 April 2016, Iași, International Conference, Lumen Media Publishing UK, 2016.
9. Chifu, Iulian, "Intelligence and Crisis Decision-making: a Bridge Too Far?", in *IAFIE – EUROPE 2019*, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, 14.04-17.04.2019, to be publish in proceedings.
10. Chifu, Iulian, "Non-Conventional Threats and the New Types of Conflicts of Hybrid Nature in the 21st Century", in *Romanian Military Thinking Conference "Security and Defence between History, Theory and Public Policies"*, 6-7 November 2019 – in course of publishing.
11. Chifu, Iulian, "Războiul hibrid și reziliența societală. Planificarea apărării hibride", in *Revista Infosfera*, February 2018, pp. 23-30.
12. Chifu, Iulian, "Războiul informațional: componentă a războiului hibrid și instrument de acțiune agresivă cu relevanță strategică", in *Revista Infosfera*, 2016.
13. Chifu, Iulian, "Technology and Democracy. The Impact of the Evolution of Security and International Relations", in: *15th International Scientific Conference „Strategies XXI” Proceedings "Strategic Changes and International Relations"*, 11-12 April 2019, Bucharest, Romania, National Defence University, pp. 11-23.
14. Chifu, Iulian, "Trei generații de război informațional. Nivelul dezvoltării domeniului în partea sa publică", in *Revista Infosfera*, September 2017, pp. 20-28.
15. Chifu, Iulian, *Gândire Strategică*, The Publishing House of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 2013.
16. Chifu, Iulian; Ivan, Cristina, "Rolul democrației participative, al meta-narațiunilor și autorului colectiv în secolul XXI. Mesaj din viitor", in: *Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence, RRSI* no. 10/ December 2013, Bucharest.
17. Chifu, Iulian; Nantoi, Oazu, *Război informațional: tipizarea agresiunii informaționale a Federației Ruse*, Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale "Ion I. C. Brătianu" al Academiei Române, București, 2016.
18. Chifu, Iulian; Țuțuianu, Simona, *Torn Between East and West: Europe's Border States*, Routledge, London and New York, 2017.
19. Dans, Enrique, "Did Social Networks Cause Populism?", in *Forbes*, December 3, 2018, URL: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2018/12/03/social-networks-and-populism-cause-and-effect/#19a17d475276>.
20. Emmott, Bill, *The Fate of the West. The Battle to Seave the World's Most Successful Political Idea*, Profile Books Ltd, London, 2018.
21. Engesser, Sven; Ernst, Nicole; Esser, Frank; Büchel, Florin, "Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology", in *Information, Communication & Society*, No. 8 [20]/ 2017.
22. Fukuyama Francis, *Identity. Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition*, Profile books Ltd, London, 2018.
23. Geiselberger, Heinrich (ed.), Appadurai, Arjun; Porta, Donatella de la; Fraser, Nancy; *Marea Regresie: De ce trăim un moment istoric*, Editura Art București, 2016.
24. Gurri Martin, *The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium*, Stripe Press, Stripe Matter Inc., 2018.
25. Ishinger, Wolfgang, *Lumea în Pericol. Germania și Europa în vremuri nesigure*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2019.
26. Kagan, Robert, *The Jungle Grows Back. America and Our Imperiled World*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2018.

27. Kirchick, James, *Sfârșitul Europei. Dictatori, demagogi și Noul Ev Întunecat*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018.
28. Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel, *How Democracies Die*, Broadway Books, New York, 2019.
29. Muller, Jan-Werner, *Ce este populismul*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2017.
30. Nicu, Gavriluță, *Noile religii seculare. Corectitudinea politică, tehnologiile viitorului și trans-umanismul*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2018.
31. Pehe, Jiri, *Populism in the Age of Mediocracy and Mediacracy*, URL: http://www.pehe.cz/Members/redaktor/populism-in-the-age-of-mediocracy-and-mediocracy_
32. Rice, Condoleezza; Amy, Zegart, *Political Risk. Facing the Threat of Global Insecurity in the Twenty First Century*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2018.
33. Richards, Steve, *The Rise of the Outsiders. How Mainstream Politics Lost its way*, Atlantic Books, London, 2017.
34. Romaniuk, Scott Nicholas, "Copenhagen School" in: Bruce A. Arrigo, *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy*, SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks.
35. Rosling, Hans, *Factfulness, Ten Reasons We're Wrong About the World--and Why Things Are Better Than You Think*, Sceptre, 2018.
36. Simons, Greg; Chifu, Iulian, *The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century*, Routledge, London and New York, 2017.
37. Stern, Eric, *Crisis Decision making. A Cognitive institutional approach*, Swedish National Defence College, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 2003.

NEW CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OF THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, Ph.D.

Senior Researcher, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
"Carol I" National Defence University
E-mail: sarcinschi.alexandra@unap.ro

Abstract: *The aim of this paper is to connect at a theoretical level the latest changes in the political landscape of Europe – namely the reinforcement of right-wing populism, national conservatism, Euroscepticism, etc. subsumed to the oxymoron “illiberal democracy” – to the issue of governance of the defence and security sector. Since these changes are to be considered challenges to nowadays democracy, it is obvious that the security sector might be placed under pressure by those who govern it and are not committed to the set of principles specific to this type of political leadership. The author will introduce a brief description of Europe’s political landscape, will identify some representative countries currently governed by nationalist parties and will correlate them with the most important indicators regarding governance of the defence and security sector.*

Keywords: *democracy; governance; defence and security sector; illiberal democracy; national conservatism; autocratization; flawed democracy.*

INTRODUCTION

The last years brought into European political discourses themes that seemed to be retained in the secondary plane of the political scene, such as those specific to right-wing populism, national conservatism, Euroscepticism, and even extreme nationalism. The most evident cause of this revival was the crisis of refugee and illegal migrants that is used by some political leaders in order to promote their populist ideas by categorizing it as a threat to national security, although this issue was on debate years before 2015 (the peak year of the crisis)¹. This is part of the so-called strategy of political weaponization of migration, in which migration is used to increase political legitimacy of certain parties and to justify a series of actions that are not in complete concordance with nowadays democracy. The effect of using this theme in nationalist and Eurosceptic discourses is more powerful since it is correlated to other themes: on the one hand, the potential economic crisis that could be fostered by the presence of the large number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, and, on the other hand, the issue of national sovereignty that might be affected by EU’s decisions on relocation. This is the case for some European parties such as the ones in Hungary (Fidesz), Italy (Northern League), Poland (Law and Justice) or even Switzerland (Swiss People’s Party). For instance, Hungary and Poland disapproved both EU refugee relocation scheme and the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

¹ Peter Walker and Matthew Taylor, “Far right on rise in Europe, says report”, in *The Guardian*, 06.11.2011, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-rise-europe-report>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

Even if the purpose of this paper is not to analyse the issue of corruption, it must be at least mentioned as it poses an important threat to democracy and, as shown below, it is connected with the trend of *autocratization* and development of *illiberal democracy*. Corruption is affecting and weakening democracy, and, in turn, a weakened democracy is more vulnerable to an expanding phenomenon of corruption. In 2016, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, corruption and poor governance were recognized as “security challenges as they undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development, erode public trust in defence institutions and have a negative impact on operational effectiveness”², and in December 2018 NATO and EU signed an agreement to cooperate in promoting good governance in the defence and security sector³. The issue of corruption is affecting the entire world: *The Corruption Perception Index 2018* published by Transparency International shows that the maximum score is reached by Denmark (88/100 points) out of 180 analysed countries and the lowest by Somalia (10/100 points); in between, more than 2/3 of the analysed countries reach no more than 50 points⁴. In the EU countries, the Report identifies a lack of prioritising anti-corruption reforms alongside rising populist rhetoric combine with weakening democratic institutions⁵. These democratic institutions are the ones that govern the defence and security sector and any step back might be a security threat.

1. Main changes in the current European political landscape

The political landscape of Europe is now characterized by both liberal and democratic forces, on the one hand, and right-wing populist and national conservatism forces, on the other hand.

The latter are correlated with a high occurrence of Eurosceptic ideas, especially those regarding a strong nationalism and immigration. Even if nationalism itself is not a threat to democracy (under normal conditions, democracy generates nationalism, and nationalism generates democracy⁶), some of its conceptions are negatively exploited: for instance, assertion of specific identity and ethnic purity. Last decade was characterized by the rise of neo-nationalism, as it is associated with anti-immigration discourses and right-wing populism. Some authors identify this type of political doctrine in both Donald Trump’s and Boris Johnson’s political discourses: “America First”, respectively Brexit⁷.

The strengthen of the right-wing populism is another trend in Europe’s political landscape, even if EU leaders, such as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, are trying to

² ***, NATO Building Integrity Policy Endorsed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, NATO Official Texts, 2016, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_135626.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on September 16, 2019.

³ ***, “NATO and the EU sign agreement to support good governance”, *NATO News*, 11.12.2018, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161489.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on September 16, 2019.

⁴ ***, *Corruption Perception Index 2018*, Transparency International, 2018, URL: https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/CPI_2018_Executive_Summary_EN.pdf, accessed on September 16, 2019.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Gheorghită Geană, “Naționalism”, *Dicționar de sociologie*, Babel Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, pp. 375-377.

⁷ Michael Hirsh, “Why the New Nationalists Are Taking Over. Our post-Cold War system might be a triumph for peace and security, but it’s built on unsustainable economic ideas”, in *Politico Magazine*, 27.06.2016, URL: <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/nationalism-donald-trump-boris-johnson-brexit-foreign-policy-xenophobia-isolationism-213995>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

contain it⁸. For instance, in Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Norway, right-wing populist parties are supporting the parliamentary majority or are even governing⁹. Such a doctrine combines right and populist themes and it is correlated especially with neo-nationalism, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and Islamophobia.

Moreover, the governing parties in Hungary (Fidesz) and Poland (Law and Justice) are good examples for the way in which the national conservatism is shaping the EU¹⁰. In Hungary, Fidesz won in 2018 elections the fourth governing mandate based on themes such as the threat of immigration and foreign interference, but has lost the last local elections (October, 2019) in a confrontation with the united opposition (from left to right)¹¹. Because of Viktor Orbán’s governing measures regarding restrictions on free media, justice, academia, minorities and refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, Hungary was placed under Article 7 investigation and the European Parliament identified “a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded”¹². In Poland, last parliamentary elections were re-won by the Law and Justice Party, a party that uses anti-immigration themes¹³. In the same time, the European Commission decided to refer Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU on issues regarding the rule of law¹⁴.

All of these parties are examples for an oxymoronic term called *illiberal democracy*. Since *liberal democracy* (and *democracy* itself) is about rule of law, separation of powers, and guaranteeing civil rights, the idea of an *illiberal* characteristic is denying its core values. Still, this notion is not new and specific to the latest developments in the European political landscape. In 1997, Fareed Zakaria authored in *Foreign Policy* a paper on the rise of illiberal democracy¹⁵ in which explains the fact that “illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably democratic”¹⁶. Main characteristics of illiberal democracies are: political power is increasingly being centralized and the freedom of people is constantly eroded¹⁷. More comprehensive approaches argue that illiberal democracy might be

⁸ Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and Guy Chazan, “European politics: leaders struggle to contain rising populism”, in *Financial Times*, 13.12.2017, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/7d012adc-dc32-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

⁹ Simon Kuper, “Why rightwing populism has radicalised”, in *Financial Times*, 11.09.2019, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/0fcafba6-d428-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

¹⁰ George F. Will, “National Conservatism policies are full of oxymorons”, in *The Washington Post*, 10.08.2019, URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/national-conservatism-is-elizabeth-warren-conservatism/2019/08/09/5f8e3106-b9fb-11e9-b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html, accessed on September 12, 2019.

¹¹ Keno Verseck, “Ungaria: Formațiunea de guvernământ Fidesz pierde primăria din Budapesta”, in *Deutsche Welle*, 14.10.2019, URL: <https://www.dw.com/ro/ungaria-forma%C5%A3iunea-de-guvern%C4%83m%C3%A2nt-fidesz-pierde-prim%C4%83ria-din-budapesta/a-50798680>, accessed on October 14, 2019.

¹² European Parliament, REPORT on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)), PE 620.837v02-00, 2018, URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0250_EN.html, accessed on September 16, 2019.

¹³ Marcin Gocłowski, Agnieszka Barteczko and Anna Koper, “Polish opposition warns refugees could spread infectious diseases”, in *Reuters*, 15.10.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-poland-idUSKCN0S918B20151015>, accessed on October 11, 2019.

¹⁴ European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission refers Poland to the Court of Justice to protect judges from political control, 10.10.2019, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6033, accessed on October 11, 2019.

¹⁵ Fareed Zakaria, “The rise of illiberal democracy”, in *Foreign Affairs*; Nov/Dec 1997, No. 76, pp. 22-42.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 42.

¹⁷ Andrea Schmidt, “Challenges of the Illiberal Democracy in Hungary. Some Aspects to the 2018 Elections”, in *Polish Political Science Review*, Volume 6, Issue 2/2019, pp.70-90, URL: <https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/ppsr/6/2/article-p70.xml>, accessed on September 16, 2019.

described as “a temporary co-existence of overlapping political structures that contradict to each other” and even if from a theoretically point of view it is an oxymoron, yet it might exist in the real world as a form of hybrid regimes¹⁸.

Still, how this situation impacts the governance of the defence and security sector?

The illiberal democracy is characterized by authoritarianism, the existence of a strong political clique, corruption, and chaotic public administration¹⁹. One of the main dangers is not the condemnation of international democratic elites, but the double game played by the illiberal leader who uses the benefits offered by country’s membership to democratic community while disrespecting the democratic norms²⁰.

In this context, the illiberal democracy affects the roots of the defence and security sector.

2. The governance of the defence and security sector

The topic of governing the defence and security sector is not new in studying the relations between society and the armed forces, especially regarding the political dimension. The issues included in this analysis are specific to the conceptual framework on political system, democracy, good governance, and democratic political control over the armed forces.

According to Enciclopædia Britannica, the political system is a set of formal legal institutions that constitutes *the government* or *the state*; in a wider approach, it includes both the current forms and the pre-established ones, and not only the legal organization of the state, but also the way in which it is functioning²¹. However, in an even wider approach, the political system is a “processes of interaction” or a subsystem of the social system that interacts with other subsystems²². One of these subsystems is the military one, but not in the sense described by Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver in their book, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), who use the notion of *military sector* as identifying a specific type of interaction regarding relationships of forceful coercion inside the broad agenda of security (Buzan introduces five security sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental)²³. Therefore, the *military subsystem* does not equal the *military sector of security*, but is a component of the broader *social system*. Since security is a state of the entire social system, it means that the *security sector* includes all of the elements that are needed in a society to manage this state regardless the subsystem they are part of. *Security sector* definition includes more than security providers, but also “all the institutions and personnel responsible for security management and oversight at both national and local level”²⁴.

Alongside these concepts is the one of *defence sector*. This sector is broader than the military sector of security theorized by Buzan. It includes “the domain of public administration

¹⁸ András Bozóki, *Illiberal Democracy Belongs to the Hybrid Regimes*, 02.08.2017, URL: <http://publicseminar.org/2017/08/illiberal-democracy-belongs-to-the-hybrid-regimes/>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Alan D. Heslop, “Political system”, in *Enciclopædia Britannica*, URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-system/Confederations-and-federations>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, Ole Wæver, *Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiză*, CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2011.

²⁴ ***, *Defence Reform. Applying the principles of good security sector governance to defence*, SSR Backgrounder, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2019, URL: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_13_Defence%20Reform_0.pdf, accessed on September 23, 2019.

responsible for military power” and “usually it comprises the armed forces, their political leadership (commander in chief, ministry of defence), the executive controlling authorities (president, prime minister) and other state agencies, permanently or occasionally involved in defence matters”, even some commercial service providers of the defence industry²⁵.

The notion *defence and security sector* marks the importance of defence for achieving security and, even if the latter has now a comprehensive approach that includes multiple sectors, defence is still prevailing.

Given these considerations, it is obvious that the type of political leadership reflects in the way in which the defence and security sector is governed. The state holds the legitimate monopoly on use of force and any backslide from democracy may affect the development, the implementation and the reviewing process of the security and defence policy, the declaring and lifting the state of emergency and the state of war, and may lead to unethical behaviour regarding the public acquisitions and managing the human resources and even the use of military and security forces against its own citizens²⁶.

3. How the challenge of *illiberal democracy* impacts upon the governance of the defence and security sector?

The issues introduced in the previous chapter are complicated by the fact that there is a trend for autocratization, even if democracy is not globally in decline²⁷. According to the V-Dem Institute from the Swedish University of Ghotenburg, autocratization “means any substantial and significant worsening on the scale of liberal democracy”²⁸ and it can occur both in democracies and autocracies. It covers the democratic backsliding, the breakdown of democracy, and the worsening of conditions in electoral authoritarian countries²⁹. The analysis reveals that European countries such as Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Serbia, etc. are subjected to a “third wave of autocratization”³⁰. Also, Hungary is in Top 10 Estimated Risks for 2019–2020³¹ meaning that the erosion of democratic norms and institutions by sitting political elites represents a significant threat.

Moreover, in 2018, as mentioned above, the European Parliament adopted a resolution welcoming the Commission decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU in relation to Poland, as well as a resolution on launching the Article 7(1) TEU procedure in relation to Hungary³². This refers to the need to determine the existence of a clear risk of serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality,

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ Svein Eriksen, Francisco Cardona, *Criteria for Good Governance in the Defence Sector. International Standards and Principles*, Center for Integrity in the Defence Sector, Norway, n.d., URL: <https://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/7215-Criteria-for-Good-Governance-in-the-Defence-Sector-k6.pdf>, accessed on September 23, 2019.

²⁷ ***, *Democracy Facing Global Challenges. V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019*, V-Dem Institute, University of Ghotenburg, May 2019, Sweden, URL: https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf, accessed on September 23, 2019.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p.14.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

³² ***, *The protection of fundamental rights in the EU*, Fact Sheets on the European Union, European Parliament, URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/146/the-protection-of-fundamental-rights-in-the-eu>, accessed on September 23, 2019.

the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities³³.

In the case of Hungary, the European Parliament is concerned on the following issues: the functioning of the constitutional and electoral system; the independence of the judiciary and of other institutions and the rights of judges; corruption and conflicts of interest; privacy and data protection; freedom of expression; academic freedom; freedom of religion; freedom of association; the right to equal treatment; the rights of persons belonging to minorities, including Roma and Jews, and protection against hateful statements against such minorities; the fundamental rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; economic and social rights³⁴. Still, according to the *Fragile State Index 2019*, Hungary is registering an improvement regarding the total country score (from 50.2 in 2018 to 49.6 in 2019), but the following indicators worsened in the last year: state legitimacy; human rights and rule of law; human flight and brain drain; external intervention³⁵.

Case of Poland is different: the concerns of the Commission refers to the lack of an independent and legitimate constitutional review and the adoption by the Polish Parliament of new legislation relating to the Polish judiciary which “raises grave concerns as regards judicial independence and increases significantly the systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland”³⁶. According to *Fragile State Index 2019*, Poland registers the worsening both of the total country score (from 41.5 in 2018 to 42.8 in 2019) and of seven indicators out of twelve: security apparatus; group grievance; state legitimacy, human rights; external intervention; public services; human flight and brain drain³⁷.

It is obvious that in both cases, there are indicators directly linked to the defence and security sectors, such as state legitimacy, security apparatus, group grievance, external intervention, human rights and the rule of law. Each of them includes at least one component that is correlated to the defence and security sector. For instance, state legitimacy indicator assesses the existence or not of the democratic governance, but it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place, the nature of political transitions, and the degree to which the government is representative for the population it governs. The human rights and the rule of law indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population and, among others, looks at whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. Also, external intervention focuses on security aspects of engagement from external actors, in the internal affairs of a state at risk, and on economic engagement by outside actors.³⁸

Moreover, international reports on defence and security governance in 2018 and 2019 underlines the fact that the current global political climate was not favourable to multilateralism

³³ ***, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. Title I. Common Provisions. Article 2, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/1, 26.10.2012, URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/art_2/oj, accessed on September 23, 2019.

³⁴ ***, Report on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)), European Parliament, 04.07.2018, URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0250_EN.html, accessed on September 16, 2019.

³⁵ ***, *Fragile State Index. Hungary*, The Fund for Peace, 2019, URL: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data>, accessed on September 23, 2019.

³⁶ ***, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, European Commission, 20.12.2017, URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0835&from=EN>, accessed on September 23, 2019.

³⁷ ***, *Fragile State Index. Poland*, The Fund for Peace, 2019, URL: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data>, accessed on September 23, 2019. For more details on the content of the indicators, see URL: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/>.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

and global agreements³⁹. There are serious trends regarding disillusionment on the functioning of the government, decreased confidence in political institutions and, finally, in democracy itself, even if the political participation is rising⁴⁰. In this type of democracies, called *flawed democracy*⁴¹, the issues of governance and political culture are very problematic due to the fact that might be affected the very heart of good governance in the security sector: parliamentary oversight, anti-corruption policies, anti-corruption specialized bodies, arrangements for handling conflicts of interests, arrangements for transparency, arrangements for external and internal audit, and ombudsman institutions⁴².

CONCLUSIONS

As shown above, the entire world, and consequently Europe, is confronting a trend of autocratization that affects not only autocracies, but democracies too. In the case of the latter, this phenomenon implies the erosion of liberal democracy, resulting an oxymoronic form characterized as *illiberal*: the rule of law, the separation of power, and the protection fundamental freedoms are endangered. Since the defence and security sector is subjected to the same standards of good governance as any other public sector, the incapacity of the state to deliver democratic civilian control, rule of law and respect for human rights is preventing from providing security to its citizens. The next level of danger is where the poor governance of the defence and security sector meets the need for conflict prevention, crisis management or peace building: state's incapacity to address one or more of the phases of the conflict cycle is creating a spiral of conflict and insecurity.

Therefore, the explanation outline seems to be simple: one of the main component of a strong democracy is good governance of the defence and security sector; any challenge to democracy might impact this sector and any dysfunctionality of the defence and security sector is aggravating the regress of democracy and is creating and fostering insecurity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. Title I. Common Provisions. Article 2, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/1, 26.10.2012, URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/art_2/oj.
2. ***, NATO Building Integrity Policy Endorsed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, NATO

³⁹ Amira El-Sayed (Ed.), *Global Standards for Responsible Defence Governance*, Transparency International, UK, 2018, URL: <https://ti-defence.org/publications/global-standards-for-responsible-defence-governance/>, accessed on September 12, 2019.

***, *Democracy Facing Global Challenges. V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019*, V-Dem Institute, University of Ghotenburg, May 2019, Sweden, URL: https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf, accessed on September 23, 2019.

***, *Democracy Index 2018: Me too?*, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, URL: https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy2018, accessed on September 23, 2019.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ According to the report of the Economist Intelligence Unit (*Democracy Index 2018: Me too?*, 2019), *flawed democracy* is where "the countries have free and fair elections and, even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation" (*op. cit.*, p. 49).

⁴² Svein Eriksen, Francisco Cardona, *op. cit.*, n.d.

- Official Texts, 2016, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_135626.htm?selectedLocale=en.
3. ***, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, European Commission, 20.12.2017, URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0835&from=EN>.
 4. ***, “NATO and the EU sign agreement to support good governance”, *NATO News*, 11.12.2018, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161489.htm?SelectedLocale=en.
 5. ***, *Corruption Perception Index 2018*, Transparency International, 2018, URL: https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/CPI_2018_Executive_Summary_EN.pdf.
 6. ***, *REPORT on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL))*, PE 620.837v02-00, European Parliament, 2018, URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0250_EN.html.
 7. ***, *REPORT on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL))*, European Parliament, 04.07.2018, URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0250_EN.html.
 8. ***, Rule of Law: European Commission refers Poland to the Court of Justice to protect judges from political control, European Commission, 10.10.2019, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6033.
 9. ***, *Defence Reform. Applying the principles of good security sector governance to defence*, SSR Backgrounder, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2019, URL: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_13_Defence%20Reform_0.pdf.
 10. ***, *Democracy Facing Global Challenges. V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019*, V-Dem Institute, University of Ghotenburg, May 2019, Sweden, URL: https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf.
 11. ***, *The protection of fundamental rights in the EU, Fact Sheets on the European Union*, European Parliament, URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/146/the-protection-of-fundamental-rights-in-the-eu>, accessed on September 23, 2019.
 12. ***, *Fragile State Index*, The Fund for Peace, 2019, URL: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data>.
 13. ***, *Democracy Index 2018: Me too?*, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, URL: https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy2018.
 14. BOZÓKI, András, *Illiberal Democracy Belongs to the Hybrid Regimes*, 02.08.2017, URL: <http://publicseminar.org/2017/08/illiberal-democracy-belongs-to-the-hybrid-regimes>.
 15. BUZAN, Barry; de WILDE, Jaap; WÆVER, Ole, *Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiză*, CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2011.

16. CHASSANY, Anne-Sylvaine; CHAZAN, Guy, "European politics: leaders struggle to contain rising populism", in *Financial Times*, 13.12.2017, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/7d012adc-dc32-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482>.
17. ERIKSEN, Svein; CARDONA, Francisco, *Criteria for Good Governance in the Defence Sector. International Standards and Principles*, Center for Integrity in the Defence Sector, Norway, n.d., URL: <https://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/7215-Criteria-for-Good-Governance-in-the-Defence-Sector-k6.pdf>.
18. GEANĂ, Gheorghită, "Naționalism", *Dicționar de sociologie*, Babel Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998.
19. GOCLOWSKI, Marcin; BARTECZKO, Agnieszka; KOPER, Anna, "Polish opposition warns refugees could spread infectious diseases", in *Reuters*, 15.10.2015, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-poland-idUSKCN0S918B20151015>.
20. HESLOP, Alan D., "Political system", in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-system/Confederations-and-federations>.
21. HIRSH, Michael, "Why the New Nationalists Are Taking Over. Our post-Cold War system might be a triumph for peace and security, but it's built on unsustainable economic ideas", in *Politico Magazine*, 27.06.2016, URL: <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/nationalism-donald-trump-boris-johnson-brexit-foreign-policy-xenophobia-isolationism-213995>.
22. KUPER, Simon, "Why rightwing populism has radicalised", in *Financial Times*, 11.09.2019, URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/0fcafba6-d428-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77>.
23. EL-SAYED, Amira (Ed.), *Global Standards for Responsible Defence Governance*, Transparency International, UK, 2018, URL: <https://ti-defence.org/publications/global-standards-for-responsible-defence-governance>.
24. SCHMIDT, Andrea, "Challenges of the Illiberal Democracy in Hungary. Some Aspects to the 2018 Elections", in *Polish Political Science Review*, Volume 6, Issue 2/2019, pp.70-90, URL: <https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/ppsr/6/2/article-p70.xml>.
25. VERSECK, Keno, "Ungaria: Formațiunea de guvernământ Fidesz pierde primăria din Budapesta", in *Deutsche Welle*, 14.10.2019, URL: <https://www.dw.com/ro/ungaria-forma%C5%A3iunea-de-guvern%C4%83m%C3%A2nt-fidesz-pierde-prim%C4%83ria-din-budapesta/a-50798680>.
26. WALKER, Peter; TAYLOR, Matthew, "Far right on rise in Europe, says report", in *The Guardian*, 06.11.2011, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-rise-europe-report>.
27. WILL, George F., "National Conservatism policies are full of oxymorons", in *The Washington Post*, 10.08.2019, URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/national-conservatism-is-elizabeth-warren-conservatism/2019/08/09/5fbc3106-b9fb-11e9-b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html.
28. ZAKARIA, Fareed, "The rise of illiberal democracy", in *Foreign Affairs*; Nov/Dec 1997, No. 76, pp. 22-42.

RUSSIAN FAKE NEWS – A NEW INSTRUMENT OF PROPAGANDA

Mara Sofia CRĂCIUNESCU

Student at Bachelor's Programme of International Relations and European Studies,
Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: c.marasofia@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Russia is using the internet to spread propaganda, by sharing fake news, which creates tensions between states. The first targets were the European neighboring countries. In order to create an ideal image of Russia, the fake messages would raise the trust of the countries in the information coming from there. Other targets were the European countries at some crucial moments, such as the 2014 European Parliament elections and regional elections and also U.S.A., due to personal interests in the 2016 presidential elections. In this paper, recent statistics presenting the current influence of Russian mass-media are reviewed. The latest reports on the targeted countries and means adopted by European institutions for combating the Russian propaganda are presented. All of these show a tremendous impact of fake news on population's opinion and international politics.*

Keywords: *Russia; European Union; U.S.A; propaganda; fake news; hybrid war; elections.*

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, a new type of conflict has been developed in the sphere of international relations: hybrid warfare. Starting with the online posting of political news, everyone has the liberty to comment about the latest events in the international arena. This has raised a threat coming from Russia, which is using this modern technology to spread propaganda, by sharing fake news, which creates tensions between states. It might not seem dangerous, but in most countries of the world the power belongs to the people. They represent the fundamental power of the state and if they are negatively influenced, they would make decisions based on what others want, not what they want for the future of their country. This is the reason why the citizens are the target of this phenomenon of propaganda through fake news. This influence will create tensions both internally and externally and they could not be controlled, because fake news is a recent influencing method which is still vaguely understood. However, it has already proved it can be a serious threat for international relations.

1. Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe – Romania and the Post-Soviet states

1.1. Propaganda by specific means

Russia has developed a strategy to influence all its neighboring countries through the internet, spreading fake news on social media and news websites. This is a big concern for the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest. The Political Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, David Schlaefer, claimed that a Russian attempt to influence Romania was noticed, both internally by creating divisions in the society and externally between Romania and other E.U. members and, also, between Romania and its strategic partner U.S.A. Moreover, Russian influence is targeting, in the long run, the whole Europe. He named this situation a hybrid war, because "Moscow has the ability (...) to target individual countries with very different messages, to tailor these propaganda messages, these fake news messages for each country; so, what you are going to hear or see or detect in Romania is not going to be the same as you might in one of your

neighbors, like Bulgaria”¹. Thus, these differences between the propaganda texts are related to the social, cultural and historical factors of each country. A study realized this year by Expert Forum presented which countries were liable to Russian influence depending on their social environment and acceptance level of propaganda².




Figure no. 1: The vulnerability of countries to Russian propaganda³

This graphic clearly shows how the geopolitical context has a tremendous role in this situation. Ukraine and the Baltic States are neighbors with Russia and are fighting the propaganda, while Moldova and Romania, which are located further, do not try to stop it. Why did they adopt this position? One explanation could be the familiarity of Ukraine and the Baltic States with the Russian attempts of influencing them and their desire to prove that they are now independent countries, while the other states do not notice any bad influence and due to historical precedents, the mentality of trusting Russian information did not change. One more detail from this graphic is that Moldova is the most influenced among all four by the Russian propaganda due to its social environment and no will to combat it. Starting from the 19th century, when Russia annexed a territory of Moldova, called Bessarabia, its power of influence in that country has been continuously growing.

¹ Cristina Cileacu, “Diplomat american: Suntem îngrijorați. Rusia are o strategie sofisticată ținută spre România”, in *Digi24*, 24.02.2019, URL: <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/diplomat-american-suntem-ingrijorati-rusia-are-o-strategie-sofisticata-tintita-spre-romania-1087675>, accessed on 14th of August 2019.

² Andrei Luca Popescu, “Temele propagandei ruse în România. Expert Forum: La București, fake news e instrument de guvernare”, in *Radio Europa Libera Romania*, 14 March 2019, URL: <https://romania.europalibera.org/a/temele-propagandei-ruse-%C3%AEn-rom%C3%A2nia-expert-la-bucure%C8%99ti-fake-news-e-instrument-de-guvernare/29821867.html>, accessed on 20th of July 2019.

³ Translated following the original source: Sorin Ioniță, *Raport Expert Forum 2019*, in: Andrei Luca Popescu, “Temele propagandei ruse în România. Expert Forum: La București, fake news e instrument de guvernare”, in *Radio Europa Libera Romania*, 14 March 2019, URL: <https://romania.europalibera.org/a/temele-propagandei-ruse-%C3%AEn-rom%C3%A2nia-expert-la-bucure%C8%99ti-fake-news-e-instrument-de-guvernare/29821867.html>, accessed on 20th of July 2019.

1.2. Propaganda through television

Nowadays, the Russian language is the most spoken after Moldavian and Romanian, which are very similar.⁴ Thus, Moldova has a high potential of being influenced by the information coming from Russia. The Russian mass-media dominates the news TV channels in Moldova, as shown by a report realized in 2018 by Expert Forum⁵.




Figure no. 2: Popularity of TV Channels broadcasting international news in Moldova in 2018⁶

This graph shows that the Russian TV Channels have a popularity of over 60% in broadcasting international news. One of the effects of the Russian monopoly in mass-media is that in 2016 the most popular political leader in Moldova was Vladimir Putin, followed by Angela Merkel and Klaus Iohannis.⁷ Thus, the events happening on the international arena are broadcast in Moldova through a Russian perspective, which is very subjective and can be easily transformed into propaganda. Nevertheless, controlling the news and spreading the Russian language shows how Russia is using the soft power in its plan to dominate and influence other countries.

In Russia, the situation is different. Since 2015, there has been spotted a decrease in the popularity of state-controlled News TV Channels, claims a survey done by Public Opinion Foundation (FOM). The most popular TV Channel in 2015, Pervyi Kanal, with a 53% level of trust in the news has fallen this year to just 33%.⁸ People who decided to stop watching Pervyi Kanal explained their choice by saying that “the News TV Shows have a lot of propaganda and are subordinated to the authorities” and they were watching “continuous negativism”.

Another survey made by FOM asked the people who watch TV if they have observed an increase or a decrease in the quality of the information coming from the state-controlled

⁴ National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Table *Characteristics – Population 1*, URL: <http://statistica.gov.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=479>, accessed on 19th of August 2019.

⁵ Andrei Luca Popescu, *op. cit.*

⁶ Translated and adjusted following the original source: Sorin Ioniță, *Raport Expert Forum 2019*, in: Andrei Luca Popescu, *op. cit.*

⁷ Andrei Luca Popescu, *op. cit.*

⁸ European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, “Figure of the week 1/3”, 24 September 2019, URL: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/figure-of-the-week-1-3/>, accessed on 10th of October 2019.

News TV Channels. 85% were valid answers and among them there was observed an increase in the general tendency of distrust state-controlled news since 2015. In the same time, a decrease of trust in the quality of information was reported.⁹




Figure no. 3: The level of trust in the quality of Russian News TV Channels¹⁰

Taking into consideration the numbers from the last two graphs and the surveys mentioned, the decline of popular support inside Russian borders can be noticed. Thus, Russia reoriented to gain support outside the borders and, according to the studies, it has been a success.

2. Russian influence in the European Union

2.1. The influence in the European Elections

The studies made in the last five years showed that there was a Troll Factory in Saint Petersburg, called Internet Research Agency (IRA), which coordinated all the fake news.¹¹ Thus, the Russian influence over its neighboring countries represents just the first steps in spreading propaganda worldwide. In order to stop this phenomenon, the European Commission shared a message on their website: *“The exposure of citizens to large scale disinformation, including misleading or outright false information, is a major challenge for Europe”*¹² and created the website euvdisinfo.eu as a countermeasure. On this platform, messages and fake news, spread especially by IRA are shared, and they are proved wrong. This year, a timeline of IRA’s actions was posted on this website. The Russians started to post in 2014, during the European Parliament elections, a lot of messages on Twitter, targeting especially Greece. Their aim was to convince the E.U. population that there was not good security at the polling stations in Greece and the voting process was not legitimate, so the results would not be fair. Thus, Russia had a clear attempt to meddle in the 2014 European election.

⁹ Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), *СМИ: ТВ и интернет*, URL: <https://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/14258?fbclid=IwAR1paQGoqtZWv8QyMzNXSqEv6rgq9Lx8uFE5-IWEbTLyhzi6X-IPNKjXwo>, accessed on 15th of October 2019.

¹⁰ Translated and adjusted following the original source: Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), *СМИ: ТВ и интернет*, URL: <https://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/14258?fbclid=IwAR1paQGoqtZWv8QyMzNXSqEv6rgq9Lx8uFE5-IWEbTLyhzi6X-IPNKjXwo>, accessed on 15th of October 2019.

¹¹ European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, “Trolling European Elections 2014 – 2019”, 20 May 2019, URL: <https://euvdisinfo.eu/trolling-european-elections-2014-2019/>, accessed on 19th of August 2019.

¹² European Commission Media Convergence and Social Media (Unit I.4), “Tackling online disinformation”, 13 September 2019, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation>, accessed on 19th of September 2019.

To spread their messages in all the EU member states, they translated them. However, starting in 2016, their target-country changed and a report realized by Cardiff University's Crime and Security Research Institute showed how there was a sudden increase in the number of messages in German¹³.




Figure no. 4: The amount of Troll Factory tweets in each language in 2016¹⁴
Source: Cardiff University Crime & Security Research Institute

Data showed how the posts in other European languages increased continuously until 2015, when “The number of IRA tweets in German grew drastically in just one year: from over 4,000 in 2015 to over 14,000 in 2016. A third of all IRA accounts created in 2016 were targeting German-speaking audience, enabling Russia to meddle in high-profile political debates on German Twitter”, claimed the report. This sudden action could point out a very possible meddling of Russia in the German and Austrian elections, too¹⁵.

Troll Factory accounts created in 2016




Figure no. 5: Troll factory accounts created in 2016¹⁶
Source: Cardiff University Crime & Security Research Institute

¹³ European External Action Service's East StratCom Task Force, “Trolling European Elections 2014 – 2019”, 20 May 2019, URL: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/trolling-european-elections-2014-2019/>, accessed on 19th of August 2019.

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶ European External Action Service's East StratCom Task Force, “Trolling European Elections 2014 – 2019”, 20 May 2019, URL: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/trolling-european-elections-2014-2019/>, accessed on 19th of August 2019.

2.2. Propaganda on the European Parliament

Propaganda, however, did not stop after the German elections. Since one of the most used languages in the propaganda messages is English, the best topic to approach in order to reach a large number of people is the European Parliament.

In 2017, the news website "eptoday.com" was created together with a Facebook and a Twitter account. It described itself as "a monthly newspaper for the European Parliament" and claimed that the MEPs were the editors of the posts. However, this is not true, because most of the articles are copies from "Voice of America" and "Russia Today". Since 2017, only 0.14% of the publications were true contributions from MEPs. EUvsDisinfo analyzed all the articles and claimed that until 24th of October 2018, "Voice of America" was the main source of news and now it is followed by "Russia Today", whose articles are entirely copied and published on the website. Although the published news did not represent real messages from MEPs, the website and the Facebook and Twitter accounts were so credibly designed that they had together over 150 000 readers, who believed it was authentic content.¹⁷ Most of them were for sure citizens in the European Union, since it was a website about one of its most important institutions, and this showed another hidden method of Russian propaganda to meddle in Europe. However, after EUvsDisinfo discovered the deceitfulness of sources from this platform, the European Parliament took measures and stopped the sharing of fake news by suspending the Facebook and Twitter accounts of EP Today.

3. Russia and the 2016 U.S. Presidential election

Nevertheless, Europe is not the only target of IRA propaganda. FBI started an investigation in July 2016 to find out if Russia interfered in the U.S. presidential elections. One year later, The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence confirmed that a report from the Director of National Intelligence was declassified and marked the intention of the Russian President Vladimir Putin to publish damaging information about Hillary Clinton, in order to help Donald Trump presidential campaign.¹⁸

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice accused 13 Russians of being associated with this "troll factory", which influenced the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. Marat Mindiyarov is one of the former employees in the "troll factory" and he presented, in an interview for "The Washington Post", how the propaganda worked. He had to comment on Russian news websites, supporting ideas given by his superiors. He was part of a team of three commentators who created a scenario in which they were arguing in the comment section of a news article: one of them criticized the news, while the other two replied to him saying that his opinion was not plausible and, in the end, the first one agreed with them. Thus, they managed to influence people's choices. The department where he was working was targeting Russian citizens, but in the factory there was a "Facebook Department", which targeted Americans. He claimed that the people working there had to know English perfectly, in order to create the illusion that they are not foreigners. One of the tests to enter there was to write what they think of Hillary Clinton and what were her chances to win the U.S. election. Marat Mindiyarov quit the job because he was ashamed of what he had to do. However, he noticed

¹⁷ European External Action Service's East StratCom Task Force, "How to get the European Parliament read Russia Today", 9 October 2019, <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/how-to-get-the-european-parliament-to-read-russia-today/>, accessed on 12th of October 2019.

¹⁸ ***, CNN Editorial Research, "2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts", in *CNN*, 15 November 2019, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/12/us/2016-presidential-election-investigation-fast-facts/index.html>, accessed on 17th of August 2019.

that the tactics used by the factory for propaganda in the U.S. elections have improved in the meantime, now they became more complicated.¹⁹

CONCLUSIONS

Russia has a big history that shows its desire to dominate and be present all over the world. However, as it can be observed in the recent events, its methods have adapted to the technology. Nowadays, the internet can be accessed by anyone who wants to search or publish information and this represents a security threat to all countries. Both the identity of the user and the information can be either real or fake. Only an investigation would be capable of finding out the truth, but until it is realised, the information spreads, people start believing it and propaganda has already spread and reached its goal.

As a result of recent analyses and reports, Russia has lost popular support inside its borders. More and more Russian citizens do not trust the state-controlled news, so Russian TV Channels started to broadcast in the neighboring countries. Furthermore, Russia expanded propaganda on the internet, in order to influence a wide range of audience, mostly in the European countries and the U.S.A. Online fake news was the most used propaganda method in West. Coordinated by IRA, fake news was published at specific moments, especially during elections. It was translated for each country, subtle and had a big impact, because the citizens were more vulnerable discovering political news during elections than in other moments of the year. Soon enough, the authorities discovered the agency and took measures both at regional and international level in order to diminish this phenomenon. The project EUvsDisinfo and the FBI reports were the main publications dealing with Russian propaganda, which caught the attention of the population who became more careful in choosing a credible source of international news.

Furthermore, the analyses of Russian fake news are in a continuous progress. The proofs of the Russian meddling in the 2014 European Parliament elections and the 2016 American presidential elections were recently revealed. Thus, since new discoveries are still being made on subjects from more than three years ago, the “fake news” subject is and will remain for the next period of time a headline.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, CNN Editorial Research, “2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts”, in *CNN*, 15 November 2019, URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/12/us/2016-presidential-election-investigation-fast-facts/index.html>.
2. ***, European Commission Media Convergence and Social Media (Unit I.4), “Tackling online disinformation”, 13 September 2019, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation>.
3. ***, European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, “Trolling European Elections 2014 – 2019”, 20 May 2019, URL: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/trolling-european-elections-2014-2019>.
4. ***, European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, “Figure of the week 1/3”, 24 September 2019, URL: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/figure-of-the-week-1-3>.

¹⁹ Anton Troianovski, “A former Russian troll speaks: ‘It was like being in Orwell’s world’”, in *The Washington Post*, 17 February 2018, URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/17/a-former-russian-troll-speaks-it-was-like-being-in-orwells-world/?noredirect=on>, accessed on 20th of August 2019.

5. ***, European External Action Service's East StratCom Task Force, "How to get the European Parliament read Russia Today", 9 October 2019, <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/how-to-get-the-european-parliament-to-read-russia-today/>
6. ***, National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Table *Characteristics – Population 1*, URL: <http://statistica.gov.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=479>.
7. ***, Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), *CMI: TB u интернет*, URL: <https://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/14258?fbclid=IwAR1paQGoqtZWv8QyMzNXSqEv6rgq9Lx8uFE5-IWEbTLyhziH6X-IPNKjXwo>, accessed on 15th of October 2019.
8. CILEACU, Cristina, "Diplomat american: Suntem îngrijorați. Rusia are o strategie sofisticată țintită spre România", in *Digi 24*, 24.02.2019, URL: <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/diplomat-american-suntem-ingrijorati-rusia-are-o-strategie-sofisticata-tintita-spre-romania-1087675>.
9. POPESCU, Andrei Luca, "Temele propagandei ruse în România. Expert Forum: La București, fake news e instrument de guvernare", in *Radio Europa Libera*, 14 March 2019, URL: <https://romania.europalibera.org/a/temele-propagandei-ruse-%C3%AEnrom%C3%A2nia-expert-la-bucure%C8%99ti-fake-news-e-instrument-de-guvernare/29821867.html>.
10. TROIANOVSKI, Anton, "A former Russian troll speaks: 'It was like being in Orwell's world'", in *The Washington Post*, 17 February 2018, URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/17/a-former-russian-troll-speaks-it-was-like-being-in-orwells-world/?noredirect=on>.

FUTURE GEOPOLITICS OF A DEMOGRAPHICALLY CHANGING EUROPE

Dragoş Ionuţ PALĂ

Ph.D. Student, University of Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: har_dragos_91@yahoo.com

Abstract: *In the last part of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, demographic data has been set for a major change that will affect Europe as a whole. These changes will take place in the next 20 to 30 years and are so potent that they can modify the geopolitical landscape of the continent forever. In this circumstance it is of vital importance to understand where the demographics of Europe were, where they are and in which direction they are going. Thus, we can map out the future poles of geopolitical power and the manner in which they will influence the continent. The article uses qualitative and quantitative methods to paint the picture of the near future of Europe and tries to answer the question of how the future geopolitics of the continent will look. To better understand the situation demographic and economic data will be introduced and analysed with the intent of predicting future poles of economic power and implicitly geopolitical power.*

Keywords: *geopolitics; demography; Europe; changes; migration impact.*

INTRODUCTION

The European geopolitics is changing rapidly, its adapting to the new security environment, and amongst the factors of change, one of the most significant and with the biggest impact is demography. In the last decades, demographic changes in Europe have created the necessary conditions for the creation of a new geopolitical map in which countries like Germany, France, Italy, Greece or United Kingdom, will be forced to adapt its economy, diplomacy and geopolitics to its new population. A trend of falling of birth rates that occurred 30 to 35 years ago and maintained itself at low levels up to this day, will generate this geopolitical changes. Amongst the mist of possibilities, the demographic numbers are shaping a new Europe with new problems, with new threats that can and will affect the cultures and life style of the European populations and with new poles of power like Turkey, Russia or the Scandinavian countries. Demographic changes will represent both the cause and the effect of future socio-economic changes with a heavy influence on geopolitics. In this context, this paper aims to identify as precisely as possible the implications and the modifications that will occur in the near future. By using data related to fertility rates, past and present, the evolutions of different groups of people (sex and age) and migration we can assess the future of the population of Europe, and by correlating this data with economic indicators like GDP, national debt/GDP, GDP/capita, government budget and GDP growth rate, we can estimate the future impact of demography on European countries. Given this information, future geopolitical changes can be predicted within a margin of error.

The paper is structured in 4 main chapters plus conclusions, each studying a different aspect.

The first chapter has the role of defining the terms that will be used in the next 3 chapters. The second one uses data related to demography as a support for population growth/decline predictions. The third chapter uses macroeconomic data in order to identify the economic pressure that is and will be placed on the future populations of the European countries in the

context of the new demography. The fourth and final chapter will use the data, and predictions, acquired in the previous two chapters and illustrates future changes on the geopolitical map of Europe. The study ends with the conclusions that summarize the findings and offers a selection of actions that can be implemented in order to control to a degree future geopolitical changes.

1. General terms and definitions

In order to have a clear picture of what will be presented it is of vital importance to define the terms that will be used.

Geopolitics is a term that is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as being “a study of the influence of such factors as geography, economics, and demography on the politics and especially the foreign policy of a state”¹. The Cambridge Dictionary define it as: “the study of the way a country’s size, position, etc. influences its power and its relationships with other countries”². Famous geo-politicians like Rudolph Kjellen, defined it as being “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space”³. Karl Haushofer “geopolitics is the new national science of the state,...a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography”⁴. Silviu Neguț “an interdisciplinary discipline, at the borderline between Geography, History, Political Science and Social Science, which studies/establishes the relations between events and the geographic space, as well as the distribution of power on the Globe”⁵. Having said all of this, it is safe to define geopolitics as being the science that studies the interactions between states on the given geographical territory.

Demography is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as being “the statistical study of human populations especially with reference to size and density, distribution and vital statistics”⁶. The same term is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as: “the study of changes in the number of births, marriages, deaths etc., in a particular area during a period of time”⁷. The Oxford Dictionary of Geography define it as “the observed, statistical and mathematical study of human populations, concerned with the size, distribution and composition of such populations”⁸. *Birth rate* is defined in the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology as “a measure designed to provide information on the comparative fertility of different populations, most commonly used in demographic analyses”⁹, it is also defined by the Collins Dictionary as “the ration of live births in a specified area, group, etc., to the population of that area, etc., usually expressed per 1000 population per year”¹⁰. The article will also use the *fertility rate* which is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Human Geography as “the average number of children that

¹ Merriam-Webster, URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/geostrategy>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

² Cambridge Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, URL: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/geopolitics>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

³ Exploringgeopolitics, URL:

https://exploringgeopolitics.org/publication_efferrink_van_leonhardt_the_definition_of_geopolitics_classical_french_critical/, accessed on 12.09.2019.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ Silviu Neguț, *Geopolitica, universal puterii*, Meteor Press, Bucharest,2006, p. 16.

⁶ Cambridge Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, URL:

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/geopolitics>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

⁷ Merriam-Webster, URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/geostrategy>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

⁸ Susan Mayhew, *A Dictionary of Geography*, Oxford University Press, 2015, URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199680856.001.0001/acref-9780199680856-e-344?rskey=bnbv42&result=5>, accessed at 12.09.2019.

⁹ John Scott, *A Dictionary of Sociology*, Oxford University Press, 2015, URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199683581.001.0001/acref-9780199683581>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

¹⁰ Collinsdictionary, Collins 2019, URL: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/birth-rate>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

would be born to a woman over her lifetime”¹¹. Also an important element will be the *GDP – Gross domestic product* which is defined as a monetary measurement of the value of all goods and services produced inside an economy in predetermined period of time, most frequently a year¹². *National debt, public debt or sovereign debt* represents the total amount of money which a country’s government has borrowed and the *GDP/capita* represents a simple division of the GDP by the total population of the nation. Also the ratio of *nation debt/capita* represents the fraction of the national debt that the person must pay back sometime in the future.

2. Demographic data of Europe (past and present)

In order to understand the geopolitical implications of fertility rates at a national level we need to understand the statistics of Europe as a whole compared to the rest of the world.

	Total population 2019	World population (%)	Growth rate (%)	Fertility rate children/ mother 2019
Asia	4,601,371,198	59.65%	0.89%	2.15
Africa	1,308,064,195	16.96%	2.52%	4.44
Europe	747,182,751	6.69%	0.10%	1.61
South America	427,199,446	5.54%	0.85%	2.04
North America	366,600,964	4.75%	0.63%	1.75
Oceania	42,128,035	0.55%	1.34%	2.36

Table no. 1: Major demographic data by continents¹³

One of the most important aspects of demographics for a country is the *replacement level of fertility* which can be defined as the total fertility rate – the average number of children born per woman – at which the population replaces itself from a generation to the next, without migration. This rate is roughly 2.1 children per woman for most countries, although it may vary with mortality rates¹⁴.

Given this context, we can observe the fact that Europe, as a continent, is experiencing at this point in time, the lowest population growth rate in the world 0.1% and the lowest fertility rate in the World 1.61. Facts like this, could and will have an impact on the geopolitics of the continent and its position in the world. A lower population has a direct impact on the military strength, economic power, economic cost of a country and at the same time creates a vacuum of youth that somehow will have to be replaced in order to maintain a healthy ration of youth/aging population.

In order to better understand the future geopolitical map of Europe we have to go in detail.

¹¹ Alisdair Rogers, Noel Castree, Rob Kitchin, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, Oxford University Press, URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199599868.001.0001/acref-9780199599868-e-1904?rskey=whljKV&result=14>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

¹² International Monetary Fund, URL: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm>, accessed on 13.09.2019.

¹³ World Population Review, URL: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/>

¹⁴ Searchinger, T. et al., “Achieving Replacement Level Fertility”, Installment 3 of Creating a Sustainable Food Future, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2013, p. 1.


Country name	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020
Albania	4.60	3.90	3.41	3.15	2.79	2.38	1.95	1.64	1.71	1.62
Austria	2.04	1.65	1.60	1.45	1.48	1.39	1.38	1.40	1.45	1.53
Belarus	2.25	2.09	2.09	2.08	1.68	1.31	1.26	1.44	1.65	1.71
Belgium	2.01	1.70	1.60	1.56	1.61	1.60	1.68	1.82	1.78	1.71
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.73	2.27	2.02	1.86	1.70	1.68	1.32	1.31	1.31	1.27
Bulgaria	2.16	2.19	2.01	1.95	1.55	1.20	1.25	1.52	1.52	1.56
Croatia	1.98	1.90	1.87	1.72	1.52	1.62	1.41	1.52	1.49	1.45
Cyprus	2.49	2.29	2.45	2.43	2.33	1.89	1.59	1.48	1.38	1.34
Czech Rep.	2.21	2.36	1.97	1.90	1.65	1.17	1.19	1.43	1.48	1.64
Denmark	1.96	1.68	1.43	1.54	1.75	1.76	1.76	1.85	1.73	1.76
Estonia	2.15	2.06	2.09	2.20	1.63	1.33	1.39	1.66	1.59	1.59
Finland	1.62	1.66	1.68	1.66	1.82	1.74	1.75	1.84	1.77	1.53
France	2.31	1.86	1.86	1.80	1.71	1.76	1.88	1.98	1.98	1.85
Germany	1.71	1.51	1.46	1.43	1.30	1.35	1.35	1.36	1.43	1.59
Greece	2.53	2.42	2.06	1.53	1.38	1.31	1.29	1.42	1.34	1.30
Hungary	2.04	2.25	1.81	1.82	1.74	1.38	1.30	1.33	1.33	1.49
Ireland	3.73	3.25	2.83	2.26	1.96	1.90	1.93	2.00	1.97	1.84
Italy	2.32	1.89	1.52	1.35	1.27	1.22	1.31	1.44	1.42	1.33
Latvia	2.00	1.89	2.03	2.16	1.63	1.17	1.29	1.49	1.50	1.72
Lithuania	2.30	2.10	2.04	2.06	1.82	1.47	1.28	1.42	1.59	1.67
Moldova	2.56	2.44	2.55	2.64	2.11	1.70	1.24	1.27	1.28	1.26
Netherlands	2.10	1.60	1.51	1.55	1.59	1.60	1.74	1.75	1.73	1.66
Macedonia	2.86	2.54	2.45	2.27	2.12	1.83	1.64	1.46	1.50	1.50
Norway	2.35	1.81	1.69	1.80	1.89	1.86	1.81	1.92	1.82	1.68
Poland	2.23	2.23	2.31	2.16	1.95	1.51	1.26	1.37	1.33	1.42
Portugal	2.83	2.55	2.01	1.62	1.48	1.46	1.45	1.37	1.28	1.29
Romania	2.65	2.55	2.22	2.27	1.51	1.32	1.29	1.51	1.51	1.62
Russia	2.03	1.94	2.04	2.12	1.54	1.25	1.30	1.46	1.70	1.82
Serbia	2.36	2.37	2.32	2.23	1.96	1.83	1.71	1.58	1.46	1.46
Slovakia	2.51	2.46	2.27	2.15	1.87	1.40	1.22	1.32	1.38	1.50
Slovenia	2.20	2.16	1.93	1.65	1.33	1.25	1.21	1.44	1.58	1.60
Spain	2.85	2.55	1.88	1.46	1.28	1.19	1.28	1.45	1.33	1.33
Sweden	1.91	1.66	1.64	1.91	2.01	1.56	1.67	1.89	1.90	1.85
Switzerland	1.87	1.54	1.54	1.55	1.54	1.48	1.41	1.47	1.53	1.54
Turkey	5.39	4.69	4.11	3.39	2.90	2.65	2.37	2.20	2.12	2.08
Ukraine	2.08	1.98	2.00	1.95	1.62	1.24	1.15	1.38	1.49	1.44
United Kingdom	2.01	1.73	1.78	1.84	1.78	1.74	1.66	1.86	1.87	1.75











Table no. 2: Evolution of the fertility rate of the major countries of Europe¹⁵











Table no. 2 represents the numerical evolution of the fertility rate of all major European countries and it was created by averaging the fertility rate of 5 consecutive years starting with 1970.

¹⁵ United Nations, World Population Prospects, URL: <https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/>.

From this table, countries with a population below one million people, like: Andorra, Malta or Luxembourg, etc., were excluded. This is due to the fact that they geopolitical impact is not significant from this point of view. By analysing the data, we can observe that, for many countries, the lowest fertility rate was registered around form 1995-2005, when, in many cases, the fertility rate was lower than 1.5 children/woman. Since then, a number of countries have been experiencing a small rise of the fertility rate with approximately 15-20% in 5 years. The lowest number registered is the period 2000-2005 in Ukraine (1.15) and the highest was between 1970-1975, in Turkey (5.39). From the table we can see that there is only 1 country in Europe (Turkey) that has not fallen below 2.1 in the last 50 years. The big variations in fertility rates have led, and will lead to big changes, thus, this paper will present the data on the division of demography by age and sex for all the countries from table no.2 in form of a population pyramid.










Figure no. 1: The population distribution of the with +1 mil people, separate by age and sex¹⁶

Figure no.1 represents the individual distribution of the population for each of the countries in Table no. 2. The figure separates the population by age and sex. In all the population pyramids, the males are on the left side and the females on the right. The age interval selected was 5 years, therefore each of the segments represents all of the males/females of a country in the specific age brackets starting with 0-4 years.

From Figure no. 1 we can observe that almost all the countries have a disproportionate distribution of the population between the ages of 35-70 compared to the one from 0-35. By knowing this we can anticipate a bigger economical cost for the youth in the next 25-30 years in order to maintain the economic power of the state, plus the social programs necessary for the elderly. Another fact worth mentioning is the almost in all of the countries, there are more males

¹⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.

then females in the young and middle age brackets, the statistics shifting in the opposite direction if we include the senior ages as well. Thus we can conclude there is a surplus of men in almost all the countries. With the exception of a few states, all of them have a shrinking generational poll, which will inevitably, in the context of similar fertility rates, shrink the population even further. This has the potential to ignite social distress and quite possible economic downturn or civil war. Another possible reaction will be enhanced migration, or a reorganization of the economic power of some of the countries.

In the context of demographic influence on the geopolitics of a country, immigration statistics can't be ignored. Currently, countries of the European Union are receiving an influx of immigrants from other European countries and from countries outside the continent. Only in 2017 there were approximately 4.4 million persons have immigrated in Europe, amongst which 2 million were born outside Europe and, 1.3 million were born in a different European country from the one they reside in and 1 million people were immigrants returning to their country of birth.¹⁷ The statistics of the foreign-born population expressed in thousands and as a percentage of the total population, are as follows: Belgium, 1913.3, 16.8%; Bulgaria, 156.5, 2.2%; Czech Rep., 467.9, 4.4%; Denmark, 690.5, 11.9%; Germany, 13745.8, 16.6%; Estonia, 196.2, 14.9%; Ireland, 811.2, 16.8%; Greece, 1277.9, 11.9%; Spain, 6198.8, 13.3%; France, 8177.3, 12.2%; Croatia, 529.0, 12.9%; Cyprus, 181.4, 21.0%; Italy, 6175.3, 10.2%; Latvia, 246.0, 12.7%; Lithuania, 131.0, 4.7%; Hungary, 536.2, 5.5%; Netherlands, 2215.8, 12.9%; Austria, 1690.5, 19.2%; Poland, 659.9, 1.8%; Portugal, 909.6, 8.8%; Romania, 508.6, 2.6%; Slovenia, 250.2, 12.1%; Slovakia, 190.3, 3.5%; Finland, 363.7, 6.6%; Sweden, 1876.6, 18.5%; United Kingdom, 9512.5, 14.4%; Norway, 822.4, 15.5%; Switzerland, 2432.5, 28.7%.¹⁸ It is worth pointing out, that, the biggest foreign born groups of people, in absolute numbers, is in Germany and UK, while the smallest are Poland and Romania. Also one important statistic is the one related to native-born immigrants (natives returning to their country of birth), which is highest amongst Romanian immigrants (54%), followed by Bulgarian (49%), and in contrast stand countries like Austria (7%), Norway (8.2%) or Germany (9.9%).¹⁹

3. Macroeconomic data of Europe

Macroeconomic indicators illustrate the economic power, the economic threats, the economic opportunities or future perspectives of a country. In the context of this article they are used to better understand the future geopolitics of the continent in the context of a changing demography and a changing economic profile. Thus, indicators like: GDP, National debt, GDP/capita and debt/capita, will be used in order to estimate future implications.

Country name	GDP- 2018 in billions \$	National debt- 2018 % of GDP	GDP/capita \$ 2018	Government Budget/GDP - 2018 (surplus/deficit)	GDP growth rate Jun/2019
Albania	15	63.63	5,075	2	0.68
Austria	455	73.80	50,250	0.10	0.30
Belarus	60	29.00	6,745	2.90	
Belgium	531	102.00	46,683	0.70	0.20
Bosnia and Herzegovina	20	24.80	6,056	2.30	0.60
Bulgaria	65	20.30	8,651	2.00	0.80

¹⁷ Eurostat, *Migration and migrant population statistics, Statistics explained*, 2019, p. 1, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf>, accessed on 03.10.2019.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 11, accessed on 03.10.2019.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 5, accessed on 03.10.2019.

Croatia	61	74.10	15,870	0.20	0.20
Cyprus	25	102.50	30,926	4.80	0.80
Czech Rep.	244	32.70	23,344	0.90	0.70
Denmark	351	34.10	62,888	0.50	0.90
Estonia	30	8.40	19,949	0.60	0.40
Finland	275	58.90	48,580	0.70	0.50
France	2,777	98.40	43,664	2.50	0.30
Germany	3,996	60.90	47,502	1.70	0.10
Greece	218	181.10	23,558	1.10	0.80
Hungary	155	70.80	16,504	2.20	1.10
Ireland	376	64.80	78,765	0.00	0.70
Italy	2,074	134.80	35,392	2.10	0.00
Latvia	35	35.90	16,406	1.00	0.70
Lithuania	53	34.20	17,669	0.70	0.80
Moldova	11	27.40	2,684	1.00	2.00
Netherlands	913	52.40	55,041	1.50	0.40
Macedonia	13	40.70	5,394	2.70	
Norway	434	36.30	92,121	7.30	0.30
Poland	585	48.90	16,639	0.40	0.80
Portugal	238	121.50	23,737	0.50	0.50
Romania	240	35.10	11,534	3.00	1.00
Russia	1,658	13.50	11,729	2.70	0.20
Serbia	51	54.50	6,880	0.60	1.20
Slovakia	107	48.90	20,669	0.70	0.50
Slovenia	54	70.40	26,758	0.80	0.20
Spain	1,426	97.10	33,146	2.50	0.40
Sweden	551	38.80	57,232	0.90	0.10
Switzerland	705	27.70	78,816	1.30	0.30
Turkey	767	30.40	15,026	2.00	1.20
Ukraine	130	60.90	3,110	1.90	1.60
United Kingdom	2,825	84.70	42,986	2.00	0.20

Table no. 3: Macroeconomic data²⁰

From the macroeconomic data, we can see that there are a number of countries that are in a better position than others. The biggest GDP/capita is the one of Norway with 92,121 \$ and the smallest is one of Moldova with 2,684 \$ followed by Ukraine with 3,110 \$. This proves that the well-being is disproportionally distributed amongst the European countries, but the question is, how will the future demographics impact the economic stability and power of the nations?

4. Future demographic impact on European countries

In order to create a clear picture of the European geopolitical map, present and future (of the next 20-30 years), this paper will use the quantitative data illustrate up until now and, by observing the connections between them, will make qualitative predictions using the following framework: present geopolitical status (Pgs), representing an estimate of the present

²⁰ Tradingeconomics.com, URL: <https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp>, accessed on 03.10.2019.

geopolitical power; future threats (*Thr*), representing the threats that will arise from future demographics; future opportunities (*Opp*), representing the opportunities for the states that could appear in the context of the new demographics; natural geopolitical tendencies (*Nt*), representing the first logical geopolitical action at hand in the future demographic context; geopolitical abilities (*Ga*), representing the technical ability to put in to practice the natural tendencies and geopolitical projects; geopolitical perspective (*Gp*) representing the ideal geopolitical position it can obtain. These elements together create an overview of the present and future geopolitics of a state in connection with its demography. This analyse will be focused on the countries that will influence the geopolitics of the continent as a whole.

France: *Pgs*- France is one of the biggest countries of Europe, by population and by GDP. It is a member of the EU and NATO, and is a nuclear power. Is a leading vector in decision making for the European Union`s direction. It has the ability to influence the continent economically/financially, military, technologically and diplomatically. *Thr* - The big proportion of immigrants can create social distress and could, in the future, fight for political power inside the state. With the influx of many non-European immigrants, terrorism will become a key issue of the internal affairs, and it will become a permanent subject in any electoral campaign. Excess governmental spending can lead to a bigger debt and that will result in bigger taxes for the people and for businesses which could lead to a slowing of the economy. *Opp* – While demographic predictions for France show that the total population not change much, the other countries of Europe show signs of population decrease. This could be an opportunity to gain an economic advantage by using future consumption to attract economic growth by attracting foreign capital for investments. *Nt* – A country with the economic power and influence and demographic perspective that France has, will be inclined to create a mini sphere of influence in its proximity. Thus, countries like the Netherlands and Belgium will be more and more connected to France and its future geopolitical power. At the same time it will search for future big markets for its products in its old colonies. *Ga* – Given the economic power, future demographics, technological level and diplomatic influence, France will be able to obtain a bigger geopolitical role and at the bare minimum maintain its geopolitical status. *Gp* – If France will be able to negotiate the internal problems that can cripple it within, it will be in one of the best geopolitical positions of Europe. It can become the most powerful states in West Europe.

Germany: *Pgs*- Germany is the economic power house of Europe. Its influence can be observed in any corner of the continent. It is a member of the EU and NATO. It has the ability to dictate the economic policy of Europe and influence it at political, diplomatic, military and technological level. *Thr* – Germany has a very disproportional distribution of the population. The highest peak is at the 50-55 years of age bracket with almost 6.7 million people and the smallest being the 0-5 years with 3.4 million. This will lead to social imbalance and a greater dependency rate in the future 20-30 years. This will translate in higher taxes for the population especially for the youth. This could result in a diminished standard of living for the German people and a general diminished purchasing power for the country as a whole. Also a big threat to the internal stability of Germany is the number of immigrants. Germany has the highest number of immigrants in Europe and that can lead to future cultural changes and struggles for internal political power. Also a big challenge will be represented by the refugee problem that in the past years has become a constant source of internal tension. *Opp* – Because the economic pressure for the German youth will be very big it is important to invest considerable amounts in technology now, to ensure an economic generator of growth in the future, when the economy will not be able create further economic growth based on consumption. *Nt* – Given Germany`s position as a geopolitical power house of Europe it will naturally want to maintain its position and for that it will try to create the necessary conditions for immigrants to come. Given this context, Germany will look at Austria as a potential source of immigrants, given the small ethnical barriers

between the two, in order to try to reinstate an approximate homogenous ethnic population. *Ga* – Germany has all the necessary instruments, economic and political, to create the future parameters to limit the future geopolitical power losses. *Gp* – Germany faces a delicate problem. In order to maintain its geopolitical power and economic status, it is forced to create the necessary conditions for a mass influx of new population. This influx could be so drastic that it will challenge the political stability and create a massive cultural clash inside its own borders. If Germany can negotiate this problem it will be able to maintain its geopolitical power.

Russia: *Pgs* – Russia it is one of the world military powers. It is not a member of the EU or NATO. It is also a nuclear power. It has the ability to influence Europe at an economic (important gas supplier), military, technological and diplomatic level. *Thr* – The Russian demographics a similar problem to the rest of Europe. The age brackets of 30-35 have the biggest number of people approximately 12.2 million people, but the next generations, more precisely the 20-25 bracket has only 6.8 million people. For the moment and the near future this does not represent a problem but in 30-40 years, the present 30-35 bracket will weigh heavily on the younger generations that will have to pay more taxes in order to maintain an internal stability. *Opp* – However, the recent fertility rates of Russia are looking better and better. In the near future, Russia could reach the minimum replacement level of 2.1 children/woman. This could fix the future problems that will occur in 30-40 years. *Nt* – Russia is one of the only countries in Europe with a growing fertility rate. Thus, Russia has the possibility of maintaining its geopolitical power while its neighbours will suffer diminishing demographics. This will naturally create a sphere of influence in its vicinity. *Ga* – Russia has the necessary economic strength to by the time for the fertility rates to restabilize and for the natural sphere of influence to occur. *Gp* – Russia needs to turn its attention to its internal affairs and create the necessary economic base to sustain the future dip in population that will happen in the next 35-40 years in order to maintain its influence in the region and in Europe as a whole.

CONCLUSIONS

The future demographics of the European continent are the corner stone of the geopolitical and economic changes that will take place. It is of vital importance for all of the state to understand where they are heading so that they can plan in advance. Migration, economic stability, economic growth, internal unrest, social changes, cultural changes are only a few problems that awaits the European continent. Of them all, migration and the heavy burden of an aging European population will be the biggest issues that we will have to fix. Migration will appear naturally because of the change in demography and lack of economic opportunity, while the heavy taxation will have to be implemented in order to compensate for the added value the present 35-50 years old generations (which outnumbers the young generation in some cases almost 2 to 1) brings to the economy. At the same time we have to take in consideration the economic pressure exercised by the growing national debts on the future active part of the European societies. In this circumstances, states that are now at a stable demography, like Turkey, France and maybe Russia in the near future, will obtain a natural geopolitical advantage that they will be able to use in order to negotiate better geopolitical and economical deals. New spheres of influence will be established on the base of past diplomatic affiliations and immigrant minorities present inside the state.

In order to diminish the impact of the future demographic problem a number of measures need to be taken in the near future, 1-5 years. It is of vital importance to invest and develop technologies to counteract future necessities of the elderly. Japan is one of the countries that has understood future demographic threats and is currently investing considerable amounts in robotics and technology that will serve its future social needs. Japan could be an inspiration

for future investments and it could be a partner for Europe and the European Union, regarding this future problem.

At the same time, the states that are in a poor demographical position need to start implementing social programs to encourage the youth to start families, by offering them economic stability and predictability in the short and medium term. Even reaching a fertility rate of 2.1 could give a minimum of demographic stability for the next 20-30 years. An example of a social program could be a monthly salary from the state for a woman that will take care of the neighbours children while they are at work. This could relieve economic pressure and save time for the working families, giving them more incentive to procreate.

Countries could look at their diaspora as a potential source of positive demographics. Thus, social programs aimed at returning the diaspora population to their native lands could diminish the negative impact on future demographics.

Migration could be a solution but only for the states that are prepared to create the conditions for the immigrants to come and integrate them in the local culture and population.

Europe will go through future powerful demographic changes that will influence the geopolitical landscape. The impact of these changes can be diminished if the right solutions are implemented in an early phase. The longer they will be postponed the harder will be to reverse the effects to the social life of Europe and its geopolitics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Cambridge Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/geopolitics>.
2. ***, CIA.gov, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.
3. ***, Collins Dictionary, Collins 2019, URL: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/birth-rate>.
4. ***, Eurostat, *Migration and migrant population statistics, Statistics explained*, 2019, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf>.
5. ***, Exploringgeopolitics, URL: https://exploringgeopolitics.org/publication_efferink_van_leonhardt_the_definition_of_geopolitics_classical_french_critical/.
6. ***, International Monetary Fund, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm>.
7. ***, Merriam-Webster, URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/geostrategy>.
8. ***, Tradingeconomics.com, URL: <https://tradingeconomics.com/>.
9. Espenshade, Thomas J.; Guzman, Juan Carlos; Westoff, Charles F., "The Surprising Global Variation in Replacement Fertility", in *Population Research and Policy Review*, volume 22, Issue 5-6, 2003.
10. <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199680856.001.0001/acref-9780199680856-e-344?rskey=bnbv42&result=5>.
11. MAYHEW, Susan, *A Dictionary of Geography*, Oxford University Press, 2015, URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199680856.001.0001/acref-9780199680856-e-344?rskey=bnbv42&result=5>.
12. NEGUT, Silviu, *Geopolitica, universal puterii*, Meteor Press, Bucharest, 2006.
13. ROGERS, Alisdair; CASTREE, Noel; KITCHIN, Rob, *Dictionary of Human Geography*, Oxford University Press, URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199599868.001.0001/acref-9780199599868-e-1904?rskey=whljKV&result=14>.
14. SCOTT, John (2015), *A Dictionary of Sociology*, Oxford University Press, URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199683581.001.0001/acref-9780199683581>.
15. SEARCHINGER, T. et al., "Achieving Replacement Level Fertility", Installment 3 of Creating a Sustainable Food Future, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2013.

EXTREMISM AND RADICALISM – CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY

Daniel-Mihai DUȚU

MA student in International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science,
University of Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: dutu.daniel-mihai@fspub.unibuc.ro.

Teodor BADIU

MA student in International Relations and Intelligence Studies
"Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: teodorbadiu01@gmail.com.

Abstract: *The development of industries and the emergence of globalization have led to the alteration of the physical boundaries of the states, and the geographical proximity has given rise to the desire of each individual to have a different identity than others, desire that led to the emergence of radical and extremist ideologies and movements. These differ according to factors that cause individuals to radicalize, but also depending on the purposes of these movements. Thus, the international society faces many radical movements, such as radical Islamism, revolutionary nationalism and extreme populism, resulting in the accession of extremist groups in national and international leadership structures. Today we are talking about mass radicalization representing a real threat to international and human security that generalized especially since 9/11.*

This paper aims to analyze the causes and modes of manifestation of extremist ideologies, focusing on radicalization models and on the impact that these ideologies and movements have on both international and individual levels.

Keywords: *globalization; extremism; radicalism; radicalization; de-pluralization; security.*

INTRODUCTION

After the two World Wars that greatly affected the international society of the previous century, the 21st Century is facing new phenomena that are threatening the international security. The development of industries and the emergence of globalization have led to the alteration of the physical boundaries of the states, and the geographical proximity has given rise to the desire of each individual to have a different identity than others, desire that led to the emergence of radical and extremist ideologies and movements. Thus, radical and extremist movement represent a real threat not only to the international security, but especially to the security of each individual. Depending on their goals, these movements can be non-violent, or extremely violent. So, we need to identify the causes that led to the emergence of such ideologies and movements, but, more importantly, we need to focus on the causes that can trigger one's process of radicalization.

The present work represents the efforts to understand and perceive the changes in the international environment based on the socio-cultural approaches and researches of socio-political studies of authors like Pierre Brechon and Anthony Giddens. Also, the works of authors like Daniel Koehler and Jessica Stern are very important regarding the process of radicalization and the factors that can trigger this process. The theoretical elements used and

presented in this paper have a general applicability and provide a solid theoretical foundation for this research.

1. General aspects of extremism and radicalism

It is considered that the fall of the Iron Curtain after 1989 and the dissolution of the USSR brought fundamental changes globally, so these events helped states and societies to improve the process of globalization and allowed free exchange of ideas. The world began to be more and more connected, and the prospects were very optimistic that more and more societies would share common values and principles based on peace, freedom and cooperation. Then the events of 9/11 have shown that individuals, societies and states faced a new threat at a global scale that exceeds the one represented by the Soviet Union and its allies.

It should be mentioned that, although the USSR had officially announced its dissolution in 1991, the minds of European societies and even political elites retained the valence of a perpetual Hobbesian conflict where „man is a wolf for man”.¹ At the ideological level, communism had ceased to be an opponent at the declarative level, but in a relatively short time it was replaced by the tendency of the political and social environment towards the extremes of the political chessboard.

In this context there were highlighted the negative aspects of globalization where free exchange of ideas has been perverted toward a radical, extremist and populist direction. Anthony Giddens shows that in the context of social change due to globalization, there are three important aspects: *culture*, *environment* (geopolitics) and *political organization*.² On the one hand, depending on the history, the evolution and the interactions between states and societies can show different degrees of flexibility or intolerance to the cultural alterity due to globalization, the intolerance being manifested by declarations and/or actions led by extremism. On the other hand, the current and the historical geopolitics of the European continent are segmented, so different regions have been subjected to various exchanges that have influenced their way of manifestation and thinking. For example, in the area of the Western Balkans the tendency towards extremism of individuals is visible, having in mind that this region represented a space of military campaigns between East and West and was under foreign occupation for decades. This type of interaction has ethnically, religiously and culturally diversified the geographical space of the Balkans, but has perpetuated social conflicts between different extremist factions.

Although these are relevant aspects of globalization especially when we discuss about extremist tendencies, globalization is not a cause in itself, but rather an instrument. The problem of extremism is one that dates back to ancient times, but in the interwar period we can say that it developed a new significance among states such as Germany, Spain, Italy, the Soviet Union, Japan, and extended to other states. The Romanian geo-politician Simion Mehedinți attributed to that type of national extremism the name *nationalismus latrans*³ (barbarous nationalism) because it focuses on the political discourse on the subjectivization of the history of some nations and favour ethnocentrism or a set of territorial-political interests. He also gives as an example the relation between Romania and Bulgaria – at that time –, where he remembers how the Romanian space favored the Bulgarians’ struggle for independence in the face of the Ottoman Empire. After the World War I, the Bulgarian political discourse changed to an anti-

¹ Olivier Nay, *Istoria ideilor politice*, Polirom, Iasi, 2008, p. 211.

² Anthony Giddens, *Sociologie*, All, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 42-48.

³ Simion Mehedinți, *Politica de vorbe și omul de stat*, Editura Librăriei Socec&Co. Societate Anonimă, Bucharest, 1928, pp. 81-96.

Romanian one and it was focused on the historical right of the Bulgarian nation over Dobrogea (which was part of the Kingdom of Romania)⁴.

Since then, the international opinion wanted to highlight – from the social and political levels - the spread of extremism as well to nations who did not have the economic or the military capabilities to change the order of the international system. That was seen like a vulnerability to the international stability which was combined with the increased influence of societies built on extremist ideologies – Nazism, fascism, imperialism, communism – over other small societies caused destabilization and incoherence for the security system. As one can see, there was a propagation of this phenomenon – then, as it is now – in downstream societies, where all elites, in particular the political ones, most often have to signal the existence of a threat to the national security or to the internal order from objective or subjective perspectives (real or perceived)⁵. In a certain spatial and temporal context, extremism can take the form of a real political theme after being fed into society by a certain conception of man and nation in which citizens find themselves⁶. Thus, in an attempt of the political leaders to justify themselves in front of the society, that political theme may include valences of ideologies that feed on rumors about a threat and on a misunderstanding of the cause in which the militant tends to believe and act due to the tendency to judge sentimentally⁷.

We can explain this behavior on the basis of two causes, namely the dependent and the independent, of the individual's will:

I. The dependent cause refers to the individual's choices regarding the assumption of a (cultural) identity and his/her association with a group that reflects the values of the identity that he/she had assumed. The ultimate otherness generated by globalization has created a true cultural crisis for the European space. So, both the individual and society try to define themselves in relation to other cultures based on their specific historical, cultural, religious, ideological view. But, because we talk about a need and not a desire, individuals and societies are vulnerable to the stylization and exaggeration of radical ideas and tend to access them more easily.

II. Independent causes⁸ can be:

- i. *Political*: through the state of conflict in which a state or society is as a result of political decisions; through the political instability and crises leading to government incoherence; through the absence of the principle of good governance and a degree of transparency in the process of decision-making; the existence at high level of a high degree of corruption; through the *anti-ideological discourse*⁹ where an antithetical political relationship is created between a state or a majority group and the others and it is focused on exploiting and exaggerating the negative aspects of the adversary - for example one can note the Visegrád Group's attitudes towards the EU as an ideological conflict between states or the antithesis between Nazism, Communism and Liberalism at the social-political level.
- ii. *Economic*: by widening the gap between the social classes and the thinning of the middle class; through the presence of high levels of unemployment and poverty; by spreading social exclusion on the labor market, from the service

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 69-80.

⁵ Paul Robbinson, *Dicționar de securitate internațională*, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, pp. 17-18.

⁶ Pierre Brechon, *Partidele Politice*, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, p.83.

⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 79-81.

⁸ Alexandra Sarcinchi, *Dimensiunile nonmilitare ale securității*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2005, pp.14-30.

⁹ Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și frica: O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Cartier, Chișinău, 2017, p. 161.

system and from social relations¹⁰; by installing the economic crises due to either the international crashes or the bad financial policies of a government; through the absence of the necessary infrastructure for the economic development of a region or state; through underdevelopment; through poor and unsatisfactory economic life – we can recall the situation of most Eastern European states such as Poland, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria, whose economic conditions have led to a strong population migration to the West.

- iii. *Social*: by the belonging of the individual to an ethnicity, religion or minority group; through the existence of positive or negative discrimination; through the presence or absence in society of an ethnic and/or religious diversity that can determine the degree of tolerance towards possible future cultural interweaving of the migrants; through the attestation of a racist past of a society or the spread of a scourge of racism among societies that have not profoundly experienced extremism; through a wide promotion of policies against or for the benefit of the minority groups.

From this point forward, the discussion is directed towards the area of human security because the development and spread of extremism, radicalism and populism is caused by the installation of the state of insecurity. And, in this context, although universally felt, insecurity can cause contextual manifestations. In this regard, at the one hand, the situation of Poland, whose national policy, but also popular support, are based on a radical ethnocentrism as a result of its long history of foreign occupation, must be remembered. Culminating with military training camps for civilian volunteers, there is also a deep anti-Russian tendency in the Polish society, which took the form of a political theme of national interest, even causing the state to set the threshold of 2% of its army's GDP in opposition to most of its NATO allies who are hardly approaching this threshold¹¹. At the political level, on the other hand, there is a discrepancy between the Polish political elites and the society in relation to the EU over the mistrust and offensiveness that they are showing to their European counterparts.

On the other hand, the case of Spain highlights another type of extremism manifested this time by separatist tendencies. Since the 1950s, the authorities in Madrid have been confronted with the terrorist organization ETA (*Euskadita Ta Askatasuna*), whose main purpose is to achieve the independence of the Basque Country from Spain¹². This type of extremism is oriented around another type of political discourse focused on local patriotism, precisely because of the absence of a common belief in the national common values of Spain. For the Basque Country, the idea of belonging to a common nation and to a common national ideal was not based on some solid and sustainable principles – see the Spanish civil war of 1936-1939 – so this led to the emergence of ETA and the terrorist actions undertaken on over the decade against what represented central authority.

Also, the episode of interethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia, the culmination of which was the war in Kosovo sustained by NATO's bombing of Belgrade, may be another example of radicalism. This form encompasses strong cultural and religious valences because radicalism has fueled an extensive process of ethnic purification generated by the idea of the superiority of races over a certain territory. Kosovo conflict may represent a summary of the events in the former Yugoslavia because it has cultural-historical value for the Serbs, Kosovo being the cradle of their culture, religion, and politics, while Kosovo Albanians were considered a

¹⁰ Anthony Giddens, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-351.

¹¹ Christopher S. Chivvis, Raphael S. Cohen, Bryan Frederick, Daniel S. Hamilton, F. Stephen Larrabee, Bonny Lin, *NATO's Northeastern Flank Emerging Opportunities for Engagement*, RAND Corporation, 2017, pp. 74-80.

¹² Paul Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

separate entity that wanted to be free from the abuses of the central authorities¹³. This conflict can be translated as a struggle of different cultures to liberate themselves from one that was trying to be dominant.

But in this context, one can also highlight the reminiscent extremism of Germany, although, after 1945, a broad process of denazification was initiated by both the Allies and the Soviets – by fundamentally opposite means. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the social and political movements of the extreme right began to gradually manifest again to the point where extreme right-wing party *Alternative für Deutschland* has managed to join the government in the Bundestag, being the third political party in Germany¹⁴. Based on an anti-EU and anti-migration political discourse, this type of extremism has its origins in neo-Nazi thinking and exploits the shortcomings and social-political problems of Germany.

And although these are just a few examples, one can say that radicalism and extremism are problems with strategic and security values. Although apparently related to the internal affairs of a state and highlighting the expression of the lack of confidence and support of societies for the national leadership, the emergence of these phenomena causes vulnerabilities which can be easily exploited by other state and non-state actors.

Regarding the state actors, the most well-known activity undertaken in this regard is the one of the Russian Federation. This has been used by the rise of extremist or radical movements in European states to legitimize their internal actions, but also to create a set of informational operations that have been executed through misinformation, fake news and manipulation¹⁵. For the Russian Federation, EU is one of its major competitors due to the fact that – at their western borders – it is an extensive and complex system of multi-country cooperation with an economic capacity that is comparable to the one of the USA and with a population of about half a billion people¹⁶. Thereby helping radical and extremist movements either by potentiating their importance or by mystification through fake news or through financial support, they have emphasized anti-European and anti-national trends, the most relevant case being the one of Brexit. The radicalization of the population on an anti-EU direction and the success of the referendum highlighted how this issue can cross national borders and have implications throughout the Union. Also following the informational operations, extremist factions such as the Italian League, the National Rally (France), the Alternative for Germany, the Freedom Party (Austria), the Flemish Interest (Belgium), the True Finns, etc.¹⁷ managed to accede to the governance in the European Parliament.

But extremism as a phenomenon is not something unique in the heart of a society because there is a connection between extremism and radicalism. For example, we can recall the situation in France where extremist political movements flourish in close connection with the radicalization of certain categories of social groups in the direction of an exacerbated nationalism or the one of the Islamic extremism – materialized by terrorist attacks. Thus, we

¹³ Stephen T. Hosmer, *The conflict over Kosovo: why Milosevic decided to settle when he did*, RAND Corporation, 2001, pp. 7-9.

¹⁴ ***, "AfD: What you need to know about Germany's far-right party", in *Deutsche Welle*, 24 September 2017, URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-know-about-germanys-far-right-party/a-37208199>, accessed on 8 October 2019.

¹⁵ ***, "Foreign influence operations in the EU", *European Parliament*, July, 2018, URL: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625123/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)625123_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625123/EPRS_BRI(2018)625123_EN.pdf), accessed on 8 October 2019.

¹⁶ Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, *Rusia amenință oare Occidentul?*, Cartier, Chișinău, 2010, p. 113.

¹⁷ ***, "Far-right parties form new group in European Parliament", in *Deutsche Welle*, 14 June 2019, URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/far-right-parties-form-new-group-in-european-parliament/a-49189262>, accessed on 8 October 2019.

are further interested in radical typologies that can cause an individual to radicalize and so his/her system of values is modified and can lead to the formation of a new assumed identity.

2. Radicalization and the Islamist ideology

2.1. Radicalization and models of radicalization

There are many definitions of the term *radicalization* in the literature. A general definition, which, although insufficient in terms of complexity of the phenomenon, serves the purpose of this work, is the one provided by the European Commission, which appreciates that *radicalization* represents “a process of embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism”¹⁸. Also, from a different perspective, radicalization is “a process forming through strategy, structure, and conjuncture, and involving the adoption and sustained use of violent means to achieve articulated political goals”¹⁹. As mentioned before, the process of radicalization depends on multiple factors and the ways individuals choose to behave are very different: some prefer to action or militate in their home countries while others choose to go to other parts of the world and join terrorist groups.

In order to understand this complex phenomenon, some authors tried to identify the factors that can favor one’s process of radicalization. One of these authors, Jessica Stern, identified six factors that can trigger a person’s radicalization process²⁰. *Prejudices and social inequalities*²¹ mostly affect the national minorities in a country because they are forced to accept the most undesirable jobs so the rate of unemployment between immigrants is very high. *Groups’ dynamics*²² can influence young people so they are attracted by the radical lifestyle through music, fashion, and social connections. At the same time, the radical life can represent a *working place* and a *form of self-validation*²³. Also, different forms of *abuse*²⁴ may constitute the triggering factor of the radicalization process. The ones exposed to violence may suffer from *post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)*²⁵ or other diseases associated with the war, just like the soldiers do, which favors recidivism among terrorists or extremists who discarded the violent way of life and wanted to integrate into society.

These factors should be considered when analyzing the reasons that led to the radicalization of an individual, but, as mentioned above, each individual is different, and life experiences are also different, and so this list of factors is not exhaustively and does not apply universally to all radical extremists. However, in many cases, only such a factor is sufficient to facilitate the radicalization of an individual, and the corroboration of several factors clearly increases the chances of radicalization. However, this does not mean that all individuals experiencing social inequalities or unemployment will be radicalized, but the presence of such frustrations may be sufficient to cause a person to explore a different kind of life.

In an attempt to find possible common elements that can lead to radicalization and which may be applicable to wider categories of individuals, various authors have developed radicalization patterns. Of these, Marc Sageman identified a model in four steps. The first step

¹⁸ Daniel Koehler, *Understanding deradicalization*, Routledge, New York, 2017, p. 67.

¹⁹ Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou, Stefan Malthaner, “A Contentious Politics Approach to the Explanation of Radicalization”, in: L. Bosi, C. Demetriou, S. Malthaner (eds.), *Dynamics of Political Violence. A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*, Ashgate, Surrey, 2014, p. 2.

²⁰ Jessica Stern, “Deradicalization or Disengagement of Terrorists: Is it possible?”, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2010, pp. 5-9, URL: <https://www.hoover.org/research/future-challenges-deradicalization-or-disengagement-terrorists>, accessed on 26 September 2019.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

²² *Ibidem*, pp. 6-7.

²³ *Idem*.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 8-9.

is represented by a strong *moral outrage*²⁶, exemplified by reactions of rage and/or indignation, which led to a *specific interpretation*²⁷ of things, so the individual is changing his/her vision of the world. This specific interpretation of the world inevitably leads to an *identification of personal experiences with various events or facts*²⁸ that are currently occurring or have occurred at some point. This contextualization (de-pluralization) of the facts can lead to *mobilization through different interactive networks*²⁹ when the individual is taking contact with others who share his/her vision and violent attitude. Sageman's model has a broad applicability especially due to the fact that it has only four elements and because it does not exclude the radicalization of individuals who already have radical ideas.

The central element of Sageman's model is *de-pluralization*, referring to the definition of specific religious or political problems and their contextualization with the past and experiences of the individual to connect global or abstract problems with specific micro-events. In other words, the individual analyses certain aspects of the world and identifies himself with specific events from the international arena, so he is associating his own experiences with those events. Thus, the individual is integrated into a "contrast society" that connects the radical social movement with the mainstream environment, where basic ideological principles intertwines with individual values, political concepts and personal beliefs. These values and beliefs suffer a process of mutation, and this connection with radical ideological principles leads to a "reset" of the individual's system of values. Thus, the individual comes to subordinate all the issues at the international level to a specific one that is far more important than all the others and that has only one solution. In fact, this single solution legitimates the use of violence to solve the problem and to build the future. However, there are also cases where the de-pluralization process does not lead to the use of violence, but that means that personal ideology or the one of the extremist organization is not in obvious contrast to any mainstream political and social values³⁰.

De-pluralization is the engine of radicalization, because the individual perceives international events through the perspective of his own experiences, identifying himself with them, investing emotions and feelings, so the problem becomes very personal and requires direct involvement of the individual. Many Islamist extremists have seen the sufferings and abuses that Muslims have endured and have identified themselves with their experiences, and this has led to the desire for radicalization and participation in extremists and/or terrorist activities.

Another relevant radicalization model is the one observed by Quentin Wiktorowicz³¹ on members of the radical British group al-Muhajiroun, his study focusing on the social factors that triggered the radicalization process. A first stage of this model is constituted by a *cognitive openness*³² of the individual which is necessarily followed by a *religious search*³³. Thus, the individual is eager to learn and he finds his refuge in radical religious ideology. Subsequently, as he dedicates more and more time to the study of ideology, it *begins to take shape and to make sense*³⁴, and the individual becomes increasingly attached to the radical religious values. One last process Wiktorowicz observes is the one of *socialization*³⁵, which is done through

²⁶ Daniel Koehler, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 71.

²⁸ *Idem*.

²⁹ *Idem*.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 74-76.

³¹ Former Adviser on terrorism to the US National Security Council.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 72.

³³ *Idem*.

³⁴ *Idem*.

³⁵ *Idem*.

indoctrination, creating a new identity and changing personal values. According to the author's assertions, the first three stages logically lead to the last, this being achieved by the presence of intense religious propaganda during the first stages.

These models represent only a small part of the effort of various authors to try to better explain the phenomenon of radicalization. As is observed, all these models have common elements, from where it can be concluded that, during the process of radicalization, individuals suffer, to some extent, similar transformations. However, the way in which the individual's perception of the world evolves and how it is influenced by the radical ideology is very different from one person to another, so, although transformations may be similar in terms of effects, it cannot be measured how and how much the individual is touched by certain factors that cause radicalization.

2.2. ISIS and the Islamist ideology

The terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is considered to be deeply religious and its actions are considered to be based on the aggressive interpretation of the Quran's texts, using religious rhetoric to motivate its actions and attract new followers among its fighters. However, ISIS is much more than a religious group. In support of this statement comes the testimony of former CIA agent Marc Sageman, who, in 2015, following his experiences with Muslim terrorists, said "religion has a role but it is a role of justification"³⁶ of the jihadists' actions. Sageman continues: "To give themselves a bit more legitimacy, they use Islam as their justification. It's not about religion, it's about identity ... You identify with the victims, [with] the guys being killed by your enemies"³⁷. This implies that religion is a mechanism through which people identify themselves with their peers, but it is not the only reason that could cause them to fight alongside a terrorist organization. The testimony of former FBI agent Ali H. Soufan, who led the interrogators of Al-Qaeda members before 11 September 2001, comes in support of earlier affirmations, claiming that Al-Qaeda members had the ability to quote from bin Laden's speeches, but did not know the Quran or even Arabic, this showing that, in fact, religion is not the main pillar in the life of an Islamist terrorist.

Taken separately, these depositions do not demonstrate anything, but they come to support the assertion that ISIS is not, in itself, such a religious group as it was presented by the media, but uses religious rhetoric to justify its acts of violence and to attract sympathizers. This vision and this way of acting seek to propose an ethical and moral component for religious extremists, proclaiming *jihad*, meaning "holy war" for the preaching of Islam, which, in the vision of Muslim radicals, is a necessary war against the unbelievers and in the name of Allah. Thus, jihadist propaganda uses a complex message, the role of which is to target specific groups: *lone wolves*, who act in their own name on national territory; *women* (mostly underage), who are convinced to leave their family and go to Syria or Iraq to marry jihadists fighters; *mercenaries*, who fight not for religious reasons, but for material gain; and *religious or ideological fanatics*, who identify themselves with the ideological and religious message of the jihadist propaganda. This classification of the public to which the ISIS propaganda is directed helps us better understand the situation in Syria and identify who, why and what are they fighting for. It is not the religious component that determines the majority of westerners to go to Syria and fight for ISIS, but women, drugs, money and the violence that was promised. In other words, ISIS propaganda is not necessarily religious, as centered on material things and on violence that dwells within the human being (*homo homini lupus*).

Propaganda is only a part of ISIS activity, the so-called *soft power* of the group. However, there is also the *hard power*, which refers to the ways jihadists struggle to achieve

³⁶ Mehdi Hasan, "How Islamic is Islamic State?", *New Statesman Ltd.*, 6-12 March 2015, p. 28.

³⁷ *Idem*.

their goals. To this end, ISIS, like all non-state actors who engage in a battle with a state-type actor, is using asymmetric tactics (propaganda, informational networks, and psychological operations), the constant adaptation to new tactics and the use of terror.

EUROPOL reports from 2017 and 2018 show that 142 terrorist attacks were reported by EU member states in 2016, and 205 attacks occurred in 2017. Of this, more than half have been reported by the Great Britain, and many failed or were prevented by the national authorities. In the 2016 terrorist attacks, more than 379 people were injured and 142 were killed, the number reaching 68 dead and 844 injured in 2017³⁸. Although the number of attacks in 2017 increased significantly compared to the situation in 2016 (with 45%), and 2015, of these, 137 attacks were caused by ethno-nationalist and/or separatist movements, and not by jihadists. However, both in 2016 and 2017, jihadist attacks made the most victims: 135 dead³⁹ (in 2016) and 62 dead and 819 injured⁴⁰ (in 2017). As a result of the attacks, 718 people were arrested in 2016 as suspects in jihadist terrorism cases⁴¹, and only 705 were arrested in 2017⁴². The situation in 2017 does not comply with the upward trend of arrests among jihadists and the descending one in terms of the number of attacks.

Terrorism has also become a way of expressing the frustrations of young westerners who, for various reasons, either do not identify with the values of the state in which they live (a *moral outrage*⁴³ occurs, followed by a process of de-pluralization), or, as we have previously shown, they may be victims of *prejudiced and social inequalities*⁴⁴, so they have planned and carried out terrorist attacks on their own. These attacks were not actually organized by ISIS, but were inspired and encouraged by the actions of Islamist fighters and by the jihadist propaganda. These attacks are the hardest to prevent, because the attackers act as simple citizens, seeking to blend in the society. Although they are not part of ISIS, they manage to fulfill the organization's mission to attack western states and to kill or harm the citizens of these states, so these attacks are almost always claimed by the ISIS. In 2016, ISIS claimed 16 deadly attacks in the west (in the USA, France, Belgium, Turkey and Germany), killing 302 people and hurting other 1277. By September 2017, ISIS organized or inspired 6 major attacks in England, France, Turkey and Spain, killing 31 people and hurting another 327⁴⁵.

Part of Islamist terrorists acting in the territories of the MENA region or in Europe are citizens of western states, raised and educated in the spirit of western modernism, using the latest technologies. However, this extremist vision must not be identified with Islam, and the Muslim communities from the western countries have tried to show this thing. After almost every attack with victims, the Muslim community in that state mobilized and militate against ISIS and its extremist speech and actions.

CONCLUSIONS

The will of man can cause fundamental political and social changes within a state or within an international system. Thus, by adding radical and extremist tendencies to a man's will in order to replace the stable values of fundamental freedoms will accentuate the state of insecurity.

³⁸ EUROPOL, "TE-SAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018", p. 9.

³⁹ EUROPOL, "TE-SAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017", pp. 10-11.

⁴⁰ EUROPOL, "TE-SAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018", p. 9.

⁴¹ EUROPOL, "TE-SAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017", pp. 10-11.

⁴² EUROPOL, "TE-SAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018", p. 10.

⁴³ Daniel Koehler, *op. cit.*, p.71.

⁴⁴ Jessica Stern, *art. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴⁵ Cüneyt Gürer, "Presenting a Strategic Model to Understand Spillover Effects of ISIS Terrorism", in *Connections: The Quartely Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2017, pp. 44-45.

As we have seen in the mentioned examples, radical actions seem to be perceived by some individuals as immediate solutions to social-political problems, but, in fact, these actions deepen the problems until the stage when their effects become irreversible. Also, the ease with which individuals embrace these alternative ideas may be the result of a failure of the states' management of the elements and factors that contribute to the emergence and spread of radicalism and extremism. Through sustained religious propaganda and the use of asymmetric tactics, such as intelligence operations, constant adaptation to new tactics and land and the use of terror, ISIS created the so-called *CNN effect*, which refers to influencing public opinion by intense media coverage of its military bombings and actions, spreading fear among citizens throughout the world.

During this research we have shown how these extremist phenomena could generate serious problems for the security environment, precisely because of their anarchic tendencies to destroy the current international system to build a new one. These anarchic characteristics can be used by other actors, state or non-state, to destabilize and to legitimize aggressive or extremely violent actions and to impose their will on others.

ISIS has not been definitively defeated, and the loss of territories and support does not mean the disappearance of Islamism. Radical ideologies are born from divergences between individuals, from the abuses and sufferings to which they are subjected. Moreover, the factors leading to the emergence of ISIS are still present in the Middle East, and the political regimes in the region have lost their legitimacy, so a vacuum of power exists in the region. All these elements favor the existence of tensions in the Middle East region, tensions that can create the framework for resumption and intensification of violence in the entire world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, "AfD: What you need to know about Germany's far-right party", in *Deutsche Welle*, <https://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-know-about-germanys-far-right-party/a-37208199>.
2. ***, "Far-right parties form new group in European Parliament", in *Deutsche Welle*, <https://www.dw.com/en/far-right-parties-form-new-group-in-european-parliament/a-49189262>.
3. ***, "Foreign influence operations in the EU", *European Parliament*, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/RIE/2018/625123/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)625123_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/RIE/2018/625123/EPRS_BRI(2018)625123_EN.pdf).
4. BOSI, Lorenzo; DEMETRIOU, Chares; MALTHANER, Stefan, "A Contentious Politics Approach to the Explanation of Radicalization", in: BOSI, L; DEMETRIOU, C.; MALTHANER, S. (eds.), *Dynamics of Political Violence. A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*, Ashgate, Surrey, 2014, pp.1-23.
5. BRECHON, Pierre, *Partidele Politice*, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2004.
6. BUZAN, Barry, *Popoarele, statele și frica: O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Cartier, Chișinău, 2017.
7. CHIVVIS, Christopher S.; COHEN, Raphael S.; FREDERICK, Bryan; HAMILTON, Daniel S.; LARRABEE, F. Stephen; LIN, Bonny, *NATO's Northeastern Flank Emerging Opportunities for Engagement*, RAND Corporation, 2017.
8. EUROPOL, "TE-SAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018".
9. EUROPOL, "TE-SAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017".
10. GIDDENS, Anthony, *Sociologie*, ALL, București, 2010.
11. GÜRER, Cüneyt, "Presenting a Strategic Model to Understand Spillover Effects of ISIS Terrorism", in *Connections: The Quartely Journal*, Vol.1 6, No. 2, 2017.

12. HASAN, Mehdi, "How Islamic is Islamic State?", *New Statesman Ltd.*, March 6-12, 2015.
13. HOSMER, Stephen T., *The conflict over Kosovo: why Milosevic decided to settle when he did*, RAND Corporation, 2001.
14. KOEHLER, Daniel, *Understanding deradicalization*, Routledge, New York, 2017.
15. MEHEDINȚI, Simion, *Politica de vorbe și omul de stat*, Editura Librăriei Socec&Co. Societate Anonimă, Bucharest, 1928.
16. MONGRENIER, Jean-Sylvestre, *Rusia amenință oare Occidentul?*, Cartier, Chișinău, 2010.
17. NAY, Olivier, *Istoria ideilor politice*, Polirom, Iasi, 2008.
18. ROBBINSON, Paul, *Dicționar de securitate internațională*, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010.
19. SARCINSCHI, Alexandra, *Dimensiunile nonmilitare ale securității*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2005.
20. STERN, Jessica, "Deradicalization or Disengagement of Terrorists: Is it possible?", in *Hoover Institution*, Stanford University, 2010, <https://www.hoover.org/research/future-challenges-deradicalization-or-disengagement-terrorists>.

THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY – WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

Sorina Ana MANEA

Major, PhD candidate “Carol I” National Defense University,
Defense Intelligence Training Centre, Bucharest, Romania
sorinaman2@yahoo.com

Abstract: *This essay discusses the necessity of defining the content of the concept of threat to national security, not from the point of view of a particular criterion, but from the perspective of describing social behavior and the subjects involved in dealing with and addressing the situations that disrupts the state of national security. It also tries to specify some content elements for the national security threat concept and to bring to the readers’ attention the importance of this concept to the Romanian national security architecture.*

Keywords: *threat; national security; investigative powers; beneficiaries.*

INTRODUCTION

Currently, the concept of threat to national security, in Romania, is almost exclusively analyzed from the perspective of security studies. There are several analysis of legal specialists such as Mihai Udroi and Ovidiu Predescu¹, Dan Constantin Măță² and Corneliu Bîrsan³, but more seems to be needed. This situation draws attention since the threat to national security, when it manifests itself, generates the application of the punitive force of the state, externalized by measures of temporarily restricting the human fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as punishment of those who commit criminal acts against the state's security. Because of this two reasons, but also because it should benefit of predictability in the eyes of the citizens, the concept of threat to national security should have a general definition beyond references to some phenomena - terrorism, subversion, etc.

Klaus Knorr has noted when security is concerned there are “actual threats”, which show definite signs of intent and “potential threats” which arise from some capability of an opponent, and this manner of treating national security threats causing “a lot of conceptual uneasiness”⁴.

And Barry Buzan also discusses the difficulties in characterizing the state of security by means of describing threats: “The word itself implies an absolute condition - something is either secure or insecure - and does not lend itself to the idea of a graded spectrum like that which fills the space between hot and cold”⁵.

¹ Mihail Udroi, Radu Slavoiu, Ovidiu Predescu, *Tehnici speciale de investigare în justiția penală*, C.H. Beck Publishing house, Bucharest, 2009.

² Dan Constantin Măță, *Securitatea națională. Concept. Reglementare. Mijloace de ocrotire*, Hamangiu Publishing house, Bucharest, 2016.

³ Corneliu Bîrsan, *Convenția europeană a drepturilor omului. Comentariu pe articole*, C.H. Beck Publishing house, Bucharest, 2010.

⁴ Klaus Knorr, “Threat Perception”, in: K. Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, University of Kansas, 1976, p. 78 and Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (eds.), “Economic Interdependence and National Security”, in *Economic Issues and National Security*, Published for the National Security Education Program by the Regents Press of Kansas, 1977, p. 18.

⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, states and fear: An Agenda for security Analysis in the Post-Cold War Era*, Weatsheaf, Brighton 1991, p. 218.

This situation also is notice by Hans G. Brauch who said "In security policy and studies 'threat' is used as a 'political term' and as a 'scientific concept' that remains undefined in many social science dictionaries"⁶.

But the need for a definition is felt also because "if security is specified in terms of threats to all acquired values of a state, it becomes almost synonymous with national welfare or national interest and is virtually useless for distinguishing among policy objectives"⁷.

1. Views on the concept threat to national defense

In Romania, there is a tendency to keep the concept of threat to national security in the sphere of politics and security studies, which is evident also in the official Defense and security planning documents, which refer only to its political and foreign policy facets without considering the legal vein of this concept, and thus making it difficult for the society to understand and internalize what threats are and do, and how each citizen is responsible to act against them.

Probably one of the reasons for this situation is the dynamic content of the concept of threat to security as well as its permanent transformation, both stimulated by globalization and the IT&C revolution, but especially by the process of Romania's integration into the European Union and NATO.

The integration of Romania in the two organizations has brought, at least in the academic environment, an orientation towards European and Euro-Atlantic studies on security which have as main subject of study security from the international relations point of view. This way of seeing threats poses a problem in that, most of the time, it loses sight of the fact that national security is a domestic issue, specific to a certain nation, and even regional and international threats should be regarded from an internal perspective that cannot be identical with the regional or international approach of situation that affect multiple states or with the associative nature of security measures adopted by international bodies to counteract transnational threats.

The European perspective on the threats, even those manifested at the domestic level of the EU Member States, reflects the associative character of the organization and the idea that the internal security issues of a Member State can, at any time, become a security issue for the entire Union, precisely because of the political, economic, military, social and environmental interconnections, formed by accession. Specifically, the European approach to the concept of threat to national or regional security preserves and develops the ideas of the Copenhagen School, which is perfectly justified if one considers that the issues in question are related to international relations between the Member States and other States.

The North Atlantic Alliance's perspective on threats is marked by the military nature of the organization. Therefore, the threat from NATO's point of view is a military actionable and political concept that encompasses the need to ensure global stability for the development and prosperity of Western society. In other word the political side gives order to the military side to act against a specific threat, for example a state that is harboring a specific terrorist group, in order to prevent the escalation of that specific situation or to prevent a more damaging situation to human rights or other global values. It should also not be forgotten that NATO is, from a legal stand, located at the confluence of two major legal systems, namely the Anglo-Saxon and the Roman ones. This political-military organization is executive in nature and never a

⁶ Hans Günter Brauch, "Concepts of security, threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks" in: Hans Günter Brauch, John Grin, Czeslaw Mesjasz, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Béchir Chourou, Pal Dunay, Jörn Birkmann, *Coping with environmental changes, disasters and security*, Springer, Berlin, 2011, p. 63.

⁷ David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security", in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 23, British International Studies Association, 1997, p.18.

supranational entity able to formulate norms invested with the power of law. Therefore, at the level of the North Atlantic Alliance, the threat is viewed punctually oriented towards an objective reality generated by a momentary military necessity, but without being able to provide a stable legal concept.

Adherents of the realist school of thought define security as a freedom from any objective military threat to the state survival in an anarchic international system. Stephen Walt “the studies of the threat, use, and control of military force”⁸. This approach is essentially based on idea that “the social relations as well as security threats are result of material factors and that they exist “objectively”⁹.

Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School have challenged this approach on security by widening and deepening security studies agenda, and stating that in reality the diversification of threats modify the security concept which has expanded from exclusively military onto political, economic, societal and environmental sectors and this altered security concept should also be open to referent objects [other than the state (individuals, social groups, humanity as a whole)]¹⁰.

Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde think security is about survival; it is when an issue, presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object, justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them¹¹.

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies conceptualizes security as a process of social construction of threats which includes securitizing actor (mostly political elite), who declares certain matter as urgent and a posing threat for the survival of the referent object, that, once accepted with the audience, legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures for neutralization of the threat. Thus, the issue is securitized and removed outside the normal bounds of democratic political procedure and put on the “panic politics” agenda¹².

Defining what the concept of threat to national security refers to, what other notions and concepts it involves becomes a complicated step in our country given the context of the permeability to the influence of security studies. Still, formulating a clear concept, explaining the threat to national security as completely as possible, is absolutely necessary, this being a way of upholding democracy, the only form of social organization in which the rule of law is fundamental, by this understanding the clear rules that an individual must follow so that he respects the freedom of others as the other respects his.

2. The need for a legal definition of threat to national defense

The field of national security is imperatively regulated by Law no. 51/1991 regarding the national security of Romania¹³, modified in 2014¹⁴, republished in the same year and

⁸ Filip Ejdus, “Dangerous liaisons: Securitization theory and Schmittian Legacy”, in *Western Balkans Security Observer*, No. 13, 2009, pp. 9-17.

⁹ Barry Buzan, *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1998 pp. 21-22.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 34.

¹³ The modification of the name of Law no. 51/1991 was made in 2014 once the amendments adopted by the Parliament entered into force. On this occasion, the title and provisions of Law No. 51/1991 were brought into line with the provisions of the Romanian Constitution, in which the phrase “national security” was introduced in 2003. At the same time, in order to avoid confusion with other laws, and in strict compliance with Law no. 24/2000 on the norms of legislative technique for the elaboration of normative acts, republished, article 41, the law on national security bears the name Law no. 51/1991 on the national security of Romania, republished, with subsequent amendments and completions.

¹⁴ Law no. 255/2013 for the application of Law no. 135/2010 on the Code of Criminal Procedure and for the modification and addition of normative acts including criminal procedural provisions entered into force in

complemented in 2016 by the inclusion of actions that affect the national security from the perspective of the quality of the environment. The reasons of this completion were: growth of organized criminality involved in illegal deforestation of forests, which, besides the financial losses causes damage to strategic infrastructure and affects the health of the population, even the life of citizens, in case of floods and damages or destroys private and public property.¹⁵

Considered by many¹⁶ to be a normative act not adapted to the realities of environment security specific to the beginning of the 21st century, it has nevertheless proved, in the 28 years that have passed since its entry into force, sufficiently flexible and comprehensive regarding the acts that are named as threats to national security, ensuring the legal basis even for those circumstances and phenomena with a rapid evolution such as terrorism, asymmetrical threats, or more recently, hybrid ones and covering all the areas stipulated in the security and defense strategies adopted during the successive presidential mandates since 1990.

A probable reason for this approach – that Law No. 51/1991 is not adapted to the security reality of today - might be the fact that threat to national security is not defined but described, meaning that the legislator described acts like plans to destabilize the constitutional order, or acts to support foreign interest¹⁷ when it defines threat to national defense. So when the need to include other concept considered as threats to national security was felt different planning documents¹⁸ were adopted by Parliament¹⁹. But the issue with Parliament decisions is that they cannot extend or modify in any way the provisions of laws²⁰ as they are of inferior legal power and are opposable only the public institution that have responsibilities in the field mentioned in them. For example, The national defense strategy for the years 2015-2019 - For a Strong Romania in Europe and in the world includes as threats to national security distortions on the energy markets, but for the intelligence services to gather intelligence on this kind of phenomenon, they have to seek legal bases in article 3 of Law No. 51/1991, because otherwise article 4 of the mention law which states that no person can be investigate unless he commits acts that are in accordance with the law threats to national defense, comes into action preventing them to apply article 13 of the same law and so to uphold the prevision of the strategy.

The absence of a legal definition of the threat to national security is felt today, not because the acts described by the legislator as disturbing to the state of balance, stability, and national legality are not comprehensive, but because the permeability of the concept itself can

02.01.2014, URL: <https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gm3tgnbtgy/legea-nr-255-2013-pentru-punerea-in-aplicare-a-legii-nr-135-2010-privind-codul-de-procedura-penala-si-pentru-modificarea-si-completarea-unor-acte-normative-care-cuprind-dispozitii-procesual-penalem> accessed on 10.02.2019.

¹⁵ Pl-x nr. 428/2015 Legislative proposal for the addition of the Law on Romania's national security no. 51/1991. Reasons, URL: <http://www.cdep.ro/proiecte/2015/400/20/8/em538.pdf>, accessed at 10.02.2019.

¹⁶ Marian Zulean, *Reforma sistemului de securitate*, URL: https://www.academia.edu/715252/REFORMA_SISTEMULUI_DE_SECURITATE, accessed on 10.02.2019; and Marian Zulean, "Puterea politică și securitatea națională: la început a fost cuvântul...", in *Contributors.ro*, 28 November 2016, URL: <http://www.contributors.ro/administratie/puterea-politica-%c8%99i-securitatea-na%c8%9bionala-la-inceput-a-fost-cuvantul/>, accessed on 10.02.2019; Eduard Hellvig, "Este nevoie de dezbatere pentru un pachet de legi pe securitate", in *Bursa.ro*, 29 March 2019, URL: <https://www.bursa.ro/eduard-hellvig-este-nevoie-de-dezbatere-pentru-un-pachet-de-legi-pe-securitate-80900234>, accessed on 10.02.2019; Iulian Fota, "Formele fără fond ale securității naționale", in *Reporter Global*, 13 October 2018, URL: <https://reporterglobal.ro/formele-fara-fond-ale-securitatii-nationale/>, accessed on 10.02.2019.

¹⁷ Art. 3 of Law no. 51/1991 on Romania's national security.

¹⁸ The national defense strategy, as the Law no. 473/ 2004 on defense planning stipulates, is an executive document drawn up by the President and submitted to Parliament approval.

¹⁹ Law no. 473/ 2004 regarding the defence planning.

²⁰ Decision of Constitutional court no. 720/2017 on the notification of unconstitutionality of the provisions of the Decision of the Romanian Parliament no. 85/2017 for the modification and addition of the Decision of Romanian Parliament no. 30/1993 on the organization and functioning the Permanent Common Commission of the Deputy Room and Senate for exerting parliamentary control on the Romanian Intelligence Service, paragraph 9.

lead to legal confusion and ultimately to the uncertainty of respecting the right to legal security as described in European and Romanian jurisprudence and doctrine, but especially by constitutional norms²¹. As said above, Parliament decision cannot be opposable to citizens, so the social behavior prescribed is not mandatory, but public authorities seek acts that are considered as threat in administrative documents which require sometimes invasive measure of investigation (beside those that are under judicial control) against individuals that are under the suspicion of committing acts evaluated as threats to national security. In legal term this situation raises issues regarding the predictability and necessity principles²² of the laws²³.

In the following we will try to identify some content elements of the concept of threat to national security as they arise from different legal documents. This perspective on the concept discussed here is, in our opinion, important because laws are those that set the mandatory framework for achieving national security, even though policies are those that reflect the dynamism of society.

First of all, threat is in the eyes of the majority, meaning the law, an objective reality, a circumstance that concerns all society, who's perpetrator is directly targeted by institutional entities invested with state authority to take actions with intrusive character, if his behavior is evaluated as deviating from the reality constituted on the observance of the rules of conduct generally accepted by the community.

For this reason, the concept of threat to national security should not be studied only by security studies, but also should be a focus study for constitutional lawyers, those who are dedicated to the study of administrative law, human rights and criminal law, and after that set into mandatory acts, because it involves a punitive action based on a ratio of proportionality between facts, and their potential social impact.

The analysis of the provisions of the law on national security helps to identify a feature of threats to national security, namely that it is the act viewed from the perspective of an action or inaction against the state attributes, the fundamental rights and freedoms and / or the constitutional order.

The legislator ruled in Law No. 51/1991 on national security of Romania the necessity for real actions to be implemented by individuals before the concept of threat to national security to be invoked. So the law stipulated that individuals can be investigated only if they commit the limiting facts described in Article 3 of the normative act above-mentioned as threats.

So from a legal doctrinal point of view threat to the national security “means external acts of commisive or omissive conduct, intentional and which are objectified in facts, situations, circumstances in which a state of danger is outlined or undermines the values that are confined to the concept of national security, defined as such by the law regarding the national security of Romania, namely the state of legality, balance and social, economic and political stability necessary for the existence and development of the Romanian national state as a sovereign, unitary, independent and indivisible state, to maintain the order of law, as well as the climate of unrestricted exercise of the fundamental rights, freedoms and duties of the citizens, according to the democratic principles and norms established by the Constitution.”²⁴.

²¹ Article 1 paragraph 5 Romania's Constitution.

²² Decision of the Constitutional Court no. 51/2016 on the acceptance of the unconstitutionality exception of the provisions of art. 142, alin. (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

²³ Decision of Constitutional Court no. 26 of 16 January 2019 on the request for resolving the juridical conflict of constitutional nature between the Public Ministry and the Prosecutor of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Parliament of Romania, High Court of Cassation and Justice, and the other law courts.

²⁴Doru Ioan Cristescu, Victor Cătălin Enescu, *Cadrul general tactic al investigației penale în cazul infracțiunilor contra securității naționale și acte de terorism. Ep. 3. Amenințările la adresa securității naționale. Corespondența cu infracțiunile contra securității naționale și acte de terorism. Formele de realizare a amenințărilor la adresa*

The all-inclusive nature of the threats to national security is imposed by the principles of accessibility and predictability under which the law must allow the citizen to understand what behavior to adopt and it must be drafted with sufficient precision so that any person can correct his behavior in such a way that it is within the parameters set by the legislator; the person must be able to predict within the reasonable limits the consequences of his action²⁵.

Also, the legal provisions in the field of security establish competence to investigate the acts defined as a threat to the state institutions with competence in achieving national security, known in the doctrine as intelligence services, in that the informative activity for the achievement of security is exclusively their attribution. In this sense, they are given a series of competences that relate to how concrete facts can be known that are confined to the legal description of situations that may disturb the state of national security. At the same time, the intelligence services have the task of preventing the effects of the threats, as well as the task of informing the decision-makers expressly nominated by the legal text to prevent and counteract the negative effects produced by the facts stipulated in article 3 of the Law No. 51/1991 regarding the national security of Romania.

According to Law No. 51/1991, as well as Law No. 415/2008 regarding the organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of the Defense of the Country for the achievement of national security, contribute the intelligence services through the informative activity materialized in intelligence products for the decision-makers provided by the two normative acts.

Thus according to the provisions of Law No. 51/1991 are beneficiaries of the informative activity:

a) the president of the Senate, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as the standing committees for defense, public order and national security of the two chambers of Parliament;

b) ministers and heads of departments in ministries, when the information concerns issues related to the areas of activity they coordinate or which they are responsible for;

c) the prefects, the general mayor of the Capital, as well as the leaders of the county councils, respectively of the General Council of the Municipality of Bucharest, for problems concerning the competence of the respective bodies;

d) criminal prosecution bodies, when the information concerns the perpetration of a crime.²⁶

The communication of intelligence is approved by the heads of bodies with responsibilities in the field of national security²⁷.

And according to the same normative act, these state entities are the only ones able to access the results of the intelligence activity, which has a *state secret* (classified) character and on which the prohibition of disclosure in conditions other than those provided by law is stipulated. Under the law of national security, the members of the Supreme Council of the Defense of the Country can access the information resulting from the activity of intelligence because this autonomous administrative body of the state in the area of national security the following competences:

securității naționale. Cunoașterea căilor, metodelor și mijloacelor folosite pentru comiterea de amenințări contra securității naționale / infracțiuni contra securității naționale sau acte de terrorism, 09.03.2015, URL: <https://www.juridice.ro/364621/cadrul-general-tactic-al-investigatiei-penale-in-cazul-infracțiunilor-contra-securitatii-naționale-si-acte-de-terorism-ep-3-amenintarile-la-adresa-securitatii-naționale-corespondenta-cu-infracțiun.html>, accessed on 09.26.2019, in the author's translation.

²⁵*Sovisto vs Finland* 13 January 2009; *Varga vs Romania* 1 April 2008.

²⁶ Article 11 of Law no. 51/1991 on Romania's national security.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

- a) analyzes the data and information obtained and evaluates the state of national security;
- b) establishes the main directions of activity and approves the obligatory general measures for removing the threats provided in Art. 3;
- c) establishes the uses of the intelligence regarding the national security;
- d) analyzes reports and intelligence regarding the implementation of the law on national security;
- e) approves the organizational structures, personnel and operating regulations of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the External Information Service and the Protection and Guard Service;
- f) approves the operative expenses destined to achieve the national security²⁸.

CONCLUSIONS

In accordance with the remarks above, it is found that the facts considered legally as threats to national security can be known by investigative methods expressly provided by law only by the bodies with attributions in the field of national security, and they are limited by the law and they can be prevented by informing the bodies empowered to decide the measures to counteract and restore the national security state.

Having in mind these clear powers of investigation and decision, a new clarification is required namely that threats to national security are not crimes or attempts at crimes provided by the criminal law. In this regard, the Constitutional Court of Romania clarified the competences for investigating criminal acts as well as the bodies empowered to determine the circumstances that are criminal facts. Thus it was established that the only competent bodies in criminal matters are those of investigation and prosecution, the intelligence services having only the competence and the obligation to inform about the situations on which the reasonable opinion was formed that there would be criminal acts and that they came to be known occasionally, without any systematic measures of investigation²⁹.

Although, in regard of the acts stipulated in Article 3 of Law No. 51/1991 which have correspondent in the Criminal Code, things are apparently clear, the same cannot be said about those that do not, where things are more complex. In this order of ideas, the bodies empowered to carry out the activity of intelligence must permanently take into account the fact that the act evaluated as a threat becomes a crime when the criminal resolution manifested itself in the objective reality, the prediction or prognosis becoming in this way a diagnosis. In other words, the intelligence services are competent to investigate those facts that are usually equivocal and do not highlight the intent for which they were done.

To conclude this brief approach we can say that the threat to national security represents the act of a Romanian, foreign or stateless citizen most likely directed against the state of stability, social balance and legality of Romania, expressly and limited provided by law, which differs from the criminal fact by its character of prognosis and that can be investigated exclusively by the intelligence services by means provided by law, in order to prevent and counteract by informing the beneficiaries of the intelligence activity their the negative effects.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, art. 7.

²⁹ Decision of Romania's Constitutional Court no. 51/2016 on the acceptance of the unconstitutionality exception of the provisions of art. 142, alin. (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. BRAUCH, Hans Günter, "Concepts of security, threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks" in: Hans Günter Brauch, John Grin, Czeslaw Mesjasz, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Béchir Chourou, Pal Dunay, Jörn Birkmann, *Coping with environmental changes, disasters and security*, Springer, Berlin, 2011.
2. BALDWIN, David A. "The concept of security", in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 23, British International Studies Association, 1997
3. BÎRSAN, Corneliu, *Convenția europeană a drepturilor omului. Comentariu pe articole*, C.H. Beck Publishing house, Bucharest, 2010.
4. BUZAN, Barry, *People, states and fear: An Agenda for security Analysis in the PostCold War Era*. Weatsheaf, Brighton, 1991.
5. BUZAN, Barry; WEAVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap, *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rinner Publishers Inc., Boulder Colorado, 1998.
6. KNORR, Klaus, "Threat Perception", in: K. Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, University of Kansas, 1976, p. 78 and Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (eds.), "Economic Interdependence and National Security", in *Economic Issues and National Security*, Published for the National Security Education Program by the Regents Press of Kansas, 1977.
7. MĂȚĂ, Dan Constantin, *Securitatea națională Concept. Reglementare. Mijloace de ocrotire*, Hamangiu Publishing house, Bucharest, 2016.
8. UDROIU, Mihail; Slavoiu, Radu; Predescu, Ovidiu, *Tehnici speciale de investigare în justiția penală*, C.H. Beck Publishing house, Bucharest, 2009.
9. ZULEAN, Marian, *Reforma sistemului de securitate*, URL: https://www.academia.edu/715252/REFORMA_SISTEMULUI_DE_SECURITATE, accessed on 10.02.2019; and Marian Zulean, "Puterea politică și securitatea națională: la început a fost cuvântul...", in *Contributors.ro*, 28 November 2016, URL: <http://www.contributors.ro/administratie/puterea-politica-%c8%99i-securitatea-na%c8%9bionala-la-inceput-a-fost-cuvantul/>

A STUDY ON CYBER SECURITY LEGISLATION

Simona ENESCU

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA),
Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: seenescu@gmail.com

Abstract: *The cyber space amplitude and the cyber threats variety pose a great challenge in protecting the internet users, given the attackers' capability of acting from anywhere in the world, the impact that an attack might have on real life, and also the difficulty of reducing vulnerabilities and a cyber-attack consequences management.*

States need to address this area by legislation, as part of international organizations' or national security strategy, given the fact that at least three out of five types of cyber threats aim to directly affect critical infrastructures – cyber war, cyber espionage and cyber terrorism. The risk and potential consequences of such acts generated a new mission in terms of security.

International organizations, as well as some states, already adopted strategic legislation on cyber security, but less importance was given to implementing national laws. These norms need to consider issues like jurisdiction, sovereignty or responsibility in a global space. But there are not few those who consider that cyber security legislation could affect human rights. So it raises the question if these laws are really necessary, given the cyber threats' evolution, or it's enough to establish certain guidelines in approaching them.

Keywords: *cyber security; legislation; jurisdiction; sovereignty, awareness; security culture; cooperation; human rights.*

1. International Law on Cyber Security

The term cybercrime was first used in international law, in 2001, when the Council of Europe¹ issued the Cybercrime Convention², and the first international strategy on cyber security belongs to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization³ and dates back to 2002⁴.

1.1. Cyber Security Strategies

The 9/11 events marked the entire architecture of the international security system, including the cyber security field. In 2003, with the National Security Strategy's entry into force, the United States recognized cyber security as a national strategic priority, for the first time in history. In the following years, since 2005, concerns about issuing and implementing cyber security strategies have also expanded in Europe - firstly Germany and Sweden. However, a particular impact in this area had the 2007 cyber attack on Estonia. Thus, the most

¹ Council of Europe – CoE is the European organization for protecting human rights. It includes 47 members, of which 28 are EU member states.

² NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/library/incyder/?search=cyber>, accessed on 12 September 2019.

³ Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation - APEC is a regional economic forum, founded in 1989, URL: <https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC>, accessed on 12 September 2019

⁴ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/library/incyder/?search=cybersecurity>, accessed on 12 September 2019.

comprehensive such document is the National Strategy for Cyber Security of Estonia, issued in 2008. In the same year, Finland and Slovakia have issued such strategic documents. Countries such as the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom followed in 2011. In the same year, Germany revised the strategy issued in 2005, out of the need to emphasize the field of critical infrastructure protection⁵.

1.2. The European Union vs. North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

The European Union was established as an economic union, later becoming an economic and political union, while NATO is a political-military alliance. But both became important actors in the field of security, because stability could not be ensured for any of the dimensions of action – political-economic or political-military⁶. At present, both the European Union and NATO have become important actors in developing the capabilities of the Member States in the field of security.

At the European Union level, the security dimension is governed by the principle of subsidiarity, so each member state issued cyber security strategies. Regardless of where they come from, every strategic document establishes a set of directions of action, based on the context description that generated the need to develop measures capable of responding to specific security needs and adapted to the future projection of the cyber environment, as it is perceived, at the level of each country⁷. However, the European Union issues directives in this area, with the obligation for Member States to transpose them into national law. The most relevant such directives are: The NIS Directive (2016), The Cyber Security Act – Digital Single Market (2019), and why not, the GDPR Directive (2016), because personal data protection online became a real challenge.

At NATO level, the first cyber defense policy was adopted in 2008, as a result of the cyber attack against Estonia. According to this document, the responsibilities in the field of cyber security fall to the political, military and technical authorities, as well as to the allies, individually, but based on the following principles:

- Defense in the cyber domain is part of the main mission of the collective defense
- NATO is responsible for protecting its own communications networks
- Allied states are responsible for the protection of their own communications networks which must be compatible with each other and with those of the Alliance
- Allied states are committed to improving mutual cooperation and assistance, with the aim of preventing, combating and recovering from a cyber attack
- NATO intensifies its cooperation with industry
- NATO is improving its capabilities for cyber-exercises, training and education.⁸

In 2011, the second NATO cyber defense policy entered into force, establishing a new vision on coordinating cyber defense efforts within the Alliance, in the context of rapid technology and threat evolution, as well as an action plan for implementation.⁹

Each of the two organizations has created dedicated structures to cyber security issues. For example, since 2004, ENISA – the European Union Agency for Cyber Security has been operating within the EU, playing an important role in the development of the European cyber

⁵ ***, National Cyber Security Strategies – Setting the Course for National Efforts to Strengthen in Cyberspace, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, 2012, URL: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cyber-security-strategies-paper>, accessed on 12 September 2019.

⁶ Cristian Bizadea, Bucharest Security Conference, 4-5 October 2019.

⁷ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/library/strategy-and-governance/>, accessed on 15 September 2019

⁸ ***, Cyber Defence, NATO, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm, accessed on 13 February 2019.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

security policy, in supporting the Member States and EU authorities to prepare for dealing with cyber incidents that may affect two or more Member States. It also ensures the proper functioning of the Single Digital Market.¹⁰ And, in 2008, at NATO level, the Center of Excellence for Cyber Defense Cooperation - CCDOE was established, with the mission to support the Member States and the Alliance with interdisciplinary expertise in the field of cyber defense.¹¹

Given the missions of the two structures - ENISA and CCDCOE, both the European Union and NATO have issued documents intended to support the governments of the Member States, respectively the Practical Guide for the development and implementation of the national security strategies for the Member States¹² and the Framework Manual for National Cyber Security.¹³

Moreover, in 2016, NATO and the European Union signed a technical agreement on cyber defense, establishing a legal framework for cooperation between the structures of the two organizations by exchanging information and good practices, with the aim of increasing the common capacity for prevention and response to cyber-attacks.¹⁴

At present, all EU and NATO member states have a cyber security strategy. Some of these were updated, either according to the priorities of the states at one time, or because they targeted a limited life cycle, being short-term issued documents.

Regarding the national cyber security strategies of EU and NATO member states, the overall picture is captured in Table no. 1.

Nr. crt	NATO Member State	EU Member State	The entry into force year of The Cybersecurity Strategy
1.	Albania		2015
2.		Austria	2013
3.		Belgium	2014
4.		Bulgaria	2016
5.	Canada		2018
6.		Croatia	2015
7.		Cyprus	2012
8.		Czech Republic	2015
9.		Denmark	2018
10.		Estonia	2018
11.		Finland	2013
12.		France	2015
13.		Germany	2016
14.		Greece	2017
15.		Hungary	2013
16.	Iceland		2015
17.		Ireland	2015
18.		Italy	2017
19.		Latvia	2014
20.		Lithuania	2018
21.		Luxembourg	2018

¹⁰ European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, URL: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa>, accessed on 15 September 2019

¹¹ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/about-us/>, accessed on 15 September 2019

¹² National Cyber Security Strategies – Practical Guide on Development and Execution, December 2012

¹³ Alexander Klimburg (ed.), National Cyber Security Framework Manual, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/national-cyber-security-framework-manual/>, accessed on 15 September 2019.

¹⁴ ***, Cyber Defence, NATO, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm, accessed on 2 October 2019.

22.		Malta	2016
23.	Montenegro		2017
24.		Netherlands	2018
25.	Norway		2019
26.		Poland	2017
27.		Portugal	2019
28.		Romania	2013
29.		Slovakia	2015
30.		Slovenia	2016
31.		Spain	2019
32.		Sweden	2017
33.	Turcia		2016
34.		United Kingdom	2016
35.	United States of America		2018

Table no. 1: The National Cyber Security Strategies of EU and NATO Members States

Sources: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,

URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/library/strategy-and-governance/>

European Union Agency for Cybersecurity,

URL: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/national-cyber-security-strategies-interactive-map>

Overall, the strategies of the EU and NATO member states are built on a common structure – describing the cyber security context, describing the threats, establishing the principles of the activity and the strategic objectives in the fight against cyber crime. Among these, it is noticeable:

- Austria's security strategy presents in the first Annex a risk matrix, related to 2011, which shows the following: the lowest probability associated with low level consequences have been established for the risk of "manipulating the GPS signal"; low probability, but major impact were associated with the risk of "affecting the digital signature system"; the highest probability with the highest impact was established for the risk of "unknown technology anomalies"¹⁵.
- Canada's National Cyber Security Strategy represents a brochure that addresses directly to the society/ citizens, which encourages them to express their views by providing the contact details of the National Directorate for Cyber Security, on cyber security sub-topics, such as: the evolution of cyber threats, increasing the economic significance of cyber security, expanding borders or Canada's future in cyber security¹⁶.
- The National Security Strategy of France is built around five objectives: 1. Fundamental interests, defense and security of information systems and critical infrastructures, major cyber security crises; 2. Digital trust, privacy, personal data, cyber malevolence; 3. Increasing the level of awareness, initial training and continuing education; 4. Business environment in digital technology, industrial policies, export and internalization; 5. Europe, digital strategic autonomy, cyber space stability¹⁷.

¹⁵ The Austrian Cyber Security Strategy, 2013, URL: https://www.bmi.gv.at/504/files/130415_strategie_cybersicherheit_en_web.pdf, accessed on 23 September 2019.

¹⁶ National Cyber Security Strategy: Canada's Vision for Security and Prosperity in the Digital Age, 2018, URL: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-cbr-scrtr-strtg/ntnl-cbr-scrtr-strtg-en.pdf>, accessed on 23 September 2019.

¹⁷ French National Digital Security Strategy, 2015, URL: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/France_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf, accessed on 23 September 2019.

- The strategy with the shortest term is that of Ireland - 2 years¹⁸, and the strategy with the longest term belongs to Iceland - 11 years¹⁹.
- The American strategy is built on four pillars, representing a set of national values: 1. Protecting the American citizens, the territory and the American way of life; 2. Promoting American prosperity; 3. Ensuring peace through power; 4. Expanding American influence²⁰.

2. Cyber Security Legislation

Only 12 of the EU member states have also issued a national cyber security law and 13 of the NATO member states. Given that 22 EU member states are also NATO members, the difference is made at the level of the seven NATO-exclusive member states, compared to the six EU-only members.

Nr. crt	NATO Member State	EU Member State	The entry into force year of The Cybersecurity Laws
1.	Albania		
2.		Austria	
3.		Belgium	
4.		Bulgaria	2018
5.	Canada		
6.		Croatia	2007
7.		Cyprus	
8.		Czech Republic	2014
9.		Denmark	
10.		Estonia	2018
11.		Finland	2013
12.		France	
13.		Germany	2015
14.		Greece	2018
15.		Hungary	2013
16.	Iceland		
17.		Ireland	
18.		Italy	2013
19.		Latvia	
20.		Lithuania	2014
21.		Luxembourg	
22.		Malta	
23.	Montenegro		
24.		Netherlands	2018
25.	Norway		
26.		Poland	2018
27.		Portugal	2018
28.		Romania	
29.		Slovakia	
30.		Slovenia	
31.		Spain	
32.		Sweden	
33.	United States o America		2017
34.	Turkey		
35.		United Kingdom	

Table no. 2: The National Cyber Security Acts of EU and NATO Members States

¹⁸ Ireland's National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017, 2015.

¹⁹ Iceland's National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2026, 2015.

²⁰ United States' National Cyber Strategy, 2018.

Sources: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,
URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/library/strategy-and-governance/>
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, URL: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/national-cyber-security-strategies-interactive-map>

Six of the 12 laws were issued in 2018, by transposing the NIS Directive of the European Union into national law, and the law of the Czech Republic was updated in 2017, based on the same document²¹.

The issue of regulating this area is so complex that Jim Lewis, the director of the Policy in Technology Program, at the Center for International and Strategic Studies²², stated that it can be compared with the "*transition from the Wild West to the rule of law*"²³.

Although the countries chosen for comparison are members of at least two international organizations, so, as we have shown above, they benefit from support in developing the capabilities and resources needed to combat cyber threats, less than half have developed and issued national cyber security laws.

It raises disputes regarding jurisdiction, sovereignty and responsibility, issues that are more relevant internationally than nationally.

2.1 Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Responsibility

There are many debates in various international forums regarding the regulation of cyber space, but problems arise in making a decision starting from the fact that cyber space does not belong to one state or another. The authors of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations express their agreement that cyber space is a common good, similarly to maritime and cosmic space.²⁴ In addition, the same manual mentions the Netherlands Cyber Defense Strategy of the year which establishes cyber space as the *fifth area of military action*, next to the air, maritime, cosmic and terrestrial ones. That is why, quite frequently, a treaty was taken into account in international regulation, similar to the 1967 Cosmic Space Treaty, or the Paris Declaration of 1856 on maritime piracy. Even a way regarding the Treaty of Antarctic of 1959, a territory considered also common, was taken into account.²⁵

"*Sovereignty is a fundamental principle in international law*"²⁶. In the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, the term national sovereignty is defined as "*the independence of a state from other states*" and that of state sovereignty, as "*the supremacy of state power within the country and independence from the power of other states*".²⁷ The two definitions cover the two valences of the term: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty²⁸, respectively the supremacy of the state inside and independence from other states.

²¹ Eric J. Shinabarger, "Czech Republic Amends Its Cyber Security Act", 24 July 2017, URL: <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2549b390-18f7-4088-841d-d38b23921b81>, accessed on 3 October 2019

²² James Andrew Lewis, URL: <https://www.csis.org/people/james-andrew-lewis>, accessed on 3 October 2019.

²³ P.W. Singer; A. Friedman, "Cybersecurity and cyberwar. What everyone needs to know", Oxford University Press, 2014.

²⁴ International Group of Experts within CCDCOE, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

²⁵ P.W. Singer; A. Friedman, *op. cit.*

²⁶ *Idem.*

²⁷ ***, Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, second edition, The Romanian Academy, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 1998.

²⁸ International Group of Experts within CCDCOE, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Reported to the cyber space, the term can be applied under the conditions of its definition on three dimensions – *physical*, *logical* and *social*. The physical dimension includes the cyber networks and its components, the logical one covers the whole range of connections between the devices of the networks, and the social one represents the users of the cyber space²⁹.

The principle of internal sovereignty allows any state to legislate at national level the cyber domain, both regarding infrastructure and user activity, as long as this does not break the international law³⁰.

Given the global nature of the cyber space, as well as the principle of equality of states, basic principle of the external sovereignty concept, each state can carry out cyber activities on the territory of another state, but without violating international treaties or violating their sovereignty³¹.

The *jurisdiction* term is defined by the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language as “*the territory in which a judge or a court exercises its power*”³². The meaning is close to the sense of *state sovereignty* concept. Based on the principle of territoriality, it is exercised mainly within a state, but limited by the provisions of international law and by the following conditions, at the same time: *establishment of an authority by international law and consent of a foreign government regarding the exercise of jurisdiction in its territory*.³³

The concept of jurisdiction is based on four important principles: *the territorial principle* which supposes the exclusive authority of the state for managing illegal actions within its borders, that has been modified to allow the authorities to act, in certain circumstances, on the territory of another state; *the principle of nationality*, which allows states to take measures regarding their own citizens who carry out illegal actions in the territory of other states; *the principle of passive personality*, which allows, in certain circumstances, to seek jurisdiction to take action against a foreign national whose illicit actions affect its interests; *the protective principle*, which covers acts of taking hostages or planes hijacking - illicit actions that happen outside the territory of any states by foreign citizens; *the principle of universality*, which involves assuming jurisdiction if some illicit actions can be judged by all states³⁴.

In the cyber domain, the principle of *state responsibility* is translated by prohibiting the conduct of illicit actions that can have serious consequences for other states, on its own territory or in a network under government control³⁵.

2.2 Human Rights

Human rights are included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1948, that became a common standard for all nations³⁶. These are transposed into the constitution of each democratic state, in the system of the rights and freedoms of the citizens.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² ***, Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, second edition, The Romanian Academy, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 1998.

³³ International Group of Experts within CCDCOE, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

³⁴ ***, Encyclopaedia Britannica, URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law/Jurisdiction>, accessed on 3 October 2019.

³⁵ International Group of Experts within CCDCOE, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

³⁶ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, URL: <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>, accessed on 4 October 2019.

Whether we are talking about the freedom of the individual, a community or a nation, it is just as important. The Internet has undergone such a great expansion, at least until now, precisely because it represents an environment in which all these freedoms and rights can manifest. There are no restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of conscience or the right to information. The meaning of free movement can also be extended in the cyber environment. Even the right to meetings is exercised on the Internet. It is well known that, in recent times, most street movements have been organized on social platforms. But freedom is so important, that the secret of correspondence, intimate, family and private life are apparently protected by a password.

The term *freedom* is defined in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, 2009 edition, by "the possibility to act according to your own will or desire; (...) the status of a person enjoying the fullness of political and civil rights in the state; the condition of one who is not subject to a master; the situation of a person who is not confined or imprisoned; (...) independence, non-compliance; (...) fundamental rights recognized by the citizens' constitution, development and free expression of personality; (...) individual freedom - the right that guarantees the inviolability of the person; freedom of conscience - a formal principle, in the modern pluralistic society, which makes possible the action in accordance with one's own conscience, mainly as regards religion; freedom of thought - right of the citizen provided by the democratic constitutions, to express his own way of thinking (...)"³⁷. This definition eliminates some aspects of the previous edition, such as: "the possibility of conscious action of people, in the conditions of knowing and mastering the laws of development of nature and of society; (...) the status of a free person, who enjoys the fullness of political and civil rights in the state ... freedom of conscience - the right of any citizen to have his own opinion in any field of activity; freedom of thought or freedom of speech - the right to express one's opinions in writing or in writing (...)"³⁸. The modification of these definitions is justified mainly because, at least one of the meanings attributed to the concept of freedom, it provided precisely a form of restraint "under the conditions of knowledge and mastery of the laws of development of nature and society". In these circumstances, it appears that freedom applies only under conditions of knowledge and mastery of laws and is limited only to nature and society.

History has shown that most revolts stem from the need for freedom. Freedom meant *protection against the tyranny of political leaders*³⁹. Today, most countries are organized in democratic republics⁴⁰, a form of administrative organization in which the leaders are elected by the people's vote, and freedom is its main driver. In the context of the paper, we must refer to the constitutional meaning of freedoms, as they are concerned with a possible exacerbation of security:

- Individual freedom;
- Freedom of circulation;
- Intimacy, family and private life;
- The secret of correspondence;
- Freedom of conscience;
- Freedom of speech;
- The right to information;

³⁷ ***, Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, second edition, The Romanian Academy, Univers Enciclopedic Gold Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.

³⁸ Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, second edition, The Romanian Academy, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 1998.

³⁹ John Stuart Mill, Despre libertate, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1994.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

- Freedom of assembly⁴¹.

However, the same document also provides the possibility of restricting citizens' rights and freedoms, under certain conditions: "the exercise of rights or freedoms can be restricted only by law, and only if required, for: defense of national security, or of public order, health or morals, defense of citizens' rights and freedoms; conducting criminal investigation; preventing the consequences of a natural calamity, a disaster or a particularly serious disaster"⁴².

The matter of restricting fundamental rights and freedoms was also addressed in a report of the Venice Commission on European internal security services. According to this report, it is necessary to ensure a balance between the need for security and that of guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens⁴³.

CONCLUSIONS

Although great progress has been made in understanding and addressing cyber threats, activity, organization and processes are still at the beginning. The types of attacks are developing at a much more alert pace and are becoming more and more diversified. It can be slowed down, in particular, by the cooperation of all actors in the cyber intelligence community, and must cover every step of a cyber-security process: *prevention*, by using the relevant resources necessary before any cyber-attack occurs; *counteracting*, by ensuring a reaction of the system during the manifestation of the attack; *resilience*, by ensuring the ability to recover systems after an attack.

The main feature of the cyber security concept is prevention that is meant to hinder online threats materialization. This approach can be the solution for a safer internet. Specialists' analyzes can be the basis of the discovery of new threats before they become attacks. At the same time, they can provide support for the developers of security products in addressing cyber threats. But it is precisely the prevention component that raises problems, by making it difficult to regulate the competences of the institutions, at the state level.

There is a need for cooperation between all actors involved in various stages of the cyber security process, but also between entities with similar competences, as already established in the relationship between NATO and the EU. Also cyber security education and culture are needed, in equal measure, because every user, regardless of level - whether it is an individual or a critical infrastructure operator, must know and use online security measures. For all this, and for being safe and free online, legislation is necessary.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, French National Digital Security Strategy, 2015.
2. ***, Government Decision no. 271/2013 for the approval of the Cyber Security Strategy of Romania and the National Action Plan on the Implementation of the National Cyber Security System
3. ***, Iceland's National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2026, 2015.
4. ***, Ireland's National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017, 2015.
5. ***, National Cyber Security Strategies – Practical Guide on Development and Execution, December 2012.

⁴¹ The Romanian Constitution, 2003, Cap II – Fundamental Liberties and Rights, art. 22-52.

⁴² The Romanian Constitution, 2003, Cap II – Fundamental Liberties and Rights, art. 53, alin. (1).

⁴³ F. Coldea, "Rolul legislației în activitatea de intelligence", in *Intelligence*, December 2014.

6. ***, National Cyber Security Strategy: Canada's Vision for Security and Prosperity in the Digital Age, 2018.
7. ***, *Revista Intelligence*, The Romanian Intelligence Service, December 2014.
8. ***, The Austrian Cyber Security Strategy, 2013.
9. ***, The Romanian Constitution, 2003.
10. ***, United States' National Cyber Strategy, 2018.
11. Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, second edition, The Romanian Academy, Univers Enciclopedic Gold Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009.
12. Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, second edition, The Romanian Academy, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998.
13. International Group of Experts within CCDCOE, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
14. International Group of Experts within CCDCOE, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber War, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
15. Mancu, I.; Rusu, M.I., "Securitatea Cibernetică în infrastructurile critice. Provocări contemporane", "Nicolae Balcescu" Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 2016.
16. Official webpage of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, URL: <https://www.apec.org>.
17. Official webpage of Encyclopaedia Britannica, URL: <https://www.britannica.com>.
18. Official webpage of Lexology, URL: <https://www.lexology.com>.
19. Official webpage of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org>.
20. Official webpage of NATO, URL: <https://www.nato.int>.
21. Official webpage of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, URL: <https://www.csis.org>.
22. Official webpage of the Council of Europe, URL: <https://www.coe.int>.
23. Official webpage of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, URL: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu>.
24. Official webpage of United Nations, URL: <https://www.un.org>.
25. Panc, D., "Securitatea cibernetică la nivel național și internațional", Hamangiu Publishing House, 2017.
26. Singer, P.W., Friedman, A., *Cybersecurity and cyberwar. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford University Press, 2014.

APPLICATIONS OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Cristina BODONI, Ph.D. Student

“Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: cristina_bodoni@yahoo.co.uk

Abstract: *Since 2009, the year of the establishment of the first digital diplomacy department within the US Department of State (US foreign ministry), this type of diplomacy has spread to all states and international organizations. Ending the first decade of official practicing digital diplomacy, we see that digital diplomacy has covered all branches of diplomacy, whether we agree with it or not. Although, in ten years, digital diplomacy became a buzzword in theory and practice, we consider that it is not yet sufficiently explored.*

The purpose of this article is to find out what kind of online tools and applications are effective in the practice of digital diplomacy in intergovernmental organizations. In responding to this question, we take into consideration the following assumptions: (a) by strengthening the means of diplomacy through digital diplomacy, the multilateral diplomacy revitalized the global and/or regional partnership for sustainable development of collaboration between state, organizations and people and (b) international organizations, their member states and the other international actors recognize this practice as legitimate and powerful in the international relations.

This study focuses on the specific applications from the internet adapted in multilateral organizations in conducting digital diplomacy and provides a better understanding and framing of this concept. In this paper, we examine the digital diplomacy's applications in three multilateral organizations: NATO, Council of Europe (CoE), and OSCE.

Keywords: *diplomacy; digital diplomacy; multilateral diplomacy; cyberspace; social media; international organization; intergovernmental organization (IGO).*

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

“We are analogue beings living in a digital world, facing a quantum future.”

Neil Turok

Digitization of cyberspace with its communication elements remains one of the most debated issues in the world of the first quarter of the 21st Century. Sometimes, the digitization of systems becomes synonymous with globalization by spreading, the number of people involved in different actions online and offline. In cyberspace, the national borders of the states cannot be delimited. There, everybody is able to enter without passport, visas, approvals or specific authorizations preset by (inter-)state systems. On the internet everything is possible, the public or private entity transfers its economic, political, social and cultural values, its shortcomings and all its qualities. As a result of these diversifications, diplomacy has begun to accept cyber-instruments as non-traditional methods, to begin to reconsider its practice in order to be at the level of the era in which we live in the information age. This diplomatic practice is referred to as digital diplomacy.

The purpose of our research is to discuss how digitization affects diplomacy at the multilateral level, especially in Europe, NATO, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the OSCE. The main reason why we chose these three international organizations was that they represent the classic type of international organizations or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Although these three organizations are quite different in scope, they have many common elements, such as: promoting (e-)democracy, the rule of (internet) law, (cyber) security of the state and people. Given that actors in international relations in the information age are states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational organizations and individuals, the role of multilateral diplomacy in the three IGOs proportionally enhance to the number of actors, as the actions taken by all three IGOs affect billions of citizens of the world, both online and offline.

The terms and concepts used are theoretically framed and emphasized in the following section. The second and third sections highlight the common applications of digital diplomacy's tools in multilateral diplomacy from all three IGOs. Also, we take into consideration that cyberspace is unlimited, as there is no specific geographical border, our study is limited, the effects of new high-tech instruments of diplomacy, especially digital diplomacy, cannot be subjected to fragmented evaluation.

This study includes three main aspects: the first is digital diplomacy; then, we underline the main concepts regarding the IGOs, and towards the end of the last chapter, we highlight the important aspects of the applications, social media and digital platforms used in the case study included.

1. The conundrum of digital diplomacy in the 21st Century

Until the identification of diplomacy, in its current sense, diplomatic practices have come a long way from thousands of years of history. In brief, nowadays, we define diplomacy as one of the most important instrument of the state's foreign policy and, then, going back to the history of diplomacy, in antiquity, the relations between pre-state entities are prefigured within the consular institution called Proxenos that is encountered in the ancient Greek diplomacy. Diplomacy is gradually developing in tandem with all other fields. Thus, permanent representations appear progressively during the Venetian Republics of the 15th Century. Then, as a result of the emergence of the state, in its contemporary meaning, after the signing of the Westphalian Treaties, Richelieu becomes one of the pioneers of current diplomacy, establishing the first foreign ministry for the French. We also find the central elements of the history of traditional diplomacy in the Vienna Conventions of 1814-1815, followed by the Versailles Treaties and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations from 1961 and 1969.

We highlighted only these aspects because they remain valid even in the present century, from the customs, the protocol, the diplomatic and consular law, which regulate diplomatic and consular representations regarding the field of cyberspace.

According to Article 3 (1) of the Convention of Vienna, the functions of a diplomatic mission are: "(a) Representing the sending State in the receiving State; (b) Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; (c) Negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; (d) Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State; (e) Promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations"¹.

¹ *** *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961*, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 500, (1964), 2005, p. 3, URL: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf, accessed on 12.08.2019.

The great changes that occurred after the First World War led to the emergence of multilateral diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy represents a diplomacy practiced within some intergovernmental, nongovernmental or multinational organizations, between organizations or between states and organizations.

After the 60's, another kind of diplomacy would appear in the US, this being *public diplomacy*, in order to overcome the barriers of bilateralism through communication/interaction between official representatives and companies/public opinion. Public diplomacy has gradually gained importance. Unlike (white, grey or black) propaganda or manipulation, this form of diplomacy is the sum of the activities of understanding, informing and influencing the public. Through public diplomacy, communication started to change. Its practice started to include in its everyday activities the explanations on diplomatic practice. Diplomats started to listen to voices from other environments than those belonging to their small circle. Information became a dialogue that could reach all the members of the society, from the highest forums of the political-military space to the grassroots. This is not only about change or collect information, it is about feedback.

Public diplomacy has also extended to the online space. Cornelius Bjola and James Pamment affirm that "digital diplomacy is now part of the regular conduct of international relations. Foreign ministries use social media to promote their countries, policies and values, contributing to a transparent and mostly cordial exchange of promotional materials and political views with anybody interested in global issues"². With its help, diplomats have the opportunity to influence the people and intellectuals of another nation to turn their policies to their advantage.

Another author, the former diplomat Shaun Riordan makes the following distinctions between public diplomacy, digital diplomacy and cyberdiplomacy. He argues that digital diplomacy is more than electronic propaganda obtained through public diplomacy of a government and, even more, a marketing strategy, because the public and digital diplomacies do not have a well-defined purposes, they are rather another instruments in the service of broader diplomatic strategies. Cyberdiplomacy should be used to advance national goals through a wide range of digital tools. In contrast, foreign ministries and embassies seem to have become obsessed with social media presence³. This process risks undermining the credibility of the diplomats, and therefore their effectiveness.

Although some authors, such as Riordan, make clear boundaries between digital diplomacy and cyberdiplomacy, we consider the following definition to work for this paper: "Digital diplomacy is the use of digital technologies for diplomatic purposes, primarily resides in the field of public diplomacy, but consular services, policy management and international negotiations are increasingly seen by MFAs as suitable areas for digitization"⁴.

2. Applications of digital diplomacy in cyberspace at CoE, NATO and OSCE

The most important OIG in the world is the UN; from 1945, this is the only organization with a universal vocation. Its founding document is the UN Charter, according to which (Art. 52) there can be created other international organizations.

In the conditions in which the establishment of an international organization appears as an agreed diplomatic decision of at least three states, it appears a situation of harmonization of

² Corneliu Bjola, James Pamment, *Countering Online Propaganda and Extremism. The Dark Side of Digital Diplomacy*, Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, Abingdon, UK, 2019, pp. 2-3.

³ Shaun Riordan, *Cyberdiplomacy. Managing Security and Governance Online*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2019, pp. 85-87.

⁴ Corneliu Bjola, Markus Kornprobst, *Understanding International Diplomacy: theory, practice and ethics*, Second Edition, Routledge, New York, USA, 2018, p. 244.

at least three types of national law that must also take into account the international law and the norms under which the organization was founded. To these are added the specific elements of the virtual space where the services in the information space are provided by private providers, transnational organizations. Applying the strategy for providing and protecting systems is possible thanks to cooperation between all international actors, state, intergovernmental organization and transnational private companies by respecting security systems and access to information recognized by public international law. For every private or/and public entity who wants to navigate, needs to comply with the specific rules and terms of that provider, such as: Yahoo, Google, Internet or DuckDuckGo, etc.

From 2004, these situations started to be taken into attention at multilateral level in each international organization. UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) specialists promoted three pillars for the sustainable development of a secure and stable cyberspace: (a) the rule of existing international law to be extended in cyberspace; (b) norms, rules and principles of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, and (c) confidence-building measures (CBMs) in cyberspace. These practical steps aim to increase transparency, predictability and thereby stability as a form of preventive diplomacy to restrain the use of force and limit the causes of mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation between states⁵.

The diplomacy practice in the digital world is not really new. As a daily routine, in bilateral and multilateral diplomacies, everybody is accustomed to write, to listen and to inform. Thus, they extended their activity in other spaces, respectively in cyber one. To see if digital diplomacy gives the expected results in multilateral diplomacy led in NATO, OSCE, CoE, we continue the study focusing on a series of aspects.

Firstly, much of the digital diplomacy applications for dealing with social media activities are based on communication, dialogue, signalling and reactive capacities of followers with the aim to influence the behaviour of friends or foe (sometimes potential aggressor), without being interpreted by other entities, to know better the common people and, in turn, to be more correctly perceived by them. We will try to see if opening accounts on the most representative social networks has reached the public opinion. If they have reached their goals or they have success, the figures reflect the level of success and recognition of their policies regarding their activities in cyberspace.

Secondly, the decision of using information tools includes a kaleidoscope of soft and hard (software and hardware) instruments. All three IGOs have built laborious websites and they opened accounts on the most popular social networks, also, their key-staff could be followed on the internet. Social media as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube is common for all three IGOs. By starting with the focus area posts, the designated persons kept people's attention on the specific activities and level of ambition. On social media, each of the three organizations made their habit in regular posting, fragments of organization's history, news regarding the activities of their bosses, activities carried out on the ground, peace missions (as the case may be), and going up to employment opportunities.

2.1. Council of Europe

The end of the Second World War is the starting point of the European multilateral relations projects, establishing regional organizations that could guarantee peace and prosperity in Europe, much sought after the two world wars. Starting from 1945, the West European political personalities of the time began to promote the idea of a United Europe, immediately after the reestablishment of peace on our continent. Winston Churchill and the founding fathers

⁵ *** *Operational Guidance for the EU's international cooperation on cyber capacity building*, Imprimerie Centrale, Luxembourg, 2018, p. 20.

of European communities are among the political personalities who fought for the establishment of a common structure at European level.

The first materialized European project is the Council of Europe, whose treaty was signed in London on 5 May 1949. The main purpose of this organization: “is to achieve greater unity among its members in order to safeguard and realize the ideals and principles that are their common heritage and to facilitate their economic and social progress”⁶.

Among these, 28 are EU Member States, Vatican has observer status, and Belarus is a candidate country (since 1993). However, maintaining the death penalty and violating the rights of minorities are the causes for which this country cannot become a member state at this stage.

In our opinion, it is relevant to point out a few landmarks in the activity of this IGO: in 2002, a protocol was signed within the European Convention on Human Rights on the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances and the “Guidelines on Human Rights and the fight against terrorism” was adopted, while in the following year, the protocol on the fight against cybercrime was adopted⁷.

Presently, CoE’s Strategy on Internet governance (2015-2019) is still in force. Starting from the three central values of this organization – rule of law, democracy and human rights –, the strategy extends them in the digital space, as follows⁸: (a) digital citizenship education in European schools – “digizen”; (b) digital democracy, implying that innovation is on the agenda of the organization, it is highlighted by policies regarding the future of the internet and e-government, (c) a possible “Magna Carta” for the Internet, and “net-citizenship”; (d) No Hate Speech Campaign; (e) plurilingualism in fostering linguistic and cultural diversity; (f) digital literacy of youth; (g) access and management of digital culture, including the digitization of culture, to promote citizen engagement, access to culture, openness. Also, we add the inclusion and tolerance in democratic societies. Council of Europe requires permanently specific actions from all its member state with the aim of building democracy online and ensuring safety and security for all.

Currently, the Council of Europe identifies itself with human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Democracy, freedom and a common Europe for all its inhabitants has remained the same for decades. All three values have become the rule of internet law, e-democracy and human rights.

CoE created its Facebook account on October, 23, 2008. They timidly started to post videos – seven videos in 2008, while in 2019, got to post five-six videos/month. The sum of all posted videos was 267 at the end of September 2019⁹. They gathered 215,909 likes from 222,797 followers. Council of Europe also joined Twitter on March 6, 2009; their tweets number 20.1K, follows 418, it is followed by 367K, it received 15 Likes¹⁰. On LinkedIn, the professional branch of the social Media, CoE keyword is International Affairs, with 55,590 followers. On Instagram, Council of Europe summarizes 398 posts for 7,954 followers, watching 111 people and organizations¹¹. Council of Europe joined YouTube on December 6,

⁶ Stelian Scăunaș, *Uniunea Europeană. Construcție, reformă, instituții, drept*, Ed. C.H. Beck, București, 2008, p. 53.

⁷ *** *Internet Governance – Council of Europe Strategy 2016-2019 Democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the digital world*, printed at Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 2016, pp. 8-13, URL: <https://rm.coe.int/16806aafa9>, accessed on 16.08.2019.

⁸ *** *Internet Governance – Council of Europe Strategy 2016-2019 Democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the digital world*, printed at Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 2016, pp. 8-13, URL: <https://rm.coe.int/16806aafa9>, accessed on 16.08.2019.

⁹ Council of Europe on Facebook, URL: <https://www.facebook.com/councilofeurope/>, accessed on 30.09.2019.

¹⁰ Official Twitter account of Council of Europe, on www.twitter.com/coe, accessed on 16.08.2019.

¹¹ Council of Europe on Instagram, URL: <https://www.instagram.com/councilofeurope/?hl=ro>, accessed on 16.08.2019.

2007, and in September 2019, it has 14.3K subscribers and 6,757,515 views and seven featured channels – European Parliament, European Commission, Council of the EU, United Nations, OSCE, UNESCO, while the seventh is related to this organization activity – *NohatespeechMovement* channel, with 553 subscribers and 665 views¹².

2.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Founded in 1949, NATO is a political military alliance whose aim is to guarantee freedom and security of its members. Having recently celebrated 70 years of existence, NATO has been able to reinvent itself, to show resilience through adapting to political, social and military changes in the Euro-Atlantic area in order to subsequently develop new defense and security capabilities, decade after decade of activity. After the development of information capabilities, NATO department for communication and diplomacy has gradually become more visible on their Internet accounts seeing that:¹³

(a) The tasks, policies and processes of decision making, peace support and crisis management operations have transformed the Alliance into a unique IGO in the world;

(b) Within it, the member states promote public debate and understanding of the Alliance, through direct involvement, both online and in person, while coordinating the activities and actions between all members;

(c) The specific department that harmonizes all the activities of public diplomacy and coordinates the communication activities at all levels is the Division of Public Diplomacy (PDD) within the NATO Headquarters;

(d) The military orders and of the International Military Staff enter into the duties of the division, in accordance with the agreed NATO policies;

(e) NATO's information activities, guidelines and general directions of communication are provided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and specific directions and directions are coordinated by the Secretary General.

Within NATO, the governments of individual member states are responsible for explaining their national security and defence policies, as well as their role as members of the Alliance for their public. Also, or the implementation of non-military campaigns, such as those carried out on social networks, NATO develop its own programs and objectives that inform the public in the member countries and around the world.

From NATO's point of view, cyber security (NCS) can be divided into five segments: military anti-cybercrime products, critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and crisis management, cyber information and counter-intelligence, digital diplomacy, and internet governance. In turn, they can be broken down into another five perspectives: diplomacy and internet governance, crisis management and critical infrastructure protection, cyber military operations, (against) cyber intelligence, and cybercrime¹⁴.

NATO's internal body designated with the mission of maintaining the liaison with all stakeholders is the Committee on Public Diplomacy (CPD). Three of four main aspects of its mission recall us the classic functions of diplomacy¹⁵: "(a) to promote public debate and understanding of the Alliance through direct engagement; (b) to harmonize all public diplomacy

¹² Council of Europe on Youtube, URL: <https://www.youtube.com/user/CouncilofEurope/about>, accessed on 16.08.2019.

¹³ NATO Encyclopaedia 2018, pp. 155 – 159, URL: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190211_2018-nato-encyclopedia-eng.pdf, pp. 155 – 159, accessed on 16.08.2019.

¹⁴ Eric Luijff, Jason Healey, *Organizational Structures & Considerations, in National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, ed. Al. Klimburg, pp. 108-140, NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn, Estonia, 2012, pp. 108 -140.

¹⁵ NATO Encyclopaedia 2018, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

activities and coordinates communication activities NATO-wide; (c) to communicate on activities under their responsibility, in accordance with agreed NATO policy”.

An alliance of 29 states, NATO is permanently connected with its state members, third countries, and other IGOs or NGOs in Peacekeeping Missions, with its public interested in the current issues such as counterterrorism and cyber-terrorism, defence and strategic security, as the allies are involved in defending democratic values and universal human rights, in the real or digital spaces. NATO collaborates with important IGOs, as European Union (EU). One of the newest written document, Operational Guidance for the EU’s international cooperation on cyber capacity building, is promoted in tandem with NATO. There, both IGOs, EU and NATO decided to harmonize their cyberspace’ instruments in the area of defence and international relations¹⁶.

NATO’s Public Diplomacy is involved in projects that permanently develop communication with the general public. In 2008, the Alliance launched the online TV channel “natochannel.tv”, which, in April 2009, was used by 199 international agencies, and at the end of the year, their number increased to 67,418¹⁷. The Secretary-General in office at that time, Anders F. Rasmussen and his assistant for Public Diplomacy, realized the potential, but also the dangers in the digital social media space. In August 2010, NATO opened the gate to Facebook, where they started to post videos in 2015. In four years, they posted 665 videos and received 1,324,572 likes from 1,325,794 followers¹⁸. On Instagram, NATO has 1,665 posts, 333k followers and 250 follows. On LinkedIn, NATO keywords are International Affairs, Defence, Political, Security, Military, with 123,798 followers. NATO joined Twitter on October 20, 2009, where it gathered 7,167 tweets, has 643K followers, while it follows 756, having 3,474 likes¹⁹. NATO Joined YouTube on March 25, 2008, it has 81.8K subscribers and 19,613,631 views and five featured channels: (a) NATO News, with 3.29K subscribers and 3359 views; (b) NATO History with 1.24K subscribers and 2202 views; (c) OTAN (NATO in French) with 1.64K subscribers and 534 views; (d) NATO Russian with 1.25K subscribers and 532 views; NATO ARABIC with 211k subscribers and 51k views²⁰.

With this change, NATO had one of the most complicated missions, to extend its smart power on the internet by using some of soft power’s instruments in virtual space. Its words, ideas and images become useful weapons. In the autumn of 2019, its online accounts, platforms and fora were among the most watched IGO videos from the world. These transformations have made the important difference between having the limited access to audio-visual and written media to unlimited access to all kinds of information on it. Since 2016, virtual space has become a strategic area alongside other spaces: land, air, sea and space²¹.

2.3. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The youngest regional IGO from all three, OSCE, was founded in 1973. At present, it has 57 state members, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

¹⁶ *Operational Guidance for the EU’s international cooperation on cyber capacity building*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018.

¹⁷ ***, *NATO, Public Diplomacy Dept. International Security Assistance Force launches new website*, 2009, URL: <http://www.rs.nato.int/en/article/press-releases/international-security-assistance-force-launches-new-website.html>, accessed on 15 September 2019.

¹⁸ NATO on Facebook, URL: <https://www.facebook.com/NATO/>, accessed on 15 September 2019.

¹⁹ NATO@NATO, Official Twitter account of NATO, on www.twitter.com/NATO, accessed on 15 September 2019.

²⁰ NATO channel, URL: www.youtube.com/user/NATOCOMMUNITY/about.

²¹ Jens Stoltenberg, *NATO and Cyber: Time to Raise our Game*, July, 26, 2016 URL: <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/omr/roadtowarsaw/2016/07/08/nato-and-cyber-time-raise-our-game/86859198/>, accessed on 15 September 2019.

In the early 2000's, OSCE created the first motions for resolutions on cyber threat management framework regarding the illicit cyber activity. Then, in 2012, OSCE initiated a process that includes a kit with cyber-confidence building measures; one year after, OSCE decided to incorporate cyber security the following OSCE areas of interest: (a) security, (b) economic cooperation, (c) cultural exchanges and human rights.

The change of the presidency in 2016 would bring to mind an innovative plan that also included a strategy for implementing OSCE digital diplomacy policies. Derived from the German digital agenda of 2014: "open, secure, and free space", the German OSCE digital diplomacy plan promoted three priorities:

(a) Information security, specific instruments to prevent and protect the critical cyber-infrastructure, where, the security dimension also takes into account aspects of digital diplomacy (with its synonym, cyber-diplomacy);

(b) Economic cooperation – through which cooperation between the public and private sectors is strengthened in order to secure a wide range of critical infrastructures, including the financial, transport and energy sectors;

(c) Human rights – Member States continue to severely restrict freedom of expression on the Internet. This is at odds with Germany's policy of protecting freedom from virtual space.

Perhaps the issues on the Internet related to human digital rights, such as censorship, military issues, surveillance of networks and copyright abuses should be resolved in the virtual space.

Since 2015, OSCE has made recommendations to the Member States for ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime (Cybercrime), also involving major IGOs such as the UN, EU and non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and military associations (European Organization of Military Associations and Trade Unions – EUROMIL). From September 2016, OSCE administrates an open virtual platform in collaboration with the United Nations. This unique platform allows online and offline dialogue on migration issues, which has not existed internationally so far. International Organization for Migration (IOM) will become an affiliated, specialized agency of the UN system on migration issues. This would be a new element in multilateral diplomacy worldwide.

Since the diplomatic activities of the OSCE have begun, including collaboration with other IGOs and other state actors for signing protocols on cyberspace, we believe that OSCE diplomatic branch that is responsible with the signing of international protocols, conventions and treaties began to implement a genuine digital diplomacy.

One of the aspects that take into account is the multitude of languages of the citizens of the Member States. This reflected the way the OSCE wishes to interact with them. On their website, the dialog and communication is possible in German, English, French, Italian, Russian, and Spanish. However, on their official website, it is possible to read material in 12 other languages, including Romanian.

OSCE Facebook page was opened on February 6, 2009. No less than 246 videos were posted from 2015 to 2019, gathering 107,901 likes, having 109,651 followers²². On Instagram, OSCE has 49,458 posts regarding the organization through #OSCE. However, the simple OSCE account is inactive but it shows 18 followers²³. OSCE joined Twitter on February 2009, has 11.4K followers, while it follows 975 entities; it has 1,332 likes from 1,178 photos and videos²⁴. On LinkedIn, OSCE has 97,165 followers, its keyword is International Affairs. OSCE joined

²² *** OSCE, URL: <https://www.facebook.com/osce.org/>, accessed on 15 September 2019.

²³ *** OSCE, URL: <https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/osce/?hl=ro>, accessed on 15 September 2019.

²⁴ *** OSCE@OSCE, Official Twitter account of OSCE, URL: www.twitter.com/osce, accessed on 15 September 2019.

YouTube on August 11, 2006 and has gathered 795,127 views and 3.55K subscribers²⁵ on the main channel on YouTube. Also, OSCE has another six related channels. For OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 889 subscribers and 297 views; OSCE Mission in Kosovo has 141 subscribers and 328 views; OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine has 19 subscribers and 53 views; OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine has 1.29K subscribers and 3325 views; OSCE HCNM (The High Commissioner on National Minorities) has 9 subscribers with 5 views; OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has 296 subscribers and 346 views²⁶.

All the three IGOs can be found on other social media platform. For instance, on Weibo, the microblogging media from China, the interest on European international organizations crosses Europe's borders. We found out on Weibo different kind of posts, such as: the official declaration of Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister regarding the statute of member of Council of Europe²⁷. Then, we found news, for instance the official briefings presented by the Chairperson-in-Office of OSCE, Security Council at the 7887th meeting²⁸ or an article on NATO's member states and their attitude regarding the organization²⁹.

3. Collection and interpretation regarding the digital diplomacy activity of NATO, CoE and OSCE

We pointed out that the three OIGs decided to implement digital diplomacy with very good results. What we know about these results, they are based on accurate public figures of the likes, followers and following on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn or YouTube. The following graph highlights the data collected on NATO, Coe and OSCE accounts.




Figure no. 1: Followers on main social networks of the Council of Europe, OSCE, and NATO (September 30, 2019)

²⁵ *** The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), URL: www.youtube.com/user/osce/about, accessed on 15 September 2019.

²⁶ *** *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*, URL: www.youtube.com/osce, accessed on 15 September 2019.

²⁷ Xinhua, *Russian FM says Moscow has no intention to leave Council of Europe*, from May, 17, 2019, URL: s.weibo.com/weibo/Council%2520of%2520Europe?topnav=1&wvr=6&b=1, accessed on 15 September 2019.

²⁸ Qiáo Zhī Yù, *Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE-Security Council, 7887th meeting*, from Feb. 23, 2017, URL: www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404078451026961683, accessed on 15 September 2019.

²⁹ Xixin, *Spotlight: Turkey's NATO membership to be questioned following...*, from July, 20, 2019, URL: www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309351000124396394004742184, accessed on 15 September 2019.

After gathering data from the internet, we found different types of involvement in social media. NATO, OSCE and Council of Europe started to become resilient, they have continually adapted to the newest applications of digital instrument applications. Although all three IGOs are based in Europe, Member States are almost all Western, promoting international diplomacy, peace and security, they approach regional policies differently. Given that the three organizations have different main goals, the networks considered in this article do not all have the same criteria for scoring, and the style of each OIG is transposed on a personalized route for expanding activities in the cyberspace.

Beyond the traditional diplomatic communication, in these figures we find elements of diplomatic functions, for example, information or related ones, such as press releases. The figures from social media highlight aspects of marketing, dialogue and public relations campaigns specific to interdisciplinary approaches. Keeping a realistic image, as optimistic as possible, the three IGOs develop on social media the following the digital diplomacy's activities: promoting themselves through predetermined smart campaigns (combining online with offline actions) including security, democracy and rule of law topics; given that although these IGOs are regional, they have a level of ambition that far exceeds the regions of which their member states belong; protecting peace and security, human rights and the rule of law.

Although the Commissioner for Human Rights or the European Court of Human Rights are universally recognized, few people know that these institutions are part of the main structure of Council of Europe. It seems that the Council of Europe's digital diplomacy efforts are decentralized, since, from what we could observe, the organization does not have a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy, but strategic plans for different specific elements (education or rule of law). The classic IGOs' political roadmap influenced the practice of digital diplomacy. There, it is not forgotten the respect the traditional practice of the multinational diplomacy, the sovereignty of the states and the rights that derive from this international norm.

After more or ten years of online activity, they have enhanced their public images. Nowadays, they have used to promote themselves although different campaigns, they have penetrated internationally. All three of them run visitors programs, podcasts on Youtube, Facebook or Instagram. They all tweet in forty characters, and other platforms to increase their credibility and reputation with all the actors available online. We also noted that on all the social media platforms investigated there are reports, press releases, and recordings from different official events or conferences. Also, it needs to be mentioned that, having a rather limited scope, we did not analyse all their accounts on social media, but we consider that it is necessary to state that they have digital accounts on SoundCloud, Pinterest, NewsFeed, Flickr or Google+. We remarked their official websites are built in four or five levels to seem a simplified process of navigating on the internet, from "home page" through the library, from changing language to Q&A sessions. Also, they use cookies³⁰, they could collect big data. From here, we deduce that their websites are built on complicated algorithms. The higher level of the algorithms used on the website leads us to the idea that all three IGO's are familiar with using big data or artificial intelligence.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this article was to find out what kind of online tools and applications are effective in the practice of digital diplomacy in intergovernmental organizations. From this study, we identified the social media tools as successful digital diplomacy's applications implemented in an IGO. This examination of all three IGOs' engagement activities confirms

³⁰ **Note:** Usually, cookie is an algorithm used by the website that can be read internally. Websites could use internal or external services, cookies could be persistent or session cookies. Its role is to store visitors' preferences, to ensure the smooth operation of the sites, to collect analytical data (about user behaviour) etc.

that Council of Europe, NATO and OSCE interact with different target audiences from around the world.

After we had framed the main terms and concepts used in digital diplomacy domain, we highlighted in figures the activities of all three IGOs on internet, social media being one of main digital diplomacy's tools.

Each entity has at its disposal the tools necessary for building, implementing and monitoring projects for improving its reputation, becoming more transparent, prevent and diminish the effects of manipulation or fake news. Also, the influence the public opinion can be measured on social media.

Computerization of the multinational systems and the algorithmic increase of the number of cross-border Internet users and mobile devices with non-stop access to it have led to new problems in all areas of professional and private activity.

Relations in international affairs did not transform the background of the international actors, the multilateral diplomacy remains as important as it was fifty years ago for international relations, the changes are made in scope to improve the future. They bring elements of novelty in classic political and social framework of the resilient world, where everything is interconnected, the economic and political relations, the international relations and the public affairs are becoming more interdependent, and the balance between them has crossed the border of the consecrated domains of the decision-making factors in high-politics. Nowadays, it involves non-state actors from established areas of low-politics, such as culture, management, marketing or international public affairs. Today, diplomacy has begun to be treated as a holistic, multidimensional, multi-layered concept that far exceeds the professional area of diplomats. This development has restructured states to revise the communication strategies in foreign policy activities that will target public and private institutions, citizens of other countries in international public opinion.

The remaining challenge is to translate digital instruments into a high-performance multilateral diplomacy for a multinational environment that must remain in the hands of people and life in all the spaces known by it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. *** *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961*, Copyright@United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 500, (1964), 2005.
2. *** *Operational Guidance for the EU's international cooperation on cyber capacity building*, Imprimerie Centrale, Luxembourg, 2018.
3. *** *Internet Governance – Council of Europe Strategy 2016-2019. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the digital world*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 2016.
4. *** *Operational Guidance for the EU's international cooperation on cyber capacity building*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018.
5. BJOLA, Corneliu; PAMMENT, James, *Countering Online Propaganda and Extremism The Dark Side of Digital Diplomacy*, Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, Abingdon, UK, 2019.
6. BJOLA, Corneliu, KORNPROBST, Markus, *Understanding International Diplomacy: theory, practice and ethics*, Second Edition, Routledge, New York, USA, 2018.
7. LUIIJF, Eric; HEALEY, Jason, "Organizational Structures & Considerations, in National Cyber Security Framework Manual", in: Al. Klimburg (Ed.), NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn, Estonia, 20120.

8. RIORDAN, Shaun, *Cyberdiplomacy. Managing Security and Governance Online*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2019.
9. SCAUNAȘ, Stelian, *Uniunea Europeană. Construcție, reformă, instituții, drept*, C.H. Beck Publishing house, Bucharest, 2008.
10. Website of Defense news, <http://www.defensenews.com>
11. Website of NATO, <http://www.nato.int>
12. Website of Facebook, www.facebook.com
13. Website of Instagram, www.instagram.com
14. Website of Twitter, www.twitter.com
15. Website of Youtube, www.youtube.com/user/osce/about
16. Website of Weibo, www.weibo.com

OSCE WORK ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN CYBERSPACE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL FUTURE EVOLUTIONS

Cristina-Florentina DINCĂ

MA Student in Security and Diplomacy, National University of Political Studies
and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: cristinadinca.f@gmail.com

Abstract: *Under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization's 57 participating States have developed and continued to work on a ground-breaking set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs (Information Communication Technologies). They are designed to make cyberspace more predictable and offer concrete tools and mechanisms to avoid and address potential misunderstandings. The paper will explore the main features of the OSCE work in the cyberspace, more precisely the two sets of confidence-building measures, their accomplishments and challenges, and a perspective on future potential developments. The paper is structured as follows: a brief introduction will provide a view on the main OSCE mechanisms in the cyber domain, the first part is devoted to the analysis of the two sets of confidence building measures, and the last part will provide a scrutiny on achievements, challenges and potential future developments.*

Keywords: *cybersecurity; CBMs; OSCE; challenges; cyber threats; cyber space.*

INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of the modern information and communication technologies has had a major impact on the evolution of the social, economic and political environment and also on the everyday life of the individuals. Cyberspace is a true opportunity for the development of an informational society based on knowledge, but it also poses a lot of challenges. Therefore, it is stressed the need for the development of a cyber-security culture in which all the involved parties are sufficiently aware of the risks and challenges related to this domain. Cyber threats are asymmetric and difficult to be identified and countered. The current threats from cyber space are targeted towards the critical infrastructure of a nation: banking, transport, energy and national defence sectors. Individuals are also the target of the cyber-attacks and cyber espionage. Over the time, the diversity of threats related to the illegal access to information have escalated. Although most governments and major agencies and corporations have deployed tools as security measures, targets of attacks have expanded, calling for more robust counter measures.

Regional organizations – like the OSCE, the Organization of American States and the Association of South-East Asian Nations – have developed and continued to work on practical Confidence Building Measures to reduce tensions stemming from the use of Information and Communication Technologies. Confidence building measures are defined as an instrument of international politics, negotiated by and applied between states¹ to strengthen international

¹ Jason Healey, John C. Mallery et al, "Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace", Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, November 2014, p. 1, URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Confidence-Building_Measures_in_Cyberspace.pdf, accessed on 03.06.2019.

peace and security by reducing and eliminating the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding, and miscalculation between states, especially regarding their military activities.² Although, originally drafted in the context of disarmament, in cyberspace, the ultimate roles of the CBMs are to describe a common understanding of acceptable State behaviour in cyberspace and a state of cyber stability in international relations. In general terms, those measures usually contain aspects of transparency, cooperation and stability.³ The CBMs are designed to bring actors together to solve issues in cyberspace through compliance to policies, establishing community practices and conducting joint international investigations into major cyber incidents, establishing effective channels for exchange of information and best practices, and conducting joint trainings.⁴

States are not the only and the most important actors in cyberspace. The role of nongovernmental organizations, companies, civil society can increase the role and scope of the CBMs that do not fit any more the traditional model of state-based CBMs.⁵

The OSCE has succeeded in formulating CBMs and reaching agreement between states. The organization is focusing on discussions and collaboration which are an important part of the norm-building process in the cyber domain. In 2007, the foreign ministers participating in the OSCE format have pledged to re-double their efforts to implement CBMs. The OSCE is also building institutional partnerships to promote a secure and stable cyberspace. So far, the OSCE efforts in number can be portrayed as follows: 16 CBMs adopted since 2013, 110 national Cyber points and more than 80 national-makers trained in cyber aspects, 4 meetings between capital-level cyber experts held every year.⁶

The mechanisms and tools adopted under the CBMs are split out in three directions and are designed to make cyberspace more predictable, transparent and secure.

- I. A mechanism to bring together States for consultations over potential cyber/ICT security incidents to de-escalate rising tensions;
- II. A platform for exchanging views, national cyber/ICT security policies and approaches to allow States to better “read” each other’s intentions in cyberspace;
- III. Co-operation items including protecting ICT-enabled critical infrastructure as part of enhancing cyber resilience in the OSCE region for the benefit of all.⁷

OSCE states have adopted two sets of confidence-building measures. The first set of transparency measures, adopted in 2013 established among other things, official contact points, and communication lines to prevent possible tensions resulting from cyber activities. The second set, adopted in 2016, focused on further enhancing co-operation between participating States – including, for example, to efficient mitigation of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure that could affect more than one participating State.⁸

² Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decision Adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth Special Session: Report of the Disarmament Commission, 1996, URL: <https://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/discomm/2102.htm>, accessed on 03.06.2019.

³ Katharina Ziolkowski, *Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy*, NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn 2013, pp. 540-541, URL: <https://cryptome.org/2014/01/nato-peacetime-cyberspace.pdf>, accessed on 04.06.2019.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 544.

⁵ Jason Healey, John C. Mallery et al, *Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace: A Multistakeholder Approach for Stability and Security*, Atlantic Council, Washington DC, November 2014, pp. 1-2, URL: Jason Healey, John C. Mallery et al, *Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace*, accessed on 03.06.2019.

⁶ Cyber/ICT Security – Global Trends. 2018, URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/390830>, accessed at 03.06.2019.

⁷ Transnational Threats Department. Cyber/ICT Security. Factsheet on Cyber/ICT Security, URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/256071>, accessed on 03.06.2019.

⁸ *Idem*.

1. OSCE's Confidence Building Measures in Cyberspace

This part of the paper will provide an overview on the CBMs that were adopted through Permanent Council Decision No. 1106 on 3 December 2013. The first measures are related to the need for the States to provide their national view/insights on various aspect concerning national and transnational threats in the use of ICTs. The next two measures are connected to co-operation and consultation, thereby participating States are encouraged to facilitate co-operation among the competent national bodies and to conduct consultations in order to reduce the risks of misperception and possible political and military tensions that may stem for the ICTs. In terms of transparency, states pledged to share information on the measures they have taken in order to ensure an open Internet. In this Decision, OSCE is portrayed as a dialogue platform for best practices exchange, awareness-rising and information on capacity-building in cyberspace. States are also encouraged to have modern and effective legislation, including law enforcement agencies, and they will share on a voluntary basis, their national organization including strategies, policies, programmes and the cooperation between the public and the private sector. Participating states are also required to provide a contact point in order to facilitate communication and dialog on security of and in the use of ICTs. For managing the risks of misunderstanding, states also agreed to provide a list of national terminology related to the cyber space security. States are encouraged to use the OSCE platforms and mechanisms as OSCE Communication Network and OSCE Secretariat's Prevention Centre, so as to facilitate communication regarding the CBMs. Last but not least, the Permanent Council Decision No. 1106, established a meeting at least three times each year, where the national experts will meet to discuss and exchange information and to explore appropriate development for CBMs.⁹

During the 1092nd Plenary Meeting the OSCE Member States adopted Decision No. 1202 - OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies.

This part of the paper will present the CBMs that were adopted through Permanent Council Decision on 10 March 2016. The first measures are related to the fact that participating states, on a voluntary basis, share information and facilitate inter-State exchanges in different formats: workshops, seminars, roundtables. The purpose of this measure is to investigate and analyse the area of co-operative measures as well as other processes and mechanisms that could enable participating States to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs. In this respect, States are encouraged and recommended to conduct activities that enhance cooperation, transparency, predictability and stability, and to take into account the needs and requirements of the States taking part in these activities, and to avoid duplicating work done by other international fora.¹⁰

Another CBM refers to the fact that participating States are conducting activities for officials and experts to support the facilitation of authorized and protected communication channels to reduce and prevent the risks of misperception, escalation and conflict and to clarify technical, legal and diplomatic mechanism to address ICT-related requests. Another task for the participating States is to promote public-private partnership and develop mechanisms to exchange best practices of responses to common security challenges stemming from the use of ICTs.¹¹

⁹ Decision No. 1106 Initial Set of OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. 975th Plenary Meeting, 3 December 2013, pp. 1-2, URL: <https://www.osce.org/pc/109168?download=true>, accessed on 04.06.2019.

¹⁰ Decision No. 1202 OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. 1092nd Plenary Meeting, 10 March 2016, pp. 3, URL: <https://www.osce.org/pc/227281?download=true>, accessed on 04.06.2019.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

States are also encouraged to facilitate/participate in regional and sub-regional collaboration formats between legally-authorized authorities responsible for securing critical infrastructures, to discuss opportunities and address challenges to national as well as trans-border ICT networks. This collaboration includes: information sharing, best-practices-exchanges, developing shared responses to common challenges (crisis management in case of disruption of ICT-enabled critical infrastructure), improving the security at the national and transnational ICT-enabled critical infrastructure, rising awareness about the importance of protecting industrial control systems and about issues related to their ICT-related security, sharing national views of categories of ICT-enabled infrastructure States consider critical.

With the goal of achieving transparency and co-operation within OSCE cyber-related activities, States are encouraged to report on the vulnerabilities affecting their security in the use of ICTs and share associated information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities including with relevant segments of the ICT business and industry.¹²

The two Council Decisions are aiming at enhancing interstate cooperation, transparency, predictability and stability, and reducing the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs. A strong focus is put on transparency, cooperation and on the freedom of decision, affirming that all CBMs shall be "voluntary". Of course, this aspect can be perceived as a limit, since the language is that of a non-legally binding document. The word "cyberspace" is absent from the whole document, being replaced with terms such as "Information Communication Technology", which is a reflection of the differing views of the countries on how to cope with the free flow of information across borders facilitated by cyberspace. The second set of CBMs put more focus on best practices and public-private partnerships and critical infrastructure. In comparison with the CBMs of 2013, the new document reflects the serious stance nations showed in regard to the potential conflicts arising from cyberattacks against the infrastructure.¹³

The Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) has the role to assist States in their endeavour to enhance cyber/ICT security. The body also supports participating actors in implementing OSCE's capacity building measures. It is also helping states in South-Eastern Europe and South Caucasus by providing training courses on issues such as dark web, money laundering and online drug trafficking. The project was launched as a pilot in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary to support these countries in fighting against gender-based violence.¹⁴

The adoption of the CBMs in the digital sphere under the auspices of the OSCE succeeded in gathering rivals like US and Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey in the attempt to reduce the risks stemming for the use of ICTs. This very positive aspect might have a good outcome/prospect because enhancing cooperation and transparency between states helps them be more confident about each potential adversaries' intentions and capabilities/strategies.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 4.

¹³ OSCE Expands Its List of Confidence-Building Measures for Cyberspace: Common Ground on Critical Infrastructure Protection. CCDCOE, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/incyber-articles/osce-expands-its-list-of-confidence-building-measures-for-cyberspace-common-ground-on-critical-infrastructure-protection/>, accessed on 06.06.2019.

¹⁴ OSCE Annual Report, 2018, p. 37, URL: <https://www.osce.org/annual-report/2018?download=true>, accessed on 06.06.2019.

2. Accomplishment, challenges and futures developments

Under the auspices of the OSCE, a series of seminars were organized with the purpose of protecting critical energy infrastructure from cyber-related terrorist attacks. In Kazakhstan, OSCE Programme Office trained law enforcement officers across the country in strategies to combat cybercrime, terrorism, transnational organized crime and trafficking in drugs. The OSCE established a framework of cooperation with the EU where they discuss how to strengthen cooperation on conflict prevention, cyber/ICT threats, rule of law and democratic institutions, election support, countering violent extremism that leads to terrorism. The subject of cyber/ICT threats was also on the NATO-OSCE annual meeting.¹⁵ In countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, the OSCE has developed a E-learning Module that has as objective up-to-date course materials that provide basic knowledge about the most relevant aspects of the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. It is designed as a tool for increasing awareness, knowledge and understanding on how terrorists use the Internet and how to counter this threat.¹⁶

In line with CBM 12, which state that “Participating States will, on a voluntary basis, share information and facilitate inter-State exchanges in different formats, including workshops, seminars, and roundtables, including on the regional and/or sub-regional level”, the participating states, under the umbrella of the OSCE, have organized and taken part in numerous formats of exchanges and trainings. The OSCE office in Yerevan facilitated a survey on enhancing the implementation of the CBMs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Transnational Threats Department facilitated a visit of experts from the University of Florence to conduct survey on implementation of OSCE CBMs to reduce the risks of conflicting stemming from the use of information and communication technologies.¹⁷

Another example is the sub-regional training on the role of information and communication technologies in the context of regional and international security, in order to reduce the risks of conflict stemming for the use of ICTs, following high threshold cyber-attacks. The event was held in Bucharest, Romania, on June 2018.¹⁸

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE organized a “Regional Cybercrime Training for Police Investigators and Digital Forensics Examiners in South-Eastern Europe Introductory Open Source Digital Forensics.” The training was intended to enhance the skill level of investigators in the countries of South-Eastern Europe which dealt with highly complex computer crimes, as well as computer related crimes with an emphasis on digital forensics.¹⁹ As a member of the European Cybercrime Training and Education Group (ECTEG), the OSCE has operated in accordance with its aim of acting in consistence with the international law and helping harmonise cybercrime training across international borders. The OSCE trainings were based on the ECTEG curricula.²⁰

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (PCUz) is designated at supporting country’s efforts to address transnational threats, fight corruption and promote transparency. It also facilitates the implementation of the OSCE’s confidence building measures to reduce the

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 91-92.

¹⁶ Information Sheet – OSCE’s E-learning Module on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/312561?download=true>, accessed on 05.06.2019.

¹⁷ Office in Yerevan facilitated survey on enhancing the implementation of OSCE CBMs, 2016, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/node/1068>, accessed on 07.06.2019.

¹⁸ OSCE POLIS, Calendar, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/subregional-training-role-information-and-communication-technologies-icts-context-regional-and>, accessed on 07.06.2019.

¹⁹ Regional Cybercrime Training for Police Investigators and Digital Forensics Examiners in South-Eastern Europe Introductory Open Source Digital Forensics, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/node/1083>, accessed on 07.06.2019.

²⁰ *Idem*.

risk of conflicts emerging from the use of ICTs and raising awareness among key national stakeholders and governance agencies. As a result, Uzbekistan developed a map to further improve cyber security and established a contact point to manage ICT-related issues.²¹

The adoption of the two sets of CBMs plays a unique role in reducing conflicts stemming from the use of ICTs, that's why the participating States have developed numerous initiatives on driving implementation forward. In this sense, the Italian OSCE Chairmanship with the support of the OSCE Secretariat organized a two-day conference in 2018, in order to discuss and seek for ways to contribute to the "meaningful implementation" of the CBMs by gathering the political sector, academia and the private sector. In line with the first CBM which states that "Participating States will voluntarily provide their national views on various aspects of national and transnational threats to and in the use of ICTs", the first session of the conference served as a platform to exchange view on current international developments designed to promote cyber security and how the OSCE can contribute to these processes. The second session was dedicated to the discussion of goals, way forward and emerging technological features. The focus was on how to respond to the evolving technological landscape. The third session, in accordance with the 14th CBM which says that "Participating States will, on a voluntary basis and consistent with national legislation, promote public-private partnerships and develop mechanisms to exchange best practices of responses to common security challenges stemming from the use of ICTs", focused on finding ways for enhancing cyber resilience through public-private partnership mainly through non-traditional ideas.²²

Another sub-regional training held in Athens addressed the theme of Handling Cyber Security Incidents. The training involved 38 governmental agencies and business representatives and the scenario involved a cyber-attack on critical infrastructure. In Sarajevo, the OSCE Mission organized a workshop on capacity-building in cyber security and developing a cyber-strategic framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina: the scope, vision, objective and priorities for such a strategy.²³

In line with the 16 CBM, numerous initiatives and projects were organised, in order to drive the implementation process forward:

- Mission aids establishment of trilateral co-operation in the field of cyber security – assist Macedonia in improving cyber security capabilities;
- Mission to Serbia organised a workshop to exchange best practices in cybersecurity – aiming at enhancing cooperation among relevant actors in the field of cybersecurity in Serbia;
- Office in Yerevan facilitated international seminar on cybersecurity – facilitated the development of a new legal mechanism of cooperation between state and private sector;
- Centre in Ashgabat organized an event on Cyber and ICT security – aimed at supporting the Government of Turkmenistan in countering cyber threats;
- OSCE Chairmanship Event on Effective Strategies to Cyber/ICT Security Threats, Belgrade, Serbia - contribution to the implementation of the Initial Set of OSCE Confidence Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies.

²¹ OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (PCUz), URL: <https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-uzbekistan>, accessed on 07.06.2019.

²² 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security, Rome, Italy, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/2018CSCRome>, accessed on 09.06.2019.

²³ Sub-regional training on the role of ICTs in the context of regional and international security, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/subregional-training-role-icts-context-regional-and-international-security>, accessed on 09.06.2019.

Cyberspace is a very complex system and planning policies for it is so challenging. What makes the nature of cyberspace so challenging is its intangible nature, the limited understanding and awareness of all segments of society, which led to lack of action, the complexity of the interactions and socio-technical dependencies, the privacy of the individuals, and other vulnerabilities.

A 2017 Official Annual Cybercrime Report stated that “cybercrime is the greatest threat to every company in the world and one of the biggest problems with mankind.”²⁴ Cybersecurity Ventures predicted that cybercrime will cost the world \$6 trillion annually by 2021, up from \$3 trillion.²⁵ The greatest challenging as can be seen from this data is the fast growing of the cyber-attacks and incidents which are increasing in size, sophistication and costs.

A strong focus is put on transparency, cooperation and measures and on the freedom of decision, affirming that all CBMs to be “voluntary”. This aspect can be perceived as a limit, since the language is that of a non-legally binding document. Countries are not tied by binding provision or obligations, their contributions and commitments are voluntary, thereby they can freely choose to limit their contributions and engagement, and the aspects that are going to be tackled at the international level.

One of the main obstacles and challenges posed by the implementation of the CBMs can be identified in the anonymity of actions in the cyberspace. Activities and actions conducting by a state in the cyber space can retain a certain degree of secrecy. This may result in misperception, mistrust and inefficiency of any transparency measures. In the end, this situation may result in improper responses to malicious cyber activities.

The CBMs are aiming at preventing a cyber crisis escalation between states. It assumes that such a conflict can exist between states only, excluding any consideration of a de-escalation of non-state actors in a cyber crisis situation. A serious challenge is posed by the fact that Internet is widely used by terrorist groups and organizations. It has become a strategic weapon used to identify, recruit, and train members, collect and transfer funds, organize cyber-attacks and terrorist acts, and incite violence. The OSCE has undertaken measures to tackle terrorist use of the Internet and maintain an open Internet. The participating States committed to exchanging information on the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes and to identify possible strategies to combat this threat, while ensuring respect for relevant international human rights obligations and standards.²⁶ The exchange of information does not cover the realities of the global cyberspace, which is mainly managed by non-state actor.²⁷

Even if the sharing of information between participating states is strongly encouraged, this may be challenging to some extent because some states are unwilling to disclose in depth details about their offensive cyber forces, the abilities of their personnel and their technique capabilities.

As it was mentioned before, CBMs were originally developed in the area of the traditional disarmament and arms control, in the context where states were in possession of the use of the weaponry and other military means. In the cyber area the situation is different. Cyber activities and capabilities are globally widespread – also outside the government sector, and in

²⁴ Steve Morgan, *2017 Cybercrime Report*, Herjavec Group, 2017, URL: <https://1c7fab3im83f5gqiw2qqs2k-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/2015-wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2017-Cybercrime-Report.pdf>, accessed on 11.06.2019.

²⁵ Cybersecurity Ventures Official Annual Cybercrime Report, 2016, p. 6, URL: <https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-original-cybercrime-report-2016/>, accessed on 09.06.2019.

²⁶ OSCE Online Expert Forum Series on terrorist Use of the Internet: Threats, Responses and Potential Future Endeavours. Final report. 2013, pp. 5-6, URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/102266?download=true>, accessed on 07.06.2019.

²⁷ Constantin Tsiourtos, “Analysis: Global rules for Cyberspace – The cost of non-cooperation”, 08.06.2019, URL: <https://www.brief.com.cy/english/analysis-global-rules-cyberspace>, accessed on 10.06.2019.

possession of non-state actors as well. The states cannot control the production and deployment of malicious software. The CBMs cannot serve as a limitation to the use of cyber capabilities, as it was designated in the case of armament and weapons. At the same time, cyber capabilities are not limited to equipment, they are rather characterized by personnel's skills to operate cyber systems. In terms of military spending, the classical CBMs stipulate the exchange of information between states. For cyber capabilities, the funds spent on the maintenance and development of defensive and offensive capabilities does not indicate the orientation of the state. Some of the information may be classified, especially the ones referring to the training of the professional hackers and other hacking methods.²⁸

Another weakness of the OSCE's CBMs was determined in the context of the cyber-attack suffered by the Ukrainian power grid infrastructure, when the CBM's mechanism was not applied. The attack occurred on December 23, 2015, when the Kyivoblenergo, a Ukrainian regional electricity distribution company reported service outages to consumers. These outages were due to a third party's illegal entry into the company's computer and SCADA systems. It affected approximately 80.000 customers. The Ukrainian government claimed that the outages were caused by a cyber-attack for which the Russian security services were made responsible.²⁹ The fact that there was no indisputable evidence on Russia's responsibility and the fact that the CBM's are based on voluntary commitments made it possible for crises management mechanism to not be applied.

CONCLUSIONS

The cyber arena is becoming more and more dangerous as we are witnessing an increasing consolidation of cyber weapons and actors that are using them with various purposes, reinforced by the lack of "common international rules" to govern cyber activities.

The OSCE participating-States have launched CMSs in the cyber space domain in order to enhance stability, promote cooperation and increase trust and transparency among states in the cyber area. The 16 initiatives, adopted in 2013 (first set of 11 CBMs) and 2016 (the second set of 5 measures) include, in general, the identification of common rules, the sharing and exchange of information, consultations and cooperation, and a level of transparency with the aim of reducing the risk of misperception, escalations and political tensions in cyberspace. OSCE's endeavour is perceived as the main activity that paved the way for political and diplomatic dialogue in cyberspace.

Even if the CBMs are based on "voluntary" commitments, and it was portrayed as a weak point in the essay, they still favour a minimum standard of regional cooperation in cyberspace and attracted players such as Russia and USA. The CBMs create a framework for transparency and predictability through two main directions: first, they create means of protecting and securing the ICTs and second, they establish means of responding in case of cyber-attacks or incidents, as it is highlighted in the CBM 8.

The OSCE attempt to create a shared legal framework for state's behaviour in the digital sphere faces some challenges posed by the anonymity of actions in cyberspace, the existence of non-state actors, the inability of the state to fully control malicious actions, the non-legally binding effect of the CBMs, the privacy of the individuals and aspects that are related to the state sovereignty. It is difficult to depict, at this stage, the means through which those challenges can be tackled, but it is clear that there is need for more commitment and development in order to address the increased number and sophisticated cyber-attacks.

²⁸ Katharina Ziolkowski, *Confidence Building Measures for Cyberspace – Legal Implications*, CCDCOE Tallinn, 2013, pp. 14-16, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CBMs.pdf>, accessed on 11.06.2019.

²⁹ Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid. Defence Use Case. March 18, 2016, E-ISAC, p. IV, URL: https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf, accessed on 12.06.2019.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Decision No. 1106 Initial Set of OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. 975th Plenary Meeting, 3 December 2013, URL: <https://www.osce.org/pc/109168?download=true>.
2. ***, Decision No. 1202 OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. 1092nd Plenary Meeting, 10 March 2016, URL: <https://www.osce.org/pc/227281?download=true>.
3. ***, OSCE Online Expert Forum Series on terrorist Use of the Internet: Threats, Responses and Potential Future Endeavours. Final report. 2013, URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/102266?download=true>.
4. ***, Cybersecurity Ventures Official Annual Cybercrime Report, 2016, URL: <https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-original-cybercrime-report-2016/>.
5. ***, Sub-regional training on the role of ICTs in the context of regional and international security, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/subregional-training-role-icts-context-regional-and-international-security>.
6. ***, 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security, Rome, Italy, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/2018CSCRome>.
7. ***, Information Sheet – OSCE’s E-learning Module on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/312561?download=true>.
8. ***, Transnational threats Department. Cyber/ICT Security. Factsheet on Cyber/ICT Security. URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/256071>.
9. ***, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (PCUz), URL: <https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-uzbekistan>.
10. ***, Office in Yerevan facilitated survey on enhancing the implementation of OSCE CBMs, 2016, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/node/1068>.
11. ***, OSCE POLIS, Calendar. URL: <https://polis.osce.org/subregional-training-role-information-and-communication-technologies-icts-context-regional-and>.
12. ***, Regional Cybercrime Training for Police Investigators and Digital Forensics Examiners in South-Eastern Europe Introductory Open Source Digital Forensics, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, URL: <https://polis.osce.org/node/1083>.
13. ***, Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decision Adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth Special Session: Report of the Disarmament Commission, 1996, URL: <https://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/discomm/2102.htm>.
14. ***, OSCE Expands Its List of Confidence-Building Measures for Cyberspace: Common Ground on Critical Infrastructure Protection. CCDCOE, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/incyber-articles/osce-expands-its-list-of-confidence-building-measures-for-cyberspace-common-ground-on-critical-infrastructure-protection/>.
15. ***, OSCE Annual Report, 2018, URL: <https://www.osce.org/annual-report/2018?download=true>.
16. ***, Cyber/ICT Security – Global Trends. 2018, URL: <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/390830>.
17. ***, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid. Defense Use Case, March 18, 2016, E-ISAC, URL: https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf.
18. HEALEY, Jason; MALLERY, John C. et al, “Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace”, *Atlantic Council*. Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, November 2014, URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Confidence-Building_Measures_in_Cyberspace.pdf.

19. MORGAN, Steve, "2017 Cybercrime Report", *Herjavec Group*. 2017, URL: <https://1c7fab3im83f5gqiow2qqs2k-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/2015-wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2017-Cybercrime-Report.pdf>.
20. TSIOURTOS, Constantin, *Analysis: Global rules for Cyberspace – The cost of non-cooperation*, URL: <https://www.brief.com.cy/english/analysis-global-rules-cyberspace>.
21. ZIOLKOWSKI, Katharina. "Confidence Building Measures for Cyberspace – Legal Implications", *CCDCOE Tallinn 2013*, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CBMs.pdf>.
22. ZIOLKOWSKI, Katharina, *Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy*, NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn, 2013, URL: <https://cryptome.org/2014/01/nato-peacetime-cyberspace.pdf>.

MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN'S REFORMS VS. WAHHABI RULES: A CHALLENGE FOR THE STATUS QUO OF THE SAUDI STATE?

Ecaterina MAȚOI, Ph.D.

Junior Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defence University,
E-mail: matoi.ecaterina@myunap.net

Diana-Monica CONSTANTIN

Student, “Carol I” National Defense University,
E-mail: constantin.diana@myunap.net

Abstract: *In the mid-eighteenth century, the as-Saud family concluded an agreement with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a rebellious preacher who promoted a very literal approach to Islamic religious precepts and was against of any deviation from the initial practices of Islam. This understanding between the Wahhabis and the As-Saud family has legitimized the latter to pursue an expansionist policy and to create a sustainable state at the beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, the Saudi monarchy monopolized political and military action, while the Wahhabi clergy took over the religious, legal and social spheres of the newly established Saudi state. However, with the "modernizing" reforms initiated by Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) in 2017 in Saudi Arabia, such as authorizing women to drive or reopening cinemas – among others - accompanied by his statements and initiatives calling for a moderate Islam - have been interpreted by the fundamentalists as a tendency to break the historic pact between the Saudi House and the Wahhabi religious institution.*

In this paper we will try to see to what extent the reforms so widely circulated in the regional, international and local press, are sustainable in the long term, taking into account the importance and role of Wahhabi ulema in the Saudi society and, equally, if the "moderate Islam" model promoted by MbS could find supporters among them.

Keywords: *Wahhabism; as-Saud family; reforms; Muhammad bin Salman; ulema.*

1. Wahhabism – roots, doctrine and development

Wahhabism is seen by specialists as an interpretation of Islam that shaped and still shapes the modern as well as the contemporary history of the Arabian Peninsula, and exerts a considerable influence beyond the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It seems to be “indissolubly, intertwined with one of the most influential states in the Arab and Muslim world, and economic power of global relevance when it is about oil market, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”¹. As it was already observed during the last four decades at least, Islam as a religion is far from being a monolithic one, based on a homogeneous behavior or thinking; on the contrary, it has many facets: one of them is the Wahhabism.

1.1 Who are the Wahhabis? The Hanbali school of Law

In a Report for the American Congress, an analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs defines

¹ Esther Peskes, *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, Vol. 1, *Doctrine – Wahhabism and the Exclusive Muslim Community*, Gerlach Press, 2016, p. 1.

Wahhabism as a "puritanical form of Sunni Islam"², that it is practiced mostly in Saudi Arabia. Its name is derived from the name of a Muslim scholar, Muhammad Ibn-Abd al-Wahhab, who lived in the Nejd (*Najd*) area - today, Saudi Arabia - during the 18th century (1703-1791)³. He founded a religious movement, that sought to reject the moral decline of society during his time, particularly, some Islamic beliefs and practices, which he considered as being idolatrous, and encouraging the true Muslims to return to *the pure and orthodox practice of the fundamental principles of Islam, as they were embodied in the Qur'an, and in Sunnah*⁴. He followed the Hanbali ideology that has been stated 900 years earlier, by a medieval scholar, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, who established the fourth and youngest school of Sunni law: the *Hanbaliya*⁵.

1.1.1. Sunni Islam and the four schools of law

In order to understand these principles for which Wahhabism militates and that Muhammad Ibn-Abd al-Wahhab had introduced to his followers, one must look back in the history of Islam, during the 7th and 8th centuries, and especially at one of the two main branches of Islam respectively Sunni, and its representation within Muslim religion - approximately 90% of them around the world⁶.

Sunni Islam is divided into four orthodox schools of law, each one having its own doctrine based on fundamental principles. These schools are: the *Hanafiya*, the *Malikiya*, the *Shaafiyya*, and the *Hanbaliya*; this means that any Sunni Muslim is following the principles of one of the above mentioned schools, in every aspects of life, such as marriage, business, public or personal life conduct, etc. Therefore, one of the most challenging "*phenomena in Islamic religious history is the development of the schools of law (...). The idea of a school of law implies a body of doctrine followed by the members of that school*"⁷.

The *Hanafi School* is the oldest, and the most widespread of its kind in Islamic Law, being followed by one-third of the Muslims around the world. Its origins are attributed to An-Numan ibn Thabit Abu Hanifa from Kufa, Iraq, in the 8th century. It was dominant during the Abbasids, and also in the Ottoman Empire. Its legal doctrines are relatively liberal, especially in regard to personal freedom and women rights in contracting marriages; also to this school, it is attributed the role of contract rules in businesses⁸. Due to his approach towards interpretation of law, Abu Hanifa has been regarded as the "*founder of the speculative legal scholarship*", fact that led his critics to say that he had invented the science of juridical trick, and did not find the sympathy of his conservative contemporaries, who labeled him as "*the*

² M. Blanchard Cristopher, "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya", CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, January 24, 2008, p. 1, URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf>, accessed on 06.09.2019.

³ *Idem*.

⁴ According to Oxford Islamic Online Studies' website "the Arabic word Sunnah has referred to a body of established customs and beliefs that make up a tradition. In Muslim legal and religious thought, the term became associated more specifically with the actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad". "Sunnah". Oxford Islamic Studies Online, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e332, accessed on 30.09.2019.

⁵ Mihaela Matei, *Islamul politic și democrația. Între reformă, interpretare și jihad*, Editura RAO, București, 2011, p. 80.

⁶ Diana Zacharias, "Fundamentals of the Sunni Schools of Law", *Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, ZaöRV*, No. 66, 2006, pp. 491-507, URL: http://www.zaoerv.de/66_2006/66_2006_2_b_491_508.pdf, accessed on 07.09.2019.

⁷ George Makdisi, "The Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic Religious History", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1979, pp. 1-8, URL: www.jstor.org/stable/162473, accessed on 07.09.2019.

⁸ ***, "Hanafi School of Law", Oxford Islamic Studies Online, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e798, accessed on 07.09.2019.

*best informed man with regard to things that never happened but the most ignorant with regard to things that really took place*⁹.

The followers of the *Maliki School* are mostly those Sunni Muslims that are living in North Africa: Upper Egypt and Sudan, but also in the Middle East area, in countries like Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, or Kuwait. This school of Sunni law is attributed to Malik bin Anas al-Asbahi, also in the 8th century. Unlike many of his contemporary scholars, Malik never left Medina in search for knowledge; he considered Medina as a religious center superior to the others, especially to those from Iraq¹⁰. This school is putting strong emphasis on *hadith*¹¹; many principles are attributed to those early Muslims that lived during Prophet Muhammad's time in Medina, therefore, the Maliki School is relying on the practice of those times as a source of law, besides *ra'y* (personal opinion) and *qiyas* (analogy)¹².

The law school initiated by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Abbas ibn Uthman ibn Shaafi, known as the *Shaafi'i School*, was founded in the 8th century. Its founder is perceived as the original theorist of Islamic law, and in different ratios, he influenced all other schools. Originally from the Quraysh tribe, he considered that the opinion of a scholar could not be taken into consideration in comparison with what was coming from Prophet Muhammad¹³. This school's followers are living in Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Hijaz area, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Egypt, but also in Yemen and a few in Iran. It was the official school for the Ayyubids in Egypt, and it was also relevant for the Mamluks. It combines practices of *fiqh* from present-day Iraq and Saudi Arabia; also it considers hadith as being superior to customary doctrines of the earlier Islamic law schools, and does not accept *istihsan* (preference) as a law source¹⁴.

Finally, the last school of law, the *Hanbaliya*, has origins attributed to Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal in the 9th century in Baghdad. He was of Arabian origin, and a collector of traditions, a theologian, and a legal scholar. In his opinion "*the Qur'an in its wording, without any exegetic infringements and correcting interpretations, was the absolute irrefutable basis of the law*". He, himself, collected more than 80,000 *ahaadiyt*, (plural to *hadith*-saying) and unlike Abu Hanifa, rejected human considerations in any form as a source of law¹⁵. The *Hanbali* is the official school followed in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, also with many followers in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. Its sources of law are: the Qur'an, Hadith,

⁹ Diana Zacharias, 2006, p. 496.

¹⁰ Yasin Dutton, "The Origins of Islamic Law", in *The Qur'an, the Muwatta' and the Madina*, Amal, Richmond 1999, p. 14.

¹¹ According to Oxford Islamic Online Studies' website, the term *hadith* - which is used as a singular or a collective term in English - refer to "report of the words and deeds of Muhammad and other early Muslims; considered an authoritative source of revelation, second only to the Quran. Hadith were collected, transmitted, and taught orally for two centuries after Muhammad's death and then began to be collected in written form and codified. They serve as a source of biographical material for Muhammad, contextualization of Quranic revelations, and Islamic law". Oxford Islamic Studies Online, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e332, accessed on 30.09.2019.

¹² Oxford Islamic Studies' website, mentions that in Islamic law, the deduction of legal prescriptions from the *Quran* or *Sunnah* by analogic reasoning. *Qiyas* provided classical Muslim jurists with a method of deducing laws on matters not explicitly covered by the *Quran* or *Sunnah* without relying on unsystematic opinion (*ray* or *hawa*). According to this method, the ruling of the *Quran* or *Sunnah* may be extended to a new problem provided that the precedent (*asl*) and the new problem (*far*) share the same operative or effective cause (*illa*). "Maliki School of Law", Oxford Islamic Studies Online, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e798, accessed on 07.09.2019.

¹³ Adel Theodor Khoury, "Shafi'iten", in: A. Th. Khoury/L. Hagemann/P. Heine, *Islam-Lexikon*, vol. 3, Freiburg, Basel-Vienna, 1991, p. 673.

¹⁴ *** "Shafii School of Law". Oxford Islamic Studies Online, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e798, accessed on 03.10.2019.

¹⁵ Diana Zacharias, 2006, p. 504.

Fatwas of Muhammad's Companions and uses *qiyas* only if it is absolutely necessary; it encourages the practice of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), through the study of Qur'an, and Hadith. It advocates a literal interpretation of sources, and rejects *taqlid* (blind adherence to scholars' opinions). When it comes about rituals, this Sunni school is the most conservative, which is not the case in business, where it is the most liberal¹⁶.

1.1.2. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: the founder of Wahhabism

Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was born in one Nejd¹⁷ city; his father was an *alim* (scholar) and the *qadi* (judge) of the region; by the time he was ten he had memorized the Qur'an, and shortly after that, he performed the pilgrimage. His name, his life, and his beliefs, as well as the religious current he had established, are a source of controversy among the contemporary Muslims thinkers, and the Western ones¹⁸. During his studies in Medina, he rejected the influence of the local *ulema* (*ulama - religious scholars*), who in their turn started to counter his influence among the students; during his studies and traveling both in Mecca and Medina, he met and was influenced by Muhammad Hayat Al-Sindi, who witnessed the deterioration of the Mughal Empire, and was the one who instilled in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab "*the idea that the pure forms of Islam could regenerate lost political glories*"¹⁹. He also studied in Basra, Iraq, where probably met scholars from the rival Shia branch of Islam, which he denounced in one treatise; the Shias, weren't only ones with whom Abd al Wahhab was quarreling, but also with the *mystic Sufi* sect of Islam²⁰. Eventually, after he was traveling and studied in the most important centers of Islam, moved to Huraymila where wrote the 15 treatises, known as "*Kitab al Tawhid, or the Book of Monotheism*"²¹. Shortly, he began to attract the leaders of the local tribes, who accepted him as a religious leader, but equally, gained critics among those that were against his strict rules regarding sexual immorality, that some people mounted an assassination attempt against him²². Important to notice is that before the moment when Ibn Abd al-Wahhab made himself visible with his principles, manifestations of polytheism were widespread in Nejd according to Ibn Bishir²³.

In his hometown, Abd al-Wahhab started to implement an own version of Islam, even a graphic one, being protected by military ruler of the area; thus, with his followers destroyed a group of trees considered by local population as being sacred. In those trees, people were hanging various items in order to bring good luck, or blessings; but Ibn Abd al Wahhab, considered the gestures as a violation of *tawhid*²⁴ and himself cut the most venerated tree of

¹⁶ "Hanbali School of Law", Oxford Islamic Studies Online, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e798, accessed on 07.09.2019.

¹⁷ Nejd is a region situated in center of Saudi Arabia.

¹⁸ ***, "Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab Biography", URL: <https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-A-Bu-and-Obituaries/Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab-Muhammad.html>, accessed on 07.09.2019.

¹⁹ "Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab" *Encyclopedia.com*, Encyclopedia.com, 2019, URL: www.encyclopedia.com/people/philosophy-and-religion/islam-biographies/muhammad-ibn-abd-al-wahhab, accessed on 03.10.2019.

²⁰ ***, "Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab Biography", URL: <https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-A-Bu-and-Obituaries/Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab-Muhammad.html>, accessed on 07.09.2019.

²¹ *Idem*.

²² *Idem*.

²³ Ibn Bishir, cited in Michael Cook, "The Hanbalites of Najd", in: Esther Peskes (ed.), *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, Volume II, Development-Wahhabism in Society and Politics, Gerlach Press, 2016, p. 63.

²⁴ "Tawhid is the defining doctrine of Islam. It declares absolute monotheism—the unity and uniqueness of God as creator and sustainer of the universe. Used by Islamic reformers and activists as an organizing principle for human society and the basis of religious knowledge, history, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics, as well as social, economic, and world order". "Tawhid." *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2356. accessed on 03.10.2019.

all. In the same direction of “purifying Sunni Islam”, he destroyed monuments, and ordered that a woman, who committed adultery and confessed to him, to be stoned to death. As a result of these actions, but as well of his growing influence, the local scholars mounted a campaign against him, and eventually he was exiled from the region. But this exile near Riyadh brought him closer to the “*one who would become the most powerful Arabian ruler of all*”²⁵, who was attracted by the Abd al-Wahhab’s religious fervor: Muhammad ibn Saud, the founder of the modern House of Saud²⁶. The “intersection” of the two different leaders’ interests lead to a partnership of mutual noninterference that started in 1744; the main features of this understanding persist even today, although followers of Wahhabi philosophy are a minority within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, their thinking controls and restricts the Saudi society’s life in everyday issues²⁷.

1.2. The “social contract” between the Wahhabis and as-Saud family

The aim of the above mentioned alliance was the transformation of the “*political structure of Nejd society and the relations of Hanbalism to political authority within it*”²⁸, while the outcome was the rise of a militant Wahhabi movement, “*in symbiosis with what we can now begin to call the Saudi state. (...) Hanbalism was now cast in the unfamiliar role of a doctrine of state-formation in a near-stateless tribal society, and in this role it functioned as the political ideology of three successive Saudi states*”²⁹.

1.2.1. Society and politics in the Najd area: 1744-1921

In comparison with the rest of territory of the Abbasid Caliphate (the last period of the Arab Empire in the Arabian Peninsula), the Ottoman Empire had only a nominal suzerainty over the territory of what today it is Saudi Arabia. The Sultans appointed the political leaders in Jeddah and Medina (*Madīnah*) and controlled the Hijaz for a few centuries in alliance with the Sharifian rulers, while they failed in extending their control into the “heart” of the region, respectively, in the Najdi area. Therefore, for the first Saudi-Wahhabi emirate (1744-1818) known also as the Emirate of Diriyah, there was no immediate existential threat, and under the leadership of Saudi family, it expanded into Riyadh, Kharj and Qasim by 1792; the cities received Wahhabi judges as the new religious-political authority’s representatives. Most of the emirs in Najdi were kept in their settlements, as long as they paid *zakat* (*giving away money to the poor*)³⁰. In a short period of time, the Saudis extended their control over Hasa (whose control was important for the Wahhabis as long as the majority of Hasa population was Shias), Qatif (in 1780), Qatar (1797), and also Bahrain. And in spite of the tough resistance of the Hijazi population, the Saudis succeeded in gaining control - though, a temporary one - over Taif (1802) Mecca (1803) and Medina (1804), where they ordered the destruction of “*domed tombs of the Prophet and the caliphs in Medina in accordance with the Wahhabi doctrine (...). According to Wahhabi teachings, graves should remain unmarked to discourage later visits and veneration by Muslims*”³¹. The expansion period continued with Asir, and to the north-east to the present day Iraq, in the Shia holy city Karbala, action that was paid by the Saudi

²⁵ “Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab.” *Encyclopedia.com*, Encyclopedia.com, 2019, URL: www.encyclopedia.com/people/philosophy-and-religion/islam-biographies/muhammad-ibn-abd-al-wahhab. accessed on 03.10.2019

²⁶ Ibn Bishir, p. 63.

²⁷ *Idem*.

²⁸ Michael Cook, “The Hanbalites of Najd”, in: Esther Peskes, (ed.), *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, Volume II, Development-Wahhabism in Society and Politics, Gerlach Press, 2016, p. 62.

²⁹ *Idem*.

³⁰ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A history of the Saudi Arabia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 21.

³¹ Madawi Al-Rasheed, 2002, p. 21.

leader Abd al-Aziz with his life; he was assassinated by a Shiite in a Sunni mosque³². Their expansion has been stopped, and the power of the emirate weakened by Ottomans with the help of the Egypt viceroy Muhammad Ali Pasha during the Ottoman-Saudi War in 1818³³.

The second Saudi-Wahhabi emirate, or the Emirate of Nejd, or the Second Saudi state, existed between 1823-1887³⁴; this state was smaller in size than the previous emirate; its rulers were called Wahhabi imams, while references to practice of the *commanding right and forbidding wrong* are more present in texts dating this period, thus, the practice of this “duty” was more important than the *holy war against the infidels*³⁵. The forbidding wrong practice had/has to be interpreted as a duty of each Muslim to induce “his fellow believers to live in accordance with the norms enshrined in Islamic etiquette (adab) and law (Shari’a)”³⁶.

The third Saudi state was established by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in 1902, and exists until today; according to Michael Cook, this third state’s history has to be divided into two parts, in order to be understood. Thus, the first refers to the emerging state (1902-1932) till the conquest of the Hijaz region in 1924-1925, and from that moment, till present day, the second period³⁷. The expansion of this Saudi state at the beginning of the 20th century it was possible due to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and as a result of the redrawing of the Middle East, and partially of the North Africa map/s based on the interests – in a first stage - of at least two Great Powers of those times, the British Empire and France and, shortly afterwards, of the United States.

2. Society in the contemporary Saudi state

The third Saudi state established at the formal level in 1932 by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Saud, has as a main characteristic the fact that is further relying on the unity created by Wahhabi doctrine between political power granted to the Saudi family, and the desideratum to integrally apply Shari’a as explained by the Saudi King to a foreign visitor: “*Any right and good policy has to be founded on religion, in the absence of which, it is neither right nor good. You cannot dissociate politics and moral. I think there should be no separation between the two. I have never seen how it would be possible to separate them. Islam represents a very important power in our existence ... in our politics ... but Islam degenerated. I do nothing else but returning to original teaching, as given by the Prophet in the Qur’an. The Qur’an, as well as the example given by Prophet’s life, represent the foundation of our lives in Saudi Arabia ... What I am trying to achieve during my own existence is to live the example of Prophet’s life, during which He strictly respected the Qur’an*”³⁸.

Saudi political ideology starts from the idea that there is a unique Islamic governing system, anchored in the original aspects of Muslim tradition, that makes useless or even prohibits overtaking other systems, like the ones proposed by Occident. The king bears the title of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” (*wali al-amr*), which means that the ruler of

³² *Idem.*

³³ *Idem.*

³⁴ Michael Cook, “The Hanbalites of Najd”, in: Esther Peskes, (ed.), *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, Volume II, Development-Wahhabism in Society and Politics, Gerlach Press, 2016, p. 69. Other researchers are mentioning 1824-1891 as the period for the existence of the second Saudi-Wahhabi Emirate; for further info see: <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam033/2001043609.pdf>, p. 26.

³⁵ Michael Cook, “The Hanbalites of Najd”, 2016, p. 69.

³⁶ Sam Houston, “Sufism and Islamist activism in Morocco: an examination of the tradition of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ in the thought of ‘Abd al-Salam Yassine”, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, 53:2, 2017, p. 26.

³⁷ Michael Cook, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Ibn Saud towards a foreign visitor, in 1936; in Yves Besson, *Ibn Sa'ud, roi bédouin*, Lausanne, Édition des Trois Continents, 1980, p. 90.

this state is the defender of the Islamic faith, while his position cannot be questioned. He is a sponsor (from his own funds) for the Hajj's expenses for approximately 2000 pilgrimages per year, and is encouraging the expansion and promotion of the Wahhabi ideology abroad³⁹. The religion cannot be separated from the monarchy, in this respect it is enough to look at article 1 from the *Basic Law of Government* that underlines the fact that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, governed by Islamic Law (Shari'a)⁴⁰. Relevant for this paper to stress is that the Saudi family benefit of their relation and understanding with the Wahhabi *ulema* and use Islam as an instrument for social control, which is exercised through institutions such as the Shari'a courts, the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Evil, and especially on the streets, through those 5,000 members of Moral Police (*al-mutawwa*)⁴¹. Across Saudi Arabia there are more than 300 religious courts that are passing sentences according to the Wahhabi *ulema* interpretation of Shari'a. Therefore, those that are found guilty of crimes under *hudud* (limit, or restriction), which are the most serious crimes, are punished severely: for murder – *beheading*; for theft – *amputation of hands and legs*, for adultery – *stoning to death, or beheading*⁴².

Therefore, at present, the entire political juridical and social Saudi system is defined considering Islamic prerogatives as expressed in Shari'a, i.e. its neo-Hanbali version, without any compromise related to cultural or legislative modernity, be it Muslim or Occidental. Wahhabi jurists supervise their strict application by population, and often, their rigorous ardour extends even upon royal family, criticized for shift from Islam or breaching religious norms⁴³. One of the most well-known case in this respect took place back in 1970s, when Princess Mishaal bint Fahd al Saud, together with her boyfriend were executed. The princess, a 19-year-old girl, was in an arranged marriage by her royal family according to the local customs; still, she insisted to be sent to Beirut for studies. In the capital of Lebanon, Princess Mishaal fell in-loved and began an affair with the Saudi Ambassador's son, and continued their affair in the kingdom, fact that enraged her grandfather, who was the brother of the Saudi king at that moment. Even though he loved her very much, she was sent to Shari'a court, where the Princess simply refused to denounce her 20-year-old lover Khaled Mulhallal al Sha'er and confessed the adultery. Under the customary Saudi law, to be convicted of adultery there are necessary testimonies of four adult male who witnessed the act in itself, either eight adult female, or the one who has been accused to simply confess three times that committed the offence⁴⁴.

As a result, she was executed exactly as her grandfather ordered, while her boyfriend, in his turn was beheaded by a relative of Princess Mishaal, in such bad way "*that it took four strokes to complete*"⁴⁵, or at least this it was the official story. No matter the way the killing was carried out (there are different versions of her execution: shot in the head or beheaded), the fact that matters is that the Princess had been executed, being accused of adultery, for

³⁹ Anna Odrowaz-Coates, "Can religion survive globalization? The phenomenon of XXI century Saudi Arabia", in *Kultura I Polityka*, 2013, No. 14, p. 124, URL: <http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-2a3d5bdc-55f6-4507-b16f-17710f93c5c8>, accessed on October 1, 2019.

⁴⁰ Sting Stenslie, *Regime stability in Saudi Arabia: The challenge of succession*, Routledge, London and New York, 2012, p. 10.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 10-11.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 11.

⁴³ Ecaterina Cepoi, *Sisteme de relații religie-lume-stat în Orientul Mijlociu și Africa de Nord: între secularizare și Islam*, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, 2014, p. 78.

⁴⁴ Raza Ali Sayeed, "Weekly Classics: Death of a princess", in *Dawn*, October 05, 2012, URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/754388>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

⁴⁵ David Torsmen, "10 sordid stories of the Saudi royal family", in *Listverse*, June 23, 2015, URL: <https://listverse.com/2015/06/23/10-sordid-stories-of-the-saudi-royal-family/>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

bringing dishonour to the family according to the Shari'a rules implemented by the Wahhabi *ulema* a few hundred years ago. Even the Saudi authorities had done their best, to keep the story of Princess Mishaal quiet, it caused international anger which was amplified in 1980 when the story was the subject of a documentary broadcasted on the two well-known TV stations: BBC and PBS. The Saudi royal family had tried to suppress the movie, expelled the British ambassador from Riyadh, withdrawn 400 royal family members from London, cancelled orders and boycotted British products⁴⁶.

From the very beginning of this third Saudi state, until today, the public attention was on obeying the principles of religious observance, as well as the fulfilment of the recommendations of the *ulema*. Within the Saudi society there is a huge control of potential social deviances, no matter if it is about a person, family and, or public opinion. The government owns facilities and capabilities of tracking citizens, monitoring their phone calls and the internet communication, including those on social networks⁴⁷.

The main issue of the present day Saudi society, is that if initially, during the first, or the second Wahhabi-Saudi state, the *ulema* were literate men in a "illiterate society", today, the development of education started to challenge the "monopoly of knowledge" of the Wahhabi clerics. Therefore, each sign of modernity in the Saudi society had/has to be filtered by the *ulema*; starting with the women education, acceptance of satellite antennas, or the access to the internet; each one of this aspect was accepted only, when the Wahhabi clerics were sure that nothing immoral can be "transferred" to the society through these channels. Also, the *ulema* are aware about the potential of society control through "education"; this is why they are using it to control students' minds through the monopoly of the educational curricula. Religion is taught at all levels of education, including university, therefore, the education system is "*one of the pillars of cultural and religious preservation and the prevailing distribution of power (...). One of the most important concept taught in school is obedience, especially the civil one towards authorities i.e. Allah, the Prophet Muhammad and the Royal Family*"⁴⁸.

Furthermore, in schools, there is no possibility to challenge the teacher, to discuss, to have a dialogue or learning through deduction, the only sources of knowledge being the Qur'an and Sunnah. A non-Muslim is not allowed to enter into the two Holy cities: Mecca and Medina, also there are separate highways for any other non-Muslim faiths, while the worship of other religion is completely forbidden in public, and import of any non-Islamic things are not permitted, even the presence of other faiths are questioned, because they "*hold a danger for Muslim beliefs, morality, and for education*"⁴⁹, according to the former Grand Mufti, sheikh Ibn Baz, even though in 2004, 55% of all workers in Saudi Arabia were foreign⁵⁰. By using informal discussion with a 53 Saudi boys between 12 and 16 years old, Anna Odrowaz-Coates had realised that Christians and Jews, the "People of the Book", are considered infidels, therefore, the use of "Salam Alaykum" should not be used/exchanged with them, neither socializing, unless they express their wishes to convert to Islam. Jewish conspiracy is seen as the trigger behind the most important historical events, such as the French Revolution, Marxism, etc.)⁵¹, and together with the Americans are blamed for staging the "Arab Spring", in order to gain control of the richness of the Arab countries⁵².

⁴⁶ *Idem*.

⁴⁷ Anna Odrowaz-Coates, *art. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 128-129.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 130.

⁵⁰ *Idem*.

⁵¹ *Idem*.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p.132.

A certain degree of dichotomy is to be noticed in state promotion of the English language because at one hand is used largely in the street, and at home, and on the other hand there are fears about children access to Western television, which in the Wahhabi clerics' opinion it is a corrupting instrument, even though, the media is controlled and censored by the *ulema* and security structures, with no room for freedom of expression, or choices. Books, magazines that are published in any other country except Saudi Arabia, are highly censored “and often sold with pages torn out or with stickers glued over fragment of photographs or text that was considered inappropriate by censors⁵³. And despite the well-known wealth of the present-day Saudi Arabia, a consistent number of women and children begging are spotted on the streets of the main cities, while they are not necessarily of African origin or slave descent.

3. The rise of the Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) and his (historical) reforms

The House of Saud has been the driving force behind all the three states established in the heart of the Nejd area; the last one was created by Ibn Saud at the beginning of the 20th century, who, in order to connect and control most of tribes in the region, married with numerous women; while the exact number of wives is still disputed among scholars – for example in the Major World Leaders, there is mentioned that Abdul Aziz had nearly 300 wives during his life⁵⁴ - it is known that at least 16 of them gave him sons and daughters. The number of children mentioned by Sting Stenslie in his book is at least 36 sons and 21 daughters, and when the first king of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia died in 1953, 34 sons who survived their father inherited the kingdom. Six of them succeeded him as a king: the late Kings Saud, Faysal, Khalid, Fahd, Abdallah⁵⁵, and the current king, Salman, the father of Muhammad bin Salman (MbS).

Saudi's succession rules were formalised by a royal decree by King Fahd in 1992 in the Basic Law of Government, article 5(b). Thus here appears that: “Rule passes to the sons of the founding king, Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, and to their children` children”, and further in article 5(c): “The King chooses the apparent heir and relieves him of his duties by royal order”. Except the so-called “second-generation princes”, this law opened the opportunity for a figure of 200 “third-generation princes” to claim the right to be king⁵⁶.

The succession to the Saudi Arabian throne followed the pattern established after the death of King Abdulaziz in 1953, namely the “*succession to the next oldest son*”, until 2015, when King Salman took unexpected steps in the history of Saudi Arabia. In his first day as a king, “he nominated one of his nephews as a Deputy Crown Prince, signalling, for the first time, a pathway to the grandsons of Abdulaziz”⁵⁷, and only two years later, he deposed his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef relieving him of all responsibilities, and appointed his son Mohammed bin Salman as a Crown Prince⁵⁸. At least the latter move was perceived as a risky

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 134.

⁵⁴ Jennifer Bond Reed (with additional text by Brenda Lange), “The Saudi Royal Family”, in *Major Leaders*, Chelsea House Publishers, 2007, p. 30.

⁵⁵ Sting Stenslie, *Regime stability in Saudi Arabia: The challenge of succession*, Routledge, London and New York, 2012, p. 25.

⁵⁶ Sting Stenslie, “Saudi Arabia: the coming royal succession”, in *Policy Brief*, NOREF, February 2014, URL: https://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Saudi_Arabia_The_Coming_Royal_Succession.pdf, accessed on 12.09.2019.

⁵⁷ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Who is Saudi Arabia's New Crown Prince?”, in *Washington Post*, June 22, 2017, URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/22/who-is-saudi-arabias-new-crown-prince/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3315f4498f43, accessed on 18.09.2019.

⁵⁸ Ali Shihabi, “Mohammed bin Salman is here to stay”, in *Foreign Policy*, March 1, 2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/mohammed-bin-salman-is-here-to-stay/>, accessed on 18.09.2019.

one by analysts all over the world, because it vested very close to absolute power an *"inexperienced young prince with already unprecedented control over economic strategy and oil policy, as well as defence, and an increasingly hawkish foreign policy"*⁵⁹.

3.1. The rise of Mohammed bin Salman, a genuine one for the Saudi-Wahhabi society?

Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) is the son of king Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud of Saudi Arabia, and of his third wife – Fahda bint Falah bin Sultan from the Ajman tribe; born in 1985, he is married with Sara Bint Mashhoor bin Abdulaziz al Saud, and has four children. The Crown Prince has graduated from King Saud University with a degree in Law, and after the graduation he spent several years in private sector, before becoming special advisor for his father when the latter was still a governor of Riyadh Province. Since 2013, when MbS received the rank of minister, his career rose rapidly to prominence, even though *"unlike his much older half-brothers, he didn't travel abroad for his education"*⁶⁰. Thus, Mohammed bin Salman became *"the youngest person on record to be named as a Minister of Defence"* in 2015, and taking into consideration health and age of King Salman, MbS is seen *"by many to be the true power behind the throne"* of Saudi Arabia; also, he is the key advisor of Trump administration in the region, and for the last three years has paid high-level visits in different parts of the world⁶¹, while promoting a "new face" of the Saudi state for the near future through different means, such as projects, measures, and policies, under the umbrella of reforms.

3.1. Economic reforms

In April, 2016, MbS had announced a highly ambitious reform programme, *Vision 2030*, which was meant and designed to lower Saudi Arabia's dependency on oil, and to smooth government bureaucracy; among the main measures/directions, was the partial privatization of Saudi Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO), and the plans of NEOM⁶². If the role and importance of ARAMCO were known at a certain degree at the international level, the announcement of the NEOM project had produced a shock among the researchers on the Middle Eastern region, due to its scope and dimensions. This "utopian megacity" is an example of the *"Saudi's new vision for the country: diversified, global, grandiose and modern"*⁶³ and it is expected to transform the Kingdom into a *"top economic power in the region, and presenting a new picture to the world of the highly conservative Arab country"*, and as MbS, himself has described it *"a picture of the future human civilization"*⁶⁴. Other aims of Vision 2030 are *"entering the top 15 largest world economies; increasing the private sector share of GDP from 40% to 65%, manufacturing 50% of military equipment domestically, and*

⁵⁹ David Gardner, "Saudi Arabia's succession switch creates fresh set of risks", in *Straits Times*, June 23, 2017, URL: <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/saudi-arabias-succession-switch-creates-fresh-set-of-risks>, accessed on 18.09.2019.

⁶⁰ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Who is Saudi Arabia's New Crown Prince?", in *Washington Post*, 2017.

⁶¹ Biography.com Editors, "Mohammed bin Salman", *BIOGRAPHY, A&E Television Networks*, June 27, 2018, URL: <https://www.biography.com/people/mohammed-bin-salman>, accessed on 18.09.2019.

⁶² According to *Al Arabiya* newspaper the first three characters "NEO" comes from the Latin word which means "new", while the fourth character "M" is the abbreviation of the Arabic word "Mostaqbal" meaning "future". Source: URL: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2017/10/24/What-does-NEOM-mean-.html>, accessed on 20.09.2019.

⁶³ Sebastian Shehadi. "Saudi's Neom: utopian oasis or mirage in the desert?", in *FDI Intelligence*, 12.02.2018, URL: <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/Locations/Middle-East-Africa/Saudi-s-Neom-utopian-oasis-or-mirage-in-the-desert>, accessed on 18.09.2019.

⁶⁴ ***, "Mega dream: Bin Salman's NEOM project hardly feasible", in *Press*, November 1, 2017, URL: <http://iuvmpress.com/18918>, accessed on 18.09.2019.

*increasing non-oil state revenues five-fold*⁶⁵.

But not all those reforms/changes that were made in an authoritarian way, had positive effects or just results at all. The partial privatisation of Saudi Aramco, has failed, eventually, this action being put on hold in the summer of 2018; besides, foreign investments in the Saudi kingdom have declined, therefore, fight against corruption within Saudi Arabia looked like a kind of last resort for Mohammed bin Salman to help the economy; thus, at the end of 2017, princes, politicians and businessmen, as well as members of his own royal family, were arrested and confined at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. *Deutsche Welle* (DW) is mentioning that “*as many as 500 people were imprisoned in the luxury hotel*”, and that as a result of the campaign there were seized from the detainees, real estate assets, financial settlements, commercial entities and securities, and cash in more than \$106 billion, in exchange for their freedom⁶⁶.

3.2. Major social reforms

Although, Muhammad bin Salman was named heir to the Saudi throne not long time ago, he succeeded in introducing in a very short time new policies that seemed unlikely before his arrival, and that looks as he is “*pushing his country at breakneck speed*”⁶⁷. He “*re-opened movie theatres after more than 30 years, inaugurated a construction on an entertainment city outside Riyadh three times the size of Disney Land in Florida*”⁶⁸, and lifted the decades-old ban on women driving – this being by far one of the most progressive step for women's rights in the kingdom⁶⁹. Also, he limited the power of the religious police, whose role is to guard gender segregation and to observe proper behaviour in the public sphere in Saudi Arabia, and appointed Sheikh Muhammad al-Issa as the new head of the Muslim World League, as a sign of a relative liberty regarding the interpretation of Islam⁷⁰. Furthermore, at the end of September 2019, the Riyadh government announced that Saudi Arabia opened its doors for foreign tourists, and that it would launch a new visa programme for 49 countries “*in a bid to draw foreign companies to invest in the country's tourism sector*”, while relaxing “*strict dress codes for female visitors that previously required them to wear all-covering black robes, or abayas*”⁷¹.

3.3. Foreign policy of Muhammad bin Salman

Foreign policy seemed to be by far the weakest point of MbS; he was the mastermind of the intervention in Yemen which began in 2015, that led to a humanitarian disaster which

⁶⁵ Sukru Cildir, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘liberal’ Crown Prince is a year into his tenure – how is he doing?”, in *The Conversation*. July 25, 2018 URL: <http://theconversation.com/saudi-arabias-liberal-crown-prince-is-a-year-into-his-tenure-how-is-he-doing-99743>, accessed on 18.09.2019.

⁶⁶ Wesley Dockery, “Saudi Arabia: Has the Ritz-Carlton corruption crackdown achieved its goals?”, in *Deutsche Welle*, 30.01.2018, URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-has-the-ritz-carlton-corruption-crackdown-achieved-its-goals/a-42373697>, accessed on 18.09.2019.

⁶⁷ David B. Ottaway, Middle East Fellow Wilson Center, “Will Saudi Arabia’s Social Revolution Provoke a Wahhabi Backlash?”, Wilson Center, May, 2018, p. 2.

⁶⁸ *Idem*.

⁶⁹ ***, “Mohammed bin Salman: The dark side of Saudi Arabi’s crown prince”, in *Al Jazeera*, October 20, 2018, URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/mohammed-bin-salman-dark-side-saudi-arabia-crown-prince-181015123719153.html>, accessed on 20.09.2019.

⁷⁰ ***, “After the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi: Muhammad bin Salman and the Future of Saudi-U.S. Relations”, *CSIS Briefs*, December 12, 2018, URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/after-killing-jamal-khashoggi-muhammad-bin-salman-and-future-saudi-us-relations>, accessed on 20.09.2019.

⁷¹ ***, “Saudi Arabia Will Issue New Visas, Relax Dress Code for Tourists”, in *Saudi Arabia News, Al Jazeera*, September 27, 2019, URL: www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/saudi-arabia-issue-visas-relax-dress-code-tourists-190927045326165.html, accessed on 30.09.2019.

cost the Saudi Arabia billions of dollars per month, and also a resulted in a huge diplomatic setback.

The boycott of Qatar initiated in 2017, and still an ongoing one, is the second on the list of MbS's failures; the small state of Qatar is the richest country in the world, therefore, an economic boycott is likely to fail, not to mention that the US has its largest military base from the Middle East in Qatar, while Turkey is supporting Doha, diplomatically, as well as militarily⁷². Also, actions such as summoning the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri in November 2017 in Riyadh, and forcing him to announce publicly the resignation from his position, or killing the journalist Jamal Khashoggi within the premises of the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, which led to an international crisis, are facts talking about a still very young man for a Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia who holds key positions in this Persian Gulf state.

Ely Karmon in a paper presented in a Conference at *Herzliya Center* in Tel Aviv, said that she fears Iran has pushed MbS to cooperate with Israel, in the fight against its main opponent: Iran, and in solving the already historical conflict between Israel and Palestinians. Further, Karmon is mentioning that in April 2018, when MbS had paid a visit in the US, he met with Jewish community and religious leaders, and for the first time in history for a Saudi leader he admitted that: "*each people, anywhere, has a right to live in their peaceful nation ... (and) the Palestinians and the Israelis have the right to have their own land*"⁷³. Also, Karmon is stressing that there are important problems for MbS, because most of his reforms are targeting the pillars of the Saudi state, among which two are critical for the near future of the Saudi state: the royal family members and the religious ideology when it is about domestic issues, while when it is about foreign policy "*the most obvious danger is from bin Salman's impulsiveness in foreign policy, the war in Yemen being the most immediate worrisome example. Time will tell if MbS can stand to these enormous challenges and finish his career as a reformist, or even a revolutionary...*"⁷⁴.

CONCLUSIONS

Not long ago, *The Economist*, referring to the reforms of MbS and speaking from the latter's position, asked in a title, rhetorically: "How to remove the God's Law? Or, rather, how to change what God said?"

If this is what MbS is intending through social reforms which he has initiated over the past years, it is still too early to draw a conclusion; even more than that, in spite of these attempts to cancel social constraints, it must not be forgotten that in the 1930s, during the time of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi state, women did work in fields and ride their own camels; while in the 1960s, even the 1970s, the Saudis enjoyed the pleasure of cinemas among other modern things. Although today Saudis can enjoy watching movies in public, and women seem to regain some rights which in the Western society they are perceived as natural, or genuine things, it was not been forgotten or fully forgiven at the international the fact that Prince Mohammed Bin Salman since his rapid rise to power has also committed many abuses, and has made decisions whose consequences are difficult to predict.

In spite of the revival of public concerts, cinemas, the publicizing of mixed public events and the granting of the right to drive for women after it was banned for years, these reform attempts are viewed with caution by the international community as well as by the

⁷² ***, "After the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi: Muhammad bin Salman and the Future of Saudi-U.S. Relations", CSIS Briefs, *art. cit.*

⁷³ Ely Karmon, "Muhammad bin Salman, a new protagonist in the Middle East", in *Herzliya Conference Papers*, April 2018, pp. 2-6, URL: <https://www.idc.ac.il/en/research/ips/2018/Documents/ElyKarmon.pdf>, accessed on 28.09.2019.

⁷⁴ Ely Karmon, *art. cit.*, pp. 4-6.

Saudi society. Because time, place and conditions are extremely important factors when somebody is initiating daring reforms as MbS has done.

In Saudi Arabia they can be seen as sacrilegious by Wahhabis who (may) see their position within the Saudi society threatened, on the one hand, while to change the collective mentality of a society that has been settled for many decades, it will also require decades to change it, and for this it is necessary a steady political, economic, security, climate – at the national, regional and international level. Therefore, as a second conclusion, it is difficult to assess at this point if the reforms initiated by MbS might pose a serious threat to the status-quo of the Saudi state.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, “After the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi: Muhammad bin Salman and the Future of Saudi-U.S. Relations”, CSIS Brief, December 12. 2018, URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/after-killing-jamal-khashoggi-muhammad-bin-salman-and-future-saudi-us-relations>.
2. AL-RASHEED, Madawi, *A history of the Saudi Arabia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
3. BESSON, Yves, *Ibn Sa'ud, roi bédouin*, Lausanne, Édition des Trois Continents, 1980.
4. BLANCHARD, Cristopher M., “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya”, CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, URL:<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf>.
5. BOND REED, Jennifer, “The Saudi Royal Family”, *Major Leaders*, Chelsea House Publishers, 2007.
6. CEPOI, Ecaterina, *Sisteme de relații religie-lume-stat în Orientul Mijlociu și Africa de Nord: între secularizare și Islam*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2014.
7. CILDIR, Sukru, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘liberal’ Crown Prince is a year into his tenure – how is he doing?”, in *The Conversation*. July 25, 2018.
8. DOCKERY, Wesley, “Saudi Arabia: Has the Ritz-Carlton corruption crackdown achieved its goals?”, in *Deutsche Welle*, 30.01.2018.
9. DUTTON, Yasin “The Origins of Islamic Law”, in: ***, *The Qur'an, the Muwatta' and the Madina*, Amal, Richmond, 1999.
10. GARDNER, David, “Saudi Arabia’s succession switch creates fresh set of risks”, in *Straits Times*, June 23, 2017.
11. HOUSTON, Sam, “The Tradition of “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong” in the Islamist Discourse of ‘Salafī Šūfī’ ‘Abd al-Salam Yassine”, Florida State University, www.academia.edu.
12. KARMON, Ely, “Muhammad bin Salman, a new protagonist in the Middle East”, in *Herzliya Conference Papers*, April 2018.
13. KHOURY, Adel Theodor, “Shafi’iten”, in: A. Th. Khoury/L. Hagemann/P. Heine, *Islam-Lexikon*, vol. 3, Freiburg, Basel-Vienna, 1991.
14. MAKDISI, George, “The Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic Religious History”, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, JSTOR, vol. 10, no. 1, 1979, pp. 1–8, URL: www.jstor.org/stable/162473.
15. MATEI, Mihaela, *Islamul politic și democrația. Între reformă, interpretare și jihad*, RAO, Bucharest, 2011.

16. ODRÓWAZ-COATES, Anna, "Can religion survive globalization? The phenomenon of XXI century Saudi Arabia", in *Kultura i Polityka*, No. 14, 2013, p. 124, URL: <http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-2a3d5bdc-55f6-4507-b16f-17710f93c5c8>.
17. OTTAWAY, David B., "Will Saudi Arabia's Social Revolution Provoke a Wahhabi Backlash?", Wilson Center, May 2018.
18. PESKES, Esther (eds.), *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*. Volume II, "Development-Wahhabism in Society and Politics", Gerlach Press, 2016
19. PESKES, Esther, *Wahhabism: Doctrine and Development*, Volume 1, "Doctrine – Wahhabism and the Exclusive Muslim Community", Gerlach Press, 2016.
20. SAYEED, Raza Ali, "Weekly Classics: Death of a princess", *Dawn*, October 05, 2012, URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/754388>.
21. SHEHADI, Sebastian, "Saudi's Neom: utopian oasis or mirage in the desert?", in *FDI Intelligence*, February 12, 2018.
22. SHIHABI, Ali, "Mohammed bin Salman is here to stay", in *Foreign Policy*. March 1, 2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/mohammed-bin-salman-is-here-to-stay/>.
23. STENSLIE, Sting, "Saudi Arabia: the coming royal succession", Policy Brief, NOREF, February 2014, URL: https://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Saudi_Arabia_The_Coming_Royal_Succession.pdf.
24. STENSLIE, Sting, *Regime stability in Saudi Arabia: The challenge of succession*. Routledge, London and New York, 2012.
25. TORMEN, David, "10 sordid stories of the Saudi royal family", in *Listverse*, June 23, 2015, URL: <https://listverse.com/2015/06/23/10-sordid-stories-of-the-saudi-royal-family/>
26. ULRICHSEN, Kristian Coates, "Who is Saudi Arabia's New Crown Prince?", in *Washington Post*, June 22, 2017.
27. ZACHARIAS, Diana, "Fundamentals of the Sunni Schools of Law", Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, *ZaöRV*, No. 66, 2006, pp. 491-507, URL: http://www.zaoerv.de/66_2006/66_2006_2_b_491_508.pdf.
28. *Al Jazeera* website, URL: www.aljazeera.com.
29. *Biography.com* Editors website, URL: www.biography.com
30. *IUVM Press* website, URL: <http://iuvmpress.com>.
31. *Oxford Islamic Studies Online* website, URL: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.

WAR FOR WATER

Viorel ORDEANU, Ph.D.

Colonel (r.), Professor, “Titu Maiorescu” University, Bucharest
Senior Researcher, Medical-Military Research Center

Benoni ANDRONIC, Ph.D.

Colonel (r.), Consultant Professor, “Carol I” National Defence University,
Correspondent member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists

Lucia Elena IONESCU, Ph.D.

Biologist, Researcher, Medical-Military Research Center

Abstract: *The role of water is so important in all practical aspects of life, then the need to control water resources is a mandatory condition for mankind, that has and will always lead to conflicts and even war, be it declared or not, for water. Conflicts have been a constant throughout history, as well as the regulations for water access, all these may be shortly named politics of water – hydropolitics.*

Fresh water is a limited natural resource, and the growing demand for this resources may be the cause of conflict escalation and wars, as it is the case for oil. The availability of drinking water per capita is inadequate and insufficient on a global scale. The spread of water on the planet is not equal, considering geographical area, season and historical period, which poses a potential threat for the relations between people, nations, countries and alliances. The history of conflicts for water is old and when the political and diplomatic means fail, wars for water can emerge.

Keywords: *water; hydropolitics; water conflicts; war for water; areas of conflict; survival.*

INTRODUCTION

Water is the major constituent (as volume and mass) of all beings, an average of three quarters of human, and bacterial, bodies being made of water. Water is also the environment in which all biochemical processes sustaining life, happen, and, in absence of water, as the internal body environment all beings shall perish. As such, all beings have their own water resources, while every cell has its own cytoplasmic water environment, including in the case of primitive bacterial cell, to which the structural water bonding various body molecules is added.

1. Water as vulnerability, threat and risk

Water is one of the substances that are essential to life, but also to any activity, may it be industrial, military and so on. On a global scale, the usable water is a *scarce resource* and may lead to conflicts for water. The efforts to regulate access to water led to specific politics emerging, but when the political and diplomatic means fail, *wars for water* may emerge.

Drought and floods are natural catastrophes that can affect communities, populations or countries, with severe consequences: dead, injured, ill, refugees, economic and financial losses, etc. The most terrible caused millions of victims, while *global warming* will increase this risk. The geophysical war involves even unleashing such catastrophes, through influencing rainfalls,

dams' destruction¹, in war or in peace times, as *state terrorism* or *asymmetric warfare*.

The armies and paramilitary groups can terrorize enemy population through threats, may them be real or fake, about stoppage of water supply or about water *poisoning*. As examples from our country: the *scorched earth* tactics in the battles between Romanian rulers and Ottoman army, when the water sources were poisoned on the invaders' way²; during the Revolution of 1989, there was a fake news about drinking water contamination in Bucharest with botulinum toxin, while during the Informal meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs and defence ministers of the European Union of 2019, in Bucharest, there were several news regarding the contamination with ammonium of the main source of water of the city. Public declarations were both alarming and contradictory as there were many voices arguing that the level of contamination hadn't exceeded the thresholds set by the law, as well as officials claiming that the crisis was solved quickly through water hyperchlorination, as immediate measure for *biochemical* decontamination³.

The role of water, in any kind, is so important in all practical domains of life, then one can consider, in good reason, that is one of the essential resources of Planet Earth. Water is necessary from maintaining life to different anthropic, civilian and military activities. Nowadays, water is metaphorically called *the blue gold*.

Regulation and negotiation of access to water constitutes, in a whole, the politics of water – *hydropolitics*. The term was first used by John Waterbury, în 1979.⁴ An accepted definition for hydropolitics is: "*the systematic analysis of interstate conflict and cooperation regarding international water resources*", after Elhance AP (1999)⁵.

Human rights claim that equal access to drinking water is an absolute right, not a privilege. The right for water was especially created to help poor people in the developing countries to have equal access to water and to prevent diseases and death⁶. *Hydropsychology* represents usage of water on micro and individual level, which also influences the behavior towards water consumption.

According to *World Water Reserve*,⁷ the politics for good water management have to include, as measures of prevention against effects of potable water deprivation: education for water quality, holistic effort of the community for hygiene, regulation of water consumption, protection of water quality and distribution points, increasing protection of natural areas, development of emergency response for potential water crisis, creation of water storage systems and hydrologic informing and water quality, that have to be compatible and transferable.

Privatization of water sources, as in privatization of water companies, was frequently contested, due to poor water quality, costs increase and lack of ethics.

¹ Emil Străinu, „Războiul geofizic – Tehnici des modificarea a mediului în scopuri militare”, in *Veghe Patriei*, 23 September 2017, URL: <https://veghepatriei.wordpress.com/2017/09/23/general-dr-emil-strainu-razboiul-geofizic-tehnici-de-modificare-a-mediului-inconjurator-in-scopuri-militare/>, accessed on 10.10.2019.

² Maria Burlă, “Tactica tradițională a pământului parjolit”, in *Doxologia*, URL : <https://doxologia.ro/viata-bisericii/documentar/pierde-o-batalie-nu-inseamna-pierde-razboiul>, accessed on 11.10.2019.

³ Irina Olteanu, “Prima reacție de la Apele Române în scandalul apei din București”, in *Ziare.com*, 31 January 2019, URL: <http://www.ziare.com/social/capitala/prima-reactie-de-la-apele-romane-in-scandalul-apei-din-bucuresti-cantitatea-de-amoniu-s-a-incadrat-in-limitele-legale-1547920>, accessed on 10.10.2019.

⁴ Nicu Pârlog, “Războaiele pentru apă: una dintre marile provocări ale viitorului”, in *Descoperă.ro*, 23.10.2014, URL: <https://www.descoperar.ro/2014/10/23/razboaiele-pentru-apa-una-dintre-marile-provocari-ale-viitorului/>, accessed on 10.10.2019.

⁵ Arun P. Elhance, “Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins”, US Institute of Peace Press, URL: https://bookstore.usip.org/sites/usip/resrcs/chapters/1878379909_otherchap.pdf, accessed on 23.03.2019.

⁶ Peter H. Gleick, *Water Conflict Chronology, The World's Water*, May 2013, URL: <http://worldwater.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ww8-red-water-conflict-chronology-2014.pdf>, accessed on 30.03.2019.

⁷ *World Water Reserve*, URL: <https://worldwaterreserve.com/>, accessed on 09.04.2019.

2. Natural water resources

Water covers almost three quarters of the surface of our planet, but only 1% of all fresh water can be used as drinking water. This represents the equivalent of 0.0026% of the total volume of water. The availability of drinking water per capita is insufficient and insufficient at the level of certain areas⁸. The causes, quantitative and qualitative, are multiple: lack of local sources, demographic pressure, massive consumption activities (agriculture, industry, etc.), environment degradation, water pollution, climate change, etc. The problem is serious and affects also the survival capacity of some human communities.

Drinking water is unevenly spread on the planet land, as in some countries have water in abundance (Canada, Chile, Norway, Russia, Columbia, Peru, Brazil etc.), while other countries do not have enough (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and others)⁹. *UN World Water Development Report from the World Water Assessment Program* estimates that, by year 2023, the available amount of water per planet capita will be reduced by 30%, while 40% of the people will not have enough water for minimal hygiene¹⁰. It is difficult to integrate this realistic prognosis with the Worldwide Health Organization (UN/WHO) objective to improve the population health, under the slogan *Healthcare for all*. At the beginning of 21st Century, more than 2.2 million people die every year because of thirst or contaminated waters, the latter especially with microorganisms¹¹. According to World Health Organization and UNICEF (2000), worldwide, every 15 seconds a child dies because of hydric diseases that could be prevented by water treatment¹². The riparian rights are sustained as well by international diplomacy, while World Bank (Vice President Ismail Serageldin) warned that: “*Many of the wars of the 20th century were about oil, but wars of the 21st century will be about water*”¹³.

Water is a critical resource, with multiple uses: food, hygiene, agriculture, foundry, industry, transport, etc., and with continuously increasing demand. If the surface water (rivers, lakes, etc.) is renewed after rain, the deep water (*fossil water*) is basically not renewable and must be carefully managed. The UN Secretary General declared that “*Access to safe water is a fundamental need and therefore a basic human right. Polluted water threatens physical and social healthcare in the world and is an affront to human dignity*”¹⁴. Some studies consider that

⁸ Margriet Samwel, Aglika Yordanova, „*Calitatea apei potabile*”, in: ***, Planuri de Siguranță a Apei și a Sistemelor Sanitare pentru Comunitățile Rurale. Informații de Bază Necesare Elaborării unui Plan de Siguranță a Apei și a Sistemelor Sanitare. Compendiu, vol B, modulul B1, Women Engage for a Common Future, 2015, URL: <http://www.wecf.eu/download/2015/July/PartB.pdf>, accessed on 12.10.2019.

⁹ ***, “Apa: 71% din suprafața pământului, totuși insuficientă”, 20 March 2009, Parlamentul European, URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20070329STO04903+0+DOC+XML+V0//RO>, accessed on 12.10.2019.

¹⁰ 2015 UN Water Annual International Zaragoza Conference. Water and Sustainable Development: From Vision to Action. 15-17 January 2015. Side Event. Water Footprints Assessment in Support of Sustainable Development, 14 January 2015, URL: https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/waterandsustainabledevelopment2015/side_event_water_footprint_14_01_2015.shtml, accessed on 17.03.2019.

¹¹ Nicholas J Ashbolt, “Microbial Contamination of Drinking Water and Disease Outcomes in Developing Regions”, in *Literature Review in Toxicology*, 198(1-3):229-238, June 2004, URL: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15138046>, accessed on 14.10.2019.

¹² World water quality facts and statistics, World Water Day, 22 March 2010, URL: https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/water_quality_facts_and_stats3.pdf, accessed on 14.10.2019.

¹³ Ismail Serageldin, “Water: conflicts set to arise within as well as between states”, in *Nature*, 2009, Vol. 459, p. 163, URL: <https://www.nature.com/articles/459163b>, accessed on 14.10.2019.

¹⁴ Access to safe water fundamental human need, basic human right, says Secretary-General in message on world water day says, 12 March 2001, URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sgsm7738.doc.htm>, accessed on 25.03.2019.

minimal amount for drinking and hygiene of every person is 20 litres of water per day, i.e. 7.3 cubic meters a year¹⁵. That means that many countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania don't have enough water resources or necessary infrastructure to treat natural water. This situation often leads to sickening, thirst or death.

3. Wars for water

The history of water conflicts is old; *Water Conflict Chronology* 2019 presents 655 wars, terrorist attacks and other conflicts for water, all historically documented around the world, on a period larger than five millenniums, between 3000 BC and 2018¹⁶. Water is essential to life, as well as to any industrial, military or other activity. On a global scale, the usable water is a scarce resource and may determine to conflicts for water. Only 0.4% of the drinkable water is accessible to the nearly 8 billion people of the planet.¹⁷

History presents many cases of water deprivation in order to reduce the fighting capacity of the enemy. *Pacific Institute, Water Conflict Chronology, 2003*¹⁸, counts this type of attacks between 3000 BCE-2003 CE. In the course of time, fresh water has been used as a weapon in war (destroying an enemy's water sources by contamination thereof, putting him in a situation of not being able to use water to secure his population and fighters or forcing him to provide them water of poor quality or insufficient, can cause more victims than using the combat power A/N) or as an instrument of terrorism"¹⁹ and this practice could be continued, as estimated in a report on water security, presented by *U.S. National Intelligence*. Actually, history shows that water has been used in this scope in the last five thousands of years. It is considered that improper water, from quality and quantity points of view, due to poverty, social tensions or inefficient government, could determine the collapse of some states. Speaking about access to clean water, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showed that "problems arising from ensuring access to clean water will only intensify... and that water scarcity could have profound implications for security (individual and collective A/N)... water resources could become a real source of manipulation and increasing instability... Here at the UN, we have to work in our continuing efforts to ensure no child dies of a water-related disease and certainly no war is ever fought over water"²⁰. Also, crisis in water supplies can be taken into consideration for generation of popular riots, with the end goal of overthrow inconvenient governments.

4. Areas with potential conflict for water

Africa: Senegal River can generate conflict between Senegal and Mauritania;²¹ Zambezi

¹⁵ Review evidence on minimum household water security requirements for health protection, Research Division Royal Scientific Society Amman-Jordan October, 2011, p. 5, URL: www.mdgfund.org, accessed on 15.10.2019.

¹⁶ Peter H. Gleick, *Water Conflict Chronology, The World's Water*, URL: <http://worldwater.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ww8-red-water-conflict-chronology-2014.pdf>, accessed on 30.03.2019.

¹⁷ The Study: A summary of integrated water resources management (IWRM) and its potential in the Caribbean, Why is IWRN, In partnership with CARIWIN and McGill University, Montreal, Canada, March 2007, p. 2, URL: https://www.mcgill.ca/cariwin/files/cariwin/IWRM_REPORT_MAR_2007, accessed on 17.10.2019.

¹⁸ *Pacific Institute, Water Conflict Chronology, 2003*, URL: <http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/>, accessed on 17.03.2019.

¹⁹ ***, "Water, a cause for war, in coming decades: US Intelligence", in *Dawn Today's Paper*, 23 March 2012, URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/704832>, accessed on 14.10.2019.

²⁰ Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State United Nations, Remarks Roundtable on Water Security, New York City, September 25, 2012, URL: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/198179.htm>, accessed on 12.10.2019.

²¹ ***, Case no.1, The Senegal-Mauritania conflict, URL: <https://www.oecd.org/countries/mauritania/44650413.pdf>, accessed on 09.10.2019.

River can generate conflict between Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana;²² The aquifers in Sahara Desert can generate conflict between Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger etc.; the Nile River can generate conflict between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as other countries adjacent to Nile: Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya and others (Figure no. 1). Actually, according to some information from Wikileaks, in 2010, Egypt allied with Sudan against Ethiopia and, according to Stratfor, Egyptian army received approval for an aerial base in Sudan with the goal of destruction of hydrotechnical constructions on the Blue Nile, in Ethiopia.²³ In South Africa, there were already some fights over the water wells.



Figure no. 1: Potential conflict areas for water in Africa on the Nile²⁴

America: Columbia River can generate conflict between Canada (that has the largest reserves of fresh water) and USA (that is the largest water consumer); Colorado River, with water used almost completely by USA (sometimes water does not reach Gulf of Mexico), can generate conflict with Mexico, while Senepas River can generate to conflict between Ecuador and Peru.

Asia: In Asia, access to water can generate dissensions, which can be tackled against a broader conflict background. Access to water can indeed be a source of tension, but the range of factors that cause the conflict in the region is far greater.

In 2016, in Yemen, 20 million people were left without water as a consequence of civil war, which lead to a horrible epidemic of cholera that is still present today,²⁵ while the international community fakes an intervention.

The Arabic aquifer system, under the desert, that ensure water for 60 million people, is

²² Patricia Wouters, “*Dreptul Internațional - Facilitarea Cooperării Internaționale privind Apa*”, Parteneriatul Global al Apei. Comitetul Tehnic, Stockholm, Suedia, 2013, pp. 23-24; 34-35, URL: <https://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/toolbox/publications/background-papers/17.-international-law---facilitating-transboundary-water-cooperation-2013-rumanian.pdf>, accessed on 09.10.2019.

²³ Andrei Luca Popescu “Documente Wikileaks, Egipt și Sudan se pregăteau de război, din cauza fluviului Nil”, in *Gândul*, 15 octombrie 2012, URL: <https://www.gandul.info/international/documente-wikileaks-egipt-si-sudan-se-pregateau-de-razboi-din-cauza-fluviului-nil-10222392>, accessed on 08.10.2019.

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ Rick Gladstone, “Cholera, Lurking Symptom of Yemen’s War, Appears to Make Roaring Comeback”, in *The New York Times*, March 27, 2019, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/middleeast/cholera-yemen.html>, accessed on 15.10.2019.

running empty because of intensive agriculture²⁶ and can generate to war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, while Ataturk Dam and the other dams used by Turkey to control Tigris and Euphrates, deprive Syria and Iraq of part of water (sometimes, Tigris does not reach to Persian Gulf), will cause a Turkish-Arabic war for water. The Israel war for water is already half a century old and occupied the Golan heights, not only for strategic defense position, but also because of the rains there that fuel the rivers that bring water to Tiberiada Lake, the main water source of Israel. The Jordan River can generate to conflict between Israel and Jordan.

In Central Asia, the Sar Daria and Amu Daria Rivers are so dried because of cotton irrigations, that no longer flows in Aral Lake (the main water reservoir of the area), which is running dry. In 1997, Uzbekistan sent 130,000 soldiers in Kirghizstan to guard the Toktogul reservoir. The Sar Daria River can generate to conflict between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.²⁷



Figure no. 2: Water resources in Central Asia²⁸

In the Middle East, the Helmand River basin is used for agriculture in Iran and Afghanistan, but the disputes has been successfully mediated by United States.²⁹ The Indus River basin, with a huge subterraneous aquifer, that ensure 85% of drinking water and 60% of irrigations in Indian agriculture, will run dry in less than 20 years and can generate to war between India and Pakistan. The Ganges River can generate conflict between India and Bangladesh.³⁰

In the Far East, the Mekong River can generate conflict between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.

Europe: during World War II, the great powers of the time bombarded each other's dams to provoke damages to adversaries; in the war in former Yugoslavia, NATO bombarded the Serbian water supplies, while the Serbians cut the water for Bosnians; the Tagus (Tajo) and

²⁶ Alan Buis, Janet Wilson, "Study: Third of Big Groundwater Basins in Distress", in NASA, 16 June 2015, URL: <https://www.nasa.gov/jpl/grace/study-third-of-big-groundwater-basins-in-distress>, accessed on 15.10.2019.

²⁷ Ben Makuch, "Is Central Asia on the Verge of a Water War?", in *Vice*, September 28, 2012, URL: <https://www.vice.com/gr/article/ex5kg4/is-central-asia-on-the-verge-of-a-water-war>, accessed on 10.10.2019.

²⁸Ibidem.

²⁹ Fatemeh Aman, "Water Dispute Escalating between Iran and Afghanistan", Atlantic Council, South Asia Center, August 2016, URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Water_Dispute_Escalating_between_Iran_and_Afghanistan_web_0830.pdf, accessed on 03.10.2019.

³⁰ India and Bangladesh Conflict Over the Ganges River - ECC, Platform Library, URL: <https://library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/india-and-bangladesh-conflict-over-ganges-river>, accessed on 03.10.2019.

Duero Rivers can generate conflict between Spain and Portugal.³¹

Towards the end of the 20th Century it was estimated that the next world war will start in Middle East, Indochina or Latin America³² and, as we can see, none of these regions is missing from the presentation of areas with potential for water conflicts.

CONCLUSIONS

The fresh water represents a critical resource for existence of life, from food point of view, but also fundamentally important for hygiene and health insurance, for agriculture, energy supply, industries availability and food processing, being a limited resource and unevenly distributed on the Blue Planet. While the climate changes started to affect more and more the surface and underground waters, through droughts and, subsequently, through reduction in volumes of these resources, a food crisis seems unavoidable as of today. Population increase, growth in standards of living, in context of climate changes, can generate to continuous increase in fresh water demand and, as such, a restriction of access to this resource will make conflicts between nations possible, in order to secure the said resource.

Wars for water, with military and terrorist attacks, existed since ancient times, exist nowadays and will continue to exist, as long as the world countries are not prepared or are not willing to cooperate in finding solutions so that water, so necessary to ensure survival of populations on Earth, will be equitably distributed to them.

In order to ensure water potential to generate conflicts, states and global political organizations through politics, diplomacy, but also through negotiations and corresponding regulations, can find the means for peaceful and equitable solving of water conflicts and for prevention of war for water.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, 2015 UN Water Annual International Zaragoza Conference. Water and Sustainable Development: From Vision to Action. 15-17 January 2015. Side Event. Water Footprints Assessment in Support of Sustainable Development, 14 January 2015, URL: https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/waterandsustainabledevelopment2015/side_event_water_footprint_14_01_2015.shtml.
2. ***, "Apa: 71% din suprafața pamântului, totuși insuficientă", 20 March 2009, Parlamentul European, URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20070329STO04903+0+DOC+XML+V0//RO>. ***, 2015 UN Water Annual International Zaragoza Conference. Water and Sustainable Development: From Vision to Action. 15-17 January 2015. Side Event. Water Footprints Assessment in Support of Sustainable Development, 14 January 2015, URL: https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/waterandsustainabledevelopment2015/side_event_water_footprint_14_01_2015.shtml.
3. ***, "Water, a cause for war, in coming decades: US Intelligence", in Dawn Today's Paper, 23 March 2012, URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/704832>.

³¹ GWP-INBO Handbook tradus final 03.08 2011 – RIOB, URL: <https://www.riob.org/en/file/257477/download?token=1HFbWGb5>, accessed on 04.10.2019.

³² Eric Hobsbawm, "War and Peace in the 20th Century", London Review of Books, Vol. 24 No. 4, 21 February 2002, URL: <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n04/eric-hobsbawm/war-and-peace-in-the-20th-century>, accessed on 04.10.2019.

4. ***, Access to safe water fundamental human need, basic human right, says Secretary-General in message on world water day says, 12 March 2001, URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sgsm7738.doc.htm>.
5. ***, Case no.1, The Senegal-Mauritania conflict, URL: <https://www.oecd.org/countries/mauritania/44650413.pdf>.
6. ***, GWP-INBO Handbook 03.08 2011 – RIOB, URL: <https://www.riob.org/en/file/257477/download?token=1HFbWGb5>.
7. ***, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State United Nations, Remarks Roundtable on Water Security, New York City, September 25, 2012, URL: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/198179.htm>.
8. ***, India and Bangladesh Conflict over the Ganges River - ECC, Platform Library, URL: <https://library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/india-and-bangladesh-conflict-over-ganges-river>.
9. ***, Pacific Institute, Water Conflict Chronology, 2003, URL: <http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list>.
10. ***, Planuri de Siguranță a Apei și a Sistemelor Sanitare pentru Comunitățile Rurale. Informații de Bază Necesare Elaborării unui Plan de Siguranță a Apei și a Sistemelor Sanitare. Compendiu, vol B, modulul B1, Women Engage for a Common Future, 2015, URL: <http://www.wecf.eu/download/2015/July/PartB.pdf>
11. ***, Review evidence on minimum household water security requirements for health protection, Research Division Royal Scientific Society Amman-Jordan October, 2011, URL: www.mdgfund.org.
12. ***, Study: A summary of integrated water resources management (IWRM) and its potential in the Caribbean, Why is IWRN, In partnership with CARIWIN and McGill University, Montreal, Canada, March 2007, URL: https://www.mcgill.ca/cariwin/files/cariwin/IWRM_REPORT_MAR2007.
13. ***, World water quality facts and statistics, World Water Day, 22 March 2010, URL: https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/water_quality_facts_and_stats3.pdf.
14. ***, World Water Reserve, URL: <https://worldwaterreserve.com>.
15. AMAN, Fatemeh, "Water Dispute Escalating between Iran and Afghanistan", Atlantic Council, South Asia Center, August 2016, URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Water_Dispute_Escalating_between_Iran_and_Afghanistan_web_0830.pdf.
16. Ashbolt, Nicholas J., "Microbial Contamination of Drinking Water and Disease Outcomes in Developing Regions", in Literature Review in Toxicology, 198(1-3):229-238, June 2004, URL: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15138046>.
17. BUIS, Alan; Wilson, Janet, "Study: Third of Big Groundwater Basins in Distress", in NASA, 16 June 2015, URL: <https://www.nasa.gov/jpl/grace/study-third-of-big-groundwater-basins-in-distress>.
18. BURLĂ, Maria, "Tactica tradițională a pământului parjolit", in Doxologia, URL: <https://doxologia.ro/viata-bisericii/documentar/pierde-o-batalie-nu-inseamna-pierde-razboiul>.
19. ELHANCE, Arun P., "Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins", US Institute of Peace Press, URL: https://bookstore.usip.org/sites/usip/resrcs/chapters/1878379909_otherchap.pdf.
20. GLADSTONE, Rick, "Cholera, Lurking Symptom of Yemen's War, Appears to Make Roaring Comeback", in The New York Times, March 27, 2019, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/middleeast/cholera-yemen.html>.

21. GLEICK, Peter H., Water Conflict Chronology, The World's Water, May 2013, URL: <http://worldwater.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ww8-red-water-conflict-chronology-2014.pdf>
22. GLEICK, Peter H., Water Conflict Chronology, The World's Water, URL: <http://worldwater.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ww8-red-water-conflict-chronology-2014.pdf>.
23. HOBBSAWM, Eric, "War and Peace in the 20th Century", London Review of Books, Vol. 24 No. 4, 21 February 2002, URL: <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n04/eric-hobsbawm/war-and-peace-in-the-20th-century>.
24. MAKUCH, Ben, "Is Central Asia on the Verge of a Water War?", in Vice, September 28, 2012, URL: <https://www.vice.com/gr/article/ex5kg4/is-central-asia-on-the-verge-of-a-water-war>.
25. OLTEANU, Irina, "Prima reacție de la Apele Române în scandalul apei din București", in Ziare.com, 31 January 2019, URL: <http://www.ziare.com/social/capitala/prima-reactie-de-la-apele-romane-in-scandalul-apei-din-bucuresti-cantitatea-de-amoniu-s-a-incadrat-in-limitele-legale-1547920>.
26. PÂRLOG, Nicu, "Războaiele pentru apă: una dintre marile provocări ale viitorului", in Descoperă.ro, 23.10.2014, URL: [Războaiele pentru apă: una dintre marile provocări ale viitorului](http://descoperia.ro/2014/10/23/razboaiele-pentru-apa-una-dintre-marile-provocari-ale-viitorului/).
27. POPESCU, Andrei Luca, "Documente Wikileaks, Egipt și Sudan se pregăteau de război, din cauza fluviului Nil", in Gândul, 15 octombrie 2012, URL: <https://www.gandul.info/international/documente-wikileaks-egipt-si-sudan-se-pregateau-de-razboi-din-cauza-fluviului-nil-10222392>.
28. SERAGELDIN, Ismail, "Water: conflicts set to arise within as well as between states", in Nature, 2009, Vol. 459, URL: <https://www.nature.com/articles/459163b>.
29. STRĂINU, Emil, „Războiul geofizic – Tehnici des modificarea a mediului în scopuri militare”, in Veghe Patriei, 23 September 2017, URL: <https://veghepatriei.wordpress.com/2017/09/23/general-dr-emil-strainu-razboiul-geofizic-tehnici-de-modificare-a-mediului-inconjurator-in-scopuri-militare/>.
30. WOUTERS, Patricia, "Dreptul Internațional - Facilitarea Cooperării Internaționale privind Apa", Parteneriatul Global al Apei. Comitetul Tehnic, Stockholm, Suedia, 2013, URL: <https://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/toolbox/publications/background-papers/17.-international-law---facilitating-transboundary-water-cooperation-2013-rumanian.pdf>.

CROSS BORDER CRIME IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

Diana-Gabriela POHAȚĂ, Ph.D.

Anti-Fraud Specialist, ANAF-PTB, Bucharest, Romania

Email: dianagabriela.cojocar@yaho.ro

Abstract: *In the context of globalization, transnational organized crime is gaining huge proportions, especially in recent years. Trade abundance, poor cooperation, and high levels of poverty lead inevitably to cross-border crime. Drug trafficking is experiencing a huge increase all across Central and Eastern Europe. The present article aims to identify the current situation of this scourge in Romania and other states of the world.*

Keywords: *cooperation; corruption; transnational organized crime; drug trafficking; trafficking in human beings; poverty.*

INTRODUCTION

In this article we aim to observe the evolution of cross-border crime, represented by organized crime, drug trafficking and human trafficking, as well as the presence of this phenomenon in Romania and in other states of the world. At the same time, we will present a series of statistical data from 2018 regarding the two national crimes.

The table below captures the most relevant studies regarding tax evasion in other states. The author’s purpose was to make a summary that would include the most recent tax evasion research.

Author(s)	Period	Sample	Methodology	Findings
Lavorgna, A. (2015)	2011-2013	Semi-structured interviews with law enforcement officials and recognized experts from Italy, UK, USA and Holland; court transcripts; police records; media news.	Interview, survey	The Internet has been used for various criminal activities traditionally associated with the rhetoric of organized crime and cross-border trafficking activities.
Rashad, S. (2019)	2014-2018	State Department Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018	Observation method, descriptive, explanatory	Child trafficking in Egypt is a serious phenomenon, which comes from social, economic and cultural reasons. Even though the Egyptian government is making huge efforts to combat this crime, all attempts have been shown to be insufficient due to lack of coordination between stakeholders and low funds, in addition to the poor services provided to victims.
Saner, R. , Yiu, L. și Rush, L. (2018)	2012-2017	54 surveys and interviews with more than 71,000 people from 48 countries about their immediate experiences and their families with forced labor and forced marriage	Surveys and interviews; Comparative analysis based on laws, institutional agreements, treaties	Complications of traffic monitoring are observed in both national and global contexts. At the same time, this phenomenon violates human rights. Crime is the effect of poverty, injustice, poor development and weak government institutions
Soudijn, M. (2016)	2012	46 interviews	Interview, survey	First, cash plays a significant role; secondly, it is found that the proceeds of crime are moved to other jurisdictions, thirdly, money laundering actually appears in a much simpler form than it is presented in theory

Table no. 1: Studies regarding tax evasion

Source: Author’s work based on literature review

Human trafficking

Saner et al. (2018)¹ define human trafficking through the following actions: forced labor, forced marriage, forced begging, removal of organs, sale of children and sexual exploitation. They say that most victims come from underdeveloped countries and that poverty, migration and unemployment are key factors in this scourge. Rashad (2019)² discusses human trafficking in Egypt and believes that this phenomenon is due to the financial, civic and cultural situation of a state. It underlines the idea that human trafficking exists primarily in the poorer states of the world. Therefore, the latest studies on human trafficking identified poverty as the main cause of human trafficking.

Drug trafficking

Snapp and Valderrabano (2018)³ discuss the drug policy of the US. They found that there will be no major change in the phenomenon in the immediate period. Soudjin (2016)⁴ considers that the money from these offenses are moved to other jurisdictions, in order to avoid tax and legal laws. In order to realize a concrete situation of this phenomenon, it is important to analyze the situation of the convictions regarding drug trafficking. Summers and Pływaczewski (2012)⁵ discuss the dynamics of drug use in Poland. They concluded that police reforms and legislative changes led to substantial increase in the number of arrests for drug trafficking. Another important aspect of drug trafficking is the identification of the persons involved. Paoli and Reuter (2008)⁶ concluded that Turkish and Albanian groups control the import and retail of heroin, and Colombian groups control the import and market of cocaine. Therefore, the latest studies on drug trafficking did not identify a decrease in this phenomenon, as the profits are huge.

The general conclusion of our work converges on the idea that it is imperative to make visible progress in the fight against cross-border crime, a fact recognized by national organizations.

1. Globalization at the national level

Globalization, in fact, the opening of borders, has led to the creation of new jobs for both Romanians living in the country and for those who have established in other states. The consumers were able to obtain food, clothing or medicines from other states much more advantageous prices and at a much higher quality than the products in our country. Not least the globalization has increased the degree of culture among the population and the contribution of know-how brought from developed countries.

Thus, the access to tourism, as well as openness to the culture, traditions and customs of the more developed countries, played an essential role in post-December Romania. During this period, some entrepreneurs visited more developed countries, studied businesses that had

¹ Saner, R., Yiu, L. and Rush, L. (2018), "The measuring and monitoring of human trafficking", *Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 94-106.

² Suzi Mohamed Rashad, "Child trafficking crime and means of fighting it: Egypt as a case study", in *Review of Economics and Political Science*, 19 June 2019, URL: <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-03-2019-0029/full/html>, accessed on 2 August 2019.

³ Z. Snapp, J. Valderrábano, "United States Drug Policy: Flexible Prohibition and Regulation", in A. Klein and B. Stothard (Eds.) *Collapse of the Global Order on Drugs: From UNGASS 2016 to Review 2019*, Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018, pp. 251-268.

⁴ M. Soudijn, "Rethinking money laundering and drug trafficking", in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 19 No. 3, 2016, pp. 298-310.

⁵ D. Summers and E. Pływaczewski, "The Polish context", in *Policing: An International Journal*, Vol. 35 No. 2, 2012, pp. 231-252.

⁶ L. Paoli, P. Reuter, "Drug trafficking and ethnic minorities in Western Europe", in *European Journal of Criminology*, 5(1), 2008, pp. 13-37.

huge profits abroad, on various levels of activity and put them into practice in our country. Another benefit was the access of young people to top universities abroad.

A disadvantage for Romania in the face of globalization is the migration of the intellectuals to more developed areas and the decrease of the level of education and implicitly the standard of living. Of course, like any other economic phenomenon, globalization incorporates both elements beneficial to the Romanian society, as well as aspects that are not beneficial⁷ for the growth of the economy.

The opening of the borders has made possible the globalization and manifestation of phenomena extremely harmful to the Romanian society. One of these is organized crime, a phenomenon that we will analyze in an attempt to find new ways to prevent and counteract it.

2. Cross border crime in Romania

Cross-border crime is an extremely serious problem, both for Romania, and also for all the states involved⁸. The specialists, who have studied the issue, believe that cross-border crime appeared in the earliest times, being an easy mean of rapid enrichment. This crime also existed in Romania long before the transition period, but we can say that the period after this period favored the emergence and development, in essence, of organized crime in our countries. For example, the geographical position of our country is an aspect for which cross-border crime has been growing. After 1989, cross-border crime began to develop as criminal groups migrated to the West, and there they created all kinds of networks with foreign citizens.

In the following, we present the main causes, effects and features of the phenomenon at the level of the 21st century, identified following the research carried out. At the same time, we are trying to provide viable solutions to prevent and combat cross-border crime.

The causes of cross-border crime: poverty; the strong desire for enrichment (greed); the decline of morality, of the Romanian society, in general; the absence of clear legislation, numerous legislative gaps; bureaucracy.

The effects of cross-border crime: the enrichment of a category of individuals (huge profits); the loss of human life; the decline of society; it is no longer focused by ethical aspects; affects the credibility and competitiveness of the state; affects the sustainable development of the state, since the enrichment is carried out by illegal means; long investigations and complex schemes for catching criminals.

The features of cross-border crime are countless and, for sure, some we will never be able to decipher. However, we try to remember the most suggestive ones, as follows:

- listening to the orders, which are required, according to the hierarchy;
- a well-established multinational structure, in which each member knows his/her duties;

⁷ "Globalization offers to the criminal groups a whole set of facilities that allows them to grow unabatedly. In our opinion, the most important factor that favors the extension of business criminality is the speculation of the gaps in the legislative system worldwide. To this it adds the excessive bureaucracy and formalism in achieving judicial cooperation between law enforcement authorities, as well as insufficient training of police and other judicial structures to effectively respond to the phenomenon." Source: Costică Voicu, Adriana Camelia Voicu, Ioan Geamănu, *Criminalitatea organizată în domeniul afacerilor*, Editura "Pildner & Pildner", Târgoviște, 2006, pp. 45-46.

⁸ "Besides the effect of diminishing and eroding the budgetary revenues, organized crime has negative consequences on the economy and social life. Changes the attitudes and behaviors of citizens in relation to the state, increasing the risks of tax systems, decreasing their efficiency, while ensuring the conditions of financial instability in many countries of the world" Source: Vasile Bîrle, *Frauda fiscală*, Teora Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 57.

- an extremely well-organized structure (kinship, friendship, father-to-son relationships);
 - clear punishments for treason (briefings towards the investigation bodies);
 - the ability to create complex work schedules;
 - unwritten code of silence;
 - permanent availability for colligation, regardless of personal situations;
 - the connections are made through intermediaries in such a cross-border colligation;
 - not accepting in group the persons who have degrees of kinship with the investigation and criminal prosecution bodies;
 - old political connections (for protection) - corruption;
 - the multitude of people involved (national and international);
 - dividing by regions and segments of activity;
- Viable solutions for prevention and combating cross-border crime:*
- bringing / training new professionals, on specific fields of activity (drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling);
 - increased inter-institutional cooperation;
 - common databases, at international level, regarding mafia groups and the ongoing monitoring of these criminals.

Of course, in the fight against cross-border organized crime, a number of European agencies for the investigation, prosecution and settlement of organized crime crimes have joined, of which the most important are: *EUROPOL*⁹, *CEPOL*¹⁰ and *EUROJUST*¹¹.

2.1 Organized crime

In a broad sense, organized crime encompasses much more than a group of criminals, from the same continent or from different continents, which produce a series of illegalities to make huge profits. The amounts from organized crime are extremely high, and some of these earnings are “washed out” to acquire legal forms (investments in construction, for example). Criminals are using methods adapted to the new times for drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, trafficking of counterfeit coins. Also, in the area of organized crime there is talk about blackmail, protection charges, kidnappings, including assassinations carried out on order.

It is unanimously known that the purpose of setting up a trading company is to produce maximum profit with minimum effort. As well as, in the case of organized crime, the main purpose of the leader of such a group is the monetary gain.

It is important to add that these groups also have a number of expenses, similar to a company manager. The difference between the two examples is that the second activity causes crimes, damages, profit offenses. Another aspect is the secret with which these people and all those paid on the criminal chain work to do this. In the case of the first example, the

⁹ This agency operates at European Union level and investigates cases committed by the citizens of Europe, as well as those who are not citizens of the European Union but commit crimes that fall within the scope of Europol. At present, Europol is investigating 5,000 criminal groups, where citizens from different states, meaning 180 nationalities, are involved. It is important to add that this Agency has an impressive database (data collected from the media, TV, notifications of people, notifications from external sources), databases, which greatly helps investigations.

¹⁰ In particular, it deals with the formation and training of European authorities in the fight against cross-border organized crime.

¹¹ The main activity of EUROJUST is the assistance offered to the competent authorities of the Member States, when they face serious and cross-border organized crimes, such as: terrorism, human trafficking, illegal smuggling of immigrants, drug trafficking, sexual exploitation of women and children, computer crime, online child abuse, fraud and money laundering, counterfeiting, environmental crime.

entrepreneur¹² pays taxes and fees to the state to which he belongs, while these criminals spend money from the state, first of all, in the research and prosecution phases (the state pays everyone involved: police, prosecutors, judges, secret services), as well as in the final stages (of catching the offenders), as the state pays them the detention period, the ex-officio lawyer and all the post-acquittal actions.

If from an economic agent the state has to gain jobs, taxes, which, in essence, it contributes to a sustainable growth of the state, in case of catching the heads of an economic crime group the state has a huge profit, because the crimes of human and economic nature, of this type, cause enormous damage, for any market economy.

However, these networks continue to appear and expand their domain of activity and each time they find new and new ways to adapt young market economies, which leads us to think of more laborious and much more complex schemes. It is well known that these groups exist and are transmitted from generation to generation, along with fraud schemes and the entire transactional chain.

They do not consider any consequences, they are only interested in accumulating huge profits, to meet their personal and family's needs. They have no civic spirit, interest in the state and society, moral values. They are a combination of all the harmful elements of society.

2.2 Drug trafficking

Since 1995, drug trafficking in Romania has been frequently discussed. If we refer to drug use, in our country¹³, there was also the communist period. However, unlike today, before 1989, the drug use existed, mainly in the high circles of the Romanian society from that era, and the predominance of consumption was the luxury drug, namely cocaine¹⁴. After this period of the desire for money, numerous traffickers appeared.

Romania has proved to be one of the countries with the most carriers¹⁵ in the European Union. For the sum of 1,000 – 2,000 euros for a drug transport South America – Europe, some Romanians choose to practice this "job". Named in the specialty literature as "carriers", because they are not aware of the dangers to which they are exposed and do not know the effects of this phenomenon, some Romanians, they are attracted by quick winnings and choose this path of enrichment by illegal means.

Drug traffickers choose their carriers that meet at least a few conditions: must have a knowledge of a foreign language, have an above average intelligence and not be very well

¹² "Transnational criminal organizations, which some experts characterize as a mixture of corporations and crime, are different from those that carry out legal business due to the way they gain access to the market. While legal organizations can negotiate for permission to conduct operations in a foreign territory, criminal organizations use techniques to evade legal obligations. Usually, they operate from a secure base in their own country and travel abroad to obtain higher incomes. In this way, the phenomenon of localized crime can acquire an important transnational dimension". For details see: Petru Albu, *Crima organizată în perioada de tranziție – O amenințare majoră la adresa securității internaționale*, The Publishing house of the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 35.

¹³ "In recent years, Romania has become a country where drugs are stored, and even a center for the transformation of opium and morphine into heroin, as demonstrated by the large catches of chemical precursors. Finally, Romania represents a real basis for several criminal organizations, especially for the French, Turkish and Kurdish gangs." Source: George-Marius Țical, *Crima organizată și traficul de droguri*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, Bucharest, 2008, p. 84.

¹⁴ "The intensification of drug trafficking in Romania is a reality that cannot be ignored. The increasing number of traffickers discovered and the appreciable quantities of drugs confiscated highlight the tendency to amplify the phenomenon. The sums of money resulting from the commercialization of drugs are used for the purchase of valuable goods or are invested in commercial affairs on the Romanian territory." Costică Voicu, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

¹⁵ "In general, the leaders of drug trafficking networks (suppliers and beneficiaries) are outside the territory of Romania, in our country being found (arrested) couriers and freight attendants." Valeriu Bujor, Octavian Pop, *Aplicații criminologice privind crima organizată*, Mirton Publishing house, Timișoara, 2003, p. 42.

informed. Usually, Romanians are preferred because they are cheaper, they do not have very high claims, they do not ask many questions and because of their quality as European citizens can travel almost anywhere. What these people, who become carriers, forget is the enormous risks to which they submit.

As a result of these acts, several Romanians are load in prisons from in the USA, the Middle East and Europe for committing drug trafficking acts. Sometimes, drug shipments are made by swallowing the quantity transported, which can lead to the death of the Romanian trafficker. In 2012¹⁶, a Romanian trafficker, after absorbing 50 packages of cocaine exploded during transport, which led to his death. Therefore, most of the times, Romanian traffickers risk their health and freedom paying for these acts, even with one's own life. Sometimes, even drug traffickers denounce their carriers because they are no longer useful to the group, or because they no longer want to pay them and send them intentionally to areas where drug trafficking is punishable by death¹⁷.

“It is painful that Romania has transformed from a transit country into a big drug user, with a major impact on the young generation who, due to poverty and lack of perspective, generated by the same lack of jobs, finds the refuge in the illusory world of drugs.”¹⁸ From a statistical point of view, at the level of 2018, Romania has recorded huge quotas on drug use. From the total population of 22.194.000 people, it is assumed that drug addicts are 46.000, of which 5.000 are declared. So, with their consent or involuntarily by their desire (since they are already dependent and are no longer fully aware of their acts), all these people fund organized cross-border crime.




Figure no. 1: Romania’s analysis of offenses such as trafficking and illicit drug use and the number of persons sent to trial, 2009-2018¹⁹

According to Figure no. 1, it can be observed that most drug trafficking offenses were committed in 2013, when more than 25.000 people were sent to trial. At the same time, it is noted that, after 2014, both the number of persons sent to trial and the crimes of this type are decreasing, which means a diminution of the whole phenomenon, but which is still extremely present on the Romanian territory.

According to the *Report on the activity carried out by the Public Ministry in 2018*, “during 2018, of the 16,832 cases to be solved, of which 9,033 newly registered cases, 6,407

¹⁶ ***, „Un român, cărauş de droguri, mort după ce o capsulă de cocaină i-a explodat în stomac”, in Cuget Liber, 24 November 2012, URL: <https://www.cugetliber.ro/stiri-eveniment-un-roman-caraus-de-droguri-mort-dupa-ce-o-capsula-de-cocaina-i-a-explodat-in-stomac-155148> accessed on: 08.10.2019.

¹⁷ In Malaysia, a country in Southeast Asia, drug trafficking is punishable by capital punishment, i.e. death regardless of the nationality of the offender and the quantity transported.

¹⁸ Vasile Fulga, *Crima organizată și corupția – Elemente de suport vital pentru organizațiile teroriste*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, Bucharest, 2008, p. 55.

¹⁹ Source: Own processing according to the data published in the Report on the activity carried out by the Public Ministry in 2018, p. 133, URL: http://www.mpublic.ro/sites/default/files/PDF/raport_activitate_2018.pdf, accessed on 19.08.2019.

cases were solved, compared to 4,064 in 2017. They were solved by indictment and agreement for the acknowledgment of guilt 1,017 cases, compared to 904 in 2017, with 1,785 defendants sent to court, compared to 1,757 in 2017, of which 719 defendants arrested preventively sent to court, compared to 637 in 2017".²⁰

2.3 Human trafficking

The issue of human trafficking is extremely serious for Romania, both during the communist period, and in the post-communist period. The figures for this crime are increasingly rising from day to day, which means that this illegality will never end soon or maybe never will. The main purpose of human trafficking is the strong desire of some individuals to become rich.

Human trafficking²¹ is used by criminals either for prostitution networks, for the sale of organs or for begging, and all the money earned from these operations they are, "black money", which does not have a clear origin. By studying this phenomenon, we can think about, including the fact that, these amounts of money finance electoral campaigns, foundations or associations, in the political²² background, or even terrorist organizations. There is very little talk about such situations, because there is not much data on these phenomena so present in society.

"So, an incompetent legislative framework, the deficiencies in the economic, social and political life doubled by the favorable international conjuncture, led to the creation of a general framework permissive for the development of human trafficking, pimping, and prostitution, all due to poverty, chaos, excessive freedom and demagogu"²³.




Figure no. 2: Romania's analysis of crimes such as pimping, child trafficking and human trafficking, 2009-2018²⁴

According to Figure no. 2, it can be observed that most crimes, with regard to human trafficking, were committed in 2013. At the same time, it is found that, after 2014, this crime is

²⁰ The report on the activity carried out by the Public Ministry in 2018, URL: http://www.mpublic.ro/sites/default/files/PDF/raport_activitate_2018.pdf, accessed on 19.08.2019.

²¹ "Trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation is the most frequent and important form of trafficking, with a rapid rate of development, because it brings the greatest profits to traffickers, and is often expressed by the idea that women and girls are more easily transportable than a certain amount of cocaine or heroin, and a woman can be sold and resold several times, while drugs held on a woman are a source of safe and long-term income." For details see: Florea Pasca, *Combaterea fenomenului infracțional de trafic de ființe umane, Vol. II Modalități de traficare a persoanelor și fenomenului traficului ilicit de persoane în România*, Sitech Publishing house, Craiova, 2009, p. 29.

²² "Life has shown that all the political parties in the world have, through more or less legal means, supported various fields, certain interest groups, by providing their financial resources to the political campaigns. The Romanian political formations are no exception." Source: Valeriu Bujor, Octavian Pop, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 75.

²³ Luminița Arondescu, *Crima organizată și problema traficului de persoane în România post-comunistă*, Argonaut Publishinghouse, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 40.

²⁴ Source: Own processing according to the data published in the Report on the activity carried out by the Public Ministry in 2018, pp. 128, URL: http://www.mpublic.ro/sites/default/files/PDF/raport_activitate_2018.pdf, accessed on 19.08.2019.

decreasing, which means a reduction of this phenomenon. Another notable aspect which can be seen from the graph is that both the trafficking of persons and the trafficking of minors, during 2010-2013, registered huge proportions, which confirms that this phenomenon is quite present in the Romanian society.

According to the *Report on the activity carried out by the Public Ministry in 2018*, “in 2018, out of the 1,816 cases to be solved having as object crimes of human trafficking, out of which 695 newly registered cases, 601 cases were solved, compared to 532 in 2017. A number of 118 cases have been settled through the indictment and agreements for the recognition of guilt, compared with 132 in 2017, with 400 defendants sent to court, compared with 451 defendants in 2017, of which 209 defendants were preventively arrested, compared to 249 in 2017. The number of victims trafficked for exploitation was 312, compared to 609 in 2017, out of which 139 minors, compared to 225 minor victims in the previous year”²⁵.

3. Actions and strategies to prevent and combat cross-border crime

On October 13, 2015, GD no. 779/2015 on the National Strategy for Public Order and Safety 2015-2020. It contains an action plan with the main objective of preventing and combating cross-border crime and improving cooperation in the field.

The main directions of action established in the framework of the *National Strategy for Public Order and Safety 2015-2020* are²⁶:

- 1) Extension and intensification of international cooperation and participation of structures with responsibilities in the field of serious crime and organized within the policies of the European Union;
- 2) Strengthening the capacity to fight against cross-border crime;
- 3) Develop legal instruments based on mutual recognition for facilitating criminal investigations and joint operations, both with the European Union and third countries;
- 4) Achieving the interoperability of the different information / information systems used by the structures of the Member States with tasks in the field, including in the common operations;
- 5) Continue training the staff in the field of cooperation with other European Union states and the use of European instruments.

Romania is trying to adopt concrete measures in this area and strategies with the help of public institutions such as: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Information and Security Service, High Court of Cassation and Justice and wants to implement them in order to achieve their objective, respectively to fight organized crime.

In Europe, the phenomenon of organized crime is extremely present. As can be seen in table 1.3, cross-border crime ranks 4th in the European Union, according to a study conducted by EUROJUST in 2018. Also, the drug trafficking ranks 3rd and human trafficking ranks 4th in the ranking below.

²⁵ Report on the activity carried out by the Public Ministry in 2018, URL: http://www.mpublic.ro/sites/default/files/PDF/report_activitate_2018.pdf, accessed on 19.08.2019.

²⁶ GD no. 779/2015 for the approval of the National Strategy for Public Order and Public Safety 2015-2020.




Figure no. 3: Analysis of organized crime in the European Union, according to EUROJUST, period 2017-2018²⁷

In a recent study, the Council of Europe²⁸ proposes a series of recommendations for combating this scourge, including:

- setting up an entity to fight cross-border crime;
- involvement of civil society and protection of victims;
- common conventions and strategies for all the states involved;
- encouraging international cooperation.

Organized crime remains a major problem and, at the same time, a priority on the security agenda of all the states facing this phenomenon. Therefore, both nationally and internationally, a number of concrete measures have been put in place to prevent and combat organized crime, human trafficking, drug trafficking and more.

CONCLUSIONS

The present study wanted to show how present in Romania and other criminal states such as: organized crime, drug trafficking and human trafficking are present. Cross-border organized crime networks have considerable monetary benefits which could not be provided from legal sources. Therefore, given that the financial revenues are huge and the expenses are significant, it is an illusion to believe that the phenomenon of cross-border organized crime will be stopped, as this virus of society economy is in a continuous dynamics.

The present paper has analyzed the crime regarding human trafficking, showing that poverty has been shown to be one of the main causes of this phenomenon. At the same time, it has been found that the number of crimes involving human trafficking is of concern for both Romania and other states. Also, drug trafficking remains an extremely present phenomenon due to the huge gains. However, what remains to be done is that practitioners and theorists have to fight against this scourge and punish all those who commit such acts. As long as this is going to happen, this phenomenon will grow ever lower, which means small steps in prevention and combating cross-border organized crime groups.

²⁷ Source: Own processing according to the data published in the Report on the activity carried out by EUROJUST in 2018, p. 16, URL: http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202018/AR2018_EN.pdf; accessed on: 19.08.2019.

²⁸ White Paper on Transnational Organized Crime, Analysis by the Council of Europe, URL: <https://rm.coe.int/carta-alba-a-criminalitatii-organ-organized-transnational/168070ab40>, accessed on 20.08.2019.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Plan for the years 2018-2019 regarding the implementation of the National Strategy for the prevention and fight against crime organized for the years 2011-2019.
2. ***, Report on the activity carried out by EUROJUST in 2018, URL: http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202018/AR2018_EN.pdf.
3. ***, Report on the activity carried out by the Public Ministry in 2018, URL: http://www.mpublic.ro/sites/default/files/PDF/raport_activitate_2018.pdf.
4. ***, White Paper on Transnational Organized Crime, Analysis by the Council of Europe, URL: <https://rm.coe.int/carta-alba-a-criminalitatii-organorganizat-transnational/168070ab40>.
5. ALBU, Petru, *Crima organizată în perioada de tranziție – O amenințare majoră la adresa securității internaționale*, the Publishing house of the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, Bucharest, 2007.
6. ARONDESCU, Luminița, *Crima organizată și problema traficului de persoane în România post-comunistă*, Argonaut Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2010.
7. BEARE, M., “North America: A Perspective on the Globalisation of Organised Crime”, in *Journal of Financial Crime*, Vol. 6 No. 1, 1998.
8. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, D. and NOUGIER, M. (2018), “Measuring the ‘World Drug Problem’: 2019 and Beyond”, in: KLEIN, A. and STOTHARD, B. (Eds.), *Collapse of the Global Order on Drugs: From UNGASS 2016 to Review 2019*, Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018.
9. BUJOR, Valeriu; POP, Octavian, *Aplicații criminologice privind crima organizată*, Mirton Publishing House, Timișoara, 2003.
10. FULGA, Vasile, *Crima organizată și corupția – Elemente de suport vital pentru organizațiile teroriste*, „Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008.
11. LAVORGNA, A., “Organised crime goes online: realities and challenges”, in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 18 No. 2, 2015.
12. PAOLI, L., & REUTER, P., “Drug trafficking and ethnic minorities in Western Europe”, in *European Journal of Criminology*, 5(1), 2008.
13. PASCA, Florea, *Combaterea fenomenului infracțional de trafic de ființe umane, Vol. II Modalități de traficare a persoanelor și fenomenului traficului ilicit de persoane în România*, Sitech Publishing House, Craiova, 2009.
14. RASHAD, S., “Child trafficking crime and means of fighting it: Egypt as a case study”, in *Review of Economics and Political Science*, 19 June 2019, URL: <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-03-2019-0029/full/html>.
15. RĂPAN, Florian; BIBIRIȚĂ, Marian Claudiu, *Managementul organizațiilor de securitate*, Pro Universitaria Publishinh House, Bucharest, 2014.
16. Saner, R.; YIU, L. and RUSH, L. (2018), “The measuring and monitoring of human trafficking”, in *Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 21 No. 2, 2018.
17. SNAPP, Z. and VALDERRÁBANO, J., “United States Drug Policy: Flexible Prohibition and Regulation”, in: KLEIN, A. and STOTHARD, B. (Eds.) *Collapse of the Global Order on Drugs: From UNGASS 2016 to Review 2019*, Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018.
18. SOUDIJN, M., “Rethinking money laundering and drug trafficking”, in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 19 No. 3, 2016.
19. STIGLITZ, Joseph E., *Globalizarea. Speranțe și deziluzii*, Economică Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003.

20. SUMMERS, D. and PŁYWACZEWSKI, E., "The Polish context", in *Policing: An International Journal*, Vol. 35 No. 2, 2012.
21. ȚICAL, George-Marius, *Crima organizată și traficul de droguri*, Editura „Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei”, Bucharest, 2008.
22. VOICU, Costică *Banii murdari și crima organizată*, Artprint Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995.
23. VOICU, Costică; VOICU, Adriana Camelia; GEAMĂNU, Ioan, *Criminalitatea organizată în domeniul afacerilor*, Pildner & Pildner Publishing House, Târgoviște, 2006.

THE VULNERABILITIES OF PUBLIC POLICIES – TAX EVASION

Diana-Gabriela POHAȚĂ, Ph.D.

Anti-Fraud Specialist, ANAF-PTB, Bucharest, Romania

Email: dianagabriela.cojocar@yahoo.ro

Abstract: *The public policy, in particular, fiscal policy and fiscal legislation of a state, has an important role for today's entire society. The level of tax evasion increases considerably, in Romania, from one year to another, given that the collection of taxes is one of the lowest rates in the European Union. For this reason, public policy on these threats must be clear and concise, as well as sanctions in the area of tax evasion.*

Keywords: *tax evasion; tax fraud; taxes; fiscal legislation; public policy; vulnerabilities.*

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this article is to find out where the phenomenon is located, in 2019, in Romania. Thus, I will try to identify, what are the inadequate measures, regarding public policies, in particular the fiscal policy, given that the collection of taxes at national level is the lowest indicator in the European Union. In my opinion, the level of tax evasion is extremely difficult to quantify, and the data on this subject are limited.

Khlif and Achek (2015)¹ came to the idea that measuring the phenomenon of evasion remains a difficult issue. To estimate this phenomenon the two authors identify a series of variables: demographic, cultural and behavioral, legal, institutional and economic. I believe that, if we refer to tax evasion, we can bring into question the fiscal morale and the public's awareness of this phenomenon. Payment of taxes and fees is an obligation established by the Constitution, however fiscal compliance in Romania seems to remain a utopia. Analyzing the phenomenon in other states, as in the case of Russia, Alm et al., (2016)² identified a direct relationship between social norms and fiscal compliance. The results of the study conducted in Russia showed that trust in state institutions positively influences fiscal morale. From my point of view, non-payment of taxes and fees has an immediate effect on the general welfare of a country. Compin (2015)³ also analyzes this idea, studying the situation in France. He is of the opinion that unpaid taxes and fees, which result from undeclared work, tax evasion on VAT or carousel fraud represent a serious loss to the state's revenues or local budgets. The biggest evasion is found in the case of (value added tax) VAT. Wilks and Soussa (2019)⁴ focused their study on methods of combating the evasion of VAT in Portugal and concluded that the request for invoices with tax identification number would significantly reduce this form of evasion. I believe that for practitioners and theorists in the field this phenomenon must be pursued, permanently, since inefficient control can lead to economic instability, an enrichment of the criminals and a depletion of the population.

¹ H. Khlif, I. Achek, "The determinants of tax evasion: a literature review", in *International Journal of Law and Management*, Vol. 57 No. 5, 2015, pp. 486-497.

² J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazque, B.Torgler, "Russian attitudes toward paying taxes – before, during, and after the transition", in *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 33 No. 12, 2006, pp. 832-857.

³ F. Compin, "Tax fraud: a socially acceptable financial crime in France?", in *Journal of Financial Crime*, Vol. 22 No. 4, 2015, pp. 432-446.

⁴ D. Wilks, J. Cruz, P. Sousa, "Please give me an invoice': VAT evasion and the Portuguese tax lottery", in *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol. 39, No. 5/6, 2019, pp. 412-426.

Table no. 1 captures the most relevant studies regarding tax evasion in other states. The author's purpose was to make a summary that would include the most recent tax evasion research.

Author(s)	Period	Sample	Methodology	Findings
Ahmed Aly Abdel-Mowla, S. (2012)	2004-2008	Egypt's productivity and investment climate surveys	Survey, descriptive analysis	Tax obstacles are still major obstacles for small businesses in Egypt. The results show that more reforms targeting small businesses are needed
Amoh, J. and Ali-Nakyea, A. (2019)	2018-2019	Executive opinion poll of the World Economic Forum on corruption activities and data on factors triggering tax evasion from World Development Indicators and the Bank of Ghana	Modeling of structural equations	Corruption activities significantly cause tax evasion activities in Ghana; Therefore, there is at least one corruption activity that triggers tax evasion. Corruption in Ghana presents all five dimensions of corruption that have been examined. Therefore, there is a correlation between corrupt activities. The results indicate that most emerging economies tend to have more than one type of dominant dimension of corruption, which triggers taxes.
James, S., McGee, R., Benk, S. and Budak, T. (2019)	2010-2014	485 students from 57 countries, faculty members at the University of Exeter in England	Survey, Questionnaire	Older groups tend to have greater respect for the law than younger ones
Mangani, A. (2019)	2012-2016	618 articles on tax evasion published in two top newspapers in Italy, La Repubblica (based in Rome) and Il Corriere della Sera (based in Milan)	Empirical analysis	This paper considers tax evasion less dramatic than acts, such as (terrorism or crime). In addition, an assessment of the media's attitude towards tax evasion is more complex, as the news reports both the crime and the successful actions that fight it
Raczkowski, K. and Mróz, B. (2018)	2018	The tax gaps (TGs) of 35 countries (28 EU member states and 7 additional countries – Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, Switzerland and the USA, both as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) and a nominal value (in USD)	Empirical study - indirect method	Tax gaps are determined individually for a particular country and are strongly correlated with GDP, ie if GDP is high, TG as the percentage of GDP is lower in most countries. Results: US (TG - 3.8% of GDP), UK (TG - 3.2% of GDP) or Japan (TG - 4.3% of GDP)
Schneider, F., Raczkowski, K. and Mróz, B. (2015)	2003-2014	28 European Union countries and other three countries from Europe, i.e. Norway, Switzerland and Turkey	MIMIC method	The average size of the underground economy in 28 EU countries was 22.6% in 2003 and decreased to 18.6% (from official GDP) in 2014.

Table no. 1: Studies on tax evasion in other states⁵

I consider that for practitioners and theoreticians in the field this phenomenon must be pursued permanently, as inefficient control can lead to economic instability, enrichment of criminals and impoverishment of the population.

1. Public policies

Over time, the governors have tried a number of measures to increase the level of collection of taxes and duties in Romania. However, the level of collection in 2019 is among the lowest in Europe, which means that these public policies were not, entirely, effective. We can say that a low collection represents, in essence, the increase of the tax evasion phenomenon. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze what wrong decisions have been made and how we can act in the future to increase the degree of collection in Romania.

As it is known, the financial policy at the macroeconomic level is represented by the fiscal policy, the budgetary policy, the monetary policy and the currency policy. Fiscal policy is the basis of our research, but it is important to add the fact that, each of these policies is particularly important and that it "plays" an essential role in the sustainable development of a country. Fiscal decisions influence the good course of things in fiscal matters. So, in developed countries, such as France, a fundamental role for the adoption of public policies, and subsequently of fiscal policies, is essentially politics, that is, the desire and the government involvement.

⁵ Source: Author work based on literature review.

1.1. National fiscal policy in 2019

In our opinion, the current *public policy* of Romania, in order to be productive, must meet a number of criteria, among which we mention:

- be adapted to the norms of the international economic and financial system;
- be adopted as a matter of urgency in case of possible crisis situations;
- be correlated with the issues of 2019, for their urgent resolution;
- to take into account forecast analyzes that warn of certain inadvertencies;
- to ensure greater transparency of the process of debate and approval;

Although, on a theoretical level, the fiscal policy objectives have been debated and some have been or are being approved, a number of major shortcomings persist regarding the full efficiency of fiscal-budgetary decisions.

1.2. Measures and objectives of fiscal-budgetary policy in 2019

During the period 2018-2019, *measures and objectives of fiscal-budgetary policy*⁶ were adopted, as well:

- Fiscal-budgetary measure for combating tax evasion and increasing the level of collection of taxes and fees by ANAF with 7.5 billion lei, and the Government's proposal in this regard is to intensify the control actions.
- Fiscal-budgetary measure to encourage and support the Romanian business environment, which in the future will generate a sustainable growth of the economy.
- Fiscal-budgetary measure to support public investments for sustainable economic growth.
- Fiscal-budgetary measure to simplify taxation, bureaucracy, in the area of filing tax declarations, in order to reduce the forms and all the formalities that may prevent the tax declaration.
- Fiscal-budgetary measure of poverty reduction in Romania. Regarding this measure, we wanted to analyze more deeply, as the problem of poverty should concern each one of us and should be a national priority. Analyzing Table no. 2, it is observed that in the Bucharest-Ilfov region is registered the lowest degree of poverty, in the last years, while in the North-East region (which includes Iasi, Suceava, Bacau, Neamț, Botoșani, Vaslui) are recorded huge proportions of the poverty level, indicating, in 2016, with a maximum of 36.1% in 2016. Therefore, this measure is useful for the population of Romania, but it is important to follow what concrete actions have been done and if this percentage will decrease in the coming years.

DEVELOPMENT REGIONS	YEARS		
	2015	2016	2017
The region BUCURESTI - ILFOV	5.9	10.2	6.1
The region CENTRU	17.8	20.8	17.3
The region NORD-VEST	19.2	17.1	19
The region VEST	19.8	25.1	21.4
The region SUD-MUNTENIA	30.6	24.8	24.9
The region SUD-VEST OLTENIA	32.1	34.2	33.4
The region SUD-EST	32.4	31.2	29.6
The region NORD-EST	35.9	36.1	33.4


The amounts are expressed in percentages

Table no. 2: The degree of poverty, by regions, between 2015-2017⁷

⁶ The information was taken from the Report prepared by the Ministry of Public Finance on the Macroeconomic Situation for 2019 and its projection for the years 2020-2022, URL: http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/buget/2020/raport/Raport_buget_2019.pdf, accessed on 22.09.2019.

⁷ Source: Data processed by the author according to the materials published by the National Institute of Statistics - Relative poverty rate, by development regions and macro regions, period 2015-2017, URL: <http://statistici.insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table>, accessed on 23.09.2019.

- Fiscal-budgetary measure to encourage investment (in infrastructure, health, education and agriculture) to facilitate new jobs and for sustainable growth in Romania. And here we wanted to see the concrete correlation between the budget deficit and the investment expenses.



-The amounts are expressed in percentages-

Table no. 3: Budget deficit versus investment spending, period 2017-2022, reported to GDP⁸

As can be seen in Table no. 3, starting with the year 2017, the investment expenses were above the average budget deficit. At the same time, it is important to add that for these investments, a series of tax facilities are allocated, which are not currently received by small businesses.

Therefore, there is an inequity between large corporations and small taxpayers, the latter lose from these fiscal decisions and to remain on the market they use fraudulent or legal⁹ evasion methods. The effects of the investments are extremely beneficial for the sustainable development of Romania, but it is important that the small businesses, which contribute to the payment of taxes and fees, and, in essence, to the entire market economy, are not neglected in fiscal policy.

1.3. Inadvertencies of the national fiscal policy

Although, the fiscal policy measures mentioned above have a beneficial role in the sustainable growth of the economy, we will also list a series of inconsistencies that fiscal policy faces in 2019:

- *Legislative changes*, including¹⁰:
 - The increase of the minimum gross wage in the country to the amount of 2.080 lei (for people with high school education), 2.350 lei (for people with higher education and at least one year old in the specialty of studies) and 3.000 lei in the field of construction;
 - Reduction of the income tax rate from 16% to 10%;
 - CAS reduction by 2 percentage points, from 39.25% to 37.25%;
 - 5% VAT rate on the supply of mountain, eco and traditional foods;
 - 5% VAT rate for the delivery of housing;
 - The 9% VAT rate, related to water supply and sewerage services.
- *Frequent changes to the governance formula*, which led to some imbalances in most public institutions, with major effects on the Romanian economy.

⁸ Source: Data processed by the author according to the materials published by the Ministry of Public Finance in the Report on the macroeconomic situation for 2019 and its projection for the years 2020-2022, p. 30.

⁹ The tax evasion is defined in the specialized literature as being at the limit of the law, allowed due to the legislative deficiencies.

¹⁰ The information was taken from the *Report prepared by the Ministry of Public Finance on the Macroeconomic Situation for 2019 and its projection for the years 2020-2022*, URL: http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/buget/2020/raport/Raport_buget_2019.pdf, accessed on 22.09.2019.

- *High fiscal pressure*, such as Single Declaration 2019. First of all, it is a new declaration, in a different format, compared to the previous period, what has a number of 53 pages, therefore a fiscal pressure and a fiscal burden among ordinary citizens. Initially, the deadline set for this statement was March 15, 2019, but due to the difficulty of completing it, the deadline for July 31, 2019 was postponed. Therefore, this is the most eloquent example that fiscal pressure in 2019, for certain types of statements and forms, is increasingly difficult for all the taxpayers.

2. Tax evasion

Over time, the topic of tax evasion¹¹, it has acquired a number of terms, with which it has been tried to define this concept. The tax evasion represents, in essence, a crime with an economic nature, aiming to obtain profit, by flagrant violation of the law, respectively by non-payment of taxes or fees, or the partial declaration of the sources of income.

In the specialty literature, *tax evasion* is defined with terms such as “tax avoidance”, “tax fraud”, “economic crime”, and is on the border between the underground economy¹² and the real economy. At the same time, it is interesting to mention also about the so-called legislative evasion, which means the regulation of certain emergency ordinances, government decisions, ministers' orders, which, in most cases, work in favor of the offender.¹³For this reason, it would be appropriate to follow the whole legislative chain (who submitted the project, who adopted it, who signed it) and to blame those responsible, thus eliminating this type of evasion. Therefore, I believe that one of the reasons for the low VAT collection and other taxes and fees is legislative evasion.

2.1 Evolution of tax evasion at national level

The absence of clear legislation, regarding tax evasion and tax fraud, as well as significant legislative deficiencies, represented for Romania, a new era, from which, the Romanian society, with great difficulties, manages to separate. At the beginning of 2007, the moment when the tax declarations are introduced is a situation in which Romania is trying to recover the situation and a decrease of these harmful phenomena in the society, which increased after 1995.

Another important aspect is that the decrease by five percentage points of the VAT and the decrease by six percentage points of the tax on the profit, has an insignificant impact, more specifically an increase of 2% -5% of the degree of collection of the two taxes. and taxes. Therefore, this fiscal policy¹⁴ of lowering taxes did not cause the Romanians to pay on time the taxes and fees related to their incomes.

¹¹ “In the field of tax evasion, the economic agents, often benefiting from the advice of the specialists, have demonstrated a prodigious inventiveness regarding the techniques and methods of circumvention of the tax, focusing in particular on the fields of marketing fuels, alcohol, cigarettes and coffee”. Source: Augustin Lazăr, *Ancheta antifraudă în mediul afacerilor*, Lumina Lex Publishing house, Bucharest 2008, p. 33.

¹² “The underground economy or the black economy, as a form of tax evasion (black work, prostitution, drug trafficking, gambling), is estimated to be at 8% of the gross national product in the United Kingdom, 13% in Sweden, 12% in Belgium, 11% in Italy, 9% in France, Holland and Germany, 8.5% in the USA and 5% in Japan”. Source: Dan Drosu Șaguna, Mihaela Tofan, *Drept financiar și fiscal european*, “C.H.Beck” Publishing house, Bucharest, 2010, p. 259.

¹³ Another example, in this case, is a recent change, being promulgated amending Art. 6 (2) of the Law no. 31/1990, regarding trading companies, which previously specified that they cannot open companies, persons who have been convicted, by the new amendment, it is forbidden to set up commercial companies, only among the persons who have been prohibited by this court decision. So this is a pretty eloquent example that the law, sometimes is in favor of to the potential evasionist.


¹⁴ “We agree that tax facilities, exemptions or reductions, used as levers of fiscal policy, compete for a “re-arrangement” of budgetary income among taxpayers. By applying them, some of them will pay less in relation to

VAT tax fraud is the largest economic fraud¹⁵ by weight, reported, to all other taxes and fees. It is important to remember that tax evasion disadvantages, the most, the honest taxpayers. Take, for example, the following case, on the same field of activity, the wholesale of a product: a taxpayer A - honest taxpayer and taxpayer B- tax evader. Due to the tax fraud that is made by taxpayer B, it can lower the price of the product, which leads to unfair competition. In time, taxpayer A may go bankrupt. Therefore, if the tax authorities do not notice that taxpayer B flagrantly violates the law, taxpayer A either goes out of the market or uses tax evasion. We find this example more and more often, in today's practice, reason for the measurement of tax evasion is extremely difficult to accomplish and at the same time there is no real interest for this. We are assisting passively in the growth of this scourge and as long as there is no desire to eliminate this phenomenon, it will continue to record increasing proportions, even if we do not have concrete figures in this case.

2.2 Reasons leading to tax evasion in Romania

The main reasons for which it is considered that, in 2019, the national tax evasion are increasing quotas are:

1) The degree of collection of taxes and fees



amounts are expressed in percentages

Figure no. 1: Total receipts from taxes and social contributions related to the European Union, reported to GDP, period 2015-2017¹⁶

As can be seen in Figure no. 1, the level of tax collection and social contributions at the level of our country is among the lowest in the European Union, around 26%. It can be seen that developed countries, such as Belgium and France, have a high collection rate of over 40%. The low level of revenue is yet another reason to say that the level of evasion in Romania is very high.

2) High unemployment

According to the data published by the National Institute of Statistics, the unemployment rate, in 2019, in Romania, is 3%. According to the data published by the

others or to themselves, compared to the periods when they did not benefit from these facilities. However, we cannot agree with the fact that the beneficiaries of these "advantages" offered by the state are avoided from the payment of the tax obligations, even if, by non-payment of taxes or fees, there has been a decrease of the budgetary revenues." Source: Vasile Bîrle, *Frauda fiscală*, Teora Publishing house, Bucharest, 2005, p. 25.

¹⁵ "There are no sensitive and efficient tools and possibilities for measuring this phenomenon. In today's fiscal state this fact is a paradox. But, in the interweaving of political options aiming at fiscal evasion, that is, on the one hand, the tendency, if not to end it, at least of a significant limitation of it starting from the harmful influence it exerts on the economic - social environment, and on the other. Another part, another tendency, of using tax evasion as a positive element of fiscal policy, is difficult, and often there is no interest in measuring the extent of tax evasion." Source: Dan Drosu Şaguna, Mihaela Tofan, *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 239.

¹⁶ Source: Own processing according to the materials published by Eurostat - Tax revenue statistics, period 2015-2017, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Tax_revenue_statistics, accessed on 23.09.2019.

National Institute of Statistics, the unemployment rate was estimated at 3.1% for July 2019 (3.6% for men and 2.5% for women).¹⁷ Therefore, the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the number of crimes and people who accept illegal work, which leads to the fact that the phenomenon of tax evasion, in fact, will increase.

3) *Very high inflation rate*

According to Eurostat data, the inflation rate in Romania in 2018 is 4.1%, with the highest value in the European Union¹⁸. Therefore, the higher the inflation, the greater the desire of citizens to buy certain "black" goods, due to the price, which is considerably lower. In fact, this is another element which leads to tax evasion.

2.3 Methods of combating tax evasion

We believe that in addition to the existing measures and means of preventing and combating tax evasion at national level, efforts should be made to supplement and strengthen them with new methods. The most important ones could be:

- Clear tax legislation that will remain unchanged for at least a period of 2-3 years, during which time certain legislative deficiencies will be found and corrected;
- Decrease in fiscal pressure;
- Urgent investments in an optimal and current ANAF database, containing the data of all the tax dodgers;
- The pursuit of tax dodgers, constantly, through unexpected checks;
- Increased control where there is evidence of tax evasion, with high intensity;
- Attracting specialists, in the fiscal field, and improving them;
- Stricter penalties for tax evasion.

3. The influence of tax evasion on national security

Undoubtedly, fiscal fraud and the phenomenon of tax evasion influence and affects the national security of Romania. The national security of a nation it also means the protection of the population from criminal offenses of nature, criminal and civil, as well as a series of acts, which are contrary to a rule of law. Due to the fact that these phenomena are increasing, the state of national security loses its strength and, therefore, it is tried with all the available means to combat these crimes of an economic nature.

The specialized literature divided the national security on several dimensions: military, political, economic, social and environmental nature. Next I will refer to the economic dimension of security, as economic crime has effects on economic security. Through economic security¹⁹, a state guarantees to the other states and to its own population a market economy that operates under normal parameters²⁰.

¹⁷ According to the press release no. 213/30.08.2019, published by the National Institute of Statistics, URL: http://www.insse.ro/cms/sites/default/files/com_presa/com_pdf/somaj_bim_iul19r.pdf, accessed on 23.09.2019.

¹⁸ According to data published by EUROSTAT on the inflation rate in the European Union, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00118&plugin=1>, accessed on 23.09.2019.

¹⁹ "Economic security refers to the ability to access the resources, finances and markets necessary to support an acceptable level of welfare, stability, prosperity and power of the state". Source: Ștefan Rădulescu, *Securitatea națională în contextul globalizării*, Nouă Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 90-91.

²⁰ "No nation, no matter how powerful, cannot be or become invulnerable to current threats. The problem that divides the states, however, is the lack of a common perception regarding these threats, and this leads to difficulties in obtaining the consensus on the definition and responsibilities of the collective security". Source: Florian Răpan, Marian; Claudiu Bibiriță, *Managementul organizațiilor de securitate*, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014, p. 72.

Normally, from a fiscal point of view, any taxpayer, regardless of their income and their amount, will pay taxes and fees on the income obtained, according to the regulations established, by law. The opposite of normality is represented by tax evasion, bypassing by any means, the payment of taxes and fees, to the state. Therefore, one of the objectives of economic security should be the pursuit of these phenomena and finding valid levers, at the level of 2019, to combat this phenomenon and others in the sphere of economic crime.

Can these phenomena really be stopped in the name of ensuring national security? Is the only issue of national security tax evasion? Of course, the answer to the second question is no, but it is appropriate, to have a permanent concern, in this sense, for things to work, in an optimal way.

The issue of tax evasion is a matter that should fit into in the national defense strategy. National security is based on the common interests, as well as the objectives of a country but the tax evasion and the tax fraud, endanger the other citizens, the honest ones, basically, the security of the ordinary citizen. Or all these aspects contradict the national security policy of a state.

“The economic dimension of security is politicized and, it can be analyzed on the basis of indicators, at two levels: national and international. At national level, the capacity (of a state) of managing inflation, unemployment, quality of life, unbalanced payments balance, lack of economic opportunities is of interest”²¹. Therefore, the economic dimension of national security should aim to reduce the imbalances within a country, from an economic point of view.

Through the defense policy, certain objectives are set, regarding the national security of the country, in this case, the economic dimension of security. An increase in the level of tax evasion has harmful effects for the economic security of the country, among which we mention:

- Decreased confidence of foreign investors in the stability of the country;
- Macroeconomic imbalances;
- Decreasing the standard of living and increasing the poverty of the population;
- Economic instability of the country;
- Failure to comply with the objectives proposed by the national defense strategy of the country;
- The distrust of the population in justice, governors and in the state institutions;

These examples represent a small part of the effects of tax evasion on national security. We only set out to sound an alarm signal, and through the fiscal policies adopted, through controls, through well-trained specialists and by increasing the state's interest in this issue, to look for and find the best means of stopping this phenomenon of tax evasion.

CONCLUSIONS

The present study wanted to channel its attention to the phenomenon of tax evasion and to show that this scourge exists in the Romanian society. The present research has shown three main reasons for arguing the presence of tax evasion:

- 1) The collection of taxes is very low.
- 2) Unemployment that grows in an accelerated way leads to undeclared work.
- 3) A significant inflation share.

Within the present paper the fiscal measures adopted by the Government were exposed, which theoretically cover many solutions for the eradication of this economic slippage, but the implementation of these projects is deficient and is due to the Romanian bureaucracy. The author's urge is to continue tackle this phenomenon. At the same time, it is important to analyze

²¹ Marian Sandu, Eugen Siteanu, *Securitatea națională prin securitatea colectivă*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 44-45.

the evasion in other EU countries, as well as the effective measures taken by these countries, in order to increase the collection of taxes.

Although, some of the measures identified in this study have been mentioned in other research, I would like to point out that in my opinion, one of the viable solutions to combat the phenomenon is to eliminate bureaucracy and the cumbersome forms of filing tax returns, such as (Single Declaration 2019). Otherwise, I recommend social actions to raise awareness and knowledge of the harmful effects of this phenomenon. My recommendation is to have guidance actions for requesting the tax receipt, for every purchase made. Another solution identified by the author is the reduction of taxes and contributions, the adoption of effective fiscal measures, as well as the increase of controls by the institutions of economic and fiscal control institution. These guidelines are essential for a sustainable growth of the Romanian economy and for the significant diminution of this scourge in the Romanian society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ABDEL- MOWLA, Ahmed Aly S., “The Egyptian tax system reforms, investment and tax evasion (2004-2008)”, in *Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 28 No. 1, 2012.
2. ALM, J.; MARTINEZ-VAZQUE, J.; TORGLER, B., “Russian attitudes toward paying taxes – before, during, and after the transition”, in *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 33 No. 12, 2006.
3. AMOH, J.; ALI-NAKYEA, A., “Does corruption cause tax evasion? Evidence from an emerging economy”, in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 22 No. 2, 2019.
4. BÎRLE, Vasile, *Frauda fiscală*, Teora Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.
5. CLEMENTE, F. and LÍRIO, V., “Tax evasion in Brazil: the case of specialists”, in *Journal of Economic Studies*, Vol. 45 No. 2, 2018.
6. COMPIN, F., “Tax fraud: a socially acceptable financial crime in France?”, in *Journal of Financial Crime*, Vol. 22 No. 4.
7. IOAN, Leția; ANDREIA, Alina, *Investigarea criminalității de afaceri. Spălarea banilor. Corupția și frauda fiscală*, Universul Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest.
8. JAMES, S., MCGEE, R., Benk, S. and BUDAK, T., “How seriously do taxpayers regard tax evasion? A survey of opinion in England”, in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 22 No. 3, 2019.
9. KHLIF, H. and ACHEK, I. , “The determinants of tax evasion: a literature review”, in *International Journal of Law and Management*, Vol. 57 No. 5, 2015.
10. LAZĂR, Augustin, *Ancheta antifraudă în mediul afacerilor*, Lumina Lex Publishing house, Bucharest, 2008.
11. MANGANI, A., „Tax evasion in the media: a comparison of Southern vs Central and Northern Italy”, in *Journal of Financial Crime*, Vol. 26 No. 1, 2019.
12. MUSIMENTA, D.; NAIGAGA, S.; BANANUKA, J. and NAJJUMA, M., “Tax compliance of financial services firms: a developing economy perspective”, in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 22 No. 1, 2019.
13. ONOFREI, Mihaela *Impactul politicilor financiare asupra societății*, Economica Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000.
14. RACZKOWSKI, K. and MRÓZ, B., “Tax gap in the global economy”, in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 21 No. 4, 2018.

15. RĂDULESCU, Ștefan, *Securitatea națională în contextul globalizării*, Nouă Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015.
16. RĂPAN, Florian; BIBIRIȚĂ, Marian Claudiu, *Managementul organizațiilor de securitate*, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014.
17. Report of the Ministry of Public Finances, Report on the macro-economic situation in 2019 and the projection for 2020-2022, URL: http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/buget/2019/raport/Raport_buget_2019.pdf.
18. SANDU, Marian; SITEANU, Eugen, *Securitatea națională prin securitatea colectivă*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007.
19. SCHNEIDER, F.; RACZKOWSKI, K. and MRÓZ, B., "Shadow economy and tax evasion in the EU", in *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2015.
20. ȘAGUNA, Dan Drosu; TOFAN, Mihaela, *Drept financiar și fiscal european*, C.H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.
21. VORNICEANU, Marius, *Frauda fiscală și riscurile acesteia pentru securitatea națională*, "România de Măine" Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.
22. WILKS, D., CRUZ, J. and SOUSA, P., "Please give me an invoice": VAT evasion and the Portuguese tax lottery", in *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol. 39 No. 5/6, 2019.
23. Eurostat website, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>.
24. National Statistics Institute website, URL: <http://statistici.insse.ro:8077/tempo-online/#/pages/tables/insse-table>.

ON STRATEGY IN HYBRID WARFARE

Dan-Lucian PETRESCU, Ph.D.

Lieutenant-Colonel, Lecturer, “Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: dan_petrescu1@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Hybrid warfare is one of the most complex issues regarding the security of actors in the world, at the beginning of the 21st century. Each hybrid threat has a configuration which corresponds to a strategic model that underpins the manifestation of the threat – the hybrid aggression – carried out by an aggressor against a target, usually a state actor. The latter has to develop a system in a “whole-of-government” approach, corresponding to its own characteristics, integrated into that of the partners and adapted to the configuration of the hybrid threat that may be conducted against it, which allows the target to survive and counteract it, meaning to detect and prevent the threat, to manifest resilience against the aggression and to respond accordingly. The hybrid threat countering system must implement a coherent strategy, which uses all instruments of power in actions carried out across all areas that define the state actor to achieve all national security goals and to meet the purpose for which it was created.*

Keywords: *hybrid threat; hybrid warfare; aggression; strategy; resilience; whole-of-government; conflict prevention.*

INTRODUCTION

The hybrid warfare takes form in the security environment in a highly complex configuration, always different, adapted to the targeted actor’s vulnerabilities and in a way that, most of the time, produces an effect of destabilization and erodes its capabilities in all areas, diminishing its power to respond. Countering hybrid warfare must not be seen only in the classic sense of defense against a traditional armed aggression, but as one of the most complex issues in ensuring the security of state actors, at the beginning of the 21st century. In other words, hybrid warfare is no longer a matter of national defense, but becomes a national security issue.

Hybridization of the means and actions employed in warfare is not a new approach, whatsoever. Modern technology and modern techniques, on the other hand, are. It is not the “hybridity” itself, which defines the novelty in this formidable threat against the security of states and international organizations, but its conduct, the unusually high importance granted to unconventional and non-military actions used in combination with low intensity and subversive use of armed forces. However, we fully agree that an isolated and singular attack, even with a combination of conventional and unconventional military means could not be considered “hybrid” *per se*. Taking into account the general aspect of “hybridity” described in general science (e.g. biology) and particularized in the military sciences, we consider that there is no distinct and singular “hybrid” attack, but that it will always be a comprehensive and adaptive mélange of actions, carried out in multiple areas and environments, aiming at multiple essential elements of the target actor and which require a complex response in order to counter it.

1. On hybrid threat strategy

Although the term *hybrid threat* has often been referred to, it was not explicitly used or defined until the end of the first decade of the 2000s, when a number of researchers, such as Frank Hoffman or Russel W. Glenn, have tried to find a phrase that characterizes the war

between Israel and Hezbollah (2006). The first attempts in this regard had generated several confusing approaches, including the terminology used, as the aforementioned theorists had also acknowledged. The original concept was *hybrid war*, starting from David Krulak's *three-block war* theory¹, from the 1990s, created to illustrate the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by US Marines on the modern battlefield. This concept was an operational extension of what Thomas Huber described as a *compound war*², namely a combination of combat actions that came, in terms of forces and means, as well as deployment modes, within both the conventional and the unconventional sphere. Of course, this resulted in a certain doctrinal and conceptual omission, in the sense that, as it was defined later, *hybrid warfare* involves a much wider spectrum of threats and aggressions than those involved in combat.

Currently, among the military specialists from around the world, there are various forms of debates on the future threats in the operating environment. At first glance, this matter can be framed as a dichotomous choice between conventional and unconventional actions³, which would somewhat simplify the decision-making process regarding defense planning – resource allocation and configuring the national defense system. In fact, the situation pinpoints a totally different aspect, as the contemporary trends (and the facts – e.g. Ukraine, 2014) indicate the rise of opponents whose strategy implies the simultaneous engagement of various forms of combat belonging to both categories, within an immense multimodal complex of aggressions in the other domains of the target actor (political, social, economic, informational etc.). At the strategic level, we are witness to an inversion according to which the complex of actions that traditionally represented the background of armed aggression becomes the main way to produce the decisive effects. Thus, adversaries who implement the hybrid threat use combinations of mainly non-military capabilities to generate compound effects in order to gain a decisive advantage in a possible military confrontation (if this is still needed). The significant military power of some state or supranational actors and / or the international sanctions that the war of aggression entails have led to significant changes in the strategy of potential aggressors. They sought to identify some asymmetrical and “niche” capabilities and some combinations of actions using new technological means and tactics, executed directly or by proxies, to avoid these impediments and, consequently, gain strategic advantages in ways that cannot be placed outside the legal framework. This approach has led to the emergence of the *hybrid warfare* that can be defined as *a complex of actions developed by a state or non-state adversary who uses, in an adaptive and concerted manner, political, military, economic, social, informational or other means, in combinations of unconventional and conventional methods of action, to achieve the objectives pursued.*

In our view, the terminology matter concerns the difference between *hybrid threat* and *hybrid warfare*, given that *hybrid war* is no longer conceptual endorsed. In order to start the building of the judicial framework, we will add the term *hybrid aggression*. Given the definition for hybrid warfare, we consider that the *hybrid threat* is the real and imminent possibility of an adversary, with a high level of readiness, to use the hybrid warfare against a target actor. By its manifestation, the threat generates the *hybrid aggression*, which starts with covert actions during the preparatory phase and takes its most acute and overt form during the attack phase. This is the

¹ Charles C. Krulak, “The strategic Corporal: Leadership in the three block war”, in *Marines Magazine*, January 1999, p. 4, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399413.pdf>, accessed on 10 October 2019.

² Thomas M. Huber, *Compound Warfare: That fatal knot*, 2002, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a481548.pdf>, accessed on 10 October 2019.

³ Andrew J. Bacevich’s theory on Crusaders and Conservatives in fighting the next war, “The Petraeus Doctrine”, in *The Atlantic*, October 2008, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/10/the-petraeus-doctrine/306964/>, accessed on 10 October 2019.

meaning we attach to these basic concepts, depending on the context, with the aforementioned interconnections.

The excessive use of these concepts and, moreover, the invention of new ones (*hybrid actor*, *hybrid strategy*, *hybrid means*, *hybrid effects*, *hybrid influencing*, etc.) to express the novelty and complexity of the contemporary conflicts and to induce a sense of alertness may be inefficient or even counterproductive. Moreover, the Russian approach has introduced some other terms, apart from the feature “hybrid”, such as: *non-linear war*, *non-traditional war* or *special war*. Military specialists and those in the field of security studies should avoid misusing the term “hybrid” because the general including feature of the “Hybrid War” theory can create confusion and blur the essentials that decision makers must understand when configuring the solution. The “hybrid strategist”, on the part of the adversary, might consider such a lack of understanding as a vulnerability that could be exploited to secure success.

The actor who chooses to use hybrid warfare resorts to an intelligent combination of subversive actions, almost impossible to be proven, and in such a new configuration that, at international level, there is no in force legislation that contains strong incrimination criteria and consistent amending rules. There are, of course, legal provisions that impose punitive measures against some of the actions that make up the hybrid aggression, but they become useless when the direct perpetrators are proxy actors whose agendas are masking the backing aggressor's motivations. Since many of these actions (mostly in the *preparatory* phase) are directed against undermining the target state's instruments of power (so that during the *attack* phase the target can no longer defend itself), the development of a countering strategy in a proactive approach is fully justified.

Regarding the strategy (in the general acceptance of the means-ends-ways triad⁴) in which the aggression is prepared and executed, its hybrid character is present both at the *modus operandi* level, aiming at the dynamics in which the actions adaptively cover the whole spectrum delimited by the conventional and the unconventional, as well as structurally, with refers to the structures of forces and to the means used in a hybrid configuration. It should be mentioned that the “hybridization” of means and actions is maintained during all phases of the hybrid warfare, i.e. during preparation, attack and stabilization⁵, with different weights assigned to the capabilities of the aggressor or to those controlled by the aggressor, depending on the target's vulnerabilities and circumstantial opportunities. It is a long-term strategy (especially during the preparation phase) that requires significant human, material and financial resources, even if the combat actions are secondary or may be completely eluded (in order to eliminate the need to justify military intervention). Thus, the aggressor avoids the massive human and material losses generated by the traditional aggression, as well as the sanctions imposed by the international security organizations following the finding of the aggression act attributed to it. Regarding the purpose, the aggressor aims primarily to diminish the target's combat power (by disrupting its instruments of power) and to impose its will on it, exploiting its vulnerabilities and the opportunities arising in the security environment, and taking advantage of a tense security situation created throughout the target state, as a background. The actor who conducts hybrid warfare is extremely flexible, volatile, heterogeneous in terms of combat capabilities, with excellent adaptability and strong motivation.

The configuration and the way of conducting hybrid warfare changes permanently, depending on the characteristics of the target and the situation. Globalization and increased

⁴ Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy”, in *Guide to strategy*, U.S. Army War College, February 2001.

⁵ András Rácz model presented in *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist*, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 16, 2015, URL: <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/russias-hybrid-war-in-ukraine>, accessed on 2 September 2019.

complexity of the geostrategic environment, fueled by technological developments easily accessed by many, have allowed aggressors to combine sophisticated asymmetrical and subversive forms of aggression to hide their role and objectives in the conflict, in order to complicate and delay the target's decision-making process and countermeasures implementation. Hybrid aggression and its components are rarely in line with the international law, and its ambiguity represents challenges for the legal and conceptual framework of traditional regulations regarding security crisis and armed conflicts. Therefore, countering this new type of approaching the security threats requires the highest level of awareness and cooperation between state actors and throughout international organizations (especially regarding the exchange of information), high political determination and readiness (regarding making and implementing decisions), a coherent and efficient strategy for strategic communication (for combating propaganda and disinformation) and also resilience, provided by solid defense systems (regarding cyber defense, economic and social solidarity etc.).

2. On the strategy of countering hybrid threat

The novelty of the hybrid threat configuration, the complexity and the ambiguous character perceived by the target regarding the complex of actions that are being carried out against him, especially in the preparation phase of the aggression, amplify the difficulty of formulating a coherent and efficient countering strategy. However, we consider that this difficulty can be mitigated by using an approach based on morphological analysis, which involves the decomposition of the complex object into simpler components, their separate analysis and then the recomposition of the result taking into account the functional relationships between the basic elements. We start from the premise that conducting hybrid warfare involves three phases, namely preparation, attack and stabilization, with the specific actions of each and with the corresponding effects that combine to generate a holistically decisive outcome. Analyzing the dynamics of the strategy underlying the operationalization of the hybrid threat, we consider that the aggressor gives a great importance to the preparation phase as the achievements of the incumbent actions, aimed at destabilizing the society and the governance in the target state and disrupting its instruments of power, directly influence the attack phase, improving significantly the chance of success. The resulting hypothesis is that the most effective way to achieve success against hybrid warfare is to counteract the hybrid threat and to prevent it from manifesting openly, turning into hybrid aggression. In this way, counteracting the hybrid threat must be viewed, in particular, as a set of actions that must be taken in a proactive approach.

This reasoning justifies focusing the process of determining a successful strategy against the hybrid warfare on several major directions: threat detection, threat prevention, manifesting resilience and combating aggression. All capabilities, resources and instruments of power (MPECI⁶), as well as the measures/actions (as proactive approach) and countermeasures/counteractions (in reactive approach) must be conducted in an integrated manner, based on a coherent and comprehensive strategy able to connect them in all areas (PMESII-PT⁷) defining the actor state, in order to achieve all the security objectives. At national level, the hybrid threat countering system must be created and augmented in a "whole-of-government" approach, corresponding to the basic characteristics of the state and the security environment (SWOT), and must be integrated regionally and adapted to the configuration of the hybrid threat.

Threat detection is the first and perhaps the most important strategy development direction, not by its decisiveness effect but by its awareness effect. An actor unable to detect that a certain complex of aggressive actions carried out against it is part of a bigger picture that

⁶ Military, Political, Economic, Civil, Information.

⁷ Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time.

may be the preparatory phase for hybrid aggression, is an easy target. It is blind, it cannot defend itself, it cannot react. Valery Gherasimov, quoting Georgy Isserson with his book *New Forms of Combat* said: "War in general is not declared. It simply begins with already developed military forces. Mobilization and concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in 1914 but rather, unnoticed, proceeds long before that."⁸ The value of information has always been extremely high, but in this context it becomes vital. It seems that, more than anything else, creating a system able to raise a red flag to the authorities in the target state about the imminent occurrence of hybrid aggression is vitally important. The state actor, first by itself and then through cooperation, must develop a highly efficient network of sensors and a proper set of indicators, each of them characterized by specific thresholds, in order to identify and early warn on the actions with aggressive tendencies that take place in the preparatory phase. Beyond providing and confirming the necessary information, the most difficult task of this system is assigned to its analysts who need to collate them, in order to identify whether the current configuration and intensity of the triggered indicators stand for a real hybrid threat. Based on these conclusions and on the tendencies, a potential target can identify the fact that a hybrid aggression is being prepared against it, can declare it at the political level and can react accordingly to prevent it from escalating into the attack phase or degenerating into a military conflict.

Threat prevention, the second main direction of strategy development, concerns three main aspects: preparation, active defense and deterrence. Preparation means, in particular, identifying national vulnerabilities and taking coherent measures to eliminate them or to protect the elements that may create vulnerabilities. In this sense, the analysis of the threat shows that the population, the government and the critical infrastructure can generate vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor can exploit with major effects. The inclusion in the strategic model of countering the hybrid threat of some firm measures to protect these high-value targets is obviously a priority. Examples in this regard are: conducting campaigns to inform and warn the population; implementing education measures against disinformation and propaganda; regulating the functioning of mass-media; increasing the transparency of political decisions. We strongly believe that disinformation can be counteracted through education. Active defense consists of, as V. Gherasimov said⁹, a "set of measures to proactively neutralize threats to state security" that may include preemptive offensive countermeasures taken during a building crisis. Based on Gerasimov's comments, the strategy must include "joint employment of interagency forces and means to ensure complete security" in order to augment the "territorial defense" by coordinating military forces with multiple federal bodies in wartime, as the national guard's wartime support to the military. Briefly, the strategy must include several formats of military and internal security forces operating together to counter any threats that may be components of a hybrid construct. The deterrent effect against the attacker is achieved by sending a strong and realistic signal that the state has a high level of defense capacity, but also that of reaction in all areas, including the military, by deploying adequate forces at the right place and at the right time. Also, participating in strong alliances or bilateral security agreements with major international players are serious arguments in favor of deterrence.

The manifestation of resilience represents the direction aimed at the purely defensive component of the countering hybrid threat strategy. Although not yet completely defined, it is

⁸ Valery Gerasimov, "Speech at the annual meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Science", in *Military-Industrial Courier*, January 2013, Moscow. 2013. URL http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf, accessed on 13 August 2019.

⁹ Dara Massicot, *Anticipating a new Russian military doctrine in 2020: what it might contain and why it matters*, September 9, 2019, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/anticipating-a-new-russian-military-doctrine-in-2020-what-it-might-contain-and-why-it-matters/>, accessed on 25 September 2019.

considered a key factor in addressing the defense against hybrid threat. One definition of resilience is “the ability of people, societies or states to survive major shocks and crises, to maintain vital functions, to limit their impact on their own functioning, and to improve upon experience”¹⁰. This concept defines a multidimensional approach to defense against a multidimensional threat as it “implies not only not being overcome by hostile conditions and the adaptation to this type of environment, but a combination of all the above, the ability to identify and exploit these opportunities included in adverse conditions and to continue evolving”¹¹. The *whole-of-government* and *whole-of-society* approaches within the borders of the state actor and the *comprehensive approach* at the level of international organizations, and also between organizations, can focus on joint efforts to develop and manifest resilience against any hybrid form of the threat. Increasing the level of resilience consists in developing more capabilities meant to increase the chances of the state actor to resist the impact of the hybrid aggression, to manage its effects and to recover in its aftermath.

Improving the defense system of state actors against the emerging security challenges must begin by accurately highlighting to relevant decision makers the issues regarding the existing capabilities and vulnerabilities. “Each time we face a new security challenge, a defense or security contractor is waiting in the wings to sell us a solution. In the case of hybrid threats, there is no one-size-fits-all solution nor new system we can just buy to mitigate them. Instead, everything we’ve learned since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 tells us that we must adapt our legal frameworks and working culture and improve the connective tissue between ministries and organizations to enable our own governments and organizations to better protect our societies.”¹²

As a consequence, the main measures for strengthening resilience must be taken in all areas specific to the state (PMESII), not only at the military level. They must be focused on identifying the risks associated with vulnerabilities and taking appropriate measures to mitigate, eliminate or protect them; developing an efficient interagency decision-making process; educating society and providing military and law enforcement support for the measures taken; developing and providing the necessary resources. Efforts should be directed towards almost all areas that could be targeted by the components of the hybrid threat: critical infrastructure protection, strategic communications, civil protection, cyber defense, energy security and counterterrorism.

*Combating aggression*¹³ begins in the attack phase and is carried out concurrently with the manifestation of resilience. It involves actions in response to the hybrid aggression, thus constituting the offensive component of the countering strategy. This is the case when the preventive measures were not successful, so it is necessary to configure the response to be given to the hybrid aggression, which can contain both deterrent and direct response actions. The deterrent actions may be in the form of political statements, setting up agreements against the

¹⁰ Cristina Bogzeanu, “Resilience: concept, approaches and implications”, *Strategic Impact* No. 3-4/2017, “Carol I” National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 51, URL: https://cssas.unap.ro/en/pdf_periodicals/si64-65.pdf, accessed on 13 September 2019.

¹¹ *Ibidem*

¹² Christopher Kremidas-Courtney, *Countering hybrid threats: We can’t just buy a solution*, 15.02.2019, URL: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/237701/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/countering-hybrid-threats-we-cant-just-buy-a-solution>, accessed on 20 September 2019.

¹³ This chapter is built on ideas taken from a Multinational Capability Development Campaign project named *Countering Hybrid Warfare Project: Countering Hybrid Warfare* developed and written by a group of contributing nations and international organizations, under the leading of Dr. Patrick Cullen and Dr. Njord Wegge, Senior Research Fellows at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The project was published in March 2019 and is available at URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/784299/concepts_mcdc_countering_hybrid_warfare.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2019.

violation of air and maritime space or determining a framework for imposing economic sanctions on the aggressor. Direct response actions are purely offensive in nature and may aim to increasing freedom of action at sea and in the airspace; raising awareness of national and international public opinion, regarding the aggressive actions; conducting an intense information campaign to explain the aggressive posture and practices of the aggressor; initiating measures for the imposition of economic sanctions by the international community; adapting the rules of engagement in order to give the possibility of using force in response actions.

The dilemma that exists in formulating a strategy to combat hybrid aggression is to identify a set of real goals (objectives) and actions, supported by means and resources, in order to shape the appropriate response. In order to describe the combating aggression component, we use the same classic structural model of strategy, namely the triad of *goals – ways – means*. *Nota bene*, the relation between them must be constantly adjusted in the dynamics of strategy implementation, in order to achieve the highest level of efficiency and effectiveness in overcoming the obstacles raised by unforeseen events.

In formulating the *objectives*, the government must take into account the fact that it cannot respond to all the incidents incumbent to hybrid aggression and that it must analyze and interpret responsibly the level of hostility that the nation can tolerate. On the other hand, the more strategic goals are set, the more effective in reducing, if not annihilating, hybrid aggression is the response, even if it may be more complex and difficult to implement. Considering the aggressor's vulnerabilities, as well as the opportunities that may arise in the operating environment, it must be established when, how and for what purpose the response will have to be given, in order to ensure that it is justified, appropriate and effective.

With respect to *ways and means*, once it has been decided that acting in response is appropriate and the objectives have been set, the next step is to identify the ways and means to achieve them. Given that the target actor has limited resources (usually smaller than the aggressor's) it is recommended that ways and means be analyzed simultaneously, because the former will have to make numerous adjustments on this correlation to obtain the most efficient course of action. Establishing the best solution for the *ways – means* tandem must be done through the perspective of *policy options, key factors* and *instruments of power*.

A. The defender's *policy options* must be related to some fundamental aspects that define the nature and characteristics of the response. These approaches refer to its posture, the direction of its actions, as well as the public character and the coercive effect of its actions. Each of them is presented below from the perspective of the advantages and disadvantages determined by the minimum and maximum levels associated with them. The four approaches that determine the fundamental characteristics of the policy choice are interdependent and the elements within them must be found in the final course of action.

a. Defender's posture

This approach is determined by the level at which the aggressor is aware that it can receive a response to the attack initiated. An offensive strategy, according to which the defender conducts direct actions in response, can produce an effective deterrence. The disadvantage of this approach is that it can legitimize further offensive actions carried out by the aggressor and thus, the target would be exposed to more virulent attacks or other threats that would otherwise be less obvious. On the other hand, the strategy of simply ignoring or rejecting the possibility of an attack, as being irrelevant or inconsistent, can contribute to its recurrence until the adversary obtains the desired effects. Adopting a defense strategy that ignores threats may involve the defender's lack of preparation and / or political support for future actions that are valuable opportunities for the aggressor.

b. *Direction of actions*

This approach determines whether the defender's response is concentrated internally, to protect its own population and decision-makers, or externally, to the aggressor and/or to obtain support from the international community. The inward-oriented response is aimed at increasing resilience – through actions meant to educate the population on the aspect of disinformation or increase its confidence in governing bodies – and can have a deterrent effect on the adversary. If the response is oriented towards the opponent, it is recommended to contain smart power actions – e.g. through diplomatic channels (soft power) or by imposing economic sanctions (hard power). Although their impact can have unintended consequences, it can be used constructively. Opposition-oriented measures, such as economic sanctions, could assure the population that the adversary is kept at distance. Under no circumstances should the support of international actors, which can be obtained through cooperative relationships established, preferably, before the aggression be triggered, be ignored.

c. *The public character of the response*

The overt actions are characterized as public, visible and official, and can be oriented inwards and outwards. They can be effective in raising awareness and warning the population regarding the threat, in obtaining the support of the international public opinion and in exposing the aggressor's actions. The disadvantage of the overt actions may involve unintended consequences due to their public character, which eliminates the possibility of surprising the opponent or may cause disagreement with international public opinion. Covert actions are characterized by a limited audience. They can be effective by sending direct messages to the adversary's decision-makers and by generating physical effects that can prevent the adversary from preparing for future attacks (for example, cyber-attacks). On the other hand, covert actions can have consequences against the defender who, by these, can give the aggressor control over informing its own population.

d. *Coercive defense*

This approach determines whether the answer involves taking realistic and resolute measures to constrain the adversary or applying measures that will persuade him to resort to dialogue and cooperation. When choosing to implement coercive measures, the defender must aim at exploiting the advantages in all PMESII domains, by credible and creative actions carried out at moderate intensity and using all instruments of power in a concerted and adapted way. The disadvantages lay in the significant costs involved or in the possibility of conflict escalation by creating a *casus belli* for the aggressor and justifying an open intervention on its part. In this way, the situation could become disastrous for the target, as the aggressor might have the opportunity to induce at the level of the audience and international organizations the idea that the target actor is the real aggressor. On the other hand, measures designed to convince the aggressor to cooperate and to give up his goals may prove insufficient to change the aggressor's behavior, leading to the continuation or even escalation of the aggression. Probably the most appropriate approach is the one specific to smart power, in which the coercive measures are complemented with those of inducing the aggressor towards the path of negotiation and dialogue. The exact proportions of these two sets of measures are circumstantial, but it is clear that a "carrot and stick" balance must be established, according to the situation and the actors involved. However, the "carrot actions" should be carried out at low intensity level, providing a reasonable sufficiency and implementing a strategy of limited action, with the meaning given in 2017 edition of Dmitry Rogozin's *Война и Мир*¹⁴.

¹⁴ Dmitry Rogozin, *War and Peace in Terms and Definitions*, "Chapter 5. Military art. Strategy", URL: http://rulibs.com/ru_zar/ref_dict/rogozin/0/j4.html, accessed on 2 October 2019.

B. Key factors

When analyzing the policy choice, while formulating the measures to be taken in response to a hybrid aggression, certain key factors must be taken into account. The most important are: risk taken, vulnerabilities, own instruments of power, horizontal escalation vs. vertical escalation, multinational character, coordination and constraints.

The main risk of taking an action is the possibility of raising the level of aggression, while the risk of inaction may be the continuation of hybrid aggression. Moreover, in the event of inaction, even if the short-term consequences may be a minor or no escalation, the long-term risk may be the major escalation by the aggressor. The internal measures, such as those meant to increase the level of resilience, aim at diminishing the defender's vulnerabilities, and the response measures that are applied externally target the aggressor's vulnerabilities. Strengthening the defense and finding the best way to address the aggressor's weaknesses must be one of the most valuable criteria in shaping a good course of action. The means that build the instruments of power, in terms of institutions, forces, resources and doctrine, must have the capacity to effectively influence the targeted vulnerabilities. Their weight is extremely important in developing and implementing a coherent response. The set of specific actions must take advantage of a coordinated play of horizontal (addressing diversity) and vertical (intensity) escalation. Usually, the aggressor tries to increase the level of complexity, thus escalating horizontally in order to increase the ubiquitous effect of the aggression perceived by the target. The defender can give a proportionate response, performing vertical escalation through an asymmetric response, or horizontal escalation, which is more credible and easier to implement, by increasing the spectrum of action and targeting a wide range of vulnerabilities. A multinational response can result in a diverse and more efficient set of actions but it is much more difficult to plan, generate and implement. The response to hybrid aggression must be coordinated by the government through a structure created for this purpose. Similarly, the multinational response entails a framework agreement for planning and implementation. Regarding the constraints that may appear in planning and conducting the response, the related legal framework must be very specific as one of the main characteristics of building up the aggression is that it exploits the "gray areas" of international law. In this regard, we must remember that hybrid aggression exploits extensively the non-traditional forms of warfare, especially asymmetric warfare. From a judicial point of view, the aggressor exploits the situations that occur at the limit of the international law in order to prevent the target to effectively tailor and give a matching and decisive response. When combined with coercive measures to prevent the reaction, the aggressor may achieve a situation of asymmetrical advantage. However, there are key arguments that can be appealed from the perspective of international law.

The first argument refers to the fact that the states can respond to the use of the armed forces according to chapter 7 of the UN Charter, on the basis of the right to self-defense (art. 51) and the resolutions of the UN Security Council (art. 42). Both NATO and the EU are based on treaties that guarantee collective / common defense according to Article 51 of the Charter. In its desire to adapt to contemporary threats, NATO intends to find the legal framework to consider cyber-attacks and hybrid aggressions as armed attacks, in order to place them under art. 5 of the Washington Treaty and be able to apply the principle of collective defense. The response must take into account the related constraints of its implementation that can affect both its credibility and impact, in terms of public awareness and support of certain measures, the resources available, the nature of the hybrid attack or the attack attribution to the aggressor.

The second argument considers the fact that international law provides for sufficient measures, both internal and external, that can be taken to counteract hybrid aggression without using force. Here we can include imposing sanctions, financial protection, security sector

reform, fighting corruption, diversification of resources, education, infrastructure protection, cyber defense and regulation of mass-media activity. In other words, there is, however, a generous legal framework for horizontal escalation of actions to counter hybrid aggression.

C. Defender's instruments of power (MPECI) are considered high priority targets for the aggressor, especially during the hybrid aggression preparation phase. As we have mentioned, one of the criteria for achieving success in actions conducted prior to the attack is the disruption of the main structures that stand for the military, political, economic, civil and information instrument. Developing resilience and implementing strong and timely countermeasures by the defender really contributes to keeping its instruments of power operational, so that they can be used while planning the response and combating hybrid aggression.

In using the military instrument, the defender can employ the full range of military response options against hybrid aggression, but the intensity of the actions must depend on the strategic objectives set, thus respecting the principle of proportionality, even if the coercive power tends to be maximized in order to target the aggressor's vulnerabilities. The political measures may range from restricting the national access of state officials, severing diplomatic relations, to endorsing suspension of membership or withdrawing the voting rights of the aggressor in international bodies. The power of the economic instrument should never be underestimated. Economic sanctions targeting certain institutions, corporations or even persons operating in the economic spectrum of the aggressor can be extremely effective in the short term. However, on a long term, imposing economic sanctions, especially reducing commercial flow, can have a much greater impact on the population. As for the civilian instrument, actions such as public accusation, as happened after the 2016 US elections or the nomination of suspects, in the case of poisoning the former Russian KGB agent in England, can be very effective. Internally, the transparency through public blame increases society's trust in public institutions. Externally, it contributes to influencing the international public opinion against the aggressor. In addition to its basic mission of underpinning comprehension and decision-making, the information instrument can contribute actively to combating the hybrid aggression. An efficient activity of intelligence services and sound StratCom measures taken in order to support the openness and transparency of the countering actions and of mass-media, by regulating its activity, can increase society's confidence and access to information.

CONCLUSIONS

In our opinion, counteracting the hybrid threat must include a complex of actions to discourage and, if they have no effect, to combat hybrid aggression or at least some of its components. We must take into account the fact that the hybrid threat manifests through a highly complex, composite and adaptable system of aggressions that seriously affect the target, crippling its basic elements (society and governance) and disrupting its instruments of power (MPECI) based on the synergistic effect of its components. Moreover, some of the actions may cause even worse effects such as turning the population against the authorities or the military instrument against the population. Fighting and dismantling some of aggressor's actions or agents can lead to a significant diminution of the holistic aggressive result, rendering it useless or, at least, not as effective as planned.

The measures and actions meant to achieve success in countering the hybrid warfare must begin before the threat materializes into aggression and must be planned and conducted in a proactive manner. Otherwise, the target actor will face major difficulties in configuring and giving the response, difficulties that will escalate exponentially, as its power diminishes. Increasing the capabilities needed to counter the hybrid threat must be done in a proactive approach by prospecting crisis situations, building resilience, properly training the force and by

performing effective and efficient actions that compose the appropriate response. These sequences must be interconnected through an efficient national crisis management process, which must be carried out in cooperation at all levels of PMESII elements.

Although hybrid threat addresses the survival of the target state as it is, in terms of maintaining its *statu-quo*, so countering it would be a national defense problem, its characteristics and, in particular, its complex dynamics and the multiple domains concerned make it a national security issue, and the measures and countermeasures/counteractions must be at this level. Moreover, the way in which the threat is implemented, especially in the preparatory phase (which we consider critical), together with its amplitude and intensity in the attack phase, make the response to the hybrid threat almost unbearable by an actor state, alone. If effective countermeasures are not taken in the first phase, i.e. if the target state does not have an effective system for detecting the threat and timely implementing countermeasures in the early phase, defending against it in the second phase becomes extremely difficult. This is because many of the aggressor's high priorities targets in the preparatory phase are aimed at elements whose destruction or disruption leads to dismantling the instruments of power that the state should use to defend itself in the second phase.

It is well known that the hybrid threat generates a holistic effect which is much more than the sum of the effects generated by its constituent parts. Countering such a threat does not necessarily demand new capabilities as it requires new partners, new processes and, above all, a new strategic approach, a new way of thinking. Cooperation with other state actors in this area, in bilateral or multinational formats, is one of the key components in winning hybrid warfare.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. *** Countering hybrid threats, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2017, URL: <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats/>.
2. BACEVICH, Andrew J., "The Petraeus Doctrine", in *The Atlantic*, October 2008, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/10/the-petraeus-doctrine/306964/>.
3. BOGZEANU, Cristina, "Resilience: concept, approaches and implications", in *Strategic Impact* No. 3-4/2017, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest.
4. CULLEN, Patrick; WEGGE, Njord, *Countering Hybrid Warfare Project: Countering Hybrid Warfare*, Multinational Capability Development Campaign project, March 2019, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/784299/concepts_mcdc_countering_hybrid_warfare.pdf.
5. GERASIMOV, Valery, "Speech at the annual meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Science", in *Military-Industrial Courier*, January 2013, Moscow. 2013. URL http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf.
6. GHERASIMOV, Valery, "The value of science in prediction", in *VPK journal*, no. 8(476), 2013.
7. HOFFMAN, Frank, "Hybrid vs. Compound War: The Janus choice; Defining Today's Multifaceted Conflict", in *Armed Forces Journal*, 2009, URL: <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/>.
8. HOFFMAN, G. Frank; MATTIS, N. James, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars", in *Proceedings Magazine*, vol. 132/II/1,233, US Naval Institute, November 2005, URL: <http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf>.

9. HUBER, Thomas M., *Compound Warfare: That fatal knot*, 2002, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a481548.pdf>.
10. KREMIDAS-COURTNEY, Christopher, *Countering hybrid threats: We can't just buy a solution*, 15.02.2019, URL: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/237701/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/countering-hybrid-threats-we-cant-just-buy-a-solution>.
11. KRULAK, Charles C., "The strategic Corporal: Leadership in the three block war", in *Marines Magazine*, January 1999, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399413.pdf>.
12. LYKKE, Arthur F., Jr, "Toward An Understanding of Military Strategy", in *Guide to strategy*, U.S. Army War College, February 2001.
13. MASSICOT, Dara, *Anticipating a new Russian military doctrine in 2020: what it might contain and why it matters*, September 9, 2019, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/anticipating-a-new-russian-military-doctrine-in-2020-what-it-might-contain-and-why-it-matters/>.
14. RÁCZ, András, *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist*, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 16, 2015, URL: <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/russias-hybrid-war-in-ukraine>.

THEORIES ON HYBRID THREAT AND HYBRID WAR. DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY THINKING

Costinel Nicolae MAREȘI, Ph.D. Student

Lieutenant, "Carol I" National Defence University,
Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: maresicostinel@gmail.com

Abstract: *Suggesting a short citation of Marcus Luttrell, one of the American heroes of Asadabad, Afghanistan 2005, we can say that the war is not only black and white, it can also be gray, and the one who refuses to fight in the gray zone may lose the fight. This is the simplistic description, but it is a realistic way of conducting the contemporary war.*

In practice, the hybrid war existed, some said, just before being theorized, but this fundamental feature has gained new strengths in the contemporaneity, through the massive integration of aggressive means belonging to other plans than the military one. The theories regarding the hybrid war were accepted and granted by the schools of military thinking thanks to the efforts of experienced military personnel that fought in the conflict zones after the Cold War, the academic environment in the field of military sciences and the military organizations/ military entities that develop and apply military doctrines.

Keywords: *operational concept; unconventional; asymmetrical tactics; hybrid threat; multimodal war; transnational criminal organizations; fight for perceptions; information operations.*

INTRODUCTION

The hybrid warfare is a two-edged sword that is used both by USA and Russia in their campaign to diminish the other's influence using conventional and unconventional tactics and means, simultaneously.

Hybrid warfare is the last-minute topic for all those who are concerned with the study of war or armed conflicts, although it has been around for over a decade. Several critics of the new theories on hybrid threat and hybrid warfare bring strong arguments that this *hybrid* feature added is just a buzzword, a cosmetics of old warfare theories.

In the new bipolar world, or multipolar as others say, divided between the USA and Russia, together with their traditional allies, each one accuses each other of using a new kind of war that has surpassed the military field and targets many other aspects of society. Both sides condemn those who appeal the new tactics that they consider at least too despicable to operationalize them.

Approaching the subject in a dialectical manner, applied to two different theories, in this article I will highlight Russia and USA scientific and operational views on hybrid warfare theory.

1. Russia's view on hybrid warfare theory

Russia's interest in the theory of hybrid warfare (*gibridnaya voyna*, non-linear warfare) began with the observation of the West.¹ Their military doctrine already contained military theories similar, at a certain degree, to the American hybrid warfare theory, such as

¹ Ofer Fridman, "Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna?", in *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 162 No. 1, 2017, p. 42.

the subversive war theory, but they also came out with new theories such as *non-linear warfare* theory, a brand new hybrid theory of their own.

1.1. Subversion-war theory

In 1959, the Russian war theorist Evgeny Messner observed the rising in volume of the psychological and informational dimension that had transformed the nature of conflict, creating an entirely new type of confrontation that he called *subversion-war*². Before his passing in 1974, Evgeny Messner wrote many theoretical works regarding the evolution of warfare. The most outstanding of them was *Subversion – The Name of the Third World War*, where Messner stated that the regular forces have lost their military monopoly in conflict and the irregular forces were fighting together with the regular ones³. He established that this kind of war has some specific targets, very close to those from Frank Hoffman's theory: the disintegration of the spirit of the enemy population, the defeat of the enemy's active part (the military, partisan organizations and violent popular movements), the confiscation or elimination of objects of a psychological value, the confiscation or destruction of objects of material value, the creation of an impression of order to gain new allies and crush the spirit of the enemy's allies.

1.2. Non-linear war theory

Messner theory of subversion-war was brought in our days by Major General Alexander Vladimirov, the author of a Russian book on military strategy *Fundamentals of the General Theory of War*.

In 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, the Head of the Russian Federation's Army, argued that *wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template... the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures --applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special operations forces*.⁴ Since then it has been said that Russian strategy adapted to the hybrid warfare and was ready to make it an operative concept.

The conventional warfare was something that needed improvements. The Russian scholars did not include in their doctrine the Frank Hoffman's theory of hybrid warfare, instead they came on with one of their own, the non-linear war theory. The main concepts included in the Russian non-linear war theory, the so-called General Gerasimov's doctrine, were: deep operations, active measures and reflexive control.

Deep operations concept implies attacking a variety of targets into the depth of the enemy territory using high mobile forces (aeronautical and airborne forces) and can be extended to the use of operational and informational operations, diplomatic or even economic means.

² Ofer Fridman, "The Russian Perspective on Information Warfare: Conceptual Roots and Politicization in Russian Academic, Political, And Public Discourse", in *The official journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence*, Vol. 2, 2017, p. 68, URL: <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/offer-fridman-russian-perspectiveon-information-warfare-conceptual-roots-and-politicisation-russian>, accessed on July 21, 2019.

³ Ofer Fridman, "Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna?", in *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 162 No. 1, 2017, p. 43.

⁴ Lázaro Tijerina, "General Gerasimov And Modern War", 03.08.217, URL: <https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/general-gerasimov-and-modern-war>, accessed on July 21, 2019.

Active measures include operations in which the enemy's population and leaders can be influenced, namely deception operations, media manipulation, propaganda, bribe and many other non-military operations such as assassinations, sabotages etc.

Reflexive control is a behavioral theory adapted to the military domain that argues a state or a non-state actor could manipulate his adversary by understanding his behavioral pattern, his OODA loop (the cycle observe–orient–decide–act).⁵

1.3. Hybrid war theory as mixed Color Revolution and Unconventional Warfare

Our research has led me to another Russian theory of hybrid warfare never been encountered before. This theory assumes that a hybrid opponent such as the USA projects its strategic interests by appealing to hybrid warfare, that involves a psychological part, manipulation of the masses, called by the author the *color revolution* and a military part represented by *unconventional war*.⁶

Andrew Korybko thinks that the primary backbone for a Color Revolution is information outreach among the population, through propaganda (see Edward Bernay's 1928 *Propaganda*). Through propaganda a social network warfare can be initiated, a conflict energy is given to the masses which, in turn, start to riot and impose a regime change. If the newly made protestors or insurgents face up a harsh intervention from the security forces, and media shows to the international community cases of abuses, then external actors plead for intervention and start what Andrew Korybko names *unconventional war*, keeping its initial meaning of any nonconventional form of warfare. In the worst-case scenario a conventional warfare is started. In his paper Andrew Korybko argues that USA unconventional war tactics were described in a field manual, TC 18-01⁷ that was leaked by a whistleblower and eventually published in 2012.

His most important contribution is in describing the *color revolution* as a set of operations carried out through a complex interaction of many factors: ideology, finance, social, training, information and media. At the social factor he points out that making a *color revolution* implies three types of participants with different roles: *core, cohorts and civilians*. In conclusions he gives examples of former Soviet states' vulnerabilities that can be the target for this kind of hybrid warfare.

Andrew Korybko hybrid warfare theory is different than Frank Hoffman's theory, in terms of using less military intervention, but we must not forget that a *color revolution* could be done with the help of special operations forces.

2. United States of America's view on hybrid warfare theory

In the year 2002, William Nemeth first used the hybrid term in his dissertation work, presented in the California Naval School, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case of Hybrid Warfare*. Nemeth considered that the Chechen society had a traditionally built architecture on clans and families, naming them a hybrid society. In the author's opinion, this kind of society

⁵ Marius Potîrniche, "Non-linear warfare vs. Hybrid warfare", in *Romanian military thinking*, No. 1-2, 2018, pp. 10-20.

⁶ Andrew Korybko, *Hybrid wars: the indirect adaptive approach to regime change*, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Publishing House, Moscow, 2015, pp. 33, 78-80, URL: <https://orientalreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AK-Hybrid-Wars-updated.pdf>, accessed on September 10, 2019.

⁷ Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 2010, URL: <https://nsnbc.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/special-forces-uw-tc-18-01.pdf>, accessed on September 10, 2019.

developed a hybrid way of conducting combat actions against Russian forces, which combined elements of conventional and irregular warfare in a flexible and efficient manner.⁸

William Nemeth recognizes that he has developed this subject from the fourth-generation theory of warfare, already existing in American military thinking. In his vision the hybrid concept refers to both the organization and the means used by potential opponents, who can be state or non-State actors.

The emergence of the American version of hybrid warfare military theory inside US Marines Corps is the inevitable result of previous theories and researches published by the American military scholars, which have settled the basic ideas on which later Frank Hoffman built his famous theory.

2.1. Inspirational theories for developing hybrid war theory

Frank Hoffman describes a number of theories, in the section *Origins and Development of Hybrid Warfare* of his book entitled *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, theories that I listed first in the following paragraphs: *fourth generation warfare theory, unrestricted warfare theory, compound warfare theory and complex warfighting theory*.⁹

Beside the above-mentioned contributions to military knowledge, it is necessary to review some others that I consider to be linked indirectly with Frank Hoffman's theory on hybrid warfare: the *soft power theory and the five-ring theory*.

2.1.1. William Lind's fourth-generation warfare theory

Little is unknown, generally assumed with few critics brought, about the thinking of William Lind and the collective he collaborated with, on war generations, in particular the theory of the fourth generation of warfare.

War generations stand for a set of paradigms strictly related to the capabilities developed by military systems based on technological developments in a timeframe starting from the peace of Westphalia (1648) and ending with the Cold War. The generations of war following one another, according to those theorized by William Lind, are:

- First-generation warfare, considering as the best example the Napoleonic Wars in the beginning of 19th century, meant vast lines of soldiers meeting face to face;
- Second-generation warfare (e.g. WW I), meaning an increased fire-power, smaller units of men to maneuver separately, static firing positions and slow-moving infantry;
- Third-generation warfare, WW II *blitzkrieg*, focused on speed and surprise by using close air support and tanks;
- Fourth-generation warfare (contemporary wars), which is characterized by the following: at least one actor is non-state; war-peace dichotomy is diluted in a state of uncertainty regarding the geopolitical situation; the military conflict takes on exaggerated violent path justified by ethnic or religious believes; combatants mostly operate among the civilian population in order to be undetected; the battlefield is not well defined; technologically advanced arsenal is used.¹⁰

⁸ William J. Nemeth, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*, Naval Postgraduate School Publishing House, Monterey, 2002, URL: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36699567.pdf>, accessed on October 2019.

⁹ Hoffman Frank G., *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Publishing House, Arlington -Virginia, 2007, pp. 17-28.

¹⁰ William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth generation War", in *Military Review*, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Publishing House, 2004, pp. 12-16, URL: <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=482203>, accessed on July 21, 2019.

The ideas of William Lind regarding the fourth-generation warfare, who is a conservative American civilian, were taken over and redefined by a professional military scholar. Thomas X. Hammes, through his reference work *The Sling and the Stone; On War in the 21st Century*, became a disciple of Lind's theory in American military thinking. He manages to underscore some theoretical elements which will later be also observed in the theory of hybrid warfare and here I refer to the fact that the main line of effort is to affect the will of the adversary at the expense of his military submission.¹¹

2.1.2. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui's unrestricted warfare theory

In 1999, two colonels from the Armed Forces of China (the People's Liberation Army), Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, assumed the role of military theorists, and wrote their own book called *Unrestricted Warfare*. It is about war in the era of globalization, an evolved form of warfare in which all means are used, armed force and civilian population, military and non-military force, lethal and non-lethal means, in order to force the enemy to accept the interests pursued by these actions.

Through their work the two authors argued that a country like China could defeat a super-technological power like USA through another kind of war, in which the use of the armed forces is less important. They assumed that the future war will overcome all the known boundaries and limits, becoming briefly a war without limits. *In this war all means will be used, the information will be ubiquitous, the battlefield will spread everywhere, and the boundaries between war and non-war, military and non-military will be destroyed.*¹² Frank Hoffman recognized these three principles as being of great value for his theory.¹³

They also wrote down some essential principles for their theory: omni-directionality, synchrony, limited objectives, unlimited measures, asymmetry, minimal consumption, multidimensional coordination, adjustment and control of the entire process.

2.1.3. Thomas Huber's compound wars theory

Thomas Huber in *Compound Wars: The Fatal Knot* used the term *compound warfare*, defining it as the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy. He stated that the *compound war* increased the efficiency of military actions while concertedly applying conventional and unconventional force. Numerous examples of what he calls a *compound war* were given, including the American War of Independence (1775-1813) and Mao Zedong's military actions in the revolutionary Chinese movements (1927-1949).¹⁴

Therefore, compound wars are conflicts with regular and irregular components that fight simultaneously under unified direction of effort. The complementary effects of the compound wars are generated by its ability to exploit the advantages of each type of force and the nature of the threat that each of them represents. Irregular force attacks weak areas and obliges a conventional opponent to disperse their security forces. Conventional force

¹¹ Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, Zenith Press, St. Paul, 2004, pp. 12-31, apud Valerică Cruțeru, *Războiul hibrid în gândirea militară americană*, "Carol I" National University of Defence Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 10-13.

¹² Liang Qiao & Xiangsui Wang, *Unrestricted Warfare*, People's Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing 1999, pp. 3-4.

¹³ Frank Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁴ Şafak Oğuz, "Is Hybrid Warfare Really New?", in *Ankara University SBF Journal*, No. 3, Ankara, 2017, p. 529, URL: <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/345212>, accessed on July 25, 2019.

generally determines the opponent to focus for defense or to obtain critical mass for decisive offensive operations.¹⁵

2.1.4. David Kilcullen's complex warfighting theory

As Frank Hoffman acknowledged, David Kilcullen's concept paper *Complex Warfighting* was a very important source to his thinking at the time.

David Kilcullen is an Australian reserve officer, counterintelligence expert, who also worked for the US State Department in 2005-2006, so he was no stranger to the academic environment where Frank Hoffman was active.

When referring to *complex warfighting* David Kilcullen meant *the increasing complexity of terrain, which lost its purely geographic significance, appearing instead the synonyms such as physical terrain, human terrain, informational terrain, the second aspect concerned was the diffuse and unclear mixing between the types of conflict, between combatants and non-combatants, between the state of war and the state of peace.*¹⁶

Moreover, the Australian strategist relied heavily on the effects of globalization on contemporary military conflicts, on the role played by local insurgency movements seeking autonomy, social networks, global movements, local / regional culture and on training troops in asymmetrical battles with a weaker opponent who has an *evasive fighting character*. Military forces must be capable of achieving success in battle, but the success in combat situations will not lead to victory unless it is combined with effective actions in all the confrontation areas – political, economic, ideological and social, to mention the most important of them.

*Complex Warfighting operations will be conducted by Combined Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs). These task forces incorporate all elements of national power in an integrated framework, tailored and scaled to the requirements of a specific mission*¹⁷.

Joint Interagency Task Forces are being formed to achieve unity of effort and bring all instruments of national power¹⁸ (DIME spectrum: diplomacy, information, military, and economic) to bear on hybrid threats and may consist of: military forces, secret services, security and law enforce agencies, NGO and others. *For instance, NGO's extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations can make them valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes, making them an important player in a Joint Interagency Task Force.*¹⁹

2.1.5. Joseph Nye's soft power theory

Joseph Nye's *soft power* theory was brought to the public attention in the 20th century, more precisely in the '90s. *Soft power* has become popular both in the academic and operational environment, and both in and outside the United States. It was defined by Nye as "the ability to affect the behavior of others by influencing their preferences". He also mentioned that "there are at least three generic power currencies from which both power and

¹⁵ Thomas Huber, *Compound Wars: The Fatal Knot*, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, Kansas, 2002, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a481548.pdf>, accessed on August 10, 2019.

¹⁶ David Kilcullen, *Complex warfighting*, Australia, 2004, apud. Frank Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁷ David Kilcullen, *Complex Warfighting (draft developing concept)*, 7 April 2004, URL: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/complex_warfighting.pdf, accessed on August 10, 2019.

¹⁸ ***, *The lightning press-intellectual food for the military webpage*, URL: <https://www.thelightingpress.com/the-instruments-of-national-power/>, accessed on August 5, 2019.

¹⁹ Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, URL: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_08pa.pdf?ver=2018-02-08-091414-467, accessed on August 10, 2019.

its “softness” are derived. They can be called beauty, brilliance, and benignity”²⁰. In international relations, brilliance manifests itself in various forms, for example a strong and disciplined army, or a country that achieves military victories. Moreover, military alliances can also be examples of power outsourcing.²¹

Soft power is not synonymous with non-military power as it can be built by military forces through psychological operations, adversary cultural awareness and even through peace operations.

2.1.6. John Warden’s five-ring system theory

Colonel John Warden was an air power theorist working for the USAF at the time of the first Gulf War. Warden viewed the enemy as an organic system made of five concentric rings. In the order of their importance, from the innermost to the outer most, the rings represent *leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, fielded forces*. His theory is known as the *five-ring system theory* or as the *theory of strategic paralysis*.

The main value of this theory is that by destroying an inner ring will disable the ones that encompass it. Warden sees the leadership as the brain of the system, its center of gravity. Having this in mind, he suggested that commanders should direct their attack not towards the enemy’s army but to their leaders. If that is not possible they should concentrate the attack to the next power rings. Here I may say that the attack should not limit only to the physical domain.

*His theory was put in practice in Gulf War One when stealth aircraft targeted the Iraq’s government (Leadership), rapidly followed by concurrent attacks on the electrical grid and petroleum distribution (System Essentials), railroad bridges (Infrastructure), military elites (Population), and military units (Fielded Military).*²²

2.2. Frank Hoffman’s hybrid warfare theory

The most prominent pioneer of the *hybrid war* concept is said to be Frank Hoffman, whose work is considered to be the trigger in terms of hybrid warfare theory. Together with James N. Mattis, he wrote in 2005 the article *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*²³ which is considered the birth certificate of *hybrid wars*. In the late 2007 Frank Hoffman wrote his book *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. To characterize the nature of hybrid threats, Hoffman studied various historical examples such as the Irish insurgencies of 1919 and 1920, the mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Chechen rebels in conflict with Russian forces during the ‘90s, the Balkan (1990s) and the contemporary Middle East conflicts. The author paid special attention to the conflict between the Israeli Armed Forces and Hezbollah in 2006, especially in terms of operational and tactical missions.

Consequently, Hoffman defined hybrid threat as any enemy who simultaneously and adaptively uses the complex combination of conventional tactics, irregular elements, terrorism and organized crime in the battlefield, to meet his political goals. It aims at the combined exploitation of the weaknesses of the society (ethnic tensions, weak and corrupt institutions, economic / energy dependence, etc.) with the military ones, the latter not being explicitly

²⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs Publishing House, New York, 2004, p. 6

²¹ Alexander Vuving, “How Soft Power Works “, in *Soft Power and Smart Power (panel)*, Toronto, 2009, p. 8.

²² RNZAF Air Power Development Centre, *Revisiting Warden’s Rings Targeting for Today?*, URL: <http://www.airforce.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/apdc/tematataua-19-revisiting-wardens-rings.pdf>, accessed on July 25, 2019

²³ The full text is available at URL: <http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf>, accessed on July 25, 2019.

assumed.²⁴ The concept *hybrid warfare* does not have a unanimous accepted definition, but subscribes to the rules and principles of war. As Frank Hoffman states *the rise of hybrid warfare does not represent the defeat or the replacement of the old-style warfare or conventional warfare by the new, instead it presents a complicating factor for defense planning in the 21st Century.*²⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Russia and USA bring solid arguments about the new mutation of war towards a hybrid configuration providing detailed examples of an adversary making use of such means of waging war. Obviously, there is a common ground on hybrid warfare topic but also many differences, especially at conceptual level, starting from naming differently the same concept. The fact that both parties treat with great interest the theory of hybrid warfare can be accounted for an argument that it has an intrinsic value which raises it to the height of pre-existing war theories, deserving a rightful place in military science.

In this article I have brought to light substantial reasons to justify that the theory of hybrid warfare is not something that came from nowhere; it is the evolution in military thinking made by older warfare theories. It synthesizes the elements from many warfare theories in a new manner, both from the American and Russian military doctrines.

I strongly believe that this subject has much to reveal, can lead to profound understanding of military events that already happened and can help us to take a glimpse to the outcome.

Frank Hoffman thought that his theory of hybrid warfare had its place at tactical and operational level, but not having a strategic value. I may say that he underestimated the real potential of his theory, relying only on the military domain.

Unfortunately, nowadays there is a serious race between states for arming themselves with hybrid warfare means that builds up skepticism, cuts off diplomatic relations between states, rises crises and conflicts.

As a final thought, I consider that the idea of massively employing the deception, grasped by Sun Tzu in his famous work – *all warfare is based on deception, hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near*²⁶ – as being extremely relevant both for the non-linear warfare and for the hybrid warfare theory, a theory of the undeclared warfare situated in the gray area of military conflicts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, URL: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_08pa.pdf?ver=2018-02-08-091414-467.
2. ***, *The lightning press-intellectual food for the military webpage*, URL: <https://www.thelightningpress.com/the-instruments-of-national-power>.

²⁴ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Virginia, December 2007, p. 8, URL: https://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2019.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 43.

²⁶ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Allandale Online Publishing House, Leicester, 2000, p. 3, URL: https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf, accessed on July 25, 2019.

3. ***, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, URL: <https://nsnbc.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/special-forces-uw-tc-18-01.pdf>.
4. FRIDMAN, Ofer, "Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna?", in *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 162 No. 1, 2017.
5. FRIDMAN, Ofer, "The Russian Perspective On Information Warfare: Conceptual Roots And Politicization In Russian Academic, Political, And Public Discourse", in *The official journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence*, Vol. 2, 2017, URL: <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/ofer-fridman-russian-perspectiveon-information-warfare-conceptual-roots-and-politicisation-russian>.
6. HAMMES Thomas, *The Sling and the Stane: On War in the 21th Century*, Zenith Press, St. Paul, 2004.
7. HOFFMAN, Frank, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Publishing House, Arlington -Virginia, 2007.
8. HUBER, Thomas, *Compound Wars: The Fatal Knot*, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, Kansas, 2002, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a481548.pdf>.
9. KILCULLEN, Dave, *Complex Warfighting* (draft developing concept), URL: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/complex_warfighting.pdf.
10. KORYBKO, Andrew, *Hybrid wars: the indirect adaptive approach to regime change*, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Publishing House, Moscow, 2015, URL: <https://orientalreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AK-Hybrid-Wars-updated.pdf>.
11. LIND, William, "Understanding Fourth Generation War", U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Publishing House, *Military Review*, 2004.
12. NEMETH, William, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case of Hybrid Warfare*, Naval Postgraduate School Publishing House, Monterey, 2002.
13. NYE, Joseph, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs Publishing House, New York, 2004.
14. OĞUZ, Şafak, "Is Hybrid Warfare Really New?", in *Ankara University SBF Journal*, No. 3, Ankara, 2017, URL: <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/3452129>.
15. POTÎRNICHE, Marius, "Non-linear warfare vs. Hybrid warfare", in *Romanian military thinking*, No. 1-2, 2018.
16. QIAO, Liang; WANG, Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, People's Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing 1999.
17. RNZAF, Air Power Development Centre, *Revisiting Warden's Rings Targeting for Today?*, URL: <http://www.airforce.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/apdc/temataua-19-revisiting-wardens-rings.pdf>.
18. TIJERINA, Lázaro, *General Gerasimov And Modern War*, URL: <https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/general-gerasimov-and-modern-war>.
19. TZU, Sun, *Art of War*, Allandale Online Publishing House, Leicester, 2000, URL: https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf.
20. VUVING, Alexander, "How Soft Power Works", *Soft Power and Smart Power (panel)*, Toronto, 2009.

NATO-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP FOR COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

Costinel Nicolae MAREȘI, Ph.D. Student
Lieutenant, "Carol I" National Defence University,
Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: maresicostinel@gmail.com

Abstract: *The start of NATO-EU strategic partnership in countering hybrid threats was marked on July 8, 2016. At the NATO summit in Warsaw the president of the European Council Donald Tusk, the president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg signed a joint statement on EU-NATO cooperation in the field of defense and security. The discussions held by both parties at this summit aimed at starting joint projects against a common adversary, the 21st century hybrid threats. The general opinion was for increasing the ability to counter hybrid threats by strengthening resilience, by exchanging timely information and partnerships between intelligence departments, for building a strategic communication coordinated between both parties, as well as for having corresponding and coordinated military exercises built on countering hybrid threat scenario.*

Keywords: *strategic partnership; NATO-EU; hybrid threat; strategic communication; cyber defense.*

INTRODUCTION

Military doctrines introduces the levels of war as follows: political, military-strategic, operational, and tactical. The political level produces policy (*why* and *what*) and military strategy (how) links policy with the military domain. "Policy is essentially prescriptive. It can direct, assign tasks, prescribe desired capabilities and provide guidance for preparing the forces to perform their assigned roles"¹. The military strategy determines how the military forces should act in order to achieve the desired aims of policy. Operational and tactical levels execute the tasks established by strategy, concerning the employment of military forces in campaigns and operations.²

Before taking on the subject of NATO-EU partnership in countering hybrid threats it is necessary to highlight the difference between the two concepts (see Fig. no. 1):

Hybrid threats are a combination of a wide range of non-violent means to target vulnerabilities across the whole of society to undermine the functioning, unity, or will of their targets, while degrading and subverting the status quo. This kind of strategy is used by revisionist actors to gradually achieve their aims without triggering decisive responses, including armed responses.

¹ AJP-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine, NATO Standardization Office, 2017, p. 1-1.

² Murat Caliskan, "Hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory", in *Defense & security analysis*, Vol. 35, 2019, p. 4.

Hybrid warfare is the challenge presented by the increasing complexity of armed conflict, where adversaries may combine types of warfare plus non-military means to neutralize conventional military power.³




Figure no. 1: Hybrid threats and hybrid warfare shown on a continuum of conflict

The idea which I wish to emphasize is that the NATO-EU new born partnership is for countering hybrid threats. By hybrid threats they mean the above description, where most of the military (conventional warfare) contribution is ignored, avoiding Frank Hoffman's original theory of hybrid warfare, and the combination of conventional and unconventional means, terrorism and criminal activity.

When they discuss about hybrid threats they situate themselves at strategic level not at operational or tactical level, in contradiction with Frank Hoffman's theory. NATO-EU partnership aims to counter hybrid threats by appealing to psychological and informational operations, especially cyber operations, disregarding in high percentages the use of regular forces. However, one certain argument for my statement is that EU cannot protect itself against full hybrid warfare spectrum due to the fact that EU doesn't have yet regularly (conventional) forces.

1. NATO-EU initial joint actions proposals

The EU and NATO cooperated before, for example in 2004 when EU deployed Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (under Berlin Plus Agreement). Then, EU benefited in full of NATO expertise and capabilities. The two organizations shook hands again in the following conflicts from Afghanistan and Kosovo. Sharing the same values and much of their member states being parts in both organizations, an honest and solid partnership was imminent.

On July 8, 2016, at the NATO summit in Warsaw, European Council President Donald Tusk, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg signed a joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation in defense and security. The areas of discussion were numerous but I will mention only the ones on countering hybrid threats. The high representatives of both parties voted for (see Figure no. 2):

a) Increasing the capacity to *counter hybrid threats*, strengthening resilience, collaboration in early analysis, prevention and warning, timely information exchange, partnerships between intelligence services and coordinated strategic communication on both sides;

³ ***, *Countering Hybrid Warfare: Conceptual Foundations and Implications for Defence Forces*, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795224/20190318-MCDC_CHW_Info_note_8.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2019.

- b) Extending bilateral coordination in the field of *cyber security* and defense, during operations and in common exercises, by training of professionals in cybernetic environments;
- c) Working together in parallel and coordinated *exercises*, including against the hybrid threat, planned for year 2017-2018⁴.




Figure no. 2: Info graphic implementation of NATO-EU Joint Declaration July 8, 2016⁵

This statement naturally came in response to hybrid threats proliferated at that time in the vicinity of the community area, in south by ISIS and in east by Russia, after it was noted that the informational operations undertaken by the adversaries had as objectives, both NATO-EU diplomatic relations and each of them in a separated manner.

After assuming this policy of cooperation by the two international bodies followed the elaboration of concrete measures, so a common set of proposals (42 proposals on 7 areas) was endorsed by the Council of the European Union on December 6, 2016, which had been approved during a parallel process by NATO in a North Atlantic Council. At the same time, it has been established by the European side that, from June 2017 onwards, six-monthly reports on the implementation of this common set of proposals, including possible proposals on streamlining future cooperation, should be provided.

The conclusions of the EU Council reaffirmed a cooperation between the EU and NATO that will continue to be carried out in a spirit of full openness and transparency and in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organizations.⁶

The joint proposals concerned means of:

1. *Countering possible hybrid threats*, through parallel NATO-UE procedures in order to obtain:

a) Timely knowledge of the situation, an effective exchange of information of an urgent nature between the EU fusion cell against hybrid threats and the similar structure within NATO, the collaboration of states from both sides with the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, Finland (Hybrid CoE)⁷;

b) Strategic communication, opportune response and analysis of disinformation directed against the EU and NATO (throughout the online spectrum, including social networks), a solid cooperation between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia⁸ and the EEAS⁹ Strategic Communications Unit;

⁴ NATO-EU Joint Declaration at the Warsaw Summit on July 8, 2016, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>, accessed on July 21, 2019.

⁵ *EU-NATO cooperation* Fact Sheet, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet-final.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2019

⁶ European Council Declaration on December 6, 2016, URL: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15283-2016-INIT/ro/pdf>, accessed on August 20, 2019.

⁷ The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, URL: <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/>, accessed on August 20, 2019.

⁸ NATO StratCom Center of Excellence, URL: <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/>, accessed on August 20, 2019.

c) Decisive crisis management and harmonization of parallel activities.

2. *Establishing common cyber defense* by increasing the interoperability of requirements and standards in the field, training courses available to the staff of both organizations (knowledge sharing), enhancing the collaboration of EU similar structures with NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia¹⁰ and exercises with joint participation such as *Cyber Coalition* and *Cyber Europe*.

3. *Operating parallel and coordinated exercises* such as certain pilot projects that had been made in 2017 and 2018, but also the NATO crisis management exercise 2017 (CMX 17) and the EU multi-level crisis management exercise 2018 (ML 18), which also included hybrid elements, as well as mutual invitations to events like workshops, presentations, and so on.¹¹

On December 15, 2016, at the quarterly meeting, the European Council communicated that one of the priorities of the European Union internal Security Strategy for the period 2015-2020 was the implementation of the joint EU-NATO set of proposals.

The development of EU and NATO capabilities aimed to complement efforts while avoiding duplication.¹²

On June 08, 2017 the Council of the EU decided to establish the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to improve EU crisis management structures.

2. Implementation of NATO-UE joint framework on countering hybrid threats

On June 14, 2017, in the first joint report¹³, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General presented to the European Council new opportunities for collaboration in countering hybrid threats through establishing the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell in order to offer a single focus for the analysis of hybrid threats. It was established to be within the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

An effect of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) was the creation of an EU information situation and analysis center, the main body integrating the security assessment efforts based on information provided by the information services in the community area. This action was followed in 2017 by setting up the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, that analyses and shares open-source and classified information received from different actors within the EEAS and from member states (having a network of national contact points), specifically to indicate and warn on hybrid threats.¹⁴

In all this context, a very important bilateral relationship in countering hybrid threats is the one between the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the NATO Hybrid Analysis Branch.

In the second report on November 29, 2017 on EU cooperation on security and defense issues, the operationalization of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), Helsinki, was highlighted. Also, it was argued that NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence had shared its cyber defense courses to the

⁹ European External Action Service.

¹⁰ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre, URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/>, accessed on August 20, 2019.

¹¹ European Council Declaration on December 6, 2016, URL: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15283-2016-INIT/ro/pdf>, p. 67.

¹² European External Action Service, *EU-NATO Cooperation*, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet-final.pdf, accessed on August 20, 2019.

¹³ First progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on December 6, 2016, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23997/170614-joint-progress-report-eu-nato-en.pdf>, accessed on August 20, 2019.

¹⁴ European Commission Press Release Database Official Website, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1250_en.htm, accessed on August 25, 2019.

EU for uniformity, discussions and with the purpose to build a taxonomy of cyber incidents and cyber hygiene. In September and October 2017, exercises were conducted in parallel and coordinated, EU PACE17/CMX17 which exploited the 4 areas of the hybrid threat procedures: Early warning/knowledge of the situation, strategic communication, cyber defense, and crisis management (prevention and response to crisis).¹⁵

On June 8, 2018, in the third report, it was brought into account that the newly established EU intelligence capability and the NATO Joint Intelligence and Security Division (OSINT NATO component) regularly communicate (monthly) through videoconferencing. The ongoing efforts on countering hybrid threats are built on the already-presented institutions, now strengthened by the cooperation of the intelligence service. During the period covered by the mentioned report, NATO has invited EU to the following military exercises: *Trident Juncture 18*; *Trident Jaguar 18*; *Cyber Coalition 18* and *Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise 18*, while NATO participated with observers at *MILEX 18* in April 2018. Discussions were made also about the planning of the *HEX-ML 18* and *PEACE 2018* exercises, which provide for cyber-attack scenarios and hybrid threat.¹⁶

On July 10, 2018, one day before the NATO summit in Brussels, a new joint declaration for the continuation of the EU and NATO strategic partnership was signed, like the one in Warsaw, reassigning the joint fight against hybrid threats, the joint efforts in cyber defense and parallel and coordinated exercises, together with the new objectives on the common agenda:

- a) Military mobility;
- b) Combating terrorism;
- c) Increasing the resistance to the risks posed by CBRN substances (new fear occurring in the community area after the attack with the neurotoxic agent "Noviciok" against the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, UK, of March 4, 2018).¹⁷

On this occasion, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, held that the EU and NATO have 22 common members and around 90% of EU citizens live in NATO countries, and the strategic partnership between the two bodies only gives a note of complementarity to joint efforts.

I manifest my enthusiasm that this strategic partnership is very timely and considerably increases the security of member states against hybrid threats and effective crisis management. NATO-EU partnership links together many structures which are key institutions in their efforts and I consider it very opportune for Romania to keep close to the NATO-EU common vision in this *grey war*. I emphasize the fact that in November 2018 Romania expressed its willingness to participate in the Memorandum of Understanding at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), thus becoming the 19th member of the Centre.¹⁸

¹⁵ Second progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35577/report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf>, accessed on September 7, 2019.

¹⁶ Third progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on December 6, 2016 and 5 December 2017, URL: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_180608-3rd-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-eng.pdf, accessed on August 9, 2019.

¹⁷ Joint declaration on NATO-EU cooperation by the president of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of NATO, URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf, accessed on August 7, 2019.

¹⁸ Robert Lupitu, *Romania became the 19th member of Hybrid CoE*, URL: <https://www.calea-europeana.ro/romania-a-devenit-al-19-lea-stat-membru-al-centrului-european-de-excelenta-pentru-combaterea-amenintarilor-hibride-cu-sediul-la-helsinki/>, accessed on August 5, 2019.

It can be seen that the core of the NATO-EU partnership for the fight against hybrid threats are of recent date and are located in the western part of Europe, where there are the central offices of the two major international bodies and also in the eastern part of the Baltic countries, which were targeted by Russia's hybrid attacks. For example, it is not a coincidence that the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence was built in the year 2008 in Tallinn, bearing in mind that in 2007 Estonia was the target of strong cyber-attacks that came from Russia.

A weak spot in NATO-EU cyber-security is that there are a lot of cyber-security hubs that are not linked to one center, making the information flow quite inefficient. A study in 2017 had revealed that there were 660 cyber expertise centers in the member states. Serious discussions are being made to build a network of national centers in the field of cybersecurity and a new European center for industry, technology and cyber research, in order to reduce the gap technology between states, to stop the brain migration and to find solutions in crisis situations faster.¹⁹




Figure no. 3: The three pillars of an efficient strategy in countering hybrid threat

To sum up, I believe that the NATO-UE partnership strategy in achieving security against the hybrid threat stands on three pillars (see Figure no. 3): the development of *common resilience* (through lessons learned, identifying vulnerabilities, coordinated exercises), *strategic communication* (StratCom), in order to combat disinformation and *cyber security*, as cyberspace is the operational terrain of the future, whereby a potential opponent can engage deeply and with maximum efficiency in our devices.

CONCLUSIONS

One huge step towards a more secure environment against hybrid threats has been done during the Romanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and involves the newly built Rapid Alert System (RAS) that became functional on 18 March 2019. RAS helps Member States and EU institutions to share information from media monitoring, to address disinformation campaigns and also to build situational awareness regarding possible attacks on the elections networks. It is based on open-source information, information from social platforms and browsing trends. The procedure is simple: EU member states upload information into RAS, which, in turn and under European External Action Service

¹⁹ European Commission Official Website, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/proposal-european-cybersecurity-competence-network-and-centre>, accessed on August 13, 2019.

supervision, provides coordinated responses to disinformation campaigns. As I mentioned before, disinformation is a vital instrument used by a hybrid threat and RAS could efficiently counter it.

In the second half of 2019 Finland took the presidency of the Council of the European Union and reaffirmed that "member states will strengthen their capacities to prevent and respond to hybrid threats through coordinated response at EU level and in close cooperation with NATO".²⁰

The NATO-UE partnership, whose main target is to prevent and respond to hybrid threats, should not replace each member country own defense measures. Each state should focus on finding their own vulnerabilities so as to understand the kind of hybrid threats that can be directed against them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, European Commission Official Website, URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/proposal-european-cybersecurity-ompetence-network-and-centre>.
2. ***, European Commission Press Release Database Official Website, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1250_en.html.
3. ***, European Council Declaration on December 6, 2016, available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15283-2016-INIT/ro/pdf>.
4. ***, European External Action Service, *EU-NATO Cooperation*, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet-final.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2019
5. ***, Finland's Presidency of the Council of the European Union official website, *Common action to counter hybrid threats*, URL: <https://eu2019.fi/en/backgrounders/hybrid-threats>.
6. ***, First progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23997/170614-joint-progress-report-eu-nato-en.pdf>.
7. ***, Joint declaration on NATO-EU cooperation by the president of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of NATO, URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf.
8. ***, Multinational Capability Development Campaign, *Countering Hybrid Warfare: Conceptual Foundations and Implications for Defence Forces*, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795224/20190318-MCDC_CHW_Info_note_8.pdf.
9. ***, NATO-EU Joint Declaration at the Warsaw Summit on July 8, 2016, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>.
10. ***, Second progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35577/report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf>.
11. ***, Third progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, URL: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_180608-3rd-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-eng.pdf.

²⁰ Finland's Presidency of the Council of the European Union official website, *Common action to counter hybrid threats*, URL: <https://eu2019.fi/en/backgrounders/hybrid-threats>, accessed on August 13, 2019.

12. LUPITU, Robert, *Romania became the 19th member of Hybrid CoE*, URL: <https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/romania-a-devenit-al-19-lea-stat-membru-al-centrului-european-de-excelenta-pentru-combaterea-amenintarilor-hibride-cu-sediul-la-helsinki>.
13. CALISKAN, Murat, “Hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory”, in *Defense & security analysis*, Vol. 35, 2019.

SPACE STRATEGIES IN THE 21st CENTURY: INITIATING “STRATEGIC PROTECTED COSMIC AREAS”. IS THE “IMMEDIATE COSMIC SPACE” AN “ASSET FOR THE ENTIRE HUMANITY”? THE NEW AMERICAN STRATEGIC CONCEPT “MOON-MARS STRATEGIC COMPLEX”

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU, Ph.D.
Researcher, University of Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: vam55ro@yahoo.com

Abstract: *In our opinion, at present, academics are not giving enough attention to a fully developing and transforming topic – the geostrategic evolutions of the so-called “near cosmic space”. Major strategic doctrines of great powers include, nevertheless, several express or implicit elements regarding this area. Our paper is proposing to identify and explore briefly, some elements of the American strategic doctrine concerning relation to cosmic space, after the Cold War epoch, to identify lines of strategic continuity and elements of novelty brought by Trump doctrine. Can we talk about initiation, within the American strategic doctrine, under Trump administration, of a very ambitious strategic concept regarding cosmic space that can be a tri-dimensional strategic complex (Earth-Moon-Mars), within a space doctrine, where “Moon–Mars” are considered to represent two inter-connected strategically elements forming a single area? How is the American strategic doctrine relating to the extra-Earth space? Can we talk about a strategic concept as the “near cosmic space”/ “the space close vicinity” and what would be its limits? What would be US contribution in creating a “strategic orbital complex” to include/exclude the present international space station, and what would be the basis for re-discussion of the present international space cooperation? Can we talk about consecration of the “protected strategic cosmic areas” concept, or about the “near cosmic space as common good of the whole mankind”?*

Keywords: *strategic complex “Earth-Moon-Mars”; orbital strategic complex; space race; limits of international space cooperation; extra-Earth strategic area; strategic protected cosmic areas; space close vicinity; Moon-Mars strategic area; US strategic space doctrine.*

INTRODUCTION

The idea to configure a national policy of space goes back as far as the ‘50s, during the Eisenhower administration. So far, presidential administrations have preferred not to adopt comprehensive documents on the matter, instead referring to *specific issues*. It is worth mentioning, however, that a National Space Policy was signed during the Jimmy Carter administration, in 1978, followed by two other directives regarding the civil space policy. Starting with Carter, other presidential decrees regarding the NSP have been passed, in each following administration that showed an interest in issuing documents *connecting* the national policies regarding activities such as commercial special transportation, navigation, exploration¹.

¹ James A. Vedda, “Considerations for the next national policy space”, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, policy paper, March 2017, URL: <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/NationalSpacePolicy.pdf>, accessed at 23 July 2019.

*The interdiction on invoking the “right to space sovereignty”² (a legal obligation for the US and other powers of the space) can be in future, questioned from the perspective of the interest shown by these great special powers in claiming extra-terrestrial mineral and exploitation resources in the future³. Although the space-related rights continue to be governed by a set of universally accepted principles, such as exploiting and using space for peaceful purposes, the principle of cooperation among states regarding the cosmic space and encouraging the scientific discoveries as an asset of the entire humanity⁴, in parallel, the great powers have continued to adopt *strategic approaches regarding their own interests* in the cosmic space and its resources.*

Therefore, one cannot overlook a *competition* for access to the cosmic space, to build stable bases, to use the cosmic space for observation, communication or commercial purposes, to explore space as *an asset of national interest* for these powers, despite the principles of international cooperation. These countries continue to view the cosmic space as *a domain which eventually becomes the object of competition for claiming the right to sovereignty*, which would entail the risk of positioning the other (non-spatial) states in a disadvantageous way and thus violating the principle of equality of rights among all the states. In other words, the cosmic space *already raises, in our opinion, future questions of international law, as the strategic and sovereign approach to the cosmic space becomes increasingly accentuated*, as well as *the competition among the great powers over several space-related fields. A Westphalian, neorealist approach to the space would emphasise an increasing competition among the great space powers*, legitimating even the idea of *claiming sovereignty* over various delimited space areas/territories, over various areas of celestial bodies/over the Earth’s orbit. These claims, in our view, would generate in concrete international relations, tensions and disagreements among the space states *regarding the boundaries*, which would raise the issue of the necessity to create, from the second half of 21st century, *a compelling space law*, with clearly defined rights and obligations regarding the space-related territorial delimitations and the right to conquer space territories (similar to conquering a new continent), as well as the issue of *a Space Tribunal or a Space Mediator, with the role to prevent and solve the differences among states regarding the requests for sovereignty and drawing the space territories*.

In the future, the problem would be even more complicated with the competition over space growing more intense, in our view, in the Westphalian neorealist paradigm, due to several reasons.

Firstly, *discrimination and exclusion of the non-space states* would occur, with these states being deprived of the possibility to exercise the space sovereignty exercised by the great powers. This would infringe upon the international contemporary law (designed mainly as land law – including the maritime law dimension), as well as its coordinating nature (an expression of the equal and sovereign quality of all the states).

Two categories of states would be created in the space competition: space states (which have the capacity to access space) and *non-space states* (which do not have the capacity to access space, being therefore deprived of the right to exercise their sovereignty over a space territory, under conditions of equality with the great space powers). Therefore, we observe that at this point the contemporary international law is *obsolete*, and the legal issues need to be solved using *parameters that belong to new branches of international law (public or private)*.

In addition, when discussing the *first category (the space states)*, the international law *would remain behind as legal categories, with different rights and obligations being created by*

² Ion Diaconu, *Curs de drept internațional public*, Șansa SRL Publishing house, Bucharest, 1993, p. 147; Ludovic Takacs; Marțian I. Niciu, *Drept internațional public*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, Bucharest, 1976, pp. 176-177.

³ James A. Vedda, *op.cit.*

⁴ Ludovic Takacs; Marțian I. Niciu, *op.cit.*, pp. 174-178.

the space states: states which only have the capacity to *access* space (in a limited number of cases); states with a *permanent* capacity to access space (with a space policy and the means to *access space on a regular basis*, during each presidential administration); states which *own their own bases* in space; states which *do not own their own orbital bases*, and find themselves in the position to apply the principles of the international law on the cooperation among states regarding the peaceful use of space; states which *own bases on celestial bodies* (planets, natural satellites) and states which *do not own* such bases. These different situations lead to *legal issues and claims: who has the right to determine the borders of space territories* for commercial exploitation, for urbanization, permanent habitation etc.? Who has the right to set borders on space territories for communication, observation, strategic or military planning? *What would be the legal grounds* (or the first come, first served principle specific to the exploration of virgin territories) for setting these borders, *once the competition for space is triggered on Westphalian, practical and neorealist bases*? Would the states *conclude a special international treaty to ban non-state actors, private companies, individuals, various networks* from claiming the right to delimit and occupy areas in space, in the same manner as the states? To what extent would this treaty be observed if the underground empires, the transnational criminal organizations, the drug cartels, the terrorist networks *decided to participate in this space race and claim space territories, registering them in the International Register for Space Territories as private property, company property or property of a quasi-state*? An entire research-area of what we prefer to call "space geopolitics" would start, in this hypothesis, to develop itself, based on this Westphalian approach which has already started to pressure the entire strategic political approach of the great space powers, *determining them to rather focus on a pragmatic, commercial or security approach to space*.

Non-state actors (so-called future "space leagues"). The 21st century world is a *globalized world*, which cannot exclude the proliferation of non-state actors from the elements within the scope of the space policy evolution. Currently, international law does not expressly set interdictions against non-state actors accessing space and claiming property rights over space territories. However, another issue arises: *who delimits space territories and what criteria do they use on these space territories*, which are either the subject of state sovereignty, or the subject of the property right of non-state actors (*space private property?*). In the future, the legal issues will become complex, as the *competition over spaces starts to generate problems not only in the international public field* (issues with the relationships among states), *but also in the international private law* (differences among states and private individuals/companies regarding claims over space territories), *the business law* (business relations, commercial relations among private actors, transnational or national companies, which assume the right to access and explore space areas), *the international commercial law* (commercial relations among the states or among the states and the companies), or *the space investment law* (regulating investment-related legal relations regarding space and its exploitation).

So-called future "space federations" can be another type of actors, as composed from small and medium states grouped into a legal entity with legal personality, with the right to access space and to claim space sovereignty).

Finally, *the global approach to space*, supporting the premise that, starting from the model of the 21st century globalised world (which has moved on from the concept of the nation-state), some *mixed associations* (between *states and private actors, capable of supporting access to space*) can be formed, with the territorial delimitations (including small and medium states) and the claim over territorial sovereignty including the latter. *The space would be delimited, in this hypothesis, not only as a state territory, but also as private property, hence the occurrence of a space civil law, of a law covering space transports, of a space public law* (a branch of the international law which is better developed than the current ones). It could be

an approach to space based on *a peaceful mentality* (a harmonious society) or *a conflictual one* (with the state and non-state actors fighting over the power and influence, claiming the right to space sovereignty/private property, and the right to explore and exploit resources and strategic territories for their own use).

The occurrence, in the globalized world of 21st century, of some *special global institutions*, which, in our view, could handle the specific issues arisen as a result of the space competition: *a set of specific institutions, such as the Space Mediator* (which mediates among the states, among the states and non-state actors, among non-state actors); *a Space Tribunal* (in charge with issues regarding space transports, space delimitations, ownership rights); *a Global Body for Space Order and Safety* (some sort of UN branch required to prevent conflicts between states and non-state actors, in space or on space-related matters).

1. The “National Space Strategy”, Part of the “America First Doctrine” and Fundamental Pillar of a Global Leadership Policy, as Developed by the Trump Administration

A quite recent report, dated March 2016 and issued by the American Centre for Space Policies, also mentions certain *recommendations and comments* regarding what the next American National Space Policy⁵ should look like.

A notable element of the *national space policy is the NSS (National Security Space)* or the Space of National Security: this element would include *strategic objectives* such as: integration of the commercial capacities *in a space security architecture* (the role of the communication services with commercial satellites, as well as other issues, should be defined in the military satellites communications architecture); access to (with a focus on cutting launching costs and on improving flexibility and safety); proximity operations; the spatial industrial base (interest in maintaining a sufficient level of expertise and capacities⁶).

Starting from 2017, during the Trump administration, interest in developing a national spatial policy able to *compete simultaneously* against the *ascending* space policies of other states (India, China, Russia, France, and EU etc.) has increased, taking the shape of *a true national space strategy*, with clear objectives and milestones. Thus, the US continues to maintain its status as a space power, in the 21st century as well, in the context of *the multipolarity displayed by the space field, too*.

Thus, on March 23rd, 2018, the White House issued a press release about adopting the National Space Strategy, based on *the objective to ensure the US leadership in the space race*. This approach is based on four pillars: “it ensures durable space architecture; it discourages the adversaries and covers the war options; it improves the basic capabilities, structures and processes (which would include space situational awareness, intelligence and acquisition issues); it supports conducive international and internal environments”⁷.

According to this report, the Strategy introduces *a reform-based perspective* of the American industry, in order to guarantee that the US maintains its *leader status* among the global suppliers of space services and technologies⁸.

The National Space Strategy falls within the scope of the “space competition”, which it includes in Trump’s doctrine (“MAGA-AF”, “Make America Great Again”, and “America

⁵ James A. Vedda, *op. cit.*

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ ***, *White House releases facts sheet on National Space Strategy*, 26 March, 2018, URL: <https://www.space.commerce.gov/white-house-releases-fact-sheet-on-national-space-strategy/>. Jeff Foust, *New National Space Strategy emphasizes “America First” policies*, March 24, 2018, URL: <https://spacenews.com/new-national-space-strategy-emphasizes-america-first-policies/>, accessed on 20 July 2019.

⁸ Idem.

First"). This specific dimension intends to ensure the protection of American interests in space, in the competition with other powers, through a revised approach, with a space military layer added, and through reforms regarding the commercial regulations⁹. The purpose of the Strategy is to "*make America strong, competitive, and great*", from the perspective of the American interests in the cosmic space, as well. *One of the specific neo-realist Westphalian elements of this strategy* (focused on the competition among states, in the space sector, too) also introduces the idea of *protecting the American security and military interests*. According to the Strategy, the Trump administration admits that the "*competitors and adversaries have turned space into a warfighting domain*". The document reiterates a theme used by the American president Donald Trump in a speech given on March 13th, 2018, in which he mentioned the creation of a *Space Force*.

According to the *National Space Strategy*¹⁰, influenced by the Westphalian perspective (which includes the possibility to use the cosmic space for a military conflict, besides the commercial competitions or the international cooperation), "any harmful interference with or attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing"¹¹. The neorealist perspective of the Strategy (integrated in the America First doctrine) clearly shows a *security and military US approach* to space, considered *necessary for the protection of American interests in space*, while revealing *space as the playing field for the competition among the space powers*, a competition which is commercial, while also *including strategic components, space security architectures that can interfere in a conflictual manner*. However, including *the perspective of a space conflict among the space powers is a precautionary measure*, in our perspective, meant to *discourage* potential adversaries or competitors, and to make a concrete, visible statement, to assume this dimension of military security and protection of the American interests in space. This means that, through the "America First" doctrine, the US intends to assume the "space power" role of from the perspective of space policies, while *considering the possibility to ensure global space leadership, i.e. ensure space preeminence* among all the space powers. It is an extremely ambitious strategic objective, which the US realizes it can achieve only by associating *a constellation of allies* to it, to *approve the America First doctrine*.

If *these allies (not named as such in the respective strategy)*, which can be the allies from the configurations of *already existing terrestrial alliances* (for example, the US allies within NATO) or *US partners outside NATO* (the strategy is rather vague about this aspect), or *they can be other allies* (a network of US space architecture built exclusively for space objectives, therefore detached from any terrestrial alliances, *with allies specially selected within a special treaty over space and space defence* that could be conceived and signed by the US during the following years, based on the space component of the America First doctrine) *choose not to participate/not to support/not to agree on a doctrine such as America First, then the US is aware of the fact that its space security architecture cannot be executed or is fragile*. This is something that *the US cannot afford to have* (weak, fragile, questionable space architecture) because the US's explicit objective is *space unilateralism* (including an explicit *security and military* component). America First is a doctrine meant to restate the American global

⁹ Marcia Smith, "White House Releases Fact Sheet on New National Space Strategy – Updated", SpacePolicyOnline.com, 24 March 2018, URL: <https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/white-house-releases-fact-sheet-on-new-national-space-strategy/>, accessed on 20 July 2019.

¹⁰ Also see Brian WEEDEN, "US National Security Space Policy and Strategy: From Sanctuary to Space Force", JMOD Symposium on Space Security, Tokyo, Japan, February 6, 2019, URL: swfound.org, accessed on 20 July 2019. Also see: Marcia Smith, *op. cit.*

¹¹ *Ibidem.*

unilateralism, based on *an offensive policy and a strategy to expand* the security architecture not only at terrestrial level (including the maritime level), but also *at space level*. In other words, in the 21st century, the US intends to maintain its dominant position as an air force power, as a maritime power, as well as *to build a space security architecture* meant to guarantee its position *as a supreme power of the space* (in its security and military dimension)¹².

However, this does not exclude the international cooperation with commercial and international partners, in order to ensure the US's commercial industry, to ensure the bilateral and multilateral agreements to support it, enabling human exploration, task division and leading the collective response to threats¹³.

The strategy also includes guidelines regarding the policies for *commercial regulation* of the space. Thus, in a recommendation issued on February 21st, 2018, the National Space Council proposes that the role of the Office for Space Commerce, attached to the US Trade Department, be strengthened¹⁴. It is, however, *a commercial approach that needs to be interpreted in the context of the America First doctrine*, i.e. protecting the American interests and the American businesses first, in any commercial agreements regarding space. The strategy encourages civil space activities, acknowledging that they ensure the starting point for the new generation of American space exploration. According to Space Policy Directive no.1 issued by President Trump, NASA adds returning to the Moon as an objective to the human spaceflight programme, while human missions on Mars become a long-term goal¹⁵. The following statement was made at the assembly held on February 21st 2018 by the National Space Council, chaired by Vice President Mike Pence: “not only will this strategy advance the benefits of space for us, but it will also ensure a benefit for all the peoples, from the great potential provided by space”¹⁶.

On May 14th, 2019, during the hearings before the Trade Committee of the USA Senate, the director of the Office for Space Commerce was heard on the matter of “The Emerging Space Environment. Operational, technical, and policy challenges”¹⁷. He considers that the future of the operational space environment will be mainly commercial, with the commercial space industry entailing a greater need for support from the US Trade Department. In addition, he discussed issues concerning the evolution of the framework management, of the new commercial space traffic, imposed by the space policy Directive 3¹⁸.

2. “Moon-Mars Geostrategic and Space-Political Structure”, as viewed by Trump Administration and the New US Space Policy for the 21st Century. The Science of “Space-Politics” and Its Object

We consider that an element which is truly revolutionary from a geopolitical standpoint for space management, for the security, defence and commercial implications is included in *the famous tweet sent by President Trump on June 7th 2019*, regarding the fact that NASA should not send people to the Moon as this is an obsolete element of the American space policy, and it is more part of America's space history, rather than an

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ ***, Testimony from Senate Hearing on the Emerging Space Environment, 14 May 2019, URL: <https://www.space.commerce.gov/testimony-from-senate-hearing-on-the-emerging-space-environment/>, accessed on 12 July 2019.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

ambitious objective¹⁹. The American President considers that NASA should focus on grander things, *"including Mars (of which the Moon is a part), Defence and Science"*²⁰. This phrase has been quite debated or mocked by the press, but it has not been debated sufficiently by the doctrine. Of course, President Trump did not make a mistake as a part of the press tries to imply²¹, leaving aside a serious analysis and replacing it with shallow comments. *This phrase is essential for an entire new, developing American space doctrine, starting from the current national space strategy. It is a very ambitious approach, which is part of the America First-MAGA doctrine.* At the same time, we cannot exclude the fact that this is a *Westphalian, neorealist view*, therefore a view *assuming a potential conflict among the space powers, when regarding space from a mainly security and defence perspective*, without excluding the scientific perspective (exploring space) or the commercial-economic perspective.

The *neorealist approach to the cosmic space*, used by the Trump administration in its process to implement America First, displays a highly ambitious perspective which, in our opinion, has not been explored by the doctrine (security studies, international relations, geopolitics). We prefer to call it *"Moon-Mars geostrategic and space-political structure"*, a comprehensive term that includes *both a geopolitical element* (the relationships among the great space powers and their geopolitical implications at terrestrial level, *starting from the Moon-Mars structure as a geopolitical movement initiated by the Trump administration, in the framework of the America First doctrine*). Secondly, we prefer to add the *"space-political" element* (an alternative to "geopolitics", a science that belongs exclusively to the terrestrial level in the power game). Regarding the cosmic space, we can talk about the occurrence of a new science related to geopolitics, but distinct from it (because it addresses the relations among space powers in the power game, focusing exclusively on the cosmic space, the relationship between the states as cosmic powers and the cosmic space, a relationship of power both soft and hard). We consider that the science of "space-politics" is born from the need of the space powers to regulate their power game in the cosmic space based on specific principles, covering the geopolitics connection (terrestrial states with space policies), as well as the exclusively spatial facet (the power projections in the cosmic space and ensuring the space strategic areas that build commercial or security strategic architectures in space).

3. The "Three Areas of Prosperity and Security" of the American Architecture Based on the "Earth-Moon-Mars Strategic Triad" and on the Strategic Pillars (Japan, Australia, and India). Connecting the "Terrestrial Heartland" (Indo-Pacific) to the "Space Heartland" (the Moon)

The objective of a "durable American presence on Mars" seems to be *only one facet* of the new space policy developed and supported by the Trump administration, starting with the famous tweet in 2019. In reality, it looks like *a wider project – building a geopolitical space-political area*, capable of protecting the American interests, to ensure the discouragement of threats, to ensure the leadership status of the US among the space powers, as well as the subsequent development of other space-political areas of safety,

¹⁹ Jeff Foust, "Trump tweet throws space policy into chaos", in *Space News*, 7 June 2019, URL: <https://spacenews.com/trump-tweet-throws-space-policy-into-chaos/>, accessed on 12 July 2019.

²⁰ Donald Trump, as President of USA, tweeting: "For all of the money we are spending, NASA should NOT be talking about going to the Moon – We did that 50 years ago", he wrote. "They should be focused on the much bigger things we are doing, *including Mars (of which the Moon is a part), Defence and Science*, in Jeff Foust, *op. cit.*

²¹ Jeff Foust, *op. cit.*

prosperity and expansion for the American interests, in the framework of the America First doctrine. It seems that, *starting from the geopolitical and space-political area*, which President Trump mentioned generically as “*Mars, of which the Moon is a part*” in his revolutionary tweet, *extremely concrete and extended approaches to the security, defence, commercial, and scientific dimensions of this area* will be developed in the new ultra-realistic American space politics.

“The Moon-Mars structure” can also be regarded as *a space-political heart of the conquerable world* in a new competition, *a new identifiable heartland for the US*, as an area of *prioritized* space-political interest, in order to ensure clear strategic objectives in the 21st century world (as a world that will regulate the global power game, *including the cosmic space facet*). *Controlling this structure and forming a protected area, as a single geopolitical and space-political area* (based on the example of the concept of Indo-Pacific double ocean), *the US propose the concept of “planet-satellite-planet”* (i.e. *a maximum projection of power*, on the basis of American military pre-eminence at terrestrial level – where a key-component for ensuring this space structure will be *ensuring the power pre-eminence is maintained at air level* – because *the international cosmic law has not created a unanimous legal definition for the limit between the air space and the cosmic space*). This concept entails building a *Space Force* (another concept proposed by the Trump administration in 2018), which is *able to support* the objectives to protect and expand *the built area* (the Moon-Mars structure). Therefore, it is *much more than* an objective to create a colony on Mars (a durable human presence on Mars)²²; it is a matter of *creating and maintaining (or even expanding) a space strategic area (the Moon-Mars structure) required for the implementation of the America First doctrine*, with the help of the terrestrial capacities (using the military pre-eminence, including the air pre-eminence), as well as that of a specially built US space force. *Introducing the geostrategic and space-political concept of “satellite-planet” (Moon-Mars), as geostrategic projects of the military pre-eminence (especially air pre-eminence) of the US at terrestrial level (“planet-satellite-planet”)*, the US display the same flexibility it did when adopting the concept of “double ocean” (Indo-Pacific and its strategic doctrine, in 2019).

From the viewpoint of the new American space policy, America First would work with *a strategic triad to project the USA military global leadership and power (“planet-satellite-planet”, i.e. “Earth-Moon-Mars”)*, as an expansion of the US military pre-eminence at terrestrial level (the aerospace and maritime level). In our opinion, it is a matter of viewing the US space politics in terms of *extended neorealism*, designed for a geostrategic Westphalian and space-political approach, which is able to fulfil *the objective of the US global leadership at cosmic level, too*. In other words, we consider that the new space politics and the Earth-Moon-Mars geostrategic structure, designed on *security, military principles*, as well as in terms of promoting the science of exploring space and commerce, *can be an adequate response to the project of Chinese globalization (OBOR/Belt and Road Initiative)*. Under the Trump administration, the only response that the US can conceive to the grandiose and predominantly soft (economic-commercial) nature of China’s

²²“A White House official, speaking on background, argued that Mars has always been the long-term goal of the administration. “We have asked Congress for additional resources *to get to the Moon by 2024, which will enable us to get to Mars roughly a decade after creating a sustainable presence on the lunar surface,*” the official said “As @POTUS said, @NASA is using the Moon to send humans to Mars!” tweeted NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine four hours after the president’s tweet. Bridenstine emphasizes the robotic exploration of Mars that is ongoing, as well as the *upcoming Mars 2020 mission*. Earlier in the day, Bridenstine spoke at the National Space Society’s International Space Development Conference in Arlington, Virginia, where he reiterated the agency *was working to land humans on the moon by 2024*”. Jeff Foust, *op. cit.*

project (BRI) *is another mega-project, able to capitalize on their field of pre-eminence (strategic, security). The USA's response to a soft project (BRI) that expresses a version of China's global leadership for the 21st century is a hard (security) project that capitalizes US's current advantages (the military and security leadership). The "Moon-Mars structure", as an area prioritized by the US for the first time, is therefore a strategic priority of a space doctrine that is much more advanced than the current American space politics*²³. *It is an area claimed by the USA in a project to create security architecture similar to the terrestrial OBOR/BRI. The commercial, civil, and scientific implications of the Moon-Mars structure cannot be ignored although its initial exposure was relevant as a security area and in terms of protecting the American interests (geostrategic and space-political area).*

In our opinion, the USA intend to create *a complex architecture (more than a security architecture), based on the Earth-Moon-Mars triad, an architecture that will encompass interconnected commercial areas and know-how hubs (bases, scientific study spaces, interconnected scientific labs etc.). They will be designed mainly in cooperation with Japan*²⁴ (a space power which we consider to be an indubitable player that supports the technologies and robotics used for space constructions)²⁵, *as well as with Australia (in a strategy to overlap the centre of the terrestrial world – the Indo-Pacific strategic area – and the centre of the outer world – the cosmic space – in the immediate vicinity of Earth).*

Built on *two pillars of the terrestrial fundamental allies, in the emerging centre of the 21st century world (the Asia-Pacific region), this strategy to build the "Moon-Mars structure" will be based on building a hub of prosperity and connection to the space hubs of prosperity (Earth – Moon – Mars). A unique network will be created with the ocean prioritized by the US in the 21st century (Indo-Pacific, no cooperation with India included) as the starting point, going through the middle hub of prosperity (Earth-Moon, a geostrategic area which, besides protecting the American security and defence interest, will become a commercial space open to investments, space civil, entertainment and scientific industries), finishing with the superior prosperity hub ("Moon-Mars"), which is also the most ambitious hub in this complex security and prosperity architecture that the USA plan to create starting with the Trump administration, in order to ensure the US global leadership in the 21st century.*

The guarantee that the *Moon* will not be used against the American security interests, that it will be a component of *America's* space security architecture (the America First doctrine) turns this natural satellite of the Earth into *an authentic space heartland, and its control will ensure the next security and prosperity hub (creating the "Moon-Mars structure")*.

In other words, so-called *"space-politics" area will accompany and replace "geopolitics" as a science of power relations among the 21st century states, because the*

²³ "On March 23, 2018, the White House released a fact sheet on the National Space Strategy, a document that puts forward a reinvigorated approach to ensuring U.S. leadership and success in space". Marcia Smith, *op. cit.*

²⁴ "In a May 28 tweet, NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine said he was "very excited" about the agreement announced by Trump and Abe". "Japan and [JAXA] are critical partners in our efforts to go forward to the Moon and on to Mars!". "Building on its International Space Station (ISS) experience, Japanese astronauts will strive to join American astronauts on the moon and destinations beyond," including contributing modules to the Gateway facility NASA plans to develop in lunar orbit to support human lunar landings, the State Department fact sheet noted". See: Jeff Foust, May 29, 2019, "U.S. and Japan to cooperate on return to the moon", in *Space News*, 7 June 2019, URL: <https://spacenews.com/u-s-and-japan-to-cooperate-on-return-to-the-moon/>, accessed on 20 June 2019.

²⁵ "Japan will join our mission to send U.S. astronauts to space. We'll be going to the moon", Trump said at a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe May 27. "We'll be going to Mars very soon. It's very exciting". Jeff Foust, *op. cit.*

power projections of the states *in the cosmic space* will no longer be avoidable; they will *render the current internal law framework useless, they will lead to the creation of different legal regimes* (based on Westphalian principles, on claiming sovereignty, and on a law of force – the right to conquer, to occupy), which can, in our view, bring to an end the age of the current international law, as a coordinating law. *The America First doctrine, in our opinion, is rather a doctrine of (military) unilateralism, in a 21st century global competition for power, which is meant to respond to simultaneous multipolar challenges, with the purpose of maintaining the American leadership in this century, too. It is not a doctrine of cohabitation with the multipolarity, but a doctrine of clear assertion of unipolarity, which must also be analysed from the perspective of the power mutations in the cosmic space and the dynamic between the power-states and this space (the Westphalian doctrine).*

4. Space Strategies in the 21st Century: Initiating “Protected Strategic Cosmic Areas”. The “Immediate Cosmic Space” – “an Asset for the Entire Humanity”?

The geostrategic movement initiated by President Trump through his famous tweet on June 7th, 2019, regarding the “Moon-Mars political structure” is *an advanced stage in an US ambitious project meant to ensure its global leadership in space, based on the MAGA-AF doctrine*²⁶. In our opinion, before this advanced stage we should talk about the *orbital geostrategic structure* that the US must build as a preliminary stage in the project announced by Trump.

More precisely, *starting from the premise of the US airspace and maritime leadership at global level, as well as from the absence of a unanimously accepted legal definition in the public international law about the limit between the “airspace”²⁷ and the cosmic space, the US should initiate a project to create an “orbital geopolitical structure”²⁸ that ensures the connection between the terrestrial space (and the projection of the American leadership in the airspace, as global leadership) and the aerospace/the space in the immediate vicinity of the airspace (the “terrestrial orbit”), before talking about the creation of a “Moon-Mars space-political structure”²⁹. Without covering this preliminary stage (the terrestrial orbital geopolitical structure), the US cannot move on to the next stage announced by President Trump. It is a preliminary, multi-faceted project (covering security, commercial, scientific, civil, and even orbital entertainment elements)³⁰, which entails *building extended orbital bases, which include components specific to the defence industry, as well as the civil industry, as well as scientific**

²⁶ MAGA-AF (Make America Great Again – America First doctrine). “In a luncheon speech at the National Space Society’s International Space Development Conference here June 8, Scott Pace, executive secretary of the National Space Council, said that efforts to return humans to the lunar surface by 2024 were ongoing, but that NASA and the administration should devote more attention to long-term aspirations of human Mars missions. Pace said the White House was focused on securing *the additional \$1.6 billion for NASA in the fiscal year 2020 budget amendment released in May*, which includes funding needed to start development of lunar landers. “Probably the highest priority thing we need to do is to get the lunar lander under contract” he said”. Jeff Froust, “White House Reiterates Human Moon Missions on the Path to Mars”, in *Space News*, 8 June 2019, URL: <https://spacenews.com/white-house-reiterates-human-moon-missions-on-the-path-to-mars/>, accessed on 20 July 2019.

²⁷ As the aerial area belonging to a state jurisdiction, within its terrestrial limits. It is different concept from the “aerospace”, which defines the immediate space surrounding the Earth.

²⁸ Connected rather to a strategic definition given to “aerospace”, than to “airspace”, as two different concepts.

²⁹ ***, “New Space Policy Directive Calls for Human Expansion across Solar System”, NASA, 11 December 2017, URL: <https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/new-space-policy-directive-calls-for-human-expansion-across-solar-system/>, ***, President Signs Space Policy Directive 1, Solar system Exploration Research, Virtual Institute, URL: <https://sservi.nasa.gov/articles/president-signs-space-policy-directive-1/>, accessed on 21 July 2019.

³⁰Also see: ***, Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space, 24 May 2018, URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-2-streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space/>, accessed on 21 July 2019.

laboratories (including space hotels), components which can be either semi-connected (through bridges) or semi-autonomous, on the same multifunctional orbital platform. Another option is to create separate components (with the defence components completely separate from the civil components of the project), including bases to land commercial or entertainment spacecraft (space tourism).

Once the America First project enters a new stage – the American space strategy for the 21st century – we will be able to analyse doctrine and space-political complex elements, such as the “protected strategic cosmic areas”, building a space policy for the “immediate cosmic space” as a “vicinity of the space power” or a “vicinity of the entire humanity” (depending on the thesis which will dominate the international cosmic law in the future, stemming from the Westphalian doctrine or from other doctrines).

CONCLUSIONS

Despite certain impulsive, superficial and ironic reactions to the famous tweet sent on June 7th 2019 by the American President, about the “including Mars (of which the Moon is a part” phrase, the present article has demonstrated that, in reality, based on the America First doctrine, the USA are preparing a much more ambitious geostrategic approach regarding the multi-stage building of a security, commercial, civil, and scientific architecture, which is meant to set the foundation for what we identify as the “Moon-Mars structure”. Thus, starting from the neorealist, Westphalian approach to the America First doctrine, we think that the USA can conceive a coherent plan to *capitalize the military leadership in the aerospace and maritime field* (through a geostrategic use of *multiple pillar-countries from the Indo-Pacific terrestrial strategic region, as a new hub for the 21st century world*), in order to build *its status as an “orbital leader”* (based on the concept of “immediate space vicinity”), followed by *its status as a “space leader”*.

Starting from the creation of *the orbital multifunctional structure (the first hub of prosperity and security)*, we also can believe in the USA capacity to create *a middle hub of prosperity* (Earth – Moon), in order to *connect it to the last stage in this mega-project (the Moon-Mars structure)*. It is a matter of *going beyond the science of geopolitics* (focused on the power projection at *terrestrial level*) and initiating *another science to study the new space-political power projections*, as briefly described in the current paper.

However, we think that the President Trump’s revolutionary tweet has not been properly understood by the media and it still needs to be explored by the experts as the tweet bravely announcing the final stage in a mega-project meant to ensure the US their global leadership status for the 21st century, in the framework of the America First doctrine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, “New Space Policy Directive Calls for Human Expansion across Solar System”, NASA, 11 December 2017, URL: <https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/new-space-policy-directive-calls-for-human-expansion-across-solar-system/>.
2. ***, President Signs Space Policy Directive 1, Solar system Exploration Research, Virtual Institute, URL: <https://sservi.nasa.gov/articles/president-signs-space-policy-directive-1/>.
3. ***, Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space, 24 May 2018, URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-2-streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space/>.

4. ***, Testimony from Senate Hearing on the Emerging Space Environment, 14 May 2019, URL: <https://www.space.commerce.gov/testimony-from-senate-hearing-on-the-emerging-space-environment/>.
5. ***, *White House releases facts sheet on National Space Strategy*, 26 March, 2018, URL: <https://www.space.commerce.gov/white-house-releases-fact-sheet-on-national-space-strategy/>. Jeff Foust, *New National Space Strategy emphasizes “America First” policies*, March 24, 2018.
6. DIACONU, Ion, *Curs de drept internațional public*, Șansa SRL Publishing house, Bucharest, 1993.
7. FOUST, Jeff, “Trump tweet throws space policy into chaos”, in *Space News*, 7 June 2019, URL: <https://spacenews.com/trump-tweet-throws-space-policy-into-chaos/>.
8. FOUST, Jeff, “U.S. and Japan to cooperate on return to the moon”, in *Space News*, 7 June 2019, URL: <https://spacenews.com/u-s-and-japan-to-cooperate-on-return-to-the-moon>
9. FOUST, Jeff, “White House Reiterates Human Moon Missions on the Path to Mars”, in *Space News*, 8 June 2019, URL: <https://spacenews.com/white-house-reiterates-human-moon-missions-on-the-path-to-mars/>.
10. FOUST, Jeff, June 8, 2019, *White House reiterates human moon missions on the path to Mars*, URL: <https://spacenews.com/white-house-reiterates-human-moon-missions-on-the-path-to-mars/>.
11. FOUST, Jeff, May 29, 2019, *U.S. and Japan to cooperate on return to the moon*, URL: <https://spacenews.com/u-s-and-japan-to-cooperate-on-return-to-the-moon/>
12. FOUST, Jeff, *New National Space Strategy emphasizes “America First” policies*, March 24, 2018, URL: <https://spacenews.com/new-national-space-strategy-emphasizes-america-first-policies/>.
13. SMITH, Marcia, “White House Releases Fact Sheet on New National Space Strategy – Updated”, SpacePolicyOnline.com, 24 March 2018, URL: <https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/white-house-releases-fact-sheet-on-new-national-space-strategy/>.
14. TAKACS, Ludovic; NICIU, Marțian, *Drept internațional public*, Didactic and Pedagogical Publishing House, Bucharest, 1976.
15. VEDDA, James A., “Considerations for the next national policy space”, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, policy paper, March 2017, URL: <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/NationalSpacePolicy.pdf>.
16. WEEDEN, Brian, *US National Security Space Policy and Strategy: From Sanctuary to Space Force*, JMOD Symposium on Space Security, Tokyo, Japan, February 6, 2019, swfound.org.

TOWARDS AN EXTENDED STRATEGIC CONCEPT IN THE 21st CENTURY: "THE GREAT NATO SPACE" AND THE EXPANSION TOWARDS THE PACIFIC. THE STRATEGIC "DOUBLE-OCEAN" CONNECTION

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU, Ph.D.
Researcher, University of Bucharest, Romania
E-mail: vam55ro@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The 21st century world is a dynamic, atypical one, with an evolution based on new paradigms that are forcing existent structures, ones 70 years old, to adapt, to expand, to re-invent, in order to achieve a better control over the new strategic environment. Thus, starting from the "Pacific Century" paradigm, as one with a special importance within the framework of American strategic doctrine in previous US administrations, and equally, taking into account doctrinal strategic elements taken over and developed by Trump administration regarding "Pacific Century", within the present paper we'll explore windows and possibilities of NATO present strategic concept regarding expansion towards extra-Atlantic zones, especially to the Pacific area. This premise signifies to take into account inclusively a future NATO development to a superior level in comparison with the present one, by considering the "double-ocean" paradigm (Atlantic-Pacific). A strategic concept regarding NATO in the 21st century would mean to initiate a strategic control developed simultaneously by NATO, regarding two oceans (as strategic areas), as strategically inter-connected (as old heartland and new heartland, as Old Europe and New Asia). From this premise, multiple strategic approaches can be developed, subsequently.*

Keywords: *double heartland; double-ocean; new strategic concept; NATO extra-Atlantic expansion; Pacific century.*

1. The Pacific, a New Power Hub of the 21st Century World

The article published by Mackinder in Foreign Affairs Magazine, 1943 edition ("*The Round World and the Winning of the Peace*"), in which the author resumes the discussion over the concept of 'Heartland', proposes that we leave behind the classic division of the world (oceans and continents, adopting the concepts of 'Interior Ocean' and 'Island of the world', instead). The island of the world comprises Europe, Asia and Africa, which make up two thirds of the world's dry land, and Australia, North and South America, which make up one third of the world's dry land, *with Africa being seen as part of the "Heartland"*. According to Mackinder, the new power hub of the world consists of the Heartland and the Interior Ocean. Mackinder proposes overcoming the traditional conflict between the maritime and the continental powers. This study, an authentic geopolitical testament, takes into consideration a new power balance created between the Northern area of influence (Heartland and the Interior Ocean) and the monsoon-ridden lands of Asia (countries with access to the ocean – India, South-East Asia, China)¹. However, one must not mistake the *Interior Ocean* (the North Atlantic), covered by NATO (as a thalassocratic alliance) and an opposition to the Heartland (and a pair to the Heartland, at the same time) with the *Great Ocean* (a space consisting of the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic). This last geopolitical area is positioned outside the belt of deserts and wildlands, neighbouring territories such as Africa – south of Sahara, South America, the Asian monsoon lands (the old

¹ Paul Dobrescu, *Geopolitica*, Comunicare.ro Publishing House, SNSPA, David Ogilvy Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, 2003, p. 57.

Oriental civilizations on the territories of China and India)². The article mentions a balance between the northern powers (“generating peace and freedom”, according to the author) and the peoples in the monsoon lands, revealing a bipolar view of the world³.

According to admiral Alfred Mahan who notes USA’s isolation in the perimeter of the Americas, the USA’s global role would entail assuming the position of global “maritime power” (the country to dominate the seas and oceans of the world will also dominate the world, including the Pacific in its area of influence, next to the continental and insular Central America)⁴. Following the Hispanic-American war in 1898, USA annexes the Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam, expanding their control over Cuba and Hawaii; in 1903, USA takes control over the area of the future Panama Canal⁵.

German geopolitician Friedrich Ratzel, father of geopolitics, notes the highly important role of the Pacific, using the concept of “*geospace*” (defined as “expansion of the civilizational force of a civilization as far as the continent level, which results in empires in the case of a political expansion”)⁶. Ratzel also coined the concept of “*oceanic cycle*”, reminding that “the value of certain seas and oceans changes depending on the size and importance of the neighbouring countries, and the oceanic cycle has a line that moves from the Mediterranean Seas to the Atlantic Ocean, wherefrom it moves to the Pacific Ocean”⁷.

According to German geopolitician Ratzel, *the Pacific Ocean is the ocean of the future*, from the standpoint of two aspects: this is an active area, which makes it an area with the potential for conflict of interests among great powers such as the USA, China, Great Britain (which comes into the equation given its possessions in the Pacific at the moment, Japan, Russia)⁸. Besides its unique geostrategic position, the Pacific is an enormous area, with great amounts of resources. According to Ratzel, the Pacific is the place where the five countries will confront and determine their power dynamics. He also considers that the main confrontation between the maritime states (England, US, Japan) and the continental states (China, Russia)⁹ will take place in the Pacific. Ratzel claimed that the continental states will win in the Pacific confrontation, given their numerous resources and extensive space as a geopolitical basis¹⁰. Ratzel considered that the battle for Pacific can be the humanity’s last battle, bringing the human civilization to an end because of its destructive consequences¹¹.

According to Theodore Roosevelt, “the Atlantic Era is now at the peak of its development and it will soon consume all its available resources. The Pacific area, which is meant to be the greatest of all eras, has just begun”¹². And, as noted by author Parag Khanna, “the Atlantic Era was dominated by Europe, and then it was dominated only by America. The Pacific Era will be dominated only by China (...) China lies at the heart of the most populated and most dynamic pan-region in the world, including the Russian Far East, Japan, the Korean peninsula, India, South-Eastern Asia, the Pacific islands, including Australia and New Zealand”¹³, considering the fact that none of the countries which form this triangle – India, Australia, Japan – can handle China’s demographic, economic, political and cultural siege, as noted by the author. Khanna already refers

² *Idem*, pp. 62-63.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 62-63.

⁴ Silviu Neguț, *Introducere în geopolitică*, Meteor Press Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 114-115.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 115.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 75-76.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

¹² Parag Khanna, *Lumea a doua. Imperii și influență în noua ordine globală*, translated by Doris Mironescu, Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 235.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 235.

to the "Pacific Century" as a century belonging to China¹⁴, a form of economic and demographic unipolarity built through China's domination over the world's 21st century power hub.

According to Haushofer, another German geopolitician, the universal thalassocratic empires such as the British Empire (at the time) had possessions and territories or areas of influence, which covered the entire planet. To describe this huge geopolitical area, Haushofer uses the concept of "*anaconda politics*"¹⁵. He talks about an Anglo-American thalassocratic hegemony, which can only be defeated by creating a solid continental block (the USSR states, as well as Japan). In Haushofer's view, the creation of the "continental coalition" (with Russia as the fundamental pillar of this political construction) would be conditioned by the setup of a German Japanese alliance (thus creating a geopolitical zone based on three seas – the Baltic Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Adriatic Sea). He considers that Russia could be used as the main pawn in building a vast geostrategic space, from the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, to the Pacific Ocean, because Russia is the country that controls the largest part of this space. According to Haushofer, the decline of the British Empire illustrates the idea of the decline of the maritime powers; therefore it illustrates a geopolitical mutation favouring the rise of the continental powers. The conflict between these two types of power (Haushofer also maintains this binary opposition paradigm) would end in favour of the continental powers, which would create a global continentalist construction similar to the former British thalassocratic empire. However, at the time, Haushofer did not take into consideration enough the ascending power of the United States, which developed international relations favourable to the maritime powers, thus proving the ascension of the maritime powers, instead of their decline.

However, the 21st century world is complex and atypical, in full process of re-defining itself and changing. Currently, the Pacific is not regarded as "a space of inevitable confrontation" among the great powers for the control over the 21st century world. Instead, it is regarded as *a space for negotiations and coming to the fore of the various powers* (regional powers, global powers), which have not defined their dynamics in this region yet, and in the world. The US remedied the absence of a strategic doctrine designed especially for the Pacific¹⁶ – until recently – or of a development and expansion of the current strategic doctrine – still focusing on the Interior Ocean (the North Atlantic) by resuming a clear, prioritized diplomatic approach for the Pacific Ocean, in 2019, through a special report dedicated to this zone (Indo-Pacific). This report amends and updates the doctrines already issued by the US, doctrines which define the Indo-Pacific area as a priority, and the US as a "nation of the Pacific", while promoting the doctrine of "a free Indo-Pacific zone, open for all the nations".

The Pacific is strategically connected to the concept of "maritime Asia", especially in its Eastern area (known as the new hub of the world, as the Mediterranean Sea used to be in the 14th century or the Atlantic, in the 19th century). The 21st century is defined as a "Pacific Century", due to the economic and commercial boom of the states in this area, with authors mentioning the Pacific century to be "a post-American century, a true Asian century" (due to the strong economic, technological development)¹⁷.

The Pacific (the power hub of the entire 21st century world) is *an extremely wide and complex geostrategic area*, which includes:

- Ancient cultural areas dominated by China's cultural area, a demographic colossus;
- The rim area in South-East Asia and China – *the inner Pacific rim* – geostrategic concept that includes: the two Koreas, the coastal South-Eastern part of China – Shanghai, Hong

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 235.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 89-90.

¹⁶ We refer here to the report issued by the US Department of Defense (DoD), with the title *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. Preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networking region*, June 1, 2019, URL <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>, accessed on 20 June 2019.

¹⁷ Paul Dobrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

Kong, Zhanjiang, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, with Myanmar and Sri Lanka, as geostrategic gateways or bridges between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific (also seen as strategic zones).

- The *outer Pacific rim (or the outer Pacific ring)* including: Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, New Guinea – this part of the rim is a strategic region connecting the two oceans – the Pacific and the Indian Ocean – on the outer ring of the Pacific;
- Plus, *a part of Oceania* (the Pacific – Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia)

In the view of other authors, there is a *compact “Asia-Pacific” zone*, which allows certain parts of the Asian to be included in the geostrategic area of the Pacific, based on the criterion of volume and intensity of commercial trades among the countries in this area. The *Pacific Rim* has been the most dynamic zone of the world ever since the ‘70s- ‘80s, a new global hub. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization was created in 1989 to be the economic institution of the region – a true economic, commercial, regional block – which reconfirms the economic dominant role that China has in the region – hence the significance of the 2001 APEC Summit held in Shanghai¹⁸.

The fact that *there is still no structure of regional security*¹⁹ either based on the concept of collective security or based on the concept of military alliance (such as OSCE or NATO) is a characteristic of this zone, with impact on the conflict of interests among the great powers in the Pacific.

According to certain authors, two types of strategic balance were created in the Asia-Pacific region, where there are countries of continental size, with multi-ethnic populations, missing a homogenous balance based on a coherent cultural affinity. US acts differently in each of the two types of balance: one in the Northeast Asia zone, among China, Japan, Russia and the US, and the second one in South East Asia (where China, India, Japan, the US and Indonesia are seen as the main regional actors whose interests must be aligned to the interests of Vietnam, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines)²⁰. The Asia-Pacific region is a particular zone from the standpoint of security, as the countries in the region prefer to “invoke the global balance of power and to take shelter under the American protection, while adopting at the same time a doctrine of non-alignment to avoid the formal connections with the USA and participate in policies meant to weaken the American power in the region”²¹.

The dissolution of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), an organization which would have been a regional nucleus of security and the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)²² prove that the region is oriented towards a prioritised economic-political cooperation model, without creating clear collective security architecture²³.

It was only on June 1st, 2019 that the objective of creating a regional security network is clearly stated in the new special strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. According to this report, a strategic line to strengthen and advance the alliances and partnerships with the US in *network-type*

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 175-176.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 176.

²⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Are nevoie America de o politică externă? Către diplomația sec. XXI*, Incitatus Publishing house, trad. Andreea Năstase, s.l., 2002, pp. 94-95.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 95.

²² ASEAN was also the root of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) initiative, a security organization which also includes key partners of dialogue (USA, China, and Japan) besides the ASEAN members. However, the main purpose of ARF is to institutionalise China’s relationship with the region and to consolidate ASEAN’s relationship with China, through a future free trade area. Another ASEAN initiative is the ASEAN+3 group (which includes the ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea), influencing the shaping of a regional presence coherent in terms of security, although the policies of its members are different from the USA’s role in the region). See Martin Griffiths, *Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics*, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, pp. 41-42.

²³ Henry Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

security architecture is initiated in order to “support the international rule of law, as well as cultivating intra-Asian relationships to discourage aggression, maintain stability and ensure free access to common spaces”²⁴.

Regarding the geostrategic relationships based on the geo-economic dimension of the region, we note that according to World Bank Atlas, in 1999 the main trading partners of countries in South East Asia (from the inner and outer Pacific Rim), such as Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan were the US, Japan, Singapore (except for South Korea, which also traded with China and Germany). This illustrates, in our view, *a true regional economic alliance*, structured on the basis of bilateral relationships, which placed this region under the economic influence (a form of soft power) of the thalassocratic powers (US, Japan, Great Britain, and Singapore). An authentic alliance of the maritime powers took shape *between 1999 and 2003* in this part of the Asia-Pacific region, as, according to our opinion, an expression of a certain *dominance of the maritime powers' coalition under the US influence*.

2. The Pacific Dimension in the USA Strategic Doctrines

In the American National Strategy based on the “*America First*” doctrine adopted in 2017²⁵, the “A Competitive World” section is built on the premise of *a multipolar world* (implicitly), in which the USA assumes the role to “take on the ascending political, economic and military competitions faced at global level”. No other paradigm is used in this section to explain and complete the main paradigm (“*America first*”). However, from the viewpoint of the “Pacific century” paradigm, each strategic direction mentioned in this section *also includes a distinct strategic component applicable in the Asia-Pacific zone* (which is implicit with the two great powers mentioned in this section as “competitors” of the American power are China and Russia, both active powers in the Asia-Pacific zone). A component specific to the new “America First” doctrine is the strategic change component, clearly expressed in this section: “with these competitions/challenges, the US must rethink its policies for the past two decades, policies based on the presumption that engaging with the rivals and including them in the international institutions and the global commercial world would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners, presumption which proved to be false”²⁶.

According to the above-mentioned doctrine, “America First” paradigm describes *a world refocused on unilateralism*, which is based on *the reality of the USA's unparalleled military power* (a military unilateralism on which a wider strategy refocused on unilateralism must be rebuilt): “We learned the difficult lesson that when America does not lead, malign actors fill the void to the disadvantage of the United States. When America leads from a position of strength and confidence and in accordance with our interests and values, all benefit”²⁷. “An America that successfully competes is the best way to prevent conflict. Just as American weakness invites challenge, American strength and confidence deters war and promotes peace”²⁸, states the strategy.

The strategic pillar of “promoting peace by asserting power”, which includes the objective to rebuild the army in order to maintain its global prominence, mentions that America will compete against any power instrument, in order to make sure that the *regions of the world* are not dominated by a single power”. This direction (*which includes the Asia-Pacific strategic region, by default*) is completed with another strategic direction (“advance of the American influence”, on the premise

²⁴ According to the *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. Preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networking region* report, dated June 1st 2019, June 1, 2019, URL <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>, accessed on 20 June 2019.

²⁵ ***, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>, accessed on 20 June 2019.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

that “a world that supports the American interests and reflects our values makes America safer and more prosperous”.

In the National Defence Strategy of the United States/2018²⁹, the international environment is described as follows: “We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order – creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism³⁰, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security”, statement made in the first phrases of the introduction to this strategy. In the second section (“Strategic environment”), *the Indo-Pacific region is particularly mentioned* as part of the premise that a “long-term strategic competition among the states” is re-emerging. The strategy classifies Russia and China as revisionist powers that “want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions”³¹.

However, the two rival powers, China and Russia, are regarded separately as *distinct threats in distinct regions* for the US, instead of an interconnected and inclusive approach. Thus, the American defence doctrine regards China exclusively from the standpoint of challenges it entails in the *Indo-Pacific region*, which is a *limited* approach when compared to China’s strategy and capacity to *reorder the international system and to connect to the strategies of other actors*.

Similarly, Russia is analysed separately, as “a revisionist power” (which is understood as “power using its veto authority over other nations, against the USA’s security interests”), which acts as a strategic competitor in the area covered by NATO (the Interior Ocean region), expanded to the European region and the Middle East, according to the doctrine. Russia is also mentioned in connection to regions such as Crimea, Georgia and Eastern Ukraine, as a “power which undermines the democratic processes” in these areas outside the actual NATO coverage.

A key phrase for the entire strategy is acknowledging the “*resilient, but weakening, post-WW II international order*”, acknowledging the fact that “*it has evolved since 1945 until the present day*” and that “*China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and ‘rules of the road.’*” These two countries are called “revisionist powers”, and the States acknowledge their capacity to act at the level of the entire international system, the capacity to change its very foundations, principles and rules, going beyond isolated and regional areas. In the “Department of defence objectives” section, the strategy defines the long-term competition with the rival powers (China and Russia) as a priority. Its second defence objective listed is “sustaining Joint Force military advantages, both globally *and in key regions*”. However, this is a strategic objective *which clearly includes the Asia-Pacific strategic area, as well as the area covered by NATO*. “Objective 5” clearly mentions *the Indo-Pacific strategic region* (a priority since it is the first to be mentioned), followed by other strategic regions (Europe, the Middle East, the Western Hemisphere). It is an objective meant to achieve the USA’s defence by “maintaining favourable regional balances of power”³². The strategic approach regarding all these regions and objectives entails “a more lethal force, strong alliances and partnerships, American technological innovation, and a culture of performance”³³.

In the “Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners” section, the US Defence Strategy clearly mentions the strategic objective to “strengthen and evolve our alliances and partnerships into an extended network capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared challenges of our time.”³⁴ Strengthening the alliances and regional partnerships is considered a *priority*, and

²⁹ ***, National Defense Strategy, Sharpening the American Military Competitive’s Edge, 2018, URL: <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>, accessed on 21 June 2019.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

the first region mentioned is the Indo-Pacific region. This priority regards the creation of a region that is “free and open” and “provides prosperity and security for all.” For this region, the US plans to strengthen its strategic alliances and partnerships to create a “networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains”³⁵. The document also mentions the creation of bilateral and multilateral security relations “with the key-countries in the region” in order to “maintain a free and open international system”.

Mentioning this region *first* on the list of long-term security alliances and partnerships (although the Indo-Pacific region does not have its own advanced security military structure of the NATO type) *is an indication of the “Pacific Century” paradigm being introduced in the strategy, on a priority position* in relation to the strategic area of the Interior Ocean (the North Atlantic), which is mentioned *on the second position*.

If the Indo-Pacific region is regarded as *a flexible strategic stage* (“expanding the Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships” through bilateral and multilateral formulae capable of building a regional security network), the North Atlantic area covered by a NATO-type military alliance is *an area intended for another strategic stage – the “alliance strengthening stage”*. According to the strategy, the main purpose of NATO is to “deter Russian adventurism, defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, and address the arc of instability building on NATO’s periphery”³⁶. However, NATO’s adjustment objective remains an important one. Yet, NATO is regarded as a regional counterbalance to Russia’s influence *in Europe, hence in a traditionalist sense, specific to the 1948s*, as well as in a bipolar security paradigm, such as *the cold war* (Russia and NATO). While Europe is regarded from the perspective of *the historical bipolarity paradigm* (NATO’s main role remains the same for Europe), in the Indo-Pacific region security structures are *progressing, expanding and following a network pattern*, without nominating any power rival to the US leading to the implementation of a bipolar/tripolar paradigm in the region. Therefore, it is a flexible approach, in which “regional security networks with key-countries in the region” (not mentioned, nevertheless) can include NATO-type alliances or they can avoid such alliances in favour of original security structures, adjusted to the 21st century.

Mentioning the Indo-Pacific region in a USA Defence Strategy already projects USA’s power (seen in the America First doctrine as an assertion of the American power at the level of *certain strategic regions*) in terms of “national security”, in the new global power hub (the Pacific). Introducing the Indo-Pacific region in the USA Defence Strategy, together with the Interior Ocean area, signifies that the *USA builds a comprehensive defence strategy for the 21st century, within an extended strategic concept*. The US national security in the 21st century is no longer a classic one, limited to defending its borders; instead it includes *positioning the power in strategic regions, regarded as vital for the national security of the US as a great power* (the America First doctrine). For America, ensuring its own security architecture and *to expand it in the Indo-Pacific region* is the expression of ensuring *national security*. Therefore, we are looking at *a strategic concept specific to a great power*, which envisages the Indo-Pacific region (as well as other regions, such as the area covered by NATO, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere, plus Africa) *as an area where the USA’s national interest lies, in terms of US national security*; therefore, all these regions listed in the National Defence Strategy of the USA/2018 are in fact *regions where the power of the USA, construed as a global power, manifests*. Only a great power can understand the strategic importance of certain regions positioned far from its borders, *from the perspective of internal security*.

By default, we consider that US operate *with security paradigms*, introduced *indirectly* in the Defence Strategy/2018 – when *mentioning the list of strategic regions* (once with its’ *priority objective*” to “build long-term coalitions and partnerships”) –, *security paradigms* as:

³⁵ *Ibidem.*

³⁶ *Ibidem.*

- The “*Pacific Century*” paradigm (main interest in the Indo-Pacific region), the concept of “Double Ocean” (the strategic region of the Indian and Pacific oceans, interconnected in a single strategic area. This is an expression of the USA’s interest in expanding its security preoccupations with the Great Ocean (Indian-Pacific), with two of these areas already identified as a priority.
- The classic paradigm of *historic bipolarity* (strengthening the area already covered by NATO, which is regarded as a regional counterbalance to Russia in Europe).
- The paradigm of *stabilizing the Middle East* (the “Arab Spring” paradigm is abandoned in favour of “creating stable conditions in the Middle East, in order to consolidate the gains obtained from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and to counterbalance Iran”).
- The paradigm of the “*stable and peaceful Western Hemisphere*” (with direct influence over reducing the security threats against the US homeland).
- The paradigm of “*fighting against terrorism in Africa*” (developing new relations, consolidating the existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships with regional states), see as a paradigm with direct impact on the security of the USA and Europe.

In the new 2019 US doctrine regarding the Pacific³⁷, the focus shifts to the concept of “Double Ocean”, by creating a priority strategic area, which include the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

Thus, we are looking at three strategic scenarios:

- The US *creates a comprehensive strategy regarding the “the Great Ocean”* (designing distinct strategies for each ocean of the world, which it later unifies into a single strategy). Thus, the US has a strategic doctrine for the North Atlantic (designed with the NATO instrument). Plus, the “double ocean” doctrine in 2018-2019 (strategic interconnection of the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean), which is however deprived of *regional instruments of concrete NATO security*, as we are looking at *the inception of implementing the “double ocean” strategic doctrine* in this new extended strategic area.

- The US *simply introduced a new strategic area – the Asia-Pacific area* – distinct from the area already covered (the “Interior Ocean”, where there is NATO), satisfying the need to match the “Pacific Century” paradigm (a strategic doctrine which expressly includes the Pacific).

- The US *introduced the concept of “double ocean” for the strategic interconnection of the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean*, not Pacific and the North Atlantic, particularly to prove a clear shift of the strategic focus *to the Pacific and the Asia-Pacific area*, to the detriment of abandoning or reducing the role of NATO (due to the need to define its priorities depending on the limits of its resources). This scenario would entail giving up Europe and another global role, with the US thus focusing *on a regional role (the strategic connection of North America to the “Asia-Pacific” region)*. In a different perspective,, particularly this new interconnection would reveal *the USA’s new global role in the new 21st century world*, because the Pacific and the Indian Ocean become the region which requires maximum coverage from the USA, through an extended strategic doctrine, in order to ensure its *leadership role* in this 21st century world dominated by the Asia-Pacific region and by the two oceans (Pacific and Indian).

According to the doctrine, the USA policy in the Asia-Pacific area³⁸ asserted itself both during the Clinton, and Obama administrations and during the current Trump administration, showing *a constant strategic interest in the Pacific area. The USA created and updated a strategic doctrine regarding the Pacific, which it expanded to the concept of “double ocean” (Indo-Pacific).*

³⁷ According to the *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. Preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networking region* report, dated June 1st 2019, June 1, 2019, URL <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>, accessed on 20 June 2019.

³⁸Samuel Charap, John Drennan, Yevgeny Kanaev, Sergey Lukonin, Vasily Mikheev, Vitaly Shvydko, Kristina Voda, Feodor Voitlovsky, “The US and Russia in Asia-Pacific”, 2016 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, https://www.academia.edu/28955297/The_US_and_Russia_in_the_Asia-Pacific_in_English_, accessed on 21 June 2019.

The USA as well as Russia and China asserts themselves as oceanic powers at the beginning of the 21st century. Moreover, they begin to define strategies as global actors in the Pacific, particularly because they define the Pacific as the power hub of the new world in the 21st century.

Today, the *established (classic) core of the USA strategic doctrine* is represented by a NATO (still, although we are witnessing the change in the strategic pillars of the international system) based on the classic Euro-Atlantic cooperation, based on the "Interior Ocean" (North Atlantic)

In Kissinger's opinion, "the USA cannot – and should not – return to the policies of the cold war or the policies of the 18th century diplomacy. The contemporary world is much more complex, and it needs a more differentiated approach", which would entail "the creation of an authentic American foreign policy (not to be mistaken for the economic policy or for spreading democracy in the world)"³⁹. Regarding NATO and its role in the 21st century world, the author considers that an expansion of the NATO role in other regions of the world "would blur the NATO focus, and it would mix up its priorities, threatening to dissolve NATO, turning it into a multilateral bazaar"⁴⁰.

Despite these reserves in the academic world, we consider that, in the 21st century, the USA could choose between several strategic options regarding the Pacific area, such as:

- *expanding* the strategic doctrine (from the Euro-Atlantic defence based on the concept of "Interior Ocean" to expanding the strategic area – North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean), in order to include and control the geostrategic mutation of the 21st century world, which builds its centre of gravity in the Pacific Ocean;
- adopting *two distinct strategic lines*, given the dynamic, undefined nature of this transition period: a line to maintain the thalassocratic hegemony, *through the North Atlantic* (maintain the old NATO line), according to the requirements of the old world, which has not disappeared yet, and a second line to build the thalassocratic hegemony *on the Pacific* (the 21st century ocean), according to the requirements of the new world (building in the Pacific area);
- adapting, expanding and developing the strategic capacities, *to support interconnection between the two distinct strategic lines*.

3. USA's Strategic Interconnections in a Comprehensive Doctrine. Going Global: the Strategy to Remake the "Complete Atlantic Area". Strategic Connection "Atlantic to North Pacific". Strategic Trilateral Alliances

Regarding US potential strategic directions in 21st century, we should take into account several options:

a. *Expanding the "double ocean" strategic doctrine to include other strategic interconnections* that the USA might envisage as a result of becoming aware of the quick need to adjust to the dynamic, ever-changing world of the 21st century: thus, *the old Euro-Atlantic strategic doctrine* (to cover the Interior Ocean, the North Atlantic) might be developed and expanded to an enlarged strategic concept, by means of:

➤ The "double-ocean" connection *covering the entire Atlantic area* (defining the strategic area of the "complete Atlantic" (the "Interior Ocean" would be redefined strategically, not only as the current North Atlantic, but *also to include the strategic component of the South Atlantic*, while applying the concept of "double ocean"). This would lead to opening NATO to new members – *states in the South Atlantic area*; expanding the strategic area covered by NATO; including NATO in the USA's general strategic move to reinforce and redefine its role as a global actor, by expanding and implementing "double ocean" strategies at global level. It is what the

³⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 32.

Trump administration has already proposed, initiating a strategic debate regarding Brazil⁴¹ (South American state) entering NATO, which annoyed the Europeans who didn't succeed to understand, in our opinion, the NATO's strategic need (and implicitly Europe's need, through the transatlantic partnership of this kind) *to open up to the oceans of the world, in a strategic unitary strategic approach of the Western civilization*. The Trump administration *also proposed that states from South America also be part of NATO, based on a highly ambitious strategic concept*, which we will include in *NATO's expansion strategy, by covering the "complete Atlantic" area*. Welcoming Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, French Guiana, Guiana, and even Venezuela (the countries in South America opening to the South Atlantic) to a NATO revamped on the basis of the 21st century world's strategic requirements would symbolise, in our opinion, the implementation of this option (*realising the strategic area of the "complete Atlantic"*). *Reuniting the North Atlantic with the South Atlantic* in an extended strategic unitary formula, which would entail rethinking NATO as an extended alliance, has already been inaugurated by the Trump administration, in a strategic effort to rethink the USA's role in the dynamic and innovative world of the 21st century.

➤ *The "double ocean" connection (North Atlantic – Pacific)* would entail NATO expanding towards the area of the following states in South America, which open to the Pacific: Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. Under the Trump administration, these states would receive invitations to join a reformed and extended NATO, *in order to implement the concept of "strategic connection between the North Atlantic and the Pacific" through the chain of partnerships and, subsequently, through their full membership*. Of course, the current NATO (yet reformed, built on a new, "double ocean" strategic concept) can be used as such, in this strategic vision, or a new military organization/alliance can be founded particularly for the strategic coverage of the Pacific area (Alliance of the Pacific States), under the US leadership and which, in subsequent stage (or from the very beginning, through a clear provision in the founding treaty) would interconnect with NATO. However, at the present moment, the Europeans seem, in our opinion, to be rather displeased with this innovative project regarding "the NATO reform", as it was proposed by the US (which is aware that the NATO role in the 21st century needs to be rethought in order to provide greater strategic coverage to the Western civilization and to give the Transatlantic Partnership the change to play its global role coherently, i.e. to play a meaningful role). The Europeans (France, Germany) seem, in our view, to be rather fearful of these strategic projects, because they are afraid they may lose their influence or that the capacity to ensure strategic defence in the European area covered by NATO may weaken to the benefit of other areas and other alliance partners. However, such fears could reflect a limit of the Europeans' strategic thinking. The Europeans must be aware of the fact that they cannot play this global strategic game individually or only as the EU; instead, *they need to consolidate, to expand, to reinvent the Transatlantic Partnership in order to generate strategic windows to areas that will allow the Western civilization to play a significant role*, instead of being excluded or reduced to an insignificant role.

b. *The strategic trilateral alliances*(connecting NATO to the Asian area, through the strategic connection of the Interior Ocean – North Atlantic – *to the new Indo-Pacific strategic area*). Strategic trilateral alliances represent extremely ambitious developments of an integrated vision of the occidental civilization (the transatlantic partnership) of the 21st century world challenges, in a world that no longer looks like 1945. The evolution of the geopolitical world in the 21st century entails, in our view, *transforming the current alliances is transforming the current alliances by expanding and diversifying* the current strategic concepts, which are limited. Thus the

⁴¹ I.B., "Stoltenberg: Brazilia și alte țări din America Latină ar putea deveni "parteneri" NATO", in *Hotnews*, 4 April 2019, URL: <https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-23068523-stoltenberg-brazilia-alte-tari-din-america-latina-putea-deveni-parteneri-nato.htm>; Tudor Curtifan, "Brazilia, în NATO? Trump: Ne vom gândi foarte, foarte serios la asta", in *Defense Romania*, 19 March 2019, URL: https://www.defenseromania.ro/brazilia-in-nato-trump-ne-vom-gandi-foarte-foarte-serios-la-asta_596346.html; David Brunnstrom, "NATO chief says Brazil, other Latin American countries could become 'partners'", in *Reuters*, 4 April 2019, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-brazil-latam-interview/nato-chief-says-brazil-other-latin-american-countries-could-become-partners-idUSKCN1RF2TT>, accessed on 22 June 2019.

USA would consider that *continuing to maintain strategic areas separate* would be a vulnerability, a major flaw, as in this case certain areas have developed coverage tools (such as the Euro-Atlantic area), while others do not have these strategic coverage tools (such as NATO), being exposed to carrying an exceedingly large unilateral burden to ensure the strategic coverage of the area (the USA would have to cover huge strategic areas by itself, without NATO instruments, areas such as the two oceans – Indo-Pacific – in the context of several regional actors becoming stronger in these oceans).

➤ *The North Atlantic – Indian Ocean – Pacific Ocean strategic trilateral alliance*, which would entail either *the expansion of the NATO mechanisms and of NATO itself* to cover this area (ambassadors/special NATO delegates for the multilateral relations with the countries invited to be *strategic partners of NATO for the Asia-Pacific region*), or *establishing a new cooperation between NATO and the states* in the Indo-Pacific region (a chain of strategic partnerships specially created with these countries, connected to NATO), or *transforming NATO as such into a new alliance* (trilateral-strategic), based on the highly ambitious concept of “triple ocean” (North Atlantic, connected to the Indo-Pacific region) adjusted to the requirements of the 21st century world. This approach entails the NATO tools, competences, capacities and doctrines adjusting, expanding, being implemented in the newly-covered area (by changing the founding treaty) – Indo-Pacific – in order to make Europe, the USA, through their Transatlantic Partnership, as *a single civilizational (Western) entity playing globally in the new power hub of the world, the Indo-Pacific*, nearby military, economic and demographic giants. Using the strategic trilateral alliance option would be proof of how both actors (USA, EU) view the involvement *as a single coherent entity* (through NATO) in strategic areas where they do not exercise form of domination and they have no guarantee of domination, areas in process of strategic reorientation, as the world advances *in a century dominated by an Asian view of development and strategy*. The only reaction the Western world can have to this Asian strategy is to *form a unitary strategy*, in which the EU and the US act through NATO as a single colossus, as a single civilizational area, in order to support the global power game started in the Indo-Pacific area.

➤ *The strategic North Atlantic – South Atlantic – Pacific trilateral alliance*. This would be another version of accentuated, highly ambitious NATO development, in order to cover the entire Atlantic area and to get out of its classic, historical shell, which made sense only for the strategic requirements of the world in which NATO was born. In our opinion, expanding, developing NATO and improving its strategic concept *by adding other strategic priorities that cover new areas* becomes more and more of a necessity for NATO to survive in a new world, with priorities and realities different from 1945 stage. This strategic version would entail *redoing the strategic area of the Atlantic, reuniting its two components and adding an element of strategic interconnection* among the North Atlantic, South Atlantic and the Pacific. In this version, either NATO is reshaped, taking a new institutional, conceptual and strategic form (*the Pacific dimension*), or a new organization (the Trilateral Alliance of the Oceans) is created, and it includes NATO as a component that strictly covers the North Atlantic area. In our opinion, NATO aside, another two military organizations/alliances should be founded under the US leadership, in an integrated command concept, i.e. *the Organization of States from the South Atlantic and the Pacific Organization*, which would reunite *distinct chains of strategic partners (states from the South Atlantic area)* under the US leadership, states such as Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, French Guiana, Guiana and even Venezuela, as well as *states from the Pacific area* (possibly the states in South America with direct access to the Pacific, such as Chile, Peru, Columbia, Ecuador), *but also another chain of states in the Pacific* (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, New Guinea, Philippines). There would be *three centres of military supreme command, interconnected based on a strategic concept* (through the strategic trilateral alliance): the NATO command centre, the OSAS (Organization of South Atlantic States) command centre, the OPS (Organization of Pacific States) command centre.

CONCLUSIONS

As shown in the present article, USA's strategic doctrine regarding the Pacific has proved *constant interest* in developing *a clear strategic area, a certain stable cooperation and dialog mechanisms* for the neighbouring countries, *constant and strong involvement* in the area (including the implementation of the "Pacific Century" paradigm, as a distinctive paradigm, which takes precedence in the American security policy, irrespective of the presidential administrations).

Currently, the USA's strategic interest in this geostrategic area (the Pacific) has been restated in *a report – amendment to the American strategic doctrine already in force* (from 2017 and 2018, report which coins the concept of "double ocean" (Indo-Pacific) and involves the USA in this *priority area, in a clear and firm manner* (designing a network-based regional security architecture, which takes into account the specifics of the region; implementing a concept of "free zone, open to all nations").

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>.
2. DOBRESCU, Paul, *Geopolitica*, Comunicare.ro Publishing House, SNSPA, David Ogilvy Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, 2003.
3. GRIFFITHS, Martin, *Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics*, Routledge, London and New York, 2005.
4. I.B., "Stoltenberg: Brazilia și alte țări din America Latină ar putea deveni "parteneri" NATO", in *Hotnews*, 4 April 2019, URL: <https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-23068523-stoltenberg-brazilia-alte-tari-din-america-latina-putea-deveni-parteneri-nato.htm>.
5. CURTIFAN, Tudor, "Brazilia, în NATO? Trump: Ne vom gândi foarte, foarte serios la asta", in *Defense Romania*, 19 March 2019, URL: https://www.defenseromania.ro/brazilia-in-nato-trump-ne-vom-gandi-foarte-foarte-serios-la-asta_596346.html.
6. BRUNNSTROM, David, "NATO chief says Brazil, other Latin American countries could become 'partners'", in *Reuters*, 4 April 2019, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-brazil-latam-interview/nato-chief-says-brazil-other-latin-american-countries-could-become-partners-idUSKCN1RF2TT>
7. KHANNA, Parag, *Lumea a doua. Imperii și influență în noua ordine globală*, translated by Doris Mironescu, Polirom, Iași, 2008.
8. KISSINGER, Henry, *Lumea a doua. Imperii și influență în noua ordine globală*, translated by Doris Mironescu, Polirom, Iași, 2008.
9. ***, National Defense Strategy, Sharpening the American Military Competitive's Edge, 2018, URL: <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
10. NEGUȚ, Silviu, *Introducere în geopolitică*, Meteor Press Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.
11. CHARAP, Samuel; DRENNAN, John; KANAIEV, Yevgeny; LUKONIN, Sergey; MIKHEEV, Vasily; SHVYDKO, Vitaly, VODA, Kristina; VOITOLOVSKY, Feodor, "The US and Russia in Asia-Pacific", 2016 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, https://www.academia.edu/28955297/The_US_and_Russia_in_the_Asia-Pacific_in_English US Department of Defense (DoD), *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. Preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networking region*, June 1, 2019, URL <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

NUCLEAR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN JOINT MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Alexandru HERCIU, Ph.D.

Lieutenant Colonel, Associate Professor,
Land Forces Department within Command and Staff College,
„Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest, Romania.
E-mail: herciu_alexandru12@yahoo.ro

Abstract: *We are witnessing these days an unprecedented harsh controversy over the development of nuclear capabilities as a result of the failure of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The brawls are more complicated than that, in the sense that there are many concerns for the development of combat components with nuclear warheads with tactical, operational, and strategic use. The main objective of the paper is to address issues related to the management of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) information in the operation of multinational joint forces that possess nuclear capabilities or operate in nuclear environment.*

Considering that the use of nuclear weapons at the right time can create favorable conditions for achieving decisive results in the dynamics of military operations, the lethal consequences of their use can significantly influence military operations and increase the complexity of the battlefield. Under these circumstances, allied forces must be able to perform all types of operations in such a complex environment.

Keywords: *nuclear environment; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons; weapons of mass destruction (WMD).*

INTRODUCTION

An increasing number of states possess offensive warfare capabilities, including CBRN WMD, or have under development such programs at different stages. The ability of these types of weapons to produce a large number of victims, the relative ease in producing and using some of them, and the escalation of research in these areas, pose significant risks to global security.

NATO, as the most relevant international political-military organization of the moment, occupies an essential position in the common front of the effort aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, by the end of the last century, NATO did not treat CBRN risks seriously, having other priority objectives, albeit, at the declarative level, the attitude of the Alliance was unequivocal in this regard.

In this context, the reconsideration of the security concept by NATO member states concerning the new dangers, risks, and threats requires the transition from the field of conventional military capabilities to specialized capabilities in order to counter them in all confrontational environments, including in CBRN circumstances. Therefore, joint operations should be planned so that the Alliance or a coalition's forces are able to defend not only against conventional attacks but also be effective in conducting operations under CBRN conditions/environments.

During the planning and running operations, it is vital for commanders at all levels to take into account the emergence of CBRN risks and to apply appropriate CBRN defense measures against their effects. The threat characteristics and associated protection measures

need to be continually reviewed to ensure the forces survival capacity and freedom of movement.

At the tactical and operational levels of military art, the forces with high capacity to control the combat space have to carry out successfully all types of operations under the conditions of CBRN threats. The success of operations depends on the achievement of the three pillars of CBRN defense, namely: prevention, protection, and consequences management of CBRN WMD attacks. Based on these considerations, we intend to address the issue of decision-making process in joint operations that concern nuclear capabilities.

Starting from this, we intend to create the theoretical framework necessary to be able to customize the general environment in which the multinational forces with nuclear capabilities operate. In this respect, we will present conceptual aspects related to this particular issue of the operations conducted by the multinational joint forces, under the circumstances and conditions of its use, from the national and Alliance doctrines perspectives.

1. Joint multinational operations – framing the problematic

The profound changes in the current security environment have liberated the thought of ideological constraints and imposed obedience. The security environment has become fluid and flexible, with all kinds of possible construction, organization, and reorganization, influencing the dynamics of interests and changes in the centers of power.

In the new security environment, the fulfillment of the missions carried out at the tactical and operational levels of military art depends on both organizational, logistic, command and control aspects, as well as an adequate approach to the requirements of the modern combat battlespace and possible types of military actions.

Joint operations conducted in a particular battlespace, are perceived as integrated and unitary actions. Military analysts believe that the future wars will be characterized by joint operations carried out in a multinational context, in the sense of involving all military service branches of two or more states, acting in all three physical environments: land, air, and maritime.

In this paper, we aim to create the theoretical framework needed to be able to address issues related to the operations of multinational forces with nuclear capabilities.

We consider that such an approach is desirable given the current security context, the interest in nuclear weapons shown by the Russian Federation and also by actors such as North Korea or Iran. The concern of these states for nuclear weapons reveals in their nuclear modernization programs, changes in military doctrine, and the conduct of recent military exercises. This situation has challenged NATO to focus its attention on nuclear weapons at the alliance level.

2. CBRN hazards, risks and threats in the current operating environment

“An increasing threat – the use or danger of using weapons of mass destruction has significantly influenced the security environment of the 20th century and will continue to have a major impact on international security in the future as well”¹.

Today we witness the expansion of terrorist activities and international organized crime, along with hidden development of nuclear, biological and chemical military programs of states that provide support to terrorist organizations. Uncontrolled proliferation and dissemination of CBRN technologies and materials, CBRN WMD and other unconventional means highlights the existence of CBRN sources that can affect the security of states, can

¹ Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl, April 4th, 2009, URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease accessed on September 29th, 2019.

seriously harm the environment and the health of the population and may negatively influence the preparation and conduct of military actions.

The North Atlantic Alliance faces a wide range of challenges and threats to its security, much different from what existed at the time of its formation. The present and future security challenges require that NATO be prepared to protect and defend its members against current threats, including the proliferation of CBRN WMD and its means of use. In this regard, the Alliance has been prudent and has developed policies that respond to the significant and growing threat represented by the proliferation of CBRN WMD. Although significant progress has been made in this area, significant challenges remain.

Despite armament control treaties and agreements, potential opponents continue to develop weapons or CBRN materials. This trend is more pronounced in areas characterized by chronic political instability, where NATO may be required to conduct operations. Moreover, there are repeated examples of terrorist groups or other *ad hoc* groups, such as terrorist and extremist groups, that find robust CBRN technologies available to achieve their intended goals.²

Unfortunately, the scientific leap has unintentionally accentuated the proliferation of CBRN WMD, facilitating the free circulation of information and scientific expertise across the globe. At the same time, the expansion of urbanization and the global industrialization process increase the possibility of accidental industrial toxic emissions (Toxic Industrial Materials / TMI) as a result of negligence or deliberate actions.

The current environment presents countless possibilities for NATO forces to meet adversaries holding CBRN capabilities. These may be CBRN weapons or improvised devices that incorporate CBRN or TIM agents. Moreover, NATO forces may be exposed to the risks emerging from the accidental or deliberate release of these substances or as a consequence of military action. Operability and, in many cases, survival after a CBRN attack or TIM emission call for a coherent response at least from CBRN defense specialists, medical staff, and environmental experts to mitigate the consequences of the incident.

NATO military analysts have pointed out that during the military actions carried out by the Alliance, its asymmetric opponent could use various means in order to reduce technological superiority. In this context, it is estimated that potential opponents could develop alternative strategies and tactics, including the use of CBRN and TIM agents, especially Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs), to reduce this imbalance.

In the same line, it is estimated that potential opponents would focus on perceived weaknesses and vulnerabilities of NATO forces, such as public sensitivity to casualties or loss, cultural, legal, and ethical constraints. Attacks can be executed to use the CBRN threat in propaganda, to limit the Alliance or any coalition's rules of engagement (ROE), and to separate their hesitant members. Opponents may be reticent on international law and ethical standards, potential action in the field, allowing them to deliberately target the civilian population, political, economical and socio-cultural objectives, including critical infrastructure elements.

The use of CBRN WMD by state actors may have severe political implications, and the authorization of their use must be a responsibility of top-level structures of the state. An unsafe political and military response to a CBRN threat allows a potential aggressor to achieve a maximum psychological and physical impact on the first use of CBRN WMD.

This attitude of a potential adversary in conflict confirms that the barrier between holding, threatening, and using CBRN weapons in operation is very fragile. The potential

² *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 2010, The Security Environment, Art. 10, URL: www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, accessed on September 29th, 2019.

enemy may intend to use CBRN weapons in military action to obtain operational advantages of political, psychological, or military.

Military actions, regardless of the characteristics, physiognomy, and the participant echelon, are prepared and conducted under the circumstances of CBRN risks or dangers. The CBRN risks result from the existence of weapons of mass destruction (CBRN WMD) or Industrial Toxic Materials (TIMs) in the theater of operations which can influence the operational capacity of the forces decisively and affect the environment irremediably.

Therefore, the extent of CBRN risks and dangers generates a certain level of CBRN threat in the area of operation. In order to accurately assess the level of the CBRN threat by the staff, the offensive and defensive CBRN capabilities of the potential enemy, its intentions, the possibilities of using CBRN weapons in time and space, as well as the forces that can be affected, are rigorously analyzed.

The level of CBRN threat has implications for the degree of forces vulnerability, the way of organizing CBRN individual and collective protection, and the preparedness for the action of CBRN defense units. The CBRN threat assessment must be continuous, permanently and timely updated, must use all available information and take the necessary measures in order to achieve CBRN protection.

From the assessment of the situations and conditions in which the multinational forces prepare and conducts operations, it emerges that the potential opponent has the following options regarding the use of CBRN weapons:

- Exert political pressure by threatening or claiming the right to use CBRN WMD or reclaiming the first use of CBRN weapons by NATO or a third party;
- Terrorism or a third party using hidden or unhidden CBRN WMD to increase tension and exert pressure on NATO to react;
- Use CBRN WMD in the final situation to avoid defeat or even revenge.

These options of a potential adversary target, on the one hand, the military impact of the use of CBRN weapons on the joint multinational force, and, on the other hand, the involvement of NATO forces in such complex actions.

Chemical weapons, due to their tactical peculiarities, can be used to attack the civilian population or to weaken the cohesion of force and its operations through attacks concentrated on less protected elements. Due to the effects of the chemical weapons first use, the opponent can direct attacks on the deployed forces to influence the conduct of the campaign. Later, by the end of the operation, the opponent may use nuclear or biological weapons to restore the balance of forces within the area of operations or to cause massive casualties. The tactical implications of using the chemical weapon are to reduce the operational capacity of the forces and/or reduce the possibilities for action by using CBRN individual protective equipment (CBRN IPE).

In the current security environment, the strategic nuclear arsenal retains its role as a global, regional, or zonal deterrent. At the same time, the danger of using tactical nuclear weapons has increased considerably due to the penetration of the monopoly held by the global nuclear powers, the increased uncertainty in the control of ammunition technologies and stocks as well as the lack of firm regulations in international law. An opponent can use the nuclear weapon as follows: the use of neutron ammunition (air nuclear explosions) to affect command and control systems, communications and computer network in an unconventional form of electronic warfare; the use of nuclear munitions for destroying air and naval enemy forces; identifying, striking, and seizing critical infrastructure objectives; disrupting the logistics system; inducing a feeling of extraordinary psychological impact and exerting pressure on the political decision-maker; and the threat of using this type of ammunition for intimidation.

The possession of the nuclear weapon still offers peace of mind and a wide range of leverage to states that are holding it, in order to discourage other states from engaging in direct military conflict. In the same vein, these capabilities can be successfully used at different levels of military operations or stages of conflict evolution to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

Nowadays, the military powers exploit, at the diplomatic level, the status of superiority offered by their nuclear capabilities as a form of protection and as a guarantee of deterring a potential attack. Other nuclear powers use this argument to strengthen their regional authority status, to match or exceed the military capabilities of traditional opponents and, if necessary, even to obtain a status of superiority in future negotiations.

As for their employment, nuclear weapons will primarily target strategic or operational objectives, focused on the target's centers of gravity at these two levels, aiming to affect the forces' will to fight and to produce a psychological impact on the population. Additionally, in a conflict, the use of nuclear weapons may be adopted if the initiative is lost, in order to tilt the ratio of forces or to obtain operational advantages.

The use of nuclear weapons at the right time can lead to the emerging of favorable conditions for achieving decisive results in the dynamics of military operations. The particularity of performing military operations in a nuclear environment is that they can be compressed in time and space, and the course of campaigns can be radically modified or accelerated. The threat and lethal consequences of using nuclear weapons can greatly influence military operations and may increase the complexity of the battlefield. Consequently, the Allied forces must be able to perform all types of operations in such a complicated environment.

3. The concept of using nuclear weapons in NATO

Due to the role NATO plays in the international security environment and the fact that the Alliance holds the option of use nuclear weapon,³ it should be specified that NATO does not have its own nuclear arsenal. It is based on the arsenal of its member states holding nuclear weapons, namely: USA, Great Britain, and France. Also, the use of these weapons is not within the reach of the Alliance's decision-makers; the national states maintain the decision to use them. Since its formation as a political-military organization, possession and use of nuclear weapons was a foreign policy argument and guaranteed the possibility of counteracting threats to the Alliance.

The easy distribution of raw materials needed to produce nuclear devices globally, simplification of access to a specific technology, and the migration of experts in the field have led to the possibility for some states or even non-state actors to have such capabilities at a small-scale. Their interest in possessing nuclear devices aims at creating and maintaining regional or international tensions and generating economic, financial, or military benefits. The use of low-power nuclear devices along with releases other than attacks hazards (ROTA) is a compensatory alternative for states or organizations with low conventional capabilities and adopting asymmetrical tactics.

Following the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, the allies committed themselves to "creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons", but at the same time it was reaffirmed that NATO would remain a nuclear alliance "as long as nuclear weapons exist in

³ *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 2010 (Preface, Al. 1, bullet 4), URL: www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf accessed on September 29th, 2019.

the world".⁴ In this context, the United States remains the holder of a substantial nuclear arsenal associated with an extensive system of carrier vectors, being the only state that used the nuclear weapon during a conflict.

As an organization based on collective defence, NATO maintains multilateral relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear allies in order to provide nuclear weapons to deter possible aggressive countries and defend the Alliance. Further, on this matter, the member states consult and decide by consensus on a number of nuclear-related issues.

4. NATO's strategic nuclear arsenal

Each of the three "nuclear allies" plays a distinctive role in contributing to NATO nuclear capabilities. Only the US president, the British Prime Minister, and the French president can authorize the employment of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the governments and the armed forces of these countries have taken extraordinary measures to validate the authenticity of authorizing orders for a possible nuclear attack.

The strategic nuclear arsenal made available to NATO is made up of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, maritime and submarine nuclear arsenals, and long-range nuclear bombers. These capabilities reflect the commitment of the United States to a nuclear response in the event of an attack against a NATO member country. At the same time, the US Strategic Nuclear Force also provides support to the Asia-Pacific allies, especially Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

Since the early 1970s, NATO has used mainly the same context to describe the role of the other nuclear allies, so the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France contribute to the general deterrence of a possible nuclear aggressor and allied security. Specifically, the British nuclear arsenal has been made available to NATO since the early 1960s, unless the UK Government could decide that national interests should be prioritized for the authorization of a possible nuclear attack. Consequently, while planning to engage the UK's nuclear arsenal takes place in close cooperation with NATO's decision-makers, the final decision on any use of nuclear weapons in the UK lies solely with the UK government.⁵

Unlike the other two nuclear powers, France believes that the decision to use its nuclear weapons is the ultimate solution when all other options are exhausted and that its president has the "ultimate responsibility" to decide whether there is a threat to vital interests of the nation. In this respect, France has not put its nuclear arsenal at NATO disposal, although French officials frequently refer to its contribution to guaranteeing Alliance security.

However, as the geopolitical and doctrinal differences between the United States, Britain and France have diminished in recent years, the three countries have intensified bilateral cooperation and consultations in areas such as nuclear deterrence strategy, the reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and nuclear weapons non-proliferation. In this respect, nuclear consultations and cooperation between the US and France have intensified in recent years and, in the future, the common interests of the major nuclear powers are likely to shift towards new forms of bilateral engagement and, in some cases, trilateral.

⁴ *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 2010, Defence and deterrence, Art. 17, URL: www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf accessed on September 29th, 2019.

⁵ *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, 27 May 1997*, URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm, accessed on May 8, 2019.

5. NATO's non-strategic nuclear arsenal

In February 2010, former NATO Secretary-General George Robertson and Franklin Miller, a former senior US official with nuclear responsibilities, said the United States had about 1,200 tactical nuclear weapons, of which 500 were operational warheads, and the rest were deposited or being dismantled. Of these, 200 operational weapons are still installed in Europe, more precisely in Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey. All official US documents state that the weapons in question are older versions of the B61, which will be replaced by 2020 with a modernized version called B61-12.

For those allied countries that have chosen to be actively involved in agreements to make available facilities for non-strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems on their territories, the tasks, responsibilities, and associated risks are not negligible. In their case, the risks are mainly of an internal political nature, because public opinion in these countries is not fully open to the subject of hosting nuclear weapons on their national territory. Moreover, the additional costs of maintaining specialized capabilities in technical assistance, training the specialized personnel and maintaining a high level of security of these military nuclear facilities imply a significant contribution to the defense budgets of the allies involved.⁶

Lately, more and more non-nuclear members of the Alliance have supported NATO's nuclear deterrence effort by providing combat aircraft carrying out complementary missions, providing air supply on the mission, or making available the means of decontamination. Besides this, many non-nuclear allies can provide valuable insights and support for NATO assessments of developments related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons by actors outside the Alliance.

6. Nuclear decision-making bodies in NATO

NATO has several fora where nuclear weapons issues are discussed and, whenever is necessary, decisions are taken by consensus.

The *North Atlantic Council (NAC)* is the Alliance's main decision-making body and includes the representatives of each of the 29 member countries. As the role of nuclear weapons in NATO deterrence and defense strategy affects all allies, this matter is discussed and decided within the NAC and reflected in the documents issued by this council, such as the Strategic Concept, Summit Statements and Special Review.

The *Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)* has authority comparable to NAC for specific nuclear-related issues such as nuclear policies or planning and consultation procedures, but includes only 28 Allies. The NPG was set up in 1966 as a result of France's decision to leave NATO integrated military structures. France, in accordance with its stricter policy of "autonomy" in decision-making and action on nuclear weapons issues, has not joined the NPG and has retained that determination so far.

Ordinarily, NPG meets at the level of defense ministers (annually) or permanent representatives to take into account issues affecting the safety and security of nuclear weapons. A leading consultative body of NPG, known as the High-Level Group, is chaired by the United States and brings together high-level politicians from the Allies. In addition to political and technical aspects involving nuclear energy sharing agreements, it also covers issues such as nuclear weapons control and non-proliferation.⁷

⁶ *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review* – Press Release, May 20, 2012, Introduction, art. 5, URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm, accessed on May 8th, 2019.

⁷ Camille Grand, "Nuclear deterrence and the Alliance in the 21st century - Conventional and nuclear elements of deterrence and defence", in *NATO Review*, URL: www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nuclear-deterrence-alliance-21st-century-nato/EN/, accessed on June 10th, 2019.

NPG is the only permanent body in which two of the nuclear allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, provide regular instructions to the other allies, whether or not they have non-strategic US nuclear facilities on their territories. The guidelines refer to topics such as the global balance of nuclear forces and the evolution of threats. NPG is also the only permanent body of the Alliance that discusses politically and militarily sensitive advisory procedures on the possible use of nuclear weapons, all allies being invited to these consultations, and decisions being made by consensus.

As a conclusion, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, and the allies have recognized that NATO nuclear deterrent posture is largely based on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and on the capabilities and infrastructure provided by the allies on whose territories there are these installations.⁸ At the same time, it is recognized that any engagement of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally change the nature of the conflict, but the circumstances in which the Alliance could use nuclear weapons are extremely remote.

7. Doctrinal aspects of NATO-led nuclear operations

In the specialized literature of the armed forces of NATO member countries possessing nuclear arsenals, the term “nuclear environment” can be found. This term is defined as the presence of any nuclear-capable system, before, during, or after nuclear-weapons employment by either friendly or enemy forces⁹ and if any of the following conditions is met:¹⁰

- The existence of a belligerent country’s ability to provide nuclear weapons;
- The existence of nuclear weapons in the area of responsibility (AOR);
- There is the possibility of deploying or using nuclear weapons in AOR.

Nuclear operations fall into two basic categories of support, namely immediate nuclear support and pre-planned nuclear support. Both terms define the use of nuclear weapons against hostile forces in support of allied operations to:¹¹

- Alter the balance between fire and maneuver;
- Change the pace of the operation;
- Respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy.

The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in a major campaign or operation can cause wide-scale changes in objectives, operation phases, and courses of action. Nuclear weapons make possible to change the ratio of forces drastically and therefore, if a potential adversary is not successful in conducting operations, it could consider using weapons of mass destruction.

Policy-makers, both at political and military level, must fully understand the potential of nuclear weapons use. Significant losses that a nuclear attack may cause can shock public opinion and confuse unprepared troops in tactical, technical, and psychological terms. That is why the soldiers assigned to carry out operations in a nuclear environment must possess knowledge and skills in terms of:

- Using appropriate individual and collective protective equipment to survive the effects of the use of nuclear weapons;
- Radiation monitoring;
- Decontamination techniques.

⁸ NATO Nuclear Policy in a Post-INF World, Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the University of Oslo, September 9th, 2019, URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_168602.htm accessed on September 29th, 2019.

⁹ FM 100-30, *Nuclear Operations*, HQ Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1996, Preface, p. vi, URL: fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-30.pdf accessed on September 29th, 2019.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, The Nuclear Environment, p. 1-1, URL: fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-30.pdf accessed on September 29th, 2019.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 1-1, URL: fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-30.pdf accessed on June 23rd, 2019.

Commanders at all levels must understand the operational and tactical implications of the nuclear environment and its effects on military operations. They must understand that nuclear weapons are incredibly destructive and have harmful effects that can irreversibly affect the personnel, the equipment, and the dynamics of combat power. A nuclear attack is extremely challenging and not an impossible situation, the key being the exercise of command and control, and the forces' ability to operate in a nuclear environment.

Weather, terrain, vegetation, and infrastructure can have a decisive influence on the effects of nuclear weapons, but the ability to exercise command and control, and the training of forces can prove to be decisive factors for action in CBRN environments. Understanding the physical and psychological hazards specific to the nuclear battlefield can counteract these risks and can improve the forces' ability to operate successfully in such environments.

Planning multinational operations gains new valences in terms of risk assessment in the context of the threat of nuclear weapons being used by the enemy. Against this background, based on strategic nuclear concepts, NATO reserves the right to use the nuclear arsenal to support the coalition's demands and, therefore, decision-makers need to assess the following:

- The availability of nuclear resources made available by the member states holding nuclear arsenal;
- The ways of using nuclear resources;
- Objectives to be attacked with nuclear strikes;
- The risks generated by a possible nuclear second strike of the enemy;
- Limitations in the execution of military operations in the area affected by nuclear strikes;
- The consequences of own nuclear attacks failure;
- The effects of nuclear strikes on targets, the environment, and the local population.

The main enemy targets that can be engaged with nuclear strikes could be the production and storage facilities for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; launching sites/installations of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; vital elements of the enemy command-control system; logistic formations of the opponent; underground facilities of strategic importance; industrial objectives of strategic importance; air defense installations and structures; concentration of enemy troops.

According to US doctrine in the field, the most likely enemy nuclear targets are:¹² nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities; troop concentrations; command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities; logistics considerations; underground facilities containing HPTs; targets which would severely impact the campaign plan; air defense facilities; weapons of mass destruction; mobile land battle targets.

Thus, CBRN measures of force protection gain greater importance in a nuclear environment, as the destructive power of nuclear weapons requires new measures to reduce vulnerability and increase survivability. The commander of the structure acting in the nuclear environment must opt for a maneuver scheme that has as a goal both accomplishing the mission and the survival of the personnel.

Commanders must quickly assess the effects of the nuclear blast and decide the appropriate actions and responses, as the immediate impact on combat power can degrade the force ability to carry out current and future missions. They must also determine the long-term effects on future operations, taking into account the following issues: the rapid restoration of C2 capabilities and logistics; decontamination of personnel, vehicles, and equipment; rapid administration of medical countermeasures and radiation exposure levels of subordinate units.

¹² FM 100-30, *Nuclear Operations*, HQ Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1996, p. 3-14, URL: fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-30.pdf accessed on June 23rd, 2019.

CONCLUSIONS

In line with the new typology of threats, risks, and challenges, the North Atlantic Alliance has reconsidered its position in the security field by placing CBRN defense as a strategic priority. In these circumstances, CBRN information management should ensure the collection, analysis, and dissemination of specific information for the effective coordination of military structures in actions in order to prevent and limit the destructive effects of CBRN events.

Given the risk of a CBRN event, the priority objective is to manage the hazard rather than eliminate it. In the hazard management process, the focus is mainly on the preventive measures to be taken before the CBRN event occurs, without unduly diminishing the operational capacity of the forces. Human and material losses, especially during operations carried out in CBRN environments, are inevitable. Commanders are required to take risks, analyze, and decide how to meet operational requirements, according to the mission.

In order to achieve a sufficient balance between the need to ensure protection and the preservation of the operational capacity of the forces, it was necessary to implement a CBRN risk management based on an active CBRN surveillance, alert and reporting information system. In the event of a CBRN incident, the timely warning/alert is the first action that is being taken to create the conditions necessary to implement the most effective force protection measures and to carry on operations with minimal impact on operational capacity.

Managing CBRN information at the level of joint forces results in an effective management of the CBRN consequences. The staff must be able to plan CBRN reconnaissance and decontamination, prevent, protect, and remove or mitigate the effects of an imminent CBRN WMD attack. In this context, the force must be able to act in CBRN environments and respond rapidly to the attack, with minimal losses, for effective management of its consequences.

The existence of an optimal level of training in the CBRN consequence management will differentiate between the success of military action and a massive disaster with considerable losses in the event of a CBRN attack. At the same time, a well-established command and control system will make the most of the forces and means available, so that the consequences of CBRN attacks will be minimal.

NATO forces must be prepared for the execution of operations in radioactive environments. The cooperation and synchronization of CBRN warning and reporting systems at the level of coalition forces in case of the possible use of nuclear weapons by the Alliance is essential. Hence, CBRN measures of force protection are of particular importance, as the destructive power of nuclear weapons requires new measures to reduce vulnerability and to increase the level of protection of forces and equipment.

Commander of the Joint Force acting in a nuclear environment must opt for a course of action that has the purpose of both fulfilling the mission and protecting the personnel because the immediate impact on combat power can degrade the force ability to carry out current and future missions. This situation is challenging but not impossible, the key being the exercise of the command and control, and the forces ability to act in a nuclear environment.

Variables such as weather conditions, land, vegetation, and infrastructure can decisively influence the effects of nuclear weapons. The ability to exercise command and understand the dangers specific to the nuclear battlefield can counter these risks and lead to improved forces ability to operate successfully in such hazardous environments.

However, CBRN warning and reporting in the case of a nuclear attack must allow the forces in the affected area to be able to take the necessary protective measures for both personnel and their equipment. At the same time, the joint force has to be prepared for the subsequent exploitation of the nuclear blasts' effects.

Taking into account the issues presented in this paper, we can conclude that CBRN information management at the level of joint forces can become an effective process in the future use of nuclear weapons by allies with these capabilities through cooperation and synchronization of CBRN warning and reporting systems of multinational structures participating in the operation. However, although NATO's doctrine regulates extensively how to carry out the CBRN warning and reporting process at alliance level, the aspects of planning, conducting and executing nuclear operations are developed and quantified only in the doctrines of the allied nuclear states (the US, UK, and France). In this respect, although it is a sensitive subject to be addressed at NATO level, the integration of the concepts of nuclear operations that can be initiated by coalition forces within the allied doctrine on CBRN information management can provide a much broader picture of carrying out operations in CBRN environments, and more specifically in the nuclear environment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, "Deterrence and Defence Posture Review", Press Release, May 20, 2012, Introduction, art. 5, URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm
2. ***, FM 100-30, *Nuclear Operations*, HQ Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1996, URL: fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-30.pdf
3. ***, NATO Nuclear Policy in a Post-INF World, Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the University of Oslo, September 9th, 2019, URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_168602.htm
4. ***, Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 2010, URL: www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng
5. ***, Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl, April 4th, 2009, URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease
6. Arms Control Association official webpage, URL: <https://www.armscontrol.org/>
7. GRAND, Camille, "Nuclear deterrence and the Alliance in the 21st century - Conventional and nuclear elements of deterrence and defence", in *NATO Review*, URL: www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nuclear-deterrence-alliance-21st-century-nato/EN
8. NATO official webpage, URL: <https://www.nato.int>

SEA CONTROL – AN ESSENTIAL TASK FOR NAVAL FORCES

Valentin – Marian TOMA, Ph.D. Student

Captain (Navy), “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: valentintomita@yahoo.com

Ion CHIORCEA, Ph.D.

Captain (Navy) (Ret.), Professor, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: chiorcea44@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Sea control is designed to secure a given part of the sea and control the sea lines of communications for a specific purpose, which essentially means that one side possesses superiority over its enemy, and interrupts or cuts off the enemy’s sea lines of communication without major opposition from the enemy. It means that the enemy does not have a significant capability to interfere with the stronger side. Controls of a specific sea area require strong naval forces which is able to achieve a substantial degree of control of surface, air and subsurface. Sea control can be strategic, operational, and tactical; it depends on the dimension of the maritime domain where the sea control concept is applied. The structure and the capabilities of naval forces are essential for maintaining sea control for a period of time. By obtaining sea control in a specific maritime area, the stronger side can exert a strong political, diplomatic and military influence on the events.*

Keywords: *sea control; naval forces; capabilities; command and control; cover and protection; military pressure; sea lines of communication.*

Since the earliest times, obtaining and maintaining the control of the sea by a naval force, within a certain maritime space, ensured the winning of the naval war. Gaining control of the sea in a certain area of the sea implies the freedom of navigation on the maritime communications lines and the interruption of the maritime communications lines for the enemy without the need to destroy the enemy fleet and military objectives from the enemy coast.

1. Conceptual approach

The concept of sea control is presented by naval theorists under various interpretations. Thus, Professor Milan N. Vego considers sea control as “the ability to use part of the ocean / sea and related airspace for military and non-military purposes and to prohibit the enemy from using this area for a period of time”¹. The concept of sea control involves the achievement of sea control in the air, surface and underwater environment.

British professor Geoffrey Till identifies three types of sea control: absolute/ total sea control, ongoing sea control and disputed sea control.² The characteristics of these types of sea control are characterized by the maritime space in which the control of the sea is obtained, the time while maintaining the control of the sea and the possibilities of action of the enemy on his own forces. The absolute / total control of the sea implies a freedom of navigation of the own forces without the enemy being able to act with forces and means to interfere, the control of the

¹ Milan Vego, *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control, Theory and Practice*, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2016, p. 54.

² Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century*, 3rd ed., Routledge, London and New York, 2013, p. 169.

sea in progress ensures a certain degree of freedom of navigation for own forces under the conditions of possible actions of the enemy, and the control of the sea in dispute is characteristic under the conditions of the interaction of some belligerents with an approximately equally fighting power who challenge each other over the control of the sea and each tries by tactical actions of battle to obtain the control of the sea in progress.

In the modern period the absolute / total control of the sea is very difficult to achieve, especially in the ocean where the freedom of movement is quite high. If we can admit that the absolute / total control of the sea can be achieved in the surface combat environment, the control of the sea in the air combat environment is very difficult to achieve, if one can obtain it then it is relatively short to maintain, while the control of the sea in the fighting environment under the surface of the water is almost impossible to achieve.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the United States Naval Forces managed to achieve absolute / total control of the sea in the air and surface fighting environment, but in the water surface fighting environment it failed the Russian submarines being present in the area. The control of the sea under the surface of the water was not accomplished by the naval forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition, in 1991, in the northern part of the Persian Gulf due to the large number of marine mines launched by the Iraqi naval forces, so the coalition ships were dragged behind in carrying out manoeuvres for fire support of the ground forces.

In the war against Yugoslavia the main mission of the participating vessels, from NATO member countries, was to maintain the local control of the sea in the Adriatic Sea and to ensure the security of the aircraft carriers in order to carry out air strikes on the objectives of the Yugoslavian coast. The control of the sea and the lack of reaction of the Yugoslavian navy were achieved, but the most important was demonstrated by the deployed of the carriers in the Adriatic Sea with the flexibility and mobility of the naval forces.

Ongoing sea control can be described as the situation where only certain types of ships can carry out tactical naval actions without considerable risk, while other types of ships execute naval tactical actions assuming a high risk or sometimes their action is on the verge of chance.³ This type of sea control is encountered especially in the case of naval powers acting in closed or semi-closed seas, where inferior naval power can take tactical actions against the enemy based on the tactics of harassment according to the principle of hit and run. Following the 6-day war between Israel and the coalition of Arab states Egypt, Jordan and Syria, June 5-10, 1967, the victory was on Israel's side, but Israel's Arab neighbours did not accept the defeat and continued sporadic attacks on the Jew state. The Israeli navy has organized a series of manoeuvres along the Sinai coast to Port Said in order to maintain sea control in the coastal area and to protect the coastline. The Egyptian navy discovered the Israeli destroyer Eilat (formerly HMS Zelos) and decided to attack it with a group of two Komar-class missile fast patrol boats. Following the attack, the Israeli destroyer was sunk, 34 crew members were killed and 91 injured.⁴ It can be stated that the Egyptian ships through the tactical executed actions took a great risk, having much inferior fighting possibilities.

The control of the sea in dispute, as a rule, is predominant in the case of a war between two strong opponents in the open ocean or in a large semi-closed sea with a considerable extent. Naval actions begin in the initial phase of the war and are characterized by continuous attempts to achieve sea control in a certain region. The characteristic of this type of sea control is the repeated succession of gaining and losing sea control in the disputed sea or ocean region. The difference between the control of the sea in dispute in the case of the closed and semi-closed seas compared to the open ocean consists in the fact that in the first situation the control of the

³ Milan N. Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, p. 135.

⁴ ***, *The Arab-Israeli War of 1967*, URL: http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajc_data/files/1968_4_arabisraelwar.pdf, accessed on 31.07.2019.

sea obtained by one of the parties is quickly challenged by the other by repeated naval and aerial actions or by planting mine fields and executing the blows with coastal missiles. In the open ocean both naval forces act with great risk because their power is balanced and in most situations one side controls the sea on a larger ocean surface and the opponent on a smaller ocean surface.

In World War II, the English Channel was the main dispute for gaining control of the sea between the Germans and the British. Also in the Mediterranean, between 1940 and 1943, the British navy, based in Alexandria and Gibraltar, had the control of the sea in the east and west of the sea, while the Italian navy had the control of the sea in the central area of the sea without that one of the parties had total control of the sea, but the Axis submarines acted in the British area as well as the British submarines and aviation deployed in Malta operated in the central part of the Mediterranean.⁵ Another example of the division of sea control, at least on the surface, is that of the Black Sea between 1941 and 1944. Mainly the Soviet navy controlled the eastern part of the Black Sea, and the Axis naval forces exercised sea control in the western part. Submarines and aviation of each side acted to expand its own sea control area.

2. Implications

The concept of sea control requires a continuous dynamic of the naval forces, especially in large maritime spaces where a series of sequential operations are needed over a relatively long period of time. For limited maritime spaces such as the closed or semi-closed seas the tactical actions are carried out with great intensity and for a short period of time using several lines of operations at the same time.

The tactical situation in the limited maritime spaces can change very quickly, challenging the control of the sea being possible through actions of the naval forces, aviation and even cover actions performed by the ground forces.

The main role in achieving and maintaining the control of the sea remains with the naval forces the only ones capable of responding to the threats of the enemy in the air, surface and underwater fighting environments.

In confined maritime spaces, each party in conflict carries out continuous surveillance so that for large battleships it is difficult not to be discovered. An advantage for the fast surface vessels is the presence of the traffic of the commercial ships, which offers them possibilities of masking and freedom of movement.

Naval tactical actions are mainly used to achieve minor tactical objectives, with or without the use of armament, while the coordination of raids, attacks and the entire naval battle is required to achieve major naval objectives.⁶

The main methods for engaging the enemy at sea, in order to achieve and maintain control of the sea, especially in the closed or semi-closed seas, are the attacks, the naval battle and the major naval operation.

The attack is a combination of manoeuvring and firing with a single ship / naval platform or a group of high intensity naval ships / platforms in a short period of time to achieve a minor tactical objective.⁷ The types of attacks are different depending on the naval platforms used, so surface and submarine ships can be used to launch missiles, torpedoes, anti-submarine bombs. Of course, mainly the attack is the basis of the blows and naval battles, but it can be executed independently. An example of this is the attacks of German submarines, during World War II, on commercial ships and convoys crossing the Atlantic loaded with products necessary to support the war effort against Germany.

⁵ Milan N. Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, Frank Cass, London/ Portland, 2003, p. 136.

⁶ Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operation in the Littorals: Doing More With Less*, Naval Forces, 2007, Military Database.

⁷ Milan N. Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, Frank Cass, London/ Portland, 2003, p. 147.

Naval fighting is the most important method of engaging naval forces in order to achieve tactical objectives. The complexity of naval combat includes the use of long-range missiles and intelligent ammunition. We can comprehensively characterize the naval fight as a series of independent or simultaneous attacks conducted by one or more ships / platforms, synchronized in time and space, in order to achieve the proposed tactical objectives or sometimes operational objectives.

Naval combat is much more intense than the attack and involves the engagement of several platforms with similar or different combat capabilities that can hit the enemy at vulnerable points. Naval actions executed within a well-planned and conducted naval battle are characterized by deception manoeuvres of the enemy, rapid attacks and mutual support between ships engaged in combat. In a naval battle in addition to the planned attacks, naval tactical actions such as raids are carried out in order to disorganize the enemy and to divert his attention from its main effort.⁸ Raids are planned and conducted against objectives considered by the enemy far too valuable to be ignored and are usually executed in an area far from the enemy's main axis of effort. A prerequisite for the success of a raid is that the force intended for this type of naval tactical action is stronger than the enemy forces in the area.

Naval battle has as its main feature the established area of operations and consists of a series of naval battles and attacks synchronized in time and space in order to achieve major tactical objectives and sometimes operational objectives in the respective area of operations. It is planned, prepared and executed on the basis of a unitary design under a single command. It is usually the method of employing naval forces and other forces typical for the closed and semi-closed seas when the fighting power is balanced between combatants.

In the closed and semi-enclosed seas, a naval battle can replace a naval battle when the forces engaged in naval combat can meet the major tactical objectives characteristic of naval battle. The management of naval tactical actions has the role of putting the enemy under constant pressure, to prevent the enemy from being surprised and to create the conditions for changing the situation in the operations area to their own advantage. The implementation of measures to protect the coastal area and the freedom of navigation between its ports by planting mine dams, air, naval and anti-submarine surveillance actions are an integral part of a major naval operation. More recently, such measures have also been identified in hybrid military actions.⁹

A major naval operation involves a succession of naval battles, naval battles, attacks as well as other tactical actions conducted simultaneously or sequentially, coordinated in time and space to achieve operational and sometimes strategic objectives in the maritime operations theatre.¹⁰ Usually, major naval operations are an integral part of maritime or land campaigns and can be carried in the ocean, in the seas adjacent to the ocean, or in closed and semi-closed seas. In the closed and semi-closed seas, it is difficult to prepare and execute a major naval operation not only because of the limited space, but also the specificity of the characteristics of the action environment. Major naval operations normally have to achieve a single operational level objective that decisively changes the situation in the maritime operations theatre, but is sometimes planned to achieve strategic level objectives, usually in the event of a surprise attack on an important part of the enemies' fleet, at the beginning of hostilities and aims to achieve a strategic objective in the theatre of maritime operations. Planning for achieving a strategic objective through a major naval operation is done in principle in the first phase of a campaign and may consist in opening a new front in a certain region.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 149.

⁹ Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, Florin Nistor, "Considerații privind acțiunile militare desfășurate în nordul Mării Negre", in *Buletin of "Carol I" National Defence University*, Bucharest, 2015, Vol 2.

¹⁰ Milan N. Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, p. 147.

The landing of Gallipoli, April 25, 1915, represented the appearance of the first major naval operation. The strategic objective was to open a second front, thus causing the Central Powers to move their forces from Europe to Turkey, and the operational objective was to gain a foothold in the Gallipoli Peninsula.¹¹

A major naval operation is also planned to protect freedom of navigation against enemy attacks, even if sea control is in dispute. In the case of the protection of a convoy, it is desirable to have the control of the sea in the three operational environments. The quality of enemy information is a prerequisite for the success of a major naval operation, as it gives the commander the opportunity to make the best decision after knowing the real situation in the area. The major naval operation is conducted at a joint level, with the commander having the opportunity to carry out a succession of tactical actions at sea and synchronize them with elements from the other categories of forces.

Regardless of whether an attack, a naval battle, a naval battle or a major naval operation is taking place, observing the principles of action is of great importance, their application being determined to achieve success at sea. One of these very important principles in the fight at sea is the manoeuvring of forces and means. At sea the forces continuously manoeuvre along the lines of operations seeking to occupy a favourable position for hitting the enemy. Concentrating effort at the right time and place is the key to success in gaining tactical superiority and involves the coordinated and synchronized application of force against the enemy, on a main direction of attack. Usually, the principle of effort concentration is applied during the control of the sea in dispute.¹² The concentration of forces and means increases the value of the surprise factor and makes it difficult for the enemy to anticipate the place and moment of a blow.

The concentration of forces and means at sea requires careful movement planning and coordination and especially close cooperation with the air forces. This concentration of forces and means takes place especially in the case of an amphibious landing.¹³

This is the unanimous opinion of the Romanian specialists. In this line, I noticed that in the Romanian specialized military literature, it is promoted that the amphibious operations represent the complex military actions carried out by specialized forces. However, such an action of great complexity cannot be achieved without a minimum control of the air and the maritime space. The degree of control of the maritime space, the sea command, the sea control, the sea denial and the projection of the force are necessary. Sea control is one of the minimum levels of sea control by which force projection can be achieved.¹⁴ These concepts are adopted by the Romanian Naval Forces and are not in contradiction with the opinion expressed in NATO doctrines.

In the opinion of the US military theorists the concept of sea control is the essence of naval power, being an essential condition for achieving the military objectives especially at operational and strategic level¹⁵. Naval actions carried out to gain the control of the sea in a certain maritime space can be supported by specific actions to the air forces, ground forces, Special Forces, actions in the cyber environment which involves a wide spectrum of offensive military actions in a joint environment. Military actions in the joint environment request a very good coordination and synchronization between forces.

¹¹ Florin Nistor, *Să redescoperim Arta Operativă Maritimă*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017, p. 67.

¹² Milan N. Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, p. 157.

¹³ Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, *Operații amfibii și riverane, o provocare națională*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, 2018.

¹⁴ Lucian Valeriu Scipanov, "The force projection during amphibious and riverine operations", in: *International Scientific Conference "Strategies XXI"*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, 2017, pp. 398-405.

¹⁵ ***, *Joint Maritime Operations*, Joint Publication 3-32, June 2018, p. I-3.

Simplicity of plans and orders is important in the logical and complete understanding of the mode of action during the succession of tactical actions. Normally the actions of a fleet at sea focus on hitting some enemy targets so as to affect or destroy their centre of gravity. In modern naval warfare, two naval forces of close values are unlikely to engage in a decisive naval battle aimed at destroying one of the powers' fleet. Technological development somewhat changes the way of conducting tactical actions at sea and contributes to increasing prudence in decision making, so that the objectives with minimum losses are achieved.

CONCLUSIONS

The concept of sea control can be applied at the strategic, operational and tactical level depending on the size of the maritime space and the amount of forces deployed. Usually, obtaining and maintaining sea control at the strategic level refers to sea control in the maritime theatre of operations. Operational sea control is applied throughout the operations area. If the control of the sea cannot be obtained and maintained throughout the operations area then it is permissible to obtain and maintain the control of the sea in a certain district in the operations area, in this case the control of the sea being of tactical level. The delimitation of the theatre of operations, the area of operations or of a district is made according to the level of the objectives to be achieved, the amount of forces deployed and the totality and intensity of naval combat actions.

In conclusion, in order to achieve the concept of sea control, ships with combat capabilities are needed in the air combat environments, in the water surface combat environment and in the water surface combat environment. The aerial and submarine components have a particularly important role both in obtaining and maintaining sea control and in challenging sea control by the enemy. In order to maintain sea control and military pressure on the enemy, an effective deployment of forces and means must be effected on the entire sea surface where sea control has been obtained. Ships and submarines must be permanently present in the area where sea control has been obtained in order to be able to carry out specific missions. Obtaining and maintaining control of the sea in the three battle environments requires a great effort on the part of a nation, alliance or coalition, because the control of the sea must be maintained until all the objectives have been met.

In my opinion, this concept, the control of the sea is at national level, a desire of the Romanian Naval Forces, which can be applied in maritime operations. The handiest maritime actions are the systematic actions, actions by which the Romanian National Forces can apply some measures by which the concept is implemented according to the doctrinal contents.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Joint Maritime Operations, Joint Publication 3-32.
2. ***, *The Arab-Israeli War of 1967*, URL: http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajc_data/files/1968_4_arabisraelwar.pdf.
3. NISTOR, Florin, *Să redescoperim Arta Operativă Maritimă*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017.
4. SCIPANOV, Lucian Valeriu, "The force projection during amphibious and riverine operations", in: International Scientific Conference "Strategies XXI", Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017.
5. SCIPANOV, Lucian Valeriu, *Operații amfibii și riverane, o provocare națională*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2018.

6. SCIPANOV, Lucian Valeriu; Nistor Florin, “Considerații privind acțiunile militare desfășurate în nordul Mării Negre”, in *Buletin of “Carol I” National Defence University*, Bucharest, 2015, Vol. 2.
7. TILL, Geoffrey, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century*, 3rd ed., Routledge, London and New York, 2013.
8. VEGO, Milan N., *Joint Operation in the Littorals: Doing More With Less, Naval Forces*, 2007, Military Database.
9. VEGO, Milan N., *Maritime Strategy and Sea Control, Theory and Practice*, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2016.
10. VEGO, Milan N., *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

Ciprian Gabriel TUDOR

HQ-MND-SE, Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: tudorcipriangabriel@yahoo.com

Abstract: *One of the imperatives of military doctrine is to conserve combat power or decisive action. Such conservation is aided through sound operations security (OPSEC) and protection against attack. Camouflage, concealment and Deception (CCD) is an essential part of operations, ranging from tactical to strategic levels. It must be integrated into METT-TC analyses and the IPB process at all echelons. CCD is a primary consideration when planning OPSEC. The skillful use of CCD tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) is necessary if a combat formation is to conceal itself and survive. A general knowledge of CCD TTPs also allows friendly troops to recognize CCD when the enemy uses it. CCD degrades the effectiveness of enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition (ISTAR) capabilities. Preventing detection impairs enemy efforts to assess friendly operational patterns, functions, and capabilities. Improved survivability from CCD is not restricted to combat operations. Benefits are also derived by denying an enemy the collection of information about friendly forces during peacetime, as well as in crisis and wartime.*

Keywords: *camouflage; concealment; deception, imagery; intelligence; military operations; hiding; blending; disguising; disrupting; decoying.*

INTRODUCTION

*"I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses
and my weaknesses as strengths while I cause his strengths
to become weaknesses and discover where he is not strong."
Sun Tzu, The Art of War*

Camouflage, concealment and deception have deep roots into the nature. Important aspect of biological evolution, self-preservation forces all animals to adopt different strategies or counterstrategies. It is therefore no mystery that these very basic principles found in nature, got their applicability in wars. Animals prove to be a source of inspiration¹, one typical and probably best-known example being the chameleon which can change its skin colors almost instantaneously allowing it to blend within the background and making it difficult to be spotted by its prey or predator.

Throughout the entire human civilization, the CCD triad has been used, in various forms for different purposes, especially in wars. From ancient wars to modern days, CCD was extensively utilized with huge success. In the early days, the only available sensor was the human eye and the main means to camouflage a military object were foliage and other material available locally. One of the first deception proofs might be considered the well-known 12th Century B.C. ruse – the wooden Trojan horse story which concluded a ten year

¹ Martin Stevens, Merilaita Sami (eds.), *Animal Camouflage: Mechanisms and Function*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, New York, 2011.

war for conquering Greece. Namely, the Greeks hid themselves in the wooden horse belly which furthermore was pulled inside Troy City by the unwary Trojans.

A more recent proof of CCD is represented by the Soviet Union which had successfully made deception a formal part of their war doctrine. Without any doubts, Maskirovka is a well-documented Soviet deception doctrine. Russian terms like “*maskirovka*”² together with “*razvedka*”³ describe a broad range of actions designed at deceiving enemies in peacetime as well as during wartime. As such, it includes every deceptive measure stretching from simple camouflage through complex strategic level deception. In the 1923 Russian magazine “*Krasnyi maskirovshchik*”⁴, a series of examples are portraying *maskirovka* employed in the Red Army’s fall maneuvers of 1922 by sharply shifting from the inspirational to the practical. Among the aforementioned examples, there is a camouflaged gun and bridge, dummy gun positions, as well as wisely concealed observation points. Another Russian deception example (Pirnie 1985) consists of the August 1944⁵ Jassy⁶-Kishinev operation which featured dozens of dummy tanks as well as whole Red Army divisions sent in false directions to throw the Germans off the scent. However, the most recent proof of how powerful Maskirovka deception doctrine might be well put into play at a strategic level can be seen in the view of the 2014 Crimea annexation⁷. The key ingredient in maskirovka is surprise and the clandestine forces that occupied Crimea delivered that by all means. Since that moment, the world awareness given to the concept of deception increased.

Before and even during World War II, the field of CCD was seen more as a military art than science. However, since then, it has developed into an authentic science. Nowadays, deception became inter-disciplinary drawing knowledge from many branches of both science and engineering. Namely, the stealth technology is a complex amalgamation of several technologies, that greatly enhances the combat survivability of a aircraft in deep fights. However, these complex and innovative technologies in military sensor technologies, continuously demand increasingly sophisticated countermeasures which is a never-ending cat-mouse game which is taking us back to a war between the strategies and counterstrategies found all over the nature. Moreover, classical terminology of CCD can be nowadays found in new terms like countermeasures, signature suppression or stealth.

One of the most representative World War II deception units, the Ghost Army⁸ was an unit which members were recruited from art schools and ad agencies, wanted for their acting skills and creativity, therefore having the artistry as their most effective weapon against Hitler and his army. Actually, the so-called Ghost Army was in fact the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops; an elite force whose specialty consisted of “tactical deception” and without any doubts might be considered Trojan Horse builders of World War II. Namely, they replaced the ancient wooden horse with an entire amazingly effective deception suite ranging from inflatable tanks, rubber airplanes, elaborated costumes up to radio codes. Between 1944 and

² Strategic deception.

³ A broad term which range from tactical reconnaissance to top levels of intelligence.

⁴ David M. Glantz, “A Deception Primer for the Fledgling Red Army”, 20 May 2016, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/a-deception-primer-for-the-fledgling-red-army/>, accessed on 20th of September 19, 2019.

⁵ “Jassy–Kishinev Offensive (August 1944) (Battle of Romania)”, URL: <https://worldhistoryproject.org/1944/8/20/jassykishinev-offensive-august-1944-battle-of-romania>, accessed on 25th of August 2019.

⁶ Iași.

⁷ Lucy Ash, “How Russia Outfoxes Its Enemies”, in *BBC News*, 29 January 2015, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283>, accessed on 25th of September 2019

⁸ Megan Garber, “Ghost Army: The Inflatable Tanks That Fooled Hitler. The Allies saved thousands of lives by embracing the artistry of war”, in *The Atlantic*, 22 May 2013, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/ghost-army-the-inflatable-tanks-that-fooled-hitler/276137/>, accessed on 15th of September 2019

1945, the Ghost Army, consisting of approximately one thousand men, managed to stage more than twenty successful battlefield deceptions, starting from Normandy (Shulsky 2000) two weeks after D-Day and ending in the Rhine River Valley. The *pièce de résistance* of Ghost Army was the “atmosphere” meaning their ability of creating the impression of an omnipresent military force. Even more, the Ghost Army men were dispatched to spend time in French cafes near war’s front in order to spread gossip among the spies, or they impersonated generals, all in all, everything they knew from their theaters’ stage. The visuals were not their only means of deception, as they tapped into the “sonic deception” as well by using recorded sounds of armored and infantry units onto cutting-edge recording technology for those times, the wire recorders (predecessors of tape recorders). What is even more, as part of their “sonic deception” they created “spoofer radio”, impersonating radio operators from real units in such details (including peculiar methods of sending Morse code) that they manage to create the illusion of an entire Allied Division preparing for battle in a location that was actually with no troops at all⁹. Of course, all of these mind-bending details were so effective due to the secrecy of this unit existence and its purpose as well, as it was only declassified in 1996 and since then a subject of documentation¹⁰ and a true question mark of what might be possible today considering the present technology and its fast evolution.

It is with no doubts, that the war is a living concept, its form is always adapting to the contemporary technologies. The war is evolving; however, old principles of war are still applicable, and deception has its vital role in achieving the success and reduces the risk. While the philosophy behind CCD remained the same, the sophistication, technology and application methods are the ones which feed its perpetuum evolution.

When properly integrated and resourced, deception can increase the rate of success and has the potential to induce actions that are favorable to a force. Moreover, successfully planned deception put commanders into relative advantage by allowing them to achieve their objectives in a speedier manner than a surprised and confused enemy concomitantly with a reduced risk. Consequently, deception can be considered a critical enabler for achieving operational surprise, therefore maintaining the initiative during combat operations in contested environments.

1. Deception

In very few words deception might be translated as “*hide the real and show the fake*”¹¹. Although, applicable at all levels of war it delivers the maximum advantage at the operational and strategic levels. Successful and safe operations in current operational environments can be enhanced by the development of deception principles of operations. Deception is, at the same time, a process and a capability. On one hand, deception as a *process* involves analytic methods to deliberately and systematically target the decision makers. The objective is to cause specific action (or inaction) from the enemy. On the other hand, deception as a *capability* can be a real force multiplier (Handel 1982) when integrated timely in the planning process in order to direct an enemy to (re)act in an anticipated manner. Above all, the element of surprise can therefore be greatly enhanced (Clark and Mitchell 2019).

⁹ <http://blog.seattlepi.com/bookpatrol/2010/03/12/ghost-army-haunts-michigan-library/>, accessed on 16th of September 2019.

¹⁰ Ghost Army Legacy Project, URL: <http://www.ghostarmylegacyproject.org/?page=homepage>, accessed on 16th of September 2019.

¹¹ Christine A. Mau (USAF), “Military Deception in Counterinsurgency Operations”, December 2009, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536857.pdf>, accessed on 25th of September 2019.

A well-played deception plan, as part of the overall mission, might induce the following effects to the opposite force:

- delay and surprise through ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding;
- misallocation of resources (personnel, financial, logistics, etc.);
- revealing the strengths, weaknesses, dispositions, and intentions;
- waste of combat power and resources.

The aforementioned effects can also be considered the functions of the military deception. Consequently, in order to achieve these functions, the deception must make use of some powerful principles, just as the principles of war guide the conduct of military operations: security, focus, objective, timing, integration and centralized planning and control (FM 3-13.34).

Main objective of deception consists of altering the level of uncertainty/ambiguity, in the mind of the deception target. Two generally recognized types of MILDEC exist (FM 3-13.4):

- ambiguity-increasing¹² deception provides the enemy with multiple plausible friendly COAs, generating confusion as well as mental conflict among the enemy decision maker. Consequently, this create the analysis-paralysis effect which will delay enemy taking timely decisions - especially effective when it is known that the enemy have a tendency of avoiding risks. These deceptions project strength where weakness exists or vice-versa and also familiarize the enemy to specific activity patterns which will be exploited later.
- ambiguity-decreasing deception push/attract the enemy in the wrong place, time, and equipment/capabilities by exploiting/solidifying enemy decision-maker beliefs and biases through intentionally display of visible proofs. However, this imply a comprehensive information on the enemy's processes and intelligence systems, and it is especially successful against strong-minded enemy decision-makers keen on accepting the risks.

Deception tactics use depends on both planners' understanding of the situation as well as the desired deception goal and might entail a mixture of the following:

- *diversion* is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). Its effect will force the enemy to concentrate resources at a place and time advantageous to friendly objectives;
- *feint* is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action (JP 3-13.4). It leads the enemy into incorrect conclusions about friendly concentrations and dispositions. In series, feints will shape the enemy so that it will not react or react ineffectively to a future real or main attack in the same area;
- *demonstration* is nothing more than a show of force similar to a feint but without actual contact with the adversary, in an area where a decision is not pursued that is made to deceive an adversary (JP 3-13.4). Its intent is to direct the enemy into selecting a COA favorable to friendly goals;
- *ruse* involve the deliberate exposure of fake information to the adversary's intelligence collection system (JP 3-13.4);
- *display* is a visual static portrayal of an activity, force, or equipment (JP 3-13.4) that may not exist but are made to appear like they are.

¹² Donald C. Daniel, Katherine L. Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, Pergamont Policy Studies on Security Affairs, 1982.

However, deception tactics should exclude the deception of perfidy as to be consistent with Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which list the acts of perfidy as faking surrender in order to bait the enemy into a trap; misusing protected signs and symbols to injure, kill or capture the enemy; and using false, deceptive, or neutral flags, insignia or uniforms in actual combat.

In order to achieve the best effect, the deception techniques should be intertwined within a formula conditioned by the following variables: time, assets, and objectives. Each one of the following *deception techniques* creates a different deception effect:

- overloading enemy sensors with multiple false indicators and displays in order to baffle collection assets
- amplifying or suppressing signatures so that a force appears smaller/ larger and less or more capable, to conceal or to simulate the deployment of critical capabilities.
- reinforcing the impression causing misleading by revealing one course of action whilst in fact taking another course of action.
- create false routine pattern when actually preparing a different course of action.
- leading the enemy by mistake by intentionally allowing false "valuable" information to get to enemy possession through a so-called breach of security, negligence, or inefficiency.

In order for the deception to be successfully summoned, complementary variety of means are to be employed so that to mislead multiple types of enemy sensors and therefore to increase the fake credibility, as well as the likelihood of generating the desired perception. Deception means consists of methods, resources, and techniques involving physical, technical and administrative realms:

- *physical means* encompasses resources, methods, and techniques used to carry or deny information or signatures normally derivable from direct observation or active sensors by the deception target evaluated using characteristics such as: shape, size (decoys equipment), movement of forces pattern, function, activity (exercises, visible tests or evaluations, training etc.), quantity, location and surroundings association;
- *technical means* manipulate the energy forms such as electromagnetic or acoustic and can be used in conjunction with related physical means or isolated, in order to replicate something physical invisible for direct visual observation (e.g.: enemy sensor disruption, multispectral simulators communication networks and interactive transmissions that imitate a specific unit type, size, electronic signature or activity etc.);
- *administrative means* expose information and/or indicators regarding coordination for planned or ongoing military activity to the deception target (e.g.: building surveys or construction requests, usage of unclassified channels to spread operational preparations regarding movement or transit plans etc.).

The most important aspect of deception is the *deception equipment* which might be considered as the "reverse" of camouflage. A plethora of different fake equipment is being developed for being used as deception devices, among which the most known categories can be grouped into the following:

- *dummies* are static, and they display all the external visual features of a military object (shape, solidity, size etc.) without being able to perform its various functions. Therefore, viewed only through sensors in the visible region of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, it can be mistaken for the original object - monospectral tridimensional (3D) dummies (visible region only). However, nowadays war scenario benefit from multispectral sensors (infrared, ultraviolet and microwave regions) which can easily detect these dummies as false. Consequently, as a counterstrategy to these adaptive technologies, multispectral

dummies came into play. Even further, a military object may have other types of signatures besides different electromagnetic signatures like acoustic, seismic, electric and magnetic that incorporated in the deception equipment gave birth to the polyspectral category of dummies. Thus, the larger the simulation spectrum of bands in a deception device, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish it from the original object even by using multispectral sensors. Usually, dummies are deployed generally in large amounts in order to portray a tactical maneuver that furthermore will mislead surveillance efforts of the adversary. They are designed to be reusable and are therefore categorized as non-expendables.

2. *decoys* are an active imitation of a person, object, or phenomenon only by the most prominent signature by which it is, or it can be detected, thus a decoy might be of a much smaller size than the original object. Namely, a decoy of a military object might not possess the visual external appearance of the object it depicts. Thus, it can be detected by the sensors of the regions other than that which it is trying to simulate. For example, an infrared decoy may simply consist of a heat source having the IR spectral characteristics (signature) of the original object. Another example might consist of a microwave decoy in which only the microwave signature of the object is imitated through very small corner-reflectors giving intense reflected returns (backscatter) to match the original radar cross-section (RCS) of the object. Even more, a noise-generator decoy might have a physical size that is totally insignificant as compared to the bulk of the object it safeguards, i.e. a ship. All these decoys are considered one-dimensional (1D) and monospectral and because they generate their own signals are labeled as active decoys. By consuming their resources of signature simulated energy, they are also mostly categorized as expendable. However, even though IR flares and chaff dispensers, as an example, are monospectral decoys, sometimes, they are used together in order to handle effectively multispectral sensors in missile-seeker missile heads. Historical well-known, elaborated deceptions required canvas and plywood fake truck bodies framed on top of real tanks (“*wolves in sheep’s clothing*”), or vice-versa, fake tanks mounted over trucks, or rubber inflatable tanks - *sheep in wolves’ clothing*. Both types of aforementioned decoys were used in North Africa by the British forced by the open terrain which made enemy aerial reconnaissance a real threat. Large numbers of decoy (rubber) Sherman tanks also played their part in the successful Allied deception plan before D-Day. Nevertheless, not so known are the decoy of Matilda tanks used by the British in France between 1939 and 1940, as well as the fake Panthers used by the Germans in Normandy in 1944¹³. These tactical-level dummies were built from local materials and were quick and easy to create.

2. Camouflage and concealment

The word *camouflage* has its origin in the French word *camoufler* which means *to disguise*. Initially the word camouflage had a partial meaning, indicating concealment or disguise of military objects in order to prevent detection by the enemy.

The concept of camouflage is old and can be found all over in nature. All animals are found to apply quite a few methods of concealment and disguise in the name of self-preservation, in offence and defense as well. Both the predator and the prey have to adopt strategies and counterstrategies for their survival due to the fact that no animal is safe, as for every animal there is a predator. Altogether, these techniques may be defined as camouflage and deception in nature¹⁴ (Owen 1982). However, whether it is concealment or disguise, deception is intrinsic in all the methods.

¹³ Gordon Rottman L., *World War II Tactical Camouflage Techniques*, Osprey Publishing, 2013, p. 60.

¹⁴ Denis Frank Owen, *Camouflage and Mimicry. Survival in the Wild*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

Camouflage and concealment are both part of operations security (OPSEC) measures and survivability tasks at the same time, used to protect friendly forces and activities from enemy detection. Camouflage produces the effect of blending in with the surroundings whereas concealment makes friendly capabilities or activities invisible or undetectable to the enemy. Concealing the location, movement, and actions of friendly forces can delay hostile attack and assist commanders in holding the tactical advantage.

Historically though, camouflage was of little concern, through many centuries in the history of warfare as the armies battled in linear formations and massed blocks, embellished in colorful uniforms. At those times, it was impossible to conceal troops which during marches raised clouds of summer dust, left heavy traces on roads, or when they camped, they lit many fires and therefore smoke. Even so, aerial observation did not exist and the only means of detecting the enemy was line-of-sight (LoS) observation.

Camouflage was employed by the French army during World War I in order to prevent detection of their guns and vehicles from the enemy's observation and it transcended from art to science during World War II when aerial observation and aerial photographs came into stage. Units had to maneuver dispersed, burrow into the ground, and camouflage themselves from observers both on the ground and in airplanes and tethered balloons. Therefore, the means of detecting an enemy multiplied. That was the moment when the field of camouflage and deception suddenly shifted to a more scientific approach. Camouflage became *sine qua non* to conceal from and deceive the enemy, as well as to disguise both dynamic activities and static installations. Technological developments in the field of remote sensing encompassing a wide range of the electromagnetic spectrum have in turn demanded equivalent countermeasures. Namely, World War II brought into the war scene the infrared¹⁵ (IR) false color film¹⁶ which gave birth to the need for camouflaging military objects beyond the red end of the visible region in the electromagnetic spectrum¹⁷. Sensitive up to 0.9 μ m, the so-called camouflage detection film made possible detection of the military objects covered with cut foliage inside a foliated background. All known bodies above absolute zero of temperature emanate IR radiation many times referred to as heat or thermal radiation. At the opposite theoretical end, a black body concept is impossible in practice.

Camouflage evolved in time from simple individual camouflage that allow to hide in sight from short range rifles, to higher-echelon camouflage projects, such as concealing entire airfields, making aircraft factories that look like residential neighborhoods, or creating decoy harbors complete with dummy ships.

Most commonly used means of camouflage, especially starting with World War I, were the camouflage nets (German, *tarnnetz*; Russian, *kaskirovochaya setka*) and they were first used to conceal artillery. Furthermore, they were also used stretched across angular objects to disguise their perceived shape and prevent reflected shine.

In order to prevent patterns in antidetection countermeasures the following recognition factors¹⁸ are taken into consideration to describe a target's contrast with its surrounding background (FM 20-3):

¹⁵ Infrared radiation was discovered by Sir William Herschel in 1800 while observing the solar spectrum; infrared radiation is that portion of the electromagnetic spectrum lying between the visible region and the microwave region

¹⁶ also known as camouflage detection film.

¹⁷ Infrared band in electromagnetic spectrum ranges from 0.75 μ m up to 1000 μ m subdivided into: near infrared (NIR or SWIR) 0.75- 3 μ m, middle infrared (MIR or MWIR) 3-6 μ m, far-infrared (LWIR) 6-15 μ m and extreme-infrared (XIR) 15-1000 μ m which overlaps with the microwave region 4.8-14 referred to as thermal.

¹⁸ ***, "Applying recognition factors when camouflaging. Reflectance, Shape, Shadow, Movement, Noise, Texture and Patterns", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/

- *Reflectance* is the quantity of energy returned from a target's surface in comparison with the energy that hit the surface. Considering the part of the EM spectrum in which the reflection occurs, reflectance might be:
 - o Visual reflectance is portrayed by the color of a target. Color contrast is essential, at close ranges and in harmonized background environments (snow, desert etc.). As distance increase, colors tend to amalgamate into an even tone. Poor light will also affect visual reflectance in case of the human eye.
 - o Temperature reflectance consists of thermal energy reflected by a target. Thermal contrast is measured with the help of IR imaging sensors.
 - o Radar-signal reflectance represents part of the received radio waves reflected by an object. Most efficient radio-wave reflector is represented by metal which is a major component of military equipment.
- *Shape*: While natural context is random, most military equipment is regular in terms of shape and angles making it evident even when covered by camouflage nets (straight-line edges or smooth curves between support points). Size matter as well in distinguishing target from backgrounds enforcing the application of shape disruption methods.
- *Shadows* are very important in camouflage detection and they can be categorized into two major types:
 - o *cast shadow* is the silhouette of an object projected against its background. It is the more familiar type and can be highly noticeable. Different antenna types can be identified by interpreting the shape of their shadow, headquarters well as different types of radars (target acquisition, target engagement, air defense systems etc.). In many situations, like homogenic natural background (snow or desert), the shadow is much more conspicuous than the object from which it erects.
 - o *contained shadow* is much darker than their surroundings and are easily detected by an enemy and it consists of the shadows under the vehicles, or an open cupola etc.
- *Movement* is always a distraction factor in a stationary background.
- *Noise* can disrupt camouflaged positions and the wind direction and velocity can highly contribute to detection of military activities and equipment from far away distances.
- *Texture* of a surface can be rough or smooth. On one hand, glass has a smooth texture which causes a shine that acts as a beacon. On the other hand, a rough surface appears darker than a smooth surface, although both surfaces are having the same color (tracks leave visible track marks on the ground).
- *Patterns* are very important, because humans have a strong attraction to creating and maintaining them which makes human activities detectable and predictable. Additionally, patterns can be intentionally created so that to deceive an observer in order to act accordingly. On the other hand, vehicle rows or stockpiles of equipment etc. create patterns which are very easy to detect. Moreover, it is difficult to paint equipment with a pattern that always allows it to blend with its background thus, no single pattern is ideal for all situations.

3. The CCD Triad

Mission always comes first. CCD efforts must augment the mission, but it must take into consideration the terrain and the enemy's ISR capabilities which influence the right choice of camouflage materials. However, at a tactical level, elaborated CCD may not be practical in all situations, available time to employ, remove and reemploy CCD countermeasures having to be taken into consideration.

CCD discipline¹⁹ mainly consists of preventing inherent occurrence of activities that alter the appearance of an area or exposes the presence of military equipment. Vehicle movement and tracks, light, noise, heat, debris and spoil are the most common signs of military activity which can cancel all the concealment efforts. CCD discipline denies an enemy the indications of a unit's location or activities by minimizing disturbances to a target area. Concealing light and heat signatures is an important CCD countermeasure, as they can be observed at great distances. For example, during clear weather, the human eye can detect campfires from 8 kilometers and vehicle lights from 20 kilometers²⁰. Noise can also be a great denial CCD element, depending on the terrain and atmospheric conditions, it can travel great distances and reveal easily a unit's position to an enemy. Spoil discipline eliminates a key signature of a unit's current or past presence in an area.

Site selection²¹ is an extremely important because the location of personnel and equipment can eliminate or reduce recognition factors. A particular site may be excellent from a CCD standpoint, although the site is useful only if the mission is accomplished. Furthermore, a site that will not allow enough dispersal for survivability and effective operations it is not that useful. Back to the patterns discussed in the previous chapter, every type of terrain, even desert, has a discernible pattern. Any change in an existing terrain pattern will indicate the presence of activity. Terrain patterns have distinctive characteristics that are crucial to be preserved. The five general terrain patterns are: agricultural (geometric, checkerboard pattern), urban (uniform rows of housing with interwoven streets and intermingled trees and shrubs), wooded (natural, irregular features), barren (uneven, irregular pattern), and arctic (snow and ice coverage).

CCD can be successfully employed by using the following five major techniques²²:

- *hiding* is shielding a target from an enemy's sensors by using tree canopies, defilade positions, camouflage nets, smoke etc.;
- *blending* means reducing a target contrast with its background by using specific camouflage and by taking in consideration the terrain patterns and the target's factors like size, shape, color, texture, and EM signature;
- *disguising* changes a target's aspect so that it looks like something of minor or superior significance - *hide the real and show the fake*;
- *disrupting* eliminate regular target patterns by pattern painting, deploying camouflage nets over selected portions of a target, and by using shape disrupters;

¹⁹ ***, "Camouflage, concealment and decoys discipline", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/camo_and_concealment/camouflage-concealment-and-decoys-discipline.shtml, accessed on 20th of August 2019

²⁰ ***, Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys. Field Manual, URL: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/20-3/ch3.htm>, accessed on 21st of August 2019

²¹ ***, "Site Selection when incorporating camouflage, concealment and decoys", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/camo_and_concealment/site-selection-when-incorporating-camouflage-concealment-and-decoys.shtml, accessed on 16th of September 2019

²² ***, "Techniques of employing Camouflage, Cover and Concealment (CCD) Hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, and decoying", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/camo_and_concealment/techniques-of-employing-camouflage-cover-and-concealment.shtml, accessed on 28th of August 2019

- *decoying*²³ is deploying a dummy target(s) within a location where the enemy might be deceived to think it is the real target(s). Decoys generally draw fire away from real targets.

CONCLUSIONS

Deception is applicable throughout all levels of warfare and all phases of military operations and it must be considered a force multiplier. Referred to as *masking* in US and NATO allied publications, or *trickery* in the Russian sources, military deception (MILDEC) mixed with proper operations security (OPSEC) measures, it transcends into a decisive tool in altering the way the enemy thinks and acts against friendly military operations. It is possible to deceive an opposing force by making use of multiple methods and techniques, in accordance with different goals and objectives. Surprise, along with deception undoubtedly is a key factor in any conflict aftermath and the two are almost always related, since surprise frequently is the result of deception. The two in combination are highly effective. MILDEC can be practiced contiguously at all levels of command and control (C2) by ingeniously using various resources. While MILDEC means and techniques may change and evolve over generations, its planning principles and fundamentals will remain constant. For example, information technology, and especially social media ((Macdonald 2006)) and the cyber domain as a whole, constitutes a new collection asset as well as powerful channels for deception.

The 21st century technological boom tremendously impacted military weapons platforms and delivery systems, mobility, command, control and communications (C3), intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition systems and reconnaissance (ISTAR), as well as countermeasures. In consequence, we are nowadays facing wars that have become highly sophisticated technologically oriented and transcends the conventional theaters of war like the land, the air and the sea expanding to space (military satellites) and cyberspace.

Contemporary technologies include new spectral imaging sensors (multispectral and hyperspectral) as well as improved camouflage fabrics to counter such technologies. Moreover, camouflage paints have also been enhanced in terms of durability, weight and infrared absorption so that to reduce the detection of vehicles at night. Therefore, camouflage nets garnished with these improvements, are still effective and heavy used to conceal military important assets.

Nevertheless, the conventional methods of camouflage and deception are no longer representative nowadays in the advanced technology warfare scenario. Stealth and low observables technology added new dimensions to the war field making conventional CCD methods serve only the earliest stages. Multispectral or hyperspectral camouflage concept (stealth technology) has to encompass countermeasures to detection by any other sensor that may be employed (radar, IR, visible and acoustic sensors).

New areas such as pattern recognition, artificial intelligence (machine learning and deep learning), automatic target recognition and neural network applications are advancing very fast causing the field of CCD, or in its modern terminology, countermeasures or low observables, to face greater challenges in future. Nevertheless, this is without any doubts an interminable battle between advances in sensor technology and corresponding countermeasures.

²³ Barton Whaley, "Toward a General Theory of Deception", in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 5, No. 1, 1982, pp. 178–192.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, "Applying recognition factors when camouflaging. Reflectance, Shape, Shadow, Movement, Noise, Texture and Patterns", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/camo_and_concealment/applying-recognition-factors-when-camouflaging.shtml
2. ***, "Camouflage, concealment and decoys discipline", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/camo_and_concealment/camouflage-concealment-and-decoys-discipline.shtml
3. ***, "Jassy-Kishinev Offensive (August 1944) (Battle of Romania)", URL: <https://worldhistoryproject.org/1944/8/20/jassykishinev-offensive-august-1944-battle-of-romania>.
4. ***, "Site Selection when incorporating camouflage, concealment and decoys", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/camo_and_concealment/site-selection-when-incorporating-camouflage-concealment-and-decoys.shtml
5. ***, "Techniques of employing Camouflage, Cover and Concealment (CCD) Hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, and decoying", URL: https://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/camo_and_concealment/techniques-of-employing-camouflage-cover-and-concealment.shtml
6. ***, Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys. Field Manual, URL: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/20-3/ch3.htm>
7. ***, Ghost Army Legacy Project, URL: <http://www.ghostarmylegacyproject.org/?page=homepage>.
8. ***, US Army, FM 3-13.4, Army support to Military Deception, 2019.
9. ***, US Army, FM 90-2 Battlefield Deception, 1988.
10. ***, US Army, JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 2012.
11. ASH, Lucy, "How Russia Outfoxes Its Enemies", in *BBC News*, 29 January 2015, URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283>.
12. CLARK, Robert M., MITCHELL, William L., *Deception: Counterdeception and Counterintelligence*. First Edition, Sage/CQ Press, Los Angeles London, New Delhi, 2019.
13. DANIEL, Donald C.; HERBIG, Katherine L. (Eds.), *Strategic Military Deception*, Pergamont Policy Studies On Security Affairs, Pergamont Press, New York, 1982.
14. GARBER, Megan, "Ghost Army: The Inflatable Tanks That Fooled Hitler. The Allies saved thousands of lives by embracing the artistry of war", in *The Atlantic*, 22 May 2013, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/ghost-army-the-inflatable-tanks-that-fooled-hitler/276137>.
15. GLANTZ, David M., "A Deception Primer for the Fledgling Red Army", 20 May 2016, URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/a-deception-primer-for-the-fledgling-red-army>.
16. HANDEL, Michael I, "Intelligence and Deception", In *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 5, No. 1, 1982, Pp. 122-54.
17. MACDONALD, Scot, *Propaganda and Information Warfare in The Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations*, Routledge, 2006.
18. Mau, Christine A. (USAF), "Military Deception in Counterinsurgency Operations", December 2009, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536857.pdf>
19. OWEN, Denis Frank, *Camouflage and Mimicry. Survival in The Wild*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

20. PIRNIE, Bruce R., "Soviet Deception Operations in World War II" Fort Belvoir, Defense Technical Information Center, 1985.
21. ROTTMAN, Gordon L., *World War II Tactical Camouflage Techniques*, Osprey Publishing, 2013.
22. Shulsky, Abram, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception", In *Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000.
23. STEVENS, Martin; MERILAITA, Sami (Eds.), *Animal Camouflage: Mechanisms and Function*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, New York, 2011.
24. WHALEY, Barton, "Toward A General Theory of Deception", In *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1982, Pp. 178–192.

GEOINT IN MONITORING AND DETECTION OF MILITARY CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION – GEOINT COUNTERDECEPTION

Ciprian Gabriel TUDOR

HQ-MND-SE, Bucharest, Romania

E-mail: tudorcipriangabriel@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Enemy camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD) degrades the effectiveness of friendly intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition (ISTAR) capabilities. By using CCD means and techniques the enemy disrupt friendly efforts to assess enemy's operational patterns, functions, and capabilities. Therefore, CCD enhances enemy survivability by reducing friendly's ability to detect, identify, and engage enemy elements. However, using advanced RS software, geospatial information systems, imagery and different GEOINT techniques, CCD detection can be made possible, hence the denial of enemy CCD efforts.*

Keywords: *GEOINT; camouflage; concealment; deception; imager; RS; intelligence; military operations; electromagnetic spectrum; multispectral; hyperspectral.*

INTRODUCTION

*"All warfare is based upon deception; when able to attack, we must seem unable, when using our forces, we must seem inactive, when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are away, when far away, we must make him believe that we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder and crush him."
Sun Tzu, The Art of War*

Deception is new neither in nature nor in war. Whatever means the prey and predator adopt for self-preservation, both in offence and, camouflage or concealment, or any other abilities such as mimicry, deception is essential¹. For instance, the predator is always looking out to locate and capture its prey, while the prey it is regularly on the alert to avoid recognition and capture. Therefore, the world is in a permanent biological evolution, an arms race, in which deception is invariably employed as a mean in strategies as well as counterstrategies. Mirroring the animal world, human civilization, too, beginning with the primitive man, has been using deception in different forms for diverse purposes. Particularly in wars, deception has been used since ancient times².

Unanimous truth, any object or event is found or is happening somewhere – it has a location defined by geographic coordinates. Knowing the exact position on the surface of the Earth for the objects or different events of interest might be critical. Location is important, location is everything. From choosing the best place for a camp, up to knowing the precise

¹ Martin Stevens, Merilaita Sami (eds.), *Animal Camouflage: Mechanisms and Function*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, New York, 2011.

² e.g. Trojan horse which helped Greeks into conquering Troy, thus ending a 10 years' war.

location of a target that needs to be engaged, the *latitude* and *longitude*, the *x* and the *y*, can easily be considered the alpha and the omega of any military operations, and in fact of any other activity on the Earth. Everything happens somewhere and we are in constant search for that *where*.

We live in an era characterized by an overwhelming technological progress that totally impacts the geospatial³ field through the evolution and creation of new aerial and satellite sensors. The computing power grows exponentially, larger and larger data sets can be stored and manipulated, complex analyzes (e.g. Artificial Intelligence - AI⁴) are being executed faster and faster. These changes implicitly influence the field known, though not unanimously defined, as GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence). Together with the technological evolution, the character of the military conflicts is also in continuous change, the adversary is redefined both in its composition and as a delimitation of its space of action.

We know that an image is worth a thousand words, which means a lot of condensed information, ready to be deciphered. However, knowing that an image can be multispectral and even hyperspectral, this aspect leads us to new possibilities. Namely, if we are talking about multispectral images, composed of several bands, then each combination helps us to obtain a new image. Therefore, each spectral band of an image contains a thousand words. The information richness offered nowadays by the continuously evolving capabilities of the existing sensors being exponentially amplified. It is just a matter of how to use this abundance of information in specific directions. GEOINT domain encompass the tools required to study in detail all the aspects regarding the informational content of the image products in order to fully unlock their true potential, in other words to identify those specific “words” that can highlight the presence of the camouflaged or concealed targets.

1. GEOINT and remote sensing

Collection is the foundation of Intelligence since biblical times⁵. Intelligence without collection is just educated guesswork, but in the end, just guesswork. The means of collecting intelligence had improved and became more diverse once with the technological advancement and these are sometimes referred to as collection disciplines or INTs. Primarily, collection is also known in military domain as intelligence⁶, surveillance⁷, and reconnaissance⁸ (ISR), a field characterized by extremely complex technical collection systems that have to be able to collect and store the desired data, or send it to remote locations in order to be processed. In the big *Intelligence* realm, there are five⁹, more or less synergic, major disciplines/domains which conduct to the fusion intelligence or all-source intelligence concepts:

- OSINT¹⁰
- HUMINT¹¹

³ Locational georeferenced information.

⁴ And its Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) fields.

⁵ Numbers, chapters 13 and 14 and the Book of Joshua.

⁶ General term for collection.

⁷ Systematic observation of a target (area or group) for an extended period of time.

⁸ A mission to acquire information about a target.

⁹ M.M. Lowenthal, R.M. Clark, *The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection*, SAGE Publications. 2015.

¹⁰ “Open-source intelligence is intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement”, according to ***, ADP 2-0. Intelligence, July 2019, URL: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adp2_0.pdf, accessed on 20th of September 2019.

¹¹ “Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities”, according to ***, ADP 2-0. Intelligence, July 2019, URL: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adp2_0.pdf, accessed on 20th of September 2019.

- SIGINT¹²
- GEOINT
- MASINT¹³.

An important aspect of GEOINT is the ability to “ingest” and “fuse” geospatial data with the other forms of intelligence collection. GEOINT gives to the customer an intelligence product which visually depicts physical features and geographically referenced activity on or just below the earth’s surface. It can combine IMINT¹⁴ (imagery intelligence) products taken from a range of collection platforms¹⁵ (through Remote Sensing - RS), with mapping or other geospatial data, allowing the analyst to detect physical change over a period of time. Change detection can be as simple as disturbed earth but may answer an information request relating to local activity. Common uses of GEOINT include identification of patterns of activity (such as movement of people or vehicles over an area over a period of time) or intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) support to military operations. However, GEOINT is capable of doing much more than that, by having the ability of tapping into all the other INT domains and by integrating Artificial Intelligence (Machine Learning and Deep Learning) algorithms.

GEOINT is a relatively newly born intelligence discipline compared to the others aforementioned which are individualized by the nature of the source of the primary data whereas GEOINT deals with methods of analysis specific to the data that have a spatial component such as network analyzes, spatial temporal analyzes or those with multiple spatial criteria (MSC). At the same time, GEOINT evolved from the necessary integration of images, IMINT and geospatial information. The universal binder of this particularity is given by the geographical localization component. A proof of the fact that GEOINT is in its youth, is given by the fact that there is no universally accepted GEOINT definition. Namely, there are several definitions of GEOINT, as they appear in the national doctrines of UK and the USA (two nations with major implications in the genesis and future of the GEOINT discipline), as well as the definition unanimously accepted by all NATO members:

- NATO: Intelligence derived from combining geospatial information, including images, with other information data to visually describe, appreciate and represent activities and details on the Earth's surface that are geographically referenced;
- SUA¹⁶: The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically

¹² “Signals intelligence is intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (JP 2-0). SIGINT provides unique intelligence information, complements intelligence derived from other sources, and is often used for cueing other sensors to potential targets of interest. For example, SIGINT, which identifies activities of interest, may be used to cue GEOINT to confirm that activity. Conversely, changes detected by GEOINT can cue SIGINT collection. The discipline is subdivided into three subcategories: communications intelligence (also called COMINT), ELINT, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (also called FISINT)”, according to ***, ADP 2-0. Intelligence, July 2019, URL: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adp2_0.pdf, accessed on 20th of September 2019.

¹³ “Measurement and signature intelligence is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to characterize, locate, and identify targets and events, and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event”, according to ***, ADP 2-0. Intelligence, July 2019, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adp2_0.pdf, accessed on 20th of September 2019.

¹⁴ “An intelligence gathering discipline which collects information via satellite and aerial photography”, according to Wikipedia.

¹⁵ UAVs, aerial ISR platforms, government satellites and even commercial satellite imagery.

¹⁶ *De jure* definition of GEOINT in accordance with USA Code, Title 10, art. 467, alin. (5) found at United States Code, 2006 Edition, Title 10 - Armed Forces, URL: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE->

referenced activities on the earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information;

- UK: Spatial and temporal reference derived from image exploitation and analysis (IMINT) and geospatial information, in order to establish patterns or to aggregate and extract additional intelligence.

Surrounding world is perceived through our five senses. Namely, some senses (e.g., touch and taste) involve contact and proximity of our sensing organs with the objects but, significantly information do not necessitate close connection between our organs and the external objects when using the sight and hearing senses. In other words, we are always performing RS terminology which encompasses the activities of perceiving/recording/observing/ (sensing) objects or events at remote places. In the artificial world, the senses (e.g. sight) are mimicked by technological sensors (e.g., special types of cameras and digital scanners) mounted on airplanes, satellites, or space shuttles - the sensors are not in direct contact with the objects or events being observed, thus remote. The information needs a medium through which to be carried, from objects to sensors, and that is the solar (electromagnetic) radiation.

RS refers to the science and technology of acquiring information about the objects/events on the earth's surface and subsurface (land and ocean) as well as atmosphere using sensors onboard airborne (aircraft and balloons) or spaceborne (satellites and space shuttles) platforms. RS is considered the science of measuring the properties of objects or phenomena using a sensor that is not in direct contact with them. Thus, a carrier platform (aircraft, satellite, UAV, motor vehicle, etc.), a sensor system as well as data processing means are involved. The instruments currently used in RS include analogue and digital cameras, multispectral and hyperspectral sensors, thermal infrared detectors, radar active systems (polarimetric, interferometric or penetrating), LIDAR¹⁷ or sonar.

By scope, RS may be divided into:

- satellite RS (satellite platforms);
- photography and photogrammetry, when photographs capture visible light;
- thermal RS, when the thermal infrared (IR) portion of the spectrum is used;
- radio detection and ranging (radar) RS, when microwave wavelengths are used;
- light detection and ranging (LiDAR) RS, when laser pulses are transmitted toward the ground and the distance between the sensor and the ground is measured based on the return time of each pulse.

RS recordings can be obtained either in analogue or digital form. The digital form can be processed directly with the help of computing systems and specialized software then converted into a classified visual image.

Furthermore, RS can be subdivided into terrestrial, aerial (from small to medium heights, to high heights) and space. The natural resources of the Earth, so necessary for the survivability and development of human civilization, are hidden from the environment. The creation of RS as an interdisciplinary system, especially of space RS, has made it possible to discover new resources and track the known ones, by detecting and recording the radiation emitted, absorbed or reflected by the material objects or by noticing the influence of the objects on the environment. The sensor is located on a suborbital platform or a satellite. The use of sensors to measure the amount of electromagnetic radiation that is emitted or reflected

2006-title10/pdf/USCODE-2006-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap22-subchapIV-sec467.pdf, accessed on 08th of September 2019.

¹⁷ Light Detection and Ranging - A detection system which works on the principle of radar but uses light from a laser.

by an object or geographically detected remote area using mathematical and statistical algorithms is known as science. RS is nowadays integrated with other modern geospatial technologies such as geographic/geospatial information system (GIS) and global positioning system (GPS). The result of a RS system is usually a digital image which furthermore needs to be analyzed and interpreted in order to extract useful information from it.

Photogrammetry is the science concerned with observing and measuring objects and phenomena on supports such as film. In the first decades of affirming this science, the main sources of data were the photographs recorded on the film. Since then, other types of sensors have emerged that record information in various areas of the magnetic spectrum, in addition to the visible spectrum, passively (without emitting radiation) or actively (by emitting radiation and recording the response). Also, if the photographs were originally taken using human-operated aerial platforms, they are now replaced by unmanned aerial or terrestrial vehicles or satellite platforms. Fundamental to all photogrammetric operations is the determination of a mathematical model that describes the relationship between the objects recorded in the image and their equivalent in the field. The types of products made by photogrammetric techniques include orthorectified images obtained by elimination of all deformations, image mosaics, radar products, digital models of terrain as well as surfaces or volumes. Besides these, the three-dimensional models of the various objects are more and more required. These photogrammetric products provide the source of information for geospatial databases and for geographic information systems.

Radiometry deals with measurement of radiant energy (RE), which may be from any range of the electromagnetic spectrum (from X-rays, through ultraviolet, visible, infrared to microwaves). A radiometer measure, absorbs and transforms the RE into electrical, thermal or chemical energy, as there is no other possible method for a direct measurement of it. It is a fact that all the existing matter uninterruptedly emits and absorbs electromagnetic radiation. The emission is a consequence of continual motion of elementary charged particles within the substance¹⁸.

2. Remote Sensing Sensors

GEOINT encompasses a complex variety of sensors which can be mainly split in two categories, passive and active. The sun is the main energy source for RS as the remote sensors record solar radiation reflected or emitted from the earth's surface and its objects.

Passive sensors receive the energy from outside (photographic cameras, electro-optical (EO), thermal IR). Their limitation is due to the fact that they can only capture data during the daylight hours (naturally occurring energy/light). The exception to this limitation is represented by the thermal IR sensors, which can detect naturally emitted energy both day and night, as long as the amount of energy is sufficient enough to be recorded. Most passive sensors operate in the microwave, millimeter wave, or optical bands.

Active sensors use their own internal source of energy which is focused toward the target to be reconnoitered. The reflected energy (back scattered) from that target is then identified and recorded by the sensors. Radar is one example of such types of sensors, by transmitting microwave signals toward the target and detects and measures the backscattered portion of the signal. Another example of an active sensor is LiDAR, which emits a laser pulse and very precisely measures its return time to calculate the height of each target¹⁹. One of the benefits of the active sensors is that they do not depend of day, night or seasons.

¹⁸ One of the fundamental laws of classical electromagnetic theory - an accelerated charged particle radiates energy; as the temperature of a body is raised, the thermal motion of the charged particles of matter - electrons and protons - increases, which results in the emission of radiation.

¹⁹ Also used in the autonomous vehicle industry.

Satellite images are achieved through the electro-optical sensors. Each sensor may encompass several different detectors which receive and measure reflected/emitted radiance from the ground, in the form of electrical signals, and convert them into numerical values (digital) stored onboard (or transmitted to a receiving station on the ground). The received radiance is often absorbed by different detectors, so that each specific range of radiance wavelength will be recorded as a spectral band. The visible, near-ultraviolet (UV), reflected IR, and thermal IR radiations can all be used in a multispectral RS system (from 5 up to 15 or even more different spectral bands). Each object has its own spectral signature which become clearer when using fine spectral multiband sensors, ranging from simple RGB²⁰ (3 spectral bands) to hyperspectral (hundreds of spectral bands).

A special type of electro-optical sensor is the thermal IR scanner which detects and measures the thermal IR portion of the electromagnetic radiation, instead of reflected IR, visible or near-IR. As a consequence of the fact that the atmospheric absorption is very strong in some portions of the electromagnetic spectrum due to the presence of water vapor and carbon dioxide, thermal IR sensing is limited to two specific regions from 3 to 5 μm and 8 to 14 μm (known as *atmospheric windows*). In comparison with the visible and reflected IR spectra, thermal IR radiation is much fainter, therefore the spatial resolution of thermal IR channels is usually much coarser than that for the visible or reflected IR bands. However, thermal imaging has a clear advantage over the aforementioned, consisting in the fact that the images can be acquired during both day and nighttime²¹.

The electromagnetic radiation in the microwave²² wavelength region in comparison with visible, reflected, and thermal IR spectra, has a longer wavelength which allows microwave to penetrate through all weather conditions, smoke, tree's foliage, cloud cover, haze, dust, different type of soils or under water²³, while not being affected by atmospheric scattering, which affects shorter optical wavelengths.

The main advantage of remote sensors over other sensors is that they can cover a large area of the earth quickly and some of them even twice a day²⁴. A very interesting satellite orbit is the "Molniya²⁵" orbit, baptized after the Soviet communications satellites, which first used it. Highly elliptical orbit (HEO) is coming close to the Earth over the southern hemisphere (480 km) in comparison with the northern hemisphere (40,200 km). The Molniya orbit has the advantage of moving very quickly across the southern hemisphere, where there are likely to be fewer targets, because it is close to the Earth's gravitational pull, but then loiters as it moves across the northern hemisphere. In a more real-life translation, approximately two thirds of the time (eight of the twelve hours of one revolution) will be allocated to northern hemisphere surveillance.

²⁰ Red Green Blue.

²¹ As long as the thermal radiation is continuously emitted from the terrain.

²² 1 cm – 1 m wavelength.

²³ Limited capability in the salty waters though (e.g. seas, ocean).

²⁴ There are several different types of orbits, depending on the mission of the satellite. Low earth orbit (LEO) ranges from roughly 320 km up to nearly 1,600 km and is used by imagery satellites as this allows a more detailed view of the Earth. Medium earth orbit (MEO) is the range between LEO and very strictly delimited geosynchronous orbits (GEO), or 35,400 km. GEO satellites stay over the same spot on Earth at all times. Satellites can also be flown in sun- synchronous orbits, (in harmony with the Earth's rotation in order to always stay in daylight), an easily tracked orbit, although perfect for commercial satellites but not for national imagery satellites.

²⁵ Molniya Satellites, URL: <https://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=14>, accessed on 10th of September 2019.

3. GEOINT in Counterdeception

*"All warfare is based on deception".
Sun Tzu*

Denial and deception (D&D) are significant weapons in the counterintelligence arsenal of a country or organization sometimes the only weapons available to many countries against highly technical intelligence, namely against GEOINT and SIGINT.

Denial against GEOINT may take the shape of camouflage netting, masking or obscuring (concealing) techniques, or placing sensitive operations in underground facilities, protecting them against attack at the same time (cover); dazzling sensors with lasers; leading operations during darkness, smoke or cloud cover to conceal military force movements or illegal activities; and last but not the least, moving units recurrently to prevent being targeted. Among many interesting aspects and application of denial, the hyperspectral imagery collection could include cancelling gas emissions (cleaning them up by removing revealing chemicals) and processing wastes to conceal the nature of the process at a plant (concealment of nuclear plants).

Deception techniques are unlimited. Passive deception might incorporate decoys or having the intelligence target imitate an activity that is not of intelligence interest (e.g. making a biological, chemical or nuclear warfare plant look like a medical drug production facility). Decoys that have been widely used in warfare include dummy missiles, tanks and/or ships.

As the grandparent of GEOINT, namely IMINT is traditionally considered of as visible photography, nowadays digital compared with the 19th century analog products (handheld camera or from aircraft, spacecraft or satellite). Radar imagery and the infrared spectrum are of a great importance in intelligence collection.

GEOINT can identify deployed test facilities (sometimes concealed), military units, their ORBAT²⁶ and their military patterns, as well as participants in exercises or operational missions. When combined with COMINT and HUMINT, it has pinpointed research and development facilities and provided detailed spectral composition evidence about the equipment used at different test areas. It can give hints to other collectors when ships or aircrafts have left their bases, are participating in tests, operational exercises or real/operational missions, or have arrived at their staging bases.

GEOINT RS sensors continuously benefit from technological advancements, thus steadily improving in availability and quality. Nowadays, commercial imagery²⁷ is prevailing a role previously reserved only for government intelligence agencies. Not very cheap sometimes, but still affordable by almost anyone it can be bought and used for any purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

Nowadays GEOINT remote sensing capabilities are potent and harder to deceive, especially the arsenal consisting of the active RS systems which emit their own electromagnetic radiation (e.g. LiDAR, radar, sonar) and have the capability to uncover, independent of weather conditions or the absence of daylight, the attempt of concealment invoked through smoke, camouflage, tree foliage, etc.

It is extremely difficult to defeat all types of intelligence at the same time. In combination with other INT disciplines (SIGINT and HUMINT), GEOINT can help revealing a concealed target in different electromagnetic ranges which furthermore is extremely important because, you cannot understand, analyze and hit what you cannot see or do not

²⁶ Useful in tracking and interpreting the new Russian doctrinal use of Battalion Task Groups (BTGs), a very modular, flexible and therefore hard to predict and target military structure.

²⁷ Images acquired by either government or commercial organizations that are sold to the general public.

know where it is. Hyperspectral imaging, for example, is a valuable weapon against GEOINT deception because it can be used to measure so many different aspects (signatures) of a target.

Without any doubts, no deception is flawless, although it can be very complex and subtle, as it requires a huge amount of preparation and attention to a plethora of details that have to be put in practice without any traces that might raise suspicions and therefore compromising the entire effort. However, the benefits in terms of the element of surprise it can generate will always make deception a living concept, dormant in his overt nature, but dangerous when awoken.

Complex operations inevitably have some weak points, inherent to individual and organizational own biases, which can be identified by skilled analysts. In the past, wars were started by exposing great forces, but they were always ended by the most intelligent side which was able to adapt much faster and use the other side strategies. The entire nature is surrounded by patterns, some of them very deep buried. There are no doubts that humans are predisposed to creating patterns, sometimes subtle enough to skip an untrained eye or mind.

The confirmation of an enemy's deception operation is an extremely powerful weapon, which can furthermore will might impose two approaches:

- it can be ignored if admitting that the deception compromises friendly deception identification capabilities which will cause future improvements in enemy deception capabilities;
- it can be exposed, leading to enemy embarrassment; will make the enemy think that if its deception operations are continued it will be futile, too expensive or risky. Furthermore, a deception exposure prior to combat operations might have a devastating effect by also weakening the enemy's political or military position with allies or domestic audiences.

A detected enemy deception if discovered and exploited will force an enemy to continue, spending its resources believing the opposite force is unsuspecting This can be used by friendly forces until the culminating point of the enemy's deception and then reacting in an unexpected manner that turns the enemy's anticipated advantage against itself, in other words it can backfire. In evaluating raw intelligence, analysts must constantly be aware of the possibility that they are seeing material that was deliberately provided by the opposing side. This deception – counterdeception cycle, manipulation of the other force own deception in friendly forces advantage cycle is a very powerful strategy and it can always generate unexpected second- and third-order effects to the adversary. In order to be able to predict such complex effects I hereby propose the necessity of developing a new terminology of *metadeception*²⁸, an adventurous untamed path in intelligence field which will require a combination of deep buried patterns identification in historical study and adaptation to the new technological advancements such as *Artificial Intelligence* and *Quantum Physics*^{29,30,31}.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, ADP 2-0. Intelligence, July 2019, URL: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adp2_0.pdf
2. ***, Molniya Satellites, URL: <https://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=14>

²⁸ A.N.: deception of deception

²⁹ <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/quantum-radars-chinas-new-weapon-take-out-us-stealth-fighters-f-22-44652> Feb19, accessed on 15th of September 2019.

³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_radar, accessed on 15th of September 2019.

³¹ <https://phys.org/news/2018-04-quantum-radar-expose-stealth-aircraft.html>, accessed on 15th of September 2019.

3. ***, United States Code, 2006 Edition, Title 10 - Armed Forces, URL: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2006-title10/pdf/USCODE-2006-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap22-subchapIV-sec467.pdf>
4. ***, US Army, FM 3-13.4, Army support to Military Deception, 2019.
5. ***, US Army, FM 90-2 Battlefield Deception, 1988.
6. ***, US Army, JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 2012.
7. BEZRUKI, Christine, "Quantum radar will expose stealth aircraft", in *Phys.org*, 23 April 2018, URL: <https://phys.org/news/2018-04-quantum-radar-expose-stealth-aircraft.html>
8. LOWENTHAL, M.M.; Clark, R.M., *The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection*, SAGE Publications, 2015.
9. MAJUMDAR, Dave, "Quantum Radars: China's New Weapon to Take Out U.S. Stealth Fighters (Like the F-22)? Or simply impossible?", in *National Interest*, 15 February 2019, URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/quantum-radars-chinas-new-weapon-take-out-us-stealth-fighters-f-22-44652>.
10. STEVENS, Martin; MERILAITA, Sami (Eds.), *Animal Camouflage: Mechanisms and Function*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK New York, 2011.

THE USE OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS FOR EVACUATION AND MEDICAL SUPPORT

Eduard Grigore JELER, Ph.D.

Lieutenant Colonel, Lecturer, Military Technical Academy,
Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: eduard_jeler@yahoo.com

Abstract: *By studying the conflicts, it was concluded that the vast number of victims between the ranks of the medical personnel during every confrontation takes place while trying to treat the soldiers engaged in battle under enemy fire, and between the combatants, there are lots of casualties while providing support for the wounded comrades.*

Therewith, the human medical personnel performs difficult interventions in dangerous areas (e.g. mined or NBC contaminated).

Autonomous systems could be having diverse applications, such as: victims' localization, tactical retreats and evacuations, in-flight care for the wounded military personnel during the process of transportation, medicine delivery; telemedicine.

The aim of this article is to analyse the existing and potential uses of autonomous systems regarding medical evacuation and support.

Keywords: *Unmanned System; Telemedicine; medical support; Multi-Domain Battle; medical robotics.*

INTRODUCTION

Military medicine can be seen as being as old as armed conflict itself in higher civilizations—such as those of the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Egyptians (from c. 4000 BCE). Major changes occurred with the introduction, in Hellenistic armies, of medics and nurses who took care of the wounded and the sick¹. With the Roman armies' systematic organizational structures, legion surgeons and physicians were present even during periods of active combat and conducted surgery and wound closures.² The following medieval period showed progress in institutionalized forms of care, from the early xenodochia of the Mediterranean to the Christian hospices and monastic facilities that took care of pilgrims, knights, and crusaders. Large-scale theological hospitals appeared, laying the groundwork for clinical care forms as well as serving as an early introduction to surgical training into medicine. During the early modern period, absolutist sovereigns endorsed large-scale standing armies, for the health of which specialized regimental surgeons had to be trained in the new academic medical faculties of southern and central Europe and in the later British colleges of surgeons and navy surgeons³.

In the modern period, there have been improvements in ambulatory care for wounded soldiers, in treating infectious diseases and epidemics, which caused many more victims than on the battlefield. Examples of these innovations are intensive care systems, specialized

¹ CF Salazar , “Medical care for the wounded in armies of ancient Greece”, in *Sudhoffs Arch.*, Vol. 82, No. 1/1998, pp. 92-97.

² Eugene Hugh Byrne, “Medicine in the Roman Army”, in *The Classical Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 6, Apr., 1910, pp. 267-272, Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and South, Inc.

³ Jack Edward McCallum, *Military Medicine: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century*, ABC – Clio Inc., Santa Barbara, California, 2008.

programs in military medical education; antibiotics; medical care options for chemical, biological and nuclear warfare, therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder^{4,5}.

It defines the medical logistics, the component of the logistics, as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of the medical forces. In its broadest sense, medical logistics encompasses the aspects of military operations which concern the following:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and the necessity of medical materials;
- movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel;
- space or building acquisition if medical installation is operated and necessary;
- acquisition or provision of medical services.^{6 7}

The fighting strategies of the future, such as the concept of multi-domain battle, will probably imply a greater dispersion, close to isolation, of the combat units which brings with it some difficult challenges from a logistical standpoint. This aspect leads to severe mobility restrictions for medical missions and deficiencies concerning the human resource, as well as the medical materials. The number of equipped evacuation platforms is probably insufficient to cover the entirety of the multi-domain battlegrounds with almost an even number of enemy forces and also restricted or anti-access areas.

Without new methods of care for the wounded and force multiplication strategies, the commanders of the units engaged in battle will deal with a great number of wounded and sick, with degraded medical resources and an impaired fighting mobility⁸.

1. Use of autonomous systems in mobility medicine

The first aerial transport of the wounded took place during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, during the Siege of Paris, where the French launched 66 Hot-Air Balloons, transporting 160 wounded French soldiers.⁹

The use of aircrafts for the evacuation of the wounded was firstly proposed right when the aircrafts first appeared, but the first true aerial evacuation took place during WWI, and it met a strong development during WWII once the heavy transport aircrafts were deployed.

Regarding actual military operations, the impact of the development of the helicopter is a decisive factor when we talk about the victim's survival. This aspect contributed to bringing up the survival rates of the American casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq up to 89.9% from 69.7% during WW II¹⁰.

But these medical interventions (of treatment and evacuation from a battleground) are dangerous missions for the medical personnel, often the medical personnel falling themselves victims. Soldiers trying to save their wounded comrades while under enemy fire could become targets themselves also.

⁴ ***, "Barber Surgeons, MASH, and Mayhem: A History of Military Medicine", URL: <https://academic.mu.edu/meissnerd/mash.html>, accessed on 22.08.2019.

⁵ Charles W. Van Way, "War and Trauma: A History of Military Medicine", in *Missouri Medicine*, Vol. 113, No. 4, 2016, pp. 260-263.

⁶ ***, *FM 4-02.1 - Army Medical Logistics*, Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 8 December 2009.

⁷ ***, *NATO Logistics Handbook*, LC Secretariat International Staff Logistics, Capabilities Section Defence Policy and Planning Division NATO HQ 1110, Brussels, Belgium.

⁸ Nathan T. Fisher, Gary R. Gilbert, "Medical Robotic and Autonomous System Technology Enablers for the Multi-Domain Battle 2030-2050", in *Small Wars Journal*, URL: <https://smallwarsjournal.com>, accessed in 22.08.2019.

⁹ Brenda L. Reiter, *The History of Aeromedical Evacuation and the Emerging System of Tomorrow*, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 1993.

¹⁰ M. Beebe, David Lam, Gary R. Gilbert, "Unmanned aircraft systems for casualty evacuation: what needs to be done", in: *Proceedings of the NATO STO-MP-HFM-231 Symposium, Beyond Time and Space*, 2013.

The operations often unfold on bad weather (flight is out of question), in NBC contaminated environments (the potential exposure of human-personnel). It is these reasons that autonomous systems appeared as a solution to the problems.

These could be bringing the following advantages:

- a greater tactical and operational flexibility for the commanders;
- it allows for mission execution on bad meteorological conditions or into a NBC-contaminated environment;
- allows for the transportation of critical medical resources for the first response in areas that are hard to access or exposed to enemy-fire;
- it acts as a force multiplier for medical evacuation system.¹¹

The main medical applications in which autonomous systems can be used are presented in the figure no. 1.




Figure no. 1: Possibilities of using autonomous systems in medical applications¹²

I'll continue by thoroughly presenting some applications for autonomous systems regarding military medicine.

2. The use of autonomous systems in recovering, evacuating and life support trauma for the wounded soldiers from the battlefield

2.1. The use of autonomous systems in recovering and evacuating the wounded soldiers from the battlefield

As with first aid on the battlefield, it is not possible to assume the universal availability of military doctors or other soldiers assigned to carry out the extraction and recovery of the

11 Gary R. Gilbert Michael K. Beebe, *Robotics and Unmanned Systems – “Game Changers” for Combat Medical Missions*, RTO-MP-HFM-182.

12 James C. Rosser, Jr: “Surgical and Medical Applications of Drones: A Comprehensive Review”, *JSLs Review* July–September 2018 Volume 22 Issue .

victims. Therefore, a means to independently find, evaluate, stabilize and extract victims is needed, especially during the fire exchange, fires or NBC contaminated hostile environments in order for the evacuation to be carried out.

In the figure no 2. you can see the project BEAR – Battlefield Extraction Assist Robot-developed by Vecna Robotics, a model of autonomous system for victims extractions, a system designed to carry a load of 500 pounds while crossing a rugged urban terrain with injured soldiers. It can grab a fragile object without damaging it. It is remote controlled by a combatant using its video cameras and sensor systems^{13,14}.



Figure no. 2: The humanoid robot BEAR and the remote control system¹⁵

The autonomous system iRobot PackBot is a robot capable of traveling on all types of terrain, any time that has been tested in Afghanistan and Iraq by soldiers in the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions and Special Operations, including a versatile platform for different types of modular payloads that can be used in a wide range of missions. Valkyrie is a payload for the autonomous system iRobot PackBot system that will help military doctors recover victims from the battlefield as you can see in figure no. 3¹⁶.



Figure no. 3: Concept regarding the use of the autonomous casualties retrieving system, Irobot Valkyrie, and the medical kit used¹⁷

¹³ [http://www.conscious-\(robots.com/2007/06/08/bear-battlefield-extraction-assist-robot](http://www.conscious-(robots.com/2007/06/08/bear-battlefield-extraction-assist-robot), accessed on 25.09.2.109

¹⁴ Barb Rupert, "Robots to rescue wounded on battlefield", in *U.S. Army*, 22 November 2010, URL: https://www.army.mil/article/48456/robots_to_rescue_wounded_on_battlefield, accessed on 19.08.2019.

¹⁵ Darren Quick, "Battlefield Extraction-Assist Robot to Ferry Wounded to Safety", in *New Atlas*, 25 November 2010, URL: <https://newatlas.com/battlefield-extraction-assist-robot/17059>, accessed on 17.08.2017.

¹⁶ Gary R. Gilbert, et al., *USAMRMC TATRC Combat Casualty Care and Combat Service Support Robotics Research & Technology Programs*, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command Telemedicine & Advanced Technology Research Center, august 2006.

¹⁷ Gary Gilbert, Troy Turner, Ron Marchessault, *Army Medical Robotics Research*, Army Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center, Fort Detrick, 2007.

2.2. Use of autonomous systems in casualties retrieving from the battlefield

The first 60 minutes after a traumatic accident were known in the past as "golden hour". Although this concept has been modified based on the recent combat experience, it is clear that the chances of survival for patients with critical trauma depend on the rapid access to ATLS stabilization and surgical care. The casualties retrieving offered by specialized personnel on the battlefield must be efficient and fast, in order to receive medical treatment and facilities in a hospital, using medical-equipped ground vehicles (ambulances) or aircraft (air ambulances)¹⁸. Casualties retrieving can be MEDEVAC (the movement of any person who is injured or ill to and / or between medical treatment units while providing medical assistance on the route, performed by dedicated medical personnel on a dedicated evacuation platform) or CASEVAC (moving victims on a non-medical vehicles or aircraft without dedicated medical care)¹⁹.

The use of standalone systems for CASEVAC offers a viable alternative method for accident extraction or evacuation. An additional factor that must be considered in the risk / benefit analysis is that CASEVAC or MEDEVAC aerial, executed with additional people, put additional lives at risk, beyond that of the victim. Recent losses in fighting MEDEVAC-equipped aircraft clearly demonstrate this risk, and using CASEVAC UAVs in certain circumstances could effectively reduce exposure to enemy fire, while extracting the victim to a safer location where the victim can be transferred to a dedicated air ambulance, with more medical capacity than can be provided on the UAV. Although a UAV may not be equipped to provide on-the-go care, time would not be wasted in configuring the aircraft for medical personnel and supplies, nor in arranging escort ships and thus the time lost before the accident may reach advanced medical care (could be reduced by a "real" air ambulance and its crew or found at an advanced medical unit)²⁰. An operational conceptual scheme is presented in Figure no. 4.




Figure no. 4: Operational conceptual scheme for the use of autonomous systems in medical support missions ²¹

¹⁸ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meDEVAC> - accessed on 18.07.2019.

¹⁹ Nathan Fisher, *Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban Environments*, US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC), Telemedicine & Advance Technology Center (TATRC), April 22, 2016.

²⁰ *Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032*, Department of Defense USA, 2007.

²¹ *Safe Ride Standards for Casualty Evacuation Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles*, Science and Technology Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization BP 25, F-92201 Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex, France, Dec. 2012.

One of the UAV systems that presents the possibility of evacuation of injured persons is Dragonfly Pictures Inc. (DP14 Hawk), a double rotor UAV, resembling a CH-47 miniature. It can be used to evacuate wounded soldiers from the battlefield, with a carrying capacity of 430 pounds with a flight time of approximately 2.5 hours²².



Figure no. 5: DP-14 Hawk autonomy system with medical evacuation capability²³

A medical extraction and evacuation system is the TAGS CX (Tactical Amphibious Ground Support system - Common Experiment) developed by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) Telemedicine. This system contains two autonomous vehicles: REX (a smaller robotic extraction vehicle for the extraction of the wounded military man and his transport to the first medical aid) and REV (robotic evacuation vehicle - an autonomy system for the long distance transport of the wounded soldiers starting from the first aid in to a specialized medical center)^{24 25}.



Figure no. 6: Robot extraction (REX) transporting the immobilized victim on a sled and (b) Robot Extraction (REX) and REV (robotic evacuation vehicle)²⁶

²² ***, "US Army Tests Dual-Rotor UAS for Casualty Evacuation", in *UAS Vision*, 3 April 2017, URL: <https://www.uasvision.com/2017/04/03/us-army-tests-dual-rotor-uas-for-casualty-evacuation/>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

²³ ***, "Fast, Agile Aerial Resupply, 430 Lbs Payload VTOL: No Runway Required", URL: <http://www.dragonflypictures.com/products/unmanned-vehicles/dp-14-hawk/>, accessed on 15.09.2019.

²⁴ Gary R. Gilbert, Michael K. Beebe, *Robotic Unmanned Systems for Combat Casualty Care*, RTO-MP-HFM-182, 2010.

²⁵ ***, *Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032*, Department of Defense USA, 2007.

²⁶ Jacob Rosen, Blak et. all, *Surgical Robotics: Systems Applications and Visions*, Springer 2011.

2.3. Autonomous systems for Trauma Life Support

During the transport of injured patients in critical condition between first aid points and specialized hospitals, potentially adverse events may occur. For this reason, adequate equipment and well-trained personnel can improve safety while transporting critically ill patients. For this reason, autonomous systems can appear as a solution. Thus appeared the LSTAT (Life Support for Trauma and Transport) system, a miniature intensive care unit with a self-contained, plain-type support designed by the United States Army to provide care to injured patients during transportation and in foreign areas where resources are limited. LSTAT contains conventional medical equipment that has been integrated into a single platform and small in size to fit the standard dimensions of a stretcher. This system is equivalent to conventional equipment for detecting and treating life-threatening problems (defibrillator, ventilator, oxygen, monitoring vital signs, blood chemistry analysis, drug infuser, data storage and transmission) as shown in the figure no. 7^{27 28 29}.




Figure no. 7: Autonomy system LSTAT (Life Support for Trauma and Transport) with the possibility of attaching to a NATO standard stretcher³⁰

CONCLUSIONS

Military medical applications of autonomous systems aim to reduce the exposure of human personnel to dangerous situations (medical military personnel are at significant risk when trying to provide first aid under enemy fire and have one of the highest rates of victims compared to any other military specialisation);

The use of autonomous systems limits the contamination of medical personnel in the NBC environments and provides the force multiplier for a limited medical capacity;

As possible applications, the autonomous systems can locate the injured military, extract and evacuate them in specialized medical centers with the care on the route during the transport of the patient.

²⁷ Johnson K, Pearce F, Westenskow D, et al., "Clinical evaluation of the Life Support for Trauma and Transport (LSTAT) platform", in *Critical Care*, Vol. 6, No.5, 2002, pp. 439–446.

²⁸ Gary Gilbert, Troy Turner, Ron Marchessault, "Army Medical Robotics Research", Army Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center, Fort Detrick, 2007.

²⁹ Richard M. Satava, "Robotic Surgery: of The Science for Today and Tomorrow", Mayo Surgical Symposium, The Mayo Clinic, Honolulu, February 10-11, 2007.

³⁰ Ken Johnson et al., "Clinical evaluation of the Life Support for Trauma and Transport (LSTAT™) platform", in *Critical Care*, Vol. 6, No. 5, October 2002.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Safe Ride Standards for Casualty Evacuation Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, NATO STO Technical Report TR-HAFM-184, December 2012.
2. ***, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032, Department of Defense USA, 2007.
3. ERGENE, Yigit, *Analysis of Unmanned Systems in Military Logistics, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, December 2016.*
4. HLAVÁČ, Václav; REINŠTEIN, Michael, *Robots Underpinning Future NATO Operations*, Sto Technical Report-Sas-097, Nato, Science and Technology Organization, 2014.
5. GILBERT, Gary R.; BEEBE, Michael K., *Robotic Unmanned Systems for Combat Casualty Care*, RTO-MP-HFM-182, 2010
6. SATAVA, Richard M., "Robotic Surgery: of The Science for Today and Tomorrow", Mayo Surgical Symposium, The Mayo Clinic, Honolulu, February 10-11, 2007.
7. FISHER, Nathan, *Unmanned Systems in Support of Future Medical Operations in Dense Urban Environments*, US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC), Telemedicine & Advance Technology Center (TATRC), April 22, 2016.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS OF UAV SYSTEMS

Eduard Grigore JELER, Ph.D.

Lieutenant Colonel, Lecturer, Military Technical Academy,
Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: eduard_jeler@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Various UAV models have proliferated around the world in the last decade, while technology has improved, allowing their greater use, both in the military, but also in the civilian sector. UAV systems present unique strategic challenges, which are relatively new to military planners. As for the civil sector, although they are at the beginning, there is an exponential increase in the areas of use. According to the NATO classification, the UAVs are classified according to their size, altitude, range and operational area divided into three basic groups based on these attributes. The varying sizes and ranges of different UAV models offer unique advantages and disadvantages to each group. The paper is an in-depth analysis of the military and non-military applications of UAVs, depending on the technical characteristics and the purpose of their deployment.*

Keywords: *UAV; GS; ISR; micro aerial vehicle; local area support vehicles; tactical area support vehicles; theatre area vehicles.*

INTRODUCTION

UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) is a type of aircraft operating without a human pilot on board. It can be remotely piloted with a remote control by an operator being on the ground or on another aircraft. Another method consist in having the flight independently controlled using the aircraft's equipment to implement pre-programmed flight plans¹. However, the flight's trend of UAVs tends to be autonomous instead of the more common manual control. For military theorists, UAVs can carry out "boring, dirty and dangerous" missions. The expression "boring" refers to the fact that UAV can supervise an area ten times larger than man would do, over a long period of time without intervening fatigue, boredom and decreased attention; "dirty" refers to the ability of a UAV to monitor NBC contaminated areas without endangering human life and ultimately, "dangerous" refers to suppressing enemy air defenses². However, the use of UAVs is not only met in military field. UAVs have a great utility in civil applications such as logistics, internal security, media, meteorology, etc.

1. Component elements of a UAV system

In order to understand the missions and to make a correct classification of the UAV systems, it is necessary to present its basic structure. In figure no. 1 are presented the basic components a UAV system (aircraft – UAV and GS – control station) must include and the relations between them and the environment.

¹ ***, Technopedia, URL: <https://www.techopedia.com/definition/29896/unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav>, accessed on 22.08.2019.

² ***, "Drones Doing the Dirty and Dangerous Jobs", Smithsonian National Airs and Space Museum, 28 November 2017, URL: <https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/drones-doing-dirty-and-dangerous-jobs>, accessed on 23.08.2019.




Figure no. 1: The main components of a UAV system and the flow of information between them³

The basic UAV system functions as an operating system and allows communication between components. It also controls the sensor, navigation, avionics and communications. It allows the integration of other optional components, such as special sensors (cameras with different capabilities. INS, GPS and radar) or weapon systems. The UAV sensor system consists of the UAV sensor equipment along with integrated pre-processing capabilities.

For most military UAVs, these sensors are often high resolution and IR cameras. Tactical-level UAVs can be equipped with additional sensors, such as GPS / INS, RADAR, weather sensors, NBC).

The avionics system is responsible for the conversion of the received control commands into controls of the engine, the devices, the rudder, the stabilizers. Communications systems are wireless and can be divided into LOS (line-of-sight) or SATCOM (satellite communication). Modern military UAVs are capable of operating autonomously and may be capable of owning and operating weapons.

Because UAVs are used in a variety of military and civilian applications, it is difficult to develop a single classification system that can be fit for all UAVs. Thus, we must distinguish between the applications based on the use of the military UAV: the military applications, the achievement of the mission, as well as the different UAV systems implemented for the latter and applications based on the use of the civilian UAVs, meaning the civil applications and the mission⁴.

³ Kim Hartmann, Christoph Steup, "The Vulnerability of UAVs to Cyber Attacks – An Approach to the Risk Assessment", in the *5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict*, 2013, Tallinn.

⁴ Gaurav Singhal, Babankumar Bansod, Lini Mathew, *Unmanned Aerial Vehicle classification, Applications and challenges: A Review*, Central Scientific Instruments Organization, Chandigarh, India, 2018.

2. Scope of UAV systems

2.1 Use of UAV systems for military purposes

The development of UAV systems led to the possibility that the armed forces could perform military operations in a more efficient and less risky manner than when the aircrafts were piloted by peoples. UAV systems are now bringing numerous ISR functions and tactical air support to the armed forces, providing real-time RSTA and new fire capabilities. They can be used in a conventional operation, on the advance line of their own troops or far beyond it, on flanks or in rear areas, as shown in figure no. 2. It can also be used in an unconventional war, such as the counter-insurgency operations.⁵




Figure no. 2: UAV specific missions in the battlefield⁶

Other key functions include laser illumination of targets designated to be hit, route and zone recognition, combat damage assessment, and communications relay. Planning for unmanned aircraft as an integrated element in combined weapon teams can be challenging, but essential^{7 8}. Figure no. 3 presents the main, but not all, military missions that can be executed by UAV systems from a military point of view.

⁵ David Glade, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations", Occasional Paper No. 16 Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base.

⁶ ***, Operational Concept Tactical UAV's in Concert with Other Means, URL: <https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/nato-uav-99/r-i-5/sld008.htm>, accessed on 24.08.2019.

⁷ "Standards Related Document ATP-3.3.7.1, UAS Tactical Pocket Guide", Edition A Version 1, Published by the NATO Standardization Agency, April 2014.

⁸ "Army Tactical Pocket Guide Organic/Non Organic Group 3/4/5 UAS" Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence (JUAS-COE), February 2010.




Figure no. 3: Possible military missions of UAV systems^{9, 10, 11, 12}

Each UAV mission requires a certain degree of flight planning, depending on aircraft size, altitude of operation, speed, mission profile and use of airspace. Different phases of the mission can be performed by staff / crew members (for example, take-off / landing or mission crew). Planners must provide instructions, objectives, tasks, etc. of the mission which are coordinated between crew to ensure understanding and success of the mission, as well as all space management controls¹³. Table 1 presents the NATO UAV classifications according to the general operating characteristics of the UAV.

⁹ Gheorghe Udeanu, Alexandra Dobrescu, Mihaela Oltean, "Unmanned aerial vehicle in military operations", in *Scientific Research and Education in the Air Force – Afases*, Brasov, 2016.

¹⁰ ***, *Standards Related Document ATP - 3.3.7.1, UAS Tactical Pocket Guide*, Edition A Version 1, Published by the NATO Standardization Agency April 2014.

¹¹ ***, "Army Tactical Pocket Guide Organic/Non Organic Group 3/4/5 UAS", Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence (JUAS-COE), February 2010.

¹² George D Friedrich, "Applications of military and non-military Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAV)", University of Applied Sciences Stralsund.

¹³ Róbert Szabolcsi, "UAV operator training – beyond minimum standards", in *Scientific Research and Education In The Air Force – AFASES*, Brasov, 2016.

Class	Category	Normal Employment	Normal Operating Altitude	Normal Mission Radius	Primary Supported Commander
Class III (> 600KG)	Strike/ Combat	Strategic / National	Up to 65.000 ft	Unlimited (BLOS)	Theatre
	HALE ¹	Strategic / National	Up to 65.000 ft	Unlimited (BLOS)	Theatre
	MALE ²	Operational / Theatre	Up to 45.000 ft MSL	Unlimited (BLOS)	JTF
Class II (150kg – 600kg)	Tactical	Tactical Formation	Up to 18.000 ft AGL	200 km (LOS)	Brigade
Class I (< 150 kg)	Small (>15kg)	Tactical Unit	Up to 5.000 ft AGL	50 km (LOS)	Regiment, Battalion
	Mini (<15 kg)	Tactical Sub – unit (manual or hand launch)	Up to 3.000 ft AGL	Up to 20 km (LOS)	Company, Platoon, Squad
	Micro (<66J)	Tactical Sub – unit (manual or hand launch)	Up to 200 ft AGL	Up to 5 km (LOS)	Platoon, Squad
1. High Altitude, Long Endurance 2. (Medium Altitude, Long Endurance)					

Table no. 1: NATO UAS Classification¹⁴

According to this classification, UAV can execute the following missions, presented in Figure no. 4.



MAVs - Microaerial vehicle - a type of mini UAVs used for surveillance, armed attacks, search and rescue operations, scientific research and transportation. MAVs are relatively smaller in size and weight than UAVs. Micro-aerial vehicles are defined by their physical dimensions, being no larger than 30 cm with a weight of up to 1 kg, and the payload of hundreds of grams. Therefore, they are very popular and suitable for military surveillance applications. They also have low noise and low production costs. Due to its small size, the probability of being intercepted by the radar is low. MAVs are controlled remotely or autonomously.



LASVs- Local area support vehicles - UAV systems generally used in "over-the-hill" surveillance missions, weighing up to 25 kg, and can carry a payload of up to 2.5 kg video camera. It can be carried in a backpack or on a land transport vehicle to support operations at crew or platoon level. They can be operated by one or two people manually or autonomously controlled.

¹⁴ ***, “Standards Related Document ATP-3.3.7.1, UAS Tactical Pocket Guide”, Edition A Version 1, Published by the NATO Standardization Agency April 2014.





Figure no. 4: Military UAV mission support^{15, 16}

2.2. Use of UAV systems for civilian purposes

As technology develops in the military, there will often be a transition in the civilian business world with similar but completely different technologies, with a wide range of uses. Depending on the market for these technologies, the business community can stimulate innovation and create better products which also have military applications¹⁷. Increased use of UAVs for military operations has unlocked new markets beyond military requirements for various civil and commercial applications. UAVs can be used in many civilian applications due to their ease of deployment, low maintenance costs, high mobility and ability to fly. Such vehicles are used for real-time monitoring of road traffic, providing wireless coverage, remote sensing, search and rescue operations, delivery of goods, security and surveillance, agriculture and civil infrastructure inspection. Now UAV applications can be divided into four sections, shown in figure no. 5¹⁸.



¹⁵ Dilek Funda Kurtulus, "Introduction to micro air vehicles: concepts, design and applications", in: ***, *Recent developments in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS, including UAV and MAV)*, Von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics, pp. 219-255.

¹⁶ Timothy H. Cox, "Civil UAV Capability Assessment", December 2004, URL: https://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/111761main_UAV_Capabilities_Assessment.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2019.

¹⁷ Stewart Smith, "Military and Civilian Drone Use (UAV, UAS). The future of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles", The Balance Careers, 25 June 2019, URL: <https://www.thebalancecareers.com/military-and-civilian-drone-use-4121099>, accessed on 28.08.2019.

¹⁸ Timothy H. Cox, *op. cit.*




Figure no. 5: Use of UAV systems in civil applications^{19, 20, 21, 22}

CONCLUSIONS

The main use of UAV systems in conflict zones is: reconnaissance and surveillance, enemy tracking and force protection (assuring our troops' safety and surroundings).

UAV systems can be used at any time to protect the lives of the military by operating them from distance. They are an excellent tool to help search for lost or wounded soldiers, as well as to have a real-time image of different missions and situations, allowing commanders to make better decisions regarding the allocation of resources.

UAV systems will continue to become smaller, lighter, quieter, with stronger batteries, high endurance, improved sensors and weapon systems; They are used in conflict zone where the army can avoid the risk of losing human lives.

¹⁹ Tomas Niedzielski, "Applications of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Geosciences: Introduction", in *Pure and Applied Geophysics*, vol. 175, 2018, pp. 3141–3144.

²⁰ ***, "Drones for Commercial Applications Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Filming & Entertainment, Mapping, Aerial Assessments, Prospecting, Data Collection, Disaster Relief, and Delivery: Global Market Analysis and Forecasts", Tractica, URL: <https://www.tractica.com/research/drones-for-commercial-applications>, accessed on 01.09.2019.

²¹ Aerial Land Management, monitoring and Conservation, URL: <http://www.landwatchconsultancy.com/aerial-land-management--monitoring-and-conservation.html>, accessed on 02.09.2019.

²² Victoria Moss, Delandria Jones, Sam Nwaneri, "Analysis of homeland security and economic survey using special missions unmanned aerial vehicle utilities", in *IEEE International Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium*, 2012.

In the civil industry: companies are already working on ways to use high-endurance drones to act as a mobile phone in areas without coverage or delivery platforms. They also have uses in: emergency services, automatic data collection for agriculture, animals and forestry, scientific research.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***"Eyes of the Army - U.S. Army Road Map for UAS 2010-2035", U.S. Army UAS Centre of Excellence, Fort Rucker, Alabama.
2. AUSTIN, Reg, *Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, Development and Deployment*, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, May 2010
3. BLOM, John David, "Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective, Combat Studies" Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
4. COX, Timothy H., "Civil UAV Capability Assessment", December 2004, URL: https://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/111761main_UAV_Capabilities_Assessment.pdf.
5. FRIEDRICH, George D, "Applications of military and non-military Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAV)", University of Applied Sciences Stralsund.
6. GERIN FAHLSTROM, Paul; Gleason, Thomas James, *Introduction to UAV Systems*, Fourth Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 29 August 2012.
7. GLADE, David, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations", Occasional Paper No. 16 Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base.
8. SMITH, Stewart, "Military and Civilian Drone Use (UAV, UAS). The future of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles", The Balance Careers, 25 June 2019, URL: <https://www.thebalancecareers.com/military-and-civilian-drone-use-4121099>.
9. SZABOLCSI, Róbert, "UAV operator training – beyond minimum standards", in Scientific Research and Education in The Air Force – AFASES, Brasov, 2016.
10. UDEANU, Gheorghe; DOBRESCU Alexandra; OLTEAN Mihaela, "Unmanned aerial vehicle in military operations", in Scientific Research and Education in the Air Force – Afases, Brasov, 2016.

INDEX OF AUTHORS

ANDRONIC Benoni, 249
ANGHEL Iulia, 118
ANTONESCU Mădălina, 308, 320
ATANASIU Mirela, 59
BADIU Teodor, 184
BODONI Cristina, 213
BOGZEANU Cristina, 131
CHIFU Iulian, 143
CHIORCEA Ion, 343
CONSTANTIN Diana-Monica, 235
COSTEA Cătălin Alin, 74
CRĂCIUNESCU Mara Sofia, 163
DIACONU Florin, 17
DINCĂ Cristiana Florentina, 225
DUȚU Daniel-Mihai, 184
ENESCU Simona, 203
HERCIU Alexandru, 332
IONESCU Lucia Elena, 249
JELER Eduard Grigore, 371, 379
LAVRIC Aurelian, 28
LUCINESCU Alexandru, 7
LUȚAI Raluca, 111
MANEA Sorina Ana, 195
MAREȘI Costinel Nicolae, 291, 300
MAȚOI Ecaterina, 235
MUREȘAN Doina, 97
NAHEED Iffat, 101
ORDEANU Viorel, 249
PALĂ Dragoș Ionuț, 171
PETRESCU Dan-Lucian, 279
POHAȚĂ Diana-Gabriela, 258, 269
RAFIQUE Shakaib, 41
SARCINSCHI Alexandra, 154
TOMA Valentin Marian, 343
TUDOR Ciprian Gabriel, 350, 362

“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING HOUSE

Director: Colonel Alin CRIVINEANU

The publications consists of 388 pages.

“Carol I” National Defence University Printing House

Panduri Street, no. 68-72, 5th district, Bucharest

E-mail: editura@unap.ro

Phone: 00-40-021-319.48.80/0215; 0453

“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
Highly appreciated publishing house in the field
of “Military science, intelligence and public order”
by the National Council for the Recognition of University
Degrees, Diplomas and certificates

ISSN 2668-6511

